

Monday, 26 November 1956,
at 3 p.m.



New York

CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 66:	
Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956 (continued)	325

President: Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON
(Thailand).

AGENDA ITEM 66

Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956 (continued)

1. Mr. ALDUNATE (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): I feel I must make a few brief remarks regarding the procedure followed at the 594th meeting on 24 November on the deplorable events taking place in the Suez Canal zone. Although there have been a number of precedents, I feel that such a procedure should be used with great caution. It should be resorted to as an exceptional measure, and only when there is an urgent need for immediate action.
2. In matters as important as those which the Assembly has been considering, everyone is entitled to express his views before voting on a resolution. For that to be possible, the best method would be for us in future to be moderate, to concentrate on analysing the proposals before us and not to bring in stories or historical accounts of a literary nature, not to repeat ideas, not to take advantage of the situation to make propaganda for specific political ideologies and not to flounder in recriminations and accusations which contribute nothing positive or constructive to the debate. Let us be grateful for new, edifying and conciliatory ideas; but let us not convert this Assembly into a court of accusations. Naturally, the patience of the Assembly is taxed when members expatiate upon matters about which the great majority of representatives already have a clear idea.
3. On 24 November, it became too much for us, and that led possibly the very people who had brought us to that point to press for an immediate decision on the draft resolutions under consideration. If we could curb that stultifying tendency to loquaciousness a little, all of us would have a chance to exercise the right to state our views briefly on any question or to make a useful contribution towards bringing about the agreement we seek.
4. If my delegation had had an opportunity to speak on 24 November, it would have made a few suggestions which might have helped to make our resolutions more precise and more fair. We had no intention of going into an endless discussion of the facts, or of criticizing or

justifying anyone's position, or of proclaiming ourselves the only possessors of the truth.

5. My country has already made clear its position on this question and has emphasized that the events in the Suez Canal zone are absolutely incompatible with the principles of our Charter and with the fundamental objectives of the United Nations. Our attitude is best illustrated by the fact that our Government offered the United Nations [A/3302/Add.28] a contingent of troops to help restore peace in the area.

6. The only purpose for which I wanted to speak was to suggest that the twenty-Power draft resolution [A/3385/Rev.1] might be given a wording that was more in keeping with the facts. I was not going to object to the phrase "*Notes with regret*", which seemed logical and natural inasmuch as an expressed wish of the Assembly had not been fully complied with. But there were other expressions or words which I would have deleted because they led us into the realm of conjecture. What was the point of invoking facts given in the Secretary-General's report of 21 November [A/3384] and asserting that "two-thirds", exactly two-thirds of these forces, or "all" those forces, were still on Egyptian territory? Who had such accurate and up-to-date figures? Had not the United Kingdom representative told us otherwise only a few moments earlier, and had not the representatives of France and Israel given us different information? Who in this hall has a monopoly of the truth? Why should we believe some and give no credence to the solemn statements of others?

7. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution, but it would have done so with more pleasure if such sweeping and questionable statements had been left out, for if it should turn out that they did not reflect the situation at that moment, our resolution would be on shaky ground, and that would deprive our decision of force and authority. That is why I would have liked to make some effort, before we rushed into the vote, to have paragraph 1 amended to read as follows:

"*Notes with regret* that, according to the communications received by the Secretary-General, French and United Kingdom forces remain and Israel troops have not all been withdrawn behind the armistice lines, though a considerable time has elapsed since the adoption of its relevant resolutions."

8. With regard to the other draft resolution [A/3386], too, I should have liked to make a few remarks in order to clarify the responsibilities and commitments it entails for each and every one of the Members of the United Nations, and to make the reservations which the constitutional system of my country necessitates. In any case, I voted in favour of it, in the conviction that the clearing of this international waterway, on which half the world depends for its supplies, cannot be postponed.

9. The amendment submitted by Belgium [A/L.215] also called for a few remarks which I could not make at the time, and which are now superfluous.

10. The point I wish to emphasize is that those who spent hours and hours in mutual vituperation and accusation, who coloured the facts with very personal and tendentious views and who used Press reports as weapons, wanted to rush headlong into a vote and to deprive others of their inalienable right to speak. This is already a matter of the past, but it is to be hoped that such methods do not come into more frequent use. That would run counter to the democratic spirit of this Assembly and to the respect we owe to each other, as also to the requirement that draft resolutions should be clear and well-founded.

11. Mr. KING (Liberia): The vote of the Liberian delegation was cast in favour of the twenty-Power draft resolution [A/3385/Rev.1], which received over and above the number of votes necessary for its adoption, calling upon two Member States, the United Kingdom and France, to withdraw their armed forces from Egyptian territory, and upon a third, Israel, to withdraw behind the demarcation lines established by the General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949.

12. This document we consider to be in conformity with and complementary to the action already taken at our special emergency session held from 1 to 10 November. At that time there was a virtually unanimous expression of condemnation and censure in this Organization of the military attacks which had been launched against and upon Egypt by Israel on the one hand, and by the United Kingdom and France on the other hand.

13. As the Chairman of my delegation said in the general debate at the present session [590th meeting], the Liberian Government strongly believes in the spirit of the law and holds that the law should be applied fairly and impartially to all, and it strongly disapproves of the resort to force or violence in the settlement of any dispute, national or international, considering it to be immoral to effect just ends by unjust means.

14. In the opinion of my delegation, the resolution adopted on the proposal of the six Powers [A/RES/411] will be ineffective as long as foreign invading troops remain on Egyptian territory. According to the report of the Secretary-General on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal [A/3376], one of the conditions set by President Nasser for the clearing of the Canal is the withdrawal of such invading troops. Attention should be drawn, in this connexion, to the Secretary-General's observations in paragraphs 7 and 9 of the report.

15. From my delegation's point of view, the complete and speedy withdrawal of the invading forces from Egyptian territory and the evacuation of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai peninsula by Israel forces to the demarcation lines established by the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 would seem to be the prerequisite for the undertaking of operations for the clearing of the Canal. A partial or token withdrawal would not, in our opinion, effect the desired ends nor ease the very acute and grave situation.

16. To have voted for the six-Power draft resolution and opposed the twenty-Power draft resolution would have implied that the matter would remain in *status quo*. How then could the former become effective, if the earlier resolution were made negative?

17. Some say that the Egyptian Government should not dictate terms to the United Nations. Equally, it does appear that the French, United Kingdom and Israel Governments, which have been censured by this

Organization, should not be in a position to lay down the terms of withdrawal of their armed forces of aggression. This seems to be a logical deduction from the premise laid down in General Assembly resolutions [997 (ES-I) and 1002 (ES-I)] of 2 and 7 November.

18. We found the six-Power draft resolution an auxiliary vehicle to the twenty-Power draft resolution, but not in itself a substantive solution of the problem confronting us. In that light, we voted for it.

19. However, we found ourselves unable to agree with the viewpoint of the Belgian delegation. The Belgian amendment [A/L.215], we consider, did not respond to the already explosive situation in the Middle East. It would not, therefore, have aided a speedy achievement of the very purpose and objective for which it was announced that the invading forces of the United Kingdom and France had been moved into that area, if we are to accept as valid the reasons disclosed subsequently by the Governments of those two countries: to stop aggression by Israel on Egypt and to protect the Canal. We have no reason to doubt the *bona fides* and earnestness of principal representatives of the United Kingdom here, nor of those of the Government of France, although we do question the moral and political wisdom and perspicacity of taking such action without invoking the provisions of the Charter, as was the case in the Korean conflict.

20. We therefore favoured the twenty-Power draft resolution, not because we felt it was expedient for us to do so, but because we considered it to be the right thing to do and the only fair and equitable course to be pursued. We supported the six-Power draft resolution because we considered it to be complementary to the twenty-Power draft resolution. We rejected the Belgian amendment because we considered that it negated the General Assembly resolutions of 2 and 7 November.

21. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): At the tumultuous meeting in the afternoon of 24 November [594th meeting], I had no opportunity to ask for an authoritative explanation of the scope and precise meaning of operative paragraph 3 of the six-Power draft resolution [A/3386], a text to which my delegation was sympathetic inasmuch as it strengthened the constructive and dynamic role of the Secretary-General. I therefore simply asked for a separate vote on that paragraph so that I could abstain.

22. My delegation's abstention was based on the following considerations. The Secretary-General's report on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal, to which reference is made in the preamble of the joint draft resolution, states as follows:

"At the present stage, the Secretary-General is not prepared to indicate how the costs should be shared. He intends to revert to this question when the approximate costs have been estimated." [A/3376, para. 6].

Farther on, the Secretary-General

"... suggests to the General Assembly to authorize him, in consultation with the Advisory Committee set up under the resolution of the General Assembly of 7 November 1956, to enter into the financial commitments that are unavoidable, although he is not now in a position to indicate the size of those initial commitments [ibid., para. 7].

23. My delegation considers that it is neither fair, nor moral, nor proper that countries which, like our own, were not in any way responsible for the deplorable

events which brought about the closing of the Canal, should now be asked to help to pay for clearing it. Consequently, my delegation cannot agree to any share whatever of those costs being born directly or indirectly by the Mexican Government. That is why I wanted on 24 November to ask whether the negotiation of agreements referred to in operative paragraph 3 of the resolution we adopted would not involve such expense for Member States, and whether the costs entailed by such negotiation would not go beyond a very modest and inconsiderable amount.

24. Until such time as we know, at any rate approximately, what the clearing operations will cost, and until the report on estimated expenditure provided for in rule 154 of the rules of procedure is forthcoming, my delegation will continue to abstain from voting in favour of provisions which might imply some kind of moral commitment by its Government to contribute to such a scheme.

25. My delegation voted in favour of the twenty-Power draft resolution [A/3385/Rev.1] because it considered that the General Assembly's resolutions of 2 and 7 November, referred to in that draft resolution, had not been implemented with the necessary speed.

26. I was pleased to note that operative paragraph 1 was reworded so as to make it more acceptable to the majority of Members. Even so, it does not set forth accurately enough the facts which were fully reported to us shortly before the vote was taken.

27. As time goes by without the speedy evacuation of the invading forces from the part of Egyptian territory they now occupy, the conflicts which becloud the Middle East become graver. We trust, therefore, that the arrival in Egypt of the first contingents of the United Nations Emergency Force will hasten the implementation of the measures recommended by the General Assembly, and thus remove whatever practical obstacles there may be to the speedy and effective application of those resolutions.

28. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) (*translated from Spanish*): The delegation of El Salvador does not propose at this time to make a statement in the general discussion on the Egyptian question. In fact, my delegation takes exception to the procedure followed here of adjourning the debate in order to take a vote, and then resuming it in order to consider all the aspects of the problem.

29. We feel that the intention of the General Assembly's rules of procedure has not been altogether respected. We believe that the normal procedure in dealing with a question is to discuss its various aspects fully, and when the discussion is completed, to proceed to the vote. Furthermore, it may and regularly does happen that after the vote has been taken, some delegations wish to explain very briefly why they voted in favour or against a draft resolution, or why they abstained. But this procedure of suspending debate in order to take a vote, and then keeping the debate open and continuing to discuss at length the various aspects of a question is not, in our view, consistent with proper parliamentary practice.

30. Having said this, I merely wish to add that my delegation voted in favour of the two draft resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at the 594th meeting, because it felt that both contained useful and necessary points likely to lead to an improvement in the situation which unfortunately still prevails in Egypt. On the other hand, my delegation was unable to vote for the Belgian

amendment [A/L.215], for reasons which I explained at length at that meeting.

