

**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/540  
Appendix II/Vol.1  
31 August 1984

ENGLISH

---

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX II

VOLUME I

List and text of documents issued by the Conference on Disarmament

GE.84-65407



REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT  
 APPENDIX II  
 VOLUME I

List and text of Documents issued by the Conference  
 on Disarmament

| Document No.          | Title   |
|-----------------------|---|
| CD/8/Rev.2            | Rules of Procedure of the Conference on Disarmament   |
| CD/329/Rev.1          | Draft mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> (Subsidiary Body) on item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"  |
| CD/329/Rev.2          | Draft mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"  |
| CD/422                | Letter dated 8 December 1983 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of the statement made on 24 November by U.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR   |
| CD/423                | Letter dated 10 January 1984 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the texts of the declaration by the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Appeal by the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Parliaments of the countries of Asia and the Pacific dated 7 December 1983           |
| CD/424<br>CD/CW/WP.61 | Verification of chemical weapons stockpile destruction  |
| CD/425<br>CD/CW/WP.60 | Verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons   |
| CD/426<br>CD/CW/WP.62 | The prohibition of military preparations for use of chemical weapons  |
| CD/427                | Letter dated 30 January 1984 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the replies given by Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to questions from the newspaper <u>Pravda</u> , published on 25 January 1984 |
| CD/428*               | Letter dated 3 January 1984 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session   |
| CD/429                | Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 16 January-6 February 1984   |
| CD/430                | Nuclear Explosions 1945-1983  |
| CD/431                | Chemical weapons convention: Verification and Compliance - The challenge element  |

| Document No.          | Title   |
|-----------------------|---|
| CD/432                | Letter dated 30 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a report containing a description of an attack with chemical weapons in Piranshahr, Iran  |
| CD/433                | Agenda for the 1984 Session and programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament  |
| CD/434                | Organizational matters of the work of the Conference on Disarmament   |
| CD/435                | Improved effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons   |
| CD/436                | Letter dated 20 February 1984 from the Representatives of Mexico, Peru and Venezuela addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament  |
| CD/437                | Letter dated 23 February 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia transmitting a proposal of Warsaw Treaty Member States to the Member States of Nato on the question of freeing Europe from chemical weapons, presented at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 January 1984 |
| CD/438                | Draft mandate for the (ad hoc subsidiary body) on a nuclear test ban  |
| CD/439                | Working Paper. Proposals on "Prohibition of Transfer" and "Permitted Transfers" in a future CW agreement  |
| CD/440                | Decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons   |
| CD/441                | Decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons   |
| CD/442                | Decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on the comprehensive programme of disarmament   |
| CD/443<br>CD/CW/WP.68 | Proposals on major elements of a future convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons  |
| CD/444 <sup>*</sup>   | Letter dated 6 March 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting excerpts from the speech of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. K.U. Chernenko, delivered on 2 March 1984 to voters of Moscow's Kuibyshev district       |

| Document No.        | Title   |
|---------------------|---|
| CD/445              | Size and structure of a chemical disarmament inspectorate   |
| CD/446              | Decision on the designation of <u>ad hoc</u> subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament   |
| CD/447              | Letter dated 2 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament containing information on missile attacks and bombardments in both military and civilian areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran        |
| CD/448<br>and Add.1 | Letter dated 9 March 1984 from the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the Third Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group |
| CD/449              | Progress report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Seventeenth Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events  |
| CD/450              | Letter dated 9 December 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/451              | Letter dated 7 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/452              | Letter dated 10 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |
| CD/453              | Letter dated 7 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/454              | Letter dated 12 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |
| CD/455              | Letter dated 8 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |

| Document No. | Title   |
|--------------|---|
| CD/456       | Letter dated 17 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure |
| CD/457       | Letter dated 9 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/458       | Letter dated 17 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure      |
| CD/459       | Letter dated 7 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure       |
| CD/460       | Letter dated 27 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/461       | Letter dated 8 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |
| CD/462       | Letter dated 30 January 1984 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Austria addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure       |
| CD/463       | Letter dated 8 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure      |
| CD/464       | Letter dated 31 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure    |
| CD/465       | Letter dated 9 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure     |
| CD/466       | Letter dated 1 February 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure    |
| CD/467       | Letter dated 9 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure     |
| CD/468       | Letter dated 2 February 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure       |
| CD/469       | Letter dated 9 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure        |

| Document No. | Title   |
|--------------|---|
| CD/470       | Letter dated 7 February 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/471       | Letter dated 8 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |
| CD/472       | Letter dated 16 February 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/473       | Letter dated 8 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/474       | Letter dated 8 March 1984 from the Acting Chief of the the Permanent Mission of Switzerland addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |
| CD/475       | Letter dated 13 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of geographical terms in submissions to the Conference on Disarmament   |
| CD/476       | Letter dated 20 March 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, transmitting the text of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth |
| CD/477       | Letter dated 27 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Greece addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/478       | Letter dated 12 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Greece addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/479       | Letter dated 1 February 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |
| CD/480       | Letter dated 19 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |

| Document No.          | Title   |
|-----------------------|---|
| CD/481<br>and Corr.1  | Letter dated 23 March 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Polish People's Republic transmitting a peace appeal by the National Conference of Delegates of the Polish United Workers Party, adopted in Warsaw on 18 March 1984   |
| CD/482<br>CD/CW/WP.73 | Working Paper:National verification measures  |
| CD/483<br>CD/CW/WP.74 | Letter dated 20 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament containing proposals on some elements of a future convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons |
| CD/484'               | Prevention of nuclear war   |
| CD/485                | Letter dated 31 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Ecuador addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |
| CD/486                | Letter dated 9 February 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Ecuador addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |
| CD/487                | Letter dated 23 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Ecuador addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |
| CD/488                | Letter dated 24 February 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cameroon addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure   |
| CD/489                | Letter dated 23 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cameroon addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/490                | Letter dated 23 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure.  |
| CD/491                | Working Paper:Aspects of modern developments in seismic event recording techniques  |
| CD/492                | Draft mandate for the <u>ad hoc</u> subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban   |



| Document No.          | Title   |
|-----------------------|---|
| CD/493                | Letter dated 2 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of an appeal of the Romanian Parliament concerning the emplacement in Europe of intermediate range missiles  |
| CD/494<br>CD/CW/WP.79 | Elimination of stocks and of production facilities  |
| CD/495                | Letter dated 27 March 1984 from the Deputy Chief of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure  |
| CD/496                | Considerations on including a ban on the use of chemical weapons and the right of withdrawal in a future chemical weapons convention  |
| CD/497                | Letter dated 11 April 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the answers of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K.U. Chernenko, to questions of the newspaper "Pravda"   |
| CD/498                | Letter dated 16 April 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the letter dated 9 April 1984 addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, from the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, on questions of the limitation of military naval activities and naval armaments |
| CD/499                | Decision on the establishment of an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological Weapons   |
| CD/500                | Draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons   |
| CD/501                | Letter dated 25 April 1984 from the Head of the Hungarian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the communiqué of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Budapest on 19 and 20 April 1984   |
| CD/502                | Letter dated 5 June 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden enclosing a joint declaration issued on 22 May by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania   |
| CD/503                | Letter dated 5 June 1984 from the Representative of Peru, to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a communication addressed by Dr. Sandro Mariategui Chiappe, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, to Licenciado Bernardo Sepulveda, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, on 31 May 1984   |
| CD/504                | Letter dated 6 June 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the text of the Statement of the Soviet Government of 31 May 1984 in connection with the Joint Declaration of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania  |

| Document No. | Title   |
|--------------|---|
| CD/505       | Letter dated 12 June 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Finland, transmitting a document entitled "Technical evaluation of selected scientific methods for the verification of chemical disarmament"   |
| CD/506       | Programme of work for the second part of the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament  |
| CD/507       | Working Paper. Seismic verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban: Future directions  |
| CD/508       | Working Paper: Verification of a chemical weapons convention. Sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions  |
| CD/509       | Letter dated 13 June 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Norway transmitting a research report entitled "Verification of a chemical weapons convention. Sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions"   |
| CD/510       | Letter dated 16 June 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the answers by Mr. Konstantin Chernenko, General-Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to questions by a United States journalist, Mr. Joseph Kingsbury-Smith                                |
| CD/511       | Letter dated 13 June 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/512       | Letter dated 26 June 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the statement made by the spokesman for the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the Joint Declaration issued on 22 May by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania |
| CD/513       | Statement of the Group of 21  |
| CD/514       | Verification of non-production of chemical weapons  |
| CD/515       | Draft mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on item 3 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament   |
| CD/516       | The declaration and interim monitoring of chemical weapons stockpiles   |

| Document No. | Title   |
|--------------|---|
| CD/517       | Letter dated 4 July 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning rules 33 50 35 of the Rules of Procedure  |
| CD/518       | Verification of the destruction of chemical weapons   |
| CD/519       | Letter dated 16 July 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the response of His Excellency Seyyed Ali Khamenei, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to a message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations |
| CD/520       | Draft mandate for the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban   |
| CD/521       | Draft mandate for the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Subsidiary Body on item I of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Nuclear Test Ban"  |
| CD/522       | Draft mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on item I of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament submitted by a group of socialist States  |
| CD/523       | Draft mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on item 2 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament submitted by a group of socialist States  |
| CD/524       | Step-by-step approach to a comprehensive test ban   |
| CD/525       | Progress report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament  |
| CD/526       | Statement by the Group of 21 on item 2 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"   |
| CD/527       | Draft mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"   |
| CD/528       | List of documents relating to the items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, including documents of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC : 1962-1969); The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD : 1969-1978); The Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament (CD : 1979-1984)           |
| CD/529       | Draft mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, submitted by the group of socialist countries  |

| Document No.                   | Title  |
|--------------------------------|--|
| CD/530<br>CD/RW/WP.52          | Working Paper : Proposals for parts of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons and the release or dissemination of radioactive material for hostile purposes   |
| CD/531                         | Working Paper : Principles for the verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty   |
| CD/532<br>CD/CW/WP.84          | Working Paper submitted by a Group of socialist States: The organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee   |
| CD/533<br>and Corr.1<br>CD/534 | Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological Weapons  |
|                                | Letter dated 10 August 1984 from the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a paper entitled "Procedures for the GSE Technical Test (GSETT) 1984" adopted at the eighteenth session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group |
| CD/535                         | Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Eighteenth Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events  |
| CD/536                         | <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or report of use of nuclear weapons: Report to the Conference on Disarmament   |
| CD/537*                        | Letter dated 14 August 1984 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Denmark, transmitting a working paper on the verification of non-production of chemical weapons  |
| CD/538                         | Letter dated 17 August 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a Tass statement published in the Soviet press on 16 August 1984  |
| CD/539<br>and Corr.1           | Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament  |
| CD/540                         | Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly   |

## RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

### INTRODUCTION

These rules of procedure were adopted taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, including the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the Member States during that Session which the General Assembly welcomed in the Final Document.

#### I. Functions and Membership

1. The Conference on Disarmament (hereinafter referred to as the Conference) is a disarmament negotiating forum open to the nuclear weapons States and 35 other States (Annex I).
2. The membership of the Conference will be reviewed at regular intervals.
3. All Member States of the Conference shall take part in its work in conditions of full equality as independent States, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

#### II. Representation and Accreditation

4. The delegation of a Member State of the Conference shall consist of a head of delegation and other representatives, advisers, and experts, as may be required.
5. Each delegation shall be accredited by a letter on the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Member State, addressed to the President of the Conference.
6. The Delegations shall be seated following the English alphabetical list of membership.

#### III. Sessions

7. The Conference shall have an annual session divided into two parts. The first part shall begin on the first Tuesday in February. The Conference shall decide, as soon as practically possible, the opening date of the second part and the closing dates of both parts of its annual session taking into account the requirements of its work.
8. The President of the Conference, in full consultation with and with the agreement of all its Members, may convene the Conference in special session.

#### IV. Presidency

9. When the Conference is in session, the Presidency of the Conference shall rotate among all its members on the first day of the calendar month, a rotation which began in January 1979 following the English alphabetical list of membership.

10. If the head of the delegation which performs the function of President cannot be present, he may be replaced by a member of his delegation. If no member of the delegation holding the chair is able to perform the function of President, the delegation next in order of rotation shall temporarily assume this function.

11. Apart from exercising the normal functions of a presiding officer and in addition to the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these rules, the President shall, in full consultation with the Conference and under its authority, represent it in its relations with States, with the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations and with other international organizations.

12. During the period when the Conference is not in session the functions of the President shall be carried out by the representative of the Member State which presided over the last plenary meeting of the Conference.

#### V. Secretariat

13. At the request of the Conference the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Conference, will appoint the Secretary-General of the Conference, who shall also act as his personal representative, to assist the Conference and its President in organizing the business and time-tables of the Conference.

14. Under the authority of the Conference and its President, the Secretary-General shall, inter alia, assist in the preparation of both the provisional agenda of the Conference and the first draft of the reports of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

15. At the request of the Conference the Secretary-General shall provide professional assistance to the Conference by preparing background papers and bibliographies on issues which are the subject of negotiations in the Conference as well as by compiling data and information relevant to the conduct of negotiations.

16. The Secretary-General shall also perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these rules or by the Conference.

17. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will be requested to provide the staff as well as the necessary assistance and services needed by the Conference and any subsidiary bodies which it may establish.

#### VI. Conduct of Work and Adoption of Decisions

18. The Conference shall conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus.

#### VII. Organization of Work

19. The work of the Conference shall be conducted in plenary meetings, as well as under any additional arrangements agreed by the Conference, such as informal meetings with or without experts.

20. The Conference shall convene in plenary meetings in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon. These meetings shall be held in public unless the Conference decides otherwise. In the event that it is decided to hold a private meeting, the Conference shall also decide whether to issue a communiqué of the meeting. The communiqué shall adequately reflect the substance of the proceedings and decisions taken by the Conference.

21. If the Conference is unable to take a decision on the substance of an item under negotiation, it will consider the subsequent examination of that item.

22. The Conference may hold informal meetings, with or without experts, to consider as appropriate substantive matters as well as questions concerning its organization of work. When requested by the Conference, the Secretariat shall provide unofficial summaries of those meetings in the working languages.

23. Whenever the Conference deems it advisable for the effective performance of its functions, including when it appears that there is a basis to negotiate a draft treaty or other draft texts, the Conference may establish subsidiary bodies, such as ad hoc sub-committees, working groups, technical groups or groups of governmental experts, open to all Member States of the Conference unless the Conference decides otherwise. The Conference shall define the mandate for each of such subsidiary bodies and provide appropriate support for their work.

24. The Conference shall decide if its own rules of procedure may be adapted to the specific requirements of its subsidiary bodies. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies shall be informal unless the Conference decides otherwise. The Secretariat shall provide assistance to the subsidiary bodies, as requested, including the preparation of unofficial summaries of the subsidiary bodies' proceedings in the working languages of the Conference.

25. The approval by consensus of reports shall not be interpreted as affecting in any manner the essential requirement that such reports must reflect faithfully the positions of all the members of the respective organs.

26. The Conference and its subsidiary bodies shall normally meet at the Office of the United Nations at Geneva.

#### VIII. Agenda and Programme of Work

27. At the beginning of each annual session, the Conference shall adopt its agenda for the year. In doing so, the Conference shall take into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly, the proposals presented by Member States of the Conference and the decisions of the Conference.

28. On the basis of its agenda, the Conference, at the beginning of each part of its annual session, shall establish its programme of work, which will include a schedule of its activities for that part of the session, taking also into account the recommendations, proposals and decisions referred to in rule 27.

29. The provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the President of the Conference with the assistance of the Secretary-General and presented to the Conference for consideration and adoption.

30. The subject of statements made in plenary meetings will normally correspond to the topic then under discussion in accordance with the agreed programme of work. However, it is the right of any Member State of the Conference to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention.

31. While the work of the Conference is in progress Member States may request the inclusion of an urgent item in the agenda. The Conference shall decide whether and when it should be considered.

#### IX. Participation by States not members of the Conference

32. Representatives of non-member States shall have reserved seats in the conference room during plenary meetings and, if the Conference so decides, at other meetings.

33. Interested States not members of the Conference may submit to the Conference written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Conference and may participate in the discussion of the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents.

34. The Conference will invite States not members of the Conference, upon their request, to express views in the Conference when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion. Having considered such a request, the Conference will, through its President, transmit an invitation to that effect to the State or States concerned.

35. The Conference may also decide to invite the States referred to in rules 33 and 34 to participate in informal meetings and in meetings of its subsidiary bodies, in which case the procedure of rule 34 is applicable.

36. The provisions of rules 4 and 5 shall also apply to delegations of non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

#### X. Languages, Records and Documents

37. Simultaneous interpretation, verbatim records of public plenary meetings and documents shall be provided in the languages used within the United Nations system by Member States of the Conference participating in its work. Any representative may speak in his own language provided he makes available simultaneous interpretation into a working language.

38. Numbers shall be given in the order in which documents are received by the Secretariat. Check lists of all documents reproduced by the Secretariat shall be available from time to time.

39. Documents of the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the Committee on Disarmament (CD) series may be referred to without their re-submission.

40. Verbatim records and formal and other relevant documents of the Conference shall be distributed to States Members of the United Nations normally within two weeks. Official documents of the Conference will be made available for public use.



XI. Invitations to organs of the United Nations System

41. The Conference may decide to invite specialized agencies, the IAEA and other organs of the United Nations system to provide information as appropriate if the Conference decides that doing so would advance its work.

XII. Non-Governmental Organizations

42. All communications from non-governmental organizations to the Conference, to the President or to the Secretariat, shall be retained by the Secretariat and be made available to delegations upon request. A list of all such communications shall be circulated to the Conference.

XIII. Reports to the United Nations General Assembly

43. The Conference shall submit, through the President, reports to the United Nations General Assembly annually or more frequently as appropriate.

44. The drafts of such reports shall be prepared by the President of the Conference with the assistance of the Secretary-General and shall be made available to all Member States of the Conference for consideration at least two weeks before the scheduled date for their adoption.

45. The reports of the Conference shall be factual and reflect the negotiations and work of the Conference. Unless the Conference decides otherwise, the drafts shall contain:

(a) The agenda;

(b) A summary of specific requests addressed to the Conference by the United Nations General Assembly at its preceding regular session;

(c) Sectional headings in accordance with items comprised in (a) and (b) above and other matters raised in the Conference during the year;

(d) Conclusions and decisions;

(e) A table of contents and an index of verbatim records, by country and subject, of the period covered by the reports;

(f) Working papers and proposals submitted during the year;

(g) Verbatim records of the meetings held during the year, distributed as a separate annex;

(h) Other relevant documents.

46. The Conference shall adopt the annual report at the end of its session. This report shall be made available to all Member States of the United Nations before the opening of the regular sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. All other reports shall be circulated without delay.

XIV. Amendments

47. These rules of procedure may be amended by decision of the Conference.



ANNEX I

|                              |  |
|------------------------------|--|
| Algeria                      | Italy  |
| Argentina                    | Japan  |
| Australia                    | Kenya  |
| Belgium                      | Mexico   |
| Brazil                       | Mongolia   |
| Bulgaria                     | Morocco  |
| Burma                        | Netherlands  |
| Canada                       | Nigeria  |
| China                        | Pakistan   |
| Cuba                         | Peru   |
| Czechoslovakia               | Poland   |
| Egypt                        | Romania  |
| Ethiopia                     | Sri Lanka  |
| France                       | Sweden   |
| German Democratic Republic   | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics                  |
| Germany, Federal Republic of | United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
| Hungary                      | United States of America                             |
| India                        | Venezuela  |
| Indonesia                    | Yugoslavia   |
| Iran                         | Zaire  |



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/329/Rev.1

29 February 1984

Original English

---

## GROUP OF 21

Draft Mandate for Ad Hoc [Subsidiary body] on Item 5  
of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled

"PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE"

---

Reaffirming the principle that outer space -- the common heritage of mankind -- should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, and in order to prevent the extension of an arms race to outer space, and prohibit its use for hostile purposes, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc [subsidiary body] with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. The Ad Hoc [subsidiary body] will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament.



GROUP OF 21

Draft Mandate for Ad Hoc Committee on Item 5  
of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled  
"PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE"

---

Reaffirming the principle that outer space -- the common heritage of mankind -- should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, and in order to prevent the extension of an arms race to outer space, and prohibit its use for hostile purposes, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. The Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament.





**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/422  
8 December 1983  
ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

---

LETTER DATED 8 DECEMBER 1983 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE ON 24 NOVEMBER BY Y.V. ANDROPOV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

I have the honour to enclose the text of the statement made on 24 November by Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the statement circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. ISSRAELYAN  
Representative of the USSR in  
the Committee on Disarmament

GE.83-64355

Statement of Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and  
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

The leadership of the Soviet Union has already brought its evaluations of the militaristic policy of the present United States Administration to the notice of the Soviet people and of other peoples and has warned the Governments of the United States and of the Western countries siding with it about the dangerous consequences of such a policy.

But Washington, Bonn, London and Rome have not heeded the voice of reason. The deployment of United States medium-range missiles is beginning on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy. The appearance of United States Pershing and cruise missiles on the European continent is thus becoming an accomplished fact.

Europe has been living in peace for almost 40 years, longer than ever before in modern history. This has been possible because of the consistently peace-loving policy of the countries of the socialist community, the efforts of the continent's peace-loving forces and also the realistic position of sober-minded politicians in the West. The approximate balance of military forces, including nuclear forces, that has emerged in Europe between the States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty, has objectively served the cause of European security and stability.

Now, the United States and NATO as a whole are taking a step aimed at tipping the scales in their favour. The nuclear missiles that are being deployed near the borders of the Soviet Union and its allies are not intended for the defence of western Europe at all. No one is threatening it. What will grow with the deployment of United States missiles on European soil is not the security of Europe, but the real danger that the United States will bring down catastrophe upon the peoples of Europe.

During the two World Wars, the territory of the United States of America was spared the flames of destruction. Now, too, those in Washington would like to think that by deploying their medium-range missiles in Europe and thereby creating an additional nuclear threat to the socialist countries, they will succeed in diverting the retaliatory strike from their abode. As for the security of the west European allies of the United States, that would seem to interest the United States leaders only to the extent to which the west Europeans would be able, by their lives, by their cities, to lessen the retribution against the United States, should Washington give in to the temptation to unleash a nuclear war in the illusory hope of winning it.

The deployment of United States nuclear missiles in western Europe is by no means a step prompted by a reaction to some allegedly existing concern in the West about the present alignment of forces of the sides in Europe. It has repeatedly been demonstrated on the basis of concrete figures - and this is accepted by many political leaders and experts in the West - that at present a rough parity still exists in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as regards medium-range nuclear weapons, while NATO has a considerable edge in terms of nuclear warheads. Thus, if anybody has cause for concern, it is the Warsaw Pact countries, which are being threatened by the military machines of the NATO States.

Nor can the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, in evaluating all this, turn a blind eye to the fact that Washington has declared a "crusade" against socialism as a social system and that those who have now

issued the orders for the deployment of new nuclear arms on our doorstep are basing their practical policy on this foolhardy premise. It appears that, by deploying the Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, the Governments of a number of NATO countries would like to create a concrete nuclear-missile foundation for this adventurist premise.

Can the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries ignore this danger? No, they cannot. That is why the highest Party and State leaders of seven socialist countries declared at their meeting in Moscow on 28 June 1983 that under no circumstances would they permit military superiority of the NATO bloc over the countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

In confirming their consent to the deployment of United States missiles in their countries, the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy could not but have known that from the outset the United States did not want to reach a mutually-acceptable accord on nuclear arms in Europe and did everything at the talks in Geneva and elsewhere to prevent such an accord. Likewise, they could not but have known that the Soviet Union and its allies would necessarily take the required measures to safeguard their security and would not allow the United States and NATO as a whole to disrupt the existing rough balance of forces in Europe.

It was also clearly stated by us that the appearance of new United States missiles in western Europe would make impossible a continuation of the talks that were being conducted in Geneva on nuclear weapons in Europe.

The decisions taken during the past few days by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy show unequivocally that despite the will of their own peoples, despite the security interests of their countries and despite the interests of European and universal peace, those Governments have given the green light to the deployment of United States missiles. By so doing, they have assumed, together with the Government of the United States, the entire responsibility for the consequences of a short-sighted policy of which the Soviet Union warned in advance.

Having carefully weighed all the aspects of the situation, the Soviet leadership has taken the following decisions:

1. Since the United States has by its actions torpedoed the possibility of reaching a mutually-acceptable accord at the talks on questions of limiting nuclear arms in Europe, and since their continuation in such conditions would serve only as a cover for the actions of the United States and a number of other NATO countries aimed at undermining European and international security, the Soviet Union considers its further participation in those talks impossible.
2. The unilateral obligations assumed by the Soviet Union with the object of creating more favourable conditions for the success of the talks are cancelled. That in turn cancels the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR.
3. By agreement with the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the preparations begun some time ago, as was announced, for the deployment of extended-range operational-tactical missiles on the territory of those countries will be accelerated.

4. Since, by deploying its weapons in Europe, the United States is increasing the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, corresponding Soviet weapons will be deployed in the light of that circumstance in ocean areas and in seas. By their characteristics, these weapons will be commensurate with the threat which the United States missiles being deployed in Europe are creating for us and our allies.

It goes without saying that other measures, too, will be taken to ensure the security of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community.

As we begin to implement the decisions taken by us, we declare that the retaliatory measures from the Soviet side will be kept strictly within the limits that the actions of the NATO countries will dictate. The Soviet Union - and we stress this once again - is not striving for military superiority and we will do only what is absolutely necessary to prevent the military balance from being destroyed.

If the United States and the other NATO countries show readiness to return to the situation that existed before the commencement of the deployment of United States medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union will be prepared to do likewise. In that event, our earlier proposals with regard to limiting and reducing nuclear weapons in Europe would become valid again. In that case - that is, subject to the restoration of the former situation - the unilateral obligations of the USSR in this field would also become effective once more.

The Soviet Union declares most definitely and emphatically that it remains wedded to a policy of principle, that of ending the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, and of lessening and ultimately totally eliminating the threat of nuclear war. It will continue to exert every effort for the attainment of these lofty aims.

The Soviet Union, as before, advocates the most radical solution of the problems of nuclear arms in Europe. It repeats its proposal to make Europe entirely free of nuclear weapons, whether medium-range or tactical.

The Soviet leadership calls on the leaders of the United States and the States of western Europe to weigh once again all the consequences threatening their own peoples and the whole of humanity as a result of the implementation of the plans to deploy the new United States missiles in Europe.

We are already living in too fragile a world. That is why responsible statesmen must evaluate what is happening and adopt a rational solution. Human reason alone can and must save humanity from the grave danger threatening it. We call on those who are pushing the world along the path of the ever more dangerous arms race to abandon their unattainable hopes of thereby achieving military superiority in order to dictate their will to other peoples and States.

The Soviet Union is convinced that peace can be strengthened and the security of peoples guaranteed, not by constantly stockpiling and inventing new types of weapons, but rather by reducing existing armaments to immeasurably lower levels. Mankind has too many problems which are not being solved merely because colossal material, intellectual and other resources are being diverted. And in this respect, too, reaching agreements on a radical reduction of nuclear and other weapons would be a boon for all peoples.

The Soviet leadership declares that, in fulfilment of the will of the Soviet people, it will, in future also, do everything to avert the danger of war and to preserve peace for the present and succeeding generations.

---

**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/423

17 January 1984

ENGLISH

Original • RUSSIAN

---

LETTER DATED 10 JANUARY 1984 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF THE DECLARATION BY THE  
GREAT PEOPLE'S KHURAL OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE  
APPEAL BY THE GREAT PEOPLE'S KHURAL OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
TO THE PARLIAMENTS OF THE COUNTRIES OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC  
DATED 7 DECEMBER 1983

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the texts of the Declaration  
by the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Appeal  
by the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic to the  
Parliaments of the Countries of Asia and the Pacific dated 7 December 1983.

I should be grateful if you would circulate these documents as official  
documents of the Committee on Disarmament.

D. Erdembileg  
Ambassador

Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic

DECLARATION BY THE GREAT PEOPLE'S KHURAL OF THE  
MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, meeting in regular session, declares the following with regard to the commencement of the deployment of United States nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

The recently-commenced deployment in a number of West European countries of first-strike weapons in the form of United States medium-range nuclear missiles has led to the breakdown of the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of this type of weapon, unleashed a new and dangerous spiral in the arms race and increased the nuclear threat to the peoples of Europe and of the entire world.

This reckless step has been taken by the current United States Administration and a number of its NATO allies despite the clearly-expressed will of the peace-loving public of several continents and they bear the full responsibility for the sharp aggravation of the international situation. The most reactionary imperialist circles have set themselves the adventurist goal of striking a blow against true socialism, halting the advance of world development and achieving a dominant military-strategic position in the world.

Such attempts are, however, doomed to failure. This has repeatedly been emphasized in joint documents of the socialist community and in the statements made on 28 September and 24 November of this year by Comrade Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic fully approves and supports the basically firm and, at the same time, flexible approaches by the Soviet Government to the vitally important problem of the elimination of the threat of nuclear war that were expressed in the statements by Comrade Y.V. Andropov. We, as representatives of the Mongolian people and in expression of its will, declare our resolute support for the concrete measures being undertaken by the Soviet Union and other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to guarantee the security of their countries and of the entire socialist community and to maintain peace in Europe and throughout the world.

The deputies of the Great People's Khural also entirely support the position of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic with regard to this dangerous turn of events as expressed in repeated statements by Y. Tsedenbal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and Chairman of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural, particularly his statement at the seventh plenum of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

The Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic expresses the hope that reason will prevail and that international relations will revert to a course of détente and the quest for mutually acceptable agreements in the sphere of disarmament and ways of consolidating universal peace and the security and co-operation of peoples. The ball is in the West's court. The socialist countries' willingness to see such a change has been expressed repeatedly and demonstrated by concrete steps.

Ulan-Bator, 7 December 1983

APPEAL BY THE GREAT PEOPLE'S KHURAL OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLES REPUBLIC  
TO THE PARLIAMENTS OF THE COUNTRIES OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

We, the deputies of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian Peoples Republic, appeal to the Parliaments and parliamentarians of all countries of Asia and the Pacific resolutely to raise their authoritative voice in defence of peace and life on the planet and to take effective steps to prevent a nuclear disaster.

Having been entrusted by their electorates with the representation and defence of their vital interests, Parliaments and parliamentarians have a heavy responsibility for the happiness and well-being of the citizens of their States, for sparing them suffering and the horrors of war. That responsibility is particularly great at the current time, when forces hostile to peace and the progress of peoples are fomenting international tension with increased vigour, are working up the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, to unprecedented proportions and are thereby placing under a growing threat the first right of every people, the right to life and peace.

The present situation in the world in general and in a number of its regions is occasioning serious concern and anxiety among world public opinion and all peoples of goodwill.

The deployment of United States medium-range nuclear missiles which, the wishes of the peoples of Europe and of other continents notwithstanding, has already begun in a number of west European countries dangerously augments the menace of nuclear war. Its pernicious consequences pose an equal threat to life and civilization in all parts of our indivisible world.

United States imperialism is intensifying its aggressive schemes in Asia, drawing into the orbit of its military-political strategy anti-popular forces and the nascent militarism which has caused such suffering to many of the peoples of Asia.

The arms race is being transferred to that continent, forcing many of the countries there to expend for military purposes huge financial and human resources that are so necessary for resolving the acute socio-economic problems with which they are faced. The network of United States military bases and strong points in Asia is expanding and the United States military presence in that continent is growing. The deployment of the notorious first-strike weapons, the United States medium-range rockets, in the Far East and the Indian Ocean area represents a particular danger. The real risk that our continent will be transformed into a base for nuclear conflicts is growing.

As a result of the intrigues of the imperialist forces and their accomplices, the situation in the Near and Middle East, in the Far East and in South East Asia is growing far worse.

All this is contrary to the aspirations and national interests of peoples and countries and constitutes a direct threat to the cause of peace and security in Asia and throughout the world.

The course of events in the world requires of the public of all countries and continents the most resolute and selfless struggle for the elimination of the threat of war and the radical improvement of the political situation throughout the world. The most varied strata of world opinion, all peace-loving forces are currently engaged in this struggle.

The Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic declares that reliance on force and confrontation will in no way contribute to stability and peace in the world and that the only road to lasting peace lies through the securing of the peaceful co-existence of States, the maintenance and consolidation of détente, the achievement of effective agreements in the sphere of disarmament, the wide implementation of confidence-building measures and the strengthening of mutual understanding and co-operation among countries and peoples.

That is precisely what is firmly and consistently advocated by the socialist countries and by other peace-loving States. Those are precisely the goals of the constructive proposals and initiatives they have put forward.

We, the deputies of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, appeal to the parliamentarians of the countries of Asia and the Pacific, whose duty it is to discharge high State office in the genuine interest of their nations, to do everything they can to remove the nuclear threat hanging over humanity and to mobilize opinion in their countries to strive for the maintenance and consolidation of universal peace and against the conversion of the Asian continent into a base for nuclear missiles. There must be no repetition of the tragedies of the last war, of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the consequences of which in our age would be inconceivable.

The Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic appeals to the parliamentarians of the countries of Asia and the Pacific actively to join the anti-war and anti-nuclear movement of the masses, to add their efforts to the struggle of the most diverse strata of their countries' populations against the danger of war and, where necessary, to use their authority and influence to make that movement more active.

The parliamentarians of Mongolia express their willingness to join their efforts to those of the parliamentarians of the countries of Asia and the Pacific to stimulate the anti-war and anti-nuclear movement by participating in the organization of various international measures having as their goal the consolidation of peace and security in Asia and throughout the world. With this in mind, the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic has resolved at its present session to establish a group of Mongolian parliamentarians charged with maintaining active contacts with parliamentarians from other countries concerning the problems of the struggle for peace and against war.

The Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic expresses its firm conviction that the Parliaments and parliamentarians of the countries of Asia and the Pacific will make an active and positive contribution to the noble cause of maintaining international peace and security and developing mutually beneficial co-operation among all States.

Ulan-Bator, 7 December 1983



---

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
VERIFICATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

The United States delegation continues to attach great importance to efforts to find a common approach to verification of destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. To help accelerate this work the United States put forward, in July 1983, illustrative on-site inspection procedures in document CD/387.

To facilitate successful completion of the Committee's work on this issue in 1984 the United States invited delegations (CD/419, 23 August 1983) to visit its chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah. The purpose of the workshop, which was held on 15 and 16 November 1983, was to give delegations a first-hand look at the actual procedures used by the United States for destruction of chemical weapons and to provide a forum for discussion of various means of verifying destruction of chemical weapons. It was intended that the workshop should provide an opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion of all points of view regarding verification of destruction.

Forty-one representatives from 25 delegations, including eight Ambassadors, attended the workshop. In addition to briefings by United States experts, from Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands made presentations.

So that the briefings on the United States stockpile destruction programme and United States views on possible on-site verification procedures will be available to all delegations, the United States delegation is submitting them as an attachment<sup>1/</sup> to this document.

