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NOTE

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1867th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 18 December 1975, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Ivor RICHARD (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1867)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Timor: Letter dated 7 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11899)

The meeting was called to order at 12.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Timor:

Letter dated 7 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11899)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken previously [1864th meeting], I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Portugal, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia to participate in the discussion of the question before the Council without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Galvão Teles (Portugal) and Mr. Anwar Sani (Indonesia) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representatives of Malaysia and Australia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber on the usual understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Harry (Australia) and Mr. Johari (Malaysia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

The PRESIDENT: In addition, I have also 3. received letters from the representatives of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau requesting that they be invited to participate in the current discussion in the Security Council. In accordance with Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, I propose to invite them to participate in the Council's discussion without the right to vote. Since there are no objections. I invite the representatives of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, in accordance with the usual practice, to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber on the usual understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table whenever it is their wish to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Fernandes (Guinea-Bissau) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now continue its examination of the item on its agenda relating to the situation in Timor. The first speaker is the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, on whom I now call.

5. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): My delegation has already made its position very clear in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly¹ with regard to the process of decolonization of Timor. We consider the principle of selfdetermination for all colonial peoples as sacrosanct. In pursuit of that principle we have never faltered in opposing its violation by colonial Powers or by any other State which sought to impede or put an obstacle in the way of its total application. For us, that right is not negotiable. The opinion of the people of the colonial Territories is paramount, and it must be expressed without any interference from anybody.

6. In that context we were dismayed at the news of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor for we had believed that Indonesia, a prominent Asian State, an active member of the non-aligned group, one which itself emerged from the yoke of colonialism through a long and turbulent struggle, could not take measures which not only defy known principles of the Charter and of international law but also fly in the face of the very conduct that we ourselves, as nonaligned States, have consistently espoused and defended. Indeed, there is no denying the fact that the use of force against another State, and the violation of international frontiers are matters which the international community, and in particular the countries of the third world, have vigorously condemned.

7. Furthermore, on a number of occasions we all have rejected the practice of those who give themselves the rights of international policemen. It was, and it is, the firm view of my delegation that these very considerations should have restrained Indonesia from taking any unilateral measures against Timor. Furthermore, we had every reason to expect that Indonesia would not take measures which would jeopardize the rights of the preople of East Timor to decide their own future. Indeed, the assurances we had received from the representatives of Indonesia reaffirmed our belief.

8. As recently as 3 December 1975, the representative of Indonesia, Mr. Anwar Sani, declared before the Fourth Committee that "Indonesia's reaction to the desire expressed by APODETI for integration had been to emphasize that it had no territorial claim on Portuguese Timor", and that "if the people of that Territory decided freely and democratically, in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), to become independent through integration with Indonesia, Indonesia would welcome that decision".² He continued to emphasize that

"Indonesia had been born of a bloody revolution against colonialism and had always supported the struggle of peoples everywhere to eradicate that evil. With its heritage and record, it could have no reason to oppose the exercise of the same right of self-determination by other peoples still living under colonial domination."³

9. It was in the light of such assurances, and bearing in mind the considerations to which I alluded earlier, that my delegation received with dismay and sadness the news of the Indonesian invasion of Timor on 7 December 1975. By that armed intervention, Indonesia appears to have considered irrelevant that it was the people of Timor, and they alone, who must decide their right to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV).

10. And, most certainly, there could be no credible argument that by invasion Indonesia was supporting the people of Timor in getting rid of a colonial Power. This military intervention by Indonesia is certainly a matter of grave concern to my delegation, and while we neither desire nor consider it necessary to speak at length on this, we must reiterate what the General Assembly has already declared in its resolution 3485 (XXX) of 12 December 1975, to the effect that the Indonesian action was deplorable. 11. We are not unaware of the arguments made, both in the Council and outside, in an attempt to justify Indonesia's invasion. But we are not persuaded that such arguments are either morally sound or legally valid. I shall refrain from commenting in detail on the arguments I allude to, but a peripheral mention of some of them would be pertinent.

12. We were told of the burden placed on Indonesia by the influx of refugees. We certainly understand and share the Indonesian Government's legitimate concern if its country, as we have been told, was burdened by refugees. But could that burden be used as a legitimate argument for invading Timor? We believe not. Many States Members of the United Nations have been at one time or another faced with the question of refugees, which in some cases has posed very critical problems. In this connexion, I can cite my own country's experiences.

