

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/228
Appendix II/Vol. I
21 August 1981

ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX II

VOLUME I

List and text of documents issued by the Committee on Disarmament

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX II

VOLUME I

List and Text of Documents issued by the Committee
on Disarmament

Document No.	Title
CD/124/Rev.1	Revision of CD/124 on the Definition of Chemical Agent and Chemical Warfare Agent
CD/140	Letter dated 2 February 1981 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session
CD/141	Considerations on the Organization of Work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981 session
CD/142	Working Paper : Prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons (4 annexes)
CD/143	Working paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
CD/144*	Agenda and programme of work of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/145	Letter dated 5 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/146	Letter dated 10 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/147	Letter dated 12 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure

Document No.	Title
CD/148	Letter dated 19 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/149	Letter dated 8 January 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/150	Progress report to the Committee on Disarmament on the eleventh session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events
CD/151	Decision adopted by the Committee on <u>ad hoc</u> working groups at its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981
CD/152	Letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of the People's Republic of China and Pakistan, handed over 12 February 1981
CD/153	Working Paper : Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/154	Letter dated 12 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/155	Working Paper : Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament "Objectives"
CD/156	Letter dated 19 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/157	Letter dated 20 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981

Document No.	Title
CD/158	Letter dated 26 February 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt transmitting the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the occasion of its ratification of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 26 February 1981
CD/159	Letter dated 24 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/160	Letter dated 2 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting part of the report of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, entitled "To Strengthen Peace, Deepen Détente and Curb the Arms Race"
CD/161	Working Paper : Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/162*	Considerations of a group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament concerning negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests
CD/163	Letter dated 2 March 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/164	Letter dated 18 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland, transmitting a working document entitled, "Creation of Chemical Weapons Control Capacity - present phase and goals of the Finnish project"

Document No.	Title
CD/165	Letter dated 19 March 1981 from the Representative of Venezuela addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the address given by His Holiness Pope John Paul II at Hiroshima on 23 February 1981
CD/166	Letter dated 23 March 1981 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the memorandum "Peace, Disarmament and International Security Guarantees" submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. A. Gromyko, to the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly
CD/167	Verification and control requirements for a chemical arms control treaty based on an analysis of activities
CD/168	Working Paper : Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents
CD/169	Working Paper : Dismantling of Production Facilities/Means of Production for Chemical Weapons
CD/170	Letter dated 26 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of India transmitting extracts from the section entitled "Review of the international situation" contained in the New Delhi declaration issued at the conclusion of the Ministerial Conference of Non-aligned countries held in New Delhi from 9 to 13 February 1981
CD/171	Tabulation of proposals on nuclear disarmament since the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
CD/172	Working Paper on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament
CD/173	Disposal of Chemical Agents
CD/174	Working Paper : Proposal for informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of qualified governmental experts on the prohibition of development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/175	Letter dated 1 April 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/176	Letter dated 7 April 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the reply of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, to the question put by the Greek newspaper, Ta Nea.
CD/177	United Kingdom Working Paper on the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/178	Letter dated 15 April 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister-Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland addressing an invitation of the Finnish Government
CD/179 + Add.1	The Chairman's Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons
CD/180	Statement by the Group of 21 on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled: "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
CD/181	Statement by the Group of 21 on item 1 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled: "Nuclear test ban"
CD/182	Statement of a Group of Socialist Countries on the results of the first part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/183	A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification Produced by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs and the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, Ottawa
CD/184	Letter dated 12 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament Transmitting Resolutions Adopted by the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Held in Baghdad from 1 to 6 June 1981

Document No.	Title
CD/185	Letter dated 9 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th Plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/186*	Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament for the second part of its 1981 session (Adopted at the 129th plenary meeting on 16 June 1981)
CD/187	Statement by the Group of 21 on the Israeli air attack against a nuclear facility on 7 June 1981
CD/188	Working paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
CD/189	Letter dated 22 June 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia transmitting an Extract from the Report of the General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, President of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural, Mongolian People's Republic Comrade Yu.Tsedenbal to the XVIII Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
CD/190	Letter dated 22 June 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Austria concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 113th Plenary meeting on 10 March 1981
CD/191	Letter dated 30 June 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the Appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World
CD/192	Statement of the Group of 21 (Item 1: Nuclear Test Ban)
CD/193	Considerations on the further proceeding of the Committee on Disarmament concerning item 2 of its agenda
CD/194	Statement of a Group of socialist countries concerning a nuclear test ban
CD/195	Working Paper: Incapacitating Agents (Some aspects of definition, classification and toxicological characteristics)

Document No.	Title
CD/196	Letter dated 13 July 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland transmitting a document entitled "Trace Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents"
CD/197	Working Paper: Suggestions for Elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/198	Working Paper: Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/199	Working Paper: Definition and Characteristics of the Toxins
CD/200*	Increasing the effectiveness and improving the organization of work of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/201	Letter dated 28 July 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia enclosing the text of "The Appeal of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic to Parliaments of all Asian and Pacific Countries"
CD/202	Letter dated 29 July 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the United States Representative to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Announcement made on 16 July 1981, by the President of the United States of America Concerning the Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Co-operation Policy of the United States of America
CD/203	Consultation and Co-operation, Verification Measures and Complaints Procedure in the framework of the Convention on the complete and effective Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of all Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
CD/204	Working Paper: Establishment of subsidiary organs
CD/205 CD/CPD/WP.52	Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/206	Working Paper: Views on Disarmament and its related Questions
CD/207	Working Paper: On the Question of Security Assurances
CD/208 CD/CPD/WP.55	Working Paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

Document No.	Title
CD/209	Working Paper on the question of verification in the field of disarmament
CD/210	Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Twelfth Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/211	Letter dated 12 August 1981 from the Representative of Cuba to the Committee on Disarmament addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting part of the Statement made on 26 July 1981 by Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz, Chairman of the Councils of State and of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba.
CD/212	Some viewpoints on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
CD/213	Some viewpoints on the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament
CD/214	Working Paper on the Elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/215 & Corr.1	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to Continue to Negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/216	Letter dated 14 August 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a Statement by Tass dated 13 August 1981
CD/217 & Corr.1	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/218	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/219	Statement of a group of socialist countries on the need for the urgent establishment in the Committee on Disarmament of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons
CD/220	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/221	Some observations of the Chinese delegation on the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981 (18 August 1981)
CD/222 & Corr.1	Statement of the Group of 21 on the Conclusions of the Annual Session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981
CD/223	Working Paper on the Chapter entitled "Measures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament"
CD/224	Statement by a group of socialist countries on the results of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/225	Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba made on 19 August 1981
CD/226	Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic
CD/227	The Chinese delegation's denial to the Soviet allegation regarding China's position on the question of the neutron bomb
CD/228 & Corr.1	Report to the United Nations General Assembly

INDONESIA

Revision of CD/124
on the Definition of Chemical Agent and Chemical Warfare Agent

1. Chemical Agent

A chemical agent is any chemical substance, that because of its toxicological effect, can be used as a chemical warfare agent.

2. Chemical Warfare Agent

On the definition of a chemical warfare agent, two alternatives could be used.

(a) A chemical warfare agent is any chemical substance, that because of its toxicological effect on man, animal and plant is designed to be used as a single substance or in combination with other substances to achieve military objectives in warfare or in other form of hostilities.

(b) A chemical warfare agent is any chemical substance that because of its toxicological effect on man, animal and plant can be used as a single substance or in combination with other chemical substances to achieve military objectives (goals) in warfare or in other form of hostilities.

3. Explanatory note:

(a) Only the toxicological effects of certain chemical substances should be taken into account.

(b) Not all toxic chemical compounds, even very highly toxic ones, could be regarded as chemical warfare agents.

(c) Precursor has been included, implicitly.

(d) The intention to use chemical warfare agent is to achieve "military goals".

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LETTER DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1981 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS 35TH SESSION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament. The relevant provisions of those resolutions are reproduced in the Annex.

For the information of the Committee, I also have the honour to transmit herewith other resolutions and decisions dealing with disarmament matters, which were adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

In addition, I should like to draw your attention to the resolutions listed in the Annex which relate to disarmament matters.

(Signed) Kurt Waldheim
Secretary-General

ANNEX

I. Resolutions dealing with disarmament matters

(a) Resolutions that entrust specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament

At its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions entrusting specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament:

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| 35/46 | "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade" |
| 35/144 B | "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons" |
| 35/145 A | "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons" |
| 35/145 B | "Prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time" |
| 35/149 | "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons" |
| 35/152 B | "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" |
| 35/152 C | "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" |
| 35/152 E | "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session" |
| 35/152 G | "Paragraph 125 of the Final Document" |
| 35/152 J | "Report of the Committee on Disarmament" |
| 35/154 | "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" |
| 35/155 | "Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" |
| 35/156 C | "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present" |
| 35/156 F | "Study on nuclear weapons" |

- 35/156 G "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
- 35/156 H "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes"
- 35/156 I "Report of the Committee on Disarmament"

The Committee's attention should be drawn, in particular, to the following provisions contained in those resolutions:

(1) In the Annex to resolution 35/46, paragraph 12 states that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament on: (a) a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; (b) a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction; (c) a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and use of radiological weapons; (d) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account all proposals and suggestions that have been made in this regard.

(2) In resolution 35/144B, operative paragraph 3 urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1981, negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

(3) In resolution 35/145 A, operative paragraph 4 urges all States members of the Committee on Disarmament: (a) to support the creation by the Committee, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests; (b) to use their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty.

(4) In resolution 35/145 B, operative paragraph 5 requests the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1981;

operative paragraph 6 further requests the Committee on Disarmament to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative steps necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and effective verification system; operative paragraph 7 urges all members of the Committee on Disarmament to co-operate with the Committee in fulfilling its mandate and, to this end, to support the creation of a working group on a comprehensive nuclear test ban; and operative paragraph 8 calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that a draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty can be submitted to the General Assembly no later than at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982.

(5) In resolution 35/149, operative paragraph 1 requests once again the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons; and operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-sixth session.

(6) In resolution 35/152 B, operative paragraph 1 notes the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to resume intensive consideration, at its session to be held in 1981, of the item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament; operative paragraph 2 believes it necessary to intensify efforts with a view to initiating as a matter of high priority, negotiations, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, on the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; operative paragraph 3 calls upon the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early commencement of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to undertake consultations in which to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and of nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

(7) In resolution 35/152 C, operative paragraph 1 urges the Committee on Disarmament to establish, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, an ad hoc working group on the item which in its agenda for 1979 and 1980, was entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"; and operative paragraph 2 considers that, in the light of the exchange of views

held on this subject during the last two annual sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, it would be advisable that the working group begin its negotiations by addressing the question of the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament.

(8) In resolution 35/152 E, operative paragraph 4 recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results.

(9) In resolution 35/152 G, operative paragraph 2 invites the appropriate international bodies in the field of disarmament to continue, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, efforts aimed at achieving positive results in curbing the arms race in accordance with the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

(10) In resolution 35/152 J, operative paragraph 1 urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1981, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those questions; operative paragraph 2 invites the members of the Committee on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee and, at the same time, to submit to the Committee a full report on their separate negotiations and the results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee in accordance with paragraph 1; operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament, at its session to be held in 1981, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and to submit the programme in time for consideration by the General Assembly at the second special session devoted to disarmament; operative paragraph 4 also requests the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its work on priority questions of disarmament, so that it may be in a position to contribute through concrete accomplishments, to a favourable climate for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; and operative paragraph 5 further requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

(11) In resolution 35/154, operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue on a priority basis, during

its session in 1981, the negotiations on the question of strengthening of security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States; and operative paragraph 4 calls upon States participating in talks on the question of providing guarantees to non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to make efforts for the speedy elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter.

(12) In resolution 35/155, operative paragraph 4 recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching agreement and concluding effective international arrangements during its next session to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

(13) In resolution 35/156 C, operative paragraph 1 requests the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present; and operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

(14) In resolution 35/156 F, operative paragraph 4 recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should take the report of the Group of Experts on a Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons (A/35/392) and its conclusions into account in its efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in particular in the field of nuclear disarmament.

(15) In resolution 35/156 G, operative paragraph 1 calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons and to report on the results to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session; and operative paragraph 2 notes in this connexion the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to set up at the beginning of its session to be held in 1981 a further ad hoc working group, under an appropriate mandate to be determined at that time, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons.

(16) In resolution 35/156 H, its operative paragraph requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

(17) In resolution 35/156 I, operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue to consider the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee and to report on this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session; operative paragraph 3 recommends that the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed following appropriate consultations among Member States, during the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; and operative paragraph 4 reaffirms that States not members of the Committee, upon their request, should be invited by it to participate in the work of the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion.

In paragraph 7 of resolution 35/156 D, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament to the Committee on Disarmament. That study is contained in document A/35/416.

In the above-mentioned resolutions 35/149, 35/152 G, 35/156 C and 35/156 G, the General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all relevant documents. They are the following:

- 35/149 A/35/27, A/35/692 and A/C.1/35/L.18.
- 35/152 G A/35/42, A/35/147, A/35/164, A/35/241, A/35/257, A/35/355, A/35/521, A/35/542, A/35/574, A/35/575, A/35/665 and Add.1, A/35/L.47/Rev.1, A/C.1/35/10, A/C.1/35/13, A/C.1/35/L.1, A/C.1/35/L.4, A/C.1/35/L.7, A/C.1/35/L.12, A/C.1/35/L.14, A/C.1/35/L.21, A/C.1/35/L.22, A/C.1/35/L.28, A/C.1/35/L.32/Rev.1, A/C.1/35/L.36/Rev.1, A/C.1/35/L.39, A/C.1/35/L.40, A/C.1/35/L.42, A/C.1/35/L.46 and A/C.1/35/L.52.
- 35/156 C A/35/145, A/35/145/Add.1 and A/C.1/35/L.13.
- 35/156 G A/C.1/35/L.27.

The relevant records of the consideration of those resolutions transmitting documentation are contained in documents A/35/PV.4 to 33, A/35/PV.79, A/35/PV.94 and A/C.1/35/PV.4 to 49.

All those documents and records were distributed during the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly to all Members of the United Nations, including all Members of the Committee on Disarmament.

(b) Other resolutions dealing with disarmament matters

At its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly also adopted the following resolutions dealing with disarmament matters:

- 35/47 "Preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament"

- 35/141 "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security"
- 35/142 A "Reduction of military budgets"
- 35/142 B "Reduction of military budgets"
- 35/143 "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 34/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"
- 35/144 A "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 35/144 C "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 35/146 A "Nuclear Capability of South Africa"
- 35/146 B "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"
- 35/147 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"
- 35/148 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia"
- 35/150 "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"
- 35/151 "World Disarmament Conference"
- 35/152 A "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament"
- 35/152 D "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"
- 35/152 F "Report of the Disarmament Commission"
- 35/152 H "Programme of research and studies on disarmament"
- 35/152 I "World Disarmament Campaign"
- 35/153 "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects"
- 35/156 A "Study on conventional disarmament"
- 35/156 B "Confidence-building measures"

- 35/156 D "Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament"
- 35/156 E "Study on the relationship between disarmament and international security"
- 35/156 J "Disarmament and international security"
- 35/156 K "Strategic arms limitation talks"
- 35/157 "Israeli nuclear armament"

The General Assembly also took a decision (35/430) that, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 24 and 34 of its decision 34/401 of 25 October 1979 and paragraph 4 of its resolution 35/10 A of 3 November 1980, the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament will hold its second substantive session from 5 to 16 October 1981.

II. Resolutions related to disarmament matters

It should also be noted that, at its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions which are related to disarmament matters:

- 35/8 "Historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations"
- 35/12 "Effects of atomic radiation"
- 35/14 "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space"
- 35/15 "Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space"
- 35/17 "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency"
- 35/49 "Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind"
- 35/50 "Report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations"
- 35/55 "Establishment of the University for Peace"
- 35/112 "Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development"
- 35/121 "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects"

- 35/158 **"Review of the implementation of the Declaration
on the Strengthening of International Security"**
- 35/159 **"Non-interference in the internal affairs of
States"**
- 35/160 **"Peaceful settlement of disputes between States"**
- 35/206 B **"Military and nuclear collaboration with South
Africa"**



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/46
24 December 1980

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 36

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/664 and Corr.1)]

35/46. Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 34/75 of 11 December 1979, in which it decided to declare the decade of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade,

Having considered the elements of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade prepared by the Disarmament Commission, 1/

Adopts the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, as set forth in the annex to the present resolution.

79th plenary meeting
3 December 1980

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/35/42), para. 19.

ANNEX

Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade

I. GENERAL

1. In proclaiming the decade of the 1970s as the first United Nations Disarmament Decade, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, enumerated its objectives as follows:

(a) All Governments should intensify without delay their concerted and concentrated efforts for effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, and for a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

(b) Consideration should be given to channelling a substantial part of the resources freed by measures in the field of disarmament to promote the economic development of developing countries and, in particular, their scientific and technological progress.

2. Although these objectives were reiterated by the General Assembly in later sessions, the first Disarmament Decade ended without their accomplishment. While it is true that some limited agreements were reached, effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament have continued to elude man's grasp. Furthermore, no progress has been made in channelling for the purpose of economic and social development any amount of the enormous resources which are wasted on the unproductive arms race.

3. Through the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, contained in resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, which was adopted by consensus, the Assembly, after expressing its conviction that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, were essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war, for the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, laid down a Programme of Action 2/ enumerating the specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years.

4. In spite of the positive and encouraging outcome of the special session devoted to disarmament, the decade of the 1980s has started with ominous signs of deterioration in the international situation. International peace and security are threatened by the use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity of States, by military intervention and occupation, hegemonism, interference in the internal affairs of States, the denial of the right of self-determination of peoples and nations under colonial and alien domination, and by the further escalation of the arms race and efforts to achieve

2/ Resolution S-10/2, sect. III.

military superiority. It is clear that, if the emerging trend continues and meaningful efforts are not made to check and reverse this trend, international tensions will be further exacerbated and the danger of war will be greater than foreseen at the time of the special session on disarmament. In this connexion, it is pertinent to recall that in the Final Document the General Assembly emphasized that, on the one hand, the arms race in all its aspects runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension to establish a viable system of international peace and security and, on the other, that peace and security must be based on strict respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is ironic that, while intensive discussions are under way in various forums on global economic problems and on the depletion of resources available for coping with present international economic problems, military expenditures by major military Powers are reaching ever higher levels, involving the greater diversion of resources that could have helped to promote the well-being of all peoples.

5. The close relationship between disarmament and development was also underscored in the Final Document, which stated that the resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries. It is, therefore, only appropriate that simultaneously with the proclamation of the Third United Nations Development Decade ^{3/} and the launching of the global round of negotiations, the 1980s should be declared as the Second Disarmament Decade.

II. GOALS AND PRINCIPLES

6. The goals of the Second Disarmament Decade should be conceived in the context of the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process, which is general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as elaborated in the Final Document.

7. Consistent with this over-all objective, the goals of the Second Disarmament Decade should be the following:

(a) Halting and reversing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race;

(b) Concluding and implementing effective agreements on disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, which will contribute significantly to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

(c) Developing on an equitable basis the limited results obtained in the field of disarmament in the 1970s in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document;

(d) Strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

^{3/} See General Assembly resolution 35/56.

(e) Making available a substantial part of the resources released by disarmament measures to promote the attainment of the objectives of the Third United Nations Development Decade and, in particular, the economic and social development of developing countries, so as to accelerate the progress towards the new international economic order.

8. The disarmament process and the activities during the Second Disarmament Decade should be in accordance with the fundamental principles enshrined in the Final Document and should be carried out in such a balanced and equitable manner as to ensure the right of each State to security through the adoption of appropriate measures, taking into account the importance of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the States with the largest military arsenals, the specific requirements of regional situations and the necessity for adequate measures of verification. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

9. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by the strengthening of the peace-making and peace-keeping functions of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter.

III. ACTIVITIES

A. General

10. The decade of the 1980s should witness renewed intensification by all Governments and the United Nations of their efforts to reach agreement and to implement effective measures that will lead to discernible progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In this connexion, special attention should be focused on certain identifiable elements in the Programme of Action as adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session which should, as a minimum, be accomplished during the Second Disarmament Decade both through negotiations in the multilateral negotiating forum, the Committee on Disarmament, and in other appropriate forums. Adequate methods and procedures of verification should be considered in the context of international disarmament negotiations.

B. Comprehensive programme of disarmament

11. Having been recognized as an important element in an international disarmament strategy, the comprehensive programme for disarmament should be elaborated with the utmost urgency. The Committee on Disarmament should expedite its work on the elaboration of the programme with a view to its adoption no later than at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled for 1982.

C. Priorities

12. The accomplishment of those specific measures of disarmament which have been identified in the Final Document as worthy of priority negotiations by the

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multilateral negotiating organ would create a very favourable international climate for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. All efforts should be exerted, therefore, by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament on:

- (a) A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;
- (b) A treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction;
- (c) A treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and use of radiological weapons;
- (d) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account all proposals and suggestions that have been made in this regard.

13. The same priority should be given to the following measures which are dealt with outside the Committee on Disarmament:

- (a) Ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) and commencement of negotiations for a SALT III agreement;
- (b) Ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco); 4/
- (c) Signature and ratification of the agreement negotiated by the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects;
- (d) Achievement of an agreement on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in central Europe;
- (e) Negotiations on effective confidence-building measures and disarmament measures in Europe among the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, taking into account initiatives and proposals to this effect;
- (f) Achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity by agreement on appropriate mutual reduction and limitation of armaments and armed forces in accordance with paragraph 82 of the Final Document, which would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security.

14. Other priority measures that should be pursued as rapidly as possible during the Second Disarmament Decade include:

4/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

(a) Significant progress towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament, which will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

- (i) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;
- (ii) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- (iii) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time;

(b) Prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

(c) Further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms. These should constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, of the establishment of a world free of such weapons;

(d) Further steps to develop an international consensus to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document;

(e) Strengthening of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone and the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document;

(f) Establishment of zones of peace in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document;

(g) Measures to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, bearing in mind various proposals designed to secure these objectives and in accordance with paragraphs 57 and 58 of the Final Document, and thereby to ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered;

(h) Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques;

(i) Multilateral regional and bilateral measures on the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document;

(j) Reduction of military expenditures;

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(k) Confidence-building measures, taking into account the particular conditions and requirements of different regions, with a view to strengthening the security of States.

