



# General Assembly

Sixty-fifth session

## First Committee

9<sup>th</sup> meeting

Wednesday, 13 October 2010, 3 p.m.  
New York

*Chair:* Mr. Koterec ..... (Slovakia)

*The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.*

### Agenda items 88 to 104 (continued)

#### **Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items**

**The Chair:** As foreseen in our programme, the Committee will begin today with an exchange with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and other high-level officials on the current state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament and the role of international organizations with mandates in this field.

The panel will include the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I welcome our distinguished guests here today. I will first give them the floor to make their statements. Thereafter, we will switch to an informal mode for a better atmosphere for dialogue, and I hope there will be a fruitful exchange with delegates. After that, time permitting, we shall reconvene in formal mode and proceed to our thematic debate discussions on nuclear issues.

It is my pleasure to invite the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Sergio Duarte, to make a statement to the Committee.

**Mr. Duarte** (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs): I am very grateful for the opportunity to participate in this panel, together with my distinguished colleagues: Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), whom I warmly welcome today on his first appearance before the Committee as Director-General; Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO); Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament; and Mr. Geoffrey Shaw, Representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the United Nations.

Before proceeding, I would like to take this opportunity to thank each member of the panel, not just for participating in this event today but also for their many contributions in advancing multilateral cooperation in disarmament and non-proliferation. They are uniquely prepared to address the Committee on the broad theme of this panel: the current state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament and the role of their respective organizations.

It is perhaps fitting to begin today with a few words on what might be called the botany of international relations, to invoke Dag Hammarskjöld. Members of the Committee might recall that he used to

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refer to disarmament as a “hardy perennial” at the United Nations. When he first used that term, in 1955, that hardy perennial was already ending its first decade, because our work here to eliminate nuclear weapons and other weapons “adaptable to mass destruction” began with the adoption of the General Assembly’s first resolution, on 24 January 1946.

Less often quoted were Hammarskjöld’s remarks at the University of Chicago Law School on 1 May 1960 on the subject of the development of a constitutional framework for international cooperation. In that remarkable speech, he stressed the importance of maintaining a balance within the United Nations system between its need for a strong centre to integrate its many activities and the benefits of specialization among diverse organizations. Using another botanical analogy, he put this challenge as follows:

“it is as if we were to permit the growth of a tree to be weakened by the development of too many branches, finally sapping its strength so that it breaks down under its own weight”.

Here he was warning of two dangers: on the one hand, the risk of the disintegration of the international framework through a proliferation of organs, and, on the other hand, the risk of overloading one organization with ever-growing functions that it could handle alone. The solution he proposed was to maintain an optimum balance based on arrangements to enable the integration of activities among autonomous organizations. The challenge, he said, was to allow for the delegation of powers within this or that organization without breaking up its inner unity.

Hammarskjöld’s observations 50 years ago remain valid today. I believe he would have been pleased to see the extent to which what he called an “optimum balance” has been maintained with respect to the diverse intergovernmental organizations with significant responsibilities in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation. This balance is not static, but continually evolves and requires constant care and attention. It is, in some respects, similar to the balance that should be maintained throughout the United Nations disarmament machinery between the specific national interests of Member States and the common interests of the international community.

This is of course not the first time that this issue of balancing priorities has come to the attention of those who work to advance multilateral disarmament.

On 24 September, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon opened the High-level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations. On that occasion, he stated:

“Disarmament and non-proliferation are essential across the board, not simply for international peace and security. They can foster confidence among nations and strengthen regional and international stability. They are critical in realizing our common vision of a better world for all.”

This theme, which underscores that the genuine benefits of disarmament and non-proliferation are too important to postpone, set the tone for several additional statements by delegations participating in that event.

Despite its many difficulties, past and present, the Conference on Disarmament remains a unique arena with the capacity to ensure the advancement of national policy interests through the pursuit of multilateral cooperation for the benefit of all. The more deeply this understanding is shared within the Conference on Disarmament, the greater will be its potential contributions in the negotiation of future multilateral disarmament agreements.

Such cooperation, however, does not involve only States; it also involves the dedicated work of a network of autonomous organizations that have mandates to promote specific disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.

For its part, my own Office, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), has maintained close relations with all the organizations represented on the panel today. As in previous years, we have continued to work in partnership with both the IAEA and the OPCW in organizing workshops to assist States, upon their request, in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Our activities this year included capacity-building workshops hosted by Kenya, Croatia and Viet Nam, which focused, respectively, on biosecurity and issues relating to export and border controls.

In terms of future events, I am pleased to report that a meeting of international, regional and subregional organizations on cooperation in promoting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), hosted

by the Government of Austria and organized in cooperation with UNODA, will be held on 15 and 16 December in Vienna.

I have every reason to believe that the long and productive working relationship between UNODA and the IAEA will continue in the years ahead, with respect to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. I expect that the Agency will continue to demonstrate its significant potential for contributing to the achievement of global nuclear disarmament, especially through its capabilities to independently verify the peaceful uses of material recovered from dismantled warheads. Such work will be essential not only in verifying compliance with disarmament commitments but also in helping to ensure the irreversibility of those commitments — two key multilateral disarmament standards.

My Office is also cooperating with the OPCW in many areas, including the prevention of chemical terrorism. The Organization is part of the Secretary-General's Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and it co-chairs, with the IAEA, the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks. We also have a mandate to cooperate in alleged-use investigations in cases of possible chemical weapons attacks in a State outside the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) or on a territory not controlled by a CWC State party. The OPCW just invited UNODA to participate in exercises in Tunisia and Poland relating to responses to chemical-agent releases, and to attend a conference in Algeria on counter-terrorism. I will also be honoured to represent the Secretary-General at the annual Conference of the States Parties to the CWC in November this year.

I would also like to note that the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) contains a request for both the OPCW and the IAEA to prepare for the 2012 Conference background documentation relating to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

UNODA also works closely with the CTBTO. This cooperation has been especially active this year, involving our UNODA staff in New York as well as in our three regional centres. I was pleased to participate in the 4 May opening ceremony of the CTBTO exhibition

at the United Nations on the theme "Putting an end to nuclear explosions", during the NPT Review Conference. We also worked together in organizing numerous events for the occasion of the 29 August International Day against Nuclear Tests, which was observed in early September due to scheduling difficulties. Among other activities, the United Nations hosted a CTBTO exhibition on nuclear tests and participated in a joint panel discussion on 8 September. On 9 September, the General Assembly held an informal meeting to mark the observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests. Later, on 23 September, again at the United Nations, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon opened the fifth Ministerial Meeting in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to promote its entry into force.

Together, the various activities I have just mentioned illustrate the productive balance among the intergovernmental organizations represented on the panel today. For brevity's sake, I have not mentioned countless other examples of cooperation with regional and subregional organizations and with non-governmental groups, which, together, are helping to give disarmament efforts more momentum while strengthening that elusive quality we know as political will. Delegations interested in obtaining further details on this cooperation can obtain that information at the UNODA website.

All of the cooperation that I have just summarized is carried out with a rational division of labour that balances general and specific interests. This approach will surely be needed in the years ahead, because the challenges of eliminating weapons of mass destruction and regulating conventional armaments are certainly among the most complex on the international peace and security agenda. They are complex politically, technologically and organizationally, and these challenges will be met only through a combination of enlightened national leadership, extensive multilateral cooperation among Member States and persistent advocacy, support and understanding from civil society.

In conclusion, I would like to recall the words of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who visited the United Nations only yesterday for the unveiling of his portrait in this very building. Though he had much to say in office about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the need for greater restraints on conventional arms, his remarks upon receiving his

Nobel Peace Prize remain especially appropriate today. On that occasion, he said:

“Beneath the surface of States and nations, ideas and language, lies the fate of individual human beings in need. Answering their needs will be the mission of the United Nations in the century to come.”

