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President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 85

The situation in the Republic of the Congo  
(continued)

The PRESIDENT: Before I come to the list of speakers inscribed for this afternoon, I give the floor to the Secretary-General.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The last intervention yesterday afternoon [969th meeting], made by the spokesman of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), contains one substantive point which, in my view, requires an immediate clarification so as to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding. I therefore wish to avail myself of the possibility of replying on this specific point, reserving my right, if necessary, to revert to other points of the intervention and to other speakers at a later stage.

The speaker referred to point 3 in the so-called status agreement<sup>1</sup> with the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, of 27 July 1960, and quoted the first paragraph of this basic agreement in full. Obviously the representative had not been properly informed by his advisers about the sense of the passage quoted, which says that:

"...the Government of the Republic and the Secretary-General state their intention to proceed immediately... to explore jointly specific aspects of the functioning of the UN Force."

The representative read into this a commitment of prior co-operation and consultation on all United Nations operations. However, the text quoted is in substance something much more limited and much more precise: the passage is simply a declaration of intention to conclude a so-called status agreement. I suppose that, just as the speaker had not been informed about the sense of the text he quoted, he was not aware of the fact that a draft of such a status agreement was presented to the Government on 2 September 1960, but that thereafter nothing was done by the Congo to get negotiations under way for the well-known reason that for months the authorities were not in a position to negotiate, the Central Government having broken up. Parliament being suspended and no constitutional

authority functioning with the right to commit the Republic in international negotiations.

5. A few days ago, from the United Nations side, in consultation with the Advisory Committee, I renewed the invitation to the Congo to negotiate the substance of a status agreement. I hope that the Congolese authorities will be able and willing finally to implement the passage quoted by the representative in accordance with the stated intention—although obviously the form of a status agreement now would have to be adjusted to the constitutional difficulties which still prevail.

6. The reasons why the Congolese authorities have never followed up point 3 in the basic agreement are only part of an aspect of the Congo picture, omitted in the speech to which the General Assembly listened yesterday. Thus, in the attempt at an evaluation of the United Nations contribution made in that statement, did the Assembly find any reference to the fact that the authorities in Leopoldville, even at the time when the United Nations came to the Congo, were not recognized all over the Republic, that soon thereafter the Central Government broke up, that later the administration claiming authority in Leopoldville was extra-constitutional, that the Congolese National Army instead of contributing to the maintenance of law and order was used by various leaders to further other political objectives, that too many in the Congo saw fit to demonstrate their nationalism by attacks on the United Nations and by trying to render its aims suspect, and, finally, that too many accepted or even furthered this or that kind of continued foreign intervention in support of their own aims and ambitions?

7. However, all this is well known to the Members of the General Assembly, and I have no reason to discuss such aspects of this intervention any more than similar aspects of other interventions which, for entirely different purposes, have also found it convenient to try to put the blame for all that happened in the Congo on the United Nations. Such efforts lead, indeed, to strange alliances.

8. It has been said that the United Nations operation in the Congo is disappointing or even a failure. It seems reasonable to ask those who say so whether the reason for their disappointment is that the Organization has done anything less than it could do, or that elements beyond the control of the Organization have created difficulties which at the present stage of its development are insuperable for the instrument for international co-operation which Members have created in the United Nations, even when that instrument is strained to its utmost capacity. One can blame a mountain climber for his failure to reach the summit when his road has been blocked by an avalanche, but to do so is an irresponsible play on words.

9. In ending, I would, without any other comments than those provided by facts as they can be evaluated

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960*, document S/4389/Add.5.

by all Members, like to quote the first of the three points of the basic agreement of 27 July 1960, a point to which the speaker yesterday did not refer. There, the Government of the Republic of the Congo states that:

"...in the exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to any question concerning the presence and functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military assistance from the United Nations and by its acceptance of the resolutions of the Security Council of 14 and 22 July 1960;"

And, further, that:

"...it will ensure the freedom of movement of the Force in the interior of the country and will accord the requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the activities of the Force."

10. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq): May I first express to the people and Government of Cuba my delegation's deep sympathy on the sudden and untimely passing of our dear friend and esteemed colleague, Mr. Manuel Bisbé, permanent representative of Cuba to the United Nations.

11. My delegation has on several occasions expressed its views on the situation in the Congo. At the Security Council last month [938th meeting], we reiterated the view shared by a substantial number of Members of the United Nations that Belgium, by its persistent disregard and flagrant violation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, bears a major responsibility for the deterioration of the situation in the Congo.

12. We fully endorsed the resolution which the Security Council adopted on 21 February 1960,<sup>2</sup> and we hoped that that clear unequivocal expression of concern of the international community would be heeded by Belgium.

13. Unfortunately paragraph 2 (a) of that resolution, urging the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian military and paramilitary personnel and advisers, has not been implemented. In fact, it remains to this day a dead letter, and it is quite conceivable that the number of Belgian personnel has increased rather than diminished in the few weeks which have elapsed since the adoption of the resolution. A close look at the correspondence carried on between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Belgian Government reveals a sad picture of evasion and procrastination, which leaves little doubt of Belgium's intention to flout this last resolution in the same way that it has flouted all the previous resolutions. This places on the United Nations a responsibility which cannot be shirked any longer. It is our considered view that the success or failure of the entire United Nations operation in the Congo depends upon the speed with which the Belgian withdrawal is effected. So long as Belgian advisers and military and other personnel remain in the Congo, there will be no peace and there will be no hope of the United Nations Force discharging the important tasks entrusted to it by the resolution of 21 February.

14. My delegation therefore fully supports the proposal of the delegations of Ghana and Yugoslavia that

a time-limit should be fixed for the withdrawal of all Belgian personnel from the Congo and that if beyond that date the withdrawal is not completed, then the United Nations should be authorized to use force if necessary. We also support the suggestion of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia [967th meeting] that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution containing, among other things, an unequivocal condemnation of Belgium for its refusal to implement the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and a request to the Security Council to invoke sanctions against Belgium in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter.

15. We cannot emphasize too strongly the imperative necessity of securing the total and unconditional withdrawal of all Belgians from the Congo, because without such a withdrawal all our efforts here and in the Congo will be fruitless and may lead to further deterioration of a situation fraught with the gravest dangers to international peace and security.

16. The Conciliation Commission has revealed in its report [A/4711, and Corr.1, A/4711/Add.1 and 2] the extent of Belgian intervention and its ruinous effects, on the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo. Let me just cite a few quotations from its report. The Commission states: "the Union Minière du Haut Katanga finances the Katanga authorities to an appreciable extent" [A/4711, para. 61]. Further on the report states: "It is a fair presumption that Mr. Tshombé, Mr. Kalonji could not have attempted his secessionist plans without foreign aid." [Ibid., para. 63].

17. Even more categorical and devastating is the assertion in paragraph 110 that:

"The root cause of the crisis in the Congo has been the attitude of Belgium, its past performance, and its continued interference in the affairs of the Congo."

18. Finally, in paragraph 142 it is stated:

"The Commission deplores the continued presence in various parts of the Republic of the Congo of large numbers of Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel, political advisers, and mercenaries. The Commission feels that immediate steps should be taken to remove forthwith all such personnel not under the United Nations Command from the territory of the Republic of the Congo."

19. These comments, emanating from a group of impartial and dedicated men, distinguished in the service of their respective countries, should convince even the most sceptical among us of the clear responsibility of Belgium and the need for prompt and speedy action to end its interference and eliminate its nefarious influence in the Congo.

20. Since the adoption of the resolution of the Security Council on 21 February, two developments have taken place which have seriously threatened the position of the United Nations in the Congo. The first relates to the incidents at Banana and Matadi, where a small force of Sudanese troops was overwhelmed by a much larger and better equipped force of Congolese soldiers, compelling the United Nations to relinquish its control over the vital port of Matadi.

21. I should like to express on behalf of my Government and the people of Iraq our profound sympathy with the people and Government of the Sudan and to

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.

add our voice in strongly deploring the failure of the United Nations Command in the Congo to provide adequate and timely assistance to the Sudanese garrison which, despite its smallness, was entrusted with the heavy and difficult task of defending the main supply centre of the United Nations operation.

22. It is needless for me to say that the incident at Matadi has demonstrated in a tragic manner the degree of impotence and helplessness to which the United Nations has been reduced by the continued weakness and vacillation of the United Nations Command in the Congo.

23. A repetition of the Matadi incident would, in our view, seal the doom of the United Nations operation in the Congo and make it impossible for many countries such as the Sudan which has loyally and steadfastly defended the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace to the Congo, to continue giving its support.

24. The other development which has had a most adverse effect on the situation in the Congo is the Conference at Tananarive<sup>3</sup> in which the puppets of colonialism parcelled out the Congo among themselves as though that country and its people were their own private property. They decided, without a shadow of legality, to divide the country and destroy the unity for which the Congolese people have fought so long and so hard.

25. This is a serious matter which goes to the very core of the Congo problem. It will be recalled that the conflict between the late Patrice Lumumba and the colonialists arose primarily because of the efforts of Belgium and its trusted tool, Tshombé, to dismember the Congo and violate its territorial integrity. Lumumba saw very clearly from the beginning that there could be no hope for the future of the Congo unless its unity was preserved. He wanted to create from the diverse tribes and ethnic groups in the Congo a unified nation which would take its rightful place in Africa and in the world at large. But that was a prospect which did not suit the Belgians and their friends. They preferred to see a weak and divided Congo deprived of its main source of wealth in Katanga which, as President Nkrumah said, was developed by the blood, sweat and great sacrifice of the Congolese people.

26. It is for this reason that our people and so many other peoples in Asia, Africa and elsewhere saw in Lumumba the eloquent and true representative of the great progressive force of dynamic African nationalism which, despite temporary setbacks, is forging ahead to build a strong Africa united by the common heritage of its people and sustained by its determination to secure for itself and its descendents a life of freedom and dignity, to which they have so fervently aspired but which has been denied to them for so long.

27. For this reason we fully share the view of the Foreign Minister of Ghana that it is not up to Kasa-Vubu, Tshombé and their like to decide the future of the Congo or change its fundamental laws and alter its system of government.

28. It is only the Congolese people, acting freely, who can ultimately determine their country's destiny. It is necessary, therefore, that Parliament should be convened without delay. This is precisely what the Conciliation Commission recommended in paragraph 139 of its report. If this should prove difficult, then we

fully agree with the Foreign Minister of Ghana that elections should be held within one month under United Nations supervision, with adequate safeguards and guarantees so that the Congolese people can fully and freely elect their own representatives.

29. This, however, does not in any way detract from the fact that the Government of Iraq has recognized the Government of Antoine Gizenga as the only legitimate Central Government of the Congo. It is our firm belief that this Government, which derives its legitimacy from the parliamentary support given to the Government of the late Patrice Lumumba, is the only one which is entitled to speak and act on behalf of the Congolese people.

30. These two recent developments—the incident at Matadi and the Conference of Tananarive—must be viewed against the background of Belgian intervention and considered as a continuation of the efforts, which began last July, to sabotage the United Nations operation and maintain foreign influence in the Congo.

