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President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

**AGENDA ITEM 85**

**The situation in the Republic of the Congo (continued)**

1. Mr. COOPER (Liberia): The chaotic and deteriorating situation in the Congo has occupied the minds of every delegation here and is of deep concern not only to the African nations, but to everybody interested in peace and security. We do not intend here to question the motive of any delegation or group of delegations in their criticism or in their suggested action to be taken in the Congo. Whatever motives they may have had, I think that most of the delegations have suggested formulas for the solution of the Congo question out of concern and interest.

2. The entrance of the United Nations into the affairs of the Congo took place at the request of the Congolese Government then in existence, which Government was at that time composed of Mr. Kasa-Vubu, President, Mr. Lumumba, Prime Minister, and the Parliament. We know now that such a Government no longer exists. As the report of the Secretary-General states, there is no central government; there are only political factions.

3. In the understanding of my delegation, the Secretary-General was authorized or empowered by the Security Council, at the request of the Congolese Government, to assist in the withdrawal of Belgian military personnel and to restore law and order in co-operation with the Government then existing. That Government no longer exists.

4. In the circumstances, three choices lie before the United Nations. In the first place, since the Government which had requested United Nations aid no longer exists, the United Nations could withdraw from all further activities in the Congo—this would mean chaos and, as Mr. Hammarskjöld has said, civil war for many years to come. Secondly, if withdrawal were to lead to confusion and chaos, then the next alternative, if the United Nations is not to act as a bystander in the Congo, would be to replace the Government which no longer exists and with which the United Nations was pledged to co-operate. As many delegations have contended, the United Nations is not a super state and it was never intended to make the Congo a trust territory. It was felt by many delegations that the United Nations could not replace any government in the Congo. Thirdly, having received no

mandate to retire or to replace the Central Government, which has disintegrated, the United Nations must either co-operate wherever possible with the existing authorities—whether these authorities are legal or illegal—or be a bystander.

5. The choice, then, which faces the United Nations, through the Secretary-General, is to withdraw from the Congo, or to take over the authority of the government that no longer exists, or to co-operate with the existing authority, no matter whether this authority is legal or illegal—unless it is to act as a bystander or, as some delegations have said, a "baby-sitter". It is in this sense that my delegation will express its view on the draft resolution tabled by Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia [A/L.331 and Add.1].

6. While my delegation appreciates the great efforts of these delegations to find a solution to the Congo problem which will break the deadlock and restore some sort of order to the chaotic condition of that country, we are of the opinion nevertheless that some of the operative parts of that draft resolution could not be implemented under the present mandate given to the Secretary-General.

7. While my delegation feels that the officials of the Central Government and the members of Parliament should be released from detention, which meets with the approval of nearly every delegation here, nevertheless, we are of the opinion that this could not be implemented unless more powers were given to the Secretary-General, for many delegations have contended that the United Nations has no right, under Article II, (7) of the Charter to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo. And further, the release of all political prisoners would require the United Nations armed forces in the Congo to take an offensive action for the release of these prisoners, as neither a simple appeal nor a request will bring about their release.

8. The Secretary-General in his statement yesterday said:

"I would like to ask the honourable Assembly if it or the Security Council has ever committed me, or the Force, to take the initiative in military action." [950th meeting, para. 103.]

9. Under operative paragraph 3 of the eight-Power draft resolution, the General Assembly:

"Urges the immediate convening of Parliament and the taking of necessary protective measures thereto by the United Nations, including custodial duties";

I think this paragraph also found favourable support among all delegations, including mine; but the question arises as to who is to convene the Parliament. Surely, this cannot be left solely to the United Nations Command in the Congo, for, under the Charter, it is

forbidden to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. If it is addressed to President Kasa-Vubu—who many have insisted has usurped powers which were not given to him under the constitution—and Colonel Mobutu—who seems to be the only man in the Congo who wields some authority, and whom we call a renegade—it is doubtful that these two parties would convene a parliament which they might consider against their own interests.

10. Under operative paragraph 4, the General Assembly:

"Urges that measures be undertaken forthwith to prevent armed units and personnel in the Congo from any interference in the political life of the country as well as from obtaining any material or other support from abroad;"

This operative paragraph also finds support from many delegations, as well as mine; but under the limited mandate given to the Secretary-General, it would be impossible for him to carry out this task without taking offensive action. The implementation of this draft resolution, therefore, would be almost impossible, for it would require, in many instances, military initiative by the United Nations forces in the Congo, to which the Secretary-General has said no such authority has been given. I quote his exact words:

"Under the Charter, such an initiative requires a decision on enforcement measures, when it is a question of international affairs. The minimum, in the case of a national affair, is of course the same, if you regard the Charter as authorizing such military initiative in the national field at all. Anyway, I repeat my question: has any mandate been given which authorizes military initiative in the Congo? My reply is 'no', and anybody who cares to go to the record can see that that is the case." [950th meeting, para. 104.]

11. The Secretary-General contends that the United Nations Force in the Congo has only the right of self-defence in the position which it holds under order and in the maintenance of this mandate. He further states that he has no authority, either from the Assembly or from the Security Council, to attack units of any kind. It is now contended by some delegations that the Secretary-General has sufficient authority in his mandates to restore law and order in the Congo despite the existence of no recognized government. Unless the United Nations is prepared to give more power and direct instructions or guidance to the Secretary-General in implementing the resolutions of the Security Council, my delegation is of the opinion that no resolution passed, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, asking the Secretary-General to take such action, which is not in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations or previous resolutions of the Security Council, could be implemented.

12. While fully supporting the preamble of the eight-Power draft resolution, my delegation will have to abstain on certain of the operative paragraphs. While we believe that the implementation of these operative paragraphs would restore some sort of order to the chaotic conditions in the Congo, we feel that there could be no implementation under the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council. In that instance, my delegation has no alternative but to

abstain on these operative paragraphs. My delegation, therefore, will abstain on paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the operative part of this resolution. We will vote for paragraphs 5 and 6; but if the four first paragraphs are maintained in the resolution, we shall have to abstain on the resolution as a whole solely on the ground that these operative paragraphs of this resolution could not be implemented without a further mandate or directive from the Security Council or the General Assembly to the Secretary-General.

13. The PRESIDENT: I should like to announce at this stage that, subject to the agreement of the Assembly, I propose to schedule a meeting of the Assembly for 8.30 this evening for the purpose of continuing and, I hope, of concluding the debate on the present item. I much regret any inconvenience which the scheduling of this further meeting may cause the delegations, but I am afraid it is absolutely necessary, to leave sufficient time for the consideration of the other questions awaiting the attention of the Assembly.

14. Mr. ROA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): On 17 December, the General Assembly, by an almost unanimous vote of the delegations present, adopted a draft resolution which stated in unequivocal terms the absolute necessity of abolishing colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. The Cuban delegation, which had voted for the declaration on the granting of independence to the colonial peoples and countries submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [A/4502], also cast its vote, without reservations, for the draft which was adopted [resolution 1514 (XV)] and which drew from this historic document all the substance of the cardinal principles contained in the declaration. Its approval represents, undoubtedly, a great moral defeat for colonialism and imperialism and is at the same time a powerful stimulus for the peoples and countries which are still offering the flower of their youth in order to win self-determination, independence and sovereignty and for the peoples and countries which love peace, justice, freedom and progress.

15. But, although moribund and inexorably condemned by history, colonialism and imperialism still retain sufficient strength to prolong, by intrigue, bribery, threats and aggression, their economic exploitation and political domination. We must at all costs, therefore, prevent this fine document that has been approved from being transformed into a merely academic declaration. If all the free peoples and countries, those recently emancipated, subjugated, semi-subjugated or dependent, do not unite together in one common front for self-defence and struggle, both within and without the United Nations, the declaration announcing the imminent interment of colonialism and imperialism in Africa, Asia, Oceania and Latin America, could be reduced, like so many other grandiloquent texts, to a mere scrap of paper.

16. This is not a future danger. This is the extremely serious risk confronting us in this discussion. The critical situation in the Congo has put that declaration to the hard test of facts. The events that have occurred and are occurring, in that vast and much coveted African country, which has been oppressed and pillaged by Belgium for many years past constitute a challenge to the United Nations and a defiance to the draft resolution that we adopted amid

applause, the echoes of which still resound in this Hall.

17. At this stage in the debate I am not going to enter into a retrospective analysis of the events that have led up to the present crisis. It will suffice if I give a few details to clarify once again the attitude already known to be Cuba's on the point.

18. The representatives of the NATO Powers have wasted their dialectical resources in vain in trying to cover up with a cloud of subterfuge and honeyed words their obvious determination to maintain colonial domination in the Congo with the fictitious attributes of an independent country. This crafty design showed up with absolute clarity from the very moment when, apparently, the Government and the people of the Congo took over the direction of their political, economic, social and cultural life. It is an undeniable fact that the Republic of the Congo was extinguished as an independent political entity when it had barely taken its first steps on the difficult path of self-determination and sovereignty.

19. The colonialists lost not one minute in carrying their schemes into execution. Intrigues were begun, subversion organized, secession encouraged, elements of the armed forces bribed and a picture of events disseminated through the international Press, with unheard-of effrontery, which suited exclusively the interests of colonialism and imperialism. The main target of the charges in this unscrupulous campaign were Patrice Lumumba and the Congolese Parliament. The Prime Minister of the Congo denounced in the Security Council the disturbing interference of the Belgian Government and its NATO allies in the internal affairs of his country. The Security Council's resolutions and the decisions of the General Assembly, convened in emergency session to consider the increasingly worsening situation, have been, as is well known, grossly distorted and flouted for the benefit of the Belgian colonialists, North American imperialism and the colonial Powers. Sabotage of the pacification effort entrusted to the Conciliation Commission, the puppet-like appearance of Kasa-Vubu in the General Assembly and the recognition of his emissaries as legal representatives of the Congo were the culmination of the organized farce.

20. The Republic of the Congo at this moment is a phantom manipulated from outside. The constitutional order set up by the Congolese people has been cunningly overthrown by the joint action of Belgian colonialism and North American imperialism, with the encouragement and backing of the imperialist Powers. The very same Powers which abstained from voting for the abolition of colonialism voted against the self-determination of the heroic people of Algeria. The civil war that these Powers have instigated, which is already assuming unsuspected proportions, is endangering international peace and security, which have already been violated by foreign interference in the internal life of the Congo.

21. The Congo today is a nation that has suffered interference and is on the verge of chaos. No one can now, in this Assembly, plead ignorance without committing the offence of perjury. No one here is blind or deaf, though some pretend to be so, and even dumb. The non-recognition of Parliament, the persecution of the most prominent popular leaders, the insults to members of the diplomatic corps, the

annoyances caused to officers of the United Nations Command, and, above all, the illegal dismissal and arbitrary imprisonment and the physical insults to which Patrice Lumumba, the lawful Prime Minister of the Congo, has been subjected, have one single purpose: to fan the flames of civil war and to prevent the new Republic from being really independent and sovereign and to prevent the Congolese people from using its right to self-determination and disposing at its own discretion of the enormous natural resources of the Congo. The Kasa-Vubus, Mobutus and Tshombés are nothing more than puppets of colonialism and imperialism in this bloody affair. The responsibilities borne by the Secretary-General in the whole of this dangerous business are extremely serious, inasmuch as the resolutions of the Security Council, the decisions of the General Assembly and the most elementary rules of international law have been systematically violated.

22. This policy of driving into submission those who are preparing to emancipate themselves or have succeeded in freeing themselves from the shameful burden of colonialism and imperialism has been experienced by Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala and, in particular, by Cuba, in Latin America. The people and the Government whom I have the honour to represent have not surrendered or bowed the knee. They are standing upright. To every intrigue, coercion, harassment, threat or aggression they have replied with an assertion of independence and sovereignty that is always more solid, vigorous and militant.

23. At this very moment, by a significant coincidence with the beginning of sugar-harvesting operations, pirate aircraft based on North American territory have violated our air space; denaturalized Cubans in the service of North American imperialism have committed terrorist acts with high explosives supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency; President Eisenhower has cancelled Cuban sugar imports for the first three months of 1961 and Mr. Christian A. Herter, the Secretary of State, who inserted a clause in the Declaration of San José, Costa Rica, condemning the alleged intervention of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of the Western Hemisphere, has just accused it once again in NATO—applying the Monroe doctrine to Europe—of having "flooded Cuba with arms" and demanded the help of NATO to crush the Cuban revolution. What Cuba is flooded with is men and women prepared to hamstring the North American invaders or the hirelings under their leadership. We understand and appreciate what is going on in the Congo as no one else in this Assembly can. It is in no empty sense that we regard ourselves as forming the antithesis of what has happened and is happening there.

24. The urgent and inflammable situation in the Congo which by its nature and extent threatens the unity of Africa and aggravates international tension, calls for immediate consideration. It empties words of their meaning and emphasizes the need for collective action by the United Nations. The Organization is confronting possibly the most critical situation in its history. Its prestige, authority and destiny will depend to a great degree on what we do here.

