

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX II

VOLUME II

List and text of documents issued by the Committee on Disarmament

GE.82-66698

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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Ad hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

GROUP OF 21

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to eliminate the danger of nuclear war, to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim to maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to initiate and expedite urgent negotiations on halting the arms race in all its aspects, to open the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis, to increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension and to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament.

The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the New International Economic Order is fully realized.

GE.82-60034

Ad hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

GROUP OF 21

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

The priorities to be observed in negotiations for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control are:

- (i) Nuclear weapons;
- (ii) Other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;
- (iii) Conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and
- (iv) Reduction of armed forces.

The inclusion of various measures of disarmament in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in stages of implementation, reflects their relative priority in terms of the urgency attached to them by the international community. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. The total elimination of such weapons and their delivery systems must, therefore, be accorded the highest priority. However, nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all the priority items concurrently.

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1982 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
TRANSMITTING THE RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament. The relevant provisions of those resolutions are reproduced in the Annex.

For the information of the Committee, I also have the honour to transmit herewith other resolutions and decisions dealing with disarmament matters, which were adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

In addition, I should like to draw your attention to the resolutions listed in the Annex which relate to disarmament matters.

(Signed) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
Secretary-General

ANNEX

I. Resolutions dealing with disarmament matters

(a) Resolutions that entrust specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament

At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions entrusting specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament:

- 36/84 "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons"
- 36/85 "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/145 B"
- 36/89 "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"
- 36/92 E "Nuclear weapons in all aspects"
- 36/92 F "Report of the Committee on Disarmament"
- 36/92 K "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon"
- 36/92 M "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"
- 36/94 "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
- 36/95 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
- 36/96 A "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 36/96 B "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 36/97 B "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
- 36/97 C "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"
- 36/97 E "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present"
- 36/97 G "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes"
- 36/97 J "Report of the Committee on Disarmament"
- 36/99 "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space"

The Committee's attention should be drawn, in particular, to the following provisions contained in those resolutions:

(1) In resolution 36/84, operative paragraph 4 urges all States members of the Committee on Disarmament: (a) to bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee; (b) to support the creation by the Committee, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests; (c) to exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty.

(2) In resolution 36/85, operative paragraph 5 reiterates the conviction of the General Assembly that the Committee on Disarmament has an indispensable role in the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing; operative paragraph 6 requests the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982; operative paragraph 7 also requests the Committee on Disarmament to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system; operative paragraph 8 further requests the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that the draft of such a treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date; operative paragraph 9 urges all members of the Committee on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Committee in fulfilling its mandate; and operative paragraph 10 calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session.

(3) In resolution 36/89, operative paragraph 1 requests the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons; and operative paragraph 5 requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-seventh session.

(4) In resolution 36/92 E, operative paragraph 2 notes the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to resume intensive consideration, at its session to be held in 1982, of the item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament; operative paragraph 3 calls upon the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early commencement

of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to continue consultations in which to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate; operative paragraph 4 deems it appropriate, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed, as the first step, to the consideration of stages of nuclear disarmament and their tentative content, inter alia, the content of the first stage; operative paragraph 5 also deems it appropriate to consider, within the framework of the discussion on the content of measures to be carried out during the first stage, the question of the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons; and operative paragraph 6 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

(5) In resolution 36/92 F, operative paragraph 1 urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1982, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those questions and, in order to reach that goal, to provide the existing ad hoc working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapons tests; operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to complete, during the first part of its session in 1982, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to submit the programme in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982; operative paragraph 3 also requests the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations on priority questions of disarmament, so that it may be in a position to contribute, through concrete accomplishments, to the success of the second special session devoted to disarmament; and operative paragraph 5 further requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a special report on the state of negotiations on the various questions under consideration by the Committee and also to submit a report on its work to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

(6) In resolution 36/92 K, operative paragraph 1 requests the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons; and operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

(7) In resolution 36/92 M, operative paragraph 4 recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results in order to contribute to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to the accomplishment of the tasks set forth in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

(8) In resolution 36/94, operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on the question of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States during its session in 1982; and operative paragraph 4 calls upon all States participating in these negotiations to make efforts for the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter.

(9) In resolution 36/95, operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out; operative paragraph 4 recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for a "common approach" or "common formula" and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the session of the Committee on Disarmament held in 1981, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties; and operative paragraph 5 recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

(10) In resolution 36/96 A, operative paragraph 3 urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, and at its thirty-seventh session.

(11) In resolution 36/96 B, operative paragraph 3 urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date.

(12) In resolution 36/97 B, operative paragraph 1 calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in order that it may be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament,

to be held in 1982; and operative paragraph 2 takes note, in this connexion, of the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to set up at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982 a further ad hoc working group, under an appropriate mandate to be determined at that time, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons.

(13) In resolution 36/97 C, operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing and future proposals designed to meet this objective; operative paragraph 4 requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems, as an important step towards the fulfilment of the objectives set out in paragraph 3 above; and operative paragraph 5 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

(14) In resolution 36/97 E, operative paragraph 1 requests once again the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

(15) In resolution 36/97 G, the operative paragraph requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

(16) In resolution 36/97 J, operative paragraph 2 recommends that the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed, following appropriate consultation among Member States, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; and operative paragraph 3 reaffirms that States not members of the Committee on Disarmament should, upon their request, continue to be invited by it to participate in the work of the Committee.

(17) In resolution 36/99, operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of an appropriate international treaty, to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space.

In paragraph 7 of resolution 36/92 G, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit the report containing the study on the relationship between disarmament and development to the Committee on Disarmament and recommended that the report be taken into account in future disarmament negotiations. That report appears in document A/36/356 and Corr.1.

In paragraph 5 of resolution 36/97 D, the General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to transmit the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament to the Committee on Disarmament. That study is contained in document A/36/392.

In the above-mentioned resolution 36/89, 36/92 K, 36/97 B, 36/97 C and 36/97 E, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all relevant documents. They are the following:

- 36/89 A/36/27, A/36/528 and Corr.1, A/36/566-S/14713,
 A/36/584, A/C.1/36/L.13 and A/36/749.
- 36/92 K A/36/27, A/36/528, A/36/566-S/14713, A/C.1/36/8, A/C.1/36/L.33
 and A/36/752.
- 36/97 B A/36/27, A/36/584., A/C.1/36/L.6 and A/36/756.
- 36/97 C A/36/27, A/C.1/36/L.7 and A/36/756.
- 36/97 E A/36/27, A/C.1/36/L.20 and A/36/756.

The relevant records of the consideration of those resolutions transmitting documentation are contained in documents A/36/PV.5 to 33, A/36/PV.91 and A/C.1/36/PV.4 to 44.

All those documents and records were distributed during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly to all Members of the United Nations, including all Members of the Committee on Disarmament.

(b) Other resolutions dealing with disarmament matters

At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly also adopted the following resolutions dealing with disarmament matters:

- 36/81 A "Preparations for the second special session of the
 General Assembly devoted to disarmament"
- 36/81 B "Prevention of nuclear war"
- 36/82 A "Reduction of military budgets"
- 36/82 B "Reduction of military budgets"

- 36/83 "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/143 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"
- 36/86 A "Nuclear capability of South Africa"
- 36/86 B "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"
- 36/87 A "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"
- 36/87 B "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"
- 36/88 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia"
- 36/90 "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"
- 36/91 "World Disarmament Conference"
- 36/92 A "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament"
- 36/92 B "Report of the Disarmament Commission"
- 36/92 C "World Disarmament Campaign"
- 36/92 D "International co-operation for disarmament"
- 36/92 G "Study on the relationship between disarmament and development"
- 36/92 H "Status of multilateral disarmament agreements"
- 36/92 I "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"
- 36/92 J "World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament"
- 36/92 L "Programme of research and studies on disarmament"
- 36/93 "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects"
- 36/96 C "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 36/97 A "Study on conventional disarmament"

- 36/97 D "Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament"
- 36/97 F "Confidence-building measures"
- 36/97 H "Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament"
- 36/97 I "Strategic arms limitation talks"
- 36/97 K "Disarmament and international security"
- 36/97 L "Study on the relationship between disarmament and international security"
- 36/98 "Israeli nuclear armament"
- 36/100 "Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe"

II. Resolutions related to disarmament matters

It should also be noted that, at its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions which are related to disarmament matters:

- 36/7 "Historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations"
- 36/14 "Effects of atomic radiation"
- 36/25 "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency"
- 36/27 "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security"
- 36/31 "Report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principles of Non-Use of Force in International Relations"
- 36/35 "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space"
- 36/36 "Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space"
- 36/37 "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects"
- 36/78 "United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy"
- 36/101 "Development and strengthening of good-neighbourliness between States"

- 36/102 "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security"
- 36/103 "Declaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States"
- 36/104 "Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace"
- 36/106 "Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind"
- 36/110 "Peaceful settlement of disputes between States".



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/81
8 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 39

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/740 and Corr.1)]

36/81. Second special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament

A

Preparations for the second special session

The General Assembly,

Recalling section III of its resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, in which it decided to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982 at United Nations Headquarters in New York,

Having considered the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1/

1. Endorses the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and the recommendations contained therein for the special session, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

2. Endorses also the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee to meet in New York from 26 April to 14 May 1982 in order to continue consideration of substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/36/49 and Corr.1).

special session, for incorporation in the document or documents to be adopted at the second special session devoted to disarmament, and any remaining organizational and procedural matters;

3. Expresses its appreciation to the members of the Preparatory Committee for their constructive contribution to its work;

4. Invites Member States to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 31 March 1982, further views on the substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session;

5. Requests all Member States engaged in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues outside the framework of the United Nations to submit appropriate information on such negotiations to the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, before its second special session devoted to disarmament;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance for the completion of its work.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

B

Prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling that removal of the threat of a world war, a nuclear war, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Reiterating that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war,

Recalling the provisions of paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding procedures designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear war,

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

Considering that prevention of nuclear war and reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority, which should be considered by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

Reiterating the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in disarmament,

Aware of the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States,

1. Urges all nuclear-weapon States to submit to the Secretary-General by 30 April 1982, for consideration at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war;

2. Invites all other Member States that so desire to do likewise;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a report containing the views, proposals and practical suggestions referred to in paragraph 1 above, as well as those received from other Member States.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/82
18 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 40

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/741)]

36/82. Reduction of military budgets

A

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the ever-spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful consequences on international peace and security,

Reaffirming the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, according to which gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, 1/

Reaffirming that it is possible to achieve continued and systematic reductions in military budgets without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any State,

Recalling its resolution 34/83 F of 11 December 1979, in which it considered that a new impetus should be given to endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned,

1/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 89.

Recalling also the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, 2/ which provides that during this period renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources thus saved to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of developing countries,

Recalling further its resolution 35/142 A of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue at its session to be held in 1981 the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" and, in particular, to identify and elaborate on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission 3/ on the work accomplished during its session in 1981 and taking into account the proposals and ideas submitted by States concerning the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, as contained in the working document annexed to the Commission's report,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States and of the activities carried out so far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Considering that the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets and the other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reinforce the endeavours of all States and international action in the area of the reduction of military budgets, with a view to reaching international agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;

2. Reiterates the appeal to all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;

2/ General Assembly resolution 35/46, annex.

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/36/42).

3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue at its session to be held in 1982 the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets", taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolution 35/142 A as well as those of the present resolution and other relevant proposals and ideas, with a view to identifying and elaborating on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

B

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the arms race, its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security and its deplorable waste of human and economic resources,

Alarmed by present tendencies to increase further the rate of growth of military expenditures,

Considering that gradual reductions of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis would be a measure that would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocating resources, now being used for military purposes, to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that such reductions could and should be carried out on a mutually agreed basis without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any country,

Reaffirming its conviction that provisions for comparability and verification will have to be basic elements of any agreement to reduce military expenditures,

Recalling the fact that these matters are being studied by the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980, and that this Group is expected to submit its report before the second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament,

Recalling further that a standardized system for international reporting of military expenditures has been recommended for use and that the first national reports have been received this year,

/...

Emphasizing the value of a full implementation of such a reporting instrument and of its further refinement as a means to increase confidence between States by contributing to greater openness in military matters, which is particularly important for arriving at international agreements to reduce military expenditures,

Reaffirming also its convictions that the reporting of military data and the examination of problems concerning comparability and verification have the fundamental objective of making possible the conclusion of international agreements to reduce military expenditures,

Noting with appreciation the first report of the Secretary-General on these matters, 4/

Considering that the activities related to the reporting of military expenditures as well as to the questions of comparability and verification and other ongoing activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

1. Stresses the need to increase the number of reporting States with a view to the broadest possible participation from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems;
2. Reiterates its recommendation that all Member States should make use of the reporting instrument and report annually, by 30 April, to the Secretary-General their military expenditures of the latest fiscal year for which data are available;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to examine ways and means to make the collection and assembling of data on military expenditures, reported by States on the basis of the reporting instrument, an integral part of the regular United Nations statistical services and to arrange and publish these data according to statistical practice;
4. Also requests the Secretary-General to include these matters in his next annual report on military budgets to the General Assembly.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

4/ A/36/353 and Corr.2 and Add.1 and 2.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/83
8 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 41

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/742)]

- 36/83. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/143 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979 and 35/143 of 12 December 1980 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 1/

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-two sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Netherlands became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971, respectively,

Noting with satisfaction that the United States of America likewise became a party to Additional Protocol I on 23 November 1981, when its instrument of ratification was deposited,

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

1. Regrets that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations addressed to France by the General Assembly and which it reiterates with special urgency in the present resolution;

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/83 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

91st plenary meeting

9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/84
8 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 43

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/744)]

36/84. Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than twenty-five years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than forty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to whose attainment it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on seven different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Reiterating the assertion made in several previous resolutions that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban,

Recalling that since 1972 the Secretary-General has declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement, that when the existing means of verification are taken into account it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban, and that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests,

Recalling also that the Secretary-General, in his foreword to the report entitled "Comprehensive nuclear-test ban", 1/ reiterated with special emphasis the opinion he expressed nine years ago and, after specifically referring to it, added: "I still hold that belief. The problem can and should be solved now",

Noting that in the same report, which was prepared in compliance with General Assembly decision 34/422 of 11 December 1979, the experts emphasized that non-nuclear-weapon States in general have come to regard the achievement of a comprehensive test ban as a litmus test of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race, adding that verification of compliance no longer seems to be an obstacle to reaching agreement,

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water 2/ undertook in that Treaty, almost twenty years ago, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3/

Recalling that in its resolution 35/145 A of 12 December 1980 it urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament to support the creation, as from the beginning of its session in 1981, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiations of the treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests,

Deploring that the Committee on Disarmament, as stated in paragraph 44 of its report to the Assembly, 4/ was prevented from responding to that exhortation owing to the negative attitude of two nuclear-weapon States,

1. Reiterates once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority and constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a contribution to nuclear disarmament;

1/ A/35/257.

2/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

3/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27).

3. Urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and, meanwhile, to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty;

4. Urges likewise all States members of the Committee on Disarmament:

(a) To bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee;

(b) To support the creation by the Committee, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests;

(c) To exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty;

5. Calls upon the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/85
9 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 44

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/745)]

36/85. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/145 B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, in particular resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977, paragraph 51 of resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, resolution 33/60 of 14 December 1978, section IV of resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, resolution 34/73 of 11 December 1979 and resolution 35/145 B of 12 December 1980,

Reaffirming its conviction that it is in the interest of all people that nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments should cease, as this would be a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations and a measure of the utmost importance in bringing the nuclear arms race to an end,

Recalling that the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water 1/ and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2/ expressed their determination in those treaties to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Expressing the belief that, to be effective and capable of attracting the widest possible adherence, a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing should include provision for an effective verification system,

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

2/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

Recognizing, accordingly, the importance to such a treaty of the work assigned by the Committee on Disarmament to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on a global network of stations for the exchange of seismological data,

Deeply concerned that the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States have not resumed their negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-test explosions in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the urgent need for a complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the indispensable role of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty capable of attracting the widest possible international support and adherence,

Expressing regret that it did not prove possible for the Committee on Disarmament to commence negotiations on such a treaty,

Convinced that the proceedings of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, would benefit substantially from positive progress towards the conclusion of such a treaty,

1. Reiterates its grave concern that, despite the express wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States, nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated;

2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the greatest urgency and highest priority;

3. Expresses the conviction that such a treaty constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries;

4. Calls upon the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to resume their negotiations and to exert their best efforts to bring them to an early successful conclusion and invites them to prepare a report on the state of negotiations in good time for submission to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;

5. Reiterates its conviction that the Committee on Disarmament has an indispensable role in the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing;

6. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982;

/...

7. Also requests the Committee on Disarmament to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system;
8. Further requests the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that the draft of such a treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date;
9. Urges all members of the Committee on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Committee in fulfilling its mandate;
10. Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session;
11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item relating to the implementation of the present resolution.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/86
9 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 45

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/746)]

36/86. Implementation of the Declaration on the
Denuclearization of Africa

A

Nuclear capability of South Africa

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/76 B of 11 December 1979 and 35/146 A of 12 December 1980,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa ^{1/} adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the continent and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

Alarmed by the content and growing sophistication of South Africa's military and nuclear programme,

Alarmed also at the fact that South Africa's nuclear programme has enabled it to acquire nuclear-weapon capability enhanced by the continued support and collaboration which certain Western countries and Israel have given to it,

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

Noting with grave concern that South Africa's capacity to produce nuclear weapons has been established, inter alia, by the content of its nuclear programme, as well as by the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field 2/ following the reported detonation by that country of a nuclear device on 22 September 1979, and that it might indeed have acquired nuclear weapons,

Taking note of the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective, 3/ as well as its report pursuant to Council resolution 473 (1980), 4/

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 9 September 1980, 2/ as well as his report of 3 September 1981, 5/ submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/146 A of 12 December 1980 on the nuclear capability of South Africa,

Noting with concern that South Africa has persistently refused to conclude adequate and comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Gravely concerned that South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has continued its military attacks against independent States of southern Africa, in particular Angola, and has increased its acts of subversion aimed at destabilizing those States,

Equally concerned that the acquisition of military equipment and nuclear-weapon capability by the racist régime of South Africa, with its abhorrent system of apartheid and its record of violence and aggression, poses a serious danger to international peace and security,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa, 6/

Expressing its indignation at the fact that some Western countries, by a ready recourse to the use of the veto, have continually frustrated every effort at the United Nations to deal with the question of South Africa,

2/ A/35/402 and Corr.1.

3/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1980, document S/14179.

4/ Ibid., document S/14167.

5/ A/36/430.

6/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 63 (c).

1. Deplores the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine, including its frenzied acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;
2. Reaffirms that the racist régime's plans and capability in the nuclear field constitute a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardize the security of African States and increase the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
3. Requests the Security Council to intensify its efforts to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field and, in particular, to institute effective enforcement action against that régime so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security through its acquisition of nuclear weapons;
4. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime, including the provision to it of such allied materials as computers, electronic equipment and related technology;
5. Demands that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to follow closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

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9 December 1981

B

Implementation of the Declaration

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa ^{1/} adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978, 34/76 A of 11 December 1979 and 35/146 B of 12 December 1980, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

/...

Recalling also that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the continent and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

Reaffirming that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States,

Noting with concern that South Africa has persistently refused to conclude adequate and comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking note of the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa 3/ on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective, in particular its recommendation that all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa should cease, and the report of the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, held in Paris from 20 to 27 May 1981, 7/

Gravely concerned over the possibility that South Africa has acquired nuclear weapons,

Convinced that the acquisition of such weapons by South Africa would endanger the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa as well as the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing its indignation that certain Western countries and Israel have continued to collaborate with South Africa in the nuclear field despite the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons which the South African nuclear programme represents,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa, 6/

1. Once again reiterates its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. Reaffirms that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

7/ A/CONF.107/8.

3. Condemns any form of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa since such collaboration frustrates, inter alia, the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Organization of African Unity to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

4. Calls upon such States, corporations, institutions and individuals, therefore, to terminate forthwith such military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa, including the provision to it of such allied materials as computers, electronic equipment and related technology;

5. Requests the Security Council, in keeping with the recommendation of its Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

6. Demands that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of its solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

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GENERAL

A/RES/36/87
9 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 46

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/747, A/36/L.53)] 1/

36/87. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region
of the Middle East

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979 and 35/147 of 12 December 1980 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit General Assembly resolution 35/147 to the Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;
2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

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1/ Resolution B was adopted without reference to a Main Committee.

B 1/

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 2/ for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, in particular paragraph 63 (d) thereof,

Recalling further Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981,

Taking into consideration the resolution adopted on 12 June 1981 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency 3/ and resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381 adopted on 26 September 1981 by the General Conference of the Agency,

Recalling further the report of the Secretary-General concerning Israeli nuclear armament, 4/

Realizing that adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 5/ by all Parties of the region will be conducive to a speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Deeply concerned that the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the region has been gravely endangered by the attack carried out by Israel, which is not a party to the Treaty, on the nuclear installations of Iraq, which is a party to that Treaty,

1. Considers that the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations adversely affects the prospects of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;
2. Declares that it is imperative, in this respect, that Israel place forthwith all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

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2/ Resolution S-10/2.

3/ See GC(XXV)/643.

4/ A/36/431.

5/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/88
8 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 47

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/748)]

36/88. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in
South Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979 and 35/148 of 12 December 1980 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will strengthen the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions it called upon the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective,

Further recalling that, in its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX), 31/73 and 32/83, it requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned therein and to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 1/ regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, 2/

1. Reaffirms its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;
2. Urges once again the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective;
3. Calls upon those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament as well as at its thirty-seventh session;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ A/36/408.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/89
8 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 48

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/749)]

36/89. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976, 32/84 A of 12 December 1977, 33/66 B of 14 December 1978, 34/79 of 11 December 1979 and 35/149 of 12 December 1980 concerning the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 39 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ according to which qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race and efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new means of warfare,

Recalling the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the Final Document to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements, and that efforts aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should be appropriately pursued,

Expressing once again its firm belief, in the light of the decisions adopted at the tenth special session, in the importance of concluding an agreement or

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Noting that in the course of its session in 1981 the Committee on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons",

Noting with satisfaction that in the course of its session in 1981 the Committee on Disarmament held informal meetings on this item with the participation of qualified governmental experts,

Convinced that all ways and means should be utilized to prevent the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Taking into consideration the part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament relating to this question, 2/

1. Requests the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons;

2. Once again urges all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

3. Calls upon the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as upon other militarily significant States, to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on this subject, bearing in mind that such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

5. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-seventh session;

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27), sect. III.E.

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament".

91st plenary meeting

9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/90
13 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 49

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/750)]

36/90. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979 and 35/150 of 12 December 1980, and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling also that at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, it stated that the establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole, 1/

Recalling further the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, 2/

1/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 64.

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/34/45 and Corr.1).

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its decision at the thirty-fourth session in resolution 34/80 B to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo during 1981,

Recalling further its decision at the thirty-fifth session in resolution 35/150 to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, particularly recent developments, as well as the progress made in the harmonization of views, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening,

Recalling the exchange of varied views in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and noting that, while progress has been made, a number of issues remain to be resolved,

Noting the exchange of views on the adverse political and security climate in the region,

Noting that the Ad Hoc Committee has failed to reach consensus on the dates for the convening, during 1981, of the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo,

Convinced that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of their confrontation, gives urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Considering that all other foreign military presence in the area, whenever it is contrary to the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, further gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps towards the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration,

Considering also that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires the active participation of and full co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users to ensure conditions of peace and security based on the purposes and principles of the Charter as well as the general principles of international law,

Considering further that the creation of a zone of peace requires co-operation and agreement among the States of the region to ensure conditions of peace and security within the area, as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Calling for the renewal of genuinely constructive efforts through the exercise of the political will necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

/...

Deeply concerned at the danger posed by the grave and ominous developments in the area and the resulting sharp deterioration of peace, security and stability which particularly seriously affect the littoral and hinterland States, as well as international peace and security,

Convinced that the continued deterioration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area is an important consideration bearing on the question of the early convening of the Conference and that the easing of tension in the area would enhance the prospect of success being achieved by the Conference,

1. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean 3/ and the exchange of views in the Committee;

2. Regrets that the Ad Hoc Committee has failed to reached consensus on the finalization of dates for the convening, during 1981, of the Conference on the Indian Ocean;

3. Emphasizes its decision to convene the Conference at Colombo as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted in 1971;

4. Emphasizes also, in pursuance of that decision and in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, its decision to request the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the remaining issues related to the convening of the Conference;

5. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work on the necessary harmonization of views on the relevant issues, including those set forth in paragraph 4 above, and to make every effort to accomplish the necessary preparatory work for the Conference, including consideration of its convening not later than the first half of 1983;

6. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions;

7. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to hold further sessions in 1982 of a total duration of six weeks, including the holding of a Meeting at a venue outside New York to be decided upon;

8. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session reports on its work and on the implementation of the present resolution;

3/ Ibid., Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/36/29).

9. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/91
8 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 50

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/751)]

39/91. World Disarmament Conference

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976, 32/89 of 12 December 1977, 33/69 of 14 December 1978, 34/81 of 11 December 1979 and 35/151 of 12 December 1980,

Reiterating its conviction that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its conviction that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could provide the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1/

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/36/28).

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ it decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

Recalling that, in paragraph 23 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, the General Assembly considered it pertinent also to recall that in paragraph 122 of the Final Document it had stated that at the earliest appropriate time a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

Further recalling that the subject of the possible convening of a world disarmament conference has been included in the draft agenda for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, 3/ to be held in 1982,

1. Notes with satisfaction that in its report to the General Assembly the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference stated, inter alia, the following:

"Having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation, the General Assembly may wish to decide that, after its second special session devoted to disarmament, a world disarmament conference would take place as soon as the necessary consensus on its convening has been reached"; 4/

2. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee;

3. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, and to consider any possible relevant proposals and observations which might be made to the Committee, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of that Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

4. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference".

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2/ Resolution S-10/2.

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/36/49 and Corr.1), para. 18.

4/ Ibid. Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/36/28), para. 16.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/92
15 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 51

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/752)]

36/92. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

A

United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, taken at the tenth special session, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, 1/

Recalling also its resolution 35/152 A of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements relating to the programme for 1981 in accordance with the guidelines approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session,

Expressing its satisfaction at the fact that Governments, particularly those of developing countries, have continued to manifest serious interest in the programme,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament for 1981, 2/

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 108.

2/ A/36/606.

1. Decides to continue the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements relating to the programme for 1982 in accordance with the guidelines approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;
3. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a report containing an assessment of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament since its inception in 1979;
4. Commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has been conducted;
5. Expresses its appreciation to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary and Sweden for inviting the fellows to their capitals to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the over-all objectives of the programme, as well as providing additional information sources and practical knowledge for the fellows.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

E

Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission, 3/

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session,

Considering the important role that the Disarmament Commission has played and the significant contribution it has made in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 H of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 F of 12 December 1980,

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/36/42).

/...

1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission;
2. Notes that the Disarmament Commission was not able to conclude its consideration of the items on its agenda;
3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/ and to continue consideration of the items included in its agenda at its session held in 1981 and, to that end, to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1982;
4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to submit a substantive report on its work to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that it may require for implementing the present resolution;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

C

World Disarmament Campaign

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 5/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, it stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament,

Recalling likewise its resolution 35/152 I of 12 December 1980, in which, for the achievement of that purpose, it requested the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the organization and financing of a World Disarmament Campaign under the auspices of the United Nations,

4/ Resolution S-10/2.

5/ Resolution S-10/2.