As we continue our deliberations in the Committee, and as work proceeds in intergovernmental organizations in these fields, let us never forget that the real beneficiaries of disarmament — and the real victims of the failure to achieve it — are human beings. The business of disarmament is not just a vocation for diplomats; it is very much the business of the peoples of the United Nations.

**The Chair:** I thank High Representative Duarte for his statement and for starting today’s panel discussion.

I now give the floor to the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Mr. Ahmet Üzümcü, to make a statement.

**Mr. Üzümcü** (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons): We are witnessing a time of renewed hope, we believe, in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Both the expectations and the resolve of the international community to seize this opportunity were underlined at the high-level meeting held at the United Nations in September. The First Committee has an important role to play in guiding our common aspirations towards productive outcomes.

I represent an organization that was born over a decade ago in a similar environment, representing unity of purpose on issues of international peace and security. At that juncture, the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and its entry into force in 1997, signified major milestones in progress towards a world free from weapons of mass destruction.

Today it gives me great pleasure to address this important forum for this first time since taking over as Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to apprise Member States about the progress we have made towards realizing the aims and objectives of the Convention and its future potential, as well as challenges.

In terms of disarmament — to which the OPCW currently devotes 85 per cent of its inspection efforts — over 62 per cent of the total declared stockpiles of chemical weapons have already been verifiably destroyed. Three of the six declared possessor States — Albania, a State party and India — have completed the elimination of their stockpiles.

Two possessor States — namely, the Russian Federation and the United States of America — shoulder the major burden of responsibility, given the massive size of their respective stockpiles. Despite the daunting technical, financial and safety challenges, they have made, to their credit, steady progress towards fulfilling their disarmament obligations under the Convention. To date, the Russian Federation has destroyed over 19,000 metric tons of chemical warfare agents, which represents 50 per cent of its chemical weapons stockpiles. For its part, the United States has destroyed more than 22,000 metric tons of chemical warfare agents, or 80 per cent of its stockpiles. In spite of their commitment to the Convention, which deserves appreciation, these two countries have indicated that they will not be able to meet the final destruction deadline of April 2012, as set under the Convention.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Iraq continue to work cooperatively with the OPCW with a view to the expeditious destruction of chemical weapons in their possession, or on their territory, as in the case of Iraq, which has declared a quantity of chemical weapons that were secured and rendered unusable.

As we approach the completion of the destruction of declared arsenals of chemical weapons, the OPCW will be expected to progressively concentrate a greater percentage of its resources on the non-proliferation dimension of its work. That entails attention to a number of areas.

First, a crucial element in the Convention’s non-proliferation regime concerns its effective domestic implementation. That requires that all States parties establish and reinforce the administrative and legislative measures necessary to prevent and redress any breach of the Convention by their nationals and in any area under their jurisdiction or control.

We carry out an intensive programme of technical assistance through visits to capitals, and we routinely support Governments and parliaments in the preparation of comprehensive legislation and provide guidance on administrative measures. Our effort is

greatly facilitated by voluntary financial contributions received from individual Member States, with the European Union and others providing a significant share of those funds.

Compared to those of other relevant disarmament instruments, member States of the OPCW have performed better in implementing their CWC obligations. Some 96 per cent of our members have designated or established a national authority, and almost 50 per cent of the States parties have enacted legislation covering all key areas of the Convention. Yet, as is obvious, there is still a need for half our membership to make further progress on implementation. The relevance of such measures for counter-terrorism purposes is also self-evident.

Secondly, the OPCW will need to continue refining the number and intensity of industry inspections and taking them to an adequate level, so as to ensure that all categories of relevant facilities are adequately covered by its verification regime, including what are referred to as other chemical production facilities. A well-functioning inspection regime covering the global chemical industry serves the Convention's non-proliferation goals. Since the CWC entered into force, in 1997, over 1,900 inspections have been carried out at industrial sites on the territory of 81 States parties. As a major stakeholder, the global chemical industry has, through its constructive attitude and cooperation, contributed significantly to the success of the industry verification regime.

Thirdly, the surveillance of transfers and trade in chemicals will need to be made more rigorous. All States parties should have the ability to fully monitor the import and export of chemicals of concern by enhancing the knowledge and skills of their relevant governmental authorities, especially customs authorities. The OPCW conducts regular training programmes for customs officials in our States parties, which we expect to further augment. Our cooperation with the World Customs Organization on such activities has been fruitful.

In the context of terrorism, as the High Representative just mentioned, the OPCW participates in activities organized to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Our own activities are guided by the OPCW Working

Group on Terrorism and cover subjects of high importance, such as the safety of chemical plants and tabletop exercises designed to test preparedness in the case of chemical weapons being used by terrorists.

Apart from its core obligations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, the CWC also establishes, for all its States parties, the right to seek assistance and protection against chemical weapons. With heightened concerns about the possible use of chemical weapons in terrorist attacks, there is growing interest among our members in increasing their national capacities for emergency response and consequence mitigation.

A major exercise on the delivery of assistance is taking place this very week, with the cooperation of Tunisia, the host country. This exercise, known as ASSISTEX 3, will have over 400 participants and observers from our States parties and international organizations, including the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

International cooperation in the promotion of the peaceful uses of chemistry is a matter of particular significance to OPCW members that are developing countries or with economies in transition. The organization has been quite successful in providing a large number of well-targeted programmes that aim to build national and regional capacities in the area of the peaceful uses of chemistry. The OPCW envisages the organization of a special event in 2011 on international cooperation and chemical safety and security, on the occasion of the International Year of Chemistry.

The near universal support that the CWC has received is evident from its membership, which currently stands at 188. That means that only seven Members of the United Nations remain outside the Convention.

Universality is indispensable to the success of the Convention. Only thus can there be an assurance that all countries of the world have legally accepted the prohibition of chemical weapons. Given the inhumane nature of chemical weapons and the fact that they are no longer regarded as holding much military value, the CWC should be accepted by all nations as a moral imperative. Acceptance of the Convention can also serve as an important confidence-building measure, especially in the region of the Middle East.

The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) decided to convene a conference in 2012 on the Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The Final Document of the Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) envisages the contribution of international organizations such as the OPCW in terms of sharing their experience and lessons learned. Given the importance of this initiative to regional peace in the Middle East, the OPCW looks forward to participating in and contributing to this endeavour.

I have provided a brief overview of both our progress and the tasks ahead of us. Every year the General Assembly adopts, traditionally by consensus, a resolution on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is sponsored by Poland. That resolution manifests the strong support that we receive from the United Nations, which is a matter of great satisfaction.

Allow me to conclude by saying that as the international community looks forward to opening a new chapter in disarmament and non-proliferation, it can draw lessons, and indeed confidence, from the achievements already made, as epitomized in the success of the CWC.

The culture of adherence to multilateralism and consensus-building through constructive engagement has led to the emergence of a concrete example of success of a multilateral disarmament regime. The same spirit can lead to yet greater achievements and progress towards realizing the United Nations Charter's vision of a peaceful and secure world.

**The Chair:** I thank the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for his statement and his contribution to our discussion.

I now give the floor to Mr. Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

**Mr. Tóth** (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization): I have a neat, very well-structured and cogent prepared statement. However, I will not read it out, as it is very difficult for me to compete with representatives who might be concerned about their draft resolutions, either as main sponsors or in seeking co-sponsors, or reporting about what is going on in the

First Committee. I will try to steal your attention and would like to focus on two or three issues. So, my request is that representatives drop, for the moment, the lists of sponsors and try to focus on what I am trying to share with them.

