

UNITED NATIONS



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

UN LIBRARY

JUN 5 1984

THIRTIETH YEAR

UN/SA COLLECTION

**1865<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 16 DECEMBER 1975

NEW YORK

---

## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1865) .....	1
Adoption of the agenda .....	1
The situation in Timor: Letter dated 7 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11899) .....	1

#### NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## 1865th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 16 December 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

*President:* Mr. Ivor RICHARD (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1865)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Timor:  
Letter dated 7 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11899)

*The meeting was called to order at 11.05 a.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### The situation in Timor:

Letter dated 7 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11899)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken yesterday [1864th meeting], I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Portugal, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia to participate in the discussion of the question before the Council without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Galvão Teles (Portugal) and Mr. Anwar Sani (Indonesia) took places at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representatives of Malaysia and Australia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber on the usual understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Harry (Australia) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.*

3. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): Over a long period, the people of East Timor have waged a protracted heroic struggle against colonial rule. On 28 November, East Timor proclaimed independence and established the Democratic Republic of East Timor. This not only reflects the aspirations of the broad masses of the people of East Timor but is the result of the protracted struggle of the people of East Timor.

4. The struggle for independence of the people of East Timor has won the sympathy and support of the people of the third world countries. However, the Indonesian Government has constantly carried out threats and intimidation against the people of East Timor. From the day of the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, the Indonesian Government has openly indicated its intention to carry out armed intervention. Its officials declared more than once that Indonesia would send its armed forces to invade East Timor, and that in the event of resistance by FRETILIN [*Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente*] it would be ready to use its land, naval and air forces. On 7 December, the Indonesian Government brazenly dispatched large numbers of warships, paratroops and ground forces for large-scale invasion of East Timor, occupied Dili, the capital of East Timor, and is now suppressing the resistance of the people of East Timor with its military strength. The Indonesian Government's naked aggression against the Democratic Republic of East Timor has fully revealed its wild ambition to exterminate the patriotic forces of the people of East Timor, strangle the new-born Democratic Republic of East Timor and thus realize its long-premeditated scheme of annexing East Timor. The above acts of the Indonesian Government constitute a gross violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The Chinese delegation cannot but express indignation at this and condemns it.

5. It should be pointed out that no matter what pretext the Indonesian Government may use to justify its large-scale armed aggression, it is only deceiving itself and others. The irrefutable fact is that, in order to oppose colonial rule, the people of East Timor have long persisted in unrelenting and arduous struggle.

gles under most difficult conditions and finally won independence and proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28 November. The former Portuguese colonies and peoples that have now won independence and the numerous other third-world countries and peoples all rejoice in this. Strangely enough, however, the Indonesian Government has openly opposed the independence of East Timor. Not only has it rejected the earnest and legitimate demands repeatedly put forward by East Timor for negotiations between the two sides, for avoidance of border conflicts and the settlement of the refugee problems, but it has ceaselessly stepped up its military intervention in East Timor. Finally it has even openly resorted to large-scale military aggression and military occupation.

6. One of the pretexts used by the Indonesian side is that the situation in East Timor has "threatened" the "peace" and "security" of Indonesia. Anyone with common sense will ask: How can East Timor, with a population of only a few hundred thousand which has just won independence from colonial rule, constitute a threat to Indonesia, a big country in South-East Asia? Things are crystal clear: East Timor has not invaded Indonesia, whereas the Indonesian authorities have openly declared their intention to annex East Timor and have dispatched their regular air, naval and ground forces and paratroops for large-scale aggression against East Timor.

7. Another pretext used by the Indonesian authorities is the maintaining of the so-called "peace and order" within East Timor. Such an argument is in fact the same cliché used by all aggressors in history to justify their acts of aggression. Have not many third-world countries suffered a great deal from the aggression committed by the use of such clichés? If such an argument is to be accepted tacitly by the United Nations and the Security Council, would not the principles of the Charter be cast to the winds, would it not be permissible for any State with aggressive and expansionist designs to use the same pretext for wilful invasion and occupation of its neighbours? It is still less convincing for the Indonesian Government to assert that the dispatch of its armed forces to invade East Timor was an action taken at the "request" of certain organizations of East Timor. This is simply to delude the public for the purpose of annexation. The desire clearly expressed by the people of East Timor is one other than for the complete realization of their national independence and the resolute defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a well-known fact which allows of no distortion.

8. The pretexts used by the Indonesian Government cannot in the least help it to cover up its ambitious design of aggression and annexation of East Timor. The Democratic Republic of East Timor is a small country with a small population; it has just attained independence and is facing many diffi-

culties. However, its struggle is just and the sympathy of the world's people is on the side of the people of East Timor who are resisting aggression, whereas the Indonesian authorities' aggressive acts have been condemned by the great majority of States Members of the United Nations and the just world. With unequivocal language, the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the question of East Timor a few days ago<sup>1</sup> strongly deplored the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia, called upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay its armed forces from East Timor and called upon all States to respect the unity and territorial integrity of East Timor. These views reflect the just demand and unequivocal desire of the great majority of Member States and the peoples of the world.

9. In our view, both Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of East Timor are countries of the third world. The Republic of Indonesia, which attained independence earlier, ought to have respected and supported the aspirations of the people of East Timor for independence and should establish and promote the relations between the two sides on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence so as to join in the efforts for defence of peace in this region against super-Power, meddling and rivalry for hegemony. Since the Indonesian Government is clinging to its obdurate course and continuing its aggression and expansion in East Timor, the Chinese delegation maintains that, if the Security Council is not to neglect its duty, it must sternly condemn Indonesia's armed invasion and annexation of East Timor, that all invading Indonesian troops must be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally from the territory of East Timor, and that all States must respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of East Timor. In view of the fact that East Timor has already become independent, the internal matters of East Timor, including the negotiations between the various organizations, should naturally be settled by the people of East Timor themselves and should not be intervened in by foreign forces. We believe that all countries which uphold the principles of the Charter and stand for justice will support the above just propositions.

10. The PRESIDENT: I have received a request from the representative of Australia to speak this morning. It has, however, been intimated to me that he would prefer to speak after the Council has heard the other three persons whom it agreed yesterday to hear, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. I shall therefore now call upon one of those three, Mr. Mario Carrascalão, member of the Central Committee of the União Democrática de Timor, to take a seat at the Council table and make his statement to the Council.

11. Mr. CARRASCALÃO\*: Mr. President, allow me to express my gratitude to you and the members

\* Mr. Carrascalão spoke in Portuguese. The English version of his statement was supplied by him.

of the Security Council for the opportunity afforded to me to speak before the Council. As a representative of the 300.000 Timorese of my party the União Democrática Timorense (UDT), I shall submit to the Council a brief account of what has been happening in East Timor.

12. Before the fall of the Caetano régime, there was in Timor only one political party, the Aço Nacional Popular (ANP), which was nothing else than the União Nacional of the Salazar régime under another name. ANP provided the essential support of the colonial régime. After the fall of the Caetano régime brought about by the military coup of 25 April 1974, five political parties were formed in Timor, each having its programme and its own viewpoint on the political future of Timor.

