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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

1881st MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 27 January 1976, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Salim A. SALIM
(United Republic of Tanzania).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Benin, China, France, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1881)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia:
Letter dated 16 December 1975 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11918)

The meeting was called to order at 4.20 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

Letter dated 16 December 1975 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11918)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken this morning [1880th meeting], I invite the representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mauritius, Nigeria and Yugoslavia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the usual understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table whenever they wish to address the Council. I also invite the President and members of the delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rahal (Algeria), Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Mr. Camara (Guinea), Mr. Marpaung (Indonesia), Mr. Hall (Jamaica), Mr. Ramphul (Mauritius), Mr. Harriman (Nigeria) and Mr. Petrić (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber; Mr. Kamana (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the members of the delegation took places at the Security Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Mauritania requesting that he be invited, in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. Accordingly, if there is no objection, I propose, in conformity with the usual practice and with the consent of the Council, to invite the representative I have just mentioned to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

It was so decided.

3. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of Mauritania to take the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber, on the usual understanding that he will be invited to take a place at the Council table when he addresses the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. El Hassen (Mauritania) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT: I have also received a letter dated 27 January 1976 from the Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, which reads as follows:

“With regard to the current discussion in the Security Council on the question of Namibia, the Special Committee against *Apartheid* at its 316th meeting, held on 21 January 1976, decided that its views on the question of Namibia should be presented to the Security Council. Accordingly, I should be grateful to receive, in the absence of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee, an invitation to address the Security Council in that connexion.”

5. I therefore propose, if I hear no objection, that the Council extend an invitation, pursuant to rule 39 of its Provisional rules of procedure, to the Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*.

It was so decided.

6. The PRESIDENT: At the appropriate time I shall invite the Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to take a seat at the Council table to make his statement.

7. The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the item on its agenda. The first speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

8. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt): It is well known to all of us that the question of Namibia has been on the agenda of every session of the General Assembly since 1946; many resolutions have been voted since then. The question has also been the subject of many resolutions of the Security Council. The time has come for the United Nations to become more vigorously involved in promoting a peaceful solution in Namibia. The United Nations involvement in Namibia is of crucial importance and must not be allowed to be put aside or thwarted.

9. In its resolution 2145 (XXI), the General Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and resolved that the United Nations must discharge its responsibilities with respect to the Territory. Subsequently, the General Assembly, at its fifth special session in 1967, established the United Nations Council for Namibia to administer the Territory until its independence.¹ Also, the General Assembly in its resolution 3295 (XXIX) urged the Security Council to convene urgently to take effective measures in accordance with the Charter to put an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. In the same resolution, the General Assembly requested all specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to take such necessary steps as would enable the representation and participation of Namibia in their work and in consultation with the United Nations Council for Namibia and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the authentic representative of the Namibian people, to render all possible assistance to the people of Namibia and their liberation movement.

10. It is useful to recall the latest resolution of the General Assembly on this subject, resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975, which reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, endorsed the relevant provisions of the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in April 1975, reiterated that SWAPO is the authentic representative of the Namibian people, reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people by all means against the illegal occupation of their country by South Africa; strongly condemned South Africa for its persistent refusal to withdraw from Namibia and for furthering its policies of bantustanization and strongly condemned the military build-up by South Africa in Namibia and the forcible removal of Namibians from the northern border for military purposes.

11. General Assembly resolution 3399 (XXX) also set up the framework for action regarding Namibia.

—First, it demanded the immediate withdrawal by South Africa of all its military and police forces and its administration from Namibia so as to enable the Namibian people to achieve freedom and independence.

—Secondly, it decided that free elections should be held in Namibia as a matter of urgency under the direct supervision and control of the United Nations.

—Thirdly, it urged the United Nations Council for Namibia to take all necessary measures for the implementation of its mandate under General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V), including the promulgation of decrees designed to protect the rights of Namibians.

—Fourthly, it urged also the Security Council to take up again the question of Namibia and to act to give effect to resolution 366 (1974), in which the Security Council:

(a) Demanded that South Africa make a solemn declaration that it would comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia, and that it would recognize the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;

(b) Demanded that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal of its illegal administration from Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations, and that in accordance with Council resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969);

(c) Demanded also that South Africa, pending the transfer of power to the people of Namibia, should comply fully with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, release all Namibian political prisoners, abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and homelands, and accord unconditionally all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities to return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment.

12. In resolution 3399 (XXX), in setting up the framework for action regarding Namibia, the General Assembly called once again upon all those States which had not yet done so to comply with the relevant provisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council concerning Namibia and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.² It urged also those States which had not yet done so to break off economic relations with South Africa that concerned Namibia and to take measures with a view to compelling the Government of South Africa to withdraw immediately from Namibia. Moreover, it called upon those States which had consular representatives in Namibia to terminate such representation.

13. Confirming the role of the United Nations Council for Namibia, it also requested once again all Member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure the full application of the provisions of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia,³ of 27 September 1974, and also such other measures as may be necessary to assist in the protection of the natural resources of Namibia.

14. In June 1975 [see 1829th meeting] the Security Council was not able to take action regarding the unacceptable situation in Namibia due to reasons we all know. We are hopeful that some acceptable formula can be evolved which would enable the United Nations to respond adequately to the challenge.

15. During the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, the delegation of Egypt expressed once again Egypt's opinion concerning the dramatic developments in Namibia and also made several comments in this regard.⁴ As an African State and also as a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Egypt's position with respect to the Namibian question can be summarized as follows: first, total and full support to SWAPO, the authentic representative of the Namibian people; secondly, condemnation of the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and its arbitrary application of racial discriminatory repressive laws and practices in that Territory, especially its policy of bantustanization; thirdly, condemnation of the South African military build-up in Namibia and its utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries which is a serious threat to peace and security in Africa; and, fourthly, condemnation of attempts by South Africa to evade the clear demand of the United Nations for holding free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision.

16. Egypt feels that the Security Council will be able during this series of meetings to give effect to its previous resolutions and put an end to the racist South African Government's betrayal of the trust given to it by the international community, its insistence on its illegal occupation of Namibia and the mockery this racist Government is making of international conventions and its refusal to abide by the resolutions of the United Nations.

17. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Yugoslavia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

18. Mr. PETRIĆ (Yugoslavia): The question of Namibia has been on the agenda of the United Nations for a number of years, although it is quite clear that, both politically and legally, South Africa has no right whatsoever to rule over that Territory and over the people of Namibia. In 1966 the General Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and established the direct responsibility of the United Nations over that country. The United Nations Coun-

cil for Namibia was established for the purpose of administering the Territory until it achieved its independence.

19. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 1971, stipulated that the further presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was under an obligation to withdraw from the Territory without delay. In its recently adopted resolution 366 (1974) the Security Council condemned the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and called upon it to take "the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal... of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia". Furthermore, in view of South Africa's persistent defiance of the United Nations and its aforementioned decisions, the General Assembly decided at its twenty-ninth session to suspend South Africa's right to take part in its work.

20. However, in June 1975 [*ibid.*] the Security Council was prevented from adopting a draft resolution demanding the imposition of a total embargo on the import of arms in South Africa, on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter, owing to the veto of three permanent members of the Council. The inability of the Security Council to impose further measures against South Africa encouraged Vorster's régime to continue to occupy Namibia illegally, to flout the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and to use the Territory of Namibia as a staging area for its aggression against the peoples of Africa.

21. My delegation is convinced that the decision to consider the question of Namibia by the Security Council now is most timely, as it is becoming ever more apparent that the continued occupation of Namibia by South Africa is rapidly becoming an acute hotbed of crisis, threatening peace and security in Africa. It is clear that the responsibility for such a negative and dangerous development is also borne by the Powers and the circles that support the South African racist régime directly or indirectly.

22. The Security Council, as the United Nations organ entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, is in duty bound to take energetic measures in order to end the illegal occupation of Namibia. We hope that we shall not witness this time a repetition of the situation of last year when three permanent members of the Security Council, by using their veto, directly protected the racist régime of South Africa from being justly condemned by the international community and prevented the Council from undertaking necessary action aimed at terminating South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. In view of the foregoing and mindful of the present circumstances, we are firmly convinced that any country's policy towards South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and towards *apartheid* is actually the touchstone of its attitude towards Africa and towards the profound aspiration

of this great continent to liberate itself completely from colonialism and racism.

23. We are all well aware that Vorster's racist régime, by resorting to brutal methods of racial segregation, persecution and arrests as well as to the ruthless exploitation of the people of Namibia and its natural resources, has the intention of keeping that Territory under its domination as long as possible. In order to maintain itself in Namibia, Vorster's racist régime is endeavouring to prevent, by recourse to force, assassinations and persecutions, all political activity by the people of Namibia. It is striving to break up this people into smaller communities, to establish bantustans. It is for this purpose that it is organizing so-called constitutional conferences where its stooges are trying to implement South Africa's sinister design to split up Namibia. In this it is abundantly helped by foreign capital from some Western countries, capital that is being directly invested in Namibia or in the South African economy. This is well known to all as well as the fact that the Governments of the countries concerned, by arguing that they are not in a position to control their economies, and so forth, are actually endeavouring to justify such co-operation and to conceal thereby the obvious interests of certain circles which are linked with the fate of racism in South Africa.