---

<sup>1/</sup> A limited distribution of the attachment to this document has been made to the members of the Committee on Disarmament. Additional copies can be obtained from the delegation of the United States of America.



---

Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons

SWEDEN

Verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons

Introduction

This Working Paper aims to analyse the need for continuous on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons at a destruction facility.

Views are given in the Appendix on actual and possible methods, including on-site inspection, to verify the destruction of chemical weapons at the present CAMDS (Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System) facility in Utah, United States of America, as it was presented in the Working Paper CD/387 and during the recent visit to the site (15 and 16 November 1983) by representatives of Delegations to the Committee on Disarmament. The comments thereafter concern the possibilities of improving the present arrangements from the verification point of view, given the same facility. Last, some suggestions are presented for the design of a more efficient verification system in the future based on the same destruction methods as those now used in CAMDS.

No attempts are made to analyse the verification needs for a destruction process on a smaller scale like the one now operating in the Federal Republic of Germany (CD/CW/CTC.18) or the one which operated in Indonesia in 1979 (CD/270).

The conclusions drawn from the analysis given in the Appendix, are presented below in the working paper proper.

Finally, on the basis of these conclusions some proposals for the future approach to the problem are presented.

Conclusions drawn from the analysis in the Appendix

With respect to the need for on-site inspections for verification purposes during the destruction of chemical weapons, some tentative conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the study of the CAMDS facility.'

1. As already pointed out in a previous Swedish analysis, CD/325, on-site inspections would be necessary during the construction of a destruction facility as well as after the termination of the destruction activities.
2. If a destruction facility has been designed without taking into account special requirements for enabling verification, the continuous on-site presence of an international inspection team would be necessary.
3. Such a facility can be modified to allow verification by means of a combination of monitoring equipment and occasional on-site inspections. However, there might be a certain, although small, risk that impermissible activities at the facilities would remain undetected by the verification procedure.
4. If the need for verification is taken into consideration when the facility is being designed, more reliable arrangements can be made. The risk for undetected impermissible activities might then be reduced to a very low level.
5. If a very high degree of confidence in the verification methods is considered necessary further technical work is needed in order to improve the reliability of the process monitoring equipment in order to eliminate the need for continuous on-site presence of inspectors.
6. Even if extensive remote monitoring is available, on-site visits are necessary during the destruction period in order to verify the functioning of the monitoring, data acquisition and data transmission equipment. Furthermore, the presence of inspectors during certain types of maintenance or repair work seems to be desirable.

#### General remarks and suggestions

The technical analysis made in the Appendix is undertaken because of the different views on the question on the necessity of having international continuous on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons in order to ensure that the convention is complied with in this respect, or, if a combination of continuously monitoring technical remote-sensing methods and on-site inspections at the international level might be sufficient. There is no question that the national authorities undertaking the destruction will have full knowledge of the actual state of affairs at the destruction site. The analysis also assumes that corresponding national information will be delivered to the international verification authority (the Consultative Committee or its suborgans), so that it can be matched against the data obtained independently from international inspectors and monitoring equipment.

The analysis does not consider the problem of whether attempts to evade the verification system of a convention is more successfully tried within the destruction process rather than e.g. with respect to the possibility of concealing stockpiles. On a preliminary basis it would seem to be more rational to conceal stockpiles than to try to fake a complicated destruction process at a high risk of being exposed, the more so if some stockpiles were already well concealed from the beginning. If such an intuitive feeling is confirmed in a more stringent analysis, this condition should be taken into account, when the balance between continuous on-site inspection and technical monitoring, is to be decided.

There does not seem to be much point in making an analysis of which methods of verification would be most effective at the least cost. It may also very well be that the difference between keeping international inspectors continuously on-site, on the one hand, and the investment and operation of remote sensing equipment on the other, would not be very large. It might be worthwhile, however, to consider whether a combination of the two methods would incur lower costs than the sum of the costs for the two methods separately, or perhaps even be less than for one of them, provided that the costs for one of them is considerably higher than for the other.

As can be seen from the Conclusions it seems technically possible to bring about a combination of international continuous technical monitoring and occasional on-site inspection creating a high degree of confidence in the proper execution of the destruction process. This would not of course give 100 per cent certainty. As a matter of fact, this would not be the case even if continuous on-site inspection was carried out. The human factor can never be disregarded.

This technical basis could be utilized in order to achieve a compromise on the design of the international verification system for the destruction of chemical weapons. Thus, it contains two important political elements it would guarantee a continuous monitoring of the destruction process with the least possible on-site presence of international observers

With the above consideration in mind the following structure for an international verification regime for the destruction of chemical weapons could be outlined

1. International on-site inspection is carried out before starting the destruction facility in order to check that the facility is built according to declared and submitted plans and drawings, and that the monitoring equipment is functioning properly.

2. International on-site inspection is undertaken at the start of the destruction process in order to check the monitoring process and compare the results with those obtained and submitted to the Consultative Committee by the national operating team.
3. International inspectors should have the right to visit the facility when larger and longer operational stops have to be made, in order to follow repair or maintenance processes. In addition a number of agreed but unscheduled visits should be made by the inspectors each year.
4. Data produced by the remote-sensing equipment should be transmitted to the Consultative Committee over tamperproof communication networks, as well as be stored on chips at the site, where they could be checked by visiting inspectors. Also data from the national operational team should be transmitted to the Consultative Committee in the same way. The log-books should be made available to the international inspectors at their visits.
5. When work at the facility is finished, international inspectors should follow the destruction of the facility, or its conversion for other destruction purposes during an initial phase, ensuring that no unauthorized changes have appeared in its construction during the destruction period.

## Appendix

### THE PRESENT CAMDS FACILITY

#### Generation of measurement data which can be used for verification purposes

Data are generated by a continuous control of the material flow and the incineration process. Thus, it is possible to verify the quantity, identity and purity of the material that is to be destroyed. Data from each sensor are transmitted to a data collection centre in the control room, where compilation, registration and storage on magnetic tape is carried out.

#### In situ incineration

In this method, storage containers and munition (after removal of fuses and explosive charges) are heated in a volatilization chamber. The toxic chemical is vaporized and transferred, by means of an inert gas flow, into the incineration furnace, which operated in two steps, including a primary fume burner and an after burner. Metal parts from munition and containers are decontaminated by heating to high temperatures. Key parameters in the incineration process which should be monitored and registered are temperature, pressure and gas flow.

#### Quantity

The establishment of a material balance, i.e. monitoring the quantities of material entering and leaving the process, will assist in verifying that all material is actually destroyed.

The quantity of material destroyed can be ascertained by a count of the number of munition pieces and containers and by weighing them before and after the vaporization of the toxic chemical. Data thus obtained can be compared with estimates based upon initial declarations. All weighing operations are subject to TV surveillance.

The exhaust gases from the incineration furnace are passed through a wet packed-bed scrubber. To establish the end products, samples are drawn from the scrubber solution and analysed.

#### Identity and purity

Before material is introduced into the volatilization chamber, samples of the agent are drawn for chemical analysis by gas chromatography and infra-red spectrophotometry. The sampling process is monitored by television. Samples are also taken from the salt residue remaining after evaporation of the scrubber solution. The actual analytical results are compared with data calculated on the basis of the quantities of toxic chemicals estimated to be present in the munition subjected to destruction.

#### Injection incineration

Compared to the in situ method, the injection incineration method offers better opportunities for verification. The contents of the chemical munition are

transferred to a storage tank, from which the liquid CW agent can be pumped into the incineration furnace, in which it is vaporized and incinerated. During the incineration process, the same parameters are monitored as in the in situ process. The empty munition pieces or storage containers are decontaminated by heating. The exhaust gases are subjected to the same purification steps as in the in situ process, and similar methods are used for establishing quantity, identity and purity.

#### Quantity

By monitoring the mass flow at a point close to the inlet to the incineration furnace, the quantity of toxic chemical to be destroyed can be established. If a reliable mass flow determination is impossible, munition pieces and storage containers must be weighed before and after withdrawal of the toxic chemical. After evaporation of the scrubber solution, the remaining salt residue is weighed.

#### Identity and purity

Samples drawn from the material to be destroyed are analysed by gas chromatography and infra-red spectrometry. The scrubber solution salt residue is analysed for the presence of relevant elements.

#### Need for on-site inspection

The monitoring operations described above provide data which can assist in verifying the destruction of toxic chemicals. However, today's sensor systems are not reliable enough to make inspections at regular, pre-determined intervals alone sufficient. Furthermore, there is a certain risk that the data generated can be manipulated. Consequently, the continuous presence of some form of inspection team is necessary for monitoring maintenance, repair and calibration activities. The high frequency of process interruptions at CAMDS emphasizes this need for continuous on-site inspection.

POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE CHEMICAL AGENT MUNITIONS  
DISPOSAL SYSTEM (CAMDS) REGARDING VERIFICATION NEEDS

#### In situ incineration

##### Quantity

Today the quantity of the materials destroyed is confirmed by counting and weighing the items before and after destruction. It is fairly easy to manipulate weighing and there is no redundancy in the system. By incorporating a continuous measurement after the scrubber of the quantity and identity of the destruction end products it should be possible to verify that the amount of waste material corresponds to the amount of agent which has been introduced into the incinerator.



### Identity and purity

At present, sampling is done by pumping the agent in a loop from the munition via the instruments (IR, GC) and then back to the munition. The instrument readings do not confirm that a new sample actually has been analysed, i.e. if the pump is out of order, or if the same sample has been recirculated.

To verify that there really is a flow of sample, a flow meter should be inserted in the sample line. To prevent recirculation of the same sample the sample line could be drained directly into the furnace.

The infra-red instrument and the gas chromatograph separately are probably sufficient to verify identity and quantity, but a simultaneous analysis with both instruments would raise the level of reliability. To minimize disturbances from instrument malfunctions, change of columns, calibrations etc. there should be two gas chromatographs and it should also be possible to change between different infra-red cells.

### Injection method incineration

#### Quantity

In the present facility the number of projectiles is counted before and after the furnace and the amount of agent which is fed into the furnace is monitored with a flow meter before the furnace. This is hardly enough for verification. By continuous analysis of the destruction products, in the same way as mentioned above, it would be possible to achieve improved reliability.

Still better redundancy could be achieved by two holding tanks. Thus, the filling and draining of one tank at the same time would not be necessary. It would then be possible to measure the flow to, and the level in, the tank both when the tank is filled and when it is empty.

#### Identity and purity

The instruments have the same drawbacks as in the in situ method and it is therefore desirable to have two gas chromatographs and the ability to change between infra-red cells. The sampling as well as the flow measurements should be done as close to the injection point as possible and could in principle be done continuously. If there are two holding tanks the demand for continuous analysis before the injection point is less, since it will be possible to make an analysis of the entire contents of the tank before draining.

Temperature, flow and other sensors that are used for process control and regulation can also be duplicated and the output be used for verification purposes.

It should also be possible to make all the sensors tamper-proof.

With the proposed modifications and with a reliable data transfer to a central inspectorate the need for continuous on-site inspection would be reduced considerably. However, when the measurement system is subjected to, for example, a change of sensors, GC-columns and to certain calibrations, there will still be a need for some kind of visual on-site inspection.

In our opinion, it is impossible to construct a completely reliable control system which does not require any presence of inspectors. What could possibly be achieved is a system in which any attempted manipulation is likely to be discovered.

## A HYPOTHETICAL DESTRUCTION FACILITY

It is assumed that verification procedures are to be applied to an incineration method based on the same general principles as the injection-method incineration described above. The agent would be processed through a two-step fume burner - primary burner - and the destruction products through a scrubbing system.

To be able to solve the verification task properly procedures have to be developed by which the mass flow can be quantified: munition of all types, bulk containers and agents entering the furnace system, and destruction products removed from the furnace system. To minimize the need for inspection and the possibility of manipulation, the sensors should be placed as near as possible to the incineration furnace

### Process design

In order to get a highly reliable control of the quantity of chemical weapons and storage containers processed through the incineration furnace, munition and containers must be counted, inspected and the agent removed. Thus, the agent should be drained into at least two agent-holding tanks. The tanks must be separate from each other. The homogeneous liquid, with known identity and purity, is pumped from each holding tank to the incinerator furnace. It is important that the filling and emptying of the holding tanks can be done independently. When one tank is being filled, liquid is pumped to the furnace from the other tank and vice versa

With two or more holding tanks it is easier to establish mass balances for the incineration step. The amount per hour of active substance and possible impurities fed to the incinerator can be measured very accurately and with a high level of reliability

Because some of the destruction products (containing P, F, Cl and S) in the flue gases are absorbed almost quantitatively in the scrubber liquid, it is possible to set up mass balances for some of these key elements. This method for confirming the complete destruction would be very effective

### Sampling methods for qualitative and quantitative analysis of agent

The selection of method is a vital step in the solution of this analytical problem. For the qualitative analysis IR (possibly GC, GC-MS or NMR) and for the quantitative analysis GC (possibly IR) have been considered to be the best choice. The methods chosen are unfortunately not without their problems. Both liquid and solid pollutants add greatly to the difficulties and will interfere with the analysis.

1. Random samples are collected from munition and storage containers before removal of the agent. The qualitative and quantitative analyses will confirm the identity and also give information on possible impurities.
2. When liquid is pumped from one of the holding tanks to the furnace, samples are taken continuously from the pumping line for qualitative and quantitative analysis.
3. Samples are collected continuously from the bleed scrubber solution for qualitative and quantitative analysis of certain key elements, e.g. P, F and S.

#### Measurement of weight and flow

A combination of separate methods for measuring agent weight and flow to the incinerator furnace could ensure more reliable data.

1. The tared transporter trays are loaded with agents and the total weight is determined. After the agent has been removed, the quantity of substance could be determined by renewed weighings before and after passage through the metal parts furnace.
2. The amount of liquid transferred from munitions, etc., to the holding tanks should be measured continuously using at least two independent methods, e.g. load cells on the holding tank legs and level indicators inside the holding tanks.
3. When the liquid has been transferred from a holding tank to the furnace, the amount could be measured using the same equipment as in 2. The quantity of agent could also be determined by means of a flowmeter positioned near the inlet to the incinerator furnace.

#### Plant instrument system and process control

It is presumed that the plant instrument system and process control will be based on sophisticated microprocessor/computer systems. These systems would be vital for the functioning of the facility. However, appropriate verification procedures require that the plant instruments system must be supplemented with further instruments and control system.

For instance a tamper-proof computer is needed for collecting and analysing data, for the storage of data and for handling the information flow on-site and via the international communication system.

Today's improved performance and reliability of microprocessor/computer based systems have in fact greatly increased the reliability of the monitoring equipment itself.

If a circuit card failure should occur, it must be possible for the microprocessor/computer to connect up immediately with a second (duplicated) card without disturbing the instrument or the process. Recently, a microprocessor-based device for measuring and transmitting differential, gauge or absolute pressure has been presented. Using such an instrument it is possible to remotely control parameters, diagnose transmitter performance and display the pressure digitally. The development of other new instruments can be expected in the future.

#### Comments

Provided that the development of new microprocessor-based actuators continues, it should be possible to construct tamper-proof sensors without moving parts for measurement of pressure, temperature, weight etc that require no calibration. It might also be possible to monitor the status of the sensors by means of special control loops. A control signal could be initiated irregularly from a remote location. It should thus be possible to develop a high performance system with built-in redundancy.

However, actuators and instruments with moving parts will probably be more susceptible to disturbances and will therefore require more frequent maintenance. Such instruments are e.g. infra-red spectrophotometers, gas chromatographs, MNR spectrometers, etc. The need for on-site inspection will greatly depend upon the performance of the instruments used for quantitative and qualitative analysis of the agents to be destroyed.



---

SwedenThe Prohibition of Military Preparations for Use of Chemical Weapons

Since 1971 Sweden has argued that a prohibition to prepare for the use of chemical weapons would be an essential element of a convention banning chemical weapons. Such preparations were initially referred to as measures aimed at acquiring or retaining a chemical warfare capability, later expressed as planning organization and training for use of chemical weapons. Protective activities alone would not be covered by a prohibition on preparations for use, unless specifically identified and agreed upon.

Reasons for prohibition

The Swedish delegation has presented concepts and suggested treaty language on the subject, inter alia, in the following documents: CD/97, 24 April 1980: Working Paper on the Prohibition of Chemical Warfare Capability, CD/142, 10 February 1981: Prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons (with four annexes), and in the Conference Room Paper CD/CW/WP/CRP 29, 15 March 1982: Abolition and non-acquisition of a chemical warfare capability after destruction of chemical weapons. The documents mentioned and various Swedish statements give a comprehensive account of these ideas. The main aspects are repeated below.

According to our present assessment a chemical weapons convention will most likely contain a prohibition of use of chemical weapons. Thus the Swedish delegation finds it logical that a prohibition of preparation for use also be included in the convention. A prohibition of preparation would support the use ban and could also serve to build confidence in this connection.

A prohibition would cover such activities as planning for use as well as organization and training of troops for the purpose of using chemical weapons. Preparations for acquiring capacity for use of chemical weapons are more time consuming than for instance the production and deployment of such weapons. Without restrictions with regard to preparations those countries, which now have chemical weapons, would have little difficulty in maintaining chemical warfare capability on a rather short notice, not only as long as their stocks of chemical weapons were not completely destroyed, but also for a considerable time thereafter.

In the absence of a prohibition of preparations for use a party to a chemical weapons convention could, after a withdrawal from the convention, fastly acquire a full chemical warfare capability, if adequate preparation had been done in advance.

It must probably be accepted that the parties which now have chemical weapons would reserve their capability of retaliation under a part of the 10-year destruction period that seems to be needed under a convention. However, after some time, such a capacity could be considered neither indispensable nor acceptable.

If a prohibition of preparations for use were not included in a convention, it would be difficult to raise legal objections against a party making such preparations. The compliance procedure of the convention could probably not be called upon for the purpose of clarifying matters in this respect. The convention would be strengthened if an explicit ban on preparations for use of chemical weapons were included, not least due to the confidence building character of such a measure.

The Swedish delegation has noted with appreciation that its views have won increased understanding and support during the years. On the other hand, our suggestions have also been met with objections even if nobody has actually denied the importance of our suggestions.

#### Objections against the prohibition

One objection is that the suggested prohibition would not be needed once the weapons had been destroyed. However, such a prohibition would nevertheless be - important because of the fact that the main bottleneck in obtaining a chemical warfare capability depends on the difficulty in the preparation and training of the armed forces in the use of chemical weapons rather than in the acquisition of the chemical weapons themselves.

It has also been said that a prohibition on preparations to use chemical weapons would not be possible to verify, and accordingly could not be included in the scope. However, it is not the question of verification in its more limited sense which is of primary importance, but the possibility to invoke the whole clarification and complaints procedure under the convention. This would not be possible, if the issue was not covered in the scope. With regard to the confidence building character of the suggested prohibition the early links of the complaints procedure would be the most important. Verification by challenge should occur only as a last resort, when reasons therefor occur to any party.

Other arguments against the proposal have dwelt upon the difficulties to decide more precisely which preparations should be prohibited. This is true to some extent. When the Swedish delegation made its suggestions in CRP.29 it seemed probable that a ban on use of chemical weapons would not be included in the convention. If this should be the case there would perhaps be a need of specifying which preparations should be prohibited. Today however the delegation finds it highly probable that a ban on use will be included. As mentioned above, it would be logical to include also a ban on preparations which, if observed, would strengthen the regime of the convention and generally serve as a confidence building measure. The actual prohibition could be easily expressed in the scope, e.g. by "prohibiting preparations to use chemical weapons".

#### Proposal

In order to have our views, as presented above, on the prohibition of preparations for use adequately covered, the Swedish delegation proposes that the formulations presented in the annex to this Working Paper be added to CD/416 or the appropriate ensuing report on the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.



Annex

Additions to CD/416, Annex I, suggested by the delegation of Sweden

To I A 2 a new (e) (existing (e) turns into (f))

An undertaking not to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons.

To III a new A No military preparations for use

The parties to the convention, undertaking not to engage in military preparations for the prohibited use of chemical weapons, agree

(1) that medical and physical protection of military forces and civilian populations against the toxic effects of an adversary's use of chemical weapons shall not be covered by the undertaking in Article .

(2) to declare, not later than ( ) year(s) after the entry into force of the convention, that such preparations have ceased. Military orders shall be issued to ensure cessation of such preparations and halt their continuation. These orders shall immediately be communicated to the Consultative Committee. A party, having declared non-possession of chemical weapons and not being involved in preparations for use, undertakes to declare that such preparations do not exist.



COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/427

31 January 1984

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

---

LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1984 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE REPLIES GIVEN BY Y.V. ANDROPOV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, TO QUESTIONS FROM THE NEWSPAPER PRAVDA, PUBLISHED ON 25 JANUARY 1984

I enclose the replies given by Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to questions from the newspaper Pravda, published on 25 January 1984.

I should be grateful if you would have this text circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. Issraelyan

REPLIES GIVEN BY MR. Y.V. ANDROPOV TO QUESTIONS  
FROM THE NEWSPAPER PRAVDA

Question Leading circles in the United States and NATO have recently been asserting that nothing alarming is happening in the international situation and that in general at present supposedly "the world has become a safer place". Is this so?

Answer This conclusion is groundless. The main causes of the dangerous tension in the world, of which I have already had occasion to speak, have not been eliminated. Has Europe become safer with the beginning of the deployment of American missiles? Of course not. The nuclear threat has increased. This is not our view alone. The acute anxiety of millions of people in Europe clearly points to this. Nor have the American missiles on the continent of Europe strengthened the security of the United States itself. By deciding to tilt the military balance in its favour, the United States has forced us to take measures in reply.

The appearance of the American missiles in Europe has increased not only military but also political tension. The talks aimed at the limitation and substantial reduction of nuclear weapons have been broken off. Relations between States have entered a phase of dangerous tension.

The leaders of the United States, the American administration, bear full responsibility for this turn of events, as do the governments of NATO countries which accepted American missiles on their territory against the will of their own peoples.

Has the world become a safer place because of the fact that in the Middle East American soldiers are now fighting side by side with the Israeli aggressor against the Arabs, and United States war ships and aircraft are reducing Lebanese towns and settlements to rubble?

The situation is also tense in Central America, where the United States administration is encroaching on the independence of sovereign States. Those who contend that supposedly "nothing dangerous is happening" in the world also apparently wish to erase the memory of American aggression against Grenada. Clearly, the United States wants to break the power of the people and restore by force of arms the odious dictators who are its protegés. In the White House this is customarily called a "struggle for human rights". It is impossible to imagine anything more cynical.

Imperialist brigandage is also perpetrated in other areas of the world. This is the real situation. It is acute and dangerous. It is unacceptable to display an underestimation of it.

The question therefore arises, why do the American leaders deliberately misrepresent the current world situation in their statements? First of all, in order to try to dispel the concern of the peoples, which is growing daily greater, over Washington's militaristic policy and beat back the rising tide of opposition to that policy.

The fact that people everywhere are better realizing the danger to peace, and where that danger comes from, is unquestionably of great significance. The struggle of millions of people for peace is another objective reality of our time.

Question The President of the United States recently spoke in favour of a Soviet-American dialogue. In his speech it sounded as follows "strength and dialogue go hand in hand". What is your attitude to this?

Answer. We do not need to be convinced of the usefulness and advisability of dialogue. That is our policy. But a dialogue must be carried out between equals, and not from a position of strength, as proposed by President Reagan. And a dialogue should not exist just for the sake of dialogue. It should be aimed at achieving concrete accords. It should be conducted honestly and no attempt should be made to use it for selfish aims.

Everything indicates that the American leadership has not given up its intentions of conducting talks with us from positions of strength, from positions of threats and pressure, we firmly reject this approach. In general, attempts to use "strong-arm diplomacy" with us are doomed to failure.

This is precisely the view we take of the idea of holding talks for the sake of talks. Unfortunately, we have already encountered such an approach on the part of the present United States administration. I should like to remind you of the Geneva talks on European medium-range nuclear weapons. It is today an open secret that for almost two years the United States representatives in Geneva have been merely going through the motions, so to speak. At the same time in Washington they were preparing for the practical deployment in Western Europe of new first-strike nuclear missiles.

We had repeatedly warned what this would lead to. The American side itself broke off the Geneva negotiations and caused great damage to the dialogue between the USSR and the United States. Now the President of the United States is saying that the United States is allegedly ready to resume the talks and return to Geneva.

One may ask, is it perhaps that the American side has realized what it has done and, desiring a dialogue, is prepared to change its negative approach? No, this has not occurred. The President's speech does not contain a single new idea or any new proposals either for the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe or on other questions. Nothing of the kind can be seen in the American position.

I have already said, and I should like to repeat, that we are ready to use any genuine chance for conducting talks in order to achieve practical agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. But we will not go to talks for the sake of talks, and we will not pretend that in Western Europe there are no new missiles targetted on us and our allies. We will not play at that game.

At the same time, I wish to confirm that the Soviet Union is prepared to solve the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe only on a constructive, mutually acceptable basis. This requires only one thing before it is too late, the United States and NATO should display readiness to return to the situation which existed prior to the commencement of the deployment of the Pershing-II and Cruise missiles. We are putting this to the United States and its NATO allies because we want to avoid yet another spiral of the arms race, this time on a new and still more dangerous level, which leads to a growth of tension and instability in Europe.

It is on the basis of practical deeds that we will judge whether the United States seriously intends to conduct a dialogue with us.

Question What other problems could become a subject of dialogue?

Answer The Soviet leadership is convinced that possibilities exist for a serious discussion of a number of problems, the solution of which would undoubtedly improve the situation in the world and Soviet-American relations. We have put forward a wide-ranging set of concrete proposals and initiatives directed at strengthening peace and international security. They are still on the table.

For instance, if the United States assumed the obligation, as the Soviet Union has done, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, this would already have a substantial influence on the international climate, on the atmosphere of our relations. What would this mean in practice? That the two most powerful nuclear-weapon Powers refuse to use nuclear arms against each other. This means that there will be neither a first nor subsequent nuclear strike.

If the NATO countries agreed to the proposal of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty not to use military force against each other, this too would significantly raise the degree of trust in Europe and throughout the world. In practice, this would mean that the opposing military groupings renounce the use of force for the settlement of disputes that arise. A broad vista for talks would be opened. Incidentally, a good deal could also be done in this respect by the conference that has just begun in Stockholm, the first stage of which is precisely devoted to the drafting of confidence-building measures and measures to strengthen security.

The solution of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space should not be put off. Otherwise, mankind will face a new threat whose scope is such that it is hard even to imagine now. The new weapons systems being developed in the United States make such a prospect quite real. The Soviet Union has made concrete proposals on how to avert the danger of the use of force from outer space and in outer space, and calls on the United States to start talks on this question without delay.

Given readiness on the part of the West, it is possible to set about finding a practical solution to the questions discussed at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. We have long placed our concrete proposals on this score on the negotiating table. They offer a rapid road to agreement, provided, of course, that there is a mutual effort to reach agreement.

As part of the set of measures directed at lessening the danger of war, we offer the United States as a beginning a simple and at the same time sufficiently effective step to freeze nuclear arms. Efforts aimed at reaching agreement as rapidly as possible on substantial limitations and radical reductions of such weapons should be stepped up. The peoples have a right to expect the United States Government to display common sense and realism on these matters.

What is needed above all to reach agreement on all these questions is the desire and political will on the part of the United States and other NATO countries. This would in turn create a favourable setting for tackling other questions as well, progressing from one to the next. We see this as an earnest of success for the policy of preserving peace.

Neither by trusting in strength nor by rhetorics, but only by advancing along this road can the world we live in be made a genuinely safer place. We expect of the Government of the United States of America practical deeds and a readiness to make precisely such a choice. This will find an appropriate response from us.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/428 \*/  
8 February 1984  
Original: ENGLISH

---

LETTER DATED 3 JANUARY 1984 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament. The relevant provisions of those resolutions are reproduced in the Annex.

For the information of the Conference, I also have the honour to transmit herewith other resolutions and decisions dealing with disarmament matters, which were adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

In addition, I should like to draw your attention to the resolutions listed in the Annex which relate to disarmament matters.

(Signed) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

---

\*/ Reissued for technical reasons

GE.84-60316





I. Resolutions dealing with disarmament matters

(a) Resolutions that entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament

At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions entrusting specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament:

- |          |   |
|----------|---|
| 38/62    | "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons"   |
| 38/63    | "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty"   |
| 38/67    | "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" |
| 38/68    | "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"                      |
| 38/70    | "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"   |
| 38/72    | "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests"   |
| 38/73 G  | "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons"   |
| 38/182   | "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"                                      |
| 38/183 C | "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon"   |
| 38/183 D | "Nuclear weapons in all aspects"  |
| 38/183 G | "Prevention of nuclear war"   |
| 38/183 H | "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session"  |
| 38/183 I | "Report of the Committee on Disarmament"  |
| 38/183 K | "Comprehensive programme of disarmament"  |

- 38/187 A "Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons"
- 38/187 B "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 38/188 B "Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof"
- 38/188 D "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
- 38/188 E "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes"

The Conference's attention should be drawn, in particular, to the following provisions contained in those resolutions.

(1) In resolution 38/62, operative paragraph 6 reiterates its appeal to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to initiate immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and to exert their best endeavours in order that the Conference may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session the complete draft of such a treaty.

(2) In resolution 38/63, operative paragraph 4 notes that the Committee on Disarmament, in the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, re-established at its session in 1983 an Ad Hoc Working Group under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", and that the Ad Hoc Working Group considered the issues under its mandate; operative paragraph 5 also notes that the Committee on Disarmament agreed that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban may thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee, which will consider this question with appropriate urgency, and that the Committee discussed the matter; operative paragraph 6 requests the Conference on Disarmament: (a) to resume its examination of issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, with a view to the negotiation of a treaty on the subject and, in accordance with the 1983 report on the work of the Committee under this item, to take up the question of a revised mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group during its 1984 session, (b) to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system, (c) to initiate investigation of other international measures to improve verification arrangements under such a treaty including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity, operative paragraph 7 urges all members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Conference in fulfilling these tasks, and operative paragraph 8 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

(3) In resolution 38/67, operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties involved have also been pointed out, operative paragraph 3 expresses its regret that the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all, related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, have once again prevented the Committee on Disarmament from making substantive progress towards the achievement of an agreement, operative paragraph 4 considers that the Conference on Disarmament should continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations to reach appropriate agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and operative paragraph 5 requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue the negotiations, as recommended in the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its 1983 session, with a view to concluding an international instrument of a legally binding character to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(4) In resolution 38/68, operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out, operative paragraph 4 recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered in the Committee on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties, and operative paragraph 5 recommends that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

(5) In resolution 38/70, operative paragraph 4 reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has a primary role in the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, operative paragraph 5 requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, operative paragraph 6 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals, including the consideration of the proposal referred to in the preambular part of the resolution, operative

paragraph 7 further requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group at the beginning of its session in 1984, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, and operative paragraph 8 requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

(6) In resolution 38/72, operative paragraph 2 urges the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly to negotiations with a view to elaborating a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States as a matter of the highest priority, taking into account all existing drafts and proposals and future initiatives, and for that purpose to assign to its subsidiary body a negotiating mandate under an appropriate item of its agenda.

(7) In resolution 38/73 G, operative paragraph 1 reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to achieve agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the annexed draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, and operative paragraph 2 further requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

(8) In resolution 38/182, operative paragraph 1 requests the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons, and operative paragraph 6 requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-ninth session.

(9) In resolution 38/183 C, operative paragraph 1 reaffirms the request to the Conference on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations within an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons as an organic element of negotiations, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and operative paragraph 3 requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

(10) In resolution 38/183 D, operative paragraph 1 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special

Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and especially to elaborate a nuclear disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament.

(11) In resolution 38/183 G, operative paragraph 1 requests again the Conference on Disarmament, to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, taking into account the documents referred to in General Assembly resolution 37/78 I as well as other existing proposals and future initiatives, and operative paragraph 2 further requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish for that purpose an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its 1984 session.

(12) In resolution 38/183 H, operative paragraph 5 once again calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda, to proceed to negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on prevention of nuclear war without further delay and to elaborate drafts of treaties on a nuclear-weapon test ban and on a complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, and operative paragraph 8 invites all States engaged in disarmament and arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament informed on the status and/or results of such negotiations, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session.

(13) In resolution 38/183 I, operative paragraph 1 expresses deep concern and disappointment that the Committee on Disarmament has not been enabled, this year either, to reach concrete agreements on disarmament issues to which the United Nations has assigned greatest priority and urgency and which have been under consideration for a number of years, operative paragraph 2 requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work, so as to make the utmost effort to achieve concrete results in the shortest possible period of time on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, operative paragraph 3 urges once again the Conference on Disarmament to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1984, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those questions, and, in order to reach that goal, to provide the existing ad hoc working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, the ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, on the prevention of nuclear war and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, operative paragraph 4 urges the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, without further delay, the elaboration of a draft international treaty on a nuclear-weapon test ban and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, operative paragraph 5 also urges the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate

its work on the elaboration of a draft international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of all chemical weapons and on their destruction and to submit the preliminary draft of such a convention to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, operative paragraph 6 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to organize its work in such a way as to concentrate most of its attention and time on substantive negotiations on priority issues of disarmament; operative paragraph 7 calls upon the members of the Conference on Disarmament who have opposed the negotiation on some substantive issues of disarmament to enable the Conference, by adopting a positive stand, to fulfil effectively the mandate that the international community has entrusted to it in the field of negotiations on disarmament; operative paragraph 8 invites the members of the Conference on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts in order to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay and to submit to the Conference a full report on their separate negotiations and the results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Conference, in accordance with paragraph 3 above, and operative paragraph 9 requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

(14) In resolution 38/183 K, operative paragraph 1 urges the Conference on Disarmament, as soon as it considers that the circumstances are propitious for that purpose, to renew its work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament previously requested, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a progress report on the matter and to submit to the Assembly, not later than at its forty-first session, a complete draft of such a programme.

(15) In resolution 38/187 A, operative paragraph 3 urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in fulfilment of its present mandate, to achieve accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to proceed immediately to drafting such a convention for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

(16) In resolution 38/187 B, operative paragraph 3 urges the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its session in 1984, the negotiations on a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for this purpose, and operative paragraph 4 requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

(17) In resolution 38/188 B, operative paragraph 5 requests the Conference on Disarmament, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, taking into account existing proposals and any relevant technological developments, to proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, and operative paragraph 7 requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

(18) In resolution 38/188 D, operative paragraph 1 requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to a prompt conclusion of the elaboration of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons in order that it may be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, operative paragraph 2 further requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue its search for a prompt solution to the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, including the scope of such prohibition, taking into account all proposals submitted to it to this end, and operative paragraph 3 takes note of the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to re-establish an Ad Hoc Working Group at the beginning of its 1984 session to continue its work and in that context to review and assess how best to make progress on the subject matter.

