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中美洲局势：对国际和平与

安全的威胁及和平倡议

安全理事会

第三十九年

1984年11月15日

尼加拉瓜常驻联合国代表给秘书长的信

1984年9月7日，孔塔多拉集团在巴拿马城举行的孔塔多拉集团国家外交部长和中美洲国家集团外交部长第七届联席会议上，向中美洲国家提出了1984年9月7日“孔塔多拉关于中美洲和平与合作的文件”。

在那个场合上，孔塔多拉集团国家外交部长们说，他们认为，面对着和平即将受到破坏的不断威胁，“区域内各国政府必须迅速通过孔塔多拉文件内所作的各项承诺”，并且“对该地域有利害关系和关联的其他国家的政府应尊重中美洲各国人民的自决，并明确表示它们赞成以政治谈判代替武力”。他们还表示，他们打算向各国际组织报告“以提交孔塔多拉文件订正本达到顶点的这个重要阶段所作出的进展”。

尼加拉瓜政府希望尽可能作出贡献，为这个严重局势寻求和平解决办法，同时考虑到事实上正如孔塔多拉集团外交部长在9月7日给中美洲国家首脑的信中所说的，同一天的文件“反映出中美洲五国政府对文件草案的意见和看法”，并且“这份最新文本是同中美洲所有国家政府进行深入协商和广泛交换意见得到的成果”，所以如实宣布了（参看S/16756，附件）它决定“全部接受孔塔多拉集团9月7日为中美洲各国人民的和平与安全提出的订正文件，并立即签字，不作任何修改”。

1984年9月25日，孔塔多拉集团国家的外交部长在纽约举行会议，目的在向你提出这份极为重要的文件，同时请你将它作为附件载入你即将提交大会和安全理事会的关于中美洲局势的报告内。9月7日的“孔塔多拉关于中美洲和平与合作的文件”实际上已作为附件载入1984年10月9日的A/39/562-S/16775号文件内。

令我们感到困惑和惊讶的是，发现作为大会议程项目25的正式文件印发的A/39/630号文件竟然附有一份所谓的“孔塔多拉关于中美洲和平与合作的文件——经中美洲国家外交部长会议订正”。

鉴于这个事实，我国政府认为向国际社会提出下述的澄清是极为重要的：

1. 10月30日哥斯达黎加、萨尔瓦多和洪都拉斯等三国驻联合国代表的信（A/39/630）所附的文件并非孔塔多拉集团的文件，因为孔塔多拉的文件只有一份，即1984年9月7日的文件——我国政府已就该文件发表了评论。同时，该文件也不反映中美洲国家外交部长会议所作的修改。如果上述三国代表所指的会议是1984年10月20日在洪都拉斯特古西加尔巴举行的他们三国的外交部长会议，那么，必须指出，该会议绝不能称作中美洲国家外交部长会议，因为危地马拉和尼加拉瓜的外交部长都没有参与该会议，而且，危地马拉也没有在最后文件上签署。尼加拉瓜认为不能接受的是，不在孔塔多拉的架构内，而在孔塔多拉集团采取的程序以外，或在违反该项程序的情况下举行会议。

2. 如果哥斯达黎加、萨尔瓦多和洪都拉斯三国代表的目的是要表明他们各自政府对1984年9月7日《孔塔多拉关于中美洲和平与合作的文件》的意见，则其目的与所用的程序很不一致，因为这三国僭取了只属于孔塔多拉集团的职权，发表了只有中美洲五国作为一个集团才能授权发表的意见。

3. 就哥斯达黎加、萨尔瓦多和洪都拉斯等国政府所提修改的实质而言，尼加拉瓜政府最近在已经作为大会和安全理事会的正式文件散发的一项声明里很清楚地表明它的立场。关于这一点，我们希望重申，这种修改“事实上拒绝接受孔塔多拉集团的提议，完全否定过去以协商一致意见达成的协议，”同时“它们反映的是美国政府的意见，并且是美国改变《1984年9月7日孔塔多拉文件》的本质和妨碍其签署的政策的一部分。”11月6日《华盛顿邮报》所载一份被美国国家安全理事会划为“机密/敏感”类的文件的存在，就证明后一种意见是准确的，现将该文件附上作为本信的附件。

4. 值此攸关中美洲地区和平的关键时刻，我们认为重申我们全力支持孔塔多拉各国的努力，是很重要的。我们同时敦促美国政府停止其阻扰就中美各种问题以和平手段经过谈判达成解决的阴谋，老老实实象它口头所说的那样，支持《1984年9月7日文件》的早日签字和批准。

敬请做出安排以便将本信及其附件作为大会议程项目25的正式文件和安全理事会的正式文件散发。

尼加拉瓜常驻联合国代表

大使

哈维尔·查莫罗·莫拉(签名)

附 件

Excerpt from the Washington Post of Tuesday, 6 November 1984

# Document Describes How U.S. 'Blocked' A Contadora Treaty

By Alma Guillermoprieto  
and David Hoffman  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Reagan administration believes it has "effectively blocked" what it views as an "unsatisfactory" regional peace settlement in Central America, according to a secret background paper prepared for a National Security Council meeting last Tuesday that the president attended.