24. It should be pointed out, however, that these very same countries and some others, which plead their supposed inability, deriving from their systems, to prevent their corporations from aiding *apartheid* in South Africa and its occupation of Namibia, were quite capable of imposing broad and effective embargoes whenever this happened to suit their political interests.

25. We consider it absolutely necessary that this time the Security Council should be able to undertake the necessary measures to terminate all co-operation with the racist régime. This applies particularly to the unacceptable practice of some countries which co-operate with South Africa in the military field supplying it with sophisticated weapons and military technology.

26. We are faced today with an even more ominous situation, with the militarization of Namibia on a large scale with the aim of perpetuating South Africa's presence in this Territory. This imposes increased oppression and suffering on the people of Namibia. Furthermore, South Africa is openly using the Territory of Namibia for its aggression against, and military incursions into, independent Angola, threatening the security of other independent African countries as well.

27. In this connexion I should like to point out in particular that the Co-ordinating Committee of Non-Aligned Countries in New York, on 12 December 1975, adopted the following declaration on the matter:

"The Co-ordinating Committee, welcoming the independence of Angola, achieved after many years of struggle against colonialism, expresses its grave concern at the acts of armed invasion perpetrated against Angola by the armed forces of the racist régime of South Africa, yet another attack of South Africa on the freedom and independence of African nations. Since a free and independent Angola is in the best interests of the freedom of Africa, international peace and security, and the freedom and independence of this great African country constitutes one of the decisive blows dealt to colonialism, racism and imperialism in Africa, and the position of *apartheid* is becoming ever more untenable, the Co-ordinating Committee condemns most emphatically the flagrant acts of aggression of the South African racist régime and calls for urgent action by the international community in order to end this aggression and to secure the withdrawal of South African troops from the soil of Angola."⁵

28. A serious warning was also sounded by President Boumediène, who in his capacity as co-ordinator of non-aligned countries, stated, *inter alia*:

"I am certain that the non-aligned countries, taking note of the solemn declaration in which the Government of the People's Republic of Angola affirmed its total support for and devotion to the principle of the policy of non-alignment, will not fail to give the situation their fullest attention, to denounce and condemn the aggression to which their brothers, the Angolan people, have been subjected, and to express their full solidarity with the people and leaders of Angola. That posture, which is consistent with the ideas of our movement, is in keeping with our long tradition of support for just causes"

29. The illegal occupation of Namibia and the use of its territory for aggression against Angola are part of imperialist efforts to arrest the process of the final liquidation of colonialism and racism in Africa. The threat to the independence of African countries by the most sinister system of slavery, assisted by colonial and imperialist forces, is aimed at splitting Africa, at weakening it, at breaking it up and at bringing it into a state of mutual confrontation, because a united Africa, composed of more than 40 free countries, constitutes a power that South Africa, even with the assistance of foreign forces, could not oppose for long. The forces supporting South Africa, or justifying by one argument or another South Africa's intervention in Angola, are acting against the interests of Africa and are bent on impeding the process of complete liberation of Africa from colonialism.

30. As for my country, which has consistently supported national liberation movements and their struggle, it is acting in the same way today in supporting and assisting the struggle of the people of Namibia and of African peoples in the south of Africa,

as well as the struggle of independent Angola against the aggression of South Africa.

31. The situation in Angola shows that some forces have linked themselves up with interventionists from the most hated racist stronghold, South Africa. In this connexion, I can state that the Government and peoples of Yugoslavia strongly condemn South Africa's aggression against the independent Republic of Angola and any assistance to that aggression.

32. In concluding my remarks, I should like to underline that the Security Council should condemn most emphatically the continuation of the illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa, its militarization and the use that is being made of its territory for aggression against the Republic of Angola and for threatening other African countries. The Council should consider this to be an additional and essential element for effective action against the occupation of Namibia by South Africa and against the régime of *apartheid* in South Africa.

33. At the same time, the Security Council cannot lose sight of the fact that the people of Namibia has already clearly manifested its desire to be free and that, in order to achieve this, it is seeking the support of the international community, of the United Nations, of the Security Council and, particularly, of all of its permanent members. SWAPO is widely recognized as the authentic representative of the people of Namibia and the political force representing its national interests. SWAPO has given proof of its strength by proposing that free political elections should be held in Namibia under the control of the United Nations and in conditions of total withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia. It has thus responded to the demands of some countries that the United Nations should concentrate its attention on the realization of free elections in Namibia, showing that Namibia desires to be independent and free from racism. By its armed struggle, too, SWAPO has demonstrated that the people of Namibia is offering ever stronger armed resistance to the racist régime. SWAPO enjoys my country's support and assistance.

34. The Security Council is under obligation to take active measures for the rapid liberation of Namibia from South Africa, in order to enable the people of Namibia to realize its right to self-determination and independence, thus contributing effectively to the process of liquidation of colonialism and racism in Africa and to the consolidation of peace in Africa and in the world.

35. The PRESIDENT: Before I call on the next speaker, I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Liberia containing a request that he be invited, in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. I propose, if I hear no

objection, to invite the representative of Liberia to participate in the discussion in conformity with the usual practice and the relevant provisions of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure.

It was so decided.

36. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of Liberia to take the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber, on the usual understanding that he will be invited to take a place at the Council table when he addresses the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Minikon, representative of (Liberia) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

37. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Mr President, it is particularly appropriate that you, as the distinguished representative of an African country, should be in the Chair for this important debate. Your knowledge of the subject, your personal contribution to the United Nations on decolonization questions and the respect in which you are held as a result of the way you have guided the Security Council will, I am sure, all help us to find a way forward this week. My delegation approaches this debate with a determination to achieve a constructive outcome, based on understanding and co-operation—two qualities which, if I may say so, were noticeably lacking in the speech we have just listened to.

38. I hesitate to trouble the Council with another survey of my Government's policy towards Namibia. I have spoken twice in the Council on the subject, on 17 December 1974 [1812th meeting] and on 6 June last year [1829th meeting]. My delegation also explained British views more recently in its statement before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on 27 October.⁶ I believe, however, that the issue before us is so important that I should once again briefly summarize our position.

39. Members of the Security Council will know from my delegation's previous statements that we regard South Africa's occupation of Namibia as unlawful and that we believe South Africa should withdraw from the Territory as soon as possible. We believe that Namibians should be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination and independence as a single State, in the same way as the peoples of all other former dependent Territories in Africa. On a number of occasions we have condemned the practice of *apartheid* in Namibia and expressed our grave concern to the South African Government both about its maintenance and about the practice of detaining Namibians without trial. We believe that the future of Namibia should be decided by the freely expressed wishes of all its inhabitants, and that at the earliest possible moment. We further believe that every political group in Namibia, including SWAPO and all other political parties whatever the basis of their com-

position, should be allowed to campaign peacefully for their views throughout Namibia and should have full and unfettered freedom to carry out peaceful political activities. Similarly, all those who are detained should be brought to trial or else released. Only in this way will it be possible for Namibians to decide their future freely and for the world community to be convinced that they have done so.

40. I might add that, quite apart from the normal bilateral contacts between my Government and the Government of South Africa, during which we have made our point of view very clear, we have taken the opportunity to convey our views, in conjunction with the Governments of France and the United States, in two separate *démarches* of 24 April and 23 October last year. This weekend the Netherlands Ambassador to South Africa, on behalf of the countries of the European Community, of which my country is a member, made a *démarche* on the subject of Namibia [S/11945].

41. We believe, furthermore, that the Organization has a special responsibility for Namibia. I do not have to enter into detailed argument about the legality or otherwise of South Africa's presence in the Territory or about the effect of General Assembly resolutions. It is undeniable, whatever view one takes of the juridical issues, that Namibia has been the concern both of the League of Nations and then of the United Nations for over 50 years. Had Namibia become a Trust Territory after the war, like other former Mandated Territories of the League of Nations, we could reasonably have expected the Territory to have undergone the same political development that took place in Trust Territories elsewhere—and Council members will know that the Trusteeship Council's work is now, happily, almost done. The participation of the United Nations in the process of self-determination in Namibia is, therefore, both right and indispensable.

42. Against this background, I should like to review briefly the developments which have taken place inside the Territory itself since the Council last met, in June 1975. At that time, it will be recalled, the South African Government was in the process of convening a constitutional conference composed of representatives of the various ethnic groups inside the country. The conference duly met on 1 September and proceeded to adopt a Declaration of Intent [see S/11948 and Add.1]. It met again briefly between 10 and 13 November for a second phase of discussions and then went into recess after setting up four committees on education, social development, economic development and employment practices. It is our understanding that these committees are due to meet shortly and that they will prepare reports which the conference as a whole will examine when it reassembles on 2 March.