(19) In resolution 38/188 E, the operative paragraph requests the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

In the above mentioned resolutions 38/70, 38/182, 38/183 C, 38/188 B, and 38/188 D, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant documents. They are the following:

- |          |  |
|----------|--|
| 38/70    | A/38/27, A/38/194, A/38/495-S/16035, A/C.1/38/L.24 and Rev.1 and 2, A/C.1/38/L.28, A/C.1/38/L.36 and Rev.1, A/38/633, A/38/640 and A/38/647. |
| 38/182   | A/38/27, A/38/495-S/16035, A/38/529, A/C.1/38/L.25 and A/38/627.   |
| 38/183 C | A/38/27, A/38/42, A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, A/38/425, A/38/495-S/16035, A/38/529, A/C.1/38/13, A/C.1/38/L.12 and A/38/628.          |

38/188 B A/38/27, A/C.1/38/L.9 and A/38/640.

38/188 D A/38/27, A/C.1/38/L.23 and Rev.1 and A/38/640.

The relevant records of the consideration of the subjects covered by those resolutions transmitting documentation are contained in documents A/38/PV.5 to 33, A/38/PV.97, A/38/PV.103, A/C.1/38/PV.3 to 31 and A/C.1/38/PV.33, 34, 38, 39 and 41.

All those documents and records were distributed during the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly to all Members of the United Nations, including all Members of the Conference on Disarmament.

(b) Other resolutions dealing with disarmament matters

At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly also adopted the following resolutions dealing with disarmament matters:

- 38/61 "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"
- 38/64 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"
- 38/65 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia"
- 38/66 "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects"
- 38/69 "Israeli nuclear armament"
- 38/71 A "Relationship between disarmament and development"
- 38/71 B "Relationship between disarmament and development"
- 38/73 A "Confidence-building measures"
- 38/73 B "Freeze on nuclear weapons"
- 38/73 C "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament"



- 38/73 D "World Disarmament Campaign"
- 38/73 E "Nuclear arms freeze"
- 38/73 F "World Disarmament Campaign actions and activities"
- 38/73 H "Disarmament and international security"
- 38/73 I "Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament"
- 38/73 J "Regional disarmament"
- 38/74 "Implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the Third Review Conference"
- 38/75 "Condemnation of nuclear war"
- 38/76 "Nuclear-weapon freeze"
- 38/181 A "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"
- 38/181 B "Nuclear capability of South Africa"
- 38/183 A "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations"
- 38/183 B "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"
- 38/183 E "Report of the Disarmament Commission"
- 38/183 F "International co-operation for disarmament"
- 38/183 J "Report of the Disarmament Commission"
- 38/183 L "Disarmament Week"
- 38/183 M "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session"
- 38/183 N "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations"
- 38/183 O "Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies"
- 38/183 P "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations"

- 38/184 A "Reduction of military budgets"
- 38/184 B "Reduction of military budgets"
- 38/185 "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"
- 38/186 "World Disarmament Conference"
- 38/187 C "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 38/188 A "Study on conventional disarmament"
- 38/188 C "Measures to provide objective information on military capabilities"
- 38/188 F "Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments, extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans"
- 38/188 G "Study on the naval arms race"
- 38/188 H "Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues"
- 38/188 I "Review of and supplement to the Comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects"
- 38/188 J "Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament"

In addition, the General Assembly adopted a decision (38/447) pursuant to which the draft statute of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research should be returned to the Board of Trustees of the Institute with a request that the Board spell out the meaning of the provisions of the draft statute, so that the Assembly can take a decision on that draft statute at its thirty-ninth session.

## II. Resolutions related to disarmament matters

It should also be noted that, at its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions which are related to disarmament matters:

- 38/8 "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency"

- 38/9 "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security"
- 38/60 "United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy"
- 38/77 "Question of Antarctica"
- 38/78 "Effects of atomic radiation"
- 38/80 "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space"
- 38/81 "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects"
- 38/126 "Development and strengthening of good-neighbourliness between States"
- 38/131 "Peaceful settlement of disputes between States"
- 38/132 "Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind"
- 38/133 "Report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principles of Non-Use of Force in International Relations"
- 38/141 "Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization"
- 38/189 "Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region"
- 38/190 "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security"
- 38/191 "Implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security"





General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/61  
11 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 43

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/621)]

- 38/61. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979, 35/143 of 12 December 1980, 36/83 of 9 December 1981 and 37/71 of 9 December 1982 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 1/

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-three sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

---

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

Recalling that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively,

1. Deplores that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it;

2. Urges once more France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/61 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983



## General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/62  
13 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 44

### RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/622)]

#### 38/62. Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons

##### The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than twenty-five years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than forty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on seven different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Reiterating the assertion made in several previous resolutions that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban,

Recalling that since 1972 the Secretary-General has declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement, that when the existing means of verification are taken into account it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban, and that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests,

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water 1/ undertook in that Treaty, twenty years ago, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2/ article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Bearing in mind the growing negative influence that the total lack of compliance with those undertakings had on both the first and the second review conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva from 5 to 30 May 1975 and from 11 August to 7 September 1980, respectively,

Convinced that the maintenance of such a situation would not augur well for the third review conference of that Treaty, which is to take place in 1985, and even for the future of the Treaty itself,

Deploring that, due to the persistent obstruction of a very small number of its members, the Committee on Disarmament - which henceforth will be designated as the Conference on Disarmament 3/ - has been unable to initiate multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, as it was specifically requested to do in General Assembly resolution 37/72 of 9 December 1982,

Noting that the Conference on Disarmament has already received various concrete proposals on this question, including a complete draft for the eventual text of the treaty as a whole,

1. Reiterates once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority;

---

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

2/ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

3/ From the date of commencement of the annual session 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21).



3. Reaffirms also its conviction that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the arms race and an indispensable element for the success of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since it is only through the fulfilment of the obligations under the Treaty that its three depositary Powers may expect all other parties to comply likewise with their respective obligations;
4. Urges once more the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to abide strictly by their undertakings to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end;
5. Urges also all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and, meanwhile, to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty;
6. Reiterates its appeal to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to initiate immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and to exert their best endeavours in order that the Conference may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session the complete draft of such a treaty;
7. Calls upon the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two Treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria;
8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons".





General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/63  
13 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 45

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/623)]

38/63. Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty capable of attracting the widest possible international support and adherence,

Reaffirming its conviction that an end to nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments would be a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations and a measure of the utmost importance in bringing the nuclear-arms race to an end,

Recalling that the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water 1/ undertook not to carry out any nuclear-weapon-test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, in the environments covered by that Treaty, and that in that Treaty and in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2/ the parties expressed their determination to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Recalling also its previous resolutions on this subject,

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

2/ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

Taking into account that part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament concerning consideration of the item entitled "Nuclear test ban" during its session in 1983, 3/

Noting, in particular, that Sweden submitted to the Committee on Disarmament the draft of a nuclear-test-ban treaty 4/ which took into account both the report on the trilateral negotiations 5/ presented to the Committee in 1980 and the basic provisions of a test-ban treaty proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1982, 6/

Recognizing the important role of the Conference on Disarmament 7/ in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Recognizing the importance to such a treaty of the work assigned by the Committee on Disarmament to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on a global network of stations for the exchange of seismological data,

Recalling paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 8/ relating to verification of disarmament and arms control agreements, which stated that the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend on, and should be determined by, the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement,

1. Reiterates its profound concern that, despite the express wishes of the majority of Member States, nuclear-weapon testing continues;
2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the greatest importance;
3. Expresses the conviction that such a treaty would constitute a vital element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, and to prevent the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries;

---

3/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), paras. 27-32.

4/ See CD/381.

5/ See CD/130.

6/ A/37/243.

7/ From the date of commencement of the annual session in 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21).

8/ Resolution S-10/2.

4. Notes that the Committee on Disarmament, in the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, re-established at its session in 1983 an Ad Hoc Working Group under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", and that the Ad Hoc Working Group considered the issues under its mandate;

5. Also notes that the Committee on Disarmament agreed that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban may thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee, which will consider this question with appropriate urgency, 9/ and that the Committee discussed the matter;

6. Requests the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) To resume its examination of issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, with a view to the negotiation of a treaty on the subject and, in accordance with the 1983 report on the work of the Committee under this item, to take up the question of a revised mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group during its 1984 session;

(b) To determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system;

(c) To initiate investigation of other international measures to improve verification arrangements under such a treaty including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity;

7. Urges all members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Conference in fulfilling these tasks;

8. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983





General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/64  
11 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 47

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/625)]

38/64. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 of 9 December 1981 and 37/75 of 9 December 1982 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing further the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous to build on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, 2/

1. Urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 3/

2. Calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. Invites those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with the relevant paragraph of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

4. Invites further those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

5. Invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and spirit of the present resolution;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

---

2/ A/38/197.

3/ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.



7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983





General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/65  
11 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 48

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/626)]

38/65. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981 and 37/76 of 9 December 1982 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will strengthen the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions it called upon the States of the South Asian region, and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested, to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective,

Further recalling that, in its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX), 31/73 and 32/83, it requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned therein and to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 1/ regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, 2/

1. Reaffirms its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. Urges once again the States of South Asia, and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested, to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. Calls upon those nuclear-weapon States that have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

---

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ A/38/198.



General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/66  
13 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 51

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/629)]

38/66. United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 35/153 of 12 December 1980, 36/93 of 9 December 1981 and 37/79 of 9 December 1982,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), 1/

Reaffirming its conviction that general agreement on the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons would significantly reduce the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants,

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General, 2/

---

1/ See A/CONF.95/15 and Corr.2, annex I.

2/ A/38/405.

1. Notes with satisfaction that an increasing number of States have either signed, ratified, accepted or acceded to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981;
2. Further notes with satisfaction that upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in article 5 of the Convention, the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto entered into force on 2 December 1983;
3. Urges all States which have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto, as early as possible, so as to obtain ultimately universal adherence;
4. Notes that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the annexed Protocols, to consider additional Protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing annexed Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols;
5. Requests the Secretary-General as the depositary of the Convention and its three annexed Protocols, to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the said Convention and its Protocols;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects."

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983



General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/67  
18 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 52

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/630)]

38/67. Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent nuclear conflagration,

Taking into account the principle of non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed in a number of United Nations declarations and resolutions,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the desire of States in various regions to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories, including through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to contribute to the attainment of this objective,

Concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the increased danger of recourse to use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions on this subject as well as the relevant part of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament, 2/ submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting that the Committee on Disarmament considered in 1983 the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and the work done by its Ad Hoc Working Group on this item, as reflected in the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 3/

Noting the proposals submitted under that item in the Committee on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention and the widespread international support for the conclusion of such a convention,

Wishing to promote an early and successful completion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, 4/ aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the item referred to above,

Further noting that the idea of interim arrangements as a first step towards the conclusion of such a convention has also been considered in the Committee on Disarmament, particularly in the form of a Security Council resolution on this subject, and reaffirming the calls made in that respect in General Assembly resolutions 35/154 of 12 December 1980, 36/94 of 9 December 1981 and 37/80 of 9 December 1982,

---

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2), paras. 61-63.

3/ Ibid., Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), paras. 74-76.

4/ From the date of commencement of the annual session in 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21.)



Convinced that abandoning policies of first use of nuclear weapons would, inter alia, constitute a substantive contribution to the efforts to achieve progress towards effective strengthening of the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States,

Welcoming once again the solemn declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States concerning non-first-use of nuclear weapons, in particular the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, assumed at the highest political level or confirmed at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly,

Convinced further that, if all nuclear-weapon States were to assume obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount, in practice, to banning the use of nuclear weapons against all States, including all non-nuclear-weapon States,

Considering that, in the search for a solution to the problem of security assurances, priority should be given to the legitimate security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States which, by virtue of their forgoing the nuclear option and of not allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories, have every right to expect to be most effectively guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

1. Reaffirms once again the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on this subject, although the difficulties involved have also been pointed out;
3. Expresses its regret that the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all, related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, have once again prevented the Committee on Disarmament from making substantive progress towards the achievement of an agreement;
4. Considers that the Conference on Disarmament 4/ should continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations to reach an appropriate agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
5. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue the negotiations, as recommended in the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its 1983 session, 5/ with a view to concluding an international instrument of a legally binding character to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

---

5/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27).

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983



General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/68  
17 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 53

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/631)]

38/68. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 and 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 of 14 December 1978, 34/85 of 11 December 1979, 35/155 of 12 December 1980, 36/95 of 9 December 1981 and 37/81 of 9 December 1982,

Further recalling paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, inter alia, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Noting the proposals submitted under that item in the Committee on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note of the decision of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, 2/ as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated at the Thirteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Niamey from 22 to 26 August 1982, 3/ calling upon the Committee on

---

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ See A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2.

3/ See A/37/567-S/15466.

Disarmament to elaborate and reach an agreement on an international basis to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further noting the support expressed in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;
3. Appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;
4. Recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered in the Committee on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;
5. Recommends that the Conference on Disarmament 4/ should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

---

4/ From the date of commencement of the annual session in 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21).





General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/ES/38/69  
13 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 54

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/632)]

38/69. Israeli nuclear armament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on Israeli nuclear armament,

Recalling its relevant resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region,

Recalling also its resolution 35/157 of 12 December 1980 on military nuclear collaboration with Israel,

Recalling its repeated condemnation of nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa,

Recalling Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981 and taking note of the first special report of the Special Committee against Apartheid on recent developments concerning relations between Israel and South Africa, 1/

Noting with concern Israel's refusal to comply with Security Council resolution 487 (1981),

Further noting with grave concern Israel's persistent refusal to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2/ despite repeated calls by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards,

---

1/ A/38/22/Add.1-S/16101/Add.1.

2/ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

Conscious of the grave consequences which endanger international peace and security as a result of Israel's development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and Israel's collaboration with South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on Israeli nuclear armament, 3/

1. Condemns Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons and to place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards;
2. Requests the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to implement its resolution 487 (1981) and to ensure that Israel complies with the resolution and places its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
3. Requests the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to Israel's nuclear capabilities;
4. Reiterates its condemnation of the Israeli threat, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, to repeat its armed attack on peaceful nuclear facilities in Iraq and in other countries;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to follow closely Israel's nuclear activities and the nuclear and military collaboration between Israel and South Africa and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session thereon, as appropriate;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983





**General Assembly**

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/70  
17 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 55

**RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/633)]

38/70. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space twenty-six years ago,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming further the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be exclusively for peaceful purposes,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1/ have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

---

1/ Resolution 2222 (XXI), annex.

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, as well as resolutions 37/83 of 9 December 1982 and 37/99 D of 13 December 1982,

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, and at its regular sessions and to the Committee on Disarmament,

Noting the grave concern expressed by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space over the extension of an arms race into outer space and the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament, 3/

Convinced that further measures are needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Recognizing that, in the context of multilateral negotiations for preventing an arms race in outer space, the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could make a significant contribution to such an objective,

Taking note of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 4/

---

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

3/ See Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982 (A/CONF.101/10 and Corr.1 and 2), paras. 13, 14 and 426.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27).

Noting that in the course of its session in 1983 the Committee on Disarmament considered this subject both at its formal and informal meetings as well as through informal consultations,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States to the Committee on Disarmament, particularly concerning the establishment of a working group on outer space and its draft mandate 5/ which had been considered extensively by a contact group,

Taking note of the draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space against the Earth, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 6/ as well as views and comments expressed during the discussion of that draft at its thirty-eighth session,

Expressing its deep concern and disappointment that, although there was no objection, in principle, to the establishment without delay of such a working group, the Committee on Disarmament has not thus far been enabled to reach agreement on an acceptable mandate for the working group during its 1983 session,

1. Reaffirms that general and complete disarmament under effective international control warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;
2. Emphasizes that further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;
3. Calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space;
4. Reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, 7/ as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has a primary role in the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space;
5. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

---

5/ Ibid., paras. 89-94.

6/ A/38/194, annex.

7/ From the date of commencement of the annual session in 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21).

6. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals, including the consideration of the proposal referred to in the preambular part of the present resolution;

7. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group at the beginning of its session in 1984, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space;

8. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983



General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/71  
12 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 56

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/634)]

38/71. Relationship between disarmament and development

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling the conclusions contained in the study entitled The Relationship between Disarmament and Development, 1/

Recalling also its resolution 37/84 of 9 December 1982,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on measures taken within the United Nations system in implementation of resolution 37/84; 2/

2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session based on appropriate measures taken by Member States and within the United Nations system in accordance with resolution 37/84.

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

---

1/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1.

2/ A/38/436.

B

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned by the arms buildup and trends in military expenditures, the consequent waste of human and economic resources and the resulting risks for world peace and security,

Also concerned by the extent of the crisis affecting the world economy, particularly the developing countries,

Considering that the magnitude of military expenditures is now such that their various implications can no longer be ignored in the efforts pursued in the international community to secure the recovery of the world economy and the establishment of a new international economic order,

Also considering that a reduction of arms expenditures, especially by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, on a mutually agreed basis would be a measure that would curb the arms buildup and would make it possible to release additional resources for use in economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Bearing in mind the conclusions of the study on the relationship between disarmament and development 1/ as well as resolutions 36/92 G of 9 December 1981 and 37/84 of 9 December 1982 in which the General Assembly took note of those conclusions,

Noting that an investigation of the modalities of an international disarmament fund for development was undertaken in 1983 by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 37/84,

Recalling the recommendation of the General Assembly in that resolution that the question of conversion of resources from military to civilian purposes and the reallocation to economic and social development of the resources released by disarmament measures should be included in the provisional agenda of the Assembly at intervals to be decided upon,

Convinced that the time has come to study measures that could be taken on the basis of the conclusions and recommendations of existing studies or studies being prepared on the question,

Noting that the envisaged initiatives include in particular a proposal for a conference on the various implications of the relationship between disarmament and development and a proposal on the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development,

1. Expresses its conviction that increased solidarity in the field of development would serve the cause of international peace and security and that the resources released by the reduction of arms expenditures would contribute to the growth and stability of the world economy, and particularly the economies of developing countries;

/...

2. Invites Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General, by 1 April 1984, their views and proposals concerning the relationship between disarmament and development, in particular with regard to the following:

(a) The evaluation of the burden of armaments in the world;

(b) The impact of military expenditures on the world economic situation and development;

(c) The contribution that a reduction in arms and military expenditures, in particular by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, or a contribution by those States, as appropriate, would make to development tasks;

(d) The ways and means that would enable this contribution to be made, in particular in the interests of the economic and social progress of the developing countries;

(e) The consideration of proposals relating to the convening of a conference;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the replies of Member States to the Disarmament Commission in good time;

4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to include this item on the agenda of its next session in 1984, to consider the replies received and to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983







General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/72  
18 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 57

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/635)]

38/72. Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned over the continuing nuclear-arms race and the growing danger of nuclear war,

Convinced that the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States would constitute a vital element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, and to prevent the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries,

Convinced also that the elaboration of such a treaty is a task of the highest priority and should not be made dependent on the attainment of any other measure in the field of disarmament,

Deploring that the Committee on Disarmament has to date been unable to carry out negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on such a treaty,

Recalling its previous resolutions on this subject,

1. Urges all States to exert all efforts for the speediest elaboration of a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States;

2. Urges the Conference on Disarmament 1/ to proceed promptly to negotiations with a view to elaborating such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority, taking into account all existing drafts and proposals and future initiatives, and for that purpose to assign to its subsidiary body a negotiating mandate under an appropriate item of its agenda;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/72 of 15 December 1983".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

---

1/ From the date of commencement of the annual session in 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21).



General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/73  
18 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 63

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/641)]

38/73. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of  
the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

A

Confidence-building measures

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 D of 13 December 1982, in which it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level and to submit a progress report on its deliberations on this item to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission on the work accomplished during its session in 1983 on the item "Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", 1/

Expressing its concern about the deterioration of the international situation and the further escalation of the arms race, which both reflect and aggravate the unsatisfactory international political climate, tension and mistrust,

---

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42), para. 26.

Desirous of strengthening international peace and security and, at the same time, creating and improving conditions conducive to further measures of disarmament,

Noting again the findings of the Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures 2/ and in particular the important role that confidence-building measures can play with regard to regional and world-wide stability as well as to progress in disarmament,

Mindful of the fact that, while confidence-building measures cannot serve as a substitute for concrete disarmament measures, they play a very significant role in achieving disarmament, whether they are taken unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally,

Convinced of the usefulness of confidence-building measures freely arrived at by the States concerned and agreed upon, taking into account the particular conditions and requirements of the regions concerned,

Convinced of the need to reduce mistrust and fear among States through the realization of confidence-building measures, such as those recommended by consensus in the Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures, including pertinent and timely information on military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security, and measures concerning the peacetime military conduct of States, as well as through progress on concrete measures of disarmament,

Recalling that confidence reflects a set of interrelated factors of a military as well as of a non-military character and that a plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and to replace them by confidence,

Welcoming the convening at Stockholm in January 1984 of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures as characterized in the Concluding Document of the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe,

1. Urges all States to encourage and assist all efforts designed to explore further the ways in which confidence-building measures can strengthen international peace and security;
2. Invites all States to consider the possible introduction unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally of confidence-building measures in their particular regions and, where possible, to negotiate on them in keeping with the conditions and requirements prevailing in their respective regions;

---

2/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3.

3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue and conclude at its 1984 session the consideration of the item entitled "Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level";

4. Further requests the Disarmament Commission to submit a report on its deliberations on this item, containing such guidelines, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

5. Recommends that all States consider the inclusion of a reference to, or an agreement on, confidence-building measures, as appropriate, in any joint statements or declarations of a political nature;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

B

Freeze on nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 A of 13 December 1982, entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons",

Convinced that in this nuclear age lasting world peace can be based only on the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Further convinced that the highest priority objectives in the field of disarmament have to be nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recognizing the urgent need to halt the arms race, particularly in nuclear weapons,

Recognizing further the urgent need for a negotiated reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles leading to their complete elimination,

Noting with deep concern that nuclear-weapon States have not so far taken any action in response to the call made in resolution 37/100 A,

1. Once again calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons, which would, inter alia, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

/...

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

C

United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/ in which it, inter alia, decided to continue the programme and to increase the number of fellowships from twenty to twenty-five as from 1983,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has already trained one hundred and four public officials from sixty-seven countries, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs within their Governments or Permanent Missions to the United Nations, or representing their Governments at international disarmament meetings,

Bearing in mind the growing interest which continues to be manifested in the programme by an ever-increasing number of States,

Recognizing the fact that the programme of studies and activities as outlined in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament 5/ has continued to expand,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General, 5/

1. Decides to continue the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to apply the same criteria of objectivity and balance in drawing up the future programme of activities as he has done so far, in accordance with the guidelines established by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;

---

3/ Resolution S-10/2.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32.

5/ A/38/533.

3. Expresses its appreciation to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for inviting the fellows to their countries in 1983 to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme, as well as providing additional information sources and practical knowledge for the fellows, and, in this connection, expresses the hope that other Member States will extend similar support for the programme;
4. Takes note of the decision of the Secretary-General to relocate the fellowship programme and its staff at Geneva as from 1 May 1983; 6/
5. Also takes note of the fact that the expansion of the programme has led to an increase in the level of activities for the programme;
6. Commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the implementation of the programme for 1984, in accordance with the guidelines established for it;
8. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

D

World Disarmament Campaign

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, it declared that it was essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation and stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament,

Recalling also its resolutions 35/152 I of 12 December 1980, 36/92 C of 9 December 1981 and 37/100 I of 13 December 1982, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General of 17 September 1981, 7/ 11 June 1982 8/ and 3 November 1982, 9/

- 
- 6/ Ibid., para. 9.
  - 7/ A/36/458.
  - 8/ A/S-12/27.
  - 9/ A/37/548.

/...

Having examined the report submitted by the Secretary-General on 30 August 1983 on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign, 10/

Having also examined the section of the report of the Secretary-General of 20 October 1983 dealing with the activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies relating to the World Disarmament Campaign, 11/ as well as the final act of the first United Nations Pledging Conference for the Campaign held on 27 October 1983,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the implementation of the programme of activities for 1983 of the World Disarmament Campaign as described in the report of the Secretary-General; 10/

2. Notes also with satisfaction the voluntary contributions made by Member States to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund, prior to and during the first United Nations Pledging Conference for the Campaign held on 27 October 1983;

3. Decides that at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly there should be a second United Nations pledging conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, in order that all those Member States that have not yet announced their voluntary contributions may have an opportunity to do so;

4. Recommends that the voluntary contributions made by Member States to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund should not be earmarked for specific activities inasmuch as it is most desirable that the Secretary-General may enjoy full freedom to take the decisions he deems fit within the framework of the Campaign previously approved by the General Assembly and in exercise of the powers vested on him in connection with the Campaign;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to instruct the United Nations information centres and regional commissions to give wide publicity to the World Disarmament Campaign and, whenever necessary, to adapt, in so far as possible, United Nations information materials into local languages;

6. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a report covering both the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign by the United Nations system during 1984 and the programme of activities contemplated by the system for 1985;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "World Disarmament Campaign".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

---

10/ A/38/349.

11/ A/38/467, paras. 5-8.



E

Nuclear arms freeze

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, 12/ its second special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly expressed deep concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling also that, on those occasions, it pointed out that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth and stressed that mankind is therefore confronted with a choice: halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face annihilation,

Noting that the conditions prevailing today are a source of even more serious concern than those existing in 1978 because of several factors such as the deterioration of the international situation, the increase in the accuracy, speed and destructive power of nuclear weapons, the promotion of illusory doctrines of "limited" or "winnable" nuclear war and the many false alarms which have occurred owing to the malfunctioning of computers,

Noting also that the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983, declared that the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations, 13/

Believing that it is a matter of the utmost urgency to stop any further increase in the awesome arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States, which already have ample retaliatory power and a frightening overkill capacity,

Believing also that it is equally urgent to activate negotiations for the substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of nuclear arms,

Considering that a nuclear arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step for the achievement of the above-mentioned two objectives, since it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of

---

12/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, para. 62.

13/ A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, sect. I, para. 28.

the reduction negotiations while, at the same time, preventing the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations would take place,

Firmly convinced that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an overall rough parity,

Conscious that the mere application of the systems of surveillance, verification and control already agreed upon in some previous cases would be sufficient to provide a reasonable guarantee of faithful compliance with the undertakings derived from the freeze,

Convinced that it would be to the benefit of all other States possessing nuclear weapons to follow the example of the two major nuclear-weapon States as soon as positive results derived from the freeze agreed by them have taken place,

1. Urges once more the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would be a first step towards the comprehensive programme of disarmament and whose structure and scope would be the following:

(a) It would embrace:

- (i) A comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (ii) The complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iii) A ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iv) The complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(b) It would be subject to all relevant measures and procedures of verification which have already been agreed by the parties in the case of the SALT I 14/ and SALT II 15/ treaties, as well as those agreed upon in principle by

---

14/ "Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms" (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 944, No. 13445, p. 3).

15/ "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" (see CD/53/Appendix III/Vol. I, document CD/28).

them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva;

(c) It would be of an initial five-year duration, subject to prolongation in the event of other nuclear-weapon States joining in such a freeze, as the General Assembly expects them to do;

2. Requests the above-mentioned two major nuclear-weapon States to submit a joint report or two separate reports to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its thirty-ninth session, on the implementation of the present resolution;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/73 E on a nuclear-arms freeze".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

F

World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities

The General Assembly,

Aware of the growing public concern at the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and its negative social and economic consequences,

Noting with satisfaction the successful beginning of the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, and its positive impact on the mobilization on a large scale of world public opinion on behalf of peace and disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 36/92 J of 9 December 1981 and 37/100 H of 13 December 1982, as well as the report of the Secretary-General on world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament, 16/

Welcoming the voluntary contributions made to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund to carry out the objectives of the Campaign,

Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General on the progress in the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign, 10/

Convinced that the United Nations system, Member States, with respect for their sovereign rights, and other bodies, in particular non-governmental organizations, all have their role to play in achieving the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign,

---

16/ A/S-12/15 and Add.1.

Taking into account the great number of various activities carried out within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign, including action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament,

1. Reaffirms the usefulness of further carrying out actions and activities which are an important manifestation of the will of world public opinion and which contribute effectively to the achievement of the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign and thus to the creation of a favourable climate for making progress in the field of disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

2. Invites once again Member States to co-operate with the United Nations to ensure a better flow of accurate information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament as well as actions and activities of the world public in support of peace and disarmament, and to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report annually to the General Assembly on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

G

Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Conscious of an increased danger of nuclear war as a result of the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the serious deterioration of the international situation,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Further convinced that a prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling its declaration, contained in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

/...

Reaffirming the declaration that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, contained in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Noting with regret that the Committee on Disarmament, during its session in 1983, was not able to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text contained in General Assembly resolution 37/100 C of 13 December 1982,

1. Reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament 17/ to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to achieve agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the annexed draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons;

2. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

#### ANNEX

#### Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

##### The States Parties to this Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

---

17/ From the date of commencement of the annual session in 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27, para. 21)).

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

/...

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at \_\_\_\_\_, on the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ one thousand nine hundred and \_\_\_\_\_.

H

**Disarmament and international security**

**The General Assembly,**

**Recalling its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979, 35/156 J of 12 December 1980, 36/97 K of 9 December 1981 and 37/100 E of 13 December 1982,**

**Deeply concerned over the continuing stagnation in the disarmament negotiating efforts and the ever-escalating armaments race, particularly nuclear, which make the survival of mankind extremely precarious,**

**Gravely concerned over the present state of international affairs characterized by the continued resort to violence and the use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations,**

**Firmly convinced that a closely interdependent world composed of many sovereign nations cannot possibly function towards peace, security and survival in a nuclear and space age without an effectively functioning organization,**

**Noting that the fundamental function of the United Nations in its primary purpose is the security system provided for in the Charter and that the principles of disarmament embodied in the Charter and flowing from it (Article 11) are an integral part of the system of security,**

**Convinced that restoring to the United Nations its essential function in accordance with the provisions of the Charter would be a significant factor in creating the conditions conducive to the cessation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and for productive negotiations on disarmament measures,**

**Bearing in mind that recent events have brought into sharp focus the reality that consecutive decisions of the Security Council, adopted unanimously, were ignored and bypassed by those required to comply with them and in consequence the chain of events that followed further aggravated the situation,**

**Determined to avert the danger of an approaching nuclear war in a world of insecurity and anarchy in which the continuing lack of collective security through the United Nations is an essential factor,**

**Having regard to the warning in the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session that "it was the lack of an effective system of collective security through the League of Nations that ... led to the Second World War", 18/**

---

**18/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/37/1).**

/...

1. Requests the Security Council to expedite the conclusion of the agreements making armed forces available to the Security Council, as required by the Charter of the United Nations, to render operative the collective security system provided for in the Charter and thereby facilitate productive negotiations for the cessation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and for progress on disarmament;

2. Further requests the Security Council to submit a report, through the Secretary-General, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

I

Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly  
devoted to disarmament

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the decision adopted at its twelfth special session to set, during its thirty-eighth session, the date of the third special session devoted to disarmament, 19/

Desiring to contribute to the furthering and broadening of positive processes initiated through the laying down of the foundations of an international disarmament strategy at its tenth special session,

1. Decides that the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held not later than 1988;

2. Decides also to set, not later than at its fortieth session, the date of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to make appropriate arrangements concerning the establishment of a preparatory committee for that third special session.

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983

J

Regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 F of 13 December 1982 on regional disarmament,

---

19/ Ibid., Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, para. 66.



1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the status of this question; 20/
2. Takes note also of the fact that, at the request of the States having participated in the Madrid meeting in 1980, held on the basis of the provisions of the Final Act relating to the follow-up to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Government of Spain has transmitted the Concluding Document of this meeting to the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
3. Expresses its satisfaction, in this connection, at the convening at Stockholm of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, commencing on 17 January 1984, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;
4. Takes note also of the proposals made in the context of regional disarmament since the adoption of its resolution 37/100 F;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly regularly informed of the implementation of resolution 37/100 F, as well as of the activities carried out by the Secretariat, in particular the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, in the field of the regional approach to disarmament;
6. Decides to include in the agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Regional disarmament: report of the Secretary-General".

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983





General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/74  
13 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 139

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/645)]

- 38/74. Implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the Third Review Conference

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the annex of which contains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the provisions of article VIII, paragraph 3, of that Treaty concerning the holding of successive review conferences,

Noting that in the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva from 11 August to 7 September 1980, the Conference proposed to the Depositary Governments that a third conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1985 and noting that there appears to be a consensus among the parties that the Third Review Conference should be held at Geneva in August/September of that year,

1. Notes that, following appropriate consultations, an open-ended preparatory committee had been formed of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or represented on the Committee on Disarmament as well as any party to the Treaty which may express its interest in participating in the work of the preparatory committee;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its preparation.

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983



## General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/75  
13 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 143

### RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/648)]

#### 38/75. Condemnation of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Expressing its alarm at the growing threat of nuclear war, which can lead to the destruction of civilization on earth,

Drawing the attention of all States and peoples to the conclusions arrived at by the most eminent scientists and military and civilian experts to the effect that it is impossible to limit the deadly consequences of nuclear war if it is ever begun and that in a nuclear war there can be no victors,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear catastrophe is the most profound aspiration of billions of people on earth,

Reaffirming its call for the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States,

1. Resolutely, unconditionally and for all time condemns nuclear war as being contrary to human conscience and reason, as the most monstrous crime against peoples and as a violation of the foremost human right - the right to life;

2. Condemns the formulation, propounding, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts intended to provide 'legitimacy' for the first use of nuclear weapons and in general to justify the 'admissibility' of unleashing nuclear war;

3. Calls upon all States to unite and redouble their efforts aimed at removing the threat of nuclear war, halting the nuclear-arms race and reducing nuclear weapons until they are completely eliminated.

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983



**General Assembly**

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/76  
18 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 144

**RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/649)]

**38/76. Nuclear-weapon freeze**

The General Assembly,

Expressing its alarm that the continuing nuclear-arms race seriously increases the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war,

Taking into account the great responsibility of nuclear States for the preservation of universal peace and the prevention of nuclear war,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 B of 13 December 1982, in which it expresses the firm conviction that at present the conditions are most propitious for a nuclear-weapon freeze,

1. Urges all nuclear-weapon States to proceed to freeze, under appropriate verification, all nuclear weapons in their possession both in quantitative and qualitative terms, namely:

(a) To cease the buildup of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear-weapon delivery systems and all kinds of nuclear weapons;

(b) Not to deploy nuclear weapons of new kinds and types;

(c) To establish a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems;

(d) To stop the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating nuclear weapons;

2. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, to freeze, in the first place and simultaneously, their nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis by way of example to the other nuclear States;

3. Believes that all the other nuclear-weapon States should subsequently and as soon as possible freeze their nuclear weapons;

4. Points to the urgent need to intensify efforts aimed at the speedy achievement of agreements on substantial limitations and radical reductions of nuclear weapons with a view to their complete elimination as the ultimate goal.