D. Disarmament and development

15. Peace and development are indivisible. During the Second Disarmament Decade, utmost efforts should be made towards the implementation of the specific measures whereby disarmament will contribute effectively to economic and social development and thus facilitate the full and early realization of the new international economic order. To this end, renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources from military purposes to economic and social development especially for the benefit of developing countries.

16. Efforts should also be made to strengthen international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, taking into account the provisions of all relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, in particular to ensure the success of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, to be convened in principle by 1983, as decided upon in General Assembly resolution 34/63 of 29 November 1979, as well as other promotional activities in this field in the United Nations system, including those within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

E. Disarmament and international security

17. An essential condition for progress in the field of disarmament is the preservation and strengthening of international peace and security and the promotion of confidence among States. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political and international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

18. All States Members of the United Nations have, in the Final Document, reaffirmed their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in

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any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others. In the decade of the 1980s, all Governments, in particular the most advanced military Powers, should therefore take such steps as will contribute to the widening of trust among nations of the world as well as in the various regions. This implies a commitment on the part of all States to avoid actions likely to increase tension or create new areas of threats to international peace and security and, in their relationship with other countries, strictly to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and the right of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to self-determination and national independence.

F. Public awareness

19. As stated in paragraph 15 of the Final Document, it is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present world armaments situation, so that world public opinion will be mobilized on behalf of peace and disarmament. This will be of great importance to the strengthening of international peace and security, the just and peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts and effective disarmament.

20. In the course of the decade of the 1980s, therefore, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations, should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connexion with Disarmament Week. These actions should constitute a large-scale programme further to alert world opinion to the danger of war in general and of nuclear war in particular. In keeping with its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, the United Nations, in particular its Centre for Disarmament, should intensify and co-ordinate its programme of publications, audio-visual materials, co-operation with non-governmental organizations and relations with the media. Among its activities, the United Nations should also, in the course of the Second Disarmament Decade, sponsor seminars in the different regions of the world at which issues relating to world disarmament, in general and to the particular region, especially, will be extensively discussed.

G. Studies

21. As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research established by Assembly resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.

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H. Implementation, review and appraisal

22. In the accomplishment of the activities earmarked for the Second Disarmament Decade, all Governments, particularly the most advanced military Powers, should make an effective contribution. The United Nations should continue to play a central role. The Committee on Disarmament should fully discharge its responsibility as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body. The General Assembly should, at its annual sessions and, in particular, at its second special session devoted to disarmament to be held in 1982, make an effective contribution to the pursuit of the goals of disarmament.

23. It is pertinent also to recall that paragraphs 121 and 122 of the Final Document stated:

(a) That bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate the negotiation of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament;

(b) That at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

24. In order to ensure a co-ordinated approach and to consider the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, this question should be included in the agenda of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, envisaged for 1982.

25. In addition, the General Assembly will undertake at its fortieth session, in 1985, a review and appraisal, through the Disarmament Commission, of progress in the implementation of the measures identified in the present Declaration.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/47
24 December 1980

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 44

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/665)]

35/47. Preparations for the second special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling section III of its resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, in which it decided to convene a second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982 and to set up, at its thirty-fifth session, a preparatory committee for the second special session,

Reaffirming the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 1/ and its conviction that disarmament remains one of the essential objectives of the United Nations,

Expressing its concern over the continuation of the arms race, which aggravates international peace and security and also diverts vast resources urgently needed for economic and social development,

Reiterating its conviction that peace can be secured through the implementation of disarmament measures, particularly of nuclear disarmament, conducive to the realization of the final objective, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

1. Decides to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament composed of seventy-eight Member States appointed by the President of the General Assembly on the basis of equitable geographic distribution;

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2. Requests the Preparatory Committee to prepare a draft agenda for the special session, to examine all relevant questions relating to that session and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session its recommendations thereon, including those in respect of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the Assembly at its tenth special session;

3. Invites all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the agenda and other relevant questions relating to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament not later than 1 April 1981;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the replies of Member States relevant to paragraph 2 above to the Preparatory Committee and to render to it all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records;

5. Requests the Preparatory Committee to meet for a short organizational session of not longer than one week before the end of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly in order, inter alia, to set the dates for its substantive sessions;

6. Further requests the Preparatory Committee to submit its progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item entitled: "Second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament".

79th plenary meeting
3 December 1980

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At the 79th plenary meeting, the President of the General Assembly announced that, in accordance with paragraph 1 of the above resolution, and on the basis of consultations held in the First Committee, he had appointed the following States as members of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/141
9 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 31

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On the report of the First Committee (A/35/684)

35/141. Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security",

Deeply concerned that the arms race, particularly in nuclear armaments and military expenditures, has continued to increase at an alarming speed, absorbing enormous material and human resources, which represents a heavy burden for the peoples of all countries and constitutes a grave danger for world peace and security,

Convinced that, disarmament being a matter of universal concern, there is a pressing need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about and be aware of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, and that the United Nations has a central role in this connexion,

Noting that, since the preparation of the updated report of the Secretary-General entitled Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, 1/ new developments have taken place in the fields covered by the reports that are of particular relevance in the present economic and political conditions of the world,

Recalling its decision, as reaffirmed in its resolution 32/75 of 12 December 1977, to keep the item under constant review,

1/ A/32/88/Rev.1 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1).

Recalling further paragraph 93 (c) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 2/ which provides that the Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to bring up to date, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts 3/ appointed by him, the report entitled Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, covering the basic topics of that report, and to transmit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

2. Invites all Governments to extend to the Secretary-General their support and full co-operation to ensure that the study will be carried out in the most effective way:

3. Calls upon non-governmental organizations and international institutions and organizations to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fortieth session the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security".

94th plenary meeting
12 December 1980

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

3/ Subsequently referred to as the Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/142
12 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 32

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee. (A/35/685)]

35/142. Reduction of military budgets

A

The General Assembly,

Expressing its deep concern about the ever-spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,

Deeply convinced that the common aspirations of mankind for peace, security and progress require the urgent cessation of the arms race, particularly of the nuclear arms race, and the reduction of military expenditures, as well as the adoption of effective measures leading towards general and complete disarmament,

Reaffirming the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly according to which gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, 1/

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 89.

Reaffirming that it is possible to achieve reductions in military budgets without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any State,

Recalling its resolution 34/83 F of 11 December 1979, in which it, inter alia, stipulated that, in the light of the above-mentioned provision of the Final Document, a new impetus should be given to endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, and, to this end, requested the Disarmament Commission to undertake during 1980 to examine and identify effective ways and means of achieving such agreements,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission on the work accomplished during its session of 1980 in pursuance of resolution 34/83 F, 2/

Noting also the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission concerning the elements of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, 3/ which provides that during the Decade renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources from military purposes to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of developing countries,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by States and of the activities carried out so far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Recalling also paragraph 41 of the Final Document, which refers, inter alia, to the contribution of the unilateral measures to the attainment of the disarmament goals, and welcoming in this connexion such measures taken by States aimed at the freezing and the reduction of their military expenditures,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reinforce the endeavours of all States and international action in the area of the reduction of military budgets, with a view to reaching international agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;
2. Reiterates the appeal to all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditure with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;
3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue at its session to be held in 1981 the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets", taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolution 34/83 F as well as those of the present resolution, and, in particular, to identify and elaborate on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/35/42).

3/ General Assembly resolution 35/46.

freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to invite Member States to express their views and suggestions on the principles which should govern their actions in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures and to prepare on this basis a report to be submitted to the Disarmament Commission at its session in 1981;

5. Considers that this action to be carried out by the Disarmament Commission should be regarded as complementary to any other ongoing activity within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of reduction of military budgets as well as to any possible unilateral initiatives which may be undertaken by States in this field;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

94th plenary meeting
12 December 1980

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provision of paragraph 90 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/ according to which it should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question,

Convinced that reductions of military expenditures could be carried out without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any country,

Recalling its resolution 33/67 of 14 December 1978, in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of an ad hoc panel of experienced practitioners in the field of military budgeting:

(a) To carry out a practical test of the proposed reporting instrument with the voluntary co-operation of States from different regions and representing different budgeting and accounting systems,

(b) To assess the results of the practical tests,

(c) To develop recommendations for further refinement and implementation of the reporting instrument,

4/ Resolution S-10/2.

Noting with appreciation the report submitted by the Secretary-General 5/ in pursuance of resolution 33/67, containing recommended steps leading to the early implementation of the revised instrument in a general and regular system for the international reporting of military expenditures, ensuring an increasing participation with a view to universal reporting by an ever-widening set of States and at the same time recommending that a further study should be undertaken of the problems of comparing military expenditures among different States and in different years as well as the problems of verification that will arise in connexion with agreements on reduction of military expenditures,

Recognizing with satisfaction that a carefully elaborated reporting instrument has now become available for general and regular implementation, in the course of which it may be further refined, in particular through its testing by a widening set of States,

Emphasizing the value of such a reporting instrument, once fully implemented in its refined form, as a means to increase confidence between States by contributing to greater openness in military matters,

Convinced that the systematic reporting of military expenditures is an important first step in the move towards agreed and balanced reductions in military expenditures,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the above-mentioned report to be issued as a United Nations publication and widely distributed;

2. Recommends that all Member States should make use of the reporting instrument and report annually to the Secretary-General their military expenditures of the latest fiscal year for which data are available, presenting their first report preferably not later than 30 April 1981;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report on these matters to the General Assembly on an annual basis;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of an ad hoc group of qualified experts in the field of military budgets; 6/

(a) To refine further the reporting instrument on the basis of future comments and suggestions received from States during the general and regular implementation of the reporting instrument;

5/ A/35/479.

6/ Subsequently referred to as the Group of Experts on Reduction of Military Budgets.

(b) To examine and suggest solutions to the question of comparing military expenditures among different States and between different years as well as to the problems of verification that will arise in connexion with agreements on reduction of military expenditures;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of paragraph 4 above to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the group of experts with the necessary financial assistance and secretariat services;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

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UNITED NATIONS

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Distr.
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A/RES/35/143
9 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 33

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

on the report of the First Committee (A/35/686)

35/143. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 34/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978 and 34/71 of 11 December 1979 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 1/

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-two sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971, respectively,

1. Regrets that the signature of Additional Protocol I by the United States of America and by France, which the General Assembly duly noted with satisfaction and which took place on 26 May 1977 and 2 March 1979, respectively, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratifications, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the invitations that the Assembly has addressed to them and which it reiterates with special urgency in the present resolution;

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/143 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

94th plenary meeting
12 December 1980



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
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Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/144
15 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 34

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/35/687)/

35/144. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to that Convention,

Recalling that, in paragraph 73 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ it expressed the opinion that all States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention,

Recalling that the States parties to the Convention met at Geneva from 3 to 21 March 1980 to review the operation of the Convention,

Noting with satisfaction that, at the time of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, eighty-one States had ratified the Convention, six States had acceded to the Convention and a further thirty-seven States had signed but had yet to ratify the Convention,

1. Welcomes the final declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 2/ in which the States parties to the Convention, inter alia:

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ See BWC/CONF.1/10.

(a) Reaffirmed their strong determination, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, their strong support for the Convention and their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions;

(b) Expressed the belief that article I had proved sufficiently comprehensive to have covered recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention;

(c) Considered that the flexibility of the provisions concerning consultations and co-operation on any problems which might arise in relation to the objective, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention enabled interested States parties to use various international procedures which would make it possible to ensure effectively and adequately the implementation of the provisions of the Convention, taking into account the concern expressed by the participants in the Conference to this effect - these procedures include, inter alia, the right of any State party subsequently to request that a consultative meeting open to all States parties be convened at expert level - and, having noted the concerns and differing views expressed on the adequacy of article V, believed that this question should be further considered at an appropriate time;

(d) Reaffirmed the obligation assumed by the States parties to the Convention to continue negotiations in good faith towards the recognized objectives of an early agreement on complete, effective and adequately verifiable measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction;

(e) Noted that during the first five years of the operation of the Convention the provisions of articles VI, VII, XI and XIII had not been invoked;

2. Calls upon all signatory States which have not ratified the Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not yet signed the Convention to consider doing so at an early date as a significant contribution to international confidence.

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B

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3465 (XXX) of 11 December 1975,

/...

31/65 of 10 December 1976, 32/77 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/59 A of 14 December 1978 and 34/72 of 11 December 1979, relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction,

Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 3/ and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 4/

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 5/ which embodies, inter alia, the report of its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons,

Taking note of the joint report on the progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to the Committee on Disarmament on 7 July 1980, which regrettably have not yet resulted in the elaboration of a joint initiative,

Considering it necessary that all efforts be exerted for the earliest successful conclusion of the negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. Notes with satisfaction the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its session held in 1980 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, in particular the work of its Ad Hoc Working Group on that question;
2. Expresses its regret that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;
3. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1981, negotiations on such a multilateral convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives;
4. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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3/ League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65,

4/ General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

5/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27).

C

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which was signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and entered into force on 8 February 1928, 3/

Noting that the States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 4/ have reaffirmed their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and called upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Noting that the Protocol does not provide for the establishment of any machinery for investigating reports about activities prohibited under the Protocol,

Believing that the continued authority of the Protocol and relevant rules of customary international law require that full and proper attention be given to all reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to their harmful effects, both immediate and long-term, to humans and to the environment of the victim countries,

Noting reports alleging that chemical weapons have been used in recent wars and certain military operations in various regions of the world,

Noting recent reports from certain States concerning the use of chemical weapons on their territories,

Noting also the statements of various international organizations, in particular of the International Committee of the Red Cross, concerning these reports,

Expressing profound regret that certain States directly interested in the clarification of reports pertaining to the actual or alleged use of chemical weapons and which have submitted appropriate proposals or suggestions in that matter had not been given the opportunity to present their views in the Committee on Disarmament during its session held in 1980,

Concerned over the fact that a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons and on the destruction of their stockpiles which would fully preclude the danger of their use has not yet been concluded,

Gravely concerned about the continued research and development programmes in the field of chemical weapons, especially the development of binary and multicomponent weapons whose field deployment could compromise the ongoing effort to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and trigger a chemical arms race,

Urging all States to refrain from the development, production and deployment of new types of chemical munitions, in particular binary and multicomponent munitions,

/...

Believing it necessary for all States, in particular militarily significant States, to refrain from any action which could impede multilateral negotiations on banning chemical weapons,

Convinced of the need to ascertain the facts pertaining to these reports and, in particular, to determine the harmful effects of the use of chemical weapons to human beings and the environment of the victim countries,

1. Calls upon all States parties to the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare to reaffirm their determination strictly to observe all their obligations under the Protocol;

2. Calls upon all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol;

3. Appeals to all States to comply with the principles and objectives of the Protocol;

4. Decides to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to the reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to assess the extent of the damage caused by the use of chemical weapons;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out such investigation, inter alia, taking into account proposals advanced by the States on whose territories the use of chemical weapons has been reported, with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts 6/ who shall:

(a) Seek relevant information from all concerned Governments, international organizations and other sources necessary;

(b) Collect and examine evidence, including on-site with the consent of the countries concerned, to the extent relevant to the purposes of the investigation;

6. Invites the Governments of States where chemical weapons were used to provide the Secretary-General with all relevant information they may have in their possession.

7. Calls upon all States to co-operate in this investigation and to provide any relevant information they may have in their possession regarding such reports;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on this matter to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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6/ Subsequently referred to as The Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/145
13 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 35

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/688)]

35/145. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 34/73

A

Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than twenty-five years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than forty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to whose attainment it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on seven different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Reiterating the assertion made in several previous resolutions that whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban,

Recalling that since 1972 the Secretary-General has declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement, that when the existing means of verification are taken into account, it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban and that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests,

Recalling also that the Secretary-General, in his foreword to the report entitled "Comprehensive nuclear test ban", 1/ has reiterated with special emphasis the opinion he expressed eight years ago and, after specifically referring to it, has added: "I still hold that belief. The problem can and should be solved now",

Noting that in the same report, which was prepared in compliance with its decision 34/422 of 11 December 1979, the experts have emphasized that non-nuclear-weapon States in general have come to regard the achievement of a comprehensive test ban as a litmus test of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race, adding that verification of compliance no longer seems to be an obstacle to reaching agreement,

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 2/ undertook in that Treaty, almost twenty years ago, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3/

1. Reiterates once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority and constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a contribution to nuclear disarmament;

3. Urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and, meanwhile, to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty;

4. Urges likewise all States members of the Committee on Disarmament:

(a) To support the creation by the Committee, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests;

(b) To use their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty;

1/ A/35/257.

2/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

3/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

5. Calls upon the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two treaties and as a provisional measure until the new comprehensive test-ban treaty enters into force, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons".

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B

Prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its conviction that it is in the interests of all people that nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments should cease, as this would be a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radio-active contamination for the health of present and future generations and a measure of the utmost importance in bringing the nuclear arms race to an end,

Recalling that the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 2/ and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 3/ have already expressed in those treaties their determination to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977, paragraph 51 of resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, resolution 33/60 of 14 December 1978, section IV of resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978 and resolution 34/73 of 11 December 1979,

Noting with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General on a comprehensive test ban, 1/

Noting the progress report on the trilateral negotiations, submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States, on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-test explosions in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, 4/

4/ CD/130.

Expressing regret that those negotiations have not moved as rapidly as had been expected,

Emphasizing the urgent need for all nuclear-weapon States to cease the testing of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the indispensable role of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty capable of attracting the widest possible international support and adherence,

Believing that the Committee on Disarmament should establish an ad hoc working group on a nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Recognizing the importance to a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing of the work being carried out under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament on the development of a global seismic verification system,

Convinced that the conclusion of such a treaty would create a favourable international climate for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982,

1. Reiterates its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the express wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;
2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the greatest urgency and priority;
3. Calls upon the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to exert their best efforts to bring their negotiations to a successful conclusion in time for consideration during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament;
4. Expresses the conviction that such a treaty is a vital requirement to halt the nuclear-arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries;
5. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1981;
6. Further requests the Committee on Disarmament to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative steps necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and effective verification system;
7. Urges all members of the Committee on Disarmament to co-operate with the Committee in fulfilling its mandate and, to this end, to support the creation of a working group on a comprehensive nuclear test ban;

/...

8. Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that a draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly no later than at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item relating to the implementation of the present resolution.

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12 December 1980



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/146
13 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 37

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/689)]

35/146. Implementation of the Declaration on the
Denuclearization of Africa

A

Nuclear capability of South Africa

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 34/76 B of 11 December 1979,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 1/ adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Alarmed by South Africa's increased sophistication in the nuclear field, including the advanced processing and enrichment of uranium as nuclear-weapon fuel and its advanced nuclear technology,

Alarmed also at the fact that South Africa's nuclear capability has been enhanced by the co-operation of certain Western States and Israel with the racist régime,

Taking note of the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective, 2/

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

2/ S/14179.

Noting with concern that South Africa has persistently refused to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 3/ and to conclude adequate and comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa, 4/

Bearing in mind the persistent concern with which the international community regards South Africa's capability and plans in the nuclear field,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field, including the reported explosion of a nuclear device in the South Atlantic on 22 September 1979, 5/

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field;
2. Expresses its deep alarm that the report has established South Africa's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons;
3. Also expresses its deep concern that South Africa's nuclear capability is being developed to preserve white supremacy by intimidating neighbouring countries and blackmailing the entire continent of Africa;
4. Reaffirms that the racist régime's nuclear plans and capability constitute a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardize the security of African States and increase the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
5. Requests the Security Council to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;
6. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions or individuals to terminate forthwith such nuclear collaboration between them and the racist régime of South Africa;
7. Requests the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action against the racist régime of South Africa, so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security through its acquisition of nuclear weapons;

3/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

4/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 63 (c).

5/ A/35/402 and Corr.1.

8. Demands that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to give maximum publicity to the report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field and to distribute it to Member States, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and non-governmental organizations, so that the international community and public opinion may be fully aware of the danger inherent in the programme;

10. Further requests the Secretary-General to follow closely South Africa's activity in the nuclear field and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

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B

Implementation of the Declaration

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa ^{1/} adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978 and 34/76 A of 11 December 1979, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling also that in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978 it vigorously condemned any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the continent and demanded that South Africa should forthwith refrain from conducting any nuclear explosion on the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

Reaffirming that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States,

/...

Noting with concern that South Africa has persistently refused to conclude adequate and comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking note of the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective 2/ and, in particular, its recommendation that all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa should cease,

Having seriously examined the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field, including the reported detonation of a nuclear explosive device in the South Atlantic on 22 September 1979, 5/

Gravely concerned that South Africa might have acquired nuclear weapons,

Expressing its indignation that certain Western countries and Israel have continued to collaborate with South Africa in the nuclear field despite the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons which the South African nuclear programme poses,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa, 4/

1. Strongly reiterates its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;
2. Reaffirms that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
3. Condemns any form of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa since such collaboration frustrates, inter alia, the objective of the Declaration of the Organization Of African Unity to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone;
4. Calls upon such States, corporations, institutions or individuals, therefore, to terminate forthwith such nuclear collaboration between them and the racist régime of South Africa;
5. Requests the Security Council, in keeping with the recommendation of its committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

/...

6. Demands that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of its solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

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Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/147
9 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 38

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/690)]

35/147. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also its resolution 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it recognized that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoyed wide support in the region,

Bearing in mind its resolution 31/71 of 10 December 1976, in which it expressed the conviction that progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance the cause of peace in the region and in the world,

Recalling its resolution 32/82 of 12 December 1977, in which it expressed the conviction that the development of nuclear capability would further complicate the situation and immensely damage the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Guided by the recommendations in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, 1/

Recalling also its resolutions 33/64 of 14 December 1978 and 34/77 of 11 December 1979,

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 63 (d).

Recognizing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

1. Urges all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 2/

2. Invites those countries, pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices;

3. Calls upon those countries to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

4. Further invites those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare their support for establishing such a zone in the region consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council for consideration as appropriate;

5. Reaffirms again its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the spirit and purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing in the region of the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote these objectives;

6. Renews its invitation to the Secretary-General to continue to explore the possibilities of making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

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2/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.