13. On 11 May 1974 UDT was formed by a group of 23 Timorese, including three members of the defunct ANP. Perhaps by an irony of fate, José Ramos Horta, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Information of FRETILIN and former Secretary-General of ASDT [*Associação Social Democrática Timorense*], forerunner of FRETILIN, was also one of the founders of UDT. However, Ramos Horta refused to accept office, saying that very soon he would leave Timor in order to attend a course at the University of Jakarta. However, he did not fail to offer his services, saying that whenever needed he would be present and would collaborate with great pleasure. Later on, UDT found out that Horta had belonged to ASDT, the forerunner of FRETILIN. Later on we found out that Horta, before 25 April 1974, had been an informer for PIDE/DGS, the Portuguese secret police, whose fundamental aim was to detect and imprison all who might be in disagreement with the régime.

14. At first, Mario Carrascalão, who was chief of the Timor Agricultural and Forestry Services as well as Vice-President of ANP, was chosen to preside over the Organizing Committee of the Party, whose fundamental aim was to prepare a provisional statute to form the basis for the election of the leaders of the Party. Francisco Lopez da Cruz was elected President of the Central Committee and Domingos Oliveira Secretary-General of the Party.

15. In those days the main goal of UDT was to make Portugal responsible for leading Timor gradually towards independence until a minimum of socio-economic development had been achieved that would allow the people freely and consciously to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination. Later on, in view of the impracticability of this solution on the part of Portugal, UDT opted for independence in the long term, envisaging a privileged relationship with Portugal. In other words, it can be said that this Party was against immediate total independence, since it understood that conditions did not yet exist for its achievement.

16. UDT is the most popular party in Timor, since it counts on the support of 236 out of the 472 existing *sukus* in Timor, comprising about 50 per cent of the population of the territory. Incidentally, Peter Hastings wrote in the *Sydney Morning Herald* in August 1974 that "third party and the strongest to date is the UDT which favours continued association with Portugal but with some form of local political autonomy".

17. FRETILIN also recognized the importance of UDT. On 22 January 1975 UDT and FRETILIN joined forces, having for their main goal the independence of the Territory. Later, during a meeting of the two parties with the local decolonization committee, presided over by Governor Lemos Pires, UDT was surprised by an intervention by Mr. Reis Marques, a member of that committee, who accused some leaders of FRETILIN of having been informers for PIDE/DGS, among them Xavier do Amaral, President of the party, and other leaders such as Nicolau Lobato, Ramos Horta and Alarico Fernandes.

18. After this discovery and after four months of uneasy association UDT asked FRETILIN that those leaders should leave the coalition. Through its President, our proposal was refused. Thus on 27 May 1975 UDT decided to leave the coalition.

19. However, in his statement yesterday [1864th meeting], Mr. Horta, the self-appointed FRETILIN Minister for Information and Foreign Affairs, said that Indonesia was behind the break-up of the coalition. He may be better informed than I, but I do not regret him since he has an informer's mentality. It is very difficult to find out the truth when dealing with adventurers of the type of Mr. Horta. UDT has nothing to hide from the rest of the world, because it has a clean record and is very proud of this.

20. What was the reason for the UDT coup? On 9 August 1975 UDT received information from highly reliable sources, confirming other earlier information that FRETILIN was planning to carry out an armed coup on about 15 August. FRETILIN intended by that coup to eliminate not only the opposition party but also whoever opposed its power, in order to make sure of complete control of the Territory. The Government and the collaborators were repeatedly advised and informed of what was going to happen, but the Governor never took any preventive measures. It was evident that he had no intention of taking such measures against the coup planned by FRETILIN.

21. Unlike FRETILIN, UDT decided to take part in the meeting at Macau on 27 June 1975. After the UDT coup and the FRETILIN counter-coup, bloody fighting began. UDT jointly with KOTA [*Klibur Oan Timor Aswain*] and the Labour Party signed at Batugadé, on 7 September 1975, a petition for the integration of Timor into the Indonesian Republic. When FRETILIN

proclaimed its independence on 28 November 1975, UDT, jointly with the three other parties, on 30 November 1975, proclaimed the integration of Timor into Indonesia. It was to safeguard rights of the majority of the people of Timor.

22. UDT, as the most powerful party in Timor, supported by over 50 per cent of the population, had no difficulty in regrouping its members, and then, together with the forces of the other parties, it attacked the FRETILIN forces until Dili, the capital of the Territory, was taken on 7 December 1975.

23. When on 11 August 1975 UDT took the headquarters of the police and the army, it did not fire a single shot. Throughout the whole operation, whether at Dili or in the interior, only one person died, at the airport. Even after the attack launched by FRETILIN against Dili, UDT, before leaving the city, freed all the FRETILIN prisoners it had taken. It could have killed them, but for humanitarian reasons it did not do so. Horta deliberately omitted to tell the Council this. Why did he not tell the truth? Everybody at Dili can confirm the truth of my story.

24. It was FRETILIN that killed innocent people after gaining power with the help of the colonial army, which had joined it. The army of UDT left Dili. We were attacked with grenades by the colonial troops helping FRETILIN. We had a difficult task saving more than 5,000 women, children and old people. Some of them died, but the majority survived. The massacre of innocent people, women and children, the old and the young, the houses and properties burned, the plundering and the terror launched by FRETILIN opened our eyes and forced us to ask ourselves what would become of Timor with FRETILIN in power.

25. The leaders of UDT held an emergency meeting in order to discuss the political situation in Timor, and reached the following conclusion. The Government of Portugal had left Dili and settled in Atauro, leaving their weapons in the hands of FRETILIN. The party concluded that in those circumstances its proposal of independence with certain ties with Portugal could not be carried out. It was a pipe-dream. After seeing the cruelty with which FRETILIN treated its own people, we realized that independence was impossible, particularly bearing in mind the socio-economic conditions in Timor.

26. After a long discussion we finally arrived at the conclusion that it was in the interest of the people of Timor to gain its independence through integration with the Indonesian Republic. As we understand it, an undeveloped Timor with 93 per cent of its people illiterate, could not survive, and if it became independent it would start to go from one country to another begging alms, and would simply become a new kind of colony.

27. That is why UDT opted for integration with Indonesia. UDT is perfectly aware of what it is doing. It was not an easy decision, but it was the best possible choice, a choice that the people of Timor will never regret. We saw Indonesia's capacity to develop, and we watched its development. UDT is sure that if Timor joins Indonesia the people will have a new life; it will have a future, a more progressive, a better one and a happier one.

28. There is another thing that I should like to clarify before the Council. The decision that my party took was the decision of the leaders of the party—nine leaders, not three as Mr. Horta stated yesterday. An opportunity must be granted to all the people of Timor to decide on their political future and the future of their land, and when I say "all the people" I am naturally including FRETILIN. As soon as better conditions for peace and order are achieved, the people shall be granted their right to self-determination with the assistance and under the supervision of the United Nations.

29. Finally, I want to say that if perchance Indonesian troops are forced to leave the territory of East Timor, then the situation will certainly become much more chaotic. UDT will not be responsible for the consequences of such a decision. It is, however, my desire, as well as the desire of 300,000 poor and illiterate Timorese, that the Council should take a decision to spare us the traumatic repetition of what we have already lived through. Let the sun shine again in the eyes of our people.