97th plenary meeting  
15 December 1983





## General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/181  
20 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 46

### RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/624)]

38/181. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

A

#### Implementation of the Declaration

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 1/ adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, its earliest on the subject, as well as its resolutions 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978, 34/76 A of 11 December 1979, 35/146 B of 12 December 1980, 36/86 B of 9 December 1981 and 37/74 A of 9 December 1982, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

---

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

Recalling its resolution 35/146 A of 12 December 1980, by which it, inter alia, expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field 2/ and expressed its deep alarm that the report of the Secretary-General had established South Africa's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that South Africa's continued development of a nuclear capability seriously jeopardizes the realization of the objective of the Declaration and poses a grave threat not only to the security of African States but also to international peace and security,

Recalling also its resolution 37/100 F of 13 December 1982, by which it, inter alia, requested the Secretariat, in particular the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to lend assistance to States and regional institutions which may request it in the context of regional disarmament measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all the States concerned,

Noting the report of the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 3/

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 4/

Taking note with concern of the report of the Disarmament Commission, 5/ in particular its paragraph 24 dealing with the question of the nuclear capability of South Africa,

Convinced of the urgent need for the international community to consider practical measures for the realization of the objectives of the Declaration,

1. Strongly reiterates its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;
2. Reaffirms that implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa by African heads of State and Government would be a significant measure

---

2/ South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.10).

3/ See A/38/475.

4/ A/38/467.

5/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42).

to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security;

3. Condemns South Africa's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime which enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons;

4. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith any form of collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa which enables it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration;

5. Demands once again that the racist régime of South Africa refrain from testing, manufacturing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons;

6. Demands once again that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

7. Requests the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to provide data on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary support to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to enable it to carry out the task entrusted to it under the present resolution and for the Institute to submit a report to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

B

#### Nuclear capability of South Africa

##### The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/76 B of 11 December 1979, 35/146 A of 12 December 1980, 36/86 A of 9 December 1981 and 37/74 B of 9 December 1982,

/...

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 6/ adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling that, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it noted that the accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, presented a challenging and an increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm, 7/

Taking note of resolution GC (XXVII)/RES/408 adopted on 14 October 1983 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency during its twenty-seventh regular session on South Africa's nuclear capabilities,

Recalling that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

Recalling its resolution 35/146 A of 12 December 1980, by which it, inter alia, expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field 8/ and expressed its deep alarm that the report of the Secretary-General had established South Africa's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons,

Noting with regret that, despite international concern over the nuclear capability of South Africa and the recognized need to deal concretely and expeditiously with it, the Disarmament Commission failed to conclude consideration of this important item on its agenda with specific recommendations during its 1983 substantive session,

Gravely concerned that South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has not only continued but has in fact intensified its military attacks and other acts of aggression and subversion against independent States of southern Africa, in particular Lesotho, Mozambique and Angola, part of whose territory still remains occupied by South African forces,

Strongly condemning the military occupation by the South African troops of parts of the territory of Angola in violation of its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and urging the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the South African troops from Angolan soil,

---

6/ Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

7/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 12.

8/ South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.10).

Expressing its grave disappointment that, despite repeated appeals by the international community, certain Western States and Israel have continued to collaborate with the racist régime of South Africa in the military and nuclear fields and that some of the same Western States have, by a ready recourse to the use of the veto, consistently frustrated every effort in the Security Council to deal decisively with the question of South Africa,

1. Condemns the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine, including its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;

2. Expresses its full support for the Governments of the independent States of southern Africa in their efforts to guarantee and safeguard their territorial integrity and national sovereignty;

3. Reaffirms that the racist régime's acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider substantively and as a matter of priority South Africa's nuclear capability during its session in 1984, taking into account, inter alia, the findings contained in the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field, 8/ with a view to adopting concrete recommendations on the question;

5. Requests the Security Council, for the purposes of disarmament and to fulfil its obligations and responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, to take enforcement measures to prevent any racist régimes from acquiring arms or arms technology;

6. Further requests the Security Council to conclude expeditiously its consideration of the recommendations of its Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa with a view to blocking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to render it more effective and prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

7. Condemns all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa since such collaboration enables it to frustrate, inter alia, the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons;

8. Condemns, in particular, recent decisions by some Member States to grant licences to several corporations in their territories to provide equipment and technical and maintenance services for nuclear installations in South Africa;

9. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime, including the provision to it of such materials as computers, electronic equipment and related technology;

/...

10. Demands once again that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983



**General Assembly**

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/182  
18 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 49

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/627)]

**38/182. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons**

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976, 32/84 A of 12 December 1977, 33/66 B of 14 December 1978, 34/79 of 11 December 1979, 35/149 of 12 December 1980, 36/89 of 9 December 1981 and 37/77 A of 9 December 1982 concerning the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 39 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ according to which qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race and efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new means of warfare,

Recalling the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the Final Document to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements, and that efforts aimed at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should be appropriately pursued,

---

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

Expressing once again its firm belief, in the light of the decisions adopted at the tenth special session, in the importance of concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Noting that in the course of its session in 1983 the Committee on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons",

Convinced that all ways and means should be utilized to prevent the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Taking into consideration the part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament relating to this question, 2/

1. Requests the Conference on Disarmament, 3/ in the light of its existing priorities, to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons;

2. Once again urges all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

3. Calls upon the States permanent members of the Security Council as well as upon other militarily significant States to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on this subject, bearing in mind that such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council;

4. Calls again upon all States to undertake efforts to ensure that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes;

---

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), sect. III, paras. 81 and 84-86.

3/ From the date of commencement of the annual session in 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21).



5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

6. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-ninth session;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983





## General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/183  
19 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 50

### RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/628)]

38/183. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

A

#### Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of deploying new medium-range missiles in Europe and about the development of those already in existence on that continent,

Profoundly alarmed that the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America commenced at Geneva on 30 November 1981 have not so far reached results to meet the expectations of peoples,

Deeply concerned that the failure of these negotiations could lead to a new significant escalation in the spiralling arms competition in Europe and in the world, gravely endangering thereby international peace and security,

Firmly convinced that an early successful conclusion of these negotiations by reaching an appropriate agreement, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armament and military forces, would have a crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security and for the reduction of the risk of nuclear war,

Convinced also that through negotiations, pursued in a spirit of flexibility and responsibility for the security interests of all peoples, it is still possible to reach an agreement,

1. Urges the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to make every effort to reach an agreement at their bilateral negotiations at Geneva, or at least to agree on a provisional basis that no medium-range missiles are deployed and the number of the existing ones is reduced, while the negotiations would continue in order to achieve positive results in conformity with the security interests of all States;
2. Calls upon all European States as well as all interested States to do their utmost in order to assist the process of negotiation and its successful conclusion;
3. Calls upon all States to do their utmost in order to bring the arms race to a halt and to proceed to disarmament, and first of all to nuclear disarmament, as well as to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the resumption of the policy of détente, co-operation and respect for the national independence of all peoples;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to transmit the content of the present appeal to the Governments of all States.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

B

Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority,

Recalling also that this commitment has been reaffirmed by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Bearing in mind its resolutions 36/81 B, 36/92 I and 36/100 of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 J of 9 December 1982,

Reaffirming that the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

---

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

Recalling also its declaration, contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war,

1. Considers that the solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States made or reiterated at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, concerning their respective obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons offer an important avenue to decrease the danger of nuclear war;

2. Expresses the hope that those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so would consider making similar declarations with respect to not being the first to use nuclear weapons.

103rd plenary meeting

20 December 1983

C

Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which it is stated that the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements, inter alia, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, which is especially emphasized in paragraph 50 (a) of the Final Document,

Stressing that the nuclear neutron weapon represents a further step in the qualitative arms race in the field of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming its resolutions 36/92 K of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 E of 9 December 1982,

Sharing the world-wide concern expressed by Member States, as well as by non-governmental organizations, about the continued and expanded production and introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon in military arsenals, which escalates the nuclear-arms race and significantly lowers the threshold of nuclear war,

Aware of the inhuman effects of that weapon, which constitutes a grave threat, particularly to the unprotected civilian population,

Noting the consideration of issues connected with the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon by the Committee on Disarmament in 1983,

/...

Regretting that the Committee on Disarmament was not able to reach agreement on the commencement of negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament or on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon in an appropriate organizational framework,

1. Reaffirms its request to the Conference on Disarmament 2/ to start without delay negotiations within an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons as an organic element of negotiations, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; 1/
2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;
3. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

D

**Nuclear weapons in all aspects**

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, it expressed its profound preoccupation over the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Reaffirming once again that nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to mankind and its survival and that it is therefore essential to proceed with nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

---

2/ From the date of commencement of the annual session in 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21).

/...

Stressing again that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike,

Recalling that at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it decided that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war had the highest priority and that it was essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

Stressing that any expectation of winning a nuclear war is senseless and that such a war would inevitably lead to the destruction of nations, to enormous devastation and to catastrophic consequences for civilization and life itself on Earth,

Recalling further that, in its resolution 35/152 B of 12 December 1980, it noted with alarm the increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe associated both with the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and with the adoption of the new doctrines of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons, which are incompatible with its resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, entitled "Measures to be taken against propaganda and the inciters of a new war", and give rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict,

Noting with alarm that to the doctrine of a limited nuclear war was later added the concept of a protracted nuclear war, and that these dangerous doctrines lead to a new twist in the spiral of the arms race, which may seriously hamper the reaching of agreement on nuclear disarmament,

Gravely concerned about the renewed escalation in the nuclear-arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which in fact are heightening the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and lead to increased tensions and instability in international relations,

Taking note of the relevant deliberations of the Disarmament Commission in 1983 with regard to item 4 of its agenda, as contained in its report, 3/

Stressing the urgent need for the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons as a step on the road to nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear weapons, and referring to paragraphs 49 and 54 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

---

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42).

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 J of 11 December 1979, 35/152 B and C of 12 December 1980, 36/92 E of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 C of 9 December 1982,

Noting that the Committee on Disarmament, at its session held in 1983, discussed the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and, in particular, the establishment of an ad hoc working group for negotiations on that question,

Regretting, however, that the Committee on Disarmament was unable to reach agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc working group for the purpose of undertaking multilateral negotiations on the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament,

Considering that efforts will continue to be made in order to enable the Conference on Disarmament 2/ to fulfil its negotiating role with regard to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, bearing in mind the high priority accorded to this question in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

1. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and especially to elaborate a nuclear-disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament;

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

E

Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission, 3/

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament,

/...



Taking into account the relevant sections of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/ the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Considering the important role that the Disarmament Commission has played and the significant contribution that it has made in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Desirous of strengthening the effectiveness of the Disarmament Commission as the deliberative body in the field of disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 H of 11 December 1979, 35/152 F of 12 December 1980, 36/92 B of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 H of 9 December 1982,

1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission;
2. Notes that the Disarmament Commission has yet to conclude its consideration of some items on its agenda;
3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and with paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 H, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations, at its next substantive session, on the outstanding items on its agenda, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the results of its 1983 substantive session;
4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1984 and to submit a substantive report, containing specific recommendations on the items inscribed on its agenda, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 5/ together with all the official records of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

---

4/ Ibid., Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32.

5/ Ibid., Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27).

F

International co-operation for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Stressing again the urgent need for an active and sustained effort to intensify the implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as contained in the Final Document of that session 1/ and confirmed in the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/ the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament of 11 December 1979 6/ and General Assembly resolutions 36/92 D of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 B of 9 December 1982,

Deeply concerned over the growing danger of nuclear war, the continued arms race and the danger of a further, qualitatively new round of the arms race, all of which will have a very negative impact on the international situation,

Stressing the vital importance of eliminating the danger of nuclear war, halting the nuclear-arms race and attaining disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, for the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security,

Bearing in mind the vital interest of all nations in the attainment of effective disarmament measures, which would release considerable financial and material resources to be used for the economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries,

Considering the increased activity of peace and anti-war movements against the arms race and the escalation of the danger of nuclear war,

Convinced of the need to strengthen constructive international co-operation based on the political goodwill of States for successful negotiations on disarmament, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Emphasizing the duty of States to co-operate for the preservation of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as confirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, 7/ the obligation to co-operate actively and constructively for the attainment of the aims of disarmament being an indispensable part of that duty,

---

6/ Resolution 34/88.

7/ Resolution 2625 (XXV), annex.

Expressing the conviction that concrete manifestations of political goodwill, including unilateral measures, such as an obligation not to make first use of nuclear weapons, improve conditions for resolving disarmament issues in a spirit of co-operation among States,

Stressing that proposals, relatively simple in their execution and at the same time effective, such as the proposals aimed at eliminating the use of force, be it on a world-wide or regional scope, contribute considerably to that end,

Bearing in mind that the United Nations bears primary responsibility and plays a central role in unifying efforts to maintain and to develop active co-operation among States, in order to resolve the issues of disarmament,

1. Calls upon all States, in implementing the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, to make active use of the principles and ideas contained in the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament by actively participating in disarmament negotiations, with a view to achieving concrete results, and by conducting them on the basis of equality and undiminished security and the non-use of force in international relations, and to refrain at the same time from developing new directions and channels of the arms race;

2. Stresses the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

3. Declares in this context that the elaboration and dissemination of any doctrines and concepts justifying the unleashing of nuclear war endanger world peace, lead to deterioration of the international situation and further intensification of the arms race and are detrimental to the generally recognized necessity of international co-operation for disarmament;

4. Declares that the use of force in international relations as well as in attempts to prevent the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 8/ is a phenomenon incompatible with the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament;

5. Appeals to States which are members of military groupings to promote, on the basis of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in the spirit of international co-operation for disarmament, the gradual mutual limitation of military activities of these groupings, thus creating conditions for their dissolution;

6. Calls upon all Member States to cultivate and disseminate, particularly in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign launched by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, 9/ the ideas of international co-operation for

---

8/ Resolution 1514 (XV).

9/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, annex V.

disarmament, inter alia, through their educational systems, mass media and cultural policies;

7. Calls upon the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to continue to consider, in order further to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, measures aimed at strengthening the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament through research, education, information, communication and culture;

8. Calls upon the Governments of all States to contribute substantially, while observing the principle of undiminished security, to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and thus to reducing the danger of nuclear war.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

G

Prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling that removal of the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Reiterating that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war,

Recalling the provisions of paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the procedures designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear war,

Recalling also its resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981 and, in particular, its resolution 37/78 I of 9 December 1982, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war,

Having considered the annual report of the Committee on Disarmament on its 1983 session, 5/

Noting with concern that the Committee on Disarmament was not able to start negotiations on the question during its 1983 session,

/...

Taking into account the deliberations on this item at its thirty-eighth session,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority and of vital interest to all peoples of the world,

1. Requests again the Conference on Disarmament, 2/ to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, taking into account the documents referred to in General Assembly resolution 37/78 I as well as other existing proposals and future initiatives;

2. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish for that purpose an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its 1984 session;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

103rd plenary meeting

20 December 1983

H

Implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted  
by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/ the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 34/83 C of 11 December 1979, 35/46 of 3 December 1980, 35/152 E of 12 December 1980, 36/92 M of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 F of 9 December 1982 and its decision S-12/24 of 10 July 1982,

Deeply concerned that no concrete results regarding the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session have been realized in the course of more than five years since that session, that in the meantime the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, has gained in intensity, that urgent measures to prevent nuclear war and for disarmament have not been adopted and that continued colonial domination and foreign occupation, open threats, pressures and military intervention against independent States and violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations have taken place, posing the most serious threat to international peace and security,

/...

Convinced that the renewed escalation in the nuclear-arms race, in both the quantitative and the qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence and of use of nuclear weapons, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations,

Further convinced that international peace and security can only be ensured through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and that, in this respect, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States have the primary responsibility,

Noting with great concern that no real progress in disarmament negotiations has been achieved for several years, which has rendered the current international situation even more dangerous and insecure, and that negotiations on disarmament issues are lagging far behind the rapid technological development in the field of armaments and the relentless growth of military arsenals, particularly nuclear arsenals,

Recalling the commitment of States undertaken in various international agreements to negotiate on disarmament measures, in particular on nuclear disarmament,

Considering that it is more than ever imperative in the present circumstances to give a new impetus to negotiations on disarmament in good faith, in particular nuclear disarmament, at all levels and to achieve genuine progress in the immediate future,

Convinced that the success of disarmament negotiations, in which all the people of the world have a vital interest, can be achieved through the active participation of Member States in such negotiations, contributing thereby to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Stressing that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the twelfth special session as the comprehensive basis for efforts towards halting and reversing the arms race, retained all its validity and that the objectives and measures contained therein still represent one of the most important and urgent goals to be achieved,

1. Expresses its grave concern over the acceleration and intensification of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, as well as the new, very serious deterioration of relations in the world, intensification of focal points of aggression and hotbeds of tension in different regions of the world, which

threatens international peace and security and increases the danger of outbreak of nuclear war;

2. Calls upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take urgent measures in order to put an end to the serious aggravation of the international situation, to promote international security on the basis of disarmament, to halt and reverse the arms race and to launch a process of genuine disarmament;

3. Invites all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to take urgent measures with a view to implementing the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as to fulfilling the priority tasks set forth in the Programme of Action contained in section III of the Final Document;

4. Calls upon all States to refrain from any actions which have or may have negative effects on the outcome of disarmament negotiations;

5. Once again calls upon the Conference on Disarmament <sup>2/</sup> to concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda, to proceed to negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on prevention of nuclear war without further delay and to elaborate drafts of treaties on a nuclear-weapon test ban and on a complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

6. Calls upon the Disarmament Commission to intensify its work in accordance with its mandate and to continue improving its work with a view to making concrete recommendations on specific items on its agenda;

7. Calls upon nuclear-weapon States engaged in separate negotiations on issues of nuclear disarmament to exert the utmost effort with a view to achieving concrete results in those negotiations and thus contribute to the success of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament;

8. Invites all States engaged in disarmament and arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament informed on the status and/or results of such negotiations, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

/...

I

Report of the Committee on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 B of 11 December 1979, 35/152 J of 12 December 1980, 36/92 F of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 G of 9 December 1982,

Recalling also the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 1/ and the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 5/

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, 2/ as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Reaffirming that the establishment of ad hoc working groups offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and contributes to the strengthening of the negotiating role of the Conference,

Deploring the fact that, despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly and expressed wish of the great majority of members of the Committee on Disarmament, the establishment of an ad hoc working group to undertake multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament was once again prevented during the session of the Committee in 1983,

Regretting that the Committee on Disarmament has also not been enabled to set up ad hoc working groups for negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war and on the prevention of the arms race in outer space, nor to entrust its Ad Hoc Working Group under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", with a new mandate enabling it to undertake substantive negotiations on this question as soon as possible,

Stressing that negotiations on specific disarmament issues conducted outside the Conference on Disarmament should in no way serve as a pretext for preventing the conduct of multilateral negotiations on such questions in the Conference,

1. Expresses its deep concern and disappointment that the Committee on Disarmament has not been enabled, this year either, to reach concrete agreements on disarmament issues to which the United Nations has assigned greatest priority and urgency and which have been under consideration for a number of years;

2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work, so as to make the utmost effort to achieve concrete results in the shortest possible period of time on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda;

/...



3. Urges once again the Conference on Disarmament to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1984, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those questions, and, in order to reach that goal, to provide the existing ad hoc working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, the ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, on the prevention of nuclear war and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space;
4. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, without further delay, the elaboration of a draft international treaty on a nuclear-weapon test ban and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;
5. Also urges the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate its work on the elaboration of a draft international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of all chemical weapons and on their destruction and to submit the preliminary draft of such a convention to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;
6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to organize its work in such a way as to concentrate most of its attention and time on substantive negotiations on priority issues of disarmament;
7. Calls upon the members of the Conference on Disarmament who have opposed the negotiation on some substantive issues of disarmament to enable the Conference, by adopting a positive stand, to fulfil effectively the mandate that the international community has entrusted to it in the field of negotiations on disarmament;
8. Invites the members of the Conference on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts in order to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay and to submit to the Conference a full report on their separate negotiations and the results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Conference, in accordance with paragraph 3 above;
9. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;
10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

/...

J

Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having examined the various concrete proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission at its 1983 session and reproduced by the Commission in its report to the General Assembly, 3/

Considering that one of these proposals, intended to expedite negotiations of nuclear disarmament through the preparation of a study on unilateral measures, would be at present of particular value in view of the impasse existing both in the bilateral and the multilateral negotiations,

Requests the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and applying the methods customary in these cases, a report, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, on ways and means that seem advisable for stimulating the adoption of unilateral nuclear disarmament measures which, without prejudice to the security of States, would come to promote and complement bilateral and multilateral negotiations in this sphere.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

K

Comprehensive programme of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Having examined the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which is an integral part of the report from the Committee on Disarmament on its 1983 session, 10/

Welcoming the progress achieved in the preparation of the programme during the period covered by the report,

Noting, however, that it has not yet been possible to complete the elaboration of a comprehensive programme which, as provided for in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, should encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and

---

10/ Ibid., Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 88.

security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated", 11/

1. Urges the Conference on Disarmament, 2/ as soon as it considers that the circumstances are propitious for that purpose, to renew its work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament previously requested, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a progress report on the matter and to submit to the Assembly, not later than at its forty-first session, a complete draft of such a programme;

2. Decides to consider at its thirty-ninth session, in the light of the above-mentioned progress report, the advisability of requesting the Disarmament Commission to examine the question further and to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

L

Disarmament Week

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the escalating arms race,

Emphasizing the urgent need for and the importance of wide and continued mobilization of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects,

Mindful of world-wide anti-war and anti-nuclear mass movement,

Noting with satisfaction the broad and active support by Governments, international and national organizations of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session regarding the proclamation of the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament,

Recalling the recommendations concerning the World Disarmament Campaign contained in annex V of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session, 4/ in particular the recommendation that, in view of the fact that Disarmament Week has played a useful role in fostering the objectives of disarmament, the week starting 24 October should continue to be widely observed as Disarmament Week,

---

11/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 109.

Recalling also its resolutions 33/71 D of 14 December 1978, 34/83 I of 11 December 1979 and 37/78 D of 9 December 1982,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up measures undertaken by governmental and non-governmental organizations in holding Disarmament Week; 12/
2. Expresses its appreciation to all States and international and national governmental and non-governmental organizations for their energetic support of and active participation in Disarmament Week;
3. Invites all States, in carrying out appropriate measures at the local level on the occasion of Disarmament Week, to take into account the elements of the model programme for the Week, prepared by the Secretary-General; 13/
4. Invites further the relevant specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency to intensify activities, within their areas of competence, to disseminate information on the consequences of the arms race and requests them to inform the Secretary-General accordingly;
5. Requests Governments, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71 D, to inform the Secretary-General of activities undertaken to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week;
6. Invites international non-governmental organizations to take an active part in Disarmament Week and to inform the Secretary-General of the activities undertaken;
7. Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 33/71 D, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a report containing the information referred to in paragraph 7 of resolution 37/78 D, as well as paragraphs 4 to 6 above.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

M

Implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by  
the General Assembly at its tenth special session

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in particular the following:

---

12/ A/38/144.

13/ A/34/436

/...

(a) That nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

(b) That it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

(c) That removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

(d) That while disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament,

(e) That the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

(f) That pending the achievement of this goal, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war,

(g) That, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility,

Deeply regretting that the nuclear-arms race has not yet been halted and that the danger of nuclear war has been increasing,

Gravely concerned over the risks of nuclear war inherent in the present world situation,

1. Solemnly reaffirms the special responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament and for undertaking measures to prevent nuclear war and to halt the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects;

2. Solemnly reaffirms the vital interest of all peoples of the world in the success of disarmament negotiations and the consequent duty of all States to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament;

3. Solemnly reaffirms the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament;

4. Requests the nuclear-weapon States to submit to the General Assembly annual reports on the measures and steps taken by them, jointly or individually, in the discharge of the special responsibilities incumbent upon them for the prevention of nuclear war and for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

/...

N

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it approved by consensus a Declaration, contained in section II of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which, inter alia, it proclaimed that, in order effectively to discharge the central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament which belong to the United Nations in accordance with its Charter, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations,

Recalling also that at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, Member States reiterated their solemn commitment to implement the Final Document, the validity of which received their unanimous and categorical reaffirmation,

Noting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have been continuing at Geneva the two series of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations begun on 30 November 1981 and 29 June 1982, respectively,

Noting with satisfaction that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has already submitted the report 14/ requested in General Assembly resolution 37/78 A of 9 December 1982,

Hoping that the other major nuclear-weapon State will find it possible to comply also with the request of the General Assembly before the closure of its thirty-eighth session,

Deploing that it has become evident that the bilateral negotiations have not yet produced the desired results,

1. Urges the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to examine immediately, as a way out from the present impasse, the possibility of combining into a single forum the two series of negotiations which they have been carrying out and of broadening their scope so as to embrace also the "tactical" or "battlefield" nuclear weapons;
2. Reiterates its request to the two negotiating parties that they bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question;
3. Requests both parties to keep the United Nations appropriately informed of the progress achieved in their negotiations;

---

14/ A/38/562.

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

O

Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

Recalling further its resolution 37/99 K of 13 December 1982, by section III of which it requested the Secretary-General to revive the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies,

1. Expresses its satisfaction that the Secretary-General has revived the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies;
2. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Advisory Board in 1983; 15/
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report annually to the General Assembly on the work of the Advisory Board.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

P

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

The General Assembly,

Deeply regretting that, in their bilateral negotiations, which commenced at Geneva on 30 November 1981, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have so far been unable to achieve positive results,

Firmly convinced that an early agreement in those negotiations, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces, would have a crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security,

---

15/ A/38/467.

/...

Deeply concerned that a breakdown of the negotiations could impede efforts to strengthen international peace and security and to achieve progress towards disarmament,

Convinced that, through negotiations pursued in a spirit of flexibility and responsibility for the security interests of all States, it is possible to reach an agreement,

1. Urges the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to continue, without pre-conditions, their bilateral negotiations at Geneva so long as it is necessary in order to achieve positive results in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament;
2. Calls upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to spare no effort in seeking the attainment of the final objective of the negotiations;
3. Invites the Governments of the two States mentioned above to work actively towards the enhancement of mutual trust, in order to create an atmosphere more conducive to disarmament agreements;
4. Expresses its firmest possible encouragement and support to the negotiating parties in their efforts to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983





**General Assembly**

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/184  
19 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 58

**RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/636)]

**38/184. Reduction of military budgets**

A

**The General Assembly,**

**Deeply concerned about the ever-spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,**

**Reaffirming once again the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, according to which the gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example in absolute figures or in terms of percentage, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities for the reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, 1/**

**Recalling that at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, all Member States unanimously and categorically reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, as well as their solemn commitment to it,**

---

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 89.

Recalling also the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second United Nations Disarmament Decade, 2/ in which it is provided that during this period renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources thus saved to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of developing countries,

Recalling further the provisions of its resolution 34/83 F of 11 December 1979, subsequently reaffirmed in its resolutions 35/142 A of 12 December 1980, 36/82 A of 9 December 1981 and 37/95 A of 13 December 1982, in which it considered that a new impetus should be given to the endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditure, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States and of the activities carried out so far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Convinced that identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets could contribute to harmonizing the views of States and create confidence among them conducive to achieving international agreements on the reduction of military budgets,

Considering that the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets and the other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

Taking note of the report of the Disarmament Commission on the work accomplished during its session in 1983 on the question of the reduction of military budgets, 3/

1. Declares once again its conviction that it is possible to achieve international agreements on the reduction of military budgets without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty;
2. Reaffirms that the human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries;

---

2/ Resolution 35/46, annex.

3/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42), para. 23.

3. Calls upon all Member States, in particular the most heavily armed States, to reinforce their readiness to co-operate in a constructive manner with a view to reaching agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;
4. Appeals to all States, in particular to the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;
5. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its next substantive session, the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets", including consideration of the suggestions of the Chairman of the working group, 4/ as well as other proposals and ideas on the subject-matter, with a view to further identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

B

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the arms race and present tendencies to increase further the rate of growth of military expenditures, the deplorable waste of human and economic resources and the potentially harmful effects on world peace and security,

Considering that a gradual reduction of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis would be a measure that would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocating resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that such reductions could and should be carried out on a mutually agreed basis without detriment to the national security of any country,

---

4/ Ibid., annex XIII.

Reaffirming its conviction that provisions for defining, reporting, comparing and verifying military expenditures will have to be basic elements of any international agreement to reduce such expenditures,

Recalling that an international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures has been introduced in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980, and that annual reports on military expenditures are now being received from a number of Member States,

Considering that a wider participation in the reporting system of States from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems would promote its further refinement and would, by contributing to greater openness in military matters, increase confidence between States,

Noting in this connection the proposal to convene an international conference on military expenditures,

Recalling its resolution 37/95 B of 13 December 1982, in which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts and with the voluntary co-operation of States, to undertake the task of constructing price indices and purchasing-power parities for the military expenditures of participating States,

Considering that a wide participation in this exercise is essential for achieving the most useful results possible,

Noting the progress report of the Secretary-General 5/ in which the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets established that a direct contact between its members and the voluntarily participating Member States is vital for the work of the Group,

Emphasizing that all above-mentioned activities and initiatives, as well as other ongoing activities within the United Nations related to the reduction of military budgets, should have the fundamental objective of facilitating future negotiations aimed at the conclusion of international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General 6/ containing the replies received in 1983 from Member States in the framework of the above-mentioned reporting system and with the submitted data arranged by the Secretariat according to statistical practice, and of the report of the Secretary-General 7/ containing views and suggestions of States on practical means

---

5/ A/38/354 and Corr.1.

6/ A/38/434.

7/ A/38/353 and Corr.1 and Add.1.

of promoting the wider participation of States in the international system of standardized reporting of military expenditures;

2. Stresses the need to increase the number of reporting States with a view to the broadest possible participation from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems;

3. Reiterates its recommendation that all Member States should report annually, by 30 April, to the Secretary-General, by using the reporting instrument, their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available;

4. Also takes note with appreciation of the progress report of the Secretary-General 5/ on the ongoing exercise undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 37/95 B;

5. Reiterates its invitation to all Member States to participate in the above-mentioned exercise;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets with sufficient financial and other resources for the carrying out of its complex tasks as outlined in the progress report of the Secretary-General;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983





## General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/185  
19 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 59

### RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/637)]

#### 38/185. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979, 35/150 of 12 December 1980, 36/90 of 9 December 1981 and 37/96 of 13 December 1982, and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling further the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, 1/

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

---

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/34/45 and Corr.1).

Recalling its decision, taken at the thirty-fourth session in resolution 34/80 B, to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo during 1981,

Recalling also its decision to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, and progress made in the harmonization of views, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening,

Recalling further its decision taken at the thirty-seventh session in resolution 37/96 concerning the consideration of the convening of the Conference not later than the first half of 1984,

Recalling the exchange of views in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean in 1983, 2/

Noting the exchange of views on the adverse political and security climate in the region,

Noting further the various documents before the Ad Hoc Committee,

Convinced that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of their confrontation, gives urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Considering that all other foreign military presence in the area, whenever it is contrary to the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps towards the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration,

Considering also that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires the active participation of and full co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users to ensure conditions of peace and security based on the purposes and principles of the Charter as well as the general principles of international law,

Considering further that the creation of a zone of peace requires co-operation and agreement among the States of the region to ensure conditions of peace and security within the area, as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Calling for the renewal of genuinely constructive efforts through the exercise of the political will necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

---

2/ Ibid., Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/38/29), para. 7.



Deeply concerned at the danger posed by the grave and ominous developments in the area and the resulting sharp deterioration of peace, security and stability which particularly seriously affect the littoral and hinterland States, as well as international peace and security,

Convinced that the continued deterioration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area is an important consideration bearing on the question of the urgent convening of the Conference and that the easing of tension in the area would enhance the prospect of success being achieved by the Conference,

1. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean 3/ and the exchange of views in the Committee;
2. Regrets that the Ad Hoc Committee has failed to reach consensus on the finalization of dates for the convening, during 1984, of the Conference on the Indian Ocean;
3. Emphasizes its decision to convene the Conference at Colombo as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted in 1971;
4. Takes note of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during 1983;
5. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to make decisive efforts in 1984 to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean, in consideration of the political and security climate in the region and with a view to enabling the opening of the Conference in Colombo in the first half of 1985, it being understood that such preparatory work would comprise organizational matters including the provisional agenda for the Conference, rules of procedure, documentation and consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and substantive issues;
6. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee at the same time to make determined efforts in 1984 for the necessary harmonization of views on the remaining relevant issues;
7. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions and requests the Committee to intensify its work with regard to the implementation of its mandate;
8. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to hold three further sessions in 1984 of a duration of two weeks each, with the possibility of holding a fourth session to be considered as required;
9. Requests the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to continue his consultations on the participation in the work of the Committee by States Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Committee, with the aim of resolving this matter at the earliest possible date;

---

3/ Ibid., Supplement No. 29 (A/38/29).

10. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a full report on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records.

103rd plenary meeting

20 December 1983



General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/185  
19 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 59

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/637)]

38/185. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean  
as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979, 35/150 of 12 December 1980, 36/90 of 9 December 1981 and 37/96 of 13 December 1982, and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling further the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, 1/

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

---

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/34/45 and Corr.1).

Recalling its decision, taken at the thirty-fourth session in resolution 34/80 B, to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo during 1981,

Recalling also its decision to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, and progress made in the harmonization of views, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening,

Recalling further its decision taken at the thirty-seventh session in resolution 37/96 concerning the consideration of the convening of the Conference not later than the first half of 1984,

Recalling the exchange of views in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean in 1983, 2/

Noting the exchange of views on the adverse political and security climate in the region,

Noting further the various documents before the Ad Hoc Committee,

Convinced that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of their confrontation, gives urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Considering that all other foreign military presence in the area, whenever it is contrary to the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps towards the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration,

Considering also that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires the active participation of and full co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users to ensure conditions of peace and security based on the purposes and principles of the Charter as well as the general principles of international law,

Considering further that the creation of a zone of peace requires co-operation and agreement among the States of the region to ensure conditions of peace and security within the area, as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Calling for the renewal of genuinely constructive efforts through the exercise of the political will necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

---

2/ Ibid., Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/38/29), para. 7.



General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/186  
20 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 60

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/638)]

38/186. World Disarmament Conference

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976, 32/89 of 12 December 1977, 33/69 of 14 December 1978, 34/81 of 11 December 1979, 35/151 of 12 December 1980, 36/91 of 9 December 1981 and 37/97 of 13 December 1982,

Reiterating its conviction that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its conviction that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could provide the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1/

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ it decided that, at the earliest appropriate

---

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/38/28).

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 23 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, the General Assembly considered it pertinent also to recall that in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session it had stated that at the earliest appropriate time a world disarmament conference should be convened, with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

1. Notes with satisfaction that in its report to the General Assembly the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference stated, inter alia, the following:

"Having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation, the General Assembly should take up the question at its thirty-eighth regular session for further consideration, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of resolution 36/91, adopted by consensus, in particular paragraph 1 of that resolution, and resolution 37/97, also adopted by consensus"; 3/

2. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee;

3. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons, in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, and to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

4. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

---

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/38/28), para. 14.