31. The Katanga secession, the Kalonji secession, Lumumba's dismissal, Mobutu's illegal seizure of power, the suspension of Parliament, the seating of Kasa-Vubu's delegation in the Assembly, the arrest of Lumumba, his transfer to Katanga and, finally, his brutal murder, and now the open and armed defiance hurled at the United Nations at Matadi and the dismemberment of the Congo at Tananarive complete the sordid picture of treachery and deceit and expose the intricate conspiracy hatched by Belgium and its friends to enslave the Congo and to continue the exploitation of its great riches. Can there be any doubt that this long and disastrous journey on which the Congo has been taken, beginning with the Katanga secession and ending at Tananarive, was inspired by Belgium and its friends? Is it conceivable that the colonial puppets in the Congo would have dared to adopt this defiant attitude towards the United Nations without the help and backing of Belgium, and how could Belgium itself have persisted in its intransigence without the support and sympathy of its friends and powerful allies?

32. It is therefore ironic that those who have supported directly, or indirectly by their silent acquiescence, the continued defiance of the United Nations by Belgium and her puppets, should now cry loudest and lament the difficulties in which the United Nations finds itself in the Congo. If the United Nations operation in the Congo fails it will be entirely the fault of Belgium and its allies and friends who, even at this very late hour, if they so desire, can extricate the United Nations from its predicament by prevailing upon Belgium and their own clients in the Congo to respect the United Nations and implement its decisions. It is not enough for them to declare from this rostrum that they want the United Nations to succeed in the Congo. These solemn pronouncements will lose all meaning if they are not matched by deeds. Do not tell us here you want the United Nations to succeed. Tell that to the Belgians and their stooges in the Congo. They are the ones who have been defying the United Nations and obstructing its path. If you really want to save the United Nations, then use whatever moral and material influence you may have to prevail on the Belgians and compel them if necessary to respect the United Nations and to abide loyally by its decisions. This is not a conflict among the great Powers, though it could develop into one. This is a conflict between the Congolese people and their colonial oppressors.

<sup>3</sup> Round-table Conference, held from 8-14 March 1961.

33. The United Nations has been called on to resolve this dispute and to prevent it from becoming a threat to international peace and security, but it can only do so if it remains loyal to the principles of its Charter by defending weak and helpless nations against external aggression. The smaller countries have been trying, but unfortunately without much success, to enable the United Nations to play its role, but all their efforts have been systematically frustrated by Belgium and its friends. The time has come to try once again, maybe for the last time, to dissuade Belgium from its disastrous course.

34. As far as my delegation is concerned, we believe that two basic objectives must be fulfilled without delay: (1) the speedy and unconditional withdrawal of Belgian personnel, with the use of the United Nations Force to effect such withdrawal if necessary, and (2) either the convening of Parliament or the holding of new elections, under United Nations supervision, as soon as possible.

35. When the country is finally rid of the Belgians and its people are ready to choose freely their own representatives, then and only then will there be an atmosphere of co-operation and mutual trust which is so vital for the success of the United Nations operation in the Congo.

36. As we have stated on many occasions, the smaller countries cannot afford to let this unique experiment in international co-operation fail or falter. The prestige and even the future of the United Nations is involved in the Congo. What better guarantee can the small countries of the world have than a strong United Nations commanding world-wide respect and support? I can find no better words than those uttered recently by the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Mr. Hashim Jawad. He said:

"It is hardly necessary to say that at this particular moment the United Nations finds itself in a very difficult situation. As a matter of fact, it is possible to say that even the very existence of the United Nations is being challenged by many forces and from many sides.

"We in this country, and I am sure we speak on behalf of all small and weak nations, believe that the United Nations is a vital necessity for our age. It is our duty to strengthen this Organization and make it more effective.

"Our only salvation as small nations is to find and to promote all the favourable conditions that make out of this United Nations an Organization which functions in accordance with the aspirations of peoples everywhere. Those who work to weaken the United Nations, to strangle its possibilities of expansion, are those who are working against peace, against justice and against the development of all the millions of people who suffer deprivation and poverty.

"Thus we believe that those who work to weaken the United Nations are working against humanity. We should join hands with other people who share our views to fight these forces which are the evil forces in our present generation."

37. These words make it quite clear that we in Iraq do not agree with the prophets of doom who are ready to write off the United Nations as another League of Nations, and we will not be discouraged by the present difficulties facing the Organization, however formid-

able they are and however insurmountable they may seem, because the United Nations with all its imperfections is far superior to anything that man has so far devised to meet the great challenges of this explosive age.

38. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) (*translated from French*): My delegation, which is taking the floor for the first time in the plenary session of the General Assembly, wishes to express to the Cuban delegation its heartfelt sympathy and deep regret at the sudden death of that eminent diplomat, Mr. Manuel Bisbé, who was the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations.

39. The delegation of the Republic of the Ivory Coast supported resolution 1498 (XV) of 22 November 1960 in which the General Assembly accepted the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) issued by Mr. Kasa-Vubu, the Head of the State, and communicated by him to the President of the General Assembly in a letter dated 8 November 1960.

40. My delegation put forward two arguments in the connexion: first, a *de facto* argument, to wit, the urgent need for a Congolese delegation to occupy the Congo's seat and to participate in the debate which was about to open. All the African delegations were agreed in recognizing this urgent need, since the idea came from one of our eminent Heads of State, who suggested it in his statement to the General Assembly. The only difference of view related to the question of which delegation should be seated. My delegation thought—and it still thinks—that, in accordance with international custom and international law, diplomatic representatives are accredited to Heads of State and by Heads of State.

41. Rule 27 of the Assembly's rules of procedure supports this point of view when it enumerates the authorities from whom United Nations representatives should receive their credentials. President Kasa-Vubu was one of those authorities, in fact the first Congolese authority according to the rules of international precedence, as long as those rules remain in force, my delegation will not in any way alter its previous position.

42. But my delegation stressed that its recognition of the international legality of the credentials of the delegation issued by President Kasa-Vubu did not mean that it was taking a position with respect to the substance of the debate. Moreover, it would like to know the reasons for the opening of this debate on the Congo. Normally, when a General Assembly appoints a commission and entrusts it with a particular mission, it hears the reports of that commission, discusses them and draws a conclusion from them. We are acting as if a Conciliation Commission had not left for the Congo. Are we afraid of its conclusions? Are we afraid that the decisions reached at Tananarive may result in a settlement of the Congo problem? Are we afraid that the Heads of State meeting at Yaounde<sup>4</sup> may induce the Congolese to settle their differences? Do we now wish to obstruct the efforts of the African Heads of States which will lead them within the next few days to their doyen, Mr. Tubman, with a view to finding an agreed solution to be suggested to the Congolese authorities?

43. It is my delegation's impression that each representative wants only that solution to the Congolese

<sup>4</sup> Conference of Heads of French-speaking African States, held from 27 to 30 March 1961.

problem which will be in conformity with his own views and his own ideology. But since the debate is now open, my delegation wishes, for the first time, to speak on the substance of the problem.

44. Until it attained independence the Congo was practically closed to other Africans. The first official visit we made to the Congo was on the occasion of the independence celebrations. When the delegation of the Republic of the Ivory Coast left the Congo it felt very uneasy: uneasy because of the multiplicity of parties with a racial or tribal basis; uneasy because of the lack of senior officials, both political and administrative. This lack made us fear that the Congo's independence might be purely fictitious and that the effective direction of the country's affairs would remain in the hands of the colonial Administration.

45. Our fears were to be confirmed shortly afterwards by the mutiny which broke out at Leopoldville and the secession of Katanga. The mutiny was followed by the immediate intervention of the Belgian army on the pretext of protecting Belgian nationals. It was then that the legitimate Government of the Congo, led by Patrice Lumumba, in agreement with the legitimate Head of State, President Kasa-Vubu, appealed to the United Nations for help in removing a foreign army which, by claiming to ensure the protection of Belgian citizens and of their property, could hold the Congo in its sway.

46. It was therefore clear that the task of the United Nations forces was to help the Congolese to rid themselves of a foreign army and to consolidate their independence and the integrity of their territory.

47. The United Nations forces arrived in the Congo amidst the utmost confusion and at the height of an institutional crisis. President Kasa-Vubu had just dismissed Patrice Lumumba, who, in turn, deposed President Kasa-Vubu, claiming that he had violated the *Loi fondamentale*.

48. In the face of such a confused situation, what attitude was the United Nations to adopt? There were two possible alternatives. The first was for the United Nations to place itself at the disposal of the legal government. But was there one at that time, since President Kasa-Vubu had dismissed Patrice Lumumba on 5 September 1960? The action he had just taken was legal and in conformity with article 22 of the *Loi fondamentale*, which states: "The Head of State appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and the Ministers."

49. The United Nations could of course have found a Lumumba government conducting day-to-day business, but there again the *Loi fondamentale* only authorizes a government to conduct day-to-day business in the case of resignation; it does not provide for the case of dismissal.

50. Consequently the United Nations was faced with a governmental vacuum. It is true that there are governments in the Congo, but they are only legal in so far as they remain within their provincial jurisdiction; thus the Gizenga government is no more legal than is the Iléo government, which has not been invested by Parliament; nor was the Council of Commissioners legal, since it resulted from a defective military revolution.

51. The Congolese themselves do not seem to be in agreement, and it was not for the United Nations to say which was the legal government. The United Nations was not entitled to take sides in the institutional crisis. In that institutional conflict, in which Kasa-Vubu,

Lumumba, Tshombé and others were involved, the United Nations could not intervene because it would have been obliged to overthrow one or the other and that would have amounted to direct intervention in the affairs of the Congo. That was certainly not its mission.

52. The second alternative was to place itself between the antagonists in order to prevent them coming to blows. That meant taking an enormous risk. We know that when two people are fighting and someone comes between them in order to separate them, he inevitably gets hit; but according to whether he uses his right hand or his left hand to defend himself, we know that, since one hand is stronger than the other, the person who was struck by the stronger hand will say that the intruder sided with his opponent.

53. The United Nations chose the second alternative; it must be acknowledged that its position is thus extremely difficult. This can only be a temporary attitude and it should revert to a more stable one which could open the way to a solution of the Congolese problem.

54. What was the mission entrusted to the United Nations? We have before us several Security Council resolutions: those of 14 and 22 July 1960, that of 9 August 1960,<sup>5</sup> and that of 21 February 1961.<sup>6</sup> In that last resolution the Security Council advocates the use of force if necessary. My delegation hopes that the debate will not become heated; hence it would like the Assembly to go back to the resolution of 14 July 1960, the first one, the one adopted in wisdom; the others came during the development of the Congolese affair with all its overtones of high feeling and cold war.

[*The representative of the Ivory Coast read out resolution S/4387.*]

55. What results have we achieved? The United Nations intervention has certainly not been negative; it has prevented the Congo from falling into unprecedented economic stagnation and it has campaigned against poverty and famine. At the military level, the advance of foreign troops was stopped but these forces immediately changed their method of intervention: they are supplying experts and officers to lead the Congolese armies.

