

**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/335  
Appendix III/Vol.VII  
17 September 1982  
ENGLISH

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME VII

Index of Statements by Country and Subject  
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament  
in 1982

GE.82-66722



FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDREDTH AND EIGHTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 31 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. Gatere Maina

(Kenya)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA-MORTAN

Australia: Mr. T. FINDLAY  
Miss S. BOYD

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. R. DEYANOV  
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U TIN KYAW HLAING  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG  
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA  
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ  
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Ms. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:  
Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES  
Mr. B. LE GARS

German Democratic Republic:  
Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. G. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of:  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:  
Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. G. GAJDA

India:  
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:  
Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA  
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. F. QASIM  
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Italy:  
Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:  
Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:  
Mr. C. GATERE MAINA  
Mr. D.D. DON NJANJIRA  
Mr. J.M. KIBOI  
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S-O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI  
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR  
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU  
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAJF

Peru: Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland: Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. T. PANAIT  
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY  
Mr. A.C. CLARKE

Sweden: Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. G. EKHOLM  
Mr. U. ERICSSON  
Mrs. G. JONÄNG

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV  
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN  
Mr. V.L. KOTJUKANSKY  
Mr. A.P. FILATKIN  
Mr. A.T. LOUGATCHEV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M.D. BUSBY  
Ms. M. WINSTON  
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO  
Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA  
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 183rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee will devote this plenary meeting to item 7 of the agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in conformity with the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the Committee's work.

Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, this is the last plenary meeting of the Committee that I shall have the privilege and the honour to chair, as Kenya's chairmanship expires at midnight tonight. I would therefore like to make a few general observations as permitted by rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

The Committee has closely followed the work programme contained in document CD/304, which we adopted at the Committee's second plenary meeting on 5 August. Nevertheless, rule 30 of the rules of procedure has afforded delegates sufficient flexibility in handling various items at the time convenient to them. A general agreement emerged in the early days of the session that it would be more productive to discuss the items on a selective basis because of the early clear indication that progress would not be possible on some of the topics on the agenda. The Kenya delegation agreed to that selective approach to the programme because we were convinced that the limited success of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, several weeks before we assembled here for this summer session of the Committee, was still very fresh in our minds. I expressed the views of my Government on the outcome of the second special session when I assumed the chairmanship of this Committee on 3 August.

The issues before the Committee for negotiation are complex and require a lot of patience. Unless our efforts are backed by a firm political will and commitment on the part of all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and the other militarily significant States, progress in the work of this Committee will continue to be very slow indeed. This was, I believe, the fundamental reason why most delegations assembled here have favoured and advanced the idea of shelving the work of the ad hoc working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, radiological weapons and negative security assurances. The failure of these groups to make real progress in their work during the spring session of the Committee earlier this year and the outcome of the second special session have blunted the expectations and hopes vested in this Committee by the international community. My delegation therefore hopes that real progress will be made when these working groups resume their work in 1983.

We welcome the reappointment of Ambassador García Robles as Chairman of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which was re-established at the beginning of this session. I wish once more to congratulate him on that important reassignment and on his assumption of the Committee's chairmanship for the month of September as well as the inter-sessional period -- between now and next February -- when the Committee will convene here again at the beginning of its 1983 spring session.



(The Chairman)

I hope that the informal consultations which Ambassador García Robles and the chairmen of the other working groups -- namely, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany -- are going to conduct within their respective working groups between now and next February will go a long way in laying the ground for real progress in these groups when they meet next year.

Progress has been modest or lacking on the other items on our agenda, namely, chemical weapons, a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The formal and informal discussions held since we convened here have indicated that a serious impasse still reigns over the questions of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It has proved difficult to agree on the procedural questions of establishing working groups to deal with these issues.

The Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has commenced its work on a negative note, with two of the nuclear-weapon States withholding their participation. I hope that the Working Group, under the able leadership of Ambassador Curt Lidgard, will overcome its difficulties and agree on a work programme for its future deliberations. I hope, too, that the Committee can agree at its current session on establishing a working group on outer space, with clear terms of reference. The question of the group's chairmanship could then be finalized at the next session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has done some serious work since it convened here on 20 July. The "homework" groups have done very useful work, and I wish to commend Ambassador Sujka of Poland for the good leadership he has provided to the chemical weapons Working Group.

The questions of the expansion of the membership of the Committee and enhancing its effectiveness still remain to be dealt with. These questions are highly political and sensitive, but I believe it is possible to find an acceptable compromise on the membership issue. Obviously, a clear distinction exists between the two issues, and they should therefore be treated separately. Informal consultations held at the levels of groups and individual delegations could be continued. Patience on the part of the applicants will be necessary. All delegations appear to me to be in favour, in principle, of some expansion of the membership of the Committee. The divergences of opinion that exist concern the timing of and criteria for such expansion. The discussions on these should be pursued with some urgency, to enable the Committee to make firm recommendations to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

Of particular and general importance, however, is the question of improving the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee appears not to have made up its mind on what needs to be done. It would be advisable, in our view, to treat this question as a separate item on the Committee's agenda. A structured debate on the matter is essential, and the sooner it takes place the better.

Distinguished delegates, the tasks lying ahead of the Committee are thus enormous and challenging, and I wish again to express my full confidence in the leadership of the incoming Chairman, Ambassador García Robles, and reiterate my delegation's support for him. I would also like to take this opportunity to inform my colleagues in the Committee that I shall be returning to Kenya shortly, at the end of my tour of duty as Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations. My departure was delayed to enable me to undertake the duties

(The Chairman)

of Chairman of this Committee for this month. I shall therefore be returning to New York tomorrow, in order to prepare for my return to Nairobi. I wish to bid you farewell and to express my personal gratitude for the friendship and co-operation which you have extended to me in the past four years, during which I have had the privilege of working with you in this Committee.

In particular, I wish to thank all the delegations for the co-operation accorded to me during my chairmanship of this Committee. To my good friend of many years, and Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, I extend my thanks for the invaluable assistance and advice he has extended to me during the past month. My thanks also go to Mr. Berasategui and all the other members of the secretariat, the secretaries of the various working groups and their contact groups, the interpreters, the translators, the technicians, the Conference Room assistants and everybody else who has made a contribution in his or her own way toward the success of the work of the Committee. To them all I extend my sincere thanks.

Finally, let me assure you that Kenya will not relax her dedication to the cause of disarmament. We shall continue to stress the negotiating character of the Committee on Disarmament. We shall, to the best of our ability, continue to play an active and constructive role in the disarmament negotiations.

Before beginning with our regular business for this plenary meeting, may I recall that, as announced at previous meetings of the Committee, I intend to put before the Committee for adoption today the schedule of work contained in paragraph 10 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events as contained in document CD/318, as well as the draft communication circulated in Working Paper No. 73.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Bulgaria, Sri Lanka, Italy, Canada, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Algeria, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Mexico and Zaire.

I give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, His Excellency Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, before beginning my statement today, may I express our appreciation of the businesslike manner in which you have led the Committee in this important period of our summer session. I am very sorry that you are leaving us tomorrow. We should like to wish you everything best in your future appointment which your Government will give you.

The great importance that the Committee on Disarmament attaches to the issue of a nuclear test ban was once again restated during the recent discussions. We are all fully aware of the firm determination of the overwhelming majority of States to put an end to all nuclear-weapon tests by all States for all time. A nuclear test-ban treaty is universally regarded as an effective means to curb the qualitative development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and gradually to reduce reliance on these weapons, thus contributing to the prevention of nuclear war.

The Bulgarian delegation welcomed the long-overdue decision of the Committee on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc working group on item 1 of the agenda, "Nuclear test ban". We hope that under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden this Working Group will make progress towards preparing the grounds for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation will do its best to contribute to this end.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

I am tempted to say a few words about the circumstances in which the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has started its deliberations.

We fail to understand why, at our last plenary meeting, the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Fields, reacted so harshly to the well-founded criticism addressed to the United States following its inconsistent approach to the issue of a nuclear test ban. Harsh words and general goodwill declarations do not have a persuasive power to deny facts. Let us see how the facts stand on the record of the Committee on Disarmament.

First. It was the United States delegation that once again confirmed at the beginning of our summer session that that country no longer considered a nuclear test ban as a priority issue but that it regarded the conclusion of a CTBT as an element in the full range of its arms control objectives, to be dealt with in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament. At the same time, however, it objected to starting negotiations on item 2 of our agenda. Can we reasonably consider as normal a procedure envisaging that the reduction of nuclear weapons should precede the halting of nuclear weapon tests? Together with the majority of delegates we have difficulties in understanding such an approach. We share the doubts expressed by the delegation of Sweden as to whether the lumping together of the CTB and "the broad range of nuclear issues" can be in full conformity with the legally binding commitments of the United States, assumed in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, where all States parties pledged to seek the achievement of "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". How can the Ad hoc Working Group on item 1 seriously examine and negotiate verification issues relating to a nuclear test-ban treaty if the delegation, which has initiated its present mandate is guided by the belief that "the present time is not propitious for the negotiation of such a ban"?

Second. Many delegations, including my own, have repeatedly underlined the importance of the tripartite negotiations. The delegation of Bulgaria associated itself with those who welcomed the report of 30 July 1980, which stated: "The three negotiating parties have come far in their pursuit of a sound treaty and continue to believe that their trilateral negotiations offer the best way forward. They are determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion". Only two years after this encouraging statement was made, the present administration of the United States, having first unilaterally discontinued the tripartite negotiations, decided not to resume them any more. The United States Government went even further in undermining the present basis for completely outlawing nuclear-weapon testing and announced that it would not ratify the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It would be a pity of what has been achieved by the tripartite negotiations is to be lost.

Third. Not only have many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament, but the entire international community has been seriously worried by reported official statements that the United States is "going to need testing and perhaps even testing above the 150-kiloton level for a long time to come". The distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, convincingly pointed to the reasons why the United States administration may need to continue the testing of nuclear weapons. Upon reading the experts' testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that whenever international efforts acquire a more positive momentum towards achieving a CTB, "the anti-ban forces in the USA immediately go to work" and destroy everything achieved.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

These are some facts which are known not only to delegations to the Committee on Disarmament but as I mentioned the whole world is aware of them. We therefore associate ourselves with those who have firmly stated that they are not prepared to tolerate a situation in which the Committee is being used to conceal from the public a policy of continued nuclear-weapon testing by the United States.

We all noted with regret the statement made at our last plenary meeting to the effect that whether popular or unpopular the United States position would continue to be determined mainly by the security interests of the United States. All States members of this Committee have their own security interests. This is, however, no reason for them to follow an approach that totally disregards the common interests of the international community of States and questions the very existence of the Committee on Disarmament.

In this regard, one cannot but recognize that the Soviet Union, which certainly has its own security concerns, is the only nuclear-weapon State ready to contribute to the achievement of the CTBT and to nuclear disarmament as a whole. Here, I cannot fail to register our regret and disappointment that the People's Republic of China and France have refused to participate in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

I wish to turn now to some of the issues discussed in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

First. As all of us know, the great majority of the delegations in the Committee on Disarmament accepted in a spirit of compromise a limited mandate with the hope that discussing and defining issues relating to verification and compliance would help us prepare for the actual drafting of a CTB treaty. However, one cannot but notice a clear-cut attempt to draw the Group into a kind of abstract exercise, which has nothing to do with the purposes of evolving common ground for negotiating a CTB treaty. And if the responsibility for the Working Group's inability to start right away its substantive work should be attributed, as suggested at the last meeting by the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Wegener, we have to point to those delegations which have persisted in their opposition to the Working Group's defining an understanding on the relationship of the verification examination to the scope and other related issues of the future CTB treaty. Referring to one or another working assumption just does not suffice if we are to carry out a political rather than an academic examination of the problem. I need not elaborate now on our ideas of the main elements of the future treaty, since this has already been eloquently done in the statements of the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

Second. The Group is facilitated by the fact that the outlines of a realistic system of verification providing a satisfactory degree of assurance that clandestine tests will be detected have emerged for quite some time. The tripartite report referred to its basic components -- national technical means of verification, international exchange of seismic data, other provisions for consultations and co-operation, including on-site inspections on challenge,

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

procedures for complaints and possible additional arrangements between two or more parties to the treaty. A balanced combination of these elements may form the skeleton of a reliable system of verification. The discussion being carried out in the Working Group has strengthened the conviction of the majority of delegations that the present technical means of verification are sufficient to ensure compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Third. We highly appreciate the work done so far by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. The Bulgarian delegation will continue to contribute to the efforts aimed at fulfilling the tasks assigned to the Group by the Committee on Disarmament. Here we should like to be very clear in respect of what the scientific experts are requested to do. We agree that following closely all new technical developments is an attractive goal for scientists. The seismic expert Group should, however, concentrate on the elaboration of an international seismic data exchange system serving strictly the purposes of a CTBT -- no more, no less. The basic elements of such a system, in our opinion, were already formulated in the consensus reports contained in documents CCD/558 and CD/43. At the same time we should like to underline that such a system can be of practical value only in the context of a clearly defined course of international action towards drafting a CTB treaty. The extent to which the international data exchange procedures might be developed and utilized by States parties to the treaty could be finally determined when and if, the scope, the potential parties, the duration and all other political and legal aspects of the future treaty are known.

I would like to touch briefly now on the question of the "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", that being the subject for our meeting today. We have only one plenary meeting for the discussion of this issue, but the series of informal meetings during the spring and the summer session have amply demonstrated the growing interest in the problem, as well as the urgent need to establish appropriate organizational structures for negotiations and the elaboration of agreements in this field.

When taking up the subject of the prevention of the spread of the arms race to outer space, we should first of all stress the fact that the cosmos is being turned more and more into a constant field of human activity that is of ever-growing importance to the over-all development of mankind. In the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the first Soviet "sputnik", a number of agreements regulating the exploration and the utilization of outer space have been elaborated, including a treaty banning the stationing of any kind of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

While including this item in our agenda and programme of work for 1982 we are aware of the responsibilities of the Committee on Disarmament for the elaboration of a universally acceptable international legal instrument designed to erect a solid barrier to the extension of the arms race to outer space. Such a course of action would be in full conformity with and would constitute a natural continuation of the existing agreements in this domain of international law.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

It is in this light that we evaluate the merits of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space which was introduced by the Soviet Union at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly and circulated in this Committee as document CD/274. Article 3 of the draft stipulates: "Each State Party undertakes not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States Parties, if such objects were placed in orbit in strict accordance with article 1, paragraph 1, of this treaty".

Does this approach not cover the meaning of both relevant resolutions adopted at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly? Is not it the right moment to start elaborating mutually acceptable measures regulating the conduct of States with a view to the latest developments and thus to prevent a new extremely dangerous and costly stage of the arms race in outer space? Or do we prefer to become helpless witnesses of the transformation of the Hollywood scenarios of "Star Wars" into a terrifying reality of our own civilization?

Our position on the creation of a subsidiary body on this item is well known. We note with satisfaction that practically all members of the Committee, with the notable exception of the leading western State, are in favour of purposeful discussions and negotiations on these issues. The draft mandate submitted by the delegation of Mongolia is a basis offering wide possibilities for various approaches to the matter. We believe that, bearing in mind the considerations presented by the delegations of Italy, Mexico, Sri Lanka and others in the course of the informal meetings, we should continue the consultations on a possible mandate for an ad hoc working group to be created before the end of the current session. This would mean that as early as next February we could proceed in a concrete manner with our discussion and negotiations, supported by national experts, as has been suggested by some delegations.

From 15 to 25 August, the Second International Assembly of Children, "Banner of Peace", took place in Sofia, uniting young representatives of 110 countries of the world, under the noble motto, "Unity, creativity, beauty!". Along with many events, a meeting of a youth and children's Parliament session was held. The appeal adopted stated, inter alia, the following: "Statesmen and public figures, remove forever the horrors of war! Protect the children -- the greatest wealth and hope of mankind!" To my Government and its delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, and we believe to many others, this appeal is a new impulse and a confirmation that we are on the right track. Only the road to disarmament, mutual understanding and peace can secure a happy future for the generations that follow us.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement. Before giving the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Sri Lanka, I wish to welcome him in the Committee. Mr. Arthur Clarke is an outstanding expert in questions relating to outer space. He has a remarkable background in that particular area, including academic and scientific activities which have made him well known as an authority in the field. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. CLARKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, it is both an honour and a responsibility to appear before you today, to discuss military activities in the last and greatest arena of human affairs. Although this meeting is concerned with the prevention of an arms race in outer space, prevention is only one aspect of the problem. As the mathematicians would say, it is necessary but not sufficient. I shall also discuss the positive uses of space technology for strengthening international security.

Before doing so, may I very briefly give my qualifications for addressing you. I became a member of the British Interplanetary Society in 1934, and was later its Chairman. In 1951 I presided over the first London meeting of the International Astronautical Federation and I have known most of the leading figures in the field. Only two months ago, I had the privilege of being hosted at "Star Village" by my friend Cosmonaut Alexei Leonov and his colleagues. I have written more than 30 books on space, and this month spoke at UNISPACE '82 as a member of the Sri Lanka delegation.

Back in 1945, as a Royal Air Force officer, I wrote the paper that outlined the principles of satellite communications. A few months later, my essay "The Rocket and the Future of Warfare" won first prize in a competition set by the Royal Air Force Quarterly. It has been a strange experience reading that paper again after almost 40 years, and I would like to quote the lines of Shelley with which the essay began:

"Cease! Drain not to its dregs the urn of bitter prophecy.  
The world is weary of the past,  
Oh, might it die or rest at last!"

Nevertheless, "bitter prophecy" is indeed what we are concerned with today. So first, I must request you -- if you have not already done so -- to read Jonathan Schell's book The Fate of the Earth, which is the most convincing account yet given of the realities of nuclear warfare. It should be required reading for every statesman.

And yet Carl Sagan has summed up the implications of this entire book in a single chilling sentence: "World War Two once a minute, for the length of a lazy summer afternoon."

One other reference: I hope that you can arrange to see the BBC's recent HORIZON science programme, "The Race to Ruin", which showed the first test of laser weapons on airborne targets and interviewed both American and Russian scientists on the possibilities of war in space.

This month at UNISPACE '82, there was some confusion as to precisely what is meant by the "militarization of space". There are very few of man's artefacts which cannot be equally well used for peaceful or warlike purposes; what matters is the intention. It is impossible to define a class of devices and say that "These must not be developed, because they can be employed offensively".

(Mr. Clarke, Sri Lanka)

Let me give an example: few things would seem more remote from military affairs than the geodetic satellites used to detect minute irregularities in the earth's gravitational field. At first sight, this would seem to be of interest only to scientists; nevertheless, these subtle variations are of vital concern to the designers of intercontinental missiles, because unless the earth's gravitational field is accurately mapped, it is impossible to target a missile with precision. Thus purely scientific satellites, by greatly increasing the accuracy of warheads, can have a major impact on strategy. Yet does anyone suggest that they be prohibited?

Even meteorological satellites, one of the most benign of all applications of space technology, because they have already saved thousands of lives, are of obvious military importance.

Similarly, communications satellites would play an absolutely vital role in military operations. Yet neither represents a direct threat to peace.

Just as military helicopters can be used for disaster relief work, so some military space systems can be positively benign. Indeed, we might not be alive today without the stabilizing influence of the reconnaissance satellites operated by both the United States and the USSR.

Let me remind you of a piece of recent history: in the early 1960s, there was a vigorous campaign in the United States claiming that the USSR was far in advance in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The so-called "missile gap" was a major theme in the Kennedy-Nixon campaign, and millions of words were written urging that the United States start a crash programme to overcome the Soviet Union's "enormous" lead.

That missile gap was a total illusion -- destroyed when American reconnaissance satellites revealed the true extent of Soviet rocket deployment. President Johnson later remarked that reconnaissance satellites had saved the United States many times the cost of the space programme, by making it unnecessary to build the counter-force originally intended.

By a fantastic coincidence, just yesterday I discovered President Johnson's actual words, and I quote:

"We were doing things we didn't need to do; we were building things we didn't need to build; we were harbouring fears we didn't need to harbour." (My italics.)

However, in a sense, that information may have come too late. One can picture the feelings of the Soviet military planners when contemplating this American debate. They knew they did not have the weapons the United States claimed, so what was the purpose of the exercise? Were the Americans deliberately creating an excuse to rearm? That might have seemed the most plausible assumption -- but in fact, ignorance rather than malice was the explanation. In any event, the Soviet Union decided it must produce the missiles which, at that time, existed only in the imagination of the Americans. So the seeds of a space arms race were planted, almost a quarter of a century ago.

It is possible to play a numbers game with payloads and launching to prove almost anything. Statistics indicate that the Soviet Union has now launched about twice as many "military" payloads as the United States -- by 1981, roughly 860 against 420.



(Mr. Clarke, Sri Lanka)

Does this mean that the Soviet Union is twice as aggressive as the United States? Not at all, because the Soviet Union's reconnaissance satellites are planned to operate for only a few weeks whereas the much bigger American satellites remain in orbit for many months. So the quantity of American reconnaissance information is probably much greater than that of the Soviet Union, a point to which we will return later.

However, photographic or television reconnaissance is limited by cloud conditions; only radar can give all-weather coverage. And only the USSR has used radar satellites, powered by nuclear reactors to reconnoitre the movements of ships at sea, as was revealed when Kosmos 954 crashed in Canada in 1978.

Another area of confusion and controversy is that of Landsats or earth resources satellites, which give superb views of our planet, of enormous value to farmers, industrialists, city planners, fishermen -- in fact, anyone concerned with the use and abuse of Mother Earth. The United States has made its Landsat photographs, which have a ground resolution of roughly 80 metres, available to all nations. Not surprisingly, there has been some concern about the military information that these photographs inevitably contain. That concern will be increased now that Landsat D has started operations with a resolution of 30 metres; I was stunned by the beauty and definition of the first photographs when they were shown to us at UNISPACE a few weeks ago. The French SPOT satellite will have even better resolution (10 - 20 metres) and this is rapidly approaching the area of military importance, although it is nowhere near (perhaps by a factor of one hundred) the definition of the best reconnaissance satellites under favourable conditions.

There is a continuous spectrum between the abilities of the earth resources satellites and the reconnaissance satellites, and it is impossible to say that one is military and the other is not. What matters is, again, intention.

One may sum up the situation by saying that although these satellites may be annoying to some nations, they are not aggressive: and that is the essential factor.

More confusion has now been created by the American space shuttle, which has been heavily criticized in the Soviet Union. It is perfectly true that many of the shuttle's missions will be military -- yet, it is as potentially neutral as any other vehicle.

The one new factor the shuttle does introduce is that, for the first time, it gives a space-faring power the ability to examine, and perhaps to retrieve, satellites belonging to somebody else, thus opening up prospects of "space piracy" -- as the Soviet Union has put it. However, one cannot help thinking that fears on this score have been greatly exaggerated. If you do not want anyone to capture your satellite, it is absurdly simple to boobytrap it and thus to destroy, with very little trouble, an extremely expensive rival space system.

From past experience, I would venture a prediction in this area. When only the United States possessed reconnaissance satellites, there was a great outcry in the Soviet Union about these "illegal spy devices". When the Soviet Union also possessed them, this cry was suddenly stilled. In the same way, when the Soviet shuttle is launched, perhaps we will hear no more talk of space piracy ...

The essential point is that all these systems -- communications, meteorological, geodetic, reconnaissance, and the shuttle itself -- though they represent some degree of militarization of space, are still, for the moment, defensive or even benign. Some countries may be upset by certain applications, but they can all live with them, accepting their benefits as well as their disadvantages. The new factor which has now entered the discussion is that of deliberately destructive space systems, i.e. weapons.

(Mr. Clarke, Sri Lanka)

It seems to have been forgotten that the first weapons were introduced into space almost 20 years ago by the United States, which exploded several nuclear warheads above the atmosphere in tests of a possible anti-satellite system. This approach was abandoned when it led to the discovery -- only recently rediscovered, to the consternation of military planners -- that a few nuclear blasts in space could knock out all satellites, simply by the intensity of the radiation pulse.

The fact hovers ominously over all discussions of space weapons systems. A desperate country could blind and cripple all its enemy's satellites -- as well as everyone else's -- by a few large nuclear explosions above the atmosphere.

Such lack of discrimination has led to a search for precision weapons. Since as far back as 1968, the Soviet Union has made more than 20 tests of a non-nuclear anti-satellite destroyer, or ASAT, which hovers near its victim and explodes in a shower of fragments. In June 1982, it tested this satellite system for the first time in conjunction with large-scale ballistic missile launches from silos and submarines.

The interesting question arises -- why are the Russians so concerned with developing an ASAT system, with its obvious destabilizing implications? One can only assume that the Soviet Union, which is able to obtain a great amount of information about the United States military establishment by old-fashioned techniques (such as buying trade magazines on the news-stands), realizes that reconnaissance satellites are much more vital to the Americans than to itself.

Predictably, the United States has not been indifferent to this Russian lead. President Reagan has now announced the development of an ASAT system much more advanced than the Soviet satellite-killers; indeed, it introduces a new dimension into space warfare.

The American weapon is launched, not from the ground but from high-flying aircraft, thus jumping up out of the atmosphere to home on a satellite as it passes overhead. This makes it very flexible and extremely difficult to intercept, as it could be launched from any point on the earth at very short notice.

Doubtless, scientists in the Soviet Union are attempting to find a counter to this system and so the insane escalation of weapons will continue -- unless something can be done to check it.

Neither the United States nor the USSR-ASAT systems will be operational for some years, so perhaps there is a last chance to prevent the introduction of offensive (as opposed to defensive) systems into space. The importance of halting this arms race before it gets truly under way will be emphasized when one realizes that these planned ASATs are only the primitive precursors of systems now being contemplated. For a horrifying description of the next phase of space warfare I refer you to the recently published "High Frontier" study directed by General Daniel O. Graham. This envisages building scores of orbital fortresses to intercept oncoming ICBMs before they could reach their targets. Such a system would cost not billions, but hundreds of billions of dollars and of course would only be a stepping stone to something even more expensive, which is the "Star Wars" just mentioned by the distinguished representative of Bulgaria.

(Mr. Clarke, Sri Lanka)

Which leads inevitably to the subject of laser and particle beam weapons. Now that the long-imagined "death ray" is technically possible, it has been seized upon as a solution to the problem of defence against nuclear missiles. A vigorous debate is in progress over the practicability of such systems and the consensus appears to be that although they are theoretically possible, it will be decades rather than years before they can become operational, except for relatively close-range purposes.

However, I am always suspicious of negative judgements, because I remember vividly the debate in the United States over the possibilities of long-range rockets in the late 1940s. Let me quote again the notorious pronouncement made by the chief American defence scientist, Dr. Vannevar Bush, in 1945:

"There has been a great deal said about a 3,000 mile high-angle rocket ... I don't think anyone in the world knows how to do such a thing, and I feel confident that it will not be done for a long period of time to come ... I think we can leave that out of our thinking. I wish the American public would leave that out of their thinking."

The American public did; but the Russians didn't.

If something is theoretically possible, and someone needs it badly enough, it will be achieved eventually, whatever the cost. And when one side develops a new system, the other will try to outdo it. The two Superpowers are both led by intelligent and responsible men, yet they sometimes appear like small boys standing in a pool of gasoline -- each trying to acquire more matches than the other; when a single one is more than sufficient.

It is no longer true that wars begin in the minds of men; they can now start in the circuits of computers. Yet the technologies which could destroy us can also be used for our salvation. From their very nature, space systems are uniquely adapted to provide global facilities, equally beneficial to all nations.

As you are well aware, in 1978 the French Government proposed the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency to help enforce peace treaties and to monitor military activities; This has been the subject of a detailed study by a United Nations Committee (see United Nations document A/AC.206/14 of 16 August 1981) conducted by Hubert Bortzmeyer. The conclusion is that such a system could well play a major role in the preservation of peace.

The operational and political difficulties are obviously very great, yet they are trivial when compared with the possible advantages. The expense -- one or two billion dollars -- is also hardly a valid objection. It has been estimated that its reconnaissance satellites saved the United States the best part of a trillion dollars. A global system might be an even better investment; and who can set a cash value on the price of peace?

However, the United States and the Soviet Union, anxious to preserve their joint monopoly of reconnaissance satellites, are strongly opposed to such a scheme. The British Government is also lukewarm, to say the least.

Nevertheless, we have seen that in matters of great, though lesser, importance, such as international communications, it is possible to have extremely effective co-operation between a hundred or more countries, even with violently opposing

(Mr. Clarke, Sri Lanka)

ideologies. Intelsat is a prime example, as on a smaller scale is Intersputnik, and in the near future Arabsat will establish its regional space system. There is no doubt that the resources exist in the Third World, independently of the space-faring powers, to establish an international monitoring system -- if the will exists.

I like the name PEACESAT, and although that has already been pre-empted by the Pacific Radio Network using the satellite ATS 1, I will use the term, with due acknowledgement, for the remainder of this talk.

Reactions at UNISPACE '82 and elsewhere suggest that the PEACESAT is an idea whose time has come. Those who are sceptical about its practicability should realize that most of its elements are present, at least in rudimentary form, in existing or planned systems. The French SPOT satellite, with a ground resolution of 10-20 metres, has already been mentioned. Whether the Superpowers wish it or not, the facilities of an embryo PEACESAT system will soon be available to all countries in the near future.

May I remind my Russian and American friends that it is wise to co-operate with the inevitable; and wiser still to exploit the inevitable.

PEACESATS could develop in a non-controversial manner out of what Howard Kurtz, their long-time advocate, has called the Global Information Co-operative.

This could be a consortium of agencies for weather, mapping, search and rescue, resources and pollution monitoring, disaster watch, information retrieval and, of course, communications. No one denies the need for these facilities. If they were provided globally, they would inevitably do much of the work of a PEACESAT system. The only extra element required would be the evaluation and intelligence teams needed to analyse the information obtained.

The organization, financing and operation of a PEACESAT system has been discussed in the United Nations report, to which I refer you. It is not a magic solution to all the problems of peace: there is no such thing. But at least it is worthy of serious consideration, as one way of escape from our present predicament -- all of us standing in that pool of gasoline, making our Mutual Assured Destruction ever more assured. To quote from General Graham of the High Frontier Project: "We should abandon this immoral and militarily bankrupt theory ... and move from Mutual Assured Destruction to Assured Survival ... Should the Soviet Union wish to join in this endeavour ... we would, of course, not object..."

I would like to end, as I began, with the conclusion of my 1946 essay, "The Rocket and the Future of Warfare".

"The only defence against the weapons of the future is to prevent them ever being used. In other words, the problem is political and not military at all. A country's armed forces can no longer defend it; the most they can promise is the destruction of the attacker ...

"Upon us, the heirs to all the past and the trustees of a future which our folly can slay before its birth, lies a responsibility no other age has ever known. If we fail in our generation, those who come after us may be too few to rebuild the world when the dust of the cities has descended, and the radiation of the rocks has died away."

Mr. ALESSI (Italy): Mr. Chairman, since I spoke last, other eminent members of this Committee have left. It is with regret that I note the departure of the distinguished representatives of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vrhunec, and Algeria, Ambassador Salah-Bey, and wish them well in their new assignments. At the same time, I would like to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of Peru, Ambassador Cannock, who, I am certain, will give an appreciable contribution to the work of this Committee.

I would like to address today item 7 of our agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". I am glad to note that the Committee has allocated formal plenary meetings for this item and that our discussions progress with the active participation of all delegations. In this regard, we have listened with attention to the very interesting contribution just made by the distinguished delegate of Sri Lanka, Mr. Clarke, who spoke with the knowledge, the eloquence and the frankness we would expect from an expert of his reputation.

The recently concluded United Nations Conference devoted to the peaceful uses of outer space (UNISPACE '82) should serve as a further inducement for us to advance with determination in our substantive examination. It is to the credit of the United Nations, in particular of the COPUOS, the motive force in international co-operation, that progress in space-science and technology is being achieved in an orderly manner and benefiting mankind as a whole. The Committee on Disarmament is called upon to complement that work from a different angle, that of arms control and disarmament proper. In carrying out this exploratory stage of our proceedings, we have to bear in mind the goal that this Committee, heeding the recommendations of the General Assembly, has set for itself. Our task is not just to deal in general with space-related weaponry, but to try to prevent an arms race in this new dimension of human activity. It is therefore essential to have a clear perception of the avenue or avenues whereby an arms race might be introduced into outer space. We regard the present stage of our work as mainly directed towards acquiring that perception which, in turn, would enable us to establish an order of priorities and to orient our future endeavours.

The view of my delegation in that regard is known: we believe that the development of physical and technical means to destroy or damage space objects or to interfere with their operation is the most immediately threatening problem confronting us. We believe that in this specific area the ingredients for a military competition are present: the importance of satellites as targets, the development of a panoply of physical and technical anti-satellite means which would give the holder a considerable strategic advantage, the difficulties of protecting satellites by making them less vulnerable etc., all these factors could set in motion -- in our view -- the reactive cycle which characterizes an arms race.

Besides anti-satellites systems, more exotic types of weapons have been mentioned in the course of our discussions, notably the "directed energy weapons". That old favourite of science-fiction writers, the laser gun, as well as particle-beam weapons have been mentioned as having a specific potential as space-related weapons. By this term of space-related weapons we mean weapons that are such by reason of the location of the weapon launcher or the location of the target. However, whether and when this potential can be translated into an operational capability remains a moot question.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Though lasers represent a branch of electronic technology that has been in existence for over 20 years now, it appears that substantive difficulties remain to be overcome before the principle can be put to full fruition, including its military applications. The necessary requirement of cost-effectiveness makes that task incomparably harder.

These are the conclusions of various authoritative studies which have been made public so far, one of the most significant being that carried out by Richard L. Garwin, a scientist with an exceptional background in the more exotic frontiers of technology. A revealing article was recently published in the Reviews of modern physics which gave the results of a collaboration between American and Soviet researchers in the field of lasers. The authors stated, inter alia, that the achievement of certain extra progress which is now needed to proceed further in the application of that kind of technology "presents as difficult a challenge as any that Man has ever undertaken". They further stated: "We cannot truly say whether we are closer to the goal today than in the past, since it is not even possible to assert that the goal will ever be reached".

Nearly all the problems encountered in laser technology would affect particle-beam systems, in particular the hydrogen-atom beam, which is the only particle-beam useful in space. Moreover, particle-beams present certain difficulties peculiar to themselves.

A realistic assessment of where lie the real dangers confronting mankind in relation to outer space is essential to our work. We can all participate in evolving such an assessment, but only States possessing major space capabilities can make a definitive contribution. In this field perhaps more than in other fields of disarmament we depend on the contribution of those who have a full knowledge of the subject matter.

We appreciate the argument that we should aim for a comprehensive agreement capable of sealing off all possible avenues towards an arms race in space. It has been said here that it is easier to prohibit something before it comes into existence.

We believe, however, that, in this case, adopting such an approach from the beginning might well result in one of two things: either an ineffective agreement unable to stem the extension of the arms race to outer space or, more probably, the unnecessary delaying of more limited but urgently needed measures.

On balance, we continue to believe that the attention of this Committee should concentrate with absolute priority on those space-related weapons which are currently operational; our task would then be a true disarmament task, as we would strive to prohibit and eliminate systems which are in the arsenals and have been deployed.

Satellites can be destroyed or damaged at present by co-orbital intercept, by orbital intercept and by direct ascent from the ground.

In our statement of 30 March we undertook a preliminary effort in order to identify some of the issues relating to a ban on ASAT systems. We stated that foremost among those issues were the definitional questions of what constitutes an "anti-satellite system" and what constitutes an "anti-satellite activity".

Following on those considerations I would add that the answer to those questions would also depend on the kind of agreement we seek and on what we actually want to prohibit. Should we try to ban both weapons and activities? How effective would

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

be an agreement that confined the prohibition to attacks on or acts of interference with satellites, irrespective of the systems used to bring about such attacks or acts of interference?

We noted, for instance, that, in its reply to the Secretary-General's note regarding the second special session devoted to disarmament, Sweden mentioned as one of the possible options an agreement restricting or prohibiting activities characterized as interference with or attacks on space objects carried out both from space itself and from Earth.

With regard to ASAT weapons, a basic issue would appear to be that of the scope of the prohibition. It would be necessary to consider carefully which of the various stages -- development, testing, deployment, acquisition, use, etc. -- should be included in the scope.

Destruction of existing ASAT systems would also be a major issue to address.

The question of verification should be considered simultaneously since it would be relevant to a definition of the scope of the prohibition. In the case of ASAT systems, verification would be as important an issue as ever. Even a limited ASAT capability, retained or acquired in evasion of an international agreement, could be of significant military value. For this very reason the question of destroying existing ASAT systems and their component parts, and providing for verifiable dismantling procedures, could not be avoided in the course of discussions.

Outer space is still a medium mainly free from kill-mechanisms. Existing ASAT systems seem to be effective only against low altitude orbiting satellites. The full testing in space of operational ASAT weapons against high-altitude space objects might foreclose the possibility of arriving at an adequately verifiable ban on anti-satellite weapons. Such an eventuality can only be regarded with apprehension: an ASAT world is a more dangerous world. The human and material resources which are available should be used to promote our security and well-being. Satellites today perform a fundamental role in this respect, and the precious contributions that satellites have made to international co-operation and peace have been eloquently underlined by the speaker who preceded me.

We no longer live in an age when a world war would stem from the assassination of an archduke; it is the instability of the situation and not the instigating event which is likely to be responsible for such an eventuality and which must be avoided.

An effective and verifiable treaty banning ASAT systems would be an important contribution towards this objective.

Last week, an International Symposium on the prevention of nuclear war was held at Erice, a small town in Sicily, under the auspices of the Centre Majorana. Scientists and analysts of the highest reputation from many parts of the world took part in the deliberations. One of the issues evoked there, among many others, was that of the outstanding importance of certain types of satellites for that purpose. Providing adequate protection for satellites would also be a significant contribution in this respect. The opportunity before us is ripe but perishable. We should seize it without delay.

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I concluded my statement without extending to you our warmest wishes for your future. The talents that once again you have displayed in providing such an able leadership to the Committee on Disarmament will undoubtedly be of great value in the new assignment that awaits you in Kenya.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, Mr. Skinner.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, first I would like to join other speakers who have congratulated you on the way in which you have conducted our meetings this month. I think we have, in spite of a number of enormous difficulties, actually achieved quite a lot and a good deal of the credit belongs to you. At the same time, I would like to say how sorry we are that you are leaving us -- as indeed are other speakers who have addressed the question of your departure -- we are sorry, but we wish you the very best. Before I begin my statement on outer space, I would like to say a word or two about why Canada may have some credentials to address this problem. One is the question of our land mass. Ever since there has been a consciousness about outer space, it has been critical to us, as a country, to be involved in the question because of the communications aspect that the curve of the earth presents to us as a country. Through satellites we are able to communicate with each other within our own country and for this reason we are perhaps one of the leading countries in space technology. Not only do we contribute to space technology but we have also been the recipients of it through the contributions of others, either directly, that is through co-operation with other State Powers, or indirectly, when we have received, of course, our Cosmos 954 which has been an interesting experience.

I would like now to address the question of outer space in some detail. In approaching the problems of arms control and outer space, we are taking up the first arms control issue of the twenty-first century. Mr. Arthur Clarke, in his statement a few minutes ago, has given us, I think, a pretty good idea of the dimensions of the problems. Even so, we are only beginning to gauge the immensity of the issues: we are less than 18 years from the year 2000 and the negotiations we undertake here could have an important effect on the manner in which we approach the next century.

Several important events have taken place between sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, I mean, in terms of outer space. The completion of the test phase of the United States space shuttle programme, culminating, as it did, almost 25 years ago after Sputnik I, portends certain commercial aspects of the application of space technology which could rival as a benchmark in the exploration of space of placing the first satellite in orbit. The appearance of a reusable space vehicle -- that is, the world's first true spaceship -- has implications, the dimensions of which are not always easy to grasp. On the Soviet side is the increasing internationalization of its space programme along with its technological perfection. While Columbia was completing its final test flight, a French space-man was orbiting the earth in a Soviet spaceship, thus creating what is a unique situation of having both astronauts and cosmonauts of three nations in orbit at one time. Truly, space is being internationalized in a real as well as a conceptual, that is, in a legal manner.



(Mr. Skinner, Canada)

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, despite the disappointment many feel, may have had one positive benefit among others. It dispensed with illusion and stands as an object lesson of the necessity of working within the framework of what is possible. Already we see, at the summer session of this Committee, a renewed sense of realism, and this sense is as important for our deliberations in outer space as on any other issue which may appear before the Committee.

In this regard we should consider the effects of UNISPACE '82 recently concluded in Vienna. It is readily apparent that the mandate of the outer space Committee on peaceful use and the mandate of this Committee on arms control issues may be considered to have in some respects a mere mirror image aspect. I do not wish to deal at great length with the organizational aspects of arms control and disarmament; this is a matter which seems to be of endless fascination, not only to this Committee but elsewhere as well. We believe it would be better to move on to more substantive matters. Nevertheless, it is our view that the basic responsibility for preventing an arms race in outer space has been placed upon this Committee by the General Assembly. We should therefore take up our work in an energetic fashion. It is equally clear that there is a background in the outer space Committee discussions which will be of immense value here in the Committee on Disarmament: for example, the 1967 outer space Treaty is a product of the outer space Committee. As we build upon the outer space Treaty and other aspects of space law in developing the arms control treaty, which we all hope for, we must ensure that the experiences of the outer space Committee as well as of the CD, the CCD and the ENDC are fully utilized. We do not think, at this stage, that it would be productive to prolong discussion about whether or not to set up a working group on outer space if these discussions actually inhibit the Committee from addressing the substantive issues.

On 18 June, before the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, Prime Minister Trudeau underscored the urgency of coming to grips with the development of new weaponry for use in outer space. He noted that 25 years ago, the first man-made satellite was launched. That event marked a leap in man's mastery of the natural environment. I have a note here on my paper, which is a term that Mr. Arthur Clarke used in this regard; he called it the last and greatest arena of human affairs.

Mr. Trudeau noted that 15 years ago it did not seem premature to close off the possibility that space might be used for other than peaceful purposes. He observed that today the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space is, in our view, patently inadequate.

The need, therefore, is clear and unequivocal.

(Mr. Skinner, Canada)

I have noted that the Committee on Disarmament has a considerable wealth of experience to draw upon. First and foremost is our negotiating experience based upon other issues, and a good amount of useful work can be undertaken in preparation for substantive negotiations. For example, an inventory of background material relevant to outer space is essential. There are a number of treaties, both multilateral and bilateral, which have served to attempt to reserve the "use of outer space for peaceful purposes". In addition to the 1967 outer space Treaty there is the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, certain aspects of SALT I and SALT II, the ABM Treaty and multilateral treaties such as the 1979 moon Treaty, all of which have a certain significance in this regard. A compendium of relevant portions of these and other aspects of space law, drawn up in a fashion similar to that used by the experts in United Nations document A/AC.206/14 on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency would, in our view, be useful indeed.

There is a considerable scope, in these preliminary stages, for dealing with other essential and basic matters such as definitions, for it must be recognized at the outset that if we are to proceed in this Committee we must do so on the basis of a common and understood language.

For this reason, and in this regard, I wish to table in this Committee a working paper on arms control in outer space which presents the issue in what we have sought to make a balanced and non-controversial manner. This working paper has been prepared in order to put forward under one cover some of the considerations in developing an approach for this Committee. You will see now that it appears in document CD/320 which has just been distributed. Among other things, the paper presents the dangers in attempting to categorize space systems in a rigid manner -- that is, some systems might lend themselves to categorization; most, however, have characteristics which, depending upon the situation, can be either stabilizing or destabilizing. You will notice, incidentally, as you go through this paper in the fourth paragraph from the end of CD/320, there is a reference to a table which, you will note, does not appear in the document. The reason for this is because of what I have just said. After a long consideration it was decided that it would serve no useful purpose to try to categorize systems at this stage. Therefore, I would ask that a correction be issued to remove that paragraph.

In any event, I hope this working paper will be useful to members and will serve as a basic presentation of some of the issues, thereby contributing to a measure of common understanding.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, His Excellency Ambassador Terrefe.

Mr. TERREFE (Ethiopia): Mr. Chairman, it is with particular pleasure and personal satisfaction even at this late date that I seize the occasion to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship for the month of August, a responsibility which you have so ably discharged during a difficult month when the Committee had to reflect on the disappointing results of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and at the same time plan its future programme. The particular pleasure and satisfaction that I express to you originate in the fact that our two neighbourly countries have enjoyed for a long time the best of relationships, going back to the time of the heroic struggle of your people against colonialism. This bond of friendship between our two countries has since been further strengthened by our common struggle against the forces which attempt to divide our regional and subregional unity. On a more personal note, as you are about to leave us to take up other appointments, may I express my warmest congratulations to you on a job well done and wish you continued success in your future assignment. My congratulations also go to Ambassador Okawa of Japan for the many significant contributions he has made not only during his term of office but throughout the years he has been associated with the Committee. Ambassadors Venkataswaran of India, Valdivieso of Peru and Yu Peiwen of China have left us, and Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia is about to leave us also. My delegation wishes all of them success in their new assignments. My delegation also welcomes to this Committee Ambassadors Dacu of Romania and Cannock of Peru and looks forward to co-operating and working closely with them.

The Committee on Disarmament is meeting at a juncture when, after four years of negotiations under a reorganized machinery, the Committee has little to show by way of concrete results. The reasons, at least as far as the non-aligned members of this Committee are concerned, are given in their common assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and I hardly need to elaborate on them. Suffice it to recall here that the review has underlined a number of factors constituting major obstacles to the implementation of the programme of action for disarmament agreed upon at the first special session. These are the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, the concept of the so-called "limited nuclear war", the suspended negotiations between the two major nuclear-weapon States, the delay in ratification of the SALT II agreement, the refusal by some nuclear-weapon States to accord the highest priority to negotiations on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing in all environments and the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons from their arsenals.