25. The delegation of Cuba proposes that decisions be adopted which will lead to the immediate restoration of the independence of, and of constitutional order in, the Congo. A stop must be put to imperial-

ist intervention and to the Fascist terror unleashed by the mercenary bands of the hireling colonel, who is manipulated by the Belgian and American monopolies and supported by the NATO Powers. The Cuban delegation will cast its vote for any measures which can contribute effectively to the total and final solution of the tragic problem of the Congo. In this sense the eight-Power draft resolution meets with our most careful consideration. We believe that, of the drafts distributed, it is the one which, within its limitations, best satisfies the requirements and the needs of the situation taken as a whole.

26. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): Once again the General Assembly meets to carry on the responsibilities of the United Nations in the Congo. The United States takes this opportunity to consider the policies and activities of the United Nations in the Congo in the light of the latest events.

27. Through all these debates on the Republic of the Congo, the United States, however our motives have been misrepresented, has had in mind no aim other than to help the people of the Congo. Thus we shall also continue to help the community of nations.

28. In this issue there is no room whatever for any outside interests, whether of a nation or of its ideology. That is the spirit in which we shall take part in this debate, and we trust that whatever differences of opinion may emerge, the same spirit will animate the greatest possible number of representatives here.

29. As we all know, this debate takes place in the setting of recent important events, some of them ominous for the United Nations and for the Congo. The arrest of Mr. Lumumba has been made the occasion for acts and threats of unspeakable violence by the individuals who have wrested control of certain areas in Oriental Province. These same people have now asserted a spurious claim to be recognized as the government of the Republic of the Congo. Meanwhile, we have learned from the Secretary-General of the tragedy of widespread starvation in Kasai Province, where hundreds of people are threatened with death by starvation every day. And at this difficult moment, of all times, when support of the United Nations is imperative, certain Member States have stated an intention to withdraw their troops from service in the United Nations Force in the Congo.

30. That much of the situation is indeed dark, but there are also some hopeful signs. One is the action of the General Assembly last month [924th meeting] in seating President Kasa-Vubu and his delegation as the representatives of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville). Another is the vigorous action of the United Nations in safeguarding lives against the vengeful threats of Messrs. Gizenga and Salumu in Stanleyville, an action which I am glad to say has been praised by representatives of virtually all shades of opinion except that of the Soviet Union. And the third hopeful sign is that the United Nations, in spite of all the difficulties of the Congo operation, has remained faithful to its fundamental aims.

31. It is well to remind ourselves what those aims have been since the first United Nations action in this crisis last July. Stated most simply, they have included assistance in the promotion of law and order, as the Secretary-General stated it, in the basic sense of protecting the lives and property of the inhabitants of the Republic of the Congo; the evacuation of Belgian

troops, the preservation of the unity and integrity of the entire nation, the safeguarding of human rights and the maintenance of essential services.

32. All these aims have had to be pursued as well as possible without overstepping the limits of the Charter or the mandate given to the Secretary-General and the United Nations Force by the Security Council and by the General Assembly. So this has meant that the United Nations has had to refrain from using force to decide those questions which the Congolese people and their leaders, in the exercise of their sovereign independence, must decide for themselves.

33. In the light of these facts and these United Nations aims, let us consider some of the recent events and issues that have arisen. I turn first to the matter of Mr. Lumumba. I would like at the outset to make this point clear: We do not challenge the motives of some of those who have differed with us about this, although we think their position is wrong. We recognize that in many cases it springs from sincerely held and honest conviction, and we also recognize the support that some such Governments have been giving and are still giving to the purposes of the United Nations in the Republic of the Congo regardless of these differences of opinion. It may not be remembered but it is nevertheless true that the United States recognized Mr. Lumumba and did its best to deal with him as long as he was constitutionally in power. However, Mr. Lumumba was removed as Prime Minister in accordance with the procedures specified in the constitutional instrument of the Republic of the Congo. His position in the political life of the Republic of the Congo cannot and should not be decided by the United Nations nor by any of us as Members, unilaterally, but only by the Congolese people. He is now under arrest on the basis of a legal warrant issued by the authority of the President of the Republic. He is charged with serious crimes under the "Loi fondamentale" of the Republic. When he was arrested, as we all remember, he was on his way to Stanleyville, where his supporters made no secret of their intention either to make him the head of a separatist régime or to help him usurp power in the Congo as a whole.

34. The Secretary-General has appealed to President Kasa-Vubu to see that Mr. Lumumba receives due process of law and is not mistreated, and that International Red Cross doctors be allowed to visit him. This is proper. However, the Secretary-General is also eternally right in refusing to use the military power of the United Nations Force to secure the release of a man legally imprisoned on the authority of the Chief of State. I ask the Members to put themselves in the same position and ask themselves what their reaction would be should the United Nations attempt any such action in their territories.

35. As the Secretary-General stated yesterday, no mandate has been given which authorizes military initiative by the United Nations Force in the Congo. I quote him: "The Force has the right of self-defence in a position which it holds under orders in the maintenance of its mandate. It cannot attack units of any kind". [950th meeting, para. 105.] I am sure that every Member here will agree that this is the proper interpretation of the mandate.

36. Now, there may be some who want a situation in which Africans kill Africans, but clearly, the United

Nations Force was not sent to the Republic of the Congo for this purpose.

37. It has been thoroughly established that the acknowledged head of the Republic of the Congo is President Kasa-Vubu, the Chief of State, whose credentials were accepted by the General Assembly on 22 November last. We think that as a matter of elementary constitutional practice, any peaceful solution of the political crisis in the Congo must start with the office and the person of the recognized President. However, Mr. Lumumba has set himself in direct opposition to President Kasa-Vubu and has made common cause with the faction which has now set up a sort of shadow government in Stanleyville, under what outside inspiration I think we all know well.

38. It is perfectly obvious that the tender concern of the Soviet Union with the welfare of Mr. Lumumba as a person does not arise from humanitarian impulses. The United States fully supports just and humane treatment for all prisoners, including Mr. Lumumba, even though his supporters in the Congo have shown no mercy to certain of his political opponents. We also support the same kind of treatment for Minister Songolo and other Congolese leaders who have been illegally detained and brutally treated in jail in Stanleyville, but whose mistreatment does not seem to arouse any concern on the part of Mr. Zorin.

39. We of the United States have expressed our concern to President Kasa-Vubu and to Colonel Mobutu and we gave further expression to that concern in the draft resolution in the Security Council on 13 December which was vetoed by the Soviet Union.<sup>1/</sup> And of course, as the Assembly knows, the Secretary-General has made similar representations and has received assurances on this score from President Kasa-Vubu.

40. Meanwhile, we believe that the Secretary-General and the United Nations Force are to be commended for the speed and effectiveness with which they moved to prevent acts of savage violence which were threatened in Stanleyville by the pro-Lumumba forces to be carried out in those parts of Oriental Province where they had seized power. This action should rank with the heroic United Nations effort to stamp out tribal fighting in Northern Katanga in which Congolese have been killing each other.

41. Those who suggest that the United Nations should leave the Congo should consider the consequences: a many-sided, confused civil war—which would invite outside interference, rapacious tribal warfare, widespread starvation, and a further break-down of the entire structure—economic as well as political—of the country. In such circumstances foreign domination would be inevitable, and we must ask ourselves from what quarter it would come.

42. I will turn to another important aspect of the Congolese situation, the part played by the former Administering Power, and by its nationals. As the Secretary-General has confirmed, Belgian military forces have long since been removed from the Congo. The United States fully supported that withdrawal as an essential step. We further believe that there must be absolutely no military aid to any faction in the Congo from any nation, except through the United Nations and pursuant to United Nations policy.

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, 920th meeting.

43. Mr. Zorin complained in the Security Council that what he called Belgian colonizers had returned to the Congo, which, I suppose, is his way of referring to technicians of all sorts, including even doctors, nurses, teachers, and civilian sanitary engineers, and he said that the instructions called for the removal of these colonizers. If this is what Mr. Zorin meant by "technicians", then I think several points must be made.

44. The first is that there is no place in the Congo for Belgian colonizers or any other colonizers. By action of the Belgian Government the age of colonialism in the Congo is over. Clearly, any technicians who come to the Congo—which desperately needs civilian assistance—must come there not as rulers but as friends, not to command or give dangerous advice but to help.

45. Secondly, at a time when this need is so great, it would be tragic and nonsensical for the invaluable help of qualified persons to be withheld because of pride or misunderstanding on any side. The most important consideration in this field is that whatever help is given by anybody—we leave out no one—it must harmonize with and reinforce the United Nations effort. We must not work at cross-purposes in the Congo. This calls for sound arrangements and, even more, for a spirit of forbearance and team work in a common cause, and that common cause is the good of the Congolese people.

46. Now, the Soviet solution—the indiscriminate and immediate rejection of all Belgian nationals from the Congo—would strip that suffering country of the best source it presently has of civilian assistance. And this solution is proposed without the slightest reference to the desires of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. It is not a constructive, but a destructive solution. As a practical matter, the Secretary-General was, as usual, right when he said on 13 December in the Security Council: "Unless the United Nations disposes of the necessary funds, how can the United Nations insist on withdrawal of technicians provided on a bilateral basis to meet essential needs...".<sup>2/</sup>

47. Now I come to another point, perhaps the crucial point in the set of sweeping proposals which Mr. Zorin brought to the Security Council and now brings before the Assembly. That is that the Armée nationale congolaise under Colonel Mobutu, should be disarmed—presumably by force, because I know of no other way—by the United Nations. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, any such action would far exceed the mandate of the United Nations; it would be a direct violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo. In fact, the representative of the Republic of the Congo, Mr. Cardoso, was entirely justified in saying during the Security Council debate that any such attempt against the will of his Government would be aggression. Even if there were a legal, moral, ethical basis for taking this step, its result would be obviously to weaken the constructive forces of the country and strengthen those who oppose the constitutional institutions of the country—including the Stanleyville faction, which appears to have the full backing of the Soviet Union.

48. That is the purpose which Mr. Zorin had in mind in proposing this step. He wants to clear the field

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., para. 69.

militarily for those whom the Soviet Union could rely on to promote its own purposes in the Congo. Make no mistake about this: the United States believes that it is most important that the "Armée nationale congolaise" should be brought and kept under effective civilian control. It should not operate as a political force in its own right, but as an arm of an established and legitimate Government under President Kasavubu, and, under those circumstances, it will be possible for the United Nations Force to resume the programme of reorganizing and training the army and putting it—as the Secretary-General said in his statement of 7 December<sup>3/</sup>—"in such a shape as to make it capable of taking care of the situation itself". Once that is done the United Nations will have achieved its primary task of promoting law and order and of preserving the unity and integrity of the entire nation, and the Congolese Government will be in a position to resume responsibility for the internal peace and security of the nation.

49. Finally, I come to another question about which much has been said, the proposed convening of the Congolese Parliament. Certainly, full constitutional government should be restored in the Congo as soon as possible, but for the United Nations to attempt to impose this would be quite wrong. Only the Congolese people and their leaders themselves can take the necessary initiative to establish parliamentary government in the conditions of tranquillity and mutual tolerance which it requires in order to function at all. Let us keep in mind the conditions under which the Parliament—or at least a part of the Parliament—last met. To use the words of the representative of the Congo in his vivid statement to the Security Council on 12 December, former Prime Minister Lumumba obtained the votes to his liking by threatening certain representatives "with bayonets or sanctions",<sup>4/</sup> and the results were described by the Special Representative to the Congo, Mr. Dayal, in his first report as "somewhat uncertain both as to substance and count",<sup>5/</sup> and in my opinion one of the understatements of the year.

50. We believe that the United Nations can and should do much to assist in establishing conditions in which Parliament can meet and function in security and freedom from outside interference. But here again the initiative must come from the Congolese people and from their leaders.

51. These are the views of the United States on the specific issues which have arisen. They are the views which compel us to oppose the draft resolution submitted by eight Powers. We find this draft resolution insufficient in many aspects, particularly in its complete lack of attention to the danger of outside intervention, and we find it totally unacceptable in its many-sided attempt to intervene in the domestic affairs of a Member State.

52. Before I close I must say a few words about the broader considerations. From the outset of the emergency in the Congo, the United States, along with a great majority of Members of the United Nations, has wholeheartedly supported this Organization as the only possible instrument to restore peace and independence to the suffering people of the Congo.

We have channelled all our aid—military transport, technical, administrative and financial—through the United Nations, and have repeatedly urged others to follow our example. Today we believe that more than ever, only the United Nations has at its disposal both the great resources and the great and impartial principles which the emergency demands.

53. I would remind the Assembly once again that the United States could easily have taken another course. As you well know, at the very beginning just after the Belgian intervention the Congolese Government asked the United States for direct military assistance. We refused, and we insisted that all military aid be channelled through the United Nations. We provided the massive airlift in which 15,000 troops from every quarter of the globe were brought to the Congo. We did not pick and choose. We did not say, "We will not carry your troops because we do not quite agree with your policies". We carried all the troops which the United Nations asked us to carry.