31. I should like now to deal in particular with one aspect of the second resolution of 24 November [A/RÉS/411], namely, the arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal referred to in operative paragraphs 2 and 3. And I would refer, in this connexion, to paragraphs 3, 6 and 7 of the Secretary-General's report on this matter [A/3376].

32. My delegation considers that there are circumstances in which the United Nations collectively and its Members individually must assume financial responsibilities in connexion with a specific situation. But in this particular instance, where the situation was brought about through the deliberate action of certain Member States, the Government of El Salvador can hardly be expected to agree to contribute in any way towards the costs of clearing the Suez Canal of the obstructions which prevent it from operating normally.

33. I should like to refer in a general way to the theory of human responsibility. Within a given State, when an offence of any kind is committed, there is as we all know a twofold responsibility: criminal responsibility and civil responsibility. If we apply this to the case under discussion, we cannot but conclude that those responsible for the present situation in the Middle East should bear the responsibility for restoring the situation as it existed before the events which have taken place in Egypt since the end of last month. In any case, if there is to be any sharing of the costs involved in clearing the Suez Canal, then the users of the Canal, those who benefit from its use, should be the ones to bear the financial responsibility.

34. I am certain, and I should like to state emphatically and very clearly, that neither the Executive nor the Legislative Assembly of my country could agree to endorse any legislation under which El Salvador would contribute to the costs involved in the clearing operations. I should like our position on the question to be perfectly clear, because the solemn responsibility of the delegation of El Salvador towards the General Assembly is involved. This morning we learned that some countries are proposing to undertake the clearing of the Suez Canal on their own account. If that is so, what I said is superfluous. However, in any event, I must state that my delegation is very much concerned with this aspect of the question and wishes to place on record that it could not endorse any resolution to such an effect.

35. In paragraph 3 of the second resolution 24 November, the General Assembly

"Authorizes the Secretary-General to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and the negotiation of agreements so that the clearing operations may speedily and effectively be undertaken".

Let me state once again, in connexion with that paragraph, that, in voting for the resolution, my delegation did not in any way agree to any financial commitment on behalf of the Government of El Salvador.

36. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): My delegation wishes, in the first place, to state its position on the status of the present debate.

37. It is our understanding that the General Assembly is now engaged in a general debate on the question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings and by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly, and transferred by that emergency special session to the agenda of this regular session. The Assembly has not disposed of this item. Until

the Assembly has concluded its consideration of the item, all the statements made must be, in our opinion, contributions to the general debate, unless it is specifically said that they are not. As we understand it, delegations have the right to present draft resolutions now or at any time before the Assembly has disposed of the item. Hence, in my delegation's opinion, it is not correct to say—as has been said during the meetings today—that the procedure followed on 24 November [594th meeting] was out of order.

38. What happened was this. The Assembly was faced with the necessity of accelerating the withdrawal of forces and of expressing its views concerning the clearing of the Suez Canal and concerning the Emergency Force. Thus, in the course of the general debate, the Assembly, acting with common sense and wisdom, decided to record its opinions. This is not the first instance during the last ten years when draft resolutions have been presented and adopted before the general debate on an item has been concluded. The position would have been quite different if the Assembly had already disposed of the present item.

39. Of course, it is up to the President to make rulings in this connexion. I do not, however, see how the position could be other than that which I have described, so long as the item remains on the agenda of this session.

40. I should like to direct the Assembly's attention to the background of the present situation, but I shall not tax members' patience by going into details.

41. The Assembly will recall that, as a result of the fact that Egypt's action in nationalizing the Suez Canal was challenged, conferences were held in London; negotiations took place; and, finally, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France brought the problem before the Security Council. Some time in October, agreements were reached on the basis for discussion. It was understood at that time by the world that the parties concerned were to talk directly to each other, using the good offices of the Secretary-General, and were to explore further the question of resolving the differences between Egypt and the two Western countries.

42. It should be realized by this time that, though the problem had vast international implications in the sense that the Suez Canal, within Egyptian sovereignty and a part of Egyptian territory, is a waterway of international importance and of great economic importance to the world, both the western and the eastern hemispheres, the Secretary-General, so far as my Government is aware, had suggested provisionally that on 29 October those discussions should continue informally—because they would have no other status—between the representatives of the United Kingdom and France and the representative of Egypt, with his assistance, and that they should be held in Geneva.

43. That is a significant date, because it was on 29 October that Israel attacked Egypt. I ask the General Assembly to put this in its proper context. Here was a whole set of arrangements which had intervened in the armed preparations by the Anglo-French alliance, which we were told were merely precautionary, and my Government accepted that statement and has no desire at the present moment to go into it. The Security Council had addressed itself to the question, and had found a basis for conversation, and 29 October was the date suggested. My Government was informed by the Government of Egypt that it was willing to par-

ticipate in those conversations. The world anticipated that the discussions would take place on 29 October, until the Anglo-French alliance announced that it was not willing to participate. It was on that selfsame date that Israel attacked Egypt.

44. Prior to that, there had been statements of a responsible character on behalf of the Israel Government that it would not take advantage of the difficulties and the disputes that had arisen over the Suez Canal to enforce its views or to indulge in any activities that might be embarrassing in those circumstances. In other words, it was not believed by anybody that advantage would be taken of the difficulties of Egypt at that time or of the world situation arising from the controversy over the Suez Canal, which is not one of the questions to be discussed by the General Assembly at this time, since it does not form part of this item, as I shall point out later.

45. So, on 29 October Egypt was attacked by the State of Israel. Now we are prepared to admit that this attack cannot be taken in isolation from the context of the history of the last ten years. All those who have been associated with the United Nations know that time and time again the Security Council has been called upon to intervene in skirmishes and attacks by one side or the other, and there is a whole background of sharp differences of opinion having resulted in armed conflict between one or other of the Arab States, or a number of them, on one side, and Israel on the other. But any justification for the attack of 29 October cannot be sought in this, because there was nothing extraordinary about that situation, and I think it would be idle to pretend that Egypt would have chosen this particular opportunity, when it was being threatened by the accumulation of the naval, air and land forces of two great Western Powers as part of the pressures to be exercised upon it, to launch a new attack.

46. Therefore, the only "justification" for this attack was that it was a preventive war, and the whole conception of preventive war is contrary to the principles of the Charter and the ideas of civilized existence. Preventive war is the doctrine of the *blitzkrieg*, and here on 29 October was launched a surprise attack.

47. On 30 October, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom issued an ultimatum to the Governments of Egypt and Israel. I should like to read out the report on this ultimatum as it appeared in the newspapers, which I believe sufficiently corresponds to the text:

"The United Kingdom and France have addressed urgent communications to the Governments of Egypt and Israel calling upon both sides to stop all warlike acts by land, sea and air forthwith, to withdraw their military forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal; further, in order to separate the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal by ships of all nations, they have asked the Egyptian Government to agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily into positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. The Governments of Egypt and Israel have been asked to answer these communications within twelve hours . . ."

48. I should like the Assembly to look at this text. The Israel Government and the Egyptian Government were asked to withdraw ten miles from the Canal. The Canal is within Egyptian territory, and for the Egyptians to withdraw ten miles within their own territory while the Israelis were permitted to go within ten

miles of the Canal would mean an open licence for the latter to come across the Sinai peninsula to the border of the Canal. Therefore it is all very well to talk about this as an equal ultimatum to both sides, but I submit that the phraseology makes it quite clear it was not.

49. Secondly, we were told that the Egyptian Government was asked by the United Kingdom and French Governments to agree that their forces should occupy Port Said, Ismailia and Suez; that is to say, there was a demand made upon a sovereign country to permit the military occupation not only of a part of its territory, but of its key strategic positions. It should not be forgotten that so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, only two or three years ago, after a great deal of negotiation, the evacuation of those bases had taken place, and the conditions for re-entry had been incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 19 October 1954.

50. Therefore this ultimatum was a violation of the principles of the Charter and of international practice, an aggression against a sovereign nation and a threat to violate its territory. Also, so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, it was a violation of a specific agreement. Therefore any idea that this was permissible or could be justified in any way because notice had been given falls to the ground.

51. On 31 October, only two days later, the Anglo-French forces started bombing Egypt. We were told that the bombing was on military targets, and in this context I will refer later this afternoon to the speech of the Foreign Minister of France, without going into the question whether anyone has a right to bomb someone else's military targets except when they are attacked or in a state of war. I understand that it is the position of the Anglo-French alliance that they are not in a state of war with Egypt but are performing military operations. That is a fine distinction, except when large numbers of people die, when the distinction does not seem to have any meaning.

52. In this bombing of military targets, large numbers of Egyptian civilians, including women and children, perished. People were wounded. What is more, Arab quarters at Port Said were burned out. A great deal of destruction and suffering was inflicted upon the Egyptian people. The whole world has been against the bombing of civilian populations, and the fact that notice was given to people to quit their own homes does not make that act any more humane.

53. On 5 November, the Anglo-French forces landed. In the meantime, the General Assembly had met and, on 2 November, had called upon those who had invaded Egyptian territory to withdraw within their own boundaries—that is, Israel—and upon the others not to import any arms or armed forces or to add to their military strength in that area.

54. Therefore the action taken by the Anglo-French side after the adoption of that resolution [997 (ES-I)] was a flouting of the resolutions of this Assembly. Instead of ceasing their action immediately the United Nations called upon them to do so, the United Kingdom and France tried by landing and military operations to gain military advantages, hoping no doubt to negotiate from that position of strength as against the military weakness of the Egyptian side.

55. On 7 November, as a result of the Assembly's efforts, a cease-fire was established; but the foreign forces still remain on Egyptian soil.

56. Before I pursue these events, I am instructed by my Government to make our position very clear in regard to the three parties concerned in this aggression.

57. I refer first to the United Kingdom. My country is in very close and harmonious relations both with the people of the United Kingdom and with its Government. While this action on its part, contrary to our judgement of what is right, has been a great shock to us—we shall criticize it, we shall never agree with it and we shall never agree not to say so—our relations with the United Kingdom still remain harmonious, and it is our hope that as a result of the developments of the days to come the lapses of the last few weeks will in some way be remedied. As I have said, this has come as a great shock to our public opinion. My Government has asked me to make this statement because, harsh as our criticism may be, definite as our position may be in this matter of aggression, it does not come from any feeling of hatred or vindictiveness or any desire to lower the prestige of another country.

58. The second party in this matter is, of course, France. We have very good relations with the French Government. By friendly conversations and agreements patiently conducted over a period of seven or eight years, the French abandoned the last vestiges of their colonial empire on our territory. It was an action which was of service to the world, as well as to our two countries. We have a great regard for their culture, their ideals and their institutions. We have a considerable amount of trade with them, and the relations between their people and ours are always friendly. Therefore anything we say in regard to the French Government's action is also in the same category.

59. I come now to the Government of Israel. The Government of India recognizes the State of Israel and the Government of Israel. We have no quarrels with them. We desire to remain in friendly relations with them as with everybody else. We have taken part in the consideration of the Israel-Arab questions as part of our responsibilities in this Assembly. There is nothing in our tradition or in our recent history which can lay at our door the charge of any racial feelings, any anti-semitic feelings, or indeed the disregard of the rights of a Member State. Our position in this is not the same as that of the Arab countries, and we do not hesitate to say so, irrespective of whatever emotions are aroused. Therefore, with respect to Israel also we have no feelings of hatred, no desire to rub things in or anything of that character. The way we address ourselves to this matter, therefore, is purely objective.