Having examined the study transmitted by the Secretary-General as an annex to his report of 17 September 1981, 6/

1. Notes with satisfaction the contents of the study on the World Disarmament Campaign and commends its conclusions;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the experts who assisted him for the prompt and effective manner in which the study was prepared;
3. Invites all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1982, the suggestions and comments which they deem appropriate to formulate for the implementation of the recommendations contained in the study;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament both the study on the World Disarmament Campaign and the opinions thereon received from Governments, in order that the Assembly may take the decisions it considers advisable for the solemn launching of the Campaign, including a pledging conference to take place at the initial stage of the special session.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

D

International co-operation for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Stressing again the urgent need for an active and sustained effort to intensify the comprehensive implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as contained in the Final Document of that session, 7/

Convinced that, to this end, effective, constructive and continuing co-operation among all States at all levels, including the highest, on the basis of mutual confidence and political will, is essential,

Deeply concerned over the growing danger of a new round of the arms race, which would seriously jeopardize international stability and increase the danger of a nuclear catastrophe,

6/ A/36/458.

7/ Resolution S-10/2.

Convinced that the halting of the arms race and adoption of effective disarmament measures, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, would release considerable financial and material resources to be used for the economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries,

Taking into consideration the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in combining efforts and in supporting and developing active co-operation among States aimed at the solution of disarmament problems,

Recalling in this context the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament of 11 December 1979, 8/

Noting that that Declaration may play a positive role in concerting efforts for the achievement of effective measures in the implementation of the goals set forth to this end in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

1. Calls upon all States to observe the principles and make active use of the ideas contained in the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament so as to secure a constructive mutual dialogue aimed at limiting armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, through the conclusion of agreements, keeping in mind the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

2. Calls upon Member States to be guided in all disarmament negotiations by the generally recognized principles of international law and to submit and constructively to consider, with full responsibility and in the spirit of co-operation, proposals and initiatives aimed at promoting speedy progress in disarmament negotiations and facilitating the achievement of mutually acceptable concrete disarmament measures;

3. Calls upon Member States to refrain from any action that could hamper, complicate or render impossible the disarmament negotiations which are under way, the opening of new negotiations or the achievement of specific disarmament agreements and, in particular, not to hinder possible progress in negotiations on disarmament by the discussion of unrelated issues;

4. Recommends that the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament should make active use of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament in the preparations for the special session;

5. Calls upon Member States to disseminate widely, in connexion with Disarmament Week, the principles of international co-operation designed to achieve the goals of disarmament.

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9 December 1981

8/ General Assembly resolution 34/88.

E

Nuclear weapons in all aspects

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming once again that nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to mankind and its survival and that it is therefore essential to proceed with nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike,

Recalling that at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it decided that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war had the highest priority and that it was essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

Recalling further that, in its resolution 35/152 B of 12 December 1980, it noted with alarm the increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe associated both with the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and with the adoption of the new doctrine of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons giving rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict,

Noting with alarm that this dangerous doctrine leads to a new twist in the spiral of the arms race, which may seriously hamper the reaching of agreement on nuclear disarmament,

Noting, in this connexion, an urgent need for the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons as a step on the road to nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear weapons, and referring to paragraphs 49 and 54 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 9/

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 J of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 B and C of 12 December 1980,

9/ Resolution S-10/2.

Noting that the Committee on Disarmament, during its session held in 1981, - discussed the question concerning the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group for negotiations on the subject,

Noting also the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament, both during its formal and informal meetings, on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and, inter alia, on prerequisites for the conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

Noting with regret that the Committee on Disarmament, during its session held in 1981, was not able to reach agreement on a basis for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, or on prerequisites for such negotiations,

Convinced that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

1. Believes it necessary to initiate, as a matter of high priority, negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and on the gradual reduction of their stockpiles up to and including their total destruction, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;
2. Notes the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to resume intensive consideration, at its session to be held in 1982, of the item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament; 10/
3. Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early commencement of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to continue consultations in which to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate;
4. Deems it appropriate, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed, as the first step, to the consideration of stages of nuclear disarmament and their tentative content, inter alia, the content of the first stage;
5. Also deems it appropriate to consider, within the framework of the discussion on the content of measures to be carried out during the first stage, the question of the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons;

10/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27), para. 85.

6. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

F

Report of the Committee on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 B of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 J of 12 December 1980,

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 11/

Affirming that the establishment of ad hoc working groups offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and contributes to the strengthening of the negotiating role of the Committee on Disarmament,

Regretting that, despite the expressed wish of the great majority of members of the Committee on Disarmament, the establishment of ad hoc working groups to undertake multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests was prevented during the session of the Committee held in 1981,

Expressing its deep concern that the Committee on Disarmament has not thus far been able to achieve concrete results on disarmament issues which have been under consideration for a number of years,

Convinced that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 12/ the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Stressing that negotiations on specific disarmament issues conducted outside the Committee on Disarmament should in no way serve as a pretext for preventing the conduct of multilateral negotiations on such questions in the Committee,

11/ Ibid., Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27).

12/ Resolution S-10/2.

1. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1982, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those questions and, in order to reach that goal, to provide the existing ad hoc working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests;

2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to complete, during the first part of its session in 1982, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to submit the programme in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982;

3. Also requests the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations on priority questions of disarmament, so that it may be in a position to contribute, through concrete accomplishments, to the success of the second special session devoted to disarmament;

4. Invites the members of the Committee on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee and, at the same time, to submit to the Committee a full report on their separate negotiations and the results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee in accordance with paragraph 1 above;

5. Further requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a special report on the state of negotiations on the various questions under consideration by the Committee and also to submit a report on its work to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

/...

G

Study on the relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 94 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 13/ in which it decided to undertake a study on the relationship between disarmament and development and requested the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General containing the study, 14/

1. Welcomes with satisfaction the report of the Secretary-General and the study contained therein;
2. Expresses its thanks to the Secretary-General and to the Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, as well as to the Governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations that have rendered assistance in the preparation of the report;
3. Commends the report, its conclusions and recommendations to the attention of all Member States;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the report as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution;
5. Invites all Member States to inform the Secretary-General, no later than 15 April 1982, of their views regarding the report and, in particular, its recommendations;
6. Decides to transmit the report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for its substantive consideration and appropriate action;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report to the Committee on Disarmament and recommends that it be taken into account in future disarmament negotiations;
8. Notes with appreciation that arrangements have been made for the preparation of a short version of the report aimed at a mass audience;

13/ Resolution S-10/2.

14/ A/36/356 and Corr.1.

9. Recommends to all Governments the widest possible distribution of the report, including, where appropriate, its translation into their national languages, so as to acquaint public opinion in their countries with its content, and invites specialized agencies and national and non-governmental organizations to use their facilities to make the report widely known.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

H

Status of multilateral disarmament agreements

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 15/ the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Having in mind that a number of multilateral disarmament agreements have been concluded so far,

Considering that the participation in the above-mentioned agreements of as many States as possible is of special importance to the attainment of their objectives,

Noting with satisfaction the special supplement to the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook under the title "Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements", 16/ as well as the information on this matter included in the yearbooks,

1. Reaffirms the importance of the provisions concerning the question of the universality of multilateral disarmament agreements contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly in particular paragraph 40;
2. Requests Member States depositaries of such agreements to furnish the Secretary-General with information regarding their status by the beginning of each regular session of the General Assembly;
3. Further requests the Secretary-General to prepare for each regular session of the General Assembly a composite table of signatories of and parties to

15/ Resolution S-10/2.

16/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.11.

such agreements with a view to enabling the Assembly to take up the question of their status, if it deems it appropriate.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

I

Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its declaration, contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, 17/

Recalling its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 D of 12 December 1980,

Taking note of the Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of experts, 18/

1. Declares once again that:

(a) The use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity;

(b) The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament;

2. Urges the consideration, at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of the question of an international convention on

17/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 58.

18/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.11.

the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war or some other agreement on the subject, taking into account the proposals and views of States in this regard;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

J

World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned over the growing threat of a nuclear war and the continuation and escalation of the arms race,

Conscious of the need to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, as called for in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly , 19/

Considering that world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament would be an important manifestation of the will of the world public and would contribute to the creation of a favourable climate for achieving progress in the field of disarmament,

Considering also that it is desirable to carry out such world-wide action under the auspices of the United Nations and with the active participation of non-governmental organizations and other public institutions,

1. Invites Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions concerning world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the most appropriate format and methods of carrying out such world-wide action under the auspices of the United Nations, taking into account the views and suggestions of

19/ Resolution S-10/2.

/...

Member States, and to submit it for consideration to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

K

Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 47 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 20/ stating that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

Stressing that the termination of the qualitative arms race and the use of scientific and technological achievements solely for peaceful purposes are in the interest of all States and peoples,

Sharing the world-wide concern on the production and intended deployment of nuclear neutron weapons expressed by numerous Member States and by many non-governmental organizations,

Considering that the introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon in the military arsenals of States escalates the nuclear arms race and significantly lowers the threshold to nuclear war, thereby increasing the danger of such a war,

Aware of the inhumane effects of that weapon, which constitutes a grave threat, particularly for the unprotected civilian population,

Recalling the proposals for the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons,

Desiring to contribute to halting the arms race, particularly in the field of weapons of mass destruction,

1. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

L

Programme of research and studies on disarmament

The General Assembly,

Taking note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies in 1981, 21/

Requests the Secretary-General to submit that report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for its further consideration.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

M

Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the
tenth special session

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 34/83 C of 11 December 1979, 35/46 of 3 December 1980 and 35/152 E of 12 December 1980,

Reaffirming the importance of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 22/ which constitutes a comprehensive basis for further

21/ A/36/654.

22/ Resolution S-10/2.

efforts towards promoting international security, halting and reversing the arms race, and the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Considering it imperative to achieve genuine progress in all negotiations dealing with disarmament issues,

Convinced that the success of disarmament negotiations, in which all peoples of the world have a vital interest, would be achieved through the active participation of Member States in such negotiations, thereby contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Deeply concerned about the continuing arms race and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race, which constitutes a growing threat to international peace and security,

Mindful of a growing awareness among States and peoples of the dangers of the continuing arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and of the need to eliminate the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war,

Calling attention to the tasks set forth in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, 23/ which demand intensified efforts to be taken in the Committee on Disarmament and other appropriate forums,

Stressing the need to promote the development, strengthening and intensification of international co-operation designed to achieve general and complete disarmament, as defined by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,

Noting with concern the lack of tangible progress with respect to the implementation of the measures set forth in the Programme of Action in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, the General Assembly will undertake a review of the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session on disarmament,

Conscious of the need to contribute to the success of the second special session through concrete accomplishments in the field of disarmament, thereby maintaining and further intensifying the momentum generated by the first special session,

23/ General Assembly resolution 35/46.

1. Expresses its deep concern about the continued arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and about the constantly growing military budgets, which bear negative consequences and pose a growing threat to international peace and security as well as to the development of countries, particularly developing countries;
2. Urgently calls upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other major military Powers, immediately to take steps in order to promote international security and lead to the effective halting and reversing of the arms race and to disarmament;
3. Urges those States also to intensify their efforts to bring to a successful end the negotiations which are currently taking place in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums and to proceed to or resume negotiations on effective international agreements on items of the highest priority as laid down by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
4. Recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results in order to contribute to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to the accomplishment of the tasks set forth in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade;
5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any actions which have or may have negative effects on the implementation of the relevant recommendations and decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament;
6. Invites all States which are engaged in disarmament and/or arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament informed of the results of such negotiations in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;
7. Also calls upon States engaged in such negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to implement the results achieved, so as to create favourable conditions for further progress;
8. Recommends that the General Assembly should keep under review at its forthcoming sessions the implementation of its recommendations and decisions on disarmament issues.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/93
13 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 52

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/753)]

36/93. United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 33/70 of 14 December 1978, 34/82 of 11 December 1979 and 35/153 of 12 December 1980,

Recalling the successful conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which resulted in a convention and three protocols, adopted by the Conference on 10 October 1980, namely, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),

Reaffirming its conviction that the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants would be further significantly reduced if general agreement could be attained on the prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General, 1/ in which indication was given that many States had already signed the Convention, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981,

1/ A/36/406.

1. Urges those States which have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to sign and ratify the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible so as to obtain the entry into force of the Convention, and ultimately its universal adherence;

2. Notes that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the Protocols annexed thereto, to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols;

3. Requests the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto, to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/94
13 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 53

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/754)]

36/94. Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent nuclear conflagration,

Taking into account the principle of non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed in a number of United Nations declarations and resolutions,

Noting with satisfaction the desire of States in various regions to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories, including through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to contribute to the attainment of this objective,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Mindful of the statements made and views expressed by various States on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the increased danger of recourse to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Deeply concerned at the plans for further stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States that could directly affect the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 of 14 December 1978, 34/84 and 34/85 of 11 December 1979, 35/154 and 35/155 of 12 December 1980 and the relevant provisions of its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980,

Noting the consideration by the Committee on Disarmament in 1981 of the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and the setting up of an ad hoc working group to continue the negotiations on this item,

Recalling the drafts of an international convention submitted on that item to the Committee on Disarmament in 1979, and noting with satisfaction that the idea of concluding such a convention has received widespread international support,

Taking note of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 2/ including the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,

Wishing to promote an early and successful completion of the negotiations on the elaboration of a convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting further that the idea of interim arrangements as a first step towards the conclusion of such a convention has also been considered in the Committee on Disarmament, particularly in the form of a Security Council resolution on this subject, and recalling the recommendation made in that respect by the General Assembly in paragraph 6 of its resolution 35/154,

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27).

Mindful of the second special session devoted to disarmament, at which the General Assembly will review the progress achieved in the field of disarmament, including the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

1. Welcomes the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament that there is continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on this subject;
3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on the question of the strengthening of the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States during its session in 1982;
4. Calls upon all States participating in these negotiations to make efforts for the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter;
5. Calls once again upon all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention, and recommends that the Security Council should examine such declarations and, if they all meet the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/95
15 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 54

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/755)]

36/95: Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolution 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,

Further recalling its resolution 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 of 14 December 1978, 34/85 of 11 December 1979 and 35/155 of 12 December 1980,

Further recalling paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, inter alia, that all efforts should be exerted, therefore, by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament, on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Noting the proposals submitted under that item in the Committee on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note of the decision of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Eleventh and Twelfth Islamic Conferences of Foreign Ministers, held at Islamabad from 17 to 22 May 1980 and at Baghdad from 1 to 5 June 1981, respectively, calling upon the Committee on

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

Disarmament to elaborate and reach an agreement on an international basis to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further noting the support expressed in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. Appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. Recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the session of the Committee on Disarmament held in 1981, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. Recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/96
15 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 42

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/743)]

36/96. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

A

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3465 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/65 of 10 December 1976, 32/77 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/59 A of 14 December 1978, 34/72 of 11 December 1979 and 35/144 B of 12 December 1980, relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 1/ and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 2/

1/ League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65.

2/ General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 3/ which embodies, inter alia, the report of its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons,

Taking note of the recommendation in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons 4/ that the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982 should re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group with an appropriately revised mandate, which would enable the Committee to build upon the areas of convergence and to resolve the differences of views which were identified by the Group during its sessions held in 1980 and 1981, so as to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date,

Considering it necessary that all efforts be exerted for the resumption and successful conclusion of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. Notes with satisfaction the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its session held in 1981 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, in particular the progress in the work of its Ad Hoc Working Group on that question;
2. Expresses its regret that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;
3. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on such a multilateral convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date;
4. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, and at its thirty-seventh session.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 5/ it stated that the complete and effective

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27).

4/ Ibid., para. 110.

5/ Resolution S/10-2.

/...

prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represented one of the most urgent measures of disarmament,

Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Taking into consideration the work done in this area in the Committee on Disarmament as well as in the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which regrettably had been suspended and did not take place in 1981,

Deeming it desirable for States to refrain from taking any action that could delay or further complicate such negotiations,

Expressing profound concern over the production of new types of chemical weapons and other actions that would intensify the chemical arms race and compromise international efforts on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. Reaffirms the necessity of the earliest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;
2. Appeals to all States to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of such a convention;
3. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on such a multilateral convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date;
4. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to resume at the earliest possible date bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction and to submit their joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament;
5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

/...

C

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/144 C of 12 December 1980 in which, inter alia, it decided to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and requested the Secretary-General to carry out such an investigation with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, 6/ to which is annexed the report prepared by the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons,

Noting that, as indicated by the conclusions of its report, the Group of Experts has not yet completed the investigations called for under paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 35/144 C,

Noting also the views of the Group of Experts concerning the importance of prompt on-site investigations of allegations of the use of chemical weapons and the need to devise appropriate procedures for impartial collection and analysis of samples that may be obtained in the course of any such investigations,

Considering, accordingly, that the Group of Experts should continue its investigations,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General,
2. Requests the Secretary-General with the assistance of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, to continue his investigations pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/144 C and to report to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/97
15 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 55

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/756)]

36/97. General and complete disarmament

A

Study on conventional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/156 A of 12 December 1980 in which it approved, in principle, the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis,

Recalling the discussions at the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in 1981 on the general approach, structure and scope of the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish the Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces, in accordance with the provisions contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 35/156 A;
2. Requests the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session in 1982 to complete its consideration of the general approach to the study, its structure and scope and to transmit the conclusions of its deliberations to the Group of Experts;
3. Agrees that the Group of Experts should pursue its work after the above-mentioned session of the Disarmament Commission, taking into consideration such conclusions as the Commission may submit to it, and, if necessary, the

deliberations at the substantive session of the Commission in 1981, in particular those reflected in paragraph 21 and annex III of the report on that session; 1/

4. Requests the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 35/156 A to submit a final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

B

Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments of 12 August 1948, which defined weapons of mass destruction to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or the other weapons mentioned above,

Recalling its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,

Recalling paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ in which it is stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,

Reaffirming its resolutions 34/87 A of 11 December 1979 and 35/156 G of 12 December 1980 on the conclusion of such a convention,

Convinced that such a convention would serve to spare mankind the potential dangers of the use of radiological weapons and thereby contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war,

Noting that negotiations on the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons have been conducted in the Committee on Disarmament,

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/36/42).

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

Taking note of that part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament 3/ which deals with these negotiations, including the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group,

Recognizing that divergent views continue to exist in connexion with various aspects relating to a convention prohibiting radiological weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the wide recognition of the need to reach agreement on the text of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons,

1. Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in order that it may be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982;

2. Takes note, in this connexion, of the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to set up at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982 a further ad hoc working group, under an appropriate mandate to be determined at that time, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

C

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Believing that any activity in outer space should be for peaceful purposes and carried on for the benefit of all peoples, irrespective of the degree of their economic and scientific development,

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27).

/...

Recalling that the States Parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 4/ have undertaken in article III to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Recalling also article IV of the said Treaty,

Recalling further paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 5/ in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Noting the important and growing contribution of satellites both for civilian purposes and the verification of disarmament agreements and aware of the possibilities of their use to promote peace, stability and international co-operation,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States to ensure that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, inter alia, in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, and at its regular sessions and to the Committee on Disarmament,

Aware of the need to prevent an arms race in outer space and in particular of the threat posed by anti-satellite systems and their destabilizing effects for international peace and security,

Convinced that further measures are needed to prevent outer space from becoming an area of military confrontation, contrary to the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Considering it necessary for the international community to give attention to specific measures regarding the question of anti-satellite systems in the Committee on Disarmament,

Bearing in mind that the restraint of anti-satellite systems has already been a subject of negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America,

4/ General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex.

5/ Resolution S-10/2.

1. Considers that further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;
2. Urges all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space and to refrain from any action contrary to that aim;
3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing and future proposals designed to meet this objective;
4. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems, as an important step towards the fulfilment of the objectives set out in paragraph 3 above;
5. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of anti-satellite systems".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

D

Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 34/87 E of 11 December 1979, in which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study assessing current institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs and outlining possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those requirements and needs, including legal and financial implications, and formulating recommendations for possible later decisions on the matter,

/...

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General 6/ to which the study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament is annexed,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General and of the study contained therein;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and the experts who assisted him for the efficient manner in which the report was prepared;
3. Recommends that all Member States should study the report;
4. Invites all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General by 31 March 1982 their comments on the study and its conclusions and recommendations;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the study to the Committee on Disarmament;
6. Decides to transmit the report and the comments of Member States to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for substantive consideration and the adoption of appropriate decisions;
7. Further decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

E

Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States
where there are no such weapons at present

The General Assembly,

Conscious that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind,

Recalling its resolution 33/91 F of 16 December 1978, which contains an appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and to all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories,

6/ A/36/392.

Recalling further its resolution 35/156 C of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present,

Noting with regret that this appeal by the General Assembly remains unheeded,

Considering that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would constitute a step towards the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States, thus contributing to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and leading eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind the clearly expressed intention of many States to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories,

Deeply alarmed by plans and practical steps leading to a build-up of nuclear-weapon arsenals on the territories of other States,

1. Requests once again the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present;
2. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further action involving the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;
4. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present: report of the Committee on Disarmament".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

/...

F

Confidence-building measures

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/91 B of 16 December 1978, in which it requested Member States to submit their views and experiences on confidence-building measures,

Noting with satisfaction that numerous Member States responded to that request and provided the Secretary-General with substantive information,

Recalling also its resolution 34/87 B of 11 December 1979, in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him on an equitable geographical basis,

Expressing its concern about the deterioration of the international situation and the further escalation of the arms race, which both reflects and aggravates the unsatisfactory international political climate, tension and mistrust,

Desirous of strengthening international security and, at the same time, creating and improving conditions conducive to further measures of disarmament,

Mindful of the fact that, while confidence-building measures cannot serve as a substitute for disarmament measures, they play a very significant role in achieving disarmament,

Convinced of the usefulness of confidence-building measures freely arrived at by the States concerned and agreed upon, taking into account the particular conditions and requirements of the regions concerned,

Expressing its conviction of the need for the exchange of pertinent and timely information on military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security, which would contribute to an improved climate of trust and confidence among States, and the conviction that agreement can be reached on measures to this end,

Noting with satisfaction the encouraging results of some confidence-building measures agreed upon and implemented in some regions,

1. Takes note of the comprehensive study on confidence-building measures prepared by the Secretary-General; 7/
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-building Measures which assisted in the preparation of the study;

7/ A/36/474 and Corr.1.

3. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution;

4. Recognizes that confidence reflects a set of interrelated factors of a military as well as of a non-military character and that a plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and to replace them by confidence;

5. Recommends that, building on the experience gained from the application and development of confidence-building measures, further efforts should be made, both within and outside the United Nations, to widen their scope, so that account is also taken of non-military approaches;

6. Regards the concept of confidence-building measures as a useful approach in reducing and eventually eliminating potential causes for mistrust, misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscalculation;

7. Believes that the promotion of confidence-building measures where appropriate conditions exist will significantly contribute to facilitating the process of disarmament;

8. Invites all States to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their particular regions and, where possible, to negotiate on them in keeping with conditions and requirements prevailing in the respective regions;

9. Decides to submit the study to its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, for further consideration.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

G

**Prohibition of the production of fissionable material
for weapons purposes**

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979 and 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 8/ and of its work on the item entitled

8/ Resolution S-10/2.

/...

"Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 included the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the Committee's programme of work for both parts of its session held in 1981 contained the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament",

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on these items,

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race,

Considering that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices also would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

H

Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/156 D of 12 December 1980 concerning the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General containing the views of Member States on the study; 9/

9/ A/36/343 and Add.1.

/...

2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament 10/ and his report containing the views of Member States to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, so that it may consider their substance and any action on them that may be required.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

I

Strategic arms limitations talks

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2932 B (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3484 C (XXX) of 12 December 1975, 31/189 A of 21 December 1976, 32/87 G of 12 December 1977 and 35/156 K of 12 December 1980,

Recalling that the SALT I agreement - which bears the official title of "Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" - entered into force on 3 October 1972 following more than two years of bilateral negotiations and that its text was issued as a document of the General Assembly, 11/

Recalling that the SALT II agreement - which bears the official title of "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" - was finally signed on 18 June 1979, after six years of bilateral negotiations, and that its text, together with the texts of the Protocol to the Treaty and the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, both signed on the same date as the Treaty, and the joint communiqué issued also on 18 June 1979, were issued as a document of the Committee on Disarmament, 12/

Reaffirming once again its resolution 33/91 C of 16 December 1978, in which it, inter alia:

10/ A/35/416.

11/ See A/C.1/1026.

12/ See CD/53/Appendix III/Vol. I, document CD/28.

(a) Reiterated its satisfaction at the solemn declarations made in 1977 by the heads of State of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, in which they stated that they were ready to endeavour to reach agreements which would permit starting the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and moving towards their complete, total destruction, with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons,

(b) Recalled that one of the disarmament measures deserving the highest priority, included in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 13/ was the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II, which should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms,

(c) Stressed that in the Programme of Action it was established that, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility, 14/

Reaffirming that, as stated in its resolution 34/87 F of 11 December 1979, it shares the conviction expressed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,

Recalling that, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, it proclaimed that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone were more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth, that the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakened it, and that the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race posed a threat to the very survival of mankind, for which reasons the General Assembly declared that all the peoples of the world had a vital interest in the sphere of disarmament, 15/

Recalling also that in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, annexed to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, it recommended that special priority be given to the ratification of the SALT II Treaty,

1. Notes that the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) has not yet been ratified;

13/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 52.

14/ Ibid., para. 48.

15/ Ibid., para. 11.

2. Urges that the process begun by the SALT I Treaty and signature of the SALT II Treaty should continue and be built upon;

3. Trusts that the signatory States will continue to refrain from any act which would defeat the object and purpose of that process;

4. Urges the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to resolutions 34/87 F of 11 December 1979 and 35/156 K of 12 December 1980, to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, looking towards the achievement of an agreement which will provide for substantial reductions and significant qualitative limitations of strategic arms;

5. Welcomes the commencement of negotiations at Geneva on 30 November 1981 between representatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear arms in accordance with the joint communiqué issued by Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko on 23 September 1981, and trusts that such negotiations will facilitate the enhancement of stability and international security;

6. Stresses the need for both parties to bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question;

7. Invites the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Strategic arms limitation talks".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

J

Report of the Committee on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Recognizing also that all States have the duty to contribute to and the right

/...

to participate in disarmament negotiations, as acknowledged in paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 16/

Recalling, to that effect, its resolutions 33/91 G of 16 December 1978 and 35/156 I of 12 December 1980,

Noting that under section IX of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament non-member States have been invited to participate in the work of the Committee,

Recalling also that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament is to be reviewed at regular intervals in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document,

1. Takes note of the relevant parts of the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its session held in 1981 17/ in which various options and different views were stated;
2. Recommends that the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed, following appropriate consultation among Member States, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
3. Reaffirms that States not members of the Committee on Disarmament should, upon their request, continue to be invited by it to participate in the work of the Committee.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

K

Disarmament and international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979 and 35/156 J of 12 December 1980,

Alarmed by the present grave state of international affairs characterized by marked deterioration in the relationship between the major military Powers, which

16/ Resolution S-10/2.

17/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27).

seriously jeopardizes the process of détente and results in the flaring up of new, and in the continuation of old, conflicts in various parts of the world,

Deeply concerned over the long stagnation in the disarmament process, the intensification of the arms race, both quantitative and qualitative, and the increased threat of a nuclear conflagration,

Convinced that for achieving progress on the reduction of arms and armaments, the arms race must first be stopped,

Convinced further that the arms race cannot be stopped as long as the concepts of balance of weapons or of deterrence continue to be regarded as the sole means for the security of nations,

Aware that the best hope for arresting the pernicious spiral of the arms race is by the provision of alternative means of security for nations rather than through reliance on the balance of armaments or of deterrence,

Aware further that the rational alternative means for such security is to move towards a halt in the arms race by developing in a parallel way the measures and modalities for collective security as mandatorily required by the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling paragraph 13 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 18/ in which it is stated that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces by international agreement and mutual example,

Considering that it is of essential importance to create a climate of confidence in the United Nations which will open the way to co-operation among Member States, in fulfilling the common and basic obligations under the Charter,

Noting with satisfaction the references to statements made by representatives of a number of Member States, including the two major Powers, in the First Committee during the current session of the General Assembly, indicating positive attitudes towards effective use of the United Nations in improving the international situation and preventing war,

Reaffirming its resolution 35/156 J of 12 December 1980, adopted by consensus, in which, inter alia, it recommended that the main organs of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security should give early consideration to the requirements for halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and developing the modalities for the effective application of the system of international security provided for in the Charter,

18/ Resolution S-10/2.