54. It has already become quite clear that the Soviet Union has other aims as regards the Congo. This has been clear for many, many weeks. Its preferred candidates for power are those who are least likely to achieve a solution to the Congo problem without violence and bloodshed. There is a wish here to foment hatred between races and between tribes. There is a wish here, of course openly expressed, to disarm the only Congolese military force that exists. It wishes to cut the Congo off from technical aid through the United Nations. It wants a civil war apparently in order to promote its own evil designs. In short, every aspect of Soviet policy is designed either to weaken and divide or to gain power in the Congo for those who will do the will of Moscow. It is a straight policy of "rule or ruin" all over again. It is a policy fraught with danger for international peace and security.

55. Now this is not our attitude nor, I am sure, the attitude of most of the Members of this Assembly towards the people of the Republic of the Congo. Those people have suffered much and they still face a difficult future. To overcome the difficulties, three things are needed. First, that the Congo should not willy-nilly become the victim in the struggle of an ambitious nation or group of nations eager to build empires. Secondly, that the Congolese people and their leaders should make the most strenuous and disciplined efforts on their own behalf to win their birthright as an independent nation, and in this task should co-operate willingly with the United Nations. Thirdly, and finally, that we, all of us, the Members of the United Nations, should support the Organization in foul weather as well as in fair. Only great problems and great difficulties can truly measure our fidelity to the Charter. Let us meet our difficulties in such a way that freedom and peace in Africa may be advanced and that in the future we shall have no reason to fear the judgement of history.

56. Mr. LORIDA'N (Belgium) (translated from French): The present discussion on the situation in the Congo Republic is being held nearly six months after that country's accession to independence. It bears essentially on the action being taken there by the United Nations and on questions affecting the internal situation of the country. At the present stage the Belgian delegation does not intend to state its Government's attitude to all the problems raised by the draft resolutions tabled. It will confine itself to

<sup>3/</sup> *Ibid.*, 913th meeting.

<sup>4/</sup> *Ibid.*, 919th meeting, para. 91.

<sup>5/</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4531, para. 26.

observations more specifically concerning the position of Belgium. Several times Belgium's name has been mentioned, not only during this discussion but also in other discussions held either in the Security Council or in various Assembly committees. It should, presumably, be no matter for surprise to find Belgium being attributed a special position as regards the Congo, a country with which it is so closely connected after having for fifty-two years past been responsible for its administration.

57. It is, however, a somewhat bitter experience for my delegation to find a certain number of delegates so completely lacking in impartiality and launching against our country such a flood of calumny and slander. It has become the fashion for some people to load Belgium with the responsibility, one way or another, for all the ills from which the unhappy Congo Republic is now suffering. If anyone refers to the pre-independence period, it is merely to dub it as colonialist, with all the opprobrious meanings attaching to that concept. Politically, it implies a yoke of oppression and economic exploitation. The creative work accomplished is regarded as non-existent.

58. If the post-independence period is referred to, great play is made of Belgian military intervention, which is denounced as aggression. People recall the exodus of the Belgians in July and hold them responsible for the chaos which befell the country without, of course, giving the least thought to the reasons which led to my compatriots leaving. But having finished criticizing the July exodus, people then condemn the Belgians' return. It is labelled as "political", using the term in a pejorative sense. It is interpreted as indicating the will to secure, or even more, the actual achievement of, the re-establishment of Belgium's domination over her former territories. Some will go so far as to assert that independence was merely a fiction devised to camouflage a tactical withdrawal effected in order the better to re-impose Belgian domination. It is added that, in order to ensure this domination, Belgium is applying in the Congo the old formula: divide and rule, and that it is encouraging and supporting these secessionist movements.

59. Such an accumulation of slanderous charges, untiringly reiterated in the most deliberately offensive terms possible, could not fail to shock Belgian public opinion deeply and evoke the keenest reactions on the part of my Government. May I, therefore, be allowed today in this discussion to recall facts, some of which now belong to a closed page of history, while others are still happening before our eyes, though people feign to ignore or forget them or even contrive to present them in a distorted or tendentious version.

60. In the first place, when they talk of the fifty-two-year period during which Belgium was responsible for administering the Congo, her detractors merely stress certain negative aspects, exaggerating them or, more often than not, making them up. May I therefore recall certain basic facts that are too often forgotten?

61. If one is to pass judgement on Belgium's colonization effort in the Congo, one must start at the beginning. What was the Congo Basin like eighty years ago? An entirely unexplored part of the world, the most backward territory in Africa, inhabited by tribes who had no contact with the outside world and warred among themselves. These peoples had no

written language; they did not know how to use the wheel or the plough or to employ domestic animals for transport. Cattle-raising even was unknown, except in a few regions in the north-west. The population suffered from serious malnutrition. No stone building or monument has been discovered. The country was riddled with disease. The population was exposed to, and decimated by, slave raids. It has been estimated that between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries the Congo lost more than thirteen million inhabitants through the slave trade. Every year tens of thousands of slaves were captured.

62. Another scourge which used to work havoc in the Congo was sleeping-sickness. Explorers discovered whole villages whose inhabitants were breathing their last, prostrate on the ground, veritable living skeletons in the last stages of debility.

63. That was the state of affairs which the Belgians found when they undertook their African mission. Speedy action was taken to stop the shameful slave trade and a cure was found for combating sleeping-sickness, so that this scourge was practically eliminated.

64. When Belgium inherited the Congo fifty-two years ago, modern civilization existed only in a handful of posts scattered throughout the jungle. Belgium had practically to start from scratch and tackle the task of building a modern nation in this territory. She has the right to ask that her achievements in the Congo should be judged in the light of these inexorable and undeniable historical facts.

65. I shall not burden the Assembly with figures which give an eloquent picture of the constructive work done by Belgium in the Congo. I do, however, think I should remind you how Belgium gradually prepared the Congo for independence. There are two aspects of this preparation: on the one hand, long-term preparation and, on the other hand, what I would call immediate preparation.

66. The establishment of a sound economic and social infra-structure was a long-term job. Belgium can rightly be proud of what she has achieved in that field.

67. From the economic angle, I shall confine myself to mentioning that in the last few years the national income of the Congo has risen at the rate of 4.4 per cent, a figure which compares favourably with the rate for India, for example, where the rate of increase in the national income between 1950 and 1956 was only 2.2 per cent, that is, half of the Congo's rate.

68. In the Report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories [A/4371] the representative of India and some other speakers note that industrialization has made slow progress, except in the Belgian Congo. That is not surprising, seeing that between 1950 and 1959 the equivalent of some 3,000 million dollars was invested in the Congo, of which nearly 1,000 millions constituted public investment under the ten-year plan.

69. In the field of education the campaign against illiteracy was waged with success. In 1959 more than 57 per cent of school-age children were attending school. With that of Ghana, this is the highest percentage in Africa. According to the last available statistics, this figure of 57 per cent should be com-

pared with 5 per cent for Ethiopia in 1949-1951, with 23 per cent for Egypt in 1954 and with 22 per cent for India. We felt that a wide dissemination of primary education, which is given throughout the country through an intensive network of 28,500 schools, was an essential phase in a general development of the level of education. Thus, the Congo had definitely more schools per 100,000 inhabitants than any other African country whatsoever.

70. The secondary school system had already expanded to such an extent that, according to UNESCO figures, 50,000 children or young persons were attending the secondary schools. This figure compares favourably with that for an African country which had, nevertheless, registered substantial results in this field. In the country in question, which is three times more populous, there are 64,000 young persons in the secondary schools as against 50,000 in the Congo. Some years ago the top level of the educational structure was completed by the establishment of two universities, which in the academic year 1959-1960 were attended by 742 students, practically all of them Congolese. The University of Lovanium at Leopoldville has often been cited as a model. It is equipped with an experimental atomic reactor, the only one of its kind in that part of the world.

71. You will often hear it said that at the moment of independence there were only seventeen university graduates in the Congo. Critics overlook the thorough work that has been done and forget to point out that an instrument had been created for the training every year of hundreds of Congolese graduates. The figure of seventeen, anyhow, is very disputable, since it leaves out of account the 644 medical auxiliaries who have, nevertheless, done four years of medical studies after finishing secondary school and who, in many countries, would be regarded as health officers.

72. I would be loath to criticize any country that is still developing for having no results to show in the field of higher education but Belgium must be allowed to express surprise at the bitterness of the criticisms levelled against her in this sphere, when another African country, which has been independent for 2,000 years past, still has no higher educational institutions and when the Head of that State, not so long ago, was thanking both the Soviet Union and the United States, the former for having donated a technical college which will be the first in that country, and the latter for the university it proposed to build there.

73. Still with reference to social welfare problems, I would like to say a word about the health services. I shall merely remind you that Dr. Candau, the Director-General of the World Health Organization, publicly expressed his admiration for the work done by the Belgians in the Congo and that Dr. Tabona, a Swiss national, also a member of the WHO, declared: "The Belgian medical organization in the Congo is one of the best in the world".

74. In its pamphlet on colonization the Soviet delegation accuses Belgium of having decimated the Congolese population. I have already mentioned one of the reasons why this population has declined in the last century: slavery. I shall do no more now than mention, in contradiction of the Soviet delegation's assertions, the simple fact that from 1931 to 1953 the rate of natural increase of the Congolese population rose from 6.5 per cent to 12.8 per cent and since then the rate has gone on rising steadily. These

figures show the results obtained in the campaign against disease and infant mortality.

75. Still with reference to social problems, I might cite some instructive figures with regard to housing. The "Office des cités africaines" and bodies connected with it have, in the last ten years, invested more than a hundred million dollars in house-building and urbanization works.

76. Those are a few basic data which show the extent to which the Congo was prepared economically and socially when it acceded to independence.

77. In the political sphere it is untrue to say, as is usually alleged, that Belgium had neglected to make any kind of political preparations. Assemblies, potential political institutions, had existed for several decades at the level of local bodies.

78. At the end of 1958 a working group of Parliament tabled its conclusions; they led up to the important declaration of the Belgian Government, which was made quite independently of the local disturbances that occurred at Leopoldville in 1959. By this declaration Belgium showed that she intended to organize in the Congo a democracy capable of exercising the prerogatives of sovereignty and of deciding on its own independence. One year later the representatives of the Congolese people, at the Round Table Conference held in Brussels, asked for independence to be granted to the Congo at the end of June 1960. Belgium signified her willingness to proclaim independence on the date desired by the Congolese leaders. Independence, therefore, was granted unconditionally, with no reservations and no ulterior motives. It was not the result of revolts, disturbances or a bloody revolution, but the outcome of a meeting held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and confidence, under the most favourable auspices. But it was not granted without preparation. By joint agreement between Congolese and Belgians another economic meeting was held at Brussels which was to consider the practical conditions that would guarantee the Congo economic viability and genuine independence. It was agreed that some 10,000 Belgian technical experts and officials would be placed at the disposal and put under the exclusive authority of the Congolese Government and would form the cadres of the administration, the judiciary, and of the security, health departments, etc. These Belgian agents would stay on until the cadres had been completely Africanized. In addition, the Belgian Government was prepared to extend to the newly emancipated State substantial financial assistance amounting to a hundred million dollars a year. Members of the Assembly will not fail to appreciate the extensiveness of this financial assistance, for they know the difficulties the United Nations have met with in setting up a fund equally as large for helping the Congo.

79. The principles governing technical and financial assistance were embodied in the General Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Co-operation between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo which was signed on 29 June 1960.

80. Furthermore, Article 250 of the "Loi fondamentale" on the structure of the Congo, dated 19 May, provides that Belgian officials and agents, Belgian officers and non-commissioned officers of the "Force publique", and career magistrates serving in the Congo on 30 June 1960, are placed at the disposal of



the Government, that is, of course, the Government of the Congo. The same Article provides that a convention will be concluded between the Congo and Belgium on practical questions involved in thus making Belgian agents available.

81. These arrangements, the aim of which was to supply the Congo with the technical experts it needed and with its own administration under its exclusive authority were intended to enable it to enjoy genuine independence, irrespective of anyone whomsoever.

82. Thus, the conditions under which the new State embarked on its independent life had been carefully prepared by arrangements jointly agreed upon, on a basis of absolute equality and in an atmosphere of friendship. And yet, all these plans, all this sensibly elaborated structure, were fated to collapse in a few days' time.

83. The very day that independence was proclaimed, the Prime Minister of the Congo gave signs of the unpredictable changes of front typical of his temperamental character. On the morning of 30 June he launched into bitter attacks on Belgium. The same afternoon he paid tribute to what Belgium had accomplished. It was only the first outburst of temper in a long series of irresponsible actions.

84. Then came the mutiny of the "Force publique", directed initially against Prime Minister Lumumba himself. But, by dint of incendiary speeches, he managed to turn the mutineers against the European officers. The Congolese armed forces broke loose. I shall not recall here the excesses they committed; insecurity and chaos established their reign in the Congo.

85. It was only on 10 July, after several members of the European population had been killed, that the Belgian troops intervened. The representatives of Belgium have had occasion to supply full details on this point to the Security Council.

86. I want merely to stress here once again the strictly limited extent of Belgian intervention; it was a rescue operation limited in time and extent to the aim it had in view—the protection of human lives and was devoid of any political aims, as the sequel has sufficiently clearly shown.