60. I now desire to refer to the position as set out by the three countries. Mr. Lloyd, speaking on behalf of his Government [591st meeting], told us, at least in that address, that the purpose of this attack was to do some sort of service to the cause of civilization, to the cause of peace, which would prevent the world from going up in the flames of war. Secondly, he told us that this was a challenge which the United Kingdom had thrown out to the United Nations. I am sorry that that should have come from him. Thirdly, we were told that it was a protective shield between the combatants. If it is a protective shield between the combatants, the shield seems to have been something which prevented one of the combatants from defending itself.

61. Neither my Government, nor anyone in my delegation, would ever privately or publicly wish or state that instead of attacking Egypt the Anglo-French forces should have attacked Israel. We would never say that, we would never think it, because the bombing of women

and children, of protected enterprise and industry and of economic development in any country, the infliction of harm and cruelty in that way, particularly in a thickly populated area, is as much a crime against humanity and as much to be deplored if it takes place on Israel's territory as on our own.

62. Therefore our argument is not, "Why do you not go and bomb them?" Our argument is that, first of all, this was not an action to limit war. If we take, for argument's sake, the idea that it was so thought of, it was wrongly conceived. The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have no responsibility, no rights and indeed no defence for the position that they take up—that they have some God-given function of policing the world. If Egypt or Israel was in danger of being attacked, either one had the right under Article 51 of the Charter to defend itself individually and collectively. But for this Organization to admit even by quiescence that any Member State, however powerful—whether it be the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom or France, the most powerful countries in the world—may take upon itself the protection of the world, is to go away from the whole idea of collective organization and from the development of some law in the world and to go back to the idea of national enterprise for the maintenance, so-called, of peace in the world.

63. In all, the United Kingdom and France have visited many countries in the last three or four centuries. In many places they have stayed in a fit of absent-mindedness; they did in ours. They have conferred a great many benefits during their sojourn. But their peoples have always desired the termination of that stay. Those like ourselves have managed to arrange it in a rather friendly way and therefore we reaped the advantage both of the subordination as well as of the present friendship.

64. Therefore we deny this conception, first of all, that in fact it was a war to prevent a greater war. We deny the right to wage the war. We state emphatically that it was a violation of the provisions of the Charter, particularly of Article 2, paragraph 4. I do not mention the Israel Government, because it makes no bones about this. Of course, there are other people who are putting on this the aura of idealism. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter definitely says:

"All Members"—there is no exemption here for the permanent members of the Security Council or for those that have higher standards of civilization or have arrogated to themselves a moral right—"shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

65. If it is going to be argued that this action is consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, then we turn to Article 1, where we say that among those purposes is the maintenance of international peace. It will be a bad day when we say that the maintenance of international peace is to be achieved by the bombing of civilian populations and by a *blitzkrieg* on countries, a word and a set of circumstances which we want to forget in our civilization. Article 1 goes on to say: "and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". The words from "to take effective collective measures" are not covered by this action. It is true that if Israel,

France and the United Kingdom act together, it is a collective measure. France and the United Kingdom, however, have denied that they acted in collaboration with the State of Israel.

66. If it is argued that the French and the British acting together are taking collective measures, I submit that Article 1 of the Charter does not imply or contemplate measures of that kind, but measures that are provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. Therefore, if the United Kingdom and France, which have a special voice in the counsels of this Assembly as permanent members of the Security Council, knew that Israel was going to attack on 29 October—and if that was the reason why they did not want to go to Geneva, because they were otherwise occupied—then their duty, in my humble submission, would have been to convoke the Security Council and ask for such action to be taken as would arrest the aggression that Israel was contemplating, especially since in this particular matter the United Nations had not only created the State of Israel but had also put in machinery, however weak or inadequate, to supervise the truce as it existed between the two countries. So they took it out of the United Nations, they took it out of the truce machinery and returned to the law of the nineteenth century.

67. The invasion of Egypt by the United Kingdom Government stands on a par with the attack on Alexandria in 1880 and the occupation of Egypt thereafter. This must be clearly understood, and we keep on reiterating these things because in the last week, in the United Kingdom, in this country and in this Assembly and elsewhere, there has been an attempt to describe this action as though it was some service to the world. The moment we permit this halo to get around it, to portray an act of aggression as an act of morality, we shall be unable to take any corrective action.

68. Mr. Lloyd further told us that the action we were taking in regard to the United Nations Emergency Force had been first conceived by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, that the idea had been repeated in this Assembly by Sir Pierson Dixon, and that thereafter it had been put before the Assembly by the Foreign Minister of Canada. I must say that we are rather taken aback by this. We had accepted, we continue to accept the actions of the Canadian Government as taken in good faith, as measures arising from themselves, not as part of the policies of the two aggressor countries. Mr. Lloyd's statement treats the Canadian proposal as though it were part and parcel of Anglo-French foreign policy. The Canadian Government can make its own explanations and defend itself.

69. So far as our Government is concerned, the proposal for setting up an emergency force was a conception—there is nothing unusual about it—put forward by the Foreign Minister of Canada as one of the ways to bring about a cease-fire.

70. Then Mr. Lloyd went on to refer to the conditions under which the aggressors would withdraw, a cease-fire having been effected on 7 November. On 2 November, an immediate cease-fire had been asked for [resolution 997 (ES-I)]. On 4 November [resolution 999 (ES-I)], the General Assembly had asked for the withdrawal of all non-Egyptian forces from Egyptian soil. The Israel forces were to go behind the armistice lines and the United Kingdom and France to withdraw from Egyptian territory. The Secretary-General was to report on compliance.

71. Therefore to suggest in any way that the withdrawal is dependent upon the judgement of the United Kingdom and French Governments as to the competence of the United Nations Emergency Force, is again to seek to usurp the powers of this Assembly. Who are these two Governments to make their own judgements? They can no more make judgements about the action of the Assembly by themselves than we can—and we do not claim that right. Therefore, whether this United Nations Emergency Force is competent, is a matter for General Burns on the one hand and the Secretary-General on the other. Constitutional responsibility for it rests in this Assembly, and my delegation denies the right of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France to appropriate to themselves the right to say that this Force is competent for any one purpose or another.

72. But the position becomes much worse when we go into the substance of this competence. Competence for what? Competence to perform the duties that the Anglo-French invaders were supposed to be attempting? In other words, the view expressed in the statement by Mr. Lloyd before this Assembly is that the United Nations Emergency Force is a continuation of the invading forces. It is to perform the part of putting what is called a protective shield between the combatants, of staying there for the solution of various problems, of preventing conflicts in the sense they understood it—and therefore hallowing the aggression.

73. I hope that this Assembly will at no time lend itself to a position where by various and devious methods it is called upon to give its blessing to invasion.

74. Mr. Lloyd continued: "We are, therefore, prepared to make this act of faith". I should have thought the withdrawal was an act of penitence, not an act of faith. I hope the word is used in the sense of their faith in the Assembly. Mr. Lloyd also stated:

"We think that there is in this a great test for the United Nations and for the Powers on whose continued support the United Nations ultimately depends.

"We are, therefore, prepared to make this act of faith because we believe that the United Nations has the will to ensure that the United Nations Emergency Force will effectively and honourably carry out all the functions laid down for it in the Assembly resolutions." [591st meeting, paras. 94 and 95.]

I entirely endorse that particular sentence, if I may. However, Mr. Lloyd continued:

"But, should our faith prove to have been misplaced, should all this effort and disturbance have been for nothing, should the United Nations fail to show the necessary will-power to procure the lasting settlements required, then indeed there will be cause for alarm and despondency." [Ibid., para. 95.]

"Alarm and despondency" where? Is it a threat to cause "alarm and despondency" in our minds or in the minds of the humble people of Egypt? He continued:

"That is our position with regard to this question of withdrawal: it will take place as soon as possible, as the United Nations Force becomes effective and competent to discharge its functions." [Ibid., para. 96.]

75. I submit that the competence of the United Nations Emergency Force is entirely a matter for the United Nations. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and Israel will contribute in that judgement in the proportion of their power here,

namely, each as one sovereign State amongst seventy-nine nations. That is our position.

76. The Foreign Minister of France in the general debate before this Assembly—not on this item—told us the position of his Government. I am glad to say that he admitted as follows:

"We have been sharply rebuked for taking the initiative in launching military operations without having been directly attacked. While I am prepared to concede the cogency of that criticism from a strictly formal point of view, I would like to suggest an analogy at this point." [589th meeting, para. 24.]

Mr. Pineau then quoted a statement he himself had made in a small rural community in France. He said that Hitler's armies should have been attacked in 1936. Well, if the comparison is right, then again I say that the place to find the force to attack an intending aggressor, if that is the argument, was the Security Council.

77. The Foreign Minister of France then went on to say:

"The most important feature of this short campaign is the vast amount of military equipment of Soviet origin captured by the Israel army in the Sinai desert. It is impossible to believe that this could have been utilized by the Egyptian army alone, which everyone knew had very few specialists and technicians." [Ibid., para. 26.]

Apparently the Egyptian army did not think so. But whatever it is, are we to be put in a position that if we buy military equipment from anyone, it means that the particular seller of the military equipment is part of our fighting forces or our military allies? My country purchases a considerable amount of military equipment from France. But, so far as I am aware, we have no military agreements with them and we have no intention of using French forces for any purposes of our own. This is a very dangerous proposition because, unfortunately, people go around and buy arms from here, there and everywhere. For that reason, should a political meaning be read into this?

78. But that is not the main purport of this statement. The French Foreign Minister continued:

"As far as the Anglo-French action is concerned, the main concern was to destroy the aircraft which had also been abundantly supplied by the Soviet Union. We bombed airfields and destroyed aircraft on the ground, but we always gave due warning so that the personnel could take shelter, which they always very carefully did." [Ibid., para. 27.]

They always did "very carefully" in Port Said and in other places where there are no air-raid shelters, where there has been very little time to get people to understand them. What is more, when the time comes—and I hope the Assembly will take the right steps—it will be found that large numbers of civilians, including women and children, have been killed, their homes destroyed and great destruction wrought in these areas.

79. However, I cannot understand the logic of the argument that says that there is an amelioration of aggression just because you want to destroy somebody else's aircraft. If there is going to be disarming in the world, that is to say, the lowering of the armed strength of any country, are we to imagine that the way to do it is for somebody to go and bomb other people's arms? Then let us cut out the Disarmament Commission and let each country go and bomb other people's arms and

destroy then that way. That seems to be a kind of law of the jungle.

80. France has been engaged in colonial wars ever since the conclusion of the Second World War. The long period in Indo-China was happily terminated by the wisdom of French and other statesmanship in 1954; and when the guns were silenced in Indo-China, for the first time in a quarter of a century there was no war in the world. France has suffered ravage by invasion, and its people, both inside and outside France, as we all know, fought heroically in its defence. But ever since the conclusion of that war, but for the brief spell of the armistice in Indo-China and the beginning of the ruthless war over North Africa, these colonial wars have gone on. We cannot help wondering whether this enterprise in Egypt was not a part of the same process.

81. We have been told that there is some distinction in the mind of the French Foreign Minister between small nations and big nations, with regard to their wisdom. He quite rightly tells us that the atomic bomb will destroy us all, and that therefore we must try to disarm and give up this atomic weapon. But the important part—and it has a bearing on the whole of this proposition—is the attitude of a big country to a small country. Mr. Pineau went on to say the following:

"In a few years, when atomic energy becomes less expensive, the manufacture of atomic bombs will be easy. We may well ask in all seriousness what will become of peace when each nation possesses the atomic bomb and threatens to use it. The mad will then be the masters of the world." [589th meeting, para. 37.]

Why should the small countries have the monopoly of madmen? That I do not understand.

