



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

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CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 65 AND 142 (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will continue the third phase of its work devoted to consideration of and action upon draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items.

As was decided this morning, the Committee will start this afternoon's meeting with consideration of and action upon the draft resolutions contained in cluster 5, which includes the following: A/C.1/39/L.4, L.5, L.8, L.20, L.25, L.26, L.32, L.42, L.43 and L.49.

I understand from consultations I have held with the sponsors of those draft resolutions that they are all ready for action, with one single exception, which is draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26, concerning which the sponsors are in consultation with some delegations. We shall therefore start with draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.4 through A/C.1/39/L.49, with the exception of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26, on which we will take action later.

I shall now call on those delegations which want to state their positions or explain their votes before the voting concerning the draft resolutions included in cluster 5.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): My delegation would like to make some comments on the draft resolutions contained in cluster 5. We are of the opinion that, with one exception, these draft resolutions can be characterized as an effort to advance by concrete and effective measures the process of arms limitation and disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons and to counter the threat of nuclear war. By such an effort, the United Nations lives up to its role and responds to the main concern of people today in the East and the West, the North and the South. These draft resolutions provide clear guidelines for the required actions based on the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and at the same time defend this historic consensus against attempts to undermine it and turn it into an empty shell. As recommended in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, especially in paragraph 50, draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25 and L.32 call for a freeze on nuclear-weapon arsenals.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Many delegations have pointed to the far-reaching positive effects of such a step, which would create a new starting point from which negotiations on arms reductions could begin without the pressure of the continuous quantitative and, above all, qualitative nuclear-arms race.

The question is, what good can the reduction of one type of weapons do when, at the same time, the arsenals are filled with even more dangerous weapons systems? The freeze of arsenals and the reduction of nuclear weapons must not be brought into contradiction with each other. Both belong together.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic will, therefore, support draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25, L.32 and L.42 dealing with the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

Draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.8, L.20 and L.43 are directed particularly to the multilateral negotiating process on nuclear disarmament, which is a matter of the utmost urgency. It is imperative that we succeed finally in setting in motion the negotiating mechanism of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament regarding questions of nuclear disarmament. The obstruction of such negotiations is in contradiction with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It ignores the world-wide interest in halting the nuclear arms race and in eliminating the danger of nuclear war.

My delegation, together with the other sponsors, submitted draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.8 and A/C.1/39/L.20 and will also support draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43 submitted by the non-aligned countries. We would like to underscore the fact that draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.8 and A/C.1/39/L.43 are especially complementary to each other.

Miss PERSAUD (Guyana): My delegation has asked to speak specifically to explain its intention to abstain from voting on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25 and A/C.1/39/L.49.

It is our view that the aims and objectives of those two draft resolutions are fully covered by draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.32. Thus, in the interest of the efficiency of the Committee's work, and in an attempt to avoid the duplication and unnecessary proliferation of draft resolutions, we have decided to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.32, which effectively covers the material contained in both draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25 and A/C.1/39/L.49.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): My delegation wishes to place on record why it will cast a negative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43 on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.

As is stated in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly:

"The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned ..." (S-10/4, para. 50)

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

It is evident to my delegation that the "States concerned" here, are in the first place the nuclear-weapon States. As has been stressed time and again by the General Assembly, the nuclear-weapon States, especially the ones with the largest nuclear arsenals, have a special responsibility and a particular role to play. A serious deficiency of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43 is that it does not even mention the need, indeed necessity, of bilateral negotiations between the two major nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, we consider the proposal for multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament made in this draft resolution, while disregarding the need for bilateral negotiations, hardly realistic, if not unproductive.

History has shown that bilateral negotiations concerning the reduction of nuclear weapons are complicated enough in themselves. There is no reason to assume that negotiations in a multilateral forum like the Conference on Disarmament will be easier. On the contrary, for these very complex problems that touch upon vital security interests of the States concerned, the Conference on Disarmament is not the appropriate place.

That is not to say that in our view there would be no role for the Conference on Disarmament in the nuclear field. Notwithstanding the fact that bilateral negotiations between the Powers concerned will be needed also on the subjects being dealt with in the Conference on Disarmament, this body could very usefully devote its attention, first and foremost, to the cessation of nuclear testing, but also to other nuclear items. In this respect I think notably of different subjects under the heading of the prevention of nuclear war, such as nuclear confidence-building measures. Let us not forget that the Conference on Disarmament is the only body in which the five nuclear-weapon States participate. Other subjects could possibly also be dealt with, such as the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. It would be a serious mistake, however, to assume that we could dispense with bilateral negotiations in addition to the work in the Conference on Disarmament.

It might be true that only a "handful" of States, as the fourth preambular paragraph puts it, possess nuclear weapons. We should recognize, however, that these States have to play a central role in this field, both in bilateral and in multilateral negotiations. The wording of this particular paragraph could also convey the - undoubtedly not intended - impression that the fact that only a "handful" of nuclear-weapon States exists is dangerous in itself. It would, in our

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opinion, "jeopardize the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons States", as the draft resolution puts it, considerably more if further proliferation were to take place.

The very unbalanced treatment of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, as well as other elements in the draft before us, will lead my delegation, as I mentioned before, to cast a negative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): I would like to explain the vote of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 relating to bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons.

On several occasions Yugoslavia has expressed its position regarding bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear weapons. We have supported such negotiations and called for them to be sustained, since only through persistent and patient negotiations between two major Powers can concrete results be achieved.

My country has resolutely been working for the halting of the further pile-up of nuclear weapons and has warned that only through negotiations can the beginning of a qualitatively new phase of the nuclear-arms race be prevented. We have pointed out that failure of the Geneva talks between the United States and the USSR would lead to further exacerbation and deepening of the existing lack of confidence. We have also warned that their failure would have as a consequence an accelerated increase of nuclear arsenals and a further increase of tension in international relations, which has, unfortunately, proved true.

This time, again, we wish to repeat that there is no alternative to negotiations in the present nuclear era and that they have to be conducted in the interest of all members of the international community. Negotiations between the two major Powers on nuclear armaments are the pre-condition for the achievement of concrete results.

For all those reasons we support the basic idea in regard to the negotiations between the United States and the USSR contained in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. However, it is evident that the draft does not offer a basis for the resumption of negotiations on nuclear weapons, whose radical reduction is needed today more than ever before.

We consider it necessary to make further efforts to seek the bases for negotiations which would make possible urgent solutions acceptable to all interested parties.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

In view of the fact that the draft resolution expresses the position of only one party and that therefore it does not offer a common basis for bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR, my delegation will abstain in the vote on it.

Mr. ELBE (Federal Republic of Germany): I should like to explain why my delegation will abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.4. My delegation acknowledges that the report of the Secretary-General on "Unilateral nuclear disarmament measures" (A/39/516) provides valuable information on unilateral disarmament measures that have been practised in the past, namely, by the two super-Powers.

My delegation acknowledges, equally, the conceptual approach to unilateralism as contained in chapter III. Unilateralism is, indeed, not one-sided disarmament, but it is a way in which through unilateral, or more precisely "graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction" (A/39/516, para. 25), two or more countries can promote genuine arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

It is another positive aspect of the report that it develops a number of rules for maintaining security, inducing reciprocity and demonstrating genuineness of intent. These rules, though they could be further refined, serve as a means to weigh legitimate security interests against unilateral measures for disarmament.

However, my delegation decided to abstain on resolution A/C.1/39/L.4 because the report lacks, to an intolerable degree, the necessary political objectivity and, furthermore, creates the notion that unilateral initiatives do not require mutual trust.

My delegation regrets the unfair imbalance that exists in the report. Whereas the declaration of the North Atlantic alliance of 10 June 1982 that "none of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack" is cited in a footnote only, undue prominence is given to the declaration of the Soviet Union "not to be the first to use nuclear weapons" by integrating this declaration in the report itself.

(Mr. Elbe, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation objects to the unqualified condemnation of the so-called doctrine of nuclear deterrence. As to the North Atlantic alliance, a strictly defensive association of 16 peace-loving, democratic nations, it is well known in this forum that its policy is based upon the principles of military security and co-operation, as contained in the Harmel report of 1967 and in the more recent declaration of Washington of 31 May 1984.

It is also with regret that my delegation has to state that one of the earliest endeavours at unilateral disarmament, namely, the contractual undertaking of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1954 not to produce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, has not been given the attention that it actually deserves.

Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway): My delegation would like to explain its vote on the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/39/L.32, L.49 and L.25, concerning a nuclear-arms freeze.

During this past year questions related to security and disarmament, including a nuclear-arms freeze, have been the subject of an extensive debate in Norway and in the Norwegian Parliament. In our Parliament there was broad agreement that a nuclear-arms freeze could constitute an important element in our efforts to achieve agreed reductions of the nuclear arsenals if the parties would agree to a freeze based on adequate verification measures.

In view of the importance that a nuclear-arms freeze should be verifiable and subject to agreement, draft resolutions by this General Assembly should contain concrete expressions of these elements, which are essential to establishing broad support for a nuclear-arms freeze.

