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President: Mr. Eelco N. VAN KLEFFENS
 (Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (*concluded*)

SPEECHES BY MR. MENON (INDIA) AND MR. SERRANO
 (PHILIPPINES)

1. Mr. MENON (India): It is a very great pleasure for me to follow, and join with, the distinguished representatives of fifty-nine other countries who have conveyed to the President their good wishes upon his elevation to the high office of the presidency of the General Assembly. My delegation, however, has a unique advantage in the sense that we do not have to speculate. Since we speak at the end of the general debate, we have had the opportunity of seeing what type of President we will have for the year. I convey to you, Mr. President, the good wishes of my delegation, and wish you a year of office of great usefulness. We hope that when the tenth year of the Assembly is over, we shall be able to say that, under your presidency, we have passed through a year fraught with great anxieties but with great hopes—perhaps more than in times when circumstances were more adverse than they are today—and with success.
2. Having said that, I would once again ask your indulgence, Mr. President, to express, in a few words, which come from the depths of my feelings and which represent the sentiments of all my colleagues, our wishes for all good fortune to your predecessor in the very heavy responsibilities which she will be undertaking shortly. As you are probably aware, she will be the representative of the Government of India in our very important Mission to the United Kingdom, and also Ambassador to Ireland. If I may say so, I have had some experience in these places and offices and, while I

wish her success, I do not envy her—it is a heavily overworked Mission with many difficult problems and will not be as little burdensome as the presidency of the United Nations. In any event, speaking for myself, there is no place to which I would rather have seen her go than to the United Kingdom at a time such as this, when great contributions to peace and conciliation can be made by maturing and increasing understanding between our two countries.

3. In the course of the general debate at the beginning of every session of the General Assembly, it has become customary to speak on matters of general policy, to review the past, to talk about the present, and to think of the future. So far as my delegation is concerned, although the past is not dead, it is certainly not the present; and in the present circumstances of the world, the dead hand of the past sometimes lies too heavily on us and takes the form of inhibitions and prejudices which make our march forward more difficult than it would otherwise be. The present does not really exist, because the moment one has spoken about the present—or is even aware of it—it has already become the past. Thus, all that really matters in public affairs, in the affairs of mankind and in the contemplation of our civilization is the future—the future that alone is the real or actual present. Therefore, the future to us is the historic present in more than one sense.

4. In viewing the world in this light, we have reason to feel somewhat anxious and concerned in some ways and gratified in others. We are today in the tenth year of the United Nations; and, as is customary on these occasions, we take stock of world affairs and draw up a balance-sheet. As the Charter provides for its own review next year, that may well be called an audit.

5. However, in spite of all the priests of gloom and counsels of despair, no General Assembly ever sends us back home the same as when we came. I do not say that we are always the worse for it! We learn a great deal and we all make some contribution. Our collective consideration brings new aspects to bear on even the most difficult problem. Therefore, while we may confront the same set of problems each year and the Secretary-General may place the same number of items on the agenda, the problems themselves are never the same; their content changes. This is the social dynamic which governs man and society, whatever his state of civilization and whatever the structure of his society.

6. Speaking from this rostrum last year [448th meeting] on behalf of my delegation, I said that the overwhelming problem before us was the one which has been called world tension, and I spoke of the remedy we have to seek for it and the objectives we must pursue to find the path towards peace. That continues to be the position today. But so far as the general atmosphere is concerned, it is the consensus of this Assembly that this year we are in a better position to understand each other and perhaps to find common ground in the solu-

tion of these problems. I hope this is the case. I am not for a moment saying that there have not been observations from one side or the other—or from all sides, if you like—where the degree of sharpness exhibited was perhaps unnecessary. I hope I shall not be guilty of this, and if I am, I hope the President will forgive me and regard it as an error.

7. So far as the actual problems are concerned, Korea still stands at a deadlock. I suppose that is not news to this Assembly. Mr. Lloyd said the other day that we are not accustomed to obtain solutions on Korea at the first try. Similarly, we are accustomed to speak of the Korean deadlock—if nobody spoke about the Korean solution, perhaps people would sit up and take notice. But though Korea stands at a deadlock, there has not, in spite of particular circumstances, been any renewal of fighting, nor has a situation arisen where the opening of further negotiations was barred, or extremely difficult.

8. In the realm of disarmament, to which I shall make only a brief reference, we appear to have made advances both between the sessions of the Assembly and in the last few days as well. It is probably one of the outstanding developments of the last few days that—in spite of the suspicions which still lurk in everybody's minds; in spite of the cautiousness of people, whether they come from the northern cold climes, or from the tropics; in spite of what may be contained in this or that suggestion—there is, on the whole, a general feeling to which many representatives subscribe, notably the representative of France [487th meeting], who gave us the assurance that the common ground on which we stand may lead us to the path of solution.

9. In the last session of the Assembly, "colonial issues" suffered reverses. The colonial Powers had greater voting strength in the Assembly, and certainly they have greater experience than we have of organization of strength, but the problems are still the same; they are still tough, stubborn, and inescapable.

10. I do not desire to recapitulate any of the items on the agenda, because they properly belong to the Committees, and I only refer to them to outline the picture before us. In regard to all the items specifically on the agenda, I shall, therefore, content myself with the observation I have made.

11. Now, between sessions of the Assembly, there have been notable improvements in the world, to one of which the representative of the United Kingdom referred the other day as a notable advance to which not too much attention has been paid; namely, the Berlin Conference. People are accustomed to refer to the Berlin Conference as though it had not achieved what it had set out to achieve, and, therefore, produced something else, as a sort of consolation prize. But first, the consolation prize itself is not unsubstantial. Secondly, the greater achievement of Berlin is that since 1948 it is the first conference which resulted in greater understanding between individual participants.

12. I would like to remind the Assembly of the fact that last year on behalf of my delegation I suggested that my Government considered that the meeting of the heads of the great States would probably break the existing deadlock. This, however, did not come to pass; but meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four great Powers took place in Berlin, and the meeting to which the five most important States in the world were called resulted from that.

13. But apart from resulting in the two Conferences at Geneva, the atmosphere that prevailed in Berlin—if reports be true, and I have no reason to doubt them—marked, one hopes, the beginning of a new era and perhaps the beginning of the thawing of the cold war. There have been definite achievements. Thanks to the initiative of the United States of America, two Conferences, or what became two Conferences, were arranged and foregathered in Geneva and dealt with two problems outside Europe, although the Berlin Conference had been primarily called together for the consideration of European problems.

14. Outside Europe, not only in Korea and Indo-China, but in other parts of the world, there seems to have been progress along the lines of conciliation. There was the difficult problem of Anglo-Egyptian relations, in which while we have no direct concern—that is, in the sense of having any interests—but in which we have a very deep-seated sentimental and political concern, in the sense that these two countries are historically very closely related to us; thus their good relations and the terms on which they find agreement are a matter of concern to the people of my country. We hope that the beginning which has been made in resolving the long-standing difficulties between Egypt and the United Kingdom will lead to further conciliatory steps to extend the area of peace.

15. Similarly, the Iranian Parliament, I understand, will very soon consider the agreements that have been reached between the Governments of Iran and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also seems to have scored another success in this respect, in having held conversations with the head of Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the neighbouring countries, and, in contrast to what might well have happened, such as disputing over borders, a settlement seems to have been reached in this part of the world.

16. Now I come to a subject which, to my delegation, is of particular importance, and for which we have particular responsibilities: that is, the so-called colonial problems and problems of Trust Territories. Here, also, there have been some advances, the most notable of which is the further approach of the territory of the Gold Coast towards independence. We take particular pride in these advances, because our country assisted by our own evolution in the forward march of these Territories, which are in the main inhabited by non-European peoples, towards self-government and towards taking their places as equal and independent States. Advance seems also to have been made in the territory of Nigeria.

17. In our own part of the world, we have a much smaller problem which, thanks to the new outlook advanced by the Prime Minister of France, is very near solution. In a few days' time, this smaller problem which has caused much irritation may be out of the way.

18. In the Trust Territories—with which I shall deal in detail later—there have been similar improvements. But all this does not in any way mitigate the harshness of the fact that, with the present burden of armaments and the speed of the armaments race, the ominousness of that picture is little lessened.

19. On the economic side, world production has increased, but world trade has not increased proportionally. Industrial production, apart from the Soviet Union and its allies, has, I think, increased 111 to 119 per cent; while in the Soviet Union itself and in other coun-

tries of Eastern Europe and in China, production has risen 12 to 15 per cent. In India, we have maintained the increase in our productivity, as I shall point out later.

20. While these facts are on the credit side among the achievements of men, nature has, as usual, been unkind so far as our part of the world is concerned. Europe, fortunately, has been free from extensive floods or other disasters; but in Asia and Africa, cyclones, earthquakes and floods have laid waste large areas of land and rendered thousands of people homeless.

21. In Algeria an earthquake has wrought considerable havoc, and I am sure that our sympathy will go out to the Algerians and the French whose homes were destroyed and whose families were killed in the disaster. In Japan, too, typhoons have caused considerable havoc. But the greatest of all natural disasters have been in China, Pakistan and India. China has suffered very severely from floods, and so has Pakistan. Those entitled can no doubt speak about them. I consider it important that, in an Assembly of this kind, we should hear about the sufferings of our fellow beings and how they stand up to them. India has witnessed the worst flood in its history. Thirty thousand square miles of its territory lie under water. Where the Brahmaputra was formerly a mile or two wide, it is now between thirteen and fifteen miles wide. Some nine and a half million people have been affected by the disaster, and some two and a quarter million rendered homeless. Thirteen and a half million acres of land—agricultural, cultivable land—have had their fertility destroyed and crops have been damaged. The present estimate, in terms of money, is about £50 million sterling. The whole of that north-eastern area of India, covering the States of Assam, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh—particularly Assam—appears like a vast ocean where some savage monster has uprooted trees and houses.

22. These floods have, in a sense, another aspect. I think that the humble peasantry are the salt of the earth. In spite of these disasters which strike them year after year—and this year in an unprecedented way—they have shown remarkable courage; there has been no pilfering or begging or anything of that kind; they have tried to rehabilitate themselves. We are grateful for the considerable number of expressions of sympathy and the material assistance that have come from abroad. I hesitate to give the names of the countries which have come to our assistance for fear I might omit some in a list that is not complete; but assistance has come from our close neighbours, and from the United Kingdom, Canada, Thailand, Australia, the United States, the USSR, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Iraq. These countries have sent medical supplies and similar commodities to relieve suffering in India.

23. While the flood disaster has been so serious and while large parts of our territory have been laid waste in this way, we are happy to say that, for the first time in recent history, India is not starving. Compared to the figures for 1949, India has produced 11,400,000 tons of food this year, an increase in production having put us in a surplus position. So, apart from the damage resulting from the breach of communications, which makes it difficult for us to take the food to these places, India, for the first time in its modern history, is free from famine. The target of our five-year plan for the production of food was only for an increase up to 7,600,000 tons this year—over the three-years—but this

target has already been exceeded by 3,800,000 tons. Similarly, the production of cotton—which is one of those commodities whereby we not only clothe ourselves but manage to earn foreign exchange—has increased by 960,000 bales. Industrial production in India has kept up a steady advance since 1950, the base year. Taking 1950 as 100, it rose to 112 in 1951; 123 in 1952; and we stood at 128 in 1953. Agricultural production which was severely affected by the ravages of nature, particularly drought—we suffered badly in 1951 and 1952—has picked up, and today stands at 102½, as against 100 in 1950.

24. In addition to this, there have been other advances; I am happy to say this not because it affects India but because, in this Assembly and its organs, we are constantly faced with the problems of the under-developed countries for which the nations assembled here show a great deal of concern. A good many of them make material contributions; they give technical assistance; they give advice; their sympathy for the under-developed areas is increasing. Therefore, when an advance is made it is good and proper to report it. The minor irrigation works of India have brought, or will bring when they have been completed, 5,300,000 acres of land under cultivation. The major irrigation works in India, up to this year, have brought 2,800,000 acres of land under cultivation, making a total of 8 million acres in all. India also has reclaimed approximately 850,000 acres of land formerly considered uncultivable.

