



Introduction
to the
Annual Report
of the Secretary-General
on the
Work of the Organization

16 June 1966—15 June 1967

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS : TWENTY-SECOND SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 1A (A/6701/Add.1)

UNITED NATIONS

Introduction
to the
Annual Report
of the Secretary-General
on the
Work of the Organization

16 June 1966—15 June 1967

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OFFICIAL RECORDS : TWENTY-SECOND SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. IA (A/6701/Add.1)



UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1967

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Introduction

I. General

1. During the period under review the international political situation has not only not improved; it has in fact deteriorated considerably. It was only recently that I noted how the war in Viet-Nam has been progressively intensified during the last two and a half years, how the number of men and the amount of war material involved in the actual fighting have immensely increased, how the savagery of the war has steadily escalated, and the casualties on the part of all parties involved in the fighting have reached frightening proportions. In addition, the flare-up in the Middle East in June of this year, which was sudden though not surprising, has led to a further deterioration of the international scene. The war in the Middle East has tended to overshadow the situation in Cyprus, which has shown no great improvement during this period.

2. I shall refer to these issues in somewhat greater detail in subsequent sections of this introduction. At the present time I must note that only limited progress has been made in other areas of activity such as disarmament, outer space, economic and social development, decolonization and human rights.

3. The frustrations to which I referred in my introduction to last year's annual report in respect of such long-standing problems as the situation in South Africa, South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia continue, although in respect of both South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia the General Assembly and the Security Council respectively have, during the period under review, taken certain definite steps which may help in time to improve the situation.

4. In regard to one area with which the United Nations is concerned—West Irian—I am glad to report that the Indonesian Government has assured me that it will comply fully with the remaining responsibilities deriving from the Agreement signed on 15 August 1962 between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The act of self-determination in West Irian will take place in 1969, at a date to be decided upon in due course, and, as called for in the Agreement, one year before the date of the consultation I shall appoint a United Nations representative "to advise, assist and participate in arrangements which are the responsibility of Indonesia for the act of free choice".

5. I should also like to report that, upon the notification on 2 November 1966 by the Government of Indonesia that it wished to resume participation in the Fund of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian, the Fund was reactivated and the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme assumed full responsibility for its operation.

6. Within the Organization itself, I again find it necessary to report with regret that the financial dif-

iculties are no nearer solution than they have been in the past. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, in spite of its best efforts, has been unable to evolve and formulate certain well established ground rules and guidelines which are essential for the successful conduct of future peace-keeping operations. The problem received detailed consideration at the last regular session of the General Assembly and several ideas and suggestions were submitted for overcoming the impasse that had been reached. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, which was asked by the Assembly to continue its work, established two working groups, one to study the various methods of financing peace-keeping operations and the other to study matters relating to the facilities, services and personnel which Member States might voluntarily provide for a United Nations peace-keeping operation. The Committee and its working groups held a number of meetings but failed to arrive at any generally acceptable conclusions. This is a matter of deep regret to me, especially as recent events have shown very clearly the need to agree on basic guidelines for the conduct of peace-keeping operations, and I express the hope that this problem will receive the urgent attention it deserves. I am also constrained to report that in spite of the unanimous agreement reached two years ago on overcoming the financial difficulties through voluntary contributions by Member States, such contributions have not been forthcoming, and the Organization's financial difficulties remain. I appeal once again to all Member Governments, and especially those that have decided in principle to make voluntary contributions, to do so at an early date as a gesture of confidence in the United Nations and as a token of their abiding interest in the Organization's effective functioning and financial stability.

II. Disarmament

7. Despite the menacing international situation, and perhaps in some measure because of it, the past year has been marked by increasing activity and some important progress in the field of disarmament. In accordance with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has met in almost continuous session to deal with the tasks assigned to it and has concentrated its efforts on reaching agreement on a treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States has been engaged in considering the arrangements for convening the Conference; and a group of consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General has been assisting in the preparation of a report on the effects and implications of nuclear weapons.

8. In January 1967, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and

Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was signed. Article IV of the treaty provides that outer space and celestial bodies should be free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and prohibits the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies.

9. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which was signed in February at Mexico City, marks an important milestone on the road to disarmament. It provides for the creation, for the first time in history, of a nuclear-free zone in an inhabited part of the earth. It is the first treaty in the field of disarmament which establishes an effective system of control under a permanent supervisory organ. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency is to ensure that atomic energy is not diverted from peaceful to military purposes and, in addition, a system of special inspection to guard against violations has been provided for, in cases where there is suspicion of clandestine activities outside the Agency's safeguards system. This treaty, which was conceived and negotiated throughout by the States of Latin America themselves, is of importance not only to Latin America; it may provide an example and a stimulant for progress in other disarmament measures of world-wide as well as of regional significance.

10. When these two treaties enter into force, they will mark significant steps towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to areas of our universe and our planet and thus help to contain and reduce the dimensions of the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

11. The question of non-proliferation has remained at the top of the agenda for international disarmament discussions during the course of the year. Intensive negotiations have taken place among the main nuclear Powers and their allies, both inside and outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in a major effort to work out an agreed text of a treaty, and definite progress has been made.

12. The tabling by the Soviet Union and the United States of separate identical draft treaties on non-proliferation, on 24 August 1967, was an event of great significance. It marked the culmination of years of patient efforts to narrow and remove the differences between them. The importance of the success they have achieved in agreeing on the principal provisions of a treaty is diminished to some extent by their failure to agree on the article dealing with safeguards. I am, however, confident that the overriding necessity of their reaching agreement if there is to be a treaty will lead the sponsors of the draft treaty to reconcile their differences.

13. The non-nuclear countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, aligned and non-aligned, have understandably raised a number of serious questions regarding the provisions and effects of a treaty on non-proliferation. They are concerned that the treaty should encourage and not limit the fullest utilization of the peaceful applications of atomic energy, including peaceful explosions of nuclear devices when these become technologically and economically feasible; they desire to avoid any discrimination as regards peaceful uses of atomic energy or in the operation of a system of safeguards and controls; they wish to ensure that

the treaty will provide a real beginning for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers and will embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Above all, they are concerned, and this applies particularly to the non-aligned countries which are not under the "nuclear umbrella" of any nuclear Power, as to how their security can be assured if they renounce the right to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent against either nuclear or conventional attack on them. These and other aspects of the question of non-proliferation have been considered in detail in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. For their part the nuclear Powers have endeavoured to reassure the non-nuclear Powers regarding all of these questions, which, of course, will be given the most thorough consideration in the General Assembly.

14. Although differences of opinion remain, the atmosphere in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the relations among its members continue to be good. The members of the Committee are on the whole cautiously hopeful of early agreement on a treaty. I am convinced that if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be prevented, this can only be done by treaty. No other way can be effective for any length of time. I regard the successful conclusion of a treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an indispensable first step towards further progress on disarmament. In fact it is difficult to conceive of any agreement in the foreseeable future on any other measure of disarmament if it is not possible to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

15. The preoccupation of the non-nuclear countries with questions of their security, in the context of either the proliferation or the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, was demonstrated by the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI), which provided for the convening of a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States not later than July 1968. The Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States has been actively considering the scope of the Conference and the question of the association of nuclear States with its work. The main items on the agenda of the Conference deal with: (1) methods of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; (2) the implications of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States; (3) the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons through co-operation among non-nuclear-weapon States; and (4) programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All these are extremely important problems, the successful solution of which will pave the way for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the establishment of conditions that will ensure the maintenance of peace and security.

16. Increased attention has also been devoted to the question of non-dissemination of conventional armaments. The problem of the limitation, reduction and control of conventional armaments has occupied the United Nations and the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to a greater or lesser extent for many years. The problem has once again been brought to the fore by the recent military conflict in the Middle East, and the discussions in the General Assembly at its fifth emergency special session and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee have stimulated renewed attention to various aspects of the question. For political and economic as well as military reasons

it is obviously desirable that the balance of conventional armaments which antagonistic States maintain as a deterrent should be kept at the lowest possible level.

17. The question of a comprehensive test ban continues to be one of the main subjects of consideration in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. France and the People's Republic of China have continued to conduct nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and appear to be reaching the thermonuclear stage. The Soviet Union and the United States seem to have accelerated the rate of underground testing. The non-nuclear Powers, and particularly the non-aligned States, have for their part continued to press for a halt to all testing in all environments, but thus far without success. The nations carrying out tests in the atmosphere seem intent on improving their nuclear capability and arsenals. Those conducting underground tests are still divided over the question of the need for on-site inspection, despite improvements in the instrumentation and techniques for detecting and identifying seismic events. Fears have been voiced that they may wish to continue underground testing in order to seek new and improved offensive and defensive missiles.

18. The small measure of success that has been achieved in controlling the arms race, in bringing about the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and in making progress towards general and complete disarmament has led to a growing sense of concern and disquiet regarding both the nuclear and the conventional arms races. I believe we have reached a critical period when there is an imminent danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons as more and more countries acquire the technological know-how that would permit them to make nuclear weapons and are in a position to acquire the plutonium as a by-product of nuclear-power reactors. The spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries poses an incalculable threat by increasing the mathematical probability of the outbreak of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation or design. At the same time there is a very grave danger that the nuclear arms race may be pushed to unimaginable levels by a new race for anti-missile missiles, anti-anti-missile missiles and the whole new armoury of weapons and counter-weapons associated with the concept of ballistic missile defences and the means to overcome such defences. A new round in an unending nuclear arms race could upset the delicate balance of stability that exists at the present time between the nuclear super-Powers, and could give rise to new fears and tensions which would offset the small but hopeful progress that has been made towards a détente and disarmament. While it is true that the threat of nuclear war poses the main danger to humanity, the arms race in the field of conventional weapons and the dissemination of such weapons by the larger to the smaller Powers also create dangers and tensions which can lead to local or regional conflicts. The nuclear Powers can easily become involved in such conflicts with all the attendant risks of precipitating a global nuclear war.

19. In the introduction to my last annual report, I referred to the desirability of undertaking a comprehensive study of the consequences of the invention of nuclear weapons. It was a matter of deep gratification to me that the General Assembly at its last session took up this suggestion and authorized me to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of

the acquisition and further development of these weapons. The work on this report is proceeding satisfactorily and I hope to make the report available before the Assembly begins the debate on the various items of its agenda relating to problems of disarmament.

III. Co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space

20. International co-operation in the scientific exploration of space provides both a present reality which is yielding practical benefits and a highly attractive prospect for future contributions to the knowledge and welfare of all nations. As the first decade of outer space exploration is about to end, it is clear that many nations of the world are now aware of their stake in this new activity of mankind. It is encouraging to note that there are signs of increased international co-operation in space exploration and use.

21. On the basis of the unanimous recommendation of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the General Assembly decided, by its resolution 2250 (S-V) of 23 May 1967, to postpone the holding of an international conference on the peaceful uses of outer space from its planned date of September 1967 to August 1968. The conference, which will be held at Vienna, will have two objectives: an examination of the practical benefits to be derived from space research and exploration on the basis of technical and scientific achievements and the extent to which non-space Powers, especially the developing countries, may enjoy these benefits, particularly in terms of education and development, and an examination of the opportunity available to non-space Powers for international co-operation in space activities, taking into account the extent to which the United Nations may play a role. The General Assembly requested all participating States to devote their utmost efforts to ensuring the success of the conference.