For this reason we have, for our part, presented our views and concrete proposals to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.32, submitted by Mexico and co-sponsored by Sweden and some other countries, with a view to broadening its base of support. We are grateful that those countries have listened to us and have been willing to consider our views.

Nevertheless, we feel that this draft resolution should have been improved further and thus it could have been made acceptable to more delegations, including my own. Although we think it important that some changes have been made in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.32, we regret that it still does not satisfy a number of requirements which ought to be fulfilled.

We believe that a nuclear-arms freeze, like any other arms-control agreement,

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must be verifiable. Some changes in the operative part underline this, although this aspect is not adequately reflected in the preambular part. We believe that a nuclear-arms freeze must be the result of a negotiated agreement among the parties concerned. In our view, this remains a fundamental requirement and we regret that this draft resolution does not explicitly base itself on this important principle. A declaratory freeze will not, in our view, have the confidence-building effect that we seek. We believe this draft resolution could and should have been improved further in a number of other respects also, especially by removing elements in the preambular part which we consider alien to this draft resolution and with respect to which we must register our reservations.

In particular, I refer to those paragraphs which question the defensive strategy of an alliance to which my country belongs. We must, furthermore, register our reservations with regard to that operative paragraph which seems to endorse the policies of one nuclear power concerning a nuclear-arms freeze at a time when that Power is continuing its deployment of nuclear arms, especially in Europe, while still remaining absent from the negotiations on the reduction of nuclear arms. This apparent endorsement, which establishes a regrettable lack of balance, is further contrasted with the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries last year decided unilaterally to withdraw 1,400 nuclear arms from Europe over the next few years, while no similar commitment has been undertaken by the other side.

In conclusion, while we reiterate our readiness to support an agreed freeze containing adequate verification measures as a positive element in a process of reductions of nuclear arms, I regret to say that we have not found it possible to support the text contained in document A/C.1/39/L.32 in its present form and my delegation will therefore have to abstain.

As regards the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/39/L.49 and L.25, we take note of the fact that no important substantive improvements have been made in the latter draft resolution compared with last year and we shall therefore have to vote against that draft resolution for the same reason as we did during the last General Assembly. As regards the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.49, we note that it does call for an agreement among the parties concerned and while this is a most important aspect, we do feel that this draft resolution ought to deal explicitly with the need for adequate verification as

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well. Hence we shall not be able to support this draft resolution; instead we shall abstain in the voting on it.

In conclusion, I should like to reiterate the positive attitude of my Government in favour of an agreed and verifiable nuclear-arms freeze. This position is also widely supported by our Parliament. Basing itself on this broad parliamentary support, the Norwegian Government would have been ready this year to support draft resolutions which would satisfy the requirements which we must lay down in order to achieve an agreed and verifiable nuclear-arms freeze. We adjusted our position on one of these texts last year and this year again we have made an adjustment in our position on another text as a demonstration of our willingness to consider positively a nuclear-arms freeze. We regret therefore that none of the present texts are drafted in such a way that we may cast a positive vote.

Hence we urge the sponsors and co-sponsors of these draft resolutions to continue to give consideration to possible changes that might be included in order to increase the support for our world Organization's future recommendations on the nuclear-arms freeze.

Mr. HELGASON (Iceland): I just want to inform the Committee that the Icelandic delegation shares fully the views just expressed by the delegation of Norway.

Mr. DEPASSE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): The Belgian delegation wishes to explain why it will be unable to support draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25, L.32 and L.49, on the subject of a nuclear-arms freeze. These draft resolutions, through which the General Assembly would call for measures towards a nuclear freeze, bear witness to the concern of the sponsoring non-nuclear-weapon States about the distressing situation resulting from the accumulation of these weapons - a concern which we share. But we believe that a freeze of nuclear weapons at present levels would mean a freeze of present imbalances, which we cannot accept, especially when one country holds a monopoly on a particularly destructive type of weapon which poses a threat to my country's security.

Negotiation of a freeze is no more satisfactory, given the difficulties of such negotiations. This could not, in any event, restore the balance which has been lost and could not lead to verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals.

In this connection, I wish to say that I was particularly impressed by the statement just made by the representative of Norway in explanation of vote. Although we have not yet had the opportunity to analyse it in detail, I think that my delegation would be able to endorse most of the explanations given by the Norwegian delegation.

In any event, for its part, my country supports negotiations leading to verifiable reductions of nuclear arsenals; in particular, we support draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 on the bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, which were suspended unilaterally by one of the super-Powers.

That is why Belgium will be unable to support draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25, L.32 and L.49.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to speak on several draft resolutions.

I wish first of all to announce that we shall vote against draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, negotiations should not be a mere accompaniment to arms increases; they should lead to practical results in the form of concrete agreements. That is why the Soviet Union has always favoured talks on the limitation of nuclear arms, both strategic and medium-range, on the basis of the principles of equality and equal security. But these talks must be serious, effective and business-like. The Soviet Union is not prepared to engage in talks when it is the target of the new missiles stationed in Europe by the United States - that is, when it is presented with an ultimatum - as is, in

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essence, suggested in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. The United States should remove the obstacles it has put in the way of such negotiations.

With reference to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.32, we wish to say that a nuclear-arms freeze should be declared as a matter of high priority, in order to bar an increased nuclear threat. An agreement on this issue would have a decisive effect in facilitating subsequent agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons until they are completely eliminated. It is clear, given the present approximate parity of nuclear and conventional capabilities, that an agreement on freezing and reducing levels of nuclear weapons would harm no one's security.

Monitoring commitments to freeze nuclear arms could be carried out effectively through national technical means, as outlined by many experts in the nuclear-weapons field and by high-ranking political figures in many countries. However, the Soviet Union is prepared also to devise additional methods of verification on the basis of co-operation founded on previous arms-limitation negotiations. Since draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.32 coincides, in its broad outlines, with our position, as outlined in document A/39/623, we shall vote in favour of that draft resolution.

The Soviet delegation will also vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.42. We have taken that position on the understanding that the word "work" in the operative paragraph of this draft resolution means practical negotiations on matters pertaining to the relevant item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. As we have had occasion to stress in the past, the question of the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should be duly linked to measures of nuclear disarmament. Specifically, it could be regarded as an early step towards the implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament, a step which could also become an integral part of a nuclear-weapons freeze.

As to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43 on cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, the Soviet delegation is of the opinion that the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons must of necessity involve a programme of nuclear disarmament by stages, including the gradual reduction of nuclear-weapons arsenals until they are completely eliminated and, in that framework, agreements on the cessation of the development of new nuclear-weapons systems, on the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the

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purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons and on the cessation of the production of nuclear armaments and deliver systems for such armaments.

Proposals by the Soviet Union on these specific topics are before the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, but negotiations on this point have yet to begin. That is the fault of other nuclear Powers, primarily the United States. Since draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43 calls on the Conference on Disarmament to begin talks on this subject, we shall support it. But our position on this question is more fully reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.8.

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Finally, with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.49, the Soviet delegation is gratified at the fact that the question of a freeze on nuclear weapons has been on the agenda of the General Assembly for a number of successive sessions, as one of the central issues for discussion.

As is known, the Soviet Union responded to the appeal made by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, and in June 1983 proposed to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China that all the nuclear Powers should simultaneously impose both a qualitative and a quantitative freeze on all the nuclear weapons in their possession. On the same lines is resolution 38/76, adopted by the General Assembly in 1983, and the draft resolution submitted by us at this session in document A/C.1/39/L.25. In Washington, our official proposals are still on the table - that is, that the Soviet Union and the United States should agree, first and foremost, to freeze their nuclear weapons and thereby set an example for other nuclear Powers.

Since, on the whole, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.49 reflects the approach that we take, we shall support it. At the same time, we wish to state that we interpret the sixth paragraph of the preamble as referring to those nuclear-weapon States that not only have failed to take any action in response to the call for a freeze, but have even spoken against this important step. As is well known, the Soviet Union favours a freeze.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I should like to explain my delegation's vote before the voting on the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/39/L.20 and A/C.1/39/L.43.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.20, we propose to abstain in the vote on that draft, which relates to the nuclear neutron weapon. Australia supports the principle that nuclear weapons should be eliminated through negotiations. But we do not consider that the nuclear neutron weapon can, practically, be the subject of a separate disarmament treaty because of the difficulty which we would encounter in attempting to verify such a separate treaty. Those weapons could be prohibited only in the context of negotiations on nuclear weapons as a whole.

In these circumstances, we consider that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.20, and particularly its operative paragraph 1, which is in fact the essential element of the draft resolution, does not meet that

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requirement. As I have indicated, therefore, Australia will abstain in the vote on that draft resolution.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43, again Australia proposes to abstain in the vote on that draft, which relates to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. I want to emphasize that we shall cast that vote with very great regret, because we strongly support the negotiation of all measures that would contribute to a cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, there are two difficulties that we have with draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43, and they will prevent us from voting in favour of it.

The first of those difficulties is that the draft resolution does contain a fairly direct attack upon the concept of deterrence. Now, Australia considers that there is a continuing need for a balanced system of deterrence, at the lowest attainable levels of nuclear arsenals. That is because this is in fact the only available guarantor of global security at the present time. I stress, however, that we regard that system of deterrence as second best. We believe that we should all seek a better and more reassuring alternative. Unfortunately, however, at present none exists.