I think this is a good moment to step back. This is the last appearance of heads or senior officials of organizations representing regimes that are operationalizing the manual we all have before us. This is probably the last moment in this decade for us to take a step back and look back with a view to understanding, based on the past 10 to 15 years, where we are trying to move in the next. In a way, this could be a continuation of the meeting of 24 September, when ministers looked back over the past 15 years of the Conference on Disarmament. Many of the same representatives were there and understand the results that emerged over the past 15 years.

As for the regimes and organizations represented here, I think the situation could be described as a work in progress. There are different levels of success, but efforts are ongoing on the part of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. As reported, two thirds of stocks have been destroyed and the norms are in place. And I am sure the International Atomic Energy Agency, too, will report on the additional progress that has been made over the past 15 years.

With regard to achievements over the past 15 years in connection with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, under this work-in-progress notion, I can share the following with the Committee.

First, the Treaty is not in force. We are nine ratifications away from entering into force. At the same time, we have managed to gather 80 per cent of the countries represented in the United Nations, subscribing to the norm with their ratification. From the short list of 44 countries, this percentage is the same: 80 per cent support for this norm. And as for the build-up of the verification system, we have 80 per cent readiness there as well. The system was tested twice, in two unfortunate instances in 2006 and 2009.

One might ask, Which picture reflects reality — the Conference on Disarmament or the work in progress? For me, they are two options for the future. I think both represent reality: a lack of progress on further codification and work in progress on the implementation side. It is very much up to us to decide

which way we will go in the next 10 to 15 years, but it is not clear at all at this stage.

The multilateral button was reset, to use a figure of speech, at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May this year. One might wonder how many times the button can be reset in the future. Can we reset again in five or 10 years, or do we have to pay more attention to carrying out the goals that we are setting?

Let me refer to the relevance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Treaty in trying to visualize the decade ahead of us, which, hopefully, will be characterized by progress. Let me emphasize that we need three ingredients for the period ahead of us: action, action and action. In that respect, looking back over the past 15 years of the Test-Ban Treaty, and taking as a historical reference the period from 1993 to 1996, we see that, yes, it is possible to negotiate a treaty in record time of less than three years; yes, it is possible to negotiate a treaty with the involvement of nuclear-weapon States; yes, it is possible to implement a treaty with the involvement of more than 180 countries and with the involvement of the nuclear-weapon States; and, yes, it is possible to create a democratic system of verification.

Let me repeat again what I see as the defining characteristic of the monitoring system that we are creating: it is all-inclusive. It is near-real-time sharing of verification information with everyone. So, what we see is what we get. It is a new standard of verification. I would say that this is multilateralism at its best, at a moment when many might question whether big forums can work and whether big treaties can function. It is a legal arrangement with equal basic verification obligations, and it is a system whereby verification data is gathered as a result of an unprecedented joint venture by 90 countries. Data-gathering is all-inclusive, data processing is all-inclusive and distribution of data products is all-inclusive.

So, yes, multilateralism can work, not just at five countries, not just at eight, not just at 20, not just at 40 or more, but at 182 countries. I think we have to take away from this the inspiration that negotiations are possible, implementation is possible and a regime and verification system that are all-inclusive and democratic are possible.

Let me say a few words about the nexus between this Treaty and the nuclear-weapon States. It is important to conceptualize this Treaty with the strong involvement of the nuclear-weapon States. Why do I emphasize this point?

In this post-New START agreement period, I think it is extremely important to see that, yes, a treaty can be negotiated with the nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the NPT but going beyond that. Yes, those countries are signing up to the norm; by now all but two of those nuclear-weapon States are on board with their ratifications. Yes, the nuclear-weapon States are sharing the same obligations as others, and yes, on the verification side — probably for the first time in the history of multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation — they are undertaking the same verification obligations. It is important to have as an inspiration for ourselves and for the nuclear-weapon States themselves that it is doable and it works.

I would like to bring up for consideration the issue of capacities. The last 10 to 15 years were characterized by an exodus of experts on nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. There may be many explanations for that, but it is a fact. A look at the nuclear industry shows that there are plans for the next 20, 30 and 40 years, plans for Generation 4 reactors. I think it is time for this community — represented here in this room — to think about the next generation of experts.

Let me cite just one number that represents the contradiction between the present exodus of arms control and disarmament experts and how totally different this situation looks in other areas. In a workshop a year and a half ago, I learned from one of the producers of nuclear reactors that in only two years, 2007 and 2008, they had added an additional 25,000 people to handle the challenges of what is perceived as a nuclear renaissance. I wonder how many people in those same two years have disappeared from this constituency.

There is a need to stop this exodus, and to reverse it. There is a need to train the next generation of people who will have to take care of all the challenges in front of us. On this subject I would like to highlight something that I flagged last year.

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is launching a trial test of a Web-streamed training

course. This Web-streamed training course is intended to reach out without geographic borders, through virtual outreach to any and every country, and to reach out not just geographically but numerically as well. We want to train not just the 30 or 40 people whom we could pack in a room, but to train 300 people, possibly many hundreds of people. This trial will run for a week starting next week. I would like everyone in this room to go to our website and take a look at it. We would like countries, institutions and individuals to share in this joint venture. I would like to encourage countries and organizations to join in. It should be an open-source arrangement for the future, with the purpose of putting in place Generation 4 disarmament experts.

The jury is out about the period before us. I will repeat that we should be inspired by the achievements of the past 10 to 15 years. I think that the way our collective future will be shaped will be defined by benchmarks that show the extent to which countries embrace or do not embrace multilateralism. Unlike benchmarks such as the outcome of trade talks or environmental talks, the benchmark will be to what degree is the safe, secure and safeguarded use of nuclear energy underpinned by right actions taken not just by the Organization, but by all its Member States.

**The Chair:** I thank Mr. Tóth for his contribution. I did notice a decrease in the circulation of sponsorship lists.

At this point I have the pleasure of calling on someone I am sure we are all eager to hear, Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament.

**Mr. Ordzhonikidze** (Conference on Disarmament): I would like to start by saying that we do have a serious problem with multilateral strategic disarmament. We have seen progress in the areas of small arms and light weapons and landmines, which is very good. But when it comes to strategic disarmament, it looks like we have made no progress since the end of the Cold War.

In the Cold War we had a world full of fear. For that reason, people, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and even Governments wanted to have some disarmament because they were afraid of being annihilated. In today's world, at least in the Euro-Atlantic area, we do not think in terms of nuclear war. In other parts of the world, things happen differently, but maybe that is the main reason why we are so calm. Governments, media and NGOs are so

calm it is unbelievable, as though arms control and disarmament — multilateral, first of all — are not huge problems.

However, worldwide, military expenditures are a continuously growing part of national budgets. At the moment, they are \$1.5 trillion, and the number is growing every year. But there are thousands of people with nice pay and good positions that they do not want to lose. They are “in arms”. I will tell the Committee openly that “arms” is the second most lucrative legal business in the world, after the pharmaceutical business.

We are sitting here and in other rooms — whether it is at the Conference on Disarmament or other bodies — and we are unable to break the 15-year-old, or maybe even 20-year-old, deadlock. Why? The answer is that there are certain deficiencies and problems. I would say that for some regions the main problem is a geopolitical one, but for the Euro-Atlantic region, I do not see a huge geopolitical problem. Rather, the problem is more of a technical nature, more of a regional nature. But every problem in the world eventually — whether it is in the Asian, African or Euro-Atlantic region — is connected, so we cannot just artificially break them and see what is going to happen.

What is happening is that the Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole multilateral body that is responsible for drafting treaties, is not active. That is not big news for anybody. But why is it not active? What are the problems with disarmament in general and in the Conference on Disarmament in particular?