Reiterating its request to the permanent members of the Security Council to facilitate the work of the Council towards carrying out this essential responsibility under the Charter,

1. Calls upon all States to take prompt action for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/156 J, which would render effective the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and thereby be conducive to meaningful disarmament negotiations;

2. Deems it necessary, as a first step in this direction, that the Security Council take the required measures towards the implementation of Chapter VII of the Charter, which would reinforce the foundations of peace, security and order through the United Nations and avert the growing threat of nuclear conflagration.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

L

Study on the relationship between disarmament and
international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977, in which it requested the Secretary-General to initiate a study on the relationship between disarmament and international security,

Recalling also paragraph 97 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 19/ in which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him, to continue the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security,

Recalling further its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979, by which it took note of the progress report of the Secretary-General and 35/156 E of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General containing the study, 20/

1. Notes with satisfaction the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security prepared by the Secretary-General;

19/ Resolution S-10/2.

20/ A/36/597.

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the Group of Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and International Security who assisted him in the preparation of the study;
3. Commends the study and its conclusions to the attention of all Member States;
4. Invites all Member States to inform the Secretary-General, no later than 15 April 1982, of their views regarding the study;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the study, together with the views of Member States, to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/98
15 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 56

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/757)]

36/98. Israeli nuclear armament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its relevant resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also its resolutions 33/71 A of 14 December 1978 on military and nuclear collaboration with Israel and 34/89 of 11 December 1979 and 35/157 of 12 December 1980 on Israeli nuclear armament,

Alarmed by the increasing evidence regarding Israel's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons,

Noting with concern that Israel has persistently refused to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1/ despite repeated calls by the General Assembly and the Security Council to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Recalling Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981,

Recalling the resolution adopted on 12 June 1981 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency 2/ and resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381 adopted on 26 September 1981 by the General Conference of the Agency, in which the Conference,

1/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

2/ See GC(XXV)/643.

inter alia, considered the Israeli act of aggression as an attack against the Agency and its safeguards régime, and decided to suspend the provision of any assistance to Israel,

Recalling its repeated condemnation of the nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on Israeli nuclear armament, 3/

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on Israeli nuclear armament;
2. Expresses its deep alarm at the fact that the report has established that Israel has the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and possesses the means of delivery of such weapons;
3. Also expresses its deep concern that Israel has undermined the credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in particular by the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facilities which were under Agency safeguards;
4. Reaffirms that Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities and Israel's capability constitute a serious destabilizing factor in an already tense situation in the Middle East, and a grave danger to international peace and security;
5. Requests the Security Council to prohibit all forms of co-operation with Israel in the nuclear field;
6. Calls upon all States and other parties and institutions to terminate forthwith all nuclear collaboration with Israel;
7. Requests the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action against Israel so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security by its nuclear-weapon capability;
8. Demands that Israel should renounce, without delay, any possession of nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to give maximum publicity to the report on Israeli nuclear armament and to distribute it to Member States, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency and non-governmental organizations, so that the international community and public opinion may be fully aware of the danger inherent in Israel's nuclear capability;

10. Also requests the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli military nuclear activity and to report thereon as appropriate;

11. Further requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report on Israeli nuclear armament to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;

12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/99
15 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 128

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/758)]

36/99. Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space

The General Assembly,

Guided by the goals of strengthening peace and international security,

Expressing the common interest of all mankind in the further exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes for the good of all States and in the interest of developing friendly relations and mutual understanding between them,

Conscious of the danger which would threaten mankind if outer space became an arena for the arms race,

Desiring not to allow outer space to become an arena for the arms race and a source of strained relations between States,

Taking into account the draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space, 1/ submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the views and comments expressed during the consideration of this item at its thirty-sixth session,

1/ A/36/192, annex.

1. Considers it necessary to take effective steps, by concluding an appropriate international treaty, to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space;
2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty;
3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space".

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/36/100
15 January 1982

Thirty-sixth session
Agenda item 135

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/36/759)]

36/100. Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the foremost task of the United Nations, born in the flames of the Second World War, has been, is and will be to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war,

Recognizing that all the horrors of past wars and all other calamities that have befallen people would pale in comparison with what is inherent in the use of nuclear weapons capable of destroying civilization on earth,

Reaffirming that the universally accepted objective is to eliminate completely the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons through the cessation of their production, followed by the destruction of their stockpiles, and that, to this end, priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that, as the first step in this direction, the use of nuclear weapons and the waging of nuclear war should be outlawed,

Solemnly proclaims, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations:

1. States and statesmen that resort first to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity.
2. There will never be any justification or pardon for statesmen who would take the decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

3. Any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons and any actions pushing the world towards a catastrophe are incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations.

4. It is the supreme duty and direct obligation of the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. The nuclear-arms race must be stopped and reversed by joint efforts, through negotiations conducted in good faith and on the basis of equality, having as their ultimate goal the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

5. Nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and only for the benefit of mankind.

91st plenary meeting
9 December 1981

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/232
CD/CPD/WP.58
29 January 1982
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Ad Hoc Working Group on a
Comprehensive Programme
of Disarmament

DELEGATIONS OF BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HUNGARY,
MONGOLIA, POLAND AND THE USSR

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

- I. It is suggested that the Group of 21's working paper contained in document CD/229, CD/CPD/WP.56, of 27 January 1982, should be taken as a basis for discussion.
- II. It is proposed that the following additions should be made to that document:
1. In the second sentence of the first paragraph, after the words, "first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament," insert "to consolidate and develop everything positive that has been achieved so far in the sphere of the curbing of the arms race,".
 2. In the same sentence, after the words "to initiate", insert a comma and add the word "renew" before "and expedite".
 3. At the end of the first paragraph, after the words "international tension," put a comma and insert the following: "to help strengthen the foundations for the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems and the development of co-operation between them".
 4. Insert the following as a second paragraph:
"The implementation of the measures provided for in the Programme should serve to strengthen both international security and the security of individual States. Genuine security can be guaranteed only by the limitation, reduction and elimination of weapons, through disarmament."

GE.82-60058

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/233
CD/CPD/WP.59
29 January 1982

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Ad Hoc Working Group on a
Comprehensive Programme
of Disarmament

DELEGATIONS OF BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HUNGARY,
MONGOLIA, POLAND AND THE USSR

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

I. It is suggested that the Group of 21's working paper contained in document CD/230, CD/CPD/WP.57, of 27 January 1982, should be taken as a basis for discussion.

II. It is proposed that the following amendments and additions should be made to that document:

1. In the first two lines, replace the words, "the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" by the words, "the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".
2. In the last paragraph, amend the third sentence to read as follows:
"Measures to avert the threat of a nuclear war and to halt the nuclear arms race, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems must, therefore, be accorded the highest priority."
3. At the end of the last paragraph, add the following sentence: "The fact that the negotiations in progress on certain items have not been completed should not be used to justify the deferral of negotiations on other items."

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/234

4 February 1982

Original: ENGLISH

MESSAGE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE 1982 SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

It is with a feeling of profound disquiet and a deep sense of responsibility that I avail myself of this first opportunity to address a message to the Committee on Disarmament. As I have only recently assumed office, I wish on this occasion to pledge my wholehearted and resolute devotion to the cause of disarmament and my strong personal support for your endeavours. Fifty years ago today, here in Geneva, the first international conference on disarmament was convened by the League of Nations. Two basic premises were set forth at the very opening of that conference: first, that armed peace is no guarantee against war and second, that the arms race, in itself a source of mutual fears and suspicions, paralyzes the will to peace.

As the Committee starts its 1982 session today, against a background of widespread public concern at the deadly dangers of the arms race, these two premises remain as pertinent as they were half a century ago, but the danger to mankind has grown immensely. The arms race has piled up weapons of incredible destructiveness and the existence of nuclear weapons has given particular urgency to disarmament efforts.

It must be said, in sober truth, that the current levels of arsenals no longer bear any relationship to the rational requirements of self-defence. These arsenals are now so huge that, should they ever be used, they would menace the future of the human species. It is also true that the ever greater accumulation of armaments causes an enormous drain on resources desperately needed for reducing the burden of poverty on the majority of the world's population. The amount required to provide the basic necessities of the entire human race for one year is estimated to be less than the cost of the arms race in a month.

At the heart of the problem of prevention of war is the question of disarmament, which has been stubbornly resisting the efforts of various organs, including the Committee on Disarmament. A favourable international climate is, of course, highly desirable for the success of disarmament negotiations. The building of mutual confidence, the correction of misconceptions of one another's military capacities and intentions, the peaceful resolution of disputes, the adoption of verification measures, the promotion of mutual security through respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states -- even the reduction of economic disparities between North and South -- these are all as important as the technical aspects of disarmament.

The world cannot afford to wait for the dawn of ideal conditions before undertaking measures of disarmament. Disarmament cannot be achieved through confrontation and condemnation. The short-term benefit of military advantage is invariably neutralized by the long-term harm of the arms race it provokes. We should recognize before it is too late that the most basic aspect of all peoples and nations is their shared humanity and consequently their shared responsibility for a world without war.

The present session of the Committee on Disarmament takes place at a time when international relations are under severe strain. The understanding between East and West so painstakingly built over the last decade and so crucial to a stable peace has been eroded. The past year has witnessed major acceleration in the upward spiral of military expenditures around the world.

At this stage in international affairs, there is a compelling need to make a credible and substantial advance towards arms limitation and disarmament. The United Nations is preparing, at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly, to breathe new life into disarmament efforts and to restore the momentum of progress in this field. There is no question that such an effort is vitally necessary if we are to halt the arms race and check the drift towards confrontation. The special session will be closely followed by a growing world audience increasingly alarmed by the prospects of a nuclear holocaust. In this endeavour, the role of the Committee on Disarmament is crucial. There is widespread interest in the comprehensive programme of disarmament that the Committee is engaged in formulating. The importance of such a programme for initiating a planned and progressive process of disarmament in stages would provide the General Assembly at the special session with a solid and encouraging basis for its efforts.

Another important issue is the long-awaited conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. This would provide a major impetus for further progress towards the limitation and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It would also be of significance in strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

Renewed and sustained efforts on the part of the Committee on Disarmament, particularly the nuclear powers, to make substantive progress on the complex issue of nuclear disarmament are also of paramount importance. It is clear that some states have a larger share of responsibility than others and I hope that proposals and practical suggestions will be made in response to the resolution recently adopted by the General Assembly on the Prevention of Nuclear War.

While the international atmosphere remains clouded at present, the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on intermediate range missiles marks a step forward. I hope that negotiations will be resumed soon on strategic arms reductions as well. Progress on these questions is of vital importance for the entire world community. They would also have a favourable effect on the work of the Committee on Disarmament and contribute significantly to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

I wish the Committee every success in its endeavours.

ROMANIA

Messages from the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu, addressed to Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and to Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, concerning the Geneva negotiations on the halting of the deployment in Europe and the withdrawal from that continent of medium-range missiles

Dear Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev,

On behalf of the Romanian people and the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania and on my own behalf, I am addressing myself to you with reference to the opening of negotiations in Geneva, between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, concerning the halting of the deployment in Europe and the withdrawal from that continent of medium-range nuclear missiles.

The Romanian people are profoundly disturbed at the serious situation which has been created in Europe through the accumulation of an enormous arsenal of weapons, and especially nuclear weapons, and the plans to install and deploy new medium-range missiles. You know better than anyone that this is creating the danger of a nuclear war which could lead only to the destruction of civilization, the existence of the world's peoples and life on earth.

All this is rousing great concern, and giving rise to large-scale demonstrations and mass movements among the peoples of Europe, who are resolutely demanding the halting of the emplacement and deployment of new nuclear armaments, the reduction of existing armaments and the freeing of our continent from atomic weapons.

As you know, the Party and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania have, from the beginning, opposed the plans to increase the number of medium-range nuclear weapons and called for the opening of negotiations with a view to preventing the expansion of the nuclear arsenals on our continent, for both sides to make a substantial reduction in such armaments, and for the establishment of conditions conducive to the relaxation of tension and the strengthening of security on the European continent.

In the atmosphere of tension existing in Europe on the eve of the Geneva negotiations, we attached particular importance to your statement, Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, that the Soviet Union is in favour of the permanent abandonment by both sides - East and West - of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe and the conversion of Europe into a continent free from nuclear weapons.

When the Grand National Assembly discussed these problems at its meeting on 28 November last, it authorized me to appeal to you, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, to use every possible means to reach concrete agreements on the halting of the emplacement and deployment of new nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Europe - vital problems for the European peoples and for international peace and security.

I have also been authorized to make a similar appeal to the President of the United States of America, Mr. Ronald Reagan.

The Grand National Assembly has further authorized me to appeal to the heads of State and Government of the other countries signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki to make every possible effort to ensure the success of the Geneva negotiations, the cessation of the accumulation of nuclear armaments in Europe and the freeing of the continent from all atomic weapons.

The Grand National Assembly has adopted a similar appeal addressed to all the parliaments, Governments and peoples of Europe and to those of the United States of America and Canada.

We welcome the starting of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, in which the Romanian people place great hopes, as indeed do all the other European peoples and the people of the world at large, and they expect it to be agreed at the outset that while the negotiations are in progress the NATO decision on the emplacement of new medium-range missiles will not be implemented and that the two sides will refrain from the deployment of the existing missiles. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, as you have stated, ought unilaterally to remove some of its medium-range nuclear weapons located in the European part of the territory of the USSR. The Romanian people cherish the hope that the negotiations will result in an agreement leading to the reduction of nuclear armaments to the lowest possible level and to the adoption of measures towards the complete elimination of medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons, so that Europe will become a continent free of nuclear weapons.

We greatly appreciate the important role played by the Soviet Union and yourself in international life, proving that socialism is inseparably linked with the struggle for peace and disarmament, just as the founder of the Soviet State, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, himself did when he issued the first legislative act of the Soviet Government, the Decree of Peace.

We would like history to be able to record that the Soviet Union, the foremost socialist country, and you yourself, as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have acted and made every effort towards the complete success of the negotiations in Geneva, contributing directly to the solution of one of the fundamental problems of our continent, so that the European peoples and all mankind may be saved from the threat of a devastating nuclear war.

I believe you agree with me, Comrade Brezhnev, that now, before the rockets are launched, before the atomic bombs have fallen, before it is too late, in a word, while we are still alive, we must stop atomic armaments and act to save humanity from an atomic war and to defend the lives of our peoples, of all humanity.

The Romanian people and the other European peoples expect that the heads of State, and in the first instance you yourself and the President of the United States of America, will take action to ensure that the two great powers possessing atomic weapons will never use them for military purposes, and that nuclear weapons will be abandoned and the atom used for peaceful purposes only in the interest of the progress, greater well-being and civilization of humanity.

I know that there are many difficult problems to resolve, that a large quantity of armaments has been accumulated and that there is much distrust, but the cause of the peace and security of peoples must be placed above all else. We therefore consider that all the States - all the heads of State and Government of Europe have a great responsibility as regards the successful outcome of the Geneva negotiations.

Romania is prepared to co-operate with the Soviet Union, with the other socialist countries of Europe and with all the States signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki, and to participate directly in the negotiations, in one way or another, in order to contribute effectively to the halting of the emplacement and deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the substantial reduction of nuclear armaments there and the elimination of atomic weapons from that continent.

In view of the particular importance for the disarmament process and for security and confidence in Europe of the creation in different parts of the continent of denuclearized zones and areas of co-operation and good-neighbourliness, Romania is determined also in the future to make every effort to develop its good relations with all the Balkan States and to work for the conversion of the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation, free from nuclear weapons.

I would like once more to state my conviction, Comrade Brezhnev, that you will do all that is in your power to ensure that the Geneva negotiations are, from the outset, fruitful and effective and that they result in the stopping of the nuclear arms race, concrete and substantial measures of nuclear disarmament, and the strengthening of peace, security and co-operation in Europe and throughout the world.

In conclusion, allow me to address to you a warm and friendly greeting and good wishes and to express the hope that the good Romanian-Soviet relations of friendship, solidarity and co-operation will develop further, in the interest of our peoples and in the cause of peace and socialism.

With communist greetings,

Nicolae Ceaușescu

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Romanian people and the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania and on my own behalf, I am addressing myself to you, the President of the United States of America, with reference to the opening of negotiations in Geneva between the United States of America and the Soviet Union concerning the halting of the deployment in Europe and the withdrawal from that continent of medium-range nuclear missiles.

The Romanian people, like the other peoples of Europe, are profoundly disturbed at the situation that has been created in Europe, which is the site of the largest military arsenal history has ever known, consisting both of conventional weapons and of nuclear weapons, which are becoming more and more highly sophisticated.

The plan to place and deploy in Europe new medium-range nuclear missiles is likely further to increase the danger of war and the state of tension on the continent, and this intensifies the disquiet of the European peoples and their determination to take energetic action to prevent the installation and deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments on this continent and to secure the reduction of the existing nuclear potential and the freeing of Europe from nuclear weapons.

The large-scale demonstrations and manifestations in which hundreds of thousands of people of the European countries, including Romania, have been taking part are proof of the will of the peoples of our continent, aware that they will be the victims of a nuclear conflict in Europe, to make the utmost efforts to secure the removal of the danger of war, the halting of the arms race, and first and foremost the nuclear arms race, and the elimination of nuclear weapons of all kinds from this region of the world.

In this context, the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the subject of medium-range missiles in Europe are of particular importance.

When the Grand National Assembly discussed these problems at its meeting on 28 November last, it authorized me to appeal to you, President Reagan, to do everything in your power to ensure that the Geneva negotiations will lead to concrete agreements on the halting of the emplacement and deployment in Europe of new nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of medium-range missiles from this continent.

I have also been authorized by the Grand National Assembly to make a similar appeal to the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev.

I have further been authorized to appeal to the heads of State and Government of the other countries signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki to make every effort to ensure the success of the Geneva negotiations, the cessation of the accumulation of nuclear armaments in Europe and the freeing of the continent from all atomic weapons.

The Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania has adopted a similar appeal addressed to all the parliaments, Governments and peoples of the countries of Europe and to those of the United States of America and Canada.

We welcome the starting of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva. The Romanian people, like all the other European peoples, expect it to be agreed at the outset of the negotiations that while they are in progress, the NATO decision on the emplacement of new medium-range missiles in Europe will not be implemented and that the two sides will refrain from the deployment of the existing missiles. They also expect the Soviet Union, in accordance with the statement of President L.I. Brezhnev, unilaterally to remove some of its medium-range nuclear weapons located on the European side of the territory of the USSR. Furthermore, the Romanian people hope that the Geneva negotiations will result in an agreement leading to the reduction of nuclear armaments in Europe to the lowest possible level and the adoption of measures for the permanent elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons and also tactical weapons, so that Europe may become a continent free of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, I should like to appeal to you, Mr. President, in the name of the Romanian people, to use your authority as leader of the United States of America in order to contribute directly to the smooth conduct of the negotiations and to help them proceed constructively and fruitfully with a view to their successful conclusion, so that they may meet the expectations of the peoples of the world and count as a major event with far-reaching positive implications for contemporary political life.

I believe you would agree with me, Mr. President, that before the missiles go into action, before the atomic bombs are dropped on the continent, now, before it is too late, while we are still alive and can act, we must do all we can to reduce nuclear weapons and eliminate them from Europe, to defend man's fundamental right to life, liberty and peace.

The Romanian people, like the other peoples, hope that the heads of State, and in the very first instance you yourself and the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, will act so that the two great Powers possessing nuclear armaments will never use them, so that they will abandon nuclear weapons and use the atom for peaceful purposes only, in the interest of the progress, the greater well-being and the civilization of humanity.

I know that there are many difficulties in international life and numerous complex problems that are difficult to resolve, and that many weapons and much distrust have accumulated, but the cause of putting a stop to the arms race and bringing about the relaxation of tension and the reduction of armaments, especially nuclear armaments, must be placed above all else. In this spirit, I feel that all the European States should manifest a special interest and concern for the success of the Geneva negotiations, and should participate in some way in the negotiations. As for Romania, it will continue to co-operate with the United States of America and with the other States for the success of the negotiations, and it is prepared to participate in them in one way or another.

In view of the particular importance for the disarmament process and for security and confidence in Europe of the creation in different parts of the continent of denuclearized zones and areas of co-operation and good-neighbourliness, Romania is determined also in the future to make every effort to develop its good relations with all the Balkan States and to work for the conversion of the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation free from nuclear weapons, and it would welcome help from the United States of America in achieving this goal of the Balkan peoples.

In conclusion, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you my warm greetings and good wishes, together with my hope that we may also co-operate in the future towards the development of the relations of co-operation between Romania and the United States of America, in our mutual interest and in the cause of peace, co-operation and international détente.

Sincerely yours,
Nicolae Ceaușescu

ROMANIA

Appeal of the Romanian Parliament to the Parliaments,
the Governments and the peoples of the European
countries, the United States of America and Canada

The Grand National Assembly, meeting on 27 and 28 November 1981, deeply concerned and with a high feeling of responsibility for the highest interests of our people and for the security, peace, life and tranquility of the other nations expresses its profound disquiet at the worsening of the international situation as a result, in particular, of the armaments race, the accumulation of an enormous arsenal of increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons, at the persistence of old conflicts and foci of tension between States and the appearance of new ones and at the increasingly sharp antagonisms between different countries and groups of countries. Special concern is felt at the plan to place medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, which are a serious threat to the freedom, the security and the very existence of the European peoples and the peace of the whole of mankind.

The Grand National Assembly expresses warm appreciation of and full support for the statement made by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the General Secretary of the Party and President of the Republic, at the recent plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, which reflects Romania's position with respect to the present international situation, the political realities of our continent, and our country's views on ways of overcoming tension in relations between States, halting the arms race, and in particular banning the emplacement and deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe, freeing our continent of nuclear weapons and the necessity to unite all the political and social forces of all peoples to eliminate the danger of war and safeguard international peace and security. The Grand National Assembly considers that the remarkable peace initiative of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, which is penetrated throughout by a high feeling of responsibility for the fate of our people and of the whole of mankind, has mobilized the energies and forces of our entire nation in the service of the great ideals of progress, peace and the peaceful coexistence of peoples, in order to strengthen Romania's co-operation with all the other European nations and with mankind as a whole, in order to preserve our most precious possession, an existence of freedom and dignity, life and peace.

Like the other European peoples, the Romanian people believe that in the present circumstances in Europe, the main and most urgent goal before them and before all the peoples of this continent is to halt the emplacement of new medium-range missiles, for both sides to make a substantial reduction in such armaments, and in all nuclear weapons, and to free Europe of atomic weapons completely and for ever.

The Grand National Assembly welcomes the forthcoming negotiations on the halting of the emplacement and deployment of nuclear missiles and the withdrawal of medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe to be opened in Geneva between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Our people, in common with the whole of Europe and the world, is following those negotiations with special interest, in the hope that they will lead to practical and concrete measures and decisions for a constructive solution of this problem, which is vital for our continent, for security, and for world détente and peace.

In that connection, the Grand National Assembly has noted with satisfaction, welcomes and expresses great appreciation of the statements made by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that the Soviet Union wishes to reach agreement on the complete abandonment by both sides -- East and West -- of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe, making Europe a nuclear-free zone. The Grand National Assembly has also taken note with interest and appreciation of the statements of Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, that the United States is willing to go so far as to cancel the emplacement of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and to reduce strategic nuclear armaments and is ready to negotiate on the Soviet proposals. There are fundamental differences between the statements made by the two Chiefs of State, but in Europe and the world, there is a realization that they express the wish of both States to conduct negotiations, and the hope that they will lead to an agreement on the elimination of all medium-range armaments, and of any nuclear armaments in Europe.

It would be extremely important to agree, from the outset of the negotiations, to halt the emplacement and deployment of new missiles, to reduce the number of existing missiles and, by the end of the negotiations, to reach agreement on reducing medium-range nuclear armaments to the lowest possible level, and then to proceed to the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and to making our continent a nuclear-armaments-free zone.

The Grand National Assembly considers that the aim of these negotiations is of the utmost importance to all the peoples and States of our continent, for it involves their security, their independence and their fundamental right to life, their present and their future. That is why there is an obvious and natural necessity for all the States of this continent to participate in some way or other in the negotiations on halting the emplacement and deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe so that they can explain their positions, take more responsibility for the solution of these problems, and help to bring about agreements that are acceptable to all parties.

For its part, Romania wishes to play an effective part in the discussion and solution of this paramount problem facing the continent, on which the peaceful activity and the very survival of our people and of all the other European peoples depend.

As the creation of denuclearized zones of collaboration and good-neighbourliness is of special importance for the disarmament process and the strengthening of security, confidence and peace in Europe, Romania is prepared to make every effort to expand good collaborative relations among all the States of the Balkans in order to transform this area into a nuclear-weapon-free zone of peace.

It is precisely towards disarmament and peace that the great mass demonstrations now going on in all the European countries are directed. They express the firm determination of the European peoples to oppose a categorical NO to the continuation of nuclear armaments on this continent, to prevent the deterioration of the international political situation and to eliminate the threat of a new devastating war.

This is the direction taken also by the Romanian people in their great peace movement, which expresses their acute political awareness and their determination to act, together with the other European peoples, to secure disarmament -- first and foremost, nuclear disarmament -- security and peace.

Expressing the wishes and the determination of our people as a whole, the Grand National Assembly is addressing to all the peoples, Governments and parliaments of Europe, the United States of America and Canada an appeal to act energetically without delay to defend the vital interests of freedom, security and peace. Before the missiles go into action, before atomic bombs are dropped on this continent -- now, before it is too late, while we are still alive and can act -- let us do everything in our power to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons from our continent, to dissipate the menacing clouds that have gathered over Europe, to defend the fundamental right of our peoples and of all the world's peoples to life to freedom and to peace.

We are absolutely convinced that if we act energetically and in concert, by our close co-operation and unity we can bar the road to war! It is in the power of our peoples to stop the dangerous course of international life, to launch a renewal of détente and collaboration and to halt the armaments race and go on from there to disarmament, starting with nuclear disarmament!

The Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania welcomes the proposals and initiatives put forward by other European States to stop the deterioration of the political situation in Europe and accelerate the disarmament process, starting with nuclear disarmament; and it considers that the action of Governments and parliaments plays a very important role in achieving this objective and in consolidating peace, security and collaboration on this continent.

As to the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Grand National Assembly declares it is ready to support and participate in any constructive action for this purpose and it authorizes the Government to undertake whatever action may be necessary for it to make a bigger contribution to the general effort in favour of disarmament, détente and peace on this continent, to the success of the negotiations to stop the emplacement and deployment of medium-range weapons and secure their elimination, in a word, to the achievement of a peaceful and united Europe.

Let us spare no effort to ensure respect for the right of the European peoples to develop freely on the path to progress, collaboration and peace, to stop the armaments race, to achieve general disarmament, and first and foremost nuclear disarmament, to strengthen security and collaboration on this continent, to build a better and juster world on our planet.

ROMANIA

Appeal by the people of Romania, to the peoples and forward-looking
democratic forces of the world, for disarmament and peace, security,
independence and progress

We, the more than 300,000 participants in the great popular assembly at Bucharest on 5 December 1981, on behalf of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front of the Socialist Republic of Romania and of the Romanian people, voicing the will of the whole nation, address to all peoples of the world, to all peace-loving forces everywhere, an urgent appeal for a united struggle to secure disarmament and peace.

We wish once again, in the most resolute manner, from the platform of this great popular assembly which marks the culmination of the energetic demonstrations and mass actions that have been taking place throughout the country to express total approval and our full support for the new and brilliant peace initiative of Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu, and the unshakeable determination of the entire Romanian people to unite all their forces in order, side by side with the other peoples of the world, to serve the great ideals of peace, freedom and independence and to deliver humanity from the nightmare of devastating wars. The urgent appeals contained in the stirring speech delivered at the conclusion of the assembly by Comrade Nicolea Ceauşescu, Secretary-General of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania and President of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front, have found a resonant echo in our hearts and have powerfully stimulated the energies of the whole country in the struggle for peace and for the defence of the sacred right of peoples to life and to free and sovereign development.