The second difficulty we have with this draft resolution is its lack of any reference to the role of bilateral negotiations in negotiating measures to stop the nuclear arms race. The absence of such a reference seems to us to make no sense. We believe that bilateral negotiations are of crucial importance in bringing an end to the nuclear arms race, and therefore in strengthening international peace and security. We support the negotiation of multilateral measures which would complement such bilateral negotiations, but we do consider that these must be viewed from within such a complementary perspective.

Hence, as I said, we shall, with regret, be obliged to abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43.

Mr. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation wishes to explain the vote it will cast against draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5.

In the view of the Cuban delegation, the purpose of this draft resolution is to attempt to justify the actions that led to the breaking off of the bilateral negotiations, in particular the beginning of the deployment of the so-called Euromissiles, which has created a qualitatively new situation in Europe and in the

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world and has increased the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. But the true intentions of the draft resolution are unmasked when we see that some of its sponsors are, contrary to the interests and wishes of the international community, playing into the hands of those who oppose the starting of concrete negotiations, within the Conference on Disarmament, on all nuclear items. This fact is demonstrated by even a cursory glance at the report submitted this year by the Conference on Disarmament.

The negotiations for the resumption of which this draft resolution calls are negotiations to create a smoke-screen in an attempt to hoodwink public opinion into believing that progress is being made on the path to disarmament when in actual fact new obstacles are being created.

Finally, the so-called appeal for the resumption of these negotiations without pre-conditions is in and of itself an unacceptable condition, which should be strongly rejected.

My delegation will consequently vote against draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. .

Mr. SHARMA (India): The Indian delegation would like to explain its vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.42. India has consistently abstained in the voting on proposals that seek to separate from the stages set forth in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the question of the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. In the view of our delegation such proposals characterize a partial and one-sided approach which is inconsistent with the goals set out in the Final Document with the agreement of all States.

We are convinced of the immediate need for a simultaneous stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons and of all fissionable material for weapons purposes. In that event all States, including the nuclear-weapon States, would have no valid reasons not to accept the same system of equitable and non-discriminatory safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. As draft resolution L.42 remains the same as the proposals advanced in previous years, our delegation will abstain in the voting on it, as it has in the past.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): I should like to explain the votes of my delegation on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25, L.32 and L.49, all concerning a proposed freeze on nuclear weapons. By implication, my statement in explanation of vote will also pertain to other draft resolutions that call for a freeze in conjunction with further measures - as, for instance, draft resolution L.26/Rev.1, at least in the form that is before us.

It is the intention of my delegation to cast a negative vote on all these draft resolutions based on the conviction that a nuclear-arms freeze given the present military situation, contrary to a widely held and apparently fashionable view, is not conducive to nuclear disarmament but, rather, counterproductive. From the perspective of my country, a nuclear freeze would make no contribution to its security but, rather, would enhance and render permanent the military threat hanging over it.

First, notwithstanding the superficial appeal which the freeze notion appears to have to many delegations, not least those from among the non-aligned countries, my delegation must insist that the proposal be assessed against the background of the military situation, and especially the military situation in Europe. It is a situation in which the Soviet Union, in addition to its constantly expanding

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conventional capabilities, has in recent years rapidly and continuously increased its nuclear potential. It is particularly preoccupying that the nuclear build-up on the Soviet side has reached new heights precisely during the years in which the Soviet Union has made the freeze proposal one of the main battle-horses of its widely publicized policies. The gulf between the nuclear arsenals of the East and the West is constantly widening, especially with regard to the Central European scene, and we must unfortunately assume from the public announcements by Soviet policy makers and from observations of present Soviet production rates that - freeze proposals or not - the Soviet Union is bent on continuing this build-up unabated.

In the last few years the Soviet Union has not only continued at a rapid pace the build-up of its SS-20 capacity but is also producing and installing new systems of a long-range, intermediate-range and theatre-range character. It is true that the countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are at present engaged in a staggered process of deploying new intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Approximately one-sixth of the planned limited programme is now in place. However, NATO has been careful to compensate - even to over-compensate - for this deployment by a drastic reduction of other nuclear weapons, with the consequence that it is now approaching a point where it will have by far the lowest nuclear arsenals in Western Europe since the early 1960s. The result is that the Soviet Union is now vastly superior in all categories of nuclear and conventional weapons to those in Western Europe. This points to a grave contradiction between the words and the deeds of the Soviet Union. Why does the Soviet Union not limit its production rate of new weapons systems? Why are Soviet nuclear arsenals increased year after year? What purpose does this relentless nuclear growth process serve if even Soviet Marshal Ogarkov, in an article just off the press this month, affirms that the Soviet Union possesses too many nuclear weapons already? Is the freeze, in Soviet eyes, only an instrument to sanction and eternalize military predominance and a one-sided potential for political blackmail? Freeze proposals coming from the Soviet Union at this time, and echoed by others, remain a doubtful proposition as long as these questions do not find their reply.

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Republic of Germany)

My delegation has frequently insisted that a freeze can be justified only if the participants in a freeze decision fully enjoy and preserve their right to security - in other words, if a genuine balance exists in both the global context and on relevant sub-global levels. If such is not the case, a freeze decision contradicts the provisions of paragraph 29 of the Final Document, in which it is stated that disarmament measures must preserve the undiminished security of all States. That paragraph would require that a freeze decision never be taken independently from underlying security situations and force relationships. Looking at the force relationship in Europe, the difficulty with the freeze is that in the absence of approximate parity it would amount to unilateral disarmament and codify the superiority of one side at an arbitrarily chosen moment. Every advocate of the freeze concept must therefore realize that given the present military equation freeze proposals are tantamount to expecting the European countries to acquiesce in a codification of Soviet superiority and to live with this threat for an indefinite period.

Secondly, the excessive nuclear armament which I have just described gives particular urgency to the efforts which can at present be observed on the part of the two major powers to initiate a new round of nuclear-disarmament talks. My delegation has on several occasions during this session welcomed these efforts, avidly anticipating the establishment of a formula that will allow the Soviet Union and the United States to resume negotiations aimed at the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons, both intermediate-range and strategic, with a view to reaching much lower levels of balance and stability. The crucial query is whether freeze decisions can promote such processes of agreed substantial reduction of weapons.

The calamity is that the freeze does not provide an appropriate motivation for subsequent reductions. Indeed, the psychological difficulty with this measure is exactly that it breaks the psychological link between the halting and the reversing of the arms race. As soon as a freeze were agreed upon the Power that considered itself superior in nuclear terms would lose every incentive to envisage a reduction of its own arsenal, knowing that it could continue to enjoy its advantage unencumbered. While removing the incentive for deep cuts, for a genuine reduction of nuclear weapons, a freeze leaves existing nuclear arsenals in place so that the threat emanating from them will endure.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal
Republic of Germany)

unencumbered. While removing the incentive for deep cuts, for a genuine reduction of nuclear weapons, a freeze leaves existing nuclear arsenals in place so that the threat emanating from them will endure.

Thirdly, few disarmament measures would be more in need of appropriate verification in order to prevent a break-out by one side. However, the issue of verification is consistently underemphasized in the draft resolutions before us and is totally absent from draft resolution L.49.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal
Republic of Germany)

That is a grave deficiency, but it should be recognized that, even if a verification were part of a concrete freeze arrangement, negotiating time could be much more profitably spent in agreeing on balanced reductions and their verification than on a lesser and less stabilizing objective.

The arguments which I have placed before the Committee are still essentially the same as those placed on record by my delegation in 1983 and 1982. In our view they are weighty and ought to be taken into account, but the disturbing fact is that none of the draft resolutions goes so far as even to attempt to deal with them. The same texts are produced over and over again and pressing arguments for change and improvement which have been offered by several Western delegations over the past year have again not been reflected. That is true of the verification requirement; it is true of the relationship between a freeze and international security; it is true of the necessary relationship between the subject-matter of these resolutions and nuclear disarmament aimed at reductions.

In fact, the three draft resolutions - every one of them - even neglect the modest conceptual progress that could be noted in the frequently cited Declaration by the six Heads of State or Government of May 1984, in which the authors at least recognized the indispensability of verification and the need to tackle the nuclear-weapons dilemma within the larger context of a comprehensive process of nuclear disarmament. I should like to conclude by expressing the wish that the same kind of mere repetition of untenable propositions will not mark the next session of this Assembly.

Mr. KEISALO (Finland): I should like to explain briefly my delegation's vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.5 and A/C.1/39/L.8. As a country which pursues a policy of neutrality and seeks security outside military alliances, Finland attaches the greatest importance to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly as it relates to nuclear weapons, through negotiation. We have the right to expect that all avenues should be explored in order to facilitate such negotiations aimed at tangible results. Finland's vote on the draft resolution concerning the bilateral negotiations in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5, and later in A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1, will be based on this position of principle. Finland does not wish to take a stand with respect to the specific issues relating to the substance of the negotiations or their resumption.

Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.8, the delegation of Finland concurs with its main thrust and will vote in favour of it.

(Mr. Keisalo, Finland)

The preambular paragraphs, particularly the sixth to ninth, however, contain certain formulations about which we have some misgivings and we would like to see them formulated in more general terms. We shall, however, vote in favour of the draft resolution because we agree with the basic elements of the resolution, that is, that the nuclear arms race should be ended and that all efforts should be made to achieve that objective. This is most urgent, particularly in Europe, at the present time.

Mr. ROCHE (Canada): Several weeks ago when Canada's new Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, addressed the General Assembly, he emphasized that Canada was determined to continue to play a leading role in the search for peace and disarmament. Countries such as Canada, he said, must use their influence to reverse the nuclear build-up and reduce the danger of destruction. He went on to stress that this objective would be a constant, consistent, dominant priority of Canadian foreign policy". (A/39/PV.7, p. 21) In my first statement in the First Committee I suggested a number of practical steps that could be taken to translate those words from principle into action. Canada's intentions and objectives on this crucial subject are therefore clear.

I am speaking today to express Canada's views on the three specific draft resolutions on a nuclear freeze, upon which the Committee is about to vote, draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25, L.32 and L.49, all of which advocate in varying degrees a nuclear-arms freeze.

Canada will today vote against the draft resolutions advocating a nuclear freeze, as it has done in the past. Our vote should not be interpreted as meaning that we wish to accept the continuation of the present level or a continued increase in nuclear-weapons arsenals: far from it, as the Secretary of State has already stated.

Canada recognizes that there is an important symbolic value in the freeze concept as an expression of the desire of mankind to be free from the fear of nuclear war. The idea of capping the nuclear-arms race and reducing the enormous number of nuclear weapons in current arsenals is attractive in its simplicity and is a general objective which I am sure is shared by all in this room, nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike.

Let there be no doubt where Canada stands on the nuclear-arms race. The Government, reflecting the will of the people of Canada, wants significant,

(Mr. Roche, Canada)

balanced and verifiable reductions in the level of nuclear arms in the world. Many Canadians believe that the present level of nuclear weapons endangers the continuation of life on the planet; but mere declarations of a freeze are not a meaningful response to this danger. Rather, we want the immediate resumption of negotiations on reductions. Canada has said this many times. I want today to repeat our demand: Canada wants the present dangerous levels reduced by the immediate unconditional resumption of negotiations on reductions.

Our vote reflects genuine doubts about the practicality of the concept of a freeze as it is currently being advocated. All arms control agreements must enhance mutual security if they are to achieve their fundamental purpose. Mutual security is not enhanced if current imbalances are locked in, as they would be, in the European theatre. The negotiation of a freeze would be as difficult and intricate and as prolonged as would be the negotiation of reductions and would acutally detract from efforts to achieve real reductions of nuclear armaments. There must be an agreement on rules for both sides to ensure that the other is honouring its part of the agreement. Declarations do not provide such assurances. The verification provisions envisaged by the most sophisticated freeze resolution are still insufficient for a number of components advocated in the freeze.

(Mr. Roche, Canada)

As an example, stronger verification procedures would be needed to ensure compliance with a ban on the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and the prohibition of the production of fissionable material, if indeed these can be achieved at all. There are also technical difficulties: while the freeze draft resolutions call for a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons, which Canada supports, and their delivery vehicles, no provision is made for dealing with the potentially destabilizing problem of peaceful nuclear explosions.

These are the major flaws that we see in the freeze draft resolutions before us. These serious deficiencies must be addressed and answered. Accordingly, Canada continues to believe that a return without pre-conditions to meaningful bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which take into account the legitimate security interests of both sides, with adequate verification measures, constitutes the most realistic means of achieving the objective we have set for ourselves, the reduction of nuclear arms.

Mr. EMERY (United States of America): I have asked to speak this afternoon to explain the votes my delegation will cast on several of the draft resolutions contained in cluster 5, those relating to the question of a nuclear freeze, draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25, A/C.1/39/L.32 and A/C.1/39/L.49, and draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 on the bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations.

The United States is not convinced, however well-intentioned the freeze proposals may be, that they would, in fact, serve their stated objectives. Implementation of a nuclear freeze might well diminish our national security, and that of our allies and friends, and in the end contribute to increasing, not reducing the danger of war.

In our view, a nuclear freeze could damage our deterrent posture and make us more vulnerable militarily by codifying military advantages now possessed by the Soviet Union. It would redirect efforts from seeking drastic reductions in strategic forces to determining how to codify the current high ceilings. It would codify the huge Soviet advantage in longer range intermediate nuclear weapons and halt North Atlantic Treaty Organization deployments intended to partially right that imbalance. It would thus eliminate any incentive for the Soviet Union to remove the threat posed by their SS-20 missiles to European and other countries.

A nuclear freeze would thus undermine the relative capability of our nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, in so far as it would freeze forces at current imbalance levels. As a result, the credibility of our strategy of deterrence, which has preserved the peace for over three decades, would be

(Mr. Emery, United States)

undermined. A freeze would thus threaten stability by preventing the re-establishment of the strategic balance, rather than strengthening that balance. It could, thus, heighten the risk of war, rather than strengthen the peace.

We should not delude ourselves. A mutual and verifiable freeze would be every bit as difficult to negotiate as arms reductions themselves - indeed, such a complete ban on production, development and deployment of new systems could prove even more complicated than complex negotiations on the reduction of arms. Determining what, when and how to freeze would take time. Agreement on effective verification measures would be both difficult and time-consuming to achieve. For example, the monitoring of production and inventories of nuclear weapons and production of system components would require measures beyond national technical means. Some aspects of a freeze would be difficult to verify, for example, nuclear warheads, even if measures beyond national technical means were available. It is our belief that time spent negotiating a freeze and its verification would be better spent negotiating deep reductions.

For these reasons, the United States delegation will vote against the freeze draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25, A/C.1/39/L.32 and A/C.1/39/L.49.

I also wish to explain the vote my delegation will cast on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations.

Arms control is a top priority of my Government. We are ready and willing to achieve real, substantial and verifiable reductions in the most destabilizing strategic systems and in intermediate-range nuclear forces. We participated seriously and with flexibility in two sets of negotiations designed to achieve substantial reductions in nuclear forces. In the so-called Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, we proposed drastic reductions in strategic arsenals. In the so-called intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations, we proposed that an entire class of weapons be banned from the face of the earth.

We have reiterated our profound regret that the Soviet Union walked out of those negotiations about a year ago and have repeated our willingness to return to the negotiating table to continue them without pre-conditions.

Since that time, the Soviet Union has invited the United States to begin talks on limiting what they call the "militarization of space". We were ready without pre-conditions to talk about what they wanted to talk about, as well as other important issues, including the question of offensive and defensive forces. We were disappointed that these talks never materialized, because the Soviet Union did

(Mr. Emery, United States)

not follow through on its invitation. Since that time, President Reagan has proposed that we discuss these and other important issues in a new, comprehensive format. We are also prepared to discuss them individually and to meet immediately without pre-conditions.

Against this background, my Government is pleased to be able to support draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations. We strongly support the call, in operative paragraph 1 of that draft resolution, for the bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations to be resumed without delay or pre-conditions. We will spare no effort in seeking attainment of the final objective of the negotiations, and will work towards the enhancement of mutual trust, in order to create an atmosphere more conducive to disarmament agreements.

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 is simple and effective. It places no pre-conditions for the commencement of negotiations or on the negotiations themselves. It does not prescribe a set procedure for the negotiations, nor does it put the finger on any one country for the disruption of negotiations, although we all know why they were terminated.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): It was not my intention to speak in the debate on cluster 5 but I have been more or less forced to do so because I have listened to so many statements of the representatives of the Western countries who have exploited this forum with a very rare exhibit of double talk.

Many Western countries have, on the one hand, expressed their willingness to limit nuclear arms, but on the other, they have announced their opposition to the draft resolutions which advocate a nuclear freeze, which means that they want to continue to increase their armaments.

Many of the representatives of the Western countries have also tried to persuade all of us in the Committee that they only want to act against the increased armaments of the East. These are, however, only claims without any real proof. I think that the continuous allegation that there is an imbalance of forces in Europe is just an attempt to force their own armaments into the European theatre.

Therefore, the Czechoslovak delegation will fully support all of the draft resolutions calling for a nuclear freeze and would ask all other representatives to follow suit.

As far as draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 is concerned, we consider it one-sided and gives no real incentive for the resumption of negotiations. Therefore, we shall vote against it.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): My delegation would like briefly to explain its vote on some of the draft resolutions in this cluster.

First of all, may I be permitted to say that my delegation, of course, appreciates the fact that bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons, by the United States of America and the USSR, was considered by the first special session devoted to disarmament as one of the main processes for achieving nuclear disarmament. Indeed, in paragraph 52 of the Final Document, the General Assembly not only encouraged the two countries to conclude their negotiations on what was then known as SALT II, but also encouraged them to commence further negotiations on strategic weapons promptly.