22. Reference has already been made to the conclusion of the "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies". I regard this as a most significant development in the area of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space during the year under review. For the first time in the short history of legal regulation of outer space activities, an international treaty has been concluded and has already been signed by more than eighty States which, *inter alia*, prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes.

23. Further progress has also been made in the elaboration of the international agreements on liability for damage caused by the launching of objects into outer space and on assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles. Another step taken towards the formulation of space law is the initiation of the study of questions relating to the definition of outer space and the utilization of outer space, including the various implications of space communications. It is hoped that the development of international law of outer space will soon catch up with the advances in space science and technology and contribute to the use of outer space for the benefit of all mankind.

24. Increasing attention is being given to the provision of education and training in space subjects, par-

ticularly for the developing countries, through bilateral and other arrangements. In this connexion, the United Nations has continued its sponsorship of the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station in India. The project is designed both to meet the needs of peaceful space research and to provide the developing countries with opportunities for valuable practical training and participation in rocket experiments. Argentina recently informed the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that it intends to request United Nations sponsorship of an experimental centre for the launching of self-propelled projectiles with characteristics similar to those of the Thumba base. Brazil has also expressed its intention of requesting United Nations sponsorship for a sounding rocket launching facility near Natal in north-eastern Brazil. These are encouraging indications of the way in which the Organization can help to uphold mankind's common interest in furthering the peaceful exploration and use of outer space for the benefit of all nations.

25. Following a recommendation by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Secretariat has compiled and published an *International Space Bibliography* to further popular understanding of the purposes and potentialities of space activities. The Secretariat has also continued to compile information on, and will publish an international directory of, facilities for education and training in basic subjects related to the peaceful uses of outer space. On the basis of information voluntarily supplied by Member States, specialized agencies and international organizations, it continues to disseminate reviews of national and co-operative international space activities and of the activities and resources of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other competent international bodies relating to the peaceful uses of outer space.

26. Within the United Nations family of organizations, I am glad to note the steadily developing World Weather Watch programme of the World Meteorological Organization. Each nation of the world, large or small, developed or developing, whatever its geographical location on the Earth's surface, shares with all other nations a common interest in the weather. With regard to telecommunication and the peaceful uses of outer space, the sixth report of the International Telecommunication Union again shows effective progress in this area of activity.

IV. Peace-keeping

27. The events of 1967 have brought both the practice and the theory of United Nations peace-keeping to an important milestone—and perhaps even to a crossroads. For some years now there has been, both within and outside the Organization, a protracted and wide-ranging controversy about many aspects of peace-keeping, and especially about its constitutional and financial aspects. The fact that the concept of peace-keeping as such is not mentioned in the Charter has contributed to this controversy. The withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force and the events which followed upon it have abruptly brought the United Nations and the world face to face with the realities of that aspect of the United Nations peace effort which has come to be known as peace-keeping, and with the great usefulness as well as with the intrinsic fragility of such operations,

28. The first reality of United Nations peace-keeping is its voluntary nature. Peace-keeping efforts must be accepted voluntarily by all parties to a conflict if they are to be effective at all—and, as we have seen recently, the time may come when that voluntary acceptance can be suddenly and unexpectedly withdrawn. When that happens, the usefulness of a peace-keeping operation almost automatically comes to an end. It must be emphasized that peace-keeping, in the sense of the operations thus far conducted by the United Nations, has no relation to enforcement action as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, nor can there ever be any question of peace-keeping forces being used in such a way as to appear to be occupation forces. The effectiveness of peace-keeping depends above all on the willingness of the parties to a conflict to accept, however grudgingly, a peaceful alternative to violence, even if they have no real will to peace in a solid and enduring sense.

29. The voluntary principle pervades all other aspects of peace-keeping. Military personnel are made available voluntarily by Governments, which can withdraw them at any time. In practice over the years, there have been surprisingly few instances of such withdrawals, whether for political or other reasons. The men engaged in a peace-keeping operation can carry out their duties only with the voluntary co-operation of the authorities and people of the host country and in some cases of other parties directly concerned. The financing of the only major peace-keeping force still operating, the United Nations Force in Cyprus, is on an entirely voluntary basis, with quite disturbing indications of a tendency towards financing future peace-keeping operations in a similar way. This is indeed a fragile and undependable foundation for operations which are usually vital to international peace and security.

30. The lack of progress in the establishment of a more durable framework for peace-keeping operations, with agreed and authorized guidelines and ground rules for setting them up, conducting and financing them, undoubtedly diminishes the confidence with which the United Nations can face the probable conflict situations of the future. It is not to the credit of the United Nations that after nineteen years of peace-keeping efforts each operation has still to be improvised for lack of measures of a general preparatory nature by the appropriate organs. While it seems to be agreed that the United Nations must have some capacity to act effectively in time of danger, it has still not been possible to agree on methods by which that capacity might be increased and made more reliable, especially in the periods between crises. This deficiency stems from the fundamental differences among the Members in their interpretation of the Charter with regard to United Nations activity in behalf of peace.

31. In this uncertain situation, the decision of a number of Member States to earmark elements of their armed forces for standby service in United Nations peace-keeping operations is a welcome step. It would be helpful in connexion with such forward-looking action if Members could at least agree that the General Assembly would study such questions as the standardization of training and equipment for standby forces, the relationship of the United Nations to Governments providing such forces, and the constitutional and financial aspects of employing them. This could be done either by a committee specially appointed for

the purpose or by the Secretary-General himself who would be authorized to carry out the necessary studies. Such a study would give some impetus to the development of the peace-keeping concept and technique and would provide useful practical ideas. The Secretary-General has now gone as far as he can properly go in this direction without specific authorization.

32. These are the basic elements of the United Nations peace-keeping problem—its voluntary nature, its inability to operate if any party is determined on violence, and the lack of agreement in the United Nations on the legitimate basis for peace-keeping, present and future. There are other less fundamental difficulties which are sometimes cited—perhaps because the real basic obstacles seem so intractable—as principal causes of the lack of progress or improvement in United Nations peace-keeping. It is often said, for example, that the lack of military staff and the lack of planning in the Secretariat are an important source of weakness. The proponents of this position, who mistakenly equate United Nations peace-keeping operations—which are only semi-military in their functioning—with normal national military operations, never make clear what they would expect even a limited military staff at United Nations Headquarters to do. It is all too obvious that contingency military planning by the Secretariat for specified future operations would be, to put it mildly, politically unacceptable. Apart from anything else, such planning would depend upon the gathering of political intelligence which it would be out of the question for the United Nations to attempt.

33. It has also been said that the preparation of all sorts of standing operational procedures would greatly improve the quality of United Nations peace-keeping performance. The fact is that such procedures do exist and have been compiled routinely for each peace-keeping operation. These are used as a basis when a new operation is mounted, but experience has shown that instructions and procedures have to be adapted specifically to each operation since, so far at any rate, the various peace-keeping operations have differed widely in scope, nature, composition and function.

34. The Secretariat has at the present time neither the authorization nor the budget to engage in widespread planning, staff work, recruitment or training activities such as are common to national military establishments; nor, indeed, in present circumstances would such activity have much practical utility. A plan for the training of officers for United Nations peace-keeping duties was elaborated in detail some years ago, but has never been implemented for lack of authorization and financing. In the political circumstances prevailing at the United Nations it is hard to see how a United Nations military staff, even if authorized by the competent organs, could justify its existence and actually improve very much the quality either of existing operations or of hypothetical future ones.

35. The hard and frustrating fact remains that the principal obstacles in the way of an improvement in United Nations peace-keeping are primarily political and constitutional, and only secondarily military and financial. The crossroads which we seem to have reached in peace-keeping is marked by a political and constitutional impasse. Member States today have the choice of two main directions. They could, despite all the difficulties, frustrations and disappointments, pursue and develop the possibilities of United Nations peace-keeping as a rational and civilized method of seeking

to mitigate conflict while basic solutions are sought. They could, on the other hand, decide that the conditions of the contemporary world are too complex and too violent to allow of reasonable and peaceful regulation and that the United Nations has no useful active role at present in helping to keep the peace or in developing a potential for future action of that nature. The latter course seems to me to be unthinkable for, should it be adopted, the dangers of the present and the risks of the future would surely not be slow in developing to a critical and disastrous stage. Whatever may be the short-comings of the United Nations and whatever its failures in finding durable solutions or in maintaining peace, its achievements both at the conference table and in the field have already demonstrated the essential worth of the peace-keeping concept.

36. The United Nations cannot begin to justify the hopes placed in it unless it is enabled by its Members to meet the challenge of the increasingly dangerous situations in many parts of the world by improved methods and new initiatives. It is worth repeating that the pioneering efforts in peace-keeping have not been matched by new and imaginative initiatives in the process of peace-making involving the peaceful settlement of disputes. The capacity of the United Nations to settle disputes or promote constructive and peaceful solutions to disputes is as much in need of study as the problems of peace-keeping—perhaps more so. The tendency for peace-keeping operations, originally set up as temporary expedients, to assume a semi-permanent character because no progress is made in settling the basic causes of conflict is a serious reflection on the capacity of the United Nations to settle disputes even when these disputes have been brought to the Organization by the parties directly concerned.

37. The United Nations Force in Cyprus, during the past year, has continued to perform its essential function of preventing a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, contributing to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The underlying assumption in this activity has been that, by helping to keep the peace and by promoting normalization, the Force would create the conditions in which a political settlement, which necessarily is mainly the responsibility of the parties, could better be sought.

38. The main effort towards a solution has been in the dialogue, recently resumed, between Greece and Turkey. United Nations mediation has been long blocked by the impasse over the selection of a mediator between the Governments of Cyprus and Turkey. My Special Representative in Cyprus, under his broadened responsibilities, has been able, in the prevailing circumstances, to do no more towards a solution than to establish useful official contacts with the Governments in Ankara and Athens in addition to his regular contacts with the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

39. To the best of my knowledge—I have to say with regret—there has been no significant progress towards a solution of the Cyprus problem. All the parties concerned, of course, wish the United Nations peace-keeping force to remain on the island. Thus, I have felt obliged to recommend to the Security Council the extension of the mandate of the Force in Cyprus. It seems all too clear that, in the absence of a solution to the Cyprus problem, the withdrawal of the Force will lead to renewed hostilities and a consequent threat to peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

40. In my view, however, it should not be expected that the Force can remain on the island indefinitely, if only because of unsatisfactory and inadequate financial support. In any case, a United Nations force, as I see it, should not be called upon to maintain indefinitely an obviously unsatisfactory *status quo*.

41. In welcome contrast to the tragic events of 1965, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir during the past year has been quiet and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan has reported few cease-fire violations, none of them of serious military or political significance. Such minor difficulties or incidents as have occurred were resolved readily with the co-operation of the parties and through the good offices of the Observer Group. However, following last year's promising development at Tashkent, there has been no serious effort on the part of the United Nations to contribute to an ultimate solution of the problem.

V. The Middle East

42. The eruption of full-scale war in the Middle East early in June of this year came as a terrific shock, but hardly as a surprise. This 1967 outbreak was the third war between Arabs and Israelis in that area within a score of years, each threatening the general peace. That is more than enough war in any one area.