In the present circumstances, in which the international situation has sharply deteriorated, in which we see an unprecedented build-up of armaments and the intention to install in Europe -- which has become an immense arsenal of nuclear weapons -- new medium-range missiles, new weapons of mass destruction, and in which the life of the whole planet is threatened, the Romanian people consider that nothing is more important for humanity, for all the nations of the world, than to unite their forces and to act together in the most resolute manner in favour of the halting of the arms race, disarmament and a climate of confidence, co-operation and peace.

We believe that everything possible should be done so that Europe, which has given, which still gives so much to civilization and to progress, may be freed from atomic weapons and the danger of nuclear catastrophe. We support without reserve the standpoint of Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu concerning the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and we hope that these negotiations will be conducted in a spirit of full responsibility for the peace of the continent and of the whole world.

All the countries of Europe are directly interested in the guaranteeing of peace on our continent; and it is normal and necessary that they should take part, in one way or another, in the negotiations, that they should actively express their views, that they should assume their responsibilities in solving this problem that is vital for the existence of Europe. On behalf of the entire nation, we declare our full support for the appeal made by the Grand National Assembly, in its resolution as the country's supreme law-making body, for Romania to participate actively in the consideration and solution of the problems of disarmament, peace and security on the continent. At the same time, we unanimously support the important mandate conferred upon the country's President, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, to make personal approaches to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, as well as to the leaders of the other States signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki, in order that every avenue may be explored with a view to preventing the deployment in Europe of new medium-range missiles, securing the removal of those already there and freeing Europe from all nuclear weapons.

At this decisive moment for the destiny of mankind, when the black clouds of impending catastrophe are gathering over Europe, the Romanian people, in the name of the fundamental right of peoples to life, a free existence and peace, address to all the peoples of Europe and the peoples of the other continents, to all in the world who love peace an urgent appeal to unite our voices in resolutely saying NO to the arms race, NO to nuclear missiles, NO to the neutron bomb, NO to atomic weapons of all kinds! Let us demand the adoption of concrete, practical measures of disarmament, and in the first instance nuclear disarmament! Let us answer YES to the policy of détente and co-operation, to the policy of independence, security and peace throughout the world!

We, the peoples of Europe, whether in the East or the West or the North or the South, are directly threatened by existing nuclear weapons and those which are to be deployed on the continent. We ought therefore to leave no stone unturned so as to achieve the halting of the installation of new medium-range missiles, a substantial reduction -- on both sides -- of such weapons, of all nuclear weapons, and the total and final liberation of the continent from atomic weapons.

Let us fight for the termination of the division of our continent into military blocs and economically opposed groupings!

Let us work energetically for the success of the Madrid meeting, for the convening of a conference devoted to confidence and disarmament, for the development of broad and free co-operation between all the States of the continent!

Let us, by our efforts, build a Europe of peace, confidence and co-operation, a united Europe freed for ever from the spectre of atomic war!

Let us do everything to achieve a military balance, not by the accumulation of armaments but by their reduction to the lowest possible level!

Let us demand the withdrawal of troops and the dismantling of military bases on the territories of other countries, and the reduction of armed forces and armaments, including conventional armaments -- the reduction of weapons of all kinds!

Let us insist on positive steps to reduce military budgets, to reduce the vast expenditures for military purposes which create a heavier and heavier burden for all peoples! Let us see to it that the resources so saved are spent on the eradication of under-development and the solution of the social problems that exist in many countries of the world!

Let us ensure that the extraordinary power of the atom is never used for destruction and war but solely in the service of man, for his well-being and happiness, for the advancement and civilization of mankind! Those who are planning to release the force of the atom should know that they will not escape its destructive power and that if by some miracle they should survive, they will not escape the just judgement of mankind, of the peoples.

Let us strive to ensure that the United Nations makes a more active and more effective contribution to the uniting of all the nations' efforts to defend peace, disarmament and world co-operation!

It is our firm conviction that it is within the power of the peoples, by concerted and ever more energetic action, to put a stop to the dangerous trend in events, to impose the adoption of concrete measures calculated to eliminate the danger of war, to set in train the process of disarmament and to safeguard peace. By their close co-operation the peoples of the world can build the most powerful of all weapons, the weapon of UNITY, of PEACE and CO-OPERATION.

In manifesting our total solidarity with the peoples' fight for peace, with the great mass movements and demonstrations in European and other countries, we, the participants at the great popular assembly in the capital of Socialist Romania, endorsing most emphatically the fervent appeals addressed to the peoples, to all who love peace, by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the President of Socialist Romania -- we give a solemn undertaking on behalf of the Romanian people to work tirelessly and in close unity with all nations, with progressive and democratic forces throughout the world, against war, for disarmament, for a policy of responsibility towards the fate of mankind, for a better and juster world, a world of peace and international co-operation.

Our struggle is a just one -- and it will triumph!

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/238

4 February 1982

ENGLISH

Original: ENGLISH/SPANISH

LETTER DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1982 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF VENEZUELA, TRANSMITTING THE RESULT OF THE STUDY CARRIED OUT IN OCTOBER 1981 BY THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, AT THE REQUEST OF HIS HOLINESS JOHN PAUL II, ENTITLED "STATEMENT ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS"

I have the honour to request you kindly to arrange for the circulation of the enclosed text, entitled "Statement on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons", which is the result of the study carried out in October 1981 by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences at the request of His Holiness John Paul II, as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament under the item, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

(Signed) Reinaldo Rodríguez Navarro
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.82-60199

STATEMENT ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

On 7-8 October 1981, under the Chairmanship of Professor Carlos Chagas, President of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, at the headquarters of the Academy (Casina Pius IV, Vatican City), a group of fourteen specialized scientists */ from various parts of the world assembled to examine the problem of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons on the survival and health of humanity.

Although most of these consequences would appear obvious, it seems that they are not adequately appreciated. The conditions of life following a nuclear attack would be so severe that the only hope for humanity is prevention of any form of nuclear war. Universal dissemination and acceptance of this knowledge would make it apparent that nuclear weapons must not be used at all in warfare and that their number should be progressively reduced in a balanced way.

The above-mentioned group discussed and unanimously approved a number of fundamental points, which have been further developed in the following statement.

* * *

Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: any nuclear war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of pandemic proportions and without the possibility of effective medical intervention. That reality leads to the same conclusion physicians have reached for life-threatening epidemics throughout history: prevention is essential for control.

In contrast to widespread belief, much is known about the catastrophe that would follow the use of nuclear weapons. Much is known too about the limitations of medical assistance. If this knowledge is presented to people and their leaders everywhere, it might help interrupt the nuclear arms race. This in turn would help prevent what could be the last epidemic our civilization will know.

The devastation wrought by an atomic weapon on Hiroshima and Nagasaki provides direct evidence of the consequences of nuclear warfare, but there are many theoretical appraisals on which we may also draw. Two years ago, an assessment undertaken by a responsible official agency described the effect of nuclear attacks on cities of about 2 million inhabitants. If a one-million-ton nuclear weapon (the Hiroshima bomb approximated 15,000 tons of explosive power) exploded in the central area of such cities, it would result, as calculated, in 180 km² of property destruction, 250,000 fatalities and 500,000 severely injured. These would include blast injuries, such as fractures and severe lacerations of soft tissues, thermal injuries such as surface burns, retinal burns and respiratory tract damage and radiation injuries, both acute radiation syndrome and delayed effects.

*/ Carlos Chagas, Rio de Janeiro; E. Amaldi, Rome; N. Bochkov, Moscow; L. Caldas, Rio de Janeiro; H. Hiatt, Boston; R. Latarjet, Paris; A. Leaf, Boston; J. Lejeune, Paris; L. Leprince-Ringuet, Paris; G.B. Marini-Bettolo, Rome; C. Pavan, São Paulo; A. Rich, Cambridge Mass.; A. Serra, Rome; V. Weisskopf, Cambridge Mass.

Even under optimal conditions, care of such casualties would present a medical task of unimaginable magnitude. The study projected that if 18,000 hospital beds were available in and around one of these cities, no more than 5,000 would remain relatively undamaged. These would accommodate only 1 per cent of the human beings injured, but it must be stressed that in any case no one could deliver the medical service required by even a few of the severely burned, the crushed and the radiated victims.

The hopelessness of the medical task is readily apparent if we consider what is required for the care of the severely injured patients. We shall cite one case history, that of a severely burned twenty-year-old man who was taken to the burn unit of a Boston hospital after an automobile accident in which the gasoline tank had exploded. During his hospitalization he received 140 litres of fresh-frozen plasma, 147 litres of fresh-frozen red blood cells, 100 millilitres of platelets and 180 millilitres of albumin. He underwent six operative procedures during which wounds involving 35 per cent of his body surface were closed with various types of grafts, including artificial skin. Throughout his hospitalization, he required mechanical ventilation. Despite these and many other heroic measures, which stretched the resources of one of the world's most comprehensive institutions, he died on his thirty-third hospital day. His injuries were likened by the doctor who supervised his care to those described for many of the victims of Hiroshima. Had twenty score of such patients been presented at the same time to all of Boston's hospitals the medical capabilities of the city would have been overwhelmed. Now, consider the situation if, along with the injuries to many thousands of people, most of the medical emergency facilities had been destroyed.

A Japanese physician, Professor M. Ichimaru, published an eyewitness account of the effects of the Nagasaki bomb. He reported: "I tried to go to my medical school in Urakami which was 500 metres from the hypocentre. I met many people coming back from Urakami. Their clothes were in rags and shreds of skin hung from their bodies. They looked like ghosts with vacant stares. The next day I was able to enter Urakami on foot and all that I knew had disappeared. Only the concrete and iron skeletons of the buildings remained. There were dead bodies everywhere. On each street corner, we had tubs of water used for putting out fires after air raids. In one of these small tubs, scarcely large enough for one person, was the body of a desperate man who sought cool water. There was foam coming from his mouth, but he was not alive. I cannot get rid of the sounds of the crying women in the destroyed fields. As I got nearer to the school there were black, charred bodies with the white edges of bones showing in the arms and legs. When I arrived some were still alive. They were unable to move their bodies. The strongest were so weak that they were slumped over on the ground. I talked with them and they thought that they would be O.K. but all of them would eventually die within two weeks. I cannot forget the way their eyes looked at me and their voices spoke to me forever ...".

It should be noted that the bomb dropped on Nagasaki had a power of about 20,000 tons of TNT, not much larger than the so-called "tactical bombs" designed for battlefield use.

But even these grim pictures are inadequate to describe the human disaster that would result from an attack on a country by today's stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which contain thousands of bombs with the force of one-million tons of TNT or greater.

The suffering of the surviving population would be without parallel. There would be complete interruption of communications, of food supplies and of water. Help would be given only at the risk of mortal danger from radiation for those venturing outside of buildings in the first days. The social disruption following such an attack would be unimaginable.

The exposure to large doses of radiation would lower immunity to bacteria and viruses and could, therefore, open the way for widespread infection. Radiation would cause irreversible brain damage and mental deficiency in many of the exposed in utero. It would greatly increase the incidence of many forms of cancer in survivors. Genetic damage would be passed on to future generations, should there be any.

In addition, large areas of soil and forests as well as livestock would be contaminated, reducing food resources. Many other harmful biological and even geophysical effects would be likely, but we do not have enough knowledge to predict with confidence what they would be.

Even a nuclear attack directed only at military facilities would be devastating to the country as a whole. This is because military facilities are widespread rather than concentrated at only a few points. Thus, many nuclear weapons would be exploded. Furthermore, the spread of radiation due to the natural winds and atmospheric mixing would kill vast numbers of people and contaminate large areas. The medical facilities of any nation would be inadequate to care for the survivors. An objective examination of the medical situation that would follow a nuclear war leads to but one conclusion: prevention is our only recourse.

The consequences of nuclear war are not, of course, only medical in nature. But those that are compel us to pay heed to the inescapable lesson of contemporary medicine: where treatment of a given disease is ineffective or where costs are insupportable, attention must be turned to prevention. Both conditions apply to the effects of nuclear war. Treatment would be virtually impossible and the costs would be staggering. Can any stronger argument be marshalled for a preventive strategy?

Prevention of any disease requires an effective prescription. We recognize that such a prescription must both prevent nuclear war and safeguard security. Our knowledge and credentials as scientists and physicians do not, of course, permit us to discuss security issues with expertise. However, if political and military leaders have based their strategic planning on mistaken assumptions concerning the medical aspects of a nuclear war, we feel that we do have a responsibility. We must inform them and people everywhere of the full-blown clinical picture that would follow a nuclear attack and of the impotence of the medical community to offer a meaningful response. If we remain silent, we risk betraying ourselves and our civilization.

(Signed) Carlos Chagas

Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive
Programme of Disarmament

BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC,
HUNGARY, MONGOLIA, POLAND AND THE USSR

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of
the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

- I. It is suggested that the Group of 21's working paper contained in document CD/208, CD/CPD/WP.55 of 10 August 1981, should be taken as a basis for discussion.
- II. It is proposed that the following additions should be made to that document:
1. In the first paragraph, containing the provisions of paragraph 26 of the Final Document, after the words, "relating to the maintenance of international peace and security", insert, "as well as to take into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament".
 2. At the end of the sixth paragraph, containing the text of the paragraph 49 of the Final Document, add the following sentence: "The existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced."
 3. After the sixth paragraph, containing the text of the paragraph 49 with the addition suggested in the paragraph 2 above, insert the paragraph, containing the text of the paragraph 54 of the Final Document: "Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned".

4. After the seventh paragraph, containing the text of the paragraph 29 of the Final Document, insert the following text: "In the negotiations between parties approximately equal militarily the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed: (from the paragraph 48 of the document A/56/597 "Study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security")".
5. At the end of the thirteenth paragraph, containing the text of the paragraph 38 of the Final Document, insert the following text: "proceeding from the fact that there is no type of weapons that could not be eliminated on the mutually agreed basis".
6. At the end of the twenty-first paragraph, containing the text of the paragraph 31 of the Final Document, insert the following provision of the paragraph 22 of the Final Document: "The negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries".

III. Transfer the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs, containing the texts of the paragraphs 47, 48 and 49 of the Final Document from the pages 5 and 4 to the page 5 after the eleventh paragraph, containing the text of the paragraph 28 of the Final Document.

IV. In introducing these additions the co-sponsors reserve the right to express some reservations concerning the specific formulations contained in the document of the Group of 21 CD/203, CD/CFD/WP.55 of 10 August 1981, which will be presented orally.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/240

10 February 1982

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 10 FEBRUARY 1982 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, CONTAINING EXCERPTS FROM THE REPORT ON THE RECEPTION BY L.I. BREZHNEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL ON DISARMAMENT

I enclose excerpts from the report on the reception by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, of representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this material circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V.L. ISSRAELIAN

Representative of the USSR in
the Committee on Disarmament

EXCERPTS FROM THE REPORT ON THE RECEPTION BY L.I. BREZHNEV,
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF
THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
ADVISORY COUNCIL OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL ON DISARMAMENT

On 3 February, L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, received the following representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament: K. Sorsa, Vice-President of the Socialist International; President of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament, and Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Finland, V. Hakker, Secretary of the Advisory Council, Secretary for international questions of the managing board of the Austrian Socialist Party, and S. Taguti, member of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan.

Mr. Brezhnev drew the attention of his audience to the dangerous consequences for the cause of world peace implicit in the present policy of the NATO bloc, and especially of its main member, the United States of America. Never since the Second World War had the situation been so serious.

With regard to the Soviet Union and its leaders, Mr. Brezhnev stressed that we are firmly convinced that for any State to build its policy calculating on nuclear war, and on victory in such a war, is madness, and an irresponsible, adventurist game with the fate of mankind. What is essential now is to remove the danger of war. That is the course followed by the USSR in its foreign policy efforts.

Diplomacy does not call for "entanglement" but rather for "disentanglement", said Mr. Brezhnev. The Gordian knot of conflict situations and controversial problems of the modern world cannot be cut with any sword. The sole path is that of patient, constructive negotiations, negotiations ensuring a real reduction and elimination of weapons.

Referring to the Soviet-American talks being held in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe, Mr. Brezhnev said that the initial stage of the talks warranted a certain watchfulness on account of the evident unwillingness of the American side to seek a basis for a mutually acceptable agreement. The so-called "zero option" advanced by Washington in the expectation that the Soviet Union should unilaterally eliminate all its medium-range missiles cannot be described as a serious proposal. Furthermore, the NATO decision of December 1979 and the "Reagan plan" run entirely counter to the principle of equality and equal security. They aim at destroying the present military balance both in Europe and on a global scale, to the detriment of the security of the USSR and its allies.

In contrast, the Soviet Union is prepared immediately to agree on the complete renunciation by both sides, East and West, of all types of medium-range weapons aimed at targets in Europe. We can go even further: we are ready to agree on the complete elimination from Europe of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

That would be a real "zero option". The USSR is ready to go that far. If the NATO countries agree to this genuine zero option, then peace in Europe (and perhaps throughout the world) will be set on an unprecedentedly firm basis.

But if the West is not yet ready for a radical solution, said Mr. Brezhnev, we are prepared, as a start, to agree to a sharp reduction by both sides in medium-range nuclear weapons - a very sharp reduction, amounting to hundreds of items. For example, by 1990 the present number of medium-range nuclear weapons on each side could be reduced by two-thirds, or even more, on a gradual basis: in the years immediately ahead, the arsenals of both sides could be reduced by about a third, and later we could go further. In this process, of course, the total number of such weapons in the possession of the NATO powers and the Soviet Union would at all stages remain equal.

It is also well known that the USSR, in its efforts to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement, has proposed that during the period of the negotiations there should be a freeze, both quantitatively and qualitatively, on the medium-range weapons of both sides in Europe. At the same time we would be prepared, even during such a moratorium, unilaterally to reduce some of our medium-range weapons in the European part of the USSR.

This, in brief, is our position on the reduction of nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe. We are ready at any time to embody it in an appropriate agreement or, as a start, in a general declaration of principle by the parties, and we continue to hope for a positive reaction from the United States.

No less importance would attach to the conclusion of an agreement between the USSR and the United States of America on another major contemporary problem, that of the limitation of strategic weapons. The United States Administration has from time to time declared that it is - allegedly - interested in the radical reduction of strategic weapons. In fact, however, Washington never does anything to that end, and under a variety of artificial pretexts is even evading the resumption of negotiations.

Mr. Brezhnev stressed that the main line of the Soviet Union's policy which was established at the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union consists in the firm defence of peace. The USSR intends in the future to amplify the provisions of the peace programme adopted at the Congress with new, concrete initiatives in an endeavour to reduce the threat of war, strengthen peace and deepen détente.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said Mr. Brezhnev, intends consistently to follow the course laid down at the twenty-sixth Congress of the CPSU in its relations with the Socialist International and with its member parties, in which it sees a highly influential social and political force. This course is one of dialogue and co-operation. The room for widening co-operation in the struggle to preserve and strengthen détente remains considerable. The greatest global problem of the present day, the problem of preventing the world from sliding towards a thermonuclear catastrophe requires us, in spite of all our differences and disagreements, to find both a common language and, most of all, common solutions.

Considerations relating to the organization of work of the
Committee on Disarmament in the course of its 1982 session

Document of a group of socialist countries

1. The main thrust of the foreign policy of the socialist States has been and remains the struggle for elimination of the threat of war and for curbing the arms race. At the present time this task has gained especial importance and urgency. The real security can be provided only through limitation, reduction and elimination of armaments, through disarmament. Disarmament as material safeguard of international security must represent, under present conditions, the main direction of the common efforts of all States of the world to overcome the international tension and to build a universal and lasting peace.
2. Proceeding from this premise, the group of socialist States appeals to all the CD member countries to start the concrete businesslike negotiations as soon as possible. The Committee must not spend its time in vain on the issues, which have nothing to do with its agenda and are intentionally injected into discussion in order to divert its attention from the matters of substance.
3. In solving the organizational matters at the present stage of the Committee's work it is necessary to take constantly into account the special character of the current session in the light of the coming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Taking into account that the current part of the Committee's session is the last one before the special session, it is necessary to make every effort during the remaining time in order to achieve practical results at the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.
4. One of the important issues, relating to the rational organization of work during the first part of the Committee's 1982 session, is the matter of establishment of its subsidiary bodies.

In accordance with the rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament and taking into account the necessity of achieving practical progress in the Committee on Disarmament, the group of socialist States considers that along with the special working group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which continues its work in accordance with the decision, adopted by the CD, it is advisable to establish a number of other subsidiary bodies of the Committee.

In considering the timing of the establishment and operation of the appropriate subsidiary bodies, the Committee should be guided by: their importance, the time available, the work already performed in 1979-1981 and the prospects on achieving specific results.

*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

Guided by these considerations the group of socialist States is ready to give favourable consideration of the establishment within the Committee's framework Ad Hoc groups on the following questions:

- complete and general nuclear weapons test ban;
- cessation of the nuclear arms race nuclear disarmament;
- prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons;
- prohibition of chemical weapons;
- non-stationing of nuclear weapons at the territories of the States, where there are no such weapons at present;
- effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- prohibition of radiological weapons;
- prohibition to deploy in outer space of the weapons of any type.

The group of socialist countries also favours the establishment of a special group of governmental experts on new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

5. In connection with the questions, relating to the establishment of the Committee's subsidiary bodies the group of socialist States expresses the following considerations:

(a) the question of creation of any given special working group or another appropriate subsidiary body must not be linked with establishment of a working group or another appropriate subsidiary body on another problem;

(b) in appointing the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies it is necessary to take into due account the principle of rotation;

(c) a flexible approach is needed to the question of allocation of time for any given subsidiary body with due account to the relative importance of their work at one stage or another;

(d) it is necessary to envisage the possibility of parallel simultaneous work of two or more subsidiary bodies.

6. On the question of the closing date of the first part of the Committee on Disarmament's 1982 session the group of socialist States holds the view that it is necessary to use at most the time remaining before commencement of work of the Preparatory Committee of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

7. As for the question about the preparation of the Committee's special report to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the group of socialist States thinks that the report should be brief and contain primarily the arrangements achieved in the Committee on Disarmament, on the substance of issues, discussed in it. The work on drafting the report should start on 12 April 1982. By this time the secretariat could prepare a draft of special report and submit it to the members of the Committee for discussion.

AGENDA AND PROGRAMME OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
(Adopted at the 156th Plenary meeting held on 18 February 1982)

The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Committee, taking into account inter alia the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- II. Chemical weapons;
- III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
- IV. Conventional weapons;
- V. Reduction of military budgets;
- VI. Reduction of armed forces;
- VII. Disarmament and development;
- VIII. Disarmament and international security;
- IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within the above framework, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1982 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of section VIII of its rules of procedure, would be considered by the Committee:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
7. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

8. Consideration and adoption of:

- (a) the special report to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament; and
- (b) the annual report to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

The Committee will conduct its work bearing in mind the contribution that it should make to the success of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

In compliance with rule 28 of its rules of procedure, the Committee also adopts the following programme of work for the first part of its 1982 session:

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| 2-16 February | Statements in the plenary.
Consideration of the agenda and programme of work, as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda. ^{1/} |
| 17-23 February | Nuclear test ban. |
| 24 February-5 March | Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. |
| 8-12 March | Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. |
| 15-19 March | New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons. |
| 22-26 March | Chemical weapons. |
| 29 March-6 April | Comprehensive programme of disarmament. |
| 7 April-... | Consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies; ^{2/}
consideration and adoption of the special report to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. ^{3/} |

Informal meetings of the Committee will be held at an appropriate time during the first part of the session to consider item 7 of the agenda.

^{1/} These questions will continue to be considered subsequently, if necessary, at informal meetings of the Committee.

^{2/} Reports of subsidiary bodies that are ready may be considered earlier.

^{3/} In accordance with rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure the draft report shall be made available to all Member States of the Committee for consideration at least two weeks before the scheduled date for its adoption.

Informal meetings of the Committee will also be held early during the session to continue consideration of the modalities of the review of its membership, including proposals submitted by members for the improved and effective functioning of the Committee.

In connection with the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 (c) of the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons established during the 1981 session (CD/220), the Committee decides that further consultations be held on the issues listed in (b) of the same paragraph during the week 15-19 March 1982.

In adopting its agenda and programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

Decision Adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on
ad hoc working groups at its 156th plenary meeting
on 18 February 1982

The Committee decides to re-establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, the ad hoc working groups on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and radiological weapons, which were established on 17 March for its 1980 session, so that they may continue their work on the basis of their former mandates.

In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration, as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with the view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date.

The ad hoc working groups will report to the Committee on the progress of their work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1982 session, in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. They will also report to the Committee before the conclusion of the second part of its 1982 session.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of
Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention

1. The United Kingdom considers that much useful work was carried out last year in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons towards elaborating the elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention. We hope that the momentum of the work of this Group will be maintained by a deeper examination of all the issues under consideration last year, especially the important issues of verification and monitoring of compliance.

INTRODUCTION

2. The United Kingdom believes that, as is the case in many arms control agreements, it is necessary for all States party to a Convention to have reasonable confidence in the compliance of all other States parties, and that the provisions of a CW Convention would therefore need to include adequate measures for its verification. The United Kingdom considers that verification measures would be necessary for each stage of implementation - that is for declaration and destruction of stockpiles and production facilities - and thereafter to monitor the continued compliance of States to the provisions of the Convention dealing with non-production of chemical weapons, including the monitoring of permitted uses of chemical warfare agents and dual-purpose agents. It is also essential that the Convention has an effective complaints procedure for the handling of any doubts which might arise about the implementation of the Convention.

3. The verification of implementation must be under international control. Thereafter verification of compliance could be by a mixture of bilateral and multilateral contacts between States parties, with an international body - a Consultative Committee - playing a decisive role.

MONITORING COMPLIANCE

(a) Voluntary Bilateral Contacts

4. Although the United Kingdom believes that implementatin should be strictly monitored by an international body (the Consultative Committee), this period will provide many opportunities for confidence building. In this respect voluntary

bilateral contacts could play an important part. A State could invite another State party (or a group of other States) to visit various research facilities, civilian chemical production facilities, CW production facilities and CW stockpiles so that other States could see for themselves the progress of implementation. They could also invite observers to any CW protection training exercises, thus helping to allay doubts about whether such training was intended for offensive rather than defensive purposes.

5. Voluntary bilateral contacts would play an even more important role in maintaining confidence in the Convention after the implementation period. States could invite other States to visit civilian chemical facilities to ensure that no chemical warfare agents were being produced. Similarly such contacts could be used to exchange information on research programmes, information on protective measures against chemical warfare agents and information on the use of permitted amounts of super toxins.

(b) National Verification Measures

6. The United Kingdom also believes it is important that the Convention provides for States to use national means of verification, provided that these means fall within the generally recognized principles of international law. Such national means of verification could, for example, include the surveying by satellite of areas of the earth's surface for traces of chemicals of known military significance. Stations could also be set up outside the national boundaries in order to detect the presence of CW in air masses which had previously passed over areas suspected of containing CW production or testing facilities. Details of such methods were contained in papers prepared by the United Kingdom and presented to the CCD (CCD 502 and CCD 371), and more recently in the series of Blue Books presented to the CD by the Government of Finland.

7. If a reliable indication of a possible infringement were obtained by some such surveillance technique, the case for on-site inspection would be greatly strengthened. National means of verification could not in themselves provide sufficient evidence to clarify whether an infringement of the Convention was taking place, and would not therefore in any way be a substitute for international measures of verification. Nor should it be a requirement of the Convention that a State should have to produce evidence from national verification techniques before it could request an on-site inspection. Very few developing States have the technology to develop adequate national verification measures and so a verification system based solely on national measures would not be available to the majority of States. Moreover, the cost of satellite or remote surveillance is extremely high and only a few States would be able to afford this means of verifying compliance.

Furthermore, such means of surveillance are not yet sufficiently developed to allow States to have confidence that national verification measures alone could adequately monitor compliance. We therefore firmly believe that national verification measures should be in addition to, not instead of, international verification measures.