The first problem is the method of decision-making. We expect too much from consensus at the Conference on Disarmament and at other bodies. I understand that the Security Council has its rules and that by changing anything there would be a destruction of all balance of powers there. But the Conference on Disarmament was formed during the Cold War period, when consensus was important for keeping the balance between the super-Powers. The question today regarding consensus is whether it is helping the Conference or not. We have to decide about that if we want to move forward — whether we want consensus on all issues, or consensus on substantive issues and no consensus on issues of a procedural nature. We have to take decisions on these issues.

For these reasons, there has been a lack of progress in the multilateral strategic disarmament



process, and the Secretary-General decided to convene the High-level Meeting in New York on 24 September entitled “Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations”. The important thing is that the General Committee decided to include this item in its agenda.

So now it is up to the Member States to take a decision. Where do they want to go and how do they want to get there? What the Secretary-General is responsible for, he has already done. Many Foreign Ministers and other high-level officials participated in the 24 September Meeting. They shared the Secretary-General’s concern about the continued stalemate in the multilateral disarmament process and called for greater flexibility in order to allow the Conference to resume substantive work, particularly negotiations.

It became self-evident that the stalemate at the Conference is not a problem only for the 65 member States of the Conference. It is also a serious concern for the entire United Nations membership and the greater international community.

The Conference is still trying very hard to adopt its programme of work. It is becoming like a comedian’s routine; it has not been able to adopt a programme of work for 15 years. If somebody wants to make fun of the United Nations and its bodies, the Conference on Disarmament is a good target. It is a very good example for the media to make fun of.

As I have previously mentioned, the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament were elaborated during the Cold War. Now is a good time to take a good look at whether, since the world has changed, the rules of procedure and everything else should change. I know we have made a lot of changes, even in the Security Council. We have made a lot of changes in the General Assembly. But not a single change has been made in the Conference on Disarmament. That is why there is a renewed deadlock over its programme of work.

The tyranny of consensus — I can only call it that, for it is a tyranny — is still hampering the Conference on Disarmament. Now it is up to the States and the General Assembly to take a decision on what to do. Do we want disarmament or do we want consensus? Or do we want a little bit of disarmament and a little bit of consensus? Or nothing in disarmament and nothing as to consensus? Member

States must take a decision. We propose a number of ideas. But finally, it is up to you, the Member States, to take those decisions.

I see that my people have helped me a lot — they wrote quite a long statement. I will conclude now.

We have an agenda and a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament. The obvious issue of the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is ready for negotiations. Why the FMCT? If we want to discuss non-proliferation, disarmament, nuclear disarmament and nuclear-weapon-free zones — we cannot talk about anything nuclear without having a serious fissile material cut-off treaty. Of course there are other issues in the Conference’s programme of work that need to be discussed and developed — the prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and issues of nuclear disarmament in general.

This is in stark contrast to what we have at the Conference on Disarmament, as compared with bilateral disarmament. I thought that bilateral disarmament — which is very important from the point of view of lowering the military threat — could influence some situations in the world. I thought that the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington — which was very successful — could help. I thought that the meeting of the Security Council dealing with nuclear disarmament would help. But nothing has helped as of the moment. That means that at this session, either Member States will have to agree to a resolution that will break the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, or the Conference will become completely irrelevant.

There are many other options. One could take some item from the Conference on Disarmament and bring it to the First Committee. I see some pluses and minuses in that. A plus is that most States would probably agree and have a treaty. However, States that object to a treaty in the Conference will continue to object. So we will have the coalition of the willing, and still we will have some States that are not members of the treaty.

I have thought about the way forward. Considering all these circumstances, I wish to offer some suggestions that I believe would help the Conference resume its substantive work.

First, consider a more flexible application of the rules of procedure. I am not speaking about getting rid

of consensus. In particular, the Conference should stop applying the consensus rule to procedural matters, including the adoption of its programme of work. This is the only way forward.

Secondly, consider the suggestion made by the Secretary-General at the High-level Meeting, that at its first meeting of the 2011 session the Conference should adopt a programme of work based on its 2009 programme. Using all my powers of logic, I cannot understand how any organ of the United Nations adopted a programme of work in 2009 yet in 2010 the exact same programme — 100 per cent the same — would be rejected. There may be something wrong with the logic, and I am sorry to say that to the Member States.

Thirdly, if opposition to the Secretary-General's suggestion persists, the Conference should consider starting substantive work, including negotiations, at plenary meetings without formally adopting a programme of work or taking a formal decision to adopt a negotiating mandate. I remember my time during the Cold War period when we had the same approach in the Conference. At that time, the Conference was for speeches, but at the same time we negotiated substantive ideas for this or another treaty, and thus we moved forward. That was the only way to move forward.

I would also suggest that Conference members embark on informal preparatory work on the sidelines of the Conference and bring their outcomes to the Conference for consideration on a regular basis. When sufficient progress is made through such preparatory work, a member or group of members should present a draft treaty at the plenary meeting. Thereafter, the Conference must begin negotiations on the basis of a draft treaty at its plenary meeting.

If the Conference takes up one of these suggestions, I believe that it would be able to undo the deadlock and begin substantive work next year. Then the Conference on Disarmament would restore international confidence and live up to international expectations. There would be no need to consider a parallel process or reform of the Conference.

Finally, as the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, I will do all that I can to assist its members in beginning substantive work in 2011. Let us turn over a new leaf next year.

**The Chair:** I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament for his statement.

I now invite the representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Geoffrey Shaw, to make a statement.

**Mr. Shaw** (International Atomic Energy Agency): The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the safe and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Agency also has a role to play in verifying nuclear disarmament. I would like to provide members with a brief overview of the Agency's activities in these areas, given their relevance to the work of the First Committee.

Most countries around the world use nuclear technologies for a wide variety of peaceful purposes, including diagnosing and treating diseases such as cancer, in numerous industrial applications and to improve agricultural production and food preservation, to name just a few. Furthermore, some 30 countries currently use nuclear power to generate electricity, and more than 60 countries, mostly in the developing world, have informed the Agency of their interest in launching nuclear power programmes. It is expected that between 10 and 25 countries will bring their first nuclear power plants online by 2030.

At the same time, the world faces increasing risks of nuclear proliferation, and the threat of a terrorist accessing nuclear or radiological material cannot be discounted. It is therefore imperative that any expansion in the use of nuclear energy be done in a way that is safe and secure and that does not contribute to proliferation. IAEA verification seeks to ensure that nuclear materials and nuclear technologies under safeguards remain exclusively in peaceful use and are not misused for military purposes.

Therefore, what is the current state of play of the safeguards system? The Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) recognized that Agency safeguards were a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference reaffirmed that comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III of the Treaty provided for verification by the IAEA of both the correctness and completeness of a non-nuclear-weapon State's declaration. In other words, the Agency is to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of

nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

But how can the Agency do this? Although the Agency has the authority under a comprehensive safeguards agreement to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State, the tools available to it under such an agreement are limited. The additional protocol equips the Agency with important supplementary tools that provide broader access to information and locations, measures which significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

However, at this time, the Agency's legal authority for verification is not universal. Eighteen non-nuclear-weapon States parties have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement, as required under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For those States the Agency cannot draw any safeguards conclusions, and therefore cannot provide any assurance that nuclear materials and activities in those States remain exclusively peaceful. For States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement but without an additional protocol, the Agency can provide assurances that declared nuclear material remains in peaceful use only.

I would now like to turn to nuclear disarmament. Credible verification is vital to nuclear disarmament. With its knowledge and experience, the IAEA can facilitate disarmament by independently verifying that nuclear materials from dismantled weapons are never again used for military purposes. In this regard, as I reported last week, the Agency recently received a joint letter from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State, requesting IAEA assistance to verify the implementation of their agreement on the disposition of plutonium no longer required for defence purposes.