These obstructive attitudes clearly manifested themselves in official statements made during the second special session and the negotiating sessions. The present climate of international tension and confrontation coupled with instances of aggression, intimidation, political and economic coercion, directed particularly against developing countries, have aggravated the prevailing threat to world peace and international security. In such a fluid situation, the existence of nuclear weapons jeopardizes all the more the security interests of all States. The prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which threatens the whole of mankind, should have been a focal point for our deliberations and negotiations. For these reasons, negotiations should have been intensified with a view to halting the arms race and bringing about a gradual reduction of nuclear weapons until they are completely eliminated from the arsenals of war. But we know, regrettably, that this was not the case. In fact the reverse was the trend -- evading the main issues by exaggerating problems such as those connected with verification instead of showing political commitment to essential requirements for proceeding with substantive negotiations.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

In the past decades efforts to increase and refine nuclear weapons and their delivery systems have been intensified to such an extent that it is now possible to deliver nuclear weapons at distances of thousands of kilometres with such accuracy that no place in the world is safe.

The variety of nuclear arsenals is such that, it is now contemplated for increasing numbers of military personnel to exercise decisions on this most destructive weapon, thus risking nuclear war by deliberate design as supported by various reports suggesting methods of winning "a protracted nuclear war". Even if these reports are challenged, the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, as a result of the escalation of international tension, local wars, etc., is not ruled out. It is for this reason that the people of the world attach the greatest importance and urgency to the halting of the nuclear arms race and to proceeding to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The nuclear arms race threatens the survival of mankind and its prevention is, as stated in the Final Document, "the most acute and urgent task of the present day". Viewed within such a global framework it is difficult to justify the policy of certain States which conceive their national security interests as the sole criterion to which all other States must conform, and defend nuclear weapons on grounds of security and national interest. This raises a fundamental question: whereas the inherent right of a State to protect its security is recognized, does that right extend to a point where the extinction of mankind becomes an acceptable risk? Such an attitude, certainly, is at variance with international norms governing inter-State behaviour. It further aggravates the already tense international climate and inspires mutual mistrust and thus weakens confidence-building efforts which could clear the way for more substantive disarmament measures.

It is undeniable that the arms race is a manifestation of attempts to use or threaten to use force against the territorial integrity of other States. Attempts such as interference in the internal affairs of other States, the perpetuation of colonial and neo-colonial domination, maintaining under various guises the present unjust and inequitable international economic relations, all of these fall under the same category of manifestation of behaviour contrary to enhancing international peace and security. National security interests are misconstrued when they are used as a means of destabilizing other countries and regions or simply for claiming them as part of that country's region of "vital interest" or when these countries and regions are used as demonstration grounds for exercising war games with unpredictable consequences for the countries of the region concerned. Such an aggressive policy has been recently witnessed in Lebanon, resulting in untold misery and suffering of the Lebanese and Palestinian people and causing ruthless destruction of life and property which my delegation condemns.

The study entitled "Relationship between disarmament and international security" (A/36/597) by the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General, states that "stretching the demands of national security interests unreasonably far would present an obstacle to disarmament".

No subject matter has aroused greater concern since the Second World War than the question of nuclear weapons, and the unceasing efforts ever since to prohibit their use. For decades now Ethiopia's position has been that, pending general and complete disarmament, the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, must be

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

halted. It was in this spirit that Ethiopia took the initiative in submitting the proposal for the total prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. This proposal was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its sixteenth session in resolution 1653 (XVI), which declared the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons to be contrary to the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity and civilization. The resolution in its operative paragraph (c) states:

"The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons."

It is in this spirit that Ethiopia received with enthusiasm the declaration by the USSR during the second special session that the USSR will "not be the first to use nuclear weapons". We express the hope that this declaration, together with earlier Soviet and Chinese declarations, will induce other nuclear-weapon States to make equivalent declarations banning the first use of nuclear weapons.

Like many other countries, Ethiopia had entertained the hope that disarmament measures such as the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty would lead to more significant disarmament measures. But to our dismay, there has been a continued upward spiral of the qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms race.

To come back to the focal question of the prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war, I would like to quote a passage from the study that I just referred to:

"As nuclear arsenals grow with a greater variety of weapons under the control or custody of an increasing number of military personnel, the danger of a nuclear war by inadvertence grows. A nuclear war could be unleashed as a result of human or mechanical failure, by accident, by miscalculation, as a result of ineffective command, control and communication procedures or capacities, the escalation of a local conventional war, as a result of blackmail or terrorism or through sheer madness".

Therefore an urgent task facing us at present is to remove the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war.

It is with this frame of mind that my delegation considered the positive proposal by the delegation of India to establish an ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war. This proposal, supported for some time now by many delegations, receives our fullest endorsement.

My delegation is pleased that at long last the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has begun its difficult work. As the task of the Working Group is made all the more difficult by the limited nature of its mandate, we are assured nevertheless by the fact that it is chaired by the distinguished Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden and his very competent delegation. We regret, however, that China and France have decided not to participate in the NTB Working Group. It is the view of my delegation that a nuclear test ban could hardly be effective without the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States. We hope that the two States will seriously reconsider their positions and recognize the responsibility placed upon them by virtue of their nuclear status.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

At every opportunity that my delegation has had to refer to the comprehensive test ban treaty, it has always expressed its favour for the continuation of the trilateral negotiations on a CTBT. In this connection, the decision of the United States not to resume the trilateral negotiations is therefore regrettable and such a move would appear to dash the prospects of a meaningful progress on a nuclear test ban at present.

I would now like to say a few words regarding the question of verification. The Ethiopian delegation has no intention of underestimating nor downgrading the importance of an effective verification mechanism for a given disarmament measure. The importance and the necessity of verification for disarmament measures are widely recognized by all. Lately, however, the issue of verification has been used by a few delegations in the Committee in a disproportionate manner. We do not question at all the legitimate concerns expressed by those seeking adequate measures of verification to ensure compliance with any agreement to be concluded. We believe this concern is shared by all. However, to engage the Committee in discussing and negotiating on detailed procedures for verification without regard to the scope or the nature of each particular measure is to make negotiations contingent upon and hostage to the structures of the verification process. It would be appropriate, therefore, as expressed by the majority of the members of this Committee, rationally to address the issues of scope and its commensurate compliance procedures.

We express the hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will show progress corresponding to its current intensified work. In this context I would like to express the admiration of my delegation for the able and dynamic leadership that Ambassador Sujka has provided to the chemical weapons Working Group. The emphasis placed on working out a composite text on the various elements needs to be urgently reinforced by a new demonstration of a strong political input so as to generate meaningful progress. In this regard, the Ethiopian delegation would like to reiterate its satisfaction, already expressed at the second special session, at the initiative undertaken by the Soviet Union in submitting a draft document on the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention.

The provisions relating to international on-site inspections to verify the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and to control the production of those chemicals permissible under a future convention are most notable. The Soviet draft, in our view, provides an impetus for serious negotiations on chemical weapons. We would appeal to and encourage those delegations which have addressed their legitimate inquiries to the Soviet delegation and sought clarifications on the Soviet provisions, to undertake likewise a corresponding bold initiative on this urgent and important subject.

Before concluding, let me touch very briefly upon the item inscribed on our agenda for today's plenary meeting, "prevention of an arms race in outer space", a subject with which we have to deal more fully in the future. The Ethiopian delegation believes that space technology should be used solely for peaceful purposes. Therefore, any military applications or any hostile use of space should be strictly prohibited by an international treaty or international agreements. Faced with rapid space technology and its frightening dimensions, our efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space will face greater difficulties the longer the realization of the objective of a demilitarized outer space is delayed by lack of a common approach. It is our earnest hope, therefore, that through the establishment of an ad hoc working group, concrete proposals can be pursued, developed and negotiated for a common approach to make outer space a lasting and peaceful heritage of mankind.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HEIDER (German Democratic Republic): In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee takes up today item 7 -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Therefore, I would like to dwell upon this question in the first part of my statement. Afterwards, I am going to touch upon some aspects of the work of the NTB Working Group.

There is no doubt that nuclear disarmament, including particularly a comprehensive test ban, is the item of highest priority this Committee has to deal with. At the same time we cannot leave out of sight developments in other fields which -- if not prevented at an early stage -- could have serious destabilizing and dangerous consequences for international security and the maintenance of peace in the future. Recent events prove that the militarization of outer space is becoming a reality. It is no longer a question of science fiction. It is also no secret that certain military planners regard outer space as the "battlefield of the future". Their programmes of super-armament in outer space have become part and parcel of their concept aimed at achieving military superiority.

Taking into account these dangerous developments, my country favours the prohibition of the deployment of any kinds of weapons in outer space. An appropriate international agreement would effectively curb an arms race in outer space and promote the peaceful uses of this area.

We were very much satisfied that this basic position was adhered to by almost all delegations at the recently concluded Conference, UNISPACE II.

As far as this Committee is concerned, my delegation is led by the following approach:

Firstly, the ban should be a comprehensive one. It should prohibit the deployment of any kinds of weapons in outer space. Thus, the ban would include the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons, but would not be limited to it. Focusing on anti-satellite weapons only would not exclude the extension of the arms race in outer space into other directions.

Secondly, following the request of the United Nations General Assembly contained in resolution 36/99, the Committee on Disarmament should embark on negotiations.

We regret that some States seem, up to now, not to be prepared to accept the negotiating role of the Committee concerning this item.

(Mr. Horder, German Democratic Republic)

But how long should we wait for real negotiations, not to speak about measures to curb the arms race in outer space? We have to take into account the fact that the United States some years ago broke off bilateral talks on the cessation of the arms race in outer space. Even more: as is well known, the United States only recently set up a military outer space command and is implementing a huge military programme in outer space.

Therefore, no efforts should be spared to start immediately negotiations on the prohibition of the arms race in outer space. The draft treaty tabled by the USSR last year represents an appropriate basis for real negotiations.

A Working Group should be set up on this subject. Where should all substantive problems be discussed and explored if not in the framework of such a body?

One cannot pronounce oneself in favour of the consideration of concrete measures against the arms race in outer space while at the same time rejecting the establishment of appropriate bodies to deal with all the proposals, draft treaties and documents which have been submitted on this subject. My delegation fully supports the draft mandate for such a Working Group proposed by the Mongolian People's Republic in document CD/272. The Committee should take action on this proposal and not confine itself to a non-committing academic exercise on the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

My delegation will support every initiative to this end.

In the course of this session, my delegation has already on several occasions explained its position concerning some basic as well as current problems with regard to a comprehensive test ban. Since the newly established NTB Working Group is now in an advanced stage of its work, allow me to make some further comments in this connection.

My country attaches great importance to the solution of the verification problems connected with a CTB. Appropriate verification measures should ensure compliance with the obligations of the treaty, enhance confidence in it, and thereby induce countries to adhere to it. At the same time, it stands to reason that issues concerning verification cannot be discussed and solved in a vacuum, but only in close connection with the basic question of the treaty -- the scope of the prohibition. Concrete verification measures are only to be agreed upon if it is known precisely what is to be prohibited and, thus, to be verified.

This relationship between scope and verification was clearly spelled out in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Concerning the work of this Group, my delegation, like the delegations of other socialist countries, proceeds from the understanding that issues relating to verification of compliance with a CTBT will be examined as applied to a treaty which would prohibit all test explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment, which would be of unlimited duration, would provide for a solution, acceptable



(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

to all parties, of the problem of underground explosions for peaceful purposes, and would include among its participants all nuclear-weapon States. In close connection with such an understanding on the scope of a CTB, the socialist countries proposed a list of seven items relating to verification to be discussed in the NTB Working Group.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to agree at the beginning of the work of this Group on an outline of its programme of work based on a clear understanding on the scope of the prohibition.

An abstract discussion on verification questions, i.e., without relevance to a specific scope, could hardly lead to concrete conclusions with regard to CTB verification.

My delegation highly appreciates the efforts of the Chairman of the NTB Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, and his alternate, Mr. Hyltenius, to fulfil the mandate of this Group. The Working Group has so far had an interesting exchange of views on the scope of the prohibition as well as on basic questions of verification. We appreciate the contributions made in this regard by the delegations of the Soviet Union, India and Sweden, among others, as well as by the Chairman of the seismic experts Group, Mr. Ericsson.

At the same time, we cannot but express our concern at the tendency shown by some delegations to involve the Working Group in academic debates on verification questions having no other purpose than to make the Committee forget all the useful experience accumulated during more than 20 years of negotiations on CTB issues. Those delegations even seem to neglect the results of the trilateral negotiations in which some of them participated. In those negotiations, a multilateral verification system for a CTBT was elaborated. It was a matter of great satisfaction to my delegation that the USSR only recently re-emphasized that it regards this verification system as adequate.

In the judgement of my delegation, the NTB Working Group seems to be now at a turning point: either, it might proceed from the assumption that all the technical means necessary for verifying compliance with a CTBT with a sufficient degree of certainty exist and it is now time to elaborate the political and legal framework or elements of such a verification system; or, it might go the other way round, and start a new detailed debate on highly technical issues, and study all pros and cons of the means of verification with the hope of obtaining in the distant future an idea of a possible verification system. This alternative is not new: both trends determined also the discussions held in the 1960s and 1970s in this Committee on a CTB.

But should we not take into account the experience gained in order to avoid the failures of the past?

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In the 1970s two main views were in the centre of debates on CTB verification.

The first view was that the verification problem could be resolved on the basis of national means, i.e. remote control, supplemented and improved upon by international co-operation and procedures. These two methods would complement each other. This opinion was expressed in 1971 by nine non-aligned and neutral countries in working paper CCD/354. A similar position was held by the socialist countries. The second view was that seismic methods of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions would not be capable of providing adequate national technical means of verifying a CTB. The conclusion was drawn that there was a continuing need for study and research into seismic methods of detection and identification of underground events. This view was held, inter alia, by the United Kingdom in document CCD/492. A similar position was taken by the United States delegation which declared, for example, in 1974: "For us, the most promising approach to achieving a CTB lies in continuing serious work on the technical issues that must be resolved, specifically those involved in the problem of verification" (CCD/PV.604).

It is, of course, important to clarify and solve technical problems connected with verification of a CTB. However, at some point a political decision should be taken. Otherwise, there would be a danger of converting negotiations into technical deliberations, and their purpose -- a CTBT -- would be buried under a heap of technical papers.

In view of the actual importance of this question, my delegation has discussed this "technical approach" already in detail in the ITTB Working Group. It especially dwelt upon the questions of evasion techniques which in the 1970s were advanced by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom and which, in their view, could very much hamper the efficiency of seismic means.

Of course, such possibilities may theoretically, and even practically, not be excluded. But here again, should one not first of all take into account the political aspect of this matter? It is only too obvious that a would-be violator of a CTBT would have to weigh up the possible military advantages gained by cheating using the above-mentioned methods against the political disadvantages in the event of the violation being detected. Moreover, the Government concerned must take into account the capability of an international seismic network to detect the violation. Furthermore, would it then not be advisable to look for an appropriate political solution of this problem? This could be an obligation by each State party to a CTBT not to impede the national technical means of the other parties, including the prohibition of the use of concealment measures, inter alia, evasion techniques.

Another question which played an important role in the CTB discussions was the problem of on-site inspections. In scientific literature it is broadly emphasized that those inspections could only marginally add to the efficiency

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

of a seismic network. This view was also broadly shared by many delegations in the discussions on CTB questions which have taken place in this Committee over the years. In this regard, I would like to draw your attention to document CCD/481 tabled in 1976 by the Swedish delegation. On the other hand, the United States delegation in particular stressed the importance of on-site inspection. It stated for example in 1976 that "adequate verification of a CTB continues to require some on-site inspection" (CCD/PV.704). However, that delegation never provided a clear answer to the question of what is meant by "adequate verification" and what special purpose on-site inspection would serve. In 1976, the USSR declared its support for the "verification by challenge" concept and included an appropriate provision in its draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests (CCD/523). Thus, one might have thought that United States concerns had been met. However, the course and the actual state of the trilateral negotiations, as well as the work of this Committee, provoke the question: what is given more importance in the position of the United States -- the search for "adequate verification", or the interest in continuing nuclear weapons tests to develop the new nuclear warheads necessary for the implementation of their new nuclear warfare doctrines?

When considering issues of CTB verification, we should not allow ourselves to be bogged down in a wealth of technical details and unreal questions. The overriding questions are political ones and we must find political answers to them, corroborated by certain technical methods, e.g., in the field of verification. Moreover, existing technical means already provide a sufficient capability for CTB verification. Therefore, I cannot but agree with the former representative of Canada to the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Pearson, who stated in 1979:

"The establishment of a fully-tested world data exchange system to which all of us can contribute could be one of the most effective methods available to the international community for setting up a comprehensive test ban regime. Let us be clear, however, that problems of verification are a matter of judgement, not of technical perfection". (CD/PV.4)

It would also be difficult not to agree with the conclusion contained in the already quoted Swedish working paper, CCD/481: "It would be impossible to create a verification system that would secure the timely detection of any violation of a treaty at any time". To look for such a "perfect" verification system could only indefinitely postpone the elaboration and conclusion of a CTBT. With all seriousness we should rather face the question: which danger is greater -- the threat caused by the absence of a CTBT, or the low risk posed by a not 100 per cent verification system? Given the present state of seismic art, no country could realistically expect to conceal clandestine tests except perhaps tests of small yield weapons of little military value.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Thus, my delegation shares the opinion expressed already in 1972 by the United Nations Secretary-General:

"While I recognize that differences of views still remain concerning the effectiveness of seismic methods of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests, experts of the highest standing believe that it is possible to identify all such explosions down to the level of a few kilotons. Even if a few such tests could be conducted clandestinely, it is most unlikely that a series of such tests could escape detection. Moreover, it may be questioned whether there are any important strategic reasons for continuing such tests or, indeed, whether there would be much military significance to tests of such small magnitude.

"When one takes into account the existing means of verification by seismic and other methods, and the possibilities provided by international procedures of verification such as consultation, inquiry and what has come to be known as 'verification by challenge' or 'inspection by invitation', it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban.

"In the light of all these considerations, I share the inescapable conclusion that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests".

This view was also broadly shared among experts in the United States. In a statement made in 1976, the Arms Control Association said the following:

"The combination of improvement in seismic detection systems and satellite surveillance capabilities has led many arms control experts to conclude that a CTB could be adequately verified at the present time by national means. They stress that the verification question is not whether an extremely small nuclear test (a few kilotons) can go undetected, but rather whether the risk of not being able to detect such small tests would be of any military significance. Furthermore, the country contemplating such a violation of a CTB would also need to examine whether a weapon test of such a small yield would produce military benefits worth risking detection and the abrogation of the treaty".

Last but not least let me quote from a statement delivered in 1972 by the former United States representative to the CCD and this Committee, Ambassador Adrian Fisher, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

"We have solved many of the problems of discriminating between earthquakes and explosions; we can identify explosions down to yields of a few kilotons. There will always, no matter how much research we do, be some events of low yield that cannot be identified. This doesn't mean, however, that a comprehensive test ban is undesirable.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

"But let's put things in proper perspective: verification of a comprehensive test ban has always been only part of the problem. The main question which existed in 1953 and exists today, 14 years later, is really this one: do we want to continue testing nuclear weapons? ...

"If we decide that it is in our best interest to ban tests, I do believe that lack of a precise capability to distinguish earthquakes from explosions at very low magnitudes will not stand in the way of our moving toward a comprehensive test ban treaty. We do not need to deploy a single new piece of equipment or await the development of still more data to be in a position to start negotiations.

"We should continue research in the means of seismic discrimination. It is likely to result in more reliable, more efficient and probably still more accurate means of discrimination, but it is not now the real obstacle to the comprehensive test ban treaty that I hope this administration will now decide seriously to pursue".

I think that these questions, touched upon by Ambassador Fisher in 1972, have not -- after 10 years -- lost their importance and topicality. On the contrary.

Let me summarize: in discussing verification questions relating to a CTB, we should carefully take into account the experience of the past. We cannot neglect the basic ideas which were already developed with regard to CTB verification. Efforts to start the whole exercise from the very beginning -- "from scratch" -- would not serve any practical purpose. They would rather lead to a new protracted verification debate.

In joining the consensus on the -- frankly speaking -- modest mandate of the NTB Working Group, it was the understanding of my delegation that this mandate could not be any long-term solution. The Committee should, rather, at the end of this session or at the beginning of the 1983 session, decide on a new, more forward-looking and action-orientated mandate.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement.

We have exhausted the time available for this morning's meeting, so I suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it this afternoon at 3.30 p.m.

If there is no objection, we will proceed accordingly.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 183rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Algeria, Mr. Taffar.

Mr. TAFFAR (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to offer you the congratulations of the Algerian delegation on the way in which you have been presiding over our Committee, and to tell you how happy my delegation is to see the representative of an African country guiding our work during this month of August.

We should also like to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Okawa, who, with the skill with which we are all familiar, presided over the fortunes of the Committee at a crucial time in our work.

I should, lastly, like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of Ambassador Salah-Bey to all those who have wished him every success in his new appointment.

Since this is the first time that my delegation is taking the floor at a plenary meeting, I beg you to allow it, in accordance with rule 31 of our rules of procedure, to refer to various matters which are of particular concern to us.

It was highly significant that at the very moment when the General Assembly, meeting in special session, was discussing problems of disarmament and security, the "Zionist entity", encouraged by complicity of all kinds, was launching a new and barbarous aggression against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples with the clearly declared aim of liquidating the Palestinian people. This aggression, which amounted virtually to genocide, reminded us once again, if that was necessary, how pointless is our search for peace and security through general and complete disarmament so long as international relations are based on the exercise of force and domination.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament ended in failure, as many delegations here have pointed out. There is no need, however, to look far for the causes of this setback. The outcome of that session nevertheless confirmed the elementary truth that it is the lack of political will on the part of certain powers that is the main stumbling-block to any substantial progress in the sphere of disarmament. True, the constant deterioration in the international climate is not conducive to the success of such gatherings, as many delegations around this table have rightly stressed. However, it must be recognized that this deterioration is caused and maintained by a system based on principles of domination and exploitation. But the root cause of the failure is undoubtedly the attitude of certain powers which conceive and apprehend problems of security only in terms of relations of strength and the balance of power, an approach which inevitably leads to an attempt to gain supremacy through a feverish arms race. It is this stumbling-block, the lack of political will, which prevents the Committee on Disarmament from undertaking real negotiations on the vitally important questions which are before it. As a result, the entire multilateral negotiating process on disarmament matters is at an impasse.

(Mr. Taffar, Algeria)

The disappointment we rightly feel at the failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is all the greater when we remember the efforts made by the non-aligned countries and the flexibility they showed throughout that session. We were justified in hoping that in response to such an attitude the States which were blocking a consensus would make an effort to help reach a compromise. Unfortunately that was not the case.

This frustration ought not, however, to paralyse us. On the contrary, we must redouble our efforts to try to achieve concrete results on the questions that are before us. This is the only way of restoring a certain credibility to the multilateral negotiating machinery and in particular to the Committee on Disarmament whose responsibility has thereby become even more important.

While the General Assembly at its second special session failed in its principal objective, namely, the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, it at least had the merit of clearly reaffirming the validity of the Final Document of 1978 and States' commitment to respect the priorities established in the Programme of Action adopted by consensus at the first special session devoted to disarmament. On the strength of this reaffirmation, the Committee on Disarmament ought to continue to work on the basis of those objectives and priorities.

Having made these few remarks of a general nature, I should like now briefly to touch upon some of the items appearing on our agenda for this summer session.

My delegation shared the views of those delegations which proposed that three of the ad hoc working groups should be "put to sleep" for the period of this short summer session.

What, after all, could we expect from a resumption of the negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament a few weeks after the second special session? A period for reflection in fact seems to us entirely necessary before the Working Group on this subject resumes its activities. Furthermore, this will give Ambassador García Robles time to hold consultations on ways and means of resuming the negotiations on sounder bases so that the Committee on Disarmament may be in a position to submit a draft programme of general and complete disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, in accordance with the decision adopted at the second special session. We are, however, firmly convinced that such a programme, to have any real value, must include specific and concrete measures of disarmament, establish an order of priority in accordance with paragraph 45 of the Final Document, lay down at least a tentative time-table for the application of the measures enumerated and, lastly, contain a credible commitment on the part of all States to carry out all the elements of this programme.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons is at an impasse because of fundamental differences of views on such important questions as the scope of the prohibition, the definition of radiological weapons, the procedure for verification of compliance with the treaty, peaceful uses and, finally, the prohibition of attacks upon nuclear installations. Given such divergences of view, it was undesirable for the Ad Hoc Working Group to meet regularly during this session. Here again, we hope that the consultations being held by Ambassador Wegener will bring about a sufficient reconciliation of these positions to permit the Group to emerge from its impasse.

(Mr. Taffar, Algeria)

As to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, we consider that the key to the problem is in the hands of the nuclear-weapon Powers, for only a change of attitude on their part could give meaning to our work in this Group. We can, however, only express our pleasure at the solemn declaration of non-first-use of nuclear weapons made by the Soviet Union at the second special session. China also having given a similar undertaking, we hope that the other nuclear-weapon Powers will reconsider their positions and undertake at last to offer the non-nuclear-weapon States all the requisite assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We have also taken note of the change in France's position which appeared to be implicit in the statement made by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs at the second special session.

I should like now to offer some brief comments on the questions we are dealing with at this session.

My delegation is, of course, very pleased at the long-awaited establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. The choice of Ambassador Lidgard as Chairman of that Working Group is further cause for satisfaction. His appointment amounts in fact to a well-deserved tribute to his country, Sweden, which has always fought for the cessation of nuclear tests, but it is also a tribute to the exceptional qualities Ambassador Lidgard has shown whenever he has been asked to direct a working group.

As we all know, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has a limited mandate, the result of concessions made principally by the Group of 21, which saw the establishment of the Group with such a mandate as a first step towards the genuine negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, in accordance with paragraph 51 of the Final Document. We are, however, convinced that the question of verification cannot be dealt with in the abstract and that prior agreement on the sphere of application and the nature of the future treaty is necessary, if only as a working hypothesis. Furthermore, any attempt to isolate verification questions could well involve us in purely technical discussions or academic debates. We would have wished the Group to use the meetings allocated to it during this session to lay the groundwork for a solution to verification questions so that it would really be able to start the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests from the beginning of next year. Unfortunately, however, this appears not to be the case. We, for our part, are ready to agree to any verification system provided it is universal and non-discriminatory and allows all States access to all data.

The Algerian delegation has taken note of the decision of two nuclear-weapon States not to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We nevertheless hope that these two Powers will contribute to the Group's work by other means and in particular through the intermediary of the Chairman of the Working Group.

The Committee on Disarmament is still, as in the past, prevented from discussing the eminently priority question of the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. Once more, all the proposals put forward under this item of our agenda have been rejected for lack of a consensus. Does not that constitute a denial of the right of all States to participate in negotiations directly affecting their vital security interests, which is certainly true of nuclear disarmament questions?



(Mr. Taffar, Algeria)

We recognize, of course, that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility in such negotiations. But this responsibility ceases to be exclusive as soon as the issues under discussion are such as to affect the security of all States.

The initiation of restricted negotiations, however important, cannot be used as an argument to justify the holding up of the multilateral process of negotiation. My delegation remains convinced of the need to set up an ad hoc working group to implement paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify the basic questions to be dealt with in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We also support the Indian proposal for the establishment, under this item, of a working group to negotiate, as the first stage in the negotiating process on the cessation of the nuclear arms race, practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It is more urgent than ever today to adopt effective measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Another item on our agenda second only in importance to that of nuclear weapons is the question of chemical weapons. The negotiations on this subject are extremely promising, to judge by the progress made -- slow, it is true, but substantial -- and the intensity of work of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the guidance of Ambassador Sujka. The Group has in fact embarked on the delicate and crucial stage of trying to reach a compromise on the questions which remain at issue.

The main tasks remaining before the Working Group are to find a balance acceptable to all parties between national means of verification and the international verification system and to reconcile the positions of delegations on the question of a clause prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. On the latter point it appears that the Working Group is near a compromise which, without prejudice to the Protocol of 1925, meets the requirements of delegations demanding the inclusion of such a provision. The solution of these two important questions will mean that an appreciable advance has been made towards the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons.

The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is the item for discussion at our meeting today. No one is unaware of the importance of this subject in view of the threat of the extension of the arms race to outer space which is increasing day by day. The use of space technology for military purposes greatly increases the risk of outer space becoming the arena of rivalries and constituting a threat to peace, security and the peaceful use of space. Paragraph 80 of the Final Document of 1978 states that further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held to prevent an arms race in outer space.

In the consideration of this question, the importance and complexity of which no one can deny, a global approach should be adopted covering all types of armaments and all activities connected with the development, production, stockpiling and deployment and use in outer space of all types of weapons, while allowing the right of every State to engage in the exploration and the peaceful use of outer space. All negotiations on this question ought, moreover, to include a consideration of measures to promote international co-operation in the matter of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Taffar, Algeria)

The time has thus come to start negotiations towards the adoption of effective measures to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space. To this end, my delegation supports the proposal for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this question, without prejudice to respect for the order of priority of the questions included in the Committee's agenda.

I should like, before I conclude, to say a few words about the Committee's working methods. My delegation still believes that the formula of ad hoc working groups constitutes the best approach for the consideration of the items that are before us. On the basis of this conviction, my delegation supports in principle any proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group which would help us to move forward along the road to disarmament, due respect being paid to the order of priorities set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Algerian delegation consequently deplores the misuse of the principle of consensus to block the establishment of ad hoc working groups on such urgent matters as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. TIMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The delegation of the USSR would like to make a few brief comments in connection with the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events which has been put before the Committee for its consideration.

The Soviet delegation has no objection to the report and agrees to its being taken note of by the Committee.

I should like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the distinguished Chairman of the Group, Dr. Ericsson, for the very useful clarifications he gave in connection with the Group's report and in answer to the questions of distinguished representatives.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the work of the Group of seismological experts. The two reports submitted by the Group in documents CCD/558 of 1978 and CD/43 of 1979 form a good basis for the elaboration of an international seismic data exchange system in connection with a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the drafting of which is one of the priority tasks of our committee.

The international exchange system proposed by the Group, including a global network of approximately 50 stations, communications channels and international centres, is designed to provide States parties to the future treaty with such information as will substantially increase the reliability of verification that nuclear weapon tests are not being carried out.

It is extremely important that such an international system should be easily accessible to all States parties to the future treaty and that every State party should have the right not only to provide data from the seismological stations designated by

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it for purposes of the international exchange, but also to receive all the seismological data made available through international exchange. This is particularly important for countries possessing a poor seismological network or no seismograph facilities at all.

It was agreed in the Group that for purposes of national verification it would be entirely sufficient to have a Level 1 parameters system which would reduce to the minimum the number of seismic events remaining unidentified after the process of identification at national centres. Such a system of parameters has been worked out by the Group of seismological experts and is suitable for the determination of the co-ordinates of epicentres, the origin time of events and their depth and magnitude.

It is envisaged that whenever the use of Level 1 parameters is not sufficient to clear up doubts about the nature of events, Level 2 data will be drawn upon for more thorough analysis, at the request of any party to the treaty.

Thus we, like many other delegations, recognize the expediency of using Level 2 data. They are in fact useful, but in practice they will be needed only in a small number of cases and only in a volume sufficient to permit identification of the nature of a given event.

The scientific Group's mandate, as Dr. Ericsson observed, is unlimited. This is perhaps also its shortcoming, for with such a mandate any State can, without restriction, present the outcome of its national investigations for discussion. All the same, however, the seismological experts must complete their work at some stage and sum up its results on the basis of the principle agreed on for the designing of the system as a means of facilitating national verification.

The representative of India rightly observed that the scientific Group ought not to go to the extreme where the better becomes the enemy of the good. We fully share this view.

The suggestions made recently by certain experts concerning an increased role for Level 2 data (as regards the volume of such data transmitted and the degree of processing) represent their national assessments, which are their prerogative. We are not trying to impose our views on this matter on any one but at the same time we see no justified technical need for departing from the principle already agreed on for the designing of the system. There already exists in the world today a sound technological base consisting of means available to many States for the receipt and exchange of seismological information. Furthermore, the Group's recommendations in that respect offer a sound basis for the establishment of a realistic seismological exchange system.

Of course we are in favour of further technological progress, but that is an endless process and the adoption of recommendations by the Group of Experts at the present stage of its work ought not, therefore, to be delayed. As regards the further improvement of the system, that was to be one of the tasks of the committee of experts proposed by the participants in the tripartite negotiations in

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document CD/130. The parties to the future treaty were to exchange technical information in that committee and to co-operate in promoting the effectiveness of the international exchange as a whole.

Dr. Ericsson, replying to questions on the work of the Group of Experts, said that the tempo of its activities had somewhat slowed down. One cannot but agree with this statement. The work of the Group was at its most successful at the time when the negotiations on a treaty were in progress. The lack of political will on the part of certain countries in favour of the conclusion of a treaty and the continuation of the negotiations naturally has a direct effect on the success of endeavours with respect to other aspects of this problem, including the purely scientific aspects. The work of the scientific Group is not taking place in a vacuum. It is likely to suffer further in the future from the effects of the political decisions of certain Governments. It is precisely for this reason that it is necessary to adopt a critical approach also to the inclination of certain countries to engage in an endless improvement of the system, at the same time rejecting what was only recently approved and demands immediate completion in the form of the third regular report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and, more important, its putting into practice through the elaboration and conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

In conclusion, we wish to support the proposal of the distinguished representative of Japan that a letter should be sent to the World Meteorological Organization requesting that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be allowed to continue to use the WMO Global Telecommunications System on a regular basis for the transmission of seismic data for purposes of the detection and identification of seismic events.

And, last but not least, I should like, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to express our gratitude to you for the skilful and successful way in which you have been conducting the meetings of our Committee during the month of August, and to wish you all success in your future posts.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, Mr. Yu Mengjia.

Mr. YU MENGJIA (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, today, I wish to make some preliminary remarks on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The rapid development of space science and technology has greatly raised man's ability to conquer the universe and utilize its potentialities. At present, space science and technology are being gradually and effectively applied to man's production activities and various aspects of man's life, thus constituting an important element in the acceleration of nations' economic development, the improvement of people's living conditions and the promotion of social progress.

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But the development of outer space science and technology has also raised questions causing us concern and apprehensions. The tendency to start an arms race in outer space between the Superpowers has become obvious. Credence is given by the Superpowers to the concept that "whoever controls the universe can control the earth". They have engaged themselves in active research on and the utilization of outer space and the development of outer space weapons. The Soviet Union started its development of anti-satellite weapons more than 10 years ago, and up to now, it has already conducted dozens of experiments. The United States is reportedly also taking effective measures to intensify its research activities and plans the deployment of anti-satellite weapons in outer space. Various indications point to the fact that the development of outer space weapons constitutes an integral part of the global strategy of the USSR and the United States. These two countries are competing with each other to extend the arms race to outer space, thus increasing the danger of war. This has already caused widespread anxiety among peace-loving people throughout the world. At the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held recently in Vienna, numerous countries urged the Superpowers immediately to cease activities leading to an arms race in outer space and expressed the hope that the Committee on Disarmament would adopt effective measures to this end as soon as possible.

China has all along held that outer space is the common environment of mankind and that space technology represents a great achievement in the development of science and technology. All countries should explore and use outer space for peaceful purposes and refrain from turning it into a new arena of the arms race. We agree with the views of the majority of the member States that the Committee on Disarmament should establish a working group as soon as possible so as to adopt all practicable measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. As is known to all, at present there exists a huge gap between States in space science and technology, especially in regard to their military application, and only the United States and the Soviet Union have the necessary conditions for it. Therefore, in the prevention of an arms race in outer space, they have unshirkable special responsibilities.

With regard to the mandate of the proposed working group, we are of the view that it should be authorized to consider and negotiate on the issue of the complete prohibition of outer space weapons. The future legal instrument on the prohibition of an arms race in outer space should be comprehensive. It should ban all outer space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons, and it should not only prohibit the deployment of weapons in outer space but also the testing, production and use of any type of outer space weapons because the mere prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space would leave leeway for the testing and use of weapons in outer space and in consequence the complete prevention of an arms race in outer space would not be achieved. Some States have proposed that the question of the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons be discussed first. As a practical step, this proposal seems to deserve our exploration.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of China for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, I shall wait until our next meeting, when I will have assumed the chairmanship of the Committee, to express to you my delegation's appreciation for the way in which you have conducted our discussions during the month of August.

I regret that I was not present at the Committee's 182nd meeting, last Thursday, when the distinguished representative of the United States referred at some length to the statement I made on Tuesday, 24 August. I was absent because I was in duty bound to attend the thirty-second Pugwash Conference that was being held in Warsaw, commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of that institution of which I have the honour to be a member.

However, although I was unable to hear Ambassador Fields personally, I have since read the statement he made here with the greatest interest, and I shall now answer it with the brevity it merits.

I hope that our distinguished colleague will forgive me for not imitating him in offering gratuitous interpretations of the motives for our respective statements. On the other hand, I would like to say that I share, to the point of making it my own, the view he expressed in the following terms:

"Rhetoric designed to mask rather than to illuminate the real issues we face does not serve any helpful purpose."

I shall therefore confine myself to pointing out that the "real issue" which I have dealt with in some detail in the three statements I have made, apart from this one, during the month of August, was that of the need for compliance with international agreements, since, as was stated on 17 June, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, at the highest political level of the country which Ambassador Fields represents here, "agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept".

I discussed this basic problem in connection with two issues, that of a nuclear test ban -- the first item on our agenda -- which I referred to in the statements I made at the 175th meeting, on 3 August, and the 181st meeting, on 24 August, and that of the "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" -- the second item on our agenda -- to which I devoted my statement of 19 August, at the Committee's 180th meeting. I have nothing to add to what I said in those three statements. I have full confidence in the good judgement of the members of the Committee and the conclusions they may reach simply by comparing the content of those three statements with that of the statement to which I have been referring.

During my lengthy association with both deliberative and negotiating bodies concerned with disarmament, I have had fairly frequent occasion to disagree with the

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views of the nuclear Superpowers. From 1969 onwards, for example, my delegation carried on a nine-year struggle against the maintenance of what we called the "outmoded institution" of the co-chairmanship of the Superpowers. These efforts were rewarded with the introduction of the democratic system of chairmanship by rotation for the Committee on Disarmament in 1978. I also spent nearly 10 years stating publicly, both in New York and in Geneva, that the Soviet Union ought to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as it finally did in 1978 and 1979 respectively. I venture to hope that the differences of opinion which now unfortunately exist between the Mexican delegation and that of the other Superpower may, in the not too distant future, be resolved in the way which, as is clearly shown in the verbatim records of this Committee and of the First Committee of the General Assembly, is desired by all the peoples of the earth and by almost all the States Members of the United Nations and of the Committee, namely, the elaboration and entry into force of a nuclear test-ban treaty which will translate into reality the goal set forth, almost 20 years ago, in the preamble to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and reaffirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 -- both of which instruments are in force for the United States -- namely, "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".

Mrs. EKANGA KABEYA (Zaire) (translated from French): Allow me first of all, Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as acting Chargé d'affaires, to offer you my delegation's warm congratulations on your accession to the chairmanship of our Committee for the month of August.

We should also like to extend our congratulations and thanks to your eminent predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, for his dynamism and the tireless efforts he made to ensure the success of our work during his period of office.

I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome among us Ambassador Datcu of Romania and Ambassador Cannock of Peru, and to associate myself with all the expressions of regret and farewell which have been voiced upon the announcement of the departure of the distinguished representatives of India, Algeria, Peru and Yugoslavia, who have been called upon by their countries to fulfil important functions elsewhere. My delegation wishes them every success in the accomplishment of their new tasks.

Our session is taking place immediately after the convening of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the participants in which have told us over and over again, here in the Committee, that it did not achieve the results expected because of the lack of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers and because of international tensions exacerbated by the invasion of Lebanon, the foreign intervention in Afghanistan and the competition in deterrence between the nuclear-weapon Powers. Ought we, at a time when international relations are characterized by the breakdown of détente, hegemonic rivalries between the major Powers and the nuclear arms race, to be content with this failure?

My delegation is firmly convinced that our Committee, the only multilateral negotiating body, absolutely must overcome all the obstacles and move forward

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towards the attainment of the objective set for it by the United Nations General Assembly, namely, the initiation of negotiations with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the "ultimate objective" of all efforts made in the sphere of disarmament.

Before explaining my delegation's views on some of the items on our agenda, I should like to quote a few paragraphs from a text in document A/S-12/AC.1/L.5/Add.1 of the Ad Hoc Committee of the twelfth special session which was prepared by the Chairman of Working Group I in New York and which fully reflects our concerns in the disarmament sphere.

These paragraphs read as follows:

"The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States' ...

"Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies ... The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries.

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

It is clear from the foregoing that, faced by the danger of a possible nuclear confrontation all countries, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons, should combine their efforts to ensure peace and international security and more particularly to make possible the development of the poor countries through the release of the ever vaster resources which are being swallowed up in the arms race.



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With respect to items 1 and 2 of our agenda, dealing respectively with the subjects of a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, my delegation would like to reaffirm here the position of the Executive Council of Zaire (the Government) which has always consisted, first, in requesting the nuclear-weapon States to assume their responsibilities in the matter of nuclear disarmament and, secondly, in giving the support of Zaire to the proposals of the Group of 21 for the setting up of two working groups, the first to negotiate on a test ban treaty and the second to consider the measures to be adopted to put a stop to the nuclear arms race.

My delegation naturally, therefore, welcomes the Committee's decision to allow the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban to begin its work during this session. Although the Group's mandate is limited for the time being we believe that it will be possible for the Group to discuss other proposals at a later date. In this connection we agree with Ambassador Onkelinx of Belgium that we should adopt a political and legal approach to our work rather than plunging into pseudo-technicalities which would be of no use to us and would give rise to pointless discussions, for example, on the acceptable level of verification.

On behalf of my delegation I should like to congratulate Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden very warmly on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and to assure him here and now of the co-operation of my delegation within its modest limits. At the same time we regret the decision of two nuclear-weapon Powers not to participate in the work of that Ad Hoc Working Group. We would urge and beg them to help the Working Group carry out its task.

I cannot fail to state the profound concern of my delegation at the introduction of nuclear weapons into southern Africa. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Africa with the complicity of certain Powers constitutes a very serious danger for the security of African States.

My delegation therefore wishes, as other African delegations have already done, to reaffirm in its turn the desire repeatedly expressed by our heads of State that Africa should be made a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Committee on Disarmament ought therefore to give this matter very serious consideration and to take appropriate measures in order to avert the disastrous consequences which could result from the introduction and accumulation of nuclear weapons in Africa.

We are happy to note that a nuclear-weapon Power recently undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

My delegation also enthusiastically welcomes the proposal by India for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war.

My delegation has always attached very great importance to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The fact that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament ended in failure and was unable to meet the great expectations placed in it with respect to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament should in no way discourage us in our efforts to achieve this goal.

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My delegation hopes that in spite of that failure the Working Group, which will resume its activities only in 1983, under the distinguished guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, will make good use of the respite which has been granted it to conduct varied and constructive consultations with a view to devising a comprehensive programme of disarmament acceptable to all. The same applies to the working groups on security assurances and radiological weapons, whose work has been suspended until the end of this year.

My delegation is very much interested in the consideration of measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind and ought to be used by States solely for peaceful purposes. My delegation is ready to agree to any constructive proposal in this connection and fully supports the idea of the consideration of this subject during the present session in a working group set up for the purpose.

My delegation considers chemical weapons the most barbarous and murderous weapons of mass destruction and has always been in favour of their total elimination.

We reaffirm our support for General Assembly resolution 35/144B which urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of high priority, negotiations towards the adoption of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons.

We believe that a general and verifiable prohibition of the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons of all types would constitute an important step towards general and complete disarmament.

My delegation would like to express its appreciation to Ambassador Sujka of Poland, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, for the noteworthy progress the Group is continuing to make under his efficient guidance.

We are glad to see that the proposal made at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament that meetings of ad hoc working groups should be concentrated in time for the sake of greater efficiency has been applied in the matter of chemical weapons.

Lastly, the subject of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of universal concern. Like very many other members of the Committee, we believe that in order to create conditions conducive to the disarmament process, all States without exception should comply strictly with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, refrain from any actions which might be prejudicial to the efforts being made in the disarmament sphere, adopt a constructive attitude towards the negotiations and manifest the political will to reach agreements.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Zaire for her statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

(The Chairman)

As I announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, I intend now to put to the Committee for adoption the schedule of work contained in paragraph 10 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as contained in document CD/318, as well as the draft communication circulated in Working Paper No. 73.

I suggest that we take up first the report of the seismic Group. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the schedule of work contained in paragraph 10 of document CD/318.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I now turn to Working Paper No. 73, containing a draft communication to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization in connection with the utilization of the Global Telecommunications System. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee accepts the text as drafted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I have consulted with the incoming Chairman of the Committee and we agree to recommend to you to advance the time for the opening of the next plenary meeting to 10 o'clock sharp in view of the long list of speakers for that meeting.

If there is no objection, the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 2 September, at 10 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.



**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.184  
2 September 1982  
ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 2 September 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. Garcia Robles

(Mexico)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia: Mr. T. FINDLAY  
Miss S. BOYD

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUIEROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. TELLALOV  
Mr. SOTIROV  
Mr. DEYANOV  
Mr. PRAHOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U TIN KYAW HLAING  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. Yu MENGJIA  
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLÁ VILA  
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ  
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. d'ABOVILLE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. G. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. G. GAJDA

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. KARYONO  
Mr. DAMANIK  
Mr. HIDAYAT

Iran: Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. C.H. OLIVA  
Mr. L. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. T. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J.M. KIBOI  
Mr. G.N. MUTHU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. H. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI  
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR  
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU  
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. P. CANNOCK

Poland: Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS  
Mr. B. SUJKA

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. T. PANAIT  
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. U. ERICSSON  
Mrs. G. JÓNÁNG  
Miss H. OLSSON



Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIYAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. V.M. GANJA

Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN

Mr. A.T. LUGATCHOV

Mr. V.L. GAI

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M.D. BUSBY

Mr. H. WINSTON

Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. J.A. ZARRAG

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Mr. O. GNOK

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES

Austria:

Mr. H. BOHM

Mr. W. LANG

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 184th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee today begins consideration of item 3 of its agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements about any other question related to the work of the Committee.