13. The United Republic of Tanzania has lived through considerable difficulties as a result of the influx of refugees from neighbouring countries because of colonial oppression-or for some other reasons. But would it have been right for the United Republic of Tanzania, or for countries of similar experience, to take matters into its own hands and restore order in those neighbouring Territories? The answer is, emphatically, no. The Charter of the United Nations does not give any one of us the role of a policeman in the neighbouring Territories. Nor does it give us the right to assume the responsibility of an administering Power when and if there is a failure on the part of the administering Power to assume its responsibility.

14. That is why I do not want to believe that Indonesia wishes to assume the role of policeman in East Timor. That is why I do not want to believe either that Indonesia wants to give itself the role of administering Power, with all the consequent obligations to provide information on the Territory, as provided for by the Charter.

15. I have followed with interest and attention the arguments made by my good friend and colleague Mr. Anwar Sani, the representative of Indonesia, when he drew the analogy of a fire breaking out in the apartment next door, and its implications. I must say that I was frankly disturbed by that argument because I kept wondering what would happen if all of the more powerful States decided to take unilateral action to restore order and peace in neighbouring countries when, in their evaluation and consideration, the situations in those areas were explosive, or potentially explosive, and detrimental to their perceived national interests. Our worries are even further reinforced when we are made to believe that, because the nature of the régime in Timor as represented by FRETILIN [Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente] was perceived as being against Indonesia's interests, intervention was considered justifiable.

16. We all know the political objectives of the political parties in Timor; we have heard their representatives speaking before the Council. I therefore need not tire representatives with that. But my delegation has been clearly disturbed by some of the information which has been put at our disposal. I have in mind, for example, the report on the visit to East Timor of the Timor Task Force for the Australian Council for Overseas Aid in October 1975. On page 5 of that report the following is stated:

"Until six months ago, harmonious relations existed between the leaders of the two main parties, FRETILIN and UDT (The Timorese Democratic Union), which between them enjoyed the support of more than 90 per cent of the population. Indeed, for a time a coalition, embodying a common programme for independence, was formed by these parties."

17. The report continues:

"By mid-August, however, the political situation in East Timor had degenerated into virtual civil war, largely because of increasing opposition to the option of independence and Jakarta's fear that a left-wing régime would emerge in Dili and in some way pose a threat to Indonesia's security, and because of deteriorating political conditions in Portugal which led to a hastily put together and poorly implemented decolonization programme. In the face of what Jakarta regarded as a dangerous shift to the left, it seems that certain Indonesian leaders advised UDT to take action against the left in East Timor. Three days after the UDT leaders returned from Jakarta, a hastily planned coup was launched. However, support for FRETILIN proved more extensive than had been anticipated. And after several weeks of bloody fighting in which more than 2.000 people appear to have perished, UDT remnants were forced to retreat to Indonesian Timor.

"From that side of the border, these troops began to launch an attack against FRETILIN, but the latter proved too good for them, both in numbers and in their fighting ability (most regular troops had gone to FRETILIN). During the past six weeks there has been clear evidence of increasing Indonesian involvement, with the last major assault being spearheaded by Indonesian troops with heavy support fire."

18. That report, which was made, as I said, in October 1975, clearly provides some disturbing information. At this stage I do not wish to go into the question of whether or not FRETILIN is a leftist organization or whether its existence would pose a danger to Indonesia. However, whether or not the belief of Jakarta is right, it is not open for any State to dictate the form of government to be adopted by a people that is to become independent. To agree to that proposal is to jeopardize all the small States whose existence has been guaranteed only by a scrupulous adherence to the principle of the Charter with regard to respect for the territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of others.

19. That is why my delegation is, guite frankly, concerned today that when we look at the events of the recent past we see a day not too far off when the rule will be for the mighty State to do what it likes. If we are not careful, we may reach a stage when intervention and arbitrary actions by more powerful States will be the law and non-intervention considered a serious departure from the new morality. My delegation cannot associate itself with such an ominous development; nor can the Security Council do so. Otherwise it will mean it is abandoning its responsibility as the major organ of the Organization to keep peace in the world. It will mean a breach of the Charter, which remains the major hope of the majority of the people in the world. We believe, therefore, that the Security Council must act decisively against this intervention as it must act against all interventions which violate the Charter and threaten peace and security, irrespective of who the perpetrators may be.

20. The General Assembly has already dealt with the part of the question which relates to the decolonization of the Territory. The Security Council must shoulder its responsibility in so far as this question relates to the instability that is developing in Timor. On 15 December [1864th meeting] we heard Mr. Horta declare before the Council the determination of his organization to continue the fight. Therefore it is necessary for the Council to act so that conditions of calm are restored. The first step in that direction is for the Indonesian Government to withdraw all its forces from Timor.