56. Civil war will probably be avoided. But have the Congolese been prevented from killing each other? We should like to express here our heartfelt indignation at the heinous crime of the murder of Patrice Lumumba and his fellow prisoners. The Government of the Ivory Coast strongly condemns this inhuman practice of physically eliminating one's political opponents. We say this all the more vehemently because our party, a branch of that great movement which forms the *Rassemblement démocratique africain* headed by President Houphouët-Boigny, despite the murder of many of its active members by the colonial Administration—with, alas, the collusion of some of our fellow-countrymen—has always opposed such methods. Not a single European, not a single political opponent, has been assassinated. What is more, it has preached reconciliation and national unity, and today our brothers who were the accomplices of repression have rejoined that great movement; some are ministers and others diplomats. The Govern-

<sup>5</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960*, documents S/4387, S/4405 and S/4426 respectively.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961*, document S/4741.

ment of the Ivory Coast therefore condemns this hideous crime, but it wishes to stress from this rostrum that it condemns with equal vigour all political murders, wherever they occur and whatever may be the reasons for them.

57. It is said that the United Nations must restore order in the Congo. We agree. But what order? That of Kasa-Vubu, of Mobutu, of Tshombé, or Kalonji or of Gizenga, or that of the United Nations—and in that last case, must the United Nations fight against the Congolese? It would be the first time that an independent country, perhaps more or less representative of the people, would have been strengthened, not by internal forces but by an international force coming to subdue an independent country under the pretext of restoring order there.

58. Let us be realistic and follow a policy which we have the means to carry out. A journalist defined the United Nations—perhaps too harshly—as an international government with the police force of a principality, an assembly possessing universal sovereignty which enacts many laws but has no means of enforcing them. The United Nations must not come to that; it would be the beginning of chaos in the world. Far from maintaining international peace and security, the United Nations would then be an instrument of upheaval.

59. The Congo is not the first country in the world to be troubled with institutional quarrels. Civil war with the aim of cementing the unity of a country or imposing the point of view of a few sections is, alas, a commonplace today. Is the United Nations ready to mobilize for a crusade of unity in Asia, Latin America and Europe? Let us stop treating Africa as a country which has not yet come of age. Africa for the Africans, the Congo for the Congolese.

60. The United Nations must protect the Congolese against foreign intervention. It must co-operate with the authorities of the Congo and give them technical and military assistance. Such are the provisions of the resolution of 14 July 1960. But with what authorities is it to co-operate? There are three legal institutions in the Congo: the Head of State, the Government and the Parliament.

61. My delegation has just expressed its view on the legality of the governments in the Congo in relation to the *Loi fondamentale*. In its opinion all the governments which claim to have jurisdiction over the whole Congolese State are illegal, either because they have not been invested by Parliament or because they are the heirs of a Government which was legally dismissed under article 22 of the *Loi fondamentale*. Governments in the Congo are legion and everyone calls the one of his choice legal. Had the confusion in the Congo not given rise to similar confusion in the United Nations, we should have noticed that we are departing from the international rule under which recognition is granted at the State level and diplomatic missions must be accredited to the Head of State and not to the Head of the Government. Even supposing the Head of the Government were at Stanleyville, the Head of State is at Leopoldville and hence it is at Leopoldville that we should all be assembled.

62. At the risk of shocking our republican beliefs, my delegation notes that nowhere in the *Loi fondamentale* is the sovereignty of Parliament mentioned. Perhaps it goes without saying; but my delegation knows that all the old republican democracies state it

specifically and all the new African Republics have done so: sovereignty shall be vested in the people; the people shall exercise it either directly or through their representatives, and no individual or section of the people may assume the exercise of it. That is the stock phrase.

63. The *Loi fondamentale* was made at Brussels, and all the countries of Europe, Asia and Africa know that in a monarchy sovereignty is not always vested in the people. It was certainly not through misrepresentation or by way of a joke that cries of "Long live the King" were mingled with those of "Long live the President" during the demonstrations in the Congo. In fact, article 15 of the *Loi fondamentale* provides that the legislative power is exercised collectively by the Head of State and the Chamber of Representatives.

64. The legislative power of the Head of State is even more clearly defined in exceptional circumstances, for under article 37 of the *Loi fondamentale* full powers are granted not to the Government but to the Head of State.

65. Parliament is not functioning; it was prorogued by a legal act which became illegal because Parliament was neither convened nor dissolved within one month. But the Parliament is fully entitled to meet where it wishes, even at Stanleyville, and if it cannot do so it is because a *de facto* power prevents it. That is perhaps a *coup d'état* with regard to Parliament, but successful *coups d'état* are sometimes a source of legality and there are many delegations here whose legality is derived from that source. We are of course agreed that Parliament should be convened, but does anyone think that my delegation's agreement and the agreement of the others here will ensure progress in the Congo problem?

66. Is the fact that Parliament is not functioning really an obstacle for the United Nations? Who is to convene Parliament? The United Nations? Some delegations advocate this and demand that it should be done even by force. What a dangerous precedent for peace! I assure you that my Government is not afraid of that precedent. It simply wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a country, but it is very much afraid for certain countries whose Parliaments, for reasons which are not for us to discuss, are unable to meet at present or, what is more, have no Parliament at all.

67. What the United Nations would not and could not do in other continents or in other countries, it must not do in Africa and in the Congo. We cannot put forward the non-functioning of Parliament as a pretext for failing to recognize a legal authority. My delegation is not siding with any particular faction among those which are conducting a fratricidal war in the Congo. It is merely convinced that the United Nations will not succeed in its mission unless it supports a Congolese authority and, through such co-operation, convinces that authority of the need to return to legality. Consequently my delegation is trying, in the light of the facts and legal realities of the Congo, to suggest an authority.

68. Whatever may be said of President Kasa-Vubu, everyone is in agreement in recognizing him as Head of the Congolese State. Not a single United Nations delegation has denied that he has that status. All the Congolese, including the authorities at Stanleyville, recognize Kasa-Vubu as Head of State. Did not Mr. Gizenga send him a cable requesting him, in his capacity as Head of State, to convene Parliament? Did he not

indicate that Kasa-Vubu was the Head of the State and that he, Gizenga, was the Head of the legal Government? Did not Tshombé, for his part, ask Kasa-Vubu to go to Tananarive because he represented the only authority recognized abroad? The authorities, whether *de jure* or *de facto*, which are in conflict in the Congo agree on one point only: Kasa-Vubu is the Head of State.

69. Let the United Nations cast a glance at developments in Africa South of the Sahara. The attainment of independence without bloodshed was only possible because all the ethnic groups—and the Ivory Coast has forty—were united round one leader: Sékou Touré in Guinea, Modibo Keita in Mali, Senghor in Senegal, Yaméogo in Upper Volta, Hamani Diori in the Niger, Maga in Dahomey, Nkrumah in Ghana, Tsiranana in Madagascar, Houphouët-Boigny in the Ivory Coast. . . . That is a fact of African life and if it was understood the Congo would be saved. The Congolese Head of State is no different from other African Heads of State. If he is surrounded by good advisers, he will be able to make all the necessary concessions to bring about union and maintain the integrity of the Congo.

70. Let the United Nations base its action on this reality; let it co-operate with the Head of State; let it inspire him with confidence, so that United Nations experts and advisers may replace the foreign experts and advisers of the Head of State, who do the Congo more harm than good. That is the only way to maintain the integrity of the Congo and it will enable Leopoldville to be obeyed even by Elisabethville. The African countries known as the "Brazzaville" States are ready to assist the United Nations if that is to be its policy. They are in a position to take part in the military efforts by supplying 12,000 soldiers to the United Nations contingent and by placing experts, technicians and doctors at the disposal of the Congo. The policy of union must be followed.

71. It is sickening to see Belgians, or other foreigners, evading the authorities of their country and coming to enlist in Congolese armies to fight Congolese—on behalf of other Congolese, they say.

72. We deny that other countries have the right to do what the United Nations cannot do. We ask those who are supplying the Congolese with arms to stop doing so. If the Congolese want to kill each other, we would rather they did so with arrows or knives than with rifles and machine-guns. Military technical assistance to the Congo must come from the United Nations or through the United Nations.

73. The Congolese problem is a human problem. It has been complicated by the rivalries and quarrels of people who are seeking the prestige of office and not the interests of the Congo. Foreigners should not aggravate the situation. We ask them not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Congo. On the contrary, we ask them to assist the Congolese who are seeking agreement, by inducing those over whom they have some influence to meet their brothers in order to determine what institutions are suitable for their country. The political solution must be found not in New York but in the Congo, and by the Congolese themselves. We must help them to do this by inducing all the leaders to settle their differences in the interests of the Congo alone. Let those who wish to help the Congo disregard their own interests.

74. Finally, we ask those who have influence with the Powers concerned, or who have very close relations with those Powers, to do what they can to induce them to cease their perverse actions, which are harmful to the Congo and to Africa. In implementation of resolution 1474 (ES-IV), which stipulates that there must be no intervention in the Congo except through the United Nations, our Heads of State are ready to assist the United Nations in its mission. It is in the interest of the United Nations to make use of them. We do not, of course, wish to adopt a policy of regionalism. But, just as we should use discretion in intervening in the problems of Kashmir, Tibet, Laos, Korea and Germany, so we ask that the same discretion should be observed with regard to the Congolese problem, because even though you may claim to have all the facts, you will never understand the psychological factors involved in Africa. If the United Nations is not willing to take these factors into account, we may be sure that its efforts will be doomed to failure. We do not want this to happen. The United Nations must not fail.

75. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (*translated from French*): The Belgian colonialists' aggression against the new independent African State, the Republic of the Congo, was launched at a time when the process of liquidating the last vestiges of the much-hated colonial system was entering a decisive stage.

76. As is always the case just before a major defeat, the losers throw into the fray all the resources that are still available to them. Those are the special circumstances which account for the fact that the Congo crisis has focused the attention of world opinion on the serious crisis in the United Nations.

77. We can, of course, make speeches full of righteous indignation denying the existence of that crisis and justifying the present state of affairs in the United Nations, but kind words cannot conceal the undeniable fact that the United Nations operation in the Congo has failed.

78. In order to have an accurate idea of its failure, we must remember the objectives of the United Nations operation in the Congo and weigh them against the situation as it is today.

79. According to the Security Council resolutions of 14 and 22 July 1960 and 9 August 1960<sup>7</sup> and the General Assembly resolution of 20 September 1960 [1474 (ES-IV)], those purposes were as follows: to provide military assistance to the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo against the Belgian aggressor; to take all the necessary steps to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian troops and Belgian military and paramilitary personnel from the Congo; to help to safeguard the unity and integrity of the country; and, lastly, to help the legal Central Government of the Republic of the Congo to restore order and security in the country.

80. Nine months after the beginning of the United Nations operation, the situation in the Congo, as everybody agrees, is much worse than it was before.

81. Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister of the legal Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, the national hero of the Congolese people's fight for liberation, the very man who had made the request

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, documents S/4387, S/4405 and S/4426 respectively.

to the United Nations for assistance, has been the victim of a cowardly murder. The murder of Patrice Lumumba and other Congolese patriots was committed before the very eyes of the United Nations Force.

82. The Belgian colonial aggression is continuing, particularly in the form of infiltration of Belgian military and paramilitary personnel in all the civilian and military institutions of Leopoldville, Kasai and Katanga.

83. The unity and integrity of the country have been all but destroyed. Over most of the territory of the Republic of the Congo, the people are being subjected to the high-handed action and terrorism practiced by gangs of outlaws subsidized and directed by Belgians and other foreign agents.