Since this is the Committee's first meeting this month, I should like to say a few preliminary words in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee for September.

Barely four months ago the Committee on Disarmament drafted and transmitted to the General Assembly a special report for the purposes of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which included, in addition to a summary of the principal background elements, the usual information on the work of the Committee carried out during the first part of its 1982 session.

This will obviously be of great help to us in the task we now have to accomplish, since the new material we have to prepare will cover no more than about six weeks. This will allow us, I hope, to give adequate treatment to the important and complex questions we must cover in the report, including agenda items 1 (nuclear test ban), 2 (cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament), 4 (chemical weapons), 5 (new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons) and 7 (prevention of an arms race in outer space), as well as the subjects of ways and means of increasing the effectiveness of the Committee and a possible enlargement of its membership. We shall also have to mention, if only very concisely, what was agreed on with respect to the ad hoc working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, security assurances and radiological weapons.

To help it in its task, the Committee will have the results of the very valuable preparatory work done under the guidance of Ambassador Gatere Maina, its Chairman during the month of August which has just ended. I am sure I am correctly interpreting the feelings of all members of this negotiating body in expressing to Ambassador Maina our great appreciation and gratitude for the very efficient way in which he carried out his important task. I should like in addition to express my personal gratitude for his very kind words about me at the last meeting over which he presided, on Tuesday.

Lastly, it is a pleasure to state that the Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Berasategui, and all their efficient colleagues in the secretariat, both visible and invisible, have once again made the valuable contribution to our work to which we are accustomed.

Even though, for the reasons I have given, the work we have to do in the next two weeks may seem less onerous than has been the case in previous years, we must not forget that next week will contain an extra two days' holidays when we shall not be able to work, which means that, taking 16 September as the closing date for our 1982 session, we have only nine working days left, including today.

I trust that members of the Committee will be aware of the responsibility which this situation places on all of us and will be ready, as they have always done in the past, to give their valuable and determined co-operation towards the successful conclusion of our efforts.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mongolia, Hungary, Cuba, Japan, the United States of America and Austria.

Mr. de BEAUSSE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, since I am the first person to take the floor in the Committee in September, I have the honour of initiating the round of congratulations that will undoubtedly be expressed to welcome you as the new Chairman of this Committee. I need hardly tell you how happy Ambassador de la Gorce would have been, had he been present, to offer you himself a warm and friendly greeting. I should like, for my part, to assure you that my delegation is looking forward to working this month under the chairmanship of the representative of a friendly country, a distinguished Ambassador whom we all consider our doyen because of his experience, whom we also consider the living memory of the Committee on Disarmament, always ready to quote texts from every possible date in the Committee's history and even, sometimes, what I would call its prehistory, when disarmament matters were dealt with by other bodies. I would also like to ask my distinguished colleague, Mr. Nanjira, kindly to convey to Ambassador Maina my delegation's thanks for the way in which he performed his difficult task as Chairman during the first month of our summer session.

My statement today will be on the subject of the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

In an earlier statement, on 20 April last, the French delegation stressed how important it felt it to be that the Committee should proceed, in accordance with resolution 36/97 C, to a thorough examination of the problems involved in the prevention of the deployment in outer space of weapons which might, in the not too distant future, have profoundly destabilizing effects.

At that time, like other delegations, we emphasized that what was needed first was agreement, in relation to outer space, on the meaning of certain terms, such as the word "weapons", which are often used ambiguously, as well as an exchange of views to determine priorities for our discussions.

The very interesting statements we heard at the plenary meeting devoted to this item on our agenda revealed not only, as might have been expected, that positions on this subject differ greatly, but also that this is an important problem which should be considered more thoroughly at the Committee's next session. France, as it indicated on 20 April last, is in favour of the establishment of a working group provided it has a structured agenda which will enable it to consider the various aspects of the problem methodically. France would also be in favour of a meeting of experts at the beginning of our next session, in the same way as was done so successfully in the case of chemical weapons.

Of the important aspects of the matter that were brought up during the discussion, I would like to draw particular attention to the following four points:

Recognition of our Committee's special responsibility in the attempt to achieve a multilateral consensus on the problems of the extension of the arms race to outer space;

The inadequacy of existing legal instruments, in view of current and foreseeable developments in technology;

The uncertainty surrounding the idea of the immunity of space objects; and

The constraints resulting from the long-standing and now irreversible use of outer space for both civilian and military purposes.

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

Recognition of the role of the Committee on Disarmament

In addition to the two competing resolutions, 36/99 and 36/97 C -- France was one of the sponsors of the latter -- which were adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, we now have, as several speakers have noted, the consensus reached at the United Nations Conference, UNISPACE '82. It is to be hoped that this will have put an end to a potentially harmful situation which would have led to a regrettable duplication of the work of the Committee on Disarmament and that of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

We hope that we can interpret the settlement of this conflict of competence as recognition of the complexity of the space element and its growing importance in the consideration of matters relating to the balance of forces and international security. This recognition should lead to acceptance of its corollary, namely, the fact that questions concerning the arms race in outer space now no longer concern the two major space Powers only, even if those Powers clearly have a particular and direct responsibility in this regard because of their existing or potential military capabilities.

It is true that the importance attaching to the work of our Committee is also connected with the inadequacy of the existing legal instruments in view of the foreseeable developments in technology.

Contrary to a widely held opinion, technological developments in the next 10 or 20 years are fairly easy to foresee: space programmes respond as much to the internal logic determined by the extent of the technical and financial investments put into them as to political promptings.

For more than a quarter of a century, outer space has been seen essentially in terms of support for military means of observation and communication. The parallel with the early days of aviation is, moreover, quite remarkable in this respect.

Even if new laser-weapon or directed-energy systems are at present still far from being technologically feasible or economically viable, it seems likely that the idea of the orbital platform, either manned or automatic, capable of use for both civilian and military purposes, will become a reality. Both the orbital rendezvous techniques practised by the Soviet Union for some years and the capacities of the United States space shuttle point in this direction.

In other words, the essential problem up to now has been (and it still is) that of the immunity of the space segment of land-based weapons systems from possible pre-emptive enemy attacks. Although it is true that the space segment is specifically designed for a particular purpose (for example, data transmission, analysis of the environment in which land-based troop movements are taking place, the detection of positions), it is functionally indissociable from a land-based network of communications and control systems. Furthermore, it has no purpose except as part of a complex military organization.

The moment outer space can itself become the scene of specific military activities, whether these are directed against other space objects (such as enemy satellites) or against land-based activities (the trajectories of ballistic weapons, for example), the problem of the arms race in outer space takes on an entirely new dimension.

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

In view of these possibilities, therefore, one of the most important aspects of our discussions ought to be to consider which of the three roles that it is possible to assign to outer space is to be chosen:

(1) That of a demilitarized "sanctuary", after the manner of Antarctica, the sea-bed and the moon;

(2) That of a "support area" for civilian and military land-based activities, to be used in accordance with its specific characteristics and advantages;

(3) That of a specific new "battlefield" in which space-based systems would attempt to destroy or cripple one another, in all likelihood as a prelude to -- the most optimistic among us say as a substitute for -- confrontation on earth.

The first idea -- that of making outer space a sanctuary or totally demilitarizing it -- is obviously no longer possible. It is therefore unrealistic to try to revert to it.

The second idea -- outer space as a support area for a mixture of civilian and military activities -- is the one which prevails today and ought, therefore, in our view, to be considered as a basic element in our work.

The third idea -- outer space as a staging ground for specific confrontations -- is one technological possibility. It remains to be seen whether it is desirable.

It may be argued that, all in all, it is preferable to transfer to outer space a rivalry that may cause untold damage to the surface of the earth; that it would be possible, there, to reduce dependence vis-à-vis nuclear ballistic missiles; and that competition between defensive weapons systems (ABMs based on orbital platforms) in outer space would, all in all, be preferable to the present situation in which the balance between offensive weapons must constantly be re-established as one side or the other becomes more or less vulnerable.

Although theoretically attractive, these arguments take no account of the facts. First, even if such space technologies become operational, it is unlikely that they would be reliable enough to justify less dependence on land-based systems: ABMs stationed in outer space would in all likelihood constitute only a first line of defence.

Secondly, it is doubtful whether, in such a situation of competition for the military domination of outer space, one of the Superpowers would tolerate the superiority of the other for any length of time. In that context, therefore, the very vulnerability of systems stationed in outer space would be a great inducement to the launching of preventive attacks.

It is thus not enough to say that weapons systems in outer space would not threaten the earth and that in any event the prospects for such systems are too distant and problematical to justify their consideration at the present time. The international community should adopt a consistent approach to the question of the arms race in outer space.

In the French delegation's view, this means that the international community should set itself the following two objectives:

Not to allow outer space to become the point of departure for acts of aggression; and

To protect space vehicles and, in particular, ensure the immunity of satellites.

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

The first objective, which, as we have seen, relates to technologies of the future, can be achieved only if the second, which involves tons of equipment now in orbit over our heads, is attained.

Hence the importance which we, like many other delegations, attach to assuring the immunity of satellites.

In this connection, it must be noted that the existing legal instruments are entirely inadequate and fail to meet the needs of the present situation.

A number of these legal instruments have been referred to during our discussions, for example:

The 1963 Treaty on the partial suspension of nuclear weapon tests, in the atmosphere and, as it states, "beyond its limits, including outer space";

The 1972 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, article V, paragraph 1, of which refers to the deployment of space-based ABMs and article XII, paragraph 2, of which refers to the principle of non-interference with national means of verification;

The SALT I agreement, which also provides for non-interference with "national means of verification", including satellites, according to the formal declaration made by President Carter on 1 October 1978 -- a declaration for which there is no Soviet counterpart;

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Use of Outer Space.

Other agreements and international conventions relating to outer space, such as the Agreement on the Return and Rescue of Astronauts, the Convention on Damage Caused by Space Objects, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and the Convention on Registration of Space Objects are, for our purposes, only of minor interest.

It may be noted that:

First, the 1967 outer space Treaty offers only a partial solution to the problems of the arms race in outer space. Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty in fact restricts, as military activities in outer space, only the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

The Treaty thus authorizes other military uses of outer space. This is clear, moreover, both from the statements made at the time by the Soviet representative and from the positions adopted by the United States.

We can go even further: from our point of view, the Treaty is of symbolic value only because the use of nuclear weapons in orbit is of doubtful military effectiveness, for the reason given on Tuesday by Mr. Arthur Clarke, speaking on behalf of the delegation of Sri Lanka, when he said that, in trying by that means to cripple or destroy its enemy's satellites, a country might well destroy its own.

Secondly, uncertainty about the immunity of satellites extends, according to some interpretations, even to those satellites whose positive role in the verification of international agreements is nevertheless provided for as "national means of verification".

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

Articles I and III of the 1967 outer space Treaty do, of course, state that outer space shall be used in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Article III also refers to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The question of the immunity of military observation satellites, including their use in application of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, is therefore closely bound up with recognition of the international lawfulness of the role they play.

The above-mentioned declaration by President Carter in 1978 establishes a link between military observation satellites and national means of verification, whose lawful use is recognized in the international instruments in force.

With regard to the Soviet Union, the situation is formally less clear, and it is essential for us to know the position of the Soviet delegation on the following three points:

Does the international protection of "national technical means of verification" specifically include satellites? It would seem obvious that it should, but it would be useful if it were clearly recognized.

Is such immunity subject to restrictive interpretations concerning the extent of acceptable verifications, or is any observation capability automatically considered lawful? and lastly,

Does the non-interference clause embodied in Soviet-American bilateral agreements apply to third countries and international organizations?

An answer to these questions might not be necessary if the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union on 11 August 1981 did not appear precisely to leave the door open for all possibilities. As the French and Italian delegations noted in earlier statements, the juxtaposition of article 1 of the draft text, which prohibits the stationing of weapons in outer space, although the term "weapons" is not -- and in our view cannot -- be defined, and article 3 thereof, which, on the other hand, legitimizes the destruction of satellites that might appear to any of the signatories to be designed for a purpose contrary to article 1, is extremely disturbing.

Article 3 not only in effect authorizes States to take the law into their own hands in outer space on the basis of their suspicions, thus creating mistrust and insecurity for all, but also legitimizes the deployment of such anti-satellite systems. In order to be used against possible violators, such systems would, of course, have to be tested, deployed and ready for use.

The wording of article 2 also gives rise to all kinds of questions: when, in the unilateral and subjective judgement of one of the parties, a satellite or space platform is considered as not being used "in strict accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding", is it to be concluded that it is legitimate to interfere with its functioning?

This question is a valid one in view of another proposal submitted by the Soviet Union on 10 August 1972 in connection with television satellites. The proposal provided that a State was entitled to use "the means available to it, not only in its territory, but also in outer space or situated outside its national jurisdiction" against programmes which it considered "unlawful".

Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Soviet draft treaty which, as indicated above, presuppose the possession of anti-satellite systems for use by what might be called

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

self-appointed space sheriffs, thus limit the self-defence capability of space objects since "target" satellites are prohibited from disturbing the functioning or changing the flight trajectory of "hunter" satellites.

The difficulties we at once encounter as soon as we try to make an artificial distinction between satellites for military purposes and satellites for civilian purposes or to use terms as ambiguous as that of "weapons", should persuade us to contemplate a variety of measures rather than a global treaty. Such measures might include:

The use of language corresponding to the facts. Everyone knows that national means of verification include satellites. Why not say so?

The immunity of satellites. As a result of bilateral agreements, satellites benefit from some measure of protection. Why should such immunity not be specified, increased and extended beyond bilateral arrangements relating to non-interference with "national means of verification" to all existing satellites, if they are equipped only with passive means of defence?

The consideration of weapons systems as a whole and not of their space segments only. Why not recognize the fact that, as regards a weapons system of which only part is in orbit, it is the system as a whole that must be restricted, as in fact was done in the bilateral ABM Treaty. It should be recognized that the central problem is still that of the arms race, and its increasing use of outer space, and not that of the "militarization of outer space".

The adoption of measures designed to build confidence in the immunity of systems whose stabilizing value arises principally from their availability in times of crisis, for example, notification of the characteristics of space objects and the adoption of "co-operative" measures in order to remove any suspicions that might be aroused by certain actions on the part of a space object belonging to another State.

Recognition of the merit of a human presence in outer space because of the capacity for initiative and judgement that is thus introduced into the conduct of space missions. In this connection, the a priori suspicion implicit in the specific reference, in article 1, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft treaty, to reusable manned space vehicles, i.e. to the United States space shuttle, is unacceptable.

The giving of higher priority to the consideration of ways of promoting international co-operation with a view to using earth observation systems for the verification of arms limitation agreements and for crisis control. Mr. Arthur Clarke rightly recalled, at our last meeting, the proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, originally made by France, which has been supported by a large part of the international community and forms the subject of a very useful report by the Secretary-General.

This is not the place to repeat the reasons why we think that the development of technology inevitably raises the question of the internationalization of space observation and, consequently, that of the benefits which the international community may derive from it, especially in the matter of disarmament. It is, however, clear that the gradual establishment of such co-operation would, in many ways, be the best response the international community could offer to the real concern of peoples at the prospect of the extension of the arms race to outer space.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, Ambassador Issraelyan, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.



Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):  
Mr. Chairman, first of all allow me, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to welcome you to that office, eminent Mexican diplomat and statesman as you are, and known throughout the world as a champion of the cessation of the arms race and one who has done much for the attainment of that goal. I wish you success in your tasks and promise you the co-operation of the Soviet delegation. We should also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Maina of Kenya who successfully guided the work of the Committee during August.

The Soviet delegation would like today to express its views on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and also to touch on questions relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union attaches exceptionally great importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space in view of the general interest in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. As Mr. Brezhnev, the head of the Soviet State, said in his message to the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:

"Co-operation in outer space should unite people and develop an awareness of the fact that we all live on the same planet and that peace and prosperity on earth depend on all of us.

"The Soviet Union consistently declares that outer space should remain an arena of peaceful co-operation, that the infinite expanses of outer space should remain free from weapons of any type. The attainment of this great humanitarian objective by joint efforts is not only feasible but is also a vital need for the sake of the future of all mankind."

At the request of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Brezhnev's message has been distributed as a document of the Committee on Disarmament.

As you know, during the 1960s and 1970s, through the efforts of our country and of other States, international treaties and agreements were drafted and concluded which closed off a number of possibilities for the appearance of weapons in outer space and these have already been recalled by delegations in their statements. However, the restrictions thus existing are not complete, for an effective international legal barrier has not yet been created for the prevention of the stationing in outer space of those types of weapons which do not fall within the definition of weapons of mass destruction. There thus remains a danger -- a danger which has recently increased -- of the militarization of outer space.

The Soviet Union believes that we should not allow this to happen. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the other States of the world are evincing an equally serious concern on this score. This is shown in particular by the decision adopted at the recently concluded United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which urged the competent bodies of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament to give due attention and attach the highest importance to the serious concern of the international community at the extension of the arms race to outer space.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I would recall that at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Soviet Union introduced a proposal aimed at preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space. The proposal concerned the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

The submission of the text of a draft treaty occasioned a broad discussion both in the United Nations General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament. The adoption by the General Assembly of two resolutions aimed ultimately at the prevention of an arms race in outer space also contributed to this end.

The main question which has arisen in the course of discussion -- and this has again been shown today by the statement of the French delegation -- is that of the determination of the basic content of possible negotiations within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of item 7 of its agenda. Both at the Committee's spring session and during the current session, including the Committee's last meeting, on 31 August, many delegations again affirmed that the only urgent aspect of this matter is the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

Allow me, gentlemen, to consider this point in greater detail.

There is no doubt that the question of anti-satellite systems is part of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. This is obvious and no one denies it. However, to confine the prohibition to anti-satellite systems means not only not looking ahead to tomorrow but also not seeing those dangerous trends which are before our eyes even today. What constitutes a threat to international peace and security is not only -- indeed, not so much weapons for attacking space objects as weapons for carrying out attacks on earth from space. Since the latter are capable of keeping the entire planet under their aim, they are infinitely more dangerous. I should like to draw attention to the fact that in his statement today the representative of France said that we should not allow space to become the departure point for acts of aggression. We agree with that. Consequently, to begin solving the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space with the prohibition of anti-satellite systems would be equivalent to trying to achieve similar aims, let us say in the sphere of military aircraft, by prohibiting anti-aircraft defence facilities.

There is also the fact that one and the same means of conducting activities in space can be used for carrying either useful or dangerous payloads. For example, a satellite may in one instance be collecting meteorological data and in another it may be equipped with homing missiles, representing a threat both to space and to earth. Other delegations in their speeches have referred to the versatility of satellites, including speakers at the Committee's last meeting, on 31 August. The make-up of the means used for conducting space activities is a matter of general knowledge. It includes land-based equipment, launching devices, controls, and so on.

Thus if we are thinking of prohibiting anti-satellite systems, then we at once have to answer the question: what are we going to prohibit? If that is to include everything that helps put into space devices for the destruction or damaging of space objects, then practically all space activity might find itself threatened

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with prohibition. This makes no sense, and in any case is hardly practicable. We therefore consider that the subject of the negotiations should be what really constitutes a threat when it is placed in space, namely, any kind of weapon.

In practice this could include space-object interceptors, based on the most diverse principles, for attacks on individual artificial earth satellites or for eliminating the space systems of an opponent, anti-missile weapons for attacks on intercontinental ballistic missiles and weapons for the destruction of air, sea or land targets from outer spaces.

What I have said applies also to reusable space vehicles. They can, of course, be used for peaceful purposes, but at the same time they can be used to carry a variety of weapons. It is for this reason that they are mentioned in paragraph 1 of article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty.

As regards laser weapons, some delegations have doubted the possibility of their appearance in space at least in the foreseeable future, regarding the whole of this problem as being rather in the realm of fantasy. But such views are in flagrant contradiction with the facts. From the statement, for example, of Mr. J. Millburn, the United States Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for research and development of advanced technology, it appears in particular that given the provision of the requisite financial means, the construction in the United States of military facilities for space laser weapons is possible even during the present decade. What fantasy is there in that, gentlemen?

We entirely agree with the argument put forward by the representative of Sri Lanka in his statement on 31 August, and indeed by many other speakers, that it is easier to prevent the appearance of new types of weapons than to eliminate those that already exist.

We therefore consider that the best way of dealing with this problem is to prohibit the placing and stationing in space of dangerous loads consisting of either specially designed or adapted devices and means for acting on objects in order to destroy or damage them, wherever these target objects may be, in outer space, in the air space or on earth.

We have been asked, both at the spring session and at this session, how we would define the expression "weapons of any kind". Obviously, the search for a generally acceptable formulation should proceed roughly along the lines indicated above.

As regards the scope of the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, our draft treaty prohibits this for any purpose, including testing, development and use. These questions were, as you know, raised at the Committee's spring session by a number of delegations, including those of Italy, the Netherlands and India.

The Soviet delegation would like once more to draw attention to the fact that the Soviet draft, as it is easy to see, does not ignore the problem of anti-satellite systems. Both the Soviet draft treaty and the draft mandate for a working group submitted by the Mongolian delegation at the spring part of our session allow for the possibility of the consideration of the question of anti-satellite systems in the

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context of other measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and also take into account other comments made during this session, in particular by the delegations of India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.,

The Soviet delegation acknowledges the technical complexity of space problems, to which the representative of the United States referred in his statement at our plenary meeting of 10 August. In our view, however, this fact does not argue in favour of putting off the discussion of the question for ever but rather in favour of supporting the Mongolian delegation's proposal for the setting up of a working group on this subject before the end of the Committee's present session.

It must be said that statements made at the Committee's plenary meeting on 31 August, as also today's statement by the representative of France, show that material for negotiations exists.

We appeal to the United States delegation to reconsider its approach and we firmly urge the establishment of an ad hoc working group which would permit the Committee to begin serious negotiations on this exceptionally important problem with the participation of experts.

In conclusion, we should like to stress that one of the most important tasks of the Committee is to do everything in its power to help prevent the possibility of space becoming a source of military danger for States, which will inevitably happen if weapons of any kind are installed in outer space. We, for our part, are ready to engage in honest, equal and business-like negotiations with the aim of achieving constructive agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In connection with the questions put by many delegations, and in particular those contained in document CD/303, concerning certain elements in the Soviet basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the delegation of the USSR would like to offer certain comments on a number of these questions which appear to us to present a broad interest.

As regards other questions that have been put, we intend to answer them in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

First of all, I should like to make a comment of a general nature. As you know, the Soviet Union submitted for consideration by the international community a draft text on basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons -- which means what it says, basic provisions and not a precise text of the entire convention. This, of course, was done deliberately. For it seems to us that in order to draft such an important and complex international convention we must first of all agree on its basic provisions, the "skeleton" of the convention, as it were, to which we can then add with less expenditure of effort the "muscles" of appendices, lists, quotas, protocols, etc.

Let us now look at the questions.

We were asked why we had included a special provision on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States.

Well, of course, it was not by chance that we included in the draft basic provisions a provision on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States and on the removal of such weapons from those territories and their

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subsequent destruction. There were very good reasons for this. The inclusion of this provision is based on reality, namely, the practice of certain States, which have stationed stocks of chemical weapons outside the boundaries of their national territory. For example, according to numerous press reports, there has been a good deal of political tension recently about the location of stores of American chemical weapons on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. This fact is clear evidence of the merit of including in the draft convention a provision on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States.

An obligation in this sense ought, in our view, to enter into force simultaneously with ratification of the convention and continue for the entire period of its validity. Naturally, the withdrawal of chemical weapons from the territories of other States will demand a certain amount of time, depending on the quantity of the stocks so stationed. We would propose reaching agreement on such periods of time. How is the fulfilment of this obligation to be verified? Such verification can be carried out through national technical means, and also upon request.

There is another and not unimportant aspect: our proposal aims at preventing the deployment of binary weapons in parts, for example, by the members of military blocs as part of a "division of labour", so to speak, between them. For example, stocks of one component of a binary weapon could be stationed on the territory of one State and stocks of the second component on that of another. Such a possibility must, of course, be reckoned with, and that is what we are trying to do.

Another of the questions put to us concerns substances produced for permitted purposes which, it is proposed, should be included in a list of chemicals presenting a particular danger from the point of view of their possible diversion to use for purposes of chemical weapons. Preparing and agreeing on such a list will, frankly, be very difficult, in particular because this question directly affects both the chemical industry and the use of chemicals for military purposes not connected with chemical weapons. An illustrative list of certain substances -- as has been suggested -- will not solve this problem. I should like to take this opportunity to appeal to Delegations to take an active part, at the appropriate stage, in efforts to find a concrete answer to this undoubtedly important question, with the help of their technical experts.

Considerable interest was expressed in the section of the draft basic provisions devoted to verification.

On the question of verification of the destruction of stocks, in particular, we assume that in addition to national verification, declarations, etc., a number of international procedures will be applied also. One of these might be when an additional exchange of information is necessary between interested States concerning the factual state of affairs. Another procedure might be the conduct of on-site inspections upon request if an exchange of information has not provided a satisfactory solution. Another, and independent -- and I would repeat, independent -- measure envisaged is that of systematic international verification of the destruction of stocks at converted or specialized facilities, for example, on the basis of an agreed quota.

Questions were put to us about certain particular aspects of this form of inspection. But it would surely be better for the participants in the negotiations to reach an agreement in principle that during the period of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons or their diversion to permitted purposes there should be provision for the possibility of the conduct of systematic international on-site inspections

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of the destruction of stocks at converted or specialized facilities. If such a provision for inclusion in the convention were agreed on in principle, which unfortunately is not the case at present, that would constitute a great step forward and we could then consider methods of implementing that agreement -- and I repeat, agreement. Such an agreement does not yet exist.

The same applies to verification that the permitted production of supertoxic lethal chemicals at specialized facilities **does** not exceed the upper limit of one tonne. We propose that such a facility should operate under national verification with very strict registration of amounts of initial products consumed and chemicals produced, that its location should be declared and that provision should be made for the carrying out of international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota, to verify the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at such a facility. But it may be asked, have we reached agreement in principle on this question too? I think not although there would not seem to be any obvious insuperable obstacles to our doing that.

We are also in agreement with those delegations which, judging by their questions are concerned about how verification can be conducted with respect to the possible production of the precursors of supertoxic substances and in truth, of binary weapons, at commercial enterprises. As for arguments that binary weapons and their production can be dealt with in the same way as other types of chemical weapons we do not find them very convincing. Such arguments do not eliminate the problem of verifying that precursors for binary weapons are not being produced, in particular at commercial enterprises.

I should also like to stress one other point. Whatever types of activity we may consider and whatever obligations under the Convention may be involved, in practice, according to the Soviet draft basic provisions international verification in the form of on-site inspection upon request would in general be applicable. We were asked about the procedure for carrying out this form of verification. In this connection I should like to point out that such a procedure has been worked out in detail in the course of negotiations on other international agreements and treaties and the experience gained in the course of those negotiations, in particular the Soviet-Anglo-American negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, could obviously be applied also to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I should like to take the opportunity to make a few brief comments on the course of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the Committee. There is no doubt that the Ad Hoc Working Group under the experienced guidance of Ambassador Sujka has done a great deal of useful work: mutual understanding has widened on many important aspects of the convention; differences of views have in many instances been reduced or minimized, and possible agreed formulations are even beginning to emerge. At the same time, however, in the Soviet Delegation's view, there have appeared certain undesirable tendencies diverting us from the speediest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. These tendencies are evident in the fact that, instead of consolidating the basic provisions of the future convention, on which consensus is in sight, some delegations have been trying to divert the discussion to secondary and at times purely technical matters. And the number of these matters is constantly growing.

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Some seem to regard the Committee as a place providing courses for the improvement of skills, and force the Committee to investigate technological methods which they have not tried out themselves, not to speak of the fact that other delegations have serious doubts about these methods.

Of course no one denies the possibility of using technical progress and the achievements of science for ensuring the effective fulfilment of international agreements, but we must not put the cart before the horse and substitute academic discussions of various kinds for political readiness. If we follow this course, with our frankly rather slow tempo of negotiations, we shall never catch up with technical progress. The existing technical procedures will be replaced by new ones; those new ones will be replaced by even newer ones, and so on. We are opposed to the conversion of the Committee into a scientific and technical society. We believe that agreement on key aspects of a chemical weapons convention such as the scope of the prohibition, declarations, confidence-building measures, verification and other aspects of the future convention should be consolidated and not made artificially dependent on the solution of particular issues.

Not long ago, during one of her visits abroad, the Prime Minister of India recalled an old Indian tradition, namely, to find something about which agreement can be reached, even if it is only something very small; that is a starting point, and you must then try to enlarge the area of agreement. That is an old and wise Indian tradition.

Those are the comments the Soviet delegation wished to make about the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is Ambassador Erdembileg, the representative of Mongolia, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, before beginning my statement I should like, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, warmly to welcome you to the office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of September. We know you well as one of the outstanding diplomats of Mexico and a great specialist with a wealth of experience and knowledge in the sphere of multilateral negotiations on disarmament. This gives us every confidence that the Committee will successfully complete the work of its 1982 session. Allow me sincerely to wish you every success in your responsible task and to assure you that the Mongolian delegation will co-operate closely with you in dealing with the matters that are on the Committee's agenda for this session.

The Mongolian delegation would also like to express its gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, for his contribution to the work of the Committee during the month of August.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

tjh The Mongolian delegation would like to speak today about item 7 of the agenda, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

A number of statements have been made on this question since the Committee first added this new item to its agenda at its spring session this year. My delegation has been following the course of the discussion with the greatest interest. It has also expressed its views on the subject both here in the Committee and in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. We believe that the Committee has on the whole reacted positively to the two resolutions on the subject adopted by the General Assembly at its last session.

At the last session, the delegation of Mongolia introduced resolution 36/99 in the First Committee on behalf of its sponsors.

Both during the spring part and during the present part of this session the Mongolian delegation, like many other delegations, has repeatedly advocated the orderly and structured consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this subject to begin concrete negotiations for the adoption of effective measures towards the elaboration of an international treaty in this connection.

As I have already reminded the Committee more than once, the Mongolian delegation formally submitted the working paper in document CD/272 which proposes a draft mandate for an ad hoc working group on this question.

As you know, an exchange of views on this question was held in formal meetings. The Committee has been discussing item 7 of its agenda this week at its plenary meetings. During the discussions both at informal and at plenary meetings it has unfortunately become clear that certain delegations intend to maintain the absence of consensus on the question of the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this matter. I will say frankly that we do not quite understand this obstructionism.

We believe that the time has come for concrete negotiations on this important and urgent question in an ad hoc working group. We know perfectly well that a very small number of States are playing the principal part in the exploration and use of outer space. Nevertheless, in view of the extremely dangerous consequences of an arms race in outer space for the peace and security of all, the Committee is obliged to take a vital interest in the consideration of this question and the urgent drafting of an international legal instrument on the subject. The overwhelming majority of the world's States demand this.

This was confirmed in particular at the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which recently ended in Vienna. The Conference urged the competent bodies of the United Nations and in particular the General Assembly and also the Committee on Disarmament, in considering measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, to give appropriate attention and high priority to the serious concern of the international community at the extension of the arms race to outer space.



(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We are all fairly familiar with the fact that outer space is not always and everywhere a peaceful sphere and frequently shows signs of becoming a new arena for the arms race. This is illustrated by the alarming reports in the world's press which have become more frequent of late. I am referring in particular to the numerous projects for the production of a whole range of space weapons designed for the launching of attacks on objects in space, in the atmosphere and on the earth's surface.

There are particularly far-reaching plans in connection with the possible military uses of the reusable space vehicles being constructed in the United States under the "shuttle" programme. According to press reports the Pentagon specialists are considering plans for the establishment of military bases in space with the help of these vehicles, the location in space of mines for attacks on the artificial earth satellites of an opponent and the creation of large-scale systems of space-based anti-missile defence. The possibilities are being examined of the use of space shuttles as vehicles for various types of weapons. Other very important plans for the militarization of outer space are connected with their use. Major-General J. Welch, deputy head of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff for research and development said recently: "Our activities continue to expand at a substantial rate and the shuttle with its potential for the delivery of heavier and more sophisticated payloads plays the part of catalyst in this."

The distinguishing feature of the new plans is the fact that the space shuttle is to play the role of the basic element in them without which the systems to be established cannot function. These systems include, for example, large platforms with laser weapons and also small-sized air and space vehicles for the carrying out of short-term operations in outer space and in the atmosphere.

One of the largest programmes to which the Pentagon is at present attaching primary importance is the programme for the development of laser weapons. Their purpose is to be the destruction of any objects, on earth, at sea, in the air and in outer space. Work on the construction of the basic element of this weapon is being carried out within the framework of the so-called triad of space-based laser weapons which, in the view of the periodical Foreign Policy, may soon bring a combat system for space into being. It is planned to test the elements of the triad in space in 1984-1985.

The American press has also published reports about the construction in the United States of anti-satellite systems based on small-sized interceptors. It is to reach its target with the help of a small missile launched from an F-15 fighter aircraft. According to the plans, flight tests of the mini-interceptor in space will begin during the first half of 1983 and it will be supplied to the armed forces in the mid-1980s.

But the United States is not merely developing space weapons; it is also creating the necessary conditions for their use. It is known that from 1 September of this year the area of space surrounding the earth will for the Pentagon become a new potential theatre of military operations. From then on,

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

a special space command will begin functioning in the United States armed forces. According to reports in the western press, the head of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff said with respect to the establishment of this command: "Research and development in the sphere of space weapons will soon make it possible for us to carry out military operations in space."

The implementation of such plans and programmes could undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences. It is therefore urgent and important to prevent an arms race in outer space in time.

Mongolia, like many other States, fully supported the Soviet Union's proposal for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

The Mongolian delegation is one of those delegations which are in favour of a comprehensive solution, that is, as proposed in article 1, paragraph 1, of the draft treaty submitted by the USSR, which states that States parties undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type or of other types which States parties may develop in the future. In addition, we are not opposed to the treaty containing a provision concerning the prohibition of the use of anti-satellite systems.

The discussion in the Committee of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has also revealed a different approach, a pragmatic and gradual one, as its advocates have put it. According to this approach, the prohibition would be confined to anti-satellite systems, the wide variety of weapons and systems not coming within the category of anti-satellite systems thus being left outside the prohibition. Furthermore, it seems that the very expression, anti-satellite systems, is being used in a very ambiguous way, probably because the advocates of this approach have not put forward a clear definition of what they mean by anti-satellite systems.

The Mongolian delegation firmly believes that the main aim should be the solution of the problem as a whole, that is, the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, and that the question of anti-satellite systems should be dealt with in the general context of measures aimed at the achievement of this goal.

In conclusion, the Mongolian delegation would like to suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to the members of the Committee, that after item 7 has been considered at plenary meetings, consultations should continue with a view to agreeing on a mandate before the end of this session and adopting a decision on the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Hungary, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): I can say without any exaggeration, Mr. Chairman, that I feel happy to be among the first to greet you on the day when you assume the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. I wish you could feel and openly say in the near future: "Well, this is the kind of negotiating forum I have been battling for". In the meantime, we count on your vast experience and diplomatic skill which, I am convinced, will help us get the maximum out of the present situation.

May I also express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, for the contribution which he made to our work as Chairman for the month of July. At the same time, I wish to bid farewell to those colleagues who have left the Committee in the short two weeks since I took the floor last time -- Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia and Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria. On behalf of my delegation, I wish them well in their new assignments.

Finally, it is a pleasure to welcome in our midst the new representative of Peru, Ambassador Cannock, and to offer him the friendship and co-operation of the Hungarian delegation.

Today I wish to set out my delegation's views on a few questions relating to agenda item 7 -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

This year the world is celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the launching of the first man-made object into outer space, the pioneer flight of the first Soviet Sputnik. That event 25 years ago opened for man the gate of the space age, the exploration and use of outer space.

The peaceful use of that new, endless area has already brought enormous benefits for mankind. Nobody can, and I believe nobody really wants to, deny or underrate the significance of the peaceful use of outer space in numerous fields such as meteorology, navigation, telecommunication, the remote sensing of natural resources, etc. Taking into account the rapid progress of science and technology, a rich flow of further results -- many of them perhaps not even thought of now -- may be expected in the near future, which can serve for the benefit of mankind as a whole. That actually was the general desire expressed vividly by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held only recently in Vienna.

It is very unfortunate that the dawn of the space age was very soon clouded by the sombre possibilities of using outer space also for hostile purposes. When that threat was realized, initiatives were quickly taken in order to avoid such a development. The first important step in that direction was the adoption of the outer space Treaty, signed in 1967, which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space, codifying at the same time the fundamental principles concerning man's activities in the cosmic environment. The peaceful activity of States and their co-operation to that end, were further regulated by the conclusion of a set of international instruments. My delegation is proud to note in this respect that Hungarian representatives in the various bodies of the United Nations outer space Committee have contributed to no small extent to the drafting of those instruments.

The growing danger of the outbreak of an arms race in outer space, and the urgent necessity to avoid it, is clearly reflected in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. In paragraph 80 it says the following:

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies."

A step of outstanding significance was taken last year at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Soviet Union -- taking into account various events showing that outer space may be getting involved more and more in hostile activities, thus becoming an arena for the arms race, and guided by the sincere desire to put an end to such a course of development -- submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The Hungarian delegation welcomed that new initiative, and we continue to consider it a very important and timely action in the proper direction. In our view, the draft treaty is a good basis for the elaboration of the international instrument which our Committee is required to do.

At its last session the General Assembly adopted two resolutions to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space. Resolution 36/99 -- referring to the draft treaty which I have just mentioned -- requests the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations in order to achieve agreement on the text of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

The other one, resolution 36/97 C, also requests the Committee to conduct negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, making special reference to the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

That development, and more concretely the two resolutions, have charged our Committee with a new responsibility and additional tasks. The Committee in turn has decided to include in its agenda for 1982, a new item, item 7, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". During the first part of the session informal meetings were held, and now the item is on our programme of work for the second part of the 1982 session.

The Hungarian delegation is firmly convinced that the Committee on Disarmament took a great step forward when it embarked on the consideration of this item. This development will have to lead soon to serious negotiations and the earliest possible elaboration of the text of a treaty banning the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. If the Committee wants to achieve that purpose -- and the trend of the discussion has so far indicated the existence of a strong will to do so -- serious negotiations must be started without delay, with the requisite political will, in order not to lose the momentum.

My delegation feels that the consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been useful. It has contributed to a better knowledge of the problems involved, and outlined the different approaches as to how our Committee should deal with this important and very timely issue.

Last Tuesday we had the opportunity to listen to the fascinating statement by Professor Clarke of Sri Lanka. My delegation also followed with great attention the statements made by Ambassador Alessi of Italy and Mr. Skinner of Canada. While admitting the seriousness and the high level of their statements, I have to express some degree of disappointment on the part of my delegation because of the one-sidedness of those interventions. Our distinguished colleagues spoke only of one aspect of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, namely, the prevention or the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

My delegation does not want to deny or belittle the importance and the timeliness of the solution of this problem. Nevertheless, we consider that this is only one of the many aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, and I know it is shared by many others, there are or there may be other weapons which could be used in or from outer space. It is really regrettable that no aspects other than the prohibition of anti-satellite systems were mentioned by our distinguished Italian and Canadian colleagues. The Hungarian delegation, like many others, feels that all aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be considered and, hopefully, solved by our Committee.

Although my delegation -- like the great majority around this table -- holds the view that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is basically a matter of political decision, I venture to make a few brief comments on some of the views expressed by certain delegations.

First of all, we cannot share the optimistic evaluation that the idea of laser-gun and particle-beam weapons can be translated into an operational capability only in the hazy distant future. Reading the expert study issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in 1973, entitled Outer Space - Battlefield of the Future? one can find the following conclusion:

"As far as space-borne lasers are concerned, these are in the development stage. For such systems, chemical lasers are more useful because of their compact size .... Advances in infra-red laser radars show that with such devices, an object in space can be tracked .... When such a device becomes available, it can be used to disable solar cells and optical sensors on board a satellite. In high energy lasers and charged-particle beams we may well be seeing the beginning of the next revolution in weapon technology."

Let me recall that the book from which I have quoted was published in 1973, just like the so-called "Occasional Paper 25" by the Stanley Foundation, entitled "Can Space Remain a Peaceful Environment?" which states the following: the United States military has proposed incorporating new types of space systems into existing operational commands, and using satellites for real-time battle management and war fighting. Space technology could free military forces from dependence on foreign bases and from the need for communication and monitoring facilities in other countries.

The study of the Stanley Foundation, whose conclusions I mention in an abbreviated form -- for brevity's sake -- but without changing their message, then goes on stating the following: the United States Air Force envisage both manned and unmanned space stations that would be used for targeting, damage assessment, and retargeting of strategic weapons, weapons guidance, and real-time battlefield command, control and communication functions.

These are only a few examples to prove the point that the problem of anti-satellite systems -- important as they may be -- is but one of the many aspects of the issue. My delegation cannot help coming to the conclusion that the extra weight given by certain delegations to this single item may perhaps serve some special interests.

In conclusion, let me say frankly that at the beginning of the summer session the Hungarian delegation expected a speedy solution of the establishment of a working group on item 7 of our agenda. Unfortunately, the position taken by some western countries

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

has not made it possible. Nevertheless, we continue to hold the view that a working group with a properly worded mandate, like the one suggested by the delegation of Mongolia in document CD/272, would be the best framework for dealing with this question.

However, I do not want to over-emphasize the importance of the establishment of a working group on outer space. I have ample reason not to do so. I am fully aware of the fact that the predecessors of the Committee on Disarmament, the ENDC and the CCD, were able to elaborate disarmament agreements without working groups, while this Committee which has now established quite a few groups, still considered to be the best framework for negotiations, has so far been unable to elaborate a single draft treaty or convention on disarmament. But that only underscores my point: what is really needed are devotion, readiness and political will. And if and when they are given, we can easily find the way to elaborate and conclude disarmament measures, with or without working groups.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Solá Vila, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. SOLÁ VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, we are very happy to see you occupying the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament this month. Mexico and Cuba are two friendly countries which have set an example of co-operation. As the President of the Cuban Council of State, Fidel Castro, declared: "With Mexico, Cuba has a tradition of history and friendship as with no other country in Latin America. Our struggles have been closely linked with the struggles and the history of Mexico."

You, Ambassador García Robles, have dedicated your efforts and your life to the cause of disarmament and peace. You have never faltered in your efforts. Your motto seems to have been based on the words of Benito Juárez, one of the great patriots of the Americas, who said: "He who does not hope to win has already lost". Despite the enormous obstacles in our way, we cannot give up the fight for general and complete disarmament.

I also wish to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Maina, for the masterly way in which he guided our work during the month of August, and to wish him success in his new functions.

Allow me also to join in the words of welcome extended to Ambassador Peter Cannock of Peru, with whom we hope to continue to co-operate closely, and to express my appreciation for the work done by two other colleagues who are leaving us, Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria and Ambassador Marko Vrhunec of Yugoslavia.

The adoption of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is an item which the Committee on Disarmament has been considering as a matter of priority since its summer session in 1979.

It should be recalled that the only assurances those States had at the time were the ones offered unilaterally by some nuclear-weapon States; and, as was pointed out by the Group of 21, some of those assurances not only contained unacceptable limitations, conditions and exceptions that reflected their subjective approach, but were also based entirely on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which has helped to bring the world to the brink of war.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

When the Committee on Disarmament decided to establish a working group to consider this important item, it stated that the Working Group's objective would be to consider, and negotiate on, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Since then, much has happened during the Committee's consideration of this item and many developments have occurred with respect to the possible use of nuclear weapons such that today the threat to the non-nuclear-weapon States posed by the possible use of such weapons is greater than it was in 1979.

In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the use of nuclear weapons would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike, as has been recognized on more than one occasion, even in this negotiating body.

At one point in its work, the Working Group dealing with this item seemed to be about to reach agreement that would lead to the adoption of an international instrument which would give effect to the assurances in question. It had begun to consider the so-called "common approach" and everything was going well until the policy of nuclear deterrence, still based on the possible use of nuclear weapons, again ruled out the possibility of reaching any kind of agreement.

Talk then turned even more insistently to the possibility of the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution containing assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, but it has so far been impossible to agree on wording that would satisfy all parties equally, primarily for the following two reasons: on the one hand, there are nuclear-weapon States which are not prepared to renounce the use of such weapons; and on the other hand, it is obvious that if the declarations made are to lead to an effective resolution, they must be identical in their content for otherwise, the countries which are seeking to ensure respect for their right to survival would find it difficult to take them seriously.

In any event, the adoption of a resolution by the Security Council would be only an interim step towards the assurances which we are demanding and it would have to be recognized that the ultimate objective is a legally binding international instrument.

In view of the situation in the Committee on Disarmament, the group of non-aligned and neutral countries, namely, the Group of 21, urged the nuclear-weapon States to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The reply to that request is known to all. One nuclear-weapon State, the Soviet Union, declared that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, thus strengthening security assurances. It also proposed the adoption of a programme of nuclear disarmament whose implementation would undoubtedly produce gratifying results and be of benefit in the matter of negative guarantees.

