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President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 85

**The situation in the Republic of the Congo
 (*continued*)**

1. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): As this is the first time that I have spoken in the Assembly since the death of Mr. Bisbé on 20 March 1961, I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to extend to the delegation of Cuba our sincere sympathy and condolences on that sad event.

2. My delegation has the privilege of sponsoring, in collaboration with many others, the draft resolution [A/L.340 and Add.1 and 2] which has been circulated. But for this fact, I must confess that I would be extremely reluctant to make another speech on the subject of the situation in the Republic of the Congo. This reluctance would not derive from any lack of concern for that situation, but from the very palpable fact that to the many misfortunes of the Congo there has now been added the not inconsiderable calamity of excessive argument and verbiage. Whether Nero did play the fiddle or not while Rome burned, we in the United Nations certainly turn phrases and moot legalisms while the Congo is being ravaged by friend and foe alike and its people suffer in great distress. The wisdom of a hundred nations has not brought peace to the Congo, though it was, after all, a fairly elementary situation that had to be corrected.

3. Happily, I find myself immune from any temptation to indulge in rhetoric or advocacy, for the simple reason that Pakistan has no partisan viewpoint whatsoever regarding the affairs of the Republic of the Congo. Although my country has not stinted its support for whatever contribution we were asked to make by the Secretary-General and we have given it most willingly and have also agreed to serve on the Advisory Committee on the Congo and on the Conciliation Commission—our representative on the Conciliation Commission was, by all accounts, extremely active and helpful—we are, I believe, entitled to derive some satisfaction from the fact that in the question of the Congo, which has become a question involving the very survival of the United Nations, we have, to put it bluntly—and perhaps even coarsely—absolutely no axe to grind. Beyond our concern for peace and our concern with, and involvement in, the prestige of the United Nations, and beyond a natural sympathy with the suffering people of the Congo, we have no interest or objective which can be either advanced or impeded by any development, or the failure of any development, in the Congolese Re-

public. This is a very obvious fact and if I am referring to it at some length, it is because much play is being given in political conversation nowadays to the adjectives “neutralist” and “uncommitted”, until the question ceases to be asked whether the position of a country which proclaims itself as “neutralist” or “uncommitted” remains so in relation to a particular problem or situation before the United Nations.

4. At any rate, neutralism and impartiality are two distinct terms. The former, neutralism, has a connotation which is just as related to political expediency as its opposite; while the latter—that is impartiality—is a moral and intellectual attitude. There are Members of the United Nations, including ourselves, who are not neutralists but who yet are impartial in this and possibly other vital questions which concern this Organization. Oriented as we are to these questions, we are convinced that there will never be anything in the vicissitudes of this Organization or the affairs of the Congo which would impair our impartiality or distort our perspective.

5. This is the ultimate background to my delegation's co-sponsorship of the draft resolution which, we believe, will commend itself to all those who wish for the restoration of tranquillity in the Republic of the Congo and a reasonable assurance of its people's welfare. I am sure that the other representatives who are among the sponsors of this draft resolution will comment upon its detailed provisions. I will only ask your permission to state some general considerations which, I believe, should influence our approach to the problem and a search for its solution, and which are perhaps effectively fulfilled in the course of action outlined in the draft resolution.

6. The first consideration is that, however distant we may be physically and mentally from the situation in the Congo, it is futile for us to adopt any approach which is abstracted from, and therefore cannot relate itself to, the interplay of human factors, the personal equations, the allegiances and animosities which determine the present situation in the Republic of the Congo and which, if they are not resolved through the beneficial processes of conciliation, threaten to explode into an all-out civil war with dire consequences both to the young Republic and to the peace of the African continent.

7. One of the tragedies of the situation in the Congo is that, among all of us who as Members of the United Nations are concerned with it, there is a tendency to look at this situation in the abstract and with preconceived notions of legitimacy, and to propose solutions which, in the given circumstances of the Congo, are not going to work. Solutions which are impeccable in theory may become tainted in practice. That, perhaps, is a part of the tragedy of the Congo. In considering what should be done next in regard to this problem, we must not consider what would be desirable or fea-

sible in the different circumstances of our own countries, but what is desirable and feasible in the Congo.

8. Second, the paramount aim is not so much the restoration of constitutionality in the sense that constitutionality is visualized and conceived by ourselves in the United Nations or in our own countries, as it is the restoration of peace and tranquillity in the Congo, which should enable its people to evolve a political and constitutional life suited to their actual human, social and economic circumstances. Members of the Assembly will doubtless note that in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, reference is made to the convening of Parliament without delay, so that it may take the necessary decisions concerning the formation of a national government and on the future constitutional structure of the Republic in accordance with the constitutional processes laid down in the *Loi fondamentale*. Let me make it clear that this provision is included in the draft resolution, for the simple reason that in the actual situation obtaining in the Congo at present the convening of Parliament appears to be the only tangible means of bringing about and demonstrating national reconciliation. Beyond that we have no desire to pronounce ourselves upon the sanctity of this Parliament or the immutability of the *Loi fondamentale*. In a revolutionary and turbulent situation, legality might be difficult to interpret. It is now generally understood both in the Congo and here in the United Nations that the *Loi fondamentale* will perhaps need to be modified if a viable basis is to be evolved in law for the future political life of the Congo. A law that is not based on the recognition of the diversity of the elements in Congolese life cannot endure, howsoever we may wish it. In urging the convening of the Parliament, therefore, we are not trying to foreclose any changes and adaptations which the Congolese people may want to make in the structure of their State. All we seek is that these changes and adaptations should be peaceful and should come by agreement and not by violent strife, and we all wish and pray that the unity and integrity of the Congo may be preserved in the end.

9. Third, while there is a consensus now that the first and foremost essential in the situation in the Congo is the elimination of the foreign element—the Belgian military and para-military personnel and other foreign agents, advisers and mercenaries—it must be understood that the time has passed when this achievement alone could ensure the return of peace and tranquillity in that country.

10. I am sure that my colleagues will have noted the causes of the crisis in the Congo narrated in paragraph 112 of the Conciliation Commission's report [A/4711]. The findings in this paragraph confirm what we read daily in reports about the Congo, namely, that there are strong emotional factors in play, factors of personal ambitions, tribal loyalties, regional interests, which will not realistically dissolve merely by bringing about the withdrawal of the Belgians and other foreigners from the Congo. It is now a matter of common knowledge that there are several private armies at present operating in the Congo. Even if we succeed in disarming all of them, we shall not have uprooted the antagonisms and irritations which brought them into being and which will otherwise continue to disrupt the life of the State, thus creating ever-new openings for intervention from outside and causing concern to all of us.

11. In addition, therefore, to ensuring a vigorous implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly which have called upon Belgium to withdraw its military and para-military personnel from the Congo, and upon all States to prevent the introduction of military equipment and supplies into the Congo except in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations, it is also the duty of the United Nations to assist the leaders of the Congo in amicably settling their mutual conflicts. I believe that while it is unwise on the part of the United Nations to try to impose any political solution on the people of the Congo, it would be equally unwise for the United Nations to detach itself completely from the necessity of a solution being worked out. The former, that is, to impose a political solution on the people of the Congo, would indicate arrogance; the latter, that is, to detach itself completely, would indicate cynicism. Operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft resolution are designed to steer a middle course between these two extremes of arrogance and cynicism.

12. These, in brief, are some of the basic considerations which seem to emerge from an impartial thinking about the situation at present in the Congo. The draft resolution represents the largest measure of agreement that could be obtained. As in all matters, compromise entails imperfections. I am conscious of the fact that this draft resolution has imperfections, but that is inescapable, considering the human and international complexities of the problem. One can think of many provisions which, in theory, could bring peace and tranquillity to the Congo; but in an affair like the Congo, as in all public affairs, perfection is unattainable and all we can hope for is a little groping, a promising approximation to the end. We believe that the provisions of the draft resolution represent the highest common denominator between the different viewpoints about the Congo, which they seek to apply to the actual situation prevailing there.

13. There are one or two specific provisions of this draft resolution which perhaps might need a little comment. It needs to be understood from the sense of operative paragraph 1 that this draft resolution supplements the earlier resolutions of the United Nations on the Congo and does not displace them. This is the reason why the provisions of these resolutions have not been reiterated in any detail. As regards operative paragraph 3, it must be understood that it is not sufficient merely to appeal to Member States to prevent the introduction of military equipment and supplies into the Congo except for the purposes of the United Nations.

14. These appeals have been made before, but they have not received a full response. It is therefore essential that the United Nations should have the requisite control over airfields and seaports with the necessary right of search, inspection and confiscation, if the flow of arms from the outside is to be stopped. Since the authority given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council and the Assembly in regard to the whole operation in the Congo is continuing, it is for him, that is, the Secretary-General, to take effective measures for the exertion of United Nations control in order to prevent the injection of the materials of violent strife into that unfortunate country. Operative paragraph 3 confirms, or at least seeks to confirm, his authority to do so.

15. A word about operative paragraph 6, which deals with a commission of conciliation. We do not visualize its membership, which will be designated by the President, as restricted to any particular region or regions. We have had much evidence recently of the efforts and approaches of the United Nations being increasingly regionalized. While the process has its utility and may even be unavoidable in certain settings, we cannot be oblivious of the danger that if it continues, the spirit of universality and the concept of equal participation, which are basic to the Charter, will be displaced and operationally the United Nations will dissolve into congeries of regional associations.

16. In setting forth our basic considerations in regard to the Congo, I believe that I have already explained the purposes and the guiding principles of operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the draft resolution. I must, however, add that in making these proposals or in deciding to appoint a commission of conciliation, nothing is so far from our intentions as any desire to arrest, or even to disturb, the movements toward mutual accommodation which the Congolese leaders may have already initiated among themselves. The best people to unravel the tangled skein of the Congo are the people of the Congo. We shall be happy if, unaided by our efforts, they come to some agreement about their political problem. Indeed, whatever may have been the merits and demerits of the meeting at Tananarive,¹ we believe that it would be a consummation of the best efforts of the United Nations that a representative conference of the principal Congolese leaders be held in a neutral place and that, in a restored sense of brotherhood, they arrive at some agreed conclusions and end the governmental vacuum in their country. Perhaps it may not be excessive optimism to hope that the events of the last nine months may have served to loosen their thoughts as to their future and thus to untie the knots in which they have been caught. I notice that somewhere in the Conciliation Commission's report mention is made of the weariness of the people of the Congo with their continuing conflicts. It is a fact of human nature that weariness can sometimes be reformatory in effect. If there should be a spontaneous move on the part of the Congolese leaders toward reconciliation, it will be a far happier development than any that we can bring about.

17. The present draft resolution seeks nothing more than to facilitate that development. The proposed commission of conciliation is not envisaged as a commission of inquiry and arbitration. Nor is it intended in any sense to delay the convening of the Parliament. If its appointment is approved by the Assembly, it should only symbolize to the people of the Congo and their leaders that we here are their friends collectively and that we seek that they be friends among themselves.

18. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan): My delegation has sponsored the draft resolution [A/L.340 and Add.1 and 2]. In so doing, my delegation has been motivated by two considerations. First, the solution of the problem of the Congo be based on strict observance of the principle of respect for the sovereignty of the Congo and also on the principle of non-interference. Second, the efforts for the conciliation and settlement of the political crisis must be continued by the United Nations, and far greater emphasis should be put on the significance of these efforts.