87. Orders were given to the Belgian troops not to open fire unless their own safety or that of the refugees depended on it and to do their utmost in every case to come to an agreement with the Congolese forces. Thus, in the few cases where fire was opened, it was the action of the mutineers which was responsible for it. Moreover, in nine-tenths of the cases it was possible to give protection without a shot being fired.

88. This rescue operation prevented the Congo from lapsing into a general state of chaos and insecurity. It enabled Belgian forces to be replaced by United Nations contingents. From the outset the Belgian Government wanted the United Nations to intervene to restore security and rescue human lives in the Congo.

89. At the Security Council's meeting on 13 July, I was authorized to declare that the Belgian Government could support the proposal for United Nations intervention made that same day by the Secretary-General. During the same Council meeting I was able to announce the Belgian Government's decision to

withdraw its intervention troops as soon as the United Nations forces could take over responsibility for the maintenance of order.<sup>6/</sup> Thus, the Belgian Government was approving in advance the decision taken a little later by the Security Council. As and when the United Nations forces arrived in the Congo to ensure the maintenance of order and security, the Belgian troops fell back on their bases in order to be repatriated.

90. The Belgian representative had occasion to stress the stages in the rapid withdrawal of the Belgian forces. In his statement made on 7 December last in the Security Council the Secretary-General said that before the end of August the withdrawal of Belgian troops had been carried out and that a delay of five weeks could not be regarded as a failure to accomplish such a task. This declaration contrasts with what the representative of India said here. Speaking in a tone of bitterness, he felt it appropriate to quibble with the Belgian Government about a few days' delay in the evacuation of small contingents of the Belgian army which were still at bases that were already occupied by the United Nations forces. The offensive way in which he felt it necessary to stress a few detailed points and the way he imputed sinister motives to the Belgian Government show that he is not greatly interested in good relations between India and Belgium.

91. I might remind the Assembly of the consequences that followed on independence in India, namely, the exodus, the torture and the massacre not of dozens, or hundreds, or thousands, but of millions of victims of religious and other forms of hatred. In his last speech to the Assembly [950th meeting], Mr. Menon described the damage done to two motorcars as "atrocities". I shall not dwell in detail on the kind of real atrocities perpetrated on a wide scale in India after independence, which sent a thrill of horror through the world when news reports, many in number, unhappily, and all concordant, began to spread. The representative of India would probably at that time have thought it very bad taste if the Assembly had discussed similar questions of allegedly domestic nature. It is true that Mr. Menon himself complacently quoted to the Security Council the words used by a statesman: "The death of one man is a calamity; the death of a million is merely statistics." Of course, if Mr. Menon reflected a little more on his country's problems, he would probably exhibit more moderation, objectivity, justice and, I would add, humility, when he talks of other countries which, like mine, only desire to maintain friendly and co-operative relations with his.

92. Belgian military intervention was condemned by the Soviet Union and some other countries as "aggression". The Soviet Union keeps on repeating this charge. It asserts that the purpose of United Nations military intervention was to expel the Belgian aggressor from the Congo. Are there perhaps some secret resolutions of the Security Council or the Assembly to this effect?

93. The repeated accusations of the Soviet Union and certain other delegations oblige me to point out that the Soviet amendment<sup>7/</sup> tabled in the Security Council on 13 July which read: "Condemns the armed aggress-

<sup>6/</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, 873rd meeting, paras. 177 to 197.

<sup>7/</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4386.

sion of Belgium in the Congo" was defeated and secured only two favourable votes in the Security Council. The Soviet Union delegation later preferred, in order to avoid defeat, to withdraw from the vote a similar condemnation of Belgium at the fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly on 19 September [863rd meeting].

94. All this does not restrain the Soviet delegation from persisting in condemning Belgian intervention as aggression. No one can prevent it from making such slanderous charges, just as no one can prevent the same slanderous charges from being published in all the Soviet Union newspapers from Tadjikistan to Latvia. Similarly, no one can oblige the Soviet Press to publish, for instance, the views of the Belgian delegation.

95. The Kremlin can decide arbitrarily what the citizens of the Soviet Union and certain other countries should hold to be true. While it can, into the bargain, stifle the voice of the opponent in the USSR in the name of the principles of freedom of the Press and information as interpreted by it, it cannot muzzle the Belgian delegation at the United Nations Assembly nor forbid representatives, who try to form an independent opinion, from hearing all the points of view. I defy the delegation of the Soviet Union to quote one single text of a resolution adopted by an authoritative body of the United Nations in which Belgium has been condemned as "aggressor"; it is an easy matter, though, to produce a resolution which is less well-known in the Soviet Union, which was adopted at the Assembly by an overwhelming majority on 4 November 1956 [564th meeting] on the question of Hungary, in which one can read the following: "The General Assembly ... Condemning the use of Soviet military forces to suppress the efforts of the Hungarian people to reassert their rights ... "[resolution 1004 (ES. II)]. The voting on this resolution was 48 for, 11 against and 16 abstentions.

96. On 14 September 1957 the General Assembly noting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, "has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights; ... Condemns these acts and the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly." [resolution 1133 (XI)].

97. I am well aware that some representatives consider it untactful to address these embarrassing reminders to the Soviet Union. They think that this kind of talk stirs up the cold war. But should we, to avoid incurring this reproach, agree to let our country be unjustly subjected to the serious accusation of being a military aggressor?

98. A number of representatives, unable to contest the evidence of the independence granted to the Congo, maintain that it is a fictitious independence, that the withdrawal of Belgian authority was merely a tactical retreat to prepare for the restoration of Belgium's domination over the Congo. I suppose a country can always be charged with Machiavellian behaviour, but is it not ridiculous to suppose that Belgium would grant independence, immediately and unconditionally, to the Congo on 30 June 1960, leave there more than 80,000 of its nationals, give up all its centres of authority, with the idea of then provoking disorder in that country—and this with the complicity of Mr. Lumumba's Government—in order to have an oppor-

tunity to reconquer it by military force? The hypocrisy, it is claimed, went even further: after carrying out military intervention, Belgium asks for United Nations help in relieving its troops in the Congo and, as the culminating feature of its aggression, withdraws with the least possible delay the forces it had been obliged to send to the Congo.

99. There you have a whole series of acts which, it would have to be admitted, the Belgian Government had committed in a fit of aberration if any credit is to be attached to the attacks levelled against Belgium in this connexion. The reality is very much simpler and clearer: after the decision to proclaim Congolese independence no Belgian thought of the folly of reconquering the country. Not one single thought, or declaration or action justify the suspicion that Belgium ever conceived of such schemes.

100. I would now like to say a few words about the relations between Belgium and the United Nations.

101. During the whole of what I will call the essentially military phase, Belgium tried to establish co-operation with the United Nations in the matter of re-establishing security. It is obvious that, without the most evident formal willingness on Belgium's part to ensure the speedy replacement of her troops by those of the United Nations and without close co-ordination with the United Nations Command, this operation could not have been achieved in such a short space of time.

102. The Belgian Government's observations [A/4629], made in reply to the criticisms levelled against it, which have been reproduced in the document distributed by the Secretariat on 20 November [A/4557 and Add.1] show how Belgium followed, during that period, a policy of loyal collaboration with the United Nations.

103. Belgium maintained this co-operation with the United Nations also in the sphere of civilian operations. In a statement made to the Security Council on 7 December the Secretary-General was able to claim that, during the month of August, the United Nations staff engaged on civil operations had restored the activities essential for the country's life and that, thanks to various kinds of assistance given by the United Nations, life had continued in more or less normal conditions. I would not dream of denying the value of the services rendered by the civilian operations officers of the United Nations but may I perhaps be allowed to add to what the Secretary-General said that the minimum services to which he referred could not have been re-established without the co-operation of the 2,000 odd Belgian technical experts who stayed on the spot under extremely adverse conditions. The Belgian Government fully realizes the difficulties hampering the recruitment by the United Nations of experts for the Congo, among which finance is certainly not the least. These difficulties explain the very small number of United Nations officials employed on civilian operations in the Congo. According to Progress Report No. 5 on United Nations Civilian Operations in the Congo, <sup>3/</sup> there were on 5 November, i.e., four months after the operation began, 165 United Nations officials in the Congo. It stands to reason that, if they had not had the co-operation of the 2,000 odd Belgian officials who stayed at their posts, it would not have been possible for the United Nations

<sup>3/</sup> These reports were not distributed as United Nations documents.

to take credit for starting up again a minimum number of services for the civil population, as mentioned by the Secretary-General.

104. The Belgian delegation, therefore, feels itself entitled to claim that, in the matter of restoring order and security, as well as in the functioning of essential services for the civilian population, the United Nations can only claim to have scored a success as a result of the co-operation given them by the Belgian elements in the Congo.

105. That being so, it will be easily understood that Belgians reacted vigorously to the criticisms contained in the second Progress Report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative. After analyzing the general deterioration of the situation in the various sectors of public life, this report mentions "increasing evidence of the return of Belgian nationals into many phases of public life in the Congo" [*Ibid.*, para. 7] and gives the impression that it is thereby disclosing the principal source of the difficulties encountered.

106. The Belgian Government submitted its observations regarding the return of Belgians in the document which I have already mentioned. The Dayal report does not specifically point to the Belgian Government but it makes insinuations. It represents the return of the Belgians to the Congo as the result of a concerted policy. It asserts, for instance, that spontaneous, personal reactions to an improvement in security conditions can hardly suffice to explain the extent and character of the Belgians' return. The Dayal report not only blames the Belgians for returning to the Congo; it complains that Belgian nationals are working at cross-purposes with the United Nations there. The Belgian Government feels obliged to state in this connexion that the arguments advanced by the Secretary-General's representative are based merely on vague facts and rumours that cannot be checked. My Government is prepared to admit that tense situations may have arisen between United Nations representatives and Belgians; but it cannot agree that, as the Dayal report claims with no evidence to back its assertion, that all these cases of tense situations are the fault of the Belgians.

107. However that may be, the Belgian Government trusts that United Nations action in the Congo will succeed; it trusts that co-operative relations will be established between the Belgian and United Nations elements in the Congo. Such co-operation is essential in the very interest of the Congo itself. My Government considers that the activities of its citizens in the Congo and those of United Nations officials should not be regarded as competing but as complementary.

108. It is in this frame of mind that the Belgian Government is prepared to use the moral influence that it can bring to bear on its nationals in order to promote the necessary co-operation on the spot. It was prepared to send to New York a special envoy who would have been able, disregarding any differences on points of principle that may exist between the Secretary-General and the Belgian Government, to seek out practical ways and means of promoting collaboration between officials of Belgian nationality and United Nations officials in the Congo, harmoniously co-ordinating their activities and creating an atmosphere conducive to accomplishing the common task which they are both tackling, some of them as

officials of our international institution and others as Congolese officials. While expressing his gratitude for this kind of co-operation on the part of the Belgian Government, the Secretary-General did not feel he could accept it at the moment. He seems to believe that the return of Belgians to the Congo is the result of a deliberate policy of the Belgian Government, for which the latter must bear responsibility and not the consequence of the appeal made to the Belgians, individually, by the Congolese Government and authorities. Since the return of Belgians to the Congo is preoccupying certain peoples' minds, I feel I should spend a little time dwelling on this point in order to draw the Assembly's very serious attention to a few of the legal and practical considerations involved which seem to the Belgian delegation to be of capital importance.

109. From the legal point of view, the recruitment of Belgians by the Congo authorities is a matter that lies within the exclusive competence of that country's Government. It is one of the prerogatives of its sovereignty. The fact cannot be overlooked that it was the Congo authorities who took the initiative of retaining in their service or recalling Belgian citizens to discharge various public functions in the Congo.

110. These Belgians who stayed behind or who are returning to the Congo are Congolese officials, placed under the exclusive orders of the Congolese authorities. It is for the Congolese Government and Congolese authorities alone to decide whether it suits their purpose to retain in their service or dismiss the officials in question.

111. Those who returned to the Congo did so on the desire and often on the express invitation of the Congolese authorities. Authority over these officials has, incidentally, been claimed by all the Congolese Governments, beginning with Mr. Lumumba's. I might mention numerous cases of this but shall refer merely to those quoted in paragraph 12 of the "Observations of the Belgian Government".

112. The fact that the Belgian Government pays, in pursuance of legal provisions dating back to before independence, a part of the salary, in some cases, of its nationals does not in the least affect their status. The departmental chiefs of these Belgians are exclusively Congolese. It is they who can, at their discretion, decide to keep them on or send them back, and they have sometimes exercised that power. For instance, an official Congolese statement dated 7 October last announces the sending back of 25 Belgians.

113. Consequently, the Belgian Government would have absolutely no power to oblige its nationals to leave Congolese Government service. No law or national regulation and no rule of international law would entitle it to take such action.

114. In addition to these basic legal objections to United Nations intervention in this sphere, there are also practical objections which would, of themselves, be sufficient to preclude any Assembly recommendation.