43. For eighteen of those twenty years the sole barriers against continuous war were the four Armistice Agreements concluded by means of United Nations mediation in the spring and summer of 1949 and the United Nations peace-keeping machinery in the area—the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and later the United Nations Emergency Force. Those agreements, as is made explicit in each of them, were considered at the time of their negotiation as only a step towards peace, and not as a basis for a more or less permanent way of life in the Middle East. They are not peace treaties and, although they were firm and voluntary undertakings by the signatory Governments and were entered into in good faith, they did not represent any fundamental changes in attitude on the part of Governments or peoples. On the other hand there has been no indication either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council that the validity and applicability of the Armistice Agreements have been changed as a result of the recent hostilities or of the war of 1956; each agreement, in fact, contains a provision that it will remain in force “until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved”. Nor has the Security Council or the General Assembly taken any steps to change the pertinent resolutions of either organ relating to the Armistice Agreements or to the earlier cease-fire demands. The Agreements provide that by mutual consent the signatories can revise or suspend them. There is no provision in them for unilateral termination of their application. This has been the United Nations position all along and will continue to be the position until a competent organ decides otherwise.

44. The suspicions, fears and animosities which have characterized the relations between Arabs and Israelis since the resolution on the partition of Palestine have been ever-present and always apparent. Dangerous tensions have never ceased nor greatly eased, and United Nations peace-keeping personnel have had to be constantly on the alert for incidents of fighting.

There have been periods of relative quiet, but there was never real peace or the prospect of real peace. The threat of war was ever present. Finally—and, it seems, inevitably in the historical circumstances—in June, once again all-out war came to the area.

45. There is a profound lesson to be derived by this Organization from recent developments in the Middle East. United Nations peace-keeping and peace-making activities had their genesis in Palestine. They have been more prolonged, more intensive and more varied in that area than in any conflict situations elsewhere. It may be registered here that the United Nations has had considerable success over these twenty years in stopping fighting in the area by means of mediation, cease-fire, truce and armistice agreements, in restoring quiet along acutely troubled lines and generally in containing explosive situations. But the basic issues which provoke the explosions remain unsolved and, indeed, except for a few sporadic and inconclusive debates over the years, largely untouched by the United Nations. There has been no enduring, persistent effort in any United Nations organ to find solutions for them. In my view, the failure of the United Nations over these years to come to grips with the deep-seated and angrily festering problems in that area has to be considered as a major contributing factor to the war of last June, although, naturally, primary responsibility rests inescapably with the parties involved. I am bound to express my fear that, if again no effort is exerted and no progress is made towards removing the root causes of conflict, within a few years at the most there will be ineluctably a new eruption of war.

46. There is a desperate need for a determined, immediate and urgent effort by the United Nations to help bring about the conditions essential to peace in the Middle East. That effort should be constant and unrelenting until those conditions have been achieved.

47. This summer, at the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly, the basic issues of the Middle East were discussed fully, but unhappily without conclusive results, except for the two resolutions on Jerusalem and one on the humanitarian aspects relating to refugees, displaced persons and prisoners of war. The Security Council, of course, took prompt cease-fire actions and also adopted a resolution on humanitarian aspects. On each of the basic issues, if taken separately, there could be agreement by a large number of the Members on a reasonable solution; on some, the support would be very great. But because of the nature of the issues, complicating considerations of priority, timing and simultaneous decision intrude, and thus far have blocked United Nations action. There is the immediate and urgently challenging issue of the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel from the territory of neighbouring Arab States occupied during the recent war. There is near unanimity on this issue, in principle, because everyone agrees that there should be no territorial gains by military conquest. It would, in my view, lead to disastrous consequences if the United Nations were to abandon or compromise this fundamental principle. But in the context of the current problems of the Middle East, the issue of withdrawal loses sizable support when taken alone by separating it from other vital issues and particularly that of national security. The unwillingness of the Arab States to accept the existence of the State of Israel, the insistence of some on maintaining a continuing state of belligerency with Israel—although those maintaining

belligerency may themselves refrain from committing belligerent acts—and the question of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal are also fundamental issues which present hotly controversial problems and sharp division, even though there is much agreement on the principles involved. The problem of the more than a million Palestinian refugees has persisted with little effort at solution since the summer of 1948, and now that problem has been enlarged by the substantial increase in the number of refugees as a result of the recent war. Another serious problem for which no solution had been found at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in June was that of the Al Fatah-type sabotage and terrorist activities across the borders into Israel, with resultant retaliation.

48. The United Nations may again be able by new peace-keeping endeavours and strengthened machinery to achieve a measure of quiet in the Middle East—for a time—but it should now be fully clear that this is not good enough and that more must be done in order to avert another round of hostilities later on. A determined effort is needed now to find solutions to the issues which have thrice in the past led, and no doubt will again in the future lead, to war between Arabs and Israelis. Naturally, it would be most encouraging if it seemed likely that Arabs and Israelis could themselves undertake to try to find the way to solution of the issues between them, but I am aware of no sign that this is in the realm of present possibility. It seems to me certain, therefore, that international effort, assistance and concerted action will be indispensable to any move towards solutions and away from a new recourse to battle. One helpful step that could be taken immediately would be an appropriate authorization for the designation by the Secretary-General of a special representative to the Middle East. Such an appointee could serve as a much needed channel of communication, as a reporter and interpreter of events and views for the Secretary-General and as both a sifter and a harmonizer of ideas in the area.

49. It seems to me also that there are certain fundamental principles which have application to the issues of the Middle East and which no one would be disposed to dispute as to their intrinsic worth, soundness and justness, at least when taken separately. It is indispensable to an international community of States—if it is not to follow the law of the jungle—that the territorial integrity of every State be respected, and the occupation by military force of the territory of one State by another cannot be condoned. Similarly, every State's right to exist must be accepted by all other States; every State is entitled to be secure within its own borders; people everywhere, and this certainly applies to the Palestinian refugees, have a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a future; and there should be free and unimpeded navigation for all through international waterways according to international conventions. The fact is that the parties themselves are firmly and solemnly committed to these principles. In the Armistice Agreements, for example, they have undertaken scrupulously to respect the Security Council injunction against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question; they agreed that no aggressive action by the armed forces of either party would be undertaken, planned or threatened against the other party; they agreed to respect fully the right of the other party to security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other and they agreed

that no warlike or hostile act would be committed by one party against the other.

50. Similar commitments have been undertaken by the parties in their membership in the United Nations and in their acceptance of its Charter provisions, which in Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, require that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered" and that "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".

51. It would be difficult but, I believe, definitely possible to work out in detail a blueprint for the solution of the major Arab-Israel problems in the Middle East which would go some way towards meeting the demands of justice, reason and practicability. However, the real and stubborn obstacle to solutions and to peace is, unmistakably, the unwillingness of the parties for their own reasons to give consideration to any proposals unless they conform very closely to their long-established and rigidly held positions. These attitudes are backed by strong emotions. The essential precondition for an advance towards peace in the Middle East is an end to incitement to hatred, the achievement of calm and a recourse to reason.

52. In the Middle East today, as an aftermath of the recent war, there are expressions of disappointment with the United Nations, in some quarters even bordering on hostility towards its presence in the area. On the one hand, there is the feeling among Arabs that the United Nations has not done enough and is not to be relied upon. On the other hand, there seems to be a decided feeling in some quarters in Israel these days that a United Nations presence there is no longer needed, that it tries to do too much and is in the way. Such attitudes, of course, are both misguided and shortsighted. However faulty or selective the memories of Governments and peoples may be, the record stands indelibly that the United Nations in its twenty years of intensive effort to achieve and maintain quiet and ultimate peace in the Middle East, has rendered invaluable services to both sides in that area, and has saved countless lives and endless destruction there. That effort has been very costly to the United Nations in both men and money. In this regard, Count Bernadotte gave his life, the Truce Supervision Organization has suffered twenty-one fatalities (eight civilian and thirteen military) and the Emergency Force had eighty-nine fatal casualties. The record also shows that Governments and peoples in the area, Israelis and Arabs alike, have at various times in the past not only welcomed but acclaimed in glowing terms the United Nations presence in the area and its helpful actions, by means of mediation—the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the United Nations Emergency Force, as well as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the Technical Assistance Board, now merged in the United Nations Development Programme. I have no doubt whatever that the impartial United Nations presence there continues to be helpful to both sides, is needed now as much as ever, and that the time will come when this will once more be understood and appreciated by all parties concerned.

53. The role of peace-keeper is never likely to be continuously popular with any of the parties to a conflict. By the very nature of its status and its moderating functions, a peace-keeping operation can never espouse the cause of any of the parties. There thus tends to be an underlying element of dissatisfaction and frustration in the relations of the United Nations with the parties to a conflict. This condition may even at times border on a breakdown in those relations. This, however, does not signify that the peace-keeping work of the United Nations has served no purpose, nor that it would be in the interest of the parties to a conflict to do without the assistance which the Organization alone can give them. Quite apart from its more positive functions, the United Nations provides an invaluable repository and a safe target for blame and criticism which might otherwise be directed elsewhere. The Organization has, during all its years and in many situations, performed a vital function as an international lightning rod, as, in fact, it is now doing in the Middle East. These are facts of international life which should not be lost sight of when the effectiveness and the future of the peace-keeping function are being considered. The basic problem, now as always, lies in the acceptance by Governments of international decisions and machinery and the degree of their realization that the wider interests of international peace may in the long run also coincide with their own best interests. We are today, I need hardly add, very far, in general, from such a realization.

VI. Problems of economic and social development

54. Financial considerations continue to affect United Nations activities in the economic and social field and, again this year, have caused the rejection or postponement of some world-wide projects. Three quarters of the way through the United Nations Development Decade, the resources made available, either bilaterally or multilaterally, to meet the major requirements of the developing countries are still far from being satisfactory. Nevertheless, the world community may find some grounds for encouragement in certain recent achievements and some new prospects.

55. The increasing tendency to adopt a comprehensive approach to the problems of development is particularly worthy of note. The United Nations work programme is concerned more and more, both conceptually and in practice, with the major elements of national development, and there is a better understanding of the interrelationship of its economic and social aspects.

56. The emphasis now placed on population problems confirms this trend. Population control is seen not only as a means of overcoming economic difficulties but also as a way to social and human progress in modern societies. In its resolution 2211 (XXI) of 17 December 1966 the General Assembly reiterated its interest in the question of population growth and economic development, and in July 1967 I invited Governments, non-governmental organizations and private individuals to contribute to a new trust fund for population activities, which will be in addition to the financial resources provided for this purpose under the regular budget of the United Nations and the various United Nations technical assistance programmes. The response has been gratifying and it is my belief that contributions to the trust fund will very soon reach the level of \$5.5 million,

which I have cited as necessary for a five-year programme of action. United Nations expenditures in the population field have thus far been relatively small, given the importance of the problem in the development process. The new resources will permit the Organization to double its activities in the field of population as a whole and treble them at regional and country levels, where action is particularly urgent.

57. Another illustration of the global approach to development is to be found in the continuous momentum of planning policies. The increasing use of planning as a rational and pragmatic instrument of action is slowly beginning to yield results, and there is a better understanding of the need for a correct definition of objectives, measures for bringing about social and mental change, and plan implementation in developing countries. The Committee for Development Planning can give a new impetus to these efforts; it has particularly stressed the importance of the domestic front in the drive for progress and the mobilization of human and natural resources as a principal concern of integrated policies for development.