19. My delegation feels that the Congo problem must be solved as quickly as possible in order to avoid further deterioration of the situation there and increasing the difficulties to the United Nations as a whole. The crisis of the Congo is at the same time the crisis of the United Nations itself. We feel at this juncture that we must realize the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need for a settlement. Sincere and earnest efforts must be pursued in this sense with redoubled vigour. May I repeat again that the solution of the crisis of the United Nations can only be worked out by the quick settlement of the Congo problem. To achieve this objective, my delegation proposed, as one approach in the speech I had the honour to make on 30 March 1961 [972nd meeting], the advisability of instituting a committee of conciliation composed of a restricted number of countries selected on a universal basis, whose experience and objectivity would contribute towards accelerating a reconciliation in the Congo. I wish to appeal strongly for the unanimous approval of this idea by the General Assembly. The Congo must be brought to normality and regularity through the co-operation of the Congolese leaders themselves at the earliest possible date. This is what my delegation is seeking with particular interest.

20. I wish to point out on this occasion that my delegation strongly endorses the conclusion of the Conciliation Commission concerning the need for the United Nations to take urgent and effective measures for the immediate enforcement of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, especially with regard to the measure to prevent the introduction of arms, military equipment and supplies into the Congo.

21. The draft resolution sponsored by us states in its operative paragraph 3:

"Considers it essential that necessary and effective measures be taken by the Secretary-General immediately to prevent the introduction of arms, military equipment and supplies into the Congo, except in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations."

It is my delegation's earnest hope that such measures will be taken without delay.

22. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Before speaking on the item under consideration in the Assembly, we wish to refer with deep regret to the sudden and untimely death of our colleague, the representative of Cuba, Mr. Bishé, and to express to the Cuban delegation and the family of our late colleague our deep condolences.

23. The question of the Congo is again a vital problem before the General Assembly, as it was during the first part of this session. In the intervening period, however, the situation has deteriorated to a great extent. It has become so entangled and complicated by antagonistic factors in the territory, and has been so aggravated by lawlessness and political crime, that drastic measures would have to be taken by the United Nations to arrest the growing deterioration and avert an impending catastrophe.

24. In order to achieve effective results, a certain degree of community of purpose should prevail in the United Nations. In dealing with this problem we should all make a common effort not to approach it from a particular angle of alignment in favour of one or the other side of Congolese groupings and leaders, for we would then be transplanting into the United Nations the differences in the Congo and, at the same time, we

¹ Round-table Conference, held from 8-14 March 1961.

would be interjecting into the Congo the differences in the United Nations. Rather, we should act with objectivity and detachment, in support of the interests of the whole of the Congolese people and of the broader interests of peace. Our immediate efforts should be directed towards ensuring peace and security in the Congo and thereby opening the way to conciliation and a peaceful solution of the problem.

25. In our view, the restoration of law and order to the Congo and the protection of individual freedom are the first and paramount duties of the United Nations. Lawlessness and contempt for human rights in that territory have resulted in acts which have outraged the conscience of humanity. The series of political crimes, culminating in the murder of the late Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, is a sad and disheartening story which has shocked the world conscience and evoked feelings of abhorrence and indignation which my delegation fully shares. The task of carrying out an immediate and impartial investigation into the death of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues and punishing those responsible, as provided in the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961,² should be consistently pursued. It is important from every aspect, including that of setting a moral standard for the future, that political murder should never be tolerated in the present time and age.

26. Even at the risk of repetition, I feel that I must stress the need to establish the rule of law in the Congo. Indeed, how can there be effective steps for a democratic solution of the constitutional and political problem, when the people directly concerned in such a solution are deprived of the fundamental human rights of security of life and freedom of expression, and live in conditions of intimidation and fear? Even the possibility of convening Parliament is said to be doubtful because of the great number of deputies who have been arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned and executed or are in hiding because they fear for their lives. Therefore, an atmosphere of security and freedom is urgently needed in the Congo, so that normal and free interchange may be possible, opening the way to conciliation and to a political solution.

27. To this end, the United Nations operation should be considerably strengthened by extending its power and authority in the Congo. It is useless to blame the Secretary-General and the United Nations operation for failure in the Congo when they are not given adequate authority and material force for effective action. The lack of sufficient authority has to a certain extent been remedied by the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961. At the same time, however, the United Nations Command needs to be reinforced. The presence of overpowering United Nations forces in the Congo would obviate resistance and clashes and would facilitate the establishment of law and order. But there is another reason why the United Nations Command must be reinforced; that is, the need to restore the prestige of the United Nations. Because of insufficient forces, the United Nations forces in the Congo have suffered the humiliating experience of the capture of the military posts in Matadi, Kitona, Banana, and the Ndjili airport, and the surrender of United Nations troops to stronger Congolese forces. In this respect, we wish to express our appreciation for the

constructive steps taken by Prime Minister Nehru in sending a brigade of Indian troops to strengthen the United Nations Command. We hope that this example will be followed by other nations with military forces at their disposal. For, indeed, the prestige of the United Nations should at all costs be preserved. My delegation stands for a strong and effective United Nations, as we believe that it is a guarantee of freedom and peace in the world and the only hope of humanity.

28. In order, however, that the United Nations may effectively handle the situation in the Congo, interference by all foreign forces and other elements outside the United Nations Command should cease. The presence of such foreign elements, in disregard of the Security Council resolutions, constitutes a disintegrating and disruptive influence, countering and neutralizing the work of the United Nations.

29. My delegation therefore endorses the contents of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961, and strongly supports the implementation of that resolution. We consider its implementation to be a matter of urgent necessity. We therefore urge consideration by the Assembly of effective measures towards such early implementation.

30. The resolution, repeating previous Security Council resolutions, calls for the evacuation of the Congo by Belgian military and civil personnel and mercenaries. Belgium's return to the Congo after independence, in contradiction to the Belgian-Congo Treaty of 29 June 1960,³ has been a disturbing factor in the whole situation. The mutiny in the army and the violence that ensued provided an excuse for that return. No such excuse, however, could be put forward from the moment when the United Nations stepped in to ensure law and order in the territory under the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960,⁴ adopted in response to an invitation from the Government of the Congo, signed by both President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Lumumba and calling for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops. The continued presence of Belgian forces in the territory and of other foreign elements can only be in opposition to the United Nations and its purpose of preserving order in that land. We therefore consider the evacuation of all foreign troops and other elements outside the United Nations Command as a matter of urgent necessity. The assurances now given by Belgium that it will comply with the Security Council resolution are, though much delayed, certainly welcome.

31. In the meantime the situation in the territory has deteriorated steadily through the seeds of division, undermining the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, and leading to its present chaotic state. In the ensuing confusion of a multiple fragmentation of the people of the Congo, each side expected the United Nations to support it. The United Nations thus came under fire whenever it appeared to be standing in the way of partisan ambition. The recent defiant attacks on United Nations military posts are an instance of such deplorable confusion.

32. In this tragic situation our thoughts go out in warm sympathy to the Congolese people who, by the force of events, have been engulfed in the evils of

³ General Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Co-operation, signed at Leopoldville on 29 June 1960.

⁴ Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September, 1960, document S/4387.

² Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.

division and strife. We appeal to them to free themselves from the negative concepts of antagonism and fratricidal strife and, as a people living in one land and having a common destiny, to go forward in unity and strength. They should turn to the great issues which unite them and brush aside the little things that divide them. Their first step in a positive direction should be to co-operate with and not to antagonize the United Nations Command, which is there to assist them and to bring peace and unity to their country.

33. Genuine reconciliation among the various parties lies at the very root of any political solution of the problem. The report of the Conciliation Commission [A/4711 and Corr.1, A/4711 and Add.1 and 2] is an informative and enlightened document. We wish to express, on this occasion, to the Chairman and the members of that Commission our appreciation of their diligent labours under adverse conditions. A round-table conference between all sections of the population and all leaders, as proposed in that report, would be a constructive step forward and should be encouraged by all means. But there can be no actual solution without the consent of the people, democratically expressed. For this purpose the convening of Parliament, as urged by the resolution of the Security Council, would be necessary, or else new elections should be held if the convening of Parliament should prove to be impossible from a practical point of view. On the other hand, on any constitutional issue involving a change in the basic structure of the Constitution as established by the *Loi fondamentale*, even the existing Parliament would have no competence. Such an issue can be resolved only by means of a referendum or a constitutional assembly elected for the purpose.

34. The conference held at Tananarive, although not sufficiently representative in character, is a welcome step forward in the sense of being an effort towards reconciliation. Nevertheless, the constitutional premise of confederation on which it proceeded, involving the parcelling of the Congo into small units, could scarcely, in our opinion, be appropriate either juridically or in substance. A system of local autonomy under a central administration preserving the unity and territorial integrity of the country would seem, in the circumstances, to be a desirable solution. These matters, however, are for the Congolese people themselves to decide in a constitutional and democratic manner. To make such processes possible, however, an atmosphere of peace and security in the Congo is needed. This is the responsibility of the United Nations Command in its effort to restore and maintain order.

35. On this occasion we would wish to place on record once more our firm conviction that the establishment and growth of a United Nations military force, sufficient to guarantee peace and security in the world, is a crying need. Recent experience in the Congo in the matter of withdrawals of national units from the United Nations Force has demonstrated the inadequacy of contingents on loan. There must be a United Nations Force arranged by the United Nations for United Nations service and having allegiance to the United Nations. Its impartiality would be ensured by the character of its composition, and particularly by the growing development of a United Nations conscience.

36. We believe that the time has come when the broader concept of a United Nations conscience should prevail in the deliberations of the Assembly. The expansion in United Nations membership to the point of

universality should constitute an element of progress in that direction. The impact of an increased membership has already begun to make itself felt. We are confident that the time is near when the Member States of a great international Organization will bring to it their voices and their influence not governed by self-centred pursuits or their particular interests, but in terms of the common good of humanity in its progress towards world peace based on freedom.

37. The recent great achievements in science and technology have so revolutionized every aspect of our world of today that a parallel revolution in our thinking and our outlook is imperative in order that we may meet the growing moral demands of our time and age. We shall then be able to deal truly and effectively with the problems which confront us. The great strides in scientific progress must be followed by a corresponding moral progress if humanity is not to be swallowed in the abyss that yawns between material and moral standards. The ominous developments in the Congo and in other parts of the world and the grave dangers involved may serve as an awakening for a seemingly unsuspecting humanity still following its old and outmoded ways of thinking and acting.

38. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The fifteenth session of the General Assembly is concluding its debate on the subject of the situation in the Republic of the Congo. The position of the Soviet Union at the present stage of the development of events in the Congo was set forth with the utmost clarity in the Soviet Government's statement of 14 February 1961, in the message of 22 February 1961 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, to the Heads of States or Governments of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, and in the statement made by the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko, at the beginning of the present discussions.

39. However, in view of the imminent conclusion of these discussions and of a number of statements made at this session, the Soviet delegation now feels it necessary to make a few observations.

40. Ever since the Congolese problem first arose—in other words, since the Belgian aggression against the Congo was unleashed—the Soviet Government has been drawing the attention of the Governments of all countries to the fact that Belgium's actions in the Congo were leading to the creation of yet another source of international tension and were aggravating the threat to peace in Africa, to universal peace and to the security of all nations. It also expressed the firm opinion that the United Nations, as proposed in the statement by the Soviet Government of 13 July 1960, "must take urgent measures to put an end to aggression and to restore in full the sovereign rights of the independent Republic of the Congo".⁵

41. In accordance with this position, the Soviet representative in the Security Council said, at the meeting of 13 July, that the Council "must condemn the invasion of Congolese territory by Belgian troops and demand the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian military forces from the territory of the Republic" and that "the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Congolese territory is the prime condition for the maintenance of peace and security in that country and for the restoration of the Republic's sovereign

⁵ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, 873rd meeting, para. 103.*

rights". The Soviet Union at the same time called upon the Security Council immediately to take effective action to halt all interference by Belgian and other colonialists in the domestic affairs of the young African State, which had only recently attained independent statehood after a long and heroic struggle for its liberation.