Other nuclear-weapon States nevertheless reaffirmed their positions with regard to nuclear deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons, thus pursuing their cold-war policies and hampering the progress of the Committee's work on the priority items on its agenda.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

We have noted with alarm that some members of this Committee have suggested that we should forget the references to nuclear deterrence and the possible use of nuclear weapons, but how can such a thing be suggested when it is precisely the root cause of the deadlock reached in the discussion of any item in this Committee, which implicitly involves, in one way or another, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons?

Reference was made at a recent plenary meeting to the so-called Baruch Plan which, it was claimed, was to place nuclear energy under United Nations control. Nothing is further from the truth; this is, moreover, a dangerous assertion because it distorts the facts and could lead us into unwitting errors.

The reason why I am dwelling on this matter is precisely because it is the basis for the positions of those who are opposed to nuclear disarmament, who are blocking the adoption of effective assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, who are hampering the establishment of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war and who are making it impossible, for example, to start concrete negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

At the first meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, held on 14 June 1946, Mr. Bernard Baruch proposed the creation of an international atomic development authority, whose functions would include, inter alia:

"1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.

2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities".

As you can imagine, Mr. Baruch's proposal, which has come to be called the Baruch Plan, was found unacceptable because of the risks it involved precisely for the security of the world that it was supposed to protect.

It escapes no one's notice that all the components of the international atomic development authority -- laboratories, information, materials -- absolutely everything was to be in the hands of the United States itself, the country which had submitted the proposal. Everything was to be in the hands precisely of those who had been responsible for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear disasters -- in the hands of those who, in an act of aggression that was to be the first of the cold war, had not hesitated to wipe off the face of the earth hundreds of thousands of peaceful Japanese citizens.

But what has not been said in some of the statements we have heard is what came after the Baruch Plan.

At the second meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, held on 19 June 1946, only five days after the submission of the United States proposal, the representative of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko, submitted a draft convention prohibiting the production and use of atomic weapons and providing that within three months from its entry into force all atomic weapons were to be destroyed.

This was a counter-proposal to the Baruch Plan and one that left no room for doubt.



(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

There is no need to say here which countries objected to that proposal, for it is the same ones, using the same arguments, which are today opposing the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a nuclear test ban and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

I should merely like to point out, if you will allow me, that now, as 30 years ago, what lies behind this policy of rejecting anything to do with nuclear disarmament and the non-use of nuclear weapons is the policy of nuclear deterrence and of the possible use of nuclear weapons, which has contributed to the failure of the negotiations in all the bodies dealing with disarmament matters in recent decades.

It may be recalled that, as early as 1942, seven years before the establishment of NATO and four years before the submission of the famous Baruch Plan, Sir Winston Churchill declared, in the famous secret memorandum whose contents were later disclosed by Macmillan at the Conference of Strasbourg:

"I must admit that my attention is focused primarily on Europe, on the rebirth of European glory, on the continent that gave birth to modern nations and to civilization. It would be an immeasurable disaster if Russian barbarism were to obliterate the culture and the independence of the ancient European States."

Similarly, the United States general, General Groves, who had been appointed as director of the "Manhattan Project", which was the code name for the atomic bomb project, said:

"I consider it important to state, and I think it is a well-known fact, that, not more than two weeks after being placed in charge of the project, I did not have the slightest doubt that Russia was the enemy and that the project was designed with that in mind".

Furthermore, the 1943 Quebec Agreement, which formally established the atomic military alliance between the United States and the United Kingdom, contained a comprehensive strategy for the use of atomic weapons that clearly reveal the origins of nuclear deterrence and the policy of the use of nuclear weapons.

It cannot be claimed that anyone taking part in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament is unaware of the dangers this policy presents, since it is precisely this policy that has provoked the arms race and created the greatest obstacles to negotiations on the priority items on the agenda of this negotiating body.

We now have before us what could be a new Baruch Plan, but it is a genuine and straightforward plan. I am thinking of the establishment of a working group to negotiate on item 2 of our agenda, the adoption of concrete measures to prevent nuclear war, the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and the initiation of negotiations for the implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament. Why are these measures being rejected? Why are objections being expressed? Why are attempts being made to prevent the Committee on Disarmament at all costs from carrying out the task entrusted to it? The reply to these questions is the same, and is to be found in the earlier events to which I have referred.

This situation has considerably increased the danger to which all of mankind, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, is exposed because it is the policy of deterrence and of the possible use of nuclear weapons that is preventing the adoption of effective security assurances.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

This policy is also the cause of and the reason for all the apparent contradictions we have encountered in this Committee in recent years:

When it was agreed to broaden the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, a decision was taken to manufacture new chemical weapons systems; when it was agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, very serious obstacles were placed in the way of the formulation of what should be an effective ban and discussion of the scope of the ban desired by the majority of the countries represented here, was blocked; when reference was made to the need for nuclear disarmament, obstacles were placed in the way of the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament.

The same contradictions are revealed by the public announcement of certain dangerous decisions. How is it possible, for example, that there are plans for the deployment of the new MX intercontinental ballistic missiles when negotiations are being held in this city on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons? How can it be that although the Minuteman missiles were said to be vulnerable, plans are now being made to place MX missiles in the very silos that were said to be vulnerable?

These apparent contradictions, both within and outside the Committee, can be explained by the policy of nuclear deterrence, by doctrines which regard nuclear war as admissible and by the decisions that have been taken with regard to a first nuclear strike.

This Committee cannot be unaware of this danger and cannot ignore its implications for the disarmament negotiations.

In 1979, in view of the danger represented by nuclear weapons and because they had inadequate security guarantees, the non-nuclear-weapon States demanded effective measures amounting to genuine guarantees. Now, with the acceleration of the nuclear arms race since that date and the reaffirmation by some high officials of the importance and validity of the doctrines I have referred to in this statement, and which have existed since the 1940s, it is more necessary than ever to demand the adoption of a legally binding international instrument which will give non-nuclear-weapon States genuine guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, allow me to quote a passage from the Final Document of the Sixth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries:

"The Conference declared that the most effective assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

It is for this reason, and because we consider that no doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons can be justified, since, among other things, it hampers this Committee's work, that we have discussed these matters at such length.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Solá Vila, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is Ambassador Okawa, the representative of Japan, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, it is more than a pleasure, indeed it is an honour for me, to be able to present to you our respects and congratulations on your assumption of the Chair of this Committee for the month of September and until the beginning of next year's session. May I also express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina, for the smooth and efficient way in which he and the members of the Kenyan delegation guided us during the month of August. While much regretting the departure of Ambassador Maina, I would wish to add my best wishes for his future career after he returns to Nairobi.

With your indulgence, I now wish to make a statement under item 5 of our agenda, namely, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". Under our work programme, this item is to be discussed next week, but since the radiological weapons Working Group is meeting this afternoon, I wish to address the subject before this afternoon's meeting.

Japan is a small country, slightly smaller than the State of California in the United States. On this small expanse of land, Japan has at the moment 24 nuclear reactors, six nuclear fuel processing facilities and one facility for the reprocessing of spent fuel. It will, thus, be easily understood that the guaranteeing of the safety and security of these nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes is a matter of great concern to our country. We are consequently of the view that the prohibition of attacks against such facilities by means of some sort of international agreement would be of considerable significance in this respect. We are sure that this view is shared by the many countries which have such nuclear facilities on their territories.

It was against this background that the Prime Minister of Japan stated at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on 9 June of this year:

"It is a matter of great concern for countries of the world to be relieved from anxieties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is important, in particular, to ensure and guarantee the security of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes, and Japan hopes that international efforts toward this end will be successful. My country, for its part, wishes to contribute positively to these efforts."

It was against the same background that my Government appreciated the initiative taken by Sweden in the context of a possible radiological weapons treaty. Japan recognizes the importance of achieving such a treaty and also the importance of prohibiting attacks against civilian nuclear facilities, and my delegation has been carefully following the deliberations on these two questions in this Committee.

In this connection, may I take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to the two successive chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Kőmives of Hungary who struggled so hard for two years to accommodate the various views and advance the work on a radiological weapons treaty, and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany for the zeal and skill with which he has been trying to find a compromise solution to the difficulties that have been encountered. In the letter he addressed to the members of this Committee at the beginning of this summer session, Ambassador Wegener suggested that we look for linkage mechanisms between a radiological weapons treaty on the traditional model and the separate regulation of the intimately related subject-matter concerning nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

Apart from our inherent interest in seeing some sort of international agreement worked out to prohibit attacks against nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes, it is also by way of responding to Ambassador Wegener's appeal, if I may use that word, that my delegation has been instructed to present a working paper in which we propose a draft protocol on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in the form of an optional protocol to the eventual treaty on radiological weapons.

The working paper can be found in document CD/323, which I believe my distinguished colleagues have before them. There is a slight typographical error in the document and I would like to take this opportunity to point that out. In paragraph 9 on page 3 of document CD/323 it says that "Japan has no intention to exclude the possibility of attacks against nuclear facilities" and that is of course completely wrong. This should read, "Japan has no intention to exclude the possibility of dealing with the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in an independent and separate treaty." I would request the secretariat to be good enough to issue a corrigendum in that respect.

Let me now try to explain in a few words why we have chosen the form of an optional protocol. We have seen the difficulty that has arisen around the proposal to include a prohibition clause in the radiological weapons treaty itself. We recognize that the two matters are closely related, and that in fact they have the common purpose of keeping to the minimum the damage that could be caused by contamination as a result of the dissemination of radio-active material. However, the one would seek to prohibit a weapon, the other an act -- the act of attacking a nuclear facility.

We therefore sought to find a way of negotiating an international agreement on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities while maintaining the relationship between such an agreement and the radiological weapons treaty. We felt that the solution was to deal with the issue of prohibition of attacks in a separate instrument, and not in the radiological weapons treaty itself, while at the same time giving parties to the treaty the option to become parties to the protocol, within the framework of the treaty, if they so wished.

We hope that the tabling of this working paper will be of some help in disengaging ourselves from the present impasse, and will thus contribute to accelerating the radiological weapons negotiations with a view to their early conclusion. At the same time, we hope that our proposal will help to get us launched into a constructive discussion on how to deal with our concern regarding attacks on nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes.

Finally, may I point out that the outline of the draft protocol annexed to our working paper is nothing more than a skeleton and that the many technical and legal points that have not even been addressed in our paper can best be taken up in the course of actual negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, my delegation congratulates you on your assumption of the Chair in the final days of our session. We take special pride in seeing the distinguished son of our great neighbour to the south, Mexico, take up the reins of our Committee. We are confident that with your wise counsel and firm leadership the Committee will conclude its business with dispatch and adopt expeditiously a report on our summer session to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. I pledge, Sir, to you my delegation's full co-operation and extend my best wishes for fruitful progress in the Committee under your leadership. My delegation also wishes to extend to Ambassador Maina, through the delegation of Kenya, our admiration and appreciation for his able chairmanship of the Committee for most of its summer session. His balanced and sage direction of the Committee's affairs confirm our expectation and reflect great credit not only upon his own quality of leadership but upon his country's as well. We note with regret that he will also be leaving our ranks to return to Nairobi for a new assignment. His loss to us will be deeply felt for his cheerful personality, warm demeanour and effective contributions were sources of inspiration to us all. We wish him well in his new task and every happiness in the days ahead.

I would like to speak today on item 7 of our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As the large number of speakers at our previous meeting indicates, this question is one in which all delegations in the Committee, including my own, share a considerable interest.

During our spring session, I addressed the Committee on this agenda item during one of the two informal sessions devoted to this subject. Since that time interest has heightened and a number of delegations have urged the creation of a working group to deal with the issues. My delegation believes that the Committee should sharpen its focus by further discussion of this agenda item before considering whether to take such a step. I hope my statement today will serve to further that goal.

As a major space Power, the United States approaches the question of arms control and disarmament arrangements affecting outer space as an important and serious matter. This approach has shaped our policies and guided our actions in international forums. The United States attaches the greatest importance to the continued preservation of outer space for peaceful purposes, and to the prevention of activity there of an aggressive character. In its support of resolution 36/97 C at the United Nations General Assembly last fall, the United States joined in agreeing to "consider the question of negotiating further arms control measures in outer space ..." here in the Committee on Disarmament.

We are the beneficiaries of the efforts of our predecessors in the field of arms control and disarmament, who have endowed us with a number of agreements affecting outer space. These have already banned from outer space the most dangerous category of weapons -- weapons of mass destruction -- and have imposed other significant restrictions on weapons-related activities there.

The outer space Treaty of 1967 is the broadest and most far-reaching of these agreements. It prohibits the orbiting of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. It forbids the installation of such weapons on any celestial body, including the moon, or their stationing in outer space in any other manner. This Treaty, moreover, also preserves the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes, and forbids "the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies."

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Additionally, the outer space Treaty provides that its parties, "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding", shall apply the principles and regulations of international law, including, most notably, the Charter of the United Nations, to their activities in outer space. This point is worth stressing. A consequence of the application of the United Nations Charter and international law to outer space is the recognition that outer space can have an important role to play in the maintenance of world peace and security. And indeed, in the view of my delegation, outer space has served this end very well, by providing a place for satellites devoted to a wide range of useful purposes, from communications to navigation, to the monitoring of arms control agreements, to the stabilizing function of providing early warning against the possibility of a nuclear attack.

In the view of my delegation, the arms control regime affecting outer space would be strengthened if States not already party to the outer space Treaty were to adhere to this agreement. Indeed, I regret to say, there are 11 members of this Committee who are not yet parties to this important Treaty.

The limited test ban Treaty of 1963 prohibits, inter alia, nuclear explosions in outer space. In addition to the direct arms control benefits this Treaty has provided, namely, the absence of nuclear explosions in outer space, the Treaty has also had another great benefit relating to the continued development of the peaceful applications of outer space. As Mr. Arthur C. Clarke pointed out on Tuesday, the many scores of satellites now performing a wide range of tasks would be placed in serious jeopardy were nuclear explosions to occur in outer space.

As with the outer space Treaty, the limited test ban treaty enjoys widespread, although not universal, adherence. One hundred and eleven countries are States parties to this important agreement. The adherence by additional States to this important agreement would serve to strengthen arms control arrangements for outer space.

The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, negotiated in our predecessor body, the CCD, and signed in 1977, also applies to outer space. This Convention has now entered into force for some 30 States, a much smaller number than for the outer space and the limited test ban treaties. Again, much wider adherence to an agreement which effectively forestalls manipulation of the environment, including outer space, for hostile purposes would serve to strengthen the outer space arms control structure.

It is possible to point to a number of other agreements that affect the regime of outer space, its use for peaceful purposes and the prevention of its misuse for aggressive purposes. I should only add to my discussion here today the 1972 bilateral Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limiting anti-ballistic missile systems. In so far as this Treaty relates to the prohibition of weapons in outer space, the two parties have undertaken not to develop, test or deploy space-based anti-ballistic missile systems or their components.

A fair assessment of the body of international law applying to the environment of outer space which I have just described would be that nations can have some confidence that the most destabilizing developments which might have been foreseen in the past -- especially the orbiting or stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space -- have already been renounced by those parties to the outer space

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Treaty. When the provisions of this Treaty and the other agreements I have described are considered, the widespread notion that an arms race in outer space is an immediate threat is placed into a more realistic perspective. I must therefore confess to some amazement at the view of some who seem to dismiss -- or minimize -- these agreements as "totally insufficient".

It is also useful to examine the contribution which the use of outer space makes to the implementation of arms control agreements generally by providing a means whereby monitoring and verification can be carried out. It is abundantly clear that those arms control agreements which rely in part or in whole on national technical means of verification would probably otherwise have been impossible. At least, such agreements would have required intrusive verification measures, measures that no State wants to adopt lightly, especially if a better or more easily available alternative can be found. It is safe to say that given the reluctance of some States to agree to so-called "intrusive" means of verification, man's ability to make use of outer space for verification and monitoring purposes has in many cases made the difference between effective agreement and no agreement. It is interesting to note that a recent article on monitoring arms curbs in the 19 May issue of Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn pointed out that reconnaissance satellites "produced a real breakthrough in means of observing and monitoring arms limitation measures."

In addition to the specific arms control functions served by outer space, the great potential of outer space for peaceful purposes serves us in a great and ever-increasing variety of important ways. We are all aware of the just completed UNISPACE '82 conference, and of the many applications demonstrated and discussed in that forum. These show just how intimately connected with our daily lives the utilization of outer space for civil purposes has become. From the use of meteorological satellites to improve weather forecasting and warning of severe storms, to communications satellites which make possible the global transmission of live television coverage of both historical and recreational events, it is evident that outer space plays an important role in maintaining the structure of our international society. The United States has taken the lead over many years in making available to the world at large the technology and benefits from its space programme, which is dedicated to placing outer space in the service of peace, and to strengthening the bonds that link nations together.

We all recognize that outer space, and these satellites, have military value. There is no point in denying the simple fact that the use of outer space can and does serve important military functions such as early warning, communication and navigation. These functions can serve to strengthen international stability by strengthening the deterrent value of military forces and reducing the chances of strategic miscalculations. But as Professor Clarke, in his eloquent statement last Tuesday pointed out, "there are few of man's artifacts which cannot be equally well used for peaceful or warlike purposes: what matters is the intention".

And there is another simple fact which there is no point in denying. That is that the Soviet Union, for whatever purpose, has been actively engaged over a number of years in the development and testing of an operational anti-satellite weapon system. That system puts at risk the satellites of every nation. In light of this fact, my Government has concluded that it has had no prudent choice but to continue to pursue a programme of its own to develop a similar capability.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

The United States is in full agreement that unrestrained competition in the development and deployment of weapons affecting outer space -- what we often call an arms race -- would not promote the larger goal of a more peaceful world. Indeed, it is for this reason that the United States supports discussion of this matter here in the Committee on Disarmament.

We continue to be willing to examine possible further measures to be added to the existing body of arms control agreements as they apply to the outer space environment. On 4 July of this year, President Reagan announced a national space policy for the civil, military and arms control uses of outer space. These policies are outlined in a document, copies of which my delegation would be happy to supply to other interested delegations. I would like, however, to quote the appropriate passage from this document as it relates to arms control:

"The United States will continue to study space arms control options. The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems, should those measures be compatible with United States national security."

There are two points in this passage which I think are worth special note. First, the United States believes that attention should be focused on measures applicable to specific types of weapon systems. Obviously, measures which are vaguely worded, and contain only imprecise generalities whose applicability would be open to question, are not useful, nor, I think would they be of interest to delegations here. Secondly, the United States believes that arms control measures subject to consideration should be equitable and verifiable. These two tests are valid standards to be applied against any potential arms control agreements.

It should also be mentioned that, as with other aspects of our work in arms control and disarmament, our consideration of further outer space arms control measures cannot proceed in a vacuum. The international climate has an important bearing on the prospects for co-operation on such measures. As with all arms control measures the real world must affect our judgement.

Finally, I believe I can confidently say that all of us here share a vision of mankind's future in space. As a boy, I recall being held in awe by the serialized exploits of "Buck Rogers" and "Flash Gordon", never dreaming that these were more than flights of fancy. Yet, in our lifetimes we have witnessed man's first tentative steps off our planet. We all remember the poignant comment of astronaut Neil Armstrong as he became the first man to set foot on the moon: "One small step for man, a giant step for mankind". It is not inconceivable that our grandchildren, or perhaps their children, will decisively break the bonds of earth and venture into a new age beyond our imagination. But only if the peace is kept can mankind reach out to that final frontier.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The last speaker on my list is the representative of Austria, Mr. Lang, to whom I now give the floor.



Mr. LANG (Austria): Mr. Chairman, taking the floor at this very late hour during the first meeting of the Committee on Disarmament in the month of September, my delegation joins with pleasure previous speakers who have expressed their satisfaction to see you, Sir, as the presiding officer for the remainder of the 1982 session. That you, Sir, one of the most eminent personalities in the field of disarmament assume the leadership of this Committee, can certainly be qualified as an historic moment. We welcome you also as the representative of Mexico, a country with which Austria has entertained time and again cordial relations in spite of the enormous distance which separates us in terms of geography.

Looking at those highly political and sensitive questions, to which your distinguished predecessor referred a few days ago, one becomes aware that patience will be necessary, as well as wisdom, realism and a certain degree of flexibility on the part of all concerned. The Austrian delegation hopes that the decisions to be taken on those questions will take due account not only of the interests of the member States of the Committee on Disarmament but also of all countries having expressed a particular concern for questions of disarmament and arms control, a concern which stems in the case of Austria from its location in one of the most sensitive areas of our globe.

This delegation wishes also to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, who guided this Committee so ably during the month of August and whose efforts were instrumental in overcoming feelings of disappointment and frustration which were harboured by many delegations as a consequence of the very limited results of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

My delegation has listened with particular care and attention to those statements which were made on the item entitled, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". May I, with your kind permission, submit the following comments for consideration by the Committee, comments which come from a Government which has for many years shown special interest in questions of outer space, in particular the peaceful uses of outer space.

Mankind is confronted with the serious prospect of outer space being progressively drawn into an arms race.

More than 1700 military satellites have been launched during the last decade; military establishments on both sides increasingly rely on satellites, especially for strategic purposes. The wide and growing range of functions turn these satellites into valuable targets, thus creating strong incentives for developing anti-satellite capabilities. Other efforts potentially introducing weaponry into space are carried out in the field of ABM technology.

These developments have led to grave concerns as to the prospects for the peaceful uses of outer space which were vividly expressed last month in Vienna during the second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The president of the Conference, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Willibald Pahr, urged the participants to conclude agreements which should definitely ban all kinds of weapons in outer space.

In its final report the Conference expressed the view that the extension of an arms race into outer space is a matter of grave concern to the international community, is detrimental to humanity as a whole and should therefore be prevented. The Conference recommended that the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament give appropriate attention and high priority to that concern when dealing with measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had already requested measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Last fall, the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly called upon the Committee on Disarmament to seek agreement on the text of an appropriate treaty to prevent the spreading of the arms race into outer space.

There is widespread agreement that the existing international instruments establishing the principle of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes are insufficient to prevent the spreading of an arms race into space. Some of the deficiencies and loopholes in the most important of these instruments, the outer space Treaty, have come up as a consequence of technological evolution. Others were deliberately built in by the drafters because some of the few possessing certain capabilities in space technology, as well as the necessary financial resources, wished to keep their options open. Again, other deficiencies stem from the growing realization that the ever-increasing use of outer space by a few, especially for military purposes, may unduly limit peaceful uses by others.

As a starting point for strengthening the arms control regime for outer space, one should examine in detail the scope and true meaning of the relevant provisions of the outer space Treaty. As long as the principle of peaceful use for the benefit of mankind which underlies the entire outer space regime remains open to radically divergent interpretations, the danger of creeping militarization will stay with us. And indeed, as we know, some interpret peaceful use to exclude only activities or devices of an aggressive character, whereas others would have it cover all military activities.

Whilst vagueness of terminology may have been helpful in the past, such uncertainty cannot any more be tolerated. In view of the concrete ongoing efforts to experiment with and eventually use offensive devices in space, terminology must be clarified, and necessary new prohibitions should be clear and unequivocal.

Upon the basis of an agreed clarification of the present provisions, it will certainly prove indispensable to introduce new prohibitions concerning the use of outer space. Extension of the provisions of paragraph 2 of article IV of the outer space Treaty to outer space itself or an express prohibition of introducing offensive devices of any kind, even for mere testing purposes, might be considered as possible approaches to this problem.

The restraint that a strengthened regime for outer space would impose on those who, at present, have the capabilities actually to use outer space will eventually, upon careful consideration, be seen even by those few countries as a benefit. For if they do not accept restrictions now, they might be faced, tomorrow, with a situation in which the hardening of devices sent into space and the risk of losing space-based communication and other capabilities will add tremendously to their costs and, especially, raise the danger of destabilizing losses of installations basic to their system of deterrence. The history of arms control, well known to most assembled here, points to earlier miscalculations where, for the semblance of temporary advantages, limitations were turned down at a point in time when they would have been technically and politically feasible, whereas the arms developments that were left uncontrolled raised endless problems only a few years later.

Finally, no new substantive provisions will curb the arms race in outer space unless the countries concerned are able to agree on an effective machinery of implementation and verification. The credibility of any new obligations will depend on their reliability, on the degree of trust they can create among the countries concerned.

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

In this context, I would like to state our conviction that sooner or later, verification from space and in space will have to be internationalized. At present only two countries dispose of a full state-of-the-art array of space capabilities. For the time being and for a long time to come, this situation makes reliance on national means of verification the least credible option. Last year's United Nations study on this subject has shown that an international satellite monitoring agency is an entirely feasible objective. This element should be taken into account when elaborating new arms control agreements concerning outer space.

As to the question of how to strengthen the outer space regime, my country had put some considerable hope in the American-Soviet talks on anti-satellite systems that were held approximately until the Vienna summit of 1979. We would see some advantages in a resumption of these talks.

At the same time this Committee, responding to relevant resolutions of the first special session on disarmament, the last General Assembly and UNISPACE II, should deepen its engagement in the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and set up a working group to this effect. Any move to accelerate the preparatory process leading towards the "take-off" of full-fledged negotiations is welcome.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. As I said a few moments ago, the representative of Austria was the last speaker on my list. Does any other representative wish to speak? I shall give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, but in view of the lateness of the hour I hope that he intends to make a very short statement. Otherwise I would prefer it if he were to wait until our next meeting.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, I apologize to you and to my colleagues for taking the floor at this very late hour and, of course, I shall be brief.

It is a matter of great satisfaction to see you in the Chair for the month of September. Your great accomplishments for the sake of disarmament are well known and give us confidence that under your leadership the Committee on Disarmament will wind up its present session in a satisfactory way. The leader of my delegation will no doubt later express our appreciation for your chairmanship in a more appropriate and ample way.

Upon the instructions of my Government I wish to place the following short statement on record.

It is our earnest conviction that no effort should be spared to prevent unrestrained competition in the development and deployment of weapons affecting outer space. We attach great importance to the responsible task confided to the Committee on Disarmament in this regard, which was reconfirmed by the concluding document of UNISPACE '82. Our concern is well known. During the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly the Netherlands, together with some like-minded States, took the initiative of introducing a draft resolution which led to resolution 36/97 C, accepted by an overwhelming majority. We welcomed afterwards the fact that, in conformity with this resolution, the Committee on Disarmament, at the beginning of its 1982 session decided to place a new item, item 7, on its agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". On 3 April 1982 the leader of

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

the Netherlands delegation had the pleasure of explaining our basic approach to this question in detail. We have followed the present debate in our plenary meetings with great interest. In our view, the contributions made by the delegations which have addressed agenda item 7 illustrate amply that consensus virtually exists as to the desirability of establishing meaningful measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. I feel therefore encouraged to reiterate the view expressed in this Committee by the leader of my delegation on 12 August 1982, to wit, that the text of resolution 35/97 C provides adequate language for elaborating an appropriate mandate for an ad hoc working group to be established under agenda item 7. We strongly urge the Committee on Disarmament to take such a course of action which would warrant that the 1983 agenda item 7 will be dealt with in an appropriate way.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement, for its brevity and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. We have now completed the list of speakers for this morning's meeting.

You will all have received the time-table which the secretariat has prepared for next week. As usual, it is merely indicative and can be amended later if necessary. After consulting the secretariat and bearing in mind the number of speakers inscribed for our meeting next Tuesday, 7 September, I intend, unless any delegation objects, to change the time given in that tentative time-table for the opening of Tuesday's meeting from 10.30 a.m. to 10 a.m. If there is no objection, I shall take it that you agree to this.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I should like to ask for your co-operation in that matter too. If we had begun this meeting promptly at the hour fixed, namely, 10 o'clock, it would now be 1 o'clock and all those who had engagements for lunch would have been able to keep them. It is therefore my intention to begin meetings, if not exactly at the hour fixed, no more than 10 minutes later, so that when we say 10 o'clock it means that the Chairman will open the meeting at 10.10 and if we say 10.30 I shall open it at 10.40. I am sure you will understand the reason for this and will co-operate with the Chairman in this matter.

I should also like to point out, at the request of the secretariat, that Thursday 9 and Friday 10 September are holidays for the United Nations and the Palais des Nations will be closed. As regards the date for the closure of this session, as I said at the beginning, for the time being I am taking 16 September as the tentative date for the termination of our work, but naturally it is for the Committee and not for myself to decide the actual date of closure.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 September, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.115  
7 September 1982  
ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 7 September 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. Garcia Robles

(Mexico)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia: Mr. T. FLUDLAY  
Miss S. BOYD

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINK  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. TELLALOV  
Mr. SOTIROV  
Mr. DEYANOV  
Mr. PRANOV

Burma: U HAUNG HAUNG GYI  
U TIN KYAU HLAING  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. SUO KAIMING  
Mr. LIN CHENG

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLÁ VILA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. H. VEJVODA  
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ  
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. I. CASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. d'ABOVILLE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. G. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. G. GAJDA

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. KARYONO  
Mr. DAMANIK  
Mr. HIDAYAT

Iran:

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. T. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DOW NANJIRA  
Mr. J.M. KIBOI  
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI  
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR  
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU  
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. J.B. DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. T. PANAIT  
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. U. ERICSSON  
Miss H. OLSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN



United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMNERHAYES

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. H.D. BUSBY

Mr. M. WINSTON

Mr. R. SCOTT

Mr. R. MILTON

Venezuela:

Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. I. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 185th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The first speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador Komives, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, our Committee starts today the consideration of item 5 of its agenda entitled, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". In accordance with a decision adopted at the 171st meeting, in April, the Committee will also hold two informal meetings today and tomorrow with the participation of experts. The purpose of the informal meetings is to examine proposals and suggestions pertaining to the first part of the agenda item. Let me express the hope that both the formal meetings of the Committee and also the informal meetings will contribute to a better understanding of this important and timely issue, and will also pave the way for concrete actions long overdue.

The Hungarian delegation has always paid particular attention to the subject of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, ever since it was taken up by the United Nations General Assembly in 1975, and by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the following year. That attention has been manifested also by the submission of working papers — the first in 1978 on the question of infrasound weapons (CCD/575); and the last one during the first part of this session, in document CD/261. Our delegation was the one that initiated last year and again this year the holding of informal meetings on this very important and urgent problem.

As I stated on 18 March, "the steady devotion of my delegation is motivated, among other things, by the growing awareness among world public opinion that the ongoing scientific and technological revolution and the accelerating pace of progress in various fields of science harbour not only beneficial possibilities for solving the basic problems of mankind, but also — if misused — a grave danger of triggering a qualitatively new round in the arms race."

Military-technical magazines and other publications have for about a decade been carrying reports on new methods of mass annihilation, which might be employed to create some hitherto unheard-of weapons. Those reports are confirmed by the statements of scientists expressing their apprehensions about certain development programmes carried out in the interest of the military.

Without going into very specific details, let me touch upon certain general characteristics of the types of weapons at present under consideration. One of the distinctive features of the new non-nuclear types of weapons of mass destruction is their highly discriminate effect. For example, such weapons are capable of disturbing certain functions of the human body, doing harm to people of a certain ethnic origin, or bringing about changes in certain types of crops or animals (thus sharply reducing agricultural production, creating severe shortages and even famine). Such weapons are highly controllable in terms of effect or manner of action. They can, for example, influence human psychic conditions or reproduction capabilities. Because of their highly discriminate action, the use of such weapons could go unnoticed for a long time. This can lead to a transformation in the nature of combat action, and may open up possibilities for a hidden warfare.

Certain new types of weapons of mass destruction exist only in principle, but others have already come off the drawing board, and the real danger of the emergence of such weapons cannot be denied any longer. The latest event substantiating profound fears in large popular masses is the infamous decision on the production and

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deployment of nuclear neutron weapons. Although a number of delegations would claim that it is simply just another nuclear weapon, there is already a great amount of scientifically supported evidence, compiled in scientific, military and other publications -- and also made known extensively in this Committee -- which proves beyond doubt that it is not only an updated version of the nuclear weapon, but also a new kind of weapon of mass destruction, both in technological terms and in political and military implications as well. It is especially so inasmuch as it increases the danger of an all-out nuclear war by introducing an "easy-to-use" nuclear weapon. That is why the delegations of the socialist countries proposed the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons, and submitted a draft convention to that effect as early as 1979.

The prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons already has a long history in disarmament efforts. In 1948 the Commission for Conventional Armaments adopted a resolution which states, among other things, that "weapons of mass destruction should be defined as including atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future with characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above".

After two decades the question was raised again at the United Nations General Assembly. On the initiative of Malta, two resolutions were adopted in 1969 concerning the possible emergence of new weapons of mass destruction: resolutions 2602 C and D (XXIV) respectively called on the CCD to consider certain implications of radiological warfare and laser technology. The Committee, however, did not find that possibility to be of immediate concern.

New achievements of science and technology and the increased danger of their military utilization prompted the Soviet Union in 1975, during the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, to propose the conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The Soviet delegation also submitted a draft international agreement. In resolution 3479 (XXX) the General Assembly asked the CCD to deal with the matter.

Since then, the General Assembly has been dealing with this question and has adopted a number of resolutions. Since 1976 our Committee, too, has been seized of the problem of the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. The delegations of the socialist countries have made great efforts to facilitate the elaboration of a treaty on the issue. In 1976 the Soviet delegation submitted document CCD/514 entitled, "On definitions of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons." In order to meet considerations expressed by various Western delegations, the Soviet Union tabled in 1977 a revised version of its draft treaty (CCD/511/Rev.1). The revised draft provides that, parallel with a general agreement, special agreements could be concluded on the prohibition of specific weapons. It provides also that a list of types and systems of weapons to be prohibited would be annexed to the agreement and could be supplemented if new areas of development were to emerge.

In 1976 the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament paid marked attention to the issue. The Final Document contains no less than three paragraphs in that context. Paragraph 77, for instance, reads as follows:

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"In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. The question should be kept under continuing review."

The exchanges of views that took place between 1976 and 1982 showed a difference of opinion concerning the effective ways of preventing the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction. My delegation, however, continues to be convinced that a comprehensive approach is the most effective way to reach our aim. This implies the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement banning in a general manner the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, accompanied by a list of specific types of weapons to be prohibited. Such an arrangement could provide for the conclusion of separate agreements on specific new types of weapons of mass destruction.

By resolution 36/89, adopted last year, the General Assembly broadened the general approach and enlarged our possibilities as well as our duties in this context when it requested the Committee on Disarmament to "intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons."

Paragraph 3 of the same resolution calls upon the States permanent members of the Security Council, and other militarily significant States, to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new weapons of mass destruction, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. Such declarations would be approved subsequently by a decision of the Security Council.

Resolution 36/89, as I have just said, broadens the general approach to solving the problem, and at the same time makes it possible for our Committee to renew its efforts in two directions. Working paper CD/261, submitted by the Hungarian delegation this spring, accordingly proposes concrete actions in both directions. Let me express the hope and expectation that the Committee is giving due attention to those proposals.

The first issue, which has already been discussed at length, is the establishment of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts under the aegis of the Committee. This group, in the view of my delegation, could be entrusted with the elaboration of a draft comprehensive agreement as well as the drafting of possible agreements on particular new types of weapons of mass destruction. This idea, I may state, has received broad support during our discussions, and only the opposition of certain Western countries has prevented the Committee from creating the ad hoc group.

The second issue concerns paragraph 3 of the General Assembly's resolution, which -- as I have already pointed out -- calls on the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States to make declarations stating their refusal to create new weapons of mass destruction. Such declarations, identical in substance, and to be approved subsequently by the Security Council, would be a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

Such an approach had already emerged as far back as 1977, when the delegation of the United Kingdom, reacting to the proposal aimed at the establishment of an ad hoc group, stated the following:

"... a more fruitful approach would be a firm condemnation by the world community of the development of new weapons of mass destruction, coupled with a request to this Conference to keep the matter under review ..."

The world community has on numerous occasions firmly condemned the development and manufacture of such weapons. Now it is the turn of those States which are capable of developing and manufacturing them to come forward with their own solemn declarations, committing themselves never to create any new weapons of mass destruction. Such declarations, as provided for in paragraph 3 of resolution 36/89, would have significant moral and political value. Since all the permanent members of the Security Council and practically all the militarily significant States are represented around this negotiating table, the Committee on Disarmament has not only the possibility but also the duty to deal with this issue in a serious manner.

The Hungarian delegation, together with a great number of other delegations, is eagerly looking forward to hearing statements of position made by the delegations concerned. While political statements are being made in formal meetings of the Committee, delegations, with the assistance of their experts, meeting informally, should give serious consideration to various aspects of the issue, among them the formulation of an appropriate draft declaration as described above.

With your kind permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall now address myself to the second part of the item: the prohibition of radiological weapons. The Committee has become deadlocked on this question, and the Working Group on Radiological Weapons has been mainly inactive during the summer session. One of the reasons for the deadlock is to be found in the existence of different approaches of priority concerning the prohibition of radiological weapons and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

Some delegations in the Working Group have been repeatedly advocating priority for the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, while unjustifiably playing down the role and necessity of the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. The Swedish delegation, for example, in its memorandum in document CD/RW/WP.19, submitted on 16 March, stated the following:

"Studies undertaken by the competent authorities in Sweden show that the development of specific radiological weapons as defined by the drafters [of the joint Soviet-United States proposal] is a very remote possibility. They could hardly become practical weapons of mass destruction or for that matter even effective weapons on the battlefield."

My delegation, together with others, however, cannot agree with such an evaluation, and holds the view that this weapon is potentially no less dangerous and deadly than any other type of weapon of mass destruction. One cannot deny that the rapid development of the nuclear industry and the adoption and implementation by many States of their own nuclear energy programmes have inevitably resulted in a vast development and proliferation in the world of a technology employing various radioactive materials. This could by its nature become a material basis for creating one or another radiological weapon system. Besides, in the absence of a ban on the development of radiological weapons, States cannot rest assured that no single State will conduct any research to develop such weapons.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

In this connection I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to an interview with American nuclear physicist Cohen and French military theorist Jeneste, published in Die Welt of 16 January this year. Without commenting on the military-strategic and political aspects of this interview, I would like merely to note that its very subject gives — at least to some extent — an answer to whether radiological weapons are feasible or not, and how effective they could be.

In the interview Cohen advocates the development of a technically feasible and quite lethal gamma-weapon which he calls a harmless "nothing-bomb". According to Cohen, this weapon is completely controllable as regards timing, range of action and intensity of use. He believes that 100 kg of Uranium-235 is enough for laying down a "carpet" several thousand kilometres long and one thousand kilometres wide, the action of which is a matter of a few days only.

Gamma-rays owing to their high energy, are very dangerous to human beings and any living organisms. Gamma-rays from natural sources of radioactivity and from artificial nuclear reactions are already widely employed in science and technology. They are used in medicine, metallurgy and many other fields. Therefore the practical application of gamma-rays, including those of high intensity, is a reality which one cannot deny. Thus, there exists today a material basis for the practical devising of highly effective and lethal gamma-weapons, which clearly fall into the category of radiological weapons.

In order to prevent any possible developments, such as the one I have mentioned, the Committee on Disarmament must redouble its efforts aimed at concluding the negotiation of a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. Should the world community already in the very near future face the fact of the emergence of one or another type of weapons employing radioactive material, the blame would be clearly on us, who have failed in due time to avert such a possibility.

The definition of radiological weapons given by the co-sponsors of the joint draft treaty covers any device, other than a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed to employ radioactive material to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material. This formula prohibits any radiological weapon systems based on employing any types of radioactive material, regardless of their characteristics or the radiation emitted, should it be alpha-, beta- or gamma-rays, or radiation of neutral high-energy particles. Thus the definition suggested in the draft treaty covers also gamma-weapons.

In conclusion, I wish to underline the following. Since the emergence of special types of radiological weapons, such as the gamma-ray weapon described above, is definitely not a question of a remote possibility, the Hungarian delegation is convinced that in 1983 renewed and vigorous efforts will have to be made by the Committee, by every member around this table, in order to elaborate and successfully conclude the drafting of a treaty banning radiological weapons of any kind.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, before I turn to the substantial part of my statement today, let me express the conviction of my delegation that our Committee has been given most efficient chairmanship for the concluding weeks of this year's session. Your impressive record as a disarmament negotiator and, may I add, our personal experience of co-operation with you in different negotiating forums and international bodies are much more than a sufficient guarantee of the reliable leadership you will provide us with.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

I would also like to thank the outgoing Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of Kenya, Mr. Gatere Maina, and also to welcome in our midst the new Ambassador of Peru, Mr. Peter Cannock whom I have already met and with whom I hope to have excellent relations. We are sorry to hear that through the rotation of heads of delegations we are going to lose the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, who always approached the difficult tasks of his delegation with wisdom and seriousness, for which he was valued by all of us. We wish him all the best in his future activities.

Among this year's items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament there are two which, to some extent, occupy a special position. Agenda item 7— the prevention of an arms race in outer space— and item 5— new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons— differ from other agenda items mainly by the fact that within their framework we seek to prevent developments which, if not halted, could lead to considerable implications in the not too distant future. From the procedural point of view those two items have one more thing in common, namely, that they are only being discussed in the plenary without special working or expert groups having been established so far.

We welcome the fact that the danger of outer space being turned into another sphere of the arms race has been finally brought to the attention of the Committee on Disarmament. During our spring session and last week, we heard many interesting statements evaluating existing international documents regulating to a certain extent the military presence in outer space and searching for possible future steps in this regard.

There is hardly any need to recall in this forum all the relevant treaties with a detailed description of their provisions. However, I would like to stress that, in spite of certain efforts to give divergent interpretations of adopted measures, we deem the treaties concluded so far very important international instruments creating the basis for further efforts to achieve a complete demilitarization of outer space. This applies first of all to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, of 1967, and to the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies within the Solar System other than the Earth, of 1979. The provisions of those two, if I may say so, "basic" space treaties, together with the provisions of certain other international documents closed outer space to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Highly appreciating the measures achieved so far, we also share the opinion of those who consider it necessary and logical to adopt further measures which would exclude the possibility of the emplacement in space of other categories of weapons not covered as yet.

Czechoslovakia has been actively participating in the peaceful exploration of outer space through the well-known international co-operation programme, "Inter-sputnik", which, inter alia, has enabled a citizen of ours to enter outer space. We have therefore more than valid reasons to pay special attention to all measures seeking the prevention of the arms race in outer space and ensuring that it will be used for peaceful purposes only.

The two relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its last session define two approaches in this respect. I would not qualify them as two different approaches. Some proponents of resolution 36/97 C try to convince us that their approach is the only possible one and they do their best to prove that the proposal contained in resolution 36/99, referring to a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, is not appropriate.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

As I have already said, we do not regard these two approaches as excluding each other. However, one does not have to be a specialist in the field to realize that the approach reflected in resolution 36/99 is much more comprehensive. Moreover, it deals not only with present dangers but takes fully into account also possible future developments in weaponry. Much has been said in this connection about the so-called "directed energy weapons". We were rather amazed by attempts of some delegations to raise doubts about the possibilities of such weapons being developed and used in practice. We would presume that problems of a purely technical nature persisting in the development of these kinds of weapons should certainly not prevent us from coping with the quite real possibility of their creation and eventual introduction into space.

We listened with interest to statements wherein the problem of anti-satellite weapons was defined as the basic problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We can agree with many thoughts and conclusions in this regard. However, we registered with concern two tendencies in this approach with which we can hardly associate.

Firstly, it is implicitly or explicitly suggested that anti-satellite weapons are the only weapons with a possible use in outer space which can now be distinctly defined and consequently that we should limit ourselves to that kind of weapon. We are far from underestimating the destabilizing effects of anti-satellite activities, but should this specific problem compel us to forget about the much more imminent dangers emanating from weapons emplaced on objects flying several tens of kilometres above the territory of any State?

Secondly, we also cannot agree with some suggestions as to the definition of, so to say, the components of anti-satellite weapons and activities. We can hardly accept the thesis that a definite line can be drawn separating peaceful from military activities in space. If one wants to render the achievement of any anti-satellite weapons agreement unrealistic, nothing is more suitable for this than the definition of a scope which would embrace preferably all space activities, whether peaceful or military, and would also seek the solution of problems which can only be solved on the earth, not from space.

In his statement last week the distinguished representative of the United States drew our attention to the fact that many valuable treaties concerning outer space have not been universally adhered to up to now. We fully agree with him that universal adherence to these treaties would undoubtedly be beneficial. At the same time we should not forget that the existing treaties, universally adhered to or not, have not closed all avenues for the arms race to spread into outer space. The United States delegation would agree with me since the provisions of these treaties, while extremely useful, have not stopped the United States from military activities in space. The mere headlines of three articles taken at random from issues of the International Herald Tribune published in June this year are enough to substantiate what I have just said. From the issue of the 7th, "Anti-satellite System Sought by Weinberger", from that of the 25th, "Military Use of Shuttle is Expanding" and from that of the 23rd, "US Air Force To Expand Military Activity in Space".



(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

There is one more serious aspect of the arms race in outer space which is a matter of concern. It would bring about an unprecedented rise in military expenditures. It is true that the expenditures would affect mostly States present in space but it would certainly be a burden felt by other countries as well. According to David A. Andelman, the deployment of a simple, ground-based defensive system against cruise missiles would probably cost \$1 billion. But the price tag would jump to \$2-3 billion to deploy a prototype space-based system with ASAT capabilities and \$10 billion to deploy a full space-based ABM system.

No delegation pretends to have a recipe for ensuring the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The effective solution of the problem can only be one which is agreed upon by all States, especially those which are technically most advanced. We consider that the best way to proceed further in this direction would be the creation of an ad hoc working group in which delegations could benefit from the active contribution of experts. We associate ourselves fully with the draft mandate for such a working group contained in document CD/272 submitted by the Mongolian People's Republic. We cannot afford to ignore further the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the danger of the militarization of outer space, a responsibility which was recently unequivocally confirmed at the Conference UNISPACE '82.