82. I come next to the Israel position. So far as the General Assembly resolutions are concerned, the Assembly has called upon Israel to withdraw its forces behind the armistice lines. Speaking on the Belgian amendment, I said [594th meeting], on behalf of my delegation, that in view of the arguments that had been raised, we would be willing to reconsider the draft resolution [A/3385/Rev. 1] if it were pointed out to us that the Israel forces had withdrawn behind the armistice lines. Then the representative of Israel, in his intervention, went on to say that thousands of people from the Sinai peninsula had gone back to their homes, to their factories and to their farms. Well, soldiers going back home is not the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice line. But if the Secretary-General had been informed with particulars that Israel forces had been withdrawn behind the armistice line, my delegation would consider it the duty of the Assembly to have recorded that fact. However, that does not appear to be the position. As I said on 24 November, if an action of that kind had been taken, the Israel Government would not be loath to inform the Assembly about it, because it would be to its advantage. And even in the evening of that day my delegation reiterated that if there were such a communication before the Secretary-General, we would be prepared to refer to it and to make our own position clear in the course of the intervention today. We waited for it.

83. This afternoon, there was a communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to the Secretary-General [A/3395]. I have read this document carefully, and the wording is just the same. There is no reference to withdrawing behind the armistice lines, merely to the withdrawal of forces from Egypt. This communication states the following:

"In the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 24 November the Israel representative expressed the willingness of the Israel Government to continue to discuss with you the means of implementing its undertakings with respect to the withdrawal of forces from Egypt."

It goes on to say that Israel is prepared to make specific proposals. The document also says:

"On 8 November, I conveyed to you my Government's expression of willingness to withdraw its forces from Egyptian territory on the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations."

84. I wish to say, in order to be frank with the Assembly, that I have not seen any document so far, coming from the Government of Israel, which categorically informs the Secretary-General that any appreciable part of its troops has been withdrawn. By this is meant regiments, units of the army, and not soldiers going home for a holiday; that can take place even in the middle of a war; soldiers go home and that cannot be regarded as withdrawal. What is more, even in this latest Israel communication, there is a specific refusal to mention withdrawal behind the armistice lines. This matter is of very great importance.

85. I address myself now to the reports and the draft resolutions that are before us. A while ago it was said—and I refer to our position in regard to the general status of this debate—that the debate is continuing and that it is open to anyone to submit draft resolutions, even hereafter. In this connexion, I should like to point out that there are still draft resolutions before the General Assembly. There are draft resolutions concerning the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force which have not been taken up. They have been introduced in order to obtain Assembly authority for the maintenance of these forces, for their expenditure and so on. Therefore, it is not as though the business is finished.

86. As regards the running of this Force, so far as my Government is concerned we have had discussions with the Secretary-General, and as members of the Advisory Committee we have been given a certain amount of information, and the matter will come up again for discussion when we consider the Secretary-General's report on this matter, which contains his revised draft resolution [A/3383(Annex)/Rev.1].

87. There are three or four matters on which my Government desires to express itself. In the first place, with regard to the United Nations Emergency Force, the position of the Government of India was fully set out in the Assembly during the debate on that matter when I read to the Assembly [567th meeting] the six conditions on which my Government would participate in the force. They have been discussed with the Secretary-General before, and the covering letter [A/3302/Add.2/Rev.1] refers to the discussion and also to the fact that there was agreement in so far as the formulation of those conditions was concerned. There was an acknowledgement by the Secretary-General to the effect that the conditions attached had been fully noted and that the offer was accepted. It is well known that both in private municipal law and in international law, if you make an offer with conditions and that offer is accepted, it means that the conditions are accepted. I will not tax the Assembly by reading them out, but those six conditions are on record.

88. That has a bearing upon what has been said with regard to the function of the Assembly by the rep-

representative of Canada and by others. Our understanding of this, and of the basis on which the United Nations Force is organized, is that there can be no violation of Egyptian sovereignty. It is the sovereign right of every Government to admit to its territory whom it likes and to refuse to admit those whom it does not like. It is equally the prerogative of the Assembly to determine the composition of the Force.

89. Now the composition of the United Nations Force and the conditions upon which it works, are, in our view, governed by various documents. One of these governing conditions is contained in paragraph 12 of the report of the Secretary-General of 6 November [A/3302]. So far as we are concerned, during the discussion of this report at the first emergency special session [567th meeting], my delegation asked for certain clarifications and also put forward our interpretation of certain points, which interpretation was accepted by the Secretary-General during the meeting. The statement to which I refer is as follows:

"The representative of India has raised a great number of points. On several he has attempted an interpretation of what I intended to say, and I think I can say that on all those points, to the extent that I could fully grasp what the representative said, I can confirm that his interpretation of my intentions is correct." [567th meeting, para. 179.]

90. This is followed by other statements on record, so there is no difficulty in that regard. In addition, there is a memorandum from the Egyptian Government which sets out conditions under which the Emergency Force may work in Egypt, which conditions are also part of the record. There have been references to the basing of units of the United Nations Force in Egypt, to their arrival and the area they should occupy, to the withdrawal of Israel forces behind the armistice demarcation line and other matters concerning the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces.

91. The question of the area occupied by the Force would be subject to agreement. The Secretary-General declared that it was his intention to negotiate with the Government of Egypt concerning the conditions of operation of the United Nations Force, having regard to the agreed list and balanced composition. At this time it would be possible to begin the transit of troops.

92. With regard to the length of stay of United Nations forces in Egypt, it was noted that the forces would arrive only with Egypt's consent, and that they could not stay or operate unless Egypt continued to give such consent. These are all quotations. The Secretary-General stated these conditions had been based on the understanding of Egyptian acceptance.

93. Therefore, so far as my Government is concerned, the position is very clear. There can be no question that these forces are in Egypt as occupying troops. They are in no way to perform the functions of invading forces, and their presence should in no way be regarded as a factor which should delay the withdrawal of the invading troops. The withdrawal of such invading troops must take place immediately and, of course, in this connexion "immediately" means as soon as practicable. There should be no delay awaiting the fulfilment of some other conditions. The only governing factor should be the mechanics of withdrawal.

94. Now we come to two other problems with regard to the Suez Canal. First, with regard to the clearing of the Canal, I desire to state on behalf of my Government that it is not our intention to do anything that

would delay such clearance. At the same time, we understand the actions taken by the United Nations on behalf of the Egyptian Government as being actions taken with the authority of the Egyptian Government. Therefore there is no question of violation of Egypt's sovereignty. We hope with confidence—we might even say with trust—that these functions will be carried out expeditiously. Furthermore, the cost involved will necessarily be the subject of discussion by this Assembly.

95. At the present moment my Government is not prepared to make any categorical statement in this connexion. We will be bound by the decision of the General Assembly, in so far as it conforms with our parliamentary procedures, but at the appropriate time my delegation will raise the question of the necessity of vigilance in, for example, the provision of a comprehensive audit of the expenses which must arise. We must also consider who is to cover such costs, whether the United Nations is to indemnify aggression which, in my opinion, would mean that it would have to underwrite aggression to a certain extent. We have already heard some of the representatives of Latin American countries who have stated that their countries are not prepared to shoulder such responsibility, and we must look upon this as a financial matter.

96. We entirely agree with the recommendation of the Secretary-General [A/3376] that this consideration should not delay action. The Secretary-General is acting on the resolution which my delegation had the honour to co-sponsor, and I want it clearly understood by the Assembly that this is not a final resolution—it is a resolution giving the Secretary-General authorization and power to undertake the necessary expenditures in order to carry out the proposals before the Assembly. I think, as all of you who have taken the trouble to read the documents to which this resolution refers will see, that this is merely a means of facilitating the commencement of operations and of enabling our Secretary-General to make the necessary investigations. That is the purpose of the resolution, and it is our intention to encourage the withdrawal of troops so that the clearance of the Canal can take place.

97. There is no doubt that the British and French equipment now in the Suez Canal area has a very considerable mechanical contribution to make and would be most useful in speeding up this process if the Egyptian Government were willing to permit its use, in which case my Government would not object. However, this is an entirely Egyptian problem, in so far as it is for the Egyptian Government to give its consent or otherwise.

98. We feel, however, that the Egyptian people cannot be asked to entertain the presence of Anglo-French personnel in the present state of affairs. We have been somewhat heartened by the fact that there are nearly 8,000 British subjects in Egypt and that so far there has been no violence against them, although, from our reports, they are living under strictly limited conditions owing to the state of public opinion. We trust that the Egyptian Government will continue to exercise restraint, and we have confidence that it will do so, as is expected of a civilized people. On the other hand, we cannot very well ask the Egyptian Government to revise its views, unless it does so of its own volition, because of the use of these invading forces, unless, perhaps, there is some sort of indemnification or penitence. This is something that is not usually expected of people, and it may lead to difficulties.

99. I understand the Secretary-General has other arrangements in hand, and we were very happy to note that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom offered every co-operation. We have every reason to believe that such co-operation would take into account these difficulties of personnel and so on. Therefore the contributions would be of a character which do not impinge on the circumstances which prevail at the present time.

100. The other draft resolution relates to the expenditure upon the Force [*A/3383 (Annex)/Rev.1*]. Here again the Secretary-General has made some reports and, so far as our contribution to the Emergency Force is concerned, these matters have been discussed by the Advisory Committee and also between Governments, and the principles on which they are based have been approved by the Assembly. However, the details have still to come before us for discussion.

101. I hope that very soon it will be possible for the Secretary-General to advise this Assembly of the extent of damage to property and loss of life which is involved, and on the need for relief in Egypt. According to our information, such damage is on a very vast scale—much larger than one would be inclined to believe from reports so far published.

102. So long as these conditions remain—and it is only fair to say that these conditions are not only those expressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom to this Assembly but also those expressed by his Government—then the withdrawal is contingent. A contingent withdrawal is not what has been asked for by this Assembly.

103. Coming back again to the extent of damage and casualties, although my Government does not readily accept these reports, because there is always an element of exaggeration of war damage, we do feel that the time has come for the Assembly to take some decision to ask for a report from the International Red Cross, and also to appoint a group of representatives of selected nations to visit the areas occupied by invading armies and to inform the public of the world as to the exact extent of damage and the requirements for rehabilitation.

104. Particularly for a country that is economically backward, the margin of resistance in these matters is very small and, while my delegation has no intention of submitting any proposals until after we have heard the Foreign Minister of Egypt, we would suggest that the General Assembly should not forget, because our minds have been focused on these big military questions of withdrawal and on the related political questions, that there is this vast humanitarian problem. Thousands of people have been killed—the official statement made by one of the Governments concerned is that the number is very much less, but whether it is less or more must be ascertained by the Assembly. Whether it be in Egypt or in Hungary, my Government would not, in public or responsible statements, be willing to accept reports that are not authorized.

105. Therefore we would suggest that the time has come for the Assembly to consider receiving a report from a highly trustworthy authority—that is, the International Red Cross—and also to consider appointing a group of its own Members to send their representatives into these areas, with the permission of the parties concerned, to apprise themselves of the conditions.

106. Finally, the Government of India has sent its troops into Egypt. As I said the last time I spoke from this rostrum [*594th meeting*], those troops have been in North Africa before. They were part of a fighting

army and, as a fighting army, they performed their duties. This time they have gone there as a peace army. On behalf of my Government, I stated categorically that our understanding of the use of Egyptian territory was merely as a right of way to the border, and that the business of this army was to separate the combatants and to keep them separated. That is the function which the Force will perform. We are happy to know that the various units—Canadian, Scandinavian, Yugoslav and Indian—are all co-operating and that it is not, as the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom feared, a hotch-potch.

107. My Government also desires to express its appreciation of the role and functions of General Burns, the Commander, to whom our officers will give full co-operation.