UNITED NATIONS

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ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/148
9 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 39

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[On the report of the First Committee (A/35/691)]

35/148. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978 and 34/78 of 11 December 1979 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will strengthen the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions it called upon the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective,

Further recalling that, in its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX), 31/73 and 32/83, it requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned therein and to render such assistance as might be

required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 1/ regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, 2/

1. Reaffirms its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;
2. Urges once again the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective;
3. Calls upon those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

94th plenary meeting
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1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ A/35/452.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/149
9 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 40

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/692)]

35/149. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976, 32/84 A of 12 December 1977, 33/66 B of 14 December 1978 and 34/79 of 11 December 1979 concerning the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 39 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ according to which qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race and efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new means of warfare,

Recalling the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the Final Document to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements, and that efforts aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should be appropriately pursued,

Expressing once again its firm belief in the light of the decisions adopted at the tenth special session, in the importance of concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

Noting that, in the course of its session held in 1980, the Committee on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons",

Taking into consideration the part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament relating to this question, 2/

1. Requests once again the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons;

2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-sixth session;

3. Once again urges all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament".

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2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27), sect. III E.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/150
12 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 41

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/693)]

35/150. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean
as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978 and 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979, and other recent relevant resolutions,

Bearing in mind, in particular, its decision at the thirty-fourth session in resolution 34/80 B to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean during 1981 at Colombo,

Recalling further the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, 1/

Welcoming the addition of new members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, appointed pursuant to resolution 34/80 B, and noting that the participation of these members has helped the work of the Committee,

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/34/45 and Corr.1).

Considering that the continued danger posed by the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of their confrontation, gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps towards the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Considering also that all other foreign military presence in the area, whenever it is contrary to the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, further gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps towards the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration,

Considering that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires the participation of and co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users, to ensure conditions of peace and security based on the purposes and principles of the Charter as well as the general principles of international law,

Considering also that the creation of a zone of peace requires co-operation among the regional States to ensure conditions of peace and security within the area, as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Deeply concerned at recent ominous developments resulting in further deterioration of peace and stability in the region and their implications for international peace and security,

1. Takes note of the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean 2/ and the exchange of views in the Ad Hoc Committee which, inter alia, indicate that:

(a) Following the expansion of its membership, there has been a varied and useful exchange of views on important issues regarding the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), and on other related matters;

(b) Progress has been made towards harmonizing differing approaches on these issues, while a number of fundamental issues remain to be resolved;

2. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in pursuance of the decision contained in resolution 34/80 B, to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean during 1981 at Colombo, and taking into consideration the exchange of views thereon:

(a) To continue its efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the issues related to the convening of the Conference to achieve the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace;

2/ Ibid., Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/35/29).

(b) To make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, particularly recent developments, as well as the progress made in the harmonization of views referred to in subparagraph (a) above, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening;

(c) To continue the preparatory work for the convening of the Conference and to hold two preparatory sessions in 1981 totalling six weeks;

(d) To submit to the Conference a full report on its preparatory work;

3. Requests the Conference on the Indian Ocean to submit its report to the General Assembly;

4. Renews the general mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions;

5. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session a full report on the implementation of the present resolution;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records. 3/

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3/ See resolution 35/10 B, para. 2 (f).



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/151
12 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 42

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/694)]

35/151. World Disarmament Conference

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976, 32/89 of 12 December 1977, 33/69 of 14 December 1978 and 34/81 of 11 December 1979,

Reiterating its conviction that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its conviction that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could provide the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1/

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ it decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/35/28).

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

Recalling that, in its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980 on the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, the General Assembly considered it pertinent also to recall that in paragraph 122 of the Final Document it had stated that at the earliest appropriate time a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

1. Notes with satisfaction that in its report to the General Assembly the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference stated, inter alia, the following:

"Having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation ... the General Assembly may wish to decide that, after its second special session devoted to disarmament, a world disarmament conference would take place as soon as the necessary consensus on its convening has been reached"; 3/

2. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee;

3. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, and to consider any possible relevant proposals and observations which might be made to the Committee, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

4. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference".

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3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/35/28), para. 15.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/152
14 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 44

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/665/Add.1)]

- 35/152. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

A

United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, taken at the tenth special session, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, 1/

Recalling also its resolution 34/83 D of 11 December 1979, in which it requested the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements relating to the programme for 1980 in accordance with the guidelines approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session,

Expressing its satisfaction at the fact that Governments, particularly those of developing countries, have continued to manifest serious interest in the programme,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament for 1980, 2/

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 108.

2/ A/35/521.

1. Decides to continue the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements relating to the programme for 1981 in accordance with the guidelines approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;
3. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session a report on the implementation of the programme;
4. Commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has been conducted;
5. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States that have invited the fellows to their capitals to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby complementing usefully the fulfilment of the over-all objectives of the programme, as well as providing additional information sources and practical knowledge for the fellows.

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B

Nuclear weapons in all aspects

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming that nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to mankind and its survival and that it is therefore essential to proceed with nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike,

Noting with alarm the increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe associated both with the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and with the adoption of the new doctrine of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons giving rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict,

/...

Stressing again that priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear weapons, and referring to paragraphs 49 and 54 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978 and 34/83 J of 11 December 1979,

Noting with satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament during its session held in 1980 considered the item of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament",

Noting also the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament,

Noting with regret that the Committee on Disarmament during its session held in 1980 did not have an opportunity to attempt to reconcile the different points of view as regards the approach, machinery and basis for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

1. Notes the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to resume intensive consideration, at its session to be held in 1981, of the item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament;

2. Believes it necessary to intensify efforts with a view to initiating, as a matter of high priority, negotiations, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, on the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

3. Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early commencement of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to undertake consultations in which to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and of nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate;

4. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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C

Nuclear weapons in all aspects

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it decided that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war had the highest priority and that it was essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

Recalling also that, at the same session, it was expressly recognized that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned, and the results that should be pursued in each one of those stages were defined,

Reiterating its conviction, as stated in its resolution 34/83 B of 11 December 1979, that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, should become urgently and most directly involved in substantive negotiations on priority disarmament questions,

Bearing in mind the declaration formulated by twenty-one of the States members of the Committee on Disarmament, in the working paper of 27 February 1980, 4/ to the effect that working groups are the best available machinery for conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee,

Taking into account the positive conclusions derived from the performance of the four ad hoc working groups established by the Committee on Disarmament on 17 March 1980 to deal, respectively, with the items relating to chemical weapons, radiological weapons, "negative guarantees" and the comprehensive programme on disarmament,

1. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to establish, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, an ad hoc working group on the item which in its agenda for 1979 and 1980, was entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament";

2. Considers that, in the light of the exchange of views held on this subject during the last two annual sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, it would be advisable that the working group begin its negotiations by addressing the question of the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament.

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D

Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its declaration, contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, 5/

Recalling its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978 and 34/83 G of 11 December 1979,

Noting the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a Group of Experts, 6/

1. Declares once again that:

(a) The use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity;

(b) The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament;

2. Requests all States that have so far not submitted their proposals concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters, to do so, in order that the question of an international convention or some other agreement on the subject may be further considered at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war".

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5/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 58.

6/ A/35/392.

E

Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the
tenth special session

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at the tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978 and 34/83 C of 11 December 1979,

Bearing in mind that general and complete disarmament has been recognized as an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community and that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Considering it imperative to achieve genuine progress in all negotiations dealing with disarmament issues,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction that the tenth special session resulted in greater involvement by Member States in efforts aimed at halting the arms race and launching a process of genuine disarmament,

Expressing its satisfaction that some initial results in the implementation of the recommendations and decision of the tenth special session have been achieved, primarily through a considerable revitalization of the multilateral disarmament machinery,

Deeply concerned, however, about the continuing arms race and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race, which constitutes a growing threat to international peace and security,

Calling attention to the tasks set forth in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, 7/ which demand intensified efforts to be taken in the Committee on Disarmament and other appropriate forums,

Stressing the need to promote the development, strengthening and intensification of international co-operation designed to achieve general and complete disarmament, as defined by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,

7/ General Assembly resolution 35/46.

Noting with concern that lack of tangible progress with respect to the implementation of the measures set forth in the Programme of Action of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/

1. Expresses its deep concern about the continued arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and about the constantly growing military budgets, which bear negative consequences and pose a growing threat to international peace and security as well as to the unhampered development of countries, particularly developing countries;
2. Urgently calls upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other major military Powers, immediately to take steps leading to effective halting and reversing of the arms race and to disarmament;
3. Urges those States also to intensify their efforts to bring to a successful end the negotiations which are currently taking place in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums or to proceed with negotiations on effective international agreements according to the priorities of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;
4. Recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results;
5. Expresses its conviction that one of the most important contributions for the preparation of the special session on disarmament to be held in 1982 will be to achieve tangible progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action;
6. Calls upon all States to refrain from any actions which have or may have negative effects on the implementation of the relevant recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session;
7. Invites all States which are engaged in disarmament negotiations or arms limitation negotiations outside the United Nations framework to keep the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament informed of the results of such negotiations in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;
8. Also calls upon States engaged in disarmament negotiations or arms limitation negotiations outside the United Nations framework to implement the results achieved so as to create favourable conditions for further progress;
9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session of the General Assembly".

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/...

F

Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission, 8/

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session,

Considering the important role that the Disarmament Commission has played and the significant contribution it has made in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Recalling its resolution 34/83 H of 11 December 1979,

1. Endorses the report of the Disarmament Commission and the recommendations contained therein;

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ and, to that end, to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1981;

3. Also requests the Disarmament Commission to continue the consideration of the agenda items contained in General Assembly resolution 34/83 H, with emphasis on the preparation of a report to the Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;

4. Further requests the Disarmament Commission to submit a report on its work and its recommendations on paragraphs 2 and 3 above to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 9/ together with all the official records of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that it may require for implementing the present resolution;

8/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/35/42).

9/ Ibid., Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27).

/...

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

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G

Paragraph 125 of the Final Document

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the declaration set forth in section II of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 3/ that, unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and the security of mankind,

Profoundly concerned over the deterioration of the international situation,

Recalling the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document as well as the activities undertaken in pursuance of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade 7/ towards bringing about the cessation of the arms race and towards real disarmament,

Reaffirming that, while nuclear disarmament is a task of the first and highest priority, progress in the limitation and subsequent reduction of nuclear weapons would be facilitated by parallel political measures and international legal measures to strengthen the security of States;

Calling for the dissolution of existing military alliances and, as a first step, for refraining from actions conducive to expansion of existing military groupings,

Concerned over the fact that the current negotiations on arms limitation and on disarmament are being protracted and that some of them have been suspended or terminated,

1. Calls upon the States permanent members of the Security Council and the countries which have military agreements with them to exercise restraint both in the nuclear and conventional fields and to resolve not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments, effective from an agreed date, as a first step towards a subsequent reduction of their armed forces and conventional armaments;

2. Invites the appropriate international bodies in the field of disarmament to continue, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, efforts aimed at achieving positive results in curbing the arms race in accordance with the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade;

/...

3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep this question under constant review and to transmit all relevant documents of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly to appropriate international bodies.

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H

Programme of research and studies on disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling the recommendations concerning the establishment of an international institute for disarmament research contained in its resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979,

Taking into account the decisions taken by the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research at its special meeting in February 1980,

Bearing in mind the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies at its meetings held in 1980,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the programme of research and studies on disarmament; 10/

2. Welcomes the establishment at Geneva of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research as an interim arrangement for the period until the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

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I

World Disarmament Campaign

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at its tenth special session it stressed the importance of mobilizing public opinion on behalf of disarmament,

10/ A/35/574.

/...

Taking into account that, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ it recommended to that end the adoption of several concrete measures intended to intensify and broaden the dissemination of information about the arms race and the efforts to halt and reverse it as well as to promote programmes of study and education concerning disarmament,

Bearing in mind that for the realization of a world disarmament campaign of a permanent character it will be necessary, on the one hand, to define some basic rules which, without detriment to the necessary flexibility, will ensure a minimum of co-ordination and, on the other hand, to establish a practical and generally acceptable system for the financing of such a campaign,

Having examined the relevant section of the report of the Secretary-General on the fourth and fifth sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 11/

1. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of a small group of experts, for whose composition, in so far as circumstances permit, preference should be given to members of the Secretariat, a study on the organization and financing of a World Disarmament Campaign under the auspices of the United Nations;

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item entitled "World Disarmament Campaign".

94th plenary meeting
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J

Report of the Committee on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 34/83 B of 11 December 1979,

Expressing its satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament has made progress in respect of the improvement of its organization and methods of work,

Affirming that the establishment of ad hoc working groups on substantive disarmament issues will promote the negotiating role of the Committee on Disarmament,

Expressing its concern that, despite improvements in its methods of work, the Committee on Disarmament has not thus far been able to achieve concrete results on disarmament issues which have been under consideration for a number of years,

11/ A/35/575.

/...

Convinced that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/

Stressing that negotiations on specific disarmament issues conducted outside the Committee on Disarmament should not in any way constitute an impediment to the negotiations on such questions in the Committee,

1. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1981, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those questions;

2. Invites the members of the Committee on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee and, at the same time, to submit to the Committee a full report on their separate negotiations and the results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee in accordance with paragraph 1 above;

3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at its session to be held in 1981, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and to submit the programme in time for consideration by the General Assembly at the second special session devoted to disarmament;

4. Also requests the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its work on priority questions of disarmament, so that it may be in a position to contribute, through concrete accomplishments, to a favourable climate for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

5. Further requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament".

94th plenary meeting
12 December 1980



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
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Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/153
13 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 43

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/695)]

35/153. United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 33/70 of 14 December 1978 and 34/82 of 11 December 1979,

Reiterating its conviction that the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants could be significantly reduced if general agreement could be attained on the prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

Reaffirming its belief that positive results as regards the non-use or restriction of use for humanitarian reasons of specific conventional weapons would serve, in addition, as encouragement in the broader field of disarmament,

Recalling that, by its resolutions 32/152 and 33/70, it decided to convene in 1979 the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and established the mandate of the Conference,

Further recalling that, by its resolution 34/82, it endorsed the recommendation of the Conference to hold another session in September/October 1980, with a view to completing negotiations in conformity with resolutions 32/152 and 33/70,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the Final Report of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions and Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons

Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, held at Geneva from 10 to 28 September 1979 and from 15 September to 10 October 1980; 1/

2. Welcomes the successful conclusion of the Conference, which resulted in the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the following instruments:

(a) Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects;

(b) Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I);

(c) Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II);

(d) Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III);

3. Takes note of article 3 of the Convention, which stipulates that the Convention shall be open for signature on 10 April 1981;

4. Commends the Convention and the three annexed Protocols to all States, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments;

5. Takes note that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the annexed Protocols, to consider additional Protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols;

6. Requests the Secretary-General, as the Depositary of the Convention and its annexed Protocols, to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the Convention and its three annexed Protocols;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

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1/ A/CONF.95/15.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/154
13 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 45

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/696)]

35/154. Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent nuclear conflagration,

Taking into account the principle of non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed in a number of United Nations declarations and resolutions,

Noting with satisfaction the desire of States in various regions to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories, including through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to contribute to the attainment of this objective,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Mindful of the statements and considerations made by various States on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 of 14 December 1978 and 34/84 and 34/85 of 11 December 1979,

Noting the consideration by the Committee on Disarmament in 1980 of the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and the setting up of an ad hoc working group to continue the negotiations on this problem,

Recalling the drafts of an international convention submitted on this item to the Committee on Disarmament in 1979,

Taking note of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, including the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, 2/

Noting with satisfaction that the idea of a convention has received widespread international support,

Wishing to promote an early and successful completion of the negotiations on the elaboration of such a convention,

Noting further the examination by the Committee on Disarmament of the suggestion that, upon the recommendation of the General Assembly, the Security Council might consider the question of concrete measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons which, as an interim arrangement, should not be a substitute for the indispensable renewed efforts to reach agreement on a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character,

1. Welcomes the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament that there is continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention;

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27), paras. 45-49.

3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue on a priority basis, during its session in 1981, the negotiations on the question of strengthening of security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States;

4. Calls upon States participating in talks on the question of providing guarantees to non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to make efforts for the speedy elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter;

5. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of such an international convention;

6. Recommends that the Security Council should examine declarations which may be made by nuclear States regarding the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States and, if all these declarations are found consistent with the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

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12 December 1980



UNITED NATIONS
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Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/155
14 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 46

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/697)]

35/155. Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about any possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

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Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolution 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,

Further recalling its resolution 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which it requested the nuclear-weapon States urgently to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document,

Recalling its resolution 33/72 of 14 December 1978,

Further recalling its resolution 34/85 of 11 December 1979,

Welcoming the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Working Group with a view to reaching agreement on consideration of the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons",

Noting the drafts of an international convention submitted under that item in the Committee on Disarmament,

Further noting the report of the Committee on Disarmament, including the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, 2/

Noting the decision of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Eleventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Islamabad from 17 to 22 May 1980, calling on the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate and reach an agreement on an international basis to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further noting the general support expressed in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27), paras. 45-49.

2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although there has been lack of progress in the Committee towards evolving a common approach acceptable to all;

3. Appeals to all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. Recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching agreement and concluding effective international arrangements during its next session to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

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12 December 1980



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/156
16 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 48

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/35/699)/

35/156. General and complete disarmament

A

Study on conventional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the continuing arms race, including the conventional arms race, and the alarming increase in expenditures on armaments,

Recognizing the right of all States to protect their security,

Reaffirming the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament, regarding priorities in the disarmament negotiations,

Recalling the recommendations in paragraphs 81 and 85 of the Final Document,

Noting that at the session of the Disarmament Commission held between 12 May and 6 June 1980, there was wide support in favour of recommending to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that it should approve, in principle, a proposal for a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken after the general approach to the study, its structure and scope had been fully discussed and agreed upon, 2/

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/35/42), para. 20.

1. Approves in principle, the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis;
2. Agrees that the Disarmament Commission, at its forthcoming substantive session, should work out the general approach to the study, its structure and scope;
3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to convey to the Secretary-General the conclusions of its deliberations, which should constitute the guidelines for the study;
4. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, and a final report at its thirty-eighth session.

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B

Confidence-building measures

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 B of 16 December 1978 and 34/87 B of 11 December 1979 on confidence-building measures,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General on a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures, 3/ to which was annexed the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-building Measures;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the work in this regard and to submit the study to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;
3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Confidence-building measures".

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12 December 1980

C

Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States
where there are no such weapons at present

The General Assembly,

Conscious that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind,

Recalling its resolution 33/91 F of 16 December 1978, in which it called upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and on all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, 4/ submitted in accordance with its resolution 34/87 C of 11 December 1979,

Bearing in mind the clearly expressed intention of many States to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories,

Considering that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would constitute a step towards the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States, thus contributing to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and leading eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

1. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;
3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present: report of the Committee on Disarmament".

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4/ A/35/145 and Add.1.

/...

D

Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/91 E of 16 December 1978, in which it decided to undertake a systematic study of all the aspects of regional disarmament and requested the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General containing the study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament, 5/

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General and the study annexed thereto;
2. Commends the study and its conclusions to the attention of all States;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the above-mentioned report to be issued as a United Nations publication and widely distributed;
4. Invites all Member States to inform the Secretary-General, at the latest by 1 June 1981, of their views regarding the study and its conclusions;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, for its information, the replies of Member States;
6. Decides to transmit the study to the Disarmament Commission;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the study to the Committee on Disarmament;
8. Expresses the hope that the study will encourage Governments to take initiatives and to consult within the different regions with a view to agreeing upon appropriate measures of regional disarmament.

94th plenary meeting
12 December 1980

E

Study on the relationship between disarmament and
international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977, in which it requested the Secretary-General to initiate a study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security,

5/ A/35/416.

/...

Recalling also its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/91 I of 16 December 1978 and 34/83 A of 11 December 1979,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General 6/ containing a letter from the Chairman of the Group of Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and International Security, informing the Secretary-General that, owing to the vast area to be covered and the complexity and sensitivity of the issues involved, the Group would need more time to complete its work;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the study and to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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12 December 1980

F

Study on nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which it was stated that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Recalling also its resolution 33/91 D of 16 December 1978, in which the Secretary-General was requested to carry out a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons,

Noting that the report of the Group of Experts on a Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons 7/ has been completed and is available,

Considering that in its report the Disarmament Commission recommended that, in the course of the decade of the 1980s, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and the specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations, 8/

6/ A/35/436.

7/ A/35/392.

8/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/35/42), para. 19.

Convinced that the wide dissemination of the report would contribute to a better understanding of the threat presented by nuclear weapons as well as of the need for progress in the various negotiations aiming at the prevention of both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General as a highly significant statement on present nuclear arsenals, the trends in their technological development and the effects of their use, as well as on the various doctrines of deterrence and the security implications of the continued quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear-weapon systems and also as a reminder of the need for efforts to increase the political will necessary for effective disarmament measures, inter alia, through the promotion of public awareness of the need for disarmament;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the experts who assisted him for the prompt and effective manner in which the report was prepared;

3. Notes the conclusions of the report and expresses the hope that all States will consider them carefully;

4. Recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should take the report and its conclusions into account in its efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in particular in the field of nuclear disarmament;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the entire report as a United Nations publication and, making full use of all the facilities of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat, to publicize the report in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable;

6. Recommends to all Governments the wide distribution of the report and its publication in their respective languages, as appropriate, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents;

7. Invites regional intergovernmental organizations, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and national and international non-governmental organizations, to use all the facilities available to them to make the report widely known.

94th plenary meeting
12 December 1980

/...

G

Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting
the development, production, stockpiling and use of
radiological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments of 12 August 1948, which defined weapons of mass destruction to include atom explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or the other weapons mentioned above,

Recalling its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,

Recalling paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which it is stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,

Reaffirming its resolution 34/37 A of 11 December 1979 on the conclusion of such a convention,

Convinced that such a convention would serve to spare mankind the potential dangers of the use of radiological weapons and thereby contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war,

Expressing its satisfaction that negotiations on the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons have begun in the Committee on Disarmament,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament which deals with those negotiations, 9/ including the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group,

Noting with satisfaction the wide recognition of the need to reach agreement on the text of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons,

1. Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons and to report on the results to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session:

9/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27), paras. 57-62.

2. Notes in this connexion the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to set up at the beginning of its session to be held in 1981 a further ad hoc working group, under an appropriate mandate to be determined at that time, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

94th plenary meeting
12 December 1980

H

Prohibition of the production of fissionable material
for weapons purposes

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978 and 34/87 D of 11 December 1979, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 1/ and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda for 1980 of the Committee on Disarmament included the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that its programme of work for both parts of its session held in 1980 contained the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament",

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on these items,

Noting further that the report of the Committee on Disarmament contains a summary of the work of the Committee during 1980 on this subject and refers to the submission of the document entitled "The prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes", 10/

10/ Ibid., paras. 37-44.