43. There has been widespread international condemnation of this conference as unrepresentative and

divisive in its intentions; the Declaration of Intent has been rejected by the United Nations Council for Namibia, and by the Assembly; there seems to be a general pessimism about the probable outcome of this conference. My own Government's view is somewhat more open-minded. We regard it as a step forward that representatives of the black and white communities in Namibia have sat down together to discuss the Territory's future. Again, we regard it as of some significance that the groups represented at the conference appear to have expressed themselves in favour of independence and, though the wording of the Declaration is obscure, in favour of a single State. It has been pointed out indeed, even by a prominent leader of white opinion inside the Territory, that the Declaration of Intent talks about drafting a constitution, not constitutions in the plural, and that it talks about the interests of the Territory in its entirety. These are perhaps some indications of the way things are moving.

44. What can be said now, however, is that the composition of the conference is inadequate. Its representation is limited to ethnic groups, and those who believe that Namibia should become a unitary State have, in fact, been excluded from the conference since they are reluctant to take part in the ethnic elections from which the conference has drawn its representation. The Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Ennals, has publicly made it clear that in our view the current talks do not constitute a process of self-determination. Some useful proposal may, however, be made at the conference, but these will need to gain the approval of the Namibian people as a whole, and that through a single electoral process conducted throughout Namibia. In calling for free countrywide elections, we do so not only because these have been a general feature in all dependent or Trust Territories in the stages before their accession to independence. We do so also because we believe sincerely that it is in Namibia's own interests to be welcomed and accepted upon independence by the whole of the international community. It is the right of the people of Namibia as a whole to decide whom they want as their future leaders. It is their right equally, as a whole, to pronounce upon the form of constitution they want. Whatever their choice may be, I am sure that the international community will accept it, provided that it has been established that this choice has been arrived at freely, fairly and openly.

45. The working paper which has been circulated informally to members of the Council goes into some detail about constitutional advance in Namibia. It will, I hope, be clear from what I have already said that we endorse the view that the United Nations should effectively exercise its supervision over the holding of a democratic electoral process throughout the whole of Namibia. Nor do we quarrel with the proposition that the Security Council needs adequate time to determine the date, timetable and modalities

for such elections. These matters need careful thought, but happily there are precedents in the arrangements made for United Nations supervision of elections or referenda held in a number of Trust Territories before they achieved independence. The high degree of United Nations supervision on those occasions reflected the common view that the inhabitants of Trust Territories were entitled to the full association of the United Nations with their electoral process, precisely because they were Territories in which this organization had a legitimate and direct concern. I believe that the same is true of Namibia.

46. But any United Nations supervision of elections in Namibia would have to address itself to a number of practical questions, which inevitably occur whenever and wherever elections are held. It would seem perfectly appropriate to my delegation that a United Nations supervisory team should be consulted by the authorities in the Territory about all such matters. From what I have already said it will therefore be clear that the United Kingdom endorses the general proposition that the electoral process should be closely monitored, and that the United Nations team should report back on the conduct of the elections.

47. I must, however, make a plea for realism in the handling of this issue. It is by no means certain that the South African Government will accept the principle of United Nations supervision. Indeed, it has been totally opposed to the idea up till now, not least because it believes or claims to believe that the United Nations is determined to impose a preconceived pattern of political development upon the Territory. It would help perhaps if members of the Council and indeed those other nations that participate in our debate were to reaffirm that this is not so. It was said time and time again last year during the course of debates in the Fourth Committee that the people must choose what is best for them, that neither the Administering Authority nor the United Nations could choose on their behalf. I believe that this is right. It is in our view both unwise and inappropriate for the United Nations to seek to play a greater part in an act of self-determination in Namibia than that which I have just outlined. Strict supervision is certainly necessary. We do not quarrel with that for one moment. But we think it would be unrealistic to demand that the South Africans should leave the Territory before any act of self-determination takes place. Some administration must remain in being. That, incidentally, is one of the reasons why we advocated contacts between South Africa and the United Nations last year and why we continue to advocate such contacts as the only way of narrowing the existing differences and bringing the authorities both in South Africa and in Namibia to accept the principle of United Nations supervision.

48. The Council faces a practical problem, and I think we must try to solve it in a practical way. Given time and patience, we may yet find a way forward

in which the demands of Namibians, both those inside and outside the Territory, the position of the South African Government and the views of this world body can be reconciled in a way which reaffirms and strengthens the principles of the Organization. My Government, for its part, will do all it can to that end.

49. The PRESIDENT: Before I call on the next speaker, I should like to inform members of the Council that I have just received a letter from the representative of South Africa containing a request that he be invited in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. I propose, if I hear no objection, to invite the representative of South Africa to participate in the discussion in conformity with the usual practice and with the relevant provisions of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure.

It was so decided.

50. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of South Africa to take the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber on the usual understanding that he will be invited to take a place at the Council table when he addresses the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Botha (South Africa) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

51. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, Mr. Valderrama. I accordingly invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

52. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*): Mr. President, it is my great pleasure, on behalf of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and on my own behalf, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January and to wish you as President all success in your work during the remaining days of your incumbency, which has been distinguished by your diplomatic skills and statesmanship.

53. I am honoured to represent the Special Committee against *Apartheid* at the discussions in the Security Council on the question of Namibia. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* values highly the close co-operation between it and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of which you, Mr. President, an eminent son of Africa, are the able and devoted leader. We in the Special Committee against *Apartheid* are sure that this co-operation will be further strengthened in the common struggle for the total eradication of colonialism, racism and *apartheid* on

the African continent. May I express to you, Mr. President, and to all the members of the Security Council the deep appreciation of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* for this opportunity to participate in the discussions on the question of Namibia and to present its views on this subject to the Council.

54. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* at its meeting on 21 January 1976 decided to participate in the discussions on the question of Namibia in the Security Council. Since the Chairman of the Special Committee, Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé of Guinea, has already left on a mission for the Committee, I have been authorized to make a statement on behalf of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*.

55. I had the honour to represent the Special Committee twice at the meetings of the United Nations Council for Namibia, in commemoration of Namibia Day in 1974 and last year. As I stated on Namibia Day 1974, the Secretary-General, addressing the eleventh session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at Mogadiscio, on 12 June, gave the following warning concerning the dangers of the situation in Namibia:

“But when fundamental rights are denied, when the advocates of orderly change are ignored or suppressed and when the avenues of political, legal and economic redress are closed, no one should be surprised if violent conflict results.”

We in the Special Committee hope that the Council will do its utmost to prevent such a dire situation coming to pass.

56. As representative of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, I have the duty to convey to you the grave concern of the Special Committee over the situation in Namibia. The special Committee, as representatives know, has been following the situation in Namibia in the discharge of its mandate to follow all aspects of the policies of *apartheid* of the racist régime of South Africa and their international repercussions, including the efforts of the régime to extend its inhuman policies beyond the borders of South Africa.

57. The Special Committee has thoroughly considered the racist policies of the Pretoria régime and decided to issue a statement on 22 January 1976 drawing the attention of Member States to the military operations launched by the Pretoria régime against the Namibian people, both in Namibia and beyond the borders of Namibia, as well as to its use of Namibia as the base for aggression against other African countries.

58. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* has stressed on a number of occasions that the *apartheid* régime of South Africa not only continues its criminal policies of racial oppression inside the country but

also constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The South African racist régime addresses open threats to neighbouring independent African States which provide facilities to SWAPO, the liberation movement which has been recognized by the international community, indeed by the United Nations, as the authentic representative of the Namibian people.

59. The Special Committee has launched an urgent appeal to all Governments and organizations to support the efforts of the United Nations and the liberation movement of Namibia. In this connexion, the Special Committee against *Apartheid* draws attention to the request made by the General Assembly to the Security Council in its resolution 3411 G (XXX) of 10 December 1975

“to consider urgently the situation in South Africa and the aggressive actions of the racist régime... with a view to adopting effective measures, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to resolve the grave situation in the area”

and, in particular, to ensure the full implementation of the arms embargo and related measures.

60. In October 1974 when the Security Council was considering the relationship of the United Nations and South Africa [see 1796th-1798th, 1800th-1804th and 1806th-1808th meetings], three permanent members of the Security Council which exercised their veto against the expulsion of South Africa assured us that they would use their influence to persuade the Pretoria régime to mend its ways. The representative of that régime told the Security Council that it would move away from racial discrimination and *apartheid* and that changes in the situation in South Africa would be made in a peaceful and orderly way.

61. Sixteen months have passed and there has been no meaningful change in the policies and actions of that régime. Instead, there has been a rapid expansion and build-up of its military forces and establishment of new military bases in Namibia. Indeed there has been an escalation of repression in South Africa and Namibia, so that South African commentators have indicated that talk of détente abroad and detentions inside are two sides of the same coin. There has been a desperate effort on the part of the racist régime in South Africa to rush the creation of bantustans both in South Africa and Namibia.

62. The offer to move away from racial discrimination and *apartheid* has meant little more than the opening of a few hotels and bars to black visitors to South Africa and to bantustan chiefs. The highly publicized abandonment of *apartheid* in Namibia has resulted in no more than the admission of a few blacks to three hotels in Windhoek.