General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/187  
20 January 1984

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 61

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/639)]

38/187. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

A

Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ which states that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of disarmament,

Referring to the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly of the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would significantly contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Recalling its resolutions 36/96 B of 9 December 1981 and 37/98 A of 13 December 1982,

---

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

Expressing profound concern at the intended production and deployment of binary chemical weapons,

Taking into consideration the decision by the Committee on Disarmament on the mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, 2/ as well as the work of this Group during the session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1983, 3/

Deeming it desirable for States to refrain from taking any action that could delay or further complicate negotiations,

Aware that the qualitative improvement and development of chemical weapons complicate ongoing negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons,

Taking note of proposals on the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones aimed at facilitating the complete prohibition of chemical weapons,

1. Reaffirms the necessity of the speediest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;
2. Appeals to all States to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of such a convention;
3. Urges the Conference on Disarmament 4/ to intensify the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in fulfilment of its present mandate, to achieve accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to proceed immediately to drafting such a convention for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;
4. Reaffirms its call to all States to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

---

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 80.

3/ Ibid., para. 79.

4/ From the date of commencement of the annual session in 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21)).



B

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 5/ and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972, 6/

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 7/ which includes, inter alia, the report of its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, 3/

Considering it necessary that all efforts be exerted for the resumption and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. Takes note of the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its session in 1983 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in particular appreciates the work of its Ad Hoc Working Group on that question and the progress achieved therein;

2. Expresses its regret that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3. Urges the Conference on Disarmament, 4/ as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its session in 1984, the negotiations on such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for this purpose;

---

5/ League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65.

6/ Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

7/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27).

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

C

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 5/

Recalling also its resolution 37/98 D of 13 December 1982,

1. Takes note of the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 37/98 D; 8/

2. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his action to this end and, in particular, to complete during 1984, with the assistance of the group of qualified consultant experts established by him, the task entrusted to him under the terms of paragraph 7 of resolution 37/98 D and to submit his report on the work of the group;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly regularly informed on the implementation of resolution 37/98 D.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983



**General Assembly**

Distr .  
GENERAL

A/RES/38/188  
20 January 1984

---

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 62

**RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

[on the report of the First Committee (A/38/640)]

**38/188. General and complete disarmament**

**A**

**Study on conventional disarmament**

**The General Assembly,**

**Recalling its previous resolutions in which, inter alia, it approved the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis,**

**Recalling the discussions at the 1981 and 1982 substantive sessions of the Disarmament Commission on the general approach to the study and its structure and scope, which resulted in the establishment of agreed guidelines for the study,**

**1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General 1/ containing a letter from the Chairman of the Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces, informing the Secretary-General that, owing to the very wide area embraced by the study and the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved, the Group of Experts needs further time in order to complete its work;**

---

**1/ A/38/437.**

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the study and to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

B

Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2660 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, in which it commended the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,

Convinced that the Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty met at Geneva from 12 to 23 September 1983 to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty were being realized,

Noting with satisfaction that the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof concluded that the obligations assumed under the Treaty had been faithfully observed by the States parties,

Noting that in its Final Declaration the Review Conference affirmed its belief that universal adherence to the Treaty would enhance international peace and security,

Noting furthermore that the States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their strong support for and continued dedication to the principles and objectives of the Treaty, as well as their commitment to implement effectively its provisions,

Recognizing that in the Final Declaration the States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed the commitment undertaken in article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof,

1. Welcomes with satisfaction the positive assessment by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of the effectiveness of the Treaty since its entry into force, as reflected in its Final Declaration;

/...

2. Reiterates its expressed hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty;
3. Affirms its strong interest in avoiding an arms race in nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, the ocean floor or the subsoil thereof;
4. Calls again upon all States to refrain from any action which might lead to the extension of the arms race to the sea-bed and the ocean floor;
5. Requests the Conference on Disarmament, 2/ in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty, taking into account existing proposals and any relevant technological developments, to proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly relevant to further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof;
7. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

C

Measures to provide objective information on  
military capabilities

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/99 G of 13 December 1982,

Deeply concerned about the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security and the deplorable waste of human and material resources for military purposes,

---

2/ From the date of commencement of the annual session in 1984, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21).

Recalling paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ which encourages Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the arms race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting that misperceptions of the military capabilities and the intentions of potential adversaries, which could be caused, inter alia, by the lack of objective information, could induce States to undertake armaments programmes leading to the acceleration of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and to heightened international tensions,

Aware that objective information on the military capabilities, in particular among nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, could contribute to the building of confidence among States and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements and, thereby, help to halt and reverse the arms race,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General; 4/
2. Calls once more upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to consider additional measures to facilitate objective information on, as well as objective assessments of, military capabilities;
3. Invites all States that have not communicated to the Secretary-General their views and proposals concerning such measures to do so as soon as possible, and those States that have already communicated such views and proposals to supplement them, as appropriate;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to ask the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies to consider the modalities of studying the question of measures to facilitate objective information on, and objective assessments of, military capabilities, in particular among nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States;
5. Further requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

---

3/ Resolution S-10/2.

4/ A/38/368 and Add.1 and 2.

D

Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling  
and use of radiological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments of 12 August 1948, which defined weapons of mass destruction to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or the other weapons mentioned above,

Recalling its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,

Recalling paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ in which it is stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,

Reaffirming its resolution 37/99 C of 13 December 1982 on the conclusion of such a convention,

Convinced that such a convention would serve to spare mankind the potential dangers of the use of radiological weapons and thereby contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war,

Noting that negotiations on the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons have been conducted in the Committee on Disarmament,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session which deals with these negotiations, including the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, 5/

Recognizing that, notwithstanding the progress achieved in those negotiations, divergent views continue to exist in connection with various aspects,

Taking into consideration that the peaceful applications of nuclear energy involve the establishment of a large number of nuclear installations with a high concentration of radioactive materials, and bearing in mind that attacks against such nuclear facilities could have disastrous consequences,

Noting with satisfaction the wide recognition of the need to reach agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of radiological weapons,

---

5/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 83.

/...

1. Requests the Conference on Disarmament 2/ to continue negotiations with a view to a prompt conclusion of the elaboration of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons in order that it may be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

2. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue its search for a prompt solution to the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, including the scope of such prohibition, taking into account all proposals submitted to it to this end;

3. Takes note of the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to re-establish an Ad Hoc Working Group at the beginning of its 1984 session to continue its work and in that context to review and assess how best to make progress on the subject matter; 6/

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons and on the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

E

Prohibition of the production of fissionable material  
for weapons purposes

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979, 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, 36/97 G of 9 December 1981 and 37/99 E of 13 December 1982, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

---

6/ Ibid., subpara. 13.



Noting that the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1983 included the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and that the Committee's programme of work for both parts of the session held in 1983 contained this item,

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on those items,

Considering that the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

Considering that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices also would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Conference on Disarmament, 2/ at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

F

Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of  
naval armaments, extension of confidence-building measures  
to seas and oceans

The General Assembly,

Convinced that all channels of the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, should be effectively covered by the efforts to halt and reverse it,

Disturbed by the growing threat to international peace and security posed by the continuing escalation of the naval arms race, especially in its nuclear aspects,

Aware that the growing military presence and naval activities of some States in conflict areas or far from their own shores increase the tension in these regions and could adversely affect the security of the international sea lanes through these areas and the exploitation of marine resources,

Alarmed by the ever more frequent use of naval formations (units, fleets, forces) for demonstration of force and as an instrument of pressure against sovereign States or of interference in their internal affairs, thus threatening their vital security interests, independence and territorial integrity,

/...

Firmly convinced that the undertaking of urgent practical steps to curb military confrontation at sea would serve the interests of international peace, security and prevention of nuclear war,

Convinced that the progress at the ongoing bilateral negotiations on limitation and reduction of strategic armaments could, inter alia, facilitate the efforts to restrict dangerous destabilizing naval activities and the naval arms race,

Aware of the numerous initiatives and concrete proposals to undertake agreed measures aimed at limiting naval activities, limiting and reducing naval armaments and extending confidence-building measures to seas and oceans,

Believing that measures in this field would be a significant contribution to the efforts to strengthen international security and prevent war, especially nuclear war,

Reaffirming that seas and oceans, being of vital importance for mankind, should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes,

1. Appeals to all Member States, in particular the major naval Powers, to refrain from enlarging their naval activities in areas of conflict or tension, or far from their own shores;

2. Recognizes the urgent need to start negotiations with the participation of the major naval Powers, the nuclear-weapons States in particular, and other interested States on the limitation of naval activities, the limitation and reduction of naval armaments, taking into due account the nuclear aspect of the naval arms race, and the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans, especially to regions with the busiest sea lanes or regions where the probability of conflict situations is high;

3. Invites the Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than June 1984, their views concerning modalities for holding such negotiations;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a report based on the replies of Member States called for under paragraph 3 above;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments, extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

/...

G

Study on the naval arms race

The General Assembly,

Concerned about the naval buildup and the development of naval arms systems,

Mindful of the paramount importance for the security and well-being of all nations, for international trade and shipping and for economic exploitation of marine resources of preserving freedom of the high seas and of keeping open international sea communications for trade and shipping in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with the principles of international law,

Mindful also of recent developments in the law of the sea,

Noting that some naval units constitute integral parts of the strategic nuclear forces of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers and are therefore included in the strategic arms negotiations while other naval nuclear weapons systems are not the subject of any disarmament negotiations,

Recalling paragraph 96 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ which stated that taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts,

Convinced that a broad study carried out by the United Nations on the naval arms race, as well as on the development of naval forces and systems and their deployment, would enhance international understanding of the issues involved,

1. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on the naval arms race, on naval forces and naval arms systems, including maritime nuclear-weapons systems, as well as on the development, deployment and mode of operation of such naval forces and systems, all with a view to analysing their possible implications for international security, for the freedom of the high seas, for international shipping routes and for the exploitation of marine resources, thereby facilitating the identification of possible areas for disarmament and confidence-building measures;

2. Invites all Governments to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 April 1984, their views on the content of such a study and to co-operate with him by making relevant material available so that the objectives of the study may be achieved;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

/...

H

Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/99 B of 13 December 1982, in which it noted the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues entitled "Common security - a programme for disarmament", submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling also that the Disarmament Commission, in accordance with resolution 37/99 B, considered the recommendations and proposals in the report of the Independent Commission, 7/ and that the Disarmament Commission recommended that the report be taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts,

Regretting the lack of trust and confidence between States, especially between the nuclear-weapon Powers, reflected, inter alia, in the concepts of security adopted by Governments,

Bearing in mind that the Disarmament Commission held a broad discussion of the concept of common security which it found a valuable approach in the search for lasting peace and security,

Emphasizing the need for creating concepts enhancing political and economic confidence between nations and policies arrived at not contrary to, but in co-operation with other nations, as, for instance, in the Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures, 8/

Recalling paragraph 96 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it stated that taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by the carrying out of studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts,

1. Welcomes the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues as a timely and constructive contribution to international efforts to achieve disarmament and to maintain and strengthen international peace and security;
2. Recommends that the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues be duly taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts;

---

7/ A/CN.10/38, sect. 6. See also A/CN.10/51.

8/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3.

3. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study of concepts of security, in particular security policies which emphasize co-operative efforts and mutual understanding between States, with a view to developing proposals for policies aimed at preventing the arms race, building confidence in the relations between States, enhancing the possibility of reaching agreements on arms limitation and disarmament and promoting political and economic security;
4. Invites all States to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 April 1984, their views on the content of such a study and to co-operate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve the objectives of the study;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

I

Review of and supplement to the Comprehensive study on the question  
of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/99 F of 13 December 1982, in which it decided that a study should be undertaken to review and supplement the Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects 9/ in the light of information and experience accumulated since 1975,

Recalling also the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, which determines that the process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons,

Considering that the documents submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the views expressed in the general debate on this particular subject, provide additional elements relevant to the updating of the study,

Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones established by resolution 37/99 F for its consideration and analysis all the relevant documents submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, as well as the records of the debate on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983

---

9/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.I.7.

J

Institutional arrangements relating to the  
process of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and should, accordingly, play a more active role in this field,

Reaffirming that the international machinery should be utilized more effectively to promote the cause of disarmament,

Reaffirming also the role of the Conference on Disarmament 2/ as a single multilateral negotiating body,

Stressing that the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat should take full account of the possibilities offered by specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament,

Stressing again the close relationship between matters concerning international security and disarmament and the interest in close co-operation between the units in the Secretariat dealing with them,

Convinced that all possible avenues should be effectively utilized for the cause of preventing war, in particular nuclear war, and achieving disarmament,

Reaffirming further a close link existing between disarmament and development,

Convinced that disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries, by contributing to reducing the economic disparities between developed and developing countries and establishing the new international economic order on the basis of justice, equity and co-operation and towards solving other global problems,

Convinced also that there is a close relationship between the development of international co-operation in various fields, such as trade, economic development, environmental protection, health and the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war, and the achievement of arms limitation and disarmament,

Reaffirming its invitation to the relevant specialized agencies to intensify activities within their areas of competence to disseminate information on the consequences of the arms race,

Taking note with appreciation of various activities conducted by United Nations institutions and agencies in the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign,

Commending the report of the World Health Organization entitled "Effects of nuclear war on health and health services", as well as appropriate efforts undertaken by other specialized agencies,

1. Invites the specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system to broaden further their contribution, within their areas of competence, to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament;
2. Reaffirms the necessity of ensuring constant co-ordination of activities carried out in the field of disarmament by various entities of the United Nations;
3. Invites the specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the activities carried out by them in implementation of the present resolution;
4. Recommends to the Secretary-General that, in the agenda of his periodic meetings with the executive heads of the specialized agencies, he include an item relative to disarmament in the consideration of which the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs would participate;
5. Resolves to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Contribution of the specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament".

103rd plenary meeting  
20 December 1983





# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/429

7 February 1984

Original ENGLISH

---

Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on  
its work during the period 16 January-6 February 1984

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee on Disarmament at its 237th plenary meeting, held on 26 August 1983, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its work on 16 January 1984 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador D.S. McPhail of Canada. Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Chief, Department for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva Branch, continued to serve as Secretary of the Working Group.
2. The Ad Hoc Working Group held its meetings from 16 January to 6 February 1984. The Working Group continued to benefit from the inclusion in delegations of national experts.
3. The representatives of the following States, not members of the Committee on Disarmament, participated in the work of the Working Group: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland.
4. During the period 16 January-6 February 1984, the following documents were presented to the Working Group:
  - Document CD/CW/WP.58, dated 18 January 1984, entitled "Indicative programme of work for the period 16 January-3 February 1984"
  - Document CD/CW/WP.59, dated 18 January 1984, submitted by The Netherlands, entitled "Verification of non-production of chemical weapons"
  - Document CD/CW/WP.60, also issued as document CD/425, dated 18 January 1984, submitted by Sweden, entitled "Verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons"
  - Document CD/CW/WP.61, also issued as document CD/424, dated 20 January 1984, submitted by the United States, entitled "Verification of chemical weapons stockpile destruction"
  - Document CD/CW/WP.62, also issued as document CD/426, dated 23 January 1984, submitted by Sweden, entitled "The prohibition of military preparations for use of chemical weapons"
  - Document CD/CW/WP.63, dated 27 January 1984, submitted by Belgium, entitled "Verification of non-production of chemical warfare agents"
  - Document CD/CW/WP.64 + Corr.1, dated 31 January 1984, submitted by Finland, entitled "On instrumental monitoring of incineration of CW agents"

- Document CD/CW/WP.65, dated 31 January 1984, submitted by France, entitled "Verification of non-production of chemical weapons"
- Document CD/CW/CRP.88, dated 25 January 1984, submitted by Canada, entitled "Precursor and key-precursor"
- Document CD/CW/CRP.89, <sup>\*/</sup>dated 27 January 1984, submitted by Canada, entitled "~~Small-scale production facility - for protective purposes or for all permitted purposes~~"
- Document CD/CW/CRP.90, dated 26 January 1984, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Concerning chemicals containing the methyl-phosphorus bond"

5. The main task of the Working Group during this period was to seek progress on outstanding issues. To this effect, the four Contact Groups set up in 1983 continued their work as follows:

Contact Group A (Existing stockpiles of chemical weapons)  
Co-ordinator: Col. J. Cialowicz, Poland

Contact Group B (Compliance and verification issues)  
Co-ordinator: Mr. S. Duarte, Brazil

Contact Group C (Prohibition of use of chemical weapons)  
Co-ordinator: Mr. R.J. Akkerman, The Netherlands

Contact Group D (Definitions)  
Co-ordinator: Dr. J. Lundin, Sweden

6. Some clarification of issues was achieved in Groups A and D, and the positions of delegations remained essentially unchanged from those recorded in CD/416.

7. On the basis of the results of its meetings and informal consultations conducted during this period, the Ad Hoc Working Group recommends to the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) that negotiation of a Convention proceed with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest possible date, in accordance with UNGA resolution 38/187/B,

(b) that the Ad Hoc Working Group <sup>\*/</sup> on Chemical Weapons be re-established <sup>\*/</sup> as soon as possible and with every intent, not later than the end of the second week of the Conference,

---

<sup>\*/</sup> The Working Group recommends that the Conference consider altering the name of the subsidiary body, in accordance with rule 23 of the rules of procedure, without prejudice to subparagraph 7 (b) of this report.

(c) that in discharging its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention, the Conference on Disarmament adopt the decision to re-establish, \*/ in accordance with rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, for the duration of its 1984 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group \*/ of the Conference to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to give the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. This agreement, if possible, or a Report on the progress of the negotiations, should be recorded in the report which the Ad Hoc Working Group \*/ will submit to the Conference at the end of the second part of its 1984 session;

(d) that the Conference while re-establishing the Ad Hoc Working Group \*/ on Chemical Weapons appoint its chairman.

---

\*/ Ibid.



SWEDEN

Nuclear Explosions 1945 - 1983

A total of 1,469 nuclear explosions have been carried out on our earth since 1945 according to current figures available from the Swedish Defence Research Institute. Of these explosions, 461 have been carried out in the atmosphere and 1,008 underground. (The number of nuclear explosions per annum is shown in Appendix 1.)

The following table shows nuclear explosions by country:

|                | <u>Atmospheric</u> | <u>Underground</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| France         | 45                 | 75                 | 120          |
| India          | —                  | 1                  | 1            |
| China          | 22                 | 5                  | 27           |
| Soviet Union   | 161                | 368                | 529          |
| United Kingdom | 21                 | 15                 | 36           |
| United States  | 212                | 544                | 756          |
|                | <u>461</u>         | <u>1,008</u>       | <u>1,469</u> |

The table shows that the United States has carried out the greatest number of nuclear tests and that the two Superpowers together have accounted for 87 per cent of the total. The number of explosions per annum (Fig. 1) has varied between 0 (1947, 1950 and 1959) up to a maximum of 141 (1962). In the last few years the number of tests has been comparatively constant at an average of 51 explosions per annum, i.e. about one test a week.

Practically all nuclear explosions today are carried out underground. Prior to 1963, nearly all nuclear weapon tests were done in the atmosphere. With the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty on 5 August 1963 (today signed by 112 States) nuclear explosions under water, in the atmosphere and in outer space were prohibited. China has not adhered to this Treaty and has carried out occasional atmospheric tests, the latest of which was in October 1980. Nor has France adhered to the Treaty, but has officially declared that it will in the future not carry out nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere. No such tests have been carried out by France since 1974.

India exploded a nuclear charge in May 1974, reportedly for peaceful purposes.

The United Kingdom and China have carried out similar numbers of tests - 36 and 27 respectively (Fig. 2).

- Today the British conduct one nuclear weapon test per annum, whereas China has only carried out two tests during the past five years.

The first French nuclear weapon tests were done in 1960. The number of tests per annum (Fig. 2) has generally been less than 10 with the exception of 1981 and 1982, when 11 explosions were recorded. During the past six years, an average of eight French explosions per annum have been observed.

Figures of the annual number of American explosions (Fig. 3) definitely changed in 1971, when the number of officially announced explosions was approximately halved. Since then the number has been about 15 per annum according to figures now available from the Swedish Defence Research Institute.

Statistics of the number of nuclear explosions carried out by the Soviet Union (Fig. 3) show a slight rising trend after the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. No small proportion of the Soviet explosions have, however, been carried out in areas outside the ordinary testing sites of Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya. These explosions can, therefore, have been carried out for non-military purposes.

Given the above premise, the number of Soviet nuclear weapon tests per annum is at about the same level as that of the United States of America (15) calculated over the 20 years since the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs = explosions carried out for non-military purposes) have been carried out by India, the United States and the Soviet Union (Fig. 4).

In the sixties and at the beginning of the seventies, the United States effected 38 PNEs which were part of the Plowshare Project. The purpose of this project was to study and develop the industrial use of nuclear explosions.

In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union shows that it is still greatly interested in nuclear explosions in association with non-military projects. Since the end of the sixties, 100 or so nuclear explosions have been localized to different places in the western part of the Soviet Union, to Siberia and to an area north of the Caspian Sea where the Soviet Union has large-scale extraction of natural gas and where nuclear explosions have been used to create underground storage for condensed gas. In recent years, the Swedish Defence Research Institute has registered series of explosions from two places north of the town, Astrakhan, and from a place west of Orenburg in that area. A series of six nuclear explosions was carried out within half an hour on one occasion on 24 September 1983 at one and the same place just north of Astrakhan.


The details given here are preliminary and may be amended should further information so require.

**FIG. 1** TOTAL NUMBER OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS  
PER ANNUM 1945 - 1983




**FIG. 2** NUMBER OF ATMOSPHERIC AND UNDERGROUND  
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS PER ANNUM 1945 - <983

ATMOSPHERIC  
UNDERGROUND






**FIG. 3** NUMBER OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS PER ANNUM CARRIED OUT BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION 1945 - 1983



**FIG. 4** ANNOUNCED UNITED STATES PNEs AND SOVIET EXPLOSIONS OUTSIDE THE ORDINARY TESTING SITES



|              | USSR      | USA       |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1961         |           | 1         |
| 62           |           | 2         |
| 63           |           | 4         |
| 64           |           | 8         |
| 65           |           | 3         |
| 66           | 1         | 7         |
| 67           |           | 4         |
| 68           | 1         | 4         |
| 69           | 4         | 2         |
| 70           | 3         | 1         |
| 71           | 7         | 1         |
| 72           | 9         |           |
| 73           | 5         | 3         |
| 74           | 3         |           |
| 75           | 2         |           |
| 76           | 2         |           |
| 77           | 5         |           |
| 78           | 7         |           |
| 79           | 8         |           |
| 80           | 3         |           |
| 81           | 5         |           |
| 82           | 16 (6)    |           |
| 83           | 13 (4)    |           |
| <b>Summa</b> | <b>94</b> | <b>40</b> |



|       | CHINA |   |   | FRANCE |   |   | INDIA |   |    | U.K |    |     | USA |     |     | USSR |     |     | A=Atmospheric<br>U=Underground<br>S=Sum |     |    |    |
|-------|-------|---|---|--------|---|---|-------|---|----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|---|-----|----|----|
|       | A     | U | S | A      | U | S | A     | U | S  | A   | U  | S   | A   | U   | S   | A    | U   | S   | A                                       | U   | S  |    |
| 61    |       |   |   | 1      | 1 | 2 |       |   |    |     |    |     | 10  | 10  |     | 30   | 2   | 32  | 31                                      | 13  | 44 |    |
| 62    |       |   |   | 1      | 1 | 1 |       |   | 2  | 2   |    | 38  | 58  | 96  | 41  | 1    | 42  | 79  | 62                                      | 141 |    |    |
| 63    |       |   |   |        |   |   |       |   |    |     | 4  | 25  | 29  |     |     |      |     |     |   |     |    |    |
| -5/8  |       |   |   | 2      | 2 | 2 |       |   |    |     |    |     |     |     |     |      |     |     | 4                                       | 27  | 31 |    |
| Total |       |   |   | 4      | 4 | 8 |       |   | 21 | 2   | 23 | 212 | 119 | 331 | 161 | 3    | 164 | 398 | 128                                     | 526 |    |    |
| 1963  |       |   |   |        |   |   |       |   |    |     |    |     |     |     |     |      |     |     |   |     |    |    |
| 5/8-  |       |   |   |        |   |   |       |   |    |     |    |     |     |     |     |      |     |     |   |     |    |    |
| 1964  | 1     |   |   | 1      | 1 | 1 |       |   | 1  | 1   |    | 14  | 14  |     |     |      |     |     |   |     | 15 | 15 |
| 65    | 1     |   |   | 3      | 3 | 3 |       |   | 1  | 1   |    | 29  | 29  | 29  | 6   | 6    |     |     | 1                                       | 39  | 40 |    |
| 66    | 3     |   |   | 4      | 4 | 4 |       |   | 1  | 1   |    | 29  | 29  | 29  | 9   | 9    |     |     | 1                                       | 43  | 44 |    |
| 67    | 2     |   |   | 5      | 1 | 6 |       |   |    |     |    | 40  | 40  | 40  | 15  | 15   |     |     | 8                                       | 56  | 64 |    |
| 68    | 1     |   |   | 3      |   | 3 |       |   |    |     |    | 29  | 29  | 29  | 15  | 15   |     |     | 5                                       | 44  | 49 |    |
| 69    | 1     |   |   | 5      |   | 5 |       |   |    |     |    | 39  | 39  | 39  | 13  | 13   |     |     | 6                                       | 52  | 58 |    |
| 70    | 1     |   |   | 8      |   | 8 |       |   |    |     |    | 29  | 29  | 29  | 15  | 15   |     |     | 1                                       | 45  | 46 |    |
| 71    | 1     |   |   | 5      |   | 5 |       |   |    |     |    | 33  | 33  | 33  | 12  | 12   |     |     | 9                                       | 45  | 54 |    |
| 72    | 2     |   |   | 3      |   | 3 |       |   |    |     |    | 15  | 15  | 15  | 19  | 19   |     |     | 6                                       | 34  | 40 |    |
|       |       |   |   | 3      |   | 3 |       |   |    |     |    | 14  | 14  | 14  | 22  | 22   |     |     | 5                                       | 36  | 41 |    |

1) Explosions 1945 - 1963 for which no dates are available

Appendix 1 (cont)

Nuclear explosions 1945-1983

|       | CHINA |   |    | FRANCE |    |     | INDIA |    |    | U.K |     |                  | USA |     |     | USSR |     |      | A=Atmospheric<br>U=Underground<br>S=Sum |    |   |
|-------|-------|---|----|--------|----|-----|-------|----|----|-----|-----|------------------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|------|---|----|---|
|       | A     | U | S  | A      | U  | S   | A     | U  | S  | A   | U   | S                | A   | U   | S   | A    | U   | S    | A                                       | U  | S |
| 73    | 1     |   |    | 5      |    | 5   |       |    |    |     |     | 12               | 12  |     | 14  | 14   |     | 6    | 26                                      | 32 |   |
| 74    |       | 1 |    | 7      |    | 7   | 1     | 1  |    |     |     | 9                | 9   |     | 19  | 19   |     | 8    | 30                                      | 38 |   |
| 75    |       |   | 1  |        | 2  | 2   |       |    |    |     |     | 17               | 17  |     | 15  | 15   |     |      | 35                                      | 35 |   |
| 76    | 3     | 1 | 4  |        | 4  | 4   | 1     | 1  |    |     |     | 15               | 15  |     | 17  | 17   |     | 3    | 38                                      | 41 |   |
| 77    | 1     |   | 1  |        | 6  | 6   |       |    |    |     |     | 12               | 12  |     | 18  | 18   |     | 1    | 36                                      | 37 |   |
| 78    | 2     | 1 | 3  |        | 7  | 7   |       | 2  | 2  |     |     | 13               | 13  |     | 27  | 27   |     | 2    | 50                                      | 52 |   |
| 79    |       |   |    |        | 9  | 9   |       | 1  | 1  |     |     | 15               | 15  |     | 29  | 29   |     |      | 54                                      | 54 |   |
| 80    | 1     |   | 1  |        | 11 | 11  |       | 3  | 3  |     |     | 14               | 14  |     | 21  | 21   |     | 1    | 49                                      | 50 |   |
| 81    |       |   |    |        | 11 | 11  |       | 1  | 1  |     |     | 16               | 16  |     | 21  | 21   |     |      | 49                                      | 49 |   |
| 82    |       |   |    |        | 5  | 5   |       | 1  | 1  |     |     | 17 <sup>*)</sup> | 17  |     | 31  | 31   |     |      | 54                                      | 54 |   |
| 83    |       | 1 | 1  |        | 7  | 7   |       | 1  | 1  |     |     | 14               | 14  |     | 27  | 27   |     |      | 50                                      | 50 |   |
| Total | 22    | 5 | 27 | 45     | 75 | 120 | 1     | 21 | 15 | 36  | 212 | 544              | 756 | 161 | 368 | 529  | 461 | 1004 | 1469                                    |    |   |

\*) On 23 September 16.00 GMT 2 devices were detonated simultaneously and are here counted as one explosion.



---

UNITED KINGDOM  
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  
VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE - THE CHALLENGE ELEMENT

1. To be effective and to maintain international confidence the proposed Convention will include procedures for mandatory routine international on-site inspection. However, to ensure that the Convention is properly observed in every respect, an additional element of challenge inspection is essential. The latter cannot be a substitute for routine international on-site inspection. But it can be an effective way of dealing with instances of suspected non-compliance which would not necessarily be revealed by regular inspection of declared facilities.

2. At the summer 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament, valuable discussion took place in Contact Group B on the structure and functions of the proposed Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs, on the specific issue of initiation of a challenge, on an ensuing request for on-site inspection, and the obligation of countries to accept such inspections as a result of a challenge. These issues were addressed in CD Documents CRP/87 and CRP/73 respectively. We hope that this paper, which deals with the challenge element, will help to clarify further the essential requirements for this important aspect of verification, thus enabling negotiations on this particular issue to reach a satisfactory conclusion.

The mandatory routine international on-site inspection regime

3. In summary, the proposed regime for mandatory routine international on-site inspection to ensure adequate verification of a CW Convention will fall into four parts

- (1) (a) regular verification of declared stocks and  
(b) continuous on-site inspection of their destruction,
- (ii) verification of the destruction of CW manufacturing and filling facilities, through on-site inspection and monitoring means,
- (iii) verification of permitted facilities for production of super-toxic chemicals for protective purposes,
- (iv) effective verification of non-production.

These requirements should be accomplished through routine international on-site inspection carried out by a team of regular inspecting teams following agreed procedures. This procedure should take into account inter alia the experience gained from the inspection procedures conducted by the IAEA. Such inspection procedures would be supplemented by continuous and comprehensive monitoring involving the use of appropriate instruments.

### The purpose of challenge inspection

4. Without generating political controversy, "routine" inspection of the sort just discussed should give a high degree of confidence that the Convention is being observed. However, because this category of inspection would be confined to declared sites and facilities, suspicions about possible or potential non-compliance with the Convention could still arise. To remove the grounds for any such suspicions would be the primary task of the challenge inspection regime. Separate and different from all the routine inspection procedures, and applying to all aspects of the Convention and irrespective of whether or not a site was declared, this regime would therefore:

- (i) deter evasion of obligations under the Convention by providing a means of uncovering and drawing attention to breaches of the Convention,
- (ii) provide a means of clarifying ambiguous situations, settling disputes and, on the assumption that allegations of evasion proved unfounded, restoring confidence;
- (iii) provide advance notice of possible breaches of the Convention, thus enabling States parties to take necessary action to ascertain the facts.

5. Given the role of the routine inspection regime, and provision in the Convention for States Parties to consult and co-operate amongst themselves, challenge inspection would only be requested in the event of a suspicion of a breach of the Convention, either at a declared facility or location which "routine" inspection had not revealed or at a non-declared facility or location for which the challenged country had not accounted in the course of co-operation and consultation.

6. The detailed arrangements for challenge inspection would fall under five main headings:

- (i) the machinery for carrying out challenge inspection,
- (ii) the criteria for ensuring that the inspections are objective and impartial,
- (iii) the basis for requesting challenge inspection,
- (iv) the rights and obligations of a challenged State,
- (v) the action to be taken in the case of refusal.

### Machinery

7. It has emerged from Group B discussions that there should be a Consultative Committee of States Parties, assisted in the discharge of its functions, including routine inspection and challenge inspection, by an Executive Council responsible for fact finding. To ensure the handling of cases of suspected non-compliance with the speed that will be necessary, it might be appropriate to provide in the Convention the means for the establishment of a separate fact-finding panel.

8. A State party which had reason to believe that another State party might not be in compliance with the provisions of the Convention or that an ambiguous situation had arisen, neither of which could be resolved through normal inspection in the case



of a declared facility, might seek clarification of the position through the appropriate organ of the Consultative Committee, by requesting the authorization of an on-site inspection and by submitting pertinent information. The Consultative Committee should seek within seven days, or such shorter period as it may decide, of receipt of such a request the necessary clarification from the State party in question. If no acceptable clarification is received within seven days, or such shorter period as the Consultative Committee may decide, of the request, then the Executive Council or fact-finding panel (if one is established) on behalf of the Consultative Committee should within a further seven days, or such shorter period as the Consultative Committee may decide, set in train an investigation involving prompt ad hoc on-site inspection, in order to clarify the position. A report on its work, whether interim or final, should be transmitted to the Consultative Committee within three months of the date of the start of the investigation. There should be provision for rapid decisions by voting in the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs.

9. If the State party's concerns about compliance have not been resolved within the three months referred to above it may request the Chairman of the Committee to convene a special meeting of the Consultative Committee to consider the outstanding issues of compliance.

#### Criteria for effective verification

10. As the Chairman of the Contact Group C has said in the context of discussions about a ban on the use of chemical weapons, reference to criteria for effective verification should be included in the Convention. He has put forward the following criteria for the verification of non-use of chemical weapons, some of which are generally applicable.

(i) urgency, promptness of the procedure, access to site (if considered necessary) within such time-lapse from the reported event as would theoretically permit the identification of a sample taken,

(ii) objectiveness, undisputed scientific quality of inspectors possibly assisted by experts from specialized international organizations such as WHO;

(iii) availability of information on occurrence of the chemicals under consideration in the region under consideration that can be explained to be of a non-hostile nature, co-operation with the national authorities of the parties to the conflict,

(iv) establishment of an indisputably impartial "chain of custody" with respect to a sample from the moment it is being taken to the moment of its scientific analysis,

(v) introduction of the result of the investigation in the relevant permanent body established by the Treaty for consultation.

11. These proposals raise a number of questions when applied to challenge inspection for all aspects of the Convention. There is a need for adequate urgency in carrying out an inspection. Time limits should be as short as possible, if international

confidence in the Convention is to be maintained. Hence the detailed proposals made in paragraph 8 above. They should provide an acceptable basis for this aspect of the Convention, although further details will still need to be resolved by further work (e.g. any necessary arrangements for objection to a particular inspector; difficulties about ensuring the safety of inspectors in zones of combat; and definition of the area of the site to be investigated).