It has not been easy for my delegation to put the 21. sentiments I have expressed in these terms. We in the United Republic of Tanzania have very good relations with Indonesia. We certainly value those relations. The history of Indonesia has been an inspiration to us who had to struggle for our own independence. The prominent role Indonesia has played in the nonaligned movement has given us encouragement. Indonesia has also played an important role in the field of decolonization. Certainly we continue to regard the Indonesian people as our brothers of the third world. However, a wrong does not become right or less wrong simply because it has been committed by a brother or a friend. Indeed, for my delegation, the converse is valid. In other words, our disappointments and regrets become all the greater when friends or brothers in our own ranks take actions which when perpetrated in similar circumstances by others invariably lead us to denounce them.

22. It is the firm conviction of the Tanzanian delegation that there are cardinal principles which cannot afford selective application. Any attempt to apply double standards in their application can only be to the peril of the Organization and more particularly to the less powerful nations like my own. It is particularly important that I should underscore this point. The countries of the third world, and the nonaligned nations in particular, have played a leading role in an attempt to bring about a more just and rational international order. In the process we have all strongly advocated, and in many cases successfully managed to achieve, a more healthy development of international law. We have all stood against aggression and intervention in the affairs of others. We have rejected all pretexts purporting to justify the arbitrary unlawful actions of those who wish to undermine the independence and integrity of others. Not only is it important that we continue to defend these principles; above all, we ourselves must endeavour to live up to them. Failure to do so could put us in the same situation as in that 'of the priest in the familiar story who told his congregation to follow not what he did but rather what he preached.

23. While deploring the role of Indonesia in its intervention in East Timor, we must, with no less emphasis and concern, deplore the failure of the Government of Portugal to fulfil its responsibilities as an administering Power in Timor. We have had occasion in the past to pay a tribute to the policies pursued by the Government of Portugal in the field of decolonization in the wake of the events of 25 April, but it must be said in all candour that Portugal's role in Timor leaves a lot to be desired.

24. While Portugal still regards itself as the administering Power in Timor, and whereas the General Assembly in its resolution 3485 (XXX) has reiterated that responsibility, it is obvious that Portugal's conduct with regard to Timor gave every indication of abdication of its responsibilities. It is, therefore, our hope that the attitude and role of the Government of Portugal on the question of Timor will be more positive and responsible.

25. I believe I have spoken frankly, and if I did so it was because the people of the United Republic of Tanzania firmly believe in the principle of selfdetermination of all the colonial peoples. We in the United Republic of Tanzania are beneficiaries of the scrupulous application of that principle. We could have not done otherwise, therefore, without being untrue to the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination. We believe that the people of Timor are no less entitled to enjoy that right and we regard the intervention of Indonesia as posing a serious, if not fatal, blow to the genuine realization of that right. Thus, as a first prerequisite for the restoration of conditions which would enable the Timorese freely and peacefully to determine their destiny, there must be a total withdrawal of the Indonesian forces in Timor.

26. As for modalities for the decolonization of Timor in accordance with known United Nations principles and practices, we believe that that remains the purview of the General Assembly. At the same time, we would view with favour any decisions by the Security Council which would have the effect of accomplishing the objectives enunciated in General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX).

27. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision that the Council has just taken, has taken this morning, I invite the representative of Guinea-Bissau to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

28. Mr. FERNANDES (Guinea-Bissau): Mr. President, in the name of my delegation, allow me to say a few words to you about the way you have been conducting the work of the Security Council. I am quite sure that your vast experience as a man of law and as a member of Parliament will certainly help us in trying to find an equitable solution to this problem.

29. It is indeed an honour for my delegation to address the Council on a matter of such crucial importance. It is the view of my delegation that the decision the Council takes will transcend the immediate problem of Timor as we know it today. There is a principle here to be reaffirmed. The Council has to make it clear, and very clear, that everyone everywhere has the right to be free, has the right to choose what he wants to be and what kind of life he wants to lead.

30. Being from a very small country ourselves, we hold this principle as sacred because, in fact, our very existence might well depend upon it. I am quite sure that the Council will understand our anguish when we see this principle violated by a friendly country like Indonesia, a country which in the 1950s inspired many oppressed people of the third world and which helped many of us achieve self-determination and probably even national liberation, a country which at the height of the cold war had the courage to convene the 1955 Asian-African Conference (Bandung Conference). It is very painful to see Indonesia applying massive force to solve a problem which is primarily political. Indonesia, with its vast resources and a population of approximately 130 million people spread over an area covering thousands of kilometres on as many islands, can in no way-and I repeat, can in no way-be threatened by events taking place on one half of one island with a population of a little more than half a million.

