

United Nations  
**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**

**ELEVENTH SESSION**  
**Official Records**



**PLENARY MEETING. 659th**

**Friday, 22 February 1957,**  
**at 3 p.m.**

**New York**

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**President: Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON**  
**(Thailand).**

**Statement by the President**

1. The PRESIDENT: Before turning to the consideration of item 66, I would refer to the following matter.
2. Members of the Assembly will recall that, on the basis of a report from the General Committee [A/3534], a decision was made to establish 23 February 1957, which is tomorrow, as the date for the completion of the work of the Assembly except for items 66 and 67. However, a number of items still remain to be completed in committee and a total of seventeen items remain to be dealt with in the General Assembly.
3. In these circumstances, I have consulted informally with all the members of the General Committee, who agree that I may suggest to the Assembly a further extension into next week. I wish, therefore, to put the question to the Assembly as to whether it favours a continuation of our general programme of work into next week.

*In the absence of any objection, it was so decided.*

**AGENDA-ITEM 66**

**Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956 (*continued*)\***

4. The PRESIDENT: In connexion with this item, Members have before them the report of the Secretary-General [A/3527] submitted in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution [1125 (XI)] of 2 February 1957; another report of the Secretary-General [A/3526] which deals with arrangements concerning the status of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt and, with respect to this report, a draft resolution submitted by ten delegations [A/3542].
5. I call on the representative of the Philippines on a point of order.
6. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): I would suggest, on a point of order, that the Secretary-General's report on arrangements concerning the status of UNEF [A/3526] and the ten-Power draft resolution [A/3542] should be considered first by the Assembly, since they

are non-controversial in character and could be disposed of easily. I would also suggest that the consideration of the other report of the Secretary-General [A/3527] might be deferred until Monday, 25 February, to enable the delegations to study it more carefully.

7. The PRESIDENT: If there is no objection, we shall take the first report of the Secretary-General [A/3526] and the ten-Power draft resolution [A/3542] first, and then the second report of the Secretary-General [A/3527].

8. Mr. JAMALI (Iraq): The Iraqi delegation does not see any difficulty in accommodating the representative of the Philippines by bringing the first report and the joint draft resolution to the front. But we do think that the postponement of the second report is quite out of place, because so much time has already elapsed and because the whole world is watching us and is awaiting the results of our deliberations. Therefore, my delegation believes that we could make a start this afternoon and those of us who are ready to take part could do so and those who wish further deliberation and further study would have the opportunity of waiting until Monday. Therefore, to expedite our work, my delegation requests the representative of the Philippines to withdraw his last proposal in order to let us go ahead and expedite work on the item.

9. The PRESIDENT: I should like to find out from the representative of Iraq if he agrees with me when I say that the first report and the joint draft resolution will not take a long time and that we shall deal with the second report this afternoon.

10. Mr. JAMALI (Iraq) (from the floor): That is what I meant.

11. The PRESIDENT: So we are in agreement now, and we shall now take the first report of the Secretary-General [A/3526] and the joint draft resolution [A/3542].

12. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): My delegation has carefully gone over the text of the *ad hoc* arrangements agreed upon between the Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt [A/3526] and we can state that, subject to certain clarifications which we shall now voice, we will be willing to support the ten-Power draft resolution [A/3542].

13. I would like to call the attention of the Assembly to paragraph 8 of the report, and to suggest that the word "required" in the first and third sentences should be changed to the word "asked". That would be more in keeping with the privileges and immunities of the United Nations Emergency Force. Needless to say, there is a big difference between the use of the word "asked" and the word "required". There might be circumstances — the possibility is remote, and we hope it will not occur — where the Egyptian authorities might unreasonably exact the presentation of identity cards by members of UNEF and the unreasonable

\* Resumed from the 652nd meeting.

demand might be refused. In such an eventuality, the Egyptian authorities should make representations to the Commander of the Force to obtain the necessary submission of such cards.

14. I now call the attention of the Assembly to paragraph 11, which states:

"Members of the Force shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national States in respect of any criminal offences which may be committed by them in Egypt."

I wish merely to seek certain clarifications as to the extent of the meaning of the phrase "exclusive jurisdiction" in order to avoid any possibility of a misunderstanding between the Government of Egypt and the participating States in relevant cases.