115. No one who has made an impartial study of the Congo situation can have any doubts of the catastrophic vacuum which the departure of the Belgians would cause there, a vacuum the United Nations would be quite unable to fill. In this connexion the Secre-

tary-General made an interesting statement in the Security Council on 13 December. He said:

"Unless the United Nations disposes of the necessary funds, how can the United Nations insist on withdrawal of technicians provided on a bilateral basis to meet essential needs ..."<sup>9/</sup>

According to the Secretary-General the United Nations cannot demand either that these technicians be placed under United Nations orders or that the United Nations provide the necessary assistance in another form, unless it has the necessary funds available.

116. I would make reservations about the expression "provided on a bilateral basis" used by the Secretary-General to refer to Belgian technicians—the context shows that it is actually these who are referred to. From the Secretary-General's point of view the only difficulties in carrying out the alternative policy he has in mind would be financial difficulties. In the view of the Belgian delegation realization of either of the hypotheses proposed would meet with even more serious obstacles than those of a purely financial nature. I say nothing for the moment about the legal objections involved if the Congolese Government had to adopt one of the two hypotheses; I shall merely mention here the practical difficulties.

117. Even if the Secretary-General had hundreds of millions of dollars, he would not be able to recruit at the requisite moment the thousands of administrators, experts and various technicians, teachers, agricultural experts, judges, doctors, engineers, etc., who know local conditions in the Congo, can speak the vernacular languages, who have the technical experience necessary for keeping the public services running and who, in addition, are willing to work in the Congo under present circumstances.

118. So much for the replacement of Belgians by other elements. As regards the ultimate possibility of transferring Belgians to United Nations allegiance, this would also entail, over and above legal objections and financial obstacles, difficulties of various kinds.

119. Certain delegations seem to consider, however, that the presence of Belgians in the Congo, far from helping to restore stability, is a factor promoting disorder. They are trying to get a resolution adopted demanding the departure from that country of all Belgians.

120. Such a step would mean riding roughshod over the sovereign rights of the Congolese Republic. The delegations who advocate it are shutting their eyes to the disastrous effects it would have for that country and seem to overlook the financial and other problems which the departure of Belgian officials would create for the United Nations itself. It may be wondered whether one of the aims underlying this demand, made as it is in disregard for the sovereign rights of the Congo, is not actually to aggravate chaos there and to endanger the country's economic and social recovery. In any case, if the Assembly, disregarding the legal objections, felt it wise to recommend the departure of Belgian technical experts from the Congo, it is to the Congolese Republic and to it alone that the appeal should be addressed.

121. The Belgian Government could not vote in favour of such a recommendation, for it is resolved

to respect the Congo's sovereignty and independence. As a general rule, it abstains from interfering in any way in the domestic affairs of that country. Accordingly, it refuses to commit itself on the problems connected with the internal political arrangements of the new State. It is for the Congolese themselves, and only for the Congolese, to take decisions in this field. It is rather odd to find Belgium being accused of encouraging the dismemberment of the Congo when, as a matter of history, it was the Belgian authorities who created Congolese unity. Some Congolese leaders today blame it on that score. It was also the Belgian Parliament which, on the basis of the decisions taken at the Round Table Conference, drew up the "Loi fondamentale" on the political structure of the Congo which enshrines the unity of the Congo. This Law, however, could do no more than lay down the provisional structure in anticipation of the Congolese, in the full exercise of their sovereignty, being able to adopt the final Constitution for their country. After 30 June that, let me repeat, was an entirely domestic matter which was no concern whatsoever either of the Belgian Government or of the United Nations. The Security Council's resolution of 9 August clearly states that the United Nations Force "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise".<sup>10/</sup> The Belgian Government bases its policy in this matter on the same principles.

122. In conclusion, I would like to recall my country's attitude as regards military assistance.

123. On 20 September 1960 the General Assembly adopted a resolution [1474 (ES-IV)] inviting all States to abstain from furnishing, directly or indirectly, military assistance to the Congo. The Belgian delegation voted unreservedly in favour of that resolution. Even before it was adopted, the Belgian representative was able to give the Assembly a formal assurance that all steps had been taken to prevent any arms being dispatched to the Congo and also that the Government had already made every arrangement in its power to render the recruiting and departure of volunteers for the Congo impossible. I formally repeat here these assurances. Following the Belgian withdrawal from the Congo there now remains no Belgian army officer, apart from the technicians whose retention in the bases has been deemed necessary by the United Nations.

124. Certain officials of Belgian nationality, who belonged to the senior ranks of the "Force publique", have remained on the spot in a personal capacity, to act as military technicians, in virtue of the General Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Co-operation. These individuals have been retained at the request of the Katanga authorities. They are serving in the police and gendarmerie forces which are responsible for internal order. They are, moreover, fewer and less numerous than before the Congo became independent.

125. To conclude, the Belgian delegation will be able to support any resolution that is likely to contribute to the success of the United Nations operation in the Congo and to the economic and social recovery of the Congo Republic. It is prepared to co-operate in this action of the United Nations. Its attitude is based essentially on the following principles: first, respect

<sup>9/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, 920th meeting, para. 69.

<sup>10/</sup> Ibid., Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4426.

for the sovereign rights of States; secondly, non-interference in domestic affairs and thirdly, abstention from any direct or indirect military assistance to the Republic of the Congo.

*Mr. Adeel (Sudan), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

126. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker on the list, whom I now recognize, is the representative of Rumania.

*Mr. Boland (Ireland), resumed the Chair.*

127. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translated from French): In listening to the two speakers who preceded me on this rostrum, in the dramatic atmosphere in which this discussion is proceeding, I have, nevertheless had the feeling that the great humorists of the human race are really and truly dead and buried. I am thinking more particularly of Mark Twain, the Russian writer, Saltykov-Shchedrin and the Romanian, Caragiale. What could they have written? What spicy comments would they have uttered which would have remained treasures of world literature, had they been able to hear the two speakers who spoke before me?

128. Only a little while ago someone said that there is nothing that kills like ridicule. We must admit that, in any case, it does not do so any longer, at any rate not in the United Nations.

129. We had the privilege of hearing made from this rostrum a declaration on the granting of independence to the colonial countries and peoples in which it is recognized that all the peoples of the world ardently desire to see the ending of colonialism in all its forms; where it is stated that the continuance of colonialism hinders the development of international economic co-operation, hampers the social, cultural and economic progress of the dependent peoples, and runs counter to the United Nations ideal of world peace; where it is claimed that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to obviate serious crises, a stop must be put to colonialism and to all the policies of segregation and discrimination that accompany it; a declaration in which it is stated that to expose peoples to subjugation, domination and exploitation by foreigners constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the United Nations Charter and endangers world peace and co-operation; I could go on multiplying quotations from this document.

130. Yet the ink is barely dry on this document, recently issued from the United Nations printing presses, and already we have someone coming to this rostrum to enter a plea for colonialism. That is precisely what the speaker who preceded me has just done.

131. I do not want to take up his speech in detail. It is not for me to answer him back, seeing that only a few moments ago the chair was occupied by the representative of the Sudan. In this Assembly where half of the members now represented have emerged from under the colonialist yoke during the last fifteen years, I do not propose to undertake replying to the two speakers who preceded me on this rostrum.

132. For I am convinced that replies, in dignified and caustic terms, to those mockers who dared to sing the praises of colonialism three days after the adoption of the declaration which I have just been quoting will be given by the representatives best

qualified to do so—I mean the representatives of those peoples who have groaned under the colonial yoke until the last few years.

133. But, if you will allow me, Mr. President, I would like to express my disapproval and deep indignation that such a thing could happen in the United Nations. Any human being from another planet who would land in the midst of this discussion on the problems of the unhappy people of the Congo and would hear the speakers who follow one another on to this rostrum would be deeply surprised and greatly disconcerted.

134. He might get the impression that the Congolese people have friends and, of course, enemies too, and draw the conclusion that the friends of the Congolese people, the real champions of its independence, those who are really fighting for its national liberties, its prosperity and its progress, are the United States, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, etc.—maybe I have forgotten some of them—whereas the opponents of the young Congo Republic and of its people should be looked for elsewhere. Where? In Ghana, in India, in Indonesia, in Ceylon, in Guinea; and it is absolutely on the basis of such an impression that anyone poorly informed about the realities of the world in which we live—realities which we hope we shall shortly be rid of for good and all—might form a conclusion.

135. You are also aware that we must not forget either the Secretary-General or the part that he has constantly played in this whole matter. The positions that certain people maintain here are motivated by the erroneous idea that the sister nations of Africa and Asia, who until quite recently have languished under the colonial yoke, are the enemies, the opponents of the Congolese people who themselves have barely emerged to a life of freedom, if they can be said to have so emerged, whereas the most hardened colonialists, the exploiters of the peoples, known throughout world history as such, they are the innocent lambs, the traditional friends of this people, as they are of the other peoples who have managed to free themselves from their claws. It really is—and I am sorry to be repeating myself—a very painful spectacle that these gentlemen exhibit on the rostrum of the United Nations.

136. Anyone who heard the representative of Belgium would imagine, first, that there were no Belgians in the Congo; second, if there are Belgians there, that they are in the Congo with the agreement of its Government. The only thing still to be added to complete the picture presented by the representative of Belgium would be to point out that there is no Government in the Congo any more, since the legal Central Government has been liquidated with the connivance of the United Nations and its Secretary-General, that the Prime Minister of this legal Central Government, Lumumba, has been arrested, the country's Parliament paralysed, that an armed military dictatorship, controlled by the colonial Powers, has been installed in the young Republic of the Congo, that all these things have happened at the time when the so-called United Nations action in the Congo was being carried out; and that, finally, all these acts: liquidation of the Central Government, arrest of its Prime Minister, paralysis of the Government, etc., carried out with the direct or, at least, with the tacit, concurrence of the United Nations Command and

under the explicit or implicit instructions of the Secretary-General, have led to the result that the prestige of the United Nations has at this moment—unless something is done to remedy the situation—fallen to the lowest level it has ever known since the Organization was founded.

137. It is impossible to pass over in silence the fact that at this very moment, while we are discussing the matter here and while anarchy reigns in the Congo, the heads of the military dictatorial régime in the Congo, with Colonel Mobutu at their head, and the secessionist leaders, Tshombé and Kalonji, all of them confidantes of the colonialists, have left the capital of the country to attend some conference or other.

138. Why have all these leaders been above to leave their bailiwick? Because they know that the United Nations Command is on the spot and will act for them in looking after the colonialists' positions in the Congo. That is the task which the Secretary-General has taken over, in flouting disregard of the mandate assigned to him by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

139. There has been a great lot of talk in the General Assembly plenary session and in the Security Council about the Secretary-General's mandate. Several speakers, representing a certain school of thought, have expressed regret that the Secretary-General's mandate was limited and argued in favour of a wider mandate. According to certain views expressed here, the very limitative nature of the mandate and a certain vagueness in its terms were, it was alleged, primarily responsible for the collapse of the United Nations action in the Congo. Accordingly, although several speakers have reminded the General Assembly of the terms of this mandate, I shall venture to cite operative paragraph 2 of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 14 July 1960.<sup>11/</sup> Its categorical and very clearly worded terms read as follows:

"Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks."

140. Is there anything obscure in that mandate? Absolutely nothing. The Secretary-General was authorized to take the necessary steps to provide the legal Central Government of the Congo with the assistance it needed to cope with the intervention of the Belgian colonialists and all its consequences. Yet, just a few days ago, in the Security Council, the Secretary-General wanted to put the matter in a quite different light. Certain speakers—for instance the United States representative—restated here, a few moments ago, the respective views advanced. What did the Secretary-General say about the mandate? This is what he said:

"The aim was to protect life and property within the Congo, in danger after the breakdown of the national security system, so as to eliminate the

reasons given for the Belgian military intervention and thereby to reduce what internationally had to be regarded as a serious threat to peace and security."<sup>12/</sup>

141. Consequently, as far as the Secretary-General was concerned, the idea of consulting with the Central Government of the Congo in order to provide it with the assistance needed to cope with the problems confronting the country did not arise. We know perfectly well that this was precisely the situation, since, from the very outset, the Secretary-General's actions in the Congo were conducted along the lines of keeping the Central Government, headed by Mr. Lumumba, in a state of ignorance and of giving direct or indirect support, implicit or explicit, to all the illegal forces in the Congo. Remember the really absurd and disgraceful story of the Secretary-General's entry into Katanga at the head of two Swedish companies to salute the colours of the secessionist leader, Tshombé. That occurred at the time when the Secretary-General found it impossible to meet the Prime Minister of the country which had in that capacity asked the United Nations for assistance.

142. These things must not be forgotten and, in any case, when the Secretary-General—and his defenders—try to clear him of responsibility in the Congo by arguing that his mandate was too restricted and that the language used was vague, there are plenty of facts which help to clarify the issue and to give a proper reply to the colonizers and those in their service.

143. As everyone knows, there is no longer, at the present moment, a Central Government in the Congo which the United Nations should provide with the necessary assistance to cope with the problems of order and security. The Prime Minister has been arrested by unlawful forces. Yet the Secretary-General dares to come before the Security Council and the General Assembly and ask to be authorized to plead for clemency for the prisoners, through the intermediary of the International Red Cross.