42. However, already at that time—in July of last year—this clear Soviet position unreservedly defending the national interests of the Congolese people, a position which had been justified by the whole course of events in the Congo, came up against a different position—that of Belgium's NATO allies, who were doing everything possible to whitewash the aggressor's actions and to avoid condemnation of those actions by the Security Council. We may remember that the United Kingdom representative in the Security Council [873rd meeting] tried with all his might to present the facts in such a way as to imply that the Belgian troops sent to the Congo were merely performing "a humanitarian task", for which he expressed warm gratitude to Belgium on behalf of his Government and even on behalf of "the international community". Following the line of his United Kingdom colleague, the representative of France said (I quote his speech from the same verbatim record): "Nor could I agree, for my part, to any talk about Belgian aggression when in fact that Government's efforts have been directed solely towards saving the lives of Belgians and other nationals who have been threatened".⁶ Mr. Lodge, the then United States representative on the Security Council, spoke in more or less the same sense when he claimed that "it is not only futile, but positively harmful, to seek to apportion blame at this time for what has happened".⁷

43. It is hardly necessary to state that the Belgian Government itself completely denied any aggressive intentions, its representative on the Security Council saying, on 13 July, that "the intervention... is thus justified... by the Belgian Government's sacred duty to take the measures required by morality and by public international law". This intervention, he said, "is justified by the complete absence of interference by the Belgian Government in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo. I wish to make it absolutely clear that Belgian military operations have no political objective".⁸

44. Now, almost nine months after that first meeting of the Security Council on the subject of the situation in the Republic of the Congo, which we all remember so well, it is useful to remind the Assembly of all of these statements and once more to compare the two radically different approaches to the problem. And now, of course, there are still people who feign to be deaf and blind to the lessons of the events in the Congo and of the history of this question's consideration in the United Nations. However, the peoples of the whole world, including the peoples of Africa, can now learn, from the facts, whose actions were and are really taken in the interest of defending the Congolese Republic's sovereign rights from infringement by the colonialists and who, behind mellifluous words, has been and still is trying to maintain colonial supremacy over the young Republic.

45. Now, an overwhelming majority of the speakers from this rostrum have been forced to recognize the truth which the Soviet Government has emphasized from the very beginning—namely that, unless Belgian interference in the internal affairs of the Congo is decisively halted, it is impossible to restore normal conditions in the country. It was not without reason that even the Western Powers, which before had actively opposed this viewpoint, were forced on 21 February 1961 to vote in favour of the Security Council resolution in which it was expressed. It is precisely because this most important condition has not yet been fulfilled that the situation in the Republic of the Congo continues to be extremely dangerous, although in the whole history of the United Nations never has so much attention been devoted to one question as to the question of the Congo.

46. The main reason why this condition has not been fulfilled is because the colonialists, bound by mutual responsibility towards each other, are acting as a united front both in the Congo itself and in the United Nations. And, since some of the colonial Powers succeed, for the time being, in dragging along behind them a number of countries under their political and economic control, they are in a position, in certain cases, either completely to block the taking, by the principal United Nations organs, of decisions aimed at a restoration of normal conditions in the Congo in the interests of the Congolese people, or else to emasculate such decisions. This is one of the reasons for the impotence of the United Nations in the face of the Congolese problem.

47. But there is another reason, which the Soviet delegation has mentioned several times with complete frankness: the fact that the existing structure of the United Nations produces a situation in which the fate of the decisions already taken rests, in effect, in the hands of one group of Powers—the Western Powers—as is particularly convincingly illustrated by the whole history of the United Nations resolutions with regard to the Congo. The Security Council has adopted four resolutions, and the General Assembly one, on this question. Yet none of these resolutions has in fact been implemented, and this is because all the United Nations operations in the Congo have been headed by the direct protégés of those same monopolies which organized the aggression against the Congo. In this connexion, the fate of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 is particularly instructive.

48. It will be recalled that the Soviet delegation did not feel able to vote for this resolution, because of its firm conviction that the resolution as a whole did not guarantee a radical solution of the Congolese question. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation did not prevent its adoption, because, despite the resolution's obvious weakness and inadequacy, it expressed a condemnation of the murderers of Patrice Lumumba and his companions-in-arms and contained, moreover, one important provision—a request that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal from the Congo of all Belgian personnel. Furthermore, the resolution indicates, although not very clearly, the need to halt, by force if necessary, the punitive operations engaged in by the armed gangs of Tshombé and Mobutu.

49. Another reason why the Soviet Union did not vote against this resolution is that a number of African and Asian countries, although they acknowledged the weakness of the resolution, stated in the Security Council that in existing conditions they regarded it as con-

⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 141.

⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 95.

⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 192 and 193.

stituting the only chance of the Security Council's taking an agreed decision. The Soviet Union took into account the attitude of these countries, considering that they would themselves shortly discover in practice the real value of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 21 February, the true position of certain Western Powers which voted for this resolution, and the results which the resolution would produce so long as the leadership of the United Nations operations in the Congo was entrusted to Mr. Hammarskjöld. Two months have now elapsed since the Security Council adopted this resolution, and certain conclusions can now be drawn.

50. The most important point in the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 21 February 1961 is paragraph 2, of part A, whereby the Security Council:

"Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries".⁹

The resolution says: "immediate withdrawal". Almost two months have already elapsed. In the meantime there has accumulated a fair-sized collection of correspondence between Mr. Hammarskjöld, the representatives of the Belgian Government and the leaders of the clique which, with the help of the colonialists, has seized power in a number of regions of the Congo. The first thing clearly emerging from this correspondence is the Belgian Government's averseness, even on this occasion, from compliance with the request for the immediate removal of all Belgian personnel from the territory of the Republic of the Congo. Using various subterfuges, and again protesting its desire to co-operate with the United Nations (the Belgian representative did this here in one of his speeches), although experience has already shown the small worth of such statements, the Belgian Government is in fact trying to by-pass this request and is reserving for itself, as before, complete freedom to carry out subversive activities in regard to the Republic of the Congo.

51. Sometimes the Belgian Government alleges that Belgian military personnel were withdrawn from the Congo long ago [see note verbale of 7 January 1961], although there are countless facts which completely refute this statement; at other times it begins cynically to assert that the actions of the Belgian military personnel—which, as is well known, form the backbone of Tshombé and Mobutu's gangs—are completely in line with paragraph 2, part B, of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961, and that such personnel should therefore remain in the Congo. Sometimes it promises to consider the question of removing its political advisers from the Congo; at other times it openly refuses to do so, claiming that they are on Congolese territory in order to assist the Congolese authorities, at the latter's invitation.

52. This entire diplomatic merry-go-round has been organized in order to screen the obvious fact that since 21 February not one Belgian officer or Belgian political adviser has left the territory of the Congo or, in all probability, intends to do so, although under the United Nations Charter the decisions of the Security Council are binding on any country which is a Member of the United Nations. Furthermore, during this period the

punitive detachment of the colonialists have continued to be reinforced by officer personnel from Belgium, the Union of South Africa, West Germany, France and a number of other countries, and arms have continued to be supplied to the gangs of the illegal régime of Tshombé, Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu.

53. This was the fate of one of the most important provisions in the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961. It could not have been otherwise, since its implementation now depends upon a man who for the past nine months has been inventing one excuse after another in his attempt to avoid implementing the Congo resolutions confirmed by the principal organs of the United Nations. At first, Mr. Hammarskjöld pretended that he did not understand the general meaning of the mission entrusted to him; then, when this meaning had been explained to him in further detail, he began to refer to the inadequacy of his mandate; now, when this mandate has likewise been further explained and has even, although this was not particularly necessary, been broadened, and he has apparently received everything he asked for, he is still not implementing the Security Council resolutions. We can openly state our firm conviction that Mr. Hammarskjöld will never implement them, because he is following not the wishes of the international Organization, but the wishes of only one group of Powers—the colonialist Powers.

54. Some speakers from this rostrum have alleged it to be the main achievement of the United Nations operation in the Congo, and consequently of Mr. Hammarskjöld's activities, that these actions prevented worse developments in the Congo. One speaker expressed that view today. This is, to say the least, a strange way of evaluating the activities of the United Nations. Before the very eyes of United Nations representatives in the Congo, and often with their assistance, the democratic institutions in that country have been abolished, the national leaders of the Congolese people—headed by Patrice Lumumba—have been physically eliminated, mass repression has been inflicted on the peaceful Congolese people, the authority of the colonialist Belgian administration has been restored throughout most of the country—the *Procureur général* is still a Belgian—and, as is obvious to all, the Congo is dismembered territorially and its political independence is being done away with. What could have been worse, in the opinion of those speakers who, despite these facts which are patent to all, still seek to express what is almost gratitude to Mr. Hammarskjöld?

55. Mr. Hammarskjöld himself is relying on short memories when he asserts that all his actions in the Congo, and all his interpretations of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, have received the approval of these organs and have encountered no criticism in them. If we consult the official documents of the United Nations, we can easily see that from the outset Mr. Hammarskjöld's actions in the Congo met with the most resolute condemnation at the hands of a number of States, including the Soviet Union whose delegation categorically objected to, among other things, Mr. Hammarskjöld acting as self-appointed interpreter of the Security Council resolutions. The Soviet delegation considered and still considers, for example, that the Security Council resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960, and also of 21 February 1961, quite clearly contained a request for the cessation of Belgium's interference in the internal affairs of the Congo and that no additional

⁹ *Ibid.*, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.

interpretation of that request is needed. Yet this interference is continuing, and whatever subterfuge Mr. Hammarskjöld may use he cannot divest himself of responsibility for that deplorable course of events.

56. Instead of, in the interests of peace and security in the Congo and of the security of the United Nations troops themselves, resolutely suppressing the activities of the armed gangs which were lording it unchecked over Congolese territory, Mr. Hammarskjöld and his representatives engaged in long and useless correspondence with usurpers and with self-styled "Ministers", and were reduced to allowing these persons openly to mock at the Security Council decisions, which according to the Charter are binding on all Members of the United Nations. Can we continue to tolerate such actions from a man to whom high administrative responsibility has been entrusted on behalf of the entire Organization?

57. The Soviet delegation therefore states, with full justification, that until Mr. Hammarskjöld and his closest assistants are removed from their position of control, neither this nor any other Security Council or General Assembly resolution genuinely directed against the interests of the colonialists will be implemented, if their implementation is entrusted to Hammarskjöld. There can thus be no further question of granting Mr. Hammarskjöld's claim to "a free hand" in the choice of colleagues who, according to him, would be most helpful to him in the execution of "special tasks". It is precisely this "free hand" that has led to the United Nations Secretariat being staffed mainly by nationals of the Western Powers, who have naturally been best able to help Mr. Hammarskjöld in the discharge of his "special tasks" in the Congo, because this accorded with the interests of those Powers.