30. The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Carrascalão, on behalf of the Council, for the statement he has made. In accordance with the Council's usual procedure, I now ask him to withdraw from the Council table and resume the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber. The next speaker on my list is Mr. Guilherme Maria Gonçalves, member of the Presidium at APODETI [*Associação Popular Democrática Timorense*], whom I now invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

31. Mr. GONÇALVES\*: The party I represent, APODETI, was founded on 27 May 1974, and Mr. Arnaldo dos Reis de Araujo was chosen as President of the Presidium. He was a former high-school teacher who for 29 years was isolated by the Portuguese colonial authorities. Mr. José Fernando Osório Soares, an employee of the Service of Social Assistance, who had previously held the functions of Chief Administrator, was appointed Secretary-General of the Party by the Presidium.

32. The reason APODETI always refused to give advice to its militants concerning any type of political ideal that would lead Timor to maintain its union

\* Mr. Gonçalves spoke in Portuguese. The English version of his statement was supplied by him.

with Portugal is very simple, because it is a very valid and profound reason. The wounds inflicted by colonialism are evident in the flesh as well as in the spirit of those people of Timor, who tried to assert their rights as sentient beings. Almost 500 years of obedience to enforced subjection have left their mark upon a community in its attitude to an enterprise without issue. In view of all the wrongs committed by Portugal in Timor, APODETI could not desire any closer relationship.

33. The alternative—independence—was in reality full of difficulties and doubts, owing to the absence of adequate structures to help a young nation lacking in everything. APODETI did not want to take the risks a fertile imagination might suggest, but only to be a sincere and practical party. Without the necessary structure or the means of creating it, to think about independence for Timor was like trying to place a ship upon the highest mountain.

34. As a consequence, aware of the insuperable difficulties involved in the achievement of independence, that is in not being dependent upon another country, APODETI opted for integration based on ethnic, moral and historical grounds; besides, such a move would extend to Timor all the general structures of the Indonesian State, with all the consequent advantages for a people that has nothing.

35. The action carried out by UDT on 11 August was understood to be a highly justifiable measure. However, APODETI did not participate in any type of preparations for the coup, nor did it take part in it because it understood that it had to respect the fundamental principles agreed upon by APODETI at the conference of Macau.

36. Therefore, it is not strange that APODETI should have maintained absolute neutrality during the rise of movement. But later on, in view of the evolution of events and the responsibility of FRETILIN, APODETI decided to associate itself with the parties UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista in its struggle against elements of FRETILIN. Thus the Joint Political-Military Front that would eventually recover Dili and Baukau was born. After FRETILIN launched its counter-coup on 20 August 1975, sympathizers within APODETI started to be persecuted pitilessly. Then there came the attacks against villages and populations that supported APODETI, and massacres were committed. The militant members of APODETI, unable to remain indifferent to this, proceeded to form groups, in distant and inaccessible places, so as to be able to take part in the self-defence groups that were being formed.

37. It is necessary now to recall certain other aspects of APODETI. While in Timor nothing was disturbing the peace, APODETI, calmly and most democratically, obtained the support of 94 *sukus*—the equivalent of 20 per cent of the local population. Although it only

had a small number of sympathizers, it remained mindful of correct political form. While participating at the Macau conference for the decolonization of Timor, it showed indeed its specific desire to collaborate against precisely what was done by FRETILIN by not appearing. However, APODETI did not take up arms to impose its principles upon the people as FRETILIN did. Though APODETI may lose the votes of the majority of the people of Timor APODETI would still not participate in such an undemocratic manner. APODETI has always advocated a referendum in Timor.

38. APODETI, feeling that the natural inclination of the majority of the people of Timor would be to integrate with Indonesia, endeavoured to ensure that the Indonesian language was taught in schools wherever possible. It is interesting to note that a certain number of APODETI members at every level are men who played an active part in the 1959 revolt in Vikeke against the Portuguese colonial régime. In the suppression of the heroic resistance fighters of Timor, the Portuguese oppressors killed about 500 patriots. Because of that revolt APODETI can claim that it has within its ranks the true fighters for liberty and freedom of East Timor.

39. APODETI, following the example of the other parties—UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista—planned to attend a conference of the parties with Portugal after the meeting at Rome. However, typical lack of interest on the part of the Portuguese Government led to its failure. Jointly, with the other three parties, APODETI proclaimed the integration of East Timor into the Indonesian State on 30 November 1975. APODETI invited the Government and the people of Indonesia to protect the lives and properties of all those who consider themselves to be Indonesian in order to achieve a historical and moral goal. Also, in proclaiming that integration, all the militant members of APODETI agreed to be protected by their new State.

40. Many people, including the very militant members of FRETILIN, are not fully aware of the atrocities and abuses of every kind which have been committed by that association of FRETILIN leaders which so miserably betrayed our people. In view of the general explanation which will be read later on, there is little that can be said except that only the people of Timor know how cruelly they have suffered. However, APODETI has no hatred or ill feeling against those who participated in the evil designs of the FRETILIN leaders. APODETI wants peace and social order to be re-established as soon as possible so that the people of Timor may have the time to reflect and make their own free choice.

41. APODETI is confident that the United Nations, through its representative organs, will make an important contribution to enabling the people of Timor to express themselves freely.

42. I come from East Timor, but at this moment I feel like a citizen of Indonesia and am extremely proud to be so. I shall not reply to the insulting remarks made about me in the Security Council by Mr. Ramos Horta. In due time those insults will be turned against he who uttered them.

43. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the Security Council I thank Mr. Gonçalves for the statement he has made to the Council. In accordance with the Council's usual procedure, I now ask him to withdraw from the Council table and resume the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber. In accordance with the decision the Council took at its meeting yesterday, I now invite Mr. José Martins, President of KOTA, to take a place at the Council table and to address the Council.

44. Mr. MARTINS: I should like to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for giving me the opportunity to acquaint you with the current situation in Timor. The members of my party, Mr. Mario Carrascalão and Mr. Guilherme Gonçalves, and I, and all the people of the Territory entertain profound respect for the United Nations. We are confident that in considering our case the Council will rely upon the principles of justice and the ideals of the Organization enshrined in the Charter, which we firmly support.

45. I refer now to the problem of East Timor. Portuguese Timor is located in the heart of the Indonesian archipelago. It is one of the thousands of islands which constitute the archipelago. Portuguese Timor is part of the island of Timor; the other, or western, part is Indonesian territory. The population of Portuguese Timor, a little more than 600,000, is of the same ethnic origin as the population of 800,000 in the Indonesian part. About 25 per cent of the population are Catholics. The majority, or about 65 per cent, of the population are Animists. There are also Moslems, Hindus and Buddhists, but exact figures cannot be given.

46. The Timorese people are at the stage of a traditional society. The *sukus* and the *liurais* still hold a dominant place in society. Mr. Joseph Lelyveld wrote in *The New York Times* in October 1974 that "the nearly five centuries of Portuguese rule have left Timor not underdeveloped but undeveloped in an almost absolute sense". This observation is an accurate description of the fact that the people of Timor have been left to their own way of life more or less as it was on the day the Portuguese navigators landed in Timor in 1514.