84. "The country is on the verge of catastrophe . . ." says the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo in paragraph 115 of its report [A/4711 and Add.1 and 2], which was recently circulated and which fully confirms the description of the situation in the Congo which I have just given.

85. The very fact that, in these circumstances, some representatives who have spoken here have seen fit to congratulate Mr. Hammarskjöld upon the results obtained in the Congo and to reaffirm their confidence in him proves that those were precisely the results upon which the colonialist circles had reckoned.

86. The Belgian colonialist aggression is at the root of the present woes of the Congolese people. Of that, there is not the shadow of a doubt. But it is the powerlessness of the United Nations to put an end to that aggression that has complicated and aggravated the situation. It will be found, upon closer examination, that it is not really a matter of powerlessness but rather the lack of any desire to take action to give effect, in the spirit and in the letter, to the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

87. There have been three distinct stages in what is commonly referred to as the United Nations operation in the Congo.

88. In the first stage, the colonialists, acting through Mr. Hammarskjöld and the United Nations Command in the Congo—which was constituted almost exclusively on the basis of personnel recruited in the NATO countries—used the United Nations operation in the Congo in order to undermine the legal Central Government headed by Patrice Lumumba and to prevent it from exercising its authority.

89. The United Nations Command denied the Prime Minister of the legal Central Government of the Republic of the Congo access to the radio station and prevented him from utilizing the country's airports; it did nothing, however, to prevent the airports and ports of entry into the Congo from being used to ensure a steady flow of arms and military personnel from the Belgian colonialists and others to strengthen the position of their agents.

90. During his first visit to the Congo, Mr. Hammarskjöld avoided any encounter with Patrice Lumumba but went to Katanga to deal directly with the secessionist, Tshombé. Here is what Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister of the legal Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, wrote to Mr. Hammarskjöld at the time:

" . . . you are acting as though my Government, which is the repository of legal authority, and is

alone qualified to deal with the United Nations, did not exist.

"The manner in which you have acted until now is only retarding the restoration of order in the Republic, particularly in the province of Katanga, whereas the Security Council has solemnly declared that the purpose of the intervention is the complete restoration of order in the Republic of the Congo . . . Furthermore, the conversations you have just had with Mr. Moïse Tshombé, the assurances you have given him and the statements he has just made to the Press are ample evidence that you are making yourself a party to the conflict between the rebel government of Katanga and the legal Government of the Republic, that you are intervening in this conflict and that you are using the United Nations Force to influence its outcome.

"It is incomprehensible to me that you should have sent only Swedish and Irish troops to Katanga, systematically excluding troops from the African States even though some of the latter were the first to be landed at Leopoldville. In this matter, you have acted in connivance with the rebel government of Katanga and at the instigation of the Belgian Government."<sup>8</sup>

This condemnation of the part played by Hammarskjöld in the Congo tragedy has today an echo from beyond the grave, which gives it added weight.

91. The second stage began with the seizure of power by the Belgian agent, Mobutu, which led to the arrest of Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister of the legal Government, the suspension of the Parliament and the beginning of a régime of terror and anarchy throughout the country.

92. As the distinguished President of the Republic of Ghana showed in his statement of 7 March 1961 [961st plenary meeting], Mobutu's terrorist gangs were paid as they have been since, through Mr. Hammarskjöld's good offices, with money from the funds allocated to finance the United Nations operation in the Congo.

93. In contrast with the active role which it played during the first stage to prevent the legal Central Government from organizing and building up the country's defences against the Belgian aggressor, the United Nations operation in the Congo, in this second stage, became an exercise in diplomacy and paper-work. Mr. Hammarskjöld and the United Nations Command in the Congo constantly engaged in palavers with the colonialist agents of Leopoldville, Katanga and South Kasai. While these palavers were going on, Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Okito, Maurice Mpolo, Finant and other Congolese patriots were handed over by the Belgian executioners of Leopoldville to the Belgian executioners of Katanga and South Kasai.

94. The planes which flew the Congolese patriots to their place of execution took off from airports controlled by the United Nations Force, the very same airports which the United Nations Command had prevented Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba from using. Mr. Hammarskjöld and the United Nations Command in the Congo did not refuse to the executioners what they had denied to those executioners' victims.

95. The third stage of the United Nations operation in the Congo started after the first wave of indignation

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/4417/Add.7.



created throughout the world by the murder of Patrice Lumumba and other heroes of the Congolese people's struggle for national liberation had begun to subside. During that stage, the colonialists sought legal recognition for the régime set up by Belgian agents in Katanga, South Kasai and Leopoldville.

96. As a result of culpable acquiescence by its Command, the United Nations Force was reduced to a state of almost total subjection and its use of airfields and ports for the movement and supply of its troops became dependent upon the whim of the secessionist authorities.

97. The United Nations Command in the Congo and other high officials of the United Nations to whom Mr. Hammarskjöld has delegated powers are now negotiating, with representatives of the secessionist factions, agreements the purpose of which is not so much to settle the problems created by the presence of the United Nations Force in the Congo as to enhance the authority of those factions in the eyes of the Congolese, by presenting them in the guise of partners of the United Nations.

98. The only specific military operation in which the United Nations Force is now engaged is the sealing-off of the area controlled by the Government of Mr. Antoine Gizenga, which is the only legitimate successor to the legal Central Government formerly headed by Patrice Lumumba.

99. Having helped, through Mr. Hammarskjöld and the United Nations Command in the Congo, to bring about the present state of affairs, the colonialists are now urging that the *de facto* situation created by their doings should be the starting-point for any solution of the Congo issue—in other words, that the destruction of the country's national territorial unity should be confirmed and that colonial power in the Congo should be restored.

100. The idea of setting up a loose federation, instead of an independent, unitary State, did not originate at Tananarive. It is that of the Belgian colonialists. They put forward the concept of such a federation in opposition to the Congolese people's movement for national unity, led by the great hero of that people, Patrice Lumumba.

101. In a radio broadcast on 13 January 1959, the Head of the Belgian State asserted that "a considerable measure of decentralization would make it possible to speed up and diversify the various regions' development in accordance with their geographic, cultural and racial characteristics, as well as their economic development". That theme was repeated the same day by the Government of Belgium, when it told the Belgian Parliament:

"The size of the Congo and the way it has developed call for a process of deconcentration and decentralization whereby the administrators would be brought closer to those they administer and the voters closer to those they elect."

Certain delegations have adduced, here, much the same arguments.

102. The idea of a federation was put forward again by the Belgian Head of State a few days before the Brussels Round-table Conference,<sup>9</sup> which was to result in the establishment of a unitary Congolese State

despite the opposition of the Belgian colonialists and their agents.

103. My delegation has been unfavourably impressed by the statements of some representatives who, in their zeal to defend the so-called Tananarive decisions, have gone so far as to assert that the United Nations General Assembly should not regard the territorial unity of the Republic of the Congo as inviolable.

104. Only the people of the Congo can decide with regard to the Congo's form of government, political structure and, *a fortiori*, territorial integrity. I should add that I know of no historical precedent showing that a people master of its own decisions was prepared to sacrifice the unity and territorial integrity of its country. In my opinion, this sheds light on the nature of the people who made that decision at Tananarive.

105. The real nature of the Tananarive Conference and, *ipso facto*, of its decisions was, moreover, revealed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs when on 13 March 1961, speaking of this conference, he said:

"It is also a very important event because it is in line with a policy which we have patiently pursued."<sup>10</sup>

106. That statement alone should put on its guard an assembly composed for the most part of countries which for very many years were under colonial rule. I would ask the Assembly to imagine an idyllic world in which the oppressors followed a policy of helping the oppressed peoples to rid themselves of colonial exploitation or to consolidate an independence dearly bought! If we were to accept such a reversal of what history has taught us, what would remain of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples [*resolution 1514 (XV)*] adopted, with a few very significant abstentions, by the United Nations General Assembly only a few months ago?

107. In that Declaration, the United Nations General Assembly not only proclaimed "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations" and condemned the colonial system as contrary to the United Nations Charter and the cause of world peace and international co-operation, but also declared that "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations".

108. The logic of the way in which the various stages of the United Nations operation in the Congo have succeeded each other is strikingly similar to that to be found in certain arguments propounded from this rostrum or in certain documents circulated by the Secretariat. This circumstance leads us to believe that the phases disclosed by an analysis of the development of the United Nations operation in the Congo are nothing more than the stages of a plan carefully worked out in advance by the colonialists and executed through the agency of Mr. Hammarskjöld, the United Nations Command and other colonialist agents jockeying for power in the Congo against the legal Central Government headed by Mr. Antoine Gizenga.

109. What is more, while the country's dismemberment is being suggested by certain quarters and certain Governments as the solution of the problem before us, attempts are being made to whitewash and re-establish in the public esteem those whom the world at large has

<sup>9</sup> Conference held from 20 January to 20 February 1960.

<sup>10</sup> Statement published in *Le Soir* of 14 March 1961.

branded as cowardly murderers. Thus, in the *New York Herald Tribune* of a few days ago, we read that:

"Mobutu . . . happens to be intense, hard-working, intelligent and about as far from banditry as is Dayal himself."

And on the subject of those who delivered Patrice Lumumba to the executioners, we read:

"The leadership of Leopoldville, from President Kasa-Vubu on down, compares favourably with the best of them [*i.e.*, of the other African leaders]. Even George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln all put together would have had an incredibly difficult time trying to master the chaotic circumstances confronting this government, and in many ways the wonder is that the Kasa-Vubu régime has survived at all."

I shall not comment on that apology for crime, terror and anarchy. But I really have the feeling that those who engineered the tragedy in the Congo no longer care what resources they throw into the conflict!

110. At this stage of the Congolese crisis, resolute steps are called for.

111. The General Assembly must condemn the Belgian colonialists' aggression in the Congo and reaffirm its decision that all military and paramilitary personnel belonging to Belgium and the other colonial Powers should be evacuated within a short space of time. In the event of Belgium failing to comply with that notification within the period stipulated, the Security Council should apply the sanctions provided for in the Charter.

112. The United Nations Force—in collaboration with the only legal government of the Congo, the Government headed by Mr. Antoine Gizenga—should take vigorous action to arrest all those responsible for the murder of Patrice Lumumba and the other Congolese patriots and to disarm the terrorist bands of Tshombé, Mobutu, Kalonji and others, thus creating the necessary conditions for the re-establishment of democratic institutions and for a resumption of the country's normal political activity.

113. It will be for the Congolese Parliament, convened in circumstances permitting its free enjoyment of its rights under the Constitution, to decide all questions concerning the form and composition of the government, and all other political questions falling within its province.

114. The experience of the last nine months, and of the many resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, shows that a time-limit must be fixed for the execution of the programme of measures needed for the restoration of legality and order in the Congolese Republic. Such a time-limit might reasonably be set at one month. Upon its expiry, the United Nations Force should be withdrawn.

115. By raising the question of Mr. Hammarskjöld's responsibility and the reorganization of the Secretariat in connexion with the Congo issue, we are not injecting the "cold war" into this debate; we are drawing the logical conclusion from an examination of the facts, which supplements past experience.