(c) Role of Consultative Committee

8. As has been noted above, the United Kingdom considers that the verification of implementation and of continued compliance should be under the control of an international body -- a Consultative Committee -- which would be established once the Convention came into force. This central organization would need to be supplemented by various means of support.

9. The United Kingdom considers that the Consultative Committee should consist of a representative from each State party assisted by one or more advisers, and that it should be chaired by the Depositary nominated in the Convention. The technical advisers should draw up standard methods and routines for verification (including standardized methods of chemical analysis) preferably before the Convention enters into force, and should have access to sufficient equipment and know-how to carry out these verification procedures.

10. The Consultative Committee should have over-all responsibility to monitor compliance with the provisions of the Convention both during and after the implementation period, and should investigate complaints about the non-compliance of any State party.

Activities to be monitored by the Consultative Committee

11. Verification during the period of implementation will be of particular importance. Unless all parties can be confident that all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and all existing production facilities have been destroyed, there will be no basis for confidence in continued compliance after the implementation period. We therefore consider it necessary that the following activities should be monitored by the Consultative Committee.

(i) The declaration of existing stockpiles of chemical warfare agents and munitions, chemical munition filling facilities and chemical warfare agent production facilities

Although the Consultative Committee would not be in a position to verify that all stockpiles, etc. had been declared, it should carry out on-site inspections to ensure that the declarations which are made are accurate and comprehensive. Thus Consultative Committee experts would have to be allowed to analyse the agents, the concentration of the agents and the quantity of the agents kept in the stockpiles declared;

to assess the number of munitions declared; and then assess the capacity of the chemical munition filling facilities and the chemical warfare agent production facilities declared. The Consultative Committee should then compare the data collected from these on-site inspections with both the declarations of the State concerned and if appropriate with the estimates of that State's capability provided by other States parties.

(ii) The non-production of chemical weapons during the implementation period

The destruction of CW agent production facilities may not be completed until up to 10 years after the Convention enters into force. It will thus be necessary to ensure that none of these facilities are used in this period. To this end we consider it necessary that the Consultative Committee should seal up such facilities with tamper-proof locks within six months after the Convention enters into force. The Consultative Committee should therefore undertake regular on-site inspections at these facilities until they are dismantled or converted to check that the seals have not been broken.

(iii) The destruction, dismantling or conversion of stocks and production facilities

The United Kingdom considers it necessary that Consultative Committee experts should have on-site access during the destruction of chemical warfare agent stocks so that they can analyse the nature of the agent, its concentration, and the volume destroyed. Similarly, experts should be able to determine the quantity of munitions destroyed, and that the munitions are indeed those which the State said it was going to destroy. Finally, experts should have on-site access during the conversion and/or dismantling of production facilities to check that these facilities are properly converted so that they can no longer be used in the production of chemical weapons. The Consultative Committee would then monitor, during the period set for implementation, the estimated stocks and production facilities of each State party with the estimated stocks and production facilities destroyed, dismantled or converted.

12. Following the implementation period, the United Kingdom believes that the Consultative Committee should again play an important role, while the scope for confidence-building measures outside the Consultative Committee will also increase. The Committee should be responsible for the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. This would require regular on-site inspections to converted chemical production plants to ensure that they had not been reconverted to their original use. It would also require on-site inspections to those facilities

producing the lethal and toxic chemical agents permitted for research into defence and protection to ensure that only permissible amounts were being produced and that these amounts were being used for the stated purposes.

13. While it has been argued that to be certain of non-production, verification measures would have to be highly intrusive, we consider that it should be possible to establish a verification procedure capable of detecting any large-scale production which would be acceptable to all States parties. This could be by a combination of near-site and on-site inspections; monitoring of consumption of raw material against declared chemical production; and national verification measures to detect stockpiles and production facilities. By monitoring the consumption of raw materials and the production of final products at selected chemical factories, the Consultative Committee might be able to spot any large-scale syphoning of potential chemical warfare agents into military stockpiles. Similarly, national verification measures should be able to spot large-scale military stockpiles. Regular near-site inspections in the vicinity of selected chemical factories producing dual-purpose agents for peaceful purposes would allow the Consultative Committee to analyse the air, water and soil around the factory, without intruding into the factory premises, and thereby gain an idea of what the factory is producing. However, none of these measures could adequately replace on-site inspections - i.e. Consultative Committee officials being allowed inside the factory to observe for themselves that no forbidden chemical warfare agent production was taking place. These could be undertaken on challenge, or, preferably, regularly on the basis of a random selection by the Consultative Committee of a certain number of factories to be visited each year. In the latter case the option to ask for an on-site inspection on challenge would also be retained as part of the complaints procedure.

14. Confidence in compliance will of course be greatly enhanced if States are prompt in responding to requests for information or visits, and if States can arrange additional verification measures on a bilateral or regional basis. As confidence in the effectiveness of a Convention grows, so States will be more willing to take part in confidence-building measures.

Complaints procedure

15. The United Kingdom believes that all States party should undertake to consult each other and to co-operate in solving any problems that may arise in relation to the implementation of the provisions of the Convention. This should be a firm commitment. We believe that States should be obliged to provide evidence if their compliance is challenged by another State party. However, we should hope

that the need to remind States of that obligation, or even the need to question any State's compliance, will never arise. Our hope is that any problem that does arise should be settled amicably at a bilateral level and we consider that the compliance procedure should allow for this.

16. If, however, a problem cannot be solved at the bilateral level, any State party should be able to call a meeting of the Consultative Committee to consider the problem, and to ascertain the facts. The complainant should support his complaint with evidence concerning the alleged breach or misunderstanding. As already stated the challenged State should be obliged to provide evidence in its defence. However, we believe that the complaints procedure should protect States party against unfounded allegations. Therefore, although States with nothing to hide should have no worries about on-site inspections, we believe that, if the Consultative Committee overwhelmingly decide that the complaint is completely unfounded, the challenged State should not be obliged to allow an on-site inspection. On the other hand, if the Consultative Committee is dissatisfied with the explanations proffered by the challenged State, and the latter is not prepared to allow on-site inspections, even after a further request, it would be appropriate for the complainants or the Consultative Committee to present their case to the United Nations Security Council for its consideration.

Conclusions

17. To summarize, the United Kingdom believes that any CW convention must be adequately verifiable. This will require the establishment of a Consultative Committee whose role will be to ensure the full and proper implementation of the Convention, and thereafter to monitor continued compliance. The Committee would also be responsible for establishing an effective complaints procedure. The elaboration of such a system will require more detailed examination once agreement in principle has been reached.

18. In order to aid the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in their consideration of these proposals, we set out below United Kingdom views on verification and monitoring compliance in the form of a set of draft elements for a convention.

DRAFT ELEMENTS OF VERIFICATION AND MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE
FOR A CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

I

Destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to:

- (a) destroy or divert for permitted purposes its stocks of chemical weapons;
- (b) destroy or dismantle its means of production of chemical weapons.

Means of production of chemical weapons may be converted temporarily, before final destruction or dismantling, for the purpose of destroying stocks of such weapons.

The destruction, diversion and dismantling stipulated in this element shall be completed within ten years after the Convention has entered into force or a State Party, which has to fulfil these provisions, has adhered to it.

Matters concerning procedures, including notifications, in connection with what is stipulated in this element are set forth in Annex I.

II

Verification

1. Each State Party to this Convention may use national means of verification at its disposal, including national technical means, for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of and continued compliance with the provisions of this Convention, in as far as it would be consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. A Consultative Committee of Experts, as provided for in Element V, shall be responsible for monitoring the implementation of and continued compliance with the provisions of this Convention on behalf of the international community, and shall be authorized to conduct inspections, including on-site inspections, in order to fulfil its responsibilities.
3. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to impede, including through the use of deliberate concealment measures, either the national technical means of verification of other States Parties, operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this element, or the work of the Consultative Committee of Experts.

III

Consultation and Co-operation

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate

international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. These international procedures include the services of appropriate international organizations, as well as a Consultative Committee of Experts, as provided for in Element V.

IV

Complaints Procedure

1. Any State Party to this Convention which believes that any other State Party is acting in breach of the obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention, and is not satisfied with the results of the consultations provided for under Element III, may lodge a complaint with the Consultative Committee of Experts, as provided for in Element V. Such a complaint should where possible include any supporting evidence as well as a request for its consideration by the Committee. Such a request may include a request for an on-site inspection, as set out in Annex II sub-paragraph 4.
2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Consultative Committee may initiate, in accordance with its procedures as set out in Annex II on the basis of the complaint received by the Committee. The Committee should inform States Parties to the Convention of the results of the Investigation.
3. If a State Party receiving a request for on-site inspection from the Committee states that it is not prepared to allow an on-site inspection, it shall substantiate its decision. If the Committee still considers that an on-site inspection is warranted it may request additional information or a reconsideration of the decision in the light of additional relevant information that either party has provided. If the Requesting Party or the Committee remains unsatisfied with the substantiation for the decision it may bring the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations.

V

Consultative Committee

1. For the purpose of providing a permanent body to ensure the availability of international data and expert advice for assessing the implementation of and continued compliance with the provisions of this Convention a Consultative Committee of Experts shall be established at the entry into force of this Convention.
2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate with the Committee in carrying out its tasks.
3. The work of the Committee shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform the functions set forth in Annex II in an effective, fair and impartial manner.
4. The functions, organization and procedures of the Committee are set forth in Annex II.

Annex I

Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted
purposes of declared stocks of Chemical Weapons and
their means of production

1. Preparation for the destruction or diversion for permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons shall start immediately after the entry into force of the Convention. So-called mothballing of means of production of chemical weapons shall be undertaken immediately upon entering into force of the Convention and remain until their destruction or dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes begins.
2. The provisions given in Element I shall be performed in a manner allowing their verification through national and international means of verification.
3. The progress of destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons and of destruction, dismantling or conversion of their means of production shall be notified on a yearly basis to the Depositary until the State Party declares the final abolition of its stocks and means of production. The Depositary shall distribute such notification to the other States Parties to the Convention within one week after having received it.

Annex II

Consultative Committee of Experts

1. The Consultative Committee of Experts shall be composed of the Depositary or his personal representative, who shall serve as President of the Committee, and representatives of the States Parties. Each State Party to this Convention may appoint one representative to the Committee who may be assisted by one or more advisers.
2. The Consultative Committee of Experts shall be competent to:
 - (a) check the content of declarations made by States Parties [in compliance with Element on "Declarations" to be agreed]
 - (b) oversee the destruction and diversion for permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons, as well as the destruction, dismantling and temporary conversion of means of production of chemical weapons [as stipulated in Element I]
 - (c) inquire into facts concerning alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention;
 - (d) check periodically permitted production of chemicals with respect to amounts produced and their use;
 - (e) facilitate compliance with the Convention, e.g. by developing international standardization of methods and routines to be applied by national and international verification organs;
 - (f) make appropriate findings of fact and provide expert views relevant to other problems raised pursuant to the provisions of the Convention by a State Party.
3. Each representative shall have the right, through the Chairman, to request from States Parties, and from international organizations, such information and assistance as the representative considers desirable for the accomplishment of the Committee's work.
4. The Committee shall be allowed to undertake on-site inspections:
 - (a) in order to confirm received information concerning planned, on-going or effected measures according to subparagraphs 2 (a) and (b) of this Annex;
 - (b) in order to inquire into facts concerning alleged ambiguities or violations according to subparagraph 2 (c) of this Annex;
 - (c) in order to carry out checks according to subparagraph 2 (d) of this Annex.
5. The Committee shall decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work, where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present, and voting. There shall be no voting on matters of substance. If the Committee is unable to provide for a unanimous report on these findings of fact or in giving expert views, it shall present the different views of the experts involved.

6. The full Committee shall convene at least once a year, or otherwise immediately upon receipt of a request from any State Party to this Convention. The Committee shall present an annual report of its activities to the States Parties to the Convention. The Committee shall further, whenever it has been requested by a State Party to carry out fact-finding or provide expert views concerning a specific question, transmit to the Depositary a summary of its findings or expert views, incorporating all views and information presented to the Committee during its proceedings. The Depositary shall distribute the summary to all States Parties.

7. The Committee may, for specific tasks, set up sub-committees and verification teams which may continue their work between meetings of the full Committee. The Committee, and all bodies established by it, shall be provided with, or have access to special facilities, such as secretariat technical experts, chemical and toxicological laboratories and remote sensing equipment. The expenses of the Committee will be borne by the United Nations and the States Parties in such manner as will be decided by the General Assembly in consultation with the States Parties.

Bulgaria, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Mongolia,
Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and Czechoslovakia

Working paper on the agenda item entitled
"Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament"

General provisions

The solving of the problem of disarmament is a matter of world-historic significance: disarmament is called upon to play a decisive role in preventing war and affording genuine security to peoples.

Under present-day conditions disarmament, which is a material guarantee of international security, must represent the main trend of the combined efforts of all States to overcome international tension and construct a universal and enduring peace. Arms limitation and disarmament open the way towards a solution of humanity's global problems.

During the 1960s and 1970s certain positive results were achieved in the field of arms limitation. International agreements were concluded on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof; the prohibition of bacteriological weapons; the prohibition of the military use of environmental modification techniques; agreements were reached on the limitation of strategic arms; certain confidence-building measures in Europe began to be put into effect. A system of negotiations on disarmament matters was established on a multilateral and a bilateral basis. All this demonstrates that real measures in the field of arms limitation are possible and practicable. What was done provided a foundation for further steps in the direction of arms limitation and disarmament.

The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament adopted a set of tasks and measures, agreed by all States Members of the United Nations, aimed at the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. These tasks and measures have lost none of their urgency today.

However, at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s the arms build-up gathered new momentum. The stepping-up of the arms race is accompanied by the advancement of doctrines proclaiming the "admissibility" and "acceptability" of nuclear war and justifying the race for military supremacy. War hysteria is being whipped up, hostility and hatred in relations between States and peoples are being fanned. These actions have led to the interruption of many negotiations in the most important areas of arms limitation.

The arms build-up poses a mortal danger to civilization and threatens to create a deadlock in efforts aimed at solving vitally important international problems in the sphere of economics, social development, culture, public health and the preservation of the environment.

The task of limiting the scale of the arms race and of curbing the arms race has assumed a particularly urgent nature at the present time also because the instruments of war are undergoing profound change. Qualitatively new types and systems of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, are being developed, and this may make the monitoring of such weapons and, consequently, their agreed limitation and prohibition more difficult or even impossible. The development of military technology is constantly exercising a destabilizing effect on the world situation and intensifying the danger of war.

The arms race can and must be halted.

The execution of this task calls for the development and application of a programme of urgent and radical steps which would not only check the arms race in some of its areas but would also pave the way towards the main objective, that of general and complete disarmament.

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament represents an agreed set of measures aimed at halting the arms race and at the stage-by-stage implementation of real disarmament within established time-limits. The decision concerning the elaboration of such a Programme adopted at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is an expression of the desire of peoples to put an end to the arms race.

Objectives of the Programme. The Programme's immediate objectives are the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and the implementation of urgent measures that would halt the arms race and pave the way towards enduring peace. The ultimate objective is the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The implementation of measures envisaged in the Programme should help to strengthen both international security and the security of individual States. Genuine security can be guaranteed only through arms limitation, reduction and elimination — through disarmament.

One of the Programme's important objectives must consist of consolidating and developing all the positive results achieved thus far in the field of checking the arms race.

The application of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should contribute towards the preservation and intensification of the process of relaxation of international tension and help to strengthen the basis for the peaceful coexistence of States with different social structures and the development of confidence and co-operation between them.

Principles. All the States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their adherence to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation to abide strictly by the principles of the Charter in the process of elaboration and implementation of measures relating to arms limitation and disarmament, and, inter alia, to take into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Negotiations must be directed primarily towards limiting and halting the quantitative growth and qualitative improvement of arms, and in particular of weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new means of warfare, so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used exclusively for peaceful ends. There is no type of weapons that could not be prohibited and abolished on a mutually agreed basis.

All States are in duty bound to assist efforts in the disarmament field. This applies first and foremost to the nuclear-weapon States and other States of major military importance. The existing balance in the sphere of nuclear strength must remain undisturbed at all stages, with a constant lowering of nuclear strength levels.

Side by side with the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, reductions must be carried out in the field of conventional arms. States which possess the most important military arsenals bear a special responsibility in this process.

The adoption of measures in the disarmament field must take place on a just and balanced basis so as to guarantee the right of every State to security and to ensure that no one State or group of States may acquire superiority over other States at any stage of implementation of the Programme. At each stage the objective should be the non-impairment of security at the lowest possible level of arms and armed forces.

The principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.

The process of arms limitation and disarmament must be continuous.

States must refrain from actions which might exercise a negative effect on efforts in the disarmament field and must adopt a constructive approach in the interests of achieving agreement.

Specific measures

1. Nuclear weapons

(a) An undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

(b) Cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed, and the immediate start, towards those ends, of appropriate negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. As stated in proposals submitted previously by the socialist countries, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons should cover the cessation of manufacture of means of delivery and fissionable materials for the purposes of weapon development; as a first step, a discussion should be held concerning the possible stages of nuclear disarmament and the approximate contents of those stages, particularly that of the first stage; measures within that stage should include the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and new systems of nuclear weapons; parallel with the above, measures should be taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

(c) Further limitation and reduction of strategic arms in the quantitative and the qualitative sense.

(d) Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

(e) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

(f) Adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

(g) The conclusion of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear weapon States, and, as a first step, the issuance by nuclear-weapon Powers of declarations of similar contents undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no such weapons on their territories, with approval of such declarations by the Security Council.

(h) Conclusion of a treaty on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present; the renunciation by nuclear weapon States of further actions related to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of other States.

(i) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

2. Chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction

(a) Renunciation of the manufacture and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons and also of the stationing of chemical weapons in countries where there are none at present.

(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

(c) The conclusion of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and also of agreements concerning particular new types or systems of such weapons. As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, as already proposed by the socialist States, the permanent members of the Security Council and other States of military importance should make similar declarations of renunciation of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; those declarations would be approved by a decision of the Security Council.

(d) Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

3. Prevention of the spread of the arms race to new areas of space being conquered by man

(a) Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition on the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

(b) Further measures designed to prevent the transformation of outer space into a sphere of military confrontation.

(c) Further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

(d) Further measures for the prevention of military or any other hostile use of means of environmental modification techniques.

4. Armed forces and conventional weapons

(a) Renunciation by the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements of increasing their armed forces and conventional weapons as a first step towards the eventual limitation of armed forces and conventional weapons.

(b) Reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons.

(c) Restriction of sales and deliveries of conventional weapons.

(d) Further measures related to the limitation or prohibition of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

5. Regional measures

(a) The extension of the confidence-building measures in the military field contained in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the achievement of agreement on new confidence-building and disarmament measures. The convening, to those ends, of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe.

(b) Mutual reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe and also on a regional basis in other parts of the world.

(c) An undertaking not to enlarge existing or to establish new military and political groupings.

(d) The ending of the division of Europe into military and political alliances and, as a first step, the abolition of the military organizations of both groupings, starting with mutual reduction of military activities.

(e) Conclusion among all States participants in the European Conference of a treaty all parties to which would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another.

(f) Limitation and reduction of the level of military presence and military activity in particular regions — the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the region of the Persian Gulf.

(g) The transformation of the Mediterranean Sea area into a zone of stable peace and co-operation; the extension to that area of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory.

(h) Limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean; establishment of a zone of peace in that region.

(i) Development of confidence-building measures in the Far East and the holding of negotiations to that end among all interested countries.

(j) Conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

(k) The establishment of a zone of peace and stability in South-East Asia.

(l) Withdrawal of armed forces from foreign territory and abolition of foreign military bases.

6. Related and other measures

(a) Conclusion of a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations.

(b) Further measures relating to the prevention of unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

(c) Measures relating to the prevention of a possibility of sudden attack.

(d) Adherence to existing international agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament by all States which are not yet parties to those agreements.

7. Limitation of military expenditure

(a) Limitation in both absolute and percentage terms of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States.

(b) As a first step towards the implementation of that measure, the freezing of military budgets.

Disarmament and other global problems

Arms limitation and disarmament form a global problem of the first importance. The application of measures in that field is the key to guaranteeing international security, an important condition for the economic and social development of all States and an essential prerequisite for solving the problem of the protection and preservation of the environment and other global problems.

A close relationship exists between disarmament and development. Disarmament can and should make an effective contribution to economic and social development on a just and democratic basis and to the establishment of a new international economic order, inter alia by switching resources from military purposes to purposes of development, particularly of the developing countries.

Funds released as a result of the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction of their stockpiles should not be used under other expenditure headings of the military budgets of nuclear weapon States.

The allocation of funds set aside for the benefit of developing countries should be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the aid-receiving countries, and without any discrimination. A special committee could be set up for the allocation of such funds.

Time-limits and procedures for the implementation of the Programme.

Bearing in mind the urgency of the problems it covers, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be implemented within the shortest possible time. It is the duty of each Government to manifest the political will needed in order to fulfil this historic task.

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be implemented by stages in such a way as to ensure with the greatest degree of efficiency the immediate reduction and ultimate removal of the threat of war, a steady reduction of the level of confrontation, and the consistent limitation and reduction of nuclear, conventional and any other weapons until they are completely eliminated.

Within each stage, parallel action may be taken in different areas of arms limitation and disarmament: on partial and comprehensive measures in a particular arms field; in respect of qualitative and quantitative parameters of weapons and armed forces; on a global scale and at regional level; confidence-building measures in the military sphere and steps aimed at strengthening the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

Priority attention should be devoted to measures aimed at averting the threat of nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race. To this end it is essential as soon as possible to resume the interrupted negotiations on arms limitation and to intensify the negotiations in progress with a view to completing them by achieving appropriate agreements. At the same time it is necessary to embark upon the solution of other urgent problems so as to achieve a breakthrough in halting the arms race and to make a start on the process of genuine disarmament. The fact that, for one reason or another, negotiations in progress on one set of questions have not been completed cannot serve as a basis for postponing negotiations on other questions.

Monitoring of arms limitation and disarmament

Agreements on arms limitation and disarmament should provide for adequate reliable monitoring of their implementation so as to ensure compliance with the agreements by all parties. The forms and conditions of monitoring depend on the purposes, scope and nature of the specific agreement. Questions relating to monitoring should be considered and decided upon simultaneously and in a manner organically linked with the consideration of specific disarmament problems rather than separately from them.

Accumulated experience shows that national technical means form a reliable basis for monitoring compliance with agreements. Where necessary, different methods of verification and other monitoring procedures, including international ones, should be combined on a voluntary basis. The strengthening of confidence would assist the application of additional monitoring measures.

A most important precondition for the application of specific agreed measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament is the political will of Governments; references to technical difficulties of monitoring should not be used as a pretext for refusing to reach agreement on measures for halting the arms race.

Mechanisms and procedures

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should serve as an incentive for the broad development of constructive collective efforts in that field on the basis of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament and for the resumption and intensive continuation of negotiations which were conducted over the last few years and have now been interrupted. It is essential to make more active use of all existing negotiating channels, both multilateral and bilateral. Efforts should be made to improve the efficiency of work of the unique multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament, in particular by further improving the organization of its work.

The convening of a world conference on disarmament - an international forum with the widest participation by States - would have exceptional significance for the adoption of effective measures towards halting the arms race.

The United Nations, which bears prime responsibility and plays one of the central roles in the disarmament field, should encourage all measures in that sphere. It is important that the United Nations should be periodically informed about the results of negotiations and about compliance with the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, including all efforts in the disarmament field outside the scope of its competence, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

Conferences for the review of the operation of agreements play a substantial role in maintaining the viability and efficiency of fulfilment of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. Taking account of useful experience in that respect, it is advisable to provide for a possibility of periodic review of the progress of implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament may be convened, as required.

Participation of world public opinion in efforts to achieve disarmament

World public opinion is called upon to play an important role in the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The United Nations should promote public awareness of the danger of the arms race and all its consequences.

It is important to show the disastrous consequences for mankind to which a nuclear war would lead. To that end, an authoritative international committee should be set up which would demonstrate the necessity of averting a nuclear catastrophe. The holding of a world disarmament campaign, the collection of signatures in support of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, and the implementation of the principles of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace would also be of great significance in this respect. All Governments should take steps to prohibit war propaganda in any form.

While meeting the vital needs of the present day, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is at the same time turned towards the future. The present generation must not only ensure a peaceful life during the remaining decades of our century but must also guarantee the entry of mankind into the third millennium under conditions of peace and universal security.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/246

24 February 1982

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF DENMARK ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

I have the honour, upon instruction from my Government, to ask Your Excellency, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament regarding participation by States not members of the Committee to make due arrangements to allow the Danish delegation to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament at its 1982 session on all substantive items on the Committee's agenda, in plenary and informal meetings, in working groups and in other subsidiary bodies which may be established.

(Signed) Kaj Repsdorph
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Denmark

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/247

24 February 1982

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 NOVEMBER 1981 FROM THE MINISTER COUNSELLOR OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FINLAND ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE
RULES OF PROCEDURE

Upon instructions from my Government and in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedures of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the participation of the States not members of the Committee I have the honour to inform you that Finland wishes to take part, during its sessions in 1982, in the work on all substantive items on the Committee's agenda, in plenary and informal meetings, in the working groups and in other subsidiary bodies which may be established for the consideration of those items.

I would be grateful if you could bring this request to the attention of the members of the Committee on Disarmament so that the Committee may be in a position to take a decision at its earliest convenience.

(Signed) Paavo Keisalo
Minister Counsellor

GE.82-60709

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/248

24 February 1982

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING
RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

I have the honour to refer to the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament regarding participation by non-members and request that Norway through its Permanent Mission in Geneva be allowed to participate in the work of the Committee during its 1982 session as regards all substantive items on its agenda. This applies to plenary as well as informal meetings, working groups and other subsidiary bodies which may be established.

(Signed) Johan Cappelen
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.82-60715

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/249
24 February 1982
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 DECEMBER 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
AUSTRIA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

I have the honour, upon instruction from my Government, to inform you that Austria wishes to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1982 session, in accordance with paragraphs 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedures of the Committee on Disarmament.

Austria wishes to participate in the work of all the substantive items of the Committee's Agenda, in plenary and informal meetings, and in subsidiary bodies which may be established for the consideration of these items.

I have the honour to ask your Excellency to transmit this request to the Committee on Disarmament.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Erik NETTEL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.82-60721

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/250
24 February 1982
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 15 JANUARY 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
TURKEY ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you that Turkey wishes to participate, in accordance with rules 33-35 of the Committee's rules of procedure, in the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1982 session.

The Government of Turkey is interested in all the substantive questions on the Committee's agenda. I should therefore be grateful if you would make the necessary arrangements for the Turkish delegation to take part in plenary and informal meetings devoted to these questions and also in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The question of the possible participation of the Turkish delegation in the work of other subsidiary bodies will be decided later, after these bodies have been set up, and, if necessary, a request in that connection will be sent to you at that time.

(Signed) Kamran INAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.82-60727

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/251

24 February 1982

ENGLISH

Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
SPAIN ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that this Permanent Mission - as it did in 1980 and 1981 and in accordance with section IX of the rules of procedure - wishes to appoint a delegation through which Spain would participate, as a non-member country, in plenary meetings of the Committee on Disarmament (rule 32) as well as in meetings of its subsidiary bodies and any informal meeting which may be held in the course of the year, as provided for in rules 33 to 36 of the rules of procedure.

The delegation attending these meetings will consist of myself;
Mr. José Ignacio Navarro Figueroa, Minister-Counsellor; Mrs. María Rosa Boceta,
Counsellor; and any other person who may be designated in the light of the subjects
to be discussed.

(Signed) Enrique DOMINGUEZ PASSIER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/252
24 February 1982
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
TUNISIA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

Further to my letter No. 011 of 14 January 1982 relating to my country's request to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament (first part of the 1982 session), I have the honour to inform you that the Tunisian Government is interested in all the items included in the Committee's agenda and would therefore like the Tunisian delegation to be able to participate in the plenary meetings and the informal meetings devoted to the consideration of those items.