Much of what I have said with respect to the prevention of an arms race in outer space applies also to the problem of new weapons of mass destruction. My delegation has already addressed this item of our agenda on several occasions and I will not, therefore, go into details now. At this juncture I would only like to express once more our considered view that in this regard the emphasis should be placed on the prevention of the creation of new weapons based on new scientific achievements. We have already stated that we are not against the adoption of specific agreements on certain kinds of weapons. However, a comprehensive agreement should be a necessary first step in this direction.

Nobody can deny that a growing danger of the building of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons does exist. Let me give just one example. Numerous recent studies and articles in military journals and magazines prove that there is, for instance, a growing development in the field of electronics warfare. Some defence analysts say that in the United States electronics for destruction are becoming a completely new business area and that a new industry has been created to cover the expanding needs of the military in this field.

My delegation is deeply concerned by the fact that we have not achieved any substantial progress in dealing with this item up to now. Since the passage of time is a most unfavourable factor in relation to this question, we believe that dealing with it only at informal meetings of the plenary does not fully correspond to its urgency. We therefore most emphatically support the proposal of Hungary for the establishment of a group of experts to deal with the prevention of new weapons of mass destruction. The experience gained so far through the participation of experts in our deliberations on this problem would assure us that this would be the most appropriate and promising approach.

Before concluding I would like to make a short comment on our debate on nuclear disarmament, which unfortunately was rather unproductive. I would like to pay tribute to the statement of the delegation of Cuba in this debate, because of the very useful historical analyses he made of the problem of the nuclear arms race. All delegations should read that statement carefully. They will find the true face of the so-called Baruch Plan mentioned at the second special session by President Reagan and recently here by the United States delegation and learn that it was far from being a step to nuclear disarmament as recently claimed here by the United States delegation. I would like to express the hope that nuclear disarmament will be dealt with by this Committee at the next session with more positive results than at this session.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, my delegation joins others in welcoming you to the Chair. We all know how much the Committee can benefit in these final stages of its 1982 session from your wisdom, your immense experience, your sense of vision. Ambassador Maina, our previous Chairman, has already departed, but I should like to express to his competent colleagues from the Kenyan delegation the gratitude of my delegation for the fair and circumspect manner in which he has presided over our work.

An expert from my delegation will contribute at this afternoon's informal meeting to the subject of mass destruction weapons which is also officially inscribed on the agenda of our meeting. The comprehensive statement he will make seems to obviate the need for me to address the same issues here. Instead, I should like to speak on three subjects of particular interest to my delegation: firstly, chemical weapons, where I intend to introduce a new working paper; secondly, outer space, where the exceptionally long list of speakers last week prevented me from going on record, and lastly, radiological weapons, where I would briefly like to comment on the process of negotiation as the outgoing Chairman of the Working Group.

My delegation feels gratified that during this summer session efforts have concentrated to a considerable extent on the search for an agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and providing for the destruction of existing stocks and production and filling facilities. As a country which, as far back as 1954, renounced, in an international Treaty, the production of chemical weapons, the Federal Republic of Germany has ever since given its strongest support to all efforts aiming at the speedy conclusion of a total and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, which for my Government represents a very important and, above all, perfectly attainable goal.

Chemical weapons are distinct from most weapons in that their use in war is proscribed by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and by customary international law as well. Therefore, chemical weapons should have no role in the military considerations of any State and, if all States were unanimous in this aim, should not exist at all. The time has come for all States to relinquish weapons which have been outlawed for more than half a century and to conclude an international convention to this effect.

A ban on chemical weapons will enhance the security of the contracting parties, but it can fulfil this task only if all parties to the treaty share the conviction that contractual provisions will be fully complied with. The problem of verification is thus of crucial importance. This is a complicated but in no way insoluble issue. National means, as all of us are aware, are not enough. The solution has to be found essentially on the basis of international co-operative, non-discriminating and at the same time effective methods. International on-site inspections to be initiated by a permanent multilateral body of competent experts are an essential part of such a co-operative international verification system. The importance of a chemical weapons ban for my Government is such that I have felt constrained, now that the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament is drawing to a close, to stress a certain number of general points, even though some of them are widely accepted and often also stated by others in this Committee.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Moving on now to specifics, my authorities have studied with great care the "basic provisions" for a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons which the Soviet Union has recently submitted. They have come to the conclusion that these Soviet proposals, although in a number of areas they fail to provide satisfactory solutions, constitute progress in so far as they acknowledge, in principle, the necessity of systematic on-site inspections.

As delegations will remember, during the spring session the Federal Republic of Germany presented a working paper (CD/265) which outlined our concept of a realistic and efficient verification system.

I have the honour today to introduce a new working paper which elaborates on the ideas contained in document CD/265, taking into account contributions by other delegations and giving further precisions. The main purpose of this new paper, which is numbered CD/326, is to suggest possible formulations for those sections of the chemical weapons convention which are directly linked to the problem of verification. This is to say that the paper suggests language for the chapters dealing with "verification" and the "Consultative Committee" and thereby gives a clear picture of the obligations States will have to undertake in the field of verification.

We propose an effective, practical and reliable verification system which, at the same time, requires only limited personnel and financial resources for its implementation. Our main considerations in this respect are as follows:

A chemical weapons verification system would aspire to provide the highest possible degree of assurance that the treaty obligations are being met by all participants, while not requiring an outsized supervision apparatus.

We propose a solution which establishes a high detection risk for any possible violator by introducing two different types of checks:

(a) One which provides for investigations in case of allegations that treaty obligations are not being observed, are being neglected or are being circumvented. Such "checks on special grounds" must be binding upon the State against which an allegation of breach is levelled. Confidence in the observance of treaty obligations could indeed not develop if it were left entirely to the discretion of the suspected State to admit or refuse a special check, on the grounds that the checks were of a mere voluntary nature. An exception might be made in the event of the request being totally devoid of foundation in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the parties.

(b) Secondly, we propose regular checks upon compliance with key treaty obligations namely: destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons, dismantling and destruction of chemical weapons production and filling facilities, observance of the permitted maximum amount for the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals as defined by the treaty and compliance with the obligation not to produce chemical weapons. In order to keep the verification system practicable, it is our conviction that regular checks with regard to non-production are indispensable only for that part of the chemical industry which could potentially produce supertoxic chemical agents, and specifically for the producers of organophosphorus compounds. Coverage of this segment

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

of the chemical industry by regular checks would at the same time provide a practical and effective solution to the problem of verifying the non-production of key precursors for binary weapons. On the basis of present technological standards, no major industrial country can be ruled out as a producer of such materials.

There is no need to carry out on-site inspections at all relevant factories as a continuous operation. An adequate degree of confidence will develop if the international Consultative Committee annually decides on a quota of such factories to be inspected, and selects the individual installations by casting lots.

I appeal to all delegations to work towards a solution of the unresolved issues of a convention on the total ban of chemical weapons. As the use of chemical weapons is already proscribed, it should be possible to ban these weapons in a complete and comprehensive manner, and to reach this aim soon. It appears that the main argument for retaining chemical weapons is the fear that others might possess and use them. It is now possible to break this vicious circle.

Before leaving the field of chemical weapons, may I offer a brief comment on Ambassador Issraelyan's statement of 2 September on the subject.

My delegation is grateful for having obtained some further clarification on the questions put to the Soviet delegation, jointly with the Netherlands, in document CD/308, and we are looking forward to replies on the remainder of our queries. As a preparatory step towards the requested formal answers, my delegation would welcome, and be readily available at all times for, the kind of bilateral or trilateral informal exchanges suggested by the Soviet Ambassador.

Ambassador Issraelyan in his statement made references to old stockpiles of United States chemical weapons on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. These stocks are not within the domain of the Federal Government. At the moment of entry into force of a chemical weapons convention, they would have to be declared and destroyed by the United States of America. The implementation of these obligations would be subject to the treaty clauses on verification, which would mean, in our view, to systematic on-site inspections under the auspices of the consultative committee of experts. Although verification would thus take place on German territory, my Government would readily admit these measures in the interest of enhancing international confidence. Needless to say, the very same declaration and verification procedures would have to apply to the substantial stockpiles of Soviet chemical weapons on the territory of East European States and the German Democratic Republic.

My delegation listened attentively last week to the formal exchange of views on the dangers of an arms race in outer space, a topic to which it actively contributed both during the spring session and at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

As is now recognized, not least by the urgent recommendation contained in the concluding document of UNISPACE '82, our Committee is the only international forum which can recognize, analyse and seek solutions to the dangerous developments in outer space. Recognizing responsibility and obligations means seeking ways and means by which the Committee on Disarmament can perform these tasks. Space technology, as has frequently been spelled out in this Committee, is ambivalent: reconnaissance, remote sensing, navigation and weather satellites can, of course, be put to military use. But the heading "military usefulness" can also include military activities consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. In addition, satellites can help with the vitally important task of verifying arms control agreements. They can therefore play an important role in strengthening confidence in compliance with international treaties.

A threat to international security, however, is constituted by satellites with a destructive capability, that is to say, those anti-satellite systems which the USSR has developed and has already tested on several occasions. This, regrettably, has marked the beginning of a dangerous development. We are all aware that the development of space technology is far from having run its full course. Radiation weapons, such as high-energy laser weapons and particle-beam weapons, present further technological possibilities for the use of outer space even though their military use is not expected before the end of this decade.

What has been done so far by the community of States to end the militarization of outer space? The many years of world-wide efforts to keep outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies free of weapons and military bases are reflected in the test-ban Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the moon Treaty and the ABM Treaty. These four treaties, particularly, of course, the outer space Treaty of 1967, have not been able to satisfy the initially cherished hope that the various demilitarization provisions of the law governing outer space could spill over to give impetus to more extensive steps towards arms control. Existing bans and requirements under international law with regard to the exclusive use of the moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes have left loopholes and are open to varying interpretations.

In the operative part of the outer space Treaty, for instance, the use of the moon and other planets is only permitted for "peaceful purposes". In connection with negotiations on that treaty, the question was raised of how this term was to be understood.

As in the negotiations at that time, the unaltered attitude of my Government is that the term "peaceful purposes" must not be seen as equivalent to "non-military purposes". The right to self-defence and collective defence which is embodied in the United Nations Charter must not be restricted by a general embargo on measures of a defensive nature, even if they are carried out in space.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

On the other hand, every move which leads to a balanced reduction or restriction of offensive military devices and activities in outer space, and which can thereby increase international security, will receive our support. The inadequacy of substantive legal rules of arms control in outer space corresponds to the lack of a suitable procedure for verifying compliance with the relevant obligations. An effective system of supervision and inspection has not yet been agreed upon in any of the existing treaties. Future agreements whose object is the exclusive use of outer space for peaceful purposes must contain stringent verification provisions. As my delegation has pointed out on previous occasions, the lack of verification arrangements in the Soviet draft treaty is one of the most fundamental shortcomings in the Soviet approach. I hope and expect that the Soviet delegation will take advantage of the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament to present in detail its conception of how the question of verification can be regulated in a future treaty so that the use of space technology in breach of the treaty can be precluded.

I believe I have made clear that previous treaties have not been substantial enough to ensure an acceptable level of arms control in outer space. The Soviet draft treaty of 10 August 1981 does not bring us any further in this respect.

My delegation feels that despite the need for haste, information on the state and future development of space technology must precede formal treaty negotiations. The American space programme, as announced by President Reagan at the beginning of July, not only offers the prospect of international co-operation in the use of outer space, but also underlines American willingness to consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures in outer space that would ban or otherwise limit the testing and deployment of specific weapons systems. An informative exchange of views, in which in particular the leading space Powers ought to participate, could win sympathy for an initial approach to negotiations which concentrates only on those systems whose own destructive capacity enables them to attack and destroy satellites required for reconnaissance, navigation, communications, weather forecasting and verification of disarmament agreements. This approach was proposed in United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/97 C.

I see three steps which ought to determine our future course of action:

A comprehensive exchange of views on the state of development of space technology;

Identification of the systems posing the greatest threat;

Establishment at the appropriate juncture of a working group with a clearly defined mandate to engage, as a first step, in discussions on the most threatening and destabilizing systems.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

My concluding remarks relate to radiological weapons. Some days ago, in the Working Group, my delegation announced the imminent tabling of a working paper on the issues raised by a prohibition of military attacks on nuclear installations in the framework of a radiological weapons treaty. As I pointed out on that occasion, the working paper purports to recapitulate and amplify technical contributions made by my delegation in the course of negotiations on the subject at the spring session. The working paper also dwells upon the question how the existing protection of such installations under international law can best be improved, and formulates recommendations as to the relationship of such enhanced regulation to the "traditional" radiological weapons subject matter. The working paper offers a fairly comprehensive view of the problems mentioned, and, in the intention of its authors, should prove to be of substantial benefit to negotiators when they resume their work next spring. I am pleased to provide this brief introduction of the paper before the Committee and would like to request that it be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament, in addition to its status in the Working Group.

Speaking now as the outgoing Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, I should like to share with my colleagues a guarded feeling of optimism as to the future course of negotiations in that Group. During the current session, very limited time was set aside for formal work by the Group. However, as you are aware, I have tried to make use of the past weeks to invite delegations to reflect upon some problems which have so far hindered the rapid progress of negotiations, in particular with respect to the relationship of the two principal sets of problems to be regulated. On 2 September, I gave a full report to the Working Group on the results of my consultations which is contained in document CD/RW/WP.38 and I do not intend to repeat its contents here. I am pleased to note that the subsequent discussions have borne out my impressions that some new degree of flexibility has become visible on the part of delegations professing a particular interest in the matter. This has confirmed me in my view that a solution to the key problem of the radiological weapons negotiations can be found shortly under the double concept of "separation" and "linkage". I have also been encouraged to circulate, as a formal working paper of the Working Group, a revised, and I hope improved, version of a complete draft treaty on the so-called "traditional" radiological weapons subject-matter, after having been assured by a number of delegations that they would be prepared to consider that document as a basis for further negotiations in 1983. I continue to believe that the radiological weapons convention is a perishable good. The negotiation and conclusion of an international legal instrument -- or instruments -- cannot be protracted interminably. All delegations should constantly remind themselves that the failure of the Committee to provide comprehensive regulation in this field will gravely compromise the credibility and operationability of this body. But I think there are encouraging signs that this awareness is gaining ground. I wish every good luck to my successor as the Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, in all sincerity I wish to say that I am indeed very pleased to see you presiding over our deliberations at this point in time. I have had the pleasure and privilege of knowing or reading about you for a period of about 20 years and at no time during this period have I had any reason to doubt your total, almost religious, commitment to the cause of peace and disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, apart from our personal relations and my knowledge of you, our two countries are two close allies in the struggle for equitable international economic relations.

Similarly, I should like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya. We all wish him success in his new area of responsibility. We welcome to our midst the new Peruvian Ambassador, Mr. Cannock, and hope that we will be able to co-operate with him as we did with his predecessor. We are sorry to see Ambassador Summerhayes leave us. We shall always remember him for his constructive contribution to the work of this Committee. We also wish him success in his new assignment.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall devote my intervention today to two main topics, namely:

1. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and
2. Weapons of mass destruction.

I have had occasion to state that the total failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament could be attributed in no small measure to the lack of sense of realism prevailing in current disarmament negotiations within this Committee, and also to the lack of political will among the nuclear-weapon States, especially those with the largest arsenals. The decision taken by the Committee not to convene the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances during the present session results from the non-co-operative attitude of the nuclear-weapon States concerning this matter. Basically, disagreements centre around the interpretation of what constitutes security interests and the evolution of a "common formula" which would be acceptable to all parties. We are plagued by this impasse despite the fact that negotiations in the Working Group have clarified many of the issues involved. This is the present situation and, like most of the stages we have reached in other areas, it is a pathetic and regrettable one.

My neighbour, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, Chairman of the Working Group, led the Group through very difficult negotiating sessions with his usual competence but his efforts were thwarted by the nuclear-weapon States. It is the hope of my delegation, and possibly all non-nuclear-weapon States, that whatever difficulties may be on the way will be surmounted before the Committee's session in 1983. We hope that the cooling-off period that the Committee has afforded the Working Group will not be used to dream up new and formidable excuses by the nuclear-weapon States to stultify our efforts in this matter.



(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

During the negotiations in the Working Group, my delegation identified two major problems -- firstly, there is the problem relating to the scope of the assurances, that is to say, which non-nuclear-weapon States should be eligible for assurances from the nuclear-weapon States; and secondly, under what circumstances nuclear-weapon States will withdraw their assurances. Our views on this matter are probably well known and I need not stress again why non-nuclear-weapon States should be given legal and credible assurances that they will not be the victims of nuclear attack or blackmail. In a nutshell, my delegation believes that the unilateral declarations made by the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the USSR in 1978 are inadequate and subject to divergent interpretations. One would have preferred the nuclear-weapon States to give unconditional assurances to those non-nuclear-weapon States that have undertaken firm, binding commitments not to develop, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Having given up their sovereign rights, these countries are entitled to credible assurances by the nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. Up to now, the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 provides the only legal means for preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. While one would not like to go far into history, it is necessary to stress that the non-proliferation regime of which that Treaty is the cornerstone is being seriously threatened because certain articles of the Treaty are not being observed. For example, under articles I-III, all parties pledged not to take action contrary to the goal of non-proliferation. These articles are far from being scrupulously observed. Another article that is not being observed is article IV which provides for making the peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to all nations and article VI, which requires nuclear-weapon States to negotiate in good faith and make progress on nuclear arms reduction.

If more adherents are to be won to the cause of non-proliferation, the provisions of the Treaty must be strictly observed. It was the failure to implement article VI of the Treaty that resulted in the failure of the second non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Any further reckless breach of the articles of the non-proliferation Treaty may unleash a terrible chain-reaction.

In trying to identify ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered on negative security assurances, the Committee should take into account that there are today at least 12 nations that have developed nuclear capacities outside the non-proliferation Treaty, and they obviously pose a danger to the non-proliferation regime. Certainly some conditional assurances could be given to them, possibly by way of a non-first-use of nuclear weapons, but these States do fall outside of non-nuclear-weapon States as defined in the non-proliferation Treaty.

It appears that the greatest incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons is that of enhanced national power and prestige. As far back as 7 March 1979, a seminar organized by the Special Committee Against Apartheid under the chairmanship of Ambassador Harriman of Nigeria, concluded that the development of South Africa's uranium enrichment plant will not only strengthen its international bargaining power, but as a major supplier of enriched uranium, it can blackmail the international community. This development must be checked!

On previous occasions I have observed that if it is possible to establish a relationship between success in disarmament negotiations and a favourable international climate, will it not be worth our while to make serious efforts at improving the international climate while at the same time working hard on disarmament negotiations? Certainly the future of the non-proliferation regime requires more

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

confidence-building measures for the nuclear have-nots in the area of supplies and control of nuclear material. At the present time, parties outside the non-proliferation Treaty have readily available access to nuclear materials and equipment and are unhampered by a legally binding commitment not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Certainly the most immediate threat to the non-proliferation regime is posed by the spread of reactor-grade plutonium, a few kilos of which are readily convertible into an explosive device. By the year 2000, it is predicted that there will be enough plutonium from reactors in 22 countries to produce 50,000 bombs of the Nagasaki type. Verification of diversion of plutonium is difficult if not impossible. Solution to the above problems can only, therefore, be political.

The political solution requires the immediate granting of credible assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States by the nuclear-weapon States in treaty form, and alongside the above, as if it were a protocol, the nuclear-weapon States must undertake significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals because if they continue to increase their nuclear armaments other States will also like to have these prestige toys of death. It is up to the nuclear-weapon States to make constructive and realistic proposals on the question of "negative security assurance" in order to halt the search for nuclear independence.

Permit me now to offer some brief remarks on our agenda item for today -- new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Whenever the issue of weapons of mass destruction is discussed, one cannot help calling to mind the views of the 1978 Lambeth Conference, as follows:

"The use of the modern technology of war is the most striking example of corporate sin and the prostitution of God's gifts".

The use of weapons of mass destruction is really a prostitution of God's gifts. Some of the countries represented in this Committee have abolished capital punishment on the ground that it is barbaric and that no man has the right to take the life of another. This means that even if a mass murderer has been duly tried and found guilty, the State has no right to take his life as a form of punishment. But these same people who will move heaven and earth to protect the life of a mass murderer devote a considerable proportion of their resources producing weapons of mass destruction which, when used, kill combatants and non-combatants alike, including innocent women and children. This is one of the dilemmas of western civilization, using the word "western" in a cultural rather than ideological sense.

My delegation continues to attach great importance to the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons in pursuance of United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/97 B. We see such a convention in the context of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament; consequently, a future treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons should contain an explicit commitment to pursue urgently negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and other priority items on the Committee's agenda.

Although the brevity of the summer session does not allow for the regular meetings of the Working Group we are, however, pleased to note that the informal consultations conducted by the active Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Henning Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, has produced some fruitful results. The evaluation of the replies received from delegations, contained in working paper CD/RW/WP.38 is a true reflection of the deadlock in the Working Group on the separation of the so-called "traditional" radiological subject-matter, and the problems relating to the protection of nuclear facilities from attacks.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

It is also gratifying to note from the exchange of views held during the Ad Hoc Working Group's first meeting on 2 September 1982, that some delegations that have persistently advocated separation of the two subject-matters in appropriate legal instruments have, in a spirit of compromise, demonstrated some flexibility, and are now ready to explore various options based on the principle of "separation" with a "linkage" mechanism either in terms of protocols to the treaty or other possibilities that will have to be examined in the Working Group.

It is also noted in the Chairman's stock-taking statement that the Swedish delegation that originally made the proposal "has moved away from a rigorous application of the 'one instrument' concept, and has given thought to the possibility of an umbrella agreement for both subject-matters where either would be incorporated in a separate -- and I repeat the word 'separate' -- annexed protocol".

This positive approach towards negotiations, if pursued, will augur well for the work of this Working Group. My delegation, for one, has always shown considerable understanding for the views and national positions of other delegations based on principle, but we do not subscribe to rigid postures as a rule even where options for compromise are possible. It is in this context that we welcome the constructive proposal of the Japanese delegation on an optional linkage mechanism as contained in working paper CD/323. The proposal obviously has its demerits, but we believe it could provide a sound basis for further discussion in the effort to find lasting solutions.

My delegation stands convinced that negotiations on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in the framework of a radiological weapons convention should be pursued in this Committee. As a developing country, our interest in the subject stems from a belief in the inalienable rights of States to develop and implement their nuclear energy programmes for peaceful purposes. Also, the commitment of my country to the socio-economic development of its peoples, and to the fostering of international co-operation in the field of technology will, in my opinion necessitate the provision of adequate guarantees in an appropriate legal instrument to safeguard and protect facilities like nuclear power stations and processing or reprocessing plants developed for peaceful purposes. However, while my delegation remains flexible on the linkage mechanism that will ultimately evolve in the Working Group, we firmly believe that the scope of the prohibition should be broad enough to meet the concerns of all States -- both nuclear and non-nuclear, developed and developing.

Finally, the present trend in the Ad Hoc Working Group should remind us all that there is no creditable substitute for political will as a necessary ingredient for success in disarmament negotiations. As we prepare for the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, we should not close the door to informal consultations. Our report to the General Assembly should be forward-looking, reflecting the collective effort to find lasting solutions. We agree with the view that the divergences contained in the special report to the second special session now before the General Assembly should not be reopened. It is only in this way that the international community can make a positive contribution to the future work of the Ad Hoc Working Group at its 1983 spring session.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want to express my delegation's sincere satisfaction in seeing you in the Chair of this Committee at this crucial stage of our work. The previous speakers throughout this month have used all superlative adjectives in describing your experience and personal qualities and I can only endorse all those expressions of confidence in you. At the same time, my delegation also wants to express its gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, for the excellent way in which he carried out his tasks as our Chairman during the month of August.

The main topic for today's meeting includes the question of radiological weapons. I should, therefore, like to take this opportunity to make a brief statement on the present state of affairs as far as the work on a treaty prohibiting such weapons is concerned.

Although the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has had only one substantive meeting during this part of the 1982 session, it is the impression of my delegation that a great deal of progress has been made, thanks to the constructive efforts displayed by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Henning Wegener. The Working Group should thus be in a position to start fruitful negotiations right from the beginning of the 1983 session.

The Swedish delegation has noted with great satisfaction that the proposal regarding the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities has been widely acknowledged as a legitimate matter for negotiations in the context of a treaty banning radiological weapons. The number of negative or sceptical voices seems to be constantly diminishing as the importance and relevance of this issue becomes clearer. The comprehensive discussion we have had of these matters with the assistance of qualified experts during the 1982 session has greatly contributed to this end. This is not to say, however, that all problems have been resolved, but I think that delegations are now better prepared than before to have a serious discussion of the complex issues which arise in this context.

The time pressure felt by many delegations to have a treaty ready before the second special session on disarmament is no longer there. This will hopefully make it easier to conclude a meaningful treaty, which will be an asset to the world and to this Committee rather than a symbolic agreement devoid of all substance, which would merely have damaged the credibility of the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. It is high time for this body to be allowed to fulfil its proper role and not be confined merely to underwriting drafts which are negotiated outside the Committee, and, as in this case, practically empty of real substance in terms of arms limitation or disarmament.

It is a source of satisfaction to my delegation that several delegations have indicated that they are prepared to be flexible as far as the negotiation of a treaty on radiological weapons is concerned. It now seems to be generally acknowledged that "tracks A and B" should be given equal treatment, and that a linkage between them should be striven for. The Swedish delegation will also be flexible in this regard. As a matter of fact, Sweden intends to submit at an early stage during the spring session next year a draft treaty with two protocols, one dealing with the "traditional" part of the radiological weapons subject-matter, based on the original Soviet-American proposal, and the other dealing with the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

My delegation has noted with interest the recent Japanese draft protocol contained in working paper CD/RW/WP.37. We would like to study this in depth before making comments in detail. We note, however, that one obvious difference between the Japanese draft and the so-called Swedish proposal is the fact that Japan envisages an optional protocol for "track B", whereas Sweden, as I have just said, intends to propose two mutually dependent protocols of equal standing, which would thus give the same importance to both "track A" and "track B". The separation of those two "tracks" is in our view a useful negotiating device, but in terms of the final outcome -- a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons -- the two tracks will have to be closely linked, so that one goes with the other. My delegation has stated it many times before and I repeat it again: a treaty on radiological weapons which does not contain a prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities would be meaningless in substance. Furthermore, it would be detrimental to the credibility of the Committee on Disarmament.

Let me conclude by calling attention to another matter of great importance in this context. The primary motive for the Swedish proposal is the banning of attacks against nuclear facilities with a view to spreading radioactivity for hostile purposes. Next to a nuclear weapon explosion this would be the most effective method of dispersing radioactivity. This possibility must obviously be closed, if a treaty banning radiological warfare is to be meaningful. The protection of nuclear facilities is a secondary effect which is of great importance, not least to the civilian population. But as I said, the main motive is the banning of the military exploitation of this possibility as a means of radiological warfare. That is why it is relevant in the context of a treaty on radiological weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The last speaker on my list is the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Herder, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, it is my privilege to extend to you the warmest congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of September. This is the last month of the summer session and therefore a crucial one. Your deep knowledge and wide experience in disarmament affairs and your well-known commitment to disarmament will certainly contribute considerably to the discharge of our responsibilities. I pledge you the full co-operation of my delegation.

Today the Committee on Disarmament takes up the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Notwithstanding the priority of agenda items 1 and 2, it is an important task of the Committee as a negotiating body to find effective ways to curb the qualitative arms race in this field. Our Committee has now, as before, the duty to implement paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the validity of which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the second special session.

The conclusion of a comprehensive agreement to prohibit the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction is today more urgent than ever before.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

We are all witnessing how rapid progress in science and technology virtually day by day opens up new, until now unknown possibilities for the creation of new weapons. In previous discussions we have already referred, among other things, to such dangerous concepts as particle-beam weapons, infrasonic weapons, electromagnetic radiation weapons and ethnic weapons. Moreover, tremendous resources are spent for military research and development and thus are taken away from use for civilian purposes. According to the recently published Palme report, for example, in the United States and the United Kingdom, expenditures for so-called defence research account for half of all publicly financed research. At the same time, the transformation of military research achievements into new weapons systems takes place in a rather short time.

While in the second part of the 1970s, experts of highly developed Western countries here in the Committee on Disarmament contested the possibility of the introduction of laser weapons into military arsenals, today it is known that these weapons will become a reality in a few years' time. The United States has rapidly increased the financial resources for military laser research from year to year. These resources, amounting to \$40 million in 1975, were increased to more than \$200 million in 1980 and to nearly \$300 million in 1982.

Similar developments can be observed in other fields. Only a few weeks ago Israel, in its barbarous aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian people, used a new type of weapon, the so-called fuel-air bomb. The explosion energy of this weapon is today already four to six times greater in comparison with "traditional" bombs and could be made even 20 times greater in the near future, as was stated by experts of the United States. The main effect of this weapon is that it causes the suffocation of human beings by deoxygenizing the air.

Today nobody knows with which weapon we will be confronted tomorrow, what is still in "Pandora's box".

My delegation is fully aware of the complexity and difficulties of reaching agreement on a comprehensive treaty. But should we therefore take up a mere deliberating role, lean back and wait for developments and, preferably, a ready solution? Why should we not now try to forestall once and for all the creation of new, dangerous weapons of mass destruction? Are there really insurmountable problems with regard to the determination of the scope and the elaboration of appropriate verification provisions? Would such a prohibition of development really hamper scientific and technological progress?

It is not my intention to dwell upon these questions now in detail. My delegation has already done so on previous occasions.

Since 1976, when deliberations started in this body, a great number of questions have been discussed. A number of concrete proposals are now before the Committee, including the Soviet expanded draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons from 1977 (CCD/511/Rev.1). It was also the Soviet Union which in 1978 submitted a concrete proposal concerning the establishment of an ad hoc group of

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction to be included in the initial list of the types of such weapons to be prohibited under a comprehensive agreement. Moreover, informal meetings with experts shed light on many details of this matter.

My delegation deems it high time to go ahead in a practical manner. In our view the best way would be to proceed step by step. The first practical measure towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement could be declarations, identical in substance, by States permanent members of the Security Council as well as by other militarily significant States concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons as requested by resolution 36/89 of the General Assembly. In this regard, we have to take into account that these countries account for over 90 per cent of world military research. This measure would be of great political importance and could contribute to a further increase in confidence between States.

At the same time, we favour the establishment of an ad hoc working group of experts. As my delegation stated during this year's spring session, the experts could consider possible areas of development of new weapons of mass destruction and elaborate a general definition of such weapons to be included in an international instrument. Thus the ground would be prepared for a comprehensive agreement.

My delegation regrets very much that one group of countries in this body is up to now not prepared to support the establishment of such an expert group. General Assembly resolution 33/66 A, initiated by the United Kingdom and supported by this group, underlined the need to take effective measures in order to prevent new types of weapons of mass destruction coming into being.

In our opinion the expert group is a possible way of preparing effective measures. What is necessary is the political will of all groups of States in this Committee to achieve concrete results.

Let me summarize. To tackle in a practical manner the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, my delegation favours the following approach:

(a) Declarations by the permanent members of the Security Council as well as by militarily significant States concerning the refusal to create new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction;

(b) The establishment of an ad hoc group of experts;

(c) The conclusion of a comprehensive or "umbrella" agreement which could be supplemented by a list of individual types and systems of prohibited new weapons of mass destruction;

(d) The conclusion of individual agreements on the prohibition of specific new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, if this is deemed necessary.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In one of today's statements an attempt was made to play down the responsibility of the country in question for the enormous threat emanating permanently from its own and other people's stockpiles of chemical weapons deployed on its territory. The representative who made this statement thus confirmed the truth of the report published in recent months in this regard which has been met with great concern by the public, particularly the people living in this area. Neither general declarations nor implicit accusations of others can divert attention from this great danger. On the contrary, it should serve as a further proof of the urgent necessity to make headway towards the effective prohibition and complete destruction of all chemical weapons, to be agreed upon as soon as possible..

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no more speakers on my list for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor?

Apparently not, so I shall proceed to make certain announcements. Let us begin with this afternoon. As you know, we shall hold an informal meeting this afternoon on item 5 of the agenda, which we have been considering this morning. This afternoon also, as was announced in the timetable distributed earlier, there will be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. That meeting will take place in Conference Room No. V. As you will also recall, at our last meeting, when I spoke about the small number of working days that remained at our disposal, I indicated that the figure I gave was based on the assumption that our last meeting would be held on 16 September. The secretariat has prepared a timetable for next week's meetings which has been distributed this morning. This timetable, as all members of the Committee will have seen, is based on the same closing date of 16 September. Perhaps the Committee could adopt this timetable of meetings, on the customary understanding that it is tentative and can be adjusted later if necessary. If I hear no objections, I shall assume that the Committee adopts the timetable distributed by the secretariat today, on that understanding.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): As regards tomorrow, Wednesday, 8 September, as representatives will have seen from the timetable distributed at our last meeting, an informal meeting of the Committee has been arranged for 11 a.m. -- an informal meeting to be devoted again to item 5 of the agenda. In order that that meeting may begin promptly, may I remind you that we agreed last time that 10 minutes after the hour fixed is a reasonable time for opening our meetings. We shall therefore begin at 11.10 a.m. The informal meetings of those of the Committee's various groups wishing to hold such consultations will take place at 9.30 a.m. instead of the usual 10.30 or 11 a.m. I understand from the co-ordinator of the Group of 21 that this will apply to that group at least. As regards the other groups, their co-ordinators will inform the members of the groups.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on 14 September at 10 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.



COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.186  
14 September 1982  
ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING  
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 14 September 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. García Robles

(Mexico)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia: Mr. T. FINDLAY  
Miss S. BOYD

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUIEROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. TELLALOV  
Mr. SOTIROV  
Mr. DEYANOV  
Mr. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U TIN KYAW HLAING  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. LI WEIMIN

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLÁ VILA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. L. STAVINOHA  
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. A.R. EL REEDY  
Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. W. BASSIM  
Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. d'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINCLER  
Mr. U. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. G. GAJDA

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. T. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

Mr. J.M. KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA

Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR

Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU

Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK

Mr. J.B. DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. T. PANAIT

Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Miss H. OLSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN

Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

Mrs. J.I. LINK

Mr. L. MIDDLETON

United States of America:

Mr. M.D. BUSBY

Mr. M. WINSTON

Mr. R. MILTON

Ms. M. WINSTON

Venezuela:

Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 186th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee will today take up item 8 of its agenda, which includes consideration of the reports of its subsidiary bodies and the consideration and adoption of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements about any other matter connected with the work of the Committee.

Allow me, first, to offer a warm welcome in the Committee to the new representative of Yugoslavia, His Excellency Ambassador Kazimir Vidas, who is with us today for the first time. Ambassador Vidas is an experienced diplomat who has held important posts in the course of his career. He has taken part in many international conferences as well as in sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and of other international bodies. Ambassador Vidas has in the past been involved in disarmament efforts and has participated very actively in the meetings of the non-aligned movement. In 1978 he was appointed his country's Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He will, I am sure, make an outstanding contribution to the work of our Committee.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of India, the United Kingdom, Cuba, Indonesia, Romania, Egypt and the Federal Republic of Germany. I now give the floor to the first of these, the representative of India, Mr. Saran.

Mr. SARAN (India): It is a matter of great pleasure to my delegation to see you, the distinguished representative of friendly Mexico, in the Chair for this crucial month of September when we shall be engaged in finalizing our report to the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. Familiar as we are with your experience in, and deep dedication to, disarmament, we have no doubt that within the next few days we shall achieve a successful conclusion to our work for the 1982 session. As always, the delegation of India pledges its full support and co-operation to you in your difficult endeavours.

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome on behalf of my delegation, Ambassador Cannock of Peru. We wish him a successful tenure in Geneva and are confident that our two delegations will continue to co-operate as closely as we have done in the past. May I also join you, Mr. Chairman, in extending a warm welcome to Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia, the representative of a friendly non-aligned country. We wish him all success in his assignment in Geneva.

We have also learnt that Ambassador Summerhayes will be leaving us shortly. I take this opportunity to bid him farewell. Ambassador Summerhayes embodies in himself the best traditions of British diplomacy, and we regret that we shall be losing such an experienced member of this Committee. On behalf of my Delegation, I would like to wish him all success in his new assignment.

This summer session of the Committee has been a relatively brief one. In the wake of the dismal failure of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it has also been a session at which much less intensive work has been done than before. Among the items under negotiation, in-depth work has been possible only on chemical weapons. And for this the credit should go to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. It was under his guidance that several informal contact groups on various elements of the future convention have been mapped out, in very

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clear and precise detail, including the territory which must be covered in negotiations and the outstanding issues which must be resolved. In many cases the contact groups have gone beyond the stage of identifying existing divergences and have set forth certain promising options which may lead to compromise solutions. It is this kind of work which in our view will bring the objective of a chemical weapons convention closer to realization.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was unable to draw up any conclusions for our future work, primarily because it was unable to reach agreement on an appropriate work programme. While every delegation in the Group agreed that issues relating to verification of compliance cannot be considered in isolation, it did not prove possible to reach consensus on a working hypothesis concerning the nature and the scope of the multilateral treaty that we envisage will eventually emerge through a process of multilateral negotiations. As far as my delegation is concerned, we have consistently taken the position that a treaty on a nuclear test ban should aim at the general and complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time. Along with other members of the Group of 21, we have repeatedly stated that such a treaty should be able to attract universal adherence and should include a verification system which is universal in its application, non-discriminatory in character and which provides for equal access by all States.

While we regret that we were unable to reach a consensus on a work programme, we should not lose sight of the very interesting and fruitful exchange of views that took place on several key issues related to a nuclear test ban in the Working Group. Certain important queries were addressed to the three nuclear-weapon States participating in the negotiations, concerning their approach to verification. In response to queries from my delegation, one of the parties which had participated in the trilateral negotiations until they were suspended in the Autumn of 1980, i.e. the Soviet Union, confirmed unambiguously that the trilateral negotiators had reached complete agreement on all the elements relating to the verification aspects of a multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban. That delegation informed the Working Group that the questions awaiting solution related to certain additional measures which would be applicable only to the three parties engaged in those restricted negotiations. This is an extremely significant statement and should be taken due note of by the Committee.

The Soviet Union also confirmed that it considered the means of verification at present available, using both national technical means as well as international co-operative measures for the detection and identification of seismic events, to be more than sufficient to verify compliance with a treaty on a nuclear test ban.

It is unfortunate that the two other parties which had been engaged in the trilateral negotiations have not been as forthcoming as the Soviet Union in providing the Working Group with details relating to those negotiations which could be of considerable use to the Working Group.

The United States and the United Kingdom were also asked to specify what they regarded as adequate with respect to verification of a nuclear test ban. These two nuclear-weapon States have in the past taken the position that the means of verification at present available are not capable of giving sufficient assurance that the provisions of a general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon testing are being complied with. They have held that the main obstacles in achieving the

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successful conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban are technical in character and more specifically the inability to detect yields below a certain threshold. These delegations were asked, therefore, what they consider to be an adequate level of detection with respect to a nuclear test ban. Instead of giving us a direct reply to this question, both delegations have expressed the view that adequacy is not a matter which can be defined in terms of numbers and yield levels alone but rather involved a whole complex of issues, both political and technical. This view is, of course, one which the non-aligned and neutral countries have espoused for a number of years now. We are happy that the States which have in the past considered the question of verification purely from the point of view of overcoming certain technical obstacles have now come closer to the viewpoint that has been held by a majority of countries.

The complex of political and technical issues relating to verification of compliance with a treaty on a nuclear test ban must of course be the subject of negotiations. This we are prepared to engage in within the Working Group if and when it is set up next year. In the meantime, it would be useful if the delegations of the nuclear-weapon States concerned could give us a clear-cut idea as to what, in their view, constitutes the complex of political and technical issues which they have referred to.

The Committee has had encouraging, though inconclusive, informal discussions relating to the proposal put forward by my delegation for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war. These informal discussions have revealed that there are no objections in principle to this proposal. Some delegations have expressed their misgivings concerning the scope of the negotiations which should be engaged in under the aegis of this working group. Fears have been expressed that the Group would become a substitute for a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament. I would like to state that as far as my delegation is concerned, we do not consider the proposal for a subsidiary body on the prevention of nuclear war as a substitute for a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament. Our delegation has already put forward a very clear-cut and unambiguous mandate for the proposed working group which is to reach agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war (CD/309). Under such terms of reference, delegations may put forward whatever proposals or initiatives they consider as contributing to the prevention of nuclear war. Obviously one should not interpret the mandate in such a broad manner as to encompass negotiations on general and complete disarmament itself. Certainly, it can be argued that the most effective way of preventing nuclear war is through the elimination of nuclear weapons and in a sense through the achievement of general and complete disarmament itself. However, we are not at this stage being as ambitious as that. We are thinking of more modest initiatives of an urgent nature which could be adopted quickly in order to reduce the risk to the very survival of mankind which emanates from the very existence of nuclear weapons.

Nor can the mandate be interpreted as encompassing measures for the prevention of the use of force in general. Certainly it is true that all wars ought to be avoided and that observance of the principle of the non-use of force as set out in the



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Charter of the United Nations has a bearing on the question of the prevention of a nuclear war. Here again, our view is that we ought to have a clear-cut sense of priorities and clearly defined objectives. While wars using conventional weapons can cause widespread death and destruction, it is the use of nuclear weapons which would jeopardize the survival of mankind. The use of nuclear weapons in wars would mean the use of weapons of mass destruction. Conventional weapons, even the most destructive kind, are not weapons of mass destruction. In our view, survival comes first and it must be the object of immediate and urgent concern. The ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war should be looked at not so much from the point of view of the security of States but rather from the point of view of what is an imperative, i.e. the survival of mankind itself.

It is our hope that with these clarifications it should be possible to come to an early decision on this proposal. We are of course prepared to engage in further discussions concerning the mandate of this working group if that is considered necessary.

Although India is a developing country, it has taken a keen interest in the exploration of outer space. During the last 15 years or so, India has successfully trained a large number of personnel in space technology, including the designing and launching of satellites. The modest progress which has been achieved in India's space programme is inextricably linked with the close co-operation that its Department of Space has developed with space agencies in several countries including the Soviet Union, the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany and also international agencies. We believe that it is necessary to strengthen the environment within which such beneficial international co-operation can continue to develop and be strengthened. It is not enough to keep outer space devoid of weapons. It is necessary to keep outer space free of fears and suspicions that plague us here on earth and that is possible only through the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

We in India are convinced that space technology can be a powerful catalyst in the economic and social development of developing countries. Along with peaceful co-operation with other advanced countries we have tried to build our own indigenous expertise in this field. We are also prepared to share our modest achievements in this field with other developing countries, and the Government of India has decided to allocate a portion of India's space budget to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space among developing countries.

Given our commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space and the immense possibilities that we see in the development of space technology for our own economic development, it should come as no surprise to this Committee that my country is greatly concerned about the possibility of an arms race in outer space. Outer space must remain a domain of peace and a common heritage of mankind. We support negotiations that would ensure these objectives. Like other delegations belonging to the Group of 21, my delegation believes that we ought to set up without delay an ad hoc working group of this Committee to undertake negotiations on further measures

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for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as was called for in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In our view, the objective of negotiations within such a working group ought to be the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the development, testing and deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. Such an instrument would be a logical extension of the 1967 space Treaty which prohibits the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

While we believe that this is the kind of agreement we should aim at, we are, of course, prepared to consider, as a first step, more limited agreements such as the prohibition of the testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons.

I would like to add a few observations concerning negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons. My delegation will continue to oppose a definition of radiological weapons which would explicitly resort to an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons. These weapons should be defined in terms of the specific technical characteristics and attributes of these potential weapons of mass destruction. I would also like to clarify that my delegation cannot agree to a consideration of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, as recommended by Sweden, within the context of negotiations on radiological weapons. As we have stated earlier, the Swedish proposal relates properly to the laws of war and should, therefore, be considered in a different context and not confused with negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

In conclusion, I venture to hope that the period of review and reflection which delegations have been engaged in since the conclusion of the General Assembly's Second Special Session on Disarmament will result in a clearer direction and focus to our negotiating task during the Committee's 1983 session. The Indian delegation, for its part, is prepared to engage in intensive negotiations on all items of this Committee's agenda. Several delegations have referred to the organizational deficiencies of this Committee and have expressed the view that this body is unable to cope with negotiations on several items of its agenda simultaneously. My delegation does not share this view. It is only after we agree to engage in negotiations on various items that the machinery will have to be adjusted accordingly. The history of disarmament negotiations reveals that reform in machinery has not necessarily led to the conclusion of specific agreements. Frequently, the role of machinery becomes a mere pretext for delaying negotiations on priority disarmament items. It is for this reason that my delegation would prefer to see clearer evidence of a serious political commitment on the part of all members of this Committee, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to the principle of multilateral negotiations before giving consideration to measures of organizational reform.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, and I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, my statement this morning gives me the opportunity to welcome you in the chair of the Committee to which you have contributed in such a distinguished way. What has impressed me as a colleague of long standing is that in the marathon race— still not ended— which the proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament have become, you have always been one of those who set the pace. You have always made the extra effort which this role requires, and I admire you for that. I assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation in your present task. I would like also to extend my thanks, through the Kenyan delegation, to Ambassador Maina for his judicious and effective contribution in his work as Chairman for last month. I also want to extend a very warm welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Cannock of Peru and Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia. I wish them well in their future work in the Committee.

During the summer session which is now drawing to a close, my delegation has welcomed the chance to give particular attention to the work of two of our subsidiary bodies, those dealing with chemical weapons and with a nuclear test ban. I would like this morning to **review** briefly the progress we have made on the important issue of a nuclear test ban, for which we had a new Working Group with a mandate agreed and adopted in April this year. My delegation took part in the work from the start in the belief that the mandate of the Group was clear and precise and that it would permit us without delay "to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban". Whatever interpretation some delegations may like to put on this mandate, there is no doubt that it places verification and compliance in the centre of discussion. Some delegations none the less went on to argue that we must define the scope of a nuclear test ban before verification and compliance could be discussed; this attitude regrettably was a major factor in preventing us from adopting a work programme and undertaking the substantive examination of the issues expected of us.