58. The experience gained in development planning will be of considerable value in the preparatory work for the second development decade. Much work remains to be done before specific guidelines and proposals can be formulated; however, on a preliminary basis, it has been proposed that the United Nations might adopt a charter for the second development decade which should identify certain targets to be attained by combined action on the part of the nations of the world. The Committee for Development Planning has felt that the target for over all-growth of the economy needs to be defined more precisely and in greater detail than that set for the present Decade. Minimum objectives might be set for other economic and social areas such as *per capita* food consumption, standards of health, education and employment.

59. The concept of "development decade" should become the framework for substantive co-ordination, as distinct from formal administrative co-ordination. For instance, the work of the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development, with its attempt to evolve a world-wide plan for the development of scientific institutions, would fit into this framework. The Committee has recently prepared an important study on the production and consumption of edible protein, which is the first in a series of reports that will deal with specific problems meriting concerted attack by the international community.

60. Increasing the food supply in order to meet nutritional requirements all over the world will take a long time and will call for an intricate system of measures, both in the agricultural and industrial fields. For many years to come, planned international food aid will be needed, whatever the institutional arrangements, and I am quite certain that the General Assembly will continue to consider and review, as it decided to do in resolution 2096 (XX) of 20 December 1965, policies designed to meet these needs.

61. It is anticipated that food aid will remain an important component of international aid, in cash and in kind. Again this year, I am constrained to express my great concern regarding the loss of momentum in international aid and its adverse effects on the results of the current Development Decade. Sustained and persistent efforts are needed through trade and aid measures in order to supply the developing countries

with the external resources that they require to reinforce their own endeavours. The Kennedy Round of negotiations has been a noteworthy success, but it must be recognized that the new agreements do not give much satisfaction to the developing countries, especially in the agricultural sector. The establishment, with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme, of an export promotion programme involving the four regional economic commissions, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is certainly a step towards a more balanced system of international trade relationships.

62. The Economic and Social Council devoted a good deal of attention at its forty-third session to the means designed to encourage the flow of private capital to the developing countries, and I am convinced that there is scope at present for an increase of this flow. Private capital is, however, not suitable for many projects of a non-commercial nature, such as the provision of economic infra-structure and of educational facilities. The continuing need for international public financing is a recognized fact.

63. In the coming months two issues will, I hope, give further proof that the principle of solidarity between Member States remains alive. The first is the question of replenishing the resources of the International Development Association. The situation of the Association is of particular concern, as the contributions provided in 1965 are nearly exhausted. The type of loans granted by the Association play an irreplaceable role in the development of certain sectors of the economy, especially the infra-structure, of developing countries. I urge the principal Governments involved to make every effort to ensure the replenishment of funds for this vital institution.

64. The second issue will be the establishment of the United Nations Capital Development Fund, which has been formally decided by the General Assembly. It seems to me that, in the present circumstances, serious consideration should be given to the possibility of using for the management of the new Fund, under some suitable arrangement, the experience and knowledge gained by the United Nations Development Programme. I have already drawn attention to the constantly growing scope and flexibility which the Programme has proved capable of acquiring. I have also pointed out that, with its present size and diversity, the United Nations Development Programme cannot be considered simply as a bank for pre-investment projects; rather it should be viewed as a central development agency reaching in many directions, highly adaptable to new requirements, and capable of linking its action closely with that of financial institutions such as the new regional banks.

65. Special mention should be made of the increasingly vital contribution made by the regional economic commissions to the United Nations efforts directed towards the economic and social development throughout the world, particularly the developing countries. The regional economic commissions are providing the essential leadership in the quest for co-operation within the respective regions they serve by their practical and operational programmes which have hastened the building up of regional institutions. Developed as well as the developing countries, members of the regional economic

commissions have, as on the recent occasions of the twentieth anniversary commemoration of the Economic Commission for Europe and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, reiterated their determination to intensify their efforts and co-operate more closely to narrow the growing gap between the rich and the poor nations.

66. In the past year questions of co-operation and co-ordination among members of the United Nations family have assumed increasing significance. I decided, therefore, in agreement with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to establish the position of Under-Secretary for Inter-Agency Affairs.

67. In response to the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies there has, in the past year, been much inter-agency consultation in the administrative and budgetary fields. This consultation has been concerned first and foremost with the proposal to set up a joint inspection unit, and I look forward to its establishment early next year. On the question of the implementation of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's recommendations as a whole, I am presenting a special report to the General Assembly.

68. I welcome the increasing concern in the whole United Nations system with various aspects of what may broadly be described as evaluation. Evaluation of technical co-operation activities is being undertaken in accordance with decisions of the Economic and Social Council. Special rapporteurs will soon be appointed in the realm of social development, to make an appraisal of field activities in this area. In a broad sense the joint inspection unit soon to be established may also be engaged in activities which are related to evaluation. The same holds true for the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination of the Economic and Social Council.

69. With a highly developed international system, what is most needed now, I believe, is patient effort by the appropriate inter-governmental bodies and the Secretariat—each in its own area of competence—to make the present structure of institutions within the United Nations family function more effectively.

*
* * *

70. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has in the past year further developed and consolidated its activities and a general advance has been made in the identification and examination of the main problems faced by the world trading community in the fields of commodities, manufactures, financing, invisibles and shipping, as well as on the broad levels of trade policy in general and of development assistance. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development is thus now fully in operation as a mechanism for evolving an integrated trade and development policy, continuing the historical process that brought about the Geneva Conference of 1964, which gave birth to this new instrument for international economic co-operation.

71. It is also my duty to record, however, that, in the period under review, progress made towards the fulfilment of the aims and objectives set forth in 1964 has been alarmingly slow, and that no significant breakthrough has been registered in either trade or development financing from the point of view of the developing countries. It is true that a great number of important trading nations have participated, under the aegis of

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in the Kennedy Round of negotiations, and that the successful conclusion of those negotiations has represented a very important step which will contribute to further growth in world trade. It is also true, on the other hand—and it has been widely recognized—that this growth can be expected to be particularly marked in the trade of developed countries among themselves, and that most developing countries are likely to reap much smaller benefits from the agreements reached in the Kennedy Round. Developing countries are still facing basic difficulties which need urgent attention in order to avoid a further widening of the gap between the developed countries and the developing world. There is no doubt that the domestic policies of developing countries will be decisive in determining whether this gap will continue to widen or whether it can be narrowed; this does not detract, however, from the convergent importance in this regard of international measures in the field of trade and development.

72. While the permanent machinery of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development will continue to be fully geared to these problems, it is my fervent hope that the second session of the Conference, to be held at New Delhi from 1 February to 26 March 1968, will offer an opportunity for concerted practical action by the world community, in a spirit of shared responsibility, towards the achievement of accepted common objectives, at least on specific issues where concrete progress does not appear to be out of reach. Among such issues, reference has often been made in the recent past to the liberalization of primary commodity trade; the establishment of a general system of preferences for manufactures and semi-manufactures in favour of developing countries; a scheme for supplementary financing; the financing of buffer stocks; measures for trade expansion, economic co-operation and integration among developing countries, with supporting action on the part of developed countries; and trade relations between countries having different economic and social systems. As I stated in the introduction to my annual report last year, however, there is no doubt that the political will of Governments of Member States will remain the main factor which will determine the extent to which the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development can constitute an effective mechanism for the adoption of concrete solutions.

73. With regard to one of the issues mentioned above, the establishment of a general system of preferences, I should like to stress the significance to be attached to the declaration made on 13 April 1967 by the President of the United States of America, at the meeting of American Chiefs of State held at Punta del Este, to the effect that his Government was ready to explore "the possibilities of temporary preferential tariff advantages for all developing countries in the markets of all the industrialized countries". This attitude has considerable potential economic significance for the developing countries.

74. What we should expect from the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on these major issues of trade and development are basic political decisions which may allow the permanent machinery of the Conference to pursue many of its tasks in operational terms. A series of convergent follow-up measures could then be envisaged, aiming at concrete agreements and practical results

within a certain set time. When I referred, in addressing the Economic and Social Council recently, to the need for the Kennedy Round to be followed by a "New Delhi Round", I had in mind the emergence from the New Delhi Conference of such a process of continuing action-oriented international co-operation. The successful pursuit of such convergent measures would call for the joint and sustained co-operative efforts of both the developed and the developing world.

75. On the institutional plane, in order that these efforts of the United Nations in the field of trade and development may be further developed for the maximum benefit of Governments, it is necessary to enlist the support of all organizations and bodies which are in a position to make a positive contribution to international action, and some noteworthy steps have been taken in this respect. The harmonious development of such efforts is bound to depend largely upon the existence of an appropriate distribution of functions. It would consequently seem desirable for the central role vested in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development by the General Assembly in the field of trade, including invisibles, to be reaffirmed and strengthened.

*
* *
*

76. The establishment of new United Nations machinery for industrial development takes on particular significance in the light of disappointments with the rate of economic growth of the developing countries in recent years. By its nature as well as in its terms of reference, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization reflects a growing awareness of the crucial importance of a modern industrial sector. The developing countries are increasingly looking towards accelerated industrialization as the only alternative to the chronic stagnation of their economies and the widening of the economic gap that separates their populations from the benefits of contemporary industrial society.

77. The high hopes inspired by the establishment of a central United Nations machinery for industrialization must not, however, obscure the magnitude and complexity of the underlying tasks. So far, almost 95 per cent of the world's industrial output has come from countries with less than one third of the world's population. The creation of a better balance by opening comparable possibilities for the vast populations of the developing countries, whose industrial output has so far been limited to only 5 per cent of the world's production, will require massive efforts. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization may have an important role to play in the achievement of genuine international co-operation in this field. But there can be no doubt that the goal of accelerated industrialization for the developing countries will require vast resources.

78. The building up of industrial complexes and the establishment of manufacturing plants for a large variety of industrial products, in an effort to ensure the fullest utilization of their natural resources, is likely to become the single most important task of the developing countries in the next decade or two. There is little likelihood that their basic social and political problems will be amenable to solution in a stable environment without the establishment of an autonomous productive capacity based on modern technology. Only the pro-

digious possibilities of applied technology hold out the hope of effectively providing productive employment and higher incomes for the expanding populations of the developing countries.

79. Though neither the United Nations Industrial Development Organization nor any other existing United Nations machinery has at its disposal the vast resources required, the organization may nevertheless play a strategic role in promoting the mobilization of international efforts and in seeking new ways of dealing with the protracted problems of development. If the ultimate goal is to be taken seriously and industrialization of the developing countries is to be significantly accelerated, new approaches will have to be found for effective international action. An adequate strategy for industrial development is now considered an important requirement in the long-range development policies of individual countries. At the same time, more attention will have to be devoted to evolving an international strategy for the promotion of co-operation with a view to achieving the goals of industrial development.