58. The Soviet Union no longer intends to countenance a situation in which a group of Western Powers, which now does not even represent a majority in the world, exercises control over the executive organs of the United Nations. In stating this the Soviet Union, as has already been pointed out, seeks no position of advantage for the socialist countries; it merely insists on an equitable principle in the organization of the executive bodies of the United Nations, a principle which would take into account the interests of the three groups of countries actually existing in the world. We realize that it is difficult for the Western Powers to relinquish their monopolistic position in the United Nations; and they are putting forward every kind of opposition to the adoption of the Soviet proposal, which is fair and is based on a true evaluation of the real position in the world. If we want the United Nations really to serve the cause of peace and international co-operation, we must overcome this opposition. If we do not, the United Nations cannot escape the sad fate of the League of Nations.

59. On the basis of the general lines of the Soviet Union's policy regarding the situation in the Republic of the Congo and in view of the observations just made, the Soviet delegation adopts the following position in respect of the draft resolutions submitted. We consider the draft resolution submitted by the group of African-Asian countries, including Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic and others [*A/L.339 and Add.1-5*], to be inadequate. However, it makes one important request without which, in the firm belief of the Soviet Government, the situation in the Congo cannot be normalized—namely, the request

for the unconditional withdrawal of all Belgian personnel from the Congo within a definite period of time; and it refers, although in over-vague terms, to the use of sanctions if this request is not complied with. That is the positive aspect of this resolution.

60. At the same time, the Soviet delegation feels it necessary to express its resolute objection to certain provisions and to the general tenor of the resolution submitted by a number of countries, including Nigeria, Pakistan, the Sudan and others [*A/L.340 and Add.1 and 2*], about which the distinguished representative of Pakistan spoke today. The preambular part of this draft resolution contains views with which the Soviet delegation cannot agree. For example, the draft resolution suggests that note should be taken of the report [*A/4711 and Corr.1, A/4711/Add.1 and 2*] of the so-called "Conciliation Commission", although this Commission's conclusions are in many respects debatable, indeed sometimes harmful, and the Commission itself is not a constitutional organ of the United Nations.

61. It will be recalled that this Commission was established by the so-called Advisory Committee, a consultative body set up by Mr. Hammarskjöld without the approval of the principal organs of the United Nations. It is therefore not authoritative—quite apart from the fact that originally the Commission consisted of fifteen members, four of whom subsequently withdrew, and that the report was signed by merely nine members and then only with reservations.

62. Furthermore—and this is perhaps the most important point—the report itself states that the members of the Commission do not represent their Governments and that their views do not reflect government policy—which means that the conclusions and views of the Commission are in fact those of a group of private individuals, not binding upon anyone.

63. The Commission itself was forced to acknowledge the ineffectiveness of its work. Its report states: "Because of the constantly deteriorating situation in the Republic even before its arrival in the Congo, and ever since, culminating in the murder of Mr. Lumumba and many other political leaders, the Commission was not able to carry out its mission effectively" [*A/4711, para. 149*].

64. The Soviet delegation does not consider it necessary to enter upon a detailed discussion of this question. However, it cannot agree that a document of this type—which, as has been shown, is in certain respects highly debatable and harmful—should be used as a basis for future action by the United Nations in the Congo.

65. The Soviet delegation also strongly objects to the second view expressed in the preambular part of the draft resolution [*A/L.340*], which suggests that the Assembly should be mindful "of the desire of the Congolese people for a solution of the crisis in the Congo through national reconciliation and return to constitutionality without delay".

66. This statement is extremely obscure and ambiguous. It would perhaps not have been open to censure, had some of the sponsors of the resolution not themselves revealed, in their recent statements, what they understood by this kind of ambiguous wording. Some of them urged the General Assembly to support the decisions of the Tananarive conference, identifying them with the "national reconciliation" mentioned in the preamble to the draft resolution. They assured us all that those decisions expressed the will of the entire

Congolese people and were a real step towards conciliation in the Congo, merely regretting, in passing, that only Mr. Gizenga did not attend this—according to them—all-embracing conference.

67. However, it has been convincingly shown during the present discussions that it was not only Mr. Gizenga who did not attend this conference, but the party mainly involved in the solution of the Congolese question—namely, the Congolese people. This explains why the Tananarive conference reached conclusions clearly contrary to the national interests of the Republic of the Congo—conclusions whereby the Congo's territorial integrity would be abrogated and the basis for the country's national unity, in consequence, destroyed.

68. In his speech of a few days ago, the distinguished representative of Senegal, requesting support for the decisions taken at Tananarive, let fall the remark that he did not mind whether the Congo was a federation or a confederation, or anything else, so long as those decisions were endorsed by all. It may be that what happens in and to the Congo is indeed immaterial to him. It is, however, far from being a matter of indifference to anyone who is really concerned for the welfare of the Congolese people. The point is that the Tananarive decisions imply the splitting of the Congo into a large number of small and even microscopic territories, as Tshombé with cynical frankness quite recently acknowledged. The fact is that the Tananarive decisions were taken at the direct prompting of the colonialists, who are concerned to dismember the Congo and weaken the Congolese people; they were taken by those who are not the interpreters of the Congolese people's will, but who are the puppets of the colonialists.

69. If we remember all this, we must realize that it is far from being a coincidence that in this draft resolution there is not even a mention of the territorial integrity or of the political independence of the Congo.

70. The third operative paragraph, conferring new powers on Mr. Hammarskjöld, is completely unacceptable. To entrust to a man who, despite the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, has connived at the arming of Tshombé and Mobutu's gangs with Belgian and French weapons, including aircraft and heavy artillery, the task of ensuring that arms, military equipment and military supplies are prevented from entering the Congo is to mock at the Congolese people. The Soviet delegation cannot take part in such a farce.

71. The fifth paragraph of the resolution is also unsatisfactory. The statement which it contains about the need to convene the Congolese Parliament without delay is correct; it is linked, however, with a direct indication to that Parliament of what it should do. The sponsors of the draft resolution include a number of countries whose representatives here issued strong warnings about the danger of any interference by the United Nations in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo, when it was a question of the United Nations troops suppressing the activities of Tshombé and Mobutu's armed gangs. Yet these same representatives, strange as it may seem, now suggest instructing the Congolese Parliament, in advance, to review the structure of the State system—although they have no right whatever to do so. The Congolese Parliament must be convened, and immediately. When it is able to function normally, it will itself, as the interpreter of the Congolese people's will and without any outside

prompting, decide what its tasks shall be and by what principles it will be guided.

72. Operative paragraph 6, proposing that another "Conciliation Commission" be appointed, is likewise unacceptable. The idea of "conciliation" had some meaning before the national leaders of the Congolese people had been physically butchered. After that event, the prime emphasis should be laid on punishing the criminals responsible for that terrible crime, on liquidating the illegal régime of the criminal clique of Tshombé, Mobutu and Kasa-Vubu, on restoring the country's democratic institutions, and on establishing the conditions for the normal functioning of the lawful Congolese Government. "Conciliation" cannot be bought at the price of perpetuating in the Congo the rule of the usurpers who are selling off their country's territory in morsels. Peace cannot be bought in any country at the price of the destruction of its people and its leaders.

73. Furthermore, the creation of such a Commission, whose very composition has not been defined, can be viewed only as an attempt by certain circles to escape from the control and direction of the Security Council, which under the Charter is the only organ responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in any continent of the world.

74. The Soviet delegation could make a number of other critical remarks with regard to this draft resolution. However, what has been said is quite sufficient to justify a categorical rejection of such a resolution, clearly contrary as it is to the true interests of the Congolese people, whose will can be expressed only through the country's lawful democratic institutions and, above all, through its Parliament.

75. Since the Government of the Soviet Union—which is not alone in this, as can be seen from these discussions—attaches great importance to the convening of the Congolese Parliament, which has been dispersed by the irresponsible clique of Tshombé, Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu, the Soviet delegation submits its own draft resolution [A/L.341] on this question. It desires to express confidence that all who really wish to create in the Congo conditions permitting the Congolese people itself to decide the questions of vital importance to it, will support this draft resolution, since it contains nothing but a simple request for the establishment of conditions for the normal functioning of the Congolese Parliament, and a reaffirmation of the principle of the political independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo.

76. This draft resolution, which has already been circulated to delegates, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling that the Security Council and the General Assembly, in their resolutions, have vigorously emphasized the need to ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo,

"Noting that the speediest possible restoration of parliamentary institutions in the Congo is of paramount importance in ensuring the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo, and that the Security Council, in part B, paragraph 1, of its resolution of 21 February 1961, urgently recommended the convening of the Parliament of the Republic of the Congo,

"Expressing profound concern at the fact that the Parliament of the Republic of the Congo has still not been convened, while attempts are being made to dismember the country and to violate its territorial integrity and political independence,

"1. Declares that no actions leading to a violation of the unity, political independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo can be allowed;

"2. Urges that the Parliament of the Republic of the Congo should be convened without delay, deeming it necessary that the Parliament should be convened not later than twenty-one days after the date of adoption of this resolution;

"3. Requests the Command of the forces sent to the territory of the Republic of the Congo in accordance with the decision of the Security Council to ensure the safety of the members of the Congolese Parliament."

77. In our opinion, there is nothing here which could prevent any delegation from adopting this resolution, if those delegations consider it necessary to direct their efforts towards a peaceful solution of the Congolese question on the basis of free expression of the Congolese people's will.

78. The Soviet delegation considers that, if the General Assembly adopts this draft resolution and takes a decision to the effect that all Belgian personnel shall immediately be withdrawn from the Congo, this in itself will be a real step towards a genuine restoration of normal conditions in the Republic of the Congo and towards a solution of the Congolese problem as a whole. The future course of events in the Congo and the very existence of the United Nations will depend to a considerable extent on whether or not this step is taken.

79. The struggle in the Congo must be identified with one of the rearguard actions of the colonialists against the forces of the peoples' freedom and independence. Colonialism's final downfall is inevitable; its back has been broken, but it is still capable of base actions. The situation requires that all peace-loving forces should unite to provide every possible support for the national liberation movement of all peoples. Above all, it requires solidarity on the part of the peoples of all colonial countries, and particularly of the African countries themselves, some of whom, as the discussion of the whole Congolese question has shown, are subject to the well-known influence of various colonial Powers pursuing their mercenary interests. In the oppressed peoples' unity in the struggle for freedom and true independence lies their strength, before which colonialism will be forced to retreat. On the solidarity and unity of the African countries in the struggle for liberation from the foreign yoke, from the influence of the colonial Powers, will to a large extent depend whether the sufferings of the Congolese people are to continue or whether the problem of the Congo will be solved, rapidly and finally, in accordance with the country's national interests.

80. So far as the United Nations is concerned, the Soviet delegation hopes that the peoples' desire for a peaceful solution both of the Congo problem and of many other international problems, and their genuine endeavours to ensure peace and security in the world, will guarantee that measures are taken to restore the prestige of the United Nations which has been impaired, and to convert it into a truly international organiza-

tion, effectively defending the interests of peace and the rights of all nations, large and small.

81. The PRESIDENT: I give the floor next to the Secretary-General.

82. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I thank the President for giving me an opportunity to give a short reply right away to a few of the observations to which the Assembly has just listened. I will limit myself to some very brief factual comments.

83. The spokesman of the Soviet Union attacked again the erroneous and arbitrary, or the inefficient, way in which various decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly have been implemented. He found his worst fears confirmed in view of the way in which the 21 February resolution¹⁰ has been implemented, and naturally the responsibility was put on me. I wish only to draw attention to the fact that the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, regarding this resolution, said that it contained no mandate for the Secretary-General nor any mandate addressed to the Secretary-General.