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race,

Considering that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices would also be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

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12 December 1980

I

Report of the Committee on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Recognizing also that all States have the duty to contribute to and the right to participate in disarmament negotiations, as acknowledged in paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

Recalling, to that effect, its resolution 33/91 G of 16 December 1978,

Noting section IX of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament, relating to the participation of non-member States in the work of the Committee,

Recalling also that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament is to be reviewed at regular intervals in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document,

1. Takes note of the relevant parts of the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its session held in 1980 in which it is stated that the Committee will, at an appropriate time, conduct a review of its membership and report on the results to the General Assembly; 11/

11/ Ibid., para. 73.

2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue to consider the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee and to report on this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

3. Recommends that the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed, following appropriate consultations among Member States, during the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

4. Reaffirms that States not members of the Committee, upon their request, should be invited by it to participate in the work of the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item relating to a review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament.

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J

Disarmament and international security

The General Assembly,

Noting with concern that the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, continues unabated while efforts towards arms reduction or limitation have not yet produced concrete results,

Conscious of the grave danger of a nuclear conflagration resulting from the continued escalation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and from recent ominous developments,

Considering that the lack of effective international security is a generating factor in the escalating arms race,

Recalling that, according to Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, the primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security and, to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace,

Recognizing that compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter would promote world order and security, so necessary in these demanding times,

Convinced that confidence in the effectiveness of the United Nations and the resulting climate of trust will facilitate co-operation between Member States on matters of common interest for peace and survival, irrespective of any differences in political or social systems,

/...

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding, 12/

Recalling further that in the Final Document it is also stated that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, 13/

Considering that the objective of halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and proceeding to effective disarmament measures, compatible with national security, could be effectively served through applying the collective security system provided for in the Charter, parallel to disarmament efforts,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 34/83 A of 11 December 1979 on disarmament and international security;

2. Calls upon all States to proceed in a positive spirit towards measures under the Charter of the United Nations for a system of international security and order concurrently with efforts at effective disarmament measures;

3. Recommends that the main organs of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security should give early consideration to the requirements for halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and developing the modalities for the effective application of the system of international security provided for in the Charter;

4. Requests the permanent members of the Security Council to facilitate the work of the Council towards carrying out this essential responsibility under the Charter;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

94th plenary meeting
12 December 1980

12/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 12.

13/ Ibid., para. 13.

K

Strategic arms limitation talks

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2932 B (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3484 C (XXX) of 12 December 1975, 31/189 A of 21 December 1976 and 32/37 G of 12 December 1977,

Reaffirming once again its resolution 33/91 C of 16 December 1978, in which it, inter alia:

(a) Reiterated its satisfaction for the solemn declarations made in 1977 by the heads of State of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, in which they stated that they were ready to endeavour to reach agreements which would permit starting the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and moving towards their complete, total destruction, with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons,

(b) Recalled that one of the disarmament measures deserving the highest priority, included in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ was the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II, which should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms,

(c) Stressed that in the Programme of Action it was established that, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility,

Recalling that the SALT II agreement - which bears the official title of "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" - was finally signed on 18 June 1979, after six years of bilateral negotiations, and that its text, together with the texts of the Protocol to the Treaty and a joint statement, both signed on the same date as the Treaty, and a joint communiqué issued also on 18 June 1979, was issued as a document of the Committee on Disarmament, 14/

Reaffirming that, as stated in its resolution 34/87 F of 11 December 1979, it shares the conviction expressed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,

14/ See CD/53/Appendix III/Vol.I, document CD/28.

Bearing in mind that in the same resolution it expressed its trust that the SALT II Treaty would enter into force at an early date, inasmuch as it constituted a vital element for the continuation and progress of the negotiations between the two States possessing the most important arsenals of nuclear weapons,

Recalling that, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, it proclaimed that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone were more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth, that the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakened it, and that the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race posed a threat to the very survival of mankind, for which reasons the General Assembly declared that all the peoples of the world had a vital interest in the sphere of disarmament,

Noting that the Disarmament Commission, at its session held in 1980, agreed, while examining the "Elements of the declaration of the 1980s as the second disarmament decade", to include, among the concrete measures which should be given the highest priority, the ratification of the strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT II) and the commencement of negotiations for a SALT III agreement, 15/

Noting also that in the debates of the Committee on Disarmament during its session held in 1980 the need for prompt ratification of the Treaty was constantly stressed,

Convinced that the signature in good faith of a treaty, especially if it is the culmination of prolonged and conscientious negotiations, carries with it the presumption that its ratification will not be unduly delayed,

1. Deplores that the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) has not yet been ratified, notwithstanding that it was signed on 18 June 1979 and in spite of the many other reasons existing for such ratification as illustrated by those summarized in the preamble of the present resolution;

2. Urges the two signatory States not to delay any further the implementation of the procedure provided for in article XIX of the Treaty for its entry into force, taking particularly into account that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples are at stake in this question;

3. Trusts that, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the signatory States, in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 16/ will refrain from any act which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty;

15/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/35/42), para. 19.

16/ See Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Documents of the Conference (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.V.5) document A/CONF.39/27.

4. Reiterates its satisfaction, already expressed in its resolution 34/87 F, at the agreement reached by both parties in the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, signed the same day as the Treaty, to the effect of continuing to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the number of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation which should culminate in the SALT III treaty, and to the effect also of endeavouring in such negotiations to achieve, inter alia, the following objectives:

(a) Significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic arms;

(b) Qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms;

5. Invites the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Strategic arms limitation talks".

94th plenary meeting
12 December 1980



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/35/157
12 January 1981

Thirty-fifth session
Agenda item 49

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/35/700)]

35/157. Israeli nuclear armament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its relevant resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Reaffirming its resolution 33/71 A of 14 December 1978 on military and nuclear collaboration with Israel, and its resolution 34/89 of 11 December 1979 on Israeli nuclear armament,

1. Takes note of the progress report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Group of Experts to Prepare a Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament 1/ submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his efforts in this regard and to submit his report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;
3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

94th plenary meeting
12 December 1980

1/ A/35/458.

Considerations on the Organization of Work of the
Committee on Disarmament During its 1981 Session

Document of a Group of Socialist States

1. To curb the arms race and to achieve genuine disarmament are main objectives of foreign policy of the socialist States. The fruitful debate on disarmament issues at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly showed that these endeavours are shared by the overwhelming majority of the United Nations Member States. In the current seriously aggravated international situation, there is an urgent need for resolute action to translate into practical terms the provisions of the final document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Any concrete agreement now on arms limitation and disarmament would have a favourable impact on the international situation as a whole. The issues of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament legitimately hold the central place in the negotiations pursued in international fora, because their solution would meet the interests of the entire mankind.

The Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum has a special role to play in this process. Its membership represents all the major groups of States, namely socialist, non-aligned and neutral, as well as Western. Forty States participate in its work, including all the nuclear-weapons States, as well as other States with the largest military potentials. The Committee's agenda includes virtually all important items, the solution of which would result in furthering international peace and détente. The 1981 session of the Committee will be its last full session before the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in 1982. An important task in this regard would be to consolidate the results achieved in this field in recent years, and in particular to implement the initiatives advanced by the socialist countries at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The discussion and approval of those proposals have demonstrated their topicality. These proposals have evoked a broad positive response. The achievement of tangible progress in the negotiations on the main items before the Committee on Disarmament would be one of the most important contributions to the preparation of the forthcoming special session.

Therefore, in the view of the Group of socialist countries, all Member States of the Committee on Disarmament should duly respond to the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly, contained in resolution 35/152 E, "to intensify their efforts to bring to a successful end the negotiations which are currently taking place in the Committee on Disarmament". The resolution also recommended that the Committee "should concentrate on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results".

Having this in mind, the Group of socialist States appeals to all member countries of the Committee to start concrete, businesslike negotiations at an early time. The Committee must not waste time on issues which bear no relation to its agenda and which are deliberately introduced in the debate to divert its attention from the questions of substance. Less time should be devoted to the discussion of procedural and organizational matters.

2. Ad hoc working groups are regarded as the appropriate machinery within the Committee on Disarmament for concrete negotiations. In discharging its responsibilities, the Committee should re-establish at the outset of its 1981 session appropriate ad hoc working groups on its agenda items. The four ad hoc working groups which were set up in 1980, namely on

- radiological weapons;
- chemical weapons;
- effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- comprehensive programme of disarmament

should proceed without delay with their negotiations.

At the same time, as is demonstrated by the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament, including at its current session, many a country stand for a more serious examination of the nuclear disarmament issue, for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to this end. From the point of view of the socialist countries, it is expedient to set up such a group as soon as possible. Its work should facilitate the earliest start of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. All nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear countries should participate in this work.

The socialist countries are consistently in favour of the Committee on Disarmament playing an active part in the solution of the tasks of complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and support the proposal concerning the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this question.

In accordance with resolution 35/156 C of the United Nations General Assembly the Committee on Disarmament is requested "to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present". Having this in mind, the socialist countries deem it necessary to set up an ad hoc working group on this question, too.

The socialist countries believe that the Committee should continue to pay close attention to the issue of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. In this connection, the socialist States propose to establish an ad hoc group of experts on this problem and are willing to consider the question of its mandate, proceeding from the general task of banning such types and systems of weapons.

Being interested in ensuring effective work of the Committee on Disarmament, the Group of socialist States holds that it is not advisable to link the creation of one ad hoc working group with the creation of another. The chairmanship in the ad hoc working groups should rotate on a reasonable basis among the heads of delegations of various countries.

3. Furtheron, the Group of socialist States deems it necessary that the Committee promptly decide at this session the question of the invitation of States not members of the Committee. Those decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament which were elaborated after careful negotiations and which have proved their value.

As for the distribution of documents of non-member States in the Committee, it is necessary to continue the practice which was developed last April and which was followed by the Chairmen of the Committee in June, July and August 1980.

In submitting their Considerations on the Organization of Work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981 Session, the socialist countries proceed from the premise that at present it is particularly important to concentrate efforts on the businesslike search for concrete agreements on the main items on the disarmament agenda.

SWEDEN

Working Paper

Prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons (4 Annexes)

1. Sweden considers that in order to secure an effective abolition of chemical weapons and chemical warfare, it is not sufficient to prohibit development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. It is also necessary to prohibit activities, facilities and materials aimed at using chemical weapons in the battlefield or elsewhere in war. The reason for the Swedish position is that unless such an extended prohibition is accepted there would not exist any major difficulties for a Party either to retain or acquire the ability to use chemical weapons within a comparatively short time, were it to withdraw from a ban on development, production and stockpiling. This is illustrated in Annex I. If preparative activities aimed at the acquisition of a qualified capability to use chemical weapons were not prohibited, they would also not be subject to verification measures. This would undoubtedly cause the prospective parties to a convention to feel a lesser degree of security, and might lead to a reluctance on their part to adhere to such a convention. In Sweden's view these circumstances have to be taken into consideration in the drafting of the convention on chemical weapons now being negotiated in the CD. The following considerations appear relevant in this context.

2. A chemical warfare capability consists of two elements:

(a) ability (including resources) to use chemical weapons in a militarily effective way against an adversary,

(b) ability to perform combat duties on different levels in an environment contaminated through the use of chemical weapons, one's own or the adversary's, that is a protective capacity stretching from only surviving to actually continuing combat.

Both tasks require proper protective equipment and training. However, in order to use chemical weapons effectively some specific measures are required as exemplified in Annex I.

Recognizing the almost unanimously held view that a capability to protect oneself against attacks with chemical weapons is to be allowed in a chemical weapons convention, the Swedish delegation holds that the particular measures required to obtain or retain a capability to use chemical weapons could and ought to be prohibited in a convention. As discussed in the following, such a prohibition would -- apart from rendering it more meaningful -- increase significantly the possibilities to verify compliance thereof.

The expression used by Sweden so far to describe the suggested prohibition has been formulated "prohibition of planning, organization and training for a chemical warfare capability". This expression is to be taken as referring to a capability to use the chemical weapons.

3. Before discussing the Swedish proposals more in detail, some important conditions will be considered.

(a) The Swedish delegation is aware that its suggestions concern much more of purely military matters usually guarded by strict secrecy measures, than would a convention banning only development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. However, since the ultimate goal is the final abolition of chemical warfare, the Swedish delegation is convinced that normal military secrecy in relation to specific measures required for a chemical warfare capability need not be upheld in the long run.

(b) It is often argued that since a protective capability against chemical weapons would be allowed, it would in practice be possible to disguise efforts to obtain a capability to use chemical weapons among allowed efforts to acquire or maintain such a protective capability. There are indeed particular activities which do not fall within the area of general protection, such as training of flight behaviour or munition transportation directives (see Annex I). Sweden therefore believes that the opportunities offered by the distinction that can thus be made should be explored in order to obtain an effective prohibition.

(c) An option inherent in Sweden's approach is the possibility to increase significantly the effectiveness of the verification of compliance with the convention. If a greater number of activities were covered by a prohibition, this would clearly increase the possibilities to verify compliance thereof. It would also improve the grounds on which the Parties might adhere to or continue adherence to the convention. Examples of the activities to be monitored are given in Annex I.

(d) It is sometimes argued that the most effective way to secure the abolition of chemical warfare would be to prohibit also protective measures. It must be recalled, however, that a very long time would be needed to implement provisions concerning, inter alia, destruction of existent stockpiles of chemical weapons. Obviously during such a time many States would want to retain their capacity for protection against chemical weapons. If protective measures were to be prohibited from the outset, it would imply a diminished security for these States for whom chemical weapons at present have a military significance and might cause them not to adhere to a treaty in the foreseeable future. This would obviously detract from the value of the convention.

To this must be added that a certain capacity, military as well as civilian, will always be necessary to protect against accidents and catastrophes involving poisonous chemical substances, not intended for use as chemical weapons.

4. A prohibition of a capability to use chemical weapons would require specific undertakings to be spelled out in annexes to a convention. The following are possible examples of such undertakings:

- to declare the content of, or the non-existence of, doctrines, manuals and chains of command for the use of chemical weapons;
- to declare schools, training facilities and curricula intended for teaching the use of chemical weapons;
- to declare weapons production and training plans. (Items that might be included in such declarations would concern munition handling instructions, including labelling practices, artillery firing tables, air plane flying and bombing instructions, etc.);


- to declare the organization of protection units against (NB)C warfare;
- to invite observers or inspectors to attend military manoeuvres in general, and those which include training in (NB)C-protection in particular. In the latter case observers might be allowed to monitor also electronic communications;
- to issue a general order for all armed forces that no planning, organization and training for retaining or acquiring a capability to use chemical weapons is allowed as long as the State is a party to the convention;
- to co-operate regarding specific protective activities, e.g. exchange information on therapeutic means;
- to allow regular visits -- on site inspection -- to military units, munition stockpiles and air fields;
- to allow on site inspection when complaints about violations of a prohibition of the kind discussed here are made;
- to provide parties to a convention with information, either direct or through e.g. a consultative committee, concerning items exemplified in Annex II.

These different undertakings would be carried out on different occasions during the implementation of the convention, e.g. when the convention enters into force, when declared stockpiles have been destroyed and when a certain number of States have adhered to the convention.

5. To illustrate the proposal that a convention on chemical weapons should also prohibit activities, facilities and materials aimed at using such weapons in war, a text is given in Annex IV containing the elements which might be included in the corresponding provision of the convention.

ANNEX I

Examples of time scales for preparatory activities aimed at the acquisition of a qualified capability to use chemical weapons.



- (1) Activities to be covered by a ban on development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The time required for production and stockpiling may vary depending on the agent and quantity envisaged.
- (2) E.G., studies, doctrine evaluation, manual writing.
- (3) Higher staff training, preparations for training of the units of the armed services which are to deliver chemical charges.
- (4) Not protective training alone but for specialized activities. like donning protective equipment when handling munition, varying transporting routines for different kinds of munition, training particular flight manoeuvres at take off and landing depending on different kinds of bomb loads, etc.

- (5) ////////////// "Visibility line" = the approximate time range during which a certain activity cannot be kept secret any longer.

Comments:

It is clear from the table that banning only development, production and stockpiling would permit some of the most important activities necessary for attaining a capability to use chemical weapons. States already in possession of such a capability would in fact suffer only a minor setback of this ability since, due to previous experiences, they would most probably be able to delay a chemical weapons production until very late, perhaps only $\frac{1}{2}$ -2 years before they wished to be able to use chemical weapons. Regarding verification of such a ban, see Annexes II and III.

ANNEX II

Examples of relevant information in the context of a CW-convention prohibiting also planning, organization and training.

GENERAL CONDITIONS

Geographical area

Climatic conditions

Admitted capability to use chemical weapons before adhering to the convention

Scientific-technical level regarding issues relevant to chemical weapons

MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Military CW protective posture

Available equipment:

Protective masks, type

Collective protection (for tanks, vehicles, etc.)

Protective gear

Decontamination

Detection

Warning

Medical therapy:

Antidote

Type

Distribution

Therapeutic methods

General military education

Preparedness:

Chains of command for ordering use of chemical weapons (before adhering to the convention)

Staff functions:

Alarm rules

Special personnel

Special units:

Tasks

Equipment for use of chemical weapons*/

Salvo guns:

Caliber

Size of salvo

Range

Unit allocation

Artillery rockets:

Warhead alternatives

Range

Unit allocation

Missiles:

Type

Guiding system

Warhead alternative

Range

Unit allocation

Tear gas equipment:

Type

Caliber

Utilization

Unit allocation

Aerborne material:

Bombs

Type

Weight of charge

Spraying equipment

Capacity

*/ Chemical charges available to a State Party when adhering to the convention should be declared.

Maintenance functions

Protection for food and water

Protection for repairing services

Protection for medical service

CIVIL DEFENCE ACTIVITIES

Civil defence posture

Materials and equipment:

Protective masks

Type

Collective protection

Shelters with filter

Shelters without filter

Decontamination

Detection

Medical therapy

Education

Units

Staff function - alarm system

Special units

Type

Number

ANNEX III

Examples of activities, facilities and materials to be prohibited for the purpose of retention or acquisition of a capability to use chemical weapons.

Activities

Commerce

Transfer

Development including testing

Production

Stockpiling

Military planning, organization and training specifically intended to enable use of chemical weapons

Information

Facilities and equipment

Development and testing facilities

Production facilities (including munition filling facilities)

Training facilities (for training in the use of chemical weapons)

Stockpiles and storage facilities for chemical warfare agents

Other facilities and resources enabling handling of chemical weapons like special equipment for transporting chemical weapons and for bringing them to the target area.

Materials

Chemical warfare agents^{*/}, or precursors to such substances, warheads and weapons systems intended for use of chemical weapons.

^{*/} To be defined.

ANNEX IV

Elements which may be included in a provision of the convention concerning the prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons.

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to acquire or retain a chemical warfare capability, constituted by one or many activities, facilities and materials or their combinations, as specified in Annex X */, intended to enable a Party to use chemical weapons containing chemical warfare agents, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, or precursors to such chemical warfare agents, effective because of their direct toxic properties, on man, animal or plant, for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Corresponding activities, facilities and materials intended for use of chemical substances for peaceful purposes, or for the medical or physical protection of a State Party's military forces and civilian population against chemical weapons, are not covered by this convention, unless specifically stated.

*/ See Annex III for examples of activities, facilities and materials suggested to be covered. Some of the expressions have to be further defined.

11 February 1981

Original: SPANISH/ENGLISH

MEXICO

Working paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"

Mexico attaches particular importance to the limitation of nuclear weapons as a first step towards what is described in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament as the "progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time".

This interest has invariably been borne out by the actions of the representatives of Mexico in all multilateral and regional bodies that are concerned with disarmament, whether deliberative or negotiating bodies. To quote but one example as an illustration, it is only necessary to recall the active participation of the delegation of Mexico, ever since 1969, when the United States of America and the Soviet Union began at Helsinki the talks on the limitation of strategic arms known by the abbreviation SALT, in the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly in the negotiation of draft texts which led to the approval, very often by consensus, of the numerous General Assembly resolutions on that subject, the last of which, resolution 35/156 K, was adopted on 12 December 1980.

In view of the foregoing and of the obvious impact of the success or failure of the SALT talks on nuclear disarmament which, according to the Final Document, merits the highest priority in the negotiations entrusted to the Committee, the delegation of Mexico feels that the Committee should at all times be kept duly informed of any events of any significance which may occur at the international level on matters relating to those talks. This would appear the more advisable if it is borne in mind that the General Assembly, at its special session in 1978, stated unambiguously that in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, "all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility".

The Mexican delegation accordingly considers it appropriate to draw the attention of the Committee on Disarmament, for its information, to the declaration approved by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues at the

conclusion of its third session which was held recently in Vienna, from 6 to 8 February 1981, and was presided over by Mr. Olaf Palme, the former Prime Minister of Sweden (a list of the members of the Commission appears in the annex to this working paper). The full text of that declaration is as follows:

THE SALT PROCESS: THE GLOBAL STAKES

The future of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) is a global issue and not simply an issue in Soviet-American relations. It is, therefore, the duty of peoples everywhere to make known their views about the vital importance of an early and serious resumption of the SALT process.

The members of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security recognize that the SALT treaties and the SALT process by themselves will not lead to the solution of all East-West political differences. But they do state their belief that while the successes of the SALT process so far have been modest, the collapse of that process would be a disaster.

Man has struggled to contain the nuclear genie for more than 35 years. In 1968, the American and Soviet governments agreed to begin serious bilateral negotiations aimed at practical steps to limit nuclear weapons and contain the arms race. If the process is now cast aside, the political implications would be serious, and the associated dangers grave indeed.

The SALT negotiating process has become far more than an effort to limit the number and character of nuclear weapons; it has achieved a political meaning exceeding in significance the potential impact of the talks on the arms race itself. The talks have become a weathervane of the United States-Soviet relations, the primary symbol of the quest for United States-Soviet co-operation, with crucial implications for the character of political relations between these two great powers and, ultimately, for the risk of nuclear war. The talks have also become a central factor in diplomatic efforts to contain the effects of United States-Soviet competition in its most significant, and therefore most dangerous arenas. Détente in Europe would be endangered by a failure of the SALT process. Also the very complicated four-way relations in East Asia among the United States, the USSR, China, and Japan would be keenly influenced by

decisions concerning the negotiations. Moreover, the United States-Soviet strategic arms negotiations have become a central element in efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both because of this dependency and because of its potential effect on United States-Soviet relations, a failure of SALT would adversely affect world-wide political relations, and increase the risk of war.

Obviously, the specific implications of a failure of the SALT process would depend on the particular ways and circumstances on which it failed. Some situations would be worse than others. Still, to borrow a technique from military planners, it would be only prudent for the world's leaders to consider, in a few cases at least, "the worst case", the most extreme possibilities, before deciding to dissolve negotiating forums which have taken decades to build.