The Agency can also assist in the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones when requested. The existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties recognize the verification role of the IAEA through the implementation of Agency safeguards. The IAEA has been asked to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards in the Middle East to support the efforts by States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

Finally, let me turn to nuclear security. While responsibility for nuclear security rests with each State, the Agency's nuclear security programme assists States to develop a sustainable nuclear security capacity. Great progress has been made in securing nuclear and radioactive materials. That has helped States to counter the risk of nuclear terrorism, which remains a threat to international security.

But nuclear security still needs to be strengthened further globally. On average, the Agency receives a report every two days of a new incident involving improper use of nuclear or radioactive material — things like theft or smuggling. Just in the past week there have been media reports of the seizure by authorities of nuclear materials illicitly held by criminals.

Adherence to the relevant international legal instruments on nuclear security has increased gradually. However, while it is five years since the adoption of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), progress towards entry into force remains slow. Global nuclear security needs a strong CPPNM, and parties to the Convention are encouraged to work to accelerate the entry into force of the Amendment.

The Agency helped to protect against possible attacks with nuclear or radiological materials at the World Cup in South Africa this year, as it did at the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008. After the tragic earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, the Agency helped to verify that no nuclear or radioactive material had gone missing. The IAEA has supplied some 3,000 nuclear detection instruments to approximately 50 countries and, since 2002, has trained over 9,000 people in 120 countries on all aspects of nuclear security, ranging from physical protection at facilities to radiation detection and response.

The IAEA will continue to assist States, upon request, to prevent nuclear terrorism through the provision of practical support, in terms of guidance, training and equipment. This assistance also helps States to meet the requirements pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Let me conclude where I started. The IAEA, through its verification activities and nuclear security programme, is making a positive contribution to ensuring the safe and secure use of nuclear technology

and is assisting efforts towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

**The Chair:** I thank Mr. Shaw for his statement.

It is my intention now to provide the Committee with the opportunity to have an interactive discussion with our distinguished panellists in an informal question-and-answer session. I shall therefore suspend the meeting to enable us to continue our discussion in an informal mode.

*The meeting was suspended at 4.15 p.m. and resumed at 4.55 p.m.*

**The Chair:** I request that representatives kindly keep their interventions within a reasonable time limit.

**Mr. Macedo Soares** (Brazil) (*spoke in Spanish*): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the States members of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and associated States — Argentina, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and my own country, Brazil.

MERCOSUR and associated States take the floor to renew their commitment to the promotion of a world free of nuclear weapons. The international community is increasingly aware that as long as nuclear weapons exist, there will be a real risk of their use and proliferation. The existence of nuclear weapons diminishes the security of all States, including those that possess them. We hope that the nuclear-weapon States will fulfil their commitments and enter in good faith into a general, transparent, irreversible and verifiable process within a well-defined time frame, with the view to achieving nuclear disarmament.

Among recent positive events in the nuclear field, MERCOSUR and associated States underscore, first, the signing of the new treaty on reduction of strategic arms — the New START agreement — last April between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. The New START is a step in the right direction, although limited in not complying with the essential requirement of irreversibility. Secondly, we acknowledge the announcements of some nuclear-weapon States that they have declared a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines, and the statements by some nuclear-weapon States regarding measures to strengthen their negative security assurances. In addition, MERCOSUR and associated States welcome the announcements made by

those States whose ratifications are required for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that they will continue and complete the process of ratifying the Treaty.

Those events and initiatives demonstrate the renewed priority that the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation have today on the international agenda. However, they are not enough to bring us closer to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

For that to happen, MERCOSUR and associated States hope that the First Committee will be able to provide follow-up on the results achieved during the eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) last May, which are reflected in its Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). Those outcomes helped us to approach a new phase in the nuclear disarmament process.

MERCOSUR and associated States welcome the adoption of the 64 actions contained in the action plan adopted by the Conference, through which, inter alia, the nuclear-weapon Powers confirmed their unequivocal commitment to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, agreed to accelerate the progress on implementing the practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), and agreed that the process of reducing nuclear arsenals should cover all types of nuclear weapons without exception.

In addition, the provision by which the nuclear countries must report on the implementation of those steps to the Preparatory Committee of the Ninth Review Conference is important. We hope that concrete progress will begin to be made as soon as possible. The outcome of the 2015 Review Conference should include the adoption of a binding time frame for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. MERCOSUR and associated States remain committed to that proposal.

The progress achieved at the NPT Review Conference was in clear contrast to the impasse that still prevails in the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference concluded 2010 without adopting a programme of work that would enable it to begin substantive work. In this regard, MERCOSUR and associated States take note of the final document presented by the Secretary-General at the conclusion of

the High-level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations which he convened on 24 September.

Our countries will continue to lend their full support to reaching consensus formulas to enable the adoption of a programme of work by the Conference on Disarmament and the negotiation of new disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. In stressing their readiness to initiate without delay negotiations on a treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which would promote the objectives of both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, the members of MERCOSUR and associated States also express their interest in making progress on other key issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, such as nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of those weapons. We hope that discussions on these four issues will lead to the conclusion of legal instruments.

It is fundamental and urgent that all States that have not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) — especially all nuclear-weapon States and those listed in annex 2 of the CTBT — do so as soon as possible. We welcome the ratifications in October 2009 by the Marshall Islands, the Central African Republic and Trinidad and Tobago.

MERCOSUR and associated States reiterate the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear tests. In this regard, it is crucial that all States commit not to promote or carry out nuclear tests or any other form of nuclear explosions, or any other action that contravenes the provisions and obligations of the CTBT.

As members of the first densely populated nuclear-weapon-free zone, created through the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, MERCOSUR and associated States highlight the contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In that respect, the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, held in April, was an important initiative that should be continued.

As members of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) responding to the call of the

UNASUR Council of Heads of State and Government issued at the 2009 Bariloche Summit, States members of MERCOSUR and associated States decided to reinforce South America as a zone of peace. This call was answered by Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence at the 2009 extraordinary meeting held in Quito, Ecuador, when, among other resolutions, they decided to pledge that South America would remain a nuclear-weapon-free zone and that nuclear technology would be used solely for peaceful purposes, pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and other relevant international conventions.

MERCOSUR and associated States also welcome the decision taken at the Eighth NPT Review Conference to encourage the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among the States in each region. We further welcome the call on the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw their reservations to the protocols of these treaties, which include negative security assurances. It is also important to highlight the decision to hold a conference in 2012 for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

MERCOSUR and associated States underline the significant contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the common efforts to establish a safer international system. In this regard, we recognize the importance of the IAEA safeguards regime, in accordance with the NPT and those treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, as essential tools to ensure that nuclear materials are not used for military purposes. MERCOSUR and associated States also highlight the valuable contribution that the IAEA can make to disarmament actions through independent verification.

In the light of this commitment to the promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, MERCOSUR and associated States will support, as we have in previous years, the draft resolution entitled “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” (A/C.1/65/L.24\*).

MERCOSUR and associated States consider that nuclear weapons have no role in the new, more just, prosperous and democratic world order that we all want to build. We are convinced that if the resources allocated to nuclear-weapon programmes were spent to support social and economic development, that would

benefit humankind. Nuclear weapons are the legacy of an era and mentality that humankind has already overcome. We expect the First Committee to reflect, through its decisions and draft resolutions, this new reality.

**Mr. Lint** (Belgium) (*spoke in French*): It is my honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The candidate countries of Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro; and Liechtenstein, a country of the European Free Trade Association and member of the European Economic Area; as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, align themselves with this statement.