108. Mr. ARENALES CATALAN (Guatemala) (*translated from Spanish*): When the Egyptian question was discussed in the General Assembly, my delegation considered it proper to indicate by its votes its unwavering support of the principles of the Charter, but before the vote was taken at our 594th meeting on 24 November, my delegation felt it necessary to state its views on certain points and to express certain reservations. By a majority, however, the Assembly decided to vote immediately on a motion for what was called “adjournment of debate”, the use of which should at least be restricted to extraordinary cases of vital urgency.

109. Our statement today, whether we like it or not, inevitably becomes an explanation of our vote, at least as regards the resolutions which we adopted on 24 November, if not as regards the agenda item, and we wish to refer to three points in particular. These are: the speech made on 23 November by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom [*591st meeting*], the twenty-Power draft resolution [*A/3385/Rev.1*] and the Belgian amendment [*A/L.215*] thereto, and the communications received from the Government of Israel on 24 November [*A/3389 and A/3389/Add.1*] regarding the withdrawal of troops. Before dealing with these points, I would like to express a reservation on behalf of my delegation.

110. The delegation of Guatemala abstained when a separate vote was taken on paragraph 3 of the six-Power draft resolution [*A/3386*], because, according to the report of the Secretary-General on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal [*A/3376*], the authority given to the Secretary-General involves authority to enter into financial commitments, simply upon consultation with the Advisory Committee set up under the resolution [*1001 (ES-I)*] of 7 November. My delegation disagrees with the view expressed just now by the representative of India that no firm financial commitment is intended. The report of the Secretary-General indicated that there would be such a commitment. My delegation has confidence in the Secretary-General's management and is convinced that this aspect of the problem can best be resolved if it is left in his hands and if we have the patience to let time and the course of events assist in finding a solution.

111. Moreover, my delegation could not commit the Government of Guatemala financially, mainly by reason of the constitutional and legislative conditions to be fulfilled before my Government can enter into such financial commitments—in the event of its deciding to enter into them at all. We therefore wish to reserve our position on this point.

112. Referring now to the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, I should like to say, first, that we appreciate his contribution at this, the most constructive stage of all our deliberations on the Egyptian question. In his statement, Mr. Lloyd's object was, not to answer allusions concerning his Government's policy, but rather to deal with immediate practical problems; in this way he has fulfilled what we consider to be our first duty at this juncture, which is to build, not to destroy. We seem to part company with the United Kingdom when we say there are two immediate military objectives: the withdrawal of troops and the clearing of the Canal. But for the purpose of these remarks we would even agree with Mr. Lloyd that the problem of the setting up of the United Nations Emergency Force can be considered separately from the other two which I have just mentioned.

113. The representative of the United Kingdom said substantially the following: first, the United Kingdom wants the United Nations Force to be effective, and does not want it to be a laughing-stock; secondly, the United Kingdom is agreeable to the withdrawal of troops, on the condition that the withdrawal is "phased" in such a way that the troops are simultaneously and in co-ordinated fashion replaced by United Nations forces; thirdly, for the purpose of the clearing of the Canal, the United Kingdom offers its co-operation, though I do not think I heard Mr. Lloyd mention any condition.

114. If the representative of the United Kingdom allows me to say so, to present the case in three parts can be accepted so far as form is concerned, but my delegation cannot help noting that in fact it is being discreetly implied that the withdrawal of troops is contingent not only on their simultaneous replacement by units of the United Nations Force, but also on the latter being effective and competent to discharge its functions. And if we remember that, according to the Secretary-General's reports, the third problem, the clearing of the Canal, apparently hinges on the withdrawal of the troops, then we realize that everything turns upon or appears to turn upon this "effectiveness" of the United Nations Emergency Force.

115. It is for this reason that my delegation believes—and wishes to stress this—that the most important passage in the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom was that in which he said:

"We have great confidence in the Secretary-General and we believe that he and the General Assembly will in good faith see to it that the Force is effective and competent to carry out those tasks. On that basis we have agreed to withdraw our forces." [591st meeting, para. 90.]

My delegation understands from this statement of the representative of the United Kingdom that his Government will accept the Secretary-General's judgement as to the effectiveness or competence of the United Nations Emergency Force to perform the task defined by the General Assembly, which does not include replacing or assuming the functions of any invading force, and by this I mean functions of warlike occupation.

116. I should now like to discuss another matter which also throws light on the decisions we have taken. How are we to interpret the attitude of the United Kingdom? Previously, the withdrawal of troops was apparently conditional upon the conclusion of a satisfactory settlement—I stress the word "satisfactory"—of the two major problems of the Middle East. The whole problem hinged, then, on what was meant by

the word "satisfactory", and who was to decide what constituted a satisfactory settlement, just as until yesterday everything hinged upon what was meant by the "competence" of the United Nations Emergency Force and who was to decide whether it was competent.

117. Some speakers will no doubt remind us that bombing and invasion took place in defiance of explicit resolutions of the United Nations.

118. The present attitude of the United Kingdom, as my delegation interprets it, can be explained only in two ways, and I would ask the United Kingdom delegation not to take umbrage at the phrases I use, since I use them solely for purposes of argument.

119. The two explanations of the recent statements by the United Kingdom delegation are as follows: either the statements indicate a change of policy, or else they are used as delaying tactics aimed at securing a more propitious international atmosphere and maintaining positions of force from which to negotiate. For we shall be told that even in a withdrawal or in a change of policy, it is logical to assume that the parties concerned endeavour to secure the greatest possible advantage.

120. In the opinion of my delegation, it is dangerous and unconstructive to prejudge the intentions or the sincerity of others. However, whether we are witnessing a change of policy or delaying tactics, or both—and again I stress that I am using these terms solely for the sake of argument—we must definitely not exclude the most optimistic possibility.

121. In the light of what I have just said, I should now like to comment briefly on the resolution [A/RES/410] adopted on the proposal of twenty Powers.

122. If we could not exclude the possibility of a genuine change of policy on the part of certain States, I believe that our attitude should have been one of discretion, even caution. I believe it would be the course of discretion to facilitate as far as possible a change of policy which may be taking shape in certain Member States as a result of powerful trends of political opinion, if not of public opinion. Inasmuch as the United Nations had already taken and reiterated a similar decision, we would have thought it was unnecessary to propose and adopt the draft resolution which was adopted on 24 November, and which my delegation supported. To discretion, however, we have to add caution. Perhaps it would not have been wise to withdraw the twenty-Power draft resolution, once it had been presented, or to vote against it, or to abstain, or to approve amendments which would have distorted it altogether. To have proceeded without caution would have created the impression that the United Nations was changing a policy previously laid down in the face of similar objections and in similar circumstances.

123. It was for these reasons that my delegation voted against the amendment submitted by the representative of Belgium. However, in order that these reasons may be absolutely clear, I shall summarize them as follows. First, the object of the amendment was to omit the reference to the regret shared by my delegation at the apparent reluctance of the attacking States to comply with the earlier resolutions concerning the withdrawal of troops; secondly, the amendment dropped the reference to the armistice lines contained in the first resolution adopted on the Egyptian problem; and, finally, on the question of the withdrawal of troops, it placed an interpretation which was tantamount to laying down conditions which the United Nations had not accepted even in graver circumstances; to say the

least, it introduced a debatable element which might have created the impression that the United Nations, without the necessary evidence, had modified its policy and surrendered in the face of the refusal of certain States to comply with its resolutions.

124. One fact which caused my delegation considerable concern was that the twenty-Power draft resolution which was adopted by the Assembly made no reference to the recent communications from the Government of Israel. My delegation, in a constructive effort, suggested privately to the spokesmen for the twenty Powers an amendment which would take note of those communications, noting at the same time that they contained no reference to the armistice lines. However, in view of the circumstances of the debate on 24 November, the motion for the adjournment of debate and the fact that a proposal of this nature would have had to be discussed with each one of the twenty sponsoring delegations, our suggestion did not prosper. It should at least, therefore, be mentioned in the record.

125. Accordingly, my delegation considered it necessary to vote in favour of the draft resolution of the twenty Powers, mainly for the following three reasons: first, because the draft resolution simply reiterated the policy of the Assembly, as laid down in earlier resolutions; secondly, because, basically, we were not being asked for anything unjust, for an injustice does not become in any way less unjust because we get used to its existence; and, thirdly, because my delegation has been and still is firmly convinced that, if we are to find a just and adequate solution of the present conflict and a just, adequate and lasting solution of the two great problems of the Middle East, the United Nations must demonstrate at all times its reasonable but firm determination not to depart from the path which it has set itself in accordance with the principles of the Charter, and this determination should be strengthened by the Member States of the Organization, particularly those which can exert greater pressure and authority to ensure that these problems may be resolved according to justice.

126. My delegation reserves the right to speak again at a later stage on this matter.

Mr. Urquía (El Salvador), Vice-President, took the Chair.

127. Mr. CAÑAS (Costa Rica) (*translated from Spanish*): My delegation wishes to explain its vote at the meeting on 24 November on the twenty-Power draft resolution, the Belgian amendment and the draft resolution of the six Powers.

128. My delegation abstained in the vote on the Belgian amendment, because it could not accept the expression used in the concluding passage of that amendment, concerning the resolutions of 2 and 7 November. The amendment called for the application of those resolutions, in the spirit in which they had been adopted. As we see it, each delegation voted in a certain spirit and with its own specific intentions on 2 and 7 November. On 24 November, we heard the statements of various Powers on what that spirit was, or should be, or how it should be interpreted. Those statements did not express, but ran counter to, the spirit in which Costa Rica had voted for the resolutions. Their intention was to ensure that this interpretation of the spirit of the votes of 2 and 7 November, supplied after the event, should be accepted as valid.

129. By accepting an amendment asking France, the United Kingdom and Israel to expedite the application

of the resolutions of 2 and 7 November in the spirit in which they were adopted, the General Assembly would have taken an extremely vague attitude, since there was no certain definition, no document specifying what exactly the spirit was in which those resolutions had been adopted. Moreover, the expression referred to would have placed the Assembly in the position of departing somewhat from the texts adopted and of interpreting its own resolutions in an ambiguous manner. Yet the resolutions of 2 and 7 November are perhaps the clearest and most decisive which the Assembly has ever adopted.

130. My delegation voted in favour of the twenty-Power draft resolution on the understanding that the two Israel communications [*A/3389 and A/3389/Add.1*] distributed on 24 November, as also the statement made by Mr. Eban shortly before the vote, formed part of the record and of the background material for that resolution.

131. We have been told that the Israel documents on the withdrawal of troops are vague and that the statement that Israel troops have been withdrawn from Egyptian territory does not make it sufficiently clear whether those troops have withdrawn behind the armistice lines. But Mr. Eban explained shortly before the vote that those troops had been withdrawn to points which were, in fact, on the Israel side of the line established by the Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949. It was on the understanding that those statements of the Israel Foreign Minister and the Israel representative on behalf of their Government formed part of the record and of the background material for the resolution that we voted in favour of it; for in the light of these statements it may be said that the resolution was somewhat out of date by the time it was adopted.

132. It was regrettable that the sponsors did not accept amendments which were intended, not to soften the resolution or to alter it, but simply to bring it up to date. My country considers it unnecessary for the Assembly to reiterate its resolutions constantly, except in cases where they are openly defied or disregarded, as has happened in the last few weeks with the resolutions adopted in the case of Hungary. Above all, such reiteration is unnecessary when compliance with the resolutions has already begun. We often adopt repetitive resolutions which are perhaps quite unnecessary, simply because we are impatient to see that speedy compliance which emotionally we desire. Nevertheless, as our position on 24 November was and still is exactly the same as it was at the meetings on 2 and 7 November, we voted in favour of the twenty-Power draft resolution because we did not want to give the impression that we were refusing to stand by the declarations we had made, and the votes we had already cast.