The paper also outlines a wide-ranging plan to convince Americans and the rest of the world that Sunday's Nicaraguan elections were a "sham," promoting this view through U.S. embassies, politicians, labor organizations, non-government experts, and public reports.

The briefing paper, marked "secret/sensitive," was obtained by The Washington Post from governmental sources. It provides a detailed look at the administration's approach to the Sandinista government just days before elections in Nicaragua and the United States.

It is not known whether all the items in the briefing paper were discussed. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Assistant Secretary for Inter-America Affairs Langhorne A. Motley also attended what was described by officials yesterday as a "briefing."

The paper discussed the administration's approach to the draft version of the Contadora peace treaty that was completed Sept. 7. It was negotiated by the foreign ministers of Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela, who first met for the purpose in 1982 on the small Panamanian island of Contadora.

The treaty's principal thrust is to reduce foreign military influence, establish mechanisms for arms control, and prevent the Central American countries from making or sponsoring war on each other.

On Sept. 21, Nicaragua unexpectedly announced it would sign the 55-page draft treaty. The Reagan administration had not publicly criticized it up to that point.

Since the Sandinistas announced their willingness to sign it, three countries—Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica—reversed their previous position of support for the treaty and, along with the United States, sought extensive modifications in the draft to improve verification and execution mechanisms.

# Paper Details Anti-Managua Effort

LATIN, From A1

The paper declares: "We have effectively blocked Contadora Group efforts to impose a second draft of a revised Contadora Act. Following intensive U.S. consultations with El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica, the Central American [sic] submitted a counterdraft to the Contadora states on Oct. 20, 1984 . . . [that] shifts concern within Contadora to a document broadly consistent with U.S. interests."

The United States repeatedly has portrayed the decision by Central American countries not to approve the initial draft treaty as one made independently by those countries, despite consultations.

The briefing paper expresses concern that a fourth Central American country, Guatemala, has been reluctant to back its three neighbors in seeking changes in the treaty. "We will continue to exert strong pressure on Guatemala to support the basic Core Four position," the paper says. The "uncertain support" of Guatemala is "a continuing problem," it adds. "Core Four" refers to Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica.

Mexico has been the most insistent promoter of signing the Sept. 7 version of the Contadora treaty. The briefing paper notes that Guatemala, because of its problems with guerrilla insurgency along the Mexican border, is seeking closer ties to Mexico, providing a "strong incentive" for Guatemala to lean toward the Mexican view.

But the paper concludes in a summary: "We have trumped the latest Nicaraguan/Mexican efforts to rush signature of an unsatisfactory Contadora agreement, and the initiative is now with the Core Four, although the situation remains fluid and requires careful management."

The paper notes that the administration recently has had "mixed" success in dealing with Nicaragua. "Congressional failure to fund the armed opposition is a serious loss, but our handling of the Nicaraguan

election issue and Sandinista mistakes have shifted opinion against the sham elections," it says.

This was the administration line before and after the election. But the paper outlines ways in which this view should be promoted throughout the world.

It calls for encouraging "sympathetic American intellectuals and academics," "U.S. labor" and "selected U.S. political figures" to lobby their counterparts in Europe and Latin America, seeking critical statements about the election.

Another proposal was for the United States to use "selected embassies" in Europe and the Western Hemisphere to promote administration views.

"Embassy Bonn will approach [West German ex-chancellor] Willy Brandt to determine if he plans to make any public statements" on the election following the withdrawal of a key opposition party.

That withdrawal "has now left the Sandinistas holding a near worthless hand," the paper says.

The document also refers to the bilateral U.S.-Nicaraguan talks hosted by Mexico. At the 6th round, held in September, the U.S. side "tabled" a comprehensive statement by Nicaragua, the background paper says, adding that the Sandinistas have adopted the Sept. 7 version of the Contadora treaty as their negotiating position vis-a-vis the United States as well.