Tunisia will take a decision at a later stage regarding its possible participation in the work of a particular subsidiary body of the Committee, more especially the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

(Signed) Fouad MEBAZLI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/253

25 February 1982

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 23 FEBRUARY 1982 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A TASS STATEMENT OF 19 FEBRUARY 1982

I am sending you herewith a TASS statement of 19 February 1982.

I would ask you kindly to have it circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament under item 4 of the agenda.

(Signed) V.I. ISSRAELYAN
Representative of the USSR
in the Committee on Disarmament

GE.82-60773

TASS STATEMENT

The Government of the United States is going still further along the dangerous path of building up arsenals of weapons of mass destruction of diverse kinds.

In August last year there was the announcement in Washington of the initiation of large-scale production of neutron warheads - a particularly inhuman variety of nuclear weapon, the very thought of the possible use of which provokes feelings of indignation among all peace-loving people.

Thereafter, in October 1981, the Government of the United States announced a comprehensive plan, unprecedented in scope, for the development of the strategic nuclear arms of the United States, including the production and deployment of a new generation of land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, heavy bombers and long-range cruise missiles.

And now, just recently, President Reagan proclaimed a multi-billion-dollar programme for the "chemical rearmament" of the United States. The American Government, it seems, now finds that the huge reserves of poisonous chemical agents - another monstrous means for the mass extermination of people - which the United States already has at its disposal are not enough. It is now planned to equip the American armed forces with several millions of warheads filled with a new and even more lethal nerve-paralysing mixture (the so-called binary charges).

The decision to embark on the stepped-up production of chemical warfare agents clearly reveals why the United States has for many years so adamantly resisted the conclusion of an international convention which would prohibit chemical weapons.

It is now clear to everyone that Washington refused to continue the negotiations with the Soviet Union which were being held earlier on this subject because it was afraid that the prospect which had arisen in the course of the negotiations of the attainment of agreement on that score might hinder the execution of the plan for the "chemical rearmament" of the United States, which was evidently conceived a long time ago.

Nor, certainly, was it fortuitous - but in fact very significant - that the United States was the only one of the 157 States Members of the United Nations which voted against the adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution calling upon all States to refrain from the production and deployment of new types of chemical weapons and from stationing them on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

It is patent that it was in an attempt to prepare world public opinion for the announcement of its decision to embark on the large-scale production of new chemical weapons, and in an endeavour somehow to justify that decision, that Washington had earlier resorted to its favourite trick of making slanderous assertions - in this case that the Soviet Union was using or was preparing to use chemical warfare agents, either in Afghanistan or in the jungles of South-East Asia.

This is a flagrant lie, hardly capable of casting a slur upon the straightforward and consistent policy of the Soviet Union which, unlike the United States, was one of the first States to adhere to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has been and is in favour of the total outlawing of this criminal means of waging war and the destruction of all stocks of such weapons. And it has never and in no place used chemical warfare agents.

As far as the United States is concerned, the world has not forgotten that during the years of the American aggression in Indo-China, tens of thousands of tons of chemical agents were rained upon Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea, killing vast numbers of people and causing irreparable damage to the natural environment in that region. Nor is it a secret where the chemical agents being used against the peaceful population of Afghanistan by gangs of bandits came from - these agents were manufactured in the United States of America.

On a par with the barbarousness of these weapons, which Washington is now engaged in modernizing and accumulating, is the perfidy of the plans being nurtured there for their use.

The United States does not conceal the fact that in its scheme of things chemical warfare would be conducted in the densely populated areas of Europe and other continents. The same criminal purpose lies behind the plans under discussion in the United States to put the new chemical charges in cruise missiles, bombs and artillery shells, a large number of which it is intended to deploy in European countries as part of the United States' forward-based weapons.

Speaking in the United States Congress on 15 September 1981, the representative of the Pentagon openly admitted that the equipment of the American army with the new chemical warfare agents was intended to make it possible to wage a large-scale chemical war in Europe - just one more demonstration of the "Atlantic solidarity" of Washington with regard to its allies!

The plans now being hatched with cold-blooded cynicism for turning entire continents into gas chambers also show once again the real value of Washington's hypocritical babblings about "human rights".

It is the clear duty of all peoples, of all honest persons on the face of the earth, not to permit the accomplishment of this monstrous crime that is being plotted against peace and humanity.

An aggressor, whatever weapons he may use to unleash a war - nuclear, neutron, chemical or any other - will not escape retribution.

The reckless piling up of armaments, including chemical weapons, will bring no dividends to its initiators and will strengthen no one's security. International security can only be secured through negotiations, through a search for solutions aimed at the achievement of real measures of disarmament, including the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union decisively favours this course.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/254
2 March 1982
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 28 FEBRUARY 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF SWITZERLAND ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

On the instructions of my Government I have the honour to request that, in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the Committee's rules of procedure, Switzerland should be permitted to participate in plenary and informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament at its current session when the Committee discusses the question of chemical weapons, and that it should also be authorized to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group established on this topic.

(Signed) PICTET

Ambassador, Head of the
Permanent Mission of Switzerland

GROUP OF 21

Working Paper on the chapter entitled "Machinery and Procedures"
of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

1. In order to assure the most effective implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, two kinds of bodies will continue to be required in the field of disarmament - deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.
2. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. (Further provisions regarding the special role of the United Nations on the various aspects of the process of disarmament envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be elaborated subsequently, including the relationship between disarmament and development and its practical consequences.)
3. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures.
4. The First Committee of the General Assembly should continue to deal only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions. (Further possible provisions regarding the manner in which the First Committee should annually consider the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament may be elaborated subsequently.)
5. The Disarmament Commission shall continue to function as a subsidiary deliberative body of the General Assembly. The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly. (Further provisions regarding the specific responsibilities of the Disarmament Commission in relation to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and its procedures are to be elaborated subsequently.)
6. The Committee on Disarmament shall continue to be the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. (Further provisions relating to the Committee on Disarmament are to be elaborated subsequently.)
7. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.
8. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.
9. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it in the most effective manner, disarmament Secretariat of the United Nations shall be strengthened and developed in the light of the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/36/392). (Further provisions on this aspect are to be elaborated subsequently.)

10. (This chapter on Machinery and Procedures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should include provisions concerning the mobilization of public opinion to be elaborated taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 15, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 and 129 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and the fact that, pursuant to resolution 36/92 C, the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, is to take decisions with respect to the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign.)
11. As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. (Further provisions regarding studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations and on the possible role of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research are to be elaborated subsequently.)
12. (Provisions regarding the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies are to be elaborated subsequently.)
13. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened every five years at the end of each stage of the Programme to review its implementation. The first special session devoted to the review of the Programme's implementation shall be held in June/July 1987. Such special sessions of the General Assembly shall assess the implementation of the measures included in the stage under review. Should the assessment reveal that the full implementation of those measures has not been achieved, consideration would be given to the re-adjustments that need to be made and to the steps that are necessary to stimulate progress in the implementation of the Programme. In addition, the review shall also serve the purpose of elaborating in more concrete terms, the measures to be implemented in Stages II, III and IV of the Programme, taking into account the existing situation, including developments in science and technology. United Nations studies could make an important contribution to the task of elaborating the specific measures to be negotiated in the second and subsequent stages.
14. In addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out at the end of each stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there should be a continuous review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included in the agenda of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General, with the assistance of United Nations Disarmament Secretariat, should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.
15. During its annual review, or at its periodic special sessions to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, provide for further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme. In this connection, the proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will, inter alia, be taken into account. (Further relevant provisions related to this question may be elaborated subsequently.)

German Democratic Republic and Hungarian People's Republic

Working Paper

**NON-STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORIES OF
STATES WHERE THERE ARE NO SUCH WEAPONS AT PRESENT**

1. The German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic, like many other States, give high priority to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Both countries regard the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present as a special element of the process of curbing the nuclear arms race, reducing and eventually completely destroying the nuclear-weapon stockpiles.

This is a timely and urgent task. Already now many States have clearly expressed their intention not to allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories. At the same time there are plans to build up nuclear weapon arsenals on the territories of other States. The implementation of such plans would not only escalate the nuclear arms race, but also increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war being launched from the territory of countries where nuclear weapons are deployed. In general, the stationing of nuclear weapons on additional territories would have a negative impact on the international situation and further complicate disarmament negotiations. The dangerous implications provoked by such deployment plans are more and more recognized by the peoples of many non-nuclear weapon States demanding to cancel such plans.

It is the considered opinion of the German Democratic Republic and Hungary that the prevention of the further deployment of nuclear weapons would constitute a step to the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other countries. It would contribute to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons thus strengthening the non-proliferation regime, to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to an agreement of effective international assurances for non-nuclear weapon States. It could contribute to the prevention of the destabilization of the existing approximate strategic

balance of power in the nuclear field. International efforts to stop and reverse the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapon States would reduce the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Thus, a corresponding agreement would not only increase confidence among States but also serve the main goal of the United Nations Charter -- the strengthening of international peace and security.

2. Guided by these considerations the German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic were among the co-sponsors of corresponding United Nations General Assembly resolutions.

Resolution 33/91 F appealed to all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and all non-nuclear weapon States which do not have such weapons on their territories to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories. Resolution 34/87 C called upon all States to examine the possibilities of concluding an international agreement on this question and requested the United Nations Secretary-General to ascertain the views and proposals of States and to transmit them to the General Assembly. The opinions and suggestions of a significant number of States on the subject in the relevant report of the Secretary-General (A/35/45) clearly demonstrated the necessity and possibility of such an agreement and the wish to take practical steps to prevent the further stationing of nuclear weapons. In resolutions 35/96 C and 36/97 E the United Nations General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons. Furthermore resolution 36/97 E called upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further action involving the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States.

Despite of the consecutive resolutions of the General Assembly and despite of the efforts made by several delegations the Committee on Disarmament has been prevented so far from dealing with the question of non-stationing in an appropriate manner, not to mention the elaboration of a corresponding international agreement.

3. Under the present circumstances the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Hungary consider it even more urgent and important than before that the Committee on Disarmament take appropriate action. The aim should be an international agreement that would place obligations, on the one hand, on nuclear-weapon States not to station nuclear weapons on territories of countries where there are currently no such weapons and, on the other hand, on non-nuclear weapon States to refrain from measures which might result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories.

Hereby the German Democratic Republic and Hungary delegations proceed from the fact that it is up to the national authorities of non-nuclear weapon States to take a sovereign decision on whether to accept nuclear weapons on their territories or not. Concrete procedures for verification of compliance with a corresponding non-stationing agreement should be elaborated in the context of the negotiations on such an agreement. There is no justification for the argument that a non-stationing agreement could not be verified. Such an approach would put into doubt all efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones since a basic element of such zones is the obligation not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of the States concerned.

Concerning the elaboration of an appropriate draft agreement on non-stationing the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Hungary consider that the establishment of an ad hoc working group or any other subsidiary body in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament could serve the best this goal. At the same time both delegations are ready to take into consideration any proposal which may be submitted by other delegations in this regard.

The delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Hungary consider that such an action of the CD would be a valuable contribution to the implementation of the relevant resolution of the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly bearing in mind that the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly will put on its agenda the item entitled: "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present: report of the Committee on Disarmament."

SWEDEN

An International System for the Detection of Airborne Radioactivity
from Nuclear Explosions

Considerable progress has been made in recent years regarding techniques for detecting nuclear explosions. Impressive results have been reached in the field of seismic detection of underground explosions. The CD, through its Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, has elaborated a system for international exchange of seismic data, and developed methods for processing such data in order to assist States in detecting and identifying nuclear explosions.

Seismic methods primarily apply to underground tests. In other test environments additional techniques are required. For surveillance of the atmosphere in regard to nuclear explosions, the analysis of airborne radioactivity is a most important technique. The radioactive material released by an atmospheric nuclear explosion is dispersed in the atmosphere around the globe. This means that the fall-out, even from weak explosions, can be detected within two weeks in most of the places in the hemisphere in which the explosion takes place. Yet, this detection method has received relatively little international attention during the last two decades. The techniques for collecting and analysing radioactive substances are, however, well developed, and a number of stations all over the world are already monitoring the atmosphere. At least thirty countries operate altogether more than seventy such stations.

These stations are, however, unevenly distributed. Their main task today is to analyse airborne radioactivity for scientific and health physics purposes. These stations could be given additional functions to enable them to participate in an international system for detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions. For global coverage, between fifty and a hundred well distributed collecting stations would be required together with a number of national or international analysing centres. The cost involved is moderate. In Sweden, a collecting station costs some ten thousand dollars to establish and a national analysing centre about a million dollars.

The practical aspects of an international data exchange system for the detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions are similar to those of the data exchange already under consideration for seismic data.

The Swedish delegation is of the view that the matter of an international system for detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions should be discussed in an appropriate context under the auspices of the CD. Inter alia, the following two alternatives could be considered:

- the matter could be discussed in the already existing Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. In such a case the mandate of the group would have to be modified;

- an ad hoc meeting of experts could be convened to discuss an international system for the detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary,
Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Working paper

Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition
of chemical weapons

The delegations of the socialist countries to the Committee on Disarmament deem it necessary to draw attention to a number of circumstances that are seriously hindering the elaboration and approval of a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

What is involved here are well-known decisions concerning the production, commissioning and, ultimately, stationing on the territories of other countries of a new generation of chemical weapons — binary weapons. Whatever reasons and justifications may be adduced, it is an indisputable fact that the incorporation in arsenals of such weapons with binary charges inevitably leads to a further dangerous spiral in the chemical arms race.

As is well known, the basic difficulty in solving the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons stems from their particular nature: it is the difficulty of separating commercial chemicals from those which can be used for chemical weapons. The emergence of binary weapons will considerably complicate this already difficult problem.

Without claiming to give an exhaustive analysis of the negative consequences of embarking on the production of binary chemical weapons, the authors of this working paper would like to mention a number of important points of direct relevance to the negotiations in progress in the Committee with a view to the elaboration of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Existing information concerning binary weapons leads to the conclusion that the following consequences, in particular, are inevitable:

1. In the long term, the range of chemicals capable of being used as components in these weapons will expand considerably, with a corresponding expansion of the range of binary mixtures of varying effect (not merely paralysis of the nervous system). While, for example, the diversity of conventional

chemical munitions is limited by such factors as the stability of chemical agents during storage or the extent to which they attack the materials of which, in particular, the munition casing or other storage structures and facilities are composed, it does not seem that those factors will be of such fundamental importance in the case of binary weapons. This will allow the creation of mixtures with the widest imaginable range of effects.

2. It will become possible for many States, and not only States but also individual groups of persons, to produce, acquire and stockpile chemicals for new types of binary weapon. This means that there would be a significant increase in the danger of the proliferation of chemical weapons.

3. The positive results of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, both in the Committee on Disarmament and between the USSR and the United States of America will lose much of their value, in particular:

(a) Agreement was reached during the Soviet-United States negotiations on a provision concerning the scope of prohibition, reproduced in the joint Soviet-United States report to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/112 of 7 July 1980). This provision envisages the prohibition of all types of toxic lethal chemicals, including, of course, binary ones. The report speaks of the obligation "... never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain super-toxic lethal, other lethal or other harmful chemicals, or precursors of such chemicals", and the obligation "never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of chemicals released as a result of the employment of these munitions or devices, or equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices". These wordings thus include corresponding prohibitions in respect of binary weapons. The programme of production of binary weapons now envisaged in the United States may cancel out these positive results.

(b) The significance and effectiveness of the toxicity criteria of lethal chemicals agreed upon between the USSR and the United States (CD/112 of 7 July 1980) will be reduced.

4. The further progress of negotiations will face serious difficulties, in particular for the following reasons:

(a) It will be more difficult to ensure the implementation by States parties of obligations not to transfer the chemical weapons and other obligations related thereto, because separating chemicals for commercial purposes from those designed for weapons will become especially difficult, almost impossible;

(b) The question of the declaration by States of their stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of such weapons will become more complex because a definition will have to be provided of chemicals intended for commercial purposes which may be produced for binary weapons;

(c) Problems of monitoring the implementation of the convention will acquire a qualitatively new nature if binary weapons are produced;

Control itself, both national and especially international, will in many cases become extremely difficult, if not impossible; conditions may emerge for covert stockpiling and storage of chemicals for binary weapons purposes and for developing chemical weapons under the guise of commercial production.

The United Nations General Assembly, taking into consideration the full danger of the development, commissioning and, especially, proliferation of binary chemical weapons, called upon all States in resolution 36/96 B "to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons ... in those States where there are no such weapons at present".

In the present situation the delegations of the socialist countries consider the implementation of this appeal by the General Assembly to be a matter of prime importance.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary,
Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Working paper

Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition
of chemical weapons

CORRIGENDUM

On page 3, replace the penultimate paragraph by the following:

"The United Nations General Assembly, taking into consideration the full danger of the development, commissioning and, especially, proliferation of binary chemical weapons, called upon all States in resolution 36/96 B 'to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present'."

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Working Paper

Draft mandates for ad hoc working groups on a nuclear test ban,
and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic supports the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. To promote an early establishment of those ad hoc working groups the delegation proposes the following draft mandates:

1. "The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc Working Group of the Committee to negotiate on a Treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. The ad hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the end of its first as well as second parts of its 1982 session".
2. "The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session an ad hoc Working Group to elaborate on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the First SSOD on the stages of nuclear disarmament with the aim of preparing appropriate multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The ad hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the end of its first as well as second parts of its 1982 session".

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE
THIRTEENTH SESSION OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES
TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS

1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, initially established in pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976, held its thirteenth formal session from 1 to 12 March 1982 in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden. This was the fifth session of the Group convened under its new mandate by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 48th meeting on 7 August 1979.
2. The Ad Hoc Group continues to be open to all Member States of the Committee on Disarmament as well as upon request to non-Member States. Accordingly, scientific experts and representatives of the following Member States of the Committee on Disarmament participated in the session: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Netherlands, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.
3. At their request and on the basis of previous invitation by the Committee on Disarmament, scientific experts from the following non-Member States of the Committee on Disarmament participated in the session: Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Norway.
4. A representative of the World Meteorological Organization also attended the session.
5. Under the current mandate of the Ad Hoc Group, information on national investigations related to the work of the Group has been presented by experts from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America.
6. During its tenth session, the Ad Hoc Group agreed to establish five study groups in order to achieve an appropriate compilation, summarization and assessment of the experience acquired through national investigations and co-operative studies in areas relevant to its work. These open-ended study groups each deal with a specific issue, and are each headed by a convenor and a co-convenor, as follows:

*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

- (1) Seismological stations and station networks:
Dr. Basham (Canada), Dr. Schneider (German Democratic Republic)
- (2) Data to be regularly exchanged (Level I data):
Dr. Harjes (Federal Republic of Germany), Dr. Waniek (Czechoslovakia)
- (3) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level I data through WMO/GTS:
Dr. McGregor (Australia), Dr. Ichikawa (Japan)
- (4) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level II data:
Dr. Husebye (Norway), Dr. Christoskov (Bulgaria)
- (5) Procedures to be used at international data centres:
Dr. Dahlman (Sweden), Dr. Alewine (United States of America)

7. The Ad Hoc Group discussed national investigations presented by the conveners and made recommendations for the further pursuance of this work.

8. The national investigations so far considered were seen as relevant to the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system and to the further elaboration of an experimental test of that system.

9. The Group, in particular, considered the foreseen Third Report which is to be about recent developments in seismology and improvements in associated techniques to the extent that they are relevant to the envisaged international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events, as described in CCD/558 and CD/43. The Group has observed that certain such developments are rapid and their results can turn out to be useful for the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system and for the further elaboration of an experimental test of this system.

10. In order to assist the Committee on Disarmament in reporting to the second special session on disarmament the Group prepared the appended overview summary of its work up to March 1982.

11. The Ad Hoc Group also discussed the schedule for its further work. It considered that in the light of the time needed for national investigations and co-operative studies and for the reliable assessment of their results, it should envisage the submission of a full formal report, in compliance with its present mandate, during the second part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament or later. The Ad Hoc Group suggested that the next session, subject to approval by the Committee on Disarmament, should be convened from 9-20 August 1982, in Geneva.

OVERVIEW SUMMARY

OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS UP TO MARCH 1982 OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF
SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE
MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS

1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, so as to facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, was established in 1976 by the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and has later been maintained by the Committee on Disarmament (CD). Government appointed experts from 34 States and a representative from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) have participated in the work. 1/
2. In its consensus reports CCD/558 of 14 March 1978 and CD/43 of 25 July 1979 the Ad Hoc Group described how seismological science could be applied, in international co-operation, for a global exchange of seismological data, so as to assist States in their national monitoring of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.
3. The proposed global system has three main elements:
 - (a) a network of more than fifty existing or planned seismological stations around the globe, with improved equipment and upgraded procedures for the extraction of data;
 - (b) an international exchange of these data over the Global Telecommunications System (GTS) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO);
 - (c) processing of the data at special international data centres for the use of participant States.
4. The Ad Hoc Group has considered several theoretical models of possible future networks as envisaged in CCD/558. In the model with the most effective equipment the network was estimated to be able to detect, with 90 per cent probability, events of body wave magnitude four or greater in the northern hemisphere and body wave magnitude four point three or greater in the southern hemisphere. In their reports the Ad Hoc Group observed the importance of increasing the number of sensitive observatories in the southern hemisphere and of providing observatories generally with equipment for digital recording. The Group did not study the verification capability of the system, as this was considered to be outside its terms of reference.
5. The data to be reported from each station or observatory would be in standard form and on two levels:

1/ Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China (participating as observers), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Level 1 with the routine reporting, with minimum delay, of basic parameters of detected seismic signals and

Level 2 with detailed records of wave forms provided in response to requests for additional information.

Compared to current seismological practice, increased emphasis would be laid on parameters relevant to event identification and generally strict operational requirements would be set forth as to scope, consistency, reliability and promptness in the reporting. Where applicable, internationally agreed scientific practices would be followed.

The Ad Hoc Group specified in detail the parameters to be extracted from the measurements at the observatories. Primarily the parameters would be measured manually but the Group considered the possibilities of computer automated parameter extraction, which would very much ease the burden of work at observatories.

The Group did also report on the format for records to be exchanged on Level 2 and the record specifications necessary to go with them.

6. As regards the initial promptness of the envisaged data exchange, the Ad Hoc Group considered that realistic goals are a maximum delay of three to five days in the reporting and processing of Level 1 data and a maximum of four to six weeks for obtaining Level 2 data.

7. For the global exchange of Level 1 data on the basic parameters of the observations, the Ad Hoc Group proposed the use of the Global Telecommunications System (GTS) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), because of its global availability, proven operation and capacity. The GSE has obtained a preliminary acceptance by the 8th Congress of the WMO of its proposal and has also had the benefit of close co-operation with WMO officials in working out details. The capacity of the WMO/GTS would accommodate the additional traffic envisaged. Hours of low meteorological traffic could be employed for the seismic data exchange. However, on low speed GTS circuits in certain areas of South America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific difficulties are foreseen at days of seismological peak load. The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation that WMO has initiated the necessary actions to upgrade these low speed circuits. The Group also made a detailed study of the format to be used for such a use of the GTS and recommended a version of the International Seismic Code already in use for scientific transmissions over the WMO/GTS.

8. The formats and procedures at present available for exchange of Level 2 data with complete records were studied. They range widely, from mail delivery of seismograms or of magnetic tapes, over facsimile transmissions of graphical recordings to fast transmission of large amounts of numerical data over special telecommunication data links. The WMO/GTS does not have the capacity for exchange on Level 2 as complete records contain too much data. Therefore other and ad hoc arrangements must be made for the exchange of Level 2 data according to the facilities available in each case.

9. The purpose of the proposed data centres would be to provide States with easily accessible data on seismic events for national assessments. In particular, the Ad Hoc Group proposed that several international data centres for the collection,

processing and dissemination of seismic data should be established, in order to achieve a reliability acceptable to all. In connection with the use of the WMO/GTS for data exchange it would be desirable to locate such data centres near main WMO communications centres, such as those in Moscow (USSR) and Washington D.C. (USA). The data centres would

- (a) receive Level 1 and Level 2 data from the global network of seismic stations via the authorized Government facility of each participating State;
- (b) apply agreed analysis procedures to available data for the estimation of origin time, location, depth and magnitude of seismic events;
- (c) associate reported identification parameters with these events;
- (d) distribute, in accordance with defined procedures and without interpretation of identification parameters, compilations of the complete results of these analyses;
- (e) act as archives for reported data and results of analyses of these data;
- (f) ask for and forward Level 2 data, if requested.

The centres would have equivalent hardware and software and would perform equivalent processing of all Level 1 data. Processing would be largely automatic, with some interaction from a seismologist. The Ad Hoc Group has worked out and reported on detailed technical procedures for phase association, event location, depth estimation and magnitude calculations. The results of the calculations would be reported to States either through the WMO/GTS or by other arrangements. The data centres would issue preliminary bulletins as soon as available data allow an event to be located. Final, detailed results should be distributed within a week of occurrence of the event. The data centres would also establish data banks, for the Level 1 data reported to it, for the event analyses given in bulletins, for signals without associated events and for complete records of requested Level 2 data.

10. After giving the **consensus reports** WCD/558 and CD/43, which were accepted by States participating in the Ad Hoc Group, the Group has devoted itself to the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the proposed global exchange of seismological data, and also to the consideration of an experimental test of the whole global system. This work has taken the form of review and analysis of a number of national investigations into relevant matters, some of them of considerable impact and volume. A variety of scientific methods for the analysis of data have been studied and developed, the conditions for reliable data exchange through the WMO/GTS have been studied in two global experiments, the last one engaging twenty participating States. The results of the second experiment need additional investigations. The details of operating data centres have been investigated in depth and experimentally tested. In particular the impact of the very quick development of computer and telecommunication technology available to research institutes and others has made itself felt, suggesting that the efficiency of the envisaged global exchange system could in principle be greatly increased by the adoption of these new methods. The extent of scientific consensus in the Group about these new developments has, however, not yet been established. Therefore suggestions from the Group about how the original proposal about a global system for international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events might be improved in the light of recent scientific and technological progress, would have to await some further work by the Ad Hoc Group.

HUNGARY

Working Paper

PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND NEW SYSTEMS OF SUCH WEAPONS

1. The Committee on Disarmament has been dealing with the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons ever since 1976, following the submission of documents CCD/511 and CCD/514. A substantive summary of the discussions and exchanges of views is contained in document CD/35 of 10 July 1979. The proceedings revealed important differences concerning the basic approach as to how to prevent effectively the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and the organizational aspects of handling the issue.

The analysis of the proceedings, however, clearly indicates that even the differing positions agree on the necessity to take appropriate steps in the Committee on Disarmament, leading to the effective prevention of the emergence of NWMD, and to find the appropriate framework to reach that aim.

2. With a view to promoting the attainment of this aim, the Hungarian Delegation submitted a working paper (CD/174) on 7 April 1981, and proposed the holding of informal meetings of the Committee with the participation of qualified governmental experts. The informal meetings took place in July 1981. This fact has been noted "with satisfaction" in resolution 36/89 by the United Nations General Assembly, expressing also the conviction that "all ways and means should be utilized to prevent the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons".

3. Requesting the Committee on Disarmament "to intensify negotiations" on this item resolution 36/89 also "calls upon the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as upon other militarily significant States, to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on the subject", which "would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council".

4. Following the lines suggested in resolution 36/89, and taking into account that similar ideas had been expressed by several delegations of the Committee to the same effect, it seems feasible to give serious consideration to appropriate formulations, by which all States, especially the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States, would make solemn declarations, identical in substance, condemning any future efforts to develop, manufacture and deploy new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

5. On the basis of the successful experience of the 1981 session, the Hungarian Delegation proposes to hold informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to be provided by interested delegations, during the second part of its 1982 session. The exact timing of two or three such meetings could be agreed upon when appropriate. The participation of non-member States, including that of their experts, is welcome.