Paragraph 53 of the Final Document also extends this process of negotiation to other categories of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, obviously, it is in this context that later on the two countries commence negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Thus, there can be no objection as such, or in principle, to bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers, provided that these negotiations are conducted in transparent good faith and are designed to reach agreement - not conducted either to silence, pressure and lead the international community to a sense of false security. Unfortunately, the impression seems to have been created, of course, that these bilateral negotiations are undertaken when convenient, and interrupted at will. The vital interests of other countries which watch these negotiations with considerable anxiety are not considered.

We, in this delegation, have always thought that the level of nuclear weapons of all categories, possessed by both the United States and the USSR, are so balanced that further deployment would not make much, if any, difference at all. Indeed, deployment in the course of negotiations can only disrupt the process and have the opposite effect to what may be desired.

Notwithstanding these reservations, my delegation still sees great value, of course, in the resumption of bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons between the United States and the USSR.

These, we hope, would be negotiations not to stem the tide of domestic or international criticism, but negotiations which are aimed at reaching concrete agreement on nuclear disarmament.

It is in this spirit that my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. Our vote, however, is in no way an endorsement of the idea of negotiations through leverage, which I may underline, through their

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

deployment in the process of negotiation. We believe that this can only complicate and not improve the process of negotiation.

It is also in this spirit that my delegation will vote for all the three draft resolutions which are concerned with the nuclear freeze, because we believe that it is only under the conditions of a freeze that the most desirable basis can be created for progress in bilateral or even multilateral negotiations in the nuclear-disarmament field.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any other speakers at this stage?

As there are none, we shall now take action on the draft resolutions under cluster 5.

We shall take action first on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.4, which was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 37th meeting, on 14 November. It is sponsored by the following countries: Austria, Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan and Sweden.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.4 was adopted by 118 votes to 1, with 13 abstentions.*

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. As I understand it, the delegation of Mexico has asked to speak to explain his vote. I call upon the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I wish to make a very brief explanation of vote since my delegatio will abstain on the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. This is, of course, not due to our having any objections to the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the Governments of United States and the Soviet Union - quite the contrary. Our abstention is due to the fact that there is another draft resolution which deals with the same subject and is intended for the same purpose, and that is the one in document A/C.1/39/L.26. I will not comment on that document since it was my honour to introduce it to the Committee. It is sponsored, in addition to my delegation, by the delegations of Sweden and Yugoslavia.

I think that for any objective reader of that draft resolution, it will become obvious that the procedures detailed therein could be much more effective than the recommendation contained in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. It is for that reason that my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 and will of course vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26.

* Subsequently the delegations of Burkina Faso and Sri Lanka advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5, which was introduced by the representative of the United Kingdom at the 34th meeting of the Committee, on 9 November, and is sponsored by the following countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Rwanda, Turkey and United Kingdom.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Abstaining: Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Benin, Bhutan, Burma, Cape Verde, China, Congo, Cyprus, Ghana, Greece, India, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 was adopted by 86 votes to 17, with 24 abstentions.*

* Subsequently the delegation of Burkina Faso advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.8, which was introduced by the representative of the German Democratic Republic at the 35th meeting of the Committee, on 9 November, and is sponsored by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Bahamas, Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sweden, Uruguay, Zaire

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.8 was adopted by 96 votes to 19, with 12 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.20, which was introduced by the representative of the German Democratic Republic at the 35th meeting of the Committee, on 9 November, and is sponsored by the following countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Maldives, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.20 was adopted by 61 votes to 11, with 51 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.25, which was introduced by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 40th meeting of the Committee, on 15 November, and is

sponsored by the following countries: Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Bahamas, China, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda, Sweden, Uruguay

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.25 was adopted by 95 votes to 18, with 13 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.32, which was introduced by the representative of Mexico at our 40th meeting, held on 15 November. It is sponsored by Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden and Uruguay. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Bahamas, China, Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.32 was adopted by 111 votes to 12, with 7 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.42, which was introduced by the representative of Canada and which is sponsored by the following delegations: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and Uruguay. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Mozambique

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, China, France, India, Nicaragua, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.42 was adopted by 125 votes to 1, with 9 abstentions.*

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43, which was introduced by the representative of Argentina at the 36th meeting, held on 12 November. It is sponsored by the delegations of Argentina, Bangladesh, Greece, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Romania and Sweden. A recorded vote has been requested.

* Subsequently, the delegation of Mozambique advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Bahamas, Denmark, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Spain

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43 was adopted by 115 votes to 13, with 7 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.49, which was introduced by the representative of India.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Bahamas, China, Guyana, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.49 was adopted by 110 votes to 12, with 9 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes on the draft resolutions in cluster 5.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Australia has voted today for the first time in support of the broad proposition of nuclear freeze, as reflected in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.32, which this Committee has just adopted. We have done so to give expression to the support of the Australian Government and people for the broad aspirations of a freeze. We have done so

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

also as an aligned country with a close relationship with the United States, through the ANZUS Treaty, and a strong and continuing tradition of support for the security requirements of the wider Western world.

We are in no doubt about the continuing need for a balanced system of deterrence at the lowest attainable levels of nuclear arsenals, as the only available guarantor of global security at the present time. But we regard that system of deterrence as a second-best system and one to which we seek a better and more reassuring alternative.

Our support for freeze is a matter of public record, and has also been made known frankly within our alliance relationship. In Australia there is a strong and growing pressure for a more forceful and comprehensive approach to a range of disarmament issues. We call as a first step for a mutual and verifiable freeze of nuclear-weapons testing, production and development, as a means of breaking the upward spiral of the arms race, to be followed by negotiations, and, by definition therefore, not unilateral action - negotiations which aim for deep cuts in the high stockpile of nuclear weapons. The immediate goal must be the most stable possible balance at the lowest possible level of all nuclear weapons. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the ultimate goal. We are pledged to continue to work vigorously for these ends.

In the meantime, the system of deterrence will continue to have our support, and we shall continue to make an active and responsible contribution to it.

Most freeze proposals call for the cessation of nuclear-weapons testing. We recognize the limited scope of that call in the freeze context, but we ourselves give particular priority to bringing to an end all forms of nuclear testing in all environments for all time. Accordingly, Australia is particularly dedicated to achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to that end has, in conjunction with its co-sponsors, submitted a new and practical draft resolution on a comprehensive test ban, which will be considered by this Committee shortly. In relation to testing, our draft resolution on a comprehensive test ban places great emphasis on the need for

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

assured and adequate verification. The verification requirements apply equally to all aspects of freeze and not only to the cessation of weapons testing.

Similarly, our approach to freeze stresses the requirement for mutuality and for balance, a requirement which is an absolute pre-condition to resolving the central issue of the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. We wish to see the negotiations on the intermediate-range nuclear forces, and those governing the strategic arms reduction talks, resumed as quickly as possible, and we look particularly to the Soviet Union to indicate its intention to resume the negotiations.

Obviously, these remarks reflect some variance in a number of areas between the Australian national approach and that of the draft resolution just adopted. Our vote is without prejudice in this respect and has been cast, as I indicated at the outset, to give expression to our support for the aspirations manifest in freeze proposals. It is essential that in getting on with the vital work of disarmament we keep our broad goals clearly before us.

Mr. ALI (Bangladesh): The delegation of Bangladesh abstained in the voting on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.20, regarding the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon.

While we are fully aware of the destructive potential of the neutron weapon, my delegation had to abstain on this draft resolution as we are opposed to singling out one type of such deadly weapons. We are convinced that such action will not serve any useful purpose in promoting our much cherished and common objective of achieving nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, it may give a narrow perspective to the consideration of an issue which has a much wider spectrum and implications.

The delegation of Bangladesh reiterates its unequivocal position that nuclear weapons, irrespective of their types, cause the greatest danger to mankind and to human civilization. We believe that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects, with the objective of achieving disarmament.

Permit me now to explain our vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.5, A/C.1/39/L.8 and A/C.1/39/L.25. My delegation voted in favour of all three

A/C.1/39/PV.44
64-65

(Mr. Ali, Bangladesh)

draft resolutions. While, admittedly, some of the paragraphs in them contain positions that are one sided and contradictory, we believe that the underlying spirit of the draft resolutions is in conformity with the common aspiration of mankind - that is, to achieve disarmament and to promote negotiations to achieve this objective.

(Mr. Ali, Bangladesh)

This underlying spirit needs to be encouraged for the common good of humanity. The principled position of Bangladesh, which is unequivocally against all armaments and in support of effective measures for the promotion of peace and stability, has been the fundamental motivating force for us to encourage the effective and vigorous conduct of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations with a view to achieving positive results without any further delay. We voted in favour of these draft resolutions in that spirit, and our positive vote does not imply endorsement of any negotiating position of the principal contenders.

The delegation of Bangladesh would also like to state that it will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1 on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations in its present form because it fully shares and subscribes to the view that what is at stake in the question of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations is not only the national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world. We would reiterate our appeal to the contending parties in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament to keep this constantly in view.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): My delegation wishes to place on record the reasons which have led to its abstention in the voting on the Swedish-Mexican draft resolution on a nuclear-arms freeze contained in document A/C.1/39/L.32 and those which have prompted my delegation to cast a negative vote on the two draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/39/L.25 and L.49, respectively, all of which are to be found in the cluster of draft resolutions on which we have just taken action.