25. Our population which, in 1947, was 85 per cent illiterate, is today advancing towards literacy, so that the planned target of making every person in India literate sixteen years after 1947 will easily be reached. Our community projects, which are a great social experiment, have brought a different tempo of life, even with regard to the understanding of the problems connected with the work of the United Nations, to the millions of villages of India. Social legislation has advanced in the same way, so that those evils which, quite rightly, used to be charged up to India in the past—for example, untouchability, the worst of them—have been tackled drastically in this country with a great religious tradition, with the result that today in India, the practice of untouchability is a crime punishable by law.

26. We also have raised the age requirement for marriage to eighteen for women and twenty-one for men. Our health and educational services in the last three years have been responsible for an expenditure of \$1,900 million.

27. By citing our own country as an example, we wish to draw the attention of the Assembly, in the best way we can, to that great part of the world which is easily dismissed in the shortest name of any continent, Asia. There is a new Asia, and greater understanding of that new Asia—or, at the outset, even the recognition that there is a new Asia—is of vast importance; for here lives nearly half of humanity. Asia has, in the last forty or fifty years, become politically important. Burma, Pakistan, India and Ceylon attained their independence soon after the Second World War. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the countries of western Asia obtained their nationhood. In China, for the first time, a strong and uncorrupted government has come into existence and is introducing economic and social reforms of far-reaching importance. Japan, after its defeat in the last war, has made a marvellous recovery.

While we join issue with the United Kingdom on the colonial question in Malaya, we are happy to feel that advances are being made there; and, indeed, we hope that, as freedom broadens from precedent to precedent, Malaya will belong to the fraternity of free nations along with us.

28. Politically, the most important event in our part of the world—that is, South-East Asia—has been the meeting of the Asian Prime Ministers at Colombo in April of this year, thanks to the initiative of Sir John Kotalawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon. Unhappily, he and his country are not represented here, not through any sin of theirs, but because Ceylon is one of the victims of the East-West conflict and of the incapacity of the Assembly to solve the problem of the admission of new Members to the United Nations. Sir John Kotalawala invited the Prime Ministers of five countries, and I believe that, although it was not so intended, this meeting took place at the same time as the Geneva Conference. Much of what that meeting accomplished—the resolutions it adopted and the agreements it reached—has been printed, but little is known of the fraternity and the “getting together” that Colombo represented. No doubt there are differences of opinion and of views between some countries, or between a number of countries on one side and another, and so on; but Colombo was primarily a regional conference which had no regional sentiment.

29. One of the first things that the Colombo Conference did was to proclaim that it was in no sense a rival to the Geneva Conference; and while it may appear unnecessary to say this, I believe that this is a point that ought to be made in a gathering of this character: in these days of excessive regionalism and of doctrines of all kinds which keep peoples away from various parts of the world, it is significant that the five countries with their nascent nationalism, all Asians meeting in Colombo, proclaimed to the world that their problems were not merely Asian problems, although they thought they had the right and the duty to consider them together, and suggest solutions. The deliberations in Colombo, to a large extent, were a factor—though unofficially, perhaps, informally and perhaps not through the usual channels of communication for conference papers—in the deliberations in Geneva itself.

30. I think I must refer briefly to the main points discussed. One was the “problem of Indo-China”, as it was called, although when the Conference was convened, the Indo-China problem had not reached that stage of development. This item occupied the Conference; and it is to be noted that the points of solution and the points for consideration suggested by the Conference were largely the same as those announced by the Prime Minister of India a week or two earlier, which became more or less the central topics of discussion and of the solution that might be found in Geneva. I shall speak of Indo-China a little later, so I shall not go into that subject now.

31. The next outstanding item in our history last year has been the subjects of agreement on the relationship between ourselves and the People's Republic of China, which originally was the preamble to a small agreement on certain Tibetan affairs but was afterwards proclaimed and became more formal—that is, not quite formal, but more public—when the Prime Minister of China visited India during the interval in the Geneva Conference. We believe that by the understanding reached through this historic treaty, our two countries have made a

great contribution to peace in the Asian world. We have taken a path which is not the path of maintaining the balance of power, but the path of non-aggression, fraternity and understanding.

32. There are many in this Assembly who will say, as I heard it said the other day, that there have been non-aggression agreements before. But however that may be, my function is to convey information and to state things as I see them. This relationship is based upon mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality, mutual benefits and peaceful coexistence. Now, these ideas did not come from one party or the other; they arose from the discussion of the problems in Asia itself; there was no bargaining, no attempt to find safe positions for one side or the other, no attempt to gain greater advantages for one person as against another. The agreement represents the result of a common exploration in order that two ancient Asian civilizations—we have had an historic connexion with China for three or four thousand years—might demonstrate that in modern times, forms of government inside countries need not be a bar to fraternal relations between them. I refer to this because, in the view of the Government of India, these are principles which are applicable to the relations of other countries with us or between themselves, and which probably, in our humble view represent an approach that might contribute to the solution of some of our problems.

33. I should like now to refer to the annual report [A/2663] of the Secretary-General. As usual, the Secretary-General has submitted a report which is extremely important and which I am glad to say—and here I refer to the part with which we have to deal and not the parts that concern the work of the Committees—is extremely brief, concise and to the point. The Secretary-General mentions settlements outside the United Nations. It is the view of my Government that to ignore the machinery of the United Nations where it holds the field would be wrong, but we would not regard the successes attained at Geneva as in any way an affront to the United Nations. So far as our Government is concerned, the five Prime Ministers who met in Colombo agreed, in their five points, that the decisions at Geneva should be the subject of information for the United Nations.

34. In the report of the Secretary-General, there is a reference to this matter in the context of the Security Council. That being a matter of greater importance, I propose to take it up later. It is not possible for me in the time I have—even if I wished to do so, or had the capacity—to cover the entire range of United Nations activity; but I believe that we have a responsibility to say something in regard to those matters in which we are represented by election or through the Assembly, or where, under the arrangements made by the United Nations, the relevant organs meet in our country.

35. India is represented on the Economic and Social Council; and one matter on which the Government of India desires me to lay stress is the future of the special United Nations fund for economic development. We think and I have no doubt that the Assembly thinks—having regard to all the speeches that have been made, even at this session, on the priority of attention to be given to under-developed countries, and recalling

the words of the Secretary of State of the United States only a few days ago [475th meeting] with regard to the disparity between the effort that is put into war and that which is put into peace—that the establishment of this special United Nations fund for economic development is a matter of vital importance. It will carry the message of the United Nations farther into the world and into the hearts of men and women than any resolution or any institutional development of another character could do. Political decisions are necessary, vital, and emergent—and they may change the shape of things in the world. But at the basis of everything are the lives of men and women, food, shelter, sanitation, and the opportunity to be their best selves which is provided by economic development. We believe that in the basic principles underlying this special United Nations fund there is not merely aid as such, but the element of co-operation. India receives external aid; India also sends out aid; and that is how it should be. Therefore, the fund is based on both self-respect and self-help, and upon co-operation—an endeavour and an approach that is calculated to promote the purposes of the Charter expressed in the first paragraph of its Preamble, as in its entirety; namely, to make this Organization a centre for harmonizing different interests. It is something which makes a country feel that it belongs to the world of other countries and which makes men feel very much that they are brothers.

36. We have also had meetings of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in India. I want to make particular reference to two seminars which were held, one on statistics and the other on housing. We, as a country, a people and a government, are interested in the attention which the United Nations pays to statistics, because for under-developed countries to see the picture as it is, constitutes the first step toward finding the causes and the remedies for problems. The Government of India pays considerable attention to statistical surveys in India itself; and, if the information gained as a result of these surveys is put to use, it will go a long way.

37. The next organization that we want to speak about in some detail is the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). We have a special interest in UNICEF because the degree of public support and public interest in this agency, and the extent to which its work has permeated India, are considerable. Its main activities have been in the field of the cure and prevention of malaria and tuberculosis. It may not be commonly known that in India 100 million people are affected each year by malaria, and that one million die from the disease. As a result of the start given by UNICEF, DDT factories have been set up, and many square miles of land in India have been sprayed.

38. Similarly, thanks to UNICEF and also to the generosity and the thoughtfulness of our sister State New Zealand, penicillin plants have been set up in India to deal with widespread diseases. But, above all, the BCG treatment for tuberculosis in India is planned on a larger scale than has ever been the case anywhere before. It is planned to treat 170 million people. As a result of these activities, there are today some 5,000 child welfare centres in India—perhaps it should be 50,000. UNICEF is, shall we say, one of the triumphs of the United Nations. We have made our contribution effectively and reciprocally in assisting other coun-

tries. What is more, any financial contribution that comes from UNICEF is many times added to by India itself, and that is why these things have become possible.

39. I should like to say a word about UNICEF itself, apart from the question of its activities in India. We are told, that in Africa, 3 million people are affected each year by malaria, and that 300,000 of them die. Here is a vast field in which the activities of UNICEF should be more widespread than they are. My delegation, conscious of its responsibilities as a member of the Trusteeship Council, has this year, on more than one occasion, raised the question of assistance by the specialized agencies to the colonial and Trust areas. UNICEF has some 25 million children under the umbrella of its activities. That sounds like a lot of children; but, when one considers that there are 900 million children in the world, one can see that this is a relatively small number. Of the 900 million children in the world, 600 million are insufficiently nourished and insufficiently clothed. Some of them are without any clothing and are extremely badly nourished. Therefore, the problem that we have to deal with, while it may not have the same emergent character and is not likely to cause the same staggering reaction as the problem of atomic energy used for destructive purposes, is nevertheless one of the most persistent cankers eating into the social body of every country.

40. We therefore want to take advantage of this occasion to make a plea to the Assembly to give greater thought to the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Apart from everything else, they represent a great investment in understanding of and between people. Here are the children of this generation, who in more ways than one are unlike the children of any other generation because the world stands today at a new epoch of civilization—and it is interesting that children do not appear to have inhibitions about curtains, whether of iron, or bamboo, or plastic, or nylon.

41. There is an exhibition in Delhi conducted by a man named Shankar, who gathers children's paintings from all over the world. From forty-five countries, among them the most unexpected places, children between the ages of two and fifteen send in their paintings every year. Thousands and thousands of them come. Supported by the governments and the embassies, this exhibition has become an international institution. Whether it be in North America or South America or Scandinavia or Western Europe—which today includes the United Kingdom—or in the Soviet Union, where children have special attention, or in the continent of Africa, where they are neglected, the problem of children and the concern that we should have for them, not merely out of sentiment but as a reasoned-out proposition, is extremely important.

42. Therefore, my delegation wishes to suggest that UNICEF, compared to what it should do and it could do, is doing extremely little, but is doing it very well—and, what is more, its activity is increasing. Its resources are limited. My delegation desires to make the suggestion—and it will make a proposal in the appropriate place—that the United Nations should set aside one day as a world Children's Day, on which collections can be made for this purpose. Children can be brought into the understanding and consciousness of other children, together with all the problems that concern

children, such as their health—and I do not mean only physical health.

43. This is not the time to discuss the details of this suggestion. My delegation intends to make this proposal in the appropriate committee, and we consider that this is the right place to say it initially—that the United Nations should set aside one day in the year as a Children's Day all over the world.

44. The only other aspects of the Secretary-General's report to which I want to make brief reference are the two items concerning personnel and the reorganization of the Secretariat. My delegation has views to offer on this matter, on principle, but we think that those views would be better set forth in committee than in the context of this general debate. I want to say here and now that those views are held after deep consideration, and they deal with matters which we think are vital to the health of this Organization.