133. My delegation abstained in the vote on paragraph 3 of the six-Power draft resolution, but voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, on the understanding that this affirmative vote did not commit Costa Rica except in so far as any financial obligations that may arise for my country from this resolution obtain parliamentary approval, which is a constitutional requirement in my country. In view of the fact that Costa Rica is in no way responsible for the Suez Canal events, I wish to state here that my Government does not undertake to ask for such legislative approval.

134. Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia): Since the voting has taken place, and everyone knows more or less the standpoint of other delegations, I shall be very brief. My delegation considers the recent development of

the situation in the Middle East with grave concern. The concern of my Government has been increased since we received the reports of the Secretary-General: the first on compliance with the General Assembly resolutions [997 (ES-I) and 1002 (ES-I)] of 2 November and 7 November [A/3384], and the second on basic points for the presence and functioning in Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force [A/3375].

135. The *aide-mémoire* of the French Government dated 21 November, transmitted to the Secretary-General, makes it clear that the French Government is willing to comply with the General Assembly resolutions of 2, 5 and 7 November under certain conditions of its own. The *aide-mémoire* states that France "remains ready to proceed with the withdrawal of its forces as soon as the international Force . . . is in a position to discharge the functions which have been entrusted to it under the General Assembly resolutions of 2, 5 and 7 November". [A/3384/annex I.]

136. Thus it is obvious that the French Government has now made conditions on which it is ready to withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory and, in the opinion of my delegation, in so doing France will be in a position always to object to the implementation of the resolutions passed. That will also mean in fact that, without the consent of France and, probably, of the United Kingdom and Israel, parties to the aggression in Egypt, nothing much can be done to arrive at a satisfactory solution.

137. The Secretary-General asked [A/3384] for a clarification of the positions of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and Israel, and he asked what were the reasons for the fact that so far no progress—or no more progress—had taken place in complying with the General Assembly's resolutions.

138. The Government of Israel has said [A/3384, annex II] that it is willing to withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connexion with the international Emergency Force. Apparently the "satisfactory arrangements" which Israel seeks are those which will ensure Israel's security against what it calls "the recurrence of the threat or danger of attack, and against acts of belligerency".

139. It seems to my delegation that the conditions requested by Israel can be regarded as constituting asking for the impossible, because many of us here are convinced that Israel's position is not being endangered but, rather, that Israel endangers peace in the Middle East by attacking Egypt. It is always easy to look at matters from one side and to say that one is in danger of attack while, on that pretext, making a so-called preventive attack oneself, particularly if one feels strong enough to commit aggression without fear of being punished.

140. The combined attack of France, the United Kingdom and Israel cannot be considered to be a counter-attack or an act of preventive warfare. It is nothing but an act of aggression. We have not heard anything of the withdrawal of Israel troops from the Gaza Strip, for instance, so that a complete withdrawal of Israel's army has not yet taken place.

141. Now a part of the first battalion of the United Nations Emergency Force is entering the war zone. It is generally expected that this event will immediately be followed by the withdrawal of the invading forces from Egypt. However, the great bulk—more than two-

thirds—of the invading forces still remains in the area. We cannot see the possibility of a satisfactory implementation of the General Assembly resolution by the United Nations Emergency Force as long as there are present in the same area a large number of hostile forces which may be able to hamper the Emergency Force in the execution of the task entrusted to it.

142. The twenty-power draft resolution would in fact have been unnecessary if, after the repeated and strong appeals of the United Nations, the Israel, French and British forces had been withdrawn. That the twenty Powers still considered it necessary to submit that draft resolution is in fact strong evidence that there has not been much good will shown to the United Nations by the United Kingdom, France and Israel.

143. We do not want to relinquish our hope that good will and foresight will be forthcoming, because in the absence of those human virtues we certainly believe that the fear of a larger conflagration is not without foundation. We still consider the situation in the Middle East as a very explosive one. When the parties concerned cannot be convinced that a give-and-take, live-and-let-live philosophy is the only wise solution in a world of conflicting international interests, then, indeed, the world has reason to fear that graver situations may result from this ill will.

144. The Indonesian delegation fully supported the twenty-Power draft resolution because of its undiminished belief that the strong appeal contained therein will not be in vain. It would like to emphasize that only a complete and immediate withdrawal of Israel, British and French troops from the sovereign territory of Egypt can create a climate which will be conducive to a successful settlement of the situation for the sake of lasting peace in the Middle East and in the interests of easing world tension.

145. With the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian soil, we can hope for the full co-operation of the Egyptian Government in the solution of the Suez Canal problem as a whole. We believe that with the good will thus shown by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Israel, even greater good will can be expected from Egypt. The task of the United Nations Emergency Force will be easier, and the clearance of the Suez Canal can be carried out with the co-operation of all the users of the Canal and other interested parties. It will indeed be a great day for the United Nations if such good will in world affairs can be shown to all the peoples of the world, and this will certainly be a great help in lessening the tensions that exist nowadays.

146. As regards the six-Power draft resolution, my delegation is glad that it was adopted, since it certainly deserved to be. Its sponsors exercised the most careful thought, taking into account all factors pertaining to all sides, in order that unanimity in this most urgent situation might be achieved.

147. As far as the Belgian amendment was concerned, my delegation did not see any reason to change its opinion about the facts known to us officially, even when the Government of Israel stated [A/3389] that "considerable bodies of Israel troops and equipment which were in Sinai on 7 November are now back in Israel territory". That does not mean that Israel has withdrawn all its invading forces. In our opinion, the withdrawal of the Israelis is not yet complete. That is why we could not support the Belgian amendment, even though we appreciated fully the good intentions behind it.

148. We are all deeply concerned with the Suez Canal situation. Those of us west of Suez, as those of us east of it, realize, I hope, that the sooner the Canal is cleared the better it will be for millions of people in many continents—Europe, Asia and Africa. The political and, not least, the economic impact of the closing of the Canal is already badly felt all over Africa, Asia and Europe, and that is why we voted in favour of the six-Power draft resolution.

149. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to make the following statement concerning the resolution adopted by the General Assembly [A/RES/411] on the Secretary-General's reports relating to the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force and to arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal.

150. As a result of the aggression committed by the armed forces of the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt, foreign invading armies are still on Egyptian soil. In these circumstances, the chief task of the United Nations is to take measures for the immediate and complete withdrawal of the interventionist armies from Egyptian territory.

151. At this time of anxiety for Egypt, when the aggressors' armies are still on its soil, subjecting the country to what is nothing less than military pressure, the Soviet delegation cannot agree that this vitally important question should be passed over in favour of any other questions. The settlement of the Suez Canal problem, in which we are all interested, will be possible only after the main task has been carried out and the armies of the aggressors withdrawn from Egyptian territory.

152. As a maritime Power, the Soviet Union is deeply interested in the normal functioning of the Suez Canal. Many Soviet ships with all kinds of cargoes pass through the Suez Canal on their way from the USSR to the countries of South-East Asia and the Far East and return through it to the Soviet Union with cargoes from those countries. As the economic ties between the Soviet Union and Asian countries become closer, the Soviet Union's interest in the normal functioning of the Suez Canal increases.

153. As has repeatedly been stated, the Soviet Union holds the view that the Suez question must be settled without any infringement of Egypt's sovereignty and with due regard for the interests of the Canal users. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the clearing of the Canal and its restoration to normal functioning. For our part, we are prepared to offer every assistance in solving this question.

154. As regards the cost of clearing the Canal and repairing the damage done to it, the Secretary-General's report [A/3376] virtually decides in advance that this cost should be borne by the United Nations. But why should not the cost of reopening the Canal be charged to the aggressor States that were responsible for the hostilities leading to the closure of the Canal, rather than to those States that opposed aggression and are suffering as a result of the interruption of navigation? The principles of equity and of international law, as well as established international practice, require that the full cost of clearing the Canal and repairing the damage done to it should be borne by the States that committed aggression against Egypt and opened hostilities in the Canal zone in violation of the United Nations Charter and the Constantinople Convention of

1888.¹ The Soviet delegation is resolutely opposed to the idea that the cost of clearing the Canal should be borne by the United Nations, and will not consider itself bound by any financial obligations arising out of the aforesaid resolution.

155. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Soviet delegation abstained in the vote on that resolution.

156. The resolution also approves the Secretary-General's *aide-mémoire* [A/3375, *annex*] on the basis for the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. The Soviet Union's position on these questions was explained in detail in the statement made by the Chairman of our delegation on 23 November [592nd meeting] and in a number of statements issued by the Soviet Government. I shall not therefore dwell on this aspect of the question here.

157. In his *aide-mémoire*, the Secretary-General does not directly refer to the financial aspect of the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. However, another report by the Secretary-General places before the General Assembly a draft resolution concerning the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force [A/3383 (*Annex*)/Rev.1]. This draft resolution provides in advance that all expenses connected with the presence and maintenance of the said Force shall be charged to the United Nations. The original text of the draft resolution stated unequivocally that these expenses should be apportioned among the Member States in accordance with the scale of assessments for contributions to the budget of the United Nations.

158. The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to state that this method of financing is clearly incompatible with the principles of international law and international practice. We cannot agree that expenses resulting from the armed aggression committed by the United Kingdom, France and Israel in the Suez Canal zone should be borne by other countries, which resisted that aggression and are, moreover, already sustaining losses owing to the fact that the Suez Canal is not functioning.

159. The Emergency Force was created precisely in view of the armed aggression by the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt and, as you are aware, for the purpose of halting this aggression. It is therefore entirely just that full responsibility for the material damage caused by this aggression should be placed on the States which initiated hostilities against Egypt. The General Assembly must not relieve the United Kingdom, France and Israel of their material responsibility for the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force. To do so would be tantamount to encouraging the aggressors for the crimes they have committed against Egypt and the damage they have caused to other countries.

160. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Soviet delegation will vote against any proposal making the United Nations responsible for maintaining the Emergency Force in Egypt, and it will not consider itself bound by any obligations arising out of the draft resolution submitted by the Secretary-General.

161. Mr. ACOSTA (Paraguay) (*translated from Spanish*): My delegation wishes to congratulate the Secretary-General warmly on the effectiveness of his efforts to give effect to the resolutions of the General

¹ Convention respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, signed at Constantinople on 29 October 1888.

Assembly. It would also like to give a brief explanation of its vote at the 594th meeting, on 24 November.

162. My delegation abstained in the vote on the Belgian amendment, because it considers that the immediate withdrawal of the French, British and Israel troops from Egyptian territory in compliance with the General Assembly resolutions is of fundamental importance to the peace of the Middle East. It also abstained in the vote on paragraph 3 of the six-Power draft resolution relating to the cost of financing the clearing of the Canal.

163. My delegation reserves the right to state its views on this matter at the appropriate stage. I can, however, already indicate that it will be very difficult for my Government to agree to make any contribution towards the cost of clearing the Canal, the exploitation of which is a matter of exclusive concern to the users and the owner. My delegation can see no moral reason requiring such a contribution.

164. My country is confident that this Assembly will find a solution to the Suez Canal problem which is consonant with the dignity of all the nations represented here, basing itself on law and on mutual respect among states, the only force in which the peoples that love peace, freedom and justice place their trust.

165. Mr. LIU (China): I intervene only to explain briefly the position of my delegation with regard to the resolutions adopted by this Assembly on 24 November.