116. Sooner or later, the great majority of the Members of the General Assembly will realize that the United Nations will be incapable of fulfilling its obligations under the Charter so long as the implementation of its decisions is left to the representatives of a single group of Powers, particularly the NATO Powers,

about which the least one can say is that all the colonial Powers are included in it.

117. My Government holds Mr. Hammarskjöld responsible for having directed the Congo operation for the benefit of the colonial Powers. In a cable sent to the Security Council of 15 February 1961, the Romanian Government demanded that the Council "should stigmatize the iniquitous role that Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, has played as an instrument of the colonial Powers and their supporters and that it should remove him without delay from the position that he is compromising by his conduct which is incompatible with the principles of the United Nations Charter, of honour and of human dignity".<sup>11</sup>

118. For those reasons, my Government has decided no longer to recognize Mr. Hammarskjöld in any official capacity. We shall continue to insist that he be permanently removed from office and that the Secretariat be reorganized, since we are deeply convinced that the United Nations cannot show itself worthy of the confidence which the peoples of the world placed in it at its inception unless it ceases to be the instrument of the policy of a single great Power or of one group of countries.

119. We freely admit that our criticism is severe and implacable. But the circle of countries criticizing the present state of affairs and expressing disapproval of the actions of Mr. Hammarskjöld and the United Nations Command in the Congo is rapidly and substantially widening. The Governments of eight countries which contribute troops to the United Nations Force in the Congo—Morocco, the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Ceylon, Mali and the Sudan—have decided to withdraw their contingents, numbering almost 7,000 men. That is overwhelming proof of the dissatisfaction and distrust created by the actions of Mr. Hammarskjöld and the United Nations Command.

120. The statements, critical of Mr. Hammarskjöld and the United Nations Command in the Congo, which have been made by Heads of States or of Governments already institute a thick dossier. In addition to that more or less severe criticism, the political fiasco of the United Nations operation in the Congo is further compounded by the refusal of most Member States to contribute to the financing of Mr. Hammarskjöld's illegal activities in the country—which threatens to lead to the Organization's fraudulent bankruptcy.

121. Efforts by certain Powers to persuade Mr. Hammarskjöld to disregard the criticism and distrust he has aroused among Member States by taking a stand on the side of colonialism can only have the most disastrous consequences for the United Nations. Those who justify the present state of affairs, which suits the colonial Powers, are trying to sow confusion by claiming that the reorganization of the Secretariat would paralyse the United Nations. They have asserted that such a reform would deprive the small and medium-sized countries, in particular, of the feeling of security given them by the United Nations. How hollow these words sound in a situation where the one-sidedness of the Organization's executive machinery has been used as the main weapon to destroy the independence and unity of the Republic of the Congo and to perpetuate the murder of Patrice Lumumba and the other Congolese patriots.

<sup>11</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4719.*

122. In reality, it is at the present juncture that the United Nations is paralysed and unable to carry out its function, under the Charter, of safeguarding the peoples against aggression, and that the Member States lack any assurance that the Organization's decisions will be carried out, in spirit and letter, by its administration.

123. Let us consider, for example, the Commission which is to investigate the murder of Patrice Lumumba and the other Congolese patriots. What results can be expected from its investigations, when we know that its letters of instruction will be received from the man morally responsible for these crimes and will be presented, for action, to those who actually perpetrated the crimes?

124. The reorganization of the Secretariat on the basis of equal representation for the three groups of nations existing in the world today would constitute an assurance, for all Member States of the United Nations, that the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council would be applied impartially, without damage to the interests of any country.

125. The crisis in the Congo is clearly related to the crisis in the United Nations, in that the Congo crisis and the negative role played by Mr. Hammarskjöld and the United Nations Command in the Congo have made it plain that the United Nations cannot continue to maintain so one-sided a situation.

126. At a time when it is an immediate, historic task of the peoples to wipe out the last traces of the colonial system, it can only be highly dangerous to allow the executive branch of the United Nations to be ruled by a small group of Powers which are basically opposed to the liquidation of colonialism and will stop at nothing to prolong the existence of this universally execrated system.

127. The sooner the United Nations emerges from this crisis through the re-organization of the Secretariat, the sooner will it emerge from its present position which is preventing it from acting in accordance with the Charter, to safeguard the right of peoples to peace, freedom and national independence.

128. Mr. AMADEO (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): Allow me, Mr. President, before beginning my statement, to join with the delegations which have paid a tribute to the memory of our distinguished colleague from Cuba, Ambassador Bisbé.

129. It is now nearly nine months since the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo appealed to the United Nations to lend assistance to the newly constituted State. Since our last statement in the discussions on the Congo an event has taken place which has stirred the whole world: the murder of Mr. Patrice Lumumba. We wish, on behalf of the Government and people of Argentina, to express the indignation aroused in us by this crime, and we therefore reaffirm what we said in the Security Council when the news of the misdeeds perpetrated against Mr. Lumumba reached New York.

130. On this occasion, we cannot but express our regret that the Council, owing to the veto of one of its permanent members, was not able to adopt a draft resolution sponsored by Argentina, together with the delegations of Italy, the United States and the United Kingdom, the purpose of which was to preserve the fundamental rights of political prisoners and to allow the International Red Cross access to them. We have

good reason to suppose that if this resolution had not, for political reasons, been defeated, Mr. Lumumba and many other inhabitants of the Congo might not have met a tragic end for lack of adequate protection

131. The death of Mr. Lumumba and his companion is not, unfortunately, the only violent incident which we have had to lament in the Congo. There have recently been other regrettable events which it is impossible to pass over in silence. We wish to refer especially to the murders and brutalities committed in Orientale province, the victims in this case being missionaries, nuns and defenceless civilians. Since the occurrence of these incidents, there have been certain events which point to at least some slight possibility of a solution.

132. We would like to refer, first, to the report prepared by the Conciliation Commission [A/4711]. This report is sober, well-documented and objective, and the majority of its conclusions appear to us to be sound. We agree with the Commission on the desirability of broadening the bases of power so that all political sectors, if possible, may be represented and a government of national unity set up in the Congo. We agree that the army should be insulated from political disputes and adequately reorganized. We agree that "a federal form of government can alone preserve the national unity and territorial integrity of the Congolese State" [A/4711, para. 134]. We share the view that "no conciliation can be achieved unless foreign interference in all its forms is stopped" [Ibid., para. 140].

133. The recommendations of the Conciliation Commission regarding the political and constitutional aspects of the internal life of the Congo cannot, no matter how reasonable they may appear, be more than an expression of hopes unless they are accepted by the Congolese themselves and, in particular, by those who today hold positions of responsibility in the country. My delegation therefore remains unalterably opposed to any interference by the United Nations in internal political matters and considers that operative paragraph 4 of the Security Council resolution of 9 August 1960,<sup>12</sup> which forbids us to intervene in constitutional or other conflicts, retains its full force. Similarly, we believe that the operative paragraphs of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961,<sup>13</sup> urging the convening of the Parliament and the reorganization of Congolese armed units, must be interpreted as an exhortation, and as no more than an exhortation.

134. While, however, the United Nations cannot and must not, under the terms of the Charter, take any substantive measures involving acts of domestic jurisdiction, it can and must encourage the carrying-out of a programme such as the one contained in the Council resolution and in the Conciliation Commission's report. The special situation of the United Nations in the Congo makes it the natural source of advice for the Congolese authorities and consequently confers upon it an important responsibility.

135. Now the first requirement if the programme set out in our resolutions is to be accepted is that the United Nations and its local representatives should inspire confidence. This question of confidence, we must allow, is somewhat subjective, and it would be

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4426.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.

difficult to lay down rules on how confidence is to be inspired. There is in the Congo today some lack of confidence, whether or not based on valid grounds, in the impartiality with which the United Nations is fulfilling its mission. Complaints and criticisms have been made, which we cannot simply discount on the pretext that they are biased or malicious. On the contrary, they should induce the Secretariat to take all measures and even to make any personnel changes in the field which may be necessary to re-establish this indispensable confidence in the Organization.

136. We believe that there is at the present time, within the Congo itself, a spontaneous movement aiming at a specifically Congolese formula for solving the problems with which the country is beset. We therefore feel that it is our duty to encourage, and certainly not to hamper, these efforts even though we may believe that in some respects they have been mistakenly formulated.

137. In this regard, we wish to dwell for a moment on the recent conference of Congolese leaders held in Madagascar. Reference has been made to this conference, from very varied standpoints, during the present debate, and that fact at least proves that the event has a political importance.

138. The conclusions of the Tananarive Conference has been criticized, and it has been asserted, among other things, that the Conference has furthered the constitutional disintegration of the country. Certainly to transform a united country into a confederation of sovereign States does, in itself, constitute a step towards disintegration. However, in order to form an objective judgement on the Tananarive resolutions, we must not begin from the purely theoretical assumption that the Republic of the Congo is today a united State, with legal institutions which are functioning normally and are unanimously respected. In fact, as we know only too well, the Congo is a country having five, six or more local centres of authority without any ties of mutual dependence. In such conditions, what was done in Madagascar at least represents an effort towards coming together and not a spur to disintegration.

139. We agree, of course, that the idea of confederation is less than felicitous because in theory it implies the existence of several States and not of a single State. Apart, however, from the fact that we are not entitled to interfere in the Congolese people's choice of their own form of government, we must not think that the confederation formula has the character of a final position. The important thing, it seems to us, is not to stress these defects, which we believe to be primarily defects in expression; the important thing is that, for the first time since the crisis began, a group of Congolese leaders has met to discuss the common destiny of the people and has recognized the existence of certain mutual obligations of solidarity.

140. We admit that these efforts will be incomplete so long as they do not include all the political sectors which must be reckoned with in the Congo and, in particular, the group which has its headquarters at Stanleyville. We are nevertheless convinced that if outside interference and influence by "remote control" were to cease, it would not be impossible for such a meeting—in spite of the gravity of all that has happened—to be brought about. The Conciliation Commission's report says something which seems to us to confirm this hopeful prediction. It states, and I quote:

"The Commission found among many leaders, belonging to both the pro-Lumumba and pro-Kasa-Vubu groups, a general feeling of weariness and a sincere desire to reach agreement with their opponents and achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis" [A/4711, para. 117]. We feel sure that this psychologically convincing observation by the Commission reflects the state of mind of the great majority in the country.

141. In order to stimulate this conciliatory trend, we consider that it would be desirable to create a good offices committee to act by direct mandate of the Assembly—I repeat, by direct mandate of the Assembly and not under a mere administrative delegation of responsibility by the Secretariat—for the purpose of promoting understanding between the factions and between their leaders. We fully agree in this respect with the view expressed by our colleagues from Uruguay in his reasoned speech the day before yesterday [968th meeting], that such a committee should not be set up on the basis of exclusions or preferences of a regionalist character. The Congo problem affects the Organization as such and hence all its Members, without distinction as to continent or race. It is right, therefore, that all should be called upon to participate in reaching a solution to the problem.

142. The Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 recommends the United Nations to take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war, including the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. In our judgement, this resolution is of great significance because it aims to dramatize the importance attributed by the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and because it affirms that no legitimate means will be spared for preserving such peace. We do not, however, think that it essentially alters the legal framework in which the Congo operation was undertaken. It was clear that the mission to maintain law and order entailed from the outset the possibility of using force, since otherwise technicians and civilian officers would have been sent rather than soldiers equipped with arms. But the purpose of sending soldiers to the Congo was that they should act primarily by their presence, and their arms were to be used only in the event of an attack and in self-defence.