45. I have dealt with general problems and with Asia and with the United Nations, of which we are part. I now come to some specific problems which are not covered by agenda items.

46. The first of these items is Germany. It may well be asked why the Asians, who are so far away, should have anything to say here about Germany. It may well be thought that the problem of Germany is a matter that has been discussed and considered by the four great Powers who had the major responsibility for defeating the Hitlerite armies in the Second World War. However, not only do we make no apology, but we consider that it is our bounden duty at the present moment to deal with this matter. But, in order to set doubts at rest, I am not going to say one word about the London Conference or what takes place in West Germany or East Germany internally. That is not my problem.

47. Why are we concerned about Germany? We think that Germany is the centrepiece of this peace fabric—or non-peace fabric. What happens in Germany will decide, to a very considerable extent, the question of peace or war. I make no reflection—but it so happens that, in the history of the last hundred years, it has been the position of Germany, whether in the direction of expansion or in the direction of internal unity, that has contributed to instability and to creating the conditions for war.

48. During the last thirty or forty years, my country—and at that time India included what is now Pakistan—was deeply concerned in this matter. In the First World War—in Flanders, at Mons, in Belgium, at Gallipoli, at Salonika, at Katlamara and in the rest of Mesopotamia—Indian soldiers paid with their lives, and it is generally recognized that they made some contribution to the victory and did their job as soldiers should. In the Second World War—at Sidi-Barrani, Tobruk, Benghazi and El Alamein; in Tunisia, Italy and Greece; in standing guard in the Middle East, not only for what is now one side in the world conflict, but for both—the Indian army, the Indian people and their resources were engaged.

49. I do not for a moment suggest that a country should pay its way, so to speak, by participation in war. That would be contrary to all the principles which my Government and country hold. What I have said, however, is meant only to point out that if a war of this character should break out, if a situation should deteriorate and lead to world con-

flagration, the place, we think, where the danger to world peace still largely lies is Europe even more than Asia. It is in Europe that all the great wars have begun. It is from Europe that the great wars have been carried to other parts of the world. It is European wars that have enlisted us in conflicts. It is therefore right and proper that we, as independent nations and, what is more, as countries forming part of communities which represent half the population of the world—and here I do not speak in any sense of regional or national chauvinism—should refer to this matter.

50. This introduction is necessary because this is the first time that we have intervened here in this connexion. I have no desire at the present moment to raise the question whether the Members of the United Nations or any other country should really enter into these general discussions and problems. I make no comment on the recent developments in either part of Germany. All we know is this: It is now nine years since the end of the war, and there is still no peace. A German peace is necessary for world peace, and a German peace requires the unification of Germany, in whatever way that may be brought about. Without casting praise or blame on either side, I would say that it so happens that there are two schools of thought which are united in a desire for a unified Germany, but which have different solutions to offer.

51. On the one hand, one side, the West, wants—quite rightly from its point of view and, as the plan is presented, quite unexceptionably—universal elections in Germany, presumably supervised by the United Nations, out of which will come some organ which will seek to unite Germany or will express the voice of a united Germany. I do not understand all the details, but that is how I see the plan.

52. On the other hand, the Eastern side—that is, the Soviet Union—while also wanting a united Germany, which, indeed, is in accordance with the United Nations Declaration of 1942 and the general objectives of the successful termination of the war itself, asks for a different solution. The Eastern side asks that the two Governments, one in Eastern Germany and one in Western Germany—until recently, they were not sovereign Governments but authorities—should together and presumably on an equal basis, arrange for these elections in a coalition government; that is to say, it is proposed that there should be unity before the holding of elections. On this matter the two sides have been at loggerheads, with the result that Germany remains divided.

53. Now, the unity of Germany is not a concern of the German people alone, although we think that the achieving of that unity is very largely their interest and of greater concern to them. I would say, in all humility, that we cannot make a proposal in this connexion because the subject is not before the United Nations. But, speaking for a country which has international responsibilities and which, indeed, has been drawn into more responsibilities than we had really cared to undertake, we should like to suggest at this moment that, whatever may be the merits of the two solutions I have described, they both lack one merit: the other side will not agree. Without that merit, either solution is unworkable. We should therefore like to give expression to the idea—I do not say "to propose"; I do not know, really what words best to use—that a beginning could perhaps be made along

the following lines. The Soviet Union has proclaimed that Eastern Germany today has sovereignty. Mr. Lloyd told us the other day that it has an army of a considerable size. Now, an army is usually regarded as an evidence of sovereignty. Eastern Germany has its own administration; it has, or will soon be given, sovereignty. The situation in Western Germany in this respect is similar. Western Germany has a government of its own and is also going to be allowed to have sovereignty when the occupation terminates, the occupation forces are to be withdrawn and other purposes are announced. It therefore appears that there will be one community divided into two sovereign camps.

54. On behalf of the Government of India, I would say that we think that it is time that there should be direct talks between the two sides, in order to bring about this unity which is of so much concern not only to Europe but to all of us, since the consequences of disunity have been so terrible for everyone in the past fifty or sixty years. We do not for a moment want to say—in fact, it is not our place at the present moment to say—what status or contents these talks should have, what form they should take, or anything of that kind. But, if there are two independent communities, as has been proclaimed, and if, as I have no doubt, the governments of those communities have the support of their own people, it appears to us that it should be possible for Germans to talk to Germans in order to find ways, or at least beginnings to establish the unity of their own country. We think, as we indicated in Geneva, that direct talks conducted in the way that the parties themselves may deem best, have a great value. That would not upset any arrangements that other parties responsible for the two sides today might have. This suggestion is not intended to take the place of anything now being done. If, however, as the result of direct talks, a united Germany emerges; if the two Governments are able, together, to present to the two sides—the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Western Powers, on the other, proposals which will lead to unity; if that is what the Germans want, and if it is in keeping with the security of the world, as it should be in present circumstances, then it appears common sense that such talks would open the way to some constructive solution.

55. My delegation wishes to place on record that these observations represent my Government's view in this matter and its concern.

56. I come next to another problem, one in which we are more deeply concerned. I refer to the question of Korea. That subject is on the Assembly's agenda, and we are therefore precluded—not by any ruling, but by the principles governing the good conduct of business—from going into any great detail here.

57. I hope that no one will think that I am speaking out of turn if I remind the Assembly that it has conferred upon my Government and country a very considerable responsibility as regards Korea, even though we were not active belligerents in the war. We were regarded by both sides at least as not having been too partisan. As I have said, India undertook considerable responsibility, along with other countries; we had a great responsibility as head of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Government of India has submitted its report to the Assembly, and we hope that it will some time come up for con-

sideration. I think that it would be a very bad practice if the United Nations were to call upon Governments and peoples to carry out certain responsibilities, and then forget all about them.

58. There are other matters of detail that I think it would be unwise to ventilate in this place; but on the general problem of Korea, the Government of India does not take an alarmist or a very despondent view. We are concerned, very concerned, about certain matters: that while there is no fighting, there is still no peace; and that a situation has arisen where not some ordinary person, not some irresponsible politician or some agitator, but the head of one of the party States, the head of the South Korean Government, speaking to the United States Congress on 28 July 1954, said, among many other things:

“On the Korean front, the guns are silent for the moment, stilled temporarily by the unwise armistice which the enemy is using to build up its strength.”

That is the “unwise armistice” which the General Assembly promoted under the leadership of the United States and the other parties concerned, including the enemy parties, after very long and arduous negotiations.

59. The next part is more ominous:

“Now that the Geneva Conference has come to an end with no result, as predicted, it is quite in place to declare the end of the armistice.”

60. I think we should place on record in the plenary meeting of this General Assembly that the armistice and its termination are governed by article 62 of the Armistice Agreement. While it is, I think, unkind—because, if I may speak in the privacy of this plenary meeting, the United States has exerted its very great influence to bring moderation to the counsels of this gentleman—we should ask the United States delegation to deal with this matter.

61. On the other hand, the fact remains that this armistice is an uneasy one; and it is our concern to convert the armistice into a permanent peace. It is necessary that all foreign troops in Korea be withdrawn by both sides. The presence of foreign troops is not conducive to the dignity, the unity or the well-being of a people. A foreign army on the soil of any country is, by definition and by all considerations, something which is most undesirable. It is necessary for all foreign troops to be withdrawn and for the unification of Korea to be achieved.

62. In this connexion, my delegation may have proposals to make at a later stage. We are heartened by the feeling that there is general agreement about the necessity of bringing about the unification of Korea. My delegation does not take the view that the negotiations—which, thanks to the decisions of the General Assembly at that time, have been strictly in accordance with the letter of article 60 of the Armistice Agreement—have ended; those negotiations are still in being. From the papers that one has seen, it appears that some day a report will be made to the United Nations, not a final report.

63. I make bold to say that, contrary to the usual assumptions, the proceedings at Geneva marked a definite advance. The Conference revealed, first of all, the desire by both sides to get together and a great deal of personal contacts were made. The three joint Presidents, Prince Wan Waithayakon, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov—as the two latter did in the other

Conference—used their influence to keep it going and to bring about results. This is not the time to review the field or the points of common agreement; that will have to be done in Committee. All I want to say at this moment is that we cannot just forget this matter, but, as wisdom dictates and as prudence guides us, we shall have to take steps, with the least possible disturbance but with the greatest possible efficacy, to achieve the goal that is before the United Nations.

64. The goal before the United Nations was not just the ending of the war in Korea. That was part of the achievement of that goal, or of the removal of the impediments to achieving that goal. We will, at the appropriate stage and if circumstances permit, make some suggestion which may be acceptable to both sides. In order to assuage any anxieties there may be, I want to say that our one desire in this matter is, as it always has been, in this or any other question, only to assist in the processes of settlement. If, therefore, this problem pursues that course of development, it may be the best part of common sense to leave for the present other matters relating to the Korean problem, which can be discussed at a later stage.

65. I am happy to feel that in this matter, up to this point, I appear to have the support of the major parties. I have read the speeches made at Geneva. I have read the speech of Mr. Spaak, the Foreign Minister of Belgium, and I heard Mr. Lloyd say on 4 October [487th meeting, para. 20]:

"I think everyone feels that there must be no more fighting, that unification must be achieved by peaceful means. The Western Powers, the countries which sent troops to fight under the United Nations flag in Korea, believe in unification on the basis of elections in which there will be genuine freedom of choice by the individual elector, who will be free in fact as well as in name. . . We hope for the resumption of negotiations between the appropriate parties and at the appropriate time."

66. In Geneva, the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, South Korea, and the other fifteen or sixteen Powers all agreed upon certain things: that there should be unification; there should be elections, and there should be supervision. I believe, as was discovered with regard to Indo-China, that very often the unfortunate circumstance prevails in public discussion that the same words are given different meaning by different people. I make bold to say publicly that the discussions which took place in Geneva have brought this problem another step towards unification—I should like my words to be noted—another step towards unification, which is nearer achievement than it ever was. To throw away this opportunity would be a great mistake. My delegation, for its part, will seek, as in the past, to be guided by the dictates of common sense and by the degree of assistance it can get from all concerned.

67. The next subject on which my delegation desires to express its mind is that of the colonial and Trust areas. I have already said there have been advances in this field. The Gold Coast, Nigeria, the French possessions in India, and Greenland, which was a Danish colony, have all shown an advance towards independence. The advance, perhaps, is not as fast as we desire, but at any rate it is in the right direction. Although it is not always recognized, my delegation

is not only happy but anxious to pay tribute wherever advances are made. We realize that those in possession do not easily relinquish control, but in the majority of these cases the parties concerned have had the benefit of the extremely good relations that have prevailed between themselves and their former subject peoples.