It is of course true that, as paragraph 31 of the Final Document says,

"The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope, and nature of the agreement."

But that does not, in the view of my delegation, mean that at this present stage we must narrowly define these parameters. It is quite sufficient to make broad common-sense assumptions on which our consideration of a verification system can be based. To concentrate the discussion on scope is to divert the attention of the Group from the substantive issues set out in its mandate. Nevertheless, we have been drawn into a discussion on scope and this has served to emphasize one difference of view, the resolution of which would be crucial to the successful negotiation of a nuclear test-ban treaty. I am referring, of course, to the treatment to be accorded to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs). Some delegations have argued that PNEs should be excluded from the scope of a nuclear test-ban treaty; it has even been argued that only the State carrying out a peaceful nuclear explosion must decide whether it should be classified as such. This is not the time to answer these arguments in detail; but in my delegation's view the overriding consideration in this respect is to ensure that the purposes of a nuclear test-ban treaty are not frustrated; there would certainly be grave danger of this happening if nuclear

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explosions, labelled as being for "peaceful purposes", were freely allowed and their classification left to individual States. Whatever recourse is made to legal argument or to negotiating history, there remains the inescapable fact that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would provide information of potential military value and that in the system set up to monitor a test-ban treaty PNEs would, from a seismic verification point of view, be indistinguishable from nuclear-weapon test explosions. Is it conceivable that States would have confidence in a treaty with a loophole as large as this? And for those who seek support from negotiating history I would point out that while the trilateral negotiations envisaged a separate protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, that protocol would also have established a moratorium, and that the parties agreed that they would refrain from "causing, encouraging, permitting or in any way participating in and carrying out of such explosions until arrangements for conducting them are worked out which would be consistent with the treaty being negotiated." The problems involved in making such an arrangement have not yet been solved.

I will revert now to the central issue of verification. In our view the key element in discussing the verification of a test-ban treaty is whether it is possible to elaborate a system for detecting and identifying nuclear-weapon test explosions which would give adequate confidence of compliance with the treaty for all parties. As far as the seismic detection of nuclear-weapon test explosions is concerned, we already have available to us the proposals in documents CCD/558 and CD/43 for a global network of seismic stations, an international exchange of seismic data and the establishment of international data centres. The Group of Scientific Experts has done much valuable work and the experimental interchanges, although not entirely satisfactory, have demonstrated the potential of the exchange system. Our seismic experts are continuing to work on a number of unresolved problems. Some delegations, however, talk as though a global detection system were in existence already and as though it were of established rather than potential worth. They tend to brush aside all questions relating to technical matters and tell us that it is now "time to elaborate the political and legal framework and the elements of the verification system". They suggest that we must choose either to accept that all the technical means necessary for verifying compliance with a test ban already exist, or start a new detailed debate on highly technical issues.

My delegation does not think that the choice before us is as simple as this picture presents. We do not believe that the discussions we have had so far enable us to conclude that the means necessary for verifying compliance with a test ban treaty already exist. There are some important points, e.g. on-site inspection, which we have hardly touched upon. As the first practical step in the Working Group, we need to examine the proposals put forward by the Group of Scientific Experts and to establish what points of difference still remain. We do not see this as an "abstract" exercise. In our view, no amount of study of the "political and legal framework" will enable us to reach a successful conclusion unless we first agree on the technical basis of our detection and identification system. Examination of the records of the experts Group will show that there are important differences of view between delegations, particularly with regard to the use of Level 2 data. The distinguished representative of the USSR, in commenting on the report of the Group of Experts (CD/318) on 31 August, claimed that there was no technically proved need to exchange Level 2 data on a regular basis. He argued that the system proposed in document CCD/558 involving the exchange of Level 1 parameters was quite adequate. In the view of my delegation, Level 2 data are essential for identification purposes. For this reason it is necessary that we try to resolve the differences of view about how these data might be handled.

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It has been suggested that in respect of a seismic network we should not let the best, or the better, be the enemy of the good. But I would remind the Committee that one of the purposes of a verification system, as has been pointed out, for example, in a thoughtful working paper distributed by the delegation of Sweden (CD/NTB/WP.2), is to provide confidence that the parties to a treaty are observing its obligations. Does it help to build confidence amongst potential parties to a treaty if one group of States insists that an adequate detection and identification system can be based on ideas and technology which many other delegations consider to be out of date? We would not quarrel with the suggestion that the system should be "no more and no less" than is needed; but such a statement does not solve the problem of what would constitute that optimum level. We would certainly not suggest that we should buy a Rolls Royce if another form of transport would serve our purpose equally well, but at the same time we want to be sure that we construct a vehicle that will take us to the end of the road.

There is one further issue which has so far been only briefly touched upon. This is the problem of possible evasion techniques, and here I should like to comment on the proposal advanced by the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic that we should look to a political solution of this problem and on his suggestion that a treaty might contain an obligation to prohibit the use of evasion techniques. It seems to us that when a State undertakes an obligation in a treaty, for example, not to carry out nuclear explosions, it is implicit that it will not evade those obligations. An additional obligation not to evade the main provisions of the treaty seems to add little of substance. And of course it could in no way remove the concern of other States parties over the possibility of evasion since it would not overcome the technical problem of verifying whether or not evasion had occurred. Some of the technical background to this was given in document CCD/492, to which reference has been made in the Working Group recently. We regard the assessments in CCD/492 as still generally valid and note that the seismic data on which they were based have been endorsed by the Group of Scientific Experts.

I have been able this morning to touch on some differences of view between delegations, which are confirmed in the report of the NTB Working Group. Indeed the Working Group report demonstrates how much work still remains to be done. My delegation can certainly not be counted amongst those which believe that after the preliminary discussions we have had so far the NTB Working Group can be said to have fulfilled its mandate. We believe on the contrary that much useful work can be done by further substantive discussion on the basis of a systematic work programme derived from the present mandate. We hope that agreement will be reached to pursue this substantive discussion at the beginning of the 1983 session.

Mr. Chairman, as this is my last statement in plenary, I would like now to say a few valedictory words to my colleagues. The rule of the alphabet ordained that I should sit between powerful neighbours. My situation is not that of a buffer State, but I trust that I have been at times a helpful interpreter. I have always enjoyed and appreciated the pleasure of personal friendship with those who sit and have sat on either side of me, and with all my colleagues in the Committee, past and present. I warmly thank those who have made kind remarks on my departure. More generally, I have no panacea to offer for the complexities we all face in discovering an acceptable basis for multilateral disarmament through the work of this Committee. I do believe, however, that we need to promote easier understanding of our work among those who take the most obvious interest in what we do. Here I am thinking of the representatives of non-member countries who come to join us in the Council Chamber, and of those NGO representatives who attend regularly but have to sit above us in the gallery. On

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their behalf, I want to make three small but practical suggestions: first, that copies of speaking texts should always be distributed to the representatives of non-member countries when they are made available to the rest of us; secondly, that the representatives of non-member countries should not be relegated by rule to the bottom of the speakers' list, and thirdly, that NGO representatives who regularly attend our plenary meetings should be allocated seats somewhere within the Council Chamber, a concession which has already been made for those taking part in the Fellowship Programme. Finally, I want to express my sincere thanks to those who serve the Committee behind the scenes -- to the interpreters, the translators and all the staff who produce our documents. To them and to all members of the secretariat, to Vicente Berasategui, and above all to Ambassador Jaipal, I shall always be extremely grateful. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for his statement, and I should like here to say a few words in his own language about his imminent departure.

[speaking in English]: I am sure that I am reflecting the sentiments of the entire membership of the Committee in saying that we are all very sorry that he is obliged to leave us, because of what could be called the iron rule of the retiring age. During his term in this Committee, Ambassador Summerhayes has distinguished himself as a diplomat who has a great capacity to listen to the views of others and to take them seriously into account in making his contribution to the reaching of consensus. His quiet diplomacy and his profound experience will be much missed. We wish him well in his retirement and in whatever activities he chooses to perform hereafter. But we hope also that he will retain his personal interest in disarmament matters.

[resuming in Spanish]: I shall now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutresna, who will make a statement in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for this month. The distinguished representative of Indonesia has the floor.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all extend to you, Sir, the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the remaining period of our summer session. Seeing you, the representative of Mexico, a country with which Indonesia continues to enjoy excellent bilateral relations, presiding over our deliberations is already a source of satisfaction to my delegation.

Distinguished delegates who have spoken before me have eloquently addressed themselves to your outstanding qualities, with which I concur and practically I have not much to add. Your vast experience and highly respected diplomatic skill particularly in the pursuit of the cause of disarmament, in the view of my delegation, will no doubt guide the deliberations of our Committee toward a successful conclusion.

May I also convey, through you, Sir, the appreciation of my delegation to your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, for his commendable chairmanship of the Committee during the past month. With respect to His Excellency Ambassador Summerhayes who has just stated that he will soon be leaving us, my delegation wishes to associate itself with the words that you have just spoken on our behalf.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

As you have stated, Mr. Chairman, my purpose in taking the floor at the plenary meeting today is to introduce, in my capacity as the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, a working paper concerning the rule of consensus and the establishment of subsidiary organs, as contained in document CD/330. The document has already been circulated by the secretariat, a moment ago.

The subject-matter is not a new one in this Committee; it has been with us since 1980. As you may have noticed, document CD/330 is self-explanatory and there is no need therefore for me to explain its content at length.

However, there are two main points of this working paper which I wish to stress: firstly, the deep concern of the Group of 21 on the way in which the Committee has so far applied its rules of procedure concerning the establishment of its subsidiary organs; and secondly, it is the considered view of the Group of 21 that this working paper could contribute positively to the enhancement of the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body. It has always been the opinion of the Group of 21 that all items which are included in the agenda of the Committee are subjects for negotiation.

This working paper could be considered also as a response to what was requested from us by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as reflected in its consensus concluding document paragraph 55 (b) which reads: "That a pledge be obtained from its members, in particular from the nuclear-weapon States, not to use the practice of consensus to obstruct the adjustment of the structure of the Committee, in particular the establishment, as appropriate, of new ad hoc working groups."

What is proposed by the Group of 21 in this paper is not a matter of interest to this Group only but, we believe, could serve the interests of all members of the Committee. It therefore constitutes an attempt further to advance our commitment and responsibility to the cause of disarmament, which the international community has entrusted to us.

I should like to point out clearly that by proposing this working paper the Group of 21 has no intention at all of changing or modifying the rule of consensus or replacing it by another method. What the Group of 21 has in mind is that the rule of consensus as it applies to the procedural aspect of the establishment of working groups should not be used in such a way as to prevent the Committee from performing its function effectively.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Romania, Mr. Melescanu, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. MELESCANU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament recognized, by consensus, that world public opinion can exercise a positive influence on the adoption of disarmament measures and that to that end it ought to be well informed of the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and of its extremely harmful consequences for international peace and security, as also in the economic and social spheres (document A/S-12/32, annex V, p.1).

The Committee on Disarmament has now reached the stage of adopting its annual report which ought also to serve the purposes of informing, educating and generating public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It is in this connection that my delegation would like to make some preliminary remarks.

First of all we consider that the fact that we have already submitted a comprehensive report on the first half of our session to the General Assembly, at its second special session on disarmament, as well as the brevity of this part of our session, during which only one working group has been fully operative and the very meagre results we have achieved, should be taken into account in the drafting of our report, which should be very short, factual and concise.

Secondly, my delegation considers that since, according to the rules of procedure and the Committee's established practice, the verbatim records form part of the report, emphasis should be placed in the report on the consensus which has emerged from our discussions and negotiations as well as on the broad lines of action for our future endeavours rather than on recording the different and diverging positions of delegations.

Thirdly, we should like to draw attention to the growing tendency to use, in the reports of the working groups and of the Committee itself, a language so esoteric and hermetic that these reports are virtually incomprehensible not only to those who are not members of the Committee but even to those of its members who have not taken part in the drafting of the formulas in question. The time, effort and mental energy spent on the concoction of such formulas can hardly be said to be justified.

My delegation believes that if these comments were taken into account they would help us to adopt a report which would truly serve to inform, educate and generate public understanding and support for the work of the Committee on Disarmament. For we all know that in spite of the efforts made the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the only one which has been working full time, has made no real progress, except in achieving a better understanding of the



(Mr. Melescanu, Romania)

various elements of the future convention. The activity of the new Working Group, which began consideration of a nuclear test ban, was marked from the start by the views of one delegation which denied it any possibility of negotiating a prohibition in this sphere in the near future.

It did not prove possible to adopt the positive proposals put forward by other delegations for the establishment of working groups on the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and more particularly on the prevention of nuclear war, the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in spite of the very wide measure of support given to those proposals.

This situation explains why a number of delegations have proposed -- in the working paper in document CD/330 introduced a few minutes ago by His Excellency Mr. Sutresna, the Ambassador of Indonesia -- the addition to rule 25 of the rules of procedure of a sentence stating that the rule of consensus should not be used in such a way as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary organs for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee. While it is possible to have doubts about the solution proposed, there is no denying the existence of the problem of the paralysis of the Committee as a negotiating body.

I should like to end this brief statement with a reference to one of the last items we took up in our plenary meetings and in the informal meetings with the participation of experts, namely, that of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. We can understand -- although we do not share -- the view of some delegations that the time has not yet come for the adoption of a specific agreement on one aspect of disarmament or another. We cannot, however, understand why the mere preparatory work for the conclusion of such agreement or agreements in the future should also be blocked. This situation is particularly evident as regards new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, in connection with which some delegations, including my own, put forward the idea of associating scientists with the work of the Committee (document CD/262 of 17 March 1982). Even in this matter, where the objective was to establish a body which could be used by the Committee in the future, it was not possible to secure a procedural decision.

The facts of the situation affecting the negotiations in the Committee will be examined by the General Assembly during its consideration of the report on our activities which we are in the process of adopting.

It is our hope that the General Assembly will be able to agree on a set of concrete measures capable of enriching and giving fresh impetus to the work of the Committee in 1983.

Such an impetus is more than ever needed.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador El Reedy.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, during your long career as the representative of the friendly State of Mexico, I and many others have followed your endeavours in the cause of disarmament, to which you have dedicated yourself to such an extent that, in many respects, you have become an embodiment of this cause with which your name is associated.

We congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and wish you every success. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation of the endeavours of your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, during his distinguished chairmanship of our Committee last month.

I wish, too, to join with my colleagues in offering our best wishes to members who have already left or are about to leave this Committee, namely, Ambassador Summerhayes of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria, Ambassador Valdivieso of Peru, Ambassador Yu Peiwen of China and Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia.

I welcome Ambassador Datcu of Romania, Ambassador Cannock of Peru and Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia, and wish them every success.

In a few days we shall be concluding the work of the first session held by the Committee on Disarmament after the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We began our meetings last month and feel considerable bitterness and disappointment as a result of the failure of the special session to fulfil some of the hopes to which it had given rise.

The main reason for the lack of success at the special session was undoubtedly the absence of the political will to assume international commitments or take specific measures for the achievement of disarmament.

It is strange that this failure in the work of the special session came at a time when there was increasing international awareness in the developed countries of the dangers inherent in the current situation resulting from the absence of progress in the field of disarmament in the face of the increasing production, stockpiling and development of weapons of mass destruction.

This feeling of impending danger in the developed world is reflected in the actual dangers threatening several parts of the developing world in which the most modern and lethal weapons are being used in aggression against the sovereignty and political independence of States. At the commencement of the special session, the world witnessed the beginning of the blatant Israeli aggression against Lebanon in which the invading forces used the most murderous weapons against unarmed civilians, particularly against our brothers the Palestinian refugees.

The failure of the special session came as new evidence of the fact that the international community is passing through an extremely critical and dangerous phase in which a conscientious review is required in order to stop the slide towards the abyss. Such a review must address itself primarily to the dangers of the arms race and the possibility of war.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

It should also be noted that the force of international public opinion, particularly as expressed in a number of major capitals in the countries participating in the nuclear arms race, has been instrumental in inducing the two sides to create a framework for negotiation with a view to the reduction of strategic arms and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

As already stated by the Egyptian Government on more than one occasion, we welcome the holding of these bilateral negotiations which we regard as a positive development worthy of encouragement.

However, we wish to make it quite clear that these negotiations neither negate nor reduce the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament.

While welcoming all the endeavours made by the two sides to negotiate on specific topics with a view to curbing, controlling and halting the nuclear arms race, we believe that our Committee should be kept informed of the course and progress of these negotiations, even if only in a general and non-detailed manner during the early stages.

We should all bear in mind that the Committee on Disarmament is the only body with universally recognized responsibility for multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

We therefore regard this Committee's failure to establish a working group on nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race as a serious and unjustifiable failure and we shall continue to work towards the rectification of this situation. The enormous nuclear arsenals in existence at the present time constitute a serious threat to the security of mankind as a whole, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, and for this reason we support the proposal of the delegation of India concerning the establishment of a working group on the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war. In our view, this proposal should be approved by the Committee whose favourable response will, we hope, be forthcoming at the beginning of the next session.

In the dismal aftermath of the failure of the special session, the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban offered a ray of hope. The election of the capable Ambassador Lidgard as Chairman of this Group was an additional indication that the Group was on the right track, in spite of the constraints placed upon it by the narrow scope of its mandate. It is gratifying that the Group is adopting a general approach to its tasks in which the discussion of other aspects relating to the question of a nuclear test ban will not be excluded.

Although the endeavours of the Chairman to establish a written programme of work for the Group during this stage were not crowned with success, it is undeniable that the continuation of its work on the basis of a verbal understanding provided an opportunity for a clarification of views and an identification of the various aspects of a number of issues relating to safeguards, compliance and other questions concerning a nuclear test ban. We hope that, after this stage, the Group will be able to address its tasks in an expeditious manner with a view to the eventual formulation of a draft nuclear test-ban treaty.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

Another positive factor which should not be overlooked when evaluating the work of this session is the outstandingly diligent approach which has characterized the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Under the capable chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, this Group was able to devise a practical method which had a direct effect in furthering the progress of its work. The way in which the contact groups dealt with the various elements of a draft treaty on the full and effective prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons was both positive and fruitful. We hope that, at the next session of the Committee, the Group will be able to build on its achievements during this session and that it will be successful in reaching agreement on a specific text and provisions for the various articles of the draft treaty.

I would now like to turn to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a matter which, after extensive debates during the spring session, we agreed to include on our agenda. At that time I explained Egypt's position in this respect and emphasized the fact that, since the beginning of the second half of this century, in the General Assembly of the United Nations and, in particular, in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Egypt had continually advocated the need for an agreement to prohibit the use of outer space for military purposes and to restrict its use to peaceful purposes in furtherance of the interests and progress of mankind. Although agreement was reached in 1967 on the "Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies", 15 years after the adoption of that Treaty we still lack an international agreement prohibiting the arms race in outer space and restricting its use to peaceful purposes.

The rapid progress in modern technology and the space sciences calls for an early approach to this item through an ad hoc working group endowed with a general, comprehensive and non-specific mandate within the framework of which it would be able to address all aspects of the problem, including the question of anti-satellite systems.

We are naturally aware of the complexities and ramifications of this question. During the first part of this session last spring, therefore, we proposed that the secretariat should prepare a full collection of all the background documents and proposals relating to this question so that we could identify the various stages through which it has passed. This would undoubtedly save much time and effort which would otherwise be spent in the informal consultations which have been proposed to deal with this question.

At the conclusion of the work of our session we note that, in spite of all the efforts made, there are some issues which have not been addressed. I am referring in particular to the question of guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The discussions and consultations that will be taking place during the coming session of the General Assembly may be able to remove some of the obstacles impeding agreement on these two questions.

Possibly no single item on the agenda of the international community has been the subject of greater endeavours than that of disarmament. Hence, the feeling of frustration is felt most keenly by those whose work relates to disarmament questions,

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

since the prolonged absence of any real progress comes at a time of ever-increasing development and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction and escalating expenditure on armaments, while the world is facing the most serious economic crisis since the great depression in the 1930s.

Nevertheless, we have no alternative but to continue our work and our struggle to ensure that mankind brings weapons back under its control and frees itself from enslavement to weapons technology, and to ensure that an international system is established under which man will be safeguarded against a global war instead of constantly living in fear of such a war.

With this end in view, we have no alternative but to invest more time, thought and energy in the search for the formulas needed to facilitate the adoption of political resolutions aimed at halting the arms race and making progress towards the goal of complete disarmament, however toilsome the path may be and regardless of the feelings of frustration that may be encountered in the process.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I take pleasure in introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons as contained in document CD/328. I am gratified that the Group was able to adopt this report in a single session of record brevity. This testifies to the co-operative spirit which has prevailed in the Working Group during the present summer session.

After the customary introductory paragraphs and a list of working documents that have been submitted to the group in 1982, the report makes a concise documentary reference to its work during the first part of the session. The results of the spring session are, of course, already before the General Assembly as part of the Committee's special report to the second special session devoted to disarmament. The report then deals with the proceedings of the Working Group during the second part of the session. This session has been brief for all of us, but its limited duration was particularly felt by the radiological weapons Working Group. In keeping with the priorities established for this part of the session, the Group was able to meet in formal session only twice. However, as I reported at an earlier plenary meeting, the Chairman used the better part of August to initiate an exchange of views with delegations on the particularly pressing problem of the relationship between the two main subject-matters before the Working Group. Through a written exposé and a questionnaire, I endeavoured to perceive how the future ban on radiological weapons in the narrower sense and the problem of attacks against nuclear facilities could be suitably linked. My letter and questionnaire drew a vivid response from delegations. I reported to the Working Group in an extensive statement on 2 September about the replies received and additional consultations held. The statement is available as document CD/RN/WP.38. That statement and subsequent discussions in the Working Group show that the Working Group has not yet entirely succeeded in eliminating the difficulties encountered in this regard. However, it also became apparent -- and I should make explicit reference to this positive feature -- that a

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

new degree of flexibility existed regarding the relationship between the two radiological weapons subject-matters and that the way now appears open for a more promising resumption of negotiations on the issue next spring. Notwithstanding some substantial nuances, there is a widespread view in the Working Group that the two areas of the scope of the prohibition under consideration should in the future be looked at under the twin concept of "separation" and "linkage". There is now a clearer vision that the protection of nuclear facilities from attack deserves to be more seriously looked at, and, in the view of most delegations -- in fairness, I should add, not all -- the negotiating context between the two areas of the future prohibition should be preserved.

If on this matter of principle the stage is now better set for the future, the same could perhaps also be said of the radiological weapons subject in the narrower, "traditional" sense. Here again, it was not possible to agree on all the necessary details of the provisions to be incorporated in a future treaty. It was, however, acknowledged at the close of the Group's spring session that the level of consensus on certain of the provisions under consideration was then higher than it had been on previous texts. In order to facilitate further work and to preserve the degree of consensus already reached, the Chairman, at the end of this session, has circulated his own compilation of radiological weapons treaty provisions in document CD/RW/WP.39.

Delegations will easily see from the report, as I have now introduced it, that a lot remains to be done and many problems remain to be solved. The mood in the Working Group, however, has been good. If there is not a sense of outright achievement, there is certainly a sense of hope and co-operation. I am confident that the Working Group will forge ahead in its next session and attain tangible results towards firm negotiated results.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for the statement he has just made as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, introducing the report of that Group. The next and last speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Indonesia, to whom I will now give the floor in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 so that he may introduce another document submitted by the Group. The distinguished Ambassador of Indonesia has the floor.

Mr. SUTRESMA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, I have to request your indulgence and that of the distinguished delegates because I need to take the floor again, very briefly, at this plenary meeting.

I have the honour to introduce formally, on behalf of the Group of 21, document CD/329 containing a draft mandate for a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (item 7 of our agenda).

During the discussion on item 7 both at plenary meetings and at informal meetings of the Committee, the need for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to deal with this item has been widely acknowledged. In the view of the Group of 21, the exchange of views we have had so far on this subject has revealed to us that there is already a basis for substantive negotiations. The draft mandate as contained in CD/329 has been formulated by the Group of 21 in such a way as to accommodate the different views that have so far been reflected in our deliberations, with a view to enabling the Committee to undertake substantive negotiations on this subject during the first part of 1983 session.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

It is the wish of the Group of 21 that the Committee should adopt a decision on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 7 and its terms of reference at this particular session. Such a decision, in the view of the Group of 21, is in line with what the Committee on Disarmament has been called upon to do by the recently concluded Unispace Conference in Vienna.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia, the co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for the month of September, for his introduction of document CD/329. I now have a further speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Mongolia, and I give him the floor.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Allow me, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, to offer you our best wishes as Chairman of the Committee for the month of September and for the intervening period up to the opening of our spring session; we are sure that you will make an important contribution during this critical period of the work of the Committee on Disarmament at its 1982 session.

I have asked for the floor in order to express my delegation's satisfaction at the document -- CD/329 -- just introduced by the distinguished representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutresna.

The Mongolian delegation is prepared to study that document with a view to enabling the Committee on the basis of that proposal and of document CD/272, which was submitted by the Mongolian delegation during the spring part of our session, in due course, to formulate a mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 7 of its agenda so that it can start work as soon as possible next year.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I have no further speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? Apparently not, and so I will, as usual, make a few announcements. The informal meeting we are to hold this afternoon to continue the consideration of our draft report to the General Assembly which we started yesterday afternoon will begin at half past three -- 3.30 p.m. The Chairman would be very grateful if distinguished representatives could be here punctually at that hour. With regard to the reports of the working groups, one of them has been introduced today by the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Chairman of the Working Group in question, and I hope that the other two reports will be circulated between now and tomorrow. The intention of the Chairman would be to submit these three reports to the Committee at its plenary meeting on Thursday. I have the impression that there will be no difficulty in taking, in respect of those reports, a decision similar to the decisions we have taken in previous years, that is, to adopt the reports and to include the texts of them in toto in the Committee's own report.

As regards the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, in view of the large number of speakers I already have on my list for that meeting, it will be scheduled for the same time as today's meeting -- 10 o'clock -- and I should again be grateful if you could be very punctual so that we can begin the meeting at 10.10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.





**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.187  
16 September 1982  
ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 16 September 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. García Robles

(Mexico)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia: Mr. T. FINDLAY  
Miss S. BOYD

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUIEROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. TELLALOV  
Mr. SOTIROV  
Mr. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U TIN KYAW HLAING  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mrs WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. LI WEIMIN  
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA  
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ  
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. d'ABOVILLE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. G. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. G. GAJDA

India: Mr. A.S. DAS

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA  
Mr. HIDAYAT

Iran: Mr. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. T. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA RÖBLES  
Mrs Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. S. BOLD

Monocco: Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. F. VAN DONGEN  
Mr. R. AKKERMAN

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI  
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR  
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU  
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. T. PANAIT  
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. U. ERICSSON  
Mrs G. JONANG  
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics: Mr. B.M. TIMERBAEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDEINIKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES  
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT  
Mrs J. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M.D. BUSBY  
Mr. R. SCOTT  
Ms. M. WINSTON

Venezuela:

Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs E. EKANGA KABEYA  
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 187th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee will continue today to deal with item 8 of its agenda, which includes consideration of the reports of its subsidiary bodies as well as the consideration and adoption of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject connected with the work of the Committee.

I give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Onkelinx, who is the first speaker on my list.

Mr. ONKELINK (Belgium) (translated from French): The session which is, I hope, to end today will have afforded us little satisfaction, so fruitless and unproductive will our efforts have been. Once again, our labours will not have yielded any concrete results. We have often talked about the reasons for this stagnation, and we all know that it is due principally to the deterioration in international relations. Nevertheless my delegation feels that it might be useful to look beyond present international tensions at our Committee's modalities of operation, for we perhaps allow international political tensions to persuade us too hastily to abandon certain negotiating possibilities that may exist, and let our working methods drift into unproductive ways.

Could we really have expected to achieve concrete results so soon after the General Assembly's distinctly disappointing second special session devoted to disarmament, particularly during this rather short session of only six weeks?

Our Committee, whose essential task is one of negotiation -- and this can never be repeated often enough -- ought not to depend upon the success or otherwise of the protracted deliberative efforts conducted at the level of the General Assembly. It should have its own concepts of action, its own rules aimed always at making concrete negotiations effective and leading to international agreements or treaties.

I cannot but regret that so much time should be spent on procedural matters, and in particular on the often laborious drafting of long reports addressed each year to the General Assembly. In 1982, a sixth of our time will have been spent on this activity, which can hardly be described as fruitful; and as for the summer session, something like a third of our time will have been absorbed in these drafting efforts which are of little value. We ought surely to make a better assessment of the General Assembly's needs in this respect, for it is undoubtedly more interested in concrete results than in lengthy interim reports, indigestible and repetitive, which, in the long run, through the rigid positions of principle they imply often hamper rather than help the process of negotiation.

An excess of formalism also harms our efforts. It is regrettable, for instance, that the Working Group recently set up on the subject of a nuclear test ban should have wasted so much time discussing -- in vain, moreover -- the drawing up of a programme of work that would correspond to its mandate. Appeals for moderation, for flexibility, for a certain freedom in the discussions -- while respecting the positions of the various States -- failed to have the desired effects. Pragmatism did not prevail. Instead we had marginal discussions of the scope of application of the ban. A great deal of time and energy was thus expended in vain, when this summer session could have been much more usefully employed in bringing us closer to the time when genuine negotiations might have been conducted.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

We hope that in 1983 the Committee will not waste the opportunity that has been offered to it of starting such genuine negotiations and that, on the basis of a programme of work that is as precise as possible, it will thoroughly examine the various questions falling within the mandate that has been given to the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Our agenda covers a large number of subjects, and it is difficult to organize an in-depth discussion of each of them. We should like to suggest, however, that once a main topic has been selected for discussion at the Committee's plenary meetings during a particular week, delegations should try to keep to that topic in their statements and not refer to various others. This would make for greater unity in our debates and our efforts.

It seems to us, moreover, that in 1983, if we want finally to achieve some success in our negotiations, we ought to set aside more time for those questions in respect of which the conditions for genuine negotiations appear to us to have been met. In saying this I am thinking in particular of the prohibition of chemical weapons and that of radiological weapons. This pragmatic approach should be understood as being without prejudice to the fundamental priorities as seen by each of us in the disarmament process. It would be rather a matter of functional priorities dictated by the course of the discussions and encouraged by the chances of success in certain sectors of our work. It seems to us preferable to accept such a functional selectivity rather than maintain a programme of theoretical priorities which, in the end, would merely perpetuate the present state of stagnation of our work.

So far as the prohibition of chemical weapons is concerned, we shall have at our disposal in 1983 an excellent basis for the continuation of the negotiations. I am referring to the reports of the various contact groups which the Chairman of the Working Group had the excellent idea of setting up.

While it is true that agreement on one basic element in the draft convention will always depend on agreement on the other components, our delegations ought nevertheless at the present stage to be very open-minded as regards the procedures to be employed at our next session. It seems to us that the time has come to embark on the stage of drafting a convention. The contact group approach has had the advantage of permitting parallel discussion of all the various elements of the convention. In our work in 1983 we should make use of the lessons learned from this method.

When the Committee meets again for its next session, in 1983, it will have had a long period of reflection, of some eight months, on the subject of the prohibition of radiological weapons. The consultations held by the Chairman of the Working Group and his use of a written questionnaire have, we believe, helped to clarify to some extent the various points of view. Our feeling is that we have come closer to the moment when genuine negotiations, covering both the so-called traditional subject matter and the problem of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, should become possible.

Various formulas have been put forward, in particular by Japan, for establishing a link between these two subjects of negotiation. Belgium, too, has in the past offered suggestions for the establishment of such a link. Those proposals were based on article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons. They are still valid and could be developed in the light of the new suggestions put forward during the present session.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Now that the points of view of all delegations seem to us to be more clearly defined and appear less irreconcilable than at the start of our work on radiological weapons, all delegations should make an effort to prepare negotiating positions for the next session that would make it possible for us to bring our work on the prohibition of radiological weapons to a successful conclusion. I have singled out the two subjects of chemical weapons and radiological weapons because they seemed to me to be those most likely in the near future, to enable the Committee to achieve at last its first concrete results in terms of international treaties. We can never lay enough stress on the need for this Committee to prove its negotiating ability. This in no way means that the subjects of a nuclear test ban, a comprehensive programme of disarmament and outer space should not occupy our attention during the 1983 session. But our Committee's credibility is at stake. Next year, at the same time as other very important negotiating efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament are being conducted right here in Geneva, we can make a genuine contribution to the international community's efforts to improve the climate of international relations, so that in the coming years of the present decade the atmosphere may be more encouraging than that which prevails today.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. Chairman, I should first like to express my pleasure at seeing you in the Chair for this month of September, as we are about to wind up the work of the Committee for this year. At the same time, I should also like to take this opportunity to say that your devotion to the cause of disarmament and your impartial and balanced approach to its issues have always played a valuable role in the work of this Committee.

May I also express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Maina of Kenya through the Kenyan delegation for his able chairmanship during the month of August.

I am also happy to extend my personal welcome to Ambassador Cannock of Peru and Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia, and I wish to say that my delegation looks forward to friendly co-operation with them. May I also take this opportunity to wish Ambassador Summerhayes farewell. His contribution to the work of the Committee is known by all of us and we shall miss him, particularly for his very personable qualities.

The General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament did not give any new guidelines to this Committee. It did not go beyond a reaffirmation of the principles embodied in the Final Document which already formed the basis on which we have been conducting our work since the first special session.

The lack of achievements on any measure of disarmament is the situation which we have been facing for some years. Despite this fact, it has to be acknowledged that much groundwork has been laid which would be useful for our future work.

It would not serve our purpose much if we were to make an assessment of the work accomplished during the few short weeks we have had at our disposal during this summer session. However, in view of the results of the second special session, an assessment for a longer period becomes necessary if we are to make meaningful progress. At the beginning of this session, some among us said that it would serve no useful purpose to contemplate the outcome of the second special session. Our attitude is that it would be useful for us to draw lessons from the past so that we can avoid the pitfalls that we may face in the future.



(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

If we are to express our views we can say that the character of disarmament negotiations is now not what it was when they were conducted in previous multilateral forums, particularly the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. At that time, there were no dissenting opinions about conducting negotiations on those measures on which we cannot now obtain a consensus. We now spend a great deal of our time discussing what we should or should not negotiate and the use of the rule of consensus has been placed in doubt. For this reason the working paper introduced by the Group of 21 on the establishment of subsidiary organs, which was tabled before this Committee on 14 September is most appropriate and timely.

As we see it, the lack of meaningful progress on disarmament negotiations can be attributed, by and large, to the lack of consistency on the part of some great Powers with regard to certain commitments and principles which they themselves espoused when multilateral negotiations of the present character were first initiated. To our mind, neither time nor circumstances can diminish the worth of these principles, and they remain as valid today as they were then. It can only be assumed that the expediency of the policy of continuing the arms race has made it necessary for them to sacrifice these disarmament principles.

In this context, I would like to make a particular reference to our work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the centre-piece of disarmament negotiations on which success has so far eluded us, although the General Assembly, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, gave us specific guidelines on what a comprehensive programme should comprise. We are aware that differences on the basic approach were the underlying cause of this Committee's inability to draw up a credible CPD. These differences relate primarily to stages, a time-frame, measures and the nature of the commitment. The proposal by the Group of 21 on these principles is already well known and there is no need for me to reiterate them, but I should like to point out that they are the very principles which once formed the basis on which the two principal Powers conducted negotiations on general and complete disarmament in the early 1960s. Paragraph 4 of the United States-USSR joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations is particularly relevant in this regard, and in our view the revalidation of the basic concepts contained therein that are relevant to the work on a CPD would make it possible to achieve progress on this item when we take it up again next year.

The question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is now meeting the fate of being neglected for the same reason, namely that the basic premises on which this issue was once dealt with no longer hold good for those who once espoused them. Nuclear disarmament is an issue that should be dealt with most urgently, as the nuclear arms race constitutes an increasing danger for the continued existence of mankind as a whole. Yet we are told that it is not appropriate for this issue, which is of universal concern, to be dealt with by this Committee because it is now the subject of bilateral negotiations between the two principal Powers. However, no rational explanation has been given as to why this should be so, and it is therefore difficult to accept this reasoning at its face value. In saying so, we take cognizance of the importance and necessity of dealing with certain very important aspects of nuclear disarmament such as strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear missiles on the European continent, which are at present being dealt with in a bilateral context. However, we cannot fail to take notice of the fact that the bilateral process on nuclear disarmament deals with only certain aspects of the issue. These bilateral negotiations have not resolved the issue of how to deal effectively with other equally important aspects of nuclear disarmament. The suspension

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of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament is the kind of freeze that the international community is finding it difficult to accept, and we wish to express the hope that this Committee will be able to deal with this issue within a working group when we meet again next year. It would serve our purpose to recollect that negotiations on nuclear disarmament beginning with the concept of a freeze were once conducted in the ENDC by those Powers that are now reluctant to take such a step. Here again, living up to previous commitments and principles is an imperative that we cannot ignore if this Committee is to start work on nuclear disarmament when we meet again next year.

With regard to the test-ban issue, we wish for the present to confine our remarks to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group under its given mandate and shall not be commenting on the issue as a whole.

The absence of a work programme has not made possible a systematic and structured discussion, and the exchanges of views which have taken place so far have been more or less of a general nature. However, two different fundamental approaches have once again emerged from the discussions held so far. One approach is that existing technical and scientific means are sufficient to identify a system for verification of compliance with a test ban. To our mind, this approach would make it possible to define the modalities relating to verification.

However, the other approach contends that it cannot be presumed that all technical problems have been resolved with regard to verification. We are apprehensive that this approach will lead the work of the Group into a labyrinth of technical details which will make it difficult to attain our objective of defining the modalities for the verification of compliance.

The negotiations on chemical weapons are now in an advanced stage and detailed requirements as to what a treaty should comprise have now been identified. The convergence of views of the respective positions is an encouraging factor in the negotiations. These developments have led us to believe that the prospects for an agreement are now in sight. Every effort should therefore be made for the realization of a chemical weapons convention when we meet again next year.

The proposal by the delegation of India for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to undertake appropriate and practical measures on the prevention of a nuclear war has been supported by the majority, while a few other delegations were of the view that further clarification of the issues involved would be necessary before consideration could be given to the establishment of an ad hoc working group. The informal exchanges of views which have taken place during this session have been most useful for they have paved the way for further discussions which could make it possible to deal with this issue in an appropriate working group. The desire by all delegations to deal effectively with measures on the prevention of a nuclear war is not in doubt. Needless to say, the complete prevention of a nuclear war can

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be made possible only by the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States. It stands to reason that it is not the intention of this Committee to deal with a whole range of measures on the prevention of a nuclear war in one package. We therefore feel that, while recognizing the broad principles under which measures for the prevention of nuclear war should come, and taking into account those aspects of such prevention that are already the subject of separate consideration, the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication merits priority attention.

The discussions during the summer session of this Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space were indeed very interesting and informative. The views expressed by the representatives of States with considerable knowledge of this very intricate and complex subject have given us much insight into the ramifications of the issue, despite the fact that we have not as yet been able to establish an ad hoc working group to deal effectively with this matter. The discussions also revealed that there is a consensus of opinion that this issue should be dealt with in the context of this multilateral forum. This is indeed a propitious start, for outer space, which is defined as "the province of all mankind", is not under the national jurisdiction of States, and issues dealing with the activities of States in outer space should of necessity have an international perspective.

The deliberations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space have disclosed that there appear to be differences in approach on how to achieve agreement or agreements. For this reason it would perhaps be appropriate to deal with this matter from a broad perspective.

What we have learnt from our discussions here is that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is a very complex issue as it involves an array of high-technology weapons in various stages of development, some operational or near-operational, others in the stages of experiment and development, and many others still in the realm of theoretical scientific possibility. Under the circumstances, it would be difficult to define the scope of the weapons to be prohibited and still more difficult to resolve would be the issue of verification as some would seem to suggest. There are also differing views on whether an arms race in outer space is an immediate or a remote threat. Whatever these views are, it is essential to nip the problem in the bud before it becomes more difficult to solve. The existing Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space could serve us as a very useful reference as regards the nature of the broad approach we might first take to define the general principles governing the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The inclusion of commitments to undertake further measures in such an approach could meet the need for taking practical steps that are required for the non-armament of outer space. In this connection, it has been our privilege, by the kind courtesy of the delegation of Sri Lanka, to listen to the very illuminating statement made by Mr. Arthur C. Clarke, the eminent authority on outer space. It is particularly relevant to mention what Mr. Clarke quoted in his statement, which is as follows: "The only defence against the weapons of the future is to prevent them ever being used. In other words, the problem is political and not military at all. A country's armed forces can no longer defend it; the most they can promise is the destruction of the attacker."

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Burma for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria) (translated from Russian): As co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries for the month of September, I have the honour to speak today on behalf of the delegations of Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria on the results of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The delegations of the socialist countries note that the Committee's work in 1982 fully reflected all the difficulty of the international situation, which was characterized by a sharp increase in hostility between the peace-loving forces on the one hand and the opponents of peace, disarmament and international security on the other.

The United States administration's policy of all-out preparation for the conduct of war and the implementation of vast plans for increasing its arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons so as to achieve military superiority over the countries of the socialist community is seriously destabilizing the relations between States and undermining the possibility of achieving progress in disarmament negotiations, including those in the Committee on Disarmament.

Thus as we conclude today our work for 1982, we cannot be satisfied with what has been accomplished by the Committee on Disarmament.

In spite of the difficult circumstances the socialist countries, acting on the basis of their fundamental policy, have consistently followed a line aimed at constructive negotiations -- at the spring session of the Committee, at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and at our present summer session -- with a view to achieving concrete agreements for the curbing of the arms race.

The deep concern of the socialist States about the fate of the world has been reflected in the numerous constructive initiatives they have put forward. Their delegations have submitted for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament a series of documents and concrete proposals on virtually all the items on the agenda. They note with satisfaction that the main lines of the discussion in the Committee were based in many cases on those initiatives and they express their appreciation to those delegations which demonstrated interest in the proposals of the socialist countries.

Those initiatives were aimed at strengthening peace, preserving détente, halting the arms race and broadening international co-operation. The unilateral pledge, contained in the message addressed to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, the head of the Soviet State, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons fully reflected the high sense of responsibility felt by the socialist countries for ensuring a lasting peace and strengthening international security.

The second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in June and July of this year, also left its mark on the work of the Committee. During the first half of the year, the socialist countries did everything possible to enable the Committee to achieve concrete results, especially with regard to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament so that a draft programme could be submitted to the General Assembly at its special session. The obstructionist attitude of a number of western countries undermined that possibility not only in the Committee but also at the special session itself.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Our summer session took place against the background of the mass movement for peace and disarmament throughout the world that occurred before, during and after the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the unanimous agreement of States to abide by the decisions of the General Assembly at its first special session and in their negotiations to follow the priorities laid down in its Programme of Action.

In the opinion of the delegations of the socialist countries, the cessation of the nuclear weapons race and nuclear disarmament remains the most important priority question before the Committee on Disarmament. The memorandum of the USSR entitled "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race", which was distributed as an official document of the Committee, is based on the need to take urgent measures to remove the threat of nuclear war, end the production of nuclear weapons and gradually reduce nuclear arsenals until they are completely eliminated. The approach of the majority of delegations in the Committee is based on an awareness of this need. The delegations of the socialist States note with satisfaction the increased activity in the consideration of questions relating to nuclear disarmament, which has been reflected in particular, in the proposal by the delegation of India concerning the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the elaboration of measures to avert nuclear war. The constructive approach of the majority of delegations to negotiations on this question has met with opposition from forces representing the interests of the United States and NATO military-industrial complex.

In this connection, the delegations of the socialist countries express particular satisfaction at the fact that during the 1982 session, as never before, the inhuman military concepts of the stabilizing role of nuclear weapons and the doctrines of "limited" and protracted nuclear war were resolutely condemned and rejected. The fact that a nuclear conflict will inevitably become a world-wide catastrophe in which there will be no victors was reflected in the statements made by the overwhelming majority of delegations.

The socialist countries consider that the question of the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament should be examined in all its aspects, and the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body should make a contribution to the solution of this task of global significance. The proposal submitted by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic concerning a draft mandate for a working group on agenda item 2 reflects the views of the socialist countries. In accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document, the activity of that working group should be aimed at elaborating the stages of a nuclear disarmament programme, the specific parameters of which are indicated in document CD/315.

The Committee also has to resolve the problem of the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons, the inclusion of which in a State's arsenal will lead to a lowering of the nuclear threshold, and the possible deployment of such weapons in Europe would create a particularly dangerous situation for this continent. As early as in 1978, the socialist countries put forward a draft of a convention on this subject and they are in favour of the establishment of a working group by the Committee with a view to the drafting of such an international legal instrument.

The delegations of the socialist countries consider that one of the obvious criteria as to the constructiveness of a country's approach to negotiations in the Committee is its attitude with respect to a general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Certain States' violation of their obligation to conduct such

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negotiations, contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and confirmed at the second special session, is an important indicator of their true attitude regarding the solution of this urgent disarmament problem.

The attitude shown towards the discussion of the question in the Ad Hoc Working Group on agenda item 1, set up by the Committee on Disarmament at the first part of the session, gives rise to serious fears that the Committee may be used as a screen for the policy of the United States of continuing nuclear weapon tests.

The delegations of the socialist countries share the view of the majority that in order to hold negotiations on agenda item 1 on a constructive basis, it is necessary to broaden the mandate of the Working Group so that its functions include that of elaborating the scope of the future agreement. They also express regret at the refusal of the delegations of two nuclear-weapon Powers to participate in the Working Group and hope that they will reconsider their position in this respect in the near future.