31. Our stand should not be taken as an unfriendly act towards Indonesia. It is not. Quite the contrary, we do have a profound admiration for the friendly people of those thousand islands and we wish them success in their struggle for nationhood and economic independence. 32. My country would be perfectly happy to accept Indonesian presence in Timor if the people of that country had adopted, or were to adopt in the future, integration, federation, association or whatever. If they had adopted that, we would be happy. But the people of Timor must have that choice. Substituting one colonizer for another is hardly the way to provide a choice. Manipulation of people without experience of political parties, the massive display of force, the distortion of half-truths—these are not, in our opinion, the best way to build a nation.

33. We have heard the explanations given by the representative of Indonesia on the motivation for their intervention, but we are not convinced. Some of the fire which Indonesia is trying to extinguish was lit by Indonesia itself in order to justify its massive interference.

34. I do not have to call the attention of the Council to the fact that the fighting is still going on and that Indonesian troops are encountering widespread resistance. Indonesia is a Member of the United Nations. Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Charter of the United Nations clearly state that international conflicts should not be solved by force, that peaceful means must be used, that Member States should refrain from using force. We hope that we are not witnessing here the dismemberment of Indonesia as a nation itself.

35. This tragic situation which has cost thousands of lives was brought about by several factors: first, the poor leadership offered by Portugal, which lies at the root of this drama; secondly, the miscalculation by Indonesia of the resistance and the national sentiment of the people in Timor; and thirdly, the lack of political experience of most political parties on that island. All of these factors are responsible for the situation in Timor today. We hope that the international community, and especially and specifically the Security Council, will take the necessary steps to bring peace to that area.

36. On the basis of the principles of freedom, equality and self-determination, my Government in the early stage of the conflict recognized FRETILIN as the most representative political party on the island because it did and still does represent the aspirations of a very large segment, probably the largest segment, of the population, and because it represented the most viable alternative. However, we believe that the affairs of Timor have to be settled by the Timorese people themselves, without any kind of interference from abroad.

37. We believe that there is still time for all the parties concerned to take a fresh look at the situation and to try to find a solution which will take into account the aspirations of the people and the necessity of keeping peace in the area, of trying to save the lives of the population which has been caught in the middle of this fighting. 38. My delegation was glad to hear that all the parties concerned would welcome any kind of United Nations presence in the island. I think that the Council should accept its responsibility and see to it that that request is complied with immediately so that by the time the United Nations arrives on the island it will not be facing a fait accompli of annexation by Indonesia.

39. In conclusion, I appeal to the Council to see to it that the presence of the Red Cross is restored in the island. There are many defenceless civilians caught in the conflict, and it is our duty to come to their help. Furthermore, we should like to emphasize that we cannot accept the presence of Indonesian troops on the island. To accept that is tantamount to accepting a fait accompli, and we categorically refuse to entertain that idea. Indonesian troops must be withdrawn from the island immediately. The question then arises: what is the alternative? We hope that the Council will find ways of solving that problem in consultation with all the parties concerned. Since we are so far away from the scene of this tragedy, Guinea-Bissau does not pretend to have a ready-made solution for this problem. All we are asking is the goodwill of all the parties involved, and especially, specifically and I would say primarily, of Indonesia.

40. We are quite sure that this kind of gesture from the Council would help to enhance the image of the United Nations. In the very end, the problem of Timor has to be solved by the people of Timor, but I do believe that the Council now has a very good opportunity to make valid the principle that everyone has the right to make his own choice in Timor or anywhere in the world.

41. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Security Council has listened to the statements made by the representatives of Portugal [1864th and 1865th meetings], Indonesia [1864th meeting], Malaysia [*ibid.*], Australia [1865th meeting], the United Republic of Tanzania and Guinea-Bissau today and also to the representative of FRETILIN [1864th meeting] and others on this question.

42. The events in East Timor have recently become the focal point of the attention of broad circles of public opinion in all countries and in the United Nations. The particularities of the process of decolonization in that former Portuguese colony have led to a situation where an armed conflict has erupted on the island between those in favour of national independence for East Timor and groups which are in favour of a union of the Territory with neighbouring Indonesia. Furthermore, in conditions of domestic tension on the island there has been military intervention from the outside which has even further complicated the situation. 43. Portugal has broken diplomatic relations with Indonesia, yet both are States Members of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations obliges Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. The development of events in the area thus cannot but elicit the legitimate concern of the Security Council.