15. I can imagine a number of hypothetical cases. For instance, a member of the Force commits an act on Egyptian territory, where the Force is located. The act under the laws of Egypt is an indictable and punishable offence, but, under the laws of the State to which that member belongs, it is not an indictable offence. Will this phrase "exclusive jurisdiction" mean that the laws of the State to which he belongs shall prevail?

16. Secondly, an act committed by a member of the Force might be punishable by a very heavy penalty under Egyptian law and by a very light penalty under the laws of the State to which he belonged. Which laws should apply in so far as the phrase "exclusive jurisdiction" is concerned?

17. The third case is perhaps the most important. In our examination of criminal law in all civilized countries, we have found that there are cases of offences—and a great many of them—which carry civil liability. In certain jurisdictions, the civil liability cannot be prosecuted independently of the criminal offence. Note that under sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 12, on civil jurisdiction, the members of the Force may in certain cases be subject to the civil jurisdiction of the Egyptian courts. Suppose an act is committed on Egyptian territory by a member of the Force which is admittedly a criminal offence but which carries with it civil liability: may the Egyptian courts insist on subjecting him separately to civil process, while the criminal offence committed by him is subject to the jurisdiction of his own courts?

18. Again, there may be cases where, under the so-called exclusive jurisdiction of the State to which the member belongs, a certain aspect of the offence is different in the State to which he belongs from that of Egypt. For example, it will be noted that, under certain jurisdictions of civilized States, the rule of confrontation of witnesses is a constitutional right of the accused. These difficulties will arise because, if the case has to be prosecuted in the courts of the State to which the member belongs, the right of confrontation of witnesses against him may be invoked by the accused. How shall these difficulties be resolved? I do not know whether the provisions in paragraph 18 can be considered to be applicable in contingencies of such a character.

19. Finally, I should like to make a clarification with respect to sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 12 concerning civil jurisdiction. It will be noted under this sub-paragraph that the only guarantee of these *ad hoc* arrangements is that the member of the Force shall be given sufficient opportunity to safeguard his rights. We assume that the member of the Force is subject to

the military orders of his Commander to depart for a given area of operations. If this member of the Force has a pending civil case before an Egyptian court, the question may arise: may the Egyptian court arrest or in some way prevent the departure of this member of the Force for his military assignment by order of his military Commander so that he may be held under civil process before the Egyptian court? I wish that to be clarified.

20. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union stated at the first emergency special session of the General Assembly that the decision to set up a United Nations Emergency Force for Egypt was contrary to the provisions of the Charter.

21. According to the Charter, as we all know, the right to set up United Nations international armed forces for the maintenance of international peace and security belongs exclusively to the Security Council, and not to the General Assembly. For that reason, the delegation of the Soviet Union feels unable to vote for the approval of the Secretary-General's report on the status of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt and will abstain from voting on the ten-Power draft resolution which calls for the approval of the report.

22. The PRESIDENT: I will now put to the vote the draft resolution presented by ten Powers, namely, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia [A/3542].

*The draft resolution was adopted by 67 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.*

24. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: On 11 February I submitted the report [A/3527], in pursuance of the resolution [1125 (XI)] of the General Assembly of 2 February. Events since then have not called for a further report, and I have presented none. It is well known, however, that discussions have been carried on outside this house in the continuing resolve to attain the goals defined in the several resolutions of the General Assembly, I have maintained close contact with these activities and have been kept well informed on them. These serious efforts to break through the unfortunate impasse and to unlock the door to constructive endeavor are deserving of warm appreciation.

25. In so far as United Nations activities and positions are concerned, developments in the interim have given no reason to revise any of the substance of the previous report. However, in the light of some subsequent discussions in which I have engaged, I may make the following statement in the nature of a supplement to that report.

26. The Secretary-General states with confidence that it is the desire of the Government of Egypt that the take-over of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel—which, as has been the case, in the first instance would be exclusively by UNEF—will be orderly and safe, as it has been elsewhere.

27. It may be added with equal confidence that the Government of Egypt, recognizing the present special problems and complexities of the Gaza area and the long-standing major responsibility of the United Nations there for the assistance of the Arab refugees, and having in mind also the objectives and obligations of the Armistice Agreement, has the willingness and readiness to make special and helpful arrangements with the United Nations, and some of its auxiliary bodies, such as the United Nations Relief and Works

Agency for Palestine Refugees and UNEF. For example, the arrangement for the use of UNEF in the area should ensure its deployment on the armistice line at the Gaza Strip and the effective interposition of the Force between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel.