The delegations of the socialist countries note with satisfaction the progress made in working out the elements of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The draft basic provisions of a convention submitted by the delegation of the USSR played a decisive part in the achievement of that progress. To consolidate the results achieved, all delegations must participate constructively and show flexibility. The socialist countries continue to consider it very important that the future convention should take account of new developments in the field of chemical weapons, including all aspects connected with binary or multi-component types of such weapons.

The success of the negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons can be ensured only through the speediest possible achievement of political agreements on the key problems of the convention, and not by making the solution of those problems dependent on the settlement of certain technical questions. The group of delegations of socialist countries will further and support all proposals and initiatives aimed at the speedy achievement of agreement on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

One positive result of the 1982 session is the increased attention given by the Committee to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The proposal submitted by the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this question and the draft mandate it contained met with a positive response in the Committee.

It is to be regretted that the opposition of the United States of America has made it impossible to undertake concrete negotiations with a view to preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space.

The delegations of the socialist countries will continue their efforts towards the solution of this urgent question. They note with satisfaction the awareness of its importance shown by the delegations of the Group of 21, which submitted a draft mandate two days ago, and some western States.

The socialist countries still believe that the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most important prerequisites to general and complete disarmament. Concomitant with the lack of progress in the

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negotiations on this question in the Committee there is an intensified development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, the actual introduction into nuclear arsenals of the barbarous neutron weapon and plans to manufacture gamma-ray weapons. The Committee's informal meetings on this question with the participation of experts, which were held on the initiative of the Hungarian delegation, confirmed the necessity and desirability of setting up an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts.

The group of socialist countries considers that the Committee should in the future give serious consideration to the proposal contained in General Assembly resolution 36/89.

The socialist countries regard the suspension of active work on the subjects of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament as temporary only, and they will continue to work towards the drafting of international legal instruments on these subjects. The same applies also in respect of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

The socialist countries attach particular importance to the further increasing of the effectiveness of the work of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies. A number of specific proposals towards this end were made in document CD/200 and others have been put forward at the current session. The group of socialist countries also considers the question of the Committee's membership to be of importance in the context of enhancing its effectiveness. This question should be resolved by the Committee itself, with due regard for the basic principles of its work and without upsetting the existing political balance. We welcome the heightened interest shown by a number of States in the work of the Committee and are prepared to support certain measures aimed to increase the possibilities for their active participation.

I should like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to you, Mr. Garcia Robles, our distinguished Chairman, for the efforts you have made and your skill in guiding our work during its concluding stage for this year. You have once again shown those brilliant qualities which have rightly been remarked upon by all delegations. I should also like to congratulate the chairmen of the current working groups, Ambassador Sujka of Poland and Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden as well as the chairmen of all the working groups of the spring session. On behalf of the group of socialist countries, I wish to express our gratitude to the secretariat of the Committee and, in the first instance, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, and all those who have actively contributed to our work.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov, for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, of which he is Chairman. Ambassador Lidgard has the floor.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, as is customary at this time of the year, some changes are taking place in our ranks. You yourself, Mr. Chairman, at our last meeting, made some well-termed comments in saying farewell to Ambassador Summerhayes. We fully agree with what you said: Ambassador Summerhayes has won our wholehearted respect and esteem for his diplomatic skill, his sincere devotion to our common goal and his excellent personal qualities. At the same time I wish to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia and Ambassador Cannock of Peru.

As you said, Mr. Chairman, I am going to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which is contained in document CD/332. The report may not be a model of conciseness and logical structure, but that was hardly to be expected to emerge from a process of hard bargaining on a matter which is of such a highly controversial character. Nevertheless, the report contains a broad survey of the issues relating to a nuclear test ban. It is a matter of subjective judgement to what extent it can be said that the Working Group has defined and examined those issues, but it has no doubt laid a basis for future work on the matter.

This positive judgement of its accomplishments can be upheld only if one also takes into account the very difficult political circumstances which have put their stamp on its work. This is not the time for making a detailed examination of the prevailing climate concerning disarmament negotiations in general and the consideration of a nuclear test ban in particular. It is a matter of regret, however, that the work of this Committee and its subsidiary bodies is so greatly and so directly subjected to the adverse developments in the Superpower relations.

One must also take into account that the test ban issues are of an extraordinary magnitude and complexity and therefore a difficult subject even under the most favourable conditions.

Efforts for at least a quarter of a century to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban have so far not yielded the results envisaged. The political obstacles have been tremendous. I doubt that those who are professionally responsible for the preparedness of nuclear weapons will ever voluntarily give up the possibilities of testing those weapons. Clearly, only overriding political considerations can bring about the necessary shift in attitudes, which will make it possible to achieve a nuclear test ban. When that will happen nobody can predict. The preparatory work which is necessary in order to shorten the future negotiating process can and must, however, be carried out.

In that light the discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group have their significance. However, all delegations must be prepared to permit a well-structured exchange of views, which will make it possible to examine more deeply and systematically the various issues.

Unfortunately, only a short time was available for the Ad Hoc Working Group this year. I regret that so much of that little time had to be devoted to procedural questions. One would have thought that the feelings of urgency would have led to more openness and flexibility on relatively minor questions of procedure.



(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

It is my view that the mandate of the Working Group should be broadened, so that the Working Group at least will be formally empowered substantively to examine all relevant aspects of a nuclear test ban. At the same time it must be taken into account that for the Working Group to function in the best possible way, it has to have a clear and well-structured work programme. I do hope that when the Group resumes its work next year, the proper lessons from this year's experience will be drawn and that the procedural questions will be considered in their proper perspective so that the Working Group will be able to start its work without delay, focusing on the substantive issues.

In this context, I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to Miss Levin for her truly excellent contributions to the Ad Hoc Working Group as its Secretary, as well as to her staff in the secretariat, and to the interpreters for their great skill and endurance. It has been a great asset for the Chair, and I include both myself and my deputy, Mr. Hyltenius, who replaced me during my temporary absence from the Chair, to have had this valuable assistance and co-operation.

While I have the floor, allow me now, before concluding, to turn briefly to another topic of relevance to this Committee, and I do this, of course, in my capacity as the head of the Swedish delegation.

You may recall that in article VII of the Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-bed Treaty which was held in 1977, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was invited, in consultation with the States parties to that Treaty, to consider establishing an ad hoc expert group under its auspices for the purpose of keeping under review the major technological developments which affect the operation of the Treaty. It was also said in this connection that such a group might facilitate the implementation of the purposes stated in the section dealing with Article v of the Treaty, i.e. the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Moreover, it was considered as a means of contributing to the orderly preparation of the next review conference.

The need for convening an expert group of this kind within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament is obvious. An enormous civilian exploitation of the sea and the sea-bed is continuously taking place on a global scale. Parallel and other developments are likely to affect the risks of an increased military use of the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof, be it within the present or an enlarged scope of the Treaty.

At the same time, experience shows that this area is very difficult to research. There seems to be little public information available about recent developments. There is, therefore, an urgent need to discuss what can be done to assemble the necessary information for an effective evaluation of the situation.

In the light of the above considerations it is the belief of the Swedish delegation that the expertise gathered within the Committee on Disarmament is eminently equipped to further this process. As consultations regarding the holding of the next review conference on the Sea-bed Treaty are at present being undertaken, the Swedish delegation wishes to draw the attention of the Committee to the role entrusted to its predecessor body and inherited by the Committee on Disarmament. I therefore propose that this Committee, in preparing its agenda and outline of work for 1983, make provisions for the fulfilment of this important task.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament is drawing to a close. In the brief span of the abbreviated summer part of this session, we have, I believe, achieved some modest accomplishments. My remarks today will focus on these areas of work where progress has been made, and I will as well comment on several issues where our position has been either misunderstood or misinterpreted.

First, with regard to a prohibition on chemical weapons, my delegation would like to register a degree of satisfaction at the progress that was made in the chemical weapons Working Group. The Chairman of the Group, the distinguished Ambassador of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, deserves the gratitude of all delegations, in particular for his inauguration of a method of work which allowed substantial results to be achieved. The nine contact groups were able to cover an impressive amount of material, and to report results to the Committee which clearly indicate that substantive progress has been made since we began our work in August. These results will provide an excellent basis for further progress at the Committee's 1983 session.

A number of other delegations have made important contributions to progress toward the prohibition of chemical weapons, an objective that we all agree is a matter of the greatest importance for the Committee. The contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany on the important question of verification of a chemical weapons convention is particularly noteworthy.

My delegation has also taken note of the proposals of the Soviet Union submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which have also been put forward in the Committee. These proposals seem to indicate a certain degree of flexibility on two of the key issues related to verification of a chemical weapons convention which, of course, we all welcome. We look forward to further amplification by the Soviet Union of the particulars of these proposals. There are, of course, many other unresolved verification issues. We hope that mutually acceptable solutions will be found to overcome these difficulties and thus allow progress to be made.

In sum, my delegation believes that the work of the Committee this year on a prohibition of chemical weapons has been advanced, largely through intensive work in the space of this brief six-week session. We hope these achievements are an indication that even greater advances will be possible during the course of our 1983 session.

With regard to the work of the nuclear test ban Working Group, we are, of course, disappointed that our efforts to begin substantive work under the mandate were blocked by one group. By comparison with the productive results in the chemical weapons Working Group, perhaps the best that can be said, in view of our failure to adopt a programme of work, is that in wrestling with this problem we have had several enlightening discussions related to issues of verification and compliance.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

The failure to advance the work of the Group is certainly not the responsibility of the Chairman of that Working Group, the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard. Quite the contrary. His efforts, together with those of his deputy, Mr. Hyltenius, and his scientific adviser, Dr. Ericsson, have been persistent, energetic and determined. Rather, this failure lies squarely on the doorstep of the Eastern bloc, which doggedly refused to accept a reasonable programme of work which was proposed by the Chairman and agreed to by the Group of 21 and the Western group.

My delegation recognizes that the mandate for this Working Group is limited. Only after arduous and protracted negotiations did we achieve consensus on the establishment of this Working Group. We recognize that the mandate is not the one which many in this body would prefer, but it is the one on which we agreed. My delegation considers it the height of hypocrisy for one group of delegations to have agreed to a mandate and then to block any attempts to begin to work under it. We continue to believe that there is an important role for this Committee in treating this subject, and we have high hopes that our efforts can lead to progress in the most vital and complex area of the entire test-ban issue. But the attitude of the Soviet Union and its supporters calls into question the very existence of this Working Group. We must carefully consider this question when we resume in February. Perhaps during our recess delegations will have an opportunity to engage in private consultations and, hopefully, to reassess their position. This would enable us to make progress in the nuclear test ban Working Group next year in an orderly fashion.

During the course of the discussions of the nuclear test ban Working Group, and during the preparation of its report, one delegation had occasion to raise the question of whether the United States was acting in violation of its legal obligations pursuant to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. In relation to this question, the report of the nuclear test ban Working Group (CD/332) states the following, on pages 10 and 11:

"The attention of that particular delegation was drawn by other delegations to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, in whose preamble it is stated 'seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances', and they expressed the view that this constituted a legal commitment. That delegation was asked how it reconciled being a party to that Treaty with the position it had now taken. That delegation stated that it did not accept the assertion that it had violated legal treaty commitments. It therefore stated its intention to respond fully to that assertion."

Let me categorically state that my Government does not accept any assertion that the United States has violated its legal treaty commitments under the partial test ban Treaty, any more than we accept the inference of other delegations that the United States views Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty as a dead letter. The position of the United States regarding a complete cessation of all nuclear explosions remains as I described it on 11 March of this year: a comprehensive test ban is an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives. While present circumstances have not appeared propitious for us to

(Mr. Fields, United States)

undertake negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at this time, I believe that our efforts to pursue successfully the objectives of the nuclear test ban Working Group in good faith speak for themselves as to the seriousness of purpose of the United States.

From the vantage point of my years in the legal adviser's office in the Department of State dealing with this specific issue and the interpretation of treaties, I feel qualified to address these matters on their merits. There is no doubt that the preambular language of the partial test ban Treaty states that the States parties to that Treaty will seek to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, [and are] determined to continue negotiations to this end". On 16 August 1963, Secretary of State Dean Rusk articulated the United States policy vis-à-vis this question in a press conference in these words:

"The policy of the United States is, as expressed among other places in the preamble of this limited Treaty itself, to seek a comprehensive test ban. But that will require a fully adequate assurance, inspection arrangements, so that we would know that there would not be any significant cheating that could affect our security."

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, generally recognized to be the codification of customary international law and practice, provides that "[A] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its objective and purpose". Thus, measured against this standard, the States parties have expressed their determination to seek to achieve the objective of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and indeed all other nuclear explosions, as required by article I, paragraph 1, of the partial test-ban Treaty, through continued negotiations. That cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean that the parties have bound themselves to continuous negotiations but rather to achieve the objective through a process of negotiations. This, I submit, the United States has sought to do and continues to pursue. Our participation in the trilateral process between 1977 and 1980 is but one manifestation of this determination. We have never rejected a comprehensive test ban as an objective of our Government. Indeed, we have reiterated that intent, as I pointed out earlier. The history of this process of negotiation is rife with illustrations of the verification obstacle. That is why my delegation continues to attach importance to our nuclear test ban Working Group, in the hope that some means to resolve this impediment to progress can be found.

In conclusion, the answer to the question whether the United States position regarding the objective of a comprehensive test ban "constitutes a denunciation, de jure or de facto", of the partial test-ban Treaty, is emphatically "No".

(Mr. Fields, United States)

I also want to say a brief word about the radiological weapons Working Group. Despite the fact that this Working Group met formally only twice during the summer session, I believe that, as a result of the efforts of its distinguished Chairman, Ambassador Wegener, the stage is set for more substantial progress towards the conclusion of a treaty banning radiological weapons during the coming session of the Committee. As I stated in my opening remarks to the Committee in August, my delegation is, and will continue to be, prepared to participate constructively in discussions of the question whether additional measures should be negotiated relating to the prevention of attacks on nuclear facilities. Ambassador Wegener has also introduced in the radiological weapons Working Group a compilation of treaty provisions (CD/RW/WP.39), representing his efforts to move the work of the Working Group toward a successful conclusion. My delegation appreciates these efforts, and believes that this compilation represents a useful focal point for continuing radiological weapons treaty negotiations next year.

During our summer session, the Committee returned to the question of whether additional arms control measures affecting outer space would be desirable. Our informal discussions were informative and productive. In my view, these discussions provided an appropriate perspective for further consideration of the issue. They shed light on the large body of international law already contained in existing agreements which constrain the possibilities for an arms race in outer space. The discussions also pointed up the fact that activities in outer space have utility both for peaceful as well as aggressive purposes and revealed that our main concern should be about programmes which have aggressive characteristics. In particular, the anti-satellite weapon programme of the Soviet Union has caused other nations, including my own, to take due notice of the potential threat to systems on which we all depend for such important functions as navigation, communications, early warning of nuclear attack and monitoring of arms control agreements.

Nevertheless, a large number of delegations in this Committee have not yet contributed to our consideration of the question of outer space arms control. The subject bears further scrutiny, and I continue to believe that the most efficient way to pursue our examination of these issues is through the mechanism of informal meetings of the Committee.

I would also like to say a few words regarding the two working groups which did not meet during this session. My delegation was certainly prepared to resume work on both negative security assurances and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Regarding the comprehensive programme, we look forward to resuming our work next session so that we can report to the General Assembly at its

(Mr. Fields, United States)

thirty-eighth session, as requested. And, of course, we will be prepared to participate constructively in the negative security assurances Working Group as well. Indeed, my delegation does not share the assessment of the state of those negotiations that was put forward by the Group of 21 in document CD/280, nor do we agree with the views of the delegation of Pakistan put forward by our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Ahmad, on 10 August.

My delegation has stated its belief that the Committee has, in fact, made some progress, limited though it may be, during the last six weeks. We intend to return to our work in February with the continuing conviction that the Committee has a singularly important role to fulfil in the broader spectrum of disarmament efforts, and with a determination to do all that we can to make real progress towards a more peaceful world.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not extend, on behalf of my delegation, the hand of welcome and friendship to the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kazimir Vidas. His reputation as an outstanding diplomat is well known to my Government -- and shared by many others. He will be a valuable addition to our Committee and I pledge to him the friendship, support and co-operation of my delegation.

I also note with deep personal sadness -- a feeling shared by my delegation -- the departure of Ambassador David Summerhayes, the most distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. His service in this body has brought distinction not only to himself, but to his country and indeed to this body.

It was David Summerhayes who was the first to extend the hand of friendship to me, as a fledgling member of the Committee. He became not only my friend, but my mentor. His patient guidance and support made my entry into this important responsibility much less formidable than it appeared as I accepted the President's call. It was David Summerhayes who instilled in me a profound respect for this Committee and the quality of its members. His quiet quality of leadership, his gentlemanly demeanour and his keen intellect have left a lasting imprint on this Committee. His example is a worthy one and I trust that I shall faithfully follow that example in the hope that I may leave this body with the sense of accomplishment which he will surely carry with him. He also carries with him the affection and esteem of us all. We shall be the poorer by his departure from our midst, but we are far richer from his service with us. We all wish him Godspeed and happiness in his future endeavours. But we wish to make it clear that we are saying to him "Au revoir" -- not "Adieu".

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement and I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, will introduce the Group's report.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, first of all, may I be permitted to express my great appreciation of your able and skilful chairmanship and thank you especially for the very efficient way in which you have been guiding our work during the present month. In our close co-operation with you, we welcome every one of your accomplishments as our own achievement. I wish you, therefore, a successful conclusion of the Committee's report on its activities during the present session and offer you our further assistance and support in the fulfilment of this task.

May I also take this opportunity to convey words of appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, for his contribution as Chairman during the month of August.

I welcome with satisfaction our new colleagues in the Committee, the distinguished representatives of Peru and Yugoslavia.

To those of our colleagues who have recently left Geneva or are shortly going to leave, I should like to bid farewell and wish them the best of luck.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I have the honour to introduce today to the Committee on Disarmament the Group's draft report on its activities in 1982. The text of the draft report is contained in document CD/334 and is available, I hope, to all the distinguished delegations in this Committee. By the way, I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to two errors in the report: the first is in paragraph 12, where the words "the next" should be inserted in the first line after the words "It was agreed that"; the second is that paragraph 17 should be deleted and paragraph 18 then becomes paragraph 17. All the report will therefore be reissued for technical reasons.

In view of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, I prepared a special report to the Committee on Disarmament which is contained in document CD/281/Rev.1, dated 27 April 1982. The report described, inter alia, in chapter III, the state of negotiations in the Working Group at the end of the first part of the Committee's session. Hence, in today's presentation I shall try to confine myself to the second part of the session of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons which, in accordance with the Committee's decision of 23 April 1982, started on 20 July 1982. In this connection, I only wish to recall that at the beginning of the 1982 session the Working Group on Chemical Weapons started its work with a new mandate by which the Committee decided "to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc working group ... to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date ...".

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Accordingly, from the beginning of the summer session, the Working Group continued to conduct intensive discussions and consultations aimed at elaborating the provisions of the future convention. After another round of detailed consultations within the Group based on the revised elements and comments thereto, and on such a constructive and valuable document as the "Basic Provisions" of a convention presented by the delegation of the USSR as well as on various proposals made by other delegations, nine informal, open-ended contact groups were established with the task of examining in depth specific problems involved and working out possible options and working hypotheses which could help to overcome existing divergences and advance the process of elaboration of the convention at the next stage of negotiations. These informal contact groups dealt particularly with the following spheres of the future convention:

The scope of the convention;

Definitions of technical terms which will be used in the convention;

Verification procedures, including particularly:

Declarations of the possession of stocks of chemical weapons and of the means of their production, time-frames and the forms of such declarations;

The process of and plans for the destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons and facilities;

National legislation and verification measures;

National technical means of verification;

An international verification system;

Other issues, inter alia, the convention's preamble, its relationship with other treaties and international co-operation in the implementation of the convention as well as many other aspects.

The reports of all contact groups were subsequently discussed and, where necessary, revised during the Working Group's consecutive meetings.

The consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, on certain technical questions resulted in 1982 in providing the Working Group with the recommendations on standardized operating procedures for acute subcutaneous toxicity determinations and for acute inhalation toxicity criteria. These recommendations are of direct relevance to the future convention.

The Working Group, through its intensive work in 1982 and its full devotion to the noble goal of the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, has again strongly reaffirmed not only that the conclusion of such a convention is one of the highest priorities in our negotiations but also that it is possible to reach agreement on it through a harmonized, collective effort. It is in such a way that I interpret the dedication and tireless effort of all co-ordinators and practically all delegations in seeking -- and finding -- compromise solutions



(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

and/or convergences of views in some areas and sectors of the future convention. I hope that the reports of the co-ordinators of the contact groups which are attached to the Working Group's report adequately reflect all the willingness to negotiate and to try to find agreed solutions. At the same time, they constitute a very good background for further negotiations. I wish to emphasize especially the willingness for further negotiations because -- being far from complacent -- I know how much time and effort must still be put in before the draft convention is ready.

Having this in mind and taking into account the progress which has been made by the contact groups in clarifying many issues as well as in seeking possible spheres of understanding through alternative and optional formulations and whenever possible through working hypotheses, I tried to sum them up in the form of possible compromise wordings of the elements which I presented recently to the Ad Hoc Working Group. I fully realize that it is far from being a perfect paper. I have not had such ambitions. I do hope, however, that it will help delegations in the drafting process and provide their respective Governments with a better knowledge of the present state of the negotiations. In this connection, I hope that the document entitled "Views of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on possible compromise wordings of the elements of a future convention", has already been circulated as a document under the number CD/333. Such was indeed the general wish of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

As is stated in paragraph 17 of its report the Group agreed, inter alia, "to recommend to the Committee on Disarmament that it should continue its work under the present Chairman between 17 and 20 January 1983 ...". In thanking the members of the Group for the confidence thus expressed, I endorse the said recommendations and hope that they, as well as the whole report, will meet with the Committee's approval. May I take this opportunity to appeal to all the delegations to take advantage of the recess to study the background material of this session so that we could make further tangible progress in January 1983 both in the work of the Group and in the consultations on technical issues.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude my introduction to the Committee of the draft report of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons by wholeheartedly thanking all the delegations for their valuable contribution to the Group's work. My special thanks are directed to the co-ordinators of the contact groups, Ms. Nascimbene of the Argentinian delegation, Mr. Melescanu (Romania), Mr. Lundin (Sweden), Mr. Skinner (Canada), Mr. Steele (Australia), Mr. Altaf (Pakistan), Mr. Duarte (Brazil), and Mr. Thielicke (German Democratic Republic). I am deeply convinced that no word of appreciation can be regarded as overestimating their contribution. We have had again this year sometimes a hard time. Our endurance has again been tested. But I am happy to emphasize that the Group has been trying to overcome the difficulties in a spirit of compromise. For myself, as its Chairman, this is the best reward for my own effort and the not easy job in the Chair.

My sincere thanks go to Mrs. Waldheim-Natural for her assistance as Secretary of the Working Group during the spring session and to Mr. Bensmail for his help and valuable advice during the summer session. I thank very much the secretariat staff and the interpreters for their excellent collaboration during the whole 1982 session.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement and for his very kind words addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, it is a special pleasure for my delegation, and for myself in particular, to welcome you as Chairman of the Committee and to thank you for the unequalled contribution to the cause of disarmament that you have been making for so many years.

The adoption of the report on the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban suggests some thoughts connected with the experience of the past few weeks of discussion, which I would like to share with my colleagues today. The establishment of a Working Group on a nuclear test ban represented, for my delegation, an important landmark in the work of this Committee, and that is why my delegation accepted the less than satisfactory mandate adopted for the Working Group on item 1 of our agenda. Discussion for discussion's sake, however, should not be allowed to become an activity of the Committee on Disarmament.

The difficulties experienced in the past few weeks by the NTB Working Group as regards the adoption of a programme of work that would have provided a structure for its activities came as no surprise to us. We have long been accustomed to seeing the Superpowers utilizing this Committee as yet another arena for confrontation rather than permitting it to fulfil its functions and its responsibilities.

To my delegation, it seemed constructive to structure the discussion around the existing agreements on the matter, especially the 1963 Treaty known as the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty. Its very name suggests that it should be made comprehensive, i.e., that it should be extended to cover all other environments; moreover, the negotiations on such a treaty should be conceived in such a way as to permit the resulting text to become universal. The new treaty must neither add new restrictions to non-nuclear-weapon nations nor consolidate existing discrimination; rather, it should be seen as an overdue step toward nuclear disarmament.

When responsible Governments negotiate and ratify international treaties, especially in the field of disarmament and security, the community of nations is entitled to expect that the commitments undertaken will be fulfilled. The old precept of pacta sunt servanda is still the basis for agreements among sovereign States. My delegation has already had the occasion to point to the discrepancy between the commitments undertaken by a nuclear-weapon Power, which is an original party to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, and its present official positions on the question of a nuclear test ban. We would hope that the Superpower concerned will reflect on the harmful consequences this discrepancy is likely to cause to the future of disarmament efforts, especially in the domain of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such consequences are too important to be lightly dismissed as irrelevant. Beside the political questions involved, an important legal issue immediately springs to mind: does a statement of policy according to which nuclear-weapon tests are said to be necessary for a long time to come constitute an abrogation of the legally binding obligations accepted under the preamble and under article 1 of the partial test-ban Treaty, of which Brazil is also a party? My delegation believes that all parties to the Treaty are entitled to a categorical

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answer from the Superpower concerned, so as to dispel any doubts as to its intentions. The same reasoning would, of course, also apply to article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of which Brazil is not a party. The Governments of the countries which adhered to that instrument will have to decide, in due course, what is the value attached to the expression "in good faith", perhaps not so much in legal terms as mainly in its political significance and consequences.

If adherence to an international instrument entails binding obligations for the parties to it, the same cannot be said of the negotiating activity. Participation in the multilateral bodies established to undertake the negotiation of a given issue cannot be seen as a final engagement of the positions of individual delegations, let alone of the Governments they represent. If it were so, a negotiating forum would certainly become an impossible enterprise. It is precisely because positions differ that the multilateral negotiating process was devised as the best means to harmonize differences among nations, but to negate the possibility of negotiating, to refuse even a clarification of doubts raised, amounts to confirmation of an unwillingness to search for common answers to common problems. Whether the nuclear-weapon Powers like it or not, the existence of nuclear weapons is a common problem for all nations, for which solutions acceptable to all must be negotiated. The perpetuation of threat, imbalance and discrimination is certainly not conducive to such a generally acceptable solution.

This Committee was recently reminded by a nuclear-weapon Power that its delegation acts in this forum in strict accordance with its national interests. It is true that we are all delegates for our own Governments, whose instructions we carry out to the best of our ability. But it is equally true that our Governments decided in 1945, when the Charter of the United Nations was adopted, that they would also act in accordance with interests of a higher order: the interests of the entire community of nations. In this sense, we are at the same time delegates of mankind as a whole. Our task is not only to harmonize the different perceptions of our respective Governments vis-à-vis one another; it is also, and perhaps foremost, to harmonize the interests of our own Governments with those of the community of nations. This applies more particularly to those Governments which have recognized their special responsibility in the field of disarmament.

May I introduce here an argument that, I believe, should be pondered by the Governments of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their closest allies during the recess of the Committee on Disarmament. Even though this forum is defined as a "negotiating body" -- and there seems to be no dispute on this assertion -- we can all agree that, with the exception of chemical weapons, little or no negotiation has been carried out in this chamber, particularly on the issues which have been assigned the highest priority. However, there seems to exist an apprehension, especially among the nuclear-weapon Powers, that anything they might agree upon in this forum will somehow become a binding obligation from which their Governments would never be able to extricate themselves. I simply want to point out that the participation of a given delegation in the activity of a working group, or the acceptance of a mandate for a subsidiary body that directs it "to negotiate" instead of "to examine and define" a particular subject, or the adoption of a programme of work that sets out a few general objectives and guidelines, all those are no more than decisions taken at delegation level. Both in the political and in the procedural sense, delegations seem to attach to these issues a value that stretches far beyond the import of the decisions taken on them. Similarly, there is a tendency to negotiate

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the wording of our reports as if they were legally binding treaties. Perhaps this is simply in response to a psychological mechanism of compensation, of which we are quite aware. Such decisions cannot be construed as engaging Governments to the result of the work undertaken, and they certainly do not create any final commitments. The work of this Committee on chemical weapons is a case in point, and I do not need to recall here that no delegation around this table feels engaged by the significant results achieved in this field so far, although we may all agree that substantive progress has been made in this session towards facilitating agreement. In this Committee, agreements are usually reached at working group level, before being formally approved at the Committee level, where consensus is also necessary; in any case, ample allowance is made for reservations. Furthermore, the texts submitted by the Committee on Disarmament are reviewed by the General Assembly, and if adopted, they are presented to Governments as mere recommendations. The final judgement on whether or not to join an agreement will necessarily be made, in the last instance, by the sovereign decision of the Government itself; and even the executive decision to sign an international instrument must be confirmed, in most constitutional processes, by the procedures of ratification, which usually involve national exposure of the issues to the judgement of public opinion. It is thus difficult to understand, for instance, why China and France decided on a negative attitude as regards their participation in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test-Ban.

One is forced, therefore, to ask the inevitable question: why do some delegations in this Committee persist in raising obstacles to the normal performance of its negotiating function, as if every procedural, or even substantive step would entail irrevocable commitments of a political and legal nature?

The Governments of nations where public opinion plays a role in the conduct of international affairs may overemphasize issues relating to their defence and security needs in response only to the perspective of their own national interests; conversely, Governments of nations where public opinion is not a relevant factor may deliberately engage in rhetoric with the aim of promoting dissention among their adversaries. Both attitudes, when used to impede progress in this Committee, become extremely harmful to the orderly conduct of work, since both are at variance with the decision-making process inherent in multilateral procedure. Such ambiguity of attitudes and behaviour could perhaps be dispelled if all delegations represented here attached the same meaning and value to the expression "in good faith".

I wish to thank the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Fields, for his reaction to the observation of my delegation, as well as of other delegations, concerning the compliance of his Government with a partial test-ban treaty. Unfortunately, my delegation is not yet convinced by his arguments, neither those of a juridical nor those of a political nature. But my delegation was happy to hear from the distinguished Ambassador of the United States the renewed commitment of his Government to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and I would like to state that all doubts on the part of my delegation on this matter will be dispelled when the United States delegation decides to engage in meaningful and substantive negotiations on a total ban on nuclear-weapon test explosions.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Argentina, Mr. García Moritán, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Allow me first of all, Mr. Chairman, to offer you my delegation's sincerest congratulations on your accession to the chairmanship of our Committee. As an illustrious Latin American and a brilliant diplomat, with a wealth of experience in disarmament matters, you have assured the Committee a Chairman of a quality commensurate with its acknowledged eminence. I am certainly not the first nor shall I be the last Argentine diplomat to have had the honour and the pleasure of working under your guidance. Your tireless efforts have extended beyond the limits of this Committee and there is no doubt whatever that disarmament negotiations have felt the impact of your personality, experience and wisdom.

At the same time, I would like to express my delegation's gratitude to Ambassador Maina of Kenya for his dedicated efforts during his period of chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament.

The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament provided the international community with a sound basis for the guidance of all efforts in this sphere. The Final Document of that session outlined a strategy, and stated, in its paragraph 17: "The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament".

However, the Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, has been unable to fulfil the important responsibility of carrying out the Programme of Action which the 1978 document set before us as a matter of urgency, prompted by compelling world concern. I do not think it necessary at this juncture to go into the details of the reasons which have led to this paralysis, but I must point out that the future of our negotiations cannot continue to depend on changing attitudes or on excuses based on hypothetical or possible negotiating attempts outside the ambit of our body.

The cause of disarmament cannot continue to be subject to the exclusive privilege of a certain nuclear Superpower to establish, in accordance with its own convenience, a changing order of priorities in the disarmament field. This attitude, which necessarily gives rise to a lack of coherence, disturbs and seriously hampers the elements of the negotiations and automatically generates a climate of mistrust. The results of our work during the last four years and that of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament certainly do not call for any eulogistic assessments but are a clear reflection of this situation.

We have already expressed our profound regret that the second special session was unable to reach any agreement on the matter which is of the greatest concern to mankind. Argentina, which at that time was facing military aggression by a nuclear-weapon Power, hoped that the United Nations would finally become the vehicle for eliminating the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

That was not to be, and the final report of the second special session does not reflect or take into account the hopes and aspirations of the majority of the international community. On the contrary, it is evidence of a serious failure, for it shows that the special responsibility of the most powerful nations among us to guarantee international peace and security is frequently forgotten. Furthermore -- and we consider this to be a grave defect -- the conclusions of that report do not even correspond to the facts, as for example when it states that the validity of the Final Document was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed, whereas in fact there were suggestions and attitudes which contradicted both the letter and the spirit of the concepts contained in that Document, some of which were even included in chapter III.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

At this session the Committee, which is today holding one of its last plenary meetings, has once again been prevented from reacting and has preferred to continue to conceal the facts, referring to circumstantial matters of form and having recourse to delaying tactics which only contrive to disguise as expectations the actual vacuum of a state of total paralysis.

Reference is often made to the international climate as a factor affecting developments in the disarmament field, but we feel obliged to state emphatically that the real reason for the present situation is the lack of political will on the part of some of the main protagonists. This lack of political will is reflected in attitudes which create and generate tensions and ignore the most important and fateful issues confronting mankind today.

This attitude and this trend are not in the spirit of the developing nations; they did not arise from within the movement of non-aligned countries. On the contrary, they originated and are becoming intensified in the centres of political and military power. They are the result of the inexcusable continuation of nuclear terror and the maintenance of colonialist attitudes -- like those of which the Argentine Republic is the victim, as it sees its territory occupied by force by British military colonialism, they are the result, too of the continuation of neo-colonialist attitudes, of all forms of racism and apartheid. They are the root causes of conflicts and constitute a form of permanent aggression and a constant threat to international peace and security.

It is this state of permanent aggression created by the lack of political will to negotiate which generates conflicts, the arms race and insecurity, and paralyzes efforts in the sphere of disarmament. No nation, whether powerful or weak, developed or developing, can isolate itself from the common destiny of our planet. Our main objective is to rid the world of nuclear war, which will lead to the destruction of civilization as we know it. The constant threat of this real danger faces all our nations. Mine, the Argentine Republic, was the victim of this serious threat when the United Kingdom dispatched to the South Atlantic a punitive fleet composed of nuclear submarines and warships armed with nuclear weapons.

The search for absolute security through the possession of such weapons and a declared willingness to use them has created an atmosphere of terror because, in seeking the security of a few, it has engendered total insecurity for all. That is why my delegation joins with those who demand that this body should seek to bring about nuclear disarmament. In a nuclear conflict there will be no possibility of any nation proclaiming its neutrality or of innocent peoples remaining passive spectators. All, without exception, whether they wish to or not, will be obliged to take part and to suffer the consequences. It is precisely that common destiny in the far from hypothetical possibility of a nuclear war which is a factor of interdependence and makes it essential to accelerate efforts to slow the arms race and introduce an acceptable minimum of security in international relations.

In that context, the Argentine delegation regrets that this Committee has been unable to respond to India's initiative as it appears in document CD/309 and to give appropriate implementation to General Assembly resolution 36/81 which merely reproduces statements from the Final Document and seeks to find a positive answer to the world's constant concern over its survival.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

In this last part of our 1982 session, we have initiated the first meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, under the skilled and very able chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard. It is to be hoped that at the Committee's next session we shall be able to take the final steps so that we can actually start negotiations towards the drafting of a treaty. We also hope that the two western nuclear-weapon Powers participating in the trilateral negotiations will provide a satisfactory answer to the concerns expressed to them.

Argentina has repeatedly referred to the need for an instrument which specifically bans tests of nuclear weapons, which will win universal adherence and which is equitable and non-discriminatory. In this context, I would like to make quite clear my country's position on one aspect that we consider essential: any treaty which is concluded must preserve the right of all States to carry out nuclear engineering projects, including explosions, for peaceful purposes. This is a fundamental question which concerns the very technology of the future and the possibility of using it must be jealously guarded by all States.

Mr. Chairman, in your brilliant statements as the representative of Mexico on the urgent need to conclude a nuclear test-ban treaty, you recalled the authoritative view of the Secretary-General of the United Nations when he stated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 29 February 1972: "I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement".

The impatience and general dissatisfaction of the non-nuclear-weapon States, to which the Secretary-General referred, are certainly as great now as they were when he made his remarks over ten years ago, if not greater. Fortunately, those States have shown a greater sense of responsibility than those which appear to claim a monopoly of reasonableness. But ten years is a long time to wait. Those who insist on maintaining the status quo forget that the reasons they invoke are equally valid for others. It is therefore time that those who are obstructing the urgently needed agreement on this question understood that, as time passes, two inexorable alternatives arise: either we have a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests or the number of nuclear-weapon States will increase.

We would also like to place particular emphasis on another point which, in my delegation's view, as a result of its own experience, is of a fundamental nature and consequently leads it to express regret that, at this session, the Committee has not set up an ad hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prohibition of the use of satellites for military purposes. My delegation would like to point out that our work should be aimed at the demilitarization of outer space. We have heard, not without some surprise, certain statements in which speakers have claimed that the demilitarization of outer space is unrealistic or no longer possible. We have heard such arguments on other occasions, in connection with attempts to maintain certain military advantages or to divert attention from the real problems of disarmament. Satellites are already used for military purposes to a considerable and significant extent, as my country learned, with grievous consequences, during the conflict in the South Atlantic when United States satellites were placed at the service of the colonialist Power. It is appropriate to remind members that, at the end of 1980, 75 per cent of the satellites in orbit were for military purposes and that 70 per cent of the military communications of one of the Superpowers are affected by that means.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

My delegation wonders whether the task of the Committee on Disarmament is to discuss this situation or carefully to avoid doing so in order to maintain the existing Power relationships.

I do not wish to conclude this statement without reiterating the Argentine Republic's belief that the provisions and principles to which we agreed by consensus over four years ago still offer the best guidance available to the international community for the direction of its efforts in all the matters falling within the general sphere of disarmament.

However, there is no doubt that the position and the disarmament efforts of Argentina, a developing country which possesses neither nuclear weapons nor the protection which the Superpowers provide for their allies, will be affected by the implications of the South Atlantic conflict and its consequences.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Kenya, Mr. Don Nanjira, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, permit me to speak for a while as a newcomer to this Committee and to share with you and the delegations seated around this table my impressions about the Committee on Disarmament and what it does. Before I do so, however, I wish to recall a paragraph in the statement I made before this Committee on 30 March 1982. I was talking about the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and this is what I said, inter alia (Ambassador Alessi of Italy was in the Chair):

"While not pretending that a clean text of a comprehensive programme of disarmament can be agreed upon at the current session of the Committee, I would none the less call for more flexibility in the positions of some delegations and groups of delegations in the negotiations currently being carried out under the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, to whom I would once more like to extend the gratitude of the Kenyan delegation for the tireless efforts he has been exerting over the months in the negotiations conducted within the CPD Working Group. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to request the Ambassador of Mexico, His Excellency Alfonso García Robles, to reveal to me the secret of manufacturing new and renewable sources of energy which give him all the stamina and discipline and tenacity and toughness par excellence which he possesses, and yet enable him at the same time to remain so agreeable, likeable and most respectable. Such a revelation would no doubt be a confidence-building measure to newcomers to the Disarmament Committee like myself."

Yes, Mr. Chairman, newcomers to the Committee on Disarmament like myself can learn and benefit a lot from you. This is what I have discovered since 2 February of this year, when I became, for the first time, physically associated with the work of this Committee. Naturally, I have formed my own views about the nature and function of the Committee on Disarmament -- characteristics which are not, most regrettably, what I thought the Committee possessed as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues. When I got here, I had the usual problem of finding my way and identifying who was who in this Committee. Sometimes it was



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quite a frustrating experience. For instance, one day I asked a member of the United States delegation about the whereabouts of another member of that delegation with whom I wanted to discuss a point in a CPD draft. I asked:

Question: "Where is that gentleman of your delegation?"

Response: "Which one? They are all gentlemen!"

Question: "The one with the beard?"

Response: "They all wear beards!"

Question: "The big one?"

Response: "They are all big!"

Question: "The one who speaks with an American accent?"

Response: "They all speak with American accents!"

Well, all that I could do under the circumstances was to thank her and say "See you later!" As you can see, I couldn't have been more frustrated!

Before coming here, I had been dealing for five years in New York with international development issues of an economic character. I should, interestingly, note that I was preparing to go to Mexico City to attend a United Nations meeting on economic issues when the instruction arrived that I should prepare to move on to Geneva to attend the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament! Like most other people who have not had direct dealings with the Committee on Disarmament, I had understood the talk in the Committee on Disarmament as being basically the business of the United States and the Soviet Union and eventually also as involving their respective military alliances. The fact is that very little is known by the world at large of what goes on in this Committee. Indeed, many knowledgeable people of the third world believe that participation in sessions of the Committee on Disarmament by developing nations is a waste of their very limited resources because there does not seem to be any hope of real and positive results coming from the Committee! Perhaps this is an area of the Committee's work which should be publicized more widely and regularly, whether through the mass media, or public education programmes on disarmament issues, or even through addresses by public figures such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is incredible that preparations for an important special session of the General Assembly, like the one held last June/July, and an assessment of its results can be made by this Committee, as it has done, without having the physical presence of the Secretary-General himself here to address this Committee, even for five minutes only. In any event, the talk about the mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament could not be more opportune, and since charity starts at home, we, the members of the Committee on Disarmament, must do something concrete to convince the world -- both policy makers and the public at large -- that our discussions and deliberations in this Committee are worthwhile, and that the Committee addresses issues of life and death for humankind.

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Anyway, it was only after I had critically analysed paragraphs 28 and 120 of the Final Document -- as I was changing planes in Frankfurt on 1 February 1982 on my way to Geneva -- that I really got to understand the real nature and function of the Committee on Disarmament. I must hastily add here that the Committee has not, so far, fulfilled its basic function as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament matters. The Committee has so far merely debated these issues and tried to negotiate language on them. This conviction prompted me, on 25 February 1982, to say the following, inter alia, in this Committee:

"We need to spend more time negotiating on substantive disarmament questions, rather than politicking and talking about procedural issues, exercising rights of reply and the like. We must find ways and means of improving and strengthening the capacity of the Committee to discharge competently the negotiating functions entrusted upon it by the world community. And since the United Nations itself has primary responsibility in the disarmament field, it must play a significant role within the framework of paragraphs 114, 123 and 124 of the Final Document itself."

The effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament could thus take many forms, and I am very happy to note that the Committee will be examining this question more deeply in the future. My delegation attaches considerable importance to this issue, and I would like formally to propose that it be inscribed as a separate item for consideration by the Committee in the near future. My delegation will then be happy to make practical proposals for the enhancement of the effectiveness of the Committee.

A possible expansion of its membership is another issue which the Committee will also have to address. Obviously, there exists a difference, which should be upheld, between expansion of the membership and effectiveness of the Committee. The discussions held so far on the question of expansion lead one to conclude that a limited expansion of the membership of the Committee would be acceptable, but that the time is not yet ripe for such an expansion. What can and should be done is to improve on the existing arrangements for the participation of non-members in the work of the Committee. This is a matter which the Committee will also have to address in the future. In so doing, it will have to weigh various options, and the criteria to be considered will include: the need to retain a political balance of groups; an equitable geographical distribution of membership (the so-called representative character of the Committee on Disarmament); the security interests of the third and non-aligned world, as well as effectiveness, contribution and structure and organization of the Committee.

Turning specifically to the work of the Committee at its current session, which is just about to end, Mr. Chairman, I should like to make the following observations:

The Kenya delegation has already expressed its satisfaction at your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of September and also for the period between the end of the Committee's 1982 session and the opening of its 1983 session.

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The chairmanship of the Committee could not be in better hands, especially at this point in time when it is preparing for the first regular session of the United Nations General Assembly after the second special session, the outcome of which could not, for all practical purposes, be classified as a success, and when we have to reflect on the work of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies and find ways and means of overcoming the impediments to progress in the work of the Committee.

The Kenya delegation has already expressed its views on the outcome of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We said, for instance, in our statement of 31 August 1982, that "Unless our efforts are backed by a firm political will and commitment on the part of all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and the other militarily significant States, progress in the work of this Committee will continue to be very slow indeed".

I listened very attentively to the definition which Mr. D.M. Sadleir, the distinguished Ambassador of Australia, in his statement of 5 August 1982, gave of "political will". He said:

"I conclude by returning to the idea of a new approach in our work. We need, as we have been told many times in this Committee, the political will to reach agreement. Political will has the important component of decision at the highest level to modify national positions for the greater international good. It has no less importantly the component at the negotiating level of decision to forsake rhetoric, political point-scoring, propaganda and lack of substance in favour of aiming at the practical and the achievable. Should we be wise enough now to demonstrate this latter aspect of political will -- the costs, I should point out, are small and the rewards high -- then we shall have laid a basis for renewed mutual confidence."

If anyone were to ask me why no real progress has been made in the discussions within the Committee on Disarmament on the seven items inscribed on its agenda for 1982, my response would be brief and simple: because of the lack of political will on the part of certain States members of the Committee. Thus, we have discussed in 1982, as in previous years, the issues of a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, chemical weapons, new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Yes, we have discussed these issues, and we will no doubt discuss them in the future, but unless and until those members of the international community who bear a special responsibility for disarmament, as stipulated in paragraph 48 and other paragraphs of the Final Document, demonstrate the political will and firm commitment necessary for the implementation of the recommendations made and decisions taken in the field of disarmament, our talk about general and complete disarmament under effective international control will remain a song and indeed a mere dream for very many years to come. And so long as this remains the case, then our discussions and the

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patience of the majority of the members of this Committee will continue to suffer the fate and frustrations perhaps similar to those which the Senate of Rome was subjected to, as Cicero has told us. The only remarkable difference in this comparison is that, whereas the patience of the Senate of Rome was tried by a single participant, Catalina, our patience in this Committee is being tried by a few participants, whose change of heart and positions can be brought about by nothing else but their political will.