As to the Swedish-Mexican draft resolution L.32, we wish to underline some of its shortcomings which, in our view, are serious. In the first place, this draft resolution presupposes the existence of an over-all balance. I do not have to repeat on what grounds the Netherlands firmly believes that in Europe a situation of profound imbalance continues to prevail. Freezing such an imbalance runs counter to our serious security concerns. Restoring a situation of balance - and, needless to say, this at the lowest possible level of armament - is for the Netherlands one of the essential prerequisites before a freeze could be considered.

The right path to be chosen is that of negotiations. A merely declaratory freeze on nuclear-weapons systems and their delivery vehicles is not acceptable to my Government. The Netherlands attaches the utmost importance to a resumption, without preconditions and without delay, of bilateral nuclear-disarmament

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

negotiations. To underline the urgent need for these negotiations the Netherlands is one of the sponsors of one of the draft resolutions on which we just took action, draft resolution L.5, which calls precisely for that.

Another shortcoming of the draft resolution under consideration lies in the insufficient attention it gives to the need of a nuclear freeze being adequately verified, although the text, in so far as verification is concerned, is slightly improved. Verification of a nuclear freeze will pose formidable problems. Some of them can hardly, in all likelihood, be dealt with in a satisfactory manner. For others, acceptable solutions may be found, but only as a result of painstaking negotiations. Draft resolution L.32 does insufficient justice to the verification needs of a nuclear freeze.

Apart from the freeze concept contained in draft resolution L.32, my delegation has other objections. We deeply deplore that once again this draft resolution mentions "doctrines of nuclear war" in an unacceptable manner. Let me once again emphasize that the Alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to which my country belongs adheres to a strategy aiming at preserving the peace by deterring a potential aggressor. In other words, the strategy and, for that matter, the military posture of the Alliance is purely defensive. As has been repeated many times, none of our weapons, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used except in response to armed attack.

The Netherlands Government is deeply concerned about the continuation of the arms race. Despite the shortcomings I just pointed out the Netherlands therefore abstained in the voting on draft resolution L.32.

The other two freeze draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/39/L.25 and L.49 fall even further short of the standards against which we measured draft resolution L.32. It is for that reason that my delegation voted against draft resolutions L.24 and L.49.

Mr. JAEGER (Denmark): I should like to make a statement in explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.4. Last year Denmark voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 38/183 J and its call for

"a report ... on ways and means that seem advisable for stimulating the adoption of unilateral nuclear disarmament measures which, without prejudice to the security of States, would come to promote and complement bilateral and multilateral negotiations in this sphere".

(Mr. Jaeger, Denmark)

In the report which is now before us, a number of issues concerning unilateral disarmament measures are covered. We see merits in the fact that we have now a point of departure for further deliberations in the field.

Therefore, while taking note with satisfaction of the report as a whole, my delegation would at the same time like to emphasize that this should not be interpreted as support for all parts of the report.

I should also like to give an explanation of our vote on draft resolution L.20. The Danish Government has continually stated that it opposes the production of the neutron weapon and that Denmark, as part of an area which is free from nuclear weapons, will not accept this weapon on its territory. The Danish Government still holds this view. However, we see the draft resolution just adopted as an attempt to split the Western allies in an important area of defence policy. We have therefore again decided to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

Mr. GLEISSNER (Austria): Austria's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.8, submitted under agenda item 59 (e), should be understood as an expression of our profound concern about the escalating nuclear-arms race. We support a stronger involvement of the Conference on Disarmament in the efforts to achieve progress towards nuclear disarmament and would welcome the establishment of a working group on this subject. In view of Austria's agreement with the basic thrust of the draft resolution, we have cast an affirmative vote, notwithstanding our reservations concerning some of the draft resolution's preambular paragraphs.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): The delegation of Sri Lanka would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. At the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly there were three resolutions on the subject of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, and Sri Lanka voted in favour of all three. This year we have voted in favour of draft resolution L.5, and we shall vote in favour of L.26 when it is presented.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

We do so because we have supported bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, convinced of their value in terms of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The break in those negotiations has caused us concern. We do not wish to embark on an analysis of why the negotiations were interrupted. We note that even when they were in progress the results were far from satisfying the wishes of the vast majority of mankind.

In the context of the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the dangerous nuclear-arms race, the importance of bilateral negotiations towards arresting and reversing that trend is self-evident.

In our view, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26 is in many ways a more comprehensive approach to the subject and my delegation regrets that it was not possible to fuse the two draft resolutions and have one resolution on this important subject. We cannot identify ourselves with some of the language and with the restrictive scope of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. We cannot endorse any particular view regarding the reason for the interruption of the bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, nor can we endorse any particular negotiating approach.

We do endorse the need for a linkage between the bilateral negotiations and the multilateral negotiations, in view of the vital involvement of the security interests of all States, as well as the survival of mankind. Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 is silent on this point, but it does not conflict with it either. However, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 offers an opportunity to reiterate our support for a resumption of bilateral negotiations and their continuation, seriously, with a view to reaching agreements on disarmament.

Mr. SUTOWARDOYO (Indonesia): The Indonesian delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.5 and L.25.

My delegation is supportive of the general thrust of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5, which urges the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to resume their nuclear-arms negotiations, in order to achieve positive results in accordance with the security interests of all States. We cannot but observe, however, that, given the present state of affairs, the words "without ... pre-conditions" in operative paragraph 1 would not be conducive to the attainment of the objective being pursued.

My delegation also supports the major thrust of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.25. We still consider positive the call for a freeze on all nuclear weapons, which is reaffirmed in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. It

(Mr. Sutowardoyo, Indonesia)

should be emphasized, however, that a freeze is only a means and not an end in itself. For that reason we firmly believe that the importance of a nuclear-weapons freeze should be judged in conjunction with what is stated in the last operative paragraph of the draft resolution, which stresses the urgent need to intensify efforts aimed at the speedy achievement of agreements on substantial limitations on and radical reductions of nuclear weapons, with a view to their complete elimination.

Mr. QIAN Jiadong (China) (interpretation from Chinese): I should like to explain the vote of the Chinese delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. China abstained in the voting on that draft resolution, but that does not in any way mean that we do not favour the resumption of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. On the contrary, we have regretted, since the beginning, the disruption of the bilateral arms negotiations. As expected, the disruption of those talks and the subsequent increased deployment of new missiles by both sides has worsened the military confrontation in Europe and aggravated international tension. The peoples of the world, including the people of China, cannot but feel worried and disturbed at this situation.

China wants peace. We are against cold wars as well as hot wars. We wish to see a relaxation in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as a relaxation in East-West relations. Our Government has appealed that the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States should not be disrupted.

After the disruption of these talks, the leaders of our country have repeatedly pointed out that in order to ease international tension and bring about nuclear disarmament the most urgent question and the first priority is that the Soviet Union and the United States should cease deploying new nuclear missiles in Europe and in other regions and resume negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on substantial reductions of nuclear weapons. We believe that this proposal is in conformity with reality.

Other countries than China have put forward similar proposals. We hope that this will be taken into account by the parties concerned. We know that differences exist between the United States and the Soviet Union on how the bilateral negotiations should be resumed but we sincerely hope that those two major nuclear powers will heed the demand of the peoples of the world and make appropriate efforts for an early resumption of their bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): I should like to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43. We abstained in the voting on that draft resolution, on the subject of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament, because of the difficulties we have found with regard to certain paragraphs. We share the conviction, as stated in the draft resolution, concerning the urgent need to take constructive action towards halting the nuclear-arms race. We do indeed feel that the Conference on Disarmament should and could play a more positive role in that context. However, we cannot readily support the general line of thinking in some preambular paragraphs, particularly those referring to a moratorium on nuclear weapons and doctrines of nuclear deterrence.

While sympathetic to the wishes indicated in the draft resolution, my delegation decided to abstain in the voting for those reasons.

Mr. MacFHIONNBHAIRR (Ireland): I wish to refer to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.20. Ireland has consistently stated its position that the development, testing and production of all nuclear weapons should be prohibited. We consider the neutron weapon a particularly destabilizing form of nuclear device which would lead to the lowering of the nuclear threshold.

(Mr. MacFhionnbhairr, Ireland)

However, we have difficulties in singling it out while ignoring other weapons in the same category. We therefore abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.20 because we do not consider that the approach proposed will lead to the objective which we share with the authors of the draft resolution.

Mr. DUARTE (Brazil): I should like to explain the vote of my delegation on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.20 and A/C.1/39/L.43. We have again abstained on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.20 as we have done on previous occasions. My Government continues to believe that it does not serve any useful purpose to single out a particular aspect of the nuclear-arms race as a subject for special condemnation. On the contrary, nuclear disarmament should encompass all kinds of nuclear weapons and all manifestations of the current rivalry among the nuclear-weapon Powers in the nuclear-military field, and particularly the confrontation between the two super-Powers. Nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies would do better, in our view, to work constructively towards meaningful negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament rather than promote resolutions aimed at scoring debating points or at singling out a particular aspect on which they believe the opponent to have an advantage. Such actions do not help progress towards generally acceptable solutions to the nuclear dangers posed by the unbridled nuclear-arms race.