47. A *suku* can be considered as a group of families belonging to the same clan and living in a certain area of the kingdom. The territory of a *suku* is the small village in which the members live and the land on which they grow their paddy or corn. It should be mentioned that each *suku* has its own territory and

its own chief. Altogether there are about 472 *sukus* in East Timor.

48. The *liurai*, or traditional chief or ruler of a tribe, has a certain number of *sukus* under his control. The influence of the *liurai* depends on how many *sukus* he represents. The *liurai* is left very much on his own as to how to administer his *sukus*, but he is responsible for all taxes being collected on time and delivered to the district chief, who is an official of the Government. The *liurai* is in effect the native ruler of his own tribe as far as customs and traditions are concerned.

49. Of the 472 *sukus* of East Timor, 236, or about 50 per cent, are under the influence of the UDT Party and about 95 *sukus*, or 20 per cent, are under the influence of APODETI. Thus 331 of the 472 *sukus* have pledged their allegiance to those two parties, which account for 70 per cent of the population. Together with KOTA and the Trabalhista Party they claim at least 75 per cent of the population. The effort of FRETILIN to depose the traditional chiefs of the *sukus* and the *liurais* and to replace them with village councils is one of the main reasons why FRETILIN cannot gain a foothold in the kingdom.

50. The Territory is divided into 13 counties or *concelhos*. A *concelho* is headed by an *administrador da concelho*, who is directly responsible to the Government. Each county is divided into *postos*. A *posto* is headed by an *administrador da posto* who is directly responsible to the *concelho*. The *administrador da posto* co-ordinates the work of the *liurais* on behalf of the *administrador da concelho*.

51. The *liurai* has a dual function, so to speak. On the one hand he gets his instructions from the *administrador da posto* regarding government affairs, such as taxes and so on, while on the other hand he has some autonomous author authority as a native ruler within the *sukus* serving under him. The *chefe de suku*, chief of the *suku*, is a native authority, most of the time acting on behalf of the *liurai* who looks after community problems. According to tradition, the *chefe de suku* is not elected but, according to native laws and customs, he inherits the power from his father. The *chefe da povoação*, chief of the village, is directly responsible to the *chefe de suku*. That is the lowest ranking chief in society, but he is still a powerful person as regards the maintenance of peace within his village. However, one thing should be very clear about this colonial system: whatever the circumstances, the word of the *administrador da concelho* is final in almost all cases.

52. It is relevant to recall for a moment the experience of the last Governor in the Administration at Dili. Mr. William D. Hartley wrote in *The Wall Street Journal* of 10 February 1975 as follows:

"The people have always done what the Portuguese told them to do and making a decision is



strange to them. 'The Governor would say "This is what I want". They would say "It's O.K."', says Mario Lemos Pires, the newly appointed Governor, who is trying to create a council. 'Now I ask for advice, and then they say "You decide."' He says the people are not prepared to make decisions."

There is a basic truth in what Governor Pires has experienced. The people in the village ask the *chefe de suku* what to do and in normal circumstances it is the *chefe de suku* or the *liurai* who makes the decisions for the people. It may sound strange to Western ears, but up to now these conditions were facts of life in East Timor and in every community at the same stage of development as our people in Timor.

53. The APODETI Party, formerly the Association for Integration of Timor with Indonesia (AITI), was founded on 27 May 1974. Its first Chairman was Arnaldo dos Reis de Araujo, an ex-teacher who for 29 years had been isolated by the colonial régime. The Secretary-General of this party is José Fernando Osorio Soares an official of the Portuguese Timor Social Service who once held the post of district head. The representatives of UDT and APODETI have already spoken and there is no need for me to give information about those parties.

54. I should like now to touch on FRETILIN. ASDT which later became FRETILIN, is headed by Francisco Xavier do Amaral, a regular clerk in the Tax and Customs Section and an informer of the colonial secret police. José Manuel Ramos Horta, who now claims to be Foreign Minister of the so-called Democratic Republic of East Timor, is a free-lance writer on the newspaper *A Voz de Timor* and an informer of the colonial secret police. He became Secretary-General of FRETILIN. Many Portuguese Timorese were thrown into prison because of him. In those days, he was in fact a tool of the colonial régime.

55. The FRETILIN Party called for immediate independence. *The Far Eastern Economic Review* of 17 October 1975 stated:

"The Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor has all the appearances of a hastily assembled identikit model of a third-world independence movement. Up to six weeks ago, it would have been hard to take too seriously a self-important party of Dili intellectuals, that was formed only after General Spínola's coup in Lisbon on 25 April 1974 and busily acquired a FRELIMO-type image through a vague collectivist ideology, a flag and an anthem. Although it still retains an amateurish air reminiscent of a student council, FRETILIN is now the *de facto* Government of East Timor, however long it will last. It has a lot of blood on its hands getting there. FRETILIN won because it had the guns and the soldiers."

56. FRETILIN was the only Party which boycotted the Macau meeting, which discussed the decolonization programme for Timor, hardly the action of a party which sincerely wanted independence. In fact, during the Macau meeting the leadership of FRETILIN was in Mozambique, attending the Independence Day celebrations of that country. It was clear that they intentionally ignored the invitation of the Portuguese Government, and when the Portuguese Government planned another meeting with all political parties to discuss the process of decolonization, they unilaterally proclaimed the independence of East Timor, which is, of course, not accepted by the Timorese people.

57. Those are the credentials of FRETILIN, which claims to represent the majority of the people of East Timor. What it represents is no more and no less than the colonial troops alone, which inherited all the weapons from the Portuguese Government.

58. The KOTA Party, founded on 10 November 1974, defends the existence and continuation of the *liurais* as the traditional leaders of the people, elected by the assemblies of people according to tradition. The KOTA Party has about 28.000 members, located in Baukau, Lolotoe, Vikeke, Kelikae, Manatuto, Laklubar, Laleia, Funar, Maubara, Maliana, Ermera and Hato-Lia.

59. This party is led by José Martins, whose father, former *liurai* of Ermera, was forced to abandon Timor because of his non-acceptance of the colonial régime. He has also been arrested by PIDE in 1964 in relation to a liberation movement for the independence of Timor. The KOTA party is also one of the signatories of the petition for integration with Indonesia and for the joint proclamation of 30 November 1975.

60. The Trabalhista, or Labour Party, was founded in October 1974. Its main programme is the independence of East Timor, under a system somewhat similar to the Commonwealth system, and is closely related to the UDT Party. The leader of this party is Mr. Abraão, who is represented in the Council by the UDT leader, Mr. Mario Carrascalão. Although it has a small following, that party was active during the fighting against FRETILIN.

61. With respect to socio-economic conditions in general, and education in particular, it would be more objective to quote the information supplied by the Governor of Timor to William D. Hartley of *The Wall Street Journal*, and which appeared in the 10 February 1975 issue, as follows: "We stayed here sleeping", says Governor Pires, "It has only been in the last five or six years that Lisbon spent any real money". It has been only in the past four years that primary schools were built outside Dili. There is still only one high school, and although there are about 75 university students from Timor in Portugal, half of them are in their first year. There are only one or

two university graduates on the island. The illiteracy rate is put at 93 per cent.