63. However, on the essential aspects of *apartheid* —such as the creation of bantustans and the dispos-

session of the black people—the Pretoria régime has not made the slightest retreat. It is in fact proceeding ahead with greater speed and with even more brutal repression of the black majority. The period since October 1974 has seen a tremendous escalation of repression in Namibia and has now been followed by large-scale military operations which can only be described as a colonial war.

64. There is no secret about the aims of the South African racist régime, which uses all the means at its disposal, including insidious propaganda, to suppress the liberation movement of the Namibian people to convert that international Territory into a refuge of neo-colonialism and South African racism.

65. Under these circumstances, the international community cannot idly stand by while the South African racist régime ruthlessly suppresses the Namibian people and undertakes to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia and while the *apartheid* régime desperately builds up its military forces and continues illegally to occupy the Territory of Namibia and to use it as a base for intervention against independent neighbouring countries.

66. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* considers that the Security Council must take urgent and effective measures against the South African racist régime, particularly by enforcing an embargo on military supplies to end any form of military co-operation with that criminal and aggressive régime.

67. On behalf of the Special Committee, I wish to express our hope that the three permanent members of the Council which exercised their vetoes in June 1975 to prevent a decision on an arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter will reconsider their position and now facilitate adoption by the Security Council of effective measures against the South African racist régime. We are aware that the South African racist régime has amassed a large armoury of military equipment and established a sizeable arms industry with foreign assistance. That is why the Special Committee considers that an arms embargo against South Africa would be an effective measure aimed at preventing the further deterioration of the dangerous situation in southern Africa in general and in Namibia in particular.

68. The Special Committee considers further that if there is the will on the part of a few Western Powers—namely, France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy—it is possible even at this stage to defuse the grave situation in southern Africa and to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security by an effective embargo on arms and strategic commodities. The Special Committee earnestly hopes that such action will be taken in order to promote the process of bringing an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist régime of South Africa and put an end to the *apartheid* régime itself.

69. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Mauritania. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

70. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, I should like, through you, Mr. President, to thank the members of the Security Council for giving me the opportunity to participate in the Security Council debate on Namibia. Last year—more precisely, last May and June—when the Council met in accordance with its resolution 366 (1974), the Namibian people and the international community were hoping that a decision would be taken which would open up new prospects for a settlement of the Namibian problem. Such a decision was all the more expected since the question of the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia had for a long time preoccupied the Organization and was each day constituting a threat to the peace and security of the area.

71. The Security Council, which met at that time, studied the reply of the South African Government, following upon the request addressed to it in resolution 366 (1974) that

“South Africa make a solemn declaration that it will comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia and that it recognizes the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation, such declaration to be addressed to the Security Council”.

72. The reply that the South African Government then sent to the Secretary-General [S/11701] left no doubt as to the true intentions of South Africa and the role that it plans to play in Namibia. Flouting the request addressed to it by the Security Council, the South African régime, in its reply, reiterated its traditional position. Indeed, it expressed its refusal to accept that the United Nations had any right to concern itself with Namibia. The South African Minister of Foreign Affairs went even further by stating that his Government would pursue its bantustan policy to its completion.

73. It is that reply of the South African Government that the Security Council had to study in the deliberations which lasted from 30 May to 6 June 1975. The length and scope of those debates illustrate the particular interest of the United Nations and the Security Council in this question, which continues to be a source of constant concern for the international community.

74. My delegation, as a Security Council member at the time, participated in the lengthy negotiations aimed at finding a solution acceptable to all and which would take account of the many decisions of the General Assembly as well as the categorical advisory opinion

of the International Court of Justice. At the close of these very long and difficult negotiations, the non-aligned countries of the Security Council submitted a draft resolution, [S/1713]. Instead of the strict application of Chapter VII of the Charter—which in fact went without saying but which was not accepted by certain Security Council members—that draft resolution requested the implementation of certain provisions of the Charter itself, provisions which should be interpreted as calling for a military embargo and economic sanctions.

75. It should be emphasized that this proposal by the non-aligned countries, which came after many approaches had been made to the Pretoria authorities and, above all, after numerous General Assembly warnings and condemnations of the South African policy in Namibia, contained only a set of limited measures the aim of which was above all to avoid placing certain countries in a difficult position. It was thus a spirit of conciliation and compromise that the non-aligned members of the Council displayed at that time.

76. The fact that such a proposal was made after more than a quarter of a century of fruitless negotiations with South Africa demonstrates how hard the non-aligned countries sought to avoid any break with those who persisted in thinking that the time for the application of enforcement measures had not yet come. Furthermore, the measures sought by the non-aligned countries fell far short of what was expected of the Security Council, if we bear in mind the challenge proffered by the South African Government to the United Nations in the reply addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Pretoria to the Secretary-General.

77. Thus, we were deeply disappointed when this non-aligned draft resolution was rejected. We were all the more disappointed because that rejection could but encourage a policy that had been condemned for more than a quarter of a century by the entire world community, not only because it contravened the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations but, above all, because it made the domination, exploitation and humiliation of man the very basis of its philosophy. Regardless of whether some were right or wrong in feeling that the rejection of the draft resolution of the non-aligned would not harm the prestige of the United Nations and that time would work in its favour and in favour of the Namibian people this vision of the future did not, in any case, induce South Africa to change its behaviour of more than 25 years.

78. For this reason the Council's meeting today—after the many meetings that have preceded it and after the important decision taken unanimously by the Security Council on resolution 366 (1974), and especially after the meetings held in May and June of 1975—seems to be the final step in a process of negotiation which has lasted only too long.

79. In the interval between the Security Council meeting of 6 June 1975 and today's meeting, the situation in Namibia has assumed dramatic proportions, and every day the sufferings of the Namibian people are increasing. Everything is happening as if the triple veto cast in June 1975 had been interpreted by the South African Government as a diplomatic victory and an endorsement of its policies in Namibia. Such an attitude of the South African Government hardly needs comment, if one observes the geopolitical upheavals that have been occurring in southern Africa since that time.

80. The thinly veiled challenges issued at that time by South Africa have today become direct threats to security and peace in Africa. The Council's meeting today, therefore, because of the present tragedy in southern Africa to which the whole world is a witness, is of particular importance and significance. My delegation has always had the hope that the prudent attitude observed by some members of the Security Council will not constitute an endorsement and a sign of political or diplomatic support of the racist policy followed by Pretoria in Namibia.

81. The decision that the Security Council will take shortly and that will be strengthened by the support of the countries I have mentioned, will determine the attitude of the Namibian people, which has waited all too long. We must know once and for all whether the Security Council is able to carry out the sacred mission entrusted to it, or whether it is going to allow the Pretoria régime to pursue with impunity the policy of Bantustanization that it has undertaken in Namibia. We are personally convinced that the Security Council will not abdicate its responsibilities and will not allow the law of the jungle to be the only means of settling this conflict.

82. In speaking today before the Security Council, my delegation is speaking not merely in the name of African solidarity; but also and above all to defend a people that has been deprived of its most sacred rights. The Namibian people is suffering today not because it is incapable of taking up arms and defending itself, but because it believed and still believes in the noble ideals that inspired the founders of the United Nations and which are still today the reason for its existence. Such faith in the mission of the United Nations must not be disappointed.

83. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of South Africa. I accordingly invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

84. Mr. BOTHA (South Africa): Mr. President, I am deeply appreciative of this opportunity of addressing the Security Council, more especially since it falls this month under the presidency of another African country. Congratulations are your due, Sir, on this mark of distinction.

85. In a communication addressed to the Secretary-General today [S/11948 and Add.1], I dealt at some length with salient aspects of my Government's views on the question of South West Africa, and I respectfully commend that document to the attention of the Council, as it deals with the substantive issues of South West Africa in greater detail than I shall have time to do today. While it should serve to remind the Council of the incontrovertible realities of the Territory, it also outlines the most recent developments there, summarizes my Government's position, especially as expounded in recent pronouncements, and refutes many of the allegations brought against South Africa, principally at the United Nations and in this debate. It shows clearly why we believe that Security Council and other United Nations action on South West Africa has been and remains one-sided, unrealistic and contrary to the interests of the peoples of the Territory.

86. The first irrefutable fact about the Territory which it is essential to grasp if its problems are to be approached with a minimum of realism is that my Government did not in some magical way create the peoples of South West Africa, their languages, or their cultures, nor was it responsible for their history. For example, the Owanbo, Kavango and East Caprivi peoples, who comprise 60 per cent of the total population, migrated from other parts of Africa in previous centuries and settled, long before the Mandate of the United Nations came into being, in the northern part of the Territory where they live to this present day. This is not surprising, since most of the best grazing and arable land is to be found there. As a result of these historical and physical factors, therefore, different peoples exist in the Territory, not as a result of my Government's policies or of any other policy.

87. The significance of these and similar basic facts will not be lost on the Council. It is that nothing the United Nations, including, with respect, the members sitting around this table, can propose or do can alter them. It is beyond the power of man-made institutions to change the heterogeneous complexion of the population, the low rainfall and water scarcity, the vast arid areas, the low population density and so on. The formidable obstacles to economic development are a reality. I bring these facts to the attention of the Council not to obstruct but to help it, because no discussion of South West Africa or any other question can achieve meaningful results except on the basis of correct basic information about prevailing circumstances and conditions.