In the initial section, the consequences of a failure of the SALT process for the United States-Soviet relations are examined. Subsequently, the potential effects of such a deterioration on United States-Soviet ties are described for political and economic relations in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

United States-Soviet Relations

The most direct impact of a failure of the SALT negotiating process would be seen in the weapon programmes of the United States and the Soviet Union. Unconstrained by the terms of either the SALT I or SALT II treaties, both nations could be expected to take immediate steps to increase the rate at which they now are modernizing their nuclear forces, replacing existing weapons with larger numbers of even more destructive systems. There might be disagreement as to which one was the initiator and which the responder in this new round of the nuclear arms race, but for all practical purposes that question would be irrelevant. The effect on the risk of nuclear war and, thus on the dangers posed to all mankind would be the same regardless of who were at fault.

Both nations could be expected to make additional efforts to expand the number and destructive capabilities of the weapons in their offensive arsenals. Each could greatly multiply the number of nuclear warheads on existing intercontinental ballistic missiles. Each could probably also further accelerate deployments of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and perhaps new types of manned long-range bombers as well. Both nations also could be expected to deploy larger numbers of nuclear weapons on intermediate-range missile launchers in Europe.

Even more serious consequences would follow. Most important the failure of SALT II and the end of the negotiations would result in a multiplication of pressures for revision of the 1972 treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs).

That agreement automatically comes up for review in 1982, and the pressures to abrogate or substantially revise it already are severe because of new technological developments and the putative ability of ABMs to defend offensive missiles. A failure of the SALT process would virtually guarantee major changes to, if not outright abrogation of the ABM Treaty, and quick moves on the part of both nations to deploy sizeable ballistic missile defence systems and to accelerate research and development of advanced forms of such weapons.

Inevitably, if negotiated constraints on these weapon programmes are eliminated, nuclear weapons will come to occupy a more central role in the two nations' foreign policies. Because they each have recognized the unprecedented dangers of nuclear war, both the United States and the Soviet Union have sought over the years to sharply circumscribe the international situations in which nuclear threats even potentially could be considered to be serious and relevant.

The key element in this effort to reduce the risks of nuclear war has been the ABM Treaty. By agreeing not to deploy weapons that could create the illusion of a capability to defend against a nuclear attack, the two nations formally recognized the probability that each would suffer unprecedented destruction in the event of a nuclear exchange. As such, they accepted the necessity for a certain degree of co-operation in their relations and implicitly set limits on their competition. This is not to say that they agreed to get along with one another or to end their rivalry. But they did establish a formally recognized mutual need to stop the competition from getting out of hand, to avoid confrontations that could contribute to a real danger of nuclear war.

If the ABM Treaty were abrogated and an unbridled offence/defence arms race ensued, the consequences would be severe. It would be virtually impossible to develop co-operative United States-Soviet relations in any other sphere. How could the two nations seek to keep their rivalry in regional situations under some control, for example, while competing to acquire larger and larger numbers of weapons intended solely for each other's destruction? In the absence of SALT, each confrontation between the superpowers would carry the seeds of major escalation. Without the landmarks established by the SALT process, without the boundaries on offensive weapons competition set by SALT I and II, without the modicum of co-operation imposed by the ABM Treaty, each side would fear the worst of the other. As crises developed, as local conflicts escalated to great Power stand-offs, as continued development of ABM systems buttressed the illusion that nuclear wars could be fought and survived in some meaningful sense, the risk of the use of nuclear weapons would multiply. Each side, fearing that the other might perceive advantage in a nuclear first-strike, might be tempted to act first. The instabilities and dangers in such a situation are obvious. It is impossible to measure the degree to which the United States-Soviet strategic dialogue alone has served to induce some restraints in the nuclear Powers' political relations, and thus toward reducing the risk of nuclear war, but this positive effect of the SALT process is not insignificant.

The consequences of these developments could persist for a very long time. While no one can predict the patterns that politics will trace in the future, both the United States and the USSR appear to be at decisive stages in the evolution of their attitudes toward one another. Given the political atmosphere that would accompany a breakdown of the SALT process, the internal debate in each nation could take an ominous turn. Those in both nations who believe that high-risk strategists of confrontation and military competition are inevitable could gain a decisive upper hand. The international dangers resulting from such internal developments would be most serious and difficult, if not impossible to contain.

Europe

Consequences of the turmoil in United States-Soviet political relations that would accompany a failure of the SALT process would be felt directly in Europe. East-West political and economic relations in Europe have been relatively co-operative for more than a decade. With a few obvious exceptions, political systems in both East and West are stable and most economies have performed reasonably well. Ties between the two sides in Europe have deepened and expanded in scope and, so far have survived the deterioration of East-West relations.

This relatively stable situation in Europe would have difficulty surviving the sharp escalation of United States-Soviet political conflict that would accompany a failure of the SALT process. The most immediate impact would be on the talks initiated last November to limit the deployment of theatre nuclear weapons; these negotiations probably could not continue in the absence of a United States-Soviet strategic dialogue. Prospects for limiting other kinds of nuclear weapons in Europe would also be jeopardized.

In the political atmosphere that would accompany failure of these negotiations, pressures for European governments to boost military spending could be intensified. This could lead to instabilities. These instabilities might threaten past arrangements and the mutually beneficial political, economic, and human exchanges that have resulted from these practical arrangements.

While it is impossible to predict the directions that these internal shifts might take ultimately, some of the effects of political instability are readily apparent. In both East and West, the shattering of the dialogue and the loss of the economic, technological, and other benefits that had been associated with it would mean that neither side would have much incentive to curtail the arms competition; non-nuclear arms control efforts, such as the Vienna talks for mutual balanced force reductions, would end in failure. Tensions would rise as each side raced to build up its military capabilities, increased its spending on defence, and took the political measures necessary to increase military preparedness.

Finally, as is always the case when political relations deteriorate, there might be an increased risk of war in Europe. Despite political détente throughout the 1970s, both East and West have significantly upgraded their military forces on the continent; both plan further modernization during the 1980s. It is very significant that the public opinion in Europe no longer feels that the danger of war on this continent belongs only to the past. The risk of war was real in 1961, when NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces moved toward their common borders and Soviet and

United States tanks confronted one another in Berlin. In the twenty years since the Berlin crisis, it is easy to forget what it was like to live in an atmosphere in which war in Europe is a real possibility. It has a most disquieting effect on our daily lives. It determines political relations, not only between East and West, but within each alliance.

It strongly affects our economies and it dominates our politics. Yet, virtually inevitably, a failure of the SALT process could mean a return to cold war and a real danger of actual conflict in Europe, which would almost inevitably escalate to global war.

East Asia

The character of United States-Soviet relations is more complicated in East Asia and, as a result, it is more difficult to project the consequences of a failure of the SALT process in that region. Clearly, however, deteriorating United States-Soviet relations would have a direct impact on Japan. As these relations worsen, settlement of important outstanding issues between the Soviet Union and Japan would become even more difficult. If, in a worsening of the situation in the area, Japanese military capabilities were significantly expanded, it could have serious impact on now benign political relations and mutually beneficial economic ties between Japan and China, and between Japan and other nations.

The failure of SALT also could have serious consequences for relations between the great Powers and China. It would be a major boost to those who already argue for far-reaching changes in the relationship between the United States and China. Existing constraints on certain aspects of Western exchanges with China would likely dissolve in the political atmosphere that would mean a failure of SALT. Similarly, the breakdown in United States-Soviet ties would probably lead to new tensions on the troubled Sino-Soviet border and the intensification of other difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations. The exact manifestations of these pressures are difficult to predict but, at a minimum, they certainly would include increases in the Soviet and United States military presence in East Asia and, perhaps, to more tensions involving China. This constellation of political relations is and could easily be shattered. If it were, the risk of war would grow, and its impact would be felt not only by the people living in these four nations, but by all the inhabitants of East Asia.

South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America

The failure of SALT also would have consequences for political relations in other parts of the world, although these might not be felt as directly as the effects in the industrialized nations. These effects would result both because a failure of SALT

could have significantly adverse effects on the likelihood of nuclear proliferation and because developing nations could not escape the effects of more tense United States-Soviet political relations.

The relationship between SALT and nuclear proliferation is quite clear and, in effect, was formalized in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One aspect of that agreement is a pledge by non-nuclear nations not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a commitment by the nuclear Powers that they would make progress in controlling the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The non-nuclear States have made very clear, most recently at the 1980 NPT Review Conference in Geneva, that they take this bargain seriously; for many of them continued forbearance in the development of nuclear weapons partly hinges on progress toward nuclear disarmament. These nations have already been troubled by the failure of the nuclear Powers to reach a comprehensive nuclear test ban and by the considerable time required to negotiate SALT II. A breakdown of the SALT process itself might be a decisive development; to the extent that the treaty had served to inhibit nuclear weapon programmes, that restraint would no longer be operable. For example, in South Asia we might well see a more overt nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan; the Middle East might witness the active pursuit of nuclear capabilities by the four or five nations with such potential; and in Africa and Latin America, nations with aspirations to serve as leading regional powers might be tempted to seek nuclear weapon status. The consequences of such developments for political relations in these regions and for the risk of war needs no explanation.

Also, as has already been mentioned, increasingly tense United States-Soviet relations implies that each time these two nations were involved on opposing sides in local conflicts in the third world, there would be a serious danger of confrontation, and even military conflict between them. But the effects in the third world of a failure of SALT would extend well beyond specific crises or confrontations. In the political atmosphere that could accompany a breakdown in the negotiations, both the United States and the Soviet Union could be expected to seek to enlist friends and allies, and to bolster their military positions even more assiduously than they have in the past. This could mean a more intrusive military presence on the part of both Powers in many parts of the third world; it also could mean intensified pressures on many States in the third world to provide military facilities for either Soviet or United States military forces. And it also could mean a renewal of pressures for the commitment by nations of the third world to one side or the other in the East-West struggle. The abilities of third world nations to resist these pressures would vary, of course, but in general it would mean a subordination of regional concerns to the global struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Not unaffected by such an intensification of the East-West struggle would be the resources, capital and human skills diverted from economic development to the armed forces of third world nations. In the type of world which seems likely to emerge as a result of the breakdown of the SALT process, pressures -- both internal and external -- for third world nations to spend more on their armed forces seem likely to be insurmountable. Despite the best intentions on the part of third world leaders, the insecurity stimulated by the worsening of East-West political relations, by the intensification of local conflicts and by the greater likelihood of nuclear proliferation, all would contribute to perceived requirements for further expansion of the military forces in the third world and their accelerated equipment with modern weapons. But an even greater impairment of the prospects for development is likely to ensue with more and more of the resources of the industrialized countries that should be channelled to the alleviation of poverty world-wide and the modernization of the economies of the less developed countries being pre-empted for the arms race. Both in quantitative terms and in terms of a loss of momentum for development, the world will face the unhappy prospect of further delays in efforts to ease the economic plight of peoples throughout the world.

At a time when the world economy is itself in crisis this diversion could inflict a double blow by both deferring development and the mutual gains which it can bring to the industrial world as well through enlarged production and increased world trade.

This will mean, inevitably still further pressure on the already fragile process of North-South dialogue with all the consequences a breakdown will imply for tensions between nations and within them; tensions themselves aggravated by a "cold war" environment. In short, the world could find itself in a cycle of danger with East-West tensions generating North-South failures deepening the threats to peace already implicit in the decline from détente.

Conclusion

The overriding purpose of the SALT process is to help prevent nuclear war. Nuclear weapons have confronted mankind with unprecedented dangers; civilization as we know it can literally be destroyed in moments. There are grounds for criticizing the SALT process. It is cumbersome, and slow. Its accomplishments have been limited. But it is the only existing means to deal with the most pressing threat to man's survival. If the process comes to an end, what little progress had been made in containing the risk of nuclear war would be set back immeasurably. It would mean a return to the futile propaganda wars of the 1950s in place of serious discussions of practical limitations on weaponry. And it would mean removal of one of the most important initiatives to ease the risk of nuclear war.

Politically, the failure of SALT would mean an intensification of disputes, greater instabilities, the diminishment of peaceful ties and exchanges virtually throughout the world. It means further diversions of resources to the armed forces of many nations, with all the economic problems and adverse political consequences that would entail. It could mean increased risk of war in Europe, the aggravation of tensions in East Asia, and more frequent confrontations elsewhere in the world. And it would mean a greater danger of nuclear proliferation in most regions of the globe.

Obviously, the specific consequences of a failure of the SALT process would hinge on the circumstances under which the process was terminated. Still, as in any judgement concerning international security and nuclear weapons, one must consider the worst case -- the most extreme possibilities. A failure of the SALT process and a breakdown of the restraints would represent one of the worst set-backs to international peace imaginable. Even with an on-going SALT process, the peaceful solution of international issues will be difficult. But without a viable SALT process, many issues in international dispute will become far less manageable and the world situation will become that much more precarious.

For these reasons, the Commission believes it is essential for the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to follow through on their pledges to resume the SALT negotiations. Because of these pledges and the global stakes involved, the Commission hopes that the United States and the USSR will continue their 12-year effort to negotiate limits of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible opportunity and that both sides should show maximum restraint in the interim. This is not only in the interest of the United States and the Soviet Union, but of the whole world.

Annex

MEMBERS OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES

Olaf Palme, Sweden (Chairman)	Member of the Swedish Parliament, former Prime Minister of Sweden, Chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party.
Giorgi Arbatov, USSR	Candidate Member, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet, Academician and Director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
Egon Bahr, Fed. Rep. of Germany	Member of the German Parliament, General Secretary of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Józef Cyrankiewicz, Poland	Former Prime Minister of Poland, Head of the Polish Peace Committee.
Jean-Marie Daillet, France	Member of the French Parliament, Vice-Chairman of the Parliament's Defence Committee, Chairman of the U.D.F. Defence Committee.
Robert A.D. Ford, Canada	Ambassador, Special Adviser on East-West relations to the Government of Canada, former Ambassador to Colombia, Yugoslavia, Egypt and the USSR.
Alfonso Garcia-Robles, Mexico	Ambassador, Chairman of the Mexican Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament since 1967; former Foreign Minister of Mexico.
Gro Harlem-Brundtland (Mrs), Norway	Prime Minister of Norway, Member of the Norwegian Parliament, Vice-Chairman of the Norwegian Labour Party, former Minister of Environment.
Haruki Mori, Japan	Former ambassador to the United Kingdom and to the OECD, former Vice Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
C.B. Muthamma (Miss), India	Ambassador of India to the Netherlands, formerly Ambassador to Ghana and Hungary.

Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria	General, member of the Council of State and Distinguished Fellow of the University of Ibadan, former Head of State.
David Owen, United Kingdom	Member of the British Parliament, former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
Shridat Ramphal, Guyana	Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.
Salim Salim, Tanzania	Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tanzania.
Joop den Uyl, Netherlands	Member of the Dutch Parliament, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, leader of the Dutch Labour Party.
Cyrus Vance, United States of America	Former Secretary of State of the United States of America.

(There will be additional members)

Scientific advisers to the Commission are:

Leslie Gelb, United States of America	Former Director of United States State Department Politico-Military Affairs, now with the Carnegie Endowment.
Mikhail Milstein, USSR	Institute of United States and Canada Studies of the Academy of Science, USSR. Lieutenant-General, retired.

AGENDA AND PROGRAMME OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
(Adopted at the 104th plenary meeting held on 10 February 1981)

The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Committee, taking into account inter alia the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- II. Chemical weapons;
- III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
- IV. Conventional weapons;
- V. Reduction of military budgets;
- VI. Reduction of armed forces;
- VII. Disarmament and development;
- VIII. Disarmament and international security;
- IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within the above framework, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1981 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of section VIII of its rules of procedure, would be considered by the Committee:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

* Reissued for technical reasons.

6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
7. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly at the United Nations.

The Committee will conduct its work bearing in mind the contribution that it should make to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

In compliance with rule 28 of its rules of procedure, the Committee also adopts the following programme of work for the first part of its 1981 session:

3 - 6 February	Statements in the plenary. Consideration of the agenda and programme of work.
9 -13 February	Statements in the plenary. Preliminary consideration of the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda.
16-20 February	Nuclear test ban.
23 February - 4 March	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
5 - 13 March	Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
16 - 20 March	Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
23 March - 3 April	Chemical weapons.
6 - 10 April	New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
13 - 17 April	Further consideration of agenda items.
20 - 24 April	Interim reports of <u>ad hoc</u> groups, if any.

In adopting its agenda and programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

CD/145
11 February 1981
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 NOVEMBER 1980 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
FINLAND ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

Upon instructions from my Government and in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the participation of the States not members of the Committee I have the honour to inform you that Finland wishes to take part, during its sessions in 1981, in the work on all substantive items on the Committee's agenda, in plenary and informal meetings in the working groups and in other subsidiary bodies which may be established for the consideration of those items.

I would be grateful if you could bring this request to the attention of the members of the Committee on Disarmament so that the Committee may be in a position to take a decision at its earliest convenience.

(signed) Ilkka Pastinen
Ambassador

Permanent Representative of Finland
to the United Nations

CD/146
11 February 1981
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 NOVEMBER 1980 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
DENMARK ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

I have the honour, upon instruction from my Government, to ask Your Excellency, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament regarding participation by States not members of the Committee to make due arrangements to allow the Danish delegation to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament at its 1981 session on all substantive items on the Committee's agenda, in plenary and informal meetings, in working groups and in other subsidiary bodies which may be established.

(signed) H. E. Kastoft
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Denmark to the
United Nations Office at Geneva

CD/147

11 February 1981

ENGLISH

Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1980 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF SPAIN ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING RULES
35 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

I have the honour, in accordance with the instructions of my Government, to inform you that Spain wishes to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981 session, in accordance with the Committee's rules of procedure regarding participation by States not members of the Committee.

The Spanish delegation wishes to participate in the work on all the substantive items on the Committee's agenda, in plenary and informal meetings, in the working groups and in other subsidiary bodies which may be established for the consideration of those items.

I would ask you to transmit this request to the Committee so that it may take the necessary decision.

(Signed) Jaime de PINJES

Ambassador

Permanent Representative
of Spain to the United Nations

CD/148
11 February 1981
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 NOVEMBER 1980 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING RULES 33
TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

I have the honour, upon instruction from my Government, to inform you that Austria wishes to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981 session, in accordance with paragraphs 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedures of the Committee on Disarmament.

Austria wishes to participate in the work on all the substantive items of the Committee's Agenda, in plenary and informal meetings, and in subsidiary bodies which may be established for the consideration of those items.

I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to transmit this request to the Committee on Disarmament.

(signed) Thomas Klestil
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Austria to the United Nations

CD/149
11 February 1981
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 JANUARY 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
NORWAY ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

I have the honour to refer to the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament regarding participation by non-members and would ask that the delegation of Norway be allowed to participate in the work of the Committee during its 1981-session as regards all substantive items on the agenda of the Committee. This applies to plenary as well as informal meetings, working groups and other subsidiary bodies.

(signed) Johan Cappelen
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Norway to the United Nations
Office at Geneva

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE ELEVENTH SESSION
OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS

1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, initially established in pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976, held its eleventh formal session from 5 to 12 February 1981 in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden. This was the third session of the Group convened under its new mandate by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 48th meeting on 7 August 1979.
2. The Ad Hoc Group continues to be open to all Member States of the Committee on Disarmament as well as upon request to non-Member States. Accordingly, scientific experts and representatives of the following Member States of the Committee on Disarmament participated in the session: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America.
3. At their request and on the basis of previous invitation by the Committee on Disarmament, scientific experts from the following non-Member States of the Committee on Disarmament participated in the session: Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Norway.
4. A representative of the World Meteorological Organization also attended the session.
5. Under the current mandate of the Ad Hoc Group, information on national investigations related to the work of the Group has been presented by experts from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America.
6. During its previous (tenth) session, the Ad Hoc Group agreed to establish five study groups in order to achieve an appropriate compilation, summarization and assessment of the experience acquired through national investigations and co-operative studies in areas relevant to its work. These open-ended study groups each deal with a specific issue, and are each headed by a convener and a co-convenor as follows:

- (1) Seismological stations and station networks:
Dr. Basham (Canada), Dr. Schneider (GDR)
- (2) Data to be regularly exchanged (Level I data):
Dr. Kárník (Czechoslovakia), Dr. Harjes (FRG)
- (3) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level I data through WMO/GTS:
Dr. McGregor (Australia), Dr. Ichikawa (Japan)
- (4) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level II data:
Dr. Husebye (Norway), Dr. Hristoskov (Bulgaria)
- (5) Procedures to be used at international data centres:
Dr. Dahlman (Sweden), Dr. Alewine (USA)

7. The Ad Hoc Group discussed the national investigations presented by the convenors and made recommendations for the further pursuance of this work.

With regard to seismological stations and station networks and with regard to data to be regularly exchanged, the summaries were drafts toward chapters in a formal report from the Ad Hoc Group under its present mandate, reflecting a worldwide development of seismic stations and further elaborations within the Group of the specification of the so-called Level I data to be exchanged.

In this connection, the Ad Hoc Group expressed the need for inclusion of additional seismic stations, located in the southern hemisphere, in the global network.

With regard to the exchange of such data over the WMO communication network, the summary described experiences from a first and limited test of such exchanges, performed between institutes in fourteen States and with the collaboration of the WMO. The experts of the Ad Hoc Group noted that the results obtained from the investigations have only methodological significance. The study group on this matter began preparation for further limited tests.

The study group on the exchange of entire data records, so-called Level II data, considered the most recent development of facilities for the worldwide transmission of data, discussed plans to test such facilities for the purposes of the Ad Hoc Group and made plans for a report on both the more traditional means of data transmission and on the most recent developments in the field.

The study group on data centres considered contributions both on the parameters to be calculated, on the technical requirements for data centres and on the requirements for co-operation between international data centres. The study group also prepared for further work in this field.

8. The national investigations so far considered were seen as relevant to the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system and to the further elaboration of detailed instructions for an experimental test of that system.

9. The Ad Hoc Group also discussed the schedule for its further work. It considered that in the light of the additional time needed for national investigations and co-operative studies and for the reliable assessment of their results, it should envisage the submission of a report, based on the then available information, and in compliance with its present mandate, during the first part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament. The Ad Hoc Group considered that it would require two or three further sessions to prepare its report. It suggested that the next session, subject to approval by the Committee on Disarmament, should be convened from 5 to 14 August 1981, in Geneva.

CD/151
13 February 1981
Original: ENGLISH

Decision adopted by the Committee on ad hoc working groups
at its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981

The Committee decides that the ad hoc working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament established on 17 March 1980 shall resume its work forthwith, in accordance with the conclusion reached by the Committee at its 100th plenary meeting (paragraph 68.16 of CD/139).