62. With regard to health, there are two hospitals in Dili: one for the military, and one for the public. Although there are about 30 clinics in all in East Timor, there are no doctors and no equipment, and the medicine supply is poor.

63. With respect to agriculture, coffee is the main source of the foreign exchange earnings of the Territory, accounting for an average of 80 per cent of the value of its exports. Thirty per cent of its production is owned by the State enterprises; 10 per cent belongs to white farmers and medium-scale farmers, and 60 per cent belongs to small farmers. The annual output of rice production is about 25,000 tons. To feed the population 70,000 tons of rice a year are needed; thus there is a shortage of approximately 45,000 tons. Annual imports amount to about 4,000 to 5,000 tons a year, well below subsistence levels.

64. The production of corn is about 14,000 tons a year. To feed the population 40,000 tons are needed; thus there is a shortage of 26,000 tons a year, which is never imported. It is no secret that the local production has been unable to meet the growing needs for domestic consumption.

65. I turn now to the economy and trade. The economy is purely agricultural; there is no industry and no mineral prospecting. The economy is based on a single crop: coffee. There is no energy infrastructure, and transport is inadequate. According to the Portuguese Government, Timor has had a continuous and growing foreign trade deficit. This cannot be accepted with 7,000 troops on the island, plus the civil service and the more than 10,000 *segunda linha* or second line defence people whom the Government has to feed.

66. The general picture with relation to the socio-economic conditions on the island, as I have mentioned, is of course, generally true in every colony of Portugal. I have no intention to dwell much longer on this subject; I just want to give the Council some background, so as to assist members in the exercise of their responsibilities, and to do justice to the people of East Timor.

67. I shall now start on the Timor problem. As to the exercise of democratic liberties, the plan for the decolonization of Portuguese Timor as formulated by the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement recognizes the right of the people of East Timor to opt either for independence or for integration with Indonesia. The plan further provides the people of East Timor with the opportunity to set up political parties. However, certain developments in Portugal had their repercussions on East Timor. The great hopes that the people in East Timor would soon be able freely to express their right to self-determination were soon shattered by the actions of the local Portuguese authorities.

Particular mention should be made of Major Costa Jonatas and Major Francisco Mota, both sent by the Portuguese Armed Forces to East Timor to act as special advisers to the Government. Those two officers took measures which have strengthened the influence of FRETILIN, especially among the native troops of East Timor and have also greatly limited the movements of other political parties.

68. One political party, KOTA, which has established 38 committees and has a membership of no less than 28,000 people, was refused recognition. That party stands strongly for the preservation of the traditional societies and refuses to admit to membership those who had once served the colonial Government. It has thus become increasingly apparent that the principles of the free exercise of the right of self-determination as professed by the Armed Forces of Portugal on 25 April 1974 are greatly contradicted by their practice in East Timor, to such an extent that they have made a mockery of the exercise of democratic liberties.

69. I shall now speak of the events leading up to the revolutionary movement of 11 August. After the Macau meeting, certain grave developments which occurred in Timor led to the formation of the Revolutionary Movement of 11 August. That Movement was subsequently joined by KOTA and Trabalhista. In the early part of July 1975 FRETILIN began a systematic campaign of terror and intimidation of the population. For instance, in the village of Aileu, a key-point controlling access to much of the southern part of the island, FRETILIN stationed groups of armed men who could thus regulate the traffic of people through the village, either on their way to Dili or to the south. Those armed members of FRETILIN would authorize the passage only of those who could prove FRETILIN membership by displaying the party's identity card; all those who were affiliated with other parties were forced to destroy their parties' cards and made to accept a new card attesting to membership in FRETILIN. Consequently, only those who agreed to accept the FRETILIN card were allowed to proceed to Dili, the capital of East Timor. Those who refused to accept FRETILIN membership were forced to return to their villages, taking with them the goods they had intended to sell in the market at Dili.

70. It also frequently happened that they were physically punished for their refusal. The purpose of those actions was to force the members of other parties to become members of FRETILIN against their will. These actions also resulted in a sharp reduction of the food supplies in the Dili market. The situation quickly became disastrous, for the supply of essential products quickly became acutely short, and the prices of those still available skyrocketed. Food prices rose so high that most of the people of Dili were simply unable to pay them.

71. The local Government was fully aware of all these events but took no measures to improve the situation.

The Government's passivity was interpreted as toleration of the oppressive activities of FRETILIN and as support for its policies. Despite the activities of FRETILIN, all the other parties were committed to avoiding interference with one another, and to adhering to the decisions of the Macao meeting in a strictly democratic manner. At this critical time, FRETILIN began to establish paramilitary training camps at Bukoli (Baukau), Metinario and Ai-Sim-Moy (Aileu), where their militants were instructed in the use of light firearms and hand-grenades. After having received full and authentic reports of these activities from eye-witnesses, UDT informed the Governor of them and requested him to send his confidential agent to inspect these training camps. The Governor sent Major Francisco Mota, the chief of the Political Department, to Bukoli on this mission. This Portuguese officer later reported to UDT that he saw nothing at Bukoli except simple agricultural tools. It is not difficult to understand the motives behind Major Mota's report, since he was the second-highest-ranking Portuguese officer aiding FRETILIN in its repressive activities.

72. During the first days of August 1975 a number of FRETILIN supporters, led by Hamis Bassarewa, attacked the administrative post of Remexio, from which they stole arms and ammunition, including six Mauser rifles. They also detained the passengers of a truck there for 24 hours. These passengers included women and children, as well as some members of UDT. When the Governor learned of the attack, he dispatched a military force to Remexio, which released the prisoners. According to the commander of this force, however, it proved impossible to apprehend the FRETILIN outlaws involved, who fled before the arrival of the police.

73. Between 1 and 8 August the leader of FRETILIN, Xavier do Amaral, announced at a series of assemblies held at Same, Maubissi and Hatu-Builiko that from then onwards he was himself assuming the authority of the Governor and the Military Commander of Timor. At the same time he called for all FRETILIN supporters to muster at Turiscai. On 8 August Amaral was joined in Turiscai by about 5,000 men armed with metal weapons and bows and arrows. Despite the fact that the local civil and military authorities had full first-hand evidence of what was going on, they made no move to stop Amaral and his followers from carrying out their plans to seize power by force, but left them free to act as they liked. They quickly seized the opportunity open to them. On 9 August 1975 members of FRETILIN launched a hit-and-run attack on the administrative post of Laleia, and withdrew after stealing 6 more Mauser rifles. The villagers naturally suffered a good deal of fear from then on, since it was clear that the authorities either could not or would not protect them from FRETILIN.

74. In the period between 1 and 9 August, FRETILIN had already gained control, during the hours of dark-

ness, of most of the roads leading into and out of Dili. They maintained this control by felling trees across these roads in order to force any vehicles using them to stop. They placed a sign bearing the words "By order of FRETILIN" on these makeshift barricades. Dr. Ruivo, a member of the Army Medical Corps, was a witness to these activities. On one occasion he was forced to disperse the tree-cutters by firing his pistol into the air.