84. I would also like to draw attention to the fact that the implementation of the 21 February resolution has been carried out in very close contact with the Advisory Committee, or—if, in spite of a previous decision of this General Assembly, the representative of the Soviet Union does not regard it as constitutional—let me say that it was in close contact with sixteen Members of this Organization from African and Asian countries representing all factions in those regions of the world. Those contacts and those consultations were for some time practically daily, and I do not remember any case regarding the implementation where we did not reach a consensus.

85. Further, there was a reference to the history of the case, as reflected in the records, as proof of the fact of severe criticism of the way in which this matter has been handled. Well, I do not think that anybody needs to go to the record to know that there has been very severe criticism. But we are acting in a constitutional organization with parliamentary forms of work, and it is one thing when something is said from the floor and another thing if the same view is reflected in a decision of a responsible organ.

86. I would like the representative of the Soviet Union in this light to explain the resolution of the Security Council of 22 July 1960,¹¹ the resolution of the Security Council of 9 August,¹² the outcome of the debate in the Security Council on 22 August and the resolution of the General Assembly of 20 September [1474 (ES-IV)]. Obviously the executive must be guided by the majority view as expressed in constitutional form, not by views held by minorities.

87. Finally, it was said that what has been done by way of implementation of part A, paragraph 2 of the resolution of 21 February was mainly—and I hope I noted the words correctly—"useless correspondence with usurpers". The two usurpers in question are the Government of Belgium and the Chief of State of the Republic of the Congo, as elected and recognized by Parliament and recognized by all the leaders of the Congo until 31 March 1961 when Mr. Gizenga changed his stand. He has also, as we know, been recognized

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., *Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960*, document S/4405.

¹² Ibid., document S/4426.

as the Chief of State by this Assembly and seated in the Assembly. That much about the "usurpers".

88. As regards the "uselessness", I would be very interested to know what alternatives there are to correspondence and talks when there is a question of pressing on people and authorities the necessity to implement resolutions. Is the alternative military means? If so, what troops would the Secretary-General have been able to use and with what legal authorization?

89. Mr. AKAKPO (Togo) (*translated from French*): Before taking up the question of the Congo, I should like to add my delegation's expression of heartfelt condolence to those already addressed to the delegation of Cuba on the death of our colleague, Mr. Bisbé, Ambassador of Cuba.

90. Once again it falls to the General Assembly to consider the situation which arose in the Congo (Leopoldville) in July 1960. That situation has continued to deteriorate day by day, reaching its tragic culmination in the recent wholesale massacres in, for instance, Katanga, Kasai and Oriental province. The whole world has deplored and condemned these massacres of human beings, which bring no benefit to the Congo, to Africa or to the world.

91. What is the essential, basic cause of the whole hideous tragedy in the Congo, the cause which the United Nations must tackle with all its strength? There is not the slightest doubt that it is the return of the Belgians to the Congo. The Congo's misfortunes are due to the fact that it possesses enormous wealth. Belgium gained possession of the Congo and its riches, and remained there for something like eighty years. After lengthy struggles, the Congolese people finally won its national independence in June 1960; but the Belgian colonialists were not so ready to be deprived of all the wealth of the Congo. On the morrow of independence, they began their preparations for a return to the Congo, and it is not impossible that the mutiny of troops and the original disturbances which broke out in July 1960 were planned by the Belgians. It is obvious that Belgium recovered the Congo by force of arms, on the pretext of protecting Belgians who were in danger during those first disturbances. This was indeed aggression against a sovereign State, which no State in the world, including Belgium, would accept. Reverting to colonialist methods of "divide and rule", the Belgians have savagely set the political parties against each other. All this time, they remain hidden in the wings of the dreadful scene that we contemplate, awaiting a favourable moment to do what they returned to do.

92. To whichever camp the victims belong, those who are dying there are our African brothers. The African peoples, from the politician to the man in the street, the schoolboy and the market-woman, all realize what lies behind this hideous drama, and it angers them deeply.

93. While our Congolese brothers slaughter each other with no benefit to themselves, there comes one proposal which overclouds the whole future of the Congo. The Tananarive Conference has established the principle of dismembering the Congo and creating tiny sovereign States. It is not impossible that this idea also is of Belgian origin; for in our view no advantage will, in the present situation, accrue to the Congo from such a solution, which is obviously designed to serve Belgian interests. It is no less clear that the secession of Katanga, the richest part of the Congo, would enable

the Belgians to hold that province more firmly in their grip. It seems, in fact, that what is at stake in the Congo crisis is economic rather than political in value.

94. Yet the resolutions of the Security Council stress the fact—and all delegations certainly agree—that territorial unity and territorial integrity are essential features which, in the Congo, must be preserved.

95. We know that a country which is invaded by a foreign army is not a free country. The army of occupation, peremptorily or surreptitiously, dictates its wishes, which have to be complied with. Freedom in the Congo appears diminished by the presence of Belgian troops, who have infiltrated into the whole country and who, one may be sure, are imposing their will.

96. In his report dated 2 November 1960 [A/4557 and Add.1],¹⁸ Mr. Dayal, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo, wrote:

"Significantly, within the security forces, there are, according to the latest available data, 114 Belgian officers and 117 Belgians of other ranks in the *gendarmérie*, and 58 Belgian officers in the police." [A/4557, para. 49.]

These figures refer only to Katanga, and it is more than certain that the corresponding figures today are twice, three times or even ten times as large.

97. The United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo, in its report [A/4711 and Corr.2 and Add.1 and 2], also confirmed the presence of many Belgian officers in Congolese units. The Commission wrote:

"Around a nucleus of troops of the first contingent of the former Force publique, he has built up an army equipped with modern weapons and officered by a large number of Belgians and other foreign elements." [A/4711, para. 61.]

98. Thus, all these Belgian officers, other ranks and instructors, together with mercenaries, by imposing their will on the public forces and stirring up factions, are responsible for the present serious situation which, unless very quickly remedied, might degenerate into a civil war.

99. The most urgent step to be taken is the evacuation of Belgian troops and the disarmament of all military groups in the Congo—including the Congolese National Army—for only thus can the civil war threatening the Congo be prevented. This is clearly expressed in the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961.¹⁴

The speaker read out part A, paragraphs 1 and 2, and part B, paragraph 2, of resolution S/4741.

100. In the absence of such evacuation and disarmament, any attempt to re-establish the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo would be in vain, as Mr. Dayal has observed.

101. The convening of Parliament and the release of parliamentary and political prisoners will undoubtedly bring about a return to legality. The report of the Conciliation Commission points out that "the present crisis will not be solved unless Parliament is reconvened without delay" [*ibid.*, para. 139].

102. Before concluding, I should like to quote the cable dated 18 February 1961 from the Prime Minister of the Togolese Republic addressed to the Secretary-

¹⁸ The text of this report has also been distributed, as a Security Council document, under symbol S/4557 and Corr.1.

¹⁴ Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.

General concerning the measures which should be adopted to achieve our purpose:

"Infamous murder Patrice Lumumba has greatly aggravated situation in Congo and aroused grave anxiety among African States concerned with preserving peace in Congo in particular and in Africa generally. Proposed withdrawal of United Nations troops from Congo and termination of their mission in that country would, in our opinion, further aggravate situation and, in fact, precipitate civil war in that area, which would surely be prelude to general conflict in Africa and, perhaps, throughout world. It therefore seems to us that, in higher interests of Congo and of Africa, drastic decision must be taken to put end to all hostilities in Congo. To accomplish that, all military and para-military units, regular or otherwise, must be disarmed and United Nations forces must be regarded as sole authority responsible for maintaining law and order. Mandate given Secretary-General for that purpose must be precise and unambiguous and must be conferred either by Security Council or by General Assembly itself. Struggle for influence carried on in Congo by African and non-African States must end, for interests of Congolese must take precedence over all other interests. All assistance by States Members United Nations must be channelled through United Nations, only body which cannot be accused of political or other designs on Congo. Take this occasion to reaffirm, on behalf my Government, confidence which we have always placed in you and to express hope that, despite all difficulties, you will be able to accomplish successfully mission entrusted to you."¹⁵

103. It is the duty of Member States to provide the United Nations with everything it needs for ensuring the success of the measures advocated, and to give the Congo new hope of enjoying its independence in harmony and in peace.

104. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom): It is almost nine months since the United Nations first concerned itself with the situation in the Republic of the Congo. We are now nearing the end of a long debate, the third—none of them short—which the General Assembly has held on this question. So many words have been spoken here in the past months that one may well question whether the Assembly can achieve any further progress by debate.

105. In the view of my delegation, our object should be to reinforce the resolutions adopted in the Assembly and in the Security Council, and to provide the framework in which steady and sure progress can be made towards a settlement of the Congo. We must realize that this will take time. It may be necessary for the United Nations to continue its assistance, on the economic and technical planes certainly, and probably on the military and political ones, for a good while longer. But if this is so, it is essential to get this assistance established on an orderly basis. We cannot really afford constantly to tear ourselves apart in acrimonious debate on this subject month after month. The United Nations has a vital role to play in other parts of the world, too, and it is no service to the aims of the Organization to allow a fixation, as it were, with regard to the Congo to debilitate the Organization's flexibility and effectiveness elsewhere. There has been a tendency, aggravated by this fixation, to identify the United Nations' own

future too closely with the vicissitudes of events in the Congo. There are dangers in allowing this tendency to continue. It encourages a sort of hysteria about the United Nations, and it also makes it easier for others, whose motives are not genuine and who have no interest or concern to see a Congolese solution for the Congo emerge, to blame the continuing instability in the Congo on the United Nations. An extreme manifestation of this has been the attack which members of the Soviet bloc have launched on the Organization in the past few months. But in the final analysis, this attack was prompted by considerations quite apart from the Congo.

106. I do not wish to say much about this aspect of the question at present. I do not believe that the grotesque slanders which we have heard against the Organization and the integrity and person of its Secretary-General have aroused any sympathy. Indeed, the manner in which certain of the Soviet bloc delegations and one or two others have chosen to make their attack has aroused nothing but scorn. We deplore the language which has been employed, the charges of "murderer" which have been so wilfully and wickedly repeated. We give our full support to what the Secretary-General said the other day about the implications of such a base for any parliamentary body, and we challenge those who make such charges to justify them or else to withdraw them.

107. In this connexion, I noticed that the representative of the Soviet Union has just criticized some remarks made by the United Kingdom representative at the Security Council [873rd meeting] on 14 July 1960. He found in these remarks some justification for his allegations against Belgium and its allies. I am quite content that Members of the Assembly should themselves look at the record; indeed, I hope that the record will be carefully studied before the Soviet representative's allegations are accepted as being justified.

108. I do not think that I need take up the time of the Assembly to consider in any detail the wider aspects of the Soviet attack on this Organization. The attitude of my Government is well known and, as the Secretary-General has said, the record of the United Nations is there for all to see. Many delegations have already given full expression to their belief in the United Nations and in the integrity of its chief officer. None of us here can doubt that this belief is fully shared by an overwhelming majority of the Member States of this Organization. In particular, I should like to recall the speech of the representative of Malaya [976th meeting] when he spoke of the implications of this faith which we have in the United Nations. I should like to say how much my delegation welcomed that speech and how much we share the beliefs which were expressed in it.

109. I now turn to the question of the Congo. In the view of my delegation, our approach to this question must be based on two fundamentals. The first is acceptance of, and respect for, Congolese sovereignty. The second is acceptance of and respect for the Congo's political independence and the corresponding obligations which the Charter imposes on all Member States not to interfere in any country.