44. The Charter has given the Security Council the duty of taking all necessary measures to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. The Council should do everything necessary to see to it that the situation in that area returns to normal in every respect. To that end, the General Assembly in its resolution 3485 (XXX), on Timor, draws the attention of the Security Council, in conformity with Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Charter, to the critical situation in East Timor. In that resolution the General Assembly calls upon all States to respect the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to selfdetermination, freedom and independence and their right to determine their future political status in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Assembly also called upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw its armed forces from that Territory. The Soviet delegation supported that resolution of the General Assembly, as did the majority of the other delegations.

45. As is known, the Soviet Union was the initiator of the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the fifteenth anniversary of which was solemnly celebrated by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on 12 December.⁴ In that Declaration, among other very important provisions, it is stated that all peoples have the right to self-determination and freely to define their own political status in conditions of peace and freedom.

46. The Soviet delegation, basing itself on the fundamental position of the Soviet Union on the question of the right of the peoples of the colonial countries to self-determination, has been and is in favour of ensuring that one of the most important principles of the Declaration, namely the right of each people freely to decide its own destiny without any outside interference, is observed strictly and without reservation in this case as well. Pursuant to its fundamental position in support of the right of each people to decide its own fate without any outside intervention, the Soviet Union is opposed to outside intervention in the affairs of East Timor. We are deeply convinced that the people of East Timor should be granted normal conditions so that they may implement their inalienable right to self-determination by means of a free expression of their will.

47. As to how the people of East Timor should do that, it is their own sovereign, inalienable right to decide. The task is first of all to ensure conditions which would make it possible for them to implement this inalienable right to self-determination.

48. The Soviet delegation will support any constructive measures of the Security Council which accord with the Declaration and with General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX) on East Timor which would be aimed at restoring a normal situation in the area and ensuring peace there.

49. Mr. SAITO (Japan): After listening carefully to the statements made by the previous speakers, I should like to state the position of the Government of Japan. My delegation shares the general concern over the armed action taken in Portuguese Timor. Therefore my delegation urges that peace and _order be restored in the area as soon as possible and that foreign forces be withdrawn without delay from the area. In this connexion we hold the view that the Security Council should first of all take practical and constructive steps to help to establish conditions in Portuguese Timor that will permit the restoration of peace and order and the completion of the decolonization processes, on the basis of the right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination.

50. In this connexion we note that the Portuguese Government, as the administering Power, on 28 November 1975 sent to the Secretary-General a letter [S/11887] confirming its determination to support the decolonization process in Portuguese Timor. We note also that the Indonesian Government, one of the original members of the nonaligned group, on 10 December 1975 issued a statement saying that it had no territorial ambitions in the area and confirming the right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination. The Council should also take into account the fact that, in the absence of a responsible administration in the Territory, the armed strife between rival parties there has caused bloodshed and grievous suffering, resulting in the flight of tens of thousands of refugees to Indonesia.

51. After carefully considering these circumstances, and on the basis of the consistent position of my Government that all international disputes should be settled by peaceful means, my delegation has reached the following views with regard to a solution of this problem.

52. First, we feel it imperative that the parties concerned agree to a cease-fire as a first step and enter into talks with a view to bringing to an end the strife in the Territory and ensuring the orderly and free exercise of the right of the people there to selfdetermination.

53. Secondly, in order to expedite these developments, and taking account of the fact that the parties concerned, including both the Indonesian and the Portuguese Governments, have indicated their willingness to accept the United Nations role in this question, my delegation suggests that the Security Council may wish to ask the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to facilitate consultations among the parties concerned. And, if the need arises, the Council may also consider sending a mission to the area.

54. Thirdly, in order to create an atmosphere and conditions favourable for such measures, my delegation urges the Council to issue a strong appeal to all the parties concerned to refrain from any further action which might cause the deterioration of the situation in the area and delay completion of the process of decolonization. In conclusion, it is the earnest hope of my delegation that the Council will be able promptly to take practical and constructive steps for a solution of this problem.

55. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Portugal, on whom I now call.

56. Mr. GALVAO TELES (Portugal) (interpretation from French): While speeches are being made, while serious accusations are being levelled, and proved, while timid excuses are being presented, without convincing anyone—in a word, while time is passing, in Timor thousands of persons continue to suffer the tragedy of war, of occupation, of uncertainty about their future.