144. It is highly significant that the Secretary-General's actions in the Congo have been criticized by most of the representatives who spoke in the Security Council and at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly. It is also extremely significant, in the opinion of my delegation, that the strongest support for the actions of the Secretary-General in the Congo came from the representative of the United States and, less outspokenly, from the representative of Belgium who, to save appearances, feels himself compelled to criticize certain passages in Mr. Dayal's report. He did not find one single word of criticism for the policy followed by the Secretary-General or for his actions in the Congo.

145. That is a very significant trinity we have to deal with: the United States, Belgium and the Secretary-General. I shall not call it a holy trinity for it is anything but holy. I make my apologies also to the Assembly but I am not in a position either to say who is the Holy Spirit in this trinity. We believe, however, that the Belgian colonialists and their champions in the United States and in the other colonial countries have grounds for being satisfied with the Secretary-General and the work he has done in the Congo on behalf of the colonizers.

<sup>11/</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/4387.

<sup>12/</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, 913th meeting, para. 16.

146. The United States representative said a moment ago that the United States could easily have taken other steps regarding the situation in the Congo. But, he added, they refrained from doing so; they confined themselves to supporting the action of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Command in the Congo. Frankly, I can see nothing extraordinary about that and, above all, I fail to see what sacrifice it would have cost the United States to forego direct action and resort to action taken through the agency of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Command in the Congo. The United Nations Command in the Congo and the Secretary-General have perfectly well served the interests of the colonialists. I might even add that they have served them better than the United States could have done by intervening directly, with their military forces, for the defence of their colonialist colleagues in the Congo. We have absolutely no illusions about the character and the reasons for the colonialist intervention in the Congo effected through the agency of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Command in the Congo.

147. As regards the problem of the non-intervention or the so-called neutrality of the United Nations in the Congo, it is very hard to take a serious view of those who advance this argument in the Assembly. In the face of a mandate which enjoins them to grant support to the Central Government and, in consultation with that Government, to restore order in the country, the Secretary-General and his champions come back to the Assembly to say that this mandate did not allow them to choose the party to be approached: the lawful Government or the agents of the colonialists. It really is not a serious argument to advance.

148. How can one remain neutral when one is ordered by the United Nations to give support to the Central Government of the country which has asked for assistance? How can one remain neutral as between the Government which has asked you for your assistance, between the Parliament of which that Government is an emanation, on the one hand, and the agents of the colonialists, on the other? Is this neutrality as exhibited by the Secretary-General and the United Nations Command in the Congo not the same as that exhibited by the Command of the United Nations Force which, under the direction of the Secretary-General—at a time when Belgian aircraft were using the aerodromes controlled by the United Nations to bring in arms and ammunition to the leaders of the separatists in the Congo—forbade the use of these same aerodromes to the Central Government and even forbade it to use the wireless stations? Is that the Hammarskjöld doctrine of neutrality? That is the kind of neutrality which forbids intervention when someone is seen to be assaulted and strangled—the neutrality which consists in saying: I cannot prevent the strangler from throttling his victim. An odd idea of neutrality.

149. My delegation considers that, unless energetic steps are taken to change the evolution of events in the Congo, two very serious dangers may arise for the peace and security of the peoples of Africa, as well as for international peace and security.

150. My delegation would be able to support the draft resolution submitted by the group of eight Powers [A/L.331 and Add.1]. The measures it advocates seem to us to be the minimum strictly necessary for re-

establishing the original direction that United Nations action in the Congo was to take and for helping the sound political forces in that country to regain control of their fatherland. It is the absolutely necessary minimum.

151. In the first place, this draft resolution recalls the original mandate of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Force in the Congo. The measures it recommends should not be regarded as something other than what they are, that is, as measures designed to re-establish in the Congo the legal, governmental and constitutional situation as it was at the time when United Nations intervention was requested by the lawful Government of the country.

152. People who seek, by legal subtleties, to raise insuperable constitutional difficulties against the execution of a programme as modest as that proposed in the draft resolution are deliberately refusing to admit that it is the Secretary-General and, under his orders, the Command of the United Nations Force in the Congo who have been the accomplices, when they were not the direct agents, in the liquidation of the legal, constitutional and governmental system adopted by the people of the Congo.

153. I am free to admit that my delegation would have liked the draft resolution to have contained also the idea of setting up an observation commission which would, on the General Assembly's behalf, keep a direct watch on the way in which the Secretary-General carried out his mandate and on the way in which the United Nations Command in the Congo executed the directives received and on the directives themselves. If the authors of the draft resolution agreed to amplify their text in this sense, my delegation would feel that its force and effectiveness would be greatly enhanced.

154. Otherwise, my delegation will, nevertheless, vote in favour of this draft since, as I have already had occasion to say, it represents the minimum measures to be taken in order to rectify the unfortunate line of action followed by the United Nations in the Congo and to steer this action in a direction consonant with the interests of the Congolese people and the other peoples of Africa, and consonant also with the interests of peace and security all over the world.

155. I do not believe that, as things now stand in the Congo, any action based on a desire to cover up responsibilities, to avoid calling things by their proper name, to avoid adopting the measures needed, could be of any use whatsoever. On the contrary, any such action, which would seek to justify and approve what has already been done in the Congo under the orders of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Command, would be a great danger to the peace and security of the peoples of Africa and to international peace and security.

156. It must not be forgotten that there are now in Africa—and their voice is being heard here—peoples who have won back their independence, who are eager to preserve it and who seem, to judge by their statements here and elsewhere, determined not to let colonialism be established again on the African continent, and determined also to expel the last remnants of it that remain.

157. My delegation reserves the right to speak again if other developments supervene.

158. The PRESIDENT: I call on the Secretary-General.

159. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The item to which this debate refers is called "The situation in the Congo". I do not believe that anybody is in doubt that for some the real issue might better have been called "The situation in the United Nations". The discussion of this question was opened in September during the general debate, and from then on it has been continued, overtly and covertly, in all the organs of the United Nations here at Headquarters.

160. The methods used in the interventions concerning this question have been new to the United Nations, and have given this discussion a significance going beyond the underlying problems of the administrative structure of the Organization or of the relative influence of this or that group. They have done so because they have brought us to a point where many may have been tempted to ask whether facts, or truth, or law no longer count, and whether it is possible to debate without respect for some basic rules of debate as developed in Parliamentary life, either as regards form or as regards substance. If questions regarding the intellectual integrity of the discussion can be asked, it means that we are facing a great threat to this Organization and its stature. Popular or not, proper for me or not, I feel it is my duty to voice concern.

161. For reasons made clear to the Members of the Assembly in September, a concerted and consistent effort has been made in order to create conditions for a radical change of the administrative structure of the Organization and, with that in view, to corrode whatever confidence there may be among Members in the integrity of the Secretariat. No argument has been left untried. It would be vain to try to make a catalogue of all the misrepresentations of facts to which the Members have had to listen, or demands which could not be realized, or proposals for which those putting them forward would not be willing to share in the responsibility in action, and all the distortions of the actions of the representatives of the Organization. And yet if such a catalogue is not made, and if every point is not dealt with by me, you will undoubtedly hear again that the criticisms of the Secretariat must be correct as they have not been countered.

162. In spite of this, I will not repeat what I have said already on most of the points raised, although the attacks to which my observations have been the reply have been repeated in the current debate, in the obvious hope that by repetition they will create conviction. I shall limit myself to a few points which seem to represent innovations.

163. The representative of the Soviet Union said in his intervention at the 949th meeting that the Secretary-General has been acting against demands for the convening of the Congo Parliament, and now has even some doubts of the legality of that organ. The representative has no basis for such a statement. The facts are that I have been working consistently for the re-establishment of Parliament in its proper position and that the flimsy basis that Mr. Zorin may believe that he can invoke, in support of his second allegation, is simply that I pointed out in the Security Council the obvious fact that we, the United Nations, cannot ourselves convene Parliament, nor put military forces as a sanction behind a suggestion to the proper authorities to convene Parliament.

164. Further, the representative of the Soviet Union told the General Assembly that I have acted against the Conciliation Commission. Fortunately, in this case the verbatim records of the meetings of the Advisory Committee are there, and the eighteen members of that Committee sit in this Assembly. The records show, and the members can tell, that there is no basis whatsoever for what Mr. Zorin said. But that is not sufficient. It has been said, and if I do not here present evidence showing that what is said is false I assume it is supposed to be accepted as the truth. Even if I took up the time of the Assembly with such a detailed refutation, I am sure we should soon have the same allegation repeated.

165. But more revealing than the statement to which I have referred, as an example of the way in which the question of the Congo is now discussed by a certain group, is the statement of the representative of Hungary to which we listened yesterday. I might take other examples, but, with the permission of the Members, I should like to give some special attention to that intervention.

166. Let me start out with a quotation from Mr. Peter's speech here yesterday—a quotation to which I suppose that a number of Members will have given all the attention it merits. The representative said:

"Speaking from a human and moral point of view, it is absolutely impossible to understand what the psychological motivation may be of a person's attitude when there is not the slightest sign of self-examination when confronted with an enormously grave situation partly or entirely provoked by actions under his command." [950th meeting, para. 138.]

It seems to me that the representative feels that we have now reached a stage in a certain modern ritual where it is time for a confession, to be followed by repentance and judgement.

167. With this background of concern about my supposed unwillingness to evaluate the actions of the Secretariat, the representative of Hungary wished to help me and presented eight points indicating our grave omissions. Let me repeat them and comment on them in order.

168. First, the representative of Hungary says that at the very beginning the Secretary-General did not clarify in his first proposals to the Security Council for what purpose, with what limitation, he was taking the responsibility for military action in the Congo. May I remind the representative of the fact that I did not ask for any powers. The responsibility was put on me by the Security Council, which supposedly itself had formed an idea about what exactly was expected, and certainly was capable of expressing it. Let me further remind him of the fact that exactly those points which later on proved controversial—for example, non-intervention and limitation of military action to self-defence—were made very clear by me both in my very first presentation of the problem to the Security Council on 13 July<sup>13/</sup> and, later on, in the first report<sup>14/</sup> the same month. The Security Council acted with that background, and its action must have involved the approval of the principles I outlined as

<sup>13/</sup> *Ibid.*, 913th meeting.

<sup>14/</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4389 and Add.1 to 6.



it formally endorsed my report. Thus the first point of the representative of Hungary has no substance for those who care about the history of the case.

169. The second point of the representative of Hungary is that the Secretary-General when he supposedly realized that actions within the scope as he originally imagined it could not meet the situation, did not report to the Security Council nor ask for new instructions. I believe the members of the Security Council can confirm that it has been exactly the other way around, and that at every doubtful point during the decisive phases of this operation I brought the matter back to the Security Council for its consideration.

170. Thirdly, it is said that I did not inform Mr. Kasa-Vubu early in September that the United Nations could not continue its assistance any longer unless the "Loi fondamentale" was observed and, further, that I did not inform the Security Council about the entirely new situation devolving from the move of Mr. Kasa-Vubu at that time. Certainly, the representative does realize that the Secretary-General has no right to threaten with the cancellation of an operation decided by the Security Council. Certainly, the representative also remembers that Mr. Kasa-Vubu's step was taken on 5 September and that I reported in writing and orally on the situation in the course of the same week. However, as this does not fit into the picture it is left out, obviously in the hope that nobody will remember.

171. Fourthly, the Secretary-General has not complied with Article 99 of the Charter as he has not initiated meetings of the General Assembly or the Security Council as the situation grew more dangerous. I will not enter upon any constitutional discussion with the representative, but he has here presented a new interpretation of Article 99, especially as regards the situation when the General Assembly is in session, forgetting that the initiative of the Secretary-General is subsidiary and that his duty under Article 99, in the prevailing situation, has been fulfilled when, by reports and documentation, he has fully provided the Members with the facts, giving them a chance to judge for themselves.

172. Fifthly, it is said that the Secretary-General has omitted to report in due time regarding several serious aspects, and as an example—the only one quoted—it is said that only at the last meeting of the Security Council did he report on the fact that in South Kasai some 200 persons were dying daily from starvation. If the representative had asked me before making that statement I could have told him that that piece of disturbing news was received the very same day it was reported to the Security Council.

173. The sixth point is that, as the Secretary-General has not asked for the necessary clarification of his mandate, he has become an autonomous organ of the United Nations, being himself above the legal organs. I have to refer the delegations to the record and to what I said under point two: it just is not so.

174. The seventh point is that I have neglected the views of the Member States which undertook responsibility for the situation in the Congo by providing military units. Can it be that the representative is unaware of the fact that all of those Member Governments are represented in the Advisory Committee, which has had meetings at least every week at which

so far—with one single exception—agreement has been reached on actions to be taken, and at which every member has been free to raise whatever point he wanted. The single exception was when, at the last meeting, the representative of Guinea took a stand against the sending of a vanguard of the Conciliation Commission to the Congo.

175. The eighth and last point made by the representative is that I am requesting Member States to continue their undertakings, sharing in the responsibility for a situation created mainly by failures of the Secretariat. Certainly, if I had not requested them to continue, that would also—and with justification—have been listed as an omission.