80. Examples of action of strategic significance in respect to these goals are the co-operative programmes that are being developed for the promotion of export-oriented industries and the high priority that must be accorded to the development of industries producing agricultural requisites. In another area, the renewed emphasis on food aid programmes is intended to meet immediate shortages, but an adequate level of food supplies will depend, in the long run, on the capacity of the developing countries to produce or pay for the bulk of their own requirements. Their agricultural development is hampered at present by the lack of fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides, tractors, agricultural implements, and other farm requirements whose availability in adequate supply in the developing countries depends ultimately on the existence of industries capable of producing them where they are needed.

81. At the International Symposium on Industrial Development, which will be held late in 1967, the broad policy questions of industrialization and appropriate measures for constructive co-operation at an international level will be considered. The agenda of the Symposium includes a general survey of world industry as well as the consideration of the particular problems and prospects of the main industrial sectors. An industrial promotion service will be organized in conjunction with the Symposium, to provide an opportunity for people from the developed and developing countries to discuss specific industrial development projects.

*
* *
*

82. The past year has been one of swift evolution in the operational effectiveness and potential of the United Nations Development Programme. Its Governing Council, its Administration and the executing and participating agencies have taken significant steps to raise the quality of assistance under the Programme and to speed its delivery. The United Nations—through many of its inter-governmental bodies, the Secretariat, its regular programme of technical assistance, the funds-in-trust operations and, with respect to field work, especially the resources of the United Nations Development Programme—has played an active role in this forward movement.

83. New programming procedures for the United Nations Development Programme have been recom-

mended to permit approval of requests for technical assistance as and when the need occurs and to commit financing for the duration of the projects. This greater flexibility and responsiveness would further improve not only the planning of programmes, but also the implementation of national and regional technical assistance furnished through the Programme.

84. Meanwhile, other measures have already been applied to make assistance under the Programme increasingly strategic. There is a more intimate collaboration between the Governments and the Programme in the delineation of priority needs, as well as in the integration of projects, large and small. The agencies, at their headquarters and in the field, have joined whole-heartedly in this effort to add greater thrust and coherence to our development co-operation efforts. This is particularly appropriate at a time when new interdisciplinary and multipurpose projects are being sought by the Governments of developing countries.

85. The scope of the United Nations Development Programme as an inter-governmental and inter-agency co-operative endeavour has been broadened through a continually growing collaboration with the regional economic commissions and various United Nations bodies, as well as with regional and bilateral assistance programmes, both private and public.

86. The network of consultative relationships between the Programme and financing institutions is also expanding. These are producing results on many levels. They are facilitating investment follow-up of pre-investment work—investment which some estimates put at over \$1,800 million. At the same time, these closer relations are serving to orient more of its work in directions which will stimulate further investment.

87. The United Nations Development Programme is also providing financial and technical support to national and regional lending institutions. The African Development Bank is one example. Through direct initiatives, the Administrator has supported the creation of new financing institutions when they appeared to be required. An example of this is the promising effort to create a Caribbean Development Bank. The Programme is also prudently expanding its portfolio of development investments. It is doing this by making short-term loans from its cash reserves which are committed but not immediately required. These loans, placed in association with other financing agencies, including regional banks, are dedicated to development projects.

88. At the same time, the Programme is efficiently administering the provision of technical and capital assistance under the reactivated Fund of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian. Thirty million dollars have been pledged to the Fund by the Netherlands. Additional contributions are expected from Indonesia on the completion of a master plan for development now in preparation. This performance suggests the ability of the Programme to administer, with suitable adaptations, and additional funds-in-trust arrangements which Governments might wish to assign to it in other areas of regionalized or specialized development assistance.

89. This dynamic evolution of the Programme is, I am certain, a source of great satisfaction to the more than 130 participating Governments, that is to say, the Governments of nearly all the developed and developing countries in the world. It is one further reward for the confidence they placed in the Programme

by voluntarily pledging finance for the current programme whose cost, exclusive of the West Irian fund, has reached the impressive total of \$1,761 million, of which \$781 million is to come from the central resources of the Programme and \$980 million as contributions of the developing countries directly concerned.

90. The United Nations Development Programme is a striking demonstration that multilateral technical co-operation works, and works efficiently. Yet we must face the fact that its contribution remains modest—limited not by structural deficiencies, which are energetically being overcome, but by the limited funds placed at its disposal.

*
* *
*

91. We are not winning the war on want. The opportunity gap for many, if not most, individuals and nations in the world is growing wider. Inequality is increasing. Each week more and more people suffer the degradation of an economic and social injustice which is needless, and they know it.

92. The responsibility for combating poverty more effectively lies heavily upon developing and developed countries alike. The emerging nations are far from doing all they honestly could and all that they must. The industrialized nations, for their part, must awaken from the apathy accompanying their affluence to the realities of the world around them, to the epochal ferment in which they are inevitably involved. They can help the developing world to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth or leave it in its present stage of under-development; the choice rests heavily with them, for the use they make of only a small part of the annual increase in their technical and physical wealth will determine to a large extent the tide of human progress.

93. We are near the point of no return. Unless all countries are prepared to do more, much more than they have been doing, the world will not solve the food problem. The lives of hundreds of millions of young people in rural areas will be wasted. The swelling migration to the cities will make living in urban centres in developing countries almost intolerable. Violence will become the rule rather than the exception.

94. It is not too late to open a new age of responsibility. This will call for a radically new ethos for survival, involve a bolder dimension of world partnership for development, and demand certain sacrifices. Measured by ability and reward, the sacrifices are small indeed. They are required now. Assistance from the advanced nations to the developing nations should be increased without delay, doubled, then tripled in as few years as possible.

VII. Human rights

95. On several occasions in the past I have underlined the importance of the work which the United Nations is performing, and still has to perform, in the field of the promotion and the protection of human rights for all.

96. The year under review was marked by a major event: the unanimous adoption by the General Assembly, on 16 December 1966, of the International Covenants on Human Rights. The task of standard-setting initiated by the proclamation in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and pursued

by the approval of a number of other declarations and of several international conventions in specific fields was thus crowned by agreement among countries of all parts of the world on a wide range of principles and rules which they consider necessary to ensure respect for the dignity and worth of the human person.

97. This universal commitment solemnly expressed by Member States in the General Assembly is a landmark in the United Nations efforts to encourage respect for human rights. The preambles of the Universal Declaration and of the Covenants express the conviction that recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation not only of freedom and justice but also of peace. A common philosophy is gradually emerging within the United Nations regarding the right of every individual, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, to secure respect for his dignity as a human being, whether in the political and civil or the economic, social and cultural fields. I regard this as an essential factor in the progressive attainment of the Charter goals of universal peace, as well as of peaceful economic and social co-operation and development.

98. The mere adoption of various covenants and international agreements is not enough by itself. The ultimate purpose of all United Nations conventions—to have the principles agreed on within the United Nations translated into legally binding rules under the national laws of Member States—can only be fully achieved by the ratification of these international instruments by Member States in accordance with their constitutional processes. Encouraging information is received from time to time concerning the thorough study and consideration which is given to the many provisions of the International Covenants on Human Rights and other United Nations conventions on the national level. One half of the ratifications which are necessary to bring into effect the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination have now been received. The completion of the process of ratification by Member States is essential, however, to give full effect to the instruments carefully negotiated and in order, in particular, to confer new responsibilities on existing United Nations organs or to bring to life the new institutions created by them. I very much hope that the commemoration of the International Year for Human Rights will provide an effective stimulus to Member States to comply with the General Assembly's appeals to take the necessary action so that the main United Nations conventions in the field of human rights may come into force at an early date. Those countries which may believe that it is not necessary for them to become parties to these instruments because they already have adequate guarantees of the rights proclaimed in United Nations conventions should realize that their active participation in this United Nations long-term effort is also an important part of their contribution to international solidarity and to the efforts to attain the Charter objectives of peace, economic and social co-operation and the harmonization of the action of nations.

99. In addition to the important advances in the field of standard-setting as regards universal respect for human rights significant steps are progressively being taken to enable the United Nations to play a role complementary to that of Governments in extending respect for human rights and in preventing gross

violations of such rights. The new international instruments concluded under United Nations auspices contain provisions intended to encourage and stimulate their implementation. Recent decisions of the Economic and Social Council permit a study by the Commission on Human Rights of situations that reveal consistent patterns of violations of human rights, as exemplified by the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination, and the examination of such situations by the Council. On the recommendation of the Commission and of the Council, the question of the implementation of human rights through a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights or some other appropriate international machinery will be submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly.

100. The resurgence of United Nations activity in the field of human rights corresponds undoubtedly to the genuine interest of our Organization in what I referred to recently as the "human factor", the active concern with the fate of all human beings whose life, happiness and economic and social well-being are affected by problems which are normally presented to the Organization in abstract terms of inter-State relations.

101. The International Year for Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly for 1968 will provide, I hope, a unique opportunity to review and reassess past activities and to propose objectives for future efforts. During the Year, expression should be given in concrete terms to the feelings of compassion and concern for human dignity which do honour to our generation. Account should be taken of the diversity of civilizations, political opinions and religious and philosophical beliefs which enrich mankind, in order to deepen the search for agreement on the requirements for ensuring human rights in the light of the exigencies of contemporary technical progress and development. The many meetings, seminars, lectures and other manifestations which Governments, as well as private institutions, are planning to organize in response to the General Assembly's invitation, and the major conference on human rights which will be convened by the United Nations at Teheran in 1968 should provide an outstanding opportunity in this respect.

VIII. Apartheid

102. Again this year there has been no improvement in the situation in South Africa, where the forcible imposition of the policy of racial discrimination and segregation and the tensions resulting from it have for long been a source of grave international anxiety.

103. While the South African Government has shown a greater desire than in the past to counter the international condemnation of the policy of apartheid by intensified publicity and propaganda, its policy of apartheid remains unchanged. This policy has not been abandoned, as repeatedly called for by the General Assembly and the Security Council, but has been pressed ever more vigorously. The constant reinforcement of racially discriminatory and segregationist measures is accompanied by ever more stringent action against resistance, which, increasingly denied peaceful and legitimate channels of expression, tends to assume extra-legal and even violent forms.

104. The determination of the Government to impose its racial policies by force, and its rejection of consultation with the great majority of the population on

the destiny of the nation, have led inevitably to a deepening of tension and an increasing loss of faith in the possibility of peaceful transformation in accordance with the objectives defined clearly by the General Assembly and the Security Council. This has been accompanied by a growing disappointment among Member States with the ineffectiveness of United Nations action with regard to this problem.

105. The Security Council has not considered the question since 18 June 1964. Indeed, the matter has not been brought before the Council in view of the absence of the necessary consensus among the Powers concerned on further meaningful measures beyond those adopted in 1963 and 1964, particularly the arms embargo.

106. The General Assembly has continued to consider the matter annually and has adopted a number of resolutions which may be described as focusing on four main aspects of the problem.

107. The Assembly has, by substantial majorities, exhorted the Powers concerned to take steps towards economic disengagement from South Africa and to facilitate effective action under the auspices of the United Nations, especially the Security Council.

108. Humanitarian activities to assist the victims of racial discrimination and thus demonstrate the international concern over the problem have been encouraged by the General Assembly.

109. The United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa—which was established in 1966 to provide legal assistance to persons charged under discriminatory legislation, relief for their families and for refugees, and education for prisoners and their dependants—has received increasing contributions in 1967, though still from a relatively small number of Member States.