#### Basis for Inspection Requests

12. Because of the wide range of different incidents which may concern the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs in the event of a challenge, it would be premature to specify in advance precise guidelines for determining whether a request for a challenge inspection was supported by adequate information. Each request for a challenge inspection would obviously need to be judged against the particular circumstances at the time. However, it is important that the relevant provisions of the Convention should reflect clearly that any request for challenge inspection should be considered where reasonable grounds for concern appear to exist. If an application for challenge on-site inspection were considered to be admissible, it would be necessary to follow up such a decision in whatever ways were most appropriate including the conduct of on-site inspection.

#### Rights and Obligations

13. Every State party should be under a stringent obligation to accept challenge on-site inspection. However, a State party may be reluctant to undertake the obligation to accept the principle of challenge inspection without any means of refusing it in exceptional circumstances. It is therefore vital to ensure that the scope for refusing an inspection is as small as possible and that any refusal will be a most unusual event. Refusal of a challenge inspection, for which reasonable evidence has been presented, and by extension repeated refusals, would be a serious action and call into doubt the purposes of the Convention. It would lead to follow up action as set out in paragraph 14 below and in certain circumstances would amount to prima facie evidence of a breach of the Convention.

#### Follow-up to refusals

14. The purpose of follow-up action would be to deter States parties from refusing a challenge inspection. A refusal to accept a challenge on-site inspection would, as a first step, automatically require the challenged party to propose within seven days of such a refusal, some alternative on-site inspection measures which could establish beyond reasonable doubt whether or not a case of non-compliance had occurred. If a State party were seen to be in breach of the Convention by refusing to propose alternative and acceptable measures, then the following actions could be taken:

- (i) such a refusal could lead to a more detailed presentation of information by the country making the request for a challenge inspection to the subsidiary organs conducting the investigation, and justify a renewed request for an inspection on that basis,
- (ii) in the case of a further refusal, there would then be immediate reference to the full Consultative Committee,

- (iii) if agreement still could not be reached within the Consultative Committee, the matter could be referred to the United Nations Security Council (notwithstanding the right of any State to refer to the Security Council at any time),
- (iv) in the last resort, withdrawal from the Convention, for which provision would be needed in its text.

15. This paper has dealt with the modalities for initiating a challenge on-site inspection. States parties to the Convention will also need to reach agreement on the arrangements for handling the outcome of any such inspection.



**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/432  
13 February 1984  
Original ENGLISH

---

LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1984 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF  
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A REPORT CONTAINING  
A DESCRIPTION OF AN ATTACK WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN PIRANSHAHR,  
IRAN

I have the honour to transmit to you a report describing one of the instances  
when chemical weapons were used by the Iraqi military.

The report describes the attack which was in the form of an air raid on  
9 August 1983 against the Iranian border town of Piranshahr, where poisonous gas  
bombs were dropped.

Annexed to the report are photographs of a number of victims of the  
August 1963 and several subsequent Iraqi chemical attacks.

You are kindly requested to regard the report as an official document of the  
Conference on Disarmament and to distribute it accordingly.

(Signed) Nasrollah KAZEMI KAMYAB  
Ambassador

**LETHAL EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEPLOYED BY THE INHUMAN REGIME OF IRAQ IN PIRANSHAHR**

The war is entering the fourth year since its inception and the propaganda machinery of the world oppressors blares forth tall tales of Saddam's dedication to peace, yet the Baathist regime of Iraq is resorting to more heinous war crimes all over the fronts.

Responsibility for crimes perpetrated against the Muslim people of Iran as well as Iraq, in flagrant violation of all humanitarian and international principles, undoubtedly rests upon the same international human rights organizations which have come out so brazenly in support of the Iraqi crimes by having recourse to a conspiracy of silence.

The deployment of chemical poison gases by the Iraqi regime in air raids against the border area of Piranshahr on 9 August 1983, exemplified the brutality of that regime. By this attack Iraq violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating poisonous or other gases.

By delivering toxic chemical agents, the Iraqi regime unleashed the lethal effects of the chemicals upon the area, seriously injuring over 50 military personnel as well as civilian people in Piranshahr.

This atrocity, like so many other calamities inflicted upon the Iran Muslims by the Iraqi invaders, evoked no response from the international human rights organizations other than absolute silence.

Details of the Attack

According to the victims who escaped alive and are now being treated for their injuries, the attack came at 7 a.m., 9 August 1983, six kilometres to the west of Piranshahr-Revanduz Highway.

According to eye witnesses an Iraqi plane flying very low and noiselessly over the positions of the Islamic combatants, targeted the infantry troops on the road and left the area after producing a terrible blast.

The Effects of the Blast

The troops in the area heard an explosion like that of an artillery shell, along with the explosion of the dropped bomb. They also saw a dark pillar of rising smoke. Several small groups of soldiers hit by the shock waves, dropped. The rest of the troops, unmindful of the likely dangers of a second strike by the Iraqi plane, ran to the rescue of their wounded fellow-combatants.

A pungent and nauseous stench of gas enveloped a large area around the explosion and a layer of dark powdery dust settled on all equipment in the area.

While the casualties were being carried to the hospital all the combatants who were around when the explosion occurred felt a stinging pain on their legs, backs, testicles and eyes. The pain obviously signalled the initial symptoms of contact with a noxious compound released by the explosion. The eyes of those affected became glazed, irritated and then gradually lost vision.

The injured were transferred first to hospitals in Piranshahr and Ogumieh; and after receiving primary medical care they were dispatched to Teheran to be given specialized treatment.

## DAMAGING PROPERTIES OF THE TOXIC AGENTS DELIVERED BY THE IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A specialist in dermatology in Teheran provided the following data in connection with the cases of victims of the Iraqi chemical bombs.

The victims, he said, had been poisoned by the toxic agents which the bomb had diffused over the area in various forms of gas, liquid and dust.

The analysis conducted in the chemical and pharmaceutical laboratories of the Teheran University School of Pharmacy revealed that the bomb delivered by the Iraqis had released nitrogenous compounds usually known as "mustard gas".

The noxious effects, the specialist explained, appear foremost on such sensitive tissues and organs as mouth, thighs, testicles and genitals. Among the first symptoms of contamination, he said, are irritation in the eyes and blurred vision. Also being heavier than air the compounds tend to spread low on the ground.

On the degree of toxicity of the chemicals, it was noted that in medicine controlled administration of nitrogenous compounds were employed to destroy cancerous cells. Whereas on direct contact with the chemicals, the mucous tissues of the mouth, nose and respiratory tract receive serious damage.

### Eye Witness Accounts by some Victims

Mr. A. Asadi, one of the victims, complaining of sores on his thighs and testis and anxious to return to the battlefield after the completion of his treatment, said that unlike other bombs no shrapnel or fragments flew out of this particular bomb. Another victim Mr. H. Mohammad Zadah, a member of the army personnel, suffering from inflamed eyes, said that direct light severely irritated his eyes.

Ali Ja'fari, a member of the mobilization forces (BASIJ), who had suffered most intense injuries, was in severe pain, and his physicians believed that though his treatment would be completed in a month's time most probably he would experience relapses, and the injuries of his eyes and body would re-emerge.

### FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC REPORTS OF VISITS TO THE INJURED

A group of foreign and domestic reporters, photographers and film makers visited, on 24 August 1983, the victims of the chemical attack who are under treatment in a Teheran hospital. The reporters and photographers having interviewed the patients and their physicians recorded their impressions of a fraction of human pain and anguish inflicted upon innocent victims through savage assaults of the Iraqi regime.

During this visit, the reporters of the foreign media and representatives of the news agencies observed the physical damage and bodily impairments of the victims caused by the poisonous agents released by the Iraqi chemical bomb.

The reporters were shocked and grieved to find that after 15 days of treatment the victims were still in pain from still-festering wounds.





# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/433 \*/  
22 March 1984  
Original · ENGLISH

---

## Agenda for the 1984 Session and Programme of Work of the Conference on Disarmament

(Adopted at the 242nd Plenary meeting held  
on 16 February 1984)

The Conference on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Conference, taking into account inter alia the relevant provisions of the Documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects,
- II. Chemical weapons,
- III. Other weapons of mass destruction,
- IV. Conventional weapons,
- V. Reduction of military budgets,
- VI. Reduction of armed forces,
- VII. Disarmament and development,
- VIII. Disarmament and international security,
- IX. Collateral measures, confidence-building measures, effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned,
- X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within the above framework, the Conference on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1984 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of Section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, would be considered by it:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

---

\*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

4. Chemical weapons.
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons-States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

#### Programme of Work

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Conference on Disarmament also adopts the following programme of work for the first part of its 1984 session:

- |                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
| 7 - 17 February          | Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the agenda and programme of work, as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions. |
| 20 - 24 February         | Nuclear test ban.  |
| 27 February -<br>2 March | Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.  |
| 5 - 9 March              | Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.  |
| 12 - 16 March            | Chemical weapons.  |
| 19 - 23 March            | Prevention of an arms race in outer space.   |
| 26 - 30 March            | Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.   |
| 2 - 6 April              | New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons.  |
| 9 - 13 April             | Comprehensive programme of disarmament.  |
| 16 - 27 April            | Further consideration of outstanding matters.  |

Informal meetings of the Conference will be held to continue consideration of the proposals submitted by members for its improved and effective functioning.

The Conference will consider the selection of additional members in pursuance of paragraph 19 of its report (CD/421).

Meetings of subsidiary bodies will be convened after consultations between the President of the Conference and the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, according to the circumstances and needs of those bodies.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet from 27 February to 9 March 1984.

In adopting its programme of work, the Conference has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/434  
17 February 1984

ENGLISH  
Original      RUSSIAN

---

## ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

### Memorandum of a group of socialist States

1. A group of socialist States members of the Conference on Disarmament recalls the provision in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, according to which the Conference on Disarmament, previously designated as the Committee on Disarmament, is "a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", and also rule 1 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, which describes it as "a disarmament negotiating forum". The General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly appealed to the Committee on Disarmament to undertake negotiations. In particular, resolution 38/183 I, entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament", once again urges the Conference "to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1984, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda ... and, in order to reach that goal, to provide the existing ad hoc working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, the ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, on the prevention of nuclear war and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

2. Emphasizing the character of the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating forum, the group of socialist States expresses concern at the fact that this negotiating body is, in substance, failing to perform its designated function and tending to turn into yet another deliberative body in the disarmament field. The main cause of this abnormal situation, in the socialist countries' view, are attempts to convert the Conference into a forum for academic discussions and to put up a series of preliminary conditions for the holding of negotiations. Such an approach, in the socialist countries' view, runs counter both to the terms of reference provided for the Conference in the Final Document and to its own rules of procedure.

3. The group of Socialist countries proceeds from the fact that the subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament, a negotiating forum, must have the possibility to conduct the appropriate negotiations. Only technical groups or groups of governmental experts, mentioned in rule 23 of the rules of procedure, may form an exception.

The question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies must be solved in a manner organically linked with the elaboration of an appropriate negotiating mandate. An artificial division between solving the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies and reaching agreement on their mandate merely creates loopholes to conceal the unwillingness of certain States to conduct negotiations.

4. Attempts made in the past to set up subsidiary bodies having no mandate to hold negotiations have shown that, despite the hopes placed in them in certain quarters, discussions in subsidiary bodies of this kind fail to lead to any constructive development of the position adopted by the opponents of negotiations.

5. In that connection, the group of socialist States proposes that in the course of the 1984 session subsidiary bodies should be established on all substantive items on the Conference agenda with mandates providing for the holding of negotiations. The group notes with satisfaction that the mandates of subsidiary bodies on the items "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" for the period of the 1983 session already provided for the holding of appropriate negotiations, as well as the fact that in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the agenda item "Chemical weapons" a recommendation was adopted to provide the corresponding subsidiary body which might be established at the 1984 session with a mandate "to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting".

With regard to the remaining substantive items of the agenda, the group of socialist States considers that it would be expedient to provide the following mandates:

(1) Subsidiary body on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban".

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body to negotiate on a Treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

(2) Subsidiary body on agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and clear disarmament".

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body for negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and especially to elaborate a nuclear-disarmament programme. The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

(3) Subsidiary body on agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body for negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, taking into account the documents referred to in General Assembly resolution 37/78 I as well as other existing proposals and future initiatives. The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

(4) Subsidiary body on agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, taking into account all relevant proposals, including the consideration of the proposal for a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

(5) Subsidiary body on agenda item 7, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons".

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body for

(a) Negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons,

(b) Negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,

(c) Negotiations with a view to solving the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, including the scope of such prohibition, taking into account all proposals submitted to the Conference to this end.

The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its negotiations in all three areas at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

6. At the same time, the group of socialist States indicates that it takes a positive view of proposals repeatedly advanced concerning the desirability of preparing standard terms of reference for subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament, which, of course, would provide for the holding of negotiations on the appropriate issues.

7. With regard to the designation of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament, the group of socialist States proceeds from the need to make full use of the provisions contained in rule 23 of the rules of procedure of the Conference. In particular, the group of socialist countries considers that it would be logical, in view of the change of name of the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament from "Committee" to "Conference", also to consider the question of appropriately changing the designation of its subsidiary bodies in accordance with the rules of procedure

8. Providing the subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament with the possibility of holding negotiations does not, of course, represent a guarantee of the successful solution of the problems facing it. There have been repeated cases of late where certain States have engaged in negotiations for the sake of negotiations, done everything to sidestep the solution of important issues, and failed to show the flexibility and political will necessary in order to reach agreement. Nevertheless, in the view of the group of socialist States, to provide the subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament with mandates to hold negotiations would render attempts to avoid serious negotiations more difficult and make them more obvious.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/435  
20 February 1984  
ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

---

## IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN THE FIELD OF THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

(Working paper submitted by a group of socialist countries)

The socialist countries regard the prohibition of chemical weapons as one of the most important tasks in the field of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. For many years they have persevered in making consistent efforts towards the elaboration of an international convention which would fully and completely prohibit this type of weapons of mass destruction and have submitted specific proposals designed to ensure the earliest attainment of that goal.

The recent proposal by the Warsaw Treaty Member States to the States Members of NATO to the effect that Europe should be free of chemical weapons is fresh evidence of the socialist countries' interest in the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The elimination of the chemical threat to the States and peoples of Europe would substantially reduce the risk of chemical warfare on the continent and, consequently, throughout the world and would make a start on the reduction of arsenals of chemical weapons. At the same time, the implementation of such partial measures of a regional nature in connection with the limitation, reduction and elimination of chemical means would assist efforts being undertaken at a global level - the speedy conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which remains the ultimate aim of the Warsaw Treaty Member States.

The efforts of the socialist countries aimed at activating the work of United Nations in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons are well known. It was on their initiative that the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly approved, in particular, resolution 38/187 A, urging the Conference on Disarmament to intensify negotiations so as to achieve accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to proceed immediately to drafting such a convention for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

Guided by the position of principle described on matters relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons, the socialist countries express the hope that the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament will be used from the outset by all participating States for the purpose of the earliest completion of work on the preparation of an appropriate convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction.

The socialist countries consider that efficient progress along that path would be assisted by the following

1. Bearing in mind that considerable preparatory work has been done over the years within the Committee on Disarmament and that, in the course of that work, the considerations of a large number of States on the whole set of issues relating to a future convention have been stated and considered in detail, it is necessary to embark without delay upon drafting the text of the convention in accordance with the newly adopted mandate of the subsidiary body of the Conference, providing, in particular, for starting the full and complete process of negotiations and developing and working out a convention.
2. The full and complete process of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons should cover all matters pertaining to the future convention and should be organized in such a way that the elaboration of the convention should proceed along two parallel paths the drafting of provisions on which agreement has been reached and the continuing search for mutually acceptable formulations of those provisions in respect of which divergencies remain between the positions of the negotiating parties.
3. The object of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament during the current year should be to submit to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, if possible, either an agreed draft convention or of a draft which, side by side with agreed and formulated provisions, would also reflect formulations proposed by the negotiating parties for provisions of the convention on which agreement has not been reached.
4. Negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons within the ad hoc subsidiary body should start as early as possible and should proceed without being limited by the time frame of the work of the Conference, i.e. the possibility should be envisaged of continuing them, if necessary, after the spring and summer parts of the Conference's session.

5. Taking into account the new designation of the multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters, the advanced stage of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the importance and great attention attached by the world community to the prohibition of this type of weapons, the appropriate subsidiary body of the Conference should be designated the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Within the framework of this Committee, it is advisable to set up separate working groups which would cover the full range of provisions of the future convention. Temporary subgroups, groups of "friends of the Chairman", etc., could, of course, be set up for the purpose of more detailed elaboration of specific provisions or formulations. The principle of balanced representation of various groups should be observed in the allocation of posts of chairmen of all subsidiary bodies of the Committee.

6. The establishment of the following working groups of the Committee could be envisaged.

On questions of the purposes and scope of the convention (definitions and criteria, basic undertakings formula; non-production, permitted activities, non-use of chemical weapons, relevant monitoring measures; preamble and final provisions, etc.),

On questions of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and the destruction of production facilities (first declaration, intermediate measures, destruction and monitoring);

On questions of compliance with the convention (international verification on request, national implementation measures, activities of consultative and preparatory committees, consultations and co-operation, consideration of complaints, etc.);

On questions of the structure of the convention (position of articles, their sequence, annexes, agreed interpretations, etc.).

7. The order in which separate provisions of the future convention are elaborated in the working group should take account of their importance and interrelationship and of the logical consistency and structure of the convention. It should be laid down at the very start of the Committee's work. In that connection, attention should be given, of course, to the practical possibilities of participation in that process by delegations of States members of the Conference on Disarmament.

8. Meetings of the Committee convened for the purpose of determining the programme of work, discussing and deciding upon other organizational matters, considering and evaluating results achieved in working groups and preparing progress reports to the Conference could be held when required, but, as a rule, approximately once every two weeks. Meetings of working groups or of their subsidiary bodies should be held not less than two or three times a week.

All this work could be done in the most flexible form possible in accordance with requirements and on the basis of an advance schedule of meetings of the Committee and its working groups covering the period until the end of April 1984. The sequence of work on formulations of issues to be considered at the summer part of the session of the Conference should also be specified in a general form.

In submitting the above considerations for the Conference's consideration, the socialist countries are guided exclusively by the desire to make decisive progress in the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. They believe that, given the political will for the prohibition of weapons of this type on the part of all countries parties to the negotiations, the problem before the Conference can be resolved in the interests of limiting the arms race and strengthening international security.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/436  
21 February 1984

ENGLISH  
Original SPANISH

---

## LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1984 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF MEXICO, PERU AND VENEZUELA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

The General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) at its eighth regular session, held in Jamaica from 16 to 19 May 1983, considered the question of a "report on the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into the Zone and areas of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands". The Conference adopted resolution 170 (VIII) on this matter by consensus, in which it decided "to transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session and to the Committee on Disarmament the text of this resolution with all the statements on the subject".

In accordance with the provision of the above resolution relating to the General Assembly, the heads of the delegations of Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela addressed a letter to the President of the General Assembly on 13 October 1983 requesting that the relevant documentation of the eighth session of the General Conference of OPANAL should be circulated as a General Assembly document. That material was circulated as document A/38/496.

Also in accordance with the above-mentioned resolution 170 (VIII), we have the honour to request you, in your capacity as current President of the Conference on Disarmament, to issue the necessary instructions to have document A/38/496 circulated as a Conference document.

Thanking you in advance for considering our request, we take this opportunity to present to you the assurances of our highest consideration.

(Signed) Alfonso García Robles  
Permanent Representative of Mexico  
to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed) Jorge Morelli Pando  
Head of the delegation of Peru  
to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed) Alberto López Oliver  
Permanent Representative of Venezuela  
to the Conference on Disarmament





UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
GENERAL

A/38/496  
13 October 1983  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/SPANISH

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda items 25 and 43

QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 37/71 CONCERNING  
THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE  
TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA  
(TREATY OF TLAHELCO)

Letter dated 3 October 1983 from the representatives of  
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,  
Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru,  
Uruguay and Venezuela to the United Nations addressed  
to the President of the General Assembly

The General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) at its eighth regular session, held in Jamaica from 16 to 19 May 1983, considered the question of a "report on the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into the Zone and areas of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands". The Conference adopted resolution 170 (VIII) on this matter by consensus, in which it decided "to transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session and to the Committee on Disarmament the text of this resolution with all the statements on the subject".

In accordance with the above resolution, we have the honour to request you to have this letter circulated as a General Assembly document, under items 25 and 43 of the agenda.

(Signed) Jorge GUMUCIO-GRANIER (Bolivia)  
Carlos ALBAN-HOLGUIN (Colombia)  
Fernando ZUMBADO JIMENEZ (Costa Rica)

|                          |                      |
|--------------------------|----------------------|
| Eladio KNIPPING-VICTORIA | (Dominican Republic) |
| Miguel A. ALBORNOZ       | (Ecuador)            |
| Egerton RICHARDSON       | (Jamaica)            |
| Porfirio MUÑOZ-LEDO      | (Mexico)             |
| Javier CHAMORRO MORA     | (Nicaragua)          |
| Carlos OZORES TYPALDOS   | (Panama)             |
| Javier ARIAS STELLA      | (Peru)               |
| Juan Carlos BLANCO       | (Uruguay)            |
| Alberto MARTINI-URDANETA | (Venezuela)          |

/...



CONTENTS

|  | <u>Page</u> |
|--|-------------|
| <b>ANNEXES</b>   |             |
| I. Note from the Embassy of Panama .....   | 4           |
| II. Resolution 170 (VIII): Report on the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into the Zone and areas of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands ..... | 6           |
| III. Statement by the General Secretary, Mr. José R. Martínez Cobo.....  | 8           |
| IV. Statement by the General Secretary of OPANAL .....   | 13          |
| V. Statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. David M. Edwards .....   | 14          |
| VI. Statement by the President of the Conference .....   | 15          |
| VII. Statement by the representative of the Argentine Republic, Mr. D. Atilio N. Molteni .....   | 16          |
| VIII. Statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. David M. Edwards .....  | 22          |
| IX. Statement by the representative of the United States of America, Mr. James L. Malone .....   | 23          |
| X. Statement by the representative of Argentina .....  | 24          |
| XI. Statement by the representative of Panama, Mr. José Guillermo Stoute .....   | 25          |
| XII. Verbatim record of the forty-ninth meeting .....  | 28          |
| XIII. Note from the Embassy of the United Kingdom .....  | 41          |
| XIV. Note from the delegation of the Argentine Republic .....  | 42          |

ANNEX I

Note from the Embassy of Panama

On 6 May 1983 the General-Secretary of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America received a note from the Embassy of Panama which reads as follows:

"Mr. General-Secretary,

"I have the honour to address myself to Your Excellency, and in view of the forthcoming Conference of the Agency, to present for your distinguished consideration, the interest of the Panamanian Government for the following topic to be included in the General Agenda, which we consider of regional and extra-regional interest to the aims of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

"Reports on the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the zone and areas of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

"The Government of Panama, inspired by the reiteration of the spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is concerned about any possible action which might be taken against the contractual obligations which we the countries signatories of the Treaty have committed ourselves to fulfil.

"On the basis of this, we thank you in advance for your kind attention to our request.

"I take the opportunity to reiterate to you, Your Excellency the expressions of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

"José Guillermo Stoute, F., Chargé d'Affaires ad interim (signature)."

Subsequently, the Panamanian Embassy sent another memorandum dated 9 May, in addition to the above-mentioned, which reads as follows:

"Mr. General-Secretary,

"In addition to our NOTE No. E.P.M 422/83 dated 6 May 1983, I am honoured to warmly greet you, Your Excellency, and to emphasize the interest of my Government to have the following sub-theme included in the General Agenda of the next Conference of OPANAL to be held in Kingston, JAMAICA, May 16 - 19.

"Reports on the introduction of nuclear weapons in the zone by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and in the Malvinas, Southern Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

"While the situation has been brought out by the Delegations of Nicaragua (23 May 1982, document S/PV.2362), Venezuela (22nd May, document S/PV.2362), Bolivia (22nd May, 1982, document S/PV.2362), Ecuador (21st May, 1982,

/...

document S/PV.2362), and Panama (22nd May, 1982, document S/PV.2362), before the United Nations Security Council during the South Atlantic Crisis, the Government of Panama attributes to this item presented to the Plenary of the next General Conference the greatest importance which it deserves.

"I thank you for your attention to this matter, taking the opportunity to reiterate the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

"José Guillermo Stoute, Chargé d'affaires ad interim (signature)."

/...

ANNEX II

RESOLUTION 170 (VIII)

Report on the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into the Zone and areas of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands

The General Conference,

Considering that the Governments of the States signatories to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have expressed categorically their determination that nuclear energy be used in Latin America exclusively for peaceful purposes, and, to that end, reaffirm their sovereign decision to establish a military nuclear-free Zone to keep its territories free, for ever from nuclear weapons,

Considering that the Argentine Republic has alleged in different international fora the presence of nuclear weapons in the British naval forces which operated in the area defined by paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty as a result of the conflict in the Malvinas/Falkland, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, stressing in the light of this event, the significance of the fact that the States which possess nuclear weapons carry out operations in which nuclear energy has been used for non-peaceful purposes,

Considering that spokesmen of the United Kingdom Government had declared on several occasions that it would not be in the interests of national security to depart from the established practice observed by successive Governments, neither to confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in a particular place at any particular time,

Considering that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has made the declaration which appears in document S/Inf.261 dated May 11, 1983,

Mindful that the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) must ensure compliance with the obligations of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

Reaffirming the need for the existence of a balance of responsibilities and obligations for the States which possess nuclear weapons and those which do not,

Resolves:

1. To take note with concern of the allegations formulated by the Argentine Government regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons, on the part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in areas included in the geographical Zone defined by paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

2. To take note of the statement by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to which the fourth paragraph of the preamble of this Resolution

/...

refers and which in its relevant paragraphs expresses: "The Government of the United Kingdom has scrupulously observed its obligations under Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas for which de jure or de facto it is internationally responsible and lie within the limits of the geographical Zone established in that Treaty. Further the Government has scrupulously observed its obligations under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty and has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas for which the Treaty is in force.";

3. To take note of the important statements and declarations made by the delegations of the Argentine and United Kingdom in this General Conference.

4. To express its concern over the fact that nuclear propelled submarines have been used in warlike actions in areas falling within the geographical Zone defined by paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty;

5. To urge all States for which the Treaty and its Additional Protocols are not in force, to take the necessary action in accordance with Article 28, to finalize the process of military denuclearization of the Zone of application as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty;

6. Reaffirm the commitment of all States bound by the Treaty and its Additional Protocols, to refrain from engaging in all activities which may endanger the military nuclear-free statute of Latin America, and to entrust to the Council of the Agency to oversee its strict compliance;

7. To transmit to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth Session and to the Committee on Disarmament the text of this Resolution, together with all the statements on the subject made at this Conference.

(Adopted at the forty-ninth meeting,  
held on 19 May 1983)

ANNEX III

Statement by the General Secretary, Mr. José R. Martínez Cobo

1. It gives great satisfaction to OPANAL that the eighth regular session of the General Conference is taking place in the capital of Jamaica, a sister nation which has always worked for peace and disarmament, and whose Government has continuously followed an intelligent international policy aimed at fostering closer ties and integration with other Latin American countries with which it not only shares geographic proximity but also a similar destiny.
2. For five years I had the privilege of being the Ambassador Plenipotentiary of my country to Jamaica. During that time I made frequent visits to this beautiful Caribbean Island to enjoy its scenery, always beautiful and green; and the splendid hospitality of its noble people. It was not in vain that Bolivar the Liberator came here, to this generous refuge, to state in his famous letters a dramatic call to the newly independent peoples, to wipe out any possibility of aggression and internal struggle thus forming a common and united front.
3. Being here, among the friendly Jamaican people, is not only a reason for joy, but the fact that this is the first occasion on which the General Conference is meeting in a non-Spanish speaking country, reaffirms that the States of the Continent understand the exceptional and exemplary nature of the establishment of the first, and to date, only nuclear-free zone in the world.
4. I believe I can speak for the General Conference and the Council of the Agency, when I extend special greetings to the Government of Jamaica headed by the Prime Minister, His Excellency the Hon. Edward Seaga, and convey the sincere gratitude of OPANAL for this generous offer made to hold this meeting here.
5. The Mexican people, through their legitimate and democratic Governments, which have always given its enthusiastic and decided support, have been the real promoters of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It is only fair to point out how positively and intelligently the work of this supreme organ of OPANAL was carried out at their last Regular and Extraordinary Sessions, by Ambassador Antonio González de León. We are happy that another distinguished member of the Mexican Foreign Service, Ambassador Jorge Montaña, has opened this session.
6. In this my first Report to the General Conference, in accordance with article 11, paragraph 4 of the Treaty, I give an account of the activities of the Agency from the date of my election until today. Of course, I will not repeat the statements made in that Report at this precise moment, but, I shall try to synthesize this document highlighting only those relevant events that have taken place over the last two years.
7. The eminent lawyer, internationalist and Mexican diplomat, Mr. Alfonso García Robles, having been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982, the highest honour to which any man can aspire, for his diligent and devoted work for disarmament, and for having been the inspiration and driving force behind the Treaty of Tlatelolco, bringing about recognition for the importance of the Treaty

/...

in the achievement of peace and civilized coexistence of the peoples of the nuclear-free Zone of Latin America.

8. The illustrious prize winner rightfully expressed to the United Nations General Assembly that the Nobel Peace Prize was also a tribute to Latin America as a whole, since the entire Continent participated in the arduous task that brought about the unanimous adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 as a commitment which conforms to the peaceful nature of Latin American peoples as also to the spontaneous need for survival of the countries of the region that wish their peoples to live without fear and to shape their development dynamically.

9. The most far-reaching and significant fact over the last two years was the ratification of Additional Protocol I by the only nuclear power in the Continent, the United States, after it had been unanimously adopted by the American Senate. Arising out of this ratification status of military denuclearization of Latin America now applies to the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the Guantanamo Base. As regards the so-called Panama Canal Zone, it became a military nuclear-free Zone as a result of the Panama Canal Treaty.

10. By its ratification of Protocol I, the United States is committed not "to test, use, manufacture or install nuclear weapons in any zone included in the Treaty of Tlatelolco". It is our duty to underline what was stated by the former Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, when he personally delivered to the Government of Mexico, depositary of the Treaty, the instrument of ratification: "This action complements the total commitment of the United States to respect the nuclear-free Zone of Latin America to which the Government of Washington attaches an importance that extends beyond the hemisphere, since it helps to stabilize world policy and reduces the risk of war".

11. The presence in South American waters of nuclear powered submarines and especially the allegation that the warships which participated in the South Atlantic conflict could be carrying nuclear devices, was a cause for deep concern and a justifiable uneasiness among the Governments Members of OPANAL and the Agency which I direct.

12. Although Article 5 of the Treaty clearly establishes that nuclear powered vehicles cannot be considered as nuclear devices, it is certain that the nuclear powered submarines that took part in the South Atlantic conflict were not on a peace mission, they participated in warlike actions, which lead to the conclusion that one of the nuclear powers used this energy militarily to defend its interests, which would be contrary to the political philosophy that inspired Tlatelolco.

13. The question could be more serious for the fundamental objectives of the Treaty in the situation where the warships that took part in the said conflict could have been carrying on board nuclear weapons, since as, regardless of any legal interpretation, obviously, by voluntarily committing itself not to manufacture nuclear devices, Latin America expressed categorically the wish to free the entire region from the terrible dangers attached to the application of nuclear energy for military purposes, and this sovereign decision taken by our peoples should be respected completely by all the States.

/...

14. It is certain that the Treaty, by reducing the world zones where a confrontation using nuclear weapons is possible and by limiting geographically the proliferation of these devices, not only made a great contribution to International Law, but also to the security of the hemisphere. Let us think only of how catastrophic for all our countries could have been a nuclear confrontation in the American waters of the South Atlantic. I am sure that the Conference, in dealing with this subject, will try to strengthen this Treaty and therefore, it is essential to conclude as soon as possible the process of denuclearization of the Zone, especially at this time when we have been able to notice the dangers that indicate the possible presence of nuclear devices in the region.

15. The need for the signature and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by all the Member States situated within its Zone of application, as soon as possible, has been and still is precisely the main concern of the secretariat of OPANAL. It is not necessary to reiterate here the negative effects which the fact that a reduced number of States of the region are not integrated into the Tlatelolco System, has on the efficacy of the Treaty. The highly positive attitude that has been adopted by the Governments of States situated within the Zone of application of the Treaty permits us to hope that in the near future all the countries will have signed and ratified the Treaty, thus concluding the long awaited process of denuclearization of our hemisphere. Perhaps, in order to accelerate this decision, it may be necessary to combine the efforts of all the Governments of Member States.

16. The status of the two Additional Protocols is highly satisfactory. The ratification of Protocol I by France is the only one pending, so that all the territories administered de jure or de facto by extracontinental powers within the Zone of application of the Treaty are to be considered technically free of nuclear weapons. There is confidence in the fact that France, a nation of glorious humanitarian tradition, will soon ratify this Protocol, since there are no fundamental objections.

17. With regard to Protocol II, the process has been concluded. All the countries possessing nuclear weapons have agreed not to supply in any form, directly or indirectly, such weapons to the Latin American countries and not use them against the States Parties to the Treaty. This definite guarantee eliminates the scepticism that some had about the future of the Treaty, taking into account that a Treaty had been concluded outside the context of the nuclear powers and without previously having obtained from them any guarantees in this respect.

18. The establishment of other nuclear-free zones continues to be only an aspiration of the International Community, effective realization of which is not foreseen in the near future, since none of the political circumstances that have obstructed or impeded its creation have disappeared. When the Tlatelolco Treaty was drafted it was thought that the Latin American Zone would coexist and co-operate with other Zones situated in various regions of the world, in order to carry out joint efforts for universal disarmament. Unfortunately, this has not happened; everything points to the fact that for a few years it will continue to exist as a unique example of the implementation of this visionary idea.

/...



19. This fact takes away from the Latin American Zone, the universal influence which it would have as an instrument of peace and international security if it coexisted along with other zones covering a great portion of the globe; consequently the United Nations is continuing its efforts in this direction. OPANAL has been invited to participate in a meeting of a group of eminent Government experts that will revise and up-date the study carried out in 1975 on nuclear-free zones by mandate of the General Assembly, since our Agency has a unique and privileged experience in this field from 16 years of fruitful work.

20. Efforts aimed at avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the Non-Proliferation Treaty have not produced the desired results. According to the Director of the IAEA proliferation is taking a dangerous course, as in addition to the five States recognized as nuclear powers, there are about fifteen other countries which can produce material suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, without the need for foreign assistance. These States are at present on the threshold of the nuclear arms race, as they possess the technological capacity to manufacture nuclear devices, but are legally prevented from doing so by having signed the NPT.

21. The constant increase in the number of countries that have chosen to use nuclear technology for warlike purposes, obviously constitutes a very grave danger to peace and the very existence of humanity. The presence alone of nuclear devices can lead to a catastrophe by mistake, mere chance or due to an irresponsible madness of which history has precedents. The problem of proliferation is not technological but rather political, the access to nuclear technology is made easier day by day. It is fundamental that the Governments understand that the non-acquisition of devices of this kind is in the interest of their own safety in order that efforts for non-proliferation and to establish nuclear-free zones may be successful.