110. As several speakers have pointed out, the original objectives of the United Nations when it first became engaged in the Congo have to some extent been accomplished. There is now at least some semblance of law and order, compared with the anarchy that reigned

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, document S/4726.

in July 1960. The famine which at one time threatened to spread over the country has been mercifully checked, and the more flagrant manifestations of foreign intervention have been halted. But much, of course, remains to be done. The situation continues grave. Parts of the country still live under the shadow of civil war. The national economy of the Congo as a whole is in ruins, and persistent disunity among the Congolese peoples and their leaders still presents a dangerous temptation to interference from outside for either personal or political ends.

111. In these circumstances it is abundantly clear that the main essential now is for a political reconciliation between the various leaders and factions in the Congo. Only then will the people of that unhappy country be enabled at last to live in peace and to be left to manage their own affairs. And the task of political reconciliation is made no easier if delegations here, or foreign Governments, adopt aggressive partisan attitudes, either with regard to the personalities involved or to the nature of any political settlement. This is a form of outside interference which is as intolerable as any other and, worse than this, it threatens to reproduce and make permanent among the Congolese people themselves the political divisions which we find today in this Organization and in the world at large. Such a conclusion would indeed be a tragedy for the Congo.

112. It must be a cardinal principle in all our dealings with this affair that it is for the Congolese people themselves to decide their own future. The United Nations is there to help and not to dictate, and my delegation is confident that the Congolese peoples and authorities will be able to distinguish between those statements made in the course of this debate which are genuinely disinterested, and those which clearly set out to exploit the Congo's troubles for particular ends.

113. The starting point for any political settlement in the Congo must obviously be the position as it is there today. It is no use beginning with preconceived solutions, for example, about the exact constitutional structure of the Congolese State, and then arguing that every development which does not necessarily point in any particular direction is wrong and retrograde. As the representative of Senegal said, we cannot establish the unity of the country simply by wishing it.

114. One has only to read the third chapter of the Conciliation Commission's report—that headed "The Political Situation in the Congo"—to appreciate how very far the Congo now is from being the kind of State which it was thought that it would be when it became independent. And let me emphasize that this change has come about not because of foreign interference or as the result of some deep laid plan by the so-called "colonialists"; it has been produced solely by the internal stresses in the Congo, stresses which almost certainly ante-dated independence by many years and which only time and patience and a developing sense of nationhood can possibly diminish.

115. But recently an encouraging start has been made. There was the conference at Tananarive; and now we have news of the visit which Mr. Kamitatu paid to Stanleyville. And there are hopes for a meeting between Mr. Gizenga and representatives of Mr. Iléo's Government.

116. All these are good auguries for the future. For the first time since the political struggles of the Congolese nation began, the various leaders are beginning to meet together. We very much welcome this. We hope that these contacts will lead in turn to further discussions and will ultimately bring in all the elements in the Congo. We hope that the Congolese leaders themselves will realize the imperative need for progress in this direction. We hope that they will maintain and increase all the efforts they are making so that the Congolese people may achieve an early settlement of their political differences. In particular, my delegation hopes that Katanga, which is, after all, so important to the economy of the territory as a whole, will continue to associate itself with steps leading to such a settlement.

117. Harsh things have been said here about the Conference at Tananarive and the other attempts which the Congolese leaders are making to resolve their differences. In the view of my delegation, such strictures are most unjustified and seem for the great part to have been inspired by questionable motives.

118. So far only the outline of a final picture has been drawn. It is going to be adapted and filled in at subsequent meetings. An essential stage in this process will have to be a broadening of the basis of the provisional Government; and then there are publicly stated Congolese assurances that whatever conclusions are reached will subsequently have to be legalized by Parliament. This seems to my delegation to be a proper and reasonable way of proceeding, and the Government of the United Kingdom wishes all success to the Congolese leaders in the efforts they are making to this end.

119. This task of reconciliation is bound to be difficult, and it is here particularly that the United Nations can assist—by providing safe conducts for political leaders when requested; by assisting in arrangements for convening Parliament when the time comes; by providing legal experts to draw up a new constitution if called upon to do so.

120. At this point I should like to pay tribute to the efforts of the Conciliation Commission. It was given a difficult job to do and it has done it very well. It has been criticized just recently by the representative of the Soviet Union on the grounds that it was a group of private persons only, who were not representatives of their Governments and that, therefore, no weight should be attached to its report. In contrast to this, my delegation attaches a great deal of importance and weight to the report [*A/4711 and Corr.1, A/4711/Add.1 and 2*],—and this not least because the members of the Commission were not the official representatives of their Governments but were, rather, experienced, impartial and public-spirited men who visited all parts of the Congo in an effort to furnish the United Nations with disinterested, honest and practical advice upon the way in which the Congolese authorities could work together with the United Nations to bring peace and stability to the country.

121. The report of the Conciliation Commission to the Advisory Committee on the Congo brings out clearly the nature of the difficulties facing the Congolese and suggests ways in which the United Nations can help. My delegation considers these ideas to be sound and to have been put forward in the best interests of the Congolese people. We would hope that both they and the United Nations will see their way to acting on the advice offered in this report.

122. I have referred to the way the United Nations can and should help in bringing together the Congolese leaders. I should now like to make a few remarks on some other aspects of the Organization's role in the Congo.

123. The United Kingdom Government has repeatedly affirmed its support for the United Nations in discharging its Congo mandate. We realize only too well the truly formidable difficulties under which it has to operate. Its future effectiveness in the Congo will depend to a great extent on building up mutual confidence and trust between the Organization and the Congolese.

124. There have been many misunderstandings—and not always, in the view of my delegation, has the fault lain squarely on the Congolese side. Some of these misunderstandings have been removed; some persist. All we can do, on both sides, is patiently to work for agreement.

125. The most recent resolution of the Security Council, that of 21 February 1961,¹⁶ in particular, has led to a number of misapprehensions. When my delegation voted for that resolution, we made it clear that we did not interpret it as giving the United Nations authority to impose any solution, political or otherwise, on the country by force.

126. Similarly, we regard it as unthinkable that the United Nations should ever seek to assert any sort of trusteeship over the Congo. It appears that it is anxiety on points such as these which have helped to foster recent misunderstandings in the Congo. We believe they can and must be removed. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Congolese is the foundation on which all the rest must be built.

127. Another field in which the United Nations can help is the so-called "reorganization" of the Congolese Army. Here especially the motives and intentions of the United Nations as expressed in the 21 February resolution have been grievously misunderstood—and not only within the Congo itself. There are some who believed, and possibly still believe, that the Congolese Army was to be disarmed and that, if necessary, force would be used. Of course, this was never the intention. As I emphasized at the time in the Security Council [942nd meeting], whether in regard to the reorganization of the armed forces or in any other field, there can be no question of forcing any measures on the Congolese. Whatever action the United Nations takes in this instance must be taken in close consultation with the Congolese authorities. Here, too, the report of the Conciliation Commission contains many useful suggestions.

128. Another aspect of this is the continuing mandate of the United Nations to assist in the restoration and maintenance of law and order. Assistance will be all the more necessary in any interim period covering the reorganization and retraining of the units of the Congolese Army, and consequently the number of the forces available to the United Nations has to be increased. My Government particularly welcomes the generous and statesmanlike contribution which India has made.

129. I have summarized the main responsibilities, as my delegation sees them, which the United Nations has shouldered within the Congo. I now turn to what is essentially a responsibility of individual States Members of this Organization. It is something I referred to

at the beginning of this address: the imperative obligation which the Charter imposes on every Member State not to interfere in the domestic concerns of another sovereign State.

130. The United Kingdom Government has continually supported United Nations demands that foreign intervention from whatever source should stop. This is an issue on which all Member States, including the Congolese themselves, are agreed. The divergencies on this question which have appeared in the course of this debate are not so much with regard to the fundamental principle as with regard to the extent and nature of whatever foreign intervention representatives have claimed is continuing.

131. In the view of my delegation, it seems as if we are in some danger of losing a sense of proportion on this question. A tendency has latterly manifested itself in some quarters to regard any development in the Congo of which certain delegations might not approve as being deliberately engineered by the Belgians. There is a widely held belief that all the present ills of the Congo can be accounted for by the machinations of the Belgian Government and its allies. This is not only totally erroneous, but it is the sort of approach which creates an atmosphere in which any solution of the Congo's difficulties must be made infinitely more difficult.

132. The fact is that whatever may have been the relations between the Belgian officials and the Congolese in the past, it is now perfectly clear that in the various régimes in the Congo, not even excluding Stanleyville, those Belgian advisers who remain take their orders from the local Congolese, and not from outside Powers. Just because a man is a Belgian national, that does not mean that he is at the end of a telephone wire from Brussels.

133. The United Kingdom delegation has voted for the various resolutions referring to Belgium, and we continue to give these our support. At the same time it is clear that, as its latest statements have shown, the Belgian Government has accepted the resolutions of the United Nations, and is doing its best in the cases of those nationals over whom they have any sort of control.

134. It is with these considerations in mind that my delegation will study the draft resolutions which have been or may still be tabled, and I may wish to address myself specifically to them before we are called upon to vote on them.

135. Before I end my remarks, I should like to say a short word about the financial aspects of the Congo question. I will not dwell long on this subject which has been, I think, well covered by other speakers, notably the representative of Canada. But I must place on record the deep concern of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom at the critical financial situation, and the far-reaching consequences of the refusal of certain Members to pay their share of the costs of this operation.

136. My Government believes that the financial responsibility for our collective decisions is one that falls inescapably on all Member States, and that the burden should be shared by all according to their ability to pay. We believe further that the regular scale of assessments which have been adopted in the General Assembly is a fair and just one, though we are prepared to consider any proposals for easing the burden on those least able to bear it.

137. But I must say frankly that it is the depth of cynicism for a great Power which voted for inaugurating this operation to refuse to pay anything toward the bill. It is perfectly clear that the Soviet Union and its allies are refusing payment simply because the operation has not proved in practice to be furthering their own political ends.

138. It is but a mockery of the Charter to maintain that the financing of this operation should be a matter for the Security Council under Article 43 of the Charter, when it is well known that Article 43 and the whole of Chapter VII of the Charter have remained a dead letter because of the refusal of the Soviet Government to negotiate the agreements which the framers of the Charter had in mind.

139. The Organization has undertaken an operation to preserve peace. It is vital for all Members that some satisfactory method of paying the bill for this operation be found, for if it is not we shall see the collapse through ignominious bankruptcy of the greatest effort mankind has yet made to achieve a world organization; its collapse as a means for achieving a peaceful settlement of our disputes; its collapse as a major purveyor of social and economic progress; its collapse as the main organ in which nations, young and old, great and small, can express themselves internationally and play their part in shaping the destiny of the world.

140. Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco) (*translated from French*): May I first express to the Government and delegation of the Republic of Cuba the heartfelt condolence and deep sympathy of my Government and delegation on the occasion of the sad and untimely death of Mr. Bisbé, one of our most distinguished and respected colleagues.

141. Some may think that, since the Belgian policy of breaking up the Congo is now in process of execution and the mission of the United Nations is approaching the failure intended and brought about by neo-colonialism, it is useless to continue the struggle, to make speeches or to adopt resolutions which cannot alter the inexorable march of events. At first sight, this pessimistic attitude seems justified by the Belgian Government's contempt for all decisions and resolutions of the Organization. But the experience of free African nationalism shows that the struggle for just causes always follows the same path. At first this path is rugged and is strewn with obstacles of all kinds; it seems interminable, and the traveller must face many set-backs, and even crimes; but it always leads to the achievement of the desired aim, which is the great ideal of all Africa—the freedom and unity of the continent, come what may, and the rooting-out of the policy of Balkanization and of puppet régimes.