75. On 8 August UDT received information from a reliable source indicating that FRETILIN intended to follow up these activities by launching an armed coup some time around 15 August. It was clear that FRETILIN intended to seize power in the whole Territory of East Timor through this coup, which was the logical culmination of its earlier armed efforts. It was reported that FRETILIN intended to murder its chief opponents as part of the coup, and the leaders of opposing political parties, the Chinese and the people of mixed blood who were not supporters of FRETILIN. This would effectively eliminate all opposition in their attempt to secure total control of the territory. For the success of its coup FRETILIN was counting heavily on the help of its own members, who had been given extensive military training at Aileu by Major Costa Jonatas, the highest-ranking member of the Portuguese Army to give aid and guidance to FRETILIN. The involvement of Major Jonatas was of great importance to FRETILIN, since it provided them with training not available to the members of the other parties and which they could not have received in any other way.

76. The Major maintained close contact with the leadership of FRETILIN, meeting frequently with them in his home in Dili from midnight until 4 or so in the morning. These contacts were supposed to be kept secret, but were detected and watched by members of UDT. As news of this intervention by members of the Portuguese Army spread, the supporters of UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista, as well as some citizens not affiliated to any political party, demonstrated before the Government Palace on 8 August 1975, demanding the immediate expulsion of the two officers responsible, namely, Majors Costa Jonatas and Francisco Mota, from Timor. This demonstration lasted from the afternoon of 8 August until 1 o'clock the following morning, but did not produce any positive results. Since the Government had failed to respond to the demonstration, on the following day, 9 August, the public services staff began a general strike which continued until 11 August. Their demand was the same: the immediate expulsion of the two majors from the Territory.

77. On the same day, since it was evident that the Government was either unable or unwilling to take the actions necessary to prevent an armed take-over by FRETILIN, UDT decided that it was imperative to take action in order to neutralize the predicted FRETILIN coup, then expected within the next three

or four days. As UDT became increasingly aware of the imminent threat of a coup by FRETILIN, which would result in mass killings, it decided, on 11 August 1975, to launch an immediate action with the means available. With the support of the local police, UDT was able to take control of the Dili military headquarters. Several military units soon announced their support for UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista.

78. Owing to the fact that the *Movimento* of 11 August made up of UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista exercised control over the greater part of the Territory, the Governor of Timor, Colonel Lemos Pires, offered to transfer his powers to the leaders of the *Movimento*. These leaders declined the offer, as their reason for establishing the *Movimento* was not to obtain power but to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their inalienable right to self-determination. The main proposal of the *Movimento* was also to prevent the recurrence of the evils brought about by both FRETILIN and the local Portuguese authorities.

79. Later developments clearly demonstrated that local military authorities had given their support to FRETILIN. These authorities threatened to fire all military personnel who dared to support the *Movimento*. The commander of the military units of Atabai and Bobonaro even went so far as to threaten to take harsh measures against military personnel as well as the civilian population if they gave their support to the *Movimento*. The *Movimento*, which meanwhile was in full control of the city of Dili, handed over responsibility for the city to the Government on the condition that the local armed forces would remain neutral. The total negligence of the Portuguese forces, however, enabled some members of the local army who sided with FRETILIN to seize large quantities of heavy armaments and ammunition, including 160 G-3 machine guns. The superiority of weapons obtained by FRETILIN through the negligence of the Portuguese forces finally enabled FRETILIN to take control of the Dili military headquarters and other military installations which contained approximately 20,000 rifles and 80 per cent of the heavy ammunition in the Territory, without meeting with any meaningful resistance.

80. The actions of FRETILIN led to the outbreak of general hostilities all over the city of Dili, which subsequently spread to other parts of the Territory. The Governor made some efforts to act as mediator between the warring parties, but without any success. The Indonesian Consul at Dili, however, managed to arrange, with the help of the commander of an Indonesian vessel, a temporary truce for the purpose of unloading food supplies for the population and of rescuing Timorese and non-Timorese civilians who wanted to flee the horrors of war. Countless atrocities were committed by FRETILIN in this civil war. Let me just recount some of them. About 200 people, including women and children, were assassinated by FRETILIN at the *suku* of Mau Lau in Maubisse.

FRETILIN forces burned houses and committed violent actions against the civilian population at Maubisse and Turiscai. By order of the FRETILIN leadership, hundreds of houses in Dili were burned and the greater part of the city was damaged by heavy mortar firing. Many people were wounded or killed. At the *suku* of Se-Loe, near Aileu, more houses were burned and some civilians were assassinated. At Atsabe, FRETILIN massacred about 300 people without any apparent motive beyond their usual support for APODETI in the Atsabe region. At Tibar, near Dili, FRETILIN forces, while trying to attack the position of the *Movimento* forces, forced women and children to advance in front of their troops. In order to avoid the massacre of innocent people used by FRETILIN, the *Movimento* decided to move to new positions in the hills.

81. The Portuguese Government withdrew to Atauro, an island near Dili, after having handed over to FRETILIN forces the control of the strategic points, which it had received from the *Movimento*, as related earlier. An exodus of thousands of people to Indonesian territory followed, owing to the total incapacity of the Government to guarantee their safety. The Government invited all the white staff to proceed to Atauro, in disregard of the sufferings of their Timorese staff. At Railaku and Likisa hundreds of people were murdered by FRETILIN. About 40,000 refugees, Timorese-born and some Chinese, are living now in Indonesian territory with the financial support of the Indonesian Government. According to the monitoring system of the *Movimento*, in a communication from radio station BRAVO—Portuguese Government in Atauro—to radio station PERA—FRETILIN headquarters—the former recommended that FRETILIN should unilaterally proclaim independence.

82. The atrocities committed by FRETILIN against the people of East Timor greatly strengthened the conviction of the Parties of UDT and Trabalhista that integration was the only available means of putting an end to the immeasurable suffering of the people, a course that would guarantee peace and social welfare for the people. I apologize for taking so much of the time of the Security Council, but to put the record straight I have to explain events which Mr. Horta tried to twist before the Council.

83. The desire for integration with Indonesia was not caused solely by FRETILIN atrocities. The deep awareness of ethnic and cultural affinity existing between the people of East Timor and their Indonesian kinsmen has always evoked a deep desire on the part of the people of East Timor to reunite with their kin across the border. Almost five centuries of separation caused by Dutch and Portuguese colonialism has not been able to obliterate this deep desire. It has made it even more deeply felt and profound.

84. Four centuries of Portuguese colonialism has, furthermore, left East Timor not only underdeveloped

but undeveloped. Conditions which prevailed four centuries ago in East Timor remain the same even now. Only political and economic integration with Indonesia can help East Timor rise from the quagmire of underdevelopment and enter a stage of full economic and social development. Furthermore, the destruction of the traditional structures of society by FRETILIN could not but cause a feeling of abhorrence on the part of the members of KOTA, who stand strongly for the preservation of these traditional structures. Indonesia's consistent policy of giving autonomous status to traditional societies might provide a guarantee for the preservation of such societies in East Timor.