110. The United Nations educational and training programme for South Africans also established in 1966, pursuant to Security Council resolution 191 (1964), has similarly received increasing support from a few Member States. In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2235 (XXI), I am studying the question of consolidation and integration of this programme with the special programmes for South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese administration.

111. I hope that these humanitarian programmes will receive increasing financial support from a larger number of States so as to enable them adequately to serve their purposes.

112. The need for the widest possible dissemination of information on the situation in South Africa and on United Nations efforts to deal with it has been increasingly stressed by the General Assembly and its Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. They have felt that an intensified effort to disseminate information, in co-operation with the specialized agencies and with non-governmental organizations, is essential in order to promote a wider consensus for a more effective United Nations action.

113. Towards this end, a Unit on Apartheid has been established in the Secretariat, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2144 (XXI), in order that maximum publicity may be given to the evils of the policies of apartheid. This Unit, in co-operation with the Office of Public Information, has attempted to serve this purpose within the framework appropriate for the Secretariat.

114. The commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on 21 March, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2142 (XXI) and with the encouragement of the Commission on Human Rights and the Special Committee, has contributed to the dissemination of information on the policies of apartheid.

115. Moreover, the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council have considered the question of the treatment of political prisoners, allegations of infringements of trade union rights and violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in South Africa. By their decisions on these matters, their investigations and the resulting documentation, these organs have sought to inform world public opinion of the dangers of the situation in South Africa, in the hope that it would influence the South African Government to abandon its discriminatory racial policies.

116. The General Assembly and the Special Committee have also appealed to all States to consider effective political, moral and material assistance to those combating the policies of apartheid.

117. While the United Nations is thus engaged in a wide range of efforts to deal with the situation in South Africa, in co-operation with the specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations, these efforts have not had a significant impact on the situation. Indeed, the recent developments would seem to indicate the danger of violence which, however limited in scope it may be at this stage, is likely to have grave consequences for the future of South Africa and for international harmony.

118. As I have had occasion to stress in the past, the effectiveness of the United Nations in exercising a significant influence towards a peaceful and just solution to the difficult problems in South Africa will depend essentially on the willingness and ability of the permanent members of the Security Council and the main trading partners of the Republic of South Africa to harmonize their positions and take more effective measures to persuade the South African Government to abandon its present course and seek a solution consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Progress in this direction is imperative and urgent in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation which might have grave consequences.

119. In paragraph 6 (a) of General Assembly resolution 2202 (XXI) on the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Secretary-General was requested to organize as soon as possible, in consultation with the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, an international conference or seminar on the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa, and to transmit the report of that conference or seminar to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session. In consultation with the Committees and at the invitation of the Government of Zambia, a Seminar on the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa was held at Kitwe, Zambia, from 24 July to 4 August 1967. The report of the

Seminar will be available to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

IX. The problems of decolonization

120. Progress towards decolonization has not accelerated during the past year. Although Botswana, Lesotho and Barbados attained independence and became States Members of the Organization during the latter half of 1966, seven years after the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, many territories remain under colonial rule. There was limited constitutional advance during the year in a number of smaller territories. The dependent peoples in large areas in southern Africa, however, continue to be denied effective political rights, and the authorities in power in these areas continue to pursue repressive and retrogressive policies in defiance of the basic objectives of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The General Assembly, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and, in the case of Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council have discussed with increasing concern the grave situation arising from the frustration of the legitimate aspirations of these peoples.

121. In Southern Rhodesia, the rebellion proclaimed by a group of European settlers on 11 November 1965 in open defiance of the administering Power and the United Nations entered its second year. A series of talks between the United Kingdom Government and the illegal régime culminated in December 1966 in a meeting between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Mr. Ian Smith, leader of the Rhodesian rebels, which did not, however, achieve success. The General Assembly on two occasions condemned any arrangements which would transfer power to the illegal régime on any basis that failed to recognize the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

122. Following the breakdown of the talks, the United Kingdom Government declared that it would not grant independence to Southern Rhodesia before the attainment of majority rule and approached the Security Council with the proposal that selective mandatory sanctions should be imposed on specified Southern Rhodesian exports and imports. The Council imposed such a system of sanctions by its resolution 232 (1966).

123. As requested by the Council, I have already submitted three reports on the implementation of that resolution. I am not able, however, to draw definitive conclusions on the progress of the implementation of the resolution until all Member States—in particular all the traditional trading partners of Southern Rhodesia—have replied to my request for information on trade. The available statistics in respect of the first few months of 1967, however, show that there has been a significant decline in trade between Southern Rhodesia and many of its trading partners in most of the commodities listed in the resolution of the Security Council. On the other hand, there has been continuing traffic in certain important commodities.

124. Such information on economic conditions in the Territory as is available suggests that sanctions have not so far caused the illegal authorities insuperable

difficulties. It is clear that the policies pursued by the Governments of South Africa and Portugal, controlling as they do the trade routes of land-locked Southern Rhodesia, have strengthened the economic position of the illegal régime and have fortified it in its defiance of the international community.

125. Action taken by the Security Council aimed at bringing the rebellion to an end in no way diminishes the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, as the administering Power, to restore constitutional government to the Territory. Recent developments, which involve the introduction of more systematic policies of separate development of the races, present an added challenge.

126. With regard to South West Africa, the General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, was confronted by the determination of the South African Government to maintain, and in fact vigorously to reinforce, its apartheid policy in the Territory and by the disappearance of the hope of a judicial remedy through the International Court of Justice. In its resolution 2145 (XXI), adopted by an overwhelming majority, the General Assembly declared that South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa and that it had, in fact, disavowed the Mandate. The Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty, to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa, was therefore terminated by the General Assembly, which decided that South Africa had no other right to administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa should become the direct responsibility of the United Nations.

127. At its fifth special session the General Assembly was faced with the task of establishing a machinery for the administration of South West Africa until such time as the inhabitants could democratically set up the necessary institutions for independence. By resolution 2248 (S-V) the Assembly established a United Nations Council for South West Africa, composed of eleven Member States, and entrusted it with the task of administering South West Africa. The Council was further empowered to entrust such executive and administrative functions as it deemed necessary to a United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa. The Council has already been constituted, and an acting Commissioner has been appointed.

128. I need hardly emphasize the importance and historic significance of these decisions. At the same time I view with concern the considerable obstacles that lie in the way of their effective implementation. The new Council has been requested by the General Assembly to enter into contact with the South African authorities to arrange for the transfer of power. Those authorities have, however, publicly announced their refusal to co-operate in the implementation of the resolution and have, moreover, carried out a number of previously postponed decisions leading to greater racial segregation, including the setting up of institutions of tribal self-government in Ovamboland. They have also arrested several South West African leaders and put them on trial within South Africa.

129. It seems to me that meaningful progress in decolonization in South West Africa can take place only if effective pressure is brought to bear by the Security Council. Such a degree of unanimity in deploring the

existing situation should be accompanied, in my view, by an equally unanimous sense of responsibility and determination to remedy that situation.

130. The question of the Territories under Portuguese administration has again been the subject of considerable debate in the General Assembly and in the Special Committee. Continuing hostilities in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique present a situation which, as the Security Council affirmed in its resolution 218 (1965), seriously disturbs international peace and security. The non-implementation by the Government of Portugal of the many resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and the intensification of military operations in those three Territories has been a matter of particular concern to the Special Committee, as has that Government's failure to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council in respect of Southern Rhodesia. It will be recalled that in the introduction to my last annual report I foresaw the possibility of discussions between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal and myself within the context of the implementation of the Security Council's resolution 218 (1965) and the mandate entrusted to me by the Council. It is a matter for regret that these discussions did not take place.

131. The situation in Aden has given cause for increasing concern. It will be recalled that last year I had been requested by the Special Committee to appoint, in consultation with the Committee and with the United Kingdom as administering Power, a special mission to visit Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the implementation of relevant General Assembly resolutions and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections. The General Assembly subsequently endorsed this request, and in resolution 2183 (XXI) it noted that the administering Power had stated that it was ready to co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of the relevant resolutions and that it would grant independence to the Territory not later than 1968. The General Assembly also requested the mission to recommend practical steps for the establishment of a caretaker government.

132. After lengthy consultations, I was able to appoint the members of the Mission in February 1967. During March-April, the Mission visited London, Jeddah, Cairo and Aden, but owing to circumstances beyond its control the Mission was obliged to return to Headquarters sooner than had been originally planned. In June, the administering Power announced that it had fixed 9 January 1968 as the date for the independence of the Territory. Following consultations with various parties, including the administering Power, the Mission, in August-September, visited Geneva, Beirut and Cairo and held further consultations in an effort to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. While the Mission was engaged in such consultations, the administering Power, on 5 September, announced that the Federal Government had ceased to function, that it recognized the "nationalist forces" as representatives of the people, and that it was ready to enter into immediate discussions with them for the formation of an effective government for the Territory. While awaiting the report of the Special Mission on Aden, I should like to express the hope that all concerned will make every effort towards the establishment of a representative Government leading

to the attainment of independence by the Territory under conditions of peace and tranquillity.

133. The problems in the remaining Non-Self-Governing Territories have been studied in detail by the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council. At its twenty-first session the Assembly adopted resolutions containing recommendations concerning specific measures to be taken to accelerate the process of decolonization in the Territories of Fiji, Nauru, Papua and New Guinea, French Somaliland, Ifni and Spanish Sahara, Equatorial Guinea, Gibraltar and Oman. It also adopted more general resolutions in which it expressed concern at such factors impeding decolonization as the disruption of the territorial integrity of some Territories, the establishment of military bases and installations in others, the activities of foreign financial and economic interests, and the failure of administering Powers to allow United Nations missions to visit certain Territories. The General Assembly called upon the administering Powers to eliminate these factors.

134. The Special Committee paid a fourth visit to Africa during June 1967 and held meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam at the invitation of the Governments concerned.

135. It is my earnest hope that all Member States, and in particular the administering Powers, will do their utmost to bring about the final end of colonialism without further delay. In this context I appeal to those administering Powers which have so far refused to cooperate with the Organization in respect to territories under their administration to reconsider their position and to adopt policies which are in keeping with the objectives of the Charter. It is my belief that such a change of attitude would not only be in the interests of the dependent peoples concerned, but also of all Member States, including the administering Powers, which, by signing the Charter, have undertaken to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms.

X. Financial situation of the United Nations

136. The Organization's financial position and prospects continue to give little cause for optimism. The high hopes that emerged following the consensus reached at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly remain unfulfilled. The patient and persistent efforts of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations have, as already noted, yielded disappointing results. The searching examination of United Nations finances undertaken in 1966 by an *ad hoc* committee of experts has left unresolved the basic problems posed by the Organization's short- and long-term indebtedness. The generous example of twenty-three countries in voluntarily contributing approximately \$23.6 million to assist the United Nations out of its financial difficulties has failed to inspire others to follow suit despite repeated assurances that such support would soon be forthcoming. Fortunately, the Organization's cash position has been such during the past twelve months as to enable it to meet its immediate obligations without recourse to further borrowing. Nevertheless, the current situation, while not immediately critical, is precarious.