28. Similarly, the assistance of the United Nations and its appropriate auxiliary bodies would be enrolled towards putting a definite end to all incursions and raids across the border from either side.

29. Furthermore, with reference to the period of transition, such other arrangements with the United Nations may be made as will contribute towards safeguarding life and property in the area by providing efficient and effective police protection; as will guarantee good civilian administration; as will assure maximum assistance to the United Nations refugee programme; and as will protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people.

30. Mr. FAWZI (Egypt): Once more, the General Assembly convenes to consider Israel's refusal, as we have just heard from the Secretary-General, to put an end to its aggression against Egypt and to withdraw behind the armistice line in compliance with the General Assembly's by now too many unheeded resolutions. These resolutions, which were approved almost unanimously, with only two, including Israel itself, voting against them, and no less than seventy-four of the eighty Members of the United Nations voting for them, give clear though mild expression to the intent of the Charter and to the huge mass of world opinion in this connexion. They leave no scope whatsoever for any honest doubt that Israel's withdrawal must be complete, immediate and unconditional.

31. We are nevertheless told by Israel and its abettors that we should all agree instead to the following rules of conduct which they prescribe for the present and future guidance of our Organization: rule 1. Disputes shall be settled by armed aggression; rule 2. The aggressor may continue his aggression for as long as he pleases; rule 3. The aggressor's right of conquest shall be recognized; he may retain indefinitely any territory he has invaded and dispose at will of all people and property therein; rule 4. The aggressor shall have the right to exact any price he wants for ending his aggression.

32. Then there are some subsidiary rules: (a) besides being allowed to reap the fruits and derive benefits from his aggression, the party which is the author of such an understandable indiscretion, as they call it, shall increasingly receive encouragement and substantial tokens of appreciation; (b) the victim of aggression, in the present case Egypt, shall submit to the aggressor's decision as to the duration of aggression and all related matters; (c) any claim by the victim of aggression concerning compensation for the damage sustained shall remain unheeded; (d) economic and other measures shall be taken against the victim of aggression by any Member of the United Nations wishing to do so; an illustration in point is the freezing of Egypt's assets and accounts in several countries which are Members of this Organization.

33. Such, with the supplements and auxiliaries, are the rules of misconduct recommended by Israel and its associates as a substitute for the Charter of the United Nations. Such is the caveman's world which in 1957 the Israel group is offering us—a bleak, dreary, squalid and soulless world which is in no way embellished by the ghastly sight of Israel biting every hand that feeds it, especially those of the United States,

which assisted at Israel's birth, and of the United Nations, to which Israel owes its very existence.

34. Nor is the world a better place to live in because of Israel's constant diligence in manufacturing new troubles and stirring up old ones of its own making. Indeed, Israel is giving every day additional reasons for more people to realize that there is a distinct state of contradiction and incompatibility between Israel's will to live and prosper among the people of the Middle East and its reckless and hostile actions against us. This course which Israel has charted for itself of thorough obliviousness to the decencies of civilization, this complete lack of any sense of responsibility, this "bull in a china shop" policy of Israel—all go to show how blind Israel is to every light and how stone-deaf it is to every appeal, to every word of foresight and of wisdom.

35. What, then, is the General Assembly—what are we all as Members of the United Nations—going to do? For its part, Egypt is not taking the law in its hands. In its extreme solicitude to keep the present already intolerable conditions from further deterioration, it is using almost superhuman patience and restraining itself from some actions which would naturally flow from undeniable rights clearly and expressly consecrated and recognized by the Charter. Indeed, the question we are now considering is of such a nature and has such deep and broad, nay world-wide, implications as to be primarily and most particularly the trust and responsibility of the whole United Nations—as long, of course, as this Organization rises promptly and robustly to the occasion. It is for us all to do our duty or to shirk it, to fail or to succeed. It is for us all to choose. May it please God to give us the guidance for making the right choice.

36. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): I have the honour first to seize the General Assembly of a draft-resolution sponsored by the following six Members of the United Nations, namely, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan and the Sudan [A/3557]. Although it is sponsored by these six Members only, it is actually supported by numerous other Members of the United Nations.