166. As the Assembly is aware, my delegation voted in favour of all the resolutions adopted during the first emergency special session. Those resolutions stand today with all their validity, and my delegation firmly stands by the principles embodied in them. My delegation, however, abstained on the twenty-Power draft resolution at the 594th meeting because we did not see any necessity for reiterating what had already been clearly set forth in the preceding resolutions.

167. At the same time, we voted for the six-Power draft resolution, because we believed that the functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force and the clearing of the Suez Canal were matters of urgency on which authorization by the General Assembly was required for the implementation of those resolutions.

Prince Wan Waithayakon resumed the Chair.

168. Mr. CARBAJAL VICTORICA (Uruguay) (*translated from Spanish*): Before I explain the vote of the Uruguayan delegation, I wish to pay a tribute to the memory of Alberto Guani, an eminent Uruguayan who died yesterday and who was renowned in the Americas and throughout the world.

169. As a distinguished and highly cultured university professor endowed with the alert talent which is typically Latin, he earned a lasting reputation in the international field. He served as Ambassador of Uruguay in Austria, France, the United Kingdom and Belgium, and was President of the Council of the League of Nations, President of the Advisory Committee for Political Defense of the Organization of American States and Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country. He showed conspicuous ability as a diplomat in difficult circumstances, and his clarity of vision contributed to the adoption of correct principles in the field of international law. His cultivated intelligence and profound understanding of psychology made him as adept at blunting the edge of international prejudices, reconciling antagonisms and harnessing the most divergent opinions in the service

of his most cherished ideals, those of world organization. Many thought of him only as one who loved the pleasures of life, like the men of the Renaissance. Yet, beneath the exterior of the aesthete and the sybarite he concealed the stubbornness of the pioneer. He conceived ideals, nurtured principles, and strove to secure their acceptance.

170. As Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, he contributed to the adoption by his Government of a calm, dignified and courageous attitude in calling upon the Nazi battleship *Graf Spee* to withdraw from Montevideo Bay within a given time limit, without any support but its own resolution.

171. As President of the Advisory Committee for Political Defense of the Organization of American States he bore serenely the antipathies and ill will engendered by his efforts to ensure that the continent should not be infiltrated by nazi and fascist influence.

172. For all these reasons, he earned this tribute from the Uruguayan delegation at the moment of his death. Although he was a sceptic in many ways, he was second to none in his belief in the efficacy of the United Nations. I believe that I can say without exaggeration or excessive patriotism that his spirit will always be with us in guiding the destinies of this international Organization in which we continue to place our trust.

173. I shall now proceed to explain the vote of the Uruguayan delegation on the draft resolutions submitted for our consideration on 24 November. From the moment we knew of the draft resolution submitted by twenty Member States, we felt that it was our duty to support the appeal to the United Kingdom, France and Israel to comply with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on 2 and 7 November. We noted, however, that the text of the draft resolution contained an incomplete account of facts which were known to the General Assembly, and considered that the omissions should be corrected in order that the text might be wholly in accordance with the facts. We believed that it should indicate exactly how far the resolutions of 2 and 7 November had been complied with, since what still remained to be done had already been pointed out.

174. After hearing that the text of the original draft resolution was to be changed, and listening to the representative of Belgium, Mr. Spaak, explain his amendment, we hoped that agreement would be reached on a formula accurately reflecting the extent to which the aforementioned recommendations of the General Assembly were being implemented. Obligated to choose between two incomplete formulae, neither of which was fully satisfactory from our point of view, we abstained on the Belgian proposal and voted in favour of the draft resolution, despite its failure to mention explicitly that the resolutions of 2 and 7 November had been partially complied with.

175. Operative paragraph 1 of the General Assembly resolution [997 (ES-I)] of 2 November called as a matter of priority, for a cease-fire, the suspension of hostilities and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area. It was to support this basic provision that agreement was subsequently reached on the creation of an Emergency Force to operate in Egypt for the purpose of bringing about a cessation of hostilities and of supervising such a cease-fire.

176. No one can deny that there has been full compliance with the first part of the recommendation of 2 November. There has been a cease-fire, hostilities

have been halted and no preparations are under way for resuming them. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Shepilov, expressly emphasized this happy result—which is proof of the effectiveness of the United Nations in the case of Egypt—when he said:

“The delegation of the Soviet Union notes with great satisfaction that military operations in Egypt have ceased.” [589th meeting, para. 76.]

The text we adopted on 24 November would have lost nothing—on the contrary, it would have gained—if it had recognized the extent to which the resolution of 2 November had already been carried out.

177. Subject to this remark, it is hardly necessary to say that we are in full agreement with the resolution for which we voted, in so far as it requires the complete and immediate withdrawal of the French and British forces from Egypt and calls on the army of Israel to evacuate the foreign territory which it occupies and to withdraw to the lines laid down by the General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949.

178. We hope that this *de facto* peace may lead to a final solution of all the problems which have arisen and to the elimination of the underlying causes of the conflict, under the guarantee of the United Nations, whose presence ensures a cessation of hostilities without infringement of the sovereignty of any party. We hope for a satisfactory solution to the problem of the Suez Canal without impairing the sovereignty of Egypt, and we want a final peace instead of a momentary truce in the midst of permanent belligerency between Israel and the Arab countries.

179. We should be happy if it had been possible to attain such partial success in the case of Hungary. Egypt is still independent and its Government is in office. If Egypt comes to an understanding, concludes an agreement or raises claims or demands, it will do so in the exercise of its right of self-determination. I am convinced that the invading forces will do their duty and withdraw from Egyptian territory.

180. Let us, on the other hand, compare these results with those obtained in the case of Hungary. Hungary lost its independence as a result of armed foreign intervention. Confronted with the resolution of the General Assembly calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the Soviet delegation replied immediately: “These troops will be withdrawn when there are no more American troops in the different countries of Europe, etc. etc.” Such a comparison between licit and illicit action is quite inadmissible and constitutes a mockery of the United Nations. No one has yet accused the American troops of acting as the instruments of political intervention with the intention of ruthlessly suppressing the independence of the countries in which they are stationed. If this were so, they would earn the censure of all of us here who are striving to uphold the law that protects the independence and equality of nations.

181. If we study the balance-sheet of what has been accomplished in the two cases, we must recognize that in Egypt a course has been laid down which is favourable to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. In the case of Hungary, however, we are asked to bury our aspirations to assert the claims of law and to prevent violence and foreign arms from stifling the independence of peoples.

182. The PRESIDENT: It is with profound regret that we have learned the sad news of the death of Mr. Guani. I had the privilege of knowing him at the

League of Nations, and I am aware of the high position he occupied internationally and the great services he rendered in international affairs. In the name of the General Assembly, and in my own name, I ask the delegation of Uruguay to accept our sincere sympathy and condolence.

183. Mr. JAMALI (Iraq): My delegation is deeply gratified by the vitality shown by the United Nations recently. Certainly if the United Nations continues with its new vigour and spirit we may achieve world peace based on justice.

184. In this we are greatly indebted, in the first place, to the Secretary-General, who has shown energy, integrity and great enthusiasm for serving this institution. Then we are deeply grateful to President Eisenhower, who has recently declared that this Organization is going to be the main judge in settling international problems according to the principles of the United Nations Charter. To my mind, we are entering a new era. If other great Powers follow the policy of President Eisenhower and make this Organization effective, then world peace is certainly guaranteed and we can all live in peace and harmony. To do that, however, we must always seek the truth, begin to search for facts and inquire into the foundations of situations.

185. This afternoon I should like briefly to refer to remarks made from this rostrum by three delegations.

186. To begin with, I wish to assure the representative of Albania that my country's reception of arms recently has nothing to do with the present crisis in the Middle East. The reception of arms was arranged over a year ago, and the coming of arms to us is something unconnected with what is going on in the Middle East today. Thus, I should like to clarify the situation and say that the Baghdad Pact and the reception of arms have nothing to do with complicating the Middle East situation. On the contrary, what we should like as members of the Baghdad Pact is to have peace, stability and harmony prevail in the Middle East.

187. I should like to refer to the statement made on 24 November [594th meeting] by the representative of Israel. I should like the Assembly to think of his assumptions and to examine them. The representative of Israel is well known for his ability in semantics and argumentation and for his ability to paint things in different colours, making black look white and white look black. I am familiar with his argumentation and with his presentation.

188. The first argument which he used at length was the justification of Israel's invasion of Egypt, Israel's breach of the armistice lines. If you read his statement again, you will find that he accuses Egypt of building roads, of building airfields, of having ammunition, of having troops and of arming itself. Well, to follow the logic which Israel followed, if every country which saw another country building up its strength for defence took that as justification for assault, today we would not have world peace at all. Today we would all be involved in mutual wars. In other words, the Israel representative wishes to say that because Israel believed Egypt intended to invade Israel, Israel invaded Egypt.

189. If applied universally, this kind of logic would result in the Soviet Union tonight invading the United States or the United States invading the Soviet Union. This is just an example. Any other two countries could be taken as examples. If I believe that my neighbour is filling his house with food, then, with this logic, I would complain that he is going to starve me and therefore I must loot his house. That is the kind of logic

which the Israel representative used during his speech. I hope that such logic will be discarded; it can be refuted by any man with common sense.

190. The truth is otherwise. The truth is that Israel used aggression from its very inception, from the very day it came into existence, butchering Palestinian Arabs, making them flee their homes—then attacking neighbouring Arab States.

191. No one can forget Israel's military attack in force on Qibya in 1954. Israel was censured by the Security Council. Then it attacked Nahhalin with military force. Then it attacked Wadi Fukin, then Tiberias, Gaza, Gharandal, Husan, then Rahwa, then Qalqiliya. These last three, Gharandal, Rahwa and Qalqiliya were attacked three successive times by Israel in twenty days. There were 576 people killed in these attacks, including men, women and children, and some 500 others were wounded.

192. In this period Israel was censured for its attack on Qibya, its attack on Tiberias and its attack on Gaza by the Security Council. Not a single neighbouring Arab State has ever been censured by the Security Council. This shows you the difference in aggression.

193. Israel was condemned strongly by the Mixed Armistice Commissions over twenty times. The Security Council would have censured Israel over Nahhalin, were it not that the case was withdrawn. The cases of Husan, Gharandal, Rahwa and Qilqiliya were already before the Security Council when the dastardly attack on Egypt took place.

194. Thus if we wish to look at the Israel accusation of Egypt, we must see the other side very clearly and see who started the accumulation of arms and the aggression. Was it Egypt or was it Israel? The whole world knew that Israel was preparing to attack Egypt. President Eisenhower made two appeals to Mr. Ben-Gurion a few days before the attack, asking him to desist from attacking. Israel did not heed those appeals. It went ahead with its aggression.

195. If Israel's claim is correct that it defeated Egypt in Sinai with its own forces, without the help of the United Kingdom and France—we believe otherwise, we believe that they did help—that it is so strong militarily, then all of Israel's clamour for arms and all Israel propaganda against Egypt were completely unfounded. Israel is so strong that Egypt is justified in wanting to build up its armaments for self-defence. Israel's clamour for arms was only a confirmation of its aggressive intentions in the Middle East.

196. Israel's aggressive intentions and its rejection of any effort for a Palestine settlement have already been proved by many facts, and were proved from the very inception, from the very establishment of the State of Israel. This Organization did its best to settle the Palestine issue in 1948. It appointed the late Count Bernadotte as Mediator. That peace-loving man, that fine citizen of Sweden: what happened to him? Who destroyed him? It was Israel that destroyed Count Bernadotte. That was in 1948.

197. In 1949, a meeting was held under the auspices of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in Lausanne. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria met to discuss the Palestine settlement; they signed what was called the Protocol of Lausanne to implement United Nations resolutions on Palestine. Who backed down on that Protocol? Who refused a Palestine settlement? It was not the Arab States; it was Israel.