85. As a result of the Rome meeting on 1 November 1975 between the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Adam Malik, and the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Mr. Melo Antunes, a memorandum of understanding was issued reiterating their views with regard to the future political status of Portuguese Timor. In the memorandum Indonesia emphasized its respect for the right to self-determination of the people of Portuguese Timor, and reaffirmed the role of Portugal as administering Power in this respect.

86. However, Portugal stated ambiguously that it promised to carry out its responsibility and would organize a meeting which was to be attended by Portugal and all the political parties concerned. While Portugal had announced that such meeting was to be held at Darwin, Australia, it failed to explain clearly the date, circumstances and objectives of the meeting. For our part, we could not but regard Portugal's commitments as merely a bluff aimed at obtaining concessions from the four political parties, which had previously relied on Portugal's good intentions, to their regret. However, notwithstanding the fact that the problems and difficulties faced by APODETI, UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista resulted from political oppression and military brutalities committed by FRETILIN, we decided to respond with the best will. We, therefore, informed the Portuguese Government that we were ready to attend such a meeting at Bali, Indonesia, instead of Darwin. The Portuguese Government has never stated its position in response to that proposal.

87. Suddenly, on 28 November, FRETILIN, in its characteristic way, proclaimed the unilateral independence of East Timor. Such an attitude on the part of FRETILIN can only be interpreted as complete disrespect for the inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination.

88. With great reluctance and as a direct reaction to this flagrant action by FRETILIN, APODETI, UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista decided, on 30 November 1975, to proclaim the integration of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia. At the same time, we demanded that the Indonesian Government protect the lives and property of the people of Portuguese

Timor, who regard themselves as Indonesian citizens.

89. As we have stated previously, the Government of Portugal is responsible for the worsening developments in Portuguese Timor. Portuguese negligence and failure to prevent the oppressive acts of FRETILIN before 11 August and its moral and military support for that party cast further doubts on the sincerity of Portugal's commitment to promote a fair and even-handed process of decolonization. Had the Portuguese Government been more conscious of its responsibility towards the people of East Timor, and had it carried them out more faithfully, there can be no doubt that it would not have been necessary to bring this matter before the Security Council.

90. We do not believe that the people of Portugal would ever have sanctioned the undemocratic and improper procedures carried out by their officers against the fundamental rights of the people of Timor. At the present time, owing to our superhuman efforts on the battlefield, our parties effectively control all the territory of East Timor. We do not wish, however, to imitate FRETILIN and attempt to impose our ideas on the people by armed force despite our strong position. What we insist on is that the people of our country be able to exercise fully its right to self-determination. This is what we have fought for. We therefore wish to demand of the Security Council that the right of the people of East Timor to express its choice between independence and integration in a free manner be respected and implemented.

91. A referendum should be carried out and guarantees must be given by all the parties of East Timor that they will accept without any reservations or equivocations the results of the people's choice thus freely expressed. We also fervently hope that the results of that vote and the right of our people to decide its own destiny will be strictly respected by all the nations of the world. The people of Timor urgently need peace and time for the wounds inflicted by this tragic nightmare, into which, through no fault of our own, we have been plunged, to heal. I pray that God will help our people to attain these goals, and that after so much suffering and sacrifice by the men, women and children of Timor we shall be able to smile once again.

92. The developments in Portuguese Timor, particularly those since August of this year, make it crystal-clear that the Portuguese administration bears the full responsibility for the deterioration of conditions in the Territory. Its failure to stop the mounting toll of FRETILIN atrocities, a few of which I have detailed for the Council, and above all its inability to take action to thwart the planned FRETILIN coup, for which their advance evidence was overwhelming, constituted a total abdication of its responsibilities and rights as the administering Power—rights

and responsibilities which are clearly and specifically defined by the United Nations itself.

93. Far from adhering to the neutral role demanded by its statutes as administering Power by devoting itself impartially to promoting the process of decolonization in the Territory, the Portuguese administration permitted some of its members, notably the Special Assistant of the Governor, Major Mota, to aid and encourage FRETILIN in its undemocratic efforts to impose its will on the majority of the people of Timor by armed force. Those Portuguese in positions of authority who did not actively assist FRETILIN took no effective action to prevent it from improperly gaining dominance. In the aftermath of the fighting, the Portuguese Government completely abandoned the Territory. The Governor is now at Lisbon and the Acting Governor has left us for Australia. No attempt, however feeble, has been made to restore order to the Territory, so that the people can exercise its sacred right to self-determination in a meaningful way.

94. The Portuguese Government indeed has much to answer for at the bar of history concerning its conduct at the close of its role in Timor. Those of us who were left behind have had to pick up the pieces in an attempt to exercise our right to self-determination and to rebuild our shattered lives. The four combined political parties, which together represent the majority of the people of Timor, unquestionably have the right to seek aid from Indonesia, or from any other source, in order to restore peace and order to our land. Having done this, although we practically control the whole of the Territory and represent most of its people, we have no wish to impede the process of decolonization. On the contrary, we strongly desire that the process be implemented and that all of the people of East Timor, including those who are members of FRETILIN, be able to exercise freely their right to determine their own political future in the presence of representatives of the United Nations.

95. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the Security Council, I thank Mr. Martins for the statement he has made to the Council. In accordance with the Council's usual procedure, I now ask him to withdraw from the Council table and resume the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber. I now invite the representative of Australia to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

96. Mr. HARRY (Australia): My delegation is grateful for the opportunity to make a short statement to the Council on the question of Portuguese Timor. We appreciate very much the courteous and skilful manner in which you, Sir, are conducting the Council's proceedings and we extend to you our full co-operation and best wishes in your efforts to find a satisfactory solution to this problem.

97. The Australian Government and people have for several decades been concerned that, in the evolution

to freedom of the Portuguese colonial empire, East Timor should not become an area of great Power rivalry or instability in our region. We are most conscious that a stable settlement can rest only on the free choice of the people concerned.

98. The history of East Timor in the period since the change of régime in Portugal has been recounted in varying detail by the representatives of Portugal, Indonesia and Malaysia, and by the representatives of the political parties. The Australian attitude to these events, including our view on the use of force, has been stated by our delegation in the Fourth Committee<sup>2</sup> and in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.<sup>3</sup>

99. We hope that the Security Council, instead of seeking to apportion blame for the situation which has arisen, will propose practical measures and actions with a view to enabling the people of Portuguese Timor to exercise their right to self-determination and decide their own road to an independent future. The immediate requirement as we see it, is for a cease-fire, to spare the people of Timor further bloodshed and to create a climate in which a constructive programme of decolonization can be resumed.

100. Clearly, however, some time and organization will be needed before the actual process of self-determination can begin. Meanwhile it seems to us that we must avoid the creation of a vacuum or a retrogression into chaos in the Territory. There must be some effective civil authority to restore economic activity, to ensure the food supply, to arrange medical attention for the victims of the fighting and also to make the initial preparations for a subsequent act of self-determination.

101. Portugal has, of course, the continuing legal responsibility but since the Portuguese Government does not seem to be in a position to restore the framework of civil government even after fighting has ceased, or to make the administrative arrangements under which the people could freely exercise their choice, we must make the best of existing possibilities. Some United Nations presence is also clearly required to assist with arrangements for self-determination, and we are glad to note that this is desired by all the parties concerned, including Indonesia. The practical question which faces the Council is what type of United Nations presence would be appropriate, and how soon conditions on the spot will have returned sufficiently to normal for a United Nations mission to begin work.