37. I shall proceed now to speak on this draft-resolution. In my previous statements on the question of withdrawal, I deliberately refrained from discussing the conditions which Israel was setting as a price for accepting to relinquish territories it had acquired through aggression, because we maintained, and seventy-three other delegations here also maintained, that the withdrawal must be immediate and unconditional. However, in view of the confusion that seems to have been created, it appears necessary to say a few words about this matter.

38. Israel maintains that it will not withdraw—and we all read the newspapers this morning in support of this doctrine—from the Gaza Strip and the Aqaba area unless it receives certain guarantees from the United Nations or from certain States that there will be no return to the situation that prevailed before the Israel attack and which Israel alleges was the immediate cause for its invasion of Egypt. This is Israel's point of view.

39. The Arab point of view is that the situation which Israel considers as a pretext for its attack was itself a consequence of Israel's previous acts, and, in particular, of Israel's disregard of the decisions of the United Nations. We believe this is the true sequence of cause and effect. What Israel and some Members have come to look upon as a cause of Israel's attack upon Egypt is,

in reality, no more than a consequence of Israel's previous clear record.

40. Israel's reiterated theory that its aggression against Egypt was provoked by the latter's alleged violation of United Nations resolutions, more specifically, of the Security Council resolution of 1951 on navigation in the Suez Canal [S/2322], and of Egypt's alleged disregard of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, is worthy of close scrutiny.

41. With regard to the Armistice Agreement, the Security Council records abound in examples of acts of aggression committed by Israel armed forces against Egypt and other Arab States, acts for which Israel was solemnly condemned by the Security Council; while Egypt—and this is a point that I beg the Members to note with care—has never, not even once, been condemned or censured for an act of aggression by its armed forces.

42. As for Israel's complaint that Egypt has not observed the Security Council resolution of 1951, I can only say that for a Member which has persistently violated a number of crucial resolutions to point an accusing finger at another Member for allegedly violating one single resolution affecting one partial aspect of a total problem, is clearly absurd.

43. The time has come, then, I believe, to examine thoroughly the question of the validity of Israel's championing of the authority of the United Nations. In this connexion, the following facts should be recalled, and I merely enumerate them with the utmost coolness and objectivity.

44. First, there are certain General Assembly resolutions of a universal character, not pertaining to one situation or one problem but relating to the general conduct of nations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an example. I do not believe that, with respect to Israel's treatment of the 165,000 Arabs living under its jurisdiction, Israel can be said to have respected the provisions of this Declaration or those articles of the Charter on which it is based.

45. There is a second category of General Assembly resolutions comprising those resolutions to which Israel owes its existence and upon which it was founded. In this category we must mention the following: First, the resolution [181 (II)] on partition, concerning boundaries and concerning the treatment of the Arab minority in the Jewish State; it must be recalled that this resolution was reaffirmed and accepted by Israel as the basis of negotiations between the Arab States and Israel in May 1949 at Lausanne; secondly, the resolutions relating to the Arab refugees; thirdly, the resolutions relating to Jerusalem.

46. Thus we find basic General Assembly resolutions affecting the boundaries, the Arab inhabitants, the status of Jerusalem and the rightful owners of the majority of the lands now occupied by Israel, all being flouted by Israel. It is useless to contend that these are merely recommendations, for they include the very resolution, also a recommendation, which gave birth to Israel and laid down the conditions of its being, and they regulate very vital elements of the entire Palestinian question.

47. A third category of resolutions, mainly Security Council resolutions, pertains to partial or secondary aspects of the relations between Israel and the Arab States, for example, the resolutions pertaining to the inhabitants of the Huleh region who were deported by Israel, and those relating to truce problems,

48. There are also the many decisions of the mixed armistice commissions and the orders of the Chief of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, which Israel has persistently disregarded.

49. There are, finally, specific rebukes to Israel: the Trusteeship Council rebuke in 1950 concerning the transfer of certain Israel governmental departments to Jerusalem; the Security Council rebuke of May 1951 concerning the bombing of El Hamma; the Security Council rebuke for Israel aggression in Qibya, in Gaza and near Lake Tiberias.

50. In view of this record of constant violation of universal as well as basic and also particular resolutions by Israel, it is odd for Israel to pose as the champion of adherence by Member States to United Nations resolutions.