142. We believe firmly in the final triumph of the peoples who aspire to make their unity and freedom into a force for cohesion and peace, with which to defeat the forces of the past, concentrated in the neo-colonialist camp, and the forces of inertia of the new "puppet" feudalism.

143. If we are concerned with the struggle for the ideal of the true political and economic liberation of Africa, we must fight a constant battle in connexion with the Congo problem. This problem will soon be recorded in the contemporary history of Africa and the world as a decisive turning-point which has changed the present state of human relations. The Congo will be transformed, but not according to the plans and

decisions of the neo-colonialists. Not only this but, in transforming itself, it will transform the face of Africa and the world.

144. The discussion of the Congo problem has successfully unmasked the true face of neo-colonialism, and will continue to do so. Later, it will help our continent to free itself from spheres of influence of every kind, to rid itself of puppet régimes and to strengthen movements for the liberation and unification of Africa.

145. This problem reminds us that a desperate struggle is proceeding between two kinds of forces: the forces of emancipated nationalism, which are the forces of the future, and the forces of "revived" domination known as neo-colonialism, with its indigenous puppets and its foreign allies.

146. Yet another problem arose out of the Congo tragedy: the choice between two clearly defined policies—the policy of freedom, in line with the national aspirations born of the will of the people, and the policy of privilege and exploitation imposed by the great monopolies and trusts, thanks to the servility of a modern feudal system in which ambitious men seek to destroy the unity and integrity of their country.

147. Moreover, the turn taken by future events in the Congo will decide whether there is to be stability or permanent revolution in Africa and whether, as a result, there is to be peace in the world.

148. After so many speeches by my delegation and by our colleagues, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, we must today take our bearings and find out where we stand. It is useless to repeat that the political balance-sheet is negative, that the present situation of the Congo is grave and that the prospects for the future are gloomy. While resolutions accumulate, the situation deteriorates.

149. The Tananarive Conference, far from ringing down the curtain on the tragedy, is only the first scene of a new act—an act possibly more disturbing and more complex than its predecessors. So far we have seen only two stages of this unequal struggle—Belgian aggression, and the deliberately created internal crisis.

150. This crisis was deliberately created solely in order that the tragedy might continue with a period of decay, both within the Congo and within the United Nations. We can even say that the problem has led to tensions and complications in four different areas—showing that it is embracing the world, becoming a permanent part of the international scene, and extending its effects, through space, over the whole continent of Africa and to other continents.

151. These four areas are: firstly, the Congo and the popular element representing the forces of the future arrayed against the colonialist forces of the past and their docile instruments; second, Africa, as a continent threatened from one quarter by neo-colonialism; third, the United Nations, standing on the brink of a dangerous failure in its present mission, because of neo-colonialism's diversionary tactics; and fourth, the whole world, which sees the fires spreading and multiplying and so endangering world peace and the future of the United Nations.

152. While we recognize and support the total and complete sovereignty of the Congo, it is obvious that the problem in which that country now is involved is an international one. In this connexion, many countries share with the United Nations a heavy responsibility for the exacerbation and deterioration of the position.

153. For us, the problem is extremely simple. We want a Congo such as the Congolese themselves wanted in the first days of their national independence. It is inadmissible to ignore national aspirations and to follow some other principle. What is required is this practical, simple and honest policy, and it is always in the light of the desires of the Congolese patriots that our country has hastened to make its technical and military contributions at the request of the United Nations.

154. But it is now an open secret that the perfidious policy of Belgian neo-colonialism and its allies had quite another aim. This policy consisted in granting a "surface" pseudo-independence under strict control—especially financial control—while the territorial integrity and unity of the Congo were to be maintained so that the country could continue to serve the ends of the great trusts and to follow the imperialist tradition of eighty years of colonialism. If this policy failed, neo-colonialism would then have to stir up movements of secession with pre-fabricated and servile puppet régimes; and that, as we now know, is what happened.

155. It is interesting to note that the partners of the Belgian trusts closely follow and support these tactics, which can no longer deceive anyone. Their essential aim was to maintain and protect the Belgian presence in the Congo, while speaking quite a different language in the United Nations.

156. Diametrically different from this perfidious policy was the policy of the Congolese people, designed to restore to the word freedom its unadulterated meaning. The late Prime Minister Lumumba outlined this policy in the speech which he made on 30 June 1960, the day of the proclamation of independence. These were his words:

"The Republic of the Congo has been proclaimed, and our dear country is now in the hands of its own children.

"Together, my brothers, we shall begin a new struggle, a sublime struggle which will lead our country to peace, prosperity and greatness.

"Together we shall establish social justice and ensure that each receives the just reward for his labour.

"We shall show the world what the black man can do when he works in freedom, and we shall make the Congo the radiant centre of the whole of Africa.

"We shall ensure that our country's land will be of real benefit to its children.

"We shall review all the old laws, and shall make new ones which will be just and noble.

"We shall end the oppression of free thought and shall so act that all citizens enjoy to the full the fundamental freedoms set forth in the Declaration of Human Rights.

"We shall effectively abolish all discrimination, of whatever kind, and shall give to each individual the place to which his human dignity, his labour and his devotion to the country entitle him.

"We shall establish peace—not the peace of rifles and bayonets, but the peace of hearts and of good will.

"And to this end, my dear compatriots, you may be sure that we can rely not only on our vast resources and immense wealth, but on the help of many foreign countries, whose co-operation we shall accept when-

ever it is straightforward and is not designed to impose a given policy upon us."¹⁷

Prime Minister Lumumba then asked his compatriots to respect the lives and property both of nationals and of foreigners, and to work together in unity.

157. This policy, designed to ensure that the Congolese people should exercise full sovereignty in every field, was not planned to accommodate disguised imperialism. That imperialism had quite another plan of action. Companies of every kind—particularly mining concerns—and the Belgian Government so dominate the Congo's economic life that the prospects for the country's future and for international peace cannot but be alarming if these trusts refuse to forego the imperialist habits of the nineteenth century and to move with the times. The international Suez Canal Company, with all the dangers to world peace which it created in the recent past, was an enterprise that could hardly be compared with these powerful trusts.

158. A ruthless struggle between emancipated nationalism and neo-colonialism has begun. The power of money may possibly soon achieve a temporary triumph.

159. The tragedy may be described as having four stages: first, the nationalist revolt for the Africanization of Congolese leadership, and for true independence; second, the imperialist aggression and the creation of an internal crisis; third, the failure of the United Nations operation and the decay of the crisis; and fourth, the gradual disintegration of the Republic of the Congo, and the threat of that Republic's destruction.

160. It is useless to embark upon proofs, which have become unnecessary, in order to convince ourselves of the guilt of Belgium and of the significance of its allies' silence. It is also pointless to demonstrate the failure of the mission of the United Nations, which took a dangerous course and whose prestige has been reduced both by an indifferent Belgium and by the arrogant puppets in Katanga and elsewhere.

161. But we must still ask ourselves why events developed in this way, within the framework of the United Nations and to our great disappointment, according to a set plan and method which faithfully reflect everything we know of Belgian neo-colonialism in the Congo. There are two main reasons for this.

162. The first is that African nationalism and the neo-colonialist countries coexist without understanding one another. Africa's nationalist upsurge and European neo-colonialism are incompatible and irreconcilable. They move in opposite directions. They live in two antagonistic worlds. The neo-colonialist countries, in general, are also obsessed with strategic points and strategic products in the "cold war". Like those who have jaundice, they see everything yellow. The African countries, on the other hand, while harbouring a legitimate distrust of their former colonizers, do not refuse to admit the possibility of relations based on equality and justice. In the African mind, the "cold war", although it exists, does not seem to take the form of a psychosis—as one can deduce from Mr. Lumumba's speech which I have just quoted. The neo-colonialist Powers, with the mental approach characteristic of them, seek to control everything—even the United Nations operation in the Congo—instead of leaving Africa to the Africans, in deed as well as in word.

¹⁷ Statement published in the newspaper *Le Soir* of 1 July 1960.

163. The first main reason, then, is obvious. It may be said that what was to be defended was not the interests of the Congolese people, its independence or its territorial integrity, but that United Nations intervention was resorted to, in particular, in order to protect the lives and property of Belgian nationals and to prevent the introduction of the "cold war" into Africa. Some said that this last purpose, in the strategy of the balance of power, could be more effectively achieved if the presence of the Belgians, who are members of NATO, were ensured in the Congo. But this takes us very far from neutrality. For us Africans, the non-introduction of the "cold war" into Africa means simply the removal of both the parties to the "cold war", not merely of one of them. If this point of view is not accepted, those who have jaundice may well be overtaken by a dangerous optical illusion. It is certainly dangerous, because the United Nations mission has been distorted and is now moving towards obvious failure, having made a false start and taken a wrong direction. Belgium's allies therefore bear a heavy responsibility for the distortion of the United Nations mission.

164. The second main reason for the temporary difficulties facing Congolese nationalism in the achievement of the Congo's unity and territorial integrity, with the temporary maintenance of neo-colonialism, lies in the natural alliances between corrupting imperialism and modern local feudalism. In this field also, the United Nations bears a heavy responsibility before history. There are more or less four causes of the deterioration of the Congo crisis.

165. First, the weakness of the United Nations towards Tshombé. It was paradoxical to see an international organization making contact with the governor of a province—and thus investing him with the importance which the Belgian Government wished and still wishes him to possess—instead of confining its contacts to Mr. Lumumba's Central Government and treating the Belgian Government firmly as being responsible for all the obstacles placed in the path of the United Nations mission. Today, with the varied and sustained support given to him by the Union minière du Haut-Katanga and the Belgian authorities, Tshombé lays down the law in the Congo and attacks the United Nations.

166. Secondly, the physical elimination of the opposition. This elimination was directed not only against the leaders who were its victims, but more especially against the policy which those leaders represented—the policy now courageously followed by the legal Government of Mr. Gizenga—because Prime Minister Lumumba was often accused of calling for Soviet military assistance; and it was said that, for this reason, he had made many enemies in the Western camp. If this were the only good reason, it should also apply to Mr. Kasa-Vubu, who signed the same appeal to the Soviet Union for military assistance. It is therefore clear that what neo-colonialism disliked was not Mr. Lumumba himself, but his pure, free and courageous nationalism, as subsequently displayed in his letter to Mrs. Lumumba. Mr. Kasa-Vubu, on the other hand, was given a seat in the United Nations.

167. Thirdly, the accrediting of Mr. Kasa-Vubu's delegation to the United Nations—a political act which helped to inaugurate the policy of crime. Prime Minister Lumumba was naturally discouraged. In order to continue the struggle, he escaped, and we know all the consequences of that escape.

168. Fourthly, the *coup d'état* of a pre-fabricated colonel, who became more and more important as the struggle against democracy and Congolese legality became fiercer. The United Nations bears the responsibility for negotiating with him, instead of obeying the law of the land and negotiating only with the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Lumumba, and with the general commanding the Congolese armed forces.

169. The *coup d'état* was also made possible by the trap set by the economic and financial circumstances in which the Congo then was and still is. Belgium left the Congo in a financial void. Hence the Congolese were in financial straits. A government without money could not stand; only authorities having financial resources could maintain themselves in power. The Belgians were able to bring down any government which they did not like, and accordingly financial resources could be made available only to a docile Government.

170. To complete the picture, the Press has announced, in the last few days, that relations between Belgium and the Congo will soon be resumed. These relations need not be announced. They already exist in fact, far more than on paper. But Belgium will now have full freedom to act within a legal framework and to continue its defiance of the recommendations of the United Nations and its exploitation of the country.