68. Having said that, I was equally happy—though I say this with greater reserve because I do not know what the circumstances are, nor does anyone else—to feel that the Prime Minister of France has made a new approach to the problem of Tunisia, an approach for which this Assembly has been asking year after year. All the Assembly asked for was that there should be direct contact and negotiations, but whenever that was asked for, Article 2, paragraph 7, was thrown at us. However, a beginning has been made. I do not want to speak too soon. We have seen that there are always difficulties, but I have no doubt that with the new feeling that now prevails, with the gradual recognition that the demands of national freedom are best met quickly rather than slowly and by direct negotiations in a dignified way with those who are in a position to deliver the goods, and before precipitous tendencies break up in the area itself satisfactory progress will be achieved. It is like collective bargaining in industrial disputes.

69. In some of the African protectorates, some advance is being made.

70. As regards the Trust Territories, I think this Assembly would want to—and I feel we ought to—pay high tribute to that great little country of New Zealand for the very bold and very imaginative task—I would not call it an experiment—it has undertaken in Western Samoa. This is one region of the world in which, although one nation rules another, yet there is a greater sense of equality than anywhere else. A convention is to meet in Western Samoa where the principle of self-determination will work in practice among so-called backward peoples. In the state this world is in, I hope we shall stop talking about head hunters and backward peoples. I suppose the so-called head hunters hunt only one head at a time, but we seek to hunt the heads of the whole population by atomic destruction and wars. We are not entitled to talk in that way. However, a great advance has been made in Western Samoa and, while there are still many difficulties in the way and while the final form of development is not complete, there has been no resistance from the Administering Authority. The Administering Authority has never, in word or in deed or in sentiment, expressed the idea that this territory is New Zealand Samoa; they speak about Western Samoa. We are happy to feel that this venture of the United Nations, following up the late departure in colonial matters practised by the late League of Nations, has now borne fruit.

71. Similarly, in Togoland, advances are likely to be made if there is agreement between the parties concerned. There is another Territory where again, quite silently, a great advance has been made. Colonialism is not merely an economic relationship; it is not merely a question of a land-grab or of profit. It is a historical inheritance of race relations, of the rule of one nation by another, and the only solution for it is the creation of multi-racial societies. Therefore, the step that has

been taken in Tanganyika in providing equality of representation in the new Legislature, although at the present moment it is still weighted against the Africans as far as proportion is concerned, is in the background of colonial practice a great advance. What is more, we hope that the Administering Authority will enable us to feel that the impression that we gathered in the Trusteeship Council that there will be a common electorate in this area will indeed be the fact.

72. I am afraid that we cannot say the same for the rest of Africa. Unfortunately, the worst part of Africa in the colonial domain, Portuguese Africa, never comes before us. On these colonial questions, therefore, I hope that those who have great influence and authority in this Assembly—not in theory but in reality—will not argue that these areas are part of the sovereign territories of the metropolitan country, but rather take the view advanced by our Vice-President, Mr. Trujillo of Ecuador, who, as the dean this year of the Latin-American States, must be regarded as representing the opinion of an important and influential part of the world which has experienced colonial rule—not in its own lifetime but in its history. I have seen no better statement of the juridical position of a colony than this explanation of latent sovereignty. Mr. Trujillo stated [485th meeting, para. 92]:

"Last year in the Fourth Committee, my delegation maintained that it is incompatible with the letter and spirit of Chapter XI of the Charter to plead Article 2, paragraph 7, in support of the claim that matters connected with the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories are matters of domestic jurisdiction. My delegation maintained then, and repeats now, that nations which have not reached full self-government are, as it were, incomplete States which, while possessing the elements of population and territory, but lack only government, or, in other words, the capacity of self-determination and self-rule. For that reason, possession of their own territory is the inalienable right of non-self-governing peoples and never of the administrators, whose only power over such territory can be compared with the powers under civil law of a guardian over a ward. We can no more speak of the sovereignty of an administering Power over a Non-Self-Governing Territory than we can speak of a guardian's ownership of his ward's property. We only use the term 'sovereignty' in connexion with internal administrative measures taken by an Administering Power."

73. Further, in regard to this problem, the Latin-American States at the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas came to the unanimous conclusion for all South America—and we hope that some day North America will follow—that all South America had positively declared in favour of self-government and self-determination, that is to say, if one must use the hackneyed phrase, they have taken an "anti-colonial" attitude.

74. I think that it is only proper, in view of the responsibilities that my delegation feels it has, to say at once that simply because there is a right does not mean that an attempt should be made to assert it on every occasion. Whether a particular question is com-

petent for discussion, or whether it is wise to discuss it, or whether it will yield results, is a matter of the circumstances of each case and occasion. As people responsible for making contributions to these questions in a constructive way, we should recognize that the application of these principles is conditioned by time and circumstances in each case. Of course, my country stands, fully and without reservation, for the rights of any people. We do not recognize primitive or non-primitive people, people who are competent or not competent—competence is a matter of opportunity. There is no community in the world, be it the most historic, the most ancient or the most civilized, which does not have to its credit—or is it to its debit?—a vast number of tragic mistakes.

75. At Colombo, the five Prime Ministers unanimously pronounced themselves against the continuance of colonial rule. I think that any settlement in the interests of the people must be largely a matter of our persuading and putting pressure in a way that will create results, not merely situations. My delegation has taken this view in the Fourth Committee and in the Trusteeship Council, and I am glad to say that some Administering Authorities and some colonial Powers have been amenable on occasion.

76. We now come to a specific colonial problem, that of West Irian. My delegation voted for the inclusion of this item on the agenda for exactly the same reason that it did not lend its support to the inclusion of the item on Cyprus: because we believe that these people are entitled to their own rule. Since this is a committee item I do not wish to go into it in detail. I should like, however, to say to my very old friend, the representative of Australia—perhaps his remark was not so intended, and I am sure that on mature reflection he will probably see his way to revise what he has said—that it is not really my "pigeon" in the sense that it is not India that is talked about, but it is one of our close neighbours and very good friends. We feel sad—I would not say we resent—but we are sorry that this statement came from Australia which is part of that area usually called Australasia; they are to live with us in the centuries to come. Mr. Casey said [479th meeting, para. 35]:

"Despite what the Indonesian delegation might say to the contrary, there has never been an independence movement among the Papuans. The only voices heard in favour of union with Indonesia are echoes from Djakarta. Agitation from outside, such as that now in train, can only have a disturbing and detrimental effect upon the indigenous population of Netherlands New Guinea, who, like the population of Australian New Guinea—that is, a Trust Territory—"are untroubled by political conflicts of any kind."

77. I have no desire to add to any friction that there may be in this matter. I say this, however, because not to say so would be not to perform my duty in this matter. I am sure that this statement was not ill meant, but it is one of those things to which what I said earlier applies so much: there is a new Asia.

78. My delegation does not in the least say that there should be no disagreement, because if that were our position we would raise the same objection to the expression of sentiment by Mr. Luns of the Nether-

lands. We do not. What Mr. Luns said was [480th meeting, para. 20]:

"however much we deplore the Indonesian initiative, we have no intention of letting our relations with Indonesia be affected by this case".

79. The presence of the Kuomintang troops in Burma is still an item on the agenda, and therefore we have no desire to say anything about it in detail. But I think that this Assembly ought to be reminded of the great patience of the Burmese Government and people in this regard. We hear a great deal about the aggressions to come. However, here is a case of aggression where tens of thousands of square miles have been occupied, ravaged and plundered, where there is shedding of blood and everything else. While we pay tribute to those who have brought about a partial remedy, it does appear that the remaining troops in this area should leave. It is not usually known what degree of forbearance has been exercised on the other side, and the situations that may arise from the presence of these troops in Burma.

80. I now proceed to the longest item in my notes on which I will speak: the problem of Indo-China. The question of Indo-China is not on the agenda. However it is probably the most important event, as Mr. Casey said the other day, that has occurred in the world and is a great step towards peace. With the conclusion of the Armistice in Indo-China, war came to an end after a period of twenty-five years.

81. The Indo-China settlement is important for many reasons. But before I discuss it and since there will be no other occasion, I think that, since my country has an intimate knowledge of this matter, this is a proper opportunity to mention in a very few words the great debt of gratitude that humanity owes to certain people in this connexion. I think, first of all, we must praise the two belligerents, Mr. Mendès-France of France and Mr. Pham Van Dong of Viet-Minh, two people who grappled with this task with one common aim. But the Conference would have achieved nothing but for the wisdom, the patience and the really hard work that was put into it by two persons, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. Here was an example, not only of how the problem of Indo-China has been resolved, but of how two statesmen, who differ fundamentally, as we know, on so many things, were engaged in a common task, and, in a spirit of give and take in common exploration, put formalities and other difficulties on one side and found solutions. At no time was it felt that the matter would not be worth pursuing.

82. Since the Assembly is likely to know very little about it, I should also like to say that when the real history of this affair is known the world will realize that in the Prime Minister of China there was a statesman of considerable stature who played the role of a conciliator and a co-ordinator in the talks that were conducted in Geneva. Therefore, I think that it is not a question of whether or not the matter is on our agenda. It is one of the great things that has happened in the world, because the Indo-China settlement has halted what might well have been a world

war. It has reversed the trend of conflict. It has brought about a great change in Asia.

83. At the same time, it showed the role of the United States in this matter. From what I know of him, I want to pay my personal tribute to Walter Bedell Smith, Under-Secretary of State, without whose assistance it would not have been possible to bring about a settlement. It is quite true that the United States took a different position from the others in the final settlements, but the whole world knows that, but for his beneficent influence and his willingness not to intervene where points of view had been reconciled, it would not have been possible to accomplish what was done at Geneva.

84. The personal relations of the delegations were excellent. I think the way has been opened for international conferences different from what they used to be. My own Government, by the voice of its Prime Minister on 22 February, asked that there should be a cease-fire in Indo-China. At that time, this was laughed at, except by a few, notably one man who afterwards became the Prime Minister of France. He brought the matter up in the French Parliament and rallied 250 votes for an immediate cease-fire. It did not come about.

85. Two months later, the Government of India put forward six points which are well known, one of which is extremely important to us: that we must create a climate of peace in negotiation. Our Government used what influence it had in trying to slow down the tempo of battle. These points, in essence, were restated in the Colombo proposals, which were sent to the Geneva Conference. As a result of Geneva, we have today in Indo-China hope of independence; that is to say, independence in the sense that the French Government is committed to the Indo-Chinese people, to itself and to the four great Powers to grant independence to the Indo-China States, and to withdraw its forces.

86. I shall not go into the terms of this Agreement because time is passing. However, there are certain points with which I want to deal because they have been mentioned here and it would be very wrong for these erroneous ideas not to be contradicted as far as possible.

87. It was mentioned in the course of the debate that Viet-Nam was partitioned. Nothing is further from the truth. The idea that there is a cease-fire line on the Ben Hai river near the 17th parallel is something that came from the mechanics of negotiation where it was not possible to define cease-fire arrangements by lines and pockets; some line had to be drawn. There was much give and take. Reference was made in one speech to the fact that on one side large numbers of people would move from their homes. Our Commission reports that it has set up a petitions committee and that the number of complaints that have come in is very small and the complaints have been dealt with. People go from one side to the other and vice versa, so there is no partition of this territory. What is more, this has been definitely laid down in every single one of these Armistice Agreements and embodied in the Final Declaration of the Conference. Paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference states:

"The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam."

Therefore, the idea that Indo-China is partitioned as Korea was is not in accordance with the facts.

88. You have heard it said by the representative of Australia that this is the best they could get. Now, could there be any better definition of the result of negotiations? If you negotiate, you do not get what you think you ought to get and the other fellow does not get what he thinks he ought to get. I think that is about as classic a definition of negotiation as we can have.

89. Mr. Casey described what happened in Indo-China. I think he gave a very useful explanation of what a negotiated settlement should be [479th meeting, paras. 13-14].