51. We believe that there is a difference in kind between the violation by Israel of those resolutions which are basic to its very existence and which determine the very elements of its being, such as boundary, capital, and the safeguarding of the human rights of its Arab minority and of the original owners of the greater portion of the land it occupies, and the alleged violation by other Members of particular resolutions relating to very partial aspects of their relations with other States. No one has put this matter more truthfully than the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, in his speech the night before last. Speaking of alleged violations by Egypt to which Israel constantly refers, Mr. Eisenhower said: "However, such violations constitute no justification for the armed invasion of Egypt by Israel, which the United Nations is now seeking to undo."

52. If I have dwelt at some length on this matter, it is because I feel the time has finally come when a few truths must be said. It is also with the intention of proving that Israel's refusal to withdraw from territory it acquired by aggression has no justification whatsoever, be it moral or legal. Moreover, the conditions which Israel sets as a price for its compliance with the repeated decisions of the General Assembly have absolutely nothing to do with the immediate problem before us, namely, withdrawal.

53. These conditions, particularly Israel's demands with respect to Aqaba and the Gaza Strip, touch upon the Palestine question as a whole. They go to the very roots of the problem. Should the guarantees which Israel is seeking to obtain be accorded to it, then the Arab States would be justified in demanding that certain guarantees be granted to them. Indeed, it becomes incumbent upon the Arab States to demand that ironclad guarantees be given them to ensure that Israel will abide by the resolutions—all the resolutions—of the United Nations.

54. More specifically, the Arab States would demand guarantees that Israel be made to relinquish all Arab-owned territory in Palestine which was not allotted to it by the partition plan of 29 November 1947 and which it now controls as a result of armed conquest.

55. They would demand guarantees that Jerusalem, the city holy to Christians, Moslems and Jews alike, be given up by the Israel authorities and turned over to the United Nations in accordance with the Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947, which was repeatedly reaffirmed in subsequent years.

56. They would demand guarantees that the Arab refugees—one million of them—compelled to flee for safety by terrorist attacks, be returned to their homes

if they so wished, or be paid compensation for their properties if they chose to remain where they were.

57. The Arab States would demand that guarantees be given ensuring them against renewed Israel armed attacks across the armistice demarcation lines—and this in accordance with the provisions of the armistice agreements, with the repeated decisions of the Security Council and with the solemn pledge given by Israel itself last spring to the Secretary-General of the United Nations [S/3584].

58. I proceed next to an analysis of some of the most serious consequences of Israel's refusal to withdraw from the Sharm El Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip. Israel and some other Members have maintained that Israel's attitude does not constitute a flat refusal to withdraw and that, if this or that promise is made, or if this or that guarantee is given, Israel will be quite prepared to withdraw. This sort of argument is, we submit, inadmissible. The fact that refusal by Israel to withdraw has been accompanied by various pretexts or couched in different forms does not change the basic fact that we are faced with an outright refusal by a Member of the United Nations to submit to the repeated demands of the General Assembly. We are faced with a persistent defiance of the resolutions solemnly adopted by the United Nations.

59. In my previous statement on this question before the General Assembly [650th meeting], I said that the five previous resolutions calling upon Israel to withdraw from Egypt and Egyptian-controlled territory made it quite clear that such withdrawal was to be immediate, complete and without any conditions whatsoever. If any doubt remained in the mind of anyone that this was the true meaning of the five resolutions on withdrawal, this doubt must have been completely dissipated by the two resolutions which the General Assembly adopted on 2 February.

60. In the first resolution [1124 (XI)], after deploring "the non-compliance of Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly", this body called upon Israel to do so without further delay. The second resolution [1125 (XI)], provided for certain measures which were to be adopted after the withdrawal with a view to assuring "progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions". However, this resolution made it abundantly clear that withdrawal—immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal—was to come first. The second paragraph of the preamble of that resolution reads as follows: "*Recognizing* that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would . . ." Again, paragraph 3 of the operative part provides that the General Assembly: "*Considers* that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm El Sheikh and Gaza areas . . ."

61. There can be no doubt, then, that withdrawal was to precede all action to be taken by the United Nations to improve the situation.

62. That this was the manifest will of the Assembly is further evidenced by the fact that, of those delegations which favoured the adoption, after withdrawal, of certain measures destined to improve the situation in the area, not one expressed the view that those measures could become a condition precedent to withdrawal. On the contrary, many delegations affirmed that the first resolution was in no way conditional upon the second.