88. In this connexion, I wish to remind the Council of the many efforts made by my Government to ensure that full information on the Territory is available for everyone genuinely interested in acquainting himself with the conditions in South West Africa. I need only refer to the following to substantiate this statement. Thousands of pages in the record of the International

Court of Justice which contain fully documented facts on conditions in South West Africa are available: the invitation extended to the Court in 1956 to inspect South West Africa and to see whatever it wished; the active participation by the South African delegation in the General Assembly debate on South West Africa during the twenty-first session in 1966; the publication and distribution to Governments and international organizations, including the United Nations, of the *South West Africa Survey 1967* and various communications addressed by the South African Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General, in particular those of 26 September 1967, 15 February 1968, 27 March 1968 [S/8506, annex I], 30 April 1969, 26 September 1969, 30 April 1973 [S/10921, annex I] and 27 May 1975 [S/11701], which are noteworthy examples.

89. It is clear that no serious attempt has as yet been made by the United Nations fully to acquaint itself with the facts concerning the peoples of South West Africa and their conditions and standards of living. Therefore, it is not the South African Government that is defying the United Nations but the true facts and situation of South West Africa which are defying the United Nations. This is the point: it is the truth about South West Africa that is defying the Security Council.

90. One fact has clearly emerged: namely, that any information and findings favourable to South Africa are summarily rejected and ignored by the United Nations, while mere assertions are eagerly accepted, provided that they further the political objectives of the majority within the United Nations. Nevertheless, the facts concerning the high standards of development already achieved in South West Africa cannot be assailed. What is of even greater importance is that those facts belie any allegation of a threat to peace. Those facts make it clear that there exist no grounds for Security Council intervention.

91. I would emphasize that, despite a natural environment which is basically inimical to economic development, substantial progress has been achieved in the Territory in all fields of human endeavour. The results of progress are there for everybody to see. Who can doubt them? I would refer the Council to my letter to the Secretary-General today, to which I have already referred, for statistics. The South African Government asserts that these achievements compare favourably with those of any other country of the world under comparable circumstances.

92. The South African Government does not recognize and has never recognized any right on the part of the United Nations to supervise the affairs of the Territory. Moreover, the Government cannot be expected to agree to United Nations supervision of any electoral process as long as the majority of Members of the United Nations continue for their own interested purposes to conduct a virulent, malicious and completely biased campaign in regard to the Territory. Despite this hostile attitude, we have,

nevertheless, over the years repeatedly endeavoured to find an acceptable basis for negotiations with the United Nations with a view to solving the problem.

93. The record of South African efforts to co-operate with the United Nations and the inflexibility of the United Nations in return is a long one. Examples are the 1951 Principal Allied and Associated Powers proposal, the 1952 report of the United Nations Committee concerned, the 1958 Arden-Clarke Good Offices Committee, the 1962 Carpio-De Alva mission, the contentious proceedings at the International Court from 1960 to 1966 and the consultations with the Secretary-General in 1972 and 1973. All these initiatives reflect South Africa's goodwill and willingness to accept challenges and to explore possibilities of reaching a solution. On the part of the United Nations, as the record shows—and we rely on the record—they reflect absolute unwillingness to consider any positive suggestion: rejection without exploration of recommendations, expungement from the records, denunciation of signed agreements, unwillingness to accept the judgement of the world's highest judicial authority, resort to revengeful actions in an attempt to nullify the Court's Judgment. It is important that the Council should realize that it is South Africa which has every reason to be sceptical of the good faith of the United Nations and not vice versa. I urge those who have doubts about this to look at the records of the Fourth Committee in particular in relation to the initiatives I have mentioned.

94. The present course of action in the United Nations commenced in the emotional atmosphere which followed on the 1966 Judgment of the International Court of Justice,⁷ which generally went in favour of South Africa. South Africa did not appoint the Court, nor did South Africa elect the judges; the judges were elected by the United Nations. However, that Judgment constitutes the only legally binding pronouncement on the subject of South West Africa. I say respectfully: the law is not on the part of the United Nations, neither are the facts. The 1971 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, on which many States take their stand, is not only entirely untenable but is clearly and demonstrably the result of political manoeuvring instead of objective jurisprudence, and we all know that—at least if we want to speak the truth. Furthermore, the opinion was advisory and, therefore, not binding on any State. Its political acceptance by any number of States cannot make it law, no matter how oft repeated.

95. States which accept that opinion should also declare whether they accept the Court's underpinning reasoning and its inescapable implications—*inter alia*, that the powers of the General Assembly are not limited to discussion and recommendation but include the making of decisions binding even on non-consenting and non-Member States. Clearly we are all agreed that the General Assembly does not have such powers.

96. As no homogenous people exists in South West Africa, progress towards self-determination must necessarily proceed, if it is not to be imposed, along the lines of agreement between the different peoples concerned. The role of South Africa thus becomes obvious: it is to promote agreement between the peoples of the Territory without imposing a solution on them. This is the course that South Africa is pursuing, and the peoples fully realize that all options are open to them. I ask the Council: "What is wrong with this approach? What can possibly be wrong with this approach?"

97. As a result of progress achieved in all walks of life and as a result of improved relations between the different peoples of the Territory, a historic event took place in Windhoek on 1 September 1975, when a Constitutional Conference was convened at which delegates representing all the population groups met for the first time to discuss the constitutional future of the Territory.

98. The Conference at its first session produced a "Declaration of Intent" which envisages the drafting of a constitution for the Territory, if possible, within three years of September 1975, *inter alia* mindful of the interdependence of the various population groups and the interests of South West Africa in its entirety. The participants in the Conference also resolved *inter alia* "to devote ourselves to the promotion of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination merely on the basis of race, colour or creed". Four Committees set up at the second session of the Conference in November 1975 are currently considering important aspects of discrimination, economic upliftment, social upliftment and education and will report to the third session when it resumes in March 1976 or as soon as possible thereafter.

99. The achievements of the Conference in a very brief space of time deserve the commendation of the Security Council—not condemnation. I cannot think of a more constructive way in which South West Africans could decide their future. Yet there has been little positive response in the United Nations to these events which are, in the context of the realities of South West Africa, truly of historical significance. The United Nations seems to have painted itself into a corner by clinging uncompromisingly to its earlier decisions based on outdated concepts and superseded situations. The differences between the position of South Africa and the leaders of South West Africa, on the one hand, and the United Nations, on the other, are not that substantial—provided double standards are not applied and regard is had to the basic realities in the Territory.

100. South Africa respects the separate status of the Territory and stakes no claim to one inch of it; it agrees that the peoples themselves should decide their future, which they are indeed engaged in doing;

South Africa remains in the Territory only at the wish of the peoples there; all political groups may participate peacefully in the political processes in the Territory. The Conference has invited such groups to submit proposals. While the United Nations calls for the territorial integrity of the Territory—although I must say the Charter does not preclude the peoples from deciding otherwise—South Africa has declared all options to be open to the inhabitants. The delegates to the Conference, furthermore, were resolved, as I have just stated, to devote themselves to the promotion of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination merely on the basis of race, colour or creed.

101. The clear and fundamental issue in South West Africa is self-determination by the inhabitants. This not only is conceded by all of us—the leaders of South West Africa, South Africa and the United Nations—but is actually in the course of realization now in a rational and peaceful way.

102. The common border between South West Africa and Angola can be a focus of constructive co-operation or a line of division and dissension. The Calueque Dam on the Cunene River is a concrete example of one of the reciprocal interests of Angola and South West Africa. It is a symbol of the positive results that have been and can be achieved by co-operation. The dam, still under construction by workers who travel from South West Africa, is situated some 15 kilometres inside Angola and ensures a water supply to the Owambo people in the north of South West Africa. It was built as a result of an agreement negotiated with the Portuguese Government in January 1969. The water is currently being used for hospitals, industry and agriculture in Owambo and any interruption of its flow could have serious humanitarian consequences for the local black population, certainly not for South Africa, which is more than 1,000 miles away from that dam. The security situation in the vicinity of the dam, however, grew increasingly unsettled with the launching of periodic terrorist attacks and the murder of innocent persons in Owambo and the escalating unrest and chaos in Angola.

103. In April 1975 South Africa approached the Portuguese High Commissioner at Luanda with a request for help to ensure the safety of the workers at Calueque in order that they could continue with their work. Nothing came of that request. In August 1975 the workers were endangered by fighting between contending factions in Angola and did not see their way clear to continue with their work. The Portuguese authorities were again immediately informed and discussions with Portuguese emissaries took place in South Africa in order to establish which steps could be taken to protect the interests of the workers and the safety of the dam.

104. On 9 August 1975, following the flight of the workers from the dam, a small unit of South African

troops, a platoon, arrived there with the intention of holding discussions with a view to re-establishing order, so that the workers could return. However, discussions proved impossible as the platoon was fired upon. In the course of the resulting exchange of fire the South African troops occupied Calueque.