As for draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43 on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, we find it difficult to understand the reasons why some nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies could not support that draft resolution, which embodies the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the international community.

As many speakers remarked during the general debate on disarmament items at the current session of this Committee, there seems to exist an aversion to the word negotiation on the part of some nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies. It would perhaps be useful to say, so as to help to allay such fear of negotiating, that in the view of my delegation the role of the Conference on Disarmament, as called for in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.43, surely cannot be that of deciding, through internationally negotiated texts, all details relating to the process of nuclear disarmament. Rather, the task of the Conference should be, as the draft clearly proposes, that of elaborating on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral

(Mr. Duarte, Brazil)

negotiations of agreements on some of the most pressing questions in the field of nuclear disarmament. That would necessitate the establishment of an agreed framework, with adequate target dates and precise objectives to be accomplished during the course of the process. It would also have to take into account the need for bilateral progress, which could be reported to the Conference on Disarmament as appropriate, so that one set of negotiations would not duplicate or hamper the other.

In sum, the role of the Conference on Disarmament in nuclear matters should be one that would facilitate negotiations, and not unduly hinder or interfere with negotiating processes outside its own framework. My delegation considers it regrettable that even those modest goals cannot be agreed upon by some nuclear-weapon Powers and their most faithful allies.

Mr. STEPHANOU (Greece) (interpretation from French): I should like to clarify the position of Greece, particularly its abstention on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 dealing with bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations. If operative paragraph 1 did not contain the expression "without ... pre-conditions", we would have been able to vote in favour of that draft resolution.

Mr. WAHAB (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): I should like to explain Egypt's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.20. Egypt abstained in the voting on this draft resolution, despite the amendments which were made to it. We do not believe this draft resolution conveys our attitude to this item.

All nuclear weapons should be prohibited without any exception and without singling out a specific type of weapon. The prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon would be one aspect of the total prohibition of all nuclear weapons, as we see it, so we should not overstress this particular type of armament. The prohibition of the manufacture of this kind of weapon is a praiseworthy first step towards the prohibition of all nuclear weapons in accordance with the disarmament priorities established in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, particularly those set forth in paragraph 50 thereof, which did not refer specifically to neutron weapons.

These are the reasons why we abstained in the voting on this draft resolution.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): It was with considerable regret that the United Kingdom delegation found itself unable to support resolution A/C.1/39/L.4 on the United Nations study on unilateral disarmament measures. My delegation has stressed on many occasions that the United Kingdom attaches considerable importance

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

to the overall concept of United Nations studies and to the often worthwhile reports which expert groups, carrying out work on behalf of the United Nations Secretary-General, have shown themselves capable of producing.

My Government has become concerned at the increasing politicization of studies carried out by United Nations expert groups. It has stressed on a number of occasions that in general it believes that disarmament studies made on behalf of the international community can serve a useful purpose provided that they are thoroughly discussed between the interested parties beforehand and that they tackle a carefully defined field with a precise and workable mandate. The United Kingdom considers that for any study to be fully worth while, there should be general agreement that further work is desirable, that the necessary information is likely to be available and that an expert group would be capable of carrying out a study in a balanced manner.

My delegation seriously doubts whether the study on unilateral nuclear measures fulfils all of these criteria. In a number of places, the report shows a distinct bias in the way it handles information. It also puts forward opinions which are at the best partial and at the worst actively discriminatory. This situation highlights the problems inherent in drawing on a single political group to provide all the experts for a particular study. It is not acceptable for a single group of countries to use a United Nations study, carried out on behalf of the Secretary-General, in order to endorse their own sectional interests. The United Kingdom believes that all future expert groups must reflect the political diversity of the States which belong to the United Nations. Superficial handling of important and complex issues, which ignores the need for undiminished security for all States, does nothing to enhance the role of the United Nations in the search for realistic and balanced measures of disarmament. Furthermore, such an approach calls into serious question the continued value of the entire studies programme. The United Kingdom hopes that future studies will be more realistic and balanced in their handling of arms limitation and disarmament issues.

Mr. AL-MOHAMED (Oman) (interpretation from Arabic): My country has always given support to any measures towards nuclear disarmament, because these weapons have a very serious and dangerous impact on mankind. We abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.20, which refers to the prohibition of the neutron weapon, because we do not believe that a particular type of weapon should be singled out in this way. All nuclear weapons should be lumped together equally in a single category.

Mrs. TNANI (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): The Tunisian delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. Nevertheless, we would like to explain the way in which this favourable position is to be interpreted and in what context. The purport of our vote is, first, that it is in accordance with our policies, which have always contained an appeal to dialogue rather than confrontation, because this draft resolution has called for negotiations. Secondly, since the bilateral negotiations in Geneva were broken off in November and December of 1983, the nuclear-arms race has been further stepped up.

It seems to us, in this connection, that the best solution is to resume the negotiations which have been broken off, to curb this escalation. In casting our favourable vote we fully appreciate that the resumption of negotiations is too serious a matter to be necessarily acceptable to each party without due account being taken of its urgent security needs and under conditions which are acceptable to both parties.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): The Pakistan delegation would like to offer very brief explanations of our voting on some of the draft resolutions contained in cluster 5.

Pakistan fully shares the conviction expressed in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament that nuclear weapons are the greatest danger to mankind and must therefore be eliminated. As a matter of principle Pakistan, therefore, supports all efforts which seek to prohibit nuclear weapons in all their aspects. However, the Pakistan delegation decided, as in the past, to abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.20 as this draft resolution singles out one particular weapon system from the entire range of nuclear weapons.

Like many other delegations from the non-aligned countries, Pakistan voted for all three draft resolutions on the subject of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union last year. The Pakistan delegation was motivated solely by its wish to see the current situation in this respect unfrozen. Pakistan is not partial to any negotiating approach in this regard. We

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

have therefore voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 and we will vote for draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26 in the same spirit.

Our affirmative votes for the three draft resolutions which are concerned with the question of the nuclear freeze were determined by exactly the same reasons and by exactly the same spirit as I have indicated with regard to the bilateral arms negotiations.

Mr. ELFAKI (Sudan) (interpretation from Arabic): The delegation of the Sudan abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.20, on the prohibition of the neutron weapon.

May I state the following. Sudan's position on all varieties of nuclear weapons, including the neutron weapon, is a firmly held and well-known one, and it is our belief that all such weapons should be prohibited and that an end should be put to all tests aimed at quantitatively and qualitatively developing and refining them and also that an end should be put to their stockpiling. Our abstention in the voting on this draft resolution today, as in the past, is based essentially on our conviction that the question of the nuclear neutron weapon is not something which should be singled out from the general context of nuclear weapons and should not be considered in isolation from that general context. Every effort should be made to secure the prohibition of all types of nuclear weapons without taking a selective approach. It is our hope that these considerations, as well as the points made by other countries, will be taken into account when this matter is taken up in the future.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation supported draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.4, which takes note with satisfaction of the study prepared by the Secretary-General on unilateral nuclear disarmament measures. On the whole, this study, as we see it, contains a number of points which, if they were acted on, could make a useful contribution to the whole process of preventing nuclear warfare and curbing the arms race. While rightly criticizing the approach to negotiation from a position of force, as well as the use of bargaining points in such negotiations, the study points out quite properly that the States, in their relations, should be guided by the code of peaceful conduct and peaceful relations. This is particularly referred to in paragraph 59. Particular responsibility for this falls upon the nuclear-weapon States themselves and the study quite properly recommends that they take such specific steps as undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

freezing nuclear weapons, prohibiting nuclear-weapons tests and preventing the arms race from spreading to outer space. This is to be found in paragraph 56 of the study.

At the same time, we have been obliged to note that the study suffers from a number of drawbacks, first and foremost, in that part of it which deals with the factual side of the matter. We cannot, for example, agree that the Soviet Union shares with the United States a responsibility for the present stalemate which has occurred in curbing the arms race and disarmament. Unfortunately, the study does not reflect the numerous steps which have been initiated unilaterally by the Soviet Union in order to create favourable conditions for the holding of serious negotiations on very diverse problems related to the curbing of the arms race.

After all, many of these proposals, the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, for example, the introduction of a moratorium on certain nuclear weapons during the bilateral talks on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe, establishing in 1983 the unilateral moratorium which is still in force on the launching, including experimental launching, of anti-satellite weapons and others, are very serious and substantial measures of unilateral restraint on the part of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As far as bilateral talks on nuclear armaments are concerned, referred to in paragraph 54 of the report, we have frequently had occasion to express our position on this in the past in this Committee.

Despite these shortcomings, nevertheless, and in view of the generally constructive approach taken in the study, we have found it possible to support the draft resolution endorsing it.

In conclusion, I wish to make one further point. We believe that the reproduction of the report, referred to in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, should not involve any additional financial expenditure but should be carried out through existing allocations.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation wishes to indicate the reasons why it voted against the three draft resolutions on a nuclear-arms freeze, draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25, L.32 and L.49.