"I believe that in the present world situation the ending of open hostilities in such an inflammable situation is an important thing in itself. All of us, I think, were concerned—and perhaps not least the Government of the Soviet Union—at the way in which the heat of the fighting in Indo-China appeared to be creeping steadily up towards flash-point. Wars, particularly modern wars, do not stand still. They tend either to expand or to contract. The termination of the fighting stopped what might well have been an expanding risk.

"Secondly, the Geneva settlement means that Laos and Cambodia will have complete independence."—So will Viet-Nam, that should be added. "The Soviet Union, Communist China and the Viet-Minh, as well as the representatives of the democratic countries, agreed to respect the integrity and the independence of these States. This is a provision which may be of first importance in stabilizing the situation in South East Asia. It is the earnest hope of my country that all the free Asian countries will accord diplomatic recognition . . ."

Thus, the idea of looking upon the Indo-China agreement by paying it a kind of left-handed compliment, if I may say so, does not accord with the great achievement which was brought about by these world statesmen who were gathered at Geneva.

90. Mr. Lloyd referred to trouble in Laos. I have seen some reports about this in the newspapers. But I want to assure him that the International Commission, which consists of the Canadians, the Poles and ourselves, has not reported anything of the kind. Crimes, thrusts to power occur in most of these territories, which have not been established for a long time; but whether there is any political trouble, anything that goes against the Armistice Agreement—which would naturally trouble the United Kingdom—

I would, as far as I can and with the knowledge I have, try to set his mind at rest.

91. All the reports from Indo-China to the Commission are of the most assuring character. The Viet-Nam Government (the southern Viet-Nam) assured them co-operation even though it has not signed the Armistice Agreement. The Indian Chairman and the Canadian and Polish representatives have said that this assurance was not merely verbal but physical. The Viet-Minh, that is, the northern people, have lent their good offices. Most of the prisoners have been repatriated. There have been no complaints, and if there have been difficulties, they have been dealt with between the parties. The relations between the French and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam are excellent. The Commission has set up a Department of Petitions to deal with the movement of the population. The Commission takes care not to act as a super-body. I have read out only some items of the report that has come in. In Cambodia the repatriation of prisoners is complete.

92. I thought I would mention these facts in regard to Indo-China, because my country bears witness to the patience and arduous labours of these men who have, for the first time after the conclusion of the Second World War, achieved a result that may be called a substantial contribution towards peace.

93. My delegation wishes now to refer to another matter, which is controversial in respect of some representatives in the Assembly: that is, the agreement which was recently reached in Manila. The views of the Government of India on this matter are well known. We regard it as something which should not have happened but has happened. My Prime Minister has publicly stated that we do not question the motives of any of the parties; it is not for us to question motives. As the famous jurist, Lord Acton, said, "The thought of man is not triable." We cannot go into motives. We have no desire to make this an issue which will prevent the consideration of other questions.

94. We believe that the creation of this arrangement has to a certain extent diminished the value of the climate of peace that was generated by the Indo-China settlement. At the same time, we think that the arrangement which has been reached is far less productive of anxiety than was originally thought. It is very difficult for us to understand the great hurry to perform this operation when there had been aggression, trouble and war in Indo-China for eight years; and when once a settlement had been negotiated, that there should have been an agreement of this character. The ink was not dry on the Indo-China settlement. Nothing positive was gained by this agreement, because it does not appear that it can be an instrument of great potency; but it can do a great deal of harm. It has already done some.

95. We now come to its more political aspects. My Government must register its objection to the designation in the Treaty articles of "a treaty area", that is, of a treaty area that is outside the territory of the signatories, and, what is more, one which the parties have the right to extend—in other words, a roving commission to go and protect other people's territories, whether they want it or not. We think that is contrary to the sovereignty and self-respect of the people who are there. It is contrary to the spirit if not

the terms of the Charter and, what is more, it is something calculated to prevent the Asian countries from ironing out their differences, and it is also something calculated to perpetuate the very things it is seeking to prevent. An alliance of this kind, where the principal parties are powerful countries whose interests in our part of the world in the past have been of an imperialistic character, cannot be regarded as an alliance of equals. It is based upon diplomacy by threats, which has not paid in the past.

96. There are too many such alliances in the world. There is the Soviet-Chinese alliance—the Soviet Union, presumably, has alliances with other people—there is the United States' alliance with Syngman Rhee and probably with Formosa; there is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and this and that and the other. It so much cuts into the whole idea of collective security and the principles of the Charter or, at any rate, its objectives; that is to say, it is a proclamation of the doctrine of balance of power and of power groupings. But as I said, while we regard this as harmful to the interests of peace, it does not at the present moment affect us greatly.

97. We regret that this agreement should come soon after Geneva and have helped to give rebirth to the suspicions which all of us have tried to get rid of. It has been contended that this is a regional organization under the Charter. If that point had not been mentioned, my delegation would not have wished to take it up. I would like to say that no one can object to agreements among sovereign nations, but when those agreements go beyond their own territory for the protection of an area—and what is more, in our case some of these parties are bound to us by other ties—it introduces into Asia the whole apparatus of the cold war, and cannot contribute to the extension of the area of peace or to drawing those who may have, or are reputed to have, aggressive designs, or aggressive ideas, or aggressive illusions, into the comity of nations.

98. No one can object to a club of like-minded nations, or temporarily like-minded nations, doing what they like. But this agreement goes further. It designates as its area the South-West Pacific and the general area of South-East Asia. Generally, South-East Asia extends from the Himalayas to the equator. What is more, the South-West Pacific is open sea. So that from this point of view we think that the agreement has hurt us.

99. In arguing before this Assembly that this is a regional organization, the proponents of this treaty, some of them signatories, have quoted one Article or another of the Charter. Some call to their defence Article 51, and claim that under this Article it is a purely defensive organization. Now what does Article 51 say? It says:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council . . .".

100. I shall not go into the question of whether this is a measure taken or a measure contemplated, and I

shall not go into the question of reporting to the Security Council. But if there has been no attack we cannot regard this as a measure of self-defence. And, what is more, it certainly is not the self-defence, not even of a collective self. It is very doubtful that law permits a collective self in this way, unless the selves that make up the collective self are individuals, such as in a company or in a corporation. These, however, are sovereign States, whose selves remain separate. If their selves had been merged, then the fact of their individual seating in this Assembly would be open to question. Therefore, they are multiple selves and there cannot be any question of self-defence. Article 51 of the Charter, therefore, does not apply. It is not an organization, even a military one, of the character cited within the meaning of the clause cited.

101. If it is stated that the agreement comes under Article 52, then we say that it is not a regional organization, because the maintenance of international peace and security is primarily a function of the Security Council, as stated in Article 24. Any argument, therefore, about this being a regional organization is, in our view, totally inadmissible.

102. The Government of India was invited to attend the Manila Conference. It did not attend because to do so would have meant a reversal in our policy. To do so would have meant that we were not sincere in our views, or that there was no meaning in the agreements and understandings we had just reached with Burma and with China. These agreements refer to non-aggression and non-interference. To have concluded these agreements and then to become a party to a system of this kind would not have been consistent. Furthermore, it would not have been of any positive value because, as I said, the results are more negative and harmful than positive and useful. As it stands, the main areas and the larger countries of this region are not part of this system of organization. We regret that this has come into existence and we hope that in future common sense will prevail on both sides. In spite of the many organizations and arrangements which we may not favour, we have no intention of making this a kind of barrier in our relationship with other people. We shall, as far as we can, base our conduct on understanding and use whatever persuasion we are able to exercise; particularly with respect to the United Kingdom, which in this matter has cut right across the lines of other relations, we have explained our position fully.

103. I hope that nothing I have said will be regarded as merely making an argument or as in any way cutting into the complete and unqualified right of countries to conclude whatever agreements they wish. I shall resist the temptation to quote Mr. Casey's speech on this matter.

104. That is our position regarding the Manila agreement. However, as we are optimistic, we hope that it will not do much harm. At any rate, our endeavours will take the direction which I have indicated.

105. I come now to the question of the representation of China. The resolution which was moved by the representative of the United States, Mr. Lodge [473rd meeting], does not say that we must not discuss this question; it says only that we must not take a decision on it. India's position on this question is very well known. The stability of Asia would be very much assisted by having the People's Government of China represented in this gathering. It made a great contri-

bution at Geneva. What is more, if Geneva proved anything, it was that no results could be obtained if the right people were not present. That does not necessarily mean that we are getting anywhere just because the people who are sitting together are like-minded; in order to get anywhere we also have to talk to the "unlike-minded".

106. I hope that the Assembly will take note of the very strong and considered views expressed by the Prime Ministers at Colombo in regard to the representation of China. While they have not used exaggerated language, they have sought to convey to the world the importance of this matter and their concern about it.

107. We would say that the presence in this Assembly of the People's Government of China alone can bring into our counsels the large part of Asia which is now disenfranchised. This is so in fact, though not in law, because of the position adopted by the Assembly. We believe that our delegation's view on the question of legality is well known. We hope that the political considerations which might cause difficulties in the case of some people will not last too long, and that we shall be able to talk to those with whom some people may disagree. The participation in our deliberations of the People's Government of China would be one of the most substantial contributions towards establishing stability in South-East Asia and towards providing for non-interference in the affairs of other States and for arrangements on non-aggression.

108. The Prime Ministers considered at Colombo the question of the representation of China in the United Nations. They felt that such representation would help to promote stability in Asia, ease world tension and assist in bringing about a more realistic approach to world problems.

109. On this same question, just two days ago the Prime Minister of India made the following statement:

"In regard to the United Nations, this House knows that we have stood for the People's Government of China being represented there. Recently the United Nations passed a resolution that this matter will not be considered for a year or so. I have long been convinced of the fact that a great part of our present-day difficulties—certainly in the Far East, but I would like to go further and say in the world—is a result of this extraordinary shutting of one's eyes to the fact of China. Here is a great country, and it is totally immaterial whether you like it or dislike it. Here is a great country, and the United Nations, or some countries of the United Nations, refuse to recognize that it is there. The result is that all kinds of conflicts arise. I am convinced in my mind that there would have been no Korean war if the People's Government of China had been in the United Nations—it is only guess work—because people could have dealt with China across a table. It adds to the complexities and difficulties of world problems.

"Remember this, that it is not a question of the admission of China to the United Nations. China is one of the founding Members of the United Nations. It is merely a question of who represents China. This fact is not adequately realized. It is not a question really of the Security Council or anybody else deciding as they have to decide on the admission

of new countries. China is not a new country. It is really a question, if you like, of credentials—who represents China—a straightforward question, and it surprises and amazes me how this straightforward question has been twisted round about and made a cause of infinite troubles. There will be no settlement in the Far East or in South-East Asia until this major fact of the People's Government of China is recognized. I say one of the biggest factors ensuring security in South-East Asia and in the Far East is the recognition of China by those countries and China's admission to the United Nations. There would be far greater assurance of security that way than through your South-East Asia Treaty Organization or the rest.

"If China comes in, apart from the fact that you deal with China face to face at the United Nations and elsewhere, China would assume certain responsibilities in the United Nations. . . .

"Instead of adding to its responsibility and laying down ways of co-operation, you shut the doors of co-operation and add to the irresponsible behaviour of nations in this way and call it security. There is something fundamentally wrong about it. The result inevitably is that the influence of the United Nations lessens, as it must. I do not want it to lessen because, whatever it may be, it is one of our biggest hopes for peace in the world.

"In this connexion, constant reference has been made here to what has been called aggression by subversion. The Government of India is glad to be able to relate that both the Head of State, Mao Tse-tung, and the Prime Minister of the People's Government of China, Chou En-lai, have recently said that it has been pointed out to them that the millions of Chinese who are overseas but claim Chinese nationality and who support China, cause a good deal of trouble. In former days, China did not recognize the right of a Chinese to divest himself of his Chinese nationality. It may be said that the authorities on Formosa also take the same view. This factor contributes to making the position of Chinese communities in the countries of South-East Asia very embarrassing. We know the peculiar situation that prevails in Malaya. The British Government has the very difficult position whereby one talks of Malayan independence when the Malaysians themselves are in a minority.