6. In addition to the substantive consideration of the declarations as proposed in paragraph 4, delegations and experts could also discuss the possible tasks that an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts could be entrusted with, as well as alternative ways and means of keeping under continuing review the question of the prohibition of NWFED, including the possible setting up of the proposed ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts. Subjects for discussion proposed in working paper CD/174, might still be relevant.

The Committee on Disarmament could record in an appropriate manner the findings and conclusions of such meetings, and submit them to the United Nations General Assembly as requested in resolution 36/89, as an annex to the report which the Committee on Disarmament will prepare for its thirty-seventh session.

ROMANIA

Working paper

SCIENTISTS AND DISARMAMENT

1. The Romanian national Committee, "Scientists and Peace", wishes to draw the attention of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva to a problem of vital importance for the cause of international peace and security - for the very future of mankind. This is the disquieting trend towards the increasing use of science and technology as decisive instruments for the development of new weapons, and especially weapons of mass destruction, and for the improvement of existing weapons - the prime source of the arms build-up. The destabilizing effects which the technological race in the military field has on the security of States and the very serious implications of this development in increasing the danger of war and more particularly the danger of the unleashing of a nuclear catastrophe by accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding, necessitate the adoption of urgent and resolute measures to put an end to this highly dangerous course.

2. Indeed, the massive application of science and technology to military purposes has reached an unprecedented level. According to highly reliable international studies, a huge proportion of the forces of scientific creation - more than 50 per cent of the most competent scientists, and a quarter of all the scientific and technical specialists in the world - devote their efforts to the development and production of new weapons. As a result of the vast resources allocated to military purposes, the technology of the manufacture of means of destruction is developing extremely fast, in striking contrast with the slow process of the negotiations on disarmament, where no concrete results have been achieved. In fact, we are approaching the point where the disarmament negotiations will no longer be able to exert any influence on the arms race and there is a real danger that this race will escape all control, with incalculable consequences for all mankind.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that military research and development are increasingly becoming an independent activity, proceeding in accordance with its own forces and laws. While devising new types or systems of destructive weapons, each of the parties at the same time develops the means for counteracting similar weapons and systems which the other party might produce, and this greatly accelerates the arms race.

A particular source of concern is the penetration of military research into such fundamental fields as those of physics, biology, medicine and even the social sciences, in a way which goes beyond mere military implications and leads to the over-all militarization of science. This situation has profoundly harmful effects on research for peaceful purposes at a time when the need to solve fundamental problems such as those connected with energy and food supplies is becoming more and more urgent. This situation is all the more critical in that a very small number of States are responsible for the greater part of all expenditures on research and development for military purposes.

3. The grave danger resulting from the massive orientation of science and technology towards military research and development imposes on scientists - who are in the best position to know the destructive capacity of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and the catastrophic consequences that would result from a nuclear conflagration, which is no longer a mere hypothesis but a real and frightening threat - the moral responsibility, the obligation to play an active part in efforts to achieve disarmament and peace. This danger dramatically highlights the imperative need to adopt urgent measures to halt and reverse the technological arms race.

4. To this end, the Romanian national Committee, "Scientists and Peace", considers that the Geneva Committee on Disarmament has a responsibility to negotiate and achieve agreements capable of making an effective contribution to the halting of the arms race and the initiation of a genuine process of nuclear disarmament. In this context, particular importance attaches to the measures needed to put an end to the technological race at the military level and to bring about a renunciation of the use of the achievements of science and technology for the purpose of creating and improving the means for mass destruction.

5. The achievement of an agreement on the limitation and reduction of military research in the areas where new weapons are in the process of being developed would constitute a reasonable first step towards broader agreements aimed at the "gradual stifling" of the technological race through the negotiation of measures for the reduction of allocations for military research and development purposes. In this connection, one measure that should be considered and negotiated as a matter of urgency is that of an agreement whereby the countries which are most actively engaged in military research would undertake, perhaps through identical declarations, to exercise moderation in the military use of their scientific and technological capacities.

6. The Romanian national Committee, "Scientists and Peace", considers that at the present stage in the negotiations on disarmament questions, which have become highly complex from the technological and scientific standpoint as well, scientists, and in particular those involved in military activities or in related areas, can make a useful contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The association of scientists, in an appropriate manner, with the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament would undoubtedly facilitate the negotiation of agreements on the major issues on its agenda and thus serve as a stimulus to disarmament talks in general.

The scientists could make available to the Committee eloquent scientific data concerning the immense destructive force of existing stocks of nuclear weapons, the disastrous consequences of a nuclear conflict for all countries and, consequently, the imperative need for disarmament. They could provide valuable information on the increasing fragility of modern systems for preventing the outbreak of war by accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. The great number of recent false alarms of a nuclear war is a clear illustration of the extent to which the future of mankind depends today on the faultless functioning of complex warning and control systems covering strategic weapons as well as other weapons of great destructive capacity.

Apart from publicizing the frightening extent to which the existence of mankind depends on alarm and control systems, the scientists could also make a particularly useful contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament by helping to formulate acceptable solutions to the problem of the verification of future agreements on arms reduction and on disarmament. If it has been possible to make massive use of science and technology to equip military forces with the means of annihilating human civilization, scientists are certainly capable of devising methods and techniques to facilitate the verification of disarmament measures and thus help to reverse the arms race and achieve the goal of disarmament.

Scientists could also make an effective contribution to the progress of the negotiations on disarmament by presenting in a scientific manner the advantages of a reduction in military expenditures for the strengthening of security and the development of all countries, the positive economic, social and other benefits to be derived from the conversion of facilities from military to civilian production, and the technological possibilities for the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

7. In order to increase the contribution of scientists to disarmament efforts, consideration might be given to the establishment, for the purposes of the Committee on Disarmament, of an ad hoc body of scientists which would have as its main function the examination, at the request of the Committee, of the scientific and technical aspects of questions under negotiation at Geneva, and the formulation of concrete suggestions and proposals for consideration by the Committee. This body, which would be representative in character, could be established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the basis of a decision of the General Assembly and proposals by States.

FINLAND

Working Paper on the Relation of Verification to the scope
of a Ban on Chemical Warfare Agents

The negotiations in the CCD and the CD for banning chemical weapons will soon have gone on for a decade and a half resulting in no agreement. The many consultations, working papers, and expert meetings have, however, shed light on the innumerable problems involved and consensus has been reached in several areas.

Over the last years the subject has also been dealt with in the bilateral consultations between the United States of America and the USSR, and special expectations have been placed in these negotiations. Here, too, the optimism has proved unfounded and the Joint reports promise no convention in the near future. The reports, latest (CD/112) in the summer of 1980, do augur some common understanding on many important points - mostly on the basis of earlier findings in the CCD or CD - which will give technical preparedness for a treaty as soon as the political understanding has been reached.

Firstly, it is most satisfying to note that the two sides believe that the future convention would be a comprehensive one with commitments never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain super-toxic lethal or harmful chemicals, or precursors of such chemicals, as well as chemical munitions or other means of chemical warfare. It also contains an undertaking to destroy all existing stocks.

Secondly, they proceed from the premises that the scope of the prohibition in any future convention would be determined on the basis of the general "purpose criterion". The goal of this is to give the treaty a fully unambiguous content leaving no room for misinterpretation i.e. no violator can claim to have acted in ignorance.

Unfortunately outsiders cannot easily verify the purpose of the development and production of a chemical, thus concerning it as a chemical warfare agent on the basis of the purpose criterion is often impossible until the chemical has been used as such, or at least placed in munitions or army depositories, therefore, additional definitions for chemical agents have been found necessary for facilitating verification. As such additional definition, the two sides have first come to see the use of the toxicity criterion.

There seems to exist common agreement that the most dangerous super-toxic lethal chemicals can be defined as chemical with $ld_{50}=0.5$ mg/kg (subcutaneous) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation). Since the compounds in this class have not proven to have any non-hostile use - outside the small amounts permitted for research and protection purposes - they can be totally prohibited and verified as chemical agents on the basis of the toxicity properties alone. Thus, if the toxicity of a chemical can be measured by an agreed method and it exceeds a given limit, it will be declared a prohibited agent.

In reality the determination of the toxicity may be difficult and time consuming, since known amounts of pure compounds are needed for reliable animal tests. It could be easier to identify the chemical structure of the compound in question if a certain state of readiness exists. Therefore a list of prohibited compounds as another supplemental criterion could be very useful, even if it could not include all the potential agents or already secretly developed ones, it could, if composed by experts of all countries, be complete enough to reliably indicate all the really important ones. Furthermore, since the purpose criterion would dominate as the primary one, the absence from the list would by no means exempt a chemical from the ban.

We believe that such a list of prohibited chemicals could be really useful only if accompanied by yet another amendment, namely information on the analytical facts and verification methods of each compound. If standardized verification and identification system for each compound be agreed upon, their application would greatly facilitate national verification and chemical defence measures and consequently reduce the changes of a surprise attack.

The same evaluation is even more essential to other lethal or harmful chemicals as the toxicity criterion cannot be determining for these compounds. There are numerous chemicals with ample non-hostile use with ld_{50} between 0.5-10 mg/kg., e.g. pesticides and industrial intermediates. On the other hand, many known warfare agents, before all the binary precursors, have lower toxicity. The dual purpose chemicals present a special problem. It is not possible to control the production or use of such common chemicals as hydrogen cyanide or phosgen. Their ban must be based upon the purpose criterion. A large part of important chemical agents, for instance mustards could, however, be defined by means of chemical structure and be

totally prohibited. Concerning a third group, e.g. alkylphosphonochloridates and - fluoridates, which are important binary precursors with relatively limited civilian use, a licence system with surveillance should be established, and the production and use outside this system prohibited.

The idea of creating a consultative committee with a permanent secretariat for international verification measures has also gained common ground. This committee could also take care of the list of the prohibited compounds in order to keep it updated, as well as to control that the licence system has been applied. In addition, every party to the convention should have the right to make proposals concerning the list.

By way of conclusion we believe, taking into account that the convention should be comprehensive and the banning of chemical agents primarily based on purpose criterion, that verification would be best served if, in addition to the toxicity criterion, a list of known or strongly suspected chemical agents with standardized verification data could be made available. Complete verification is not possible. Small amounts of dangerous agents can be prepared in relatively simple laboratories, and even new extremely toxic compounds developed, often unintentionally, in connection with other investigations. These products may be dangerous e.g. in the hands of terrorists. Their large scale production and development for a militarily important weapons system can be disclosed by various detection means. Thus even if the list of prohibited agents cannot be complete in regard to potential or secret toxic agents, the amounts and significance of such compounds would be limited. The standardized verification methods could constitute a good analytical system for new not previously mentioned compounds.

Finally, we understand very well that the above-mentioned suggestions do not solve the difficult problem of verification. We believe, however, that if the realistic possibilities and limits of verification were diagnosed in the context of agreeing upon the scope of the ban, the reliability of the convention is increased.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICAThe United States Programme to Deter Chemical WarfareBackground

The ultimate goal of the United States in the area of chemical warfare (CW) is a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Until such a ban can be obtained, our objective, consistent with existing treaties and international law, is to deter the use of chemical weapons. The United States will not use chemical weapons unless chemical weapons are first used against us or our allies. The United States does not and will not possess biological or toxin weapons.

Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Programmes

Soviet military doctrine envisages the use of chemical weapons and acknowledges their value, particularly when used in massive quantities and in surprise attacks.

Of more significance, the Soviet Union and its allies are well prepared to wage chemical warfare and to fight in a chemically contaminated environment. The USSR possesses a wide variety of lethal and incapacitating chemical agents and the means to deliver them. They have a busy and expanding chemical proving ground and a large, well-trained chemical organization, with over 60,000 troops, whose status within the Soviet military hierarchy was enhanced during the 1970s. They have invested heavily in individual and collective protection and decontamination equipment, and they train with actual chemical agents.

In addition to extensive Soviet chemical warfare programmes, a major accident in Sverdlovsk and evidence in Southeast Asia indicate that the Soviet Union's arsenal also includes toxic substances specifically prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

United States Programme in the 1970s

In contrast with the Soviet Union during most of the 1970s, the United States allowed its retaliatory capability to decline, did little to improve defense against chemicals and neglected relevant defense doctrine and training. In addition, the United States in 1969 stopped the production of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and the filling of new munitions with chemical agents. At the same time, the United States renounced the use of biological and toxin weapons, destroyed all stocks of these weapons and converted its biological warfare facilities to peaceful purposes.

Arms Control Efforts

While unilaterally restraining our capabilities, the United States made major efforts, in the late 1970s, to eliminate the chemical warfare threat by attempting to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Verification of such a ban is a complex and difficult problem.

These efforts stalemated due principally to fundamental disagreement on the tough issue of the need for effective verification of a CW ban and particularly Soviet intransigence on questions relating to on-site inspections. Negotiations were further complicated by our weakness in this area compared to the Soviets, who possessed a decisive military advantage and had little arms control incentive in the face of the large asymmetry in chemical warfare capabilities. The Soviets did, however, have an interest in negotiations as long as it impeded improvement of United States deterrent capabilities.

Requirements for Deterrence

In view of the over-all military balance between the United States and the Soviets, we cannot rely on other components of our military capabilities to deter chemical warfare. Consequently, to deter, we find we need to improve our CW capabilities sufficiently to deny the Soviets the significant military advantage they would gain from using chemical weapons. Improving our defences against chemical weapons is a necessary, but not sufficient, step to deny the Soviets such an advantage.

Improved defences can save lives, reduce casualties and reduce — but not eliminate — significant degradation of military performance in a chemically contaminated environment. The needed protective equipment reduces mobility, slows operations and makes many tasks difficult or impossible. Reliance solely on improved defences would leave the initiators of chemical warfare largely free to operate without the constraints imposed by protection; thus yielding them a major advantage and encouraging the use of chemical weapons.

Therefore, in addition to improving our defences we must maintain a capability to retaliate with chemical weapons, to reduce the incentive to the enemy's first use, since he would also have to operate with the encumbrance of protective equipment. However, our current chemical weapon stockpile (which will ultimately be destroyed) is inadequate to provide an effective deterrent. Most of the current stockpile is not usable because it is stored in bulk containers. Much of the remainder is in ammunition for weapons that have been or will be phased out of service. The current stockpile is also lacking in weapons that can be used against the rear echelons of attacking forces. Finally, the current stockpile presents logistical problems, due to the elaborate safety precautions required in transport, which further restrict its utility.

Programme Objectives and Requirements

It is the objective of the United States chemical warfare programme to improve defensive and retaliatory capabilities to deter CW attack and to provide incentive and gain leverage in arms control negotiations.

Recent United States Government programme requests include the following:

- The Carter Administration's CW programmes increased from \$111 million in FY 1978 to \$239 million in FY 1981, to improve defences against chemical warfare.
- In 1981 the new Administration's FY 1981 Defense Supplemental request included \$20 million to purchase and install the equipment required to complete the binary production facility authorized and appropriated by the previous Congress.
- The FY 1982 Budget request included \$532 million for chemical warfare programmes, primarily for defence, but no funds for the production of weapons.

The FY 1983 request for the chemical programme is \$705 million, with over 70 per cent for defence and 10 per cent for disposal of obsolete chemical weapons. The remainder supports the retaliatory element of the deterrence programme and includes \$30 million for procurement of binary chemical munitions: the 155mm binary artillery projectile, and the Bigeye aerial chemical bomb.

The defensive element of the FY 1983 programme (\$508 million) will improve the quality and quantity of all aspects of chemical defense: training, individual and collective protection, detection and warning, decontamination and medical.

The objective for the retaliatory element of the programme (\$123 million in FY 1983 including the funds for production) is to maintain the safest, smallest chemical munitions stockpile that provides the ability to deny a significant military advantage to any initiator of chemical warfare. We need not, and will not, plan to match the Soviets in agent/munition quantities and types.

The United States will continue to exercise responsible restraint in this area and will make only those improvements necessary to ensure that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent/retaliatory capability.

The binary munitions being developed by the United States contain two non-lethal substances which form the standard nerve gas only when mixed. The considerable safety, security, and logistical advantages that binary weapons offer during the entire life cycle from manufacturing through storage and transportation, to eventual disposal, make binaries the logical choice over unitary munitions for stockpile modernization. Transportation advantages make a strategy of centralized storage and crisis deployment more workable, and there is considerable flexibility in storage and control of the binary components.

Conclusion

The ultimate goal of United States policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Our programme supports this goal by improving our military posture sufficiently so that the Soviets will perceive they have nothing to gain from such warfare.

It is worth noting that since the end of World War I, all use of toxic chemical weapons has been against unprotected military forces and civilians who could not protect themselves and who had no ability to retaliate. Even in the intense European conflict of World War II following D-Day, Hitler did not use his chemical arsenal. He believed the Allies stood ready to retaliate.

The thrust of all our efforts in this area is to deter the use of chemical weapons, and to give incentive to the Soviet Union to join us in our objective of seeking a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of such weapons. If we are successful in achieving this ban, we will be able and eager to terminate the chemical weapons programme at any time.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Working PaperonPrinciples and Rules for Verifying Compliance
with a Chemical Weapons ConventionA. Introduction

1. There is general consensus that the observance of a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and stipulating the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons requires adequate verification. The parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical weapons did not establish a verification mechanism. However, in the event of a gross violation of the Protocol, the general rules of international law still permit retaliation since the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons is not prohibited. This state of affairs engendering mutual mistrust was soon seen to be unsatisfactory by the international community. Not least as a result of this perception a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons was called for to avert once and for all the danger of these inhuman weapons being used. However, such a treaty does not do full justice to the security needs of the Contracting Parties if the problem of verifying compliance with its provisions is not reliably resolved.
2. There is also agreement that such verification should not be confined exclusively to national measures but that it should be a combination of national and international measures and mechanisms to be implemented by a special standing international body, referred to as the consultative committee in CD/220 and as "committee" below. The Contracting Parties must therefore undertake both to ensure at the national level observance of the convention and to submit to the monitoring carried out by the committee.
3. The Federal Republic of Germany, which renounced the production of chemical weapons as early as 1954 and agreed to international verification of its non-production of these weapons, is the only country with long-standing experience in international co-operation in this field. It presented this experience in a workshop in 1979 and recorded the results in CD/37. Its intention is not to recommend the procedure applied to the Federal Republic as a model, but to prove that international verification measures, including on-site inspections of chemical plants, are feasible without harming the Contracting Parties' legitimate interest in safeguarding business and production secrets.
4. The Federal Republic of Germany realizes that permanent and full-scale monitoring by means of on-site inspections of all military and non-military plants for the manufacture, stockpiling and destruction of chemical weapons and agents covered by a convention is not practicable since the necessary effort in terms of staff and finance would be excessive. It therefore advocates regular on-site inspections of all declared plants suited for the production of supertoxic chemical warfare agents, using a procedure by which the committee selects, by casting lots, a specific number of such plants every year for monitoring.

*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

5. In addition, it must remain possible to effect examinations and on-site inspections on challenge in the event of particular incidents. Such a procedure would not, however, be sufficient on its own for reliably verifying compliance with the convention, especially with regard to the obligation to destroy chemical weapons stocks and production plants and not to manufacture chemical weapons.

6. This paper is based on elements of previous papers presented to the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of a chemical weapons convention which met with a large measure of agreement and have been summarized in CD/220 as a result of the last session. It proceeds on the assumption that it is not practicable to subject to regular inspections all military and non-military plants for the manufacture, stockpiling and destruction of chemical weapons and agents covered by a convention. With regard to regular checks, the paper therefore concentrates on a procedure for inspecting plants suited for the manufacture of supertoxic chemical agents. The advantage of this type of regular procedure is that it can take place in a business-like atmosphere. The paper is based on the concepts outlined in CD/37, which have at the same time been developed further by subjecting binary chemical weapons to the rules. In part B below, the essential principles which a convention must contain are set out.

B. Essential principles of verification

(i)

1. Purpose of verification and obligations of the Contracting Parties

The purpose of verification is to ensure confidence in the observance of a convention and safeguard the security interests of the Contracting States. To this end, the Contracting Parties commit themselves, by treaty, to national statutory measures precluding a violation of the convention and to agreed international measures. The latter consist of regular checks on a precisely defined scale and of checks on special grounds (suspicion of the convention being violated). The Committee is responsible for carrying out the international verification measures. The Contracting Parties undertake to submit to the committee, within a specified brief period after the entry into force of the convention or, if it is ratified at a later date, when depositing their instrument of ratification, their declaration together with the data needed for regular checks and also to assist the committee by word and deed.

2. Explanations

In view of the different political, economic and technological conditions in the individual Contracting States, the type and scope of the national measures for verifying observance of the convention are subject to the authority and procedures of each individual State. For the purpose of evaluating statistical data, the committee will therefore recommend standardized methods and procedures and reach agreement on them with the Contracting Parties. Of central importance for verification are the regular checks described in section (ii) below. For the purpose of the special checks it is necessary from the point of view of the joint interest of completely dispelling any suspicions to use a method which may deviate from and even exceed the scope and procedure defined in section (ii) below.

(ii)

1. Scope of regular checks

At the start and end of the period envisaged in the convention the committee carries out inspections with regard to all declared chemical agent stocks and production plants to be destroyed and monitors on a continuous basis their destruction by means of suitable technical devices (e.g. flow-meters). For the duration of the destruction measures and for the regular monitoring to verify observance of the convention the committee will carry out on-site inspections of production and storage facilities, the percentage being determined annually by casting lots. These regular checks will cover the following:

- the destruction of stocks of supertoxic chemical weapons, including their binary components,
- the destruction of facilities for manufacturing supertoxic chemical warfare agents and munitions,
- checks of current industrial production of organo-phosphorus substances to ensure that supertoxic warfare agents or their binary components are not produced for hostile purposes,
- checks to ensure that the quantity of supertoxic chemical warfare agents permitted by the convention and manufactured and stored in the declared plants is not exceeded.

2. Explanations

(a) The procedure whereby the committee establishes each year by casting lots the number of plants to be examined offers the following advantages:

- each Contracting State is given equal treatment, which in turn contributes to a business-like and co-operative atmosphere.
- verification is set on an appropriate basis in terms of expenditure and manpower.
- no Contracting Party knows until shortly before the inspection is to take place which objects and facilities in its territory are to be examined. This means a high risk for any party intending to violate the convention.

(b) When the convention comes into force, a declaration is made of existing stocks of chemical weapons by type and quantity as well as of manufacturing and munitions-producing facilities. The possibility of submitting a complete declaration as a confidence-building measure already when signing the convention might be considered. The declaration marks the beginning of preparations for destroying all chemical warfare agents prohibited by the convention. Verification by the committee of the destruction of munitions and non-munitions stocks is restricted to the supertoxic chemical agents (CD/220) and their binary components defined by toxicity criteria in the convention. In view of the military significance and the effort required in terms of equipment and manpower, it is acceptable to forgo verifying the destruction of all chemical warfare agents prohibited by the convention.

(c) Pursuant to the provisions of the convention, its entry into force is accompanied by the commencement of preparations for dismantling all declared manufacturing and munitions-producing facilities. Verification by the committee in this respect means monitoring -- for the period envisaged in the convention -- the destruction, dismantling, sealing or the hand-over within a defined period of stocks for disposal.

(d) Effective verification of the non-production of supertoxic chemical warfare agents, including their binary components, for hostile purposes is not possible without including chemical plants producing organo-phosphorus compounds on an industrial scale. Binary chemical warfare agents, i.e. supertoxic chemical warfare agents which, until their military use, exist in the form of usually two components of lower toxicity, are, by virtue of their final toxicity, to be grouped together with supertoxic chemical warfare agents since they are of equal military significance. They must therefore be included in the convention and be subject to verification. After the convention has entered into force the Contracting Parties also declare their stocks of binary chemical warfare agents by type and quantity as well as the production facilities and the enterprises manufacturing and processing organo-phosphorus compounds on an industrial scale. Adequate verification by the committee is necessary to ensure that

- existing stocks of supertoxic chemical warfare agents, including binary components, in munitions or non-munitions form are destroyed, and
- essential components of binaries are not produced on an industrial scale if they are not used for civilian purposes on such a scale or, if used on an industrial scale for civilian purposes, are not diverted and stockpiled for hostile purposes. */

(iii)

1. Verification procedures

Verification by the committee on a scale defined in the convention requires that the Contracting Parties permit the following procedures:

- on-site inspections involving sampling and toxicological or -- for components of binaries -- chemico-physical determination of samples,
- near-site inspections involving chemico-physical analyses of effluent air and water at a distance from the production plant permitting reliable measurement,
- off-site inspections involving centralized monitoring with the aid of sensor-transmitted data, and
- statistical evaluation of production, supply and reprocessing sheets.

*/ Example The essential component of sarin is methylphosphoric acid dichloride which is not required for civilian purposes and, therefore, need not be produced on an industrial scale.

2. Explanations

Depending on the nature of the plants involved, different methods and procedures are needed for effective verification by the committee. The procedures to be permitted are not intended as alternatives but are to supplement one another, as required. The details will be established in collaboration with the appropriate national authority. The determining criteria will be concentration on the information actually needed and cost-effectiveness as regards equipment and manpower. In order to establish the absence of certain substances without simultaneously ascertaining the actual composition of the sample, merely toxicological tests or the determination of functional groups of chemical compounds are necessary. This ensures that production secrets are not revealed by the regular checks.

(iv)

1. Special checks

Every Contracting Party is entitled, if it has concrete grounds for suspecting that another party is violating the convention, to demand a special check by the committee. Such a check serves to establish the facts, if necessary by means of an on-site inspection by the committee. The findings must be set out in a report. If the matter cannot be clarified satisfactorily in this manner or if the State affected refuses verification without giving good reasons, every Contracting State is entitled to appeal to the United Nations. It may also withdraw from the convention in accordance with its provisions.

2. Explanations

Special checks are a necessary supplement of regular checks. The scope of a special check will therefore be determined by the nature and substance of the suspicion and by the degree of mutual co-operation in clarifying the matter; it cannot therefore be defined in detail. Its success is dependent on a party agreeing to the demanded clarification and making the necessary declaration. It pre-supposes a large degree of willingness to co-operate. As a result of the regular checks described in this paper, the occasion on which special checks become necessary will, incidentally, be few in number.

C. Concluding Remarks

This paper presents a verification arrangement which must form an integral part of a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons. The paper is therefore intended to contribute towards reaching agreement on the minimum security requirements that have to be met and on how to secure maximum confidence in the convention being complied with.

The arrangement described above is acceptable, effective and necessary.

It is acceptable because

- it is non-discriminatory,
- it is confined to the most important and most hazardous types of chemical weapons,
- it necessitates relatively limited manpower and expenditure, and
- it ensures that production secrets are not revealed.

It is effective because

- it means a high risk for any party intending to violate the convention, and
- it includes binary chemical weapons.

It is necessary because

experience has shown that conventions without reliable verification arrangements (Geneva Protocol of 1925, Bacteriological Weapons Convention of 1972) are unsatisfactory, since existing doubts and accusations cannot be clarified. This impairs mutual trust and hence the conditions for further progress in international efforts for disarmament and arms control.

Yugoslavia

Working PaperBinary weapons and the problem of their definition
and verification

The binary (separation) principle in the storage and use of different chemical compounds for military purposes has been known since the beginning of this century. Nevertheless, it seems that no great progress in the obtaining of binary ammunitions had been achieved before the sixties, primarily because of technical and technological deficiencies. As is known, this principle is today based on two (or more) chemical compounds - components with relatively low degree of toxicity are stored and transported separately and are then introduced into corresponding ammunition or equipment for the dispersion of chemical warfare agents. These components are not mixed until the shell or rocket is fired, when the mixing of components takes place, and by reaching the target it creates highly toxic chemical warfare agents. Chemical compounds - components which are indispensable for the creation of binary chemical munitions have been called "precursors" in a large number of working papers submitted to the CD during the past years and this year as well, with the basic aim that, according to the criterion for toxicity, they are or could be far less toxic than the final product which is generated by their mutual chemical reaction.

Today there is a trend (CD/CW/CRP.31 and CD/CW/CTC/13) for the term "precursor" to be applicable regardless of the process by which the agent is produced. All things considered, this means that the term "precursors" refers not only to binary chemical munitions but also to chemicals used in the production of chemical warfare agents in chemical plants.