198. Then, later on, we find a fine Danish officer, General Bennike, taking charge of the armistice lines. What kind of pressure was brought on General Bennike? Why did he resign? He resigned his post because of Israel pressure. Israel continues to walk out of Mixed Armistice Commission meetings when the decisions of the Commission do not please its moods and interests. General Burns has already protested this Israel attitude several times.

199. Israel refuses to let United Nations observers visit the armistice lines and inspect movements. That shows its aggressive intention. Israel wants to cover up its movements so that they will not be revealed to the United Nations. Last, but not least, we have been told by the Israel Government that the Armistice Agreements no longer exist. Who is denying the existence of the Armistice Agreements? Is it the Arab States? Certainly not. It is Israel which is denying the existence of the armistice lines and agreements. Otherwise, why would they invade the Gaza Strip and then the Sinai peninsula?

200. It is a well-known fact—and the whole world must know it—that paying lip service to peace, as Mr. Ben-Gurion does, and then following an aggressive policy of force, cannot remain hidden from the world for too long. The world cannot be fooled all the time. Some of us may be fooled part of the time, but not all of us can be fooled all the time. We should open our eyes and minds and see to it that we are not fooled by these protestations about peace. We want acts for peace and not words for peace, and thus far we have seen no Israel act for peace.

201. As regards the Ben-Gurion régime, we all know that the resignation of Mr. Sharett and the entrance of Mrs. Meir was a declaration of a new policy of aggression. That is a well-known fact, and this Organization should be aware of what is going on in the politics of Israel. They certainly are eloquent in criticizing the Egyptian régime, but what about their régime? What about their intentions and plans?

202. In this connexion, I wish to refer to a very distinguished representative in this Organization, a person for whom I have great respect, namely, Mr. Casey, the leader of the Australian delegation. I think that Mr. Casey does not have the facts before him. He has not studied in detail the Palestine situation and its recent developments. It seems that his connexions with the Middle East take him back to the days of the war, the year 1943, when he was in Egypt. But what has happened since? It seems that he does not possess the facts about the truth. Otherwise, he would not have used, speaking of Egypt, the term "slow motion aggression" [595th meeting]. Had he studied the tactics and policies of Israel, he would have seen that Egypt was doing nothing more than engaging in defence, and that it desired nothing more than to defend itself vis-à-vis Israel.

203. Let us not mix up Israel aggression with the question of the Suez Canal. Those States that wish to condone Israel's action because they were angered at the nationalization of the Suez Canal are not doing any service to world peace. The Suez Canal is a separate issue. The Suez Canal situation is itself a by-product of the Israel aggression. The whole development in the Middle East results from successive stages of Israel aggression. It is a chain reaction, and the Suez Canal is one link in that long chain of action emanating from Israel aggression and the denial of the legitimate rights of the Arabs to their own homes in Palestine.

204. After justifying its attack on Egypt, Israel then wished to lay down some conditions for withdrawing its forces. First of all, Israel has never mentioned the armistice lines in its letters. The reason is very simple; it is because it no longer recognizes the armistice lines. How can we understand and appreciate Israel intentions as long as it believes that the Gaza Strip is a part of its homeland? Fifteen days before the attack, Mr. Ben-Gurion made a declaration to the effect that the Gaza Strip had nothing to do with Egypt. Then the Israel representative came and asked us why the twenty-Power draft resolution did not refer to Israel withdrawal. Israel has never recognized the United Nations resolution [997 (ES-I)] which says that its forces must withdraw behind the armistice lines. It has never mentioned officially in any of its documents the words "armistice lines", because it does not recognize armistice lines any longer.

205. The question of the freedom of Israel ships in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba is part and parcel of one big problem, namely, the Palestine problem. It includes the rights of the Arab refugees, one million of them, to their homes in Palestine. If Israel denies those human rights to the Arabs of Palestine, and if it does not wish to yield on those Arab rights, what right does Israel have to require Egypt to recognize Israel's rights? Egypt and the other Arab States wish to treat Israel as Israel treats the Arabs. Israel cannot have it both ways: to deny Arab rights and yet ask for everything in addition.

206. If Israel wishes to live in peace, and if it has peaceful intentions, it must first of all recognize Arab rights and respect United Nations resolutions. The passage of Israel ships through the Suez Canal is not more important than the lives of 900,000 Arabs and their right to their homes, to their farms and to their sacred places. The Arabs have been deprived of their rights.

207. What happens when Egypt denies passage to Israel ships? Why does not the world put the two problems into balance and see which one weighs heavier? Why do so many representatives come up here and defend the freedom of Israel ships to pass through the Suez Canal, and yet not one of them refers to Arab rights in Palestine which have been denied? If this Organization is to be a place for obtaining justice, certainly all the rights of all parties must be considered, and considered together.

208. We have been told that the United Kingdom and France attacked the Suez Canal and committed that aggression in order to save the Suez Canal from Israel invasion. If that is so, then the reason for the entry of the United Kingdom and France into Egypt is Israel. Then it is Israel's aggression, Israel's invasion, which brought in the United Kingdom and France. If the claim of the United Kingdom and France that they would not have entered Egypt had it not been for the invasion by Israel is correct, then the whole problem of the Suez Canal, has been created by Israel because, were it not for Israel and its invasion, France and the United Kingdom would not have attacked.

209. Therefore the primary cause of the trouble and of the blocking of the Suez Canal was Israel, with the United Kingdom and France as the secondary cause. If that is the case, the General Assembly must decide that payment for clearing the Canal should be undertaken by Israel, and if Israel cannot carry that burden and claims that the United Kingdom and France attacked on their own initiative, then the matter must be settled among themselves. That is the view of my dele-

gation, that the attack on the Suez Canal and its blockade were due directly to invasion by Israel, which is the reason why the United Kingdom and France have declared that their intervention would not have taken place had it not been for that invasion.

210. Israel must be made to pay for all losses, damages and expenses in the Egyptian war, including the expenditures incurred in clearing the Suez Canal. We believe that Israel should be considered by the United Nations as the prime aggressor in the Middle East, with expansionist aims.

211. Mr. Eban speaks of Sinai being demilitarized—no guns, no protection, no defences. We ask Mr. Eban, are we not entitled to request the same for Israel territory? Are we not entitled to say that Israel should have no airfields, no defences, no military equipment? Why should Egypt and Egyptian territory be subject to Israel designs without the same conditions being imposed upon Israel? After all, Israel's intentions of aggression, as I have proved and as is well known, constitute a reason for any Egyptian design for self-defence. As a matter of fact, Egypt's design for self-defence would not have become a question of international significance were it not for continued aggression by Israel, were it not for the fact that some 150 people were killed in Gaza by the Israelis.

212. We appeal to the Assembly to consider Israel as the prime aggressor in the Middle East with expansionist aims. Israel should be made to pay for all losses and expenses in the Egyptian war, including those incurred in clearing the Suez Canal.

213. We appeal to those States that make financial contributions to Israel and permit money to be raised in their countries in the name of charity, exempt from income tax, to suspend all financial assistance as long as Israel remains an aggressor and does not comply with United Nations resolutions on Palestine or with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

214. We appeal to those countries which provide Israel with arms to stop doing so. Those arms are certainly being used against neighbouring Arab States.

215. The United Nations Emergency Force should guarantee the withdrawal of Israel troops and bestride the demarcation line between Egypt and Israel. We have no faith that the Israelis are going to withdraw quickly, or that they intend to withdraw without being pushed by the United Nations Force.

216. Next, we ask that the United Nations units and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency should continue with their work of safeguarding the lives of the Arab refugees in the Gaza Strip until the situation has been settled finally by this Organization.

217. The Middle East today is one of the most explosive regions of the world. The whole situation there has been created by Israel—Israel, unchecked in all its aggressions and constantly given assistance in spite of its aggressive tendencies. This aggression by Israel, unchecked by this Organization, obliged certain Arab States to seek help behind the Iron Curtain, to seek arms there, and this has complicated the international situation. Who is responsible for that? It is Israel. Were it not for Israel's aggression, were it not that its aggression has been condoned throughout, this complication in the international field would not have arisen. The peace of the whole world is at stake. Had it not been for quick intervention by the United Nations in the situation in the Middle East, we might have had a

third world war. Israel's invasions and aggressions must be checked.

218. The United Nations is primarily responsible for the creation of Israel and must, therefore, see to it that the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine are respected by Israel. The United Nations must see to it that the Arabs of Palestine go back to their homes. Israel should comply with the fundamental provisions of the Charter and abide by the principles of law and order; otherwise it should forfeit its membership of this Organization. This Organization, which is intended to serve the cause of peace based on justice and the principles of the Charter, must see to it that world peace is not jeopardized by Israel's defiance and its recurring aggressions in the Middle East.

219. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the Secretary-General.

220. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Members of the General Assembly will have received, this morning, a revised text [A/3383 (Annex)/Rev.1] of the draft resolution that was appended to my report of 21 November on administrative and financial arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force.

221. In order to assist the General Assembly in its consideration of the revised draft resolution, might I offer the following explanations and comments.

222. The draft resolution in the "stripped-down" form in which it is now presented seeks to limit the action required to be taken at this stage by the General Assembly in plenary session to some three or four basic matters on which decisions are urgently needed in order that the establishment and operations of the Force may proceed without interruption and delay.

223. I have accordingly considered it imperative to seek the concurrence of the General Assembly in the following matters: first, the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force Special Account; secondly, the establishment of this Account in an initial amount of \$10 million; thirdly, the authorization of advances from the Working Capital Fund for the purpose of interim financing of the Force; fourthly, authorization to establish necessary rules and procedures and to make necessary administrative arrangements for the purpose of ensuring effective financial administration and control of the Account so established.

224. First, let me make it abundantly clear that the draft resolution I have offered, both in its original and in its revised form, relates solely and exclusively to arrangements regarding the Emergency Force, and in no way to other responsibilities which the United Nations may acquire in the area.

225. Secondly, I wish to make it equally clear that while funds received and payments made with respect to the Force are to be considered as coming outside the regular budget of the Organization, the operation is essentially a United Nations responsibility, and the Special Account to be established must, therefore, be construed as coming within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter. It follows from this that the Secretary-

General will be obliged to follow to a maximum degree the regular financial rules and regulations of the Organization, as well as the machinery and processes that have been laid down by the General Assembly for the purpose of financial review and control.

226. Having regard to the scope and complexity of the financial operations involved, it is indeed my intention to make special arrangements for a continuing independent audit to be carried out of all financial transactions concerning the Force.

227. Thirdly, it has been my assumption in drafting the revised text that Member States, while recognizing the need for taking certain decisions without delay, will nevertheless wish to follow established procedures to the fullest extent practicable. Accordingly, I have felt it wise to suggest that such problems as allocation of costs among Member States should be deferred temporarily, pending an opportunity of their being properly and adequately considered and discussed in the appropriate committee of the Assembly, that is, the Fifth Committee. Such action as the Assembly may see fit to take here and now in plenary session would therefore be without prejudice to subsequent decisions on other complementary and supplementary financial arrangements that need to be made. I would, however, hope that the Fifth Committee and, as necessary, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, would give these matters priority consideration.

228. The PRESIDENT: There are two more speakers on this discussion but they have agreed to speak tomorrow. Therefore the draft resolution submitted by the Secretary-General [A/3383 (Annex)/Rev.1] will now be put to the vote. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Belgium, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania.

Abstaining: Cambodia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Turkey, Union of South Africa.

The draft resolution was adopted by 52 votes to 9, with 13 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.