137. The *Ad Hoc* Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies reached the conclusion, in March 1966, that the Organization's minimum net deficit as of 30 Sep-

tember 1965 was \$52 million, towards which \$20.1 million of voluntary contributions has been paid or pledged as of the time the Committee reported. Thus, in the judgement of the Committee, additional contributions of not less than \$31.9 million were needed in order to restore solvency. On the basis of certain alternative assumptions, mainly with respect to sums to be credited or repaid to Member States from the "surplus accounts" for the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Operation in the Congo, the estimated deficit and the resulting additional voluntary contributions required would need to be increased—according to the Committee's analysis—by \$21.4 million to a total of \$73.4 million and \$53.3 million, respectively.

138. In the almost two years that have elapsed since the *Ad Hoc* Committee began its examination, the situation, while showing improvement in some respects, has deteriorated in others. In particular, because of the positions of principle of some Governments, there has continued to be a cumulative shortfall in the collection of contributions to the regular budget for the financial years 1966 and 1967 and to the budget of the United Nations Emergency Force for 1966. In the net result and in the light of the Secretariat's best judgement as to the extent to which assessed contributions and other income will in fact be received for 1967 and prior years, and of expenditures and obligations incurred since 30 September 1965, the minimum deficit, estimated by the *Ad Hoc* Committee at \$52 million, should now be considered as having risen to some \$60 to \$62 million. In the meantime, voluntary contributions paid or pledged to the special account that has been established for the purpose of liquidating this deficiency together with interest earned thereon have amounted to \$23.6 million. The additional voluntary contributions now needed on the basis of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's estimates can therefore be considered as falling within a minimum range of some \$36.5 million to \$38.5 million. These requirements relate solely to the regular budget and the Working Capital Fund and to special accounts of the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Operation in the Congo—that is to say, to United Nations activities which have been financed wholly or in part by assessed contributions as apportioned by the General Assembly. They do not provide, for example, for the needs of the United Nations Force in Cyprus which, under a Security Council decision, has been financed from the outset on a strictly voluntary basis. As I have repeatedly had occasion to point out, this method of financing United Nations peace-keeping operations has proved equally uncertain and unsatisfactory, as evidenced by the fact that when the currently authorized mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus expires on 26 December 1967, the account of the Force will show an estimated deficit of approximately \$9 million in the absence of further pledges of financial support.

139. It is, of course, to be expected that past and present financial difficulties notwithstanding, and with prudent husbanding of its net liquid assets, the United Nations will continue for some time to come to meet its more pressing obligations. Obviously, however, as the Organization's chief administrative officer, I cannot face with equanimity a situation of continuous and growing deficits, especially when these represent, in large part, debts due to individual Member States for reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs they have incurred in providing men and *materiel* for the various

peace-keeping operations in which the United Nations has been or is now engaged. Failure to meet these obligations within a reasonable period of time can only result in those countries, that have consistently responded to United Nations needs for troops and logistical support, having also to bear a wholly disproportionate share of the financial costs involved. In such an event, moreover, the promptness and effectiveness with which the Organization can be expected to cope in future with similar situations is bound to be impaired.

140. As regards the longer-term outlook, the problems to be resolved are perhaps less financial than political in origin and character. They are the consequence, for the most part, of basically divergent views, particularly among the large contributors, as to the kind of organization the United Nations should be, the type of activity in which it should or should not engage, and the manner in which certain of its activities should be authorized, directed and financed. All attempts to resolve these problems through administrative and budgetary means have so far, understandably, proved futile. The *Ad Hoc* Committee of Experts, for example, could do no more than call attention to the fact that the non-participation of some Members in the financing of certain assessed items of expenditure, notably the servicing of the United Nations bond issue, and the payment, in some instances, of their *pro rata* share of appropriations for the regular—as distinct from the voluntarily financed—programme of technical assistance, have led to a cumulative deficit in the regular budget.

141. Thus, as matters now stand, the situation is one of gradual but steady deterioration. If this trend is to be arrested, as it must be, fresh and determined efforts will be needed to liquidate the legacy of past peace-keeping indebtedness; to devise ways and means whereby future operations involving relatively large expenditures by United Nations standards are financed on a firmer and more reliable basis than in the past; and to reach accommodations that will arrest the regular budgetary shortfall and thereafter safeguard the integrity of the Organization as an expression of collective financial responsibility.

XI. Public information

142. In the introduction to last year's annual report, I had occasion to refer to the relationship between public information activities and the over-all aims and objectives of the United Nations. I stated at that time that, in my judgement, a purposeful and universal programme of information constituted in fact an essential counterpart of the substantive activities of the Organization. With this relationship in mind, I informed the General Assembly that a review and reappraisal of the existing operations and resources of the United Nations Office of Public Information had been instituted.

143. The results of the reassessment of the information activities for which the United Nations is itself directly responsible, or at least that part of them which pertains to the Organization's economic and social fields of involvement, have been embodied in two reports submitted by me, at its request, to the Economic and Social Council. It is my intention to submit a fuller report to the General Assembly itself at its twenty-third session covering not only information activities relating to the fields of economic and social development but also the aims and activities of the Organization as a whole, including its areas of political preoccupation and responsibility.

144. Pending the submission of this comprehensive report, I feel it may be pertinent for me to draw attention to some aspects of these activities which seem to me to warrant serious consideration at this time.

145. The first of these relates to what might be described as the quantity of information effort required or desired of the Office of Public Information, both by the principal organs of the United Nations itself and by national information outlets and the world public at large. In recent years, indeed, there has been a very clear and determined trend towards a larger recognition of the importance of adequate information support for various activities in which the United Nations is engaged. With the establishment of several new deliberative and executive bodies within the United Nations, there has been a growing demand for increased activity through the various media by the Office of Public Information. In the light of this greatly expanding area of United Nations activity and concern, I believe Member States will soon need to give serious thought to the adequacy of the resources at present made available for United Nations public information work, in terms both of manpower resources and of technical facilities. Although considerations of economy must of course continue, as a matter of general policy, I believe it is equally necessary to recognize that an inadequate information programme could not only sentence itself to obsolescence but also amount to a wasteful dereliction of both duty and opportunity.

146. Related to the quantity of the United Nations information effort in support of its various substantive activities, be they economic and social or political, is the question of the content and character of that effort. In this second context, I believe that Member States will need to consider carefully the nature and type of information support that they demand of the Office of Public Information. United Nations information—as it has been conducted so far under the basic principles established in 1946 by General Assembly resolution 13 (I), which created what was then called the Department of Public Information—has been essentially of a factual nature concentrating on impartial and objective reporting of United Nations deliberations, decisions and events, and drawing its material basically from official records. I believe it is still necessary for the Organization, given its essential character as an agency for harmonizing conflicting interests, to adhere closely to the injunction laid down by the General Assembly in 1946 that the Office of Public Information must not engage in promotion or propaganda. The Organization has, of course, established for itself several specific lines of endeavour and several objectives to be achieved, both in the economic and social fields and in the field of political activity. The Office of Public Information, in my judgement, contributes towards the promotion of the Organization's efforts and the attainment of its objectives by confining itself to impartial and factual reporting. Any crossing of the boundaries, whether conscious or otherwise, which traditionally divide information proper from activities with a promotional or propagandistic trend would, I believe, not only be constitutionally improper for the Office of Public Information but also self-defeating in the long run.

147. Finally, I believe it would be relevant for me to stress once again one other aspect of the over-all problem of information as a tool for the building of wider and more solid public support throughout the world for the work and purposes of the United Nations. As I stated in my report last year, the principal respon-

sibility for informing the peoples of the world about the aims and activities of the United Nations rests, in the last analysis, upon the national information outlets themselves. It must continue to do so, and it is important that national Governments take whatever steps they consider necessary to assume their share of this collective responsibility. Certain specific proposals and recommendations on how Member States may make a larger contribution in this direction have been advanced by me in my "Review of public information activities", prepared at the request of the Economic and Social Council. Although the recommendations in this report are framed with particular reference to the economic and social activities of the United Nations, they may be adapted and extended to all activities of the Organization. It is my considered view that augmented national information activity for and on behalf of the United Nations is not only necessary but essential if the Organization is to achieve its purposes. This increased national activity must be supplemented and supported by adequate measures at the international level.

XII. Concluding observations

148. The picture given above of what I regard as the most significant developments in the United Nations during the last twelve months is, on the whole, a discouraging one. I have already referred briefly to the situation in Viet-Nam. It is a subject on which I have expressed myself with frankness in many public statements and I have nothing new to say. I continue to feel that it is within the bounds of possibility, provided certain first steps could be taken, to bring this problem to the conference table. I also feel that, on the basis of the stated objectives of all the parties concerned, it is possible to secure an honourable peace. I must reiterate my conviction that without these first steps I see no end to the continuing conflict and the human suffering involved on the part of combatants and non-combatants alike. In this connexion I would like to draw attention to resolution XXVIII of the twentieth International Conference of the Red Cross in regard to the protection of civilian populations against the dangers of indiscriminate warfare.

149. Both the conflict in Viet-Nam and the recent fighting in the Middle East have inevitably affected the whole climate of international relations, including of course the relations between the two super-Powers. What worries me even more is the continuing and possibly increasing tendency which colours so much of international relations and of human life in general today—the recourse to violence and threats of violence throughout the world. It is all too clear that the civilized and reasonable approach to international disputes, of which peace-keeping has been a part, cannot long survive if there is increasingly a resort to violent solutions and to more and more widespread exhortations to violence in the name of one cause or another. This problem is relevant to a far wider subject than United Nations peace-keeping—it is, in fact, relevant to nothing less than the question of human survival.

150. Twenty-two years ago we saw the end of the most violent and destructive war in history. The shock of that war and what it made men do to each other produced a reaction in favour of peace and order—an atmosphere in which acts of violence when they occurred engendered revulsion. That mood, alas, especially among those who hold the reins of power, soon

began to evaporate. We now again see violence, threats, incitement, intimidation and even hatred being used as weapons of policy in increasingly numerous areas of the world.

151. When unbridled use of force is accepted and intimidation and threats go unchallenged, the hopes of a world order such as the one outlined in the Charter become dim and hollow. When prejudice and hatred dominate the relations of nations or groups of nations, the whole world takes a step backward towards the dark ages. When violence is highlighted and even glamorized by mass media, thus instilling in society, and particularly in the young, an appetite for solving problems by force, the turbulences of today are dangerously fanned and the seeds of larger and deeper troubles at national and international levels are sown for the future. When force and military competitiveness displace co-operation, negotiation, law and diplomacy as the natural elements of the relations between States, the nightmare of a third world war comes steadily nearer to the world of reality.

152. And even though, by some kind fate, the world may escape the ultimate catastrophe, fear and violence debase the whole coinage of human intercourse and poison the atmosphere of international relations as surely as the various forms of pollution in daily life with which modern man has afflicted himself. Violence erodes the spirit of law, order and international morality. Violence and the spirit of violence, if unchecked, will soon wither the tender growth of world order which has been fostered since the Second World War. In that event, the world would inevitably return to the sort of international chaos which produced two world wars within thirty years.

153. There is but one true answer to violence, duress and intimidation among States; the answer must be found in a resolute rejection of violence and a determined resistance to it by that vast majority of men and women throughout the world who long to live in peace, without fear. This would be a movement of mankind to save mankind. But to be effective, such a popular movement must be coupled with a determined effort by Governments to put to work the instruments of international order which they already have on hand in the common interest of peace and the advancement of man.