Recent months have been productive in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. However, it is undeniable that international security continues to be threatened at the international and regional levels by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and by the risk of non-State actors gaining access to such weapons. The EU is fully committed to upholding, implementing and strengthening treaties and agreements in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, while we also recognize that further progress in these fields is necessary, pursuant to the relevant existing instruments and through negotiations on new treaties.

The EU underscores the importance of the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1887 (2009) at its summit-level meeting on 24 September 2009 (see S/PV.6191). We also welcome the conclusion of the New START agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. The EU actively contributed to the success of the Washington, D.C., Nuclear Security Summit and will remain actively engaged in its follow-up. The EU also notes with interest the International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Technology, held in Paris in March.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and is the essential foundation of continued nuclear disarmament efforts, pursuant to article VI, as well as an important element in the further development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Given present proliferation risks, we

believe that the NPT is more important than ever. It is our duty to safeguard it and to strengthen its authority and comprehensiveness.

In this regard, the EU welcomes the outcome of the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, where consensus was reached on action plans and other provisions contained in the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). States parties thus confirmed their shared commitment to safeguarding the integrity of the Treaty and reaffirmed its importance. At the same time, they adopted provisions to strengthen the implementation of the NPT regime. The EU underscores the importance of universalizing the NPT and calls on those States that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

The EU is working to implement, as soon as possible and in a balanced way, the action plans set out in the Final Document aimed at strengthening the three pillars of the Treaty. Furthermore, the EU supports the implementation provisions of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East, which notably include the aim of holding a conference in 2012 on a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The EU is ready to provide concrete support to this process, including by organizing a seminar to follow up on that organized by the EU in Paris in July 2008.

We call on all States of the region that have not yet done so to subscribe to the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, and to conclude a generalized safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the 2010 Review Conference, concrete proposals were adopted on the three pillars that broadly reflect the ideas developed by the EU in the run-up to the Conference. Some of these are recalled in the prepared text version of this statement.

The international non-proliferation regime is facing serious crises. We must continue to address these in a determined way. By violating its Safeguards Agreement, continuing to disregard Security Council resolutions, limiting its cooperation with the IAEA and refusing to meet the demands of the Board of Governors, Iran is drawing acute concern in the international community with regard to the nature of its nuclear programme. The adoption by the Security Council, on 9 June, of resolution 1925 (2010) reflects those concerns. Iran must respect Security Council and

IAEA Board of Governors resolutions and cooperate fully with these bodies in order to re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

The High Representative of the European Union stated on 22 September here in New York, on behalf of the EU and the six countries engaged in diplomatic efforts relating to Iran, that the objective remains a comprehensive, negotiated and long-term solution that would re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, in full respect for Iran's right to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We call on that country to respond positively and without further delay to this offer of dialogue.

The nuclear and ballistic programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to be a cause of serious concern to the European Union. The EU vigorously condemns the actions carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including its nuclear tests and firing of missiles in violation of Security Council resolutions. These actions erode stability on the Korean peninsula and constitute a threat to international peace and security.

The EU calls once again on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to renounce and dismantle its nuclear-weapons programme immediately, transparently, verifiably and irreversibly. The EU once again encourages the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respect its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and the NPT, including the application of its generalized IAEA comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

The European Union confirms its support for the ultimate objective of a completely denuclearized Korean peninsula. In this regard, we reaffirm our support for the Six-Party Talks. The EU calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reopen dialogue and allow IAEA inspectors to return to its territory.

The EU attaches the utmost importance to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as soon as possible and to the completion of its verification regime. The EU welcomes the new momentum in favour of the entry into force of the Treaty, in particular the resolve of President Obama to have the United States quickly ratify the CTBT and the decision of Indonesia to begin

the ratification process. We reiterate our call on all those States that have not yet done so, and in particular the nine States listed in annex 2 of the CTBT, to sign and ratify it without further delay or conditions. Pending its entry into force, the EU calls on all States to respect the moratorium on experimental nuclear tests and to abstain from any act contrary to the obligations and provisions of the Treaty.

The EU recognizes the fundamental value of the CTBT monitoring and verification regime as a tool for international cooperation and confidence-building. With a view to strengthening its monitoring and verification capacity, the EU adopted a new Council decision relating to support for the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO). Through EU financing, projects aimed at enhancing the capacities of the CTBTO are being carried out, in particular in the area of rare gas monitoring as a way of identifying nuclear explosions.

The EU attaches great importance to the negotiation, on the basis of documents agreed upon at the Conference on Disarmament, of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices as a means of strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation. In the meantime, and until the entry into force of the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), the EU calls on all States concerned that have not yet done so to declare and implement an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to dismantle their installations dedicated to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. In that context, we welcome the actions undertaken by a number of nuclear-weapon States, in particular the EU member States that have declared such a moratorium and dismantled such installations.

The EU stresses the importance of the Conference on Disarmament as a unique standing multilateral forum at the disposal of the international community for negotiations in the field of disarmament. We call on all delegations to display flexibility and immediately to begin negotiations on an FMCT and to begin substantive work on other subjects. In that context, the EU commends the recent High-level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations. The EU also welcomes the Secretary-General's call to action.

The EU supports the pursuit of nuclear disarmament pursuant to the NPT, and welcomes the considerable reduction in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems since the end of the Cold War, as well as the significant measures taken by two EU member States in that regard. We stress the need for the comprehensive reduction of international stockpiles of all types of nuclear weapons, consistent with article VI of the NPT, in particular by those States that possess the largest stockpiles. In that context, we recognize that the application of the principle of irreversibility to encourage all measures in the field of disarmament and arms control contributes to the maintenance and strengthening of international peace, security and stability, given those conditions. We will continue our efforts to promote greater transparency and voluntary confidence-building measures to support new progress in the field of disarmament. The EU commends the increased transparency shown by a number of nuclear-weapon States, in particular the EU member States, concerning their own nuclear weapons, and we call on other States to follow suit.

In that context, we commend the conclusion and signing of the New START agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation. The EU recalls the continued existence of major deployed and accumulated arsenals that are not covered by official disarmament and arms control treaties. We encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to pursue negotiations with a view to further reducing their nuclear stockpiles, including non-strategic devices. We call on them, as well as on all States possessing non-strategic nuclear weapons, to include them in their general arms control and in the disarmament process with a view to their reduction and elimination, while recognizing the importance of new measures promoting transparency and confidence in order to move the nuclear disarmament process forward.

The EU continues to highlight the need for comprehensive disarmament and mobilization in all other spheres of disarmament. Positive and negative security assurances can play an important role in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The EU is determined to promote the review of security assurances.

The EU continues to attach great importance to the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones that are internationally recognized and established on the basis

of freely concluded arrangements among the States of the regions concerned, as stipulated by the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1999. We hope that the outstanding issues regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones will be addressed through in-depth consultations in keeping with the Disarmament Commission guidelines and with the agreement of all parties concerned.

Serious threats and major difficulties persist, and we must face them with determination. However, we note with satisfaction the increasing progress towards achieving the NPT objectives. The EU calls on all States to seize this opportunity and to work in harmony to make the world a safer place.

**The Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of Turkmenistan, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.10\*.

**Mrs. Atayeva** (Turkmenistan) (*spoke in Russian*): It is my honour to speak on behalf of the delegations of the five Central Asian States: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Nuclear weapons pose a threat to the existence of all humankind. In today's world, there are tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there will be a risk of their proliferation and use, as well as the threat of nuclear terrorism. Thousands of nuclear warheads remain in a state of enhanced battle readiness. We can only remove the danger and threat they pose through a comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons. Disarmament and non-proliferation processes must unfold simultaneously. It is time to free the world of weapons of mass destruction.