"An interesting development has now taken place, and reference to it has been made both by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, the Head of State and the Prime Minister of the People's Government of China. They stated that they would not consider Chinese communities living outside China in the same way as they had formerly been considered, but that those communities may now choose between becoming nationals of the country in which they are living—and if they so chose they would be cut off completely from China—or retaining their Chinese nationality, in which event they must not interfere in the internal affairs of another country. This is an action which certainly will remove some difficulties and apprehensions."

110. I may say that this is the view of my Government with regard to the people of Indian origin in the British colonies, and elsewhere. We regard them as Tanganyikans and Kenyans, or as whatever they are,

in spite of their civilizations and their connexions of race, and everything else.

111. The next problem that I would like to address myself to is that of disarmament. In resolution 715 (VIII) of 28 November 1953, a Sub-Committee was set up, even though our proposal for it did not have much support at first. We are all happy that the Sub-Committee has laboured very hard and our hearts must have been warmed by the speeches made by the representatives of France and the United Kingdom, and certain South American countries. It is felt now that we have gone a step beyond the Sub-Committee's report.

112. When this Assembly met, there were two positions, that of the United States and that of the Soviet Union. There was a compromise position, that of France and the United Kingdom, which the United States was willing to accept. Now, the representative of the Soviet Union has come forward and said, without qualification, that he accepts, as a basis of discussion, the proposals put forward by the Sub-Committee.

113. I am most anxious not to develop the details of this matter, nor to go into the procedural aspects of this question, because my delegation proposes to participate in the discussion on disarmament, and we believe the time has come for the Assembly to consider whether those parts of the world—regions, as they are called—can be left out in this Committee's consideration of the problem of disarmament. A revision of this attitude may be necessary, but I am more concerned about another matter which I will try to state as briefly as possible—that is, the problem of disarmament itself, with particular reference to atomic and hydrogen war.

114. In view of the short time at my disposal, I propose to leave out all the gruesome details of this affair; but I want to make the suggestion that cold war, in many ways, is like war itself. The conversion of a state of war into a state of peace is preceded by an armistice or by a truce. It is for that reason that my Government desired that the Committees concerned should take into account its proposal [DC/44 and Corr.1] in regard to the hydrogen bomb for a stand-still arrangement. In this letter, which our representative in New York handed to the Secretary-General, we requested that the Disarmament Commission should consider this matter. Paragraph 6 states:

"The Government of India make these proposals and request their immediate consideration by the Disarmament Commission in the sincere belief and the earnest hope that they will make a useful beginning in the fulfilment of the earnest desire which the General Assembly affirmed last year . . ."

This only applies to explosions, but we believe that the whole problem is amenable to a stand-still arrangement, pending the outcome of the very helpful discussions which are going on, and I think it will bring some heart and a feeling of optimism to the peoples of the world, and reverse the process of increasing arms.

115. There is, however, one matter in the Sub-Committee's report on which we must make our position categorically clear. Two views on the Anglo-French proposals are possible. There is the view of the Soviet Union that there must be unconditional non-use of the atomic weapon, which is not acceptable to the Western side; the compromise put forward is that it may be used conditionally.

116. My delegation and, indeed, the peoples of Asia, if I may say so—the majority of the peoples of Asia—

will never agree to the idea that we can have conditional use of atomic weapons. We think that this is an entirely wrong line to take. We are prepared to concede that the non-conditional non-use may entail difficulties, and, therefore, the conditions which make non-conditional non-use possible, must be made to emerge. With that point of view we are in the utmost sympathy and understanding, but with the idea that there may be conditional use of atomic weapons—that is, the idea that atomic weapons can be used in case of aggression, or in any other case, especially when there is no definition of the word "aggression"—we cannot agree.

117. We also submit that these weapons have ceased to have the kind of value that was formerly thought. We now have evidence and pronouncements, which I propose to read out in committee. We believe that the parties concerned already possess a quantity of weapons that can destroy the whole of this planet. I am sure they do not want to destroy other planets.

118. There is a proposal which has caught the imagination of this Assembly and the world, which was submitted by the United States delegation. It arose from a speech made to us by President Eisenhower last year [470th meeting], with regard to the civilian use of atomic energy, and it was put on the agenda unanimously.

119. My Government desires to state that it yields to none in the desire for promotion of steps that will make atomic energy available for peaceful purposes. All atomic energy in India belongs to the Government. All atomic knowledge is controlled by the Government. Therefore, no private interest is attached to atomic development, so far as my Government is concerned. We desire to state—and we feel the United States delegation will understand—that we require time to see and study the proposal and to consider with our experts in this matter the pattern of the proposal put forward. I do not know very much about it, so I would like our experts to come forward and participate in the discussion.

120. The Secretary-General's report refers again to the problem of the diminution of the status of the organs of the United Nations. The fact that that is even referred to indicates that this is a regrettable situation.

121. Much reference has been made to the use of the veto. My delegation would like to submit that the use of the veto is a symptom. The use of the veto is the index of a condition. I would submit that it would be profitable for delegations to peruse the observations made by the representative of Brazil [486th meeting], who referred to the emergence of the veto in San Francisco, and told us that the work of the United Nations would not have been possible if it had not been for this agreement. If that is true, then the continuance of the United Nations may require it, but the point is that it is not the veto that maintains the exclusion of the Chinese Government.

122. For lack of time, I have omitted the whole of the section relating to the representation of Asia in Committees and Councils and in the other organs generally. We think that the Security Council and the powers placed upon it by Chapter V of the Charter should remain inviolate and, since representatives of Latin America have themselves made reference to this point, it is not my desire to refer to it.

123. There is an item on the agenda entitled "Admission of new Members to the United Nations". We hope

that it will be possible to make some progress in this matter, and my delegation does not desire to say anything that would make any conversations or discussions on this item more difficult.

124. Meanwhile, there are two or three other matters to which I must make brief reference. We think that in the matter of wider representation of countries, a very significant part of Europe, which for the last hundred years has been associated, in one way or another, with war, has been left out. It would, we think, be a wholesome thing if the Soviet Union and all those countries which agree with it—I am sorry to use the expression, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European States—would take their places in the specialized agencies, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other organizations of the United Nations, so that there might be a reflection of the world as it is, at least in these organizations where there are no prohibitions. This proposition would be a contribution towards what we are trying to solve in the General Assembly and on which there is a considerable volume of agreement. I have no doubt at all that, with a degree of give and take, we should be able to find a solution. Therefore, we appeal to such countries as the Soviet Union to consider not withholding their support and their presence from the specialized agencies. The United Nations has made a gain this year in this respect in regard to the International Labour Organisation.

125. I am instructed by my Government to refer to Japan. We hope that, very soon and with the utmost speed, a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan will be concluded and that Japan will take its place in this Assembly. This is a matter of concern to us, as an Asian country, and we believe that Japan's taking its place as a free and equal Member of the United Nations would contribute to the stability of Asia and would prevent certain problems that have already begun to rear their heads from coming up here. It would also be a contribution to the greater universality of the United Nations itself.

126. I have a great deal more to say, but there is a limit to the patience even of this gathering. I have made no reference to Austria, but we believe that to Austria apply the same observations which we have made before. We hope that it will be possible for us to see Germany and Japan represented here.

127. Before I leave the rostrum I would like to summarize the different suggestions which my delegation has made. We hope that there will be a peace treaty with Japan. We hope that those concerned will encourage and do whatever is possible to bring about direct negotiations between the Governments of East and of West Germany in order that a new approach may be made to the problem of German unity. In regard to Korea, my delegation will, if circumstances permit, make such suggestions as we may consider at the time to be possible. In the matter of disarmament, it is our intention to examine the possibility of introducing into the deliberations of the Assembly consideration of what may be called a stand-still arrangement pending the conclusion of a disarmament agreement. I have referred to our position in regard to the Security Council and to the problem of membership. I have also referred to the fact that my delegation proposes to suggest establishing a Children's Day all over the world under the authority of the United Nations, in order to further the

work of UNICEF and to give the rising generation an appreciation of the new epoch in our civilization.

128. If there had been time I would have referred to the main problem of the view my Government holds in regard to its own foreign policy. We believe that each of these issues on which there are differences should be matters on which each country ought to make up its own mind; in that way it would be possible for different systems to live together. I do not want to use the word "coexistence" for the simple reason that it has been much jeered at. But what is coexistence? It is simply the working out of the Charter; that is all. The Charter says:

"... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person . . . to promote social progress . . . to ensure . . . that armed force shall not be used . . . to employ international machinery . . ."

And, according to Article 1, paragraph 4, one of the purposes of the United Nations is to be "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations . . .". There is nothing new in this idea; it is only a question of our carrying out the principles.

129. I have come to the end of my observations; the remainder I must leave for the moment and take up in committee. The problems which I have put before the Assembly may perhaps give the feeling that there are no easy solutions to them, but our attitude is all important. Some people may be inclined to say, in the words of Voltaire:

"This world, this theatre of pride and wrong
Swarms of sick fools who talk of happiness."

They may say that happiness is not possible for this world of ours! We are not thinking of idyllic and romantic happiness for nations. It is possible to find a solution for each individual proposition provided we approach it with integrity and in a spirit of common exploration. Therefore, let us think of the words attributed to the spirit of a shipwrecked sailor:

"A shipwrecked sailor buried on these coasts
bids you set sail.
Full many a gallant barque, when we were
lost, weathered the gale."

I think the latter should be our guide more than the former.

130. The PRESIDENT: The Philippine delegation has asked to be heard at this time. If the General Assembly has no objection, I shall call upon the representative of the Philippines.

131. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): When, in the afternoon of 30 September 1954 [*484th meeting*], the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vyshinsky, appeared before the General Assembly, he must have noticed that almost all representatives from the sixty member States of the United Nations were in attendance. The advance notice that he was to speak that day had bestirred the Assembly into unusual activity. What, may I ask, must have been the cause of this unusual interest and anxiety over what he had to say? A war-weary world, still bleeding from the wounds of the last global conflict and fearful of the fast-gathering clouds that hang over the surface of the earth, focused its rapt attention on the Soviet representative, hoping against hope that, against the background of so much political cynicism in the past, some words might drop from his lips which might blaze the way to the peace of mankind.

132. As he glided from one point to another, however, it became increasingly evident that he was following the old mould and the usual pattern of Soviet propaganda. Beyond his proposal for the solution of the problem of atomic and hydrogen weapons—the nature, extent and motive of which yet remain to be seen—he radiated no ray of hope, cut no new pathway to peace, and suggested no new method of approach or even a revised formula for solution of those problems upon which there have been long-standing deadlocks. On the other hand, he emitted fire and gall against the United Nations for its unwillingness to sanction a wrong and for its refusal to recognize the fruits of unlawful acts; he deplored its failure to meet effectively the problems of international peace and security attributable mainly to Russia's own intransigence; and he denounced collective systems of self-defence dictated purely by the supreme requirement of self-preservation and brought about under the compulsion of relentless acts of subversion and aggressive incursions of predatory neighbours. The representative of the Soviet Union holds nothing but contempt for the efforts of the United Nations to maintain world peace and security. By its repeated failures, said the Soviet representative, the United Nations has been prejudicing its international authority.