176. What is interesting in the eight points of sins of omission and commission allegedly committed by me is less their lack of substance than the fact that, by implication, they exclude even the possibility of any responsibility of the Security Council and its members, or of the General Assembly and its Members, or of anybody in the Congo. Everything is left at the doorstep of the Secretariat. The concentration on my activities is such that for a moment even the imperialists and colonialists seem to fade out of the picture. Why? Those who remember some things said in this Hall in September and early October and who have followed the interventions of a certain group of countries all through the General Assembly—in a follow-up of the operation started in the general debate—know the reply. As I have not been willing to pave the way for reforms of the Secretariat, desired by a certain party, by resigning "so to say, in a chivalrous manner", the desired result has to be achieved in a way the least weakness of which is that it is not chivalrous. I said at the beginning that this debate has for some been basically one about the United Nations. In what sense this is true is clear from what I have recalled here about some of the arguments used.

177. On an entirely different level from the points to which I have found it necessary to refer, by way of illustration of a trend in the present debate, is the open or implied question directed to me regarding the way in which I look at the present need for United Nations action in order to achieve what, from the beginning and all through the operation, has been the aim to which the Organization wished to contribute: stable and peaceful political conditions in the Congo, with its integrity safeguarded against all actions from outside—irrespective of the source—and with its sovereignty upheld by the subordination to the wish of the authorities of the Congo of all assistance given. To state and restate this obvious aim, in a more or less detailed form and with more or less specific indications of this or that aspect, is neither to indicate how the aim is to be achieved nor to provide the means for its achievement. These distinctions must be made.

178. First, as regards the aim: nobody has come out in opposition to the aim as I have here brought it again to the Assembly's attention. Some have, however, acted in various ways so as to endanger the possibilities of achieving it. This is true of parties both outside and inside the Congo. It is anybody's guess whether those who have acted in this way have done it wilfully, with aims of their own in mind, or not.

179. Secondly, with this aim, the United Nations has decided on certain military and civilian assistance to the Republic of the Congo and charged the Secretary-General with executive responsibility. The mandate of the United Nations representatives has been to work for the aim within the legal limits set by the Charter, and by the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, to the extent rendered possible by the means put at the disposal of the executive organ. Certainly the mandate has never been understood as being the achievement of the aim, irrespective of the legal limits set for the United Nations actions and irrespective of the adequacy of the means provided.

180. Thirdly, as regards the means: the main instrument provided has been the United Nations Force set up by the Security Council without explicit reference to Article 39 or 40 and, *a fortiori*, without basing itself on Article 41 or 42. As at early stages I brought this, both in substance and in form, to the attention of the Security Council, there can not have been any misunderstanding on this point. It follows from this, and it was stated at the very beginning of the operation—and approved by the Security Council—that the Force was not entitled to take military action unless in self defence or to protect life and property, and that it could not be used as an instrument for solutions of domestic political problems, constitutional or otherwise.

181. The discussion of principle which has characterized the development of the question here at the United Nations has tended to confuse the aim with the mandate and also to reinterpret the question of the means in terms of the mandate, irrespective of legal considerations. For that reason, during the most recent series of meetings of the Security Council, I asked for a clarification of the Council's interpretation of the mandate and a provision of means corresponding to the mandate, if it were the case that the Council felt that the mandate should be widened beyond what I have said above and beyond what present means permit. In that context I reminded the Council of the fact that such a clarification and possible expansion of the mandate and of the means had to proceed strictly within the limits set by the Charter. I added that I felt that it would be fair for the Security Council or the General Assembly, in an appropriate form, to share in the responsibility for the carrying out from day to day of the mandate and, of course, also in the decisions on the use of the means. Thus, I myself did not ask for a widening of the mandate or for new means, but I did ask the Council to do away with the ambiguities which had arisen, mainly through the discussion around the Council table. The only new point I brought in myself was the suggestion for an arrangement for an appropriate sharing of responsibilities, and I have noted with encouragement that this idea was taken up by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic.

182. If I did not ask for a widened mandate or for new means, it was because I do not believe that it is by such new means, within the limits set by the Charter, that the present problem of the Congo can be solved. That is so for two reasons. First, I reject everything that would have a touch of control or direction of the Congo's internal affairs—noting with some surprise that proposals in that direction have been made from highly authoritative African sources—and, second, I do not believe that the use of military

initiative, or pressure, is the way to bring about the political structure, in terms of persons and institutions, which at present is the first need of the Congo. The United Nations can help in such a direction, but that is by the normal political and diplomatic means of persuasion and advice, not by the use of force or intimidation.

183. Nor, of course, can widened means, of the kind on which the Security Council and the General Assembly may decide, resolve the problems presented by various forms of external support or intervention—although a solution, especially to the question of support to the "Armée nationale congolaise" is probably vital to the future of the United Nations Force—such political moves naturally having to be made, also by the organs of the United Nations, on a political level and by political means. For example, an influx of technicians, considered not to be desirable, can be counteracted by attempts to exercise direct influence on the country from which they come and on those in the Congo who have hired them, but I do not believe that we have the right to break individual contracts nor to use our military means for the arrest and deportation of individuals, at least not short of a direct request to that effect from such authorities as unquestionably would be entitled to take such actions themselves.

184. These question-marks as regards the usefulness of a wider mandate or new means should not be construed as a negative attitude from my side on decisions by the General Assembly by which the Assembly morally and politically would strengthen the hand of its representatives in their efforts to work, by peaceful and legal means, for the aim we all should have in common. On the contrary, such a strengthening is highly desirable as the authority of the United Nations has been challenged from many quarters, although for opposite reasons. In case of such strengthened authority, which might find one of its expressions in the sharing of responsibilities that I have mentioned as desirable, I would envisage the future, in brief, as follows.

185. The overriding consideration must be one of, on the one side, return to constitutionality and, on the other side, national reconciliation. With this background I feel that the United Nations should exercise its influence in favour of the restoration of Parliament to its proper position in the constitutional system, facilitating by available means its resumption of action. Combined with that, I feel that it is necessary to work in the direction of a reduction of the Army to its constitutional place as a subordinate instrument for the national executive in the maintenance of law and order.

186. This—which highlights the importance of an elimination of foreign support in money or men—indicates the necessity for the re-establishment of a civilian Government which must have constitutional legitimacy and a sufficient basis to command nationwide authority and which, further, must have a minimum degree of inner cohesion achieved by reconciliation and compromise between various factions and leaders, as normal in political life. The key position and responsibility of the Chief of State in such a development as the one indicated here is obvious, but it would be improper for me to comment on it beyond this simple statement.

187. Naturally, the development I envisage would require the establishment of a certain balance between various factions in Congolese political life, a balance which in the stormy first months has been tipped for some time in one direction and at other times just as one-sidedly in other directions. The secessionist tendencies must in this context be broken if we are to be entitled to hope for future stability in the area.

188. What can the Organization and its Members do to further a development of this kind? First there is the obvious duty for all Members, as stated already by the General Assembly in its resolution of 20 September [1474 (ES-IV)], to abstain from everything that would counteract the desired development. This applies both to comments on the situation in the Congo, to actions in relation to various parties in the Congo and to actions in the Congo itself.

189. Secondly, the General Assembly itself can, as I have said, in various ways strengthen the hand of the Organization in support of progress in the direction envisaged, but for reasons already mentioned I do not feel that it can do so by such concrete measures as, whatever their legality, would represent a direct interference by pressure of force in favour of any specific solutions in terms of persons or parties. Therefore, a formal decision of the Assembly would in a large part have to represent an effort to advise and to guide by an expression of world opinion as regards various elements appearing to be necessary as part of a situation corresponding to the ultimate aim of the Organization.

190. Thirdly, Members know that the presiding officers of the Conciliation Commission have gone to Leopoldville. I firmly believe in their possibility and later in the possibility of the Commission itself, to help towards the aims of the Organization. Naturally, I do, and will do what I can for that same purpose, but the contribution of the Commission and its forerunners is an important new element in our assistance.

191. I believe that I should in this intervention say also a word about the civilian operation.

192. References have been made to the need of assisting the Congo Government in the civilian field and of channelling all technical assistance through the United Nations. In this connexion, the request for the withdrawal of Belgian civilians has been strongly voiced. Those who have followed my various reports on the Congo operation will no doubt recall that I have repeatedly urged that personnel for the Congo should be channelled through United Nations agencies and that unilateral and competitive assistance can only lead to the most undesirable consequences. This is a matter of record.

193. Some statistics may be helpful in placing this problem in its proper perspective. Prior to independence, there were employed in the administrative apparatus of the Congo more than 7,000 Belgians, most of whom left after the events of early July. An assessment of the needs of the Congo Government for non-Congolese staff, within the same category, which has recently been undertaken by Mr. Gardiner, a Ghana citizen who was for a while seconded from the Economic Commission for Africa to Leopoldville, indicated that the number of Belgians employed was high and that some 1,800 non-Congolese would be

necessary to assist the Congolese in managing their own affairs, until some Congolese will have been trained. Most of these 1,800 are in the categories of technicians, but about 10 per cent of those required, that is to say, some 180 persons, would have to be assigned to posts which could be regarded as on the policy-making level, posts which would be sufficiently sensitive to be filled only by persons of impartiality and utmost integrity, ready to serve the interests of an independent Congo only.

194. Of 1,800 posts required, only a fraction are presently filled. The United Nations maintains 233 technicians, including seventy-six International Red Cross personnel. Belgian technicians are estimated at a low figure of 320, but it may be anything up to 970; it is impossible at present to secure more reliable information. It is even more difficult to state how large the number of Belgians is serving in the category of "policy-making" positions. Staff recruited for these levels by the United Nations amounts so far to only some twenty-five.

195. It must be obvious that the lack of technical services has a significant impact on the political crisis in the Congo, and it is even more obvious that as long as the non-Congolese staff on the policy level is not exclusively concerned with the fostering of the interests of the Congo, the political crisis is likely to be aggravated. I need not repeat here my deep conviction that the United Nations contribution could be most significant, provided that the Organization is willing to shoulder, at least temporarily, through the Congo Fund and by other means, the responsibility for underwriting adequately the civilian programme which has been initiated. It is obviously not sufficient to request the withdrawal of technicians provided outside the United Nations framework, if no steps are suggested as to how the gap created by such withdrawals can be filled by the United Nations itself.

196. Even the very modest civilian operation which the situation in the Congo has so far made possible could not be maintained in the country short of the degree of protection of life and property achieved through the United Nations Force. But that Force might have to be discontinued, as I pointed out in the Security Council, either because of political developments in and around the country or because of withdrawals of such magnitude as to render the remainder of the Force ineffective. Thus, a reasonably stable solution to the domestic problems of the Congo, the attitude of Member Governments to the Force, the maintenance of protection of life and property within the country and the maintenance of the badly needed technical assistance under United Nations auspices are all linked together into a whole of which no one part can be jeopardized without endangering all the others.

197. From early September, and even more so from the time of the debate on the representation of the Congo in the General Assembly, this Assembly has been deeply divided. This same split characterizes also the group of African Members. In the earlier stages the operation had the unanimous support of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the African group. This change is not of the making of the Secretariat. Is it permissible to overlook its dangerous influence on the effort of the Organization to help the people of the Congo to find and break its own way to a situation giving full substance to its independence?

198. The PRESIDENT: Before I call on the next speaker, I should like to announce that the meeting which I had tentatively scheduled for 8.30 this evening will not take place. Some of the speakers listed would not be prepared to proceed and the remainder would hardly be enough in number to warrant a night meeting. In view of the time that seems still to be needed in order to conclude all of our business by Tuesday night, however, I feel compelled—and I hope the Assembly will support me in so doing—to schedule a plenary meeting tomorrow afternoon to deal with the reports of the various Committees. The meeting will begin at 2.30 p.m. and the agenda will consist of the reports from the Committees as listed in today's Journal of the United Nations, with the addition of the report of the First Committee on the question of Mauritania, the three remaining reports of the Third Committee and the report of the Fourth Committee on Western Samoa. The elections to the two Councils listed in the Journal will not take place tomorrow.

199. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia): As I take the floor immediately after the statement which has just been made by the Secretary-General, it would be appropriate for me to begin with some comment on what he has just said. His remarks have the endorsement of the Australian delegation. We believe that the situation as he has described it is accurately set out. We believe that the measures that he has taken were properly taken by him in accordance with his mandate; that he has fulfilled the wishes and, indeed, the directions of the Security Council and the General Assembly as far as his mandate and his powers allowed.

200. The United Nations has always been in a dilemma in this situation of the Congo, ever since it came before the Organization. The Republic of the Congo is a sovereign State; it is a Member of the United Nations, admitted unanimously to this body at the beginning of the present session of the General Assembly. Any action of the United Nations has to recognize this, has to proceed on this basis, that we are discussing and dealing with a sovereign State and a Member of the Organization. And yet, to be fully effective, any United Nations action has to be accompanied by internal action in the Congo. Now, this is, of course, true of everything that the United Nations does—in the political field, in the economic field, in the social field, in the legal field; any United Nations action has to be accompanied to some degree by domestic action by the relevant Member States. But in some cases, appropriate domestic action has to play a greater part than in other cases, and, of course, the Congo is one of those situations where we are very much under the influence of, very much determined by, whatever the authorities, whatever the people generally in the Congo may do.