105. South Africa immediately informed the Portuguese authorities and also informed other Governments of this development. The inability of the Portuguese authorities prior to 11 November 1975 and of anyone thereafter to guarantee the security of the dam was a grave development. In the circumstances, South Africa had no alternative but to provide the necessary protection itself and did so, although this was intended as an interim measure. The Secretary-General was informed of this action in a letter dated 5 September 1975 and the Portuguese authorities were at that time requested, and they agreed, to assume responsibility for protecting the dam, which, however, they never did. Protection of the dam remained South Africa's principal preoccupation in Angola after Portugal's withdrawal and no one else was in a position to afford that protection in respect of a very important developmental project for Africans, not for whites, in the Republic of South Africa. But let me state it here clearly. To avoid any controversy in this respect and to make it easier for any Government in Angola to avoid a conflict over this matter, I propose that the Security Council should assume responsibility until such time as a Government in Angola can handle the situation satisfactorily.

106. The geographical contiguity of South West Africa and Angola necessarily imposes a concern in South West Africa for that which occurs in Angola. It is thus that South West Africa has been forced to take note of the war in Angola because of the thousands of refugees and displaced persons who have crossed the border and are still seeking to do so in ever increasing numbers. South Africa, as the Council will know from letters dated 12 September 1975 and 22 January 1976 [S/11938, *annex*], addressed by my Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General, has made a substantial contribution at a cost of \$5 million, to relieving their plight. However, the situation remains precarious from a humanitarian point of view and contains an inherent disruptive potential.

107. The plight of the refugees is of great concern to my Government and we have therefore asked the Secretary-General to request the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist in resolving this serious problem. I would request the Security Council also to do all it can to assist in this problem, the problem of the refugees, until such time as a Government in Angola can take responsibility for them.

108. My country has been attacked today in the Council for having committed aggression against Angola and for using South West Africa as a base for

intervention in other African countries. I cannot let these accusations pass unanswered. South West Africans are in fact directly affected by events in Angola. The peoples of South West Africa wish at all costs to avoid a repetition in their own country of massive foreign armed intervention. They have seen refugees, hungry, homeless, maimed and sick, streaming through their country from a war-torn and ravaged Angola and they fear that these blatant aggressors will wreck the peace that has been South West Africa's for decades.

109. We in South Africa are Africans. South Africa and South West Africa are part of continental Africa, a continent of potential greatness if its disparate elements co-operate, but, I say in the same breath, a continent of disaster if it is manipulated into dissension by outsiders. It is essential that the Council should understand, and that my African friends should understand, that South Africa's actions and reactions are predicated upon this fundamental fact of our being an African people.

110. What do representatives around this table think the reaction of the inhabitants of South West Africa is when they observe fellow Africans to the north, recently released from the bondage of colonial oppression, being crushed under the heel of the greatest imperial Power of modern times. If accusations are levelled, let us speak candidly then. Can any member of the Council tell me in all truth that it would regard with equanimity the establishment of an aggressive military presence by force of arms near its borders?

111. I ask the Council and I ask fellow Africans: What possible advantage can be derived by Africa from the establishment of Russian hegemony even in the smallest sector of Africa? The only advantage accrues to the Soviet Union itself. Why is Moscow, situated some 7,000 miles away across oceans and continents, engaged in a war of destruction in Angola? Why have Cuban troops come 7,000 miles to invest that country?

112. The Soviet Union, beginning even before 11 November 1975, has pumped between \$200 million and \$300 million worth of armaments into Angola. The 12,000 Cubans now in Angola and being transported there by Russian aircraft at the rate of 200 per day approach 15 per cent of the whole Cuban army. They are being blatantly used as infantry troops to kill, maim, humiliate and intimidate black Africans, using Russian tanks, artillery, mortar, missiles, machine-guns, bombs, landmines and soon fighters and bomber aircraft. Massive quantities of lethal Soviet arms are being used to destroy and devastate African villages, towns, roads, bridges, schools and hospitals. The economy of Angola has been dealt a severe blow; large areas are threatened by famine; thousands of Angolans have been forced from their homes and are in a state of deprivation and misery. And this the Soviet Union claims is its peculiar way of assisting an African people.

113. There was a time when we in Africa looked forward to the possibility of a peaceful transition of power in Angola. What role has the Soviet Union played to destroyed those hopes? The clue is to be found in the shiploads of Soviet armaments and equipment unloaded in Luanda.

114. Our continent has many serious problems to overcome and my Government feels that every endeavour should be made to overcome them in a climate of peace and with the mutual co-operation of all concerned. Without peace there can be no development.

115. It cannot be too strongly deplored that just at a time when the leaders of southern Africa, the leaders of the whole subcontinent, are reaching understanding in their search for peaceful solutions to their problems, at that time the Russian bear has arrived to claw a festering wound in Africa's side—a wound that can infect the whole of Africa.

116. The leaders of southern Africa have indicated their desire to work towards a peaceful solution of differences. The South African Prime Minister has made it clear that he stands for the way of peace, of sound understanding and the normalization of relations between ourselves and other countries of Africa. The South African Prime Minister, for instance, commented as follows in this regard recently, on 10 December 1975:

“As a result of the fact that South Africa has made incontrovertible progress recently, it is being much more severely attacked than possibly ever before in its history. These attacks—it appears very clearly in their motivation—have a common purpose. South Africa is being attacked because it has, particularly recently, received credit for being and wishing to be a peacemaker, and secondly because South Africa has received acknowledgement for its positive and strong anti-communist stance which is no secret. South Africa wishes to live in peace with all its neighbouring States. It has proved this over and over again in recent years.”

Referring to South Africa's immediate neighbours, the Prime Minister stated that

“it is not necessary for them to spend a single cent of their budget on defence. They do not need a defence budget because they know, in spite of all propaganda to the contrary, that they have nothing to fear from South Africa, that South Africa desires nothing that belongs to them, that South Africa does not want any land which is theirs and that South Africa is at all times willing to meet their wishes.

“This is true of all our neighbouring States and is valid also for the State of Angola, a State on which South Africa similarly has no territorial claims and where South Africa desires no sphere of influence

whatsoever for itself. Indeed, South Africa has recognized Angola as a State."

117. And, in a New Year message on 31 December 1975, my Prime Minister, dealing *inter alia* with the Angola situation, said the following:

"Our only involvement is that of the free world and the substantial interest of Owambo in the Cunene scheme—and the protection of the border, for which we are responsible—will at all times dictate our actions, regardless of the attempts to make us the scapegoat in the matter. We have recognized the State of Angola; we have committed no act of aggression or subversion; we are in favour of a political settlement and we have no claims on anything in Angola... We have established our *bona fides* and we have proved beyond all doubt that we are as good as our words. Channels of communication have been opened, bridges of understanding built and a solid foundation laid for the future."

118. The change in the Rhodesian situation from "violent confrontation and terror to hopeful talks in a much calmer atmosphere" was the result of South Africa's "peace offensive" on the African continent, Mr. Vorster said. My Prime Minister, in concert with other African leaders, has undertaken bold initiatives in an endeavour to bring together opposing groups to work out a peaceful solution to the problems of Rhodesia. South African police have been withdrawn from Rhodesia, *inter alia*, to contribute to a more amenable atmosphere in which discussions could take place between the Rhodesian political leaders.

119. In Mozambique the South African Government acted responsibly and constructively, avoiding any action which would have made the new Government's task more difficult. The South African Prime Minister has during the past year personally undertaken several journeys to black African countries in a continuing effort to reach a *modus vivendi* which can form the basis of permanent coexistence on the African continent. We have never been a colonial Power. On the contrary, one of the longest and most severe struggles against colonialist imperialism was fought by us. We neither present any threat to peace nor are we a threat to any country.

120. South Africa has not and will not attempt to prescribe to other countries what kind of Government their peoples should choose. As in the case of Mozambique and neighbouring countries, that is no concern of ours. It is the right of those people—if that is their will—to choose, for instance, a Marxist or a Communist Government. It is however a totally different matter when a foreign Power intervenes to decide who should govern a country.

121. South Africa has played a limited role in Angola in the hope that, *inter alia*, it would secure for the

Angolans the time to achieve a settlement for themselves around a conference table, or failing that an opportunity for OAU to find a political solution without outside interference. The situation in Angola must obviously exert a strong influence in South West Africa and other neighbouring countries. There is a real danger that the consequences of aggression in Angola could spill over into those countries.

122. Numerous and wild allegations have been levelled at my Government. Representatives have heard these allegations. I have also made allegations concerning Soviet and Cuban aggression, and I submit that it is for the Security Council to apprise itself forthwith of the facts. I propose that the only effective way to do so is for the Council to take the necessary steps, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to go to Angola and establish for itself who is posing a threat to peace in that area—South Africa or Soviet Russia and Cuba. My Government would welcome an on-the-spot investigation now and will lend the Council its willing co-operation in the matter. I challenge our accusers to do the same.