63. Constituting, as it does, a **flagrant defiance** of the Assembly's resolutions, Israel's **refusal** to withdraw is also contrary to the Secretary-General's views, which have been overwhelmingly endorsed by the General Assembly and which no one has challenged or disputed. In this connexion, I must emphasize what I said at a previous meeting, namely, that the function of the Secretary-General, as the chief officer of one of the principal organs of the United Nations, endowed with Charter powers for the maintenance of peace and security, gives his opinion such importance that due consideration must be given to that opinion in passing judgement on matters involving peace and security.

64. This defiant attitude on the part of Israel, if not arrested immediately and energetically by the United Nations, is bound to lead to consequences of the utmost gravity. It constitutes an immediate and real danger to the continued existence of the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of peace. The United Nations has reached a turning-point in its history. Should the United Nations submit to aggression, condone aggression or even tolerate aggression, then it is far better to allow it to collapse and die.

65. Again, may I be permitted to quote from President Eisenhower's speech of 20 February 1957:

"We are approaching a fateful moment, when either we must recognize that the United Nations is unable to restore peace in this area or the United Nations must renew with increased vigour its efforts to bring about Israel withdrawal.

"If it does nothing, if it accepts the ignoring of its repeated resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the invading forces, then it will have admitted failure. That failure would be a blow to the authority and influence of the United Nations in the world and to the hopes which humanity has placed in the United Nations as the means for achieving peace with justice."

66. It should be recalled that the courageous stand taken by the United Nations in the face of the British, French and Israel attacks on Egypt last fall aroused hopes that it was going to constitute, if strictly adhered to until the end, a very effective element—perhaps the sole decisive factor—in the re-establishment of peaceful conditions in the area. One consequence of this stand would be to enhance the prestige of the United Nations and to transform it into a real instrument for peace, into a powerful and respected authority in the area, thereby reversing the prevailing trend towards basing policy on force and towards an armaments race.

67. Failure to maintain that stand would undoubtedly result in making the situation far worse than it ever was. It would leave the countries in the area with no other choice but to arm themselves and to resolve their differences by force. Such a failure on the part of the United Nations would also have an important bearing on Israel's mentality and policy.

68. Since its inception, Israel has based its policy towards its Arab neighbours on force. Israel tries to justify this policy by alleging that it was compelled to resort to force because of Arab hostility to it. However, the records of the United Nations prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not the Arabs but Israel which committed those acts of aggression. Such names as Qibya, Nahhalin, El Hamma, Gaza and Qalqiliya stand as convictive evidence of Israel's resort to force as a primary instrument of its policy. There are no

such names in the annals of the United Nations convicting the Arabs in the same way.

69. It is true that the Security Council has, over and over again, condemned Israel for these armed attacks. Unfortunately, however, the Council did not follow up its censures and condemnations with the adoption of punitive measures, which alone could have dissuaded Israel from committing further acts of aggression. This complacency, this reluctance on the part of the Security Council to apply the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, was one of the main factors which encouraged Israel to commit on 29 October 1956 its latest act of aggression against Egypt on a much bigger scale than before—an action which may safely be described as a real war. Israel, in embarking upon that military adventure, was, one can be sure counting in advance on the relative inaction of the United Nations and on the fact that, once again, it could at least, at little cost, get away with aggression as it had done before.

70. Now if this Assembly were to fulfil Israel's hopes and expectations, and if we were, by our action or inaction, to show Israel that it was justified in its expectations, that would have, as an inescapable consequence, the confirmation of Israel in its belief that only the policy of force paid and that it could settle its problems with its Arab neighbours by force. It would also lead Israel to believe that a durable peace in the area could be achieved without having to show a more reasonable and more conciliatory attitude, and without having to give up one iota of what it illegally held or controlled.

71. I have attempted to analyse some of the consequences which would result from Israel's refusal to withdraw from Sharm El Sheikh and the Gaza Strip. However, the effect of such a refusal is not limited to the United Nations or to peace in the Near East. In a situation where the United Nations would have lost its prestige in general, where the Organization would have ceased to be a respected and effective authority in the Palestine area, where the philosophy of strength would be the only recourse left to the countries of that region, where encouragement would have been given to a policy of force and territorial expansion, where the general armistice agreements would have ceased to exist—in such a situation, where the rule of law had collapsed, anything and everything would be possible.