201. But in all cases we cannot disregard the provisions of the Charter. In the Congo we cannot disregard the provisions of the Charter. The Charter is binding on all Member nations; it is binding on all organs of the United Nations; it is binding on the Secretary-General; it is binding on the Security Council; it is binding on the General Assembly. If to any extent the decisions of any of these bodies go beyond the Charter, then to that extent they cannot validly be discharged. And so we have to begin and proceed that we operate within the limits laid down by the Charter.

202. There are in the Congo matters on which we all as Governments or individuals have views. We may take steps by diplomatic means to urge these views privately upon the Government of the Congo, upon individuals in the Congo. We may enunciate these views publicly in our own Parliaments or in other ways in our own countries or internationally. We may on behalf of our individual Governments make statements here in the General Assembly and elsewhere in the United Nations in the course of debates; but we cannot formally, as a body, give directions on matters of domestic jurisdiction.

203. As I have said here, we have this fundamental problem, that we are limited by domestic jurisdiction, and yet, at the same time, our freedom of action, the potentiality for action, is prescribed, is limited, is perhaps enlarged by what is done domestically in the Congo.

204. We have before us so far one resolution which seems to my delegation to raise very much the sort of problems that I have just referred to. For example, it urges the immediate convening of Parliament in the Congo. Now, this may or may not be an admirable idea; but can the United Nations, and should the United Nations, prescribe that in any Member State Parliament ought to meet? Whether or not we think it desirable in this particular case, whether or not we think it desirable in the case of all countries, that Parliament should be functioning actively and freely, can we, as the General Assembly, or can we, as the United Nations, prescribe that? There are a number of Member States here which do not have actively functioning Parliaments at the moment. They may have perfectly valid reasons for this. I am not pointing to any particular country, but I am raising the question whether any of us really wants the United Nations to prescribe that Parliaments shall meet or how they shall operate. I raise the question whether we have power to do such a thing, whether we want to or not.

205. And then the resolution urges the prevention of participation by military personnel in the political life of the Congo. Here again, what about other States? There are a number of Members of this Organization which have Governments that have been brought into power by military forces. Governments which today are military régimes. Here again I am not pointing to anyone, I am not attacking those Governments or those countries. Those Governments would argue that the conditions under which they came into existence were such that the steps they took were necessary. We in this Assembly are not in a position as an Assembly or as the United Nations to pass judgement on these matters. We must accept the limitations on the capacity of the United Nations to take up positions on such questions, no matter how desirable it may seem to us in particular cases. Each of us may feel that in a particular case something ought to be done on matters that lie within domestic jurisdiction, but we have to accept as a principle that these matters do lie outside our concern.

206. On this I was very impressed by the remarks that were made earlier in this meeting by the representative of Liberia, who drew attention to some of these very points that I am making now.

207. This conception of the limitations on the United Nations powers has, in the specific case of the Congo, been accepted from the very beginning of the opera-

tions that the United Nations has undertaken. We have proceeded from the beginning on the basis that anything which the United Nations did was done with the consent of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, and that anything which the United Nations did should not take sides or interfere in domestic matters of the Congo.

208. The first resolution came from the Security Council on 14 July 1960 and authorized the Secretary-General "... to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to furnish that Government with such military assistance ...". In other words, it was not and did not purport to be a direct interference by the United Nations, a direct assumption of authority in the Congo by the United Nations; it was no such thing. The wording made it very clear that that was not contemplated and not authorized.

209. Again, the Security Council on 9 August said specifically in operative paragraph 4 of its resolution: "Reaffirms that the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise;". That was accepted by the Security Council, the only body in the United Nations where any of the permanent members can prevent the adoption of a resolution. But this resolution was adopted by the Security Council and it laid down very clearly the limitations within which the Secretary-General had to operate. So much for the Security Council.

210. The General Assembly, at its fourth emergency special session, followed the same lead—as, of course, it was bound by the Charter to do. In the resolution 1474 (ES-IV) adopted on 16 September 1960, the General Assembly specifically took note of the resolutions of the Security Council and it requested the Secretary-General "to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions and to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the interests of international peace and security".

211. It is quite clear that the Assembly did not contemplate the United Nations taking over the Government of the Congo, establishing a trusteeship over the Congo, turning the Congo into a colony of the United Nations. The Republic of the Congo is a Member State of this Organization. This is the Secretary-General's mandate; it is the limit of his mandate and, in the opinion of the Australian Government, he has carried out his mandate, and he has reminded us in this debate earlier, and again a few minutes ago, in very measured terms, of what his mandate does not admit.

212. We can all have our ideas as to what ought to be done in the Congo—the way the political situation should develop. The Secretary-General this afternoon has himself adumbrated some of the ideas that he sees, some of the ways in which he believes that the political life of the Congo could evolve in a way that is consistent with the fostering of democracy and the preservation of international peace and security; and those ideas, I might say, are very close to those that the Australian Government holds.

213. In some cases, what we all discern are the tasks rather than the answers. I think that there would be general agreement on most of them: the establishment of civil authority over the military in the Congo; maintaining the unity of the nation; establishing effective parliamentary government; establishing due legal processes all over the Congo; the economic development of the Congo. All these are tasks on which we would agree. They are the problems. But how are these tasks to be carried out? What effective action can be taken to fulfill them? When we get into that question we get into a field where there is divergence of opinion in this Assembly; but perhaps even more important, we get into a field where there is divergence of opinion inside the Congo and where, in fact, it is the people of the Congo and their representatives who have to settle the questions. They have to find the answers.

214. The Australian Government believes that we have to proceed on the basis of the one generally accepted fact, which is that President Kasa-Vubu is the Chief of State. I say that that is the one generally accepted fact. It is accepted by all the factions, all the parties in the Congo. It is accepted internationally. The Assembly has, by vote, accepted the fact that President Kasa-Vubu is the Chief of State. And that, which is perhaps the only political fact that is accepted by everybody, seems to my delegation to be the basis for our action. For my part, I also see great promise in the projected round table conference which President Kasa-Vubu has mentioned. This, if put into effect and properly carried out, might very well bring about some greater harmony among the forces in the Congo—the political forces, the social forces and the regional forces. And there are other possibilities some of which were referred to by the Secretary-General this afternoon.

215. But these are things which the Congolese have to work out for themselves. The Congolese are not a passive element in this; they have their own feelings, their own divisions. Some of their ideas might seem irrational. Sometimes we might feel that unnecessary and vexatious inertia has been shown. But it is their country. They know better than any of us here the social and historical background and forces that they are now contending with, and it is out of the clash of ideas, the clash of interests inside the Congo that a solution must be found.

216. I hope that those in the Congo today will study some of the things that have been said in this debate, that they will note the way in which speakers from a wide range of countries—countries that might be opposed to the draft resolutions before us—agree on certain principles, certain objectives that we should like to see carried out if conditions in the Congo and the frame of mind and ideas of the people there permitted, such as the revival under proper conditions of parliamentary government, such as the subordination to the civil government of all military forces and paramilitary forces. But I hope that full note will be taken of our common feeling here that everyone in the Congo should co-operate with the United Nations Force. There will be differences of opinion from time to time between the representatives of the United Nations and the people in the Congo. It is inevitable that we have these differences. But I believe that the Secretary-General, under his mandate, has approached his task honestly and constructively and that he is entitled to the full co-operation of everyone

in the Congo, either international representatives or Congolese. And this is one of the things which we hope those in the Congo will take to their hearts when they read the proceedings of this Assembly.

217. But having said that, I have to repeat that we, the United Nations, cannot take over the Congo, nor can we contemplate adopting a resolution which takes over the Congo or which would be effective only if we did so. The Congolese must determine their own affairs, and the United Nations has to proceed on the basis of offering assistance, on the basis of offering good offices.

218. Some of this is being done. Assistance is being provided, not only in a material sense but in the sense of encouragement and advice, by the Secretary-General's representatives. The three members of the United Nations Conciliation Commission who have already left New York on their way to Leopoldville can, I believe, play a useful and constructive part, if everyone concerned is prepared to avail himself of these possibilities.

219. These are some of the things that the United Nations can do, without infringing on domestic jurisdiction, without supplanting the Government of the Congo; but the United Nations cannot itself take over the government or interfere unduly in the administration of the Congo.

220. The United Nations objective in the Congo has been to assist the people of the Congo, and I believe that, in the face of great difficulties, there has been real assistance to the people of the Congo. There are, I believe, many people alive and well in the Congo today who would not be so if the United Nations had not acted and was not still acting.

221. Another objective has been to avoid the Congo's becoming the cause of international conflict. Here again, I think that, as a result of United Nations action in the past and continuing United Nations action, we have so far avoided a clash of major Powers in the heart of Africa over the Congo, and this is due to the presence of the United Nations and to the action which has been carried out under the direction and control of the Secretary-General, pursuing the courses approved by the Security Council and the General Assembly. It is, therefore, still urgently and vitally necessary that any assistance given by Member States or other States should be given through the United Nations.

222. It follows from what I have said that the Australian delegation would have to oppose the draft resolution now before the General Assembly. As I have said, it goes beyond the powers of the United Nations, beyond the powers of the General Assembly. That does not mean that the preoccupations of those who have introduced the draft resolution are not present in our minds. Movement towards parliamentary government, the assurance of liberty of the person, the supremacy of civil authority—all these are things in which we, like, I believe, most Members of this Assembly, are concerned. Therefore, if there is to be a resolution, though we cannot accept the one at present before the Assembly, we could accept one and we would prefer one that kept within the terms of the Charter and which, while covering the subjects of the draft resolution already introduced, approached it on the basis of assistance to the Government of the Republic of the Congo, one which recognized the

competence of the Government of the Congo in its proper fields, recognized the sovereignty of the Congo, recognized its position as a Member nation of this Organization, and recognized also the limits on the competence of this Assembly. If this is done, if a resolution of this sort is accepted, I believe that the Assembly might rise with the situation in the Congo a little better as the result of our discussions.

223. I believe that, if Member nations here exercise restraint and approach the Congo in a generous and constructive spirit and recognize that the future and the fate of the Congo lie ultimately in the hands of the Congolese people themselves, then the Congo will slowly emerge from its present travail and become a peaceful, democratic, full-fledged State.

224. The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

225. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation has several points to make with reference to the President's announcement about the continuation of our work. He, in fact, told us that we would not be able to continue our work this evening owing to the fact that there are not enough speakers.

226. If that is so, is there any reason why we cannot go on to consider and adopt the draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly? I do not quite understand the position. If no one else wishes to speak in the general debate, then the time has come to take decisions, to discuss the draft resolution which has been submitted. If anyone wishes to submit other proposals, we can consider them too. This is my first point. My second is that, in my view, this is not a matter which can be settled simply by executive decision. Our debate has been in progress for two days. We are discussing an urgent and important item, which was included in our agenda at the request of a number of delegations.

227. We cannot take a decision to adjourn our debate on this item for some reason and resume it on Monday simply on the strength of a wish expressed by the President. The President himself also said that there will be a plenary meeting tomorrow, but that it will deal with different items. Why should it deal with different items? Why can we not conclude our discussion of the present item either today or tomorrow?

228. All these questions inevitably spring to mind and create the impression that there is something artificial about the adjournment of the debate on this item. This impression is also strengthened by the fact that when we were dealing with a question of no urgency, though fraught with important consequences for the future fate of the Congo—the question of the seating of a particular delegation—some delegations, particularly that of the United States, pressed for an urgent decision on the question and declined to agree to any delay. But now that we are discussing the really urgent question of serious developments in the Congo and of the measures the General Assembly should take following the Security Council's failure to reach an agreed decision, for some reason the question of an adjournment is being raised, an adjournment which would be quite unjustifiable. We have a draft resolution before us; many delegations have spoken, including the delegations of the great Powers, the members of the Security Council and a

number of friendly countries which are helping the Congo. I see no reason for an adjournment.

229. Since the President has raised this issue, I should be glad if he would inform the Assembly which delegation requested or which delegations are requesting an adjournment, so that the representatives concerned can come to this rostrum and explain their reasons for such a request. In other words, we must discuss the question of deferring our discussion to another meeting, of adjourning our debate on this item. We do not consider it possible to settle this issue by executive decision.

230. The PRESIDENT: As I think the representative of the Soviet Union knows, it is not always possible to arrange these things in such a way as to please everybody. I was very eager personally to continue and conclude this debate tonight, but I was pressed very hard by one delegation not to do so. I do not feel at liberty to state which delegation it was except to say that it was one of the sponsors of the draft

resolution. This representative asked that the voting and his own speech be postponed until Monday.

231. But apart from that, one or two of the other speakers listed for tonight indicated that they would not be prepared to proceed tonight, and that would have left us with an insufficient number of speakers to warrant the holding of a night meeting.

232. In these circumstances, the Chair finds itself really with no option, and I hope that in view of the explanation I have given, the representative of the Soviet Union will accept my word for the fact that everything possible was done to continue and conclude the debate tonight; but it was not convenient for one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, and mainly for that reason we decided to call the meeting off.

233. If there is no further objection on that point, the Assembly will now adjourn until 2.30 p.m. tomorrow.

*The meeting rose at 7.05 p.m.*