We have an opportunity today to create a world free of nuclear weapons. There is a new movement towards peace. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty paves the way for a world free of nuclear weapons. The prohibition of nuclear testing will make an important contribution to the struggle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to disarmament. The Central Asian countries urge all States that have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty and to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing until it enters into force.

Central Asia affirms its commitment to supporting the efforts of the international community



to maintain nuclear security and avert the threat of the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To that end, our countries have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and become parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

An important step in revitalizing joint actions of States in the field of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament at the regional level was the signing by the Central Asian States, on 8 September 2006 in the city of Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. By becoming parties to that Treaty, the five States of the Central Asian region assumed the commitment to prohibiting the production, acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons and their components, or other nuclear explosive devices, in their territories. In so doing, the parties to the Treaty confirmed their common contribution to maintaining global and regional security and to processes of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which is particularly relevant in the context of joint activities in the struggle against terrorism and in preventing weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.

According to resolutions 61/88, of 18 December 2006, and 63/63, of 12 January 2009, the purpose of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia is to facilitate the strengthening of regional and global peace and security, to help fight international terrorism and to prevent nuclear material and technologies from falling into the hands of criminals. On 21 March 2009, the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia entered into force.

Central Asia believes that the creation of such a zone in the region will contribute to maintaining peace and regional stability and is an important element in strengthening regional security and nuclear disarmament. A nuclear-weapon-free zone is one of the universal instruments for preventing the proliferation of such weapons and for guaranteeing that dozens of States throughout the world will pledge not to transfer or accept the transfer of any kind of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. They will not accept direct or indirect control of such weapons, and they pledge neither to produce nor to acquire any type of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, nor to accept any kind of assistance in producing them.

In that regard, it is my honour to introduce, on behalf of the delegations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the draft resolution entitled “Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia” (A/C.1/65/L.10\*). Our draft resolution reflects the progress achieved since the signing of the Treaty in 2006, and confirms our firm commitment to working towards effective achievements in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation.

In conclusion, allow me to voice the shared hope of the Central Asian States that our draft resolution will once again enjoy the support of Member States and make an important contribution in the struggle against international terrorism and to prevent nuclear materials and technologies from falling into the hands of terrorists. The draft resolution will be open to delegations wishing to become co-sponsors.

**Mr. Hamza** (United Republic of Tanzania): I am honoured to speak on this important cluster concerning nuclear weapons and to share my delegation’s perspectives on disarmament. At the outset, I commend you, Sir, for the excellent manner in which you continue to steer our deliberations.

My delegation associates itself with the inspiring statements to be delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group. We also align ourselves with the consensus of the Committee, which calls for the immediate, complete and irreversible disarmament and non-proliferation of all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This represents the crux of our pledge, made 65 years ago, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”.

The circle of insecurity and fear surrounding the fact that nuclear weapons might one day be deployed in an armed conflict is made worse by the worldwide presence of nuclear weapons. It is a bitter fact that, so long as some countries continue to possess such weapons, others will continue to seek them. It is also obvious that such a situation raises the possibility of such weapons or related technology falling into the hands of terrorists and other non-State actors.

In the current state of affairs, any attempt to disarm a specific nuclear-weapon State or to prevent it from using such weapons will be viewed with suspicion — because how can one attempt to remove a

speck of sawdust from another person's eye while paying little or no attention to the plank in one's own eye? Is this not the question being asked by some representatives in this very meeting?

We have a moral obligation to rid the world of nuclear weapons, which had a devastating effect on humankind twice in the past century. It was as a result of such devastation that we said "never again". A durable and ultimate guarantee that such weapons will never be deployed is their total and irreversible elimination.

We welcome the signing of the New START agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation, which, when ratified, will produce further reductions in those countries' strategic nuclear arsenals. We call on other nuclear States to complement these noble efforts, which we hope will one day deliver us the dream of global zero. We also welcome the numerous resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly on this topic. We should not allow the substance of our commitments made in those resolutions, which we have continued to adopt for more than two decades, to go to waste. That would simply be a betrayal of our moral position.

We also have a legal obligation to rid the world of nuclear weapons. The threat posed by the presence of such weapons and the possibility that they could be deployed is simply illegal and unacceptable. Those were the words of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion on the question of the *Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons*.

We are pleased that the establishment of the African and other nuclear-weapon-free zones has added a stronger voice to the opinion of the Court. We perceive such zones as a means of ensuring the non-possession, non-use or threat of use, and non-proliferation of such weapons within them. As expressed in our general statement, the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, with the involvement of all States of the region, as envisaged by the Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), and in accordance with the resolution of the 1995 NPT Review Conference, will be an effective contribution to international peace and security.

We welcome the successful conclusion of the NPT Review Conference and call on all States to implement

in good faith the five practical steps proposed by the Secretary-General for achieving complete disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear technology without discrimination. We encourage all States that are not yet party to the Treaty to get on board and call on existing parties to refrain from violating this indispensable instrument of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

Let me conclude by stressing that the time and conditions are ripe for accelerating progress on disarmament in general and on nuclear disarmament in particular. We should seize the opportunity before us to ensure the universalization of the NPT; the immediate and unconditional ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, particularly by annex 2 States; and the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; negative security assurances; and ultimately the nuclear-weapons convention under the revitalized Conference on Disarmament.

Our goal should remain that of ridding the world of nuclear weapons, while promoting the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner. Instead of building nuclear arsenals we should strengthen international cooperation, in particular technical cooperation in nuclear-related technologies, to create conditions conducive to accelerated economic growth and poverty eradication. It is our duty to promote the lawful and responsible transfer of such technologies and resources as a means of addressing the resource gap that continues to exist between the North and the South. A world free of nuclear weapons should be a common goal for global peace and security and the prosperity of all humankind. It would be a better world for all of us.

Disarmament can be achieved, and we pledge to do our part.

**Mr. Mabongo** (South Africa): My delegation fully associates itself with the statement to be delivered by the representative of Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.

For South Africa, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and we will continue to promote its universality. We remain concerned about the selective approach adopted by some States that focus exclusively on some of the Treaty's provisions in

preference over others as they suit a particular agenda. South Africa believes that the vitality of the Treaty depends on the balance that should be maintained between its three mutually reinforcing pillars.

While we remain particularly dissatisfied about the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament pursuant to article VI of the Treaty, we nonetheless welcome the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the constructive spirit exhibited by States parties that allowed us to adopt a Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). In our view, this represents an important milestone in the history of the Treaty.

South Africa welcomes the fact that the action plan was agreed to by consensus and that it reconfirms the validity of past agreements, including the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, thus paving the way, through a number of important new measures, towards achieving our goal of a world free from the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

It is imperative that these undertakings now be turned into concrete action in order to restore confidence in the NPT, which has been subjected to significant tensions over the past decade. It is most important that such actions result in a fundamental review of security doctrines, as well as other transparent, irreversible and verifiable measures aimed at achieving a world free from the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

One of the important elements included in the action plan is the commitment of States to support the development of appropriate, legally binding arrangements under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure the irreversible removal of material no longer required for military purposes. In this regard, we welcome the communication of 30 August from the Russian Federation and the United States of America to the IAEA concerning the management and disposition of plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes and related cooperation, with the goal of completing preparations for the necessary legally binding agreements in 2011. Although the agreement covers only 34 metric tons of plutonium from each party, it sets an important precedent in fulfilment of the commitments made under the NPT. Of particular

importance is the commitment to the implementation of verification measures by the IAEA with respect to each party's disposal programme. It is our hope that this necessary step will be emulated by others and may eventually include all fissile material designated by States as no longer required for military purposes.