143. The resolution of 21 February 1961, which does not contradict or annul the resolution of 9 August 1960, seems to us to confirm that the United Nations troops can take all preventive measures—but not offensive measures—to avoid armed clashes between Congolese. They were clearly entitled to do this before the Council resolution, but this right has now been more explicitly and emphatically stated. If, in taking such preventive measures—say, the occupation of an aerodrome or some other measure—the United Nations Force should be attacked, the Council resolution has confirmed their right to use force. My delegation holds to this interpretation of the resolution of 21 February 1961 not only because this seems to be the one most in conformity with the text, but also because we believe it to be the only one which makes this resolution compatible with the United Nations Charter and with a proper respect for the sovereignty of Member States.

144. The delegations of the socialist countries favour the winding-up of the whole Congo operation within a period of one month. Our colleague from Romania repeated this just now. Other delegations, without going so far, argue for a gradual withdrawal of the troops

with the object of creating a climate conducive to peace. With regard to the first position, we must reject it firmly because it would mean delivering up the Congo to anarchy and leaving it at the mercy of foreign intervention. As for the gradual withdrawal of the troops, we regard it as a very appropriate measure provided that it follows and does not precede real progress towards national reconciliation. Once certain basic agreements have been reached between the leaders of opposing camps, the gradual withdrawal of troops would have in itself a salutary effect in restoring confidence. On the other hand, if it was brought about prematurely, it might be self-defeating and necessitate the sending of more forces than had been there previously.

145. The Conciliation Commission, in a paragraph of its report which appears to have been intentionally underlined, says that an appeal should be made to all States to refrain from assuming attitudes which might aggravate the opposition between the different tendencies in the Congo.

146. This seems to us to be the real essence of the problem. Why have we been concerning ourselves with the Congo for the last nine months? Because there are internal conflicts? Because there is a danger of civil war? No; the United Nations is concerned with the Congo because there is foreign interference, or a danger of foreign interference, and because this has given rise to threats to international peace. Otherwise we would have no reason to become involved in what goes on in that country.

147. I confess that I am somewhat ashamed of recalling such obvious facts, but it has become essential to do so, since these facts seem from time to time to be forgotten in some quarters. More than once we have been asked to impose a certain régime, as if the Congo were a colony of the United Nations. In reply to these interventionist pleas, we said once before on this same subject, recalling an old Castilian proverb, that the United Nations should not make or unmake kings in the Congo, and we must continue to abide by this policy. The unfortunate fact is that some quarters are not advising us—the United Nations—to follow this policy of making and unmaking kings, but rather are practising the policy directly on their own. They are practising it by granting or not granting recognition to governments on the basis of subjective preferences; they are practising it by sending all kinds of weapons—weapons of war and of propaganda—to the factions patronized by them.

148. On this matter we must speak quite frankly. Interventionist policies in the Congo are practised not only from outside the African continent, but from within it as well. We profoundly admire and, we must admit, envy, this spirit of emotional solidarity which is a dynamic force throughout the continent of Africa at the present day. We see it as a factor—perhaps the most positive factor—in ensuring its future prosperity and greatness. Since, however, all good things have their drawbacks, this movement of African solidarity may have the disadvantage of becoming an uncontrolled impulse—although in most cases well-intentioned—to intervene in the affairs of other countries on the grounds that they belong to a common stock or to the same geographical area. We therefore believe that the policy of “hands off” in the Congo should apply to everyone. It should of course apply first and foremost to the former metropolitan Power. It should apply,

certainly, to the great world Powers; but it should apply also to the countries situated near the one undergoing the crisis, countries which have a right to be more concerned than anyone else about the plight of their brothers, but which must not, on any account, adopt an attitude of tutelage towards them.

149. We have already pointed out on other occasions that the political problems of the Congo are holding our attention much more than the miserable living conditions with which the majority of the people must contend. This is perhaps understandable, but we feel that our table of priorities should be somewhat revised. Late last year, the Secretary-General submitted a report according to which, in some areas, deaths by starvation numbered hundreds each day. The Conciliation Commission has confirmed this state of affairs and has told us “that the country is on the verge of catastrophe” [A/4711, para. 115]. Not only has this situation not improved, but it has continued to deteriorate, and only recently the ninth report on the United Nations operations told of “a rapid disintegration in both the financial and economic life of the Congo”.

150. This situation should, in our judgement, concern us even more than the differences between the Congolese leaders or the question whether the *Loi fondamentale* is or is not still in force. We should take urgent measures to ensure that this people, towards which we have adopted important responsibilities, does not perish of starvation while we casually discuss its constitutional problems or its political future.

151. We therefore hope that a vast plan of assistance will be begun as soon as possible on the basis of voluntary contributions through the United Nations from those countries in a position to make them. The rapid implementation of such a plan will have the dual advantage of alleviating the material sufferings of the people and of rendering unnecessary the unilateral action of certain countries which are keeping a large number of technicians of their own nationality in vitally important public services.

152. The survey which we have just made of the situation leads us to set forth our conclusions briefly before the Assembly. We do not presume dogmatically to formulate infallible principles, but hope to put forward a few ideas which may assist in deriving constructive results from the present debate.

153. We reaffirm our repugnance to all the crimes and brutalities committed in Congolese territory, without distinction as to the persons or political factions responsible. We hope that these criminal acts will be duly punished.

154. We concur, in general, with the conclusions contained in the Conciliation Commission's report. We hope that the United Nations will ensure that they are carried out in so far as they entail policy recommendations to Member States, and that the Congolese people for their part will take them into consideration when deciding, in the exercise of their inalienable sovereign rights, on the means of restoring order and prosperity to the country.

155. We consider the results of the Tananarive meeting to have been constructive in the sense that they represent an effort to overcome the present anarchy, and we hope that its participants, in their future action, will keep in mind that the territorial integrity of the Congo is an indispensable pledge of peace in the African continent.

156. We favour the setting-up of a good offices commission, to be directly appointed by the General Assembly, in order to promote harmony between the Congolese factions and, with full respect for the sovereignty of the country, to encourage the acceptance of the Conciliation Commission's conclusions. We believe that this commission should be constituted on a basis of universality.

157. We consider it of essential importance to the success of the United Nations operation that officials of the Organization seconded to the Congo should be chosen from among those who are capable, through the impartiality of their conduct, of earning the confidence of the leaders and the people.

158. We hold that the United Nations troops are still in the Congo in a supervisory capacity and can only engage in military action in so far as they are acting in self-defence upon being attacked while carrying out their mandate to prevent civil war.

159. We affirm in conclusion, that non-interference by foreign Powers is the key and the starting-point for a solution of the Congo's problems. We consider that the obligation of non-interference falls upon all: on the former metropolitan Power, on the great Powers and also—and without prejudice to their spiritual solidarity with the Congolese people—on the other countries of Africa.

160. Our delegation, on the basis of the conclusions which I have just enunciated, would vote in favour of any draft resolution essentially in keeping with these principles. We cannot, on the other hand, support any move by which solutions with respect to internal political affairs would be forcibly imposed on the Congolese, nor can we favour international sanctions which at the present stage, we do not believe to be justified. We reaffirm our intention to participate faithfully in this great effort of international co-operation in defence of peace represented by the presence of the United Nations in the Congo. We also express the hope that the presence of the United Nations will speedily prove unnecessary as the Congo itself becomes able, at as early a date as possible, to assume the defence of its national independence by its own efforts.

161. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): First of all I should like to express the profound sorrow of the Government and delegation of the Byelorussian SSR at the untimely death of our colleague, Mr. Manuel Bisbé, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations, and to convey their sincere sympathy to the Cuban Government and delegation, and to Mr. Bisbé's family, in their grievous loss. Long-awaited freedom, for which many sons and daughters of the Cuban people have died and for which Mr. Bisbé fought throughout his conscious life, has at last come to Cuba. We are firmly convinced that the righteous cause of freedom, independence and social justice for which the Cuban people are struggling will triumph, despite any machinations of their enemies.

162. The General Assembly again finds itself dealing with the question of the situation in the Republic of the Congo, which is a source of deep concern to all the peoples of the world. During the sharp exchanges on this question at plenary meetings of the General Assembly three months ago, speakers quite rightly expressed their concern and anxiety over the intolerable situation that had arisen in the young African State. In their endeavours to achieve a radical change

in the abnormal situation in the Republic of the Congo, most delegations, including that of the Byelorussian SSR, advocated the adoption of indispensable and pressing measures which included the immediate release from prison of Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister, and of other Congolese leaders, the withdrawal of all Belgian personnel from the Congo, the disarming of Mobutu's and Tshombé's gangs, and a resumption of activities by the Republic's lawful Government and Parliament. But none of this was done.

163. The colonialists and their protégés Tshombé, Mobutu, Kasa-Vubu and Kalonji, frightened by the swiftly rising influence of the patriotic forces of the Congo, embarked with the knowledge and connivance of United Nations organs, upon the physical annihilation of the Congo's best national political and State leaders. They brutally murdered Patrice Lumumba, the Congo's national hero and Head of the lawful Congolese Government, together with his companions-in-arms Okito, Mpolo, Finant, Lumbala, Fataki, Nzuzi, Yangara, Elengesa and many others. The colonialists and their protégés in the Congo committed a monstrous crime. The peoples of the world again saw the bared fangs of the predatory imperialist tiger.

164. The speakers who preceded me in this debate were perfectly right when they said that the situation in the Republic of the Congo has deteriorated still further in the past three months, and has become altogether intolerable and extremely dangerous. The Congo has in effect become a powder keg with a lit fuse.

165. Our delegation has studied the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo, dated 20 March 1961. The impression one derives from this report is that the Commission served as a screen which enabled the colonialists to gain time and bring about the physical annihilation of Prime Minister Lumumba. The United Nations Conciliation Commission did not even manage to meet Patrice Lumumba, the lawful Prime Minister. It failed to produce results which would have really contributed to the establishment of peace in the Congo, to the consolidation of the country's independence and to the termination of the acts of lawlessness performed there by the colonialists and their protégés. At the same time, we note, on page 47 of the English text of the Commission's report, its view that "in present conditions a federal form of government can alone preserve the national unity and territorial integrity of the Congolese State" [A/4711, para. 134]. That, then, is the Commission's conclusion.

166. The Commission recommended that "a summit meeting of Congolese political leaders be convened... at a neutral place" [A/4711, para. 136]. These proposals coincided with the plans of the Congolese puppets, who convened the notorious "conference" at Tananarive and proclaimed the creation of the "confederation" of the Congo. The establishment of such a "confederation" is one of a series of typical manoeuvres by the colonialists, designed to perpetuate the division of the Congo and maintain colonialist domination through the policy of "divided and rule"—an old and familiar slogan. As is known, the conference was convened on Tshombé's initiative and was attended by the colonialist protégés Kasa-Vubu, Iléo, Kalonji and other puppets. The lawful Government of the Congo, headed by Antoine Gizenga, refused to participate. Gizenga's statement of 8 March 1961 rightly points out that "the conference of Congolese 'leaders' which

is now taking place at Tananarive, and which was organized by the traitors and puppets Tshombé, Iléou and Kasa-Vubu for the purpose of solving the Congolese crisis, was purposely convened by the enemies of the Congolese people's freedom".