133. I do not propose to make here a detailed review of the achievements of this world Organization in the domain of peace, human freedom and social progress, to all of which the Soviet Union is a witness and rarely, if ever, a participant or contributor. Through direct action, mediation, or the exertion of its moral influence, the United Nations avoided unlawful interference in the internal affairs of Iran in 1946; it eliminated what was called "the annoying presence" of British and French troops in Lebanon and Syria in the same year; it protected Greece from further Communist incursions in 1947; it brought armistice to Palestine and independence to Indonesia; it averted the spectacle of bloodshed in Kashmir; and it halted the forces of aggression in Korea. We owe it to the constitutional elasticity of the Charter, supplemented by wise statesmanship, that the United Nations was able to overcome its organic weakness, and through the "Uniting for Peace" resolution [377 (V)], it succeeded in utilizing and applying its collective forces to halt aggression in Korea. In addition, this Organization adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is certainly consoling that in this atomic age, while man, in his evil genius, has sought to unleash those cosmic forces which threaten him with total extinction, he yet labours—while he lives—to clothe life with honour and dignity and surround it with conditions and circumstances essential to its fulfilment. Lastly, the United Nations has brought the promise of a more abundant life to millions of benighted people who have long languished in darkness and poverty before the birth of the international trusteeship system. He must be a confirmed cynic indeed who cannot find satisfaction in these substantial achievements of the United Nations during its brief existence of nine years.

134. The United Nations certainly has not lived up to all our hopes and expectations. But it is a human institution and, like all human institutions, it must proceed by a process of trial and error. On the other hand, if the United Nations had failed where it should have succeeded, if it was unable to deal effectively with breaches of the peace or threats to international security, it must be borne in mind that the behaviour of

the Soviet Union in some of its principal organs lies at the root of such failures. It is, indeed, most painful that condemnation of the failings of the United Nations should have proceeded from a source mostly, if not wholly, responsible for them.

135. When the founding fathers of the United Nations devised the system of permanent membership with the right of veto for the five Powers in the Security Council, it was in the happy anticipation that these big Powers would act with unanimity in meeting every problem of breach of the peace or threat to international security. None ever suspected that the Soviet Union—which shared with the other four big Powers both the burdens and the glory of a common victory in the last World War—would, in the task of building thereafter the peace of the world, block almost every effort of its former allies in the solution of the security problems of mankind. The record of the Security Council discloses that, to proposed solutions to many a vital problem of peace, the Soviet Union has invariably applied its veto power. Indeed, it has used the veto no less than sixty times, thereby reducing that organ, which was entrusted with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, to almost complete paralysis.

136. Mr. Vyshinsky, speaking for his Government, decried the formation by the free countries of the world of regional arrangements for self-defence such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, signed in the capital of my country last month. Deliberately ignoring their expressed objective of self-defence, he denounced these regional arrangements as instrumentalities of aggression and, therefore, calculated to augment rather than diminish the existing world tension. I do not propose to speak on behalf of the European Defence Community more than to say that in the common danger that faces the free countries of Europe and the United States, these nations realized that in the pooling of their military and economic resources alone could they find reasonable assurance of security for their freedom, political independence and territory integrity. My Government is immediately concerned only with the new multilateral defence pact of which it is a signatory.

137. My country is weak, but it is not blind to the danger to its national existence; it is small, but not resigned to its present impotence. For a number of years it was racked by Communist subversion, which broke into open defiance of the constituted Government in 1946. The effective use of military force alone, strengthened by a humane and courageous leadership, brought it under control. On the other hand, my country saw Communist China fast rising to its full panoply of power in the mainland of Asia and exerting its gravitational force on the surrounding regions. It saw and was astounded by the unexpected Communist aggression in South Korea and had in fact contributed its own limited resources and a part of the flower of its youth to the collective forces of the United Nations to suppress such aggression. It heard the disquieting plea by Thailand for a probing team to ascertain Communist incursions along its borders. It saw the grim sign in Indo-China and the danger signs, no less grim, in the other regions of South-East Asia. Even now, it watches with dread the ominous clouds that hang over its tiny island-neighbour of Quemoy, wondering what time or destiny holds for it in the few hundred miles of water that lie between. Still bleeding from Communist rebel-

tion within, and sensing that it lies directly in the pathway of a relentless Communist expansion, my country has no other recourse than to seek union with countries similarly threatened. Weak and defenceless by itself, it must seek its salvation by forging ties of common defence with those whose freedom is menaced by a like peril. This is the justification of my Government for its participation in the South-East Asia defence pact recently concluded in my country, which has been the subject of vitriolic attacks by the Soviet Union representative and other representatives at the Assembly. Self-preservation is still the supreme law for nations as it is for individuals.

138. Objection has been voiced here by the representative of India to a statement in the Manila Treaty with respect to the treaty area extending beyond the actual boundaries of the participants in the treaty, upon the ground that, by fixing such a treaty area, the members of the Manila Pact have in effect indirectly attempted to trespass on the territory of other States, and that, as a matter of fact, it goes beyond the clear implications of legitimate collective self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the Charter.

139. I cannot see any validity in this contention. The representative of India should know that, if the eight participants in the Manila Pact saw fit to fix a treaty area beyond the actual boundaries of its members, the only purpose was to provide a measure of the degree of imminence of the danger of any external acts of aggression which may be committed, so far as the actual members are concerned; and, whenever it has been determined by the members of the treaty that there is an external act of aggression against any area beyond, but clearly near, the actual boundaries of any of its members, they shall then be justified in engaging in mutual consultations with each other for the purposes of legitimate collective self-defence. That was and could have been the only intention of the eight signatories of the Manila Pact.

140. But collective self-defence was not the sole concern of my Government. No less overriding was our solicitude for the right of peoples to determine their own destiny. We believe that humanity cannot remain half slave and half free, and that all governments must rest on the consent of the governed. To the credit of the eight signatories of the Manila Pact, they solemnly declared:

"... in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and ... they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities".

141. It is my view that, if the principle of self-determination had not been upheld by the participating States to the Manila Pact, my Government would seriously have hesitated to give it the seal of its approval. It is for this reason that we consider the Pacific Charter, not only as a companion piece, but also as an integral part, of the defence agreement.

142. It may be asked: How can a country reasonably complain when, by its dangerous activities, it has compelled other countries to seek safety in the consolidation of their resources for common defence?

143. It has been said that the plan for the so-called defence of South-East Asia is built on the notion of

enlisting some Asian countries in a scheme to carry out armed intervention, and that it was aimed at hiding the special interests of the colonizers who wish to dominate that area. The Soviet Union representative said [484th meeting, para. 90]: "It is ... a perfidious scheme to set one group of Asian peoples against another." The accusation is none too complimentary to the South-East Asian signatories of the Treaty. It considers them willing pawns of the Western Powers in the promotion of their alleged colonial interests. The historic struggle for freedom of these Asian countries, and the firm stand they have always taken against the continuance of colonialism on any relevant issue before the United Nations, are adequate guarantees that they will not be privy to any scheme of colonial advancement by any Western Power. On the other hand, the accusation flies in the face of the contemporaneous history of the Western participants to the defence agreement. My Government knows of no colonial interest which the United States has to promote in Asia. On the contrary, after a successful experiment in democracy in my country, which theretofore had no parallel in history, the United States voluntarily withdrew its sovereignty. The United Kingdom has similarly granted independence to India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon. By virtue of the Indo-China truce, France has agreed to the holding of elections throughout Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos to permit their peoples to set up a government of their choice which would be, of course, a faithful expression of their right to self-determination. If any signatory has other remaining colonial possessions in South-East Asia, it is the hope of my Government and the other signatories to the treaty that, in pursuance of the solemn declarations of the Pacific Charter, it will take such progressive steps as are necessary for the eventual emancipation of those subject areas.

144. True, some South-East Asian countries have not for the present seen fit to join the defence agreement. It is the hope of my Government that, in God's appointed time, they will. They cherish identical freedoms with us. They recognize the existence of a common danger to those freedoms. Our differences lie only in the appraisal of the imminence of such danger and in the manner of combating it. We trust, however, that these differences will narrow with time, and it is in this confidence that the Manila Pact has left the door open to our other Asian neighbours.

145. Our attention has once again been called to the necessity for peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the free countries of the world. We are again told that only by recognizing the reality and importance of peaceful coexistence among States of diverse social structures and political ideologies can we expect to normalize international relations and establish the peace of the world on an enduring basis.

146. On the face of it, the plea for peaceful coexistence made by the Soviet Union and the allied Communist countries is by no means unacceptable to the free world. The essence of democracy is freedom, which necessarily implies tolerance of opposing systems or of antagonistic political or economic thoughts. I am quite certain that there is no desire on the part of the democracies to impose their political or economic concepts and ways of life upon any unwilling people.

147. The unfolding pattern of international communism, however, has disclosed conclusively that peaceful coexistence has been foisted on us as a peace formula, not for the aims that the phrase implies, but as a weapon

of subversion and the ultimate domination of the world. More accurately, peaceful coexistence is, to the Communists, a euphemism for cold war or a camouflage for incursions into free areas to undermine their political and economic structures. Fortunately, the Philippines, in common with a large number of the other free countries of the world, is keenly alive to the sinister implications of this deceptive formula for peace, and chooses to rest its security on firmer grounds.

148. There is, however, one comforting feature in the speech of the Soviet Union representative. I refer to the draft resolution which he proposed [A/2742 and Corr.1], entitled "Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction", calling for the establishment of an international control system for the observance of the convention, on the basis of the proposal made on 11 June 1954 by France and the United Kingdom [DC/53, annex 9]. My Government does not propose to express its views on the merits of the draft resolution. All that it hopes to see is the day when weapons of mass destruction shall be completely eliminated from the armaments of States and when the new discoveries of man's genius shall be made available, by common consent, for the advancement of his comfort and happiness. My Government wants to view the draft resolution as a happy indication that the Soviet Union has not utterly shut the door to the solution of an issue upon which hangs the fate of human civilization. We take it to mean that the Soviet Union shares with the free world the dreadful recognition that, with free use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, there is no more survival for the victor than for the vanquished in the total annihilation that will descend upon all.

149. Let me close with a friendly reminder that, in present as in past Soviet Union proposals, deeds—I say "deeds"—not words will be the ultimate test upon which the Soviet Union will be judged by an anxious world.

150. The PRESIDENT: I wish at this time to make my position quite clear. The General Assembly is the undisputed master of its own procedure. It has adopted rule 75 of the rules of procedure, which provides that once the list of speakers has been closed, only in one case—described in that rule—may the President call on any Member to speak; in that case there is the right of reply. In the present instance, that case did not present itself. That is why, before calling upon the representative of the Philippines, I had to ask—and did ask—whether the General Assembly had any objection to that course. I should, naturally, have to adopt the same procedure in all similar situations. If there are any other speakers, I should like to suggest that they should voluntarily make their statements brief.

151. As there appear to be no other speakers, I take it that we have now concluded the general debate. Many points of view have been presented on a great variety of topics. It is not for me to attempt to give even the briefest review of this great annual expression of opinion. What I should like to do, however, is to say how important it seems to me to be that there is such an annual opportunity to make known our views. A frank expression of opinions and, at times, of grievances before the public opinion of the world has a beneficent effect on tensions which, if given no such outlet, would be doubly unfortunate.

152. The general debate is now closed.

AGENDA ITEM 14

Election of three non-permanent members of the Security Council

153. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly must elect three non-permanent members of the Security Council to replace Colombia, Denmark and Lebanon, whose terms of office expire on 31 December of the present year. Representatives are familiar with the procedure in this respect. All Members of the United Nations are eligible for election, with the exception of those which are at present members of the Security Council. It might perhaps be useful to remind the Assembly that the present membership of the Security Council is as follows: Brazil, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, Lebanon, New Zealand, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

154. Rule 94 of the rules of procedure provides that the election shall be held by secret ballot and that there shall be no nominations.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Morales (Nicaragua) and Mr. Engen (Norway) acted as tellers.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

Number of ballot papers: 58

Invalid ballots: 0

Number of valid ballots: 58

Abstentions: 0

Number of members voting: 58

Required majority: 39

Number of votes obtained:

Iran 56

Peru 56

Belgium 52

Burma 1

Haiti 1

India 1

Panama 1

Iran, Peru and Belgium, having obtained the required two-thirds majority, were elected non-permanent members of the Security Council.