22. Technological advances and major scientific discoveries should be in the service of all the peoples of the earth in order to facilitate the even progress of mankind. At the opening of the last session of the Conference, as head of the Delegation of Ecuador, I firmly maintained that the time had come to give OPANAL a new content and that this, necessarily, had to be the beginning of activities as co-ordination in the field of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Now as head of the Agency, I am convinced that although OPANAL has an appropriate legal structure, it lacks the economic resources and suitable technical personnel to function efficiently in this sphere.

23. We believe that Latin America is capable of incorporating as quickly as possible the immense benefits from nuclear science into the socio-economic development process of its peoples and we are convinced that any delay would be detrimental. Advances in this field are spectacular. It is imperative to expand the collaboration and exchange of experiences between the States in the region. It is necessary to accelerate the training of personnel and to effectively help those countries economically weaker in order to embark on the road to development. International and inter-institutional action is also required in this regard. OPANAL has intensified the close relationship which it has always had with the International Atomic Energy Agency and we are prepared to commence any collaboration with the Inter-American Committee on Nuclear Energy.

/...

24. The right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purpose is a feature of all the States which the Treaty of Tlatelolco itself recognizes and states, but the fact that the use of this energy can be diverted for warlike purposes forces the International Community to deal with the question of strict control in order to avoid any possible deviation. The control that the IAEA enforces through the Safeguards Agreements - those that have already been signed by 18 States Parties to the Treaty, functions without any problem and does not present any difficulty, so that the nuclear powers are sufficiently secure that the technological aid in the supplies of nuclear material will not be diverted in the Zone for military purposes, since the Treaty of Tlatelolco provides a legal and political basis for preventing it.

25. This Conference is meeting at a time when the world situation has seriously deteriorated, increasing the tensions and mistrust among the big powers, when an earnest dialogue does not exist between east and west for putting a stop to the arms race, neither between the north and south for reducing destabilizing gaps. The 1982 Nobel Peace Prize has just issued a dramatic warning: "Either nuclear weapons are eliminated or they will end civilization as we know it", summarizing the present world situation thus: "The accumulated arsenals could wipe out two hundred and fifty thousand million persons, that is to say, a number sixty times greater than the population of the planet".

26. In military circles they speak of a limited nuclear war or one that is restricted to the big powers through the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Nuclear war in essence defies geographic restriction. No territory on the planet and no inhabitant of the earth would escape the terrible consequences of a nuclear conflict. There is no possibility of limiting or prolonging it for a possible victory by any of the contenders. It would probably be the last war.

27. The very existence of humanity is based on something tragic: the so-called balance of terror. In the face of this dramatic scene, the importance of the Treaty of Tlatelolco stands out. The existence of a nuclear-free Zone which covers all the Latin-American territories is the most suitable path to avoid nuclear proliferation in our region and to give its inhabitants the confidence that they will not be victims of a holocaust. It is the duty of each and every one of us to strive to disarm consciences and to try to put the forces of death to the service of life.

28. This is the message of hope that I bring to the General Conference, to whose labours the Secretariat in my charge shall give their complete and unconditional support.

/...

ANNEX IV

Statement by the General Secretary of OPANAL

The Government of Panama, through its Embassy in Mexico, has requested the inclusion of the following additional item in the agenda of the eighth regular session: "Report on the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into the Zone and areas of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands". In accordance with rule 13 of the rules of procedure of the General Conference, the Government of Panama has also submitted an explanatory memorandum addressed to the General Secretary, stating the reasons for the inclusion of the item. Under the rules of procedure, it is for the General Conference to decide on the inclusion of additional items. Should this item be included by the Conference, it would have to be taken up within 24 hours of its inclusion in the agenda.

/...

ANNEX V

Statement by the representative of the United Kingdom,  
Mr. David M. Edwards

It is, of course, for the States members of the Agency to determine the agenda in accordance with the rules of procedure. My delegation represents a State which is not a member of the Agency, but which is a Contracting Party to Additional Protocol I. I am thus speaking on this point in accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the Conference. I wish to make the following points in connection with the item which has just been added to the Conference's agenda. The item seems to indicate that nuclear weapons were deployed by my country in the area covered by the Treaty, presumably in contravention of Protocols I and II. This, of course, is not the case, as my Government has very clearly stated on many occasions. I wish to draw attention in this respect to document S/Inf. 261 of 11 May 1983, in which the Government of the United Kingdom clearly indicated that it had scrupulously observed its obligations under Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty in not deploying nuclear weapons in territories for which the United Kingdom is internationally responsible within the Treaty's zone of application and in territories for which the Treaty is in force. In the circumstances, we are perturbed by the proposal contained in document CG/251. We trust that the Conference will act constructively in support of the objectives of the Treaty. In the view of my delegation, the inclusion of this item in the agenda runs counter to that end.

/...

ANNEX VI

Statement by the President of the Conference

I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his remarks and thoughts on the matter and am in full agreement as regards the constructive spirit which has always characterized the Agency's meetings. The very concept which gave rise to the Treaty has thus been given a fresh impetus, as was borne out by the three statements of this morning. The United Kingdom representative may rest assured that this spirit will continue to prevail. It is, in any event, the intention of the Conference that the document to which he referred should be circulated once the item has been taken up, but it is, of course, available to any delegation which requires it. Furthermore, it is my understanding that the inclusion of the item does not imply or prejudice in any way any particular situation. That is my understanding as a strict matter of law and it is on this basis that we are including it in the list of additional items. If there is no further comment or objection I shall consider item 4 duly adopted. Let us now move on to item 5 of the agenda: "Election of the President and two Vice-Presidents of the eighth ordinary session of the General Conference". I now invite nominations. I recognize the representative of Mexico.

/...

ANNEX VII

Statement by the representative of the Argentine Republic,  
Mr. D. Atilio N. Molteni

I wish to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you preside over the work of this important session of the General Conference of OPANAL. We are sure that your personal qualities and skill will guarantee the success of our endeavours. At the same time, the generous hospitality offered by the people and Government of Jamaica deserve our most sincere gratitude.

The signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 14 February 1967 marked not only the first international agreement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region, but also the first in the field of arms limitation, disarmament or collective disarmament measures to establish a system of monitoring through a permanent supervisory body. Hence the importance which we attach to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) as an effective means of ensuring compliance with the Treaty.

Argentina's involvement in negotiating the Treaty of Tlatelolco is well known, as is its view of the Treaty's intrinsic merits. As was stated by the delegation which participated in the seventh regular session, I must explicitly reiterate that the Argentine Republic, as a signatory, considers itself bound by the objectives and aims of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Argentine position, in common with its position on the Treaty as stated on 27 September 1967, predates the conflicts in the South Atlantic and hence the invocation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by the Argentine Republic is legitimate.

Similarly, the Argentine position on denuclearization is in accordance with the policy on general and complete disarmament which my country has consistently followed in international forums, with the agreements on safeguards which Argentina has signed, with the lines followed in its nuclear development for exclusively peaceful ends, and with its consistent and demonstrated policy of co-operation with countries in the region in the transfer of nuclear technology.

Resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly affirmed one of the basic principles of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - the need for an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. It was realized that it was unfair for the latter to renounce the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons without corresponding, specific undertakings on the part of the former. This resolution is expressly quoted in the Preamble to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

It follows from this consideration that, when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was negotiated, two fundamental problems arose. First, there was a need - duly met - for an agreement on the geographical delimitation of the zone to be covered by the Treaty, and, secondly, it was agreed that all the nuclear Powers should guarantee to respect fully the legal status of the zone. We are all aware of the specific stipulations which the Treaty and its Additional Protocols contain on these two matters, and I shall refer to them in due course.

/...

Yet it should be recalled that General Assembly resolution 3472 (XXX) defined the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones, and among them particular emphasis was placed on the obligation to respect fully the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone, which, of course, applies to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The point is that complete and indisputable respect for the denuclearized zones constitutes their very essence, since otherwise they would have no meaning.

The same sentiment was clearly expressed in paragraph 33 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) in the following words: "The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure". These concepts are further emphasized in other paragraphs of the Final Document, namely paragraphs 60 to 63, especially paragraph 62.

Thus, when the Argentine Republic and other countries questioned the presence of tactical nuclear weapons aboard the British colonialist fleet as being in violation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the charge applies with equal force to the undermining of the foundations of the denuclearized zones as recognized by the international community, because the continuing efforts made at the United Nations to develop the concept of such zones, as a means of protecting mankind from the dangers of such weapons, were in practice frustrated by a deliberate attitude on the part of the United Kingdom.

The Embassy of the Argentine Republic in Mexico has addressed notes, dated 21 and 29 April 1983, to the General Secretary of OPANAL, further to earlier communications relating to the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into the zone and the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

Reference was made in the first of the above notes to Argentine denunciations before the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament and the Non-Aligned Movement, and emphasis was given to the decisions adopted by the latter, important group of countries.

The second note was accompanied by other information relating to IAEA and to Argentina's views on the fact that the British fleet operated in the South Atlantic with its complete arsenal, including tactical nuclear weapons. My delegation will comment at length on the specific details of its denunciation when the item proposed by the delegation of Panama is taken up.

This question is of particular importance to the General Conference of OPANAL, since this is a problem arising between the Parties to the Treaty and the United Kingdom. The events in the South Atlantic are the first test of the effectiveness of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The folly of the action there affects, as we have already stated, the credibility of the agreements aimed at establishing

/...

denuclearized zones, and makes a mockery of international public opinion, which is becoming increasingly and ever more stridently critical of the very existence of nuclear weapons.

The United Kingdom Government has never given an adequate reply to the repeated appeals made in its Parliament, nor has it satisfactorily denied press reports in the United Kingdom and other countries that, in certain notes containing extremely precise data, reference was made not only to the presence of nuclear weapons, but also to the work undertaken to recover such weapons from sunken ships. Moreover, the presence of nuclear weapons in the South Atlantic was not denied by the United Kingdom Government when faced with governmental requests for information originating at the United Nations and elsewhere.

This attitude has not only given more weight to the questions raised as to the actual facts, but has also led to serious consequences which merit careful analysis by the General Conference, since there has been a conflict between two States connected with the Treaty: one which possesses and is the carrier of nuclear weapons; and the other which has no such weapons and which, in contrast, has devoted its nuclear programme exclusively to peaceful purposes, as determined on a continuing basis by the international monitoring system constituted by IAEA safeguards.

The mere presence of tactical nuclear weapons, which was not denied by the United Kingdom, an extra-continental Power and a member of NATO, represented a threat against the Argentine Republic, the target of the military action, and also a tangible danger for the countries of the Latin American region and a lack of respect for States which have sought, through the Treaty, an effective means of avoiding the warlike uses of nuclear energy.

The Argentine Republic maintains that the British colonialist fleet committed an act which involves the juridical and moral principles that constitute jus ad bellum, since it lost all sense of proportion by transporting nuclear weapons in its attack against an adversary which has none.

Faced with this, statements to the effect that the use of such weapons is "inconceivable" should be given short shrift in view of the fact that, at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom stated textually: "... such promises can never be dependable amid the stresses of war".

In addition, no one can guarantee, once weapons are there, that a decision in the theatre of operations will not unleash a nuclear attack. May there not be a breakdown in communications? May there not be a human error? May there not be an accident?

A recent work of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, entitled "Living with Nuclear Weapons" in describing various ways in which a nuclear war may begin, emphasizes specifically that mechanical accidents and human frailties may become highly dangerous in times of profound crisis or conventional war, during which the centres of command may be threatened or destroyed. The experience of the Sheffield should be taken as proof of this.

/...



In its turn, the recent pastoral letter of the United States bishops on war and peace, in dealing with jus ad bellum, expressly refers to the possibility of the accidental detonation of highly destructive weapons as a factor conducive to creating a climate of general insecurity.

The only possible conclusion is to admit that by the dispatch, which has never been denied, of tactical nuclear weapons to the South Atlantic in its fleet of aggression, the United Kingdom created a situation of nuclear danger which, either by a decision of the carriers themselves, because of the very characteristics of the conflict or due to accidental causes, could have had unforeseeable consequences in Latin America

Those nuclear-weapon States which ratify the Protocols annexed to the Treaty of Tlatelolco undertake to implement the provisions of articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty (in the case of Additional Protocol I), and to respect fully the statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes in all its express aims and provisions (in the case of Additional Protocol II). The United Kingdom has ratified both Protocols.

Article 1 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco explicitly prohibits any form of possession of any nuclear weapons. If a country which is legally bound by this Treaty decides to send its fleet with nuclear weapons to the zone delimited by the Treaty and if, invoking reasons of national security at the time concerned, it fails to deny the existence of such weapons even when faced with legitimate inquiries from other States, there is an undeniable right to ask what importance the nuclear Power in question attaches to the denuclearized zone and what security will have been achieved by the countries of the region which, for their part, have assumed, or are prepared to assume, a series of obligations subject to maximum control and verification.

Only now, and extempore, the Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco are being formally notified of a statement by the United Kingdom Government in which that Government claims to have scrupulously complied with its obligations under Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty and not to have deployed nuclear weapons. Leaving aside for the moment the problems arising from verification of this alleged conduct, we consider that this note does not adequately cover the obligations assumed by the United Kingdom.

In any case, this statement does not deny the presence of nuclear weapons in the fleet. It merely alleges that nuclear weapons were not deployed in the areas referred to in Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II, but conversely it suggests, and with reason, that the zone delimited by the Treaty in article 4, paragraph 2, has been ignored by the United Kingdom and hence, in our opinion, the ultimate aims of the Treaty of Tlatelolco have been vitiated.

It cannot be denied that the essential objective of the Treaty is the establishment of an extensive geographical zone, defined in article 4, which involves the establishment of a real zone of Latin American security or a zone free from any use of nuclear energy for warlike purposes. To be specific, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the above-mentioned zones cannot be justified

/...

by the United Kingdom's restrictive interpretation, because the aforesaid basic aim of the Treaty was ignored if we take into account the movements and specific military objective of the colonialist fleet.

The concept of the delimitation of a zone of this character by the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been recognized by the international community in a large number of resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations (all of them adopted without a single vote against), especially resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, in which the Assembly welcomed with special satisfaction the Treaty of Tlatelolco and called upon "all States to give their full co-operation to ensure that the régime laid down in the Treaty enjoys the universal observance to which its lofty principles and noble aims entitle it".

The aim of the United Kingdom is to reduce and diminish the scope of its obligations vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon Latin American zone. In doing so it is introducing an element of grave juridical insecurity since, on the basis of an ad hoc unilateral interpretation devised in order to satisfy its ambitions to perpetuate its colonialism, it is endeavouring to restrict the scope and status of the zone which the Latin American countries wish to set free from the scourge of the warlike uses of nuclear energy, which includes not only the use of nuclear weapons but also their possession in any form in the zone and the use in the zone of nuclear propulsion for warlike purposes. In this connection we must remember the action taken by the United Kingdom which resulted in the criminal sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, with the loss of 321 lives, by a British nuclear submarine.

In its note the United Kingdom states that it has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas referred to in Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty, but these assertions cannot be verified by the Parties to the Treaty. In this connection it must be remembered that, as stated in document COPREDAL/CC/S/6 of 4 August 1965, the United Kingdom expressly reserved the right not to accept any kind of inspection on its military aircraft or vessels.

It is obvious that the eighth Conference of OPANAL cannot remain indifferent to acts which affect the credibility, effectiveness and future of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. In a world in which international crises occur with lamentable frequency and are becoming increasingly severe, the security to which the Latin American countries are entitled must be reaffirmed and guaranteed by appropriate juridical measures.

It is for this reason that my delegation is convinced that this Conference shares the views it has expressed, namely, that the United Kingdom's warlike use of nuclear energy and its introduction and possession of nuclear weapons within the non-nuclear-weapon Latin American zone should be condemned. Similarly, the unsatisfactory and inadequate nature of its replies means that consideration should be given to providing express and verifiable safeguards on commitments entered into, and to excluding interpretations aimed at limiting their scope. In this way it would be possible to guarantee the withdrawal from the non-nuclear-weapon Latin American zone of any United Kingdom nuclear weapon and any other warlike nuclear device, irrespective of its nature. Also, consideration should be given as a

/...

matter of urgency to appropriate mechanisms for preventing any contingency whereby the non-nuclear-weapon Latin American zone could be infringed as the result of action by a nuclear-weapon Power.

COPREDAL resolution 20 of 14 February 1967, contemporaneous with COPREDAL resolution 21 in which the Treaty of Tlatelolco was adopted, justly recognized the sovereign rights of the Latin American countries vis-à-vis the claims of extra-continental Powers. Such was the case inasmuch as the preparatory conference for the Treaty was fully aware that the maintenance of the territorial integrity of a State assumes particular importance by virtue of the objectives of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

Thus the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution 37/9, adopted on the initiative of the Latin American countries, will add to the effectiveness of the Treaty under which we are meeting today.

The introduction of British nuclear weapons into the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone and the warlike uses of nuclear energy by the United Kingdom, calculated to consolidate its colonial presence in the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, demonstrate that the continuation of this colonial situation threatens the security of the region and that it must therefore be speedily eliminated.

This General Conference of OPANAL is a propitious occasion on which to reiterate the gratification of the Argentine Government at the well-deserved award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Ambassador Alfonso García Robles.

In common with various previous Argentine delegations in different disarmament forums, we, too, wish to congratulate Mexico and, indeed, the whole of Latin America on the award bestowed on Ambassador García Robles.

ANNEX VIII

Statement by the representative of the United Kingdom,  
Mr. David M. Edwards

Mr. President, a few minutes ago we heard a long statement by the Argentine delegation which contained a series of points relating to my country.

These points are either inaccurate, biased, misleading, or simply mistaken. With your permission, my delegation wishes to exercise its right of reply to these unfounded allegations when we take up the additional item which the Conference included in its agenda yesterday, at which time my delegation will have an opportunity to study the Argentine statement.

/...

ANNEX IX

Statement by the representative of the United States of America,  
Mr. James L. Malone

With respect to comments made by a few delegations this afternoon, I would like to restate a long-standing United States view - supported both in negotiating history of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and State practice. That is that the United States believes that the Treaty and its Protocols do not affect the right to exercise freedom of navigation of the high seas, to undertake innocent passage through territorial waters, nor affect the sovereign right of the territorial States to grant or deny transit rights.

The United States does not believe that the actions of British naval forces in the South Atlantic were in any way inconsistent with its obligations under Protocols I and II. The Secretary-General's report in paragraph 16 states that the issue before this General Conference is in fact political rather than legal. It is important that this Conference not permit the lingering bitterness of the South Atlantic conflict to result in questioning the legal basis of the Treaty régime that has been established through the years with regard to freedom to navigate on the high seas and to transit rights.

/...

ANNEX X

Statement by the representative of Argentina

My delegation is surprised at the remarks just made by the United States representative. We are surprised by his delay in making remarks of this kind, because my delegation has frequently referred to the presence of nuclear weapons aboard the British fleet in the South Atlantic. In due course, when the item is taken up, we shall reply to the representative of the United States. I merely wish to state, in connection with the legal points raised by the United States delegation, that a distinction must be drawn between transit and the aggressive intent of the British fleet. A ship sailing through a particular area with the aim of crossing it so as to reach other ports is one thing, but when a fleet with nuclear weapons has a specific military aim of military action and confrontation in view, that is quite another. As I have said, when the time comes we shall reply to this statement.

/...

ANNEX XI

Statement by the representative of Panama,  
Mr. José Guillermo Stoute

First of all, in my brief statement, allow me to thank, through you, Mr. President, the Jamaican Government and people for their generous hospitality which, without any doubt, has facilitated and stimulated this major international gathering. My delegation wishes to express its gratification and satisfaction at the constant readiness of this fraternal country to seek ingenious forms of regional and extra-regional coexistence.

It is an honour for me to transmit to the representatives my Government's best wishes. May this plenary session of good-neighbourliness and friendly solidarity continue to be one of the forums for the peaceful settlement of disputes and, in the spirit of our Treaty of Tlatelolco, for furthering the desire of our peoples for the well-being of all in a context of international peace and security.

The Government of Panama wishes to reaffirm its devotion to the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, particularly with regard to the establishment of a Latin American zone, denuclearized in respect of warlike purposes, and its desire to reach and participate in the qualitatively higher stage of general and complete disarmament.

These two necessary and complementary aspirations constitute the foundations of the concord and tranquillity which are essential for the national development of our countries. Fortunately, Latin America has not been physically involved in the major military confrontations which, in this century, have wreaked havoc on the international community.

Yet neither have we been immune from them. Whereas in earlier days Latin American involvement in extra-continental wars was confined to evoking the general principles of international law and reason, today, regrettably, we find ourselves caught up in the web of the interests and policies of international power which may assume uncontrollable if foreseeable forms.

My delegation ventures to state, given our inability to remain aloof from the manoeuvres of the predominant international Powers and the rules they establish, that we are all concerned by the spreading areas of regional conflict, which may suddenly become international in scope in the form of new political developments that transform our historical vision of peace into a future shaped by a painful reality, which we are already experiencing and which affects us all.

It is also improbable that, with agreements between the great Powers on détente and peaceful coexistence among themselves still under negotiation, the correlation of forces will be such as to bring about an early understanding which will stabilize, or seek to stabilize, Latin American regional zones of conflict.

/...

Yet it would be a fundamental error for us to presume that it is only in cases where conflicting extra-regional interests are involved that there is an ideological, economic and cultural issue which has polarized integration and development efforts in the geographical area in which we live.

Phenomena such as the high illiteracy rate, the inequitable system of land tenure, the need for structural agrarian reform and the unequal distribution of wealth are some of the principal factors which set patterns of social and economic imbalance, which in turn have a fundamental effect on the cycle of under-development. As we can appreciate, this state of affairs is at the root of regional conflicts and the absence of negotiated settlements contributes to the escalating tension.

The reasons for violence have been studied as a critical problem in recent years. Emphasis is mistakenly placed on the theory that the international order is affected by unforeseeable causes or by conflicts of interests, while it is forgotten that the cause lies in the anachronistic persistence of the primacy accorded to policies for perpetuating a past era, policies which are incompatible with the mandate of our peoples.

The Government of Panama shares the concern of our hemisphere that the events which took place last year in the South Atlantic involved the presence of nuclear weapons in surface vessels and submarines belonging to an extra-continental Power, constituting a serious threat to the principles of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

It is not necessary for such weapons to be deployed when their mere presence represents a latent danger and a trigger which may precipitate a nuclear conflagration. Equally, the innocent transport of nuclear weapons raises the possibility of an accident with devastating effects on the countries of the area.

Although the Argentine Republic has not, to date, ratified the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, it is clear that, with its security threatened, it must denounce an extremely serious act of war, in which nuclear weapons might have been involved. As we all know, the intent in drafting the Treaty was for it to be signed and ratified by all the countries of Latin America, in furtherance of regional peace and security. That is the context in which we are considering the Argentine denunciation.

My delegation feels that, if there is no adequate control through effective machinery, over the movement of military transports carrying nuclear weapons in the island and continental areas of Latin America, we shall be constantly preoccupied with the fact that this latent threat may cause serious destruction in our geographical zone.

My delegation considers it relevant to point out that the Republic of Panama, in its desire for caution to prevent any inappropriate or indiscriminate use of atomic energy, secured the inclusion, in article XII of the new Panama Canal treaties, of a provision to prevent the United States of America from using nuclear excavation techniques, without the prior consent of Panama, for the construction of a sea-level canal.

/...



The Government of the Republic of Panama, in requesting the inclusion of the additional item in the agenda of OPANAL's eighth regular session, wished to put on record its concern regarding the issue of the alleged presence of military nuclear devices in the Latin American environment.

Nevertheless, we may rest reassured if we receive responsible explanations, provided that their real purpose is to exclude, forever, the presence, deployment or actual use of nuclear weapons in the zone covered by article IV of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

My delegation, in the light of recent experience, believes that the Treaty of Tlatelolco will emerge strengthened, since its signatories will have to adopt a firmer stance, one of respect and utter commitment, in favour of a lasting peace for all.

My Government believes that it is imperative for us soon to find ways and means of providing an appropriate starting-point for a new regional and extra-regional relationship which will promote an atmosphere of lasting and just peace and whose basis will be fully concordant with our own social, economic, cultural and political criteria.

We thus reject the simplistic approach taken by the parties involved to the problems of Latin America, particularly Central America, with its return to a divided, bipolar world. Such a view cannot be accepted since it is not sufficiently broad.

The time for negotiation is brief, both for the current situations of conflict and for those which seem to have changed. It is, perhaps, late to try to reconcile conflicting interests but there is definitely still time to convert belligerence into a regional association of tolerance through the common battle against fear and under-development.

/...

ANNEX XII

Verbatim record of the forty-ninth meeting

President: Mr. Lloyd M. H. Barnett (Jamaica)

Vice-Presidents

Mr. Antonio Oviedo

(Colombia)

Mr. Marcola Prieto

(Costa Rica)

Contents

Agenda

(Doc. CG/258)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Report on the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into the Zone and areas of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.
3. Other business.

The President, Mr. Lloyd M. H. BARNETT, representative of Jamaica: The meeting is called to order. I wish to make the best use of the time available and would like to suggest to you informally that we adopt the agenda and begin the discussions while the documents are being distributed, in both English and Spanish. There being no objections to this proposal, while we are speaking the texts will be corrected and circulated as soon as they are ready. I recognize the representative of Panama.

The representative of Panama, Mr. J. Guillermo STOUTE: In its statement yesterday morning, Panama made some general comments which, it hopes, were sufficiently clear to explain the reasons why the Panamanian Government is requesting the inclusion of the item of concern to us. So as not to prolong the present debate, we will provide the interested parties with additional information, if necessary, through the regular channels of our respective Foreign Ministries.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Panama for introducing this agenda item. Does any other speaker wish to take the floor? I remind the Conference that during the general debate on the General Secretary's report, when this item was referred to, the representative of the United Kingdom requested the right to reply at the appropriate time. I feel that this is the appropriate time and I therefore call upon the representative of the United Kingdom to make his statement.

The representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. David M. EDWARDS: In the general debate on Tuesday of this week, the Argentine delegation made a number of serious allegations against the United Kingdom. Many of these were framed in

/...

polemic terms, were based on hypothetical criteria or were largely irrelevant to the real work of this Conference. Most of them have already been made in other forums, and my Government has repeatedly stated its position on them. As indicated in previous statements, my delegation's intention is to make as constructive a contribution to this Conference as is possible in our capacity as a non-member State of the Agency. I therefore propose to limit this statement in right of reply to those matters raised by the Argentine delegation which may reasonably be considered to be of direct concern to this Agency. The Argentine delegation has sought to take advantage, in pursuit of its own political ends, of the long-standing practice of successive British Governments neither to confirm nor to deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in a particular place at a particular time. This is a practice which is based on valid reasons of security and of weapon safety and is followed also by other nuclear-weapon States. However, in recognition of the international legal obligations undertaken under the Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, we have on a number of previous occasions made a clear statement of our position. In Conference document S/Inf.261 of 11 May 1983, we pointed out that the United Kingdom had scrupulously observed its obligations under the Additional Protocols to the Treaty, firstly, in not deploying nuclear weapons in territories for which the United Kingdom is internationally responsible within the Treaty's Zone of Application; and secondly, in not deploying such weapons in the territories for which the Treaty is in force.

The delegation of Argentina has accused the United Kingdom of seeking to restrict the scope and applicability of the Zone of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It is not the United Kingdom which has sought to impose any geographical limits to the Zone of Application of the Treaty. Rather, it is Argentina, by its failure to ratify the Treaty, which has placed serious limitations on the Zone of Application.

In addition, the Argentine delegation asserts that the United Kingdom has attempted to restrict and belittle the scope of its obligations in regard to the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. At least the United Kingdom has obligations. The United Kingdom has accepted formal legal obligations under the Protocols, while Argentina has not even ratified the Treaty. The Argentine delegation has said that its country feels committed to the objectives of the Treaty. But this is a very different matter from undertaking specific and clear legally-binding obligations under international law.

The Argentine delegation has said that its nuclear programme is dedicated exclusively to peaceful uses. Why then does it not ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Non-Proliferation Treaty and conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, thus contributing to the international confidence that is necessary in these matters?

The Argentine delegation has referred to the preambular paragraph of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which recalled United Nations General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and duties for the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Consistent with the spirit of that resolution, the United Kingdom gave its Negative Security Assurance in 1978 to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or

/...

acquire nuclear explosive devices, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Because Argentina has not ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, our Negative Security Assurance does not technically apply to it, but we still remain ready to apply our Assurance to it in practice. In this connection, the United Kingdom stated categorically at the outset of the Falklands conflict that it was inconceivable that we would use nuclear weapons.

The Argentine delegation has drawn attention to a statement by the British Prime Minister at the second special session on disarmament which they have taken out of context. In pointing to the limited value of assurances, Mrs. Thatcher was discussing the first use of nuclear weapons between nuclear-weapon States. Her remarks were not intended to cast doubt on the assurances we give to non-nuclear-weapon States. As Mrs. Thatcher pointed out in the same paragraph of her speech, the fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons of particular types. It is the disposition on the part of some States to impose change on others by resorting to force. In the course of their statements the Argentine delegation made reference to a number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions. My delegation would wish to recall that Argentine action over the Falkland Islands was a flagrant act of unprovoked aggression and that Argentina refused to act in accordance with a mandatory Security Council resolution to withdraw its forces. British action in self-defence was totally in accord with the United Nations Charter.

The Argentine delegation raised the question of the dangers arising out of the loss of nuclear weapons as a result of an accident or incident. My Government has stated categorically, and repeats that statement now, that there has never been an incident anywhere involving a British nuclear weapon leading to its loss or to the dispersal of radioactive contamination.

The Argentine delegation also alleged that the sinking of the General Belgrano by a nuclear-powered submarine had constituted the military use of nuclear energy in violation of the Treaty. This allegation had already been made by the Argentine representative at the plenary meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 11 May. In this regard, I would point out that vessels propelled by nuclear power are not regulated by the Treaty. The Treaty's full title, "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", makes it clear what it is intended to cover. In addition, article 5 of the Treaty excludes means of propulsion, and the definition of nuclear weapons in that article cannot embrace, for example, nuclear-propelled submarines. Mr. President, even if the Treaty did apply to nuclear-powered submarines (which, as I have explained, it does not) I would remind the Conference that the United Kingdom's obligations under the Additional Protocols apply, firstly, to the territories for which it is internationally responsible within the Treaty's Zone of Application and, secondly, to the territories for which the Treaty is in force. These obligations did not apply, therefore, to the site of the sinking of the General Belgrano.

The Argentine delegation has pointed out that the United Kingdom's statements concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons cannot be verified by the Parties to the Treaty. I can only say in this connection that the articles of the Treaty concerned, numbers 6, 15, 16 and 20, do not apply to the United Kingdom as a Party to the Additional Protocols.

Arising out of the statement of the Argentine delegation, there was some discussion about the transit of nuclear weapons through the Zone of Application of the Treaty. The United Kingdom considers that such transit of nuclear weapons is consistent with our obligations under the Additional Protocols and that this is clear from the negotiating history of the Treaty. In this respect, therefore, our position is the same as that of the United States and France.

In closing I should like to say that, in my delegation's view, the basis of the strength of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been its ability to transcend political and ideological differences between member States themselves and other States linked to the Treaty in pursuit of the common objective of keeping Latin America and the Caribbean free from the risk of nuclear war. We fully support this objective and trust that this body will be able to continue unhindered its important task of strengthening the Treaty and its efforts to promote the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement. I take it that the representative of Argentina would like to exercise his right of reply, and I therefore recognize him.

Mr. Atilio N. MOLteni (Argentina): My delegation would like to make use, very briefly, of the right of reply. In due time, many of the statements made by the delegation of the United Kingdom will be the subject of an appropriate reply by my delegation, which will be submitted to the members of OPANAL, but there are some comments made by the United Kingdom delegation which oblige me very briefly to recall some aspects related to this problem and to the item introduced by the delegation of Panama. One of the aspects mentioned was the position of my country with respect to the non-proliferation Treaty; it is well known that not only Argentina but also other States consider this to be a discriminatory Treaty and have repeatedly stated their objections to it. Moreover, everyone knows of the failure of the Conference which at one time considered the revision of this Treaty.

The position of Argentina was also called into question with regard to ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; in this respect, I would like to draw attention to OPANAL resolution 141, adopted at the last regular session, which expressly notes, in paragraph 5, that the Government of the Argentine Republic, in view of its inclusion in the non-nuclear-weapon Zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has initiated negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to formulating the safeguards agreement which would be applicable to this country on the basis of article 13 of the Treaty. In other words, the position of my country with respect to ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been expressly recognized by OPANAL.

Moreover, the statements of my delegation in support of the objectives and goals of the Treaty of Tlatelolco are well known, and I reiterate them. The United Kingdom delegation has also mentioned again the note which it recently sent to OPANAL, on 11 May, in which it comments on the Argentine objections to the possession of nuclear weapons in the Zone and in the Malvinas, Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. My delegation sent a note to OPANAL in which we analysed the British statements: in it we raise the point that the United Kingdom note is

/...

unsatisfactory and insufficient because it does not deny that the British colonialist fleet was sent to carry out operations in the Latin American non-nuclear-weapon Zone with its complete arsenal, including nuclear-propulsion devices and nuclear weapons; it does not deny the subsequent introduction by its fleet of nuclear-propulsion material and nuclear weapons in the Zone described in article 4 of the Treaty, and it does not deny the possible introduction and maintenance of nuclear weapons in the Islands.

We have just heard a statement by the United Kingdom representative which limits even further the obligations inasmuch as that representative recalled that, according to the terms of the Protocol, it is not obligated by specific terms of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Moreover, the United Kingdom note only refers to deployment; it does not cover other obligations which are specially provided for in article 1 of the Treaty concerning the receipt, storage, installation or any form of possession of nuclear weapons.

The United Kingdom delegation has referred to the sinking of the General Belgrano. The situation is well known in which that ship was sunk outside the zone unlawfully declared by the United Kingdom to be an "exclusion zone" at a time when it was carrying out military operations. Also well known today are the negative implications which that event had as regards a possible process of negotiation which might have averted the bloody consequences of the Malvinas problem.

As for the transit of nuclear weapons, my delegation has already stated that there is a fundamental difference between the transit of nuclear weapons and the transport of nuclear weapons by a fleet which has been sent to carry out military operations against another State, and it is precisely on this illegality that my delegation has based what the United Kingdom delegation considers to be polemic, hypothetical and irrelevant charges and allegations. Given the nature of the debate, my delegation could go on and introduce a series of points which, we are sure, would enlighten the delegations, but we do not think that this is the appropriate time.

The United Kingdom delegation has mentioned Security Council resolution 502 (1982). The interpretation of this resolution is well known. But he did not refer to General Assembly resolution 37/9 which, precisely, has to do with the United Kingdom's non-compliance with the aforesaid resolution, which was initiated by the Latin American countries, and this is an example of the attitude being taken by this State which, on the one hand, invokes texts adopted by the United Nations and, on the other hand, ignores completely texts which still reflect a majority opinion of this General Assembly.