167. On 12 March 1961, the puppets' conference, in their masters' interests, adopted a decision setting up a "confederation" to be headed by a "council of state" consisting of Kasa-Vubu and the heads of the Congolese "states". The establishment of the "confederation" aims at perpetuating the division of the Republic of the Congo.

168. The puppets assembled at Tananarive addressed an "ultimatum" to Gizenga and all the patriotic forces in the Congo which support the Central Government and seek to uphold the country's sovereignty and unity. Speaking in the name of those colonialist protégés on 12 March 1961, Kasa-Vubu said that if Gizenga did not accept the decisions of the Tananarive conference he would be "outlawed", and made it clear that in that event "armed force" would be used against the Congo's lawful Government. Quite understandably, the Tananarive decisions met with approval in the West. Thus on 11 March 1961 the *New York Herald Tribune* said, in a leading article: "The Tananarive Conference has done well. It offers the best, indeed the only hope for creating a viable nation in the Congo".

169. These plans for splitting the Congo have been pronounced upon favourably by the United States Government. On 13 March 1961 a State Department spokesman said that "the Tananarive Conference appears to have been a serious effort on the part of the Congolese to come to grips with what is clearly their problem, namely the nature of the Government of the Congo".<sup>14</sup> In our view, however, this still-born "confederation" is doomed to failure.

170. The puppets, and the colonialists standing behind them, disregard the fact that the Congo is a single State with a single lawful Government—that headed by Mr. Gizenga—which enjoys the Congolese people's support and which is favoured by the whole of embattled Africa and the whole of freedom-loving humanity. The people of the Congo, aware that the division of the country into the component parts of a "confederation" would mean the end of independence and the re-establishment of colonial administration, will, without any doubt, frustrate the colonialists' criminal designs. Of that we are quite certain.

171. A particularly unseemly role in this lacerating of the Congo's living body has been played by Mr. Kasa-Vubu. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, along with many other delegations, had resolutely objected to the credentials of the so-called Kasa-Vubu delegation to the United Nations being accepted. The course of events had proved that we were completely right. The Byelorussian SSR delegation fully and wholly supports the proposal made by Mr. Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana, to the effect that since Kasa-Vubu, by virtue of his own Act towards setting up the "confederation", has ceased to be the President of the Republic of the Congo, he has no right whatever to a delegation to the United Nations.

172. Judging by recent events, the main obstacle between the colonialists and their goal in the Congo is the lawful Government headed by Gizenga. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that numerous attempts

are being made to discredit it. Money, deception, blackmail—everything is resorted to. The aim remains the same: to put an end to the lawful Government of the Congo, and bring the country back to the old colonial system once and for all. These plans need time, and a new screen. In these circumstances the lesson of the first Commission should serve as a warning. The United Nations must act with determination, and not delay. Only in that way can the colonialists' plans be frustrated.

173. We are surprised by the attitude of the representatives of certain African States. Their protestations, from this rostrum, of support for United Nations aims in the Congo can in no way be reconciled with their Government's concrete actions. When one sees that Tshombé, the Belgian puppet, is received at Brazzaville or Tananarive with the honours usually reserved for a Head of State, it becomes hard to believe that the Government of the States of which these places are the capitals sincerely wish to render genuine assistance to the Congolese people. All their assurances to that effect sound hollow and unconvincing; behind them, in our view, is an alien voice, not the voice of the African people.

174. Speaking from this rostrum on 24 March 1961, Mr. Doudou Thiam, the Senegalese representative, claimed—and I was listening carefully—that the Congolese traitors' conference at Tananarive had been a positive contribution to the creation of a realistic structure for the Congo, and that the purpose of the conference was not to split up the Congo but to establish a federation. The representative of Senegal did not, however, ask himself who stood to benefit from such a federation—the Congolese people, or the colonialists. It is no secret that the federal plan was not worked out in the Congo, and that its implementation can only lead to the division of the Congo into spheres of influence of various monopolies from certain Western colonialist States. Everyone understands that. In these circumstances, to welcome the establishment of a federation in the Congo can be equivalent only to welcoming the maintenance of the colonial régime in that country.

175. The question that comes to mind is: who is the real culprit responsible for the monstrous crimes in the Congo, and who is striving to keep the Congo in colonialist chains in order to teach a lesson to other young African States, intimidate them and paralyse their will to struggle for genuine freedom and independence?

176. In the Byelorussian delegation's view, those truly responsible for the tragic situation in the Congo are the international monopolies, together with the Belgian colonialists who enjoy the all-out support of their NATO allies, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. We are witnessing an international colonialist plot against the Congo which threatens peace in Africa and throughout the world.

177. The peoples of the entire world are particularly indignant with Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld who, having embarked on a course of direct complicity with the impudent colonialists and their protégés in the Congo, has disgraced the United Nations and done irreparable damage to its prestige. While serving as Secretary-General of the United Nations, he has directly contributed to the creation, in the Congo, of a situation fraught with grave dangers to the cause of peace.

178. The United Nations, whose mission it is to encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,

<sup>14</sup> *The New York Times*, 14 March 1961.

language or religion, and to promote the political, economic and social advancement of the colonial peoples, has embarked upon a course of encouraging colonialist acts of aggression against the Republic of the Congo, and of legalizing the acts of lawlessness perpetrated in the Congo by the colonialists and their protégés.

179. I do not think that we can go on tolerating a situation in which the United Nations is an international organization in name only while in actual fact it gives effect to the wishes of a narrow circle of colonialist Powers.

180. Together with other delegates in this hall, I listened with great attention to the interesting statement made by Mr. Nkrumah, the President of Ghana, who said that since the murder of Patrice Lumumba the moral authority of the United Nations had become dangerously weakened and the dangers of a world war had seriously increased. The honourable President of Ghana said here that "the United Nations Command actually contributed 250 million Belgian francs from United Nations resources for the payment of rebel soldiers" [961st plenary meeting]. In other words, instead of crushing Mobutu's mutiny, the United Nations to all intents and purposes financed it. The United Nations Command in the Congo went even further than that, and gave Mobutu complete control over the State finances, thus enabling him to hire mercenaries for the arrest and humiliation of the Congolese people's political leaders. Dr. Umbricht, a United Nations expert whom I know personally and who had been sent to the Congo by Mr. Hammarskjöld to help the Lumumba Government with the reorganization of its finances, placed all the financial resources of the Central Bank of the Congo at Mobutu's disposal.

181. It is hard even to imagine the depth of ignominy plumed by the United Nations. The Organization's leadership is in effect supporting and financing, out of Member States' contributions, the mutinous clique of Mobutu, Tshombé and Kalonji who opposed the Congo's democratically elected Government headed by Mr. Antoine Gizenga. Things cannot go on in this way. The United Nations must not let the colonialists get away with a new crime or think that they may do as they please. It cannot open the door to lawlessness in international relations or encourage the violation of its own decisions and its own Charter. If it does so, danger will threaten not only the young independent Republic of the Congo but also other countries which recently acceded to independence or are still struggling against colonialist domination.

182. The colonialists are doing their best to obstruct and stop the relentless process of the liquidation of the shameful colonialist system. They are acting in concert. Belgian aggression in the Congo would have been inconceivable without the support of Belgium's partners in the colonial robbery. In his letter to Mr. Nehru, Mr. Khrushchev stressed that "Belgian policy in the Congo is not that of Belgium alone; it is also the policy of those participating in blocs such as NATO, CENTO and SEATO".

183. The colonialists' particular interest in the Congo can be explained in the first place by that country's vast mineral wealth and by the desire of the major monopolistic concerns in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Belgium to continue to wax rich by exploiting that wealth. By consolidating their position in the Congo, the colonialists will be able to spread their profit-hungry tentacles into

all the other African countries. This is already happening.

184. The consequences of eighty years of Belgian colonialist rule in the Congo have been the halving of its population, chronic mass unemployment and illiteracy. As is known the Belgians derived an annual income of \$800 million from private investment in the Congo, of which only approximately \$50 million a year went back to the people whom they had robbed. The bulk of Belgian colonialist investment is concentrated in the province of Katanga, rich in natural resources. This explains all the Belgian machination designed to establish Tshombé's separatist régime in that province.

185. Mr. de Melen, the Belgian representative who spoke in his hall on 21 March 1961, zealously defended the Belgian colonialist position in the Congo. He asserted that Belgium had voluntarily granted independence to the Congo [965th plenary meeting]—whereas it is known that the independence of the Congo was won by the Congolese people after many years of sanguinary struggle against the Belgian colonialists, and was not a "gift" voluntarily presented by the Belgians.

186. Allow me to quote facts in illustration of the Belgian Government's present stand. The old masters, the Belgian colonialist businessmen and officials, are returning to Katanga and to certain other Congolese provinces. The number of Belgians in the Congo as a whole already exceeds 40,000. Mr. Porter, *New York Herald Tribune* correspondent, reported from Katanga on 17 February 1961 that the province "still closely resembles a white colony. Behind each African Cabinet Minister, a Belgian administrator runs the show. The Army's general staff is 90 per cent white." Tshombé's administration employs 1,300 Belgians and 400 Belgians constitute the backbone of the *gendarmérie*.

187. The representatives of the "United Nations Command" in the Congo do not, unfortunately, notice either those facts or the growing influx of Belgians into Leopoldville where, according to United States newspapers, they already number over 4,000. Indeed, United Nations officials are prone to admit that, in many branches of administration and business, the Belgians are irreplaceable.

188. We know that behind the traitor and secessionist Tshombé there stands the powerful Belgian company Union Minière du Haut Katanga—its activities are publicized throughout the world Press—which exploits the mineral resources of the Congo and occupies a dominant position in Katanga province. The company is engaged in the extraction of uranium, copper, cobalt, zinc and other minerals, and more than 20,000 persons are employed in its mines and factories. In 1960 it derived profits of \$190 million from copper mining alone. The company also finances the so-called "government" and troops of Tshombé. As Mr. Arthur Perret, its representative, stated in February of this year \$50 million were paid to the Katanga "government" of Tshombé in 1960. That is only a small proportion of the company's income. Even in 1960, when tens of thousands of Congolese were dying of starvation, the profits of the Union Minière continued to grow. It can be seen that the Belgian colonialists are none the worse off because blood is being shed in the Congo and hundreds of people are dying of starvation every day.

189. It is not only Belgium—it is not even mainly Belgium—which is concerned to maintain the colonial régime in the Congo. On this, we must speak openly.



The attempts of the Belgian colonialists to stifle the liberation struggle of the Congolese people are actively supported by monopolistic circles of other Powers. The West German monopolies are very busy in Africa. The Adenauer Government would like to keep the African countries as markets for the output of the Ruhr factories and as a source of agricultural and mineral raw materials. West German imperialism is one of the most active participants in the "Eurafrica" project, which reflects the idea of collective neo-colonialism. In the 1960 issue of *Uebersee Rundschau*, the West German periodical of the neo-colonialist circles, we read:

"No great flight of fancy is in fact needed to imagine the economic prospects which may be opened up by the association of the Common Market with the former French and Belgian colonies."