123. We are astonished at the lack of appreciation for the real efforts we have made to encourage and assist the constitutional development of South West Africa. The great strides which have been made in this regard, particularly in the last year, must be apparent to any objective observer. I repeat: for the first time in history, representatives of all population groups in the Territory are voluntarily co-operating to draft a constitution for South West Africa. This peaceful evolution towards independence is in glaring contradistinction to the tragic war and bloodshed in other parts of the world.

124. South Africa believes that the peaceful course of action adopted by the inhabitants of the Territory reflects the true meaning of the concept of self-determination, a concept which the United Nations seems bent on ignoring as far as the Territory is concerned. For the reaction of the Organization to the many initiatives taken by South Africa to advance the people of the Territory socially, economically and politically—which was, indeed, the task entrusted to it by the original Mandate—has been to reject out of hand these advances, and the United Nations has preferred instead to capitulate to the pressures of the supporters of a small group of militants who espouse an open and avowed policy of intimidation, violence and bloodshed against South West Africa. It is difficult to comprehend how Member States of this world body can be so eager to accept the simplistic and ill-founded arguments advanced by those who advocate violence in South West Africa and to accept without hesitation and without corroboration the allegations fabricated against my Government.

125. Despite this hostile reaction, the South African Government reiterates its offer to negotiate with a mutually acceptable personal representative of the

Secretary-General in order that he may acquaint himself with the development of the process of self-determination in the Territory. Moreover, as far as the South African Government is concerned, there would be no objection to such a representative's attending the Constitutional Conference as an observer, though this is ultimately a matter for the Conference itself to decide. This in itself would provide a measure of international observation.

126. The South African Government also reiterates its offer to discuss progress and development with leaders of Africa, the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa and the Special Committee of OAU. They would also be welcome to visit the Territory.

127. There is no legal or factual justification for the Security Council to endeavour to impose its will on the leaders of South West Africa. If the Security Council genuinely desires to achieve a peaceful solution to that question, it must have regard to the true situation which exists in the Territory and not to the narrow political ends of some of its members.

128. The South African Government expresses the hope that the Security Council would refrain from any action which may jeopardize the chances of success of the Constitutional Conference, which offers a way to achieving a peaceful future for the Territory. While serious clashes, involving violent death, starvation and misery for thousands of people occur elsewhere, while stagnation and even retrogression is prevalent in many areas, the Territory of South West Africa has a record of impressive progress, despite the formidable problems posed by its geographical and physical conformation. There is peace and progress in the Territory. Its inhabitants live in security and enjoy an improving standard of living based on modern communications and transport systems, on scientific and technical expertise and planned economic development. Its children go to schools and colleges; its inhabitants benefit from medical facilities of the highest standing; its workers enjoy increasing wages and facilities to improve their skills. The relations between the various groups have never been better. The leaders of the Territory are discussing their differences around a conference table—they are not fighting it out. Is it too much to expect the Security Council to have regard to these basic facts?

129. Finally, being an African country, South Africa is deeply aware of the problems of our continent. We realize that there is hard work ahead for all of us. But we believe that we can overcome our obstacles and differences in a spirit of co-operation based on respect for the self-determination of all our peoples—black and white.

130. We believe in Africa. We are an African nation. We believe in Africa's inherent power and potential to realize the greatness which should be that con-

continent's destiny. We believe that we in Africa can overcome our problems of economic development on condition that the developed nations live up to their responsibilities towards us, particularly by paying a fair and stable real price for imports of raw materials and semi-processed goods—in times of boom as well as recession.

131. We in South Africa appreciate that the prosperity of our neighbours is also in our interests. Their security is our security. No other country is better equipped to assist actively and directly in the development of our African subcontinent. We have the will and the desire to play our role to the full in this great adventure. South Africa looks forward to the day when the sincerity of its purpose will be accepted by all African States.

132. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): In view of the late hour, I shall not detain the Security Council members, but I must say that there has never been a falsier statement in the history of the Council than that just made by the representative of South Africa.

133. The representative of South Africa has tried to distract us from the subject we are discussing. We are discussing the subject of Namibia. We are discussing what South Africa is doing in Namibia, how it is treating the people of Namibia, how it is oppressing the people of Namibia and how it is exploiting the people of Namibia—how it is treating them as if they were not people. This is what we are discussing. What have they transformed these people into? They have transformed them into slaves—this in the middle of the twentieth century. But it will not wash; it will never wash. The Security Council will not fulfil its role unless it puts an end to these shameful practices of South Africa in Namibia. This is what we are discussing.

134. The representative of South Africa referred to the question of Angola here. Today our representative issued a statement concerning our policy in Angola [S/11947]. What is South Africa doing in Angola? Who called it there? What is it doing there? Is it to defend its interests? We know what its interests are. They are the interests of exploiters and colonizers; they are the interests of slave-owners. These are not the interests of people who are trying to help Angola to free itself from its former backwardness. The representative of South Africa states that his country's interests are limited in Angola. We know a bit about that, because it is not the first time in history that we have heard such statements. This is a base assertion. They are cowards. For this reason, they did not appear at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly. Why did they not appear there? They were afraid to appear because they would have been accused and convicted of their criminal policy. They would have been told how they are torturing the Namibian people, how they are exploiting and plundering the people of Namibia

by means of international monopolies. Do not try to divert the Security Council from its subject.

135. We have no interest in Angola. We do not need any land in Angola. We do not need its wealth. We do not need its shores. We do not need the strategic position of Angola. What we want is that the Angolan people should freely be able to determine its own destiny and future and to decide the form of life it prefers. But what does South Africa want in Angola?

136. In November South Africa sent tanks against Luanda. Were those tanks sent there for the purpose of helping the Angolan people free itself? No. The facts will refute the South African representative. South Africa tried to prevent the proclamation of the People's Government of Angola, and now he states that their goals in Angola are limited. No, you will not get away with this, sir. This time you will not get away with it. Your policy in Angola will not succeed. Our policy in Angola is honest and open. Your policy will not succeed in Angola or in Namibia.

137. The PRESIDENT: As there are no further speakers, I should like, in my capacity as representative of the UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, to make a few remarks on the statement made by the representative of South Africa.

138. I should, first and foremost, say that of course, as in the past, we will study the statement made by the South African representative, not that we have any illusions about his position or about the contents of that statement, but we normally give the necessary courtesies to all statements made, irrespective of their merits.

139. But there are preliminary observations which I think I absolutely must make at this stage of our discussion, if only to avoid certain misconceptions and certain misdirections as far as the debate is concerned. For one thing, I should like to say that the statement of the South African representative not only was disappointing but lacked anything of substance. Furthermore, perhaps in this particular case I might sympathize with the representative of South Africa, who decided to transform his speech in the Security Council into a general debate speech. I could have understood a statement of this nature being made in the General Assembly, but perhaps because South Africa did not take part in the General Assembly last year he thought this might be a suitable forum.

140. I must say that his whole statement was disappointing for a number of reasons. In the first place, when, last June, the three Western permanent members of the Security Council decided to cast a triple veto against the draft resolution sponsored by a number of delegations, including my own, a draft resolution which in our considered opinion met with the requirements of the situation, our colleagues, the Western members of the Council who cast that veto,

did so in the belief that the draft resolution went far beyond what they were prepared to accept. Above all, they were still trying to convince us, either publicly or privately, that there was a possibility for movement in South Africa's position with respect to Namibia.

141. Anyone who has followed the trends of events since last June can come to only one conclusion: there has been no movement whatsoever as far as the South African position with respect to Namibia is concerned. And perhaps it is a coincidence that the South African statement had been made only one or two hours, perhaps less than two hours, after a letter was circulated to members of the Council by the representative of the Netherlands on behalf of the European Economic Community (EEC) [S/11945].

142. Now we do not believe that the communication contained in that document and submitted to the Secretary-General by EEC went as far as we would have wanted it to go but, even if I were to take this document and compare it with the statement made by the South African representative, it would be clear that there had been no movement. The EEC countries, in their *démarche* to the South African Government contained therein, among other things, made two points: first, that the people of Namibia should be enabled to exercise their right of self-determination in deciding their constitutional future through a democratic process to be undertaken under the supervision of the United Nations. The representative of South Africa was absolutely silent in his statement before the Council even on this elementary position set forth by the EEC countries. Secondly, the communication says that there should be a release of all political prisoners and the return to Namibia of Namibians at present in exile. Again the South African representative was absolutely silent on this.

143. Now even on this moderate *démarche* made by the EEC countries in a genuine attempt to bring forth some movement with respect to Namibia the South African representative before the Council did not make any observation. Instead, he went on a long, mud-slinging exercise, not against the Africans because to the Africans in some cases mud-slinging exercises have become a customary affair; not against the United Nations as a whole because this is now an accepted fact, but against the Security Council. He considers that the Council has maintained, and is maintaining, a hostile attitude towards South Africa, and he says, in his own evaluation, that the Security Council has no justification to discuss the question of Namibia because the question of Namibia does not pose a threat to international peace and security.

144. Of course, such a statement should be treated with the contempt it deserves. But more than that, it is very depressing that, after all that has been going on, after the realization and recognition by the international community of the realities in southern Africa,

the representative of South Africa should come to the Council and treat members as if they had absolutely no knowledge of what was going on in Namibia or in southern Africa.