171. Moreover, the Organization's silence about all the violations of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and its failure to take any energetic action to remedy this evil, not only place a heavy responsibility on the United Nations itself but also help to bring about such unfortunate and illegal enterprises as the Tananarive Conference. Tshombé is increasing his contacts with those who support the policy of breaking up the Congo. The United Nations should unmask and combat this network of intrigue.

172. Lastly, since the beginning of the Belgian aggression, Belgium's allies in the Security Council and in the General Assembly have adopted an attitude which has encouraged Belgium to disregard the United Nations resolutions as a whole. The rapid increase in the number of these resolutions proves only one thing—their futility. In the first place, the only possible reason for the proliferation of these documents is their weakness, which makes it necessary to give each new draft a firmer tone. Valuable time would have been gained if the first drafts had from the outset been strong and decisive. As it was, however, endless time was lost in haggling over words, in order to avoid offending the innocent Belgian aggressors.

173. Today it is beginning to be understood that what the Belgians aimed at was precisely a war of attrition designed to make the United Nations lose valuable time, so that the resolutions would lose all meaning and would be overtaken by events.

174. All these manoeuvres have seriously jeopardized the mission and prestige of the United Nations.

175. To sum up, the Belgian plan, aimed at the break-up of the Congo, is being systematically executed against a background of astonishing passivity on the part of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Tananarive Conference is but the first scene of a new act in the tragedy, which might be called "phase of disintegration and decomposition", following the phase in which the situation "decayed" as a result of the provoked and premeditated internal crisis.

176. We emphasize this point in order to demonstrate the deep and general anxiety caused by the gravity of the situation, and to assign the blame to the quarters which merit it. We do so, moreover, in order that the disturbing effects and repercussions of this tragedy on the immediate and long-term future of Africa shall not be lost sight of.

177. What, therefore, should be done to break the dangerous deadlock in which we all find ourselves at the present time? We must simply return to legality, and put an end to half-measures and artificial pseudo-solutions. To do that, we must work for the kind of Congo desired by the country's voters and their representatives just before and during the first days of the Congo's independence. The purpose of the Belgian aggression was to destroy the national policy of the Congolese patriots by shattering the bases supporting the nation's life:

(1) A policy in the service of the people and not in that of the foreign trusts;

(2) The democratic institutions upholding that policy through their support of the true Congolese patriots;

(3) The patriots themselves, who embody the ideals of their people—those patriots to be replaced by puppets dredged out of a sort of modern, new-style feudalism.

178. We, as representatives in the United Nations, have to make a choice. For us, the whole problem of the Congo resolves itself into choosing between two possible policies: a policy in the service of the Congolese people, or a policy in the service of Belgian neo-colonialism. Morocco has chosen the first-named policy—and that is why our country is opposed to the retention of the Belgian forces of aggression, to the *coup d'état* carried out against the Parliament for the purpose of suppressing the people's will, to the secessionist movements and the traitors fomenting them, to the exploitation of the people by mining companies and, lastly, to the physical annihilation of the opposition as a prelude to the destruction of the Republic.

179. The remedy for this violation of the rights and the sovereignty of the Congolese people therefore consists in supporting three other bases on which the life of the Congolese nation also rests, namely:

(1) Recognition that the Congolese people possesses all the prerogatives of sovereignty, both political and economic. In that connexion, the Congolese people should be given all the technical assistance possible, to fill the gap deliberately created by Belgium; and the right in question should be defended against all foreigners who seek only to exploit the people.

(2) Re-establishment of the country's institutions, and guarantee of the security essential to the operation of a democratic régime, because that is the régime which the peoples desires. Parliament, which has ceased to function because of violence and foreign intrigues, should meet normally on the dates fixed by the *Loi fondamentale*, precisely in order to frustrate any attempt at interference with the institutions of another people.

(3) Recognition of the Government set up by the will of the governed, in order that the institutions established by the governed shall be respected; this means recognition of the Central Government today represented by Mr. Gizenga. It is worth noting that Mr. Gizenga's army is the only army which includes no Belgian officers or foreign mercenaries.

180. Aside from these three bases, we find a number of obstacles militating against the stability, freedom and territorial integrity of the Congo. The various resolu-

tions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly are already more than adequate to remove those obstacles, and should make it possible for the country to return to normal. That this has not happened is primarily the fault of Belgium and its friends. The following measures must therefore be taken:

(1) Belgian military and para-military personnel and Belgian political advisers must be immediately and unconditionally withdrawn, under penalty of sanctions which should be specified by the Security Council and approved by the General Assembly at its present session.

(2) The same position should be taken with regard to any other country whose nationals fall within the scope of the resolutions which have been adopted.

(3) Security measures should be immediately agreed upon for the protection, when Parliament reconvenes, of the elected representatives and of the successors of those who have been killed. Naturally, this should be preceded by the freeing of the political leaders.

(4) An investigation of the economic and financial situation must be made, and Belgium should be asked to account for the State's missing gold—within the framework of the country's sovereignty, and in co-operation with the recognized Central Government.

(5) The United Nations should in the future maintain relations only with the recognized Central Government, and should deal with the various provincial governors only in regard to local questions and through the responsible civil and military officials in those areas.

181. The only durable solution will be a return to the normal state of affairs prevailing at the beginning of independence. The solution which the neo-colonialists have proposed is precisely what has caused the crisis. It is absurd to suggest that the source of any trouble can be the remedy for it. At the beginning of independence, there existed a Republic, together with its leaders, all elected by the popular will freely expressed. Today, it is beginning to be hinted that the Republic might be extinguished.

182. The crisis began when a foreign Power, disappointed at the failure of pseudo-independence, committed aggression to paralyse the operation of the Congo's institutions and to establish in authority, against the people's will, pre-fabricated colonels who went out of the country to attend a conference arranged by Tshombé at the instigation and on behalf of a foreign Power, in order to Balkanize their country.

183. It is therefore clear that the vague "solution" of a confederation, or of an ill-defined federation, proposed after the murder of the people's representatives is in the highest degree suspect. In contrast, what strikes the observer is the fact that national opinion in the legal Congo coincides with international opinion as exemplified by the United Nations resolutions. The two classes of opinion—national and international—agree in that they both indicate that contempt for the institutions and *Loi fondamentale* of the Congo may lead to a chronic state of anarchy which may spread the danger to other parts of Africa. Both classes of opinion desire the restoration of law and order through the departure of all foreigners endangering peace in the Congo, the punishment of the murderers and their accomplices, the reopening of Parliament and the freeing of the political prisoners. The two classes of opinion are anxious to protect the Republic of the Congo from all overt or covert attempts at dismemberment, and to safeguard the Congo's unity and territorial integrity.

184. In complete opposition to this policy, which is in line with national and international opinion and with the course of history, rises the destructive spectre of neo-colonialism and its henchmen who were determined to destroy Mr. Lumumba's Government because it was serving the higher interests of the people, and to shatter the country's unity and territorial integrity in order to satisfy the insatiable ambitions of a number of companies, in particular the Union minière du Haut-Katanga. The intentions of this powerful company were known well before the Congo achieved its independence. The following statement appeared in the newspaper *L'Echo du Katanga* on 3 December 1959:

"From now on Katanga is resolved and determined to press on with becoming an independent entity . . ."—this, I should like to emphasize, was in 1959—" . . . it can be assumed that it will have, probably about one year from now, its own 'constitution', its own deputies and senators and its own ministers, the great majority of whom will naturally be Africans."

In a word, a Belgian minority was to control the whole of the Congo.

185. Another Congolese newspaper, *Pourquoi pas?*, wrote on 2 January 1960 as follows:

"Katanga declares itself to be an independent State. It claims its total and immediate independence only in order to be better able to join—on certain conditions, however—a structure of federated States."

Here, in January 1960, can already be seen the shadow of the Tanager Conference. The newspaper continues:

"And it is true that the future Constitution of Katanga . . ."—it was, of course, already in preparation—" . . . will afford one, several or all the regions of the Congo the opportunity of uniting with Katanga in a federation, so long as it is clearly understood that there can be no question of separating from Belgium."

186. It is now possible to say that the events at Tananarive have followed a set plan, prepared well before the date of independence, and that this Machiavellian plan took shape in the minds of foreigners, not in those of the Congolese people or the indigenous inhabitants of Katanga. An indigenous inhabitant of the Congo wrote, in the 29 June 1958 issue of *Horizons*:

"The indigenous people of Katanga show little enthusiasm for the idea of separation; they want to remain united. It is the Europeans—especially the settlers—who are naturally the most eager for separation, since they have common economic problems with the Rhodesians . . ."—that is a very important point—" . . . and have similar 'social tendencies'."

187. What is occurring elsewhere in Africa is in itself enough to convince us that the fragmentation of Africa is a general phenomenon and that the case of the Congo is only one particular, although explosive, example. The neighbouring territory of Ruanda-Urundi is in its turn being partitioned in the same way, possibly in order to be later incorporated into that artificial community of federated States linked to Belgium as suggested in the press extracts which I have just quoted.

188. These machinations are a veritable game of deception. First, the idea of a group of Federated States

is thrown out. Later, that shabby federation will be organized at Bakwanga or elsewhere. Lastly, in order to receive the commands of Katanga, the team of Balkanizers will go to Elisabethville and remain there until further orders. And all this is happening without a word as to the intentions behind it, but with a great propaganda clamour and much ado in the Press, to the effect that a meeting of minds is in prospect.

189. The Congolese are free to choose whatever institutions and Government they wish. But it must be the Congolese who express their desires, not Europeans who dictate their orders through men of straw like Tshombé and other puppets. That is the crux of the problem.

190. Morocco's position in this matter is clear. We shall not abandon the fight against neo-colonialism. In this connexion, H.M. the King of Morocco has just, this week, reaffirmed our country's position in a joint Moroccan-Yugoslav communiqué on the Congo, dated 1 April 1960 and issued on the occasion of the official visit paid by Marshal Tito, the Yugoslav Head of State, to Rabat. The communiqué states:

"The two Heads of State condemn the actions of the colonialist and imperialist Powers which are designed to prevent the independent development of the Congo and to break up its territorial integrity. They consider that the Congolese crisis cannot be settled without the immediate withdrawal of the colonialists, the elimination of all foreign interference from outside, the punishment of those who planned and carried out the murder of Prime Minister Lumumba and other Congolese leaders, the respecting of the independence, integrity and unity of the Congo, and the normal functioning of the Congo's legal institutions, in particular the Central Government of Antoine Gizenga."

191. When the Government of Mr. Lumumba decided to exercise control over the profits of the mines and to insist on rights of inspection over their use, and when, on the eve of independence, the elections produced a victory for the late Prime Minister, neo-colonialism brought out the weapon which it had forged in advance: secession plus a vague and watery confederation. It also swore to fight Lumumba and his Government to the death. To mislead others, it endeavours to present Katanga as an independent country where order reigns (at least on the surface), where there is an (ostensibly disciplined) army, where high wages prevail, etc.

192. The Africans who have been freed and who remain faithful to their ideal cannot help feeling saddened and revolted by this policy of crime and division. It is indeed a fight to the death, but the fight is between liberated nationalism and hypocritical neo-colonialism.

193. The PRESIDENT: The general discussion on this item of the agenda has now been concluded. That being so, the Assembly will, I hope, be able at its next meeting—of which due notice will be given in the *Journal*—to proceed to vote on the various draft resolutions and amendments, if any, in connexion with this item. Since the general debate has concluded, interventions at the future meeting or meetings of the Assembly on the item will be confined to explanations of vote.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.