The Committee further decides to re-establish, for the duration of its 1981 session, the ad hoc working groups on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and radiological weapons, which were established on 17 March for its 1980 session, so that they may continue their work on the basis of their former mandates.

It is understood that the Committee will, as soon as possible, review the mandates of the three ad hoc working groups with a view to adapting, as appropriate, their mandates to advance the progress of the process of negotiations towards the objective of concrete disarmament measures.

It is also understood that the decision taken by the Committee in no way precludes the urgent consideration of the proposals submitted for the establishment of other ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, as well as the consideration of the establishment of other subsidiary bodies which have been or may be proposed.

The ad hoc working groups will report to the Committee on the progress of their work at any appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1981 session.

CD/152
13 February 1981
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
BY THE AMBASSADORS AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND PAKISTAN,
HANDED OVER 12 FEBRUARY 1981

The Permanent Representatives of China and Pakistan request that the text of the enclosed letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament may kindly be circulated as an official document of the Committee.

(signed) Mansur Ahmad
Ambassador and Permanent
Representative of Pakistan,
Geneva

(signed) Yu Peiwen
Ambassador and Permanent
Representative of People's
Republic of China, Geneva

MISSION PERMANENTE DU
KAMPUCHEA DEMOCRATIQUE

Geneva, 9 February 1981

Excellency,

On 21 November 1980 I had the honour to address a letter to you expressing the desire of Democratic Kampuchea to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament at its 1981 session. It is a matter of regret that the Committee has been prevented so far from approving this request of a State Member of the United Nations. The inability of the Committee to approve the request of Democratic Kampuchea to participate in its work is, of course, related to the objectives of those who, as part of their expansionist design, have encouraged the regional expansionists in Hanoi to send 250,000 Vietnamese soldiers to invade Democratic Kampuchea and instal a puppet regime in Phnom Penh. The majority of the members of the Committee on Disarmament continue to recognize and support Democratic Kampuchea, the legitimate representative of the people of Kampuchea, and bear no responsibility for the difficulties created in the Committee.

In view of the above and inspired by the desire to contribute to the progress of the work of the Committee on Disarmament the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea has decided not to press at this time for a decision on its request for participation in the work of the Committee. However, I would like to emphasize that Democratic Kampuchea reserves its right to revert to this application at an appropriate stage.

Please accept, Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(signed) TE SUN HOA
Deputy Permanent Representative

His Excellency President
of the Committee on Disarmament
Palais des Nations

GENEVA

NOTE: This letter was delivered to the Secretariat on 10 February 1981 at 5.35 p.m.

BULGARIA
WORKING PAPER

EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The General Assembly of the United Nations, in its resolution 35/154, "welcomes the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament, that there is continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

In the same resolution, the United Nations General Assembly "requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue on a priority basis, during its session in 1981, the negotiations on the question of strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States". Similarly, in its resolution 35/155, the United Nations General Assembly "recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching agreement and concluding effective international arrangements during its next session to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective". As stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances (CD/125, para. 18), which is an integral part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament for its 1980 session, "the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations of the Working Group and to continue to negotiate at the beginning of its 1981 session with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Accordingly, the Bulgarian delegation shares the view that the Committee on Disarmament should continue on a priority basis the negotiations in its Ad Hoc Working Group with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In its proceedings the Working Group should take into account the evolution as reflected in its report for the 1980 session (CD/125), and more specifically, its paragraph 15 which states, inter alia, that "There was recognition that search should continue for a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character".

In pursuing its efforts to examine further all aspects of the problems related to the speedy elaboration of an international convention, the Ad Hoc Working Group could explore in parallel the possibility of reaching agreement on an interim measure, which would contribute to strengthening the security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States and facilitate the search for a common approach to concluding such a convention.

The examination of the substance of negative security assurances undertaken in 1980 was inconclusive, as was pointed out in paragraph 11 of the report of the Working Group (CD/125). The Bulgarian Delegation believes, therefore, that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue to examine at the current session the formulations, that have been or may be proposed, relating to non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to identifying their common elements. An effort could then be made to evolve the basic elements of a common formula to be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character, or of a general basis for identical in substance declarations, which the nuclear-weapon States might wish to make solemnly on their own initiative, taking into due account the results achieved in the negotiations.

Such a course of action would help, inter alia, implement resolution 35/154, in which the United Nations General Assembly "calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention". In this regard, the opportunity that the period prior to and during the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament offers, could bring about a step forward in the efforts to strengthen effectively the security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States in accordance with paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the First Special Session.

As regards the need to enhance internationally such identical in substance declarations, the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 35/154 recommends that the Security Council should examine declarations which may be made by

nuclear-weapon States regarding strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States and, if all these declarations are found to be consistent with the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them. Views could, therefore, be exchanged in the Committee on Disarmament and in the Ad Hoc Working Group as to the parameters that such an approval should have, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Security Council practice. The adoption of any interim measure, however, should not be construed as a substitute for an agreement on a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an international convention on strengthening the guarantees of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The Bulgarian delegation believes that substantial progress on this item could be made if all Member States of the Committee on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, pursue constructive approach and display maximum flexibility with a view to arriving at a solution acceptable to all.

CD/154
23 February 1981
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 12 FEBRUARY 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SWITZERLAND
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING
RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to request that, in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the Committee's rules of procedure, Switzerland should be permitted to participate in plenary and informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament when the Committee is discussing the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the question of chemical weapons, and that it should also be authorized to participate in the work of the two Ad hoc Working Groups established on those topics.

(Signed) PICTET

Ambassador, Head of the
Permanent Mission of Switzerland

ITALY

Working Paper

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
"Objectives"

1. The purpose of the CPD is to establish an agreed framework for substantive negotiations in the field of disarmament, which ensure that any partial measure contributes to progress towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

A primary objective of the CPD is thereby to harmonize the twin approach to disarmament issues, by ensuring that specific measures be sought within the context of an over-all programme leading to general and complete disarmament through an equitable, balanced and verifiable process.

2. Given its comprehensive nature, it encompasses all measures and steps thought to be advisable to this end, whether arms control and disarmament measures, or parallel and related measures. It provides for gradual and balanced movement towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament by dealing with near-term as well as longer range actions; conventional armaments and forces as well as nuclear and mass destruction weapons; regional as well as global measures; international as well as national mechanisms to verify and manage the disarmament process.

3. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament aims at strengthening the positive results achieved so far in curbing the arms race, at stimulating ongoing negotiations and inducing concrete progress in order to maintain and enlarge the momentum generated by the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

4. The CPD pursues the objective of enhancing the security of all States. In this context it recognizes the need for strengthening and developing international security mechanisms, so as to facilitate the peaceful settlement of controversies between nations and supplement the United Nations capability to maintain and restore international peace and security.

5. As all nations have a vital interest in the outcome of disarmament negotiations, the latter must be granted the active participation and support of all nations. The CPD pursues, as one of its objectives, an ever increasing involvement in disarmament matters of governments and world public opinion.

CD/156
25 February 1981
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 FEBRUARY 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF FINLAND ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE AT ITS 104TH PLENARY
MEETING ON 10 FEBRUARY 1981

In accordance with the Rules 36, 4 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament I am instructed by my Government to inform you that Mr. Paavo Keisalo, Minister Counsellor and Mr. Veikko Soralahti, Attaché, Permanent Mission in Geneva will represent Finland at the Committee on Disarmament in 1981.

As regards the decision taken at the 104th plenary meeting of the Committee relating to the participation of Finland I wish to indicate that the agenda items particularly interesting Finland are (1) Nuclear test ban; (2) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and (3) Chemical weapons.

(Signed) Paavo Kaarlehto
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Finland

GE.81-60451

CD/157
25 February 1981
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF DENMARK ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE AT ITS 104th PLENARY
MEETING ON 10 FEBRUARY 1981

Referring to your letter of 13 February, 1981, concerning the decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 10 February, 1981 on the participation of Denmark in the work of the Committee on Disarmament at its 1981 session, I have the honour upon instruction from my Government to inform Your Excellency that questions on the agenda of the Committee for 1981 and on the programme of work for the first session of the Committee of particular interest to Denmark are the preparation of a convention on chemical weapons and a comprehensive test ban.

(Signed) Kaj Repsdørph
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Denmark

GE.81-60457

CD/158

26 February 1981

ENGLISH

Original: ARABIC/ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 FÉBRUARY 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT ON THE OCCASION OF ITS RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON 26 FEBRUARY 1981

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that its instruments of ratification were deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom in London today, 26 February 1981.

On the instruction of my Government I enclose herewith the statement issued on this occasion by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and kindly request that it be issued together with this letter as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) E. A. EL REEDY
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of
the Arab Republic of Egypt
and Head of the Delegation
of Egypt to the Committee
on Disarmament.

GE.81-60524

Translation
26 February 1981

Statement

On the Occasion of the Deposit by the Government of
the Arab Republic of Egypt of its Instruments of
Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons which threatens the security of mankind must be curbed, Egypt signed and then ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Egypt was among the first countries which called for the rapid conclusion of this Treaty, and played a constructive role in the negotiations preceding its conclusion as a complement to earlier efforts which had successfully culminated in the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

Egypt's commitment by virtue of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to refrain, in any way, from acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons shall not impair its inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty, which affirms the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The stipulation of that right in the Treaty itself is, in fact, a codification of a basic human right, which can neither be waived nor impaired.

From this premise, Egypt also views with special attention the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty calling on the parties to the Treaty who are in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Embarking on a number of construction projects of nuclear power reactors to generate electricity in order to meet its increasing energy needs so as to promote the prosperity and welfare of its people, Egypt expects from industrialized nations with a developed nuclear industry a wholehearted assistance and support. This would be in consonance with the letter and spirit of Article IV of the Treaty, in particular since Egypt has committed itself to the application of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency as regards peaceful nuclear activities carried out within its territory, in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty.

Within the framework of the rights provided for in the Treaty for all Parties thereto in as far as the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is concerned, Egypt wishes to refer to the provisions of Article V of the Treaty, which state that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States party to this Treaty. Though such applications pose presently certain difficulties, particularly in view of their detrimental environmental effects, Egypt nevertheless deems that this should not relieve the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty from their responsibility to promote research and development of these applications, in order to overcome all the difficulties presently involved therein.

Egypt wishes to express its strong dissatisfaction at the nuclear weapon States, in particular the two super-Powers, because of their failure to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Although it welcomes the 1972 and 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, known as SALT I and SALT II, Egypt cannot but admit that the Treaties have failed to bring about an effective cessation of the nuclear arms race, quantitatively and qualitatively, and have even permitted the development of a new generation of weapons of mass destruction.

Moreover, in spite of the fact that more than 17 years have elapsed since the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the nuclear-weapon States are alleging that various difficulties still stand in the way of a permanent ban on all nuclear weapon tests, when there is only need for a political will to achieve that end.

Consequently, Egypt avails itself of this opportunity, namely the deposit of its instruments of rectification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to appeal to the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligation whereby the nuclear arms race will be stopped and nuclear disarmament achieved.

Egypt also calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to exert all possible efforts so as to achieve a permanent ban of all nuclear weapon tests at an early date. This will bring to an end the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, inasmuch as the cutoff of fissionable material for military purposes, will curb the quantitative increase of nuclear weapons.

As regards the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, Egypt deems that Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 does not provide non-nuclear-weapon States with a genuine guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. Egypt, therefore appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to exert their effort with a view to concluding an agreement prohibiting once and for all the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any State.

The undertaking of these steps is consistent with the letter and spirit of the basic guiding principles formulated by the General Assembly of the United Nations for the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, in particular the principle of balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, and that stipulating that the Treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament.

Convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world shall be instrumental in enabling the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve its objectives and aims, Egypt has exerted great efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as well as in Africa.

In this respect, Egypt expresses its great satisfaction with the United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus at its thirty-fifth session inviting the countries of the Middle East, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area, to declare solemnly their support for the achievement of this objective, that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons, and to deposit their declarations with the United Nations Security Council.

In conclusion, Egypt wishes to point out that it has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, out of strong belief that this step complies with its supreme national interests, provided the Treaty succeeds in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East, which would remain completely free of nuclear weapons, if it is to contribute constructively to peace, security and prosperity for its people and the world at large.

CD/159
2 March 1981
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 FEBRUARY 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING THE
DECISION TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE AT ITS 104TH PLENIARY MEETING ON
10 FEBRUARY 1981

With reference to your letter dated 13 February 1981 concerning the request of the Norwegian Government to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981-session, I have the honour to inform you that Norway is particularly interested in the following questions: nuclear test ban and chemical weapons.

(Signed) Johan Cappelen
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.81-60541

CD/16C
3 March 1981
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 2 MARCH 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TRANSMITTING PART OF THE REPORT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, MR. L.I. BREZHNEV, TO THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, ENTITLED, 'TO STRENGTHEN PEACE, DEEPEN DETENTE AND CURB THE ARMS RACE'

I send you herewith a section of the report of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, entitled, 'To strengthen peace, deepen détente and curb the arms race'. I would ask you kindly to distribute this extract as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V.L. Issraelyan,
Representative of the USSR
to the Committee on Disarmament

GE.81-60555

TO STRENGTHEN PEACE, DEEPEN DETENTE,
AND CURB THE ARMS RACE

(From the report by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade L.I. BREZHNEV, to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

The pivotal line of the foreign policy of our Party and Government has been and continues to be the struggle to reduce the danger of war and to curb the arms race. . At the present time, this objective has acquired particular significance and urgency. The fact is that rapid and profound changes are taking place in the development of military technology. Qualitatively new types of weapons, and first and foremost weapons of mass destruction, are being developed. These new types of weapons are such as to make control over them and, consequently also, an agreed limitation of these weapons an extremely difficult if not impossible undertaking. A new phase in the arms race will undermine international stability and greatly increase the danger of the outbreak of war.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the policies of the aggressive imperialist forces have already brought about a considerable increase in international tension with all the dangerous consequences ensuing from this.

There is probably no other State that has in recent years put before mankind so wide a spectrum of concrete and realistic initiatives on the most crucial problems of international relations as the Soviet Union has done.

I shall start with the problem of limiting nuclear weapons, which are the most dangerous to humanity. Throughout these years, the Soviet Union has worked resolutely to put an end to the race in such armaments, and to stop their further spread across the world. A tremendous amount of work has been done, as you know, in preparing the Treaty with the United States of America on the limitation of strategic arms. Much has been done in the course of the negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. We have made an important move by declaring and reaffirming that we will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries that do not permit their deployment in their territories. But we have also offered something more: to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons and to begin reducing stockpiles of such weapons until they are completely eliminated.

The Soviet Union has also actively sought the prohibition of all other types of weapons of mass destruction. And we have succeeded in achieving a few things in this field during the period under review. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military Use of Environmental Modification Techniques has entered into force. Preliminary agreement has been reached on the basic provisions of a treaty banning radiological weapons. Negotiations continue, albeit at an intolerably slow pace, with a view to the exclusion of chemical weapons from the arsenals of States. Thanks to the actions of the peace-loving forces it was possible to check the implementation of plans for the deployment of neutron weapons in western Europe. The renewed attempts made by the Pentagon to suspend the Damocles' sword of this weapon over the European countries are arousing all the more indignation in the peoples. We for our part, reaffirm that we will not begin production of this weapon unless it appears in other States, and that we are prepared to conclude an agreement banning this weapon once and for all.

The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries have put forward a number of concrete proposals on military détente in Europe. In particular, we should like the participants in the All-European Conference to undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other, and we would suggest that the existing military blocs should not be expanded and new blocs should not be created in Europe and on other continents.

The Soviet Union and its allies have proposed the convening of a European conference to discuss and settle questions of military détente and disarmament in Europe. This question is in the focus of attention at the ongoing meeting in Madrid.

Neither have we slackened our efforts to achieve progress at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Here the socialist countries have gone more than half way to meet our western partners. But it must be said frankly that if the western countries continue to drag out these negotiations, at the same time building up their military potential in Europe, we shall have to take this fact into consideration.

Many important initiatives taken by the Soviet Union and its allies during the past five-year period have been endorsed by the decisions of the United Nations, including those adopted at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Soviet proposals for strengthening international security and limiting the arms race remain in force. Soviet diplomats and all other officials who deal with foreign policy matters are continuing, under the guidance of the Party's Central Committee, to press for their implementation.

Our actions are consonant with the aspirations of other countries and peoples. Suffice it to recall that many States from various continents have put forward proposals -- which have received wide international support -- for the declaration as nuclear-free zones, in addition to Latin America, of Africa and the Middle East, and for the creation of zones of peace in South East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean area. The decisions of the All-European Conference are, in fact, aimed at ensuring that the whole of Europe should become such a zone.

We are carrying on the struggle for a radical improvement in the international situation. The trustworthy compass here is, as it has been, the Peace Programme proclaimed by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Today, the state of world affairs requires new, additional efforts to remove the threat of war and to strengthen international security. Permit me to put before the Congress a number of ideas directed to this end.

In recent years, as you know, flash-points of military conflict, often threatening to grow into a major conflagration, have flared up in one or another region of the world. Experience has shown that it is not easy to extinguish them. It would be far better to take preventive measures, to forestall the occurrence of such hotbeds.

In Europe, for example, this purpose is to a certain extent served -- and served fairly well on the whole -- by the confidence-building measures in the military field carried out by decision of the All-European Conference. They include advance

notification of military exercises of ground forces, and the invitation to them of observers from other countries. At present, these measures apply to the territory of the European States, including the western regions of the USSR. We have already said that we are prepared to go farther and to give notice of exercises by naval and air forces. We have proposed -- and we propose again -- that there should also be advance notification of large-scale troop movements.

And now we wish to propose that the zone of application of such measures should be substantially extended. We are prepared to apply them to the entire European part of the USSR, provided the western States, too, extend the confidence zone correspondingly.

There is a region where the elaboration and application of confidence-building measures -- naturally, with due consideration for its specific features -- could not only defuse the situation locally, but also make a very useful contribution to the consolidation of the foundations of universal peace. That region is the Far East, where such Powers as the Soviet Union, China and Japan border on each other. There are also United States military bases there. The Soviet Union would be prepared to hold concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries.

In making these far-reaching proposals for confidence-building measures, we proceed from the belief that their implementation will facilitate progress in the field of disarmament also.

Further, it is sometimes said about our proposals with respect to the Persian Gulf that they cannot be divorced from the question of the Soviet military contingent that is in Afghanistan. What can be said on this score? The Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate with regard to the Persian Gulf as an independent problem, and it is also prepared, of course, to participate in a separate settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. But we do not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed in conjunction with questions concerning Persian Gulf security. Naturally, only the international aspects of the Afghan problem can be discussed in this connection, and not internal Afghan affairs. Afghanistan's sovereignty, together with its status as a non-aligned State, must be fully protected.

Once again, we make a strong appeal for restraint in the sphere of strategic armaments. It should not be tolerated that the peoples of the world live under the menace of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

The limitation and reduction of strategic armaments is a paramount problem. For our part, we are prepared to continue the relevant negotiations with the United States of America without delay, preserving all the positive elements that have so far been achieved in this area. It goes without saying that the negotiations can be conducted only on the basis of equality and equal security. We will not consent to any agreement that would give unilateral advantages to the United States. There must be no illusions on that account. In our opinion, all the other nuclear Powers should join in these negotiations at an appropriate time.

The USSR is prepared to negotiate on the limitation of any types of weapons. We once proposed the banning of the development of the Trident naval missile system in the United States and of a corresponding system in our country. The proposal was not accepted. As a result, the United States has built the new Ohio submarine armed with Trident-I missiles, while we, in turn, have built a similar system, the Typhoon. So, who has gained from this?

We are prepared to come to terms on limiting the deployment of the new submarines -- the Ohio type by the United States and similar ones by the USSR. We could also agree to the banning of the modernization of existing and the development of new ballistic missiles for these submarines.

Now about nuclear-missile weapons in Europe. An ever more dangerous stockpiling of them is in progress. A kind of vicious circle has come about, the actions of one side provoking countermeasures by the other. How can this chain be broken?

We propose that there should be agreement that a moratorium should forthwith be set on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear-missile systems of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union, that is, a freeze quantitatively and qualitatively on the existing level of these weapons, including, of course, the United States forward-based nuclear systems in this region. The moratorium could enter into force at once, the moment negotiations begin on this question, and it could operate until a permanent treaty is concluded on limiting or, still better, reducing such nuclear systems in Europe. In making this proposal, we expect the two sides to stop all preparations for the deployment of corresponding additional weapons, including the United States Pershing-2 missiles and land-based strategic cruise missiles.

The peoples must know the truth about the destructive consequences for humankind of a nuclear war. We suggest that a competent international committee should be set up which would demonstrate the vital necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe. The committee could be composed of the most eminent scientists from various countries. The whole world should be kept informed of the conclusions it draws.

There are, certainly, many other urgent international problems in the contemporary world of today. The wise solution of these problems would help take the heat out of the international situation and permit the peoples to breathe more freely. But what is required for this is a far-sighted approach, political will and courage, authority and influence. It is for this reason that we consider that it would be useful to convene a special meeting of the Security Council with the participation of the top leaders of its member States in order to look for ways of improving the international situation and preventing war. If they so wish, the leaders of other States could obviously also take part in the meeting. Naturally, thorough preparations would be needed for such a meeting, in order to ensure that it achieved positive results.

Thus, the new measures we are proposing embrace a wide range of issues. They concern both nuclear-missile and conventional weapons and also ground troops and naval and air forces. They bear upon the situation in Europe and in the Near, Middle and Far East. They cover measures both of a political and of a military nature. All these proposals pursue a single aim, our one over-all aspiration -- to do everything possible to relieve the peoples of the threat of a nuclear war, to preserve world peace.

This is, one might say, the organic continuation and development of our Peace Programme as regards the most burning, urgent problems of present-day international life.

The safeguarding of peace -- no other task is more important now at the international level for our Party, for our people and, for that matter, for all the peoples of the world.

By safeguarding peace we are working not only for the people who are living today, and not only for our children and grandchildren; we are working for the happiness of dozens of future generations.

If there is peace, the creative energy of the peoples, backed by the achievements of science and technology, will assuredly solve the problems that are now disturbing the peoples. Of course new and still loftier tasks will then confront our descendants. Well, that is the dialectics of progress, the dialectics of life.

Not war preparations that doom the peoples to a senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth, but the consolidation of peace -- that is the clue to the future.

PAKISTAN: WORKING PAPER

Effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons

1. During the last two years, the ad hoc working group established by the Committee on Disarmament to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, has examined both the nature and the form of such assurances. Some progress has been made in these negotiations. As regards the form of the assurances, there is no objection, in principle, to the proposed international convention although the difficulties have also been pointed out. As for the nature or substance of the assurances, the report of the ad hoc working group last year (CD/125*) which was adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, recognized, in its paragraphs 15 and 17, the need to reach agreement on a "common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character".