72. For example, what would prevent a country which felt the need for outside help, military or economic, from seeking such help wherever it could find it? What would prevent such a country from accepting help if a State outside the area were interested in providing military assistance? Would that not lead to a conflict which might extend far beyond the area, and which might set the whole world ablaze?

73. That would be the result of our complacency. That would be the price of our failure to follow the course dictated by the gravity of the situation and to adopt the measures rendered necessary by Israel's defiance. Furthermore, complacency in this matter is bound to have the most adverse effect on whatever plans are being elaborated, both within and without the United Nations, for restoring order and stability to the Near East.

74. The question of Israel's withdrawal from Egypt, or from Egyptian-controlled territory, is a question to which all the Arabs attach the utmost importance. They are not prepared to compromise on their right or, for that matter, on the question of principle involved.

The paths of the Arab States have sometimes parted on several matters. They may have held different views on this international problem or that, or on some situation in this or that Arab country. Such an attitude is both normal and healthy, for, after all, they are sovereign States, and although they always endeavor as much as possible to adjust and co-ordinate their national policies with one another, still, as sovereign States, they adopt their respective policies each in the light of its national interests and of the particular situation in which it finds itself.

75. But no one should allow this healthy divergence in views to mislead him or distort his judgment. When it comes to matters affecting the security, the independence, the very existence of any of the Arab States, the Arabs, people and Governments alike, stand and speak and act as one.

76. As I have said before, the United Nations is going through one of the most crucial periods of its history. The issue before us is exceedingly delicate and dangerous, and requires wisdom, statesmanship and courage on the part of all concerned. By the decision we are about to take we shall indicate whether we desire to see the United Nations continue and grow in prestige and authority, or whether we prefer to see it collapse and fall into oblivion. We shall show whether peace and stability can be restored soon to the Middle East, or whether bloodshed, chaos, tension and misery are to be that area's lot for a long time to come. Finally, by the vote we will soon be casting we will be deciding whether the rule of force is going to be the determining factor in international relations, or whether the world is at long last on the threshold of a happy era in which the rule of law and the blessings of peace and justice shall prevail.

77. Justice is most important—but even more important than justice is truth, for without truth justice becomes false. I shall humbly and enthusiastically own every truth asserted by the representative of Israel or by any other representative here, provided, first, that it is really true and, second, that the complete truth of the situation is also faced and asserted.

78. Only by an honest, humble, complete, courageous real facing of the whole truth, in which we hide nothing and suppress nothing, are we going to pull out of the mess into which we have all, so unhappily and so smugly, got ourselves in the Near East. I therefore declare that, if there is any untruth or half-truth or partial truth or slanted truth or distortion of the truth in anything that I have said today, let it be forthwith null and void; I immediately recant such a statement, even if whoever points it out to me is not himself prepared to submit to the same rule.

79. The important thing is truth: truth of word, truth of thought and, above all, truth of being. And I sincerely believe, with a heart full of positive feeling, full of love and good will towards everyone, that it is true to say and to hold that the speech by the President of the United States on 20 February 1957 opened the door to a brighter future for all—and I emphasize the word "all"—in the Near East than we have dared to look forward to in many a long year. In the broad perspective of history, after we have gone through other crises which we may still have to face, who knows but that all of us—Israelis and Arabs alike—may one day be grateful for this new door which has been opened by the President of the United States? For the guardian of the door is a man of absolute integrity.

80. We disclaim any monopoly on wisdom in these matters which touch us all, or on the power to persuade this Assembly. We have humbly and sincerely put forward our ideas, for what they are worth. We are sure that they are not the only ideas, or even perhaps the best ideas. Let those, therefore, who have other ideas, better ideas, come forward, and let them add those ideas to the common pool.

81. Actuated by the desire to understand and be helpful, guided by a sincere regard for justice and,

above all, for truth, let us all, then, move together in good fellowship in the consideration of this momentous issue, not only to the end of serving the cause of world peace and reinforcing the prestige and authority of the United Nations, but also to the end that the tormented and lacerated peoples of the Near East, whom I know you all love and respect, may taste once again the blessings of peace with justice, and may turn their efforts at last to the wonderful creative tasks ahead.

*The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.*