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament have been characterized more by failures than by successes. There has been a general consensus, nevertheless, during the discussions and negotiations on items 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the Committee's agenda for 1982 that:

(a) The irresistible result of the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, will be the total annihilation of humankind. This is undoubtedly the message in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

(b) Items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda are of the highest priority; and

(c) The elaboration and adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is also a priority item.

All these and other similar factors have prompted the majority of members of the Committee, including my own country, Kenya, to call, inter alia, for:

- (i) The halting and reversal of the arms race and the attainment of nuclear disarmament;
- (ii) The accelerated elaboration and early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT);
- (iii) The creation of a working group on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session;
- (iv) The creation of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war;
- (v) The creation of a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and
- (vi) The halting of the abuse of the rule of consensus -- rule 13 of the Committee's rules of procedure -- as called for by the Group of 21 in its document CD/330, dated 13 September 1982.

The decision by the Committee, at the second part of its 1982 session, to defer to 1983 substantive consideration of the items on negative security assurances, radiological weapons and a comprehensive programme of disarmament, was prompted not so much by the lack of time to discuss these items, nor by preoccupations with other more important and more urgent items before the Committee for consideration, as by the lack of progress on those subjects, both in the work of the relevant working groups during the first part of the Committee's 1982 session and at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This was what we had in mind when we stated in our intervention at the Committee's plenary meeting on 31 August 1982:

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"This was, I believe, the fundamental reason why most delegations assembled here have favoured and advanced the idea of shelving the work of the ad hoc working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, radiological weapons and negative security assurances. The failure of these groups to make real progress in their work during the spring session of the Committee earlier this year and the outcome of the second special session have blunted the expectations and hopes vested in this Committee by the international community. My delegation therefore hopes that real progress will be made when these working groups resume their work in 1983."

Ways should thus be found of removing the impasse in the work of the Committee's subsidiary bodies, and as for the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, paragraph 63 of the Concluding Document of the second special session has imposed upon this Committee the important task of submitting a revised version of the programme to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth regular session. To this end, Mr. Chairman, the Working Group on a CPD has been re-established under your continued leadership, and I have no doubt in my mind that, given willingness and a commitment by all members of the Committee to negotiate on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, we can, in the next 12 months, elaborate a CPD and present it to the General Assembly at its 1983 session for adoption. One therefore hopes that informal contacts and consultations between the Chairman of the CPD Working Group and the various delegations and groups of delegations will be carried out in the inter-sessional period, i.e. between now and February 1983.

My delegation has already expressed its gratitude to all the chairmen of the working groups for the wise and impartial way in which they have guided the deliberations of their respective working groups. We would like the work of these groups to be continued, and indeed intensified, next year, with a view to formulating and agreeing on draft elements of future conventions in the various fields of disarmament.

I would be failing in my duty if I did not express the gratitude of my delegation for all the kind words which have been said about the manner in which Ambassador C.G. Maina guided the work of the Committee during the month of August. I shall convey all these good wishes and congratulatory sentiments expressed here about Ambassador Maina after his departure for Nairobi.

Last, but not least, let me take this opportunity to bid farewell to Ambassador Summerhayes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Ambassador Summerhayes has been unique in this Committee: his statements have always been short, precise and to the point -- the typical English tradition of using the English language. I speak as a person who had the misfortune -- depending on how one looks at it -- of being subjected to the English educational system at the primary, intermediate and secondary levels in Kenya as well as the university level in London, according to which a pass with distinction in all subjects and a failure in English meant a failure in all examinations. Anyway, I listened attentively to the last but moving statement made by Ambassador Summerhayes and it is regrettable that this Committee will be losing such a gentle and experienced member. You have served Her Majesty's Government well, Mr. Ambassador, and on behalf of the Kenya delegation I would like to wish you and your family good health and success in your new assignment.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Since our working groups have no vice-chairmen I am unable to delegate my responsibility for saying a few words on that subject, and I shall therefore have to make an exception to the general rule that while a member of the Committee has the honour to act as its Chairman he endeavours to speak solely in that capacity.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Speaking as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, I should like to recall that at the informal meeting that was held yesterday afternoon, a member of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, speaking on behalf of his country, made a suggestion with respect to paragraph 70 of Working Paper No. 74. Paragraph 70, as drafted by the secretariat, reads as follows:

"70. At its 176th plenary meeting on 5 August 1982, the Committee decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to submitting a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, taking into account the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was understood that the Ad Hoc Working Group would commence its substantive work in the first part of the 1983 session of the Committee. At the same meeting, the Committee re-appointed the representative of Mexico as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group."

I should like to make it clear that the secretariat at no time consulted me on the drafting of the text of that paragraph. Nevertheless, as with practically all of the draft report contained in Working Paper No. 74, I found the paragraph entirely satisfactory. Why? Because it contains all the essential facts and because I consider that Talleyrand's advice not to be over-zealous is very much to be recommended on certain occasions. However, if the distinguished delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany should wish to maintain the suggestion it made at the informal meeting yesterday, then it would be necessary to make certain additions to the text on the basis of the official documents. In the first place it would be necessary to amend the suggestion made by the distinguished representative who spoke yesterday since it does not adhere very faithfully to the wording used in the final verbatim record of the 176th plenary meeting. Apart from that, however, it would be necessary in addition to say that at the same meeting the Chairman of

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

the Ad Hoc Working Group in question, after thanking the members of the Committee for their kindness in reappointing him to act as Chairman of that Group, said the following, which is on page 31 of the verbatim record:

"Lastly, I should like to stress that although my appointment is a signal honour for me, at the same time it entails a heavy responsibility which, as I said at the Committee's informal meeting at which this subject was discussed, I only felt able to accept -- for the reasons I gave in my statement of 3 August -- because it was clear that the Working Group would not embark on its tasks until next year."

Nevertheless, since it had been said, at the meeting to which I am referring, that it would be desirable for the Chairman to hold informal consultations, I proceeded as soon as I was able to thereafter, during that same week of Thursday, 5 August, to conduct certain consultations of this kind -- informal and exploratory -- with colleagues members of the Group of 21. From those exchanges and from the replies I received to the questions I asked, it was very clear -- very clear indeed -- that the members of the Group continued to consider it essential that the comprehensive programme of disarmament, especially as regards matters connected with nuclear weapons, should not imply any retreat, however small, from what was embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and more particularly from the provisions of paragraph 51 of that document, which is concerned with the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

As you will remember, the following week, on Tuesday, 10 August, at the Committee's 177th plenary meeting, the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, said, among other things -- I am quoting from page 12 of document CD/PV.177 -- "My Government continues to hold a comprehensive test ban as an ultimate objective, although we believe that the present time is not propitious for the negotiation of such a ban". In view of this categorical statement and the views still held by the members of the Group of 21, I considered -- as I still do -- that it would be a waste of time to continue conducting informal consultations at present. I hoped that the situation would be different next year, and I must say that it was with particular satisfaction that I heard the representative of the United States today say the following: "Regarding the comprehensive programme, we look forward to resuming our work next session so that we can report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session as requested".

Thus, after this statement, which will appear in the records, if it is the wish of the Committee that paragraph 70 of Working Paper No. 74 should remain as it was drafted by the secretariat, I shall be perfectly satisfied, but if the

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Committee wishes to add something along the lines of the suggestion made yesterday afternoon, to which I referred at the outset of my statement, then it will naturally be necessary to complete the paragraph in the way I have just indicated.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): That is the end of the statement of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and I shall now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to exercise his right of reply. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom has the floor.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): I find it deplorable that I should have to make a statement in right of reply and take up the time of the Committee, at this late stage of our session and at the present late hour, in order to reply to a propagandistic and totally unwarranted attack on my country's position in respect of the Falkland Islands and its people, made by the distinguished representative of Argentina in the course of his statement this morning.

His authorities do not yet seem to have learned that virulent and propagandistic statements do not win victories. The world at large well knows what is true and is not deceived. I shall therefore be very brief in my response to the remarks made this morning.

I should like to ask delegations to reflect on the following questions:

1. Which country has made and continues to make threats and menaces in respect of the Falkland Islands?
2. Which country invaded the territory of another and then terrorized its inhabitants, who rejected absolutely the idea of being ruled by a foreign military dictatorship whose actions against its own people had given clear indications of its attitude towards human rights and liberty?
3. Which country has resolutely declined to declare an end to the hostilities since peace and liberty were restored in the Falkland Islands in June this year?

The answer to these questions is clear to all. In every case Argentina is the country at fault.

Finally, the representative of Argentina tried to suggest that the United Kingdom had disregarded its guarantees regarding nuclear weapons. My Government has stated both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly -- and I repeat it here -- that it would be inconceivable that the United Kingdom would use nuclear weapons against Argentina. The very thought is ridiculous.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement, and the next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Senegal, Mr. Ibrahim Sy, to whom I now give the floor.



Mr. SY (Senegal) (translated from French): Allow me first of all to offer you my warmest congratulations on your accession to the chairmanship of this eminent body. Your qualities as a shrewd diplomat as well as your long experience in disarmament negotiations are known and appreciated by all. We are sure, therefore, that you will bring the work of the present session to a successful conclusion.

I should also like to offer my congratulations to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina, who conducted the Committee's work last month with a skilful hand.

Participating in the Committee on Disarmament as an observer for the first time has been a most enriching experience for my delegation and has also given us a better idea of the extent and complexity of disarmament problems. As we have listened to the many statements that have been made here and as we have followed the discussions concerning the principal items on the agenda, we have become aware of the devotion of the various members of the Committee to the cause of disarmament but also of the great number of obstacles which still exist. This has confirmed us in the conviction that disarmament demands true dedication and that the participation of all States is needed in order to achieve it.

Indeed, after the disappointing results of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it is more than ever essential to give fresh impetus to disarmament negotiations. That is the expectation of world public opinion, perturbed as it is by the resurgence of the nuclear arms race and the manifold threats hanging over mankind. At the present time, when the use of force is becoming commonplace in international relations, when certain colonialist and racist regimes persist in denying peoples their fundamental human rights, when nuclear arsenals are growing larger every day, no one can be satisfied with the slowness of progress in the matter of disarmament. What we need, in fact, is a more dynamic approach in order to reverse the trend of increasing dangers and to make the disarmament effort a gradual process towards the elimination of weapons, both nuclear and conventional. Such an approach should be based upon the adoption by all of a positive attitude towards the disarmament negotiations combined with respect for previous commitments and a concern not to convert the consensus rule into a hindrance to disarmament. The present session of the Committee has not always given reason to believe that rapid progress was being made in this direction. It is regrettable, for instance, that it was not possible to adopt the proposals for the establishment of working groups on nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Similarly, although the discussions on a nuclear test ban have permitted a thorough exchange of views, uncertainty prevails as to the next stage. Nevertheless, we should welcome the progress, however limited, that has been made in these discussions. We also hope that the discussions on a comprehensive programme of disarmament will be resumed next year. We believe that the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament will provide a coherent framework for the successful continuation of the negotiations in progress on the cessation of nuclear tests and on radiological and chemical weapons. It will also serve as a starting point for new negotiations on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, the reduction of military budgets, disarmament and development, and many other questions. We are hopeful that the other working groups will emulate the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and achieve progress in the near future.

(Mr. Sy, Senegal)

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words on the question of the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament. In that connection we note with pleasure that the Committee's draft report states that it has no objection in principle to a further limited expansion of its membership. We hope that the members of the Committee will shortly be able to agree on the criteria and procedures to be applied. We feel we should emphasize at once, however, that the criterion of geographical balance applied by all organizations and bodies in the United Nations system ought in any event to be taken duly into account. Technical qualifications are, of course, important. But apart from the fact that such qualifications can be acquired, it should be borne in mind that disarmament is primarily a political process and that therefore any review of the negotiating machinery should take account of this fundamental fact. Until such time as the Committee is in a position to make proposals concerning its expansion -- and we trust that this will be soon -- we earnestly hope that the participation of non-member States will be made easier so that they can follow all aspects of the Committee's work fully.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Senegal for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The last speaker on my list for this morning is the representative of Argentina, who wishes to exercise his right of reply. He has the floor.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I am sorry that I have had to ask for the floor again after hearing the remarks of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. He spoke of propaganda and said that a third world, non-aligned country was making propaganda. That is certainly ironical. The facts of the colonial question are no mere propaganda; the facts of the colonial question are an extremely serious matter in international relations. But it seems that the right to speak about subjects which are not precisely concerned with disarmament is reserved exclusively to certain Western Powers. When those Powers referred to the cases of Afghanistan and Poland, was that not, perhaps, propaganda? In this connection it is sufficient to refer to the verbatim record of the 170th meeting of this Committee (CD/PV.170). We are also accused of having used force. It is also ironical that the colonial power par excellence should accuse Argentina of using force. The maintenance of a colonial situation is by definition an act of aggression, an act of force. I would like very briefly to recall some facts with respect to this matter. When peaceful Argentine workers were on the islands of South Georgia in February, with the full knowledge of the United Kingdom as the result of a contract signed in London, it was the United Kingdom which sent us a note signed by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, a note drafted and conceived in the most orthodox colonialist terms. We were told in that note that if we did not withdraw the Argentine workers the United Kingdom would remove them by force, and it sent a warship for that purpose. We were also told that nuclear submarines and also ships would be sent to the South Atlantic. It is sufficient to recall Security Council resolution 502, which the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom himself stated in this very Committee on Disarmament, at its 170th plenary meeting, was a mandatory resolution -- a resolution that was sponsored and drafted by the United Kingdom in the Security Council and voted for by the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, that resolution did not state that Argentina was the aggressor country; that resolution did not imply, as a number of members of the Security Council pointed out, that the United Kingdom could arrogate to itself the role of policeman and send to the South Atlantic a punitive fleet -- the largest fleet constituted since 1956, when the United Kingdom, again, embarked upon the Suez adventure. On 5 and 7 August 1982,

(Mr. Garcia Moritan (Argentina))

the United Kingdom was responsible for incidents against Argentine fishing vessels in Argentine jurisdictional waters, using British warships and military aircraft; that constitutes the use of force. It was the United Kingdom which used force in 1833 when it expelled the Argentine population living on the islands; that constitutes the use of force. And the United Kingdom should know that the use of force -- to repeat its own words -- does not win victories; in time it always has to be paid for. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom spoke about human rights. How can we forget the sufferings of the people of Northern Ireland? The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom said that Argentina had refused to declare an end to the hostilities. But Argentina was always ready to negotiate; Argentina was ready to implement resolution 502. It was the United Kingdom which did not comply with that resolution, but sent a punitive fleet to the South Atlantic. Argentina has been ready to negotiate for 150 years. During the last 17 years, Argentina was prepared to negotiate actively, but we constantly came up against the same difficulties we are coming up against today in this Committee as a result of the United Kingdom's procrastinative attitude regarding negotiations. In February 1982 we were also prepared to negotiate and we proposed a plan of work. We were also prepared to negotiate in the months of April and May of this year whenever an opportunity for negotiation presented itself. We are prepared to negotiate today and tomorrow and we shall always be prepared to negotiate. But the United Kingdom and its allies in this bloody enterprise should make no mistake, the Argentine Republic will be prepared to sit down at a negotiating table, but it will not give in, even if it has to fight, until the Malvinas Islands and the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands are finally once again a part of its national heritage.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank you. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor, and I shall give it to him now, but I should be grateful if the distinguished representatives who have participated in this dialogue, which will then be equal -- two statements on each side -- could call a halt to it after the statement that the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom is about to make, bearing in mind that the thirty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly will begin very shortly and will, I believe, have items on this question on its agenda. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Of course I fully accept your ruling, Mr. Chairman. The full history of the events in the Falklands is embodied in the documents of the Security Council and most recently in a letter dated 20 August to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom in New York. I will not weary the Committee with any further reply.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): I will be exceedingly brief. I would just like to make a brief reference to the statement made earlier by the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. By implication, my delegation was asked whether we would wish to maintain an amendment moved yesterday in an informal body on the draft report, and the reply is "Yes". My delegation maintains this amendment in full and would be pleased to give the reasoning for it in the informal plenary where we understand all discussions about the report are to be conducted at this juncture.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Thank you: that clarifies the situation, and the secretariat will take the reply into account in preparing the new text of the relevant paragraph. The distinguished representative of Nigeria has the floor.

Mr. IJEVERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, with reference to paragraph 70 of Working Paper No. 74, page 33, reading from the second line from the top, it says: "taking into account the views expressed and the progress achieved on this subject at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament". This is in connection with the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I wonder whether this is factually correct, whether progress was achieved, as far as this item is concerned. If there was progress made, of course I have no problem at all, but as far as I know, I do not see where we achieved any progress.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I shall give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, for since, as I said, this paragraph was drafted by the secretariat, I am sure he will be able to give an explanation in answer to the question put by the distinguished representative of Nigeria.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): Mr. Chairman, I think that this is an exact quotation. I will check it again and show the Ambassador of Nigeria the quotation from which these words have been taken.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Does no other representative wish to take the floor? I shall therefore adjourn the meeting. Since we have ended this morning's meeting a little later than usual, this afternoon's meeting will start officially at 3.15 p.m., and actually -- in accordance with the rule we have agreed to establish -- at 3.25 p.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.188  
17 September 1982  
ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday, 17 September 1982, at 7.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia: Mr. D. SADLEIR  
Mr. T. FINDLAY  
Miss S. BOYD

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINK  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUIEROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. TELLALOV  
Mr. SOTIROV  
Mr. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U TIN KYAW HLAING  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIEN JIN  
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. LI WEIMIN  
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLÁ VILA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ  
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. d'ABOVILLE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. G. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. G. GAJDA

India:

Mr. A.S. DAS

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA  
Mr. HIDAYAT

Iran:

Mr. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. T. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. AKKERMAN

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI  
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR  
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU  
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. T. ALTAJF

Peru: Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. T. PANAIT  
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. U. ERICSSON  
Mrs. G. JOHÄNG  
Mr. J. LUDIN



Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV  
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN  
Mr. V.L. GAI  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES  
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT  
Mrs. J. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M.D. BUSBY  
Mr. R. SLOTT  
Ms. M. WINSTON

Venezuela:

Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANCA KABEYA  
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 188th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee is to complete today its consideration of the reports of its subsidiary bodies as well as of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly.

The Committee has before it the following documents: the reports of the three ad hoc working groups, the draft report of the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly, that is, Working Paper No. 74/Rev.1, and lastly, the index of statements by country and subject of the Committee on Disarmament in 1982.

With reference to the last document, I wish to inform the members of the Committee that in preparing the index the secretariat has taken into account statements made up to and including the 186th plenary meeting, held last Tuesday, 14 September. Statements made at the last two plenary meetings, that is to say, those held yesterday and today, will be included later. I should like to invite delegations to examine the index and to inform the secretariat of any changes they wish to have made in it before midday on Wednesday, 22 September. The index will be submitted for final preparation immediately after that date.

I suggest that we now take up as our first business the reports of the Committee's ad hoc working groups and proceed to their adoption. Let us take first of all the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which is in document CD/332. If I hear no objections, I shall consider that the Committee adopts this report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, the full text of which will, as usual, be included in the Committee's own report.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): We shall now go on to the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which is in document CD/334. If I hear no objections, I shall consider this report adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): This brings us to the third report, that of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, and it is in document CD/328. Again, if I hear no objections I shall consider the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group as adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Let us now go on to consider Working Paper No. 74/Rev.1, containing the draft report of the Committee to the General Assembly. This text of the draft report has been circulated by the secretariat today, but in good time before the present meeting. Some representatives have suggested to me that since we examined the draft report as recently as yesterday, it could perhaps be submitted to the Committee for adoption as a whole. I would see no objection to that if the distinguished members of the Committee agree to that procedure. I would like to ask if there is any objection to our proceeding

(The Chairman)

in this way, that is to say, to the adoption of the draft report of the Committee on Disarmament, Working Paper No. 74/Rev.1, as a whole, on the understanding, of course, that if any typing or stylistic errors should be discovered later, they will be duly corrected. There would appear to be no objection to this course and I shall therefore proceed accordingly.

The report was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): On the list of speakers for today there are the representatives of France and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador de la Gorce.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the French delegation would like first of all to offer you its congratulations and to express its gratitude to you for the way in which you have been conducting the final phase of our session. We know from experience that each year the final weeks of our session are the most difficult: the drafting of our report has become a very onerous operation, and perhaps we ought to think about ways of lightening and simplifying this task. Nevertheless the fact that we are today bringing our work to what is, after all, a satisfactory conclusion is in large part due to your wisdom and experience and your vast knowledge of disarmament matters, and I should like here to pay tribute to the major contribution you have been making for so many years, with such skill and devotion and with such profound conviction, to the cause of disarmament, the most vital but also the most difficult of all the tasks undertaken by the international community.

I should also like to express my thanks to Ambassador Maina, who guided our work during the month of August with efficiency and competence. At the same time, I am happy to welcome my new colleagues, Ambassador Vidas, the representative of Yugoslavia, and Ambassador Cannock, the representative of Peru. I should like to offer them a warm welcome and to assure them of our desire for friendly co-operation.

Lastly, my delegation cannot but express its very great regret at the imminent departure of Ambassador Summerhayes. Our United Kingdom colleague has won the respect and friendship of all of us here. We admire his diplomatic talents and his intellectual gifts, the soundness of his judgement and of his character, and his great courtesy; his contribution to our work has been one of the highest quality. A Frenchman like myself cannot forget the bonds of alliance and association that unite our two countries, the trials we have been through together in the course of this century and the outstanding contribution of the United Kingdom, in those circumstances and in others, to the cause of freedom.

The French delegation offers Ambassador Summerhayes its very best wishes for the years to come; I shall continue, for my part, to retain warm feelings of friendship for him.

The session which is just ending has been in many ways exceptional; our spring and summer meetings were separated by the special session of the General Assembly. The disappointing outcome of that special session has adversely affected our work. But it has not caused a complete breakdown: it has not disrupted the institutional system established for the discussion and multilateral negotiation of disarmament questions; the principles and objectives laid down earlier were confirmed, and the meagreness of the results achieved in New York should perhaps be a lesson to us to adopt a more realistic and more patient approach, one more suited to the difficult times in which we live.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

It seems to me that our Committee has drawn this lesson for itself and that it has done the best it could in the very short space of time available to it and within the narrow limits set by its working conditions, both external and internal.

The Committee's efforts have to a large extent been concentrated on the important issues of chemical weapons.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has achieved praiseworthy results. The French delegation had some doubts at first about the method of contact groups suggested by the Chairman. It is glad to be able to say that its doubts were unjustified, and it wishes to compliment Ambassador Sujka whose innovations in the organization of the work proved entirely successful. The establishment of the nine contact groups permitted a thorough consideration of the various elements of a convention: it served to highlight those aspects on which a consensus was in sight; more particularly, it made it easier to tackle the very many problems remaining to be resolved, including those of the scope of the convention, definitions, declarations of stocks and the initiation and rate of their destruction and the problem of methods of international verification.

In some cases the contact groups adopted "working hypotheses", which might serve as a basis for finding solutions for the outstanding problems. The French delegation wishes to express its gratitude to the co-ordinators of the contact groups; their reports, which are annexed to the report of the Working Group, should prove very useful during our subsequent work.

With respect to radiological weapons, the consultations actively conducted by Ambassador Wegener, the Chairman of the Working Group, have had the merit, it seems, of persuading certain delegations to adopt an attitude which will permit the resumption of negotiations on the principal object of the convention in question: the prohibition of radiological weapons. The working paper presented by the Chairman will undoubtedly constitute a useful basis for this purpose.

As regards the question of the protection of nuclear installations, which several delegations wish to be dealt with at the same time, the proposal put forward by the delegation of Japan will perhaps help those delegations to find a solution in an appropriate framework.

A third Working Group has held meetings during our summer session, in its case for the first time -- the Working Group set up to examine the issues relating to verification which would arise in connection with a nuclear test-ban treaty. On 5 August last, the French delegation explained why it felt unable to participate in that Working Group. Its attitude in that respect, I should like to repeat, in no way means that it underestimates the importance attaching to the elaboration of an effective and non-discriminatory system of international verification.

The other items on our agenda have been discussed by the Committee itself.

Item 2 -- cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament -- rightly occupies the most important place in our report. Once again, however, the report reflects the differing positions of States members rather than any progress in the approach to these fundamental problems. We continue to believe that progress will depend on a correct appreciation of the relative sizes of national nuclear forces and of the hierarchy of responsibilities flowing therefrom, and on respect for the

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

conditions of each nation's security and more particularly for the balances guaranteeing that security. Recognition of these realities will open the way to the solution we have repeatedly described. The initiation of bilateral talks in Geneva is an illustration of the way we advocate.

With regard to the prevention of nuclear war, a subject which has occupied a very large place in our discussions, both here and in New York, my delegation has constantly reiterated that this objective cannot be isolated or dissociated from the other objectives which are by their nature linked with it: the prevention of war itself and the maintenance of security and thus of those balances which must in certain situations guarantee that security.

The question of negative security assurances has not been discussed in substance this summer; our report notes in this connection the views of the Group of 21 on the positions of certain nuclear-weapon powers and indicates that those views led Ambassador Ahmad, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, to conclude that the work of the Group had reached an impasse. The French delegation would like to recall in this connection that its Government has modified its position on this matter. As Mr. Cheysson, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, declared at the second special session of the General Assembly, "in thus moving closer to the kind of guarantee already made by others, France hopes to facilitate the drafting of a Security Council resolution on this issue." We have discussed various possible formulas here, and it is my delegation's view that if they were thus backed by the authority of the Security Council the existing declarations would in themselves constitute a system of security assurances of undeniable value.

With respect to the other two items on our agenda -- those concerning outer space and a comprehensive programme of disarmament -- we are putting off our hopes to the next session. As regards the first of these items, we hope that after the very useful discussions of substance which have taken place this year, the Committee will be in a position next year to set up a working group.

Lastly, my delegation would like to refer to a matter to which it attaches considerable importance and which we have discussed without reaching any conclusion, namely, that of the admission of new members. We are in favour of a moderate enlargement of the Committee which would not affect its nature as a negotiating body. We believe that the admission of 10 new members would be compatible with this condition. Such an addition would show a willingness to innovate, which is very desirable in present circumstances; it would give legitimate satisfaction to Governments which have shown an active concern for the cause of disarmament and whose participation, far from reducing the effectiveness of the Committee's work, would be likely to increase it.

We very much hope that at its next session the Committee will be able to take a decision to which, as our report itself states, there is no objection in principle.

We consider that the question of the expansion of the membership of the Committee is a different matter from that of changes that might be made in its organization and methods of work. The French delegation is naturally ready to discuss these further. However, it does not feel that the inadequate results of the negotiations in the Committee are attributable to the institution itself or to its methods. In fact, it considers that those methods, which have been improved from year to year, are now satisfactory, even if they could be improved still further.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Progress clearly depends on other conditions: the will of Governments or the possibilities they have of negotiating and reaching agreements, which themselves depend on the state of international relations and on the requirements of security and the maintenance of confidence.

Before I end I should like to express the gratitude of the French delegation to all those who have assisted us during this session including, in the first instance, Ambassador Jaipal, who has carried out his tasks with the skill and competence with which we are all familiar, the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Berasategui, and his colleagues in the Centre for Disarmament, the interpreters and translators and all members of the secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador de la Gorce, for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation has asked for the floor in order to make some general comments and observations concerning this year's session of the Committee.

Our work has been taking place during a difficult and critical period in the life of the international community. Political decisions have recently been taken which have exacerbated the arms race, and further dangerous steps have been undertaken in the realms of the building up and qualitative improvement of arsenals of strategic weapons, chemical "rearmament", the deployment of additional strategic weapons in Europe and the extension of the arms race to outer space; commitments entered into to conduct negotiations on certain highly important aspects of disarmament have been violated.

Against the background of these facts, the activity of those who are in favour of peace and the strengthening of international security has also markedly increased. The mass anti-missile, anti-nuclear, anti-war movement, which unites in its ranks representatives of all social strata has justly been described in this Committee as a portent of peace.

Expressing the world community's will for peace and disarmament, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries put forward, at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, new proposals aimed at the strengthening of peace and international security. In a message to the special session, L.I. Brezhnev, the Head of the Soviet State, announced the Soviet Union's unilateral undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union also submitted a memorandum on "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race". These important proposals, which were circulated by the Soviet delegation as official documents of the Committee, met with understanding and a positive reaction on the part of many States represented in the Committee.

The Soviet delegation does not wish today to dwell in detail on the various items on the Committee's agenda. In the course of the session we have made statements on each of them at the Committee's plenary meetings and in its working groups. Our general assessment of the session was also reflected in the summing-up statement made by the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov, the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Broadly, we associate ourselves with those delegations which have expressed concern over the intensification of the arms race and the aggravation of international tension, on the one hand, and the ineffectiveness of the Committee's work on the other. Indeed, the incapacity of the Committee on Disarmament to fulfil its mandate as the sole multilateral negotiating forum is particularly striking against the background of the acute aggravation of the international situation and the heightened danger of the outbreak of a global nuclear war.

If there have been any positive results of the Committee's work in 1982, these, in our view, relate mainly to the problem of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. As many heads of delegations pointed out at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and also here in this Committee, the submission by the Soviet Union of a draft text of "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" represented a very positive contribution to progress in the negotiations on this question. Under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Sujka, the representative of Poland, concrete negotiations on a wide range of issues relating to a future convention were successfully started within the Committee. The work done in the various contact groups set up on Ambassador Sujka's initiative — in spite, it may be said, of the objections of certain delegations — and the Chairman's document containing a consolidated text of compromise wordings of the elements of the future convention will undoubtedly provide a useful basis for future negotiations. Nevertheless, we cannot be fully satisfied even with the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are coming to the very definite conclusion that certain States are in no hurry over these negotiations. It looks as if their successful conclusion might frustrate certain plans for the creation of new types of chemical weapons. We regret that the Committee failed to reach agreement on a deadline for the completion of the negotiations and that by interrupting our work for several months we are, as it were, breaking off in mid-sentence.

I should like now to comment on the activities of the Committee on Disarmament from a wider viewpoint in a historical perspective, so to speak. Not a single agreement in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament has been drafted in the Committee since 1976. The expansion of the Committee's membership and the adoption of rules of procedure for its work in 1979 failed to change things for the better. Moreover, although a number of drafts have been submitted to the Committee in recent years, some have not been considered at all while in the case of others it has proved impossible to reach final agreement owing to the attempts of certain delegations to link them artificially with various other issues.

The reasons for this situation are well known. Both we and many other delegations have spoken about them at this session and at earlier sessions of the Committee. It is more and more often being said, as was the case at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that the Committee on Disarmament is failing to fulfil the task set before it. We agree with those judgements. Experience has shown that, in a number of cases, the Committee is not only not facilitating negotiations but is in fact becoming a kind of brake, an obstacle to negotiations. The most negative aspects of the Committee's activities which have become apparent in recent years are, in our view, the following.

First. The starting of negotiations in the Committee on the most acute problem of our time — the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament — has been blocked because of the position of the United States of America and certain other States. For the same reason, the Committee has also been unable to embark on

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negotiations on the question of the prevention of nuclear war, as proposed by India, despite the fact — I would point out — that such negotiations were begun within the framework of the second special session on disarmament, although for lack of time and other reasons they were not successfully concluded, but they nevertheless yielded a good deal of useful material. In this matter, which is of exceptional importance for the fate of mankind, the Committee on Disarmament has actually taken a step backwards in comparison with the second special session.

Second. Some States have of late been trying to distort the very content and nature of negotiations in the Committee. The United States, for example, having agreed to the establishment of a working group on a nuclear test ban, at the same time declares that it does not regard the elaboration of an agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as a matter of urgency. Thus the international community demands, as a priority task, the conduct of negotiations aimed at the immediate prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, but the Committee merely conducts general discussions, not directed towards the fulfilment of that task, that is, the drafting of a treaty on the complete cessation of tests.

Third. A tendency to drag out negotiations is becoming more and more apparent in the Committee. We have already mentioned this in connection with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. This is done under a variety of pretexts. It is claimed, for example, that it is necessary to carry out careful and thorough investigations of various technical issues, to make use of the latest achievements of science and technology in devising a system for the verification of compliance with agreements, and so on. We have seen cases where some of the methods proposed had not only not received international recognition but had not even been fully worked out by their authors.

Here are some examples. The Group of seismological experts, after doing some worthwhile and rather detailed work, submitted reports proposing the institution of a system for the verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban agreement based on an international seismological network using both Level 1 and, in certain cases, Level 2 data. The scientists of many countries, including the United States of America, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the USSR and others, have authoritatively confirmed the effectiveness of this system, but here in the Committee we are told: no, let us start again from the beginning; let us elaborate a new system, a more complex one, a system for which there is no need and, moreover, one with which, as the authors of these proposals know full well, many delegations may not agree. Evidently, that is precisely what they want.

What is particularly abnormal is the practice of a number of delegations of, so to speak, putting the cart before the horse. Before agreement has been reached on the main questions of principle of a future convention, these delegations insist upon the solution of secondary and often very debatable issues. Such an approach is contrary to the usual practice in conducting international negotiations.

We wish to state once more: we are completely opposed to the Committee's becoming involved in a pointless discussion on subsidiary issues before an understanding has been reached and an agreement has been formulated on the main issues. This concerns, in particular, the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Let me say it frankly: the political purpose of such manoeuvres is perfectly clear to us; it is



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to conceal an unwillingness, an unreadiness to conclude concrete agreements on the limitation of the arms race behind an artificial, ostentatious activity in secondary, subordinate areas.

Fourth. Yet another negative aspect has very recently become apparent in the Committee. Prior to 1980, one seat in the Committee remained empty: first, up to 1979, that of one nuclear Power and then, for a period of a year, that of another. Now we are faced with a situation where two seats are empty during negotiations on one of the most urgent disarmament issues. There is thus a trend in the Committee towards an increase in the number of empty seats. We shall perhaps see our Committee room gradually growing emptier. Of course, every State has the sovereign right to decide whether or not it is prepared to engage in certain negotiations. But you will agree that it creates a new situation in the Committee if negotiations on certain matters are to be conducted among only some of the States members of the Committee. It is obvious that we have to think about the possible consequences of this new situation.

Fifth. In spite, even, of the existence of a number of working groups -- although it must be said that some of them failed to do the job assigned to them and have ceased, for the time being at least, to exist -- the negotiating element accounts for only a small part of the Committee's activities. The Committee on Disarmament spends its time principally in discussions. Its activities are hardly different from those of the First Committee of the General Assembly or the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It has become almost standard practice for the United States of America and certain other States to declare that they do not consider it timely to conduct negotiations on, say, nuclear disarmament or the limitation of the arms race in outer space or the prevention of nuclear war, etc., but have no objection to holding discussions on those questions. We can only advise those delegations to glance at the appropriate provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, where a clear distinction is drawn between negotiating bodies and forums for discussion.

One last thing. More than a year ago the Soviet delegation, together with the delegations of other socialist countries and others, submitted a number of suggestions for improving the Committee's organizational activities. However, in this area, too, new negative elements are appearing. I will quote just two examples.

As you know, negotiations in the Committee cannot begin until the Committee has taken a decision to establish a working group -- although, as I have already pointed out, we consider that as soon as an item is placed on the Committee's agenda, given the fact that the Committee is a negotiating body, the establishment of the appropriate subsidiary body should take place automatically. We waste a great deal of time, sometimes months, on agreeing upon a mandate, although here, too, the Soviet delegation considers that the mandates of all working groups could be brief and more or less identical. They could simply provide, for example, for the establishment of a working group to conduct negotiations on the agenda item concerned with a view to drafting the appropriate agreement or agreements. That is what the Committee was set up for. But lately, yet another barrier has been created, which must be surmounted before negotiations can begin. Discussions on the establishment of working groups are not enough; discussions about their mandates are not enough; we now have to have agreement on their work programmes. Nowhere, either in the rules of procedure

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or in any decision of the Committee, is it said that agreement on its programme of work is a prerequisite to the conduct of negotiations in subsidiary bodies. And yet a situation arose this year when an attempt was made by the United States and its allies artificially to inflate the importance of this issue. How much time we have wasted on this! If we go on in this way, it is not impossible, we cannot exclude the possibility that next year somebody will propose yet another preliminary condition, say, agreement on the order and sequence of statements in the working group, and the year after that some wise man, invoking the importance of the environment to negotiations, will demand agreement on the question of optimum climatic conditions for the work of a working group. We shall thus reach the point of absurdity.

Here is the second example. During the present session many delegations advocated the prolongation of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Many concrete proposals were put forward in this respect, inter alia by the USSR delegation. In the past, there was no difficulty in deciding such matters. It was only necessary to agree on a date, as in the case of the resumption of the activity of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament last January. This year this question became terribly complicated and very nearly prevented the adoption of the report of the chemical weapons Group. For some reason, problems arose as to what the Group would do — although it has a clear and precise mandate — who would be its Chairman, and in what order its meetings would be held. All the high diplomatic skill of Mrs. Link, the United Kingdom representative, was needed in order to achieve agreement on paragraph 17 of its report. How many problems there were to be solved! I believe that not even the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon, who concluded the Treaty of Tilsit, would have found a way out of the situation in the chemical weapons Working Group!

Gentlemen, in all these new features of the Committee's organizational activities, too, we see the same intention — the intention of those who are stepping up the arms race and striving for military superiority to slow down and drag out actual negotiations.

Everything I have said testifies to the fact that, owing to the attitude of certain States, the Committee on Disarmament is failing to do the job that was given to it and is being used by those States to block or drag out negotiations and as a screen to conceal their policy of continuing the arms race. As a result, the Committee is passing through a sharp crisis. We believe that the international community should be informed about the situation which has arisen in the Committee. The Committee on Disarmament ought not to be employed for purposes which have nothing to do with the limitation of the arms race; it ought not to become a cover for the execution of military programmes; it cannot be used to deceive world public opinion.

The recently issued report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the activities of the Organization contains the following passage:

"Unfortunately there has been a tendency to avoid bringing critical problems to the Security Council, or to do so too late for the Council to have any serious influence on their development. It is essential to reverse this trend if the Council is to play its role as the primary world authority for international peace and security".

We believe that this statement applies to a certain degree to the Committee on Disarmament. We call upon all States members of the Committee which are genuinely interested in the cause of disarmament to help reverse the negative trends I have described.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We are concluding this session and separating for four months. In January we shall doubtless see some new faces in the Committee. We know that my neighbour, Mr. D. Summerhayes, the head of the United Kingdom delegation, is leaving us. Many fine things have been said about him. He is an eminent representative of the British Foreign Service. The best form of recognition of his services would be the adoption of concrete agreements in the Committee. I should like to offer him my very best wishes.

I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman and also Ambassador Jaipal and Mr. Berasategui, and I fully associate myself with the words addressed by Ambassador de la Gorce to the staff of the technical services and especially to the interpreters.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, upon the adoption of our annual report, delegations usually make their assessment of the session in terms of substance. My own delegation has followed this practice in previous years. On this occasion, however, I would like to share with the Committee some thoughts on the formal aspects of the report and chiefly on how this Committee might turn the annual ordeal of its drafting and adoption into a less tiring and a more fruitful experience. The excellent co-operation of the secretariat could also be utilized in a more rational way. A word of praise to the secretariat should be said at this stage on the efficiency with which all those documents we now have before us were so expeditiously processed.

In the form in which it has been ritually adopted four times now, plus the special report to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the Committee's report does little to help advance the multilateral negotiating process of disarmament. To draft the report, by the way, cannot be equated with negotiating on anything, and the annual two-week effort in which we engage seems to have subconsciously replaced the real activity in which this Committee should be engaged. In fact, our annual reports have serious flaws that we should endeavour to correct, especially on those items which have not been examined in working groups. They only serve the purposes of internal consumption by the delegations of member States, those of participating non-members and a few of the delegations in the First Committee of the General Assembly. The majority of the membership of the United Nations, let alone the interested organizations and the public outside the Committee, would hardly understand their cryptic contents. The excessive utilization of safeguarding expressions designed to avoid ambiguity has become a baroque exercise in futility, since it is obvious that the wording of the report does not create any kind of obligation for any delegation. Moreover, the burden of such qualifications often makes the individual positions more difficult to understand, rather than helping to clarify them. The result is that the final text usually does not satisfy any of us.

(Mr. de Souza E Silva, Brazil)

By contrast, the reports of the activities of the working groups have become progressively more informative and substantive, especially with respect to those items on which negotiations have been undertaken, albeit in a preliminary fashion. It seems obvious that in 1982 our Governments will be much more interested in studying the three reports of the working groups, and particularly the chemical weapons report, than in ascertaining if their positions on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have been accurately restated and reiterated for the fourth consecutive time in the four-year history of the Committee on Disarmament.

I do not wish to dwell on this subject today, but simply to leave with my colleagues the thought that it should not be too difficult to agree on a format for our annual report that would permit us to concentrate our negotiating abilities on topics on which we have conducted some negotiation. The insertion of qualifying sentences or of statements of positions should not be mistaken for negotiation. My delegation is convinced that the practices followed in such annual rituals detract in fact from the real purpose and function of the Committee on Disarmament and are detrimental to the effectiveness and prestige of this body.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, my concrete suggestion would be that the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament appoint at the beginning of the 1983 session a small group to work informally, with the assistance of the secretariat, on the rationalization of the format of our report, on the basis of the provisions contained in section XIII of our rules of procedure. My own delegation is ready to co-operate in this effort and to present, at the appropriate time, a further elaboration of the ideas I have just put forward.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his statement, and I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has already given its assessment on the major points of our session at an earlier point and I am not planning a repeat performance. Rather, I would like briefly to dwell upon the report. Despite the shortcomings of the reporting procedure which has just been so persuasively recalled, my delegation feels that on the whole the report reflects our proceedings well and we are gratified that it could be so quickly adopted under your dynamic leadership, even at the price of one additional day of prior negotiating. In that context, my delegation gladly takes to heart what the distinguished representative had to say and what he suggested. However, while my delegation was very glad to concur in the report, there are two small clarifications which I would like to put on record. Paragraph 50 of the report describes the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces as dealing with the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms in Europe. This denomination is a blatant misnomer. It should not convey the impression that it is in any way an official title, except either by both parties to the negotiations or by other countries immediately interested in the outcome of the INF talks.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

In paragraphs 95 and 96, my delegation would have wished a more explicit rendering of what happened in our Committee. It clearly emerges from the records of our Committee, and has been stressed by many delegations, that the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for this session was made with the understanding that the Chairman would hold informal consultations or exploratory meetings. However, no meetings were held and the Chairman of that Group informed the Committee on 10 September that he had limited the consultations he held to a few members of one group of States. I would like to express my delegation's regret that the Chairman's consultations did not include members from all three groups of States, especially since my delegation repeatedly voiced its interest in being involved in such consultations or meetings. Also, my delegation does not concur with the analysis of the distinguished Chairman of that Working Group that such meetings or consultations would have been futile. To the contrary, my delegation firmly believes that informal procedures were not only formally ordained by the Committee but would have served a useful purpose.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank you. The distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany said that many delegations had mentioned during our discussions and had supported the point of view he put forward. Up to now the Chairman has only heard the voice of the Federal Republic of Germany on this subject. As regards the informal and exploratory consultations referred to, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament gave a full explanation in that connection at the Committee's meeting yesterday morning. It would appear to me to be entirely superfluous and unnecessary to give him the floor again now in order to repeat that statement. Those who are interested in this matter can read the explanation in full in the verbatim record of yesterday morning's meeting. I have no other speaker on my list. The distinguished representative of China has the floor.

Mr. TIEN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, as this is my first statement in the Committee on Disarmament since the beginning of September I would like to express my congratulations to you on your assumption of the chairmanship. Under your excellent and experienced leadership, our meetings have yielded results.

I did not intend to speak today. However, after hearing the statement of the Soviet representative, I deem it necessary to say a few words. The Soviet representative tried to make us believe that China is a "negative factor", while the Soviet Union is a "positive factor" in the field of disarmament. The Soviet Union does put forward many proposals in the Committee on Disarmament. Moreover, it invariably talks about disarmament at many other international meetings. Even if other countries are fed up with this practice, it would simply not restrain itself. In the meantime, it is expanding its armaments and practising expansionism in various parts of the world. This is known to all.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union has the floor.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I did not once refer to China in my statement. I cannot but express my surprise, therefore, at the remarks just made by the Chinese representative.

Mr. TIEN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): I did read the statement of the Soviet representative. I think he himself knows best whether he had China in mind when he spoke.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Thank you. Does any other distinguished representative wish to take the floor? Apparently not. In that case I should like to say a few words before closing the meeting.

We are now reaching the end of the fourth session of the Committee on Disarmament, its session for 1982. It would be unfair to attribute the meagreness of the results achieved this year -- as in the three previous years -- to the delegations of the States members of the Committee. I have noted the tireless determination with which all members of the delegations have worked. We cannot but admit, however, that very little has been achieved in "translating into practical terms" the provisions of the Final Document and in proceeding "along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament", which the Final Document itself described as a pressing need. We believe that, as was rightly said here, the peoples of the world, who are vitally interested in disarmament questions, will be unable to understand how such a situation can continue. I therefore earnestly hope that next year, which will mark the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Committee, it will prove able to justify what was said about it in 1973 when it was described as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum".

I hope indeed that that will be so. Before I adjourn the meeting I should like to thank all those representatives who have given me their valuable co-operation during the present month, as also the Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Berasategui, and all their efficient colleagues, as well as the interpreters and, to use an expression which I find most apt, all those members of the secretariat, both visible and invisible, who have helped us either directly or indirectly in the discharge of our tasks.

The next meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 1 February 1983, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 8.50 p.m.

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