AGENDA ITEM 15

Election of six members of the Economic and Social Council

155. The PRESIDENT: May I remind the Assembly that the members whose terms of office expire at the end of this year are the following: Argentina, Belgium, China, Cuba, Egypt and France. Article 61, paragraph 2, of the Charter provides that retiring members of the Economic and Social Council are eligible "for immediate re-election". All Members of the General Assembly are, therefore, eligible in this election except, of course, those twelve members of the Council whose terms do not expire at the end of the year. They are Australia, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, India, Norway, Pakistan, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

156. In accordance with rule 94 of our rules of procedure the election will be held by secret ballot and there will again be no nominations.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Morales (Nicaragua) and Mr. Engen (Norway) acted as tellers.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

Number of ballot papers: 59

Invalid ballots: 5

Number of valid ballots: 54

Abstentions: 0

Number of members voting: 54

Required majority: 36

Number of votes obtained:

Argentina 52

Dominican Republic 44

Netherlands 43

France 42

China 41

Egypt 41

Philippines 20

Afghanistan 18

Mexico 4

Poland 4

Indonesia 1

Argentina, Dominican Republic, Netherlands, France, China and Egypt, having obtained the required two-thirds majority, were elected members of the Economic and Social Council.

AGENDA ITEM 8

Adoption of the agenda (continued)

THIRD REPORT OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE (A/2743)

157. The PRESIDENT: This report deals with the request submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the inclusion of two additional items in the agenda. With respect to the first request, for the inclusion of an item entitled "Violation of the freedom of navigation in the area of the China seas", members will note that the General Committee decided to postpone for a few days the discussion on the recommendation which it would make to the General Assembly. That being the case, no action would seem to be called for at this time on the part of the Assembly.

158. With regard to the second request, for the inclusion of an item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction", the General Committee has recommended without objection that the item be included in the agenda and that, furthermore, it be referred to the First Committee for consideration and report. In this connexion, I might perhaps point out that there was some discussion in the General Committee regarding the manner in which the First Committee should deal with this item, particularly in view of its relevance to item 20 of the agenda, entitled "Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission". This item is at present item 3 of the agenda of the First Committee. It was the consensus of the General Committee that no specific recommendation should be made in this regard, since it was understood that the First Committee would itself determine the procedure which it wished to adopt for the consideration of this item.

159. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I would like to ask that the following two questions be dealt with separately: (a) the proposal concerning the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction—this item was proposed by the USSR Government and submitted by our delegation to the General Committee, where it was approved unanimously; (b) the proposal to include in the agenda of this session an item entitled "Violation of the freedom of navigation in the area of the China seas".

160. The General Committee states in its report that it decided to postpone for a few days the consideration of the question of including in the agenda of the ninth session the item we proposed relating to the violation of freedom of navigation in the area of the China seas. Our delegation considers that the General Committee's decision in this case was incorrect. I am certain that we are not mistaken in our judgment. The decision is justified by neither legal nor political considerations. We feel that we cannot agree with it.

161. When my delegation submitted its proposal to include in the agenda the item entitled "Violation of the freedom of navigation in the area of the China seas", it emphasized that it was taking this step because there had recently been an increasing number of piratical attacks in the area of the China seas against the merchant vessels of various countries and of their seizure by Chiang Kai-shek's warships. We submitted a series of facts in support of this assertion. We cited the case of the seizure of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*, which is still being held. We have information to the effect that the crew of the *Tuapse* are being man-handled. We cited the case of the Polish merchant vessels *Prezydent Gottwald*, which was seized on 13 May 1954, and the *Praca*, which was seized a year ago, on 4 October 1953.

162. We cited a series of piratical attacks on the merchant vessels of other countries, such as the British cargo ships *Hydralon* and *Rosita*, the captain of which was killed. Reuters has stated that some ten attacks had been carried out against British vessels during a period of two years. In the summer of 1953, the Danish merchant vessel *Heinrich Jessen* was attacked in the Taiwan area.

163. What is the meaning of these facts? They are self-explanatory and do not require comment. They illustrate that this case does not concern mere isolated attacks against merchant vessels on the high seas, but rather a policy of criminal activities which constitute a flagrant violation of the universally recognized principle of the freedom of the high seas. It is a crime which should be strongly condemned by the General Assembly, particularly as the responsibility for these activities lies both with the Chiang Kai-shek clique and those who encourage it.

164. When the General Committee examined the question of including this item in the agenda of the present session, some members pointed out that our proposal was fully justified, but a proposal was nevertheless made to postpone for a few days the consideration of the question of including this item in the agenda because negotiations on the subject of the tanker *Tuapse* were taking place through the good offices of the French Government. We pointed out on that occasion that this

argument, too, was completely unfounded and illogical, as the item submitted by the USSR delegation did not concern one particular vessel or one particular incident. We raised a much more general and much more important question, a question of principle. It concerns a systematic policy in the area of the China seas which can only be described as a policy of piratical attacks against merchant vessels on the high seas.

165. All this proves that there were absolutely no good legal or political reasons for postponing for a few days the consideration of the question of including the item we proposed in the agenda.

166. Naturally it is impossible to agree with the General Committee's decision. It can only be explained by a reluctance to put an end to such practices, a reluctance to draw the attention of the General Assembly and the United Nations to the fact that such outrageous incidents have become a common occurrence in these waters.

167. The USSR delegation cannot therefore see any justification for the General Committee's decision and urges the rejection of that part of the General Committee's report.

168. I ask that these two questions be decided separately.

169. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) (*translated from Russian*): With the President's permission, the Polish delegation, representing a Government which is particularly interested in this question, would like to make a statement in connexion with the General Committee's third report which recommends the postponement of the consideration of the question of including in the agenda of the General Assembly the item entitled "Violation of the freedom of navigation in the area of the China seas", proposed by the USSR delegation.

170. The United Nations, in its desire to maintain peace and security, set itself the task of creating conditions which would help to ensure respect for the rule of law and the fulfilment of obligations incurred under international law. The United Nations must therefore examine all incidents which constitute breaches of the peace and all situations which may become a threat to friendly relations between nations.

171. Consequently, the United Nations has a specific duty to deal with the situation which has arisen in the Pacific, in the area of the China seas, as a result of the piratical attack against merchant vessels by Kuomintang bands and the seizure of these vessels. For example:

172. On 4 December 1953, almost a year ago, a Kuomintang gunboat seized the Polish merchant ship *Praca* 125 kilometres east of Taiwan. One hour before the *Praca* was attacked it was circled by two military aircraft, one of which bore the markings of the United States Air Force.

173. On 13 May 1954, in the same area, the Polish merchant vessel *Prezydent Gottwald* was first fired upon and then seized and detained. In this case too, aircraft of the United States Air Force had circled the ship before the attack. The vessel was plundered, its cargo pillaged, and the crew interned.

174. These are not the first piratical incidents to have occurred in the area of the China seas. During the last few years many vessels, flying British, Danish, Netherlands and other flags have been the victims of piratical attacks.

175. The chairman of the USSR delegation, Mr. Vyshinsky, informed us that the Soviet tanker *Tuapse* was attacked recently. The fate of this ship and its crew remains unknown.

176. All these facts prove that the freedom of navigation is being grossly violated. They prove that a very dangerous situation has arisen in the area of the China seas. The Polish delegation therefore cannot possibly countenance the recurrence of such incidents, and as matters stand, we have no guarantee that these incidents will cease.

177. For these reasons, the Polish delegation fully supports the USSR proposal for the immediate inclusion of the item entitled "Violation of the freedom of navigation in the area of the China seas" in the agenda, and asks the General Assembly not to approve the General Committee's recommendation that the consideration of this question should be postponed, but to deal with it forthwith.

178. Mr. TSIANG (China): The two speakers who have taken up this problem have presented to this body no new arguments, no new facts, beyond what they presented to the General Committee. The General Committee, after careful consideration, decided, by 9 votes to 2, to postpone for a few days a decision on the inscription of this item. I strongly urge this Assembly to uphold the recommendation of the General Committee.

179. Members of the Assembly must have noticed that the two speakers who preceded me have used a type of language beneath the dignity of the United Nations. They have referred to my Government as "the Kuomintang clique" or "the Chiang Kai-shek clique". That type of language is far beneath what this great Organization should tolerate. I protest against that type of language and I will state that if such language is used in the future, my delegation will be forced to retaliate in kind, or to pay no attention to such trash. This Assembly is a dignified body which handles the important affairs of the world. It is not a street corner where street urchins quarrel.

180. In regard to this question, the simple fact of the matter is that on 1 October, that is last Friday, the French Embassy in my country sent my Government a note saying that the Soviet Government had asked the French Government to offer its good offices to negotiate about the incidents connected with the ship *Tuapse*. My Government is seriously considering the French offer of good offices. That is the reason why I asked the General Committee to postpone a decision on the inscription of this item. There is no sense in negotiating on one side and debating the question here at the same time.

181. To be sure, the French offer related to the *Tuapse* case. My Government, in matters of this kind, stands ready to negotiate on every incident of this nature. In the past, a number of such incidents have been settled to the satisfaction of both parties.

182. If, on the other hand, we raise abstract questions of international law, it certainly will be realized that there are all kinds of interpretations of international law, and no one government is obliged to accept another government's interpretation. My Government, so far as the principle of law is concerned, stands ready to accept the judgment of qualified bodies, such as the International Court of Justice.

183. I think the decision of the General Committee is a reasonable one. It helps us to carry out the work of the Assembly as the Charter intended that we should carry it out. Therefore, I appeal to all delegations to uphold the decision of the General Committee.

184. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak representative in the General Committee opposed yesterday the motion to postpone the decision on the inclusion of the item proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union, entitled "Violation of the freedom of navigation in the area of the China seas". The Czechoslovak representative expressed his point of view on this subject and presented the reasons for his negative vote when this motion of postponement was put to the vote.

185. The Czechoslovak delegation today cannot agree with the recommendation of the General Committee to postpone or not to include on the agenda of the current session this very important and urgent item proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union.

186. It is very well known that since the time the Chinese island of Taiwan was occupied by the United States forces, the area of the adjacent waters has become the theatre of piratical acts against peaceful navigation, and aggressive acts carried out by the Kuomintang bands, supported by naval and air forces of the United States.

187. The representative of the Soviet Union referred today to the case of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*. He also cited, and the representative of Poland stressed the fact, the cases of two Polish ships, the *Praca* and the *Prezydent Gottwald*, but among the victims of these piratical acts are vessels of various nations, amongst them, the Italian ship *Marila*. I would say that this Italian ship carried a Czechoslovak cargo.

188. These acts of aggression in the China seas represent a gross violation of international law and the gen-

erally recognized laws of the free navigation of the open seas. It is our opinion that this matter should be discussed here in the General Assembly and should be discussed immediately. For this reason, therefore, and for the reasons I have already mentioned, my delegation cannot agree with the recommendation of the General Committee, and we fully support the proposal made by the representative of the Soviet Union and supported by the representative of Poland, to include this item on the agenda of the ninth session of the General Assembly.

189. The PRESIDENT: As there are no other speakers on this item, in accordance with the request that has been made, we shall first vote on paragraphs 1 and 2 of the report, which contain a recommendation to the effect that we should postpone for a few days consideration of the question entitled "Violation of the freedom of navigation in the area of the China seas".

The recommendation was adopted by 40 votes to 6, with 7 abstentions.

190. The PRESIDENT: We now pass to the consideration of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the report, regarding the item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction". The Committee decided, without objection, to recommend the inclusion of this item in the agenda and its allocation to the First Committee for consideration and report.

The recommendation was adopted by 55 votes to none.

191. The PRESIDENT: We shall now vote on the report as a whole [A/2743].

The report as a whole was adopted by 47 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.