102. The Australian delegation takes it for granted that the Council will require a cessation of hostilities and that a cease-fire will be observed. We are also confident that the Indonesian elements will withdraw as soon as fighting between the political parties has ceased.

103. It is regrettable that the various political parties, whose representatives are now appearing before the



Council, failed over many months to respond to efforts—with which Australia as one of the countries in the immediate region of Timor was associated—to bring them together in order to organize jointly the preparations for self-determination. We hope that they will all now co-operate with the United Nations in finding a satisfactory way in which the process of orderly decolonization can be resumed and can be completed.

104. I have said that some form of United Nations presence is clearly required, but it is difficult, in view of the sometimes conflicting information as to the precise situation in Timor, to determine what would be the appropriate form and dimension of United Nations involvement, and the right timing. The Australian delegation feels that the best course might be, as a first step, for the Secretary-General to be asked to appoint a special representative who could consult with the parties principally concerned, both in New York and on the spot, and who could recommend further action. Such action might be by the Council, which will, we assume, remain seized of the question; or if, as we hope, hostilities quickly cease and security is restored, it might be possible for responsibility to be assumed by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples under its mandate from the General Assembly.

105. The representative of Malaysia suggested yesterday [1864th meeting] that the countries of the region may have a special responsibility in assisting the administering Power. The Australian delegation endorses the principle of this approach but would like to see what sort of action the Council may have in mind to give effect to such a principle. Meanwhile the Australian Government, as it has already informed the administering Government and Indonesia, stands ready to resume its humanitarian aid and the facilitation of appropriate international aid to the distressed people in Timor, while continuing, of course, its assistance to the many hundreds of people who have sought in Australia refuge from the fighting.

106. In conclusion, I would once again emphasize, as indeed the General Assembly did in its resolution 3485 (XXX), that the purpose and aim of the United Nations, underlying any action which the Council may decide, is to enable the people of the Territory freely to exercise their right to self-determination. The main question now is to establish conditions in which the people of Timor can make its own free choice.

107. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Portugal has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply and accordingly I now call on him.

108. Mr. GALVÃO TELES (Portugal) (*interpretation from French*): I have listened most attentively to

the statement made before the Council by the representative of Indonesia, whereby he endeavoured to prove and justify the reasons that led his Government to invade and military occupy the Territory of Timor under Portuguese administration.

109. I shall not remind the Council again of the efforts made by the Government of Portugal to carry out the process of decolonization of Timor successfully, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, in particular the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). But I wish to emphasize that my Government, bearing in mind the specific circumstances of this case, has always been in close contact with the Jakarta authorities—in vain, as everyone can note. Indonesia has chosen to exercise a negative influence on the parties closest to it and that in order to justify, if need be, the use of force in the Territory.

110. As he did before in the General Assembly, here once again the representative of Indonesia invoked the “criminal negligence” of the Portuguese authorities in regard to the events which have taken place on the Territory of Timor. My delegation is sincerely astonished at the speed with which the delegation of Indonesia changes its mind on the action of Portugal and as regards Timor. In the opinion of the Government of Jakarta, “the positive attitude of the administering Power”—according to the draft resolution of which Indonesia was a sponsor on 3 December<sup>4</sup>—has now become “criminal negligence” simply in order to justify the Indonesian invasion of Timor.

111. The representative of Indonesia has affirmed that UDT, APODETI and the other groups in favour of the integration of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia represent the majority of the population of the Territory. In so far as no plebiscite of any kind has taken place, we may observe that Indonesia has a very curious conception of the self-determination of a people, since it believes that the reply can be known before the question is even put. Such an attitude, which clearly reveals the partiality of Indonesia as to the political future of Timor, proves how dangerous and harmful it would have been for Portugal to appeal to Indonesia for the restoration of “peace and order”<sup>4</sup>.

112. I believe, in fact, that there is no doubt in anyone's mind, least of all after the events of these last days, that any intervention by Indonesia in Portuguese Timor would have been aimed essentially at the achievement of its own designs over that Territory. It is therefore difficult to challenge the fact that if Portugal refrained from appealing to Indonesia to intervene to settle problems pertaining to order and the preservation of calm in Timor—problems the existence of which is not in doubt and which we

have endeavoured to solve by all means at our disposal—we did so solely in order to guarantee respect for the will of the people of Timor. It is unjust therefore to accuse Portugal of not having resorted to a solution which we would even have found convenient, but which would have been a contravention of its duties as administering Power towards the population of Timor.

113. We have furthermore observed with pleasure, after the statement today of the representative of UDT, that the people of Timor has not decided in favour of the integration of that Territory with Indonesia and that, for this reason, that Party is prepared to accept a plebiscite for the free exercise of the right to self-determination and independence.

114. It is therefore the hope of Portugal that the policy of decolonization which we have proposed may yet be applied, with the agreement of all the parties concerned, the more so since it is obvious, after the statements made this morning before the Council, that the positions of those parties are, after all, rather different from one another, since only one of those representatives took up a defence of the position of Indonesia. The acts of that country have been and are, unfortunately, of a different kind.

115. The recent evolution of events in Timor, moreover, enables us better to understand the various steps taken by Indonesia so as to prepare the intervention which was carried out a few days ago. It leads us to conclude—to use the imagery employed by the representative of Indonesia—that Indonesia has not only set fire to everything in Timor (and the image of a famous pyromaniac firefighter inevitably comes to mind), that it has not only done everything in its power so that things would come to such a point in order that the selfless mission of a voluntary firefighter that it claims to be carrying out would appear to be justified, but that it has even constantly acted so as to prevent others from being able to extinguish the fire.

116. Manifestly, it had a compelling desire to enter the house of its neighbour. Regrettably, in this case as in many others, the damage caused by the water was far greater than the damage caused by the fire. The hundreds of innocent victims of the aggression of Indonesia are irrefutable proof of this. If Indonesia had simply wished “to restore peace and order” in the Territory, why did it not resort to the United Nations? The armed attack against Dili, the hundreds of dead, wounded and missing persons, are these the best means to achieve the “peace and order” which the Indonesian authorities profess to desire?

117. Can we really believe that Indonesia intervened impartially and objectively in the internal affairs of Timor? Certainly not. And if any doubt should still subsist, the latest news concerning the official annexation of the enclave of Oucssi-Ambenu would dispel that doubt completely.

118. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Indonesia.

119. Mr. ANWAR SANI: I should only like to reserve the right of my delegation to reply to these latest remarks made by the representative of Portugal. In fact, I would have referred to my own statement once again and to the statements which have been made by the representatives of the parties this morning, but I thought it would be good to reply to the representative of Portugal in the way his statement merits. So I should like to reserve my right to reply to the Portuguese remarks at the next meeting of the Council.

*The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.*

*Notes*

<sup>1</sup> See General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX).

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Fourth Committee*, 2178th, 2185th and 2188th meetings.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2439th meeting.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 88, document A/10426, para. 8.