154. The pioneering experiments in United Nations peace-keeping are a promising aspect of the grand effort to build a world community based on peaceful and reasonable methods and practices. But if that effort is to go forward to success, the tide of violence and the trend towards violent solutions must be stemmed by a massive effort of Governments and peoples alike. That effort must include more persistent and vigorous attempts to find just and peaceful solutions to the many problems throughout the world which give rise, through despair, to the resort to violence.

155. In these circumstances I have asked myself what could be done, in addition to peace-keeping operations, to help resolve international conflicts even before they become a threat to international peace and security. I believe it is necessary to draw attention to the urgent need for States to have wider recourse, in their relations with other States, to the various means for the pacific settlement of disputes. By Article 33 of the Charter, Member States have bound themselves to seek, first of all, a solution to any disputes, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of inter-

national peace and security, by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. In this connexion, I cannot fail to draw attention to the availability of the International Court of Justice, as a principal organ of the United Nations, for the settlement of legal disputes. Prompter and wider recourse to the Court might well have settled issues which have remained unresolved in the hope that political solutions might be found for them. I am aware that criticism of the Court was expressed at the last regular session of the General Assembly as a result of the disappointment of many Member States at the outcome of the South West Africa cases; however, I regard it as essential that the independence of the Court should be fully protected and that it should not be subjected to political pressures in the course of its work or as a result of a particular case. It is in the interests of every Member State to ensure that the principles of the Charter are paramount, and that the Court is able to discharge its responsibilities free of political considerations. I hope that, in the years immediately ahead, the Court will play an increasingly useful role in regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes. If this hope is to be realized, I would suggest that it would be opportune for States at this time to review their position regarding the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36 of its Statute. At present only forty-three of the 125 parties to the Statute of the Court have accepted such jurisdiction, and then subject in some instances to wide reservations. Both as regards the number of acceptances of compulsory jurisdiction, and as regards the reservations in some of those acceptances, the situation can hardly be regarded as satisfactory in the present condition of world affairs.

156. In the introductions to previous annual reports I have also had occasion to refer to a number of situations where Governments have requested the assistance of the Secretary-General in seeking to resolve outstanding problems between them, although no principal organ other than the Secretariat has been formally seized of those problems. One such instance, mentioned in the report for 1963-1964, related to Cambodia and Thailand where, at the request of the Governments concerned, I appointed a special representative to assist them in seeking solutions to their difficulties. Another instance arose this year between Guinea and the Ivory Coast as the result of the detention in the latter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guinea and of the Permanent Representative of Guinea to the United Nations while they were returning to Conakry from the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly. In view of the possible repercussions of this situation, I thought it my duty to report on it, and on the use of my good offices to obtain the release of certain nationals and residents of the Ivory Coast detained by the Government of Guinea, to the Security Council as well as to the general membership. In so doing, I did not have in mind the Secretary-General's discretion, under Article 99 of the Charter, to bring to the attention of the Council any matter which in his opinion might threaten international peace and security, but rather the right of the Security Council, under Article 34 of the Charter, to investigate, if it so wishes, any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. In the light of this right of the Council, I feel it is my duty to notify it of any

situation where my good offices have been invoked to which it would appear to me that Article 34 of the Charter would be applicable. In this connexion, I would suggest that Member States, whether or not they are directly involved in a dispute or in a situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, should give further study and thought to the opportunities provided by Article 34 of the Charter for the Council to inquire at an early stage into such situations or disputes.

157. I should also like to make one other suggestion in the same context. One of the preoccupations of the founders of the United Nations in 1945 was to remedy what were considered to be the failings of the League of Nations, while preserving its useful features. Provision was made at San Francisco in Article 28, paragraph 2, of the Charter, for periodic meetings of the Security Council at which each of its members might, if it so desired, be represented by a member of the Government or by some specially designated representative. Further provision appears in the rules of procedure of the Security Council for the holding of such periodic meetings twice a year.

158. The above-mentioned provisions have not so far been implemented, although suggestions to this effect were made by both my predecessors in 1950 and 1955, respectively. On a number of occasions the General Assembly has also suggested to the Council that it convene meetings under Article 28, paragraph 2, of the Charter and in 1958 certain members of the Council itself made formal proposals, subsequently withdrawn, to this end.

159. It appears to me that previous efforts to implement the relevant provisions on periodic meetings of the Security Council failed not on their merits but on the basis of the prevailing atmosphere at the times when they were made. A further effort to put these provisions into effect would seem opportune at the present time, when there would appear to be a more general willingness to discuss at a high level matters of concern to the international community as a whole. I have in mind a modest beginning to test the value of such meetings, an ideal opportunity for the first of which might be provided by the opening of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly at which many Foreign Ministers will be present. Personally I have little doubt that, once initiated, such periodic meetings will provide an outstanding opportunity for a general review of matters relating to international peace and security which are within the competence of the United Nations and for seeking a consensus approach to such matters. While periodic meetings, to permit the possibility of the fullest and frankest discussion, should probably be informal and closed, a public meeting might also be convened at the end of a particular series to announce any results achieved and to permit members of the Council so wishing to elaborate publicly thereon if they so wished.

160. If there should appear to be a general willingness to initiate a periodic meeting of the Council during the early days of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, I would be prepared to suggest a tentative agenda for such a meeting well in advance so that agreement might be reached upon it. On the basis of the experience gained at such meetings, a decision could be arrived at on when a future meeting should be held and on whether full effect should be

given to the provision in the rules of procedure of the Council that such meetings should be held twice a year.

161. I have often referred to the desirability and need for the United Nations to achieve universality of membership as soon as possible because I share the common and widely held belief that no organization with the comprehensive aims of the Charter can be successful unless all the diverse peoples, cultures and civilizations of modern life are represented in it. Furthermore, outstanding international problems, such as the crisis in South-East Asia and disarmament, would seem to stand a better chance of settlement through the attainment of universality of membership of the United Nations. Political difficulties that appear to stand in the path of this objective will, I hope, be measured against the long-term advantages that universality entails.

162. I believe it is necessary to note that, while universality of membership is most desirable, like all concepts it has its limitations and the line has to be drawn somewhere. Universality, as such, is not mentioned in the Charter, although suggestions to this effect were made, but not adopted, at San Francisco, and the Charter itself foresees limitations on United Nations membership. Under Article 4 of the Charter not only must a State be peace-loving, but it must also, in the judgement of the Organization, be able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter.

163. In making this observation I have in mind those States which have been referred to as "micro-States", entities which are exceptionally small in area, population and human and economic resources, and which are now emerging as independent States. For example, the Trust Territory of Nauru, which is expected to attain independence in the immediate future, has an area of 8.25 square miles and an indigenous population of about 3,000, while Pitcairn Island is only 1.75 square miles in extent and has a population of eighty-eight.

164. It is, of course, perfectly legitimate that even the smallest territories, through the exercise of their right to self-determination, should attain independence as a result of the effective application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. However, it appears desirable that a distinction be made between the right to independence and the question of full membership in the United Nations. Such membership may, on the one hand, impose obligations which are too onerous for the "micro-States" and, on the other hand, may lead to a weakening of the United Nations itself.

165. I would suggest that it may be opportune for the competent organs to undertake a thorough and comprehensive study of the criteria for membership in the United Nations, with a view to laying down the necessary limitations on full membership while also defining other forms of association which would benefit both the "micro-States" and the United Nations. I fully realize that a suggestion of this nature involves considerable political difficulties, but if it can be successfully undertaken it will be very much in the interests both of the United Nations and of the "micro-States" themselves. There are already one or two cases where the States concerned have realized that their best interests, for the time being at least, rest in restricting themselves to membership in certain specialized agencies, so that they can benefit fully from the United Nations system in advancing their economic and social development without

having to assume the heavy financial and other responsibilities involved in United Nations membership. The League of Nations had to face the same issue over the question of the admission of certain European States which were then referred to as "Lilliputian" States. Although the League of Nations was unable to define exact criteria, it prevented in due course the entry of the "Lilliputian" States.

166. As already mentioned, a necessary corollary to the establishment of criteria on admission to full membership is the definition of other forms of association for "micro-States" which would not qualify for full membership. As members of the international community, such States are entitled to expect that their security and territorial integrity should be guaranteed and to participate to the full in international assistance for economic and social development. Even without Charter amendment, there are various forms of association, other than full membership, which are available, such as access to the International Court of Justice and membership in the relevant United Nations regional economic commissions. Membership in the specialized agencies also provides an opportunity for access to the benefits provided by the United Nations Development Programme and for invitations to United Nations conferences. In addition to participation along the foregoing lines, "micro-States" should also be permitted to establish permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters and at the United Nations Office at Geneva, if they so wish, as is already the case in one or two instances. Measures of this nature would permit the "micro-States" to benefit fully from the United Nations system without straining their resources and potential through assuming the full burdens of United Nations membership which they are not, through lack of human and economic resources, in a position to assume.

167. This latter suggestion of observer status for the "micro-States" naturally brings to mind the question of observer status in general. While the question of observers from non-member States was raised by Mr. Trygve Lie in a report on permanent missions submitted to the General Assembly at its fifth session, and while I have referred to it for a number of years in the introductions to my annual reports, the institution is one which rests purely on practice and which has not been set on any firm legal basis through discussion and decision in the General Assembly.

168. In my introduction to last year's annual report as well as in previous years, I have already expressed my strong feeling that all countries should be encouraged and enabled, if they wish to do so, to follow the work of the Organization more closely by maintaining observers at the Headquarters of the United Nations, at Geneva and in the regional economic commissions. They will thus be exposed to the impact of the work of the Organization and the currents and cross-currents of opinion that prevail within it, besides gaining opportunities to contribute to that exchange. However, I have also explained that I have felt obliged to follow the established tradition—which, as already noted, has no firm legal basis—by which only certain Governments have been enabled to maintain observers. I would like to repeat the suggestion I made last year that this question may be further examined by the General Assembly so that the Secretary-General might be given a clear directive as to the policy to be followed in the future. Were the Assembly, perhaps on the initiative of a Member State,

to study the questions involved, I am sure that it would be possible formally to establish the status of observer and to draw up legal rules permitting non-members to follow items of interest to them in the United Nations.

169. In the above observations I have endeavoured, as frankly and as objectively as I can, to draw the attention of the Organization to the serious problems which it has to tackle if the effectiveness of the United Nations is to be maintained and improved. This is not the first time in its history that the United Nations is facing a "crisis" of confidence, and I am sure it will not be the last. At the same time, this "crisis" is itself an index of the high hopes that Member States have come to place in the Organization, and their faith that these serious problems can and should be solved by determined efforts and a spirit of co-operation on the part of the Governments of Member States. The United Nations is an instrument of multilateral

diplomacy which has some special advantages when dealing with problems involving the reconciliation and harmonization of the interests of several Member States. Like all tools, its utility will depend upon the skill and tenacity of those who have the occasion and the need to use it. I hope that this instrument will be put to more effective use in the coming months, so that a climate of confidence will be established—confidence in the ability of the Organization to weather the storms, to build bridges of reconciliation, to re-establish lost lines of communication and to prove once again its capacity to promote peace and progress.



(Signed) U THANT
Secretary-General

15 September 1967

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre librairie ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.