Our objections hinge on the very concept of a freeze and they have been expressed many times. First, a freeze by its very definition preserves the existing situations and therefore the imbalances that those situations may entail and the resultant risks for the security of the States concerned. On the other hand, a freeze would be tantamount to conferring a lasting advantage upon any State which has made a major armament effort to the detriment of States that have limited their effort. Furthermore, a freeze would be difficult to verify and the negotiations that would be required to ensure effective verification conditions would be no less lengthy or complex than negotiations on the verification of an agreement on the reduction of arms. Finally, a freeze, to the extent that it may benefit one Power, entails the risk of considerably reducing that Power's interest in negotiations and its will seriously to negotiate on arms reduction. Thus progress towards a reduction of nuclear arsenals would not be promoted by declaratory measures aimed at a freeze. The path towards such a reduction is that of negotiations between the nuclear Powers, which must begin with the definition and establishment of a satisfactory balance.

The French delegation also wishes to indicate the reasons why it abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1 on bilateral negotiations. The recommendations contained in that draft resolution referring to the framework for the negotiations do not in themselves give rise to objections of principle by the French delegation, but we consider that the conditions in which bilateral

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

negotiations would be resumed fall within the purview of the two States in question. They are the ones that must agree on the necessary provisions and we do not think that the General Assembly should take a position on this matter.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation wishes briefly to explain the vote it has just cast on the draft resolutions concerning a nuclear-arms freeze, namely, draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.25, L.32 and L.49.

We voted in favour of all those draft resolutions. In doing so my delegation was of course aware of the fact that freeze is not reduction but, contrary to those delegations that underlined and overemphasized this aspect of the concept of a freeze and voted against it, thus reflecting a maximalist approach of "all or nothing", my delegation firmly adopted a realistic standpoint. Conscious of the dangerous international situation we are living in and of the deadlock experienced in the disarmament talks, we are of the opinion that every imaginable step in the direction of nuclear disarmament must be taken. It is absolutely clear to us that a freeze on nuclear weapons cannot be an end in itself, but it can be a useful first step, contributing to the creation of the feeling of security that is so much needed and to the feeling that it is possible to overcome the present deadlock. With this understanding, we voted in favour of the three draft resolutions, convinced that such a freeze could play a significant role in the creation of a saner international atmosphere, an atmosphere more propitious to conducting arms negotiations aimed at the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard the last explanation of vote on the draft resolutions in cluster 5.

As the Committee is aware, we took the decision last Thursday to give time for the delegation of Nigeria to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.30 at this stage. I therefore call on the representative of Nigeria to introduce that draft resolution.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution on the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) contained in document A/C.1/39/L.30.

As representatives will recall, by resolution 37/99 K, section IV, of 13 December 1982, the General Assembly decided to make the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research an autonomous institution. By the same resolution the General Assembly requested the Board of Trustees of the Institute to draft the Institute's statute and submit it to the General Assembly for approval.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

As Chairman of the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR for 1983, I presided over that body's work, which resulted in a draft statute (A/C.1/38/L.8/Rev.1) being submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, sponsored by 36 delegations from all regions of the world. In view of the fact that some of the provisions of the draft statute were considered by the administrative bodies of the Assembly to be insufficiently clear, the Assembly decided that the draft statute should be referred back to the Board of Trustees with the request that the Board spell out the meaning of the provisions of the draft statute so that the General Assembly could take a decision on it at its thirty-ninth session.

I can report that the Board of Trustees has thoroughly considered the provisions of the draft statute and, with the active co-operation and participation of the competent Secretariat departments, has agreed on a text, which it now recommends for approval by the General Assembly. The draft statute as adopted by the Board of Trustees is contained in annex II to the report of the Secretary-General (A/39/549).

The draft resolution I am introducing is aimed at having the General Assembly approve the statute of UNIDIR. As is indicated in the Secretary-General's report, the Board of Trustees was unanimous in recommending the draft statute to the General Assembly for consideration and approval.

My task is facilitated by the results of the work of the Institute during its short existence, as reflected in the Director's reports on UNIDIR's activities, the most recent of which is now before the General Assembly. It is useful to point out that the General Assembly has before it at this session two studies carried out by the Institute at the Assembly's request, namely, the report on the establishment of a disarmament fund for development and the report on South Africa's nuclear capability.

A number of other studies and research papers have been circulated among members of the Assembly, among which I should like to mention: the repertory of disarmament research; the document on risks of unintentional nuclear war; and the study on assumptions and perceptions in disarmament, a documentary study of Soviet and American perceptions and expectations in the field of disarmament. A large number of delegations have referred during the debate to the Institute's reports and studies.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

It should be stated also that in the course of its brief existence UNIDIR has made significant achievements with extremely limited financial resources and, of course, a very small staff. It has established and consolidated its place within the United Nations institutional framework for disarmament and has succeeded in developing working relations and co-operation with research organizations and individual experts from all over the world. The record, therefore, testifies to the viability of the proposal to establish this Institute, put forward for the first time at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament by the Government of France.

It is only proper in this context to express gratitude to the French Government both for its initiative and for the material support it has given the Institute in the past, which we are sure will continue in the future. Let me avail myself of this opportunity also to thank all the other Governments that have rendered assistance to UNIDIR in different ways, among them Australia, Canada and Norway. I wish also to join Ambassador Francois de la Gorce of France in commending the very energetic, competent and imaginative work of the Director of the Institute, Mr. Liviu Bota, and to assure him of our confidence and of our co-operation in the discharge of his tasks.

The text of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.30 is identical to that of the draft resolution proposed last year. After recalling resolution 37/99 K, the draft resolution takes note of annex II to the report of the Secretary-General (A/39/549) and, further, approves the draft statute.

The draft statute specifies that UNIDIR is an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations, established by the General Assembly for the purpose of undertaking independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues. The draft statute provides that the Institute shall work on the basis of the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and that its activities shall be funded principally by voluntary contributions from States and public and private organizations. Other sources of financing may include the regular budget of the United Nations, with respect to support for the Director and the staff of the Institute and to specific activities which the General Assembly may request the Institute to carry out.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The draft resolution, further, takes note of the report of the Director of UNIDIR and invites him to report annually to the General Assembly on the activities carried out by the Institute. It also invites Governments to consider making voluntary contributions to the Institute. The Secretary-General is requested to continue to give UNIDIR administrative and other support. I should like to stress here that the Institute is expected to reimburse the United Nations for the costs of such support; in fact, it already does so.

We have noted with satisfaction the wide support which UNIDIR enjoys within the Assembly. Besides the specific references to support by many delegations, I would note that there has been a collective expression of appreciation of the work of UNIDIR by the group of the 10 member States of the European Economic Community, on whose behalf the representative of Ireland, Mr. McDonagh, addressed this Committee. He specifically expressed the hope of the Ten that the General Assembly would agree at the present session on a statute for the Institute.

It is my earnest hope, in view of the significance we attach to the adoption of the draft statute, that this draft resolution can be adopted by the Committee without a vote.

The CHAIRMAN: In view of the shortness of the time at our disposal this afternoon, we shall take action upon draft resolutions remaining from other clusters at our meetings tomorrow.

As we have disposed of the draft resolutions in cluster 5, we should proceed tomorrow to take action on those in cluster 6. But consultations are under way among the sponsors of those draft resolutions, and it has been requested that action on cluster 6 be postponed. We shall thus go on to cluster 7.

Members will note that in cluster 7 we have in essence two types of draft resolutions: those relating to the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear winter and those relating the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the non-use of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Consultations are under way with regard to the draft resolutions relating to the prevention of nuclear war.

(The Chairman)

Thus, we could divide cluster 7 into two parts. The first would consist of the draft resolutions relating to security assurances and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; the second would consist of the draft resolutions relating to the prevention of nuclear war and to the subject of nuclear winter.

The following documents contain the draft resolutions under the first part of cluster 7, security assurances and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons: A/C.1/39/L.7, A/C.1/39/L.12, A/C.1/39/L.21 and A/C.1/39/L.50.

This division of cluster 7 into two parts is being made in order that the Committee may take up tomorrow morning the draft resolutions in the first part of cluster 7, whose numbers I have just read out.

The second part of cluster 7, relating to the prevention of nuclear war and to the question of nuclear winter, will not be taken up tomorrow. Those draft resolutions appear in the following documents: A/C.1/39/L.22, A/C.1/39/L.40, A/C.1/39/L.64, A/C.1/39/L.66 and A/C.1/39/L.69/Rev.1.

Tomorrow, after the Committee has completed action on the draft resolutions in the first part of cluster 7, it will take up all the draft resolutions in cluster 8, with the possible exception of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.45, which has financial implications. The other draft resolutions in cluster 8 are: A/C.1/39/L.6, A/C.1/39/L.14, A/C.1/39/L.44 and A/C.1/39/L.51.

We hope to dispose of the aforementioned draft resolutions during our meetings tomorrow, and we shall then take up the draft resolutions in previous clusters that have not yet been voted on. Those draft resolutions are the following: in cluster 1, A/C.1/39/L.36; in cluster 2, A/C.1/39/L.59 and A/C.1/39/L.62; and in cluster 3, A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1, A/C.1/39/L.67 and A/C.1/39/L.72.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.