2. The Pakistan delegation considers that during the 1981 session, the ad hoc working group should devote attention in the first instance to the possibilities of evolving such a "common approach" or a "common formula" on the substance of the assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Once agreement is reached on such a common approach it would become much easier to reach consensus on the form in which this should be embodied.

3. The efforts to evolve a common approach have not made substantive progress so far primarily because it has remained restricted to examination of the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States. It would be more productive if the ad hoc working group were to explore all possible alternatives with an open mind and record the areas of agreement as well as differences on each of the available options.

4. Without prejudice to its own position on the subject, the Pakistan delegation considers that there are at least five distinct alternatives which can be explored in the search for a "common approach" or "formula".

A. A categorical assurance by the nuclear-weapon
States to all non-nuclear-weapon States not to
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them

5. This form of an assurance would respond most effectively to the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States for clear and unambiguous assurances against the danger of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, only one nuclear-weapon State has so far expressed its readiness to extend such a categorical and unconditional assurance. The ad hoc working group should examine whether other nuclear-weapon States would find it possible to review their positions and also extend such categorical assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States.

- B. A categorical assurance by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them with accompanying interpretative statements by each nuclear-weapon State

6. The security assurances provided under Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) provides a precedent which could be used to evolve a common approach on the question of security assurances. Under this Protocol, now ratified by all five nuclear-weapon States, they have undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States members of the nuclear weapon free zone in Latin America. The ratification of the Protocol was, however, accompanied by statements by individual non-nuclear-weapon States as regards such matters as the viability of the zone, the policies of the individual non-nuclear-weapon States, the question of transit of nuclear weapons, etc.

7. In the case of non-use assurances at the universal level, a similar procedure could be adopted, i.e. a categorical assurance could be given by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States (either in an international convention, a Security Council resolution or some other international instrument) and be accompanied by interpretative statements containing the reservations or limitations stipulated by each nuclear-weapon State on such questions as are reflected in their present unilateral declarations.

- C. A common formula for security assurances containing such conditions and limitations as may be raised in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and agreed upon by all concerned

8. Another approach which has yet to be explored is the possibility of the Committee on Disarmament itself negotiating the precise conditions and limitations that should be an integral part of a "common formula" on security assurances. This would involve leaving aside the existing unilateral declarations and examining de nova what, if any, conditions and limitations are:

- (a) necessary to safeguard the security of nuclear-weapon States; and
- (b) acceptable to other nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In this context consideration could be given to formulations such as the one contained in the statement by President Brezhnev of the Soviet Union at the XVIII Congress of KOMSOMOL of 25 April 1978.

- D. A common formula which could reconcile the conditions and limitations contained in the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States

9. This is the approach which the ad hoc working group pursued during its 1980 session. As established during these deliberations, the conditions and limitations contained in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States can be broadly characterized into two kinds:

- First, those relating to the non-nuclear-weapon status of the States to be given security assurances; and
- Second, those pertaining to situations in which some of the nuclear-weapon States retain the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons against even non-nuclear-weapon States.

10. The first condition is a question of general principle which will perhaps require a decision in relation to all the various alternatives enumerated in this paper. The crux of the difficulty in reconciling the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States is the second kind of consideration which emanates from the subjective perceptions of each nuclear-weapon State about its national security interest. So far, it has not proved possible to reconcile the individual positions of the nuclear-weapon States because none of them has been prepared to change or modify its position in the least in order to accommodate each other's position or that of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Pakistan has suggested a compromise formula (CD/10) which reflects a sincere effort to accommodate the positions of the nuclear Powers while at the same time taking into account the preoccupations of the non-nuclear-weapon States. This approach could be examined more closely and refined further through negotiations in the ad hoc working group. At the same time, other ideas, if any, to reconcile the positions in the unilateral declarations could also be explored.

E. The investiture of more formal and legal status to the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States

11. Certain delegations have expressed the view that the position of the nuclear-weapon States as reflected in their unilateral declarations cannot be reconciled. They have, therefore, suggested that the existing unilateral declarations could be given more formal status and legal character by having them "noted" in a resolution of the Security Council. Another possibility advanced is that each of the nuclear-weapon States should formally "deposit" its unilateral declaration with the United Nations Secretary-General and that this would give the declaration a binding legal character. These proposals could be further examined although certain non-nuclear-weapon States feel that such an action would not respond to the criteria of effectiveness or the international character required of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

12. Once the ad hoc working group has reviewed the above-mentioned alternatives of evolving a common approach, it could then turn to a further examination of the form of the international instrument in which a "common approach" could be embodied. The alternative forms of an international instrument are: (a) an international convention open to all States, nuclear and non-nuclear; (b) an international convention or agreement between the five nuclear-weapon States; (c) a resolution of the Security Council; and (d) some other international "arrangement" which would have "a legal and binding character".

13. The possibility of adopting interim arrangements pending agreement on a common approach is an option which should be explored only after a genuine and in-depth effort has been made to evolve such a common approach. In fact, some of the alternatives identified above have been suggested as possible interim arrangements. In the view of the Pakistan delegation, all such proposals will have to be examined against the criteria of whether they would constitute a meaningful advance towards agreement on an effective and credible international instrument to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States **against** the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

11 March 1981

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

Considerations of a group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament concerning negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests

The socialist countries attach very great importance to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also to the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, in the belief that nuclear weapons constitute the most serious threat to the existence of mankind.

Everyone is aware of the many initiatives which have consistently been taken by these countries with a view to the effective solution of the above-mentioned problems, both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations and other international fora. A group of socialist countries has submitted to the Committee on Disarmament documents CD/4 and CD/109 which contain a specific programme of measures aimed at the solution of the nuclear disarmament problem. These proposals still remain in force.

The course of the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament provides evidence of increasing support for these initiatives of the socialist countries. Many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament are expressing serious concern at the unceasing nuclear arms race, and at the continuation of the process of perfecting and accumulating nuclear weapons. An ever wider and more weighty appeal is being made in the Committee for the immediate commencement of negotiations on these questions which are of vital importance for the future of mankind. General Assembly resolution 35/152 B and C and also General Assembly resolution 35/145 A and B -- with respect to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests -- likewise call upon the members of the Committee to discuss these issues as a matter of priority.

In the opinion of a group of socialist countries, one constructive contribution to the discussion of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also of the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would be the establishment of two working groups on these topics in the Committee on Disarmament. Proposals to set up such groups have been contained in the statements made by the representatives of socialist countries. They were formulated in document CD/141 tabled at the current session by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on behalf of a group of socialist countries. Similar ideas have also been expressed by the representatives of many other States. And this is precisely what the above-mentioned resolutions of the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly require the Committee to do.

Unfortunately, because of the unconstructive positions of certain delegations, the Committee is at present unable to solve positively the question of the establishment of working groups. In these circumstances, a group of socialist countries represented in the Committee, displaying flexibility and the desire to start business-like negotiations on the substance of the above-mentioned questions as soon as possible, proposes that:

*Reissued for technical reasons.

1. Informal consultations with the participation of all the nuclear Powers should be started forthwith in the Committee on Disarmament, under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee, with a view to preparing specific negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
2. Informal consultations with the participation of all the nuclear Powers should be initiated without delay, under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee, for the purpose of preparing negotiations to consider the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with a view to the conclusion of a treaty on this matter at the earliest possible date;
3. Informal meetings of the Committee should be held at least once a week on the substantive issues of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

In making this proposal to the Committee on Disarmament, the delegations of a group of socialist countries express the hope that it will serve as a basis for constructive negotiations on the above-mentioned priority questions of disarmament which appear as items 1 and 2 in the agenda for the current session of the Committee on Disarmament.

CD/163
11 March 1981
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 MARCH 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
AUSTRIA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE AT ITS 104th PLENARY
MEETING ON FEBRUARY 1981

Referring to the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament dated 13 February 1981, on the participation of Austria in the work of the Committee on Disarmament at its 1981 session, I have the honour upon instructions of my Government to inform you that Austria considers the following questions as being of particular interest:

- Chemical weapons
- Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
- Nuclear test ban

Erik Nettel
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

CD/164
19 March 1981
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 MARCH 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE MINISTER COUNSELLOR OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FINLAND, TRANSMITTING A WORKING DOCUMENT ENTITLED "CREATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTROL CAPACITY - PRESENT PHASE AND GOALS OF THE FINNISH PROJECT"

Upon instructions of my Government I have the honour to submit to the Committee on Disarmament a working document concerning the creation of chemical weapons control capacity, present phase and goals of the Finnish project. This document, which we intend to introduce at a plenary meeting of the Committee devoted to chemical weapons, discusses in general terms some aspects of the verification problem.

I would be grateful if the document could be circulated as an official document to the members of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) Paavo Keisalo
Minister Counsellor

GE.81-60840

Working Document

Creation of Chemical Weapons Control Capacity -
Present Phase and Goals of the Finnish Project

1. The need for the prohibition of chemical weapons is widely recognized as a question of high priority. This question has been on the agenda of multilateral disarmament negotiations for almost two decades. A commitment to reach an early agreement on the banning of chemical weapons is stated i.a. in Article IX of the Biological Weapons Convention, and the urgency of the matter has been reiterated in several resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

2. Believing that all nations, whether parties to multilateral negotiations or not, have a vital interest in promoting disarmament and a duty to do whatever they can to pave the way towards this goal, the Government of Finland has endeavoured to make practical contributions to the negotiations on a ban of chemical weapons. Since 1973 Finland has been carrying out experimental research for the creation, on the national basis, of a chemical weapons control capacity, which could be put to international use. The progress of the project has been described in working papers and handbooks that Finland has annually presented to the CCD and the CD. They are the following:

- on definitions of chemical warfare agents and technical possibilities for verification and control of c-weapons with particular regard to a Finnish project on creation of a national basis of a CW control capacity for possible future international use (CCD/381, 1972),
- on the progress of the Finnish project for the creation of a national basis of a CW control capacity for possible future international use (CCD/412, 1973),
- on methodology for chemical identification of CW agents and related compound - progress of a Finnish research project (CCD/432, 1974, CCD/453, 1975, CCD/501, 1976),
- chemical and instrumental verification of organophosphorus warfare agents (CCD/544, 1977),
- an analytical technique for the verification of chemical disarmament - trade analysis by glass capillary gas chromatography with specific detectors (CCD/577, 1978),
- chemical identification of chemical weapons agents - a Finnish project (CD/14, 1979),
- identification of degradation products of potential organophosphorus warfare agents (CD/103, 1980).

3. The Finnish project concentrates on the development of methodology necessary for a detailed trace analysis of any control samples that could be collected to verify a ban of chemical weapons. After the development of satisfactory methodology and the corresponding data bank, problems connected with the collection of samples will be studied.

4. One of the several methods proposed for verification of production and stockpiling of CW agents and for testing their use on field is on-site inspection, including sample collection and trace analysis. Unfortunately, it is quite intrusive and serves, therefore, best as the last step of a complete multistep verification procedure (as proposed in some recent working papers). International verification becomes meaningful only if the chemical identity of all agents and related compounds found is fully elucidated. True, it may be possible to verify non-production of supertoxic nerve agents just by observing the absence of special safety constructions, but the non-production of only slightly toxic components of binary weapons is not that straightforward. From the binary components sample collection and analysis may be the only fully reliable verification method. Ultrasensitive off-site monitoring of air and water for agent traces is still another potential application of the verification method based on the analysis of samples.

5. Sample collection and trace analysis are equally useful for the verification of alleged use in combat of chemical weapons. Armies use on battlefield simple test sets like colour indicator papers which are neither very sensitive nor quite specific. If verification has to be carried out from outside the battlefield or even on it but a longer time after the alleged use, a more effective method has to be used.

6. The first step of the Finnish project was to synthesize model nerve agents and related chemical compounds, and examine their relevant properties with respect to possible verification analyses. After that, the suitability of available instrumental techniques for the identification of CW agents was studied. By using the most suitable techniques, and selected repeatable measuring conditions, an initial data base was recorded for about 150 agents and their degradation products. The selected techniques were arranged in the form of a system of microanalytical methods, and this system was proposed for consideration as a basis of international standardization of CW-verification analysis. The proposed system was published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in 1978 and 1980 in the form of handbooks referred to above (CCD/577 and CD/103).

7. The Finnish project has also trained several research workers in the field of CW verification analysis. The head laboratory of the project is located at the Department of Chemistry of the University of Helsinki but the research is carried out in close co-operation with several other Finnish laboratories.

8. The primary goal of the first phase of the Finnish project was reached in summer 1980. It was a sensitive identification system for the most important supertoxic agents. The goal of the next phase is the development of detailed procedures for sample preparation and quantitative organic determination on the trace level of known and potential agents. Accurate methods are necessary for obtaining useful information also on complex and metabolized sample matrices. Parallely to these studies the Finnish project concentrates on the automation of the verification analysis including the development of automatic monitoring instrumentation. Automated verification analysis makes possible sensitive monitoring of the prohibited chemicals alone decreasing the fear of revealing commercial and industrial secrets from industrial samples by unnecessary revelation of other, peaceful compounds. The third future goal is the extension of the original data base to any chemical compound relevant to a CW ban.

9. Detailed studies on sample collection can be initiated only after completing the present methodological development of trace analysis. Such studies are, however, of primary importance in preparing detailed instructions for sample collection for verification analysis. Miniature field tests in the open air are necessary, and are being planned. They will include experiments for remote monitoring of air and water.

10. The eight years' experience of the Finnish CW project indicates that in spite of being only a single problem in the very complex CW verification field, continuous research, such as the Finnish project, is necessary to bring the chemical verification methodology along with the rapid technical development.

CD/165
20 March 1981
ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1981 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF VENEZUELA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE ADDRESS GIVEN BY HIS HOLINESS POPE JOHN PAUL II AT HIROSHIMA ON 23 FEBRUARY 1981

I have the honour to request you to arrange for the attached text of the address given by His Holiness Pope John Paul II at Hiroshima on 23 February 1981 to be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament under agenda item 2 entitled: "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

(Signed) Adolfo R. TAYLHARDAT,
Ambassador,
Representative of Venezuela to
the Committee on Disarmament

ADDRESS GIVEN BY HIS HOLINESS POPE JOHN PAUL II AT THE PEACE MEMORIAL
PARK, HIROSHIMA ON WEDNESDAY, 23 FEBRUARY 1981

A pilgrim of peace

War is the work of man. War is destruction of human life. War is death.

Nowhere do these truths impose themselves upon us more forcefully than in this city of Hiroshima, at this Peace Memorial. Two cities will forever have their names linked together, two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as the only cities in the world that have had the ill fortune to be a reminder that man is capable of destruction beyond belief. Their names will forever stand out as the names of the only cities in our time that have been singled out as a warning to future generations that war can destroy human efforts to build a world of peace.

1. Mr. Mayor,

Dear friends here present, and all of you who are listening to my voice, and whom my message will reach:

It is with deep emotion that I have come here today as a pilgrim of peace. I wanted to make this visit to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial out of a deep personal conviction that to remember the past is to commit oneself to the future.

Together we recall that it is one of humanity's sad achievements that all across the face of the earth the names of very many -- too many -- places are remembered mainly because they have witnessed the horror and suffering produced by war: war-memorials, that with the victory of one side also recall the suffering and death of countless human beings, cemeteries where rest those who sacrificed their very lives in the service of their country or in the service of a noble cause, and cemeteries where lie the innocent civilian victims of war's destructive fury; the remains of concentration and extermination camps, where contempt for man and for his inviolable rights reached its most base and cruel expression; battlefields, where nature has mercifully healed the earth's scars, but without being able to blot out past human history of hate and enmity. Hiroshima and Nagasaki stand out from all those other places and monuments, as the first victims of nuclear war.

I bow my head as I recall the memory of thousands of men, women and children who lost their lives in that one terrible moment, or who for long years carried in their bodies and minds those seeds of death which inexorably pursued their process of destruction. The final balance of the human suffering that begun here has not been fully drawn up, nor has the total human cost been tallied, especially when one sees what nuclear war has done -- and could still do -- to our ideas, our attitudes and our civilization.

To remember the past is to commit oneself to the future

2. To remember the past is to commit oneself to the future. I cannot but honour and applaud the wise decision of the authorities of this city that the memorial recalling the first nuclear bombing should be a monument to peace. By so doing, the city of Hiroshima and the whole people of Japan have forcefully expressed their hope for a peaceful world and their conviction that man who wages war can also successfully make peace. From this city, and from the event its name recalls, there has originated a new worldwide consciousness against war, and a fresh determination to work for peace.

Some people, even among those who were alive at the time of the events that we commemorate today, might prefer not to think about the horror of nuclear war and its dire consequences. Among those who have never personally experienced the reality of armed conflict between nations, some might wish to abandon the very possibility of nuclear war. Others might wish to regard nuclear capacity as an unavoidable means of maintaining a balance of power through a balance of terror. But there is no justification for not raising the question of the responsibility of each nation and each individual in the face of possible wars and of the nuclear threat.

Disputes and conflicts must be solved by peaceful means

3. To remember the past is to commit oneself to the future. I evoke before you the memory of 6 August 1945, so that we may better grasp the meaning of the present challenge. Since that fateful day, nuclear stockpiles have grown in quantity and in destructive power. Nuclear weaponry continues to be built, tested and deployed. The total consequences of full-scale nuclear war are impossible to predict, but even if a mere fraction of the available weapons were to be used, one has to ask whether the inevitable escalation can be imagined, and whether the very destruction of humanity is not a real possibility. I wish to repeat here what I said to the United Nations General Assembly: "The continual preparations for war demonstrated by the production of ever more numerous, powerful and sophisticated weapons in various countries show that there is a desire to be ready for war, and being ready means being able to start it; it also means taking the risk that sometime, somewhere, somehow, someone can set in motion the terrible mechanism of general destruction" (statement to the United Nations General Assembly on 2 October 1979, no. 10, L'Osservatore Romano, Spanish edition, 14 October 1979, p. 13).

We must renew our faith in man

4. To remember the past is to commit oneself to the future. To remember Hiroshima is to abhor nuclear war. To remember Hiroshima is to commit oneself to peace. To remember what the people of this city suffered is to renew our faith in man, in his capacity to do what is good, in his freedom to choose what is right, in his determination to turn disaster into a new beginning. In the face of the man-made calamity that every war is, one must affirm and reaffirm, again and again, that the waging of war is not inevitable or unchangeable. Humanity is not destined to self-destruction. Clashes of ideologies, aspirations and needs can and must be settled and resolved by means other than war and violence. Humanity owes it to itself to settle differences and conflicts by peaceful means. The great spectrum of problems facing the many peoples in varying stages of cultural, social, economic and political development gives rise to international tension and conflict. It is vital for humanity that these problems should be solved in accordance with ethical principles of equity and justice enshrined in meaningful agreements and institutions. The international community should thus give itself a system of law that will regulate international relations and maintain peace, just as the rule of law protects national order.

An appeal to the whole world

5. Those who cherish life on earth must encourage governments and decision-makers in the economic and social fields to act in harmony with the demands of peace rather than out of narrow self-interest. Peace must always be the aim: peace pursued and protected in all circumstances. Let us not repeat the past, a past of violence and destruction. Let us embark upon the steep and difficult path of peace, the only path that befits human dignity, the only path that leads to the true fulfilment of the human destiny, the only path to a future in which equity, justice and solidarity are realities and not just distant dreams.

6. And so, on this very spot where, 35 years ago, the life of so many people was snuffed out in one fiery moment, I wish to appeal to the whole world on behalf of life, on behalf of humanity, on behalf of the future.

To the Heads of State and of Government, to those who hold political and economic power, I say: let us pledge ourselves to peace through justice; let us take a solemn decision, now, that war will never be tolerated or sought as a means of resolving differences; let us promise our fellow human beings that we will work untiringly for disarmament and the banishing of all nuclear weapons: let us replace violence and hate with confidence and caring.

To every man and woman in this land and in the world, I say: let us assume responsibility for each other and for the future without being limited by frontiers and social distinctions; let us educate ourselves and educate others in the ways of peace; let humanity never become the victim of a struggle between competing systems; let there never be another war.

To young people everywhere, I say: let us together create a new future of fraternity and solidarity; let us reach out towards our brothers and sisters in need, feed the hungry, shelter the homeless, free the downtrodden, bring justice where injustice reigns and peace where only weapons speak. Your young hearts have an extraordinary capacity for goodness and love: put them at the service of your fellow human beings.

To everyone I repeat the words of the Prophet: "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Is. 2:4).

To those who believe in God, I say: let us be strong in his strength that infinitely surpasses our own; let us be united in the knowledge that he calls us to unity; let us be aware that love and sharing are not faraway ideals but the road to enduring peace -- the peace of God.

A prayer for peace

7. And to the Creator of nature and man, of truth and beauty I pray:

Hear my voice, for it is the voice of the victims of all wars and violence among individuals and nations;

Hear my voice, for it is the voice of all children who suffer and will suffer when people put their faith in weapons and war;

Hear my voice when I beg you to instill into the hearts of all human beings the wisdom of peace, the strength of justice and the joy of fellowship;

Hear my voice, for I speak for the multitudes in every country and in every period of history who do not want war and are ready to walk the road of peace;

Hear my voice and grant insight and strength so that we may always respond to hatred with love, to injustice with total dedication to justice, to need with the sharing of self, to war with peace.

O God, -hear my voice and grant unto the world your everlasting peace.

CD/166
23 March 1981

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 23 MARCH 1981 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE MEMORANDUM "PEACE, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY GUARANTEES" SUBMITTED BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, MR. A. GROMYKO, TO THE THIRTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in connection with the discussion of the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the memorandum "Peace, Disarmament and International Security Guarantees" introduced by Mr. A.A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, in the statement which he made on 23 September 1980 during the general debate at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the memorandum to be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V.L. ISSRAELYAN

ANNEX

PEACE, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY GUARANTEES

Memorandum of the Soviet Union

At present, the States and peoples of the world are living under the conditions of a new aggravation of the international situation.

Détente, which in the 1970s became the predominant trend in the development of international relations, has been subjected to attacks by certain influential forces. This has resulted in an exacerbation of the world situation. The arms race is acquiring even broader dimensions. In certain fields it is approaching a point beyond which it may become impossible to curb it effectively by means of agreements based on mutual verification. Attempts by some States to achieve military superiority and upset the military balance of forces in the world are becoming increasingly evident.

The negotiations on various aspects of limiting and ending the arms race, which intensified in the 1970s and produced certain results, have recently been slowed down and on a number of major issues, interrupted by the United States of America.