57. The facts are there for everyone to see. No one challenges them. The provisions of the Charter on this subject are clear and peremptory. No one denies that. It is now for the Security Council to take the appropriate action. It is for Portugal, as the administering Power, to do everything it can to enable the people of Portuguese Timor freely to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.

58. Surely, the Security Council will not fail strongly to condemn the aggression committed by Indonesia, just as the General Assembly condemned that aggression in its resolution 3485 (XXX). But, as we have said on more than one occasion, the main question is to find a peaceful and negotiated solution to the conflict in Portuguese Timor, a solution that will allow the process of the decolonization of that Territory to be concluded. It is with the aim of co-operating constructively in the search for a solution to the problem that I am now speaking again in the Council.

59. The Portuguese Government has repeatedly stated that it is prepared to assume its responsibilities as administering Power for Timor. Nevertheless, to the extent that external factors have prevented the Portuguese Government from carrying out those responsibilities, and in view of the fact that Timor is a Non-Self-Governing Territory in respect of which the international community therefore has special obligations, we believe that active intervention by the United Nations is necessary and justified in order to guarantee that the people of Timor will be able to exercise their right to self-determination.

60. Hence we believe that, in order to restore peace to the Territory and to ensure that the process of decolonization is concluded in the correct way, it is urgent for a special representative of the Secretary-General to go to Timor, study the situation there and propose the most appropriate measures for the restoration of peace, bearing in mind that it is only through the free exercise by the people of Timor of their right to self-determination that peace and stability can be guaranteed. Taking that into consideration, the Secretary-General will certainly act in co-operation with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

61. In that connexion I should like to remind the Council that the Portuguese Government has already officially informed the Chairman of that Committee that it is prepared to co-operate in any way it can in order to enable the Committee to carry out the task assigned to it under paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX)—that is, to send a fact-finding mission to the Territory as soon as possible.

62. The Portuguese Government is fully aware of the need to restore peace and order to Timor after the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops and to ensure the maintenance of an "effective civil authority"—to use the words of the representative of Australia [1865th meeting, para. 100]—that will make it possible to carry out the administration of the Territory until the free exercise by the people of their right to self-determination and independence.

63. That is why Portugal, while continuing to make every effort to find a peaceful solution, through talks with the political parties representing the people of Timor, is prepared to undertake to send to Portuguese Timor, and to maintain there, naval units and military forces to ensure the order and security necessary to conclude the process of decolonization; we are prepared to do that on the following conditions:

-First, Indonesian forces must be actually withdrawn from the Territory of Timor;

—Secondly, Indonesia must formally state that it will not commit any other act of aggression against Timor and that it will abstain from intervening, in any form whatsoever, in the Territory's domestic affairs;

- Thirdly, the countries of the region, and particularly Australia, must guarantee that Portugal will have the assistance and logistic facilities—including free access to ports and airports, delivery of fuel, and so forth—indispensable for it to maintain in Timor the naval units and military forces to which I have just referred.

64. Consequently, we believe that the Security Council could adopt the following plan for intervention by the United Nations and by Portugal as the administering Power, with a view to achieving a peaceful and negotiated solution to the question of Timor that would enable the people of that Territory to exercise their right to self-determination.

65. In a first stage the Secretary-General would be asked to send to Timor a special representative who not only would investigate the situation and propose appropriate measures to solve it, but also would verify the withdrawal of all the Indonesian armed forces. In the meantime, on the basis of the results obtained from that mission and the suggestions made, Portugal would deploy all efforts, under the auspices of the United Nations and in particular the Secretary-General, to ensure the convening of a conference with the parties representing the people of East Timor—a conference in which other countries of the region would participate as observers—with a view to reaching agreement on the way to carry out the administration of the Territory until the people of Timor had achieved self-determination and independence.

66. In a second stage, once the Indonesian troops had been withdrawn and the choice of the form of administration had been made, Portugal, with its troops and in strict and indispensable co-operation with the United Nations, would ensure the maintenance of peace and order in the Territory and its civil administration for the transitional period of preparation for self-determination.

67. Should the Security Council prefer that the maintenance of order be ensured by a force composed of contingents of different States—possibly with the participation of States of the region not engaged in the conflict—the Portuguese Government would be prepared to participate in such a force too, provided that it assumed command of the force.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

Notes

¹ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Fourth Committee, 2185th, 2187th and 2188th meetings. ² Ibid., 2180th meeting, para. 7,

⁴ Ibid., Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2438th meeting.

³ Ibid., para. 16.



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