Other measures announced or agreed to before and during the Review Conference are also now being applied. In this regard, we call for the ratification and implementation of the New START agreement as soon as possible, the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as the full and effective implementation of all 64 actions agreed to by consensus. We believe that the success of the 2010 Review Conference is dependent on the extent to which these decisions will be implemented. Our commitment to and compliance with these agreements and legal obligations will determine the continued vitality of the Treaty.

It is for this reason that we remain concerned about statements made from time to time by some nuclear-weapon States that seem to seek to rationalize the continued retention and even possible use of these indiscriminate instruments of mass destruction. Such statements are not only irresponsible but may even serve as a rationale for those who aspire to develop nuclear weapons. We have consistently argued that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons will lead only to increasing insecurity and a continuing arms race. Continuous and irreversible progress on nuclear disarmament and other related nuclear arms control measures remains fundamental to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation.

Pending the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, South Africa believes that those States that have foresworn the nuclear-weapon option have the right to demand security assurances, as opposed to those who prefer to keep their options open. The NPT is the primary international legal instrument under which the non-nuclear-weapon States have foregone the nuclear-weapon option. South Africa therefore regards the provision of internationally legally binding security assurances as a key element of the NPT. We will therefore continue to pursue negative security assurances within that framework. Legally binding security assurances will enhance strategic stability, facilitate the process of the elimination of nuclear weapons and contribute to international confidence and security.

A further step towards the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons could include a legally binding instrument banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such an instrument would be consistent with the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* and could serve as a useful interim step towards total elimination.

South Africa continues to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world, including in the Middle East. In this regard, we welcome the decision of the 2010 NPT Review Conference regarding the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in particular the convening of a conference in 2012.

Let me reiterate that nuclear disarmament remains our highest priority. Nuclear weapons are a source of insecurity, not security. They are illegal, inhumane and immoral instruments that have no place in today's security environment, which is a new reality marked by growing interconnectedness and common threats that transcend traditional boundaries. This reality requires a different approach that takes into consideration not only the narrow national security interests of States but also the shared, international and human security dimensions. My delegation was therefore pleased that the 2010 Review Conference expressed its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the need for all States at all times to comply with international law, including international humanitarian law.

In order to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, it is incumbent upon us all to begin timely preparations that will culminate in the negotiation of a nuclear-weapons convention or a framework or set of instruments for the complete and sustainable elimination of nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, as we celebrated the first World Cup ever held on African soil earlier this year, we used the Sesotho phrase "*Ke nako!*", meaning "The time has come!" This phrase can very aptly be applied to the subject under consideration in this body. Let us agree with regard to nuclear disarmament: "*Ke nako!* The time has come!"

**Mr. Macedo Soares** (Brazil): I would like to make some comments with regard to the issue of a

treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world remains a high priority for my country. Brazil strongly supports the calls for an immediate commencement of negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention that would promote the total elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specified time frame. Nevertheless, we understand that a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) could be a first, feasible step to be taken within a gradual approach to the objective of nuclear disarmament.

In considering this alternative, however, it must be clear that negotiations should not be limited to the prohibition of the production of fissile material. These negotiations should also deal with all other aspects related to fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. As a result, the treaty would be not only a non-proliferation instrument but also a real nuclear disarmament instrument.

Bearing that in mind, during the 2010 session of the Conference on Disarmament the Brazilian delegation to the Conference offered two contributions to discussions on this issue. The first was a draft programme of work presented by Brazil in its capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament (document CD/1889). According to that proposal, a working group would be established to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, while taking into consideration all other matters related to such fissile material on the basis of document CD/1299, the so-called Shannon report, of March 1995, and the mandate contained therein.

We know that a treaty dealing not only with the future production of fissile material but also with all other matters related to such fissile material raises additional complexities in terms of ensuring States' compliance. That is why Brazil presented a second contribution — a proposal on a possible structure for a treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, contained in document CD/1888. According to our proposal, the treaty would be composed of a framework or umbrella treaty containing provisions on objectives, definitions and final clauses. A first protocol would have the objective of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including

a verification mechanism. A second protocol would deal with all pre-existing fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This protocol should also provide for the creation of a verification mechanism.

The final clauses of the framework or umbrella treaty would define the modalities for participation in the protocols.

Brazil hopes that a General Assembly resolution on an FMCT, or any decision by the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on this issue, will reflect these positions.

**The Chair:** We have heard the last speaker on my list for this afternoon.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

**Mr. Kim Yong Jo** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Our colleague from Belgium, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU), touched upon the issue of the Korean peninsula. In this regard, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea totally rejects the EU's groundless argument and condemnation of my country with regard to the nuclear and missile issues, inter alia. The reason behind our total rejection is very simple and clear — in a word, the argument goes too far. It is well beyond a fair, impartial, balanced and independent position taken on the Korean issue.

First, let me address the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. As far as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is concerned, it is of great importance that it be regarded with a fair and full understanding of the security situation prevailing on the peninsula. It is true that the United States of America has consistently blackmailed and threatened our sovereign State and its stability by deploying a large quantity of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in South Korea and on submarines. It is also well known that because of the location of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in particular its proximity to such States as Japan and South Korea, which are under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, we have had to develop a nuclear capacity in order to address the region's nuclear imbalance.

However, I am very pleased to highlight that, thanks to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the nuclear imbalance in the region has been settled for good, with the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war in this region controlled and deterred to a great extent. Our nuclear weapons therefore clearly represent a defensive capacity and will never be used to threaten or blackmail any country that respects our sovereignty.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea entered into the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with expectations and wishes, seeking to benefit from the Treaty through the removal of the nuclear weapons of the United States with the help of the Treaty and to prevent the United States nuclear threat against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had lasted for more than half a century. But the NPT has failed with regard to both removing the United States nuclear weapons from South Korea and preventing the United States from posing a nuclear threat to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for more than half a century. The NPT could never meet our expectations or wishes.

Lastly, I wish to highlight that it is the United States that has abused the NPT to force the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to receive special inspections of its most sensitive military projects. This was a violation of our State sovereignty when we were already a State party to the NPT. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea therefore withdrew from the NPT in order to defend itself and survive. The relevant articles of the NPT set out provisions for a State party to withdraw in order to protect its supreme interests against violation or to defend its sovereign rights.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea delegation wishes to stress that it will continue to build its nuclear deterrence so long as the nuclear threat from the United States of America continues. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will never be able to rejoin the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

I shall now address the issue of missiles, which was raised by my colleague from Belgium. For a State to carry out missile tests is to exercise its sovereign right. It is the legitimate right of a sovereign State to manufacture, produce, possess and test fire missiles for the purpose of self-defence. Missile test firings do not contravene any international law or convention, as they

are part of regular military exercises conducted by the armed forces of any State or nation.

Why should the issue of testing missiles be raised as a problem only with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, when the United States and other countries with missile-development capabilities have also been conducting missile tests on a regular basis? It is important to approach this issue with a good understanding of the security situation unique to the Korean peninsula, just as with the nuclear issue.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States are still technically at war, and have been for more than 60 years. The situation on the Korean peninsula remains tense due to the coercive, hostile and threatening nuclear policies pursued with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by successive Administrations in Washington, D.C.

On the other hand, Japan, in line with hostile United States policy on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, has been stepping up the development of missile defence system in the North-East Asia region, jointly with the United States, which is, of course, well known to the world. Should the Democratic People's Republic of Korea just stand by and let this happen? That is not possible. We cannot sit idly by in the face of such Japanese military manoeuvring or the hostile United States policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

As stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, it is the legitimate right of a sovereign State — which we must continue to exercise — to defend our supreme sovereign interests.

*The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.*