In order not to prolong the debate, I repeat that we will in due course make known our position on the United Kingdom reply.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement. I take it that there are no more speakers for until we have the resolutions and, as I have been told that these are nearly ready and will be circulated very soon, with your permission we shall proceed to other topics and come back to this one as soon as we have the resolutions. Do I hear any objection?

/...

On the item "Other business", you have a draft resolution which has already been circulated as document L.191. It refers to the bicentenary of the birth of Simón Bolívar. If you have no objection to the draft, we shall consider it adopted. I recognize the representative of Venezuela.

The representative of Venezuela, Mr. Rafael José NERI: With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to make a kind of recommendation to the permanent officials of the Agency to the effect that they should promote the active participation of the Agency in the commemorative activities of the bicentenary. It would take more than the form of a declaration, because OPENAL will be giving its support, on a continuing basis, to this tribute throughout the entire year of the bicentenary, 1983.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Venezuela. I think that the General Secretary will have no objections to that, and I therefore call upon him.

The General Secretary of OPENAL, Mr. José Ricardo MARTINEZ COBO: OPENAL has always been well aware that the Liberator Simón Bolívar, in his wisdom, suggested that the Isthmus of Panama - a very well chosen place because it is there where the two Americas join hands - should be the site at which the foundations of the regional organization should be laid. The Liberator also made a dramatic appeal to the nations which were emerging as independent States that they should refrain from aggression of any kind so that their peoples could live free from fear, intimidation and sorrow. Both the Council and the Secretariat of OPENAL will therefore be pleased to participate in the activities commemorating the bicentenary of the Liberator Simón Bolívar.

The PRESIDENT: Having concluded this item, we shall go on to consider draft resolution L.189, referring to the ninth session. I would like to ask the General Secretary and the Council to decide where to hold this ninth session. I take it that there is no objection to this draft resolution. It is therefore adopted. The representative of Nicaragua desires to make a brief comment at this time and I therefore call upon him.

The representative of Nicaragua, Mr. Aldo DIAS LACAYO: We have read the document circulated this morning, S/Inf.284, entitled "Statement by the United States delegate, Assistant Secretary James S. Malone at the close of the eighth regular session of the General Conference" of OPENAL. The first paragraph of this statement says that the United States believes that the Treaty and its Additional Protocols do not affect the right to exercise freedom of navigation of the high seas, to undertake innocent passage through territorial waters, nor affect the sovereign right of the territorial States to grant or deny transit rights. According to the second paragraph, the United States does not believe that the actions of the British naval forces in the South Atlantic were in any way inconsistent with its obligations under Protocols I and II. It would appear that this second paragraph is designed to make this Conference believe that the presence of British warships in the South Atlantic was in exercise of the right to freedom of navigation of the high seas or a case of innocent passage through territorial waters or that they were in transit under agreements signed between sovereign States.

/...

The delegation of Nicaragua wishes to confirm its original position that the presence of nuclear weapons on warships with aggressive purposes cannot be accepted in the Zone relevant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nicaragua for his statement, of which due note has been taken. We have almost come to the end of our work, and I suggest that we suspend the meeting briefly while we await the document in question. I recognize the representative of Mexico.

The representative of Mexico, Jorge MONTAÑO: On a point of clarification, I wish to know whether it is your intention now to conclude the final item on our agenda, "Other business", or whether after the suspension which you suggest, which seems very appropriate to me, it would be possible to make a statement under the item "Other business".

The PRESIDENT: I recognize the representative of Colombia.

The representative of Colombia, Mr. Antonio OVIEDO: I merely wish respectfully to ask if we have begun consideration of draft resolution CG/L.187, which has already been circulated. The draft resolution was submitted by the delegations of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, and the representative of Ecuador has asked us to inform you that he has joined the list of sponsors. The draft resolution is before the delegations and should you, Sir, find it convenient, I request that we begin consideration of it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Colombia. In reply to the question raised by the representative of Mexico: yes, delegations may speak on other matters. In reply to the representative of Colombia: I am ready to invite the Conference to consider the draft resolution. Do you have draft resolution CG/L.187 before you? Very good, we shall now take up the draft. It is so agreed. I now propose a brief recess while the translation of this document is being completed. When we resume our meeting, you will have the English and Spanish texts of document CG/L.188, a draft resolution entitled "Report on the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into the zone and areas of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands". I must draw attention to certain typing errors which we need to correct: in the title I believe we should say Malvinas-Falkland, as it appears in United Nations documents. I also wish to draw your attention to the word "important", which should be deleted from the first line of operative paragraph 2. The same paragraph goes on to read, in the English text: "To take note of the important statements ...". There are some misplaced commas in this text which alter the meaning. It is my intention that, once you have read the document, which is the outcome of negotiations among various members, if there is no objection we can adopt it as it stands, except for the minor amendments which I have suggested. If there is no objection, the text is adopted. I recognize the representative of Trinidad and Tobago.

The representative of Trinidad and Tobago, Mr. Victor MCINTYRE: While I am impressed by the spirit of the text, I am not entirely happy with the manner in which certain paragraphs of the document have been drafted. I have listened very

/...



carefully to the previous two speakers, the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of Argentina, making allegations, rebutting allegations and reaffirming positions, and I am now confused. Frankly, the most I can hope to do is to agree with the spirit underlying the document, but not with the paragraphs and the topics which it raises.

This is a political document, and I do not believe that this is the forum in which such a document should appear. It would seem more appropriate for forums such as the United Nations, for example, or the Organization of American States, where it could be submitted and debated each time until the States involved were satisfied, including emotionally satisfied. But here we are bound by strict articles of the Treaty and these statements, which seem to fall outside the scope of the Treaty, make me think that, if I accept this consensus, I shall be coming down on one side or the other. Both States, the United Kingdom and Argentina, are countries with which my small country enjoys the closest relations and I do not wish to serve as a counterweight for either one by allying myself with either of them. I would do nothing, for example, to fan the few sparks which remain from the dispute over the Malvinas or Falkland Islands, whatever you wish to call them. Quite honestly, I do not wish to be led along this road, and I honestly cannot join this consensus. I do not believe that the clauses referred to here relate to the matters which we have been discussing in this Conference. It seems to me that they would be more suitable in other forums. In the circumstances, I deeply regret that I cannot join the consensus.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Trinidad and Tobago for his clarification. I understand that there are no other statements at this stage, and the resolution is thus adopted. I recognize the representative of the United Kingdom.

The representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. David M. EDWARDS: I wish to refer briefly to the resolution which has been adopted by this Conference in document CG/L.188. Mr. President, I thank you and those delegations which have made a great effort to produce a balanced resolution. Yet I must say that the resolution, in the opinion of my delegation, is objectionable in various ways, as is apparent from the detailed statement which I made earlier. It is not necessary for me to repeat that we do not wish to waste the time of the Conference by entering into further details. The resolution was essentially based on the fact that nuclear weapons were introduced by my country when we exercised our right of self-defence in the South Atlantic following the illegal aggression of the Argentine Republic. We are disappointed that the resolution does not incorporate the detailed replies given by my delegation, containing categorical affirmations of our compliance with our international obligations under the Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco in response to unverified allegations by a State which has not even ratified the Treaty. Finally, since my Government has repeatedly stated that it has complied with those obligations, we do not see why it is necessary to have any resolution at all.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom. I recognize the representative of the United States.

/...

The representative of the United States of America, Mr. James L. MALONE: On draft resolution CG/L.188, I would like to reiterate the comments made by the United Kingdom representative in thanking you and other representatives for their efforts to ensure that this difficult agenda item was dealt with in the fairest possible manner.

Although the resolution considered by the General Conference represents an improvement over its earlier versions in some respects, we still believe that it lacks balance. For example, Argentina's unsupported allegations of the presence of nuclear weapons are dealt with as if they were facts, whereas the statements by the United Kingdom that it has complied with its obligations under Protocols I and II are simply taken note of and are not given comparable credibility.

We also wish to comment on a specific part of the resolution in paragraph 4. The fact that nuclear-powered submarines might have been present in the geographical zone defined in article 2, paragraph 4, of the Treaty could naturally be of concern to members of OPANAL. Nevertheless, this does not alter one of the basic legal principles underlying the Treaty established by the history of negotiations and by State practices. This principle, which was brought to the attention of the General Conference by Under-Secretary Malone on Tuesday, is that the Treaty and its Protocols do not affect the right to exercise the freedom of navigation on the high seas, innocent passage through territorial waters, or the right of transit. I shall also take this opportunity to repeat that the United States has no reason whatsoever to believe that the actions of the British vessels were inconsistent with the United Kingdom's obligations under Protocols I and II. We should, perhaps, instead of questioning these acts by the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic, recognize the positive contribution which its ratifications of Protocols I and II represent as a means of prohibiting the introduction of nuclear weapons into areas in which the Treaty is in force.

The conflict in the South Atlantic might rather, perhaps, be seen as an example of the usefulness of obligations undertaken by Parties to the Protocol, instead of being used to question the credibility of compliance by the United Kingdom with its undertakings and obligations under Protocol I.

Our common objective in this Conference is to promote progress, so that the Treaty may enter into force throughout the region. This objective should remain in the forefront of our minds, and we must ensure that we are not diverted from this task by charges, for which there is no evidence, of contraventions of the Treaty or its Protocols. The United States is not taking part in this dispute, but is merely endeavouring to maintain a constructive stance in support of the régime established by the Treaty.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States. I now recognize the representative of France.

The representative of France, Mr. Jacques MASSENET: France is perfectly aware of national sensitivities and respects them. My delegation cannot but regret that certain aspects of a tragic conflict are being evoked here. It seems to me that the subject does not fall directly within our competence and has already been

/...

discussed in the United Nations. We should like to make two comments on the text of resolution CG/L.188. In accordance with the reservations expressed by my delegation when ratifying Additional Protocol II, the French Government considers that any zone extending beyond the aggregate of the territories defined in article 3 of the Treaty cannot be deemed to be established in accordance with international law. Consequently, the French Government could not agree that the Treaty applies to these areas. Secondly, the reference in paragraph 4 to nuclear-powered submarines is not covered by the definition of nuclear weapons given very specifically and clearly in article 5 of the Treaty.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France. I recognize the representative of Argentina.

The representative of Argentina: Any text can be interpreted in terms of its letter and also of its spirit. My delegation interprets this text in terms of its spirit and has comments to make on its paragraphs, with regard to the letter, whereas we have no comments and fully endorse the spirit which enabled the Latin American delegations to adopt what I would call this most important resolution. However, had we had any doubts about aspects of this resolution, the statements just made by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have dispelled any doubts we might have had, because we have seen that, regardless of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, there are still States which try to maintain their predominance in the world, to impose régimes to which the Latin American countries are completely opposed and want to exercise permanent control.

These statements are contrary to the very spirit of the Treaty, a spirit which we ourselves would like to see pervading this august assembly. They are evidence of a clash of points of view which we anticipated through the adoption of this resolution, through the path which we tried to follow when we said that this was a problem which did not concern the Republic of Argentina but was one which concerned the Parties to the Treaty by virtue of the régime and rules which Latin America wished to establish. Consequently, we consider that this has been a great experience which has strengthened the Treaty and, should any doubts be cast concerning its effectiveness, the sentiments expressed in this resolution will do much to enhance the Treaty. In this connection, my delegation expresses its deep gratitude to the delegation of Panama for introducing the subject and to the delegations of Venezuela and Mexico which have conducted these difficult negotiations. We also wish to thank you, Mr. President, very warmly for your efforts which have led to the adoption of this resolution.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina. I recognize the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Dietmar KREUSEL: As an observer for a country outside this hemisphere which is not a Party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, I take the liberty of commenting on the decisions adopted by the member States in line with their views. I deeply regret to say, however, that the resolution just adopted does not seem to me to be formulated in a way which will serve the noble cause to which Mr. Alfonso García Robles has been so committed and for which he has been paid the appropriate tribute.

/...

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. I recognize the representative of Belgium.

The representative of Belgium, Mr. Jan P. BOUSSE: First of all, my delegation wishes to congratulate the eighth General Conference of OPANAL on the positive objectives it has attained during its meetings. It wishes to express its gratitude and admiration for the work done by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, for which he was deservedly awarded the 1982 Nobel Prize and joins in the tribute paid to him at this Conference.

Belgium, as you know, has always made the necessary efforts to promote world disarmament and it is well known that it was one of the first advocates of regional disarmament arrangements and denuclearized zones. On the other hand, however, we endorse the statement made by our colleague from the Federal Republic of Germany, since we deeply regret that the matter dealt with in the resolution just adopted should have been brought before this forum. To my mind, this does not encourage appropriate and constructive solutions in the spirit of Tlatelolco.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium. I recognize the representative of the Netherlands.

The representative of the Netherlands, Mr. Gobert van VLIET: I shall be very brief. I should just like to say that the Netherlands delegation supports the statements made by the representatives of Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands. This concludes our consideration of this agenda item. We shall now consider draft resolution L.187. In the absence of any objection, this resolution is adopted. Since the Mexican representative asked earlier to be allowed to mention another matter, I now call upon him.

The representative of Mexico: Actually, my concern when I asked to speak a moment ago was to be given the opportunity to address this august General Conference in order to make a very full statement concerning its results and some specific points which my delegation wanted to emphasize. If this is the last matter to be dealt with by the General Conference I shall therefore proceed to do so. If not, I would request you to be good enough to leave me till the end.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico. There is no other matter before the Conference. Consequently, I recognize the representative of Mexico.

The representative of Mexico: I had the honour to participate in the opening meeting of the eighth regular session of the General Conference of OPANAL. I should point out that on that occasion my statement was part of an old tradition of protocol by which I was deeply honoured; however, I asked to speak in order to express, on behalf of my own and other delegations, our sincere gratitude to the Government of Jamaica for its indisputable talent as a host. We have been overwhelmed by kindness from its authorities and have experienced the courtesy and

/...

consideration of its people. We shall remember your leadership, Mr. President, as being discreet but firm, calm but effective, and one from which the future of the Agency will derive great benefit. We participants at this eighth session are fully aware that the General Conference which is concluding its work today is a landmark in the history of OPANAL. Some representatives who, as they say in my country, have recently attained their majority, have come here for the first time. That is to say that the Agency is clearly entering a new era and, for the time being, the required maturity is to be found in the Council of the Agency. Its directives will be extremely useful for shaping the future of OPANAL and it will work effectively to guide, in its turn, the next session of the General Conference.

I should like to conclude by expressing our sincere appreciation of the work of the OPANAL secretariat, the interpreters and supporting staff, and by once more publicly expressing our gratitude for the moving tribute paid to Mexico's universal man, Alfonso García Robles. To your timely telegram we shall add detailed reports of what was said during this Conference. Please convey on our behalf, Mr. President, to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Neville Gallimore, our reiterated and renewed thanks for his kindness and hospitality.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico. I call upon the General Secretary.

The General Secretary of OPANAL: The secretariat has great pleasure in endorsing the expression of gratitude just addressed by the representative of Mexico to the Government and people of Jamaica who invited us to hold our General Conference in Kingston. This generous invitation was unanimously accepted with pleasure at the third special session of the General Conference and, at the end of our work, we have realized the wisdom of this decision, because not only does Kingston possess an excellent conference centre with all modern facilities but it also fulfils all the conditions necessary for a large international conference centre. We have received invaluable aid from the Jamaican staff - interpreters, translators and all the other invisible conference personnel. I too, Mr. President, should like to express my thanks to you for the efficient, skilful and impartial way in which you have directed the discussions; you have been an excellent leader of this meeting. I thank you, Sir, on behalf of the secretariat.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the General Secretary. We have now reached the end of our work and have just concluded the eighth regular session of the General Conference of OPANAL. All will agree that we have held a very interesting debate, at least on one item; however the discussions bear witness to our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the work of the Agency, namely, to attain these objectives.

Obviously the Treaty still has some way to go before it is accepted throughout the region, since some States have not signed or ratified it; others wish to exercise the right of waiver set forth in article 28; and one nuclear Power has failed to ratify Additional Protocol I, but what is clear is the deep commitment of the Contracting Parties present at this Conference that all States should make similar commitments in order that the Treaty may be implemented throughout the region.

/...

It has also been very clearly shown at this meeting that all the States of the region, whether Contracting Parties or not, can tolerate no violation of the spirit or letter of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There have been recent challenges and it is therefore urgent that all States, whether inside or outside the region, should promote the objectives and respect the terms of the Treaty; I think that this is what we have agreed upon in principle. This, I think, was reflected in a special way in the vote on draft resolution CG/L.188 and, although we have confirmed our commitments and supported the role of OPANAL, we recognize that the Agency is faced with a difficult financial situation. We hope that this may very soon be remedied in order to enable the Agency properly to carry out its mandate.

On this matter, many people have expressed the view that the Agency must do more to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To enable it to do this, States must provide OPANAL with additional resources. Some States say that there are some discriminatory provisions in the Treaty which prevent them from acceding to full membership; we must make every effort to remove these obstacles. Other decisions have been taken, but I shall not comment on them. I should like to thank the General Secretary and congratulate him for his report and for all the work done in OPANAL.

I should also like to thank the secretariat for its work. Finally, on behalf of the Government of Jamaica, I wish to thank OPANAL and all of you, representatives, observers, members of the secretariat, for accepting our invitation to meet here in Jamaica and for your very objective participation in this eighth regular session of the General Conference of OPANAL. As President, I should also like to thank you for your support and co-operation. The session is closed.

The meeting rose at 7 p.m.

## ANNEX XIII

Note from the Embassy of the United Kingdom

On 11 May 1983, the General Secretary of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America received the following note:

"Your Excellency,

"I have just read with interest your report which you kindly sent to me as document No. CG/234 of 15 April of the 8th Ordinary Period of Sessions of OPANAL which will take place in Kingston from 16-19 May. I have also read the Notes from the Argentine Embassy of 21 April and 29 April circulated as documents Nos. S/Inf. 254 of 22 April and S/Inf. 256 of 3 May.

"The Argentine Embassy Note of 21 April refers to the 'introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom into the Falklands Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich'. The Note goes on to claim that the allegations about the presence of nuclear weapons in the British task force have never been adequately answered by the British Government.

"The Government of the United Kingdom has scrupulously observed its obligations under Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas for which de jure or de facto it is internationally responsible and lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in that Treaty.

"Further the Government has scrupulously observed its obligations under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty and has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas for which the Treaty is in force.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

"(Signed) Crispin TICKELL  
H.M. Ambassador"

/...

ANNEX XIV

Note from the delegation of the Argentine Republic

Sir,

I have the honour to draw your attention to the note from the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Mexico, reproduced in document S/Inf.161 of 11 May 1983:

1. The British statements contained in that note are entirely unsatisfactory and insufficient. The views set forth in the notes which the Argentine Embassy in Mexico transmitted to the General Secretary (S/Inf.254 and S/Inf.256) therefore stand in their entirety.

The specific and limited concept of 'non-deployment' of nuclear weapons which the United Kingdom has used in an unsuccessful attempt to sidestep the allegations made by the Latin American countries says nothing about the actual possession of nuclear weapons in zones which that country is obligated to respect under Protocols I and II.

2. In addition, the British note is unsatisfactory and insufficient in that it:

(a) Does not deny that the British colonialist fleet was sent on warlike operations to the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone with its full arsenal, including nuclear-propulsion equipment and nuclear weapons;

(b) Does not deny the subsequent introduction of nuclear material for propulsion and nuclear weapons by the British colonialist fleet on warlike operations within the Zone described in article 4 of the Treaty, specifically in the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands;

(c) Does not deny that the United Kingdom has introduced and is at present maintaining nuclear weapons in the Zone and in the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, constituting a serious threat to the security of the region.

These British affirmations imply a unilateral interpretation of the Treaty and its annexed Protocols which in fact restricts their scope by seeking to diminish the obligations which the United Kingdom undertook to fulfil. Certainly that Government cannot be unaware that the object and purpose of the Treaty is the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. The mere introduction of British nuclear weapons into any part of that Zone, in circumstances where the United Kingdom is conducting warlike operations or exercising its nuclear might in order to consolidate its colonial domination in the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, clearly contravenes the purposes for which the Zone was established.

/...



3. Furthermore, the attempt to diminish the United Kingdom's obligations is totally unacceptable, since article 1 of the Treaty also obligates the United Kingdom to use nuclear energy within the Zone exclusively for peaceful purposes. The warlike operations conducted by the United Kingdom, which resulted in the criminal sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano by the British nuclear submarine Conqueror with the loss of 321 lives, constitute a flagrant violation of the Treaty. The continuation of threatening British military operations in the Zone with the full deployment of equipment such as nuclear-powered vessels, shows an abiding contempt for the security and legitimate interests which the Zone established by the Treaty is intended to safeguard.

4. Furthermore, the validity and credibility of the statements by the British Government to the effect that it has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas falling under its de facto jurisdiction pursuant to Protocol I must be seriously questioned, because:

(a) These statements cannot be verified in the context of the British philosophy which holds that promises not to use this or that kind of weapon - and, a fortiori, to install or deploy them - can never be dependable amid the stresses of war (a philosophy enunciated by the British Prime Minister at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - document A/S-12/PV.24);

(b) These unverifiable statements contradict the consistent practice of the United Kingdom in the context of the NATO policy of nuclear deterrence, since no account is ever given of the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or the time and place in which they are deployed. This tack was adopted recently by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Francis Pym, when he said in Brazil on 28 March 1983: "We never say where our nuclear weapons are";

(c) These belated and unverifiable statements were issued more than a year after the Latin American countries began repeatedly and persistently to voice their concerns without receiving any satisfaction;

(d) Verification of the statements contained in the British note is impossible. The United Kingdom has refused to allow its aircraft and warships to be inspected.

5. All this leads to the conclusion that this attempted response by the United Kingdom is only a device based on expediency, devoid of any basis and aimed at diverting the attention of the OPANAL General Conference. In this way, the strategic nuclear interests of the United Kingdom are protected and any information about the presence of British nuclear weapons in the Latin American Zone, which, under the Treaty, ought to remain free of nuclear weapons, is kept hidden.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Attilio MOLTENI  
Head of the Argentine Delegation

-----



**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/437

23 February 1984

ENGLISH

Original - ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

---

LETTER DATED 23 FEBRUARY 1984 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT  
REPRESENTATIVE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TRANSMITTING A  
PROPOSAL OF WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES TO THE MEMBER  
STATES OF NATO ON THE QUESTION OF FREEING EUROPE FROM  
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. PRESENTED AT THE USSR MINISTRY OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 10 JANUARY 1984

I am sending you herewith a proposal of Warsaw Treaty member States to the member States of NATO on the question of freeing Europe from chemical weapons which was presented at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 January 1984, to the embassies of the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United States, Turkey and France.

I would ask you kindly to distribute this proposal as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed)

Milos VeJVoda  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative

GE.84-60461

## THE QUESTION OF FREEING EUROPE FROM CHEMICAL WEAPONS

By agreement among the Warsaw Treaty Member States, a memorandum containing a "Proposal of Warsaw Treaty Member States to the member States of NATO on the question of freeing Europe from nuclear weapons" was presented on 10 January 1984 at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the embassies of the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United States of America, Turkey and France.

The Warsaw Treaty Member States proposed to the NATO member States the convening in 1984 of a meeting of plenipotentiary representatives for a preliminary exchange of views on the question of freeing Europe from chemical weapons.

Elimination of the chemical threat to the States and peoples of Europe would make possible a substantial reduction in the risk of chemical war on the Continent and, consequently, throughout the world and the start of a reduction of arsenals of chemical weapons, and would help to lessen the threat of war and strengthen mutual trust.

The implementation of such partial measures of a regional character would further the efforts being made on a world scale to accelerate the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which remains the ultimate aim of the Warsaw Treaty Member States.

They expect the Governments of the NATO countries to treat the proposal with all due attention and seriousness.

### Proposal of the Warsaw Treaty Member States to the Member States of NATO on the Question of Freeing Europe from Chemical Weapons

The Warsaw Treaty Member States consider that the presence of chemical weapons on the densely populated territory of Europe constitutes a great danger to all European States and peoples. The use of toxic substances under European conditions would lead to especially serious consequences for peaceful inhabitants and the contamination of large areas. According to some estimates, in the event of a conflict involving the use of chemical weapons the ratio of fatalities among military personnel and civilians might be one in twenty.

The present aggravation of the international situation increases the danger of the use of chemical weapons, particularly in Europe.

The radical elimination of the chemical threat to the States and peoples of Europe and to other regions of the world, can be secured by banning chemical weapons and destroying their stockpiles on a world scale. The achievement of that main goal of the socialist countries is the aim of the concrete, realistic proposals they submit in the Disarmament Committee in Geneva in the course of their persevering and consistent efforts to elaborate an appropriate international convention.

At the same time, prior to the solution of this global task and with a view to facilitating its fulfilment, certain parallel steps can and must be undertaken within the confines of the European continent. That would make possible a substantial reduction of the risk of chemical war in Europe and, consequently, throughout the world and the start of a reduction of arsenals of chemical weapons. Such steps are also urgently necessary in terms of forestalling the possibility of a chemical weapons build-up in Europe and preventing the dangerous cycle of a chemical arms race.

Partial measures of a regional character to limit, reduce and eliminate chemical weapons would concern fewer States than measures of global scope and it would be easier to agree on them and put them into effect. At the same time, such regional measures, by leading to the elimination of an entire type of weapon of mass destruction, would undoubtedly consolidate European security and help to weaken the threat of war, strengthen mutual trust and improve the over-all political climate. Moreover, the implementation of such partial measures would facilitate the efforts being made on a world scale towards the acceleration of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which remains the ultimate aim of the Warsaw Treaty Member States. It would serve as a stimulus to the adoption of similar measures in other continents as well. The implementation of the idea of freeing Europe from chemical weapons, which would affect the territories of all the Warsaw Treaty Member States, must also provide in full measure for the extension of future measures to the relevant parts of the territory of the NATO member countries.

Taking account of all factors and circumstances, practical measures for the implementation of the initiative of the Warsaw Treaty Member States on the freeing of Europe from chemical weapons should be implemented consecutively, step by step.

The obligations of States with regard to the chemical-weapon-free territory in Europe defined in the agreement might include, for example, the declaration of the presence or absence of chemical weapons in that territory, the prohibition of the deployment of chemical weapons where there are none at present, the freezing of such weapons, the withdrawal or destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons, and renunciation of their production, acquisition, import or transfer to States within that territory. The obligations assumed must effectively ensure that there are no chemical weapons in the territory defined in the agreement.

The experience acquired in the course of the talks on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons being conducted in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva could be of use in the consideration of practical matters connected with the freeing of Europe from chemical weapons. It would, however, seem undesirable to bring in the complex technical questions which are the subject of those talks.

In elaborating an accord on the freeing of Europe from chemical weapons, the States concerned may, as necessary, reach agreement on mutually acceptable, adequate forms of verification which would ensure effective fulfilment of their undertakings by all the parties to the zone-establishing accord.

The status of a chemical-weapons-free zone must be duly respected. Provision should be made for the extension to the States whose territory is covered by such an agreement of appropriate guarantees in accordance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, as well as with other international legal instruments which will be accepted.

The accord in question might take the form either of a document having binding legal force, e.g. an agreement, a treaty or a convention, of an appropriate multilateral declaration or of a number of unilateral declarations. The content of the accord would, of course, be of significance in determining its form. A political declaration would make it possible to avoid some complicated questions of a technical nature.

The Warsaw Treaty Member States consider it advisable to convene in 1984 a meeting of plenipotentiary representatives for the purposes of a preliminary exchange of views with the NATO member countries and other interested European States on the question of freeing Europe from chemical weapons.

At that meeting agreement might be reached on various practical issues, including that of the appropriate forum for future talks on the problem in question.



MEXICO

Draft Mandate For The (ad hoc subsidiary body)  
On A Nuclear Test Ban

The Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1984 session the (ad hoc subsidiary body), on a Nuclear Test Ban to initiate immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and to exert its best endeavours in order that the Conference may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session the complete draft of such a treaty.

Pursuant to its mandate, the (ad hoc subsidiary body) on a Nuclear Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, it will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The (ad hoc subsidiary body) will also take into account the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.





---

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Working Paper

Proposals on "Prohibition of Transfer" and  
"Permitted Transfers" in a future CW agreement

A number of proposals have been submitted to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons regarding prohibition of the transfer of chemical weapons and super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors as well as on the related questions of "permitted transfers". These proposals were reflected in the report on the 1983 session of the Working Group.

The discussion of these elements of a convention should be intensified. The following observations should serve to clarify and develop the proposals so far tabled.

I

1. In addition to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the obligation to destroy such weapons and their production facilities, a future CW convention must contain a ban on the transfer of chemical weapons. It must provide for the direct or indirect prohibition of the transfer of any chemical weapon to contracting and non-contracting parties. That sort of prohibition is necessary for the period between the entry into force of a convention and the destruction of all chemical weapons.
2. The concluding report on the 1983 session of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons does not yet contain any formulation of such a provision which all Working Group members accept. Nevertheless, it has been agreed that the fundamental undertaking to ban the transfer of chemical weapons should be included in the scope of prohibition imposed by the future CW convention (CD/416 Annex I, I A, 2 a), supplemented by the corresponding ban on acquisition of chemical weapons from external sources.

It also stipulated that the initial declaration is to contain a certification that the transfer of chemical weapons has ceased (CD/416, Annex I, II A, 1 a V).

3. The concluding report envisages an exception to the transfer ban permitting the transfer of chemical weapons between States parties by mutual agreement for purposes of elimination (CD/416, Annex I, III C, 1 a).

Such an exception is useful since it allows a State party to have its chemical weapons destroyed in the destruction facility of another party, thereby avoiding the costly construction of its own facility.

## II

1. The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has not yet been able to reach a final decision on how to approach the question of the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors.

The concluding report envisages the total prohibition of the transfer of such chemicals and their key precursors to non-parties (CD/416, Annex I, III C, 2 a) and a limitation of transfers between parties (CD/416, Annex I, III C, 2 b). This element of a future convention is important and needs to be regulated.

Proposals have been submitted to the Working Group on the basis and scope of the limitations to be undertaken by States parties. These proposals differ both on the question of which chemicals are to be covered by a transfer ban and with regard to the assigned purpose and the quantitative limitation of transfers of such chemicals.

2. Any provision prohibiting the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors must take account of the following two principles

- it must not circumvent the fundamental prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and
- it must not impose undue restrictions on international trade in chemical products.

These principles have not been adequately respected in all of the proposals for transfer limitations submitted to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

3. In its concluding report, the Working Group assumed from the start that only super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors can be subject to a transfer ban and may hence be the object of an exempting provision (CD/416, Annex I, III C, 2 a).

Proposals that prohibition of transfer be extended to other chemicals especially to those which are categorized under the headings "other lethal chemicals" or "other harmful chemicals", should not therefore be pursued. The extension of a transfer ban beyond super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors would inevitably draw in chemical products which play an important role in the civilian sector, thereby leading to the imposition of an undue restriction on international trade in chemical products.

4. Fundamental to the formulation in a CW convention of a transfer ban and a provision on permitted transfers is the question which chemical products should be regarded as key precursors of super-toxic lethal chemicals.

In the view of the Federal Republic of Germany, chemicals should be defined as key precursors only if

- they have a particular significance to the relevant provisions in a CW convention,
- they constitute characteristic chemical compounds at the final technological reaction stage for the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals, and
- they are not used, or are used in minimal quantities, for permitted purposes.

This definition strictly limits the range of chemicals which might be covered by a transfer ban and a provision on permitted transfers. The chemicals concerned, and those which do not entirely match the definition but whose inclusion as key precursors is unanimously considered to be absolutely essential, should be set forth in a list. To avoid inflexible specifications and to enable subsequent developments to be taken into account, the list would have to be revised periodically.

5. A transfer ban should cover only key precursors of super-toxic lethal chemicals which match the above definition. Permitted transfers between States parties should relate to the same key precursors. International trade in chemical products, though, would only remain unaffected if this definition were strictly applied.

So that the range of chemicals subject to the transfer ban can be more precisely defined and limited, it is advisable that a further differentiation be made between protective-purpose transfers of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors and permitted-purpose transfers, an option envisaged in the concluding report (CD/416, Annex I, III C, 2 b).

In this way super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors which are transferred for protective purposes would be covered by the prohibition of transfers. Since they are not commercially available, such chemicals would in any case only be produced in the military sector and thus under government jurisdiction and on government responsibility. It was proposed in the Working Group that special small-scale facilities be built for the production of these chemicals (CD/416, Annex I, III A, 1b).

6. Permitted transfers of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors for protective purposes will not be possible in unlimited quantities. A limit is constituted by the view of the Working Group that the production of such chemicals must not exceed one metric ton. It is therefore appropriate to limit transfers to the same quantity. A quantitative transfer limit should not be lower than the permitted production level, since this would be tantamount to discrimination against those States parties which do not themselves produce super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors or which wish to renounce such production.

7. Control of permitted transfers of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors is necessary. Such a transfer to another State party should be communicated to the Consultative Committee or its executive organ, if appropriate in an annual summary report of all transfers, including chemical names, quantities and destinations of the transferred products (CD/416, Annex I, III C, 2 c).

### III

#### Proposal

1. The CW convention should provide for the comprehensive prohibition of transfers of all chemical weapons as well as all super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors. A list of these key precursors should be included in the convention as an annex. It should contain only chemicals which are not used or have only minimal application in the civilian sector.

2. For States parties permitted transfers of chemical weapons should be envisaged for the sole purpose of destroying such weapons.

With regard to the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors for protective purposes, permitted transfers between States parties should be limited to the allowed production level. Transfers must be notified to the Consultative Committee or its executive organ.

3. The CW convention should therefore contain the following provisions
- the transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, of any chemical weapons shall be prohibited. By mutual agreement chemical weapons may be transferred between parties for the sole purpose of the destruction of such weapons.
  - The transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, other than another party, of any super-toxic lethal chemical or its key precursor (listed in an annex) produced or otherwise acquired for permitted purposes shall be prohibited. Allowed transfer of substances for protective purposes between parties to the convention shall be limited to the aggregate quantity of one metric ton.
  - Notification to the Consultative Committee of any transfer of such super-toxic lethal chemicals or their key precursors shall be required.



---

Decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body  
on chemical weapons

(Adopted at the 245th plenary meeting on 28 February 1984)

The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind that the negotiation of a Convention should proceed with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest possible date, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 38/187/B, and in discharging its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention, decides to re-establish, in accordance with its rules of procedure, for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. This agreement, if possible, or a Report on the progress of the negotiations, should be recorded in the report which this ad hoc subsidiary body will submit to the Conference at the end of the second part of its 1984 session.

The Conference also decides to appoint Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden as Chairman of this ad hoc subsidiary body.

The term "ad hoc subsidiary body" is used in this connection pending a decision by the Conference on the designation to be adopted with due urgency within two weeks for its subsidiary bodies without prejudice to existing practice in this regard.

**DOCUMENT IDENTIQUE A L'ORIGINAL**

**DOCUMENT IDENTICAL TO THE ORIGINAL**