145. The South African representative stated passionately that the South Africans were also Africans, that they believed in Africa, and that they had a vested interest in Africa. I do not believe that there has ever been any question as to whether the South African whites had a right to be in Africa. The question has always been and will continue to be that Africans can never accept a superiority status of the whites in South Africa, and as long as there is the *apartheid* system in South Africa it is absolutely ridiculous for representatives of the Vorster régime to come before the Security Council and plead and claim on behalf of Africa's interests. Charity begins at home, and if the South Africans are so concerned and have now been converted to the belief that they should champion African interests they must start by transforming and radically changing the society in South Africa.

146. Mr. Botha also had the temerity to challenge the legality of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. I presume that very soon the South Africans will even challenge the sun and call it the moon, because they now say the United Nations is hostile, the Security Council is hostile, Africa is hostile, the world is hostile, the International Court of Justice is hostile. Who is not hostile? Perhaps the only people who are not hostile to South Africa are those who still believe in the outmoded system of *apartheid* and in the outmoded system of colonization.

147. Mr. Botha says that South Africa is not a colonial Power. What on earth are they doing in Namibia? How shall we categorize their position and their status in Namibia? In fact, with the impending liquidation of the last remnants of European colonialism in Africa, the only colonial Power that remains in Africa now is the South African Government. That is so obvious that one would have believed that even the South African representative would not have found it necessary to come here and rationalize otherwise.

148. The representative of South Africa has, I believe and dare suspect, disappointed even the Western members of the Council. I alluded initially to the *démarche* made to South Africa reported in a letter to the Secretary-General, but I should further state that Security Council resolution 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974 which was unanimously adopted—it was adopted by all the 15 members of the Council, including those members whose support is vital for the continuance of South Africa's arrogance and contempt in Africa—in its paragraph 3 demands that South Africa make a solemn declaration that it will comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice

of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia and that it recognizes the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation, such a declaration to be addressed to the Council. I do not have to say that the South African representative did not address himself to this specific declaration. He did not address himself to the specific *démarche* made by the countries of the European Economic Community. He did not address himself to any of the demands consistently and constantly made by the international community—not only by the African States, not only by the Asian States, not only by the Latin American States, not only by the socialist States, but indeed by the Western European States, and in some cases by the United States and by Canada.

149. The South African representative up to now has not been able to tell the Council that they would respect the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia. He says that all options are open. We know from what has been going on in Namibia that the process of the bantustanization of Namibia continues unchallenged. He refers with pride to the so-called historic event which took place in Windhoek, the so-called constitutional conference. As far as that historic event is concerned, I can only refer Mr. Botha to the pertinent statement made by my colleague and brother, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Mr. Kamana, who says that the constitutional conference organized by the South African authorities is a sham in which hand-picked puppets and stooges of South Africa have been portrayed as true representatives of the Namibian people, while political parties such as SWAPO are excluded. So much for the so-called constitutional conference.

150. The representative of South Africa, in his usual generous terms, referred to the efforts that are being made by his Government to try to find a settlement in Rhodesia and he said that the South African troops had been withdrawn. I do not know whether he said "troops" or "policemen", but he said they had been withdrawn. The Security Council is supposed to consider this an act of magnanimity. What in the first place were the South African troops doing in Rhodesia? Those troops were in Rhodesia in blatant contravention of the Security Council's demands, in blatant contravention of the General Assembly's position. To come to the Council and say, "We have withdrawn our troops from Rhodesia", is only to demonstrate further that everything the Security Council and the General Assembly have been saying, which he continues to claim not to be true, is actually a fact.

151. I know that the hour is late, but I must say that it has not been an easy experience for me as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to endure the statement of Mr. Botha, particularly when so much had been expected from that statement and so little, or nothing, came of it.

152. There is one final point. In the view of the delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania, the

Security Council is not discussing Angola. At any time the members of the Council should desire to discuss Angola, the Tanzanian delegation would be more than willing to make its own contribution, but for the South African representative to try to rationalize South Africa's aggression and intervention in Angola and try to give the impression that this aggression, this intervention is in any way condoned by any African in Africa is to add insult to injury. The South Africans have absolutely no business being in Angola. They have not been given any right by anybody, neither by the Organization nor by the people of Angola, to parade themselves as peacemakers in Angola. What is more, it must be stressed—and this is an important point—that the African States in the Council, long before Angola became a problem, drew the attention of the international community to the danger to the peace and security of that region, to the peace and security of Africa, to the peace and security of the world as a whole, to the continued utilization of Namibia by South Africa in order to mount acts of aggression against a sovereign and independent State. So let the question of Angola not be utilized as an excuse, as a cover-up, for the perpetual aggressive activities of the racist régime in Pretoria.

153. As the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, of course, I shall have occasion to make a longer statement and to examine further the statement made by Mr. Botha and to reply to it accordingly, but in conclusion I should like to say that the Security Council is dealing with a problem which is an international responsibility. The United Nations, since the revocation of the Mandate, has a legal, moral and political responsibility over Namibia. It is an international Territory. The South Africans have no business whatsoever to be in Namibia. The fact that we are today discussing Namibia and the modalities for ensuring the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence is solely due to the continued arrogance and recalcitrance of the South African régime in respect to United Nations decisions.

154. Furthermore, the fact that the United Nations has not been able to attain its objectives is due to the lack of the necessary political will on the part of some of our colleagues representing some of the important Western countries in the Council. But we do believe and, as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, I still cling to the hope that, as my brother from SWAPO said this morning, it is possible using the instrumentality of the Organization to try to find a less violent solution to the Namibian problem. We believe that, whether it is through peaceful negotiations or through military confrontation, the South Africans will eventually have to be evicted from Namibia. We have no doubt in our mind that the South Africans will lose in their war against the nationalist forces of Namibia led by SWAPO. But we believe that it is in the interests of the Namibian people, in the interests of the African people, in the interests of international harmony, in the interests of race relations,

in the interests of international understanding, that the international community must try once again to avoid the holocaust of a full-fledged conflagration in Namibia. I believe that the Security Council has the opportunity to try to do that.

155. I should like, as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, with all the seriousness and all the authority that I have as the representative of my Government, to appeal to our Western colleagues to understand the seriousness of the situation so that they may join with us in making this one more attempt to try and find a less violent solution. I do not use the word "peaceful", because to talk of a peaceful solution with respect to Namibia would be to indulge in an exercise of self-delusion. The South Africans are already not conducting themselves peacefully against the Namibian people. Therefore, what we are trying to do is to find a less violent method—we are trying to find a less violent solution to the Namibian problem.

156. I think the choice is before the Council. On the basis of the consultations that have been going on in the Council and on the basis of the views which have been expressed by members of the Council, I have no doubt in my mind that all the members of the Council will assume their responsibility on this question.

157. And now, in my capacity as PRESIDENT, I shall, with the consent of the Council, invite the representative of the South West Africa People's Organization speak. As there is no objection, I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

158. Mr. GAROEB: With the indulgence of the members of the Council, my delegation has asked to speak at this time to make one or two observations. The first is that when you, Mr. President, called on us to take our place at the Council table we noted that the delegation of South Africa walked out of the Council chamber. That proves the opinion they have of our humanity and of ourselves as Namibians.

159. Secondly, I should like to state here for the record of the Security Council that the people of Namibia never asked the South African Government to come and rule over us. The representative of South Africa claimed here that they are in Namibia because they have been expressly requested by the people of Namibia to be in our country. We should like it to be on record that that has never been the case. We challenge them to produce any historical documentary evidence to prove that they were ever asked by the people of Namibia to come and rule over us.

160. Thirdly, the representative of South Africa told the Council of developments in the social, educational and economic fields that have taken place in Namibia. He brilliantly juggled figures to prove what South

Africa is supposed to be doing for the people of Namibia. But I want to submit here that whatever is being done in Namibia has not been and never will be in the interests of the African people of Namibia. We claim our right before the world and the Security Council to rule ourselves, to develop ourselves or even, for that matter, to misrule ourselves.

161. Fourthly, I should like to endorse the views which have been expressed here by various representatives of the attempt by the representative of South Africa to divert attention from the question of Namibia, which is before the Council, to the Angolan situation. It is our sincere hope that the Council will not allow itself to be hijacked into dealing with matters which are absolutely irrelevant to the question before it.

162. I should like to say that SWAPO and my delegation will make a detailed statement in due course, but we felt it our duty to intervene at this time, having heard the most extraordinary play-acting by the representative of South Africa in the Council, who attempted

to hoodwink the world about the truth of the situation in our country. We shall respond in due course to the statement made by the representative of South Africa, but, on behalf of our delegation, I should like the Council to take note of the observations that I have made at this time.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.

Notes

¹ See General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967.

² *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*


³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 24A, para. 84.*

⁴ *Ibid., Thirtieth Session, Fourth Committee, 2152nd meeting, paras. 61 and 62.*

⁵ See document A/10496, annex of 12 December 1975.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Fourth Committee, 2155th meeting, paras. 9-15.*

⁷ *South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.*



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