In these circumstances the Soviet Union believes it necessary to draw the attention of the States Members of the United Nations and of all the peoples of the world to recent developments in major areas of the struggle for universal peace, the halting of the arms race and disarmament and for reliable guarantees of international security, and to remind them of the proposals put forward by it and other socialist countries in the interests of achieving success in this historic struggle.

The only possible way to prevent a return to the "cold war" and to establish normal stable relations between States is, as the Soviet Union sees it, to make consistent progress in international détente.

Détente means a willingness to resolve disagreements and disputes by peaceful means and not by force, threats or sabre-rattling. Détente means a certain measure of trust and the ability to take into account each other's legitimate interests.

To proceed along the road of détente means to advance towards removing the threat of world war, towards disarmament, towards strengthening international security and ensuring the most favourable peaceful conditions for a successful solution of the social and economic problems facing mankind.

Under current conditions there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of international détente. The only option for the world is either to follow the road of renunciation of the use of force, disarmament and mutually advantageous co-operation on the basis of equality, or to be plunged into the abyss of an unbridled arms race and escalation of armed conflicts fraught with the gravest consequences for mankind.

The Soviet Union believes that it is important to strive for the settlement of existing regional conflicts and at the same time to demonstrate concern for taking measures to avert or prevent new conflicts of a similar nature.

The Soviet Union is convinced that through the common efforts of peace-loving forces, it is possible to stop the unfavourable development of international events, defend and consolidate détente, and extend it to all parts of the world. As in the past, the Soviet Union is willing to make a tangible contribution to this noble struggle in the interests of strengthening peace and the security of the peoples.

The consistency of the Soviet Union's active peace-loving policy in international affairs has been reaffirmed by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who said: "We shall continue to spare no effort to preserve détente and everything positive that was achieved in the 1970s, to ensure a turn towards disarmament, to uphold the right of the peoples to free and independent development, and to preserve and consolidate peace."

Halting of the nuclear arms race and renunciation of the use of force in international relations

1. As far back as 1946, the Soviet Union took the initiative of proposing the conclusion of an international convention banning for ever the production and use of atomic weapons so that the great scientific discoveries in the field of nuclear fission could be used solely for the purposes of improving the well-being and living standards of the peoples of the world and developing culture and science for the benefit of mankind.

At that time, when it was somewhat easier to solve this historically vital problem, the Soviet Union proposed that all parties to such a convention should assume solemn obligations not to use atomic weapons under any circumstances; to ban their manufacture and storage; and to destroy all existing stockpiles of finished and unfinished atomic-weapon products within a period of three months. It was proposed that violation of those obligations should be declared the gravest international crime against humanity.

Yet, in response to these proposals by the Soviet Union, which were imbued with concern for the fate of mankind, the other Powers primarily involved took a decidedly negative stand and embarked upon a course of accelerating the nuclear arms race in the naive belief that they would succeed in maintaining a monopoly over the production of those weapons.

As a result, the problem of banning and destroying nuclear weapons has become immeasurably more complicated. That does not mean, however, that it is insoluble. Nuclear weapons were developed by people; and people can and must outlaw and eventually eliminate them.

2. In 1978, the Soviet Union and other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty again put forward a proposal for halting the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they are completely destroyed. At its special session devoted to disarmament and later at its regular sessions in 1978 and 1979, the United Nations General Assembly expressed support for that proposal. The Committee on Disarmament has before it the concrete observations of the socialist countries regarding the commencement of, and procedure for, such talks. The matter brooks no further delay. Those who are evading a businesslike consideration of the problem of nuclear disarmament are taking on full responsibility for the consequences of that line of action.

3. In advocating radical measures of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union does not approach the issue from an "all or nothing" position. On more than one occasion it has also expressed its readiness to follow the path of partial solutions capable of limiting the nuclear arms race and blocking, one by one, the channels for its development.

These statements by the Soviet Union are based on practical deeds. The USSR took the initiative of, and actively participated in, concluding the important international agreements on banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (1963), on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (1968), and on the prohibition of the placing in orbit around the earth of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and of their installation on celestial bodies (1967) or on the sea-bed and the ocean floor (1971).

The importance of these agreements lies in the strict and precise obligations set forth in them and in the fact that, in their totality, they provide a basis for further progress towards limiting and ending the nuclear arms race.

4. In recent years the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have put forward a whole series of practical proposals, and in the 1970s talks between the States concerned were begun on every one of them.

An important place among them belongs to the proposal for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The conclusion of a treaty on this subject would mean that no State would ever again conduct a single test explosion of nuclear weapons and, consequently, no type of nuclear weapons could be improved or developed anew.

In the mid-1970s, certain progress was discernible in the solution of the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Tripartite negotiations began on this matter, with the participation of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom. From the very beginning the Soviet Union has been working for the success of the negotiations and to that end it has taken important steps to meet its partners half-way. It has agreed to, inter alia, the establishment of a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions and the entry into force of the treaty even if at first not all the five nuclear-weapon States but only three of them - the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom participate in it.

At present, however, the United States and the United Kingdom are clearly pursuing a course of delaying the negotiations and, in a number of instances, they are abandoning proposals which they themselves introduced.

If the negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests continue to be blocked, this will inevitably open the way to the accelerated development and production of new, even more lethal types of such weapons. The entire responsibility for this will rest with those through whose fault the negotiations are being delayed.

5. The Soviet Union has always advocated that the formulation and implementation of measures for arms limitation and disarmament in the nuclear field should be inseparably linked with the strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States and of the preservation of peace. Such measures would dispel the atmosphere of suspicion in relations between States and lead to a general improvement in the international climate, and would contribute to efforts to end the arms race.

The key requirement is to make the renunciation of the use of force a law of international life. On the initiative of the USSR, the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1972 a solemn declaration of States Members of the Organization on the renunciation of the use of force in international relations concurrently with the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The approval by the United Nations in 1974 of the universally recognized Definition of aggression, which, for nearly half a century, the USSR had urged should be elaborated, created an international legal basis for suppressing this extremely grave crime against humanity.

These were important steps, but as the course of events demonstrated, they were still insufficient. The Soviet Union therefore proposed in 1976 that a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations should be elaborated and concluded, and submitted to the United Nations a draft text of such a treaty for its consideration. The United Nations General Assembly supported the proposal. A special body was set up to prepare a draft world treaty.

Unfortunately, no progress has been made in practical work on this subject for a number of years. Those who are unwilling to renounce the use of force and diktat in their relations with independent States are frustrating the elaboration of a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

6. Obstacles are also being raised in the path of the practical implementation of other United Nations decisions taken on the initiative of the Soviet Union and designed to strengthen peace and international security. For example, as far back as 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the prohibition of war propaganda in any form whatsoever. Nevertheless, unbridled propaganda of aggression, chauvinism and expansion is to this day being conducted in many countries.

Notwithstanding the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as far back as 1965, acts of gross interference in the internal affairs of other countries, including armed intervention, are still being committed today before the eyes of the whole world.

The Soviet Union has always been and will continue to be on the side of the peoples who fall victim to aggression and interference in the internal affairs of other States, and is prepared to make a constructive contribution to a declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention and interference of States in the internal affairs of other States, which is being elaborated on the initiative of the non-aligned countries.

7. The countries which bear responsibility for the aggravation of the international situation and for the arms race are evading the implementation of such major international instruments adopted on the initiative of the USSR as the United Nations Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (1970) and the Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente (1977), which determine the main directions of the efforts of States to contain the threat of war and ensure a stable peace.

The implementation of the principle of the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations proclaimed by the General Assembly in 1979 on the initiative of the Soviet Union is of great importance for the solution of this problem.

These decisions of the United Nations, aimed at consolidating the foundations of universal peace and security, should not simply be relegated to history; they are designed to serve States as a guide to action and to be implemented in practice in inter-State relations. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its struggle for the strengthening of the political and legal guarantees of peace and for international security has but one objective - to ensure lasting peace.

Limitation and reduction of strategic arms

8. The halting of the further growth of the strategic nuclear arsenals of States and subsequent consistent quantitative reduction and qualitative limitation of strategic nuclear-weapon systems are of decisive significance for reducing the threat of nuclear war. It is precisely for this reason that for many years the Soviet Union has been consistently seeking the conclusion with the United States of America of effective agreements on the limitation of strategic arms.

The first agreements of this kind between the USSR and the United States, achieved in 1972 - the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT I) - evoked everywhere in the world the hope that the strategic arms race could be halted and then reversed.

The Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), signed at the highest level at Vienna on 18 June 1979, is intended to become the next major step in this direction. The peoples expected that, immediately after the entry into force of the SALT II Treaty, negotiations would begin on further limitations and reductions of strategic arms.

So far, however, the SALT II Treaty has not come into force. It is well known who is responsible for the current situation, in which the process of strategic arms limitation was called in question precisely at the moment when prospects became discernible for further progress in this direction, which is of signal importance from the point of view of peace and security.

As for the Soviet Union, it is ready, as before, to participate in the process of the limitation and reduction of strategic arms with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union is prepared to ratify the SALT II Treaty and to comply with all its provisions provided that the United States acts likewise. It also confirms its willingness to participate - after the SALT II Treaty has been ratified - in negotiations on further limitations and reductions of strategic arms.

At the same time it should be made clear what serious damage would be done to the cause of peace and to further efforts to prevent nuclear war should the entry into force of the SALT II Treaty be frustrated, and, equally, who would be responsible for such a turn of events.

Prevention of a surprise or unauthorized attack

9. The Soviet Union has repeatedly and persistently raised the question of the need to elaborate measures to prevent the possibility of a surprise attack. Now that the arms race is characterized by not only quantitative but also qualitative aspects, this question is becoming ever more significant and requires an immediate solution.

The problem of preventing the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, whose importance has been stressed by the Soviet Union on numerous occasions, also remains as acute as ever. Recent events involving repeated false nuclear alarms in the United States armed forces cannot fail to arouse concern.

The Soviet Union is prepared to hold a serious discussion of these problems on both a multilateral and a bilateral basis, and is willing to co-operate in any steps aimed at preventing nuclear war.

Consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons

10. The elimination of the threat of nuclear war depends to a large extent on efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has always opposed the spread of nuclear weapons on our planet.

No one should have any doubts as to the danger to peace that would be brought about by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, in particular, by the countries situated in areas of heightened military danger, as well as by other States seeking to acquire them for aggressive purposes. The results of the recently concluded second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons testify to the fact that this anxiety is shared by the majority of States, which have declared themselves to be in favour of further measures to strengthen this Treaty and enhance its effectiveness. There is growing understanding of the need to prevent the transfer of nuclear equipment materials and technology intended for peaceful uses from becoming a channel for spreading nuclear weapons. There must be no deviations in this matter.

11. Striving to contribute to the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and thereby to the lessening of the threat of nuclear war, the Soviet Union declared in 1978 that it would never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and had no such weapons on their territories. It proposed to conclude on that basis an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States. The socialist States parties to the Warsaw Treaty proposed in the Warsaw Declaration of 15 May 1980, that this question should be solved on a European scale.

The Soviet Union has also urged that agreement be reached on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. Such agreement could envisage a straightforward clear obligation on the part of the nuclear Powers not to station nuclear weapons on the territories of those countries where there are no such weapons at present, regardless of whether or not these countries are allies of a given nuclear State.

The initiatives of the Soviet Union with regard to the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear countries have gained wide support at the United Nations as well as on the part of world public opinion. For two years the Committee on Disarmament has been discussing these initiatives with a view to translating them into concrete agreements, but owing to the non-constructive stand taken by the other nuclear Powers and some of their allies, the progress is slow, to say the least. The Soviet Union considers it necessary to bring this to the attention of all States Members of the United Nations.

12. Proposals to establish nuclear-free zones are being put forward in many regions of the world, for example in Africa, the Middle East, and Northern Europe. The desire of the States of those regions thereby to spare their peoples the risk of being involved in a nuclear conflict deserves all possible support. This is precisely the position of the Soviet Union. On that basis, it has signed and ratified Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

Prohibition of other means of mass destruction

13. With all the danger inherent in nuclear weapons, they are not the only means in the arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Other types of weapons of mass destruction already exist, and new, even more horrible weapons can be developed. The use of scientific and technological achievements for the purposes of developing engines of death is fraught with calamity for the peoples.

The Soviet Union, other socialist and all peace-loving countries have long favoured protecting mankind from this threat. For the time being only one real success has been scored in this field: bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons were prohibited in 1972. This is a tangible result but it covers only one type of weapon of mass destruction.

In the meantime some countries are intensively developing new kinds of chemical weapons - weapons which killed and maimed many thousands of people already in the First World War.

As far back as the early 1970s, the Soviet Union, in close co-operation with a number of other States, made a proposal to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The negotiations on this issue have been conducted for many years. However, there is still no agreement, while the danger continues to grow. Vigorous steps are required to bring this important endeavour to a conclusion.

14. The Soviet Union has been consistently urging that the possibility of adding new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction to the arsenals of States be ruled out altogether. It proposes that an appropriate international agreement should be concluded to this end.

No headway has been made in the solution of this important question, owing to the negative stand taken by some States which evidently would like to retain the possibility of developing entirely new means of annihilation, clearly counting on changing the strategic balance of forces to their advantage. The adventurist character of these calculations is no less obvious than their futility.

The sooner an end is put to any work in the field of the development of ever new means of mass destruction, the greater will be the confidence of the peoples in their future.

15. While advocating a comprehensive prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the Soviet Union is also ready to agree on the prohibition of individual new types of such weapons. This applies, first and foremost to neutron weapons, the threat of emergence of which in the arsenals of States is growing.

Jointly with other socialist countries, the USSR has put forward a draft international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons. But other countries capable of developing such weapons refuse to conduct negotiations on their prohibition.

At one time it was stated on the Soviet side that the Soviet Union would not begin the production of neutron weapons as long as the United States did likewise. Today this position of the USSR remains valid with respect to a possible emergence of neutron weapons in the arsenal of any other State. However, it is still the view of the USSR that the prohibition of neutron weapons on a contractual basis and on an international scale would be the best solution.

16. The Committee on Disarmament is working on the preparation of a treaty banning another type of weapon of mass destruction - radiological weapons, that is to say, weapons which affect living organisms by radiation resulting from the non-explosive decay of radio-active material. The USSR sees no reason why this work could not be completed in the immediate future.

Reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

17. Soon after the end of the Second World War, in 1948, the Soviet Union made a proposal in the United Nations to the effect that, parallel with the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the permanent members of the Security Council should significantly reduce their ground, naval and air forces within one year. In the years that followed, the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty States put forward concrete proposals concerning the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments by States and, first of all, by large States.

This issue has been examined from different angles at various stages of the disarmament negotiations, and at present there is no aspect to it that could not become the subject of agreement if all States displayed the same political will as did the Soviet Union.

However, there is no progress in the solution of this issue. Some big Powers refuse even to start serious negotiations on the subject. That is why the Soviet Union deems it necessary to reaffirm the full validity of its proposals made two years ago - to cease the production of new types of conventional armaments of great destructive capability, to agree on the renunciation, by the permanent members of the Security Council and by countries which have military agreements with them, of the expansion of their armies and the build-up of their conventional armaments.

18. Some time ago efforts were made to achieve agreement on the limitation of the sale and supply of conventional armaments the cost of which at present runs into billions and leads to the saturation of the crisis areas with dangerous means of warfare. At the Soviet-American negotiations in 1978 on this subject, a start was made in formulating political-legal and military-technological criteria for the admissibility or inadmissibility of sales of arms. Agreement seemed to be within reach.

However, the American side suspended the negotiations and then refused to continue them altogether. Simultaneously, exports of American weapons sharply increased. All this runs directly counter to the interests of peace.

19. This autumn, the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects is scheduled to finish its work. The Soviet Union made its contribution to achieving progress at the previous stages of the international consideration of the matter. It will assist in bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

Ending the arms race and disarmament at the regional level

20. The threat of war can be eliminated by radical disarmament measures taken on the global scale. It can be significantly lessened by the limitation or cessation of the arms race in individual areas. It can and should be dealt with also on the scale of individual regions of the world.

Of particular importance in this context is, of course, Europe, where the most numerous and powerful armed forces and armaments of the two military and political groupings of States are concentrated and confront each other. At present there are several basic courses of action to be vigorously followed here with respect to the European continent. As regards each and every one of them, the Soviet Union in co-operation with the other socialist States parties to the Warsaw Treaty takes an active and constructive attitude.

21. On the proposal of the USSR and other European States, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe considered the question of confidence-building measures, including notification of major military exercises and invitation of observers to attend certain military manoeuvres. The appropriate arrangements, as provided for in the Final Act, have been scrupulously carried out for five years already, thus helping to a certain extent to raise the level of confidence in Europe.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries advocate the broadening and deepening of confidence-building measures, the implementation of effective steps towards lessening military tension on the European continent, and the convening of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe. This initiative has met with wide response from nearly all States participating in the European Conference, and now many of them favour the adoption by the forthcoming all-European meeting in Madrid of a decision to convene such a conference. This is an important and promising endeavour. It requires first of all the overcoming of the opposition of those forces which would like to hamper the lessening of military tension in Europe.

22. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, supported by broad peace-loving circles in Europe, favour the conclusion by all States participating in the European Conference of a treaty on the non-first use against each other of either nuclear weapons or conventional arms. It is quite obvious how beneficial such a step would be for the peaceful life of the peoples of Europe, and not only Europe, especially in view of the fact that the two world wars that brought untold suffering to mankind started on the European continent. Here, a response is due from the United States and its Western European allies.

23. The Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe that started also on the initiative of the socialist countries have now been going on for seven years. Hopes for progress frequently emerged in the course of the talks but every time the NATO countries raised new obstacles in the way to success. Recently the socialist States participating in the Vienna talks have taken new major steps to bring the positions of the sides closer together. What is required now is a constructive response from the Western countries. The Vienna talks can and must be brought to a successful conclusion.

24. As a result of the dangerous NATO actions aimed at undermining the military balance in Europe, the question of nuclear systems in that region has of late become particularly acute. A year ago the Soviet Union declared its readiness to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear-missile systems deployed in the western areas of the USSR, provided no additional nuclear-missile systems of that kind are deployed in Western Europe. The rejection by the United States and its allies of that proposal and the NATO decision to produce and deploy in some Western European countries new medium-range United States missiles have seriously aggravated the situation in Europe.

Recently the USSR put forward a new proposal - to discuss concurrently and on the basis of their organic link the issues pertaining to both medium-range nuclear-missile systems in Europe and United States forward-based nuclear systems. This constructive step on the Soviet part has aroused a new hope among the nations which have a stake in avoiding the further exacerbation of military tension on the European continent.

This is another question awaiting the response of the United States of America.

25. In the view of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, it would be of particular importance for strengthening peace to adopt measures for the relaxation of military tension in the area of the Mediterranean Sea, which washes the coasts of three continents - Europe, Africa and Asia. On 15 May 1980, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty proposed in their declaration a broad programme of action to that effect. It includes the extension to the Mediterranean area of confidence-building measures, the reduction of armed forces in that area, the withdrawal from the Mediterranean Sea of warships carrying nuclear weapons and the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of European and non-European non-nuclear countries in the Mediterranean area.

The socialist countries are awaiting the reaction to these proposals of the other States concerned.

26. In recent years, it has become increasingly urgent to deal with the problem of strengthening security and lessening military tension in the region of the Indian Ocean, the coasts of which are inhabited by peoples who have liberated themselves from colonial domination. Their right to a peaceful and tranquil life and their desire to pool efforts and resources for their countries' economic and social development are challenged as a result of a dramatic expansion in the military presence and military activities of the United States and some of its allies in the region of the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union has invariably supported the desire of the littoral States of the Indian Ocean to make their region a zone of peace where all foreign military bases would be dismantled and where no one would jeopardize the security, independence and sovereignty of the littoral States. In the period 1977-1978, the Soviet Union conducted to that end bilateral talks with the United States on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean. Those talks have also been broken off by the American side. The current build-up by the United States of its military presence in the Indian Ocean and the setting up of its military bases there, in particular on the island of Diego Garcia, run counter to the will of the peoples of that part of the world, increase tension and pose the risk of dangerous military conflicts.

The Soviet Union supports the United Nations decision to hold an international conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981. It is taking an active part in its preparation and is ready together with other countries to contribute to turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

Reduction of military expenditure

27. The reduction of military expenditure is one of the simplest and at the same time most effective ways to end the arms race and move on to disarmament. Agreement on the reduction by States of their military budgets would lead to the scaling down of military programmes and would release enormous funds for the needs of economic and social development.

As is known, the question of reducing military expenditure is on the agenda of the United Nations and of almost all forums where disarmament questions are discussed. But there is no progress; rather, the opposite is taking place: over the past two decades the aggregate annual military expenditure of States has at least doubled.

The Soviet Union proposed many years ago a reduction of the military budgets of all States, and first of all of major Powers. Today this is still its position. The United Nations has repeatedly pronounced itself in support of those initiatives. But some States, including permanent members of the Security Council, openly frustrate all the decisions and appeals to decrease military expenditure under various kinds of contrived pretexts.

For its part, the Soviet Union reaffirms its willingness at any moment to enter into negotiations with other States possessing a large economic and military potential, including all the other permanent members of the Security Council, on specific reductions in their own military budgets, either in terms of a percentage or in absolute figures. The Soviet Union is also ready to agree on the amount to be allocated for increased economic assistance to developing countries by each State which reduces its military budget."

International experience indicates that there is only one way to lasting peace and to the elimination of the threat of another world war - that of ending the arms race and moving to measures of real disarmament, ultimately to general and complete disarmament.

There are no insurmountable objective obstacles in the path of a durable and guaranteed peace. The main obstacle is the lack of political will on the part of certain specified States. This obstacle must be removed. Détente can be preserved and consolidated and the security of States can be reliably guaranteed if the States Members of the United Nations and the leaders of all States without exception display the necessary sense of responsibility, goodwill, commitment to the cause of peace and resolve to defend it.

History leaves no choice other than that of peaceful co-existence and mutually beneficial co-operation among States. The Soviet Union is convinced that life itself dictates the need to mobilize the efforts of all States, large and small, for achieving tangible results in curbing the arms race and in strengthening political and international legal guarantees for the preservation of peace. To that end, the United Nations can and must use the full weight of its authority.

The Soviet Union calls upon all States to cast aside all considerations and calculations of expediency, whether domestic or external, to renounce attempts to achieve military-strategic supremacy and striving for hegemony, global or regional, and to realize that the vital interests of all nations demand the elimination of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and the ensuring of a peaceful future.

The Soviet Union is confident that this appeal, imbued with a concern for peace, is consonant with the hopes and aspirations of all the peoples of the world.

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