And the attention which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany pays to events in the Congo is dictated primarily by the interest which West German concerns have in the mining of uranium, cobalt and copper in Katanga.

190. The events in the Congo constitute an example of the application of collective colonialism. Feeling that the ground is finally giving way under their feet, and not being in a position separately to suppress the national liberation movement of the African States, individual colonial powers are joining in a sort of Holy Alliance. The old, enfeebled and compromised colonialists are being assisted by the new colonialists, adept in more subtle and sophisticated methods of neo-colonialism. The aims of both old and new are the same—to protect the interests of the monopolies.

191. The old colonial Powers have been compelled to give up some of their colonial interests for the benefit of the United States and Western Germany in order, with their help, to retain the "whole". It is interesting to note that the Brussels newspaper *Nation Belge* six years ago, wrote:

"There remain only four colonial powers in continental Europe: Belgium, France, Spain and Portugal... It is sheer fantasy to imagine that they can resist separately, or even together. In this situation, and with events as they are at present developing, all Europeans run the risk of being driven out of Africa... Our future course is clear: we must replace the sovereign rights of several weak and divided States by the powerful sovereignty of Europe as a whole..."

192. The collective colonialism of the imperialist Powers is clearly shown in international organizations, and particularly in the United Nations. Ever since the United Nations was established, the colonial Powers have been using its flag as a cover for their expansionist policy. The faulty structure of the principal United Nations organs enables the monopolistic forces to dictate their will in a number of cases, and to guide United Nations activities in the direction of their own selfish aims. The "United Nations Operation" in the Congo is a specific example of the United Nations being used as a tool of neo-colonialism.

193. In an attempt to undermine the national liberation movement, the monopolists have combined on a military basis. A striking instance of this is the NATO bloc, to which all the colonial Powers belong. One of this bloc's most important tasks is to use the military forces of the colonialists for the maintenance and strengthening of their colonialist positions.

194. The Mobutu gangs are equipped with the automatic weapons which are used in NATO's armed forces. Tshombé's so-called Foreign Legion consists primarily of Belgians, Frenchmen, West Germans and Italians. This "foreign legion" protects foreign interests and is paid from foreign sources. Starvation and ruin reign in the land. Thousands of Congolese are reported to be dying of hunger in Kasai province, where Albert Kalonji is still in control. Concurrently with this, as the London *Daily Telegraph* reported on 23 January, Tshombé pays the private soldiers in the "foreign legion" up to \$400 a month, while the officers of that legion receive \$840 a month. As the Associated Press correspondent, Mr. Porter, reported from Elisabethville in January of this year, these *légionnaires* are sent on an assignment once a month, after which they go back to the bars of the town in an even more dirty, stinking, savage and drunken state. Mr. Porter wrote that one drunken Frenchman told him, in a moment of frankness: "The people do not like us, but we are paid well for killing women and children". That is what he quotes! Paid mercenaries—such are the means by which the colonialists' puppets cling to power against the will and desire of the Congolese people.

195. The previous speakers have already recounted in detail the history of the colonial Powers' aggression in the Congo, and I shall therefore dwell no further on that matter. The General Assembly is entitled to inquire, of the officials responsible for carrying out the "United Nations Operation" in the Congo, what they did to check and put a stop to the manifest acts of aggression committed by Belgium against the Republic of the Congo. What have they done? There can only be one answer: Nothing! Instead of resolutely stopping the aggressive acts of the Belgians and of Tshombé's and Mobutu's men, the Command of the United Nations troops kow-towed to the aggressors and obstinately implemented the Hammarskjöld policy of so-called "non-intervention" by the United Nations in the internal conflict within the Congo. That is the theoretical argument! It is well known that when the question arose of defending the rights of the Congolese—and even of the Prime Minister of the lawful Government—Hammarskjöld refused to take any steps to restore legality and justice. But as soon as unverified rumours were spread about the alleged distressing situation of a female citizen of one of the Western Powers, the United Nations Command in the Congo dispatched Malayan troops in Kivu province in order to save her. Such are the "valour", "courage" and "heroic deeds" of the United Nations troops in the Congo. This tolerant attitude of the United Nations towards the colonialists and their protégés in the Congo is a shameful blemish on the United Nations, compromising it in the eyes of every people in the world.

196. Speaking here on 21 March this year, the representative of the United States of America, Mr. Stevenson, said that the Soviet Union did not want the United Nations to succeed in the Congo. Of what kind of success is the United States representative speaking? If the United States regards as successes the murder of the Prime Minister of the lawful Government of the Congo, the dispersal of the country's Parliament and the partition of the country into dozens of puppet régimes convenient to the colonialists, we are certainly against such "successes". We favour the success, not of the colonialists in the Congo, but of the Congolese people in the struggle against the colonialists. It emerges from Mr. Stevenson's

statement that the United States finds the truth about the events in the Congo painful.

197. There can no longer be any doubt in anyone's mind that the so-called "United Nations Operation" in the Congo, through the efforts of Mr. Hammarskjöld and those who support him, not only has failed to fulfil the tasks assigned to it by the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, but has done great harm to the Congolese people.

198. On 9 February of this year, in an article about the Congo, the chief editor of the Swedish bourgeois newspaper *Stockholms Tidningen*, Mr. Vinde, wrote (it is indeed a very interesting quotation):

"It seems in fact that the 'activity' of the United Nations in the Congo has led to completely upside-down results. Without any protest from the United Nations or from any Western Power, there is being created in Katanga, with the assistance of the Belgian authorities, a modern army of white soldiers led by white officers. At the same time a continuous flow of Belgian military personnel, technicians and officials is returning to occupy the key posts under Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu. In a few month's time the old colonial régime, which was abolished when the Republic was proclaimed, will be restored under the protection of the United Nations."

This is a truly trenchant description of the role of Hammarskjöld, who ought to have been guided by the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, adopted only three months ago by the General Assembly, but who has actually become a tool for the restoration of the colonial system in the Congo.

199. We are convinced that the United Nations must not appear as a figure, one hand of which is raising high the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, while the other hand is helping the colonialists to re-forge the chains of colonial bondage which the people had broken.

200. We have never identified Mr. Hammarskjöld with the United Nations, nor do we do so now. Mr. Hammarskjöld's activity in the post of Secretary-General is doing harm to the international Organization. By betraying the interests of the Congolese people, by entering into a plot with the colonialists and by becoming an accomplice to the murder of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues, Mr. Hammarskjöld has forfeited all confidence, has brought upon himself the condemnation and contempt of all decent people, and has placed himself beyond the pale of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Byelorussian SSR resolutely supports the demand that Dag Hammarskjöld be removed from the post of the United Nations Secretary-General, as stated in the cable from the Government of the Byelorussian SSR to the President of the Security Council dated 20 February 1961.

201. The PRESIDENT: The words reached me over the translation system that Mr. Hammarskjöld had "entered into a plot with the colonialists". I feel I must intervene at this point to draw attention to a distinction which I feel must be observed in connexion with the kind of criticism which the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic is at present making.

202. Every delegation in the Assembly is fully entitled to criticize freely and frankly everything that the Secretary-General says or does in his official capacity as Secretary-General. There is no doubt about that. Nobody can contest that for a moment. When, however,

criticism of the Secretary-General goes beyond his official acts and his official decisions to attack him in his personal character, or to insult his dignity as a man, or to cast reflections on his probity and his integrity as an individual, then I think the matter assumes a somewhat different complexion.

203. I think the rostrum of the Assembly should always be available to every delegation to criticize the official acts and decisions of the Secretary-General, but I do not think it is right that it should be used to impute improper motives, or to make imputations or insinuations, in respect of any individual in the service of the United Nations, and that applies, of course, to the Secretary-General.

204. I think there is a real distinction between, on the one hand, criticism of actions, and on the other, reflections on personal character. I am confident that the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic with his great knowledge and long experience of the Organization will himself recognize the validity and the justice of the distinction, and will maintain it in his remarks.

205. I would ask him to resume his statement bearing in mind these observations of the Chair.

206. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): I have set forth my Government's views, and I shall continue my statement.

207. We consider that the removal of Dag Hammarskjöld from the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations and the reorganization of this Organization's Secretariat in accordance with the true situation in the world—as was proposed on behalf of the Soviet Government by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, during the first part of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly—would result in a substantial improvement of United Nations activity in the interests of peace and co-operation between peoples, and in the interests of the final abolition of the shameful colonial system.

208. All this induced the Government of the Byelorussian SSR to state, on 20 February 1961, that it would no longer maintain any relations with Dag Hammarskjöld or recognize him as an official of the United Nations.

209. The so-called "United Nations Operation" in the Congo must be discontinued as soon as possible, and all the foreign troops must leave the confines of the country, so that the Congolese people may be enabled to settle its own domestic affairs. The aggressive actions of the Belgian colonialists in the Congo must be condemned by the United Nations as an international crime. The appropriate sanctions provided for by the United Nations Charter must be applied against the aggressor. In order to protect the Congolese people from new misdeeds, the bloodstained hangmen of the Congolese people, the gravediggers of the young Republic's independence—Tshombé, Mobutu, Kalonji and the others—must be arrested and tried immediately, and their gangs disarmed. At the same time the Belgian troops and all Belgian personnel must be disarmed and removed from the Congo.

210. We feel it is essential to set a precise date for the convening of the Congolese Parliament, and to set up an appropriate commission of representatives of African States with the task of ensuring that effective steps are taken to remove the aggressors and stop all forms of foreign interference.

211. It is time to put an end to every form of foreign intervention in the affairs of the Republic of the Congo. Assistance and support must be given only to the lawful Government of that country, headed by Antoine Gizenga. Wholehearted support of the lawful Government of the Republic of the Congo in its just struggle against the international plotting of the colonialists is the duty of all freedom-loving States. Such support would be fully in keeping with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the interests of international peace. The peoples are entitled to require that the United Nations should take resolute action against the aggressors and colonialist hirelings who are trying to stifle the independence of the Republic of the Congo. There is growing among the masses of the peoples a realization that a radical change is needed, that the colonial régime can continue no longer, and that there can be no compromise between the old order of bondage and slavery and the new order or freedom. As Mr. Khrushchev has said,

“The struggle which has been taken up by the Congolese people cannot be halted; it can only be slowed down or checked. But it will break out again with even greater force, and the people, having over-

come all the difficulties, will then achieve complete emancipation.” [869th plenary meeting, para. 150.]

The peoples of Africa are looking with anger upon the colonialists and their protégés who for the time being have the upper hand at Leopoldville. But that régime is only temporary.

212. I would like to conclude my statement with a passage from the testament of Patrice Lumumba:

“I know and feel from the depths of my soul that sooner or later my people will rid itself of its internal and external enemies, that it will rise as one man and say “No” to colonialism, to insolent, dying colonialism, so as to achieve its dignity on its cleansed soil.

“We are not alone. Africa and Asia, the peoples that are free or are gaining their freedom in all corners of the globe, will forever stand together with the millions of Congolese who will not give up the struggle while, in our land, a single colonialist or hireling of a colonialist remains.”

213. It is the duty of the United Nations to support the Congolese people at this difficult time in its struggle for true freedom and independence.

*The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.*