The fact that the problem of binary weapons has been approached in this manner speaks about the complexity of this matter, both with regard to definition and with regard to verification.

The definitions of "precursors" as cited in CD/CW/CTC/4 of 16 March 1982 and in CD/CW/CRP.31 and CD/CW/CTC/13 of 18 March 1982 can, in our opinion, serve as a

basis for further talks on the ban of CW. The future Convention on the ban of CW must encompass at least a part of the "other harmful chemicals". In that case, it seems logical to us that the definition of "precursors" must also encompass those chemical compounds which are also a component part of this group of chemical warfare agents.

Technological progress will in the future surely make it possible for a larger number of chemical compounds to be used as "precursors", which will, of course, present a danger of the emergence of new "binary mixtures" with different toxic effects. Theoretically, it is possible for chemical compounds of lesser toxicity to cause, in contact with the environment (water, air and other) the creation of poisonous materials of higher toxicity, which in itself renders the defining of "precursors" more complex.

In view of today's achievements in this area, for the purpose of definition and verification, "precursors" should be divided in relation to the already known division of chemical warfare agents (see: CD/112). We thus suggest:

- (a) Key "Precursors" for obtaining super-toxic lethal CWA,
- (b) Key "Precursors" for obtaining other lethal CWA, and
- (c) Key "Precursors" for obtaining other harmful CWA.

As concerns "precursor(s)" for obtaining super-toxic lethal CWA (nerve agents), in our opinion, the important binary precursors (i.e. alkylphosphonochloridates and -fluoridates) have a relatively limited use in times of peace. It therefore seems to us that it would not constitute any serious obstacle to treat these "precursors" as super-toxic lethal chemicals and to subject them to the same verification procedure. In our opinion a license system with surveillance should be established and the production and use outside this system prohibited.

It is certain that this division will also encompass a whole series of chemical compounds which serve a non-hostile purpose, especially if one bears in mind that even CWA from the group "other lethal" and "other harmful" serve dual purpose use. This is why dual purpose chemicals present a special problem. It is hardly possible to control the production or use of such common chemicals as hydrogen cyanide or phosgen. Therefore, their ban must be based on the purpose criterion. A large part of important chemical warfare agents, for instance mustards, could, however, be defined by means of chemical structure and be totally prohibited.

Based on the above, the definition of "precursor(s)" could, in our opinion, look as follows:

"Precursor(s)" are chemical compounds whose final chemical reactions enable the creation of chemical warfare agents of different toxicity levels: super-toxic lethal or lethal and other harmful chemical; regardless of whether this reaction is taking place during production (chemical plant), during use (binary chemical munitions) or at the site of use.

Apart from what we have said for the verification of "precursors" which enter into the denomination of super-toxic lethal chemical agents, we think that all three categories of chemical warfare agents should focus their attention on the so-called "main", "key" or "basic" precursors. For this reason, a list of "precursors" should be compiled which would serve as a basis for agreement on which chemical compounds should be the subject of only national verification and those which should be the subject of both national and international verification.

If there is no ban of CW within a reasonable amount of time, it can be expected that the number of chemical compounds that can be used as "precursors" will be extended.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/267

24 March 1982

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 MARCH 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

I am sending you herewith a statement issued by the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in connection with its meeting held on 24 February 1982.

I would ask you to kindly have it circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) Dr. Marko Vrhunec
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

GE.82-61765

The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, presided by the President of the Presidency, Sergej Kraigher, considered and adopted the platform for the activities of Yugoslavia in the field of disarmament.

It was stressed that the arms race had assumed alarming proportions, thus posing an immediate threat to peace, security and the survival of mankind. The Presidency, however, pointed out that the forces of peace, disturbed by this state of affairs, are resolutely opposed to such a development, are growing in number and becoming ever more active. Thanks to their activities, an important mechanism of international negotiation has been established and the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament has been reinforced. Numerous proposals on specific disarmament measures were formulated and affirmed, wherein a particularly important role was played by non-aligned countries. The Presidency particularly stressed the fact that the broadest masses of people in the world are increasingly becoming aware that disarmament is the only safe road conducive to peace, security and better social conditions. Unfortunately, despite these significant efforts at the international level in the broadest sense, no practical results have been attained. The Presidency pointed out to the responsibility of the major Powers and blocs for the arms race which is an instrument and consequence of power politics and of the struggle for spheres of interest and the strengthening of blocs.

The meeting emphasized that international security and lasting peace can only be achieved through the halting of the arms race, and that the ultimate goal of disarmament should be greater security for all States at the lowest possible level of armament and the balance of military forces.

The Presidency pointed out that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger for security and the survival of mankind. At the same time, the Presidency noted the acceleration of the conventional arms race in recent years, of arms which are primarily intended for military intervention against small and poorly armed countries, especially those not belonging to blocs. The Presidency, therefore, stressed the need for the urgent halting of the conventional arms race, accompanied by simultaneous efforts for nuclear weapons limitation.

The Presidency pointed with particular concern to the negative impact of the arms race on the position of developing countries, forced to procure additional armaments so as to preserve their own security, thus reducing their already limited development potentials. The Presidency pointed out that, on the other hand, more meaningful successes in the field of disarmament would be conducive towards the releasing of considerable financial resources which, even if partially targeted towards a more rapid development of the developing countries, would substantially contribute to the strengthening of peace and stability in the world.

The Presidency stressed that the major Powers, in view of their responsibility before mankind, must exert appropriate efforts in order to overcome the present crisis in bilateral negotiations on disarmament. The present stalemate must not discourage the efforts made within the framework of the international mechanism for negotiations on disarmament. Emphasis was placed on the importance of intensifying the work of multilateral negotiating bodies under the auspices of the United Nations with regard to all outstanding issues related to the ban or reduction of certain types of weapons. In this respect, it is essentially important to continue to strengthen the role of the United Nations.

The Presidency devoted special attention to the forthcoming activities of Yugoslavia in the field of disarmament.

In this connection, emphasis was placed on the exceptional importance of the second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament scheduled to take place from 7 June to 9 July 1982. It should make a decisive contribution to the efforts aimed at overcoming the present unfavourable situation and approve specific disarmament measures to be taken in the future as well as those for strengthening international peace and security.

The meeting also stressed that the seventh conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, to be held in September 1982, would offer an opportunity for the broadest assertion of the unified approach of the non-aligned to the strategy and the current most important issues concerning disarmament and international security, as well as the affirmation of the decisions and programmes of action of the special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. The Presidency expressed its conviction that the non-aligned countries would, in this context, accord full attention to the practical measures reflecting their primary and vital interest in security and find the ways and means for non-aligned countries to take international actions that would contribute to the achievement of greater efficiency in multilateral negotiations on disarmament.

The Presidency noted with concern the deteriorated political conditions in which the Madrid meeting of the CSCE has resumed its work. It was pointed out that all the participating States were faced with an exceptional responsibility and obligation to overcome confrontation and ensure a successful outcome of the meeting, i.e. to preserve the positive results of the previous work and ensure the continuity of the CSCE, whose integral part should also be the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe.

The meeting reviewed in some detail the question of transforming the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and established the bases and the principled political approach of Yugoslavia in this respect. It was emphasized that such a zone should serve to strengthen the security of all the States in the region, as well as European and international security. It was stressed that this implies the establishment of relations among these States based on full and equal mutual respect, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, peaceful coexistence as well as a lasting orientation towards the development of good neighbourly relations.

It was particularly emphasized that the transformation of the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone, a zone free from the threat of nuclear weapons from outside, simultaneously calls for refraining from the threat to use of any force or type of weapon against the independence and territorial integrity of the Balkan countries. This also presupposes the further strengthening and broadening of confidence, both among the Balkan nations and in the world at large, and the establishment of an extended zone of peace in the neighbouring regions.

In this context, the Presidency noted the exceptional significance of and pointed to the need for broader international action that would be aimed at transforming the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation. It was stressed that the promotion of relations and all forms of co-operation among the Mediterranean nations and States, as well as the taking of concrete measures aimed at strengthening confidence and security, would substantially contribute to the overcoming of crises and the removal of the existing hotbeds of confrontation in this region.

The Presidency was of the opinion that international actions aimed at achieving disarmament can successfully be pursued only provided that there is the broadest possible involvement of all States and peoples of the world. The interests of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia also clearly call for unified action of all the organized forces of the Yugoslav society in favour of disarmament and the strengthening of international security.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/268
26 March 1982
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Letter dated 25 March 1982 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting part of the statement by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the seventeenth Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR

I transmit herewith part of the statement by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to the seventeenth Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this text as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. ISSRAELYAN

Extracts from the statement by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to the seventeenth Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR on 16 March 1982

The militaristic course and aggressive policy of the NATO bloc headed by the United States of America are forcing us to take steps to maintain the country's defence capability at the requisite level. This is a grim necessity of today's world and it naturally requires the diversion, to the detriment of our plans for peaceful construction, of not insubstantial resources. But, as I have already had more than one occasion to say, we are not and shall not be spending for this purpose one single rouble more than is absolutely necessary to assure the security of our people and of its friends and allies. And we see the future not in terms of the unlimited accumulation of mountains of arms, but in terms of the achievement of reasonable agreements with the other side on the mutual reduction of the level of military opposition.

In this respect, the problem of the reduction of nuclear armaments in Europe naturally merits special attention. It is fair to say that this is, at the present time, the key question for the prevention of the growing threat of world war through the medium of nuclear missiles.

You are familiar with the Soviet Union's specific and far-reaching proposals on this matter: from the reduction in three stages of both sides' existing and planned European nuclear arsenals to the complete liberation of the continent from medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. It is also well known that the American side has so far been avoiding serious discussions and even more so the solution of these questions by hiding behind an absurd demand for unilateral disarmament by the Soviet Union, what they ironically call in Washington the "zero option".

But we have not given up hope of achieving a reasonable agreement on the bases of equality and equal security of the parties. What is more, we are doing everything possible to promote this aim through both word and deed. I am now in a position to tell you that, in its aspiration to facilitate the achievement of a just agreement on the large-scale reduction of both sides' nuclear weapons in Europe and its desire to set a good example, the Soviet leadership has taken the decision to institute a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the USSR. We are freezing in quantitative and qualitative terms the armaments of this kind that have already been deployed in this area, we are suspending the replacement of the old missiles known as SS-4 and SS-5 by the newer SS-20s.

This moratorium will remain in force either until the achievement of an agreement with the United States on the reduction, on a basis of equality and equal security, of medium-range nuclear weapons intended for Europe, or until such time as the United State leaders, scorning the security of peoples, proceed notwithstanding to practical preparations for the deployment in Europe of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles.

To continue: we have already declared that, upon the achievement of an agreed moratorium between the two sides, we would be prepared to effect, as a gesture of goodwill, the unilateral reduction of the number of our own nuclear arms in Europe as a contribution towards a future agreed reduction. Now we have decided to make a further step demonstrating our will for peace and our belief in the possibility, if there is no fresh aggravation of the international situation, of reducing this year on our own initiative the known number of our own medium-range missiles.

In announcing these decisions, we are confident that the peoples of the entire world will appreciate the peaceableness and the goodwill demonstrated by the Soviet Union. We also hope that our Western negotiating partners, too, will find a way of responding by constructive steps in a spirit of goodwill.

At the same time, we consider it our duty to give the following very clear warning. If the Governments of the United States and of their NATO allies, trampling underfoot the desire of peoples for peace, none the less implement their plan to station in Europe hundreds of new United States missiles capable of hitting targets within the territory of the USSR, a different strategic situation would be created in the world. There would arise a real additional threat to our country and its allies on the part of the United States. That would compel us to take such measures in response as would place the other side - including the United States itself, its territory - in a similar position. This should not be forgotten.

This circumstance calls to mind yet again the significance for the fate of the world, for the reduction of the threat of a world nuclear holocaust, of the question of agreement between the USSR and the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. As is well known, the United States has refused to bring into force the treaty signed on this subject in 1979. Nor has Washington yet been willing to hold any further negotiations on this issue. Meanwhile, the question is becoming steadily more acute and urgent.

First, the implementation of the United States plans to site new missiles in Europe could disrupt the balance which has now been achieved between the strategic arms of both sides - with consequences for the future that it is hard to predict.

Second, the development by parties of new types of weapons of mass destruction (if no end is put to this on the basis of a treaty) could cut the ground from under those agreements on limitations, reduction and monitoring that are still possible.

Consequently, we appeal to the United States Government not to place artificial obstacles in the way of strategic arms limitation talks and to engage in them at the earliest possible moment. But, pending their resumption, we would suggest that both sides enter into a mutual commitment not to open up a new avenue in the arms race, nor to deploy sea- and land-based long-range cruise missiles.

All in all, we consider that the situation in the world requires a maximum of restraint on the part of both the opposing blocs of States in their military activities. We would be prepared to come to an agreement on the mutual limitation of the activities of navies. In particular, we would consider it feasible to reach an agreement to the effect that similar missile-equipped vessels of both sides should be withdrawn from their current extensive military patrol zones, that navigation by such vessels should be limited by mutually agreed lines. We would also be prepared to discuss the issue of the extension of confidence-building measures to the surface of the seas and oceans, especially to the regions that contain the busiest sea lanes. In a word, we are in favour of the largest possible proportion of the world's oceans becoming, in the very near future, a zone of peace.

LETTER DATED 26 MARCH 1982 FROM THE HEAD OF
THE DELEGATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DECISION,
TAKEN BY THE FEDERAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON 17 MARCH,
ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AND
SECRETARY-GENERAL BREZHNEV'S PROPOSALS

With reference to statements made by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and other delegations in Plenary of 25 March, relating to recent proposals in the field of arms policy by Secretary-General Brezhnev, as well as to my own statement in Plenary of 18 March, I take pleasure in enclosing the text of a decision, taken by the Federal German Government on 17 March, on the present state of the INF negotiations and Secretary-General Brezhnev's proposals.

I should be grateful for this material to be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament, in order to enable delegations to make a more comprehensive assessment of the aforementioned proposals.

(signed) H. Wegehler

Ambassador
Head of the Delegation of the
Federal Republic of Germany

Re-issued for technical reasons.

On 17 March, the first day of the pause in negotiations, the Federal Cabinet discussed the state of the INF negotiations in Geneva.

The Cabinet takes the view that:

1. These negotiations - in comparison with other arms control negotiations - are being conducted rapidly. Both sides have presented negotiation proposals and made their objectives clear. The pause in negotiations is now necessary in order to give both delegations an opportunity to analyse the course of the negotiations thus far, to inform their Governments, and to prepare the continuation of the talks on 20 May.

2. On the first day of the pause in negotiations Secretary-General Brezhnev announced a Soviet decision to introduce a unilateral moratorium on the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the Soviet Union. This decision is similar in content to earlier moratorium proposals made by the Soviet Union. Its becoming effective is made dependent on whether or not the West stops preparations for stationing American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Europe. Thus, similar to its predecessors, this Soviet decision aims at preventing the deployment of these American weapons in Europe independent of the course taken by the Geneva negotiations and to preserve the existing imbalance in this area to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

On 16 March 1982 the Government spokesman recalled the fact that the Soviet Union presently has more than 300 SS-20 missiles armed with 900 warheads, of which two-thirds are aimed at targets in Europe. In addition, SS-20 missiles stationed beyond the Ural mountains can reach Western European territory because of their long-range capacity. A moratorium on deployment on its European territory leaves the possibility open to the Soviet Union to continue deploying SS-20 missiles East of the Urals, from where they are no less a threat to Western Europe. Thus, only the elimination of the SS-20 missiles, such as demanded by the West, can remove this threat. The Soviet Union has expanded emplacements on both sides of the Urals where further SS-20 rockets can be deployed.

3. It continues to be of decisive importance for the Federal Government that concrete negotiation results be achieved by the end of summer 1983. It advocates complete renunciation of land-based intermediate-range missiles on both sides. It will assess the importance of the Soviet decision just announced on the basis of this objective. It recognizes in the declaration of the Soviet Secretary-General that the Soviet Union is greatly interested in not having American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles deployed in Europe. This interest can only be done justice to by means of an agreed reciprocal "zero solution" as the result of the Geneva negotiations. The Federal Government concludes from this that the negotiations can only lead to success if the Soviet Union has to reckon with the fact that otherwise these American weapons will in fact be deployed in Europe as of the end of 1983.

LETTER DATED 31 MARCH 1982 FROM THE HEADS OF THE
DELEGATIONS OF INDONESIA AND THE NETHERLANDS
TRANSMITTING A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "INDONESIA AND
THE NETHERLANDS - WORKING DOCUMENT - DESTRUCTION
OF ABOUT 45 TONS OF MUSTARD AGENT AT BATUJAJAR,
WEST-JAVA, INDONESIA"

We have the honour to transmit and request circulation of the enclosed document
entitled:

"Indonesia and The Netherlands - Working Document - Destruction of about
45 tons of mustard agent at Batujajar, West-Java, Indonesia".

(signed) Nana S. Sutresna
Ambassador,
Head of the Delegation of
the Republic of Indonesia

(signed) Dr. Frans van Dongen
Ambassador
Head of the Delegation of
the Kingdom of The Netherlands

DESTRUCTION OF ABOUT 45 TONS OF MUSTARD AGENT
AT BATUJAJAR, WEST-JAVA, INDONESIA

I. BACKGROUND

1. In the period between 1940 and 1941 the Government of the then "Netherlands East Indies" manufactured several tens of tons of mustard agent - using the thiodiglycol method - in a plant at an army site at Batujajar near the city of Bandung, West-Java, Indonesia. This stockpile was intended as a deterrent against the possible initiation of chemical warfare in an eventual war in the region. When the war broke out, chemical weapons were not used. The stockpile of mustard agents remained at the site during the Japanese occupation period. In the period between 1949 and the beginning of 1950, the plant was dismantled. However, the mustard agent, stored in sealed tanks in underground shelters was not destroyed. National authorities of the two countries did not know of the existence of mustard agent and only a limited number of people were aware of this situation.
2. Not until the second half of the seventies was attention drawn to this matter by one of the persons who had been involved in the dismantling of the plant. The Indonesian Government, which wanted to eliminate this dangerous heritage, requested technical assistance from the Netherlands Government, being responsible for the matter. For this purpose, it was agreed that the Netherlands Government would provide technical assistance, including technical experts, while the Indonesian Government would provide security and logistics during the operation. The Netherlands Government charged the Prins Maurits Laboratory TNO to provide such a assistance.
3. Accordingly, the Netherlands Government sent a fact-finding mission in April 1978. The fact-finding mission located five steel tanks of 10 cubic metres in stone shelters half-filled with water at a terrain adjacent to an artillery shooting range and in close proximity of an inhabited area. One of the tanks had corroded to the extent that the contents had apparently leaked out. Water and soil samples were taken from within the remains of the tank, from within the shelter and from the soil just outside and underneath the shelter at various depths. No mustard agent could be detected in these samples but decomposition products were present and the evil smell of polysulphide containing hydrolysis products was clearly perceptible. The other four tanks were found to contain sulphur mustard in an estimated total amount of 35,000 litres with a purity of 95 per cent.
4. The presence of this large amount of mustard in close proximity to populated areas and the possibility that the tanks could begin to leak were a point of great concern to the Indonesian Government and it was decided that the mustard should be disposed of as soon as possible.

II. CONSIDERATIONS RELATIVE TO THE CHOICE OF THE METHOD OF DESTRUCTION

5. Possible methods for destruction or disposal of mustard are reviewed in the Canadian Paper (CD/173 of 3 April 1981 1/) and in Canadian and United States CCD Papers (CCD 434 2/ and 436 3/).
6. Initially, incineration of the mustard on board the M/T Vulcanus, which is owned by Ocean Combustion Services N.V., Rotterdam, was considered. This ship is equipped with two large incinerators and is frequently used for the destruction of industrial

wastes, e.g. organochlorine waste, 4/ by incineration at high sea. The Vulcanus was expected to be near Java in the beginning of 1979. However, the transport of the mustard from Batujajar over a distance of about 200 km through the densely populated areas of West-Java to the Tanjung Priok Harbour of Jakarta was considered to be too great a risk. This precluded also ocean dumping, which is generally considered unacceptable for several other reasons as well. 1/ On-site destruction was therefore necessary.

7. The following criteria were used in determining the method of destruction.

- (a) the process must be effective in destroying the mustard completely;
- (b) the process must be safe to operate and present no danger to the population in the vicinity;
- (c) the process must be environmentally acceptable;
- (d) the process must be able to operate under the Batujajar circumstances, e.g. restrictions on energy, water and materials supplies; availability of a large flat non-populated artillery shooting range, surrounded by settlements and adjacent to the storage site.

8. Open pit burning was environmentally unacceptable because of the resulting air pollution and would have presented an unacceptable risk to the neighbouring population.

9. Decontamination by reaction with Standard Tropical Bleach or the decontaminant DS-2 was considered impracticable inter alia because of the enormous amounts of decontaminants involved and the resulting disposal problem.

10. Miscellaneous methods described in the literature like reaction with sodium sulphide to an insoluble product 5/ or reaction with monoethanolamine (MEA) 6/ were only briefly considered and soon rejected. The first mainly because of the possibility of mustard being trapped in the solid and the disposal problem of the solid, the second because of the large amounts of MEA required (about 350 m³) and the necessity to dispose of the reaction products by incineration.

11. Destruction by hydrolysis in the manner described by Canada, 1/, 7/ was studied and also rejected. Reasons for this were that it would require large amounts of water and neutralizing agent, large heating capacity, good analytical instrumentation for process control, which would all be very difficult to realise under the Batujajar circumstances, but the main reason was the large volume of hydrolysate (estimated at 120 m³) that would have to be disposed of. Eventually the latter problem was solved in Canada by incineration of the hydrolysate, but in this case it seemed more practical to proceed directly to incineration of the mustard.

12. An incineration process has been used in the United States Chemical Agent and Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS). Details of CAMDS have been presented at the experts seminar held by the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in June 1980. More details on mustard destruction are contained in the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Project Eagle 8/ and in a laboratory report. 2/

13. For the destruction of the mustard in Batujajar the incineration method was finally chosen. For the design of the incineration process the necessary basic data were taken from the above-mentioned United States reports.

14. The effluent gases from the incineration of mustard will contain fairly large amounts of the corrosive and toxic gases sulphur dioxide and hydrochloric acid. In the United States CAMDS the effluent gases are cooled and scrubbed with alkaline solution and the resulting brine spray is dried so that the residue is a mixture of harmless inorganic salts. Assuming an incineration rate of 100 litres per hour scrubbing of the effluent gases would have required for the mustard in Batujajar 15 - 30 m³ of water per hour, at least 150 tons of sodium hydroxide and would have created a disposal problem of about 10,000 m³ of brine. It would have meant a technically much more complicated installation and would have required sophisticated process control equipment with additional chances of malfunctioning. If no acceptable solution for the disposal of the brine could be found, a spray drying installation would have to be installed with corresponding costs and difficulties with the provision of the required enormous amounts of energy. Instead, to cope with the problem of toxic gases in the effluent the concept of controlled incineration was developed for the Batujajar situation.

III. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

15. The concept of controlled incineration, which was to be applied in the destruction of mustard at Batujajar, was based on the dispersion of the effluent gases in the atmosphere without any purification. However, the burning rate of the mustard had to be adjusted to meteorological conditions in such a way that:

(a) outside the artillery shooting range, which is roughly rectangular with dimensions of 4.5 x 1.5 km and where the incineration would take place, the Maximum Immission Concentrations (M.I.C.) for sulphur dioxide and hydrochloric acid would never be exceeded. The MIC values are generally accepted maximum allowable concentrations at ground level which will not produce effects during indefinite exposure;

(b) inside the artillery shooting range the Maximum Allowable Concentrations (MAC values) for sulphur dioxide and hydrochloric acid would never be exceeded. The MAC (or TLV) values are considered to be the maximum allowable values for the time-weighted average concentrations during a normal working day, which will not produce adverse effects when the exposure period is defined as a normal working week during indefinite time.

16. The first condition would safeguard the health of the population living adjacent to the artillery shooting range, whereas the second condition would safeguard the health of the people involved in the destruction of the mustard.

17. In using dispersion models, the burning rates that would ensure the fulfilment of the above-mentioned conditions (allowable burning rates) had been calculated in dependence of the stability of the atmosphere, wind speeds and wind direction. The wind direction in relation to the shape of the terrain determined the distance over which sufficient dilution of the cloud should take place. The effluent gases would leave the chimney of the incinerator at a given speed and at an elevated temperature and the plume rise caused by these effects would have a positive influence

on the allowable burning rate. For extra safety, however, plume rise was not accounted for eventually in the tables resulting from the calculations.

18. These tables were to be used for the determination of the allowable burning rate during incineration upon indication of measured wind speed, wind direction and turbulence of the atmosphere. Furthermore, using portable measuring devices for sulphur dioxide and hydrochloric acid, it would be checked regularly whether the concentration of these gases at ground level was indeed below the standards set by their MEC and MAC values.

19. An incinerator should thus be designed and constructed that would enable the burning of mustard to be varied between zero and, according to the calculations, a maximum of 200 litres of mustard per hour.

20. The mustard would be pumped from the storage tanks into a transport tank of 2,000 litres (for greater flexibility two such tanks would be made available) using a pump unit, which would be designed to minimize the possibilities for contamination of personnel and surroundings. The full transport tank would then be moved towards the incinerator, which would be constructed some 4.5 km from the storage site on the artillery shooting range.

IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE EQUIPMENT

21. The incinerator was designed and built by the Central Technical Institute TNO. It consisted of a central chimney and two identical furnaces. Each furnace was equipped with a modified Oertly OE 5 two stage burner, which allowed burning of oil, of mustard and of mustard and oil simultaneously. The modification implied a separate mustard pump for which a one stage oilburner pump was chosen. Each furnace was also equipped with a ventilator which supplied air to the top of the furnace in order to cool the effluent gases, to maintain an underpressure in the furnace preventing leakages and to dilute the effluent gases initially. The burning rate could be varied from 0 - 200 litres per hour by adjustment of the liquid pressure on the nozzle and by changing the nozzle. The incinerator was provided with a number of automatic control devices, i.e.:

(a) an infra red flame safety device monitoring the existence of a proper flame inside the furnace;

(b) automatic switches monitoring the availability of sufficient combustion and dilution air (with combustion air shortage unburnt mustard might leave the furnace, with dilution air shortage the temperature of the effluent gases might increase to such an extent that the chimney's mechanical stability would be endangered);

(c) minimum and maximum temperature controls respectively ensuring that the furnace temperature was always above 800°C (and therefore the combustion efficiency of mustard was at least 99.9994 per cent) and that the furnace temperature could not rise above 1000°C.

22. If either one of these devices would be upset, the process would be stopped automatically. When changing nozzles of the burner, the dilution air ventilator had to be switched off and the furnace was shut off from the chimney. A safety

device prevented the untimely switching on of the dilution air ventilator. A flame ionization detector was used to check if unburnt mustard was leaving the chimney. A paramagnetic oxygen analyser measured the oxygen content of the effluent gases to check the combustion process. The temperature of the effluent gases was also measured continuously, because if the temperature would become too low, the upper part of the chimney might be attacked by the corrosive action of sulphur dioxide and hydrochloric acid whereas too high a temperature would be detrimental to the chimney's mechanical stability.

23. The power for the installation was provided by two sets of 10 KVA electricity generators. The whole installation was controlled from within a Portakabin, which housed the control panels and the measuring instruments.

24. The portable pump unit was designed and built at the Prins Maurits Laboratory. The pump itself was an air-driven membrane pump with Viton membranes and teflon valves. A diesel engine air compressor supplied the pressurized air. Filters were installed to prevent clogging of the nozzles of the burner by particulate material. The system offered the following possibilities:

- (a) pumping of mustard from the storage tanks into the transport tanks;
- (b) backflushing of the suction line with oil to decontaminate the suction part;
- (c) flushing of the pressure line with oil for decontamination and emptying this line by blowing some air through it. This procedure assured that virtually no mustard was spilled when disconnecting the transport tank from the pump unit.

25. The different functions were obtained by opening and closing valves according to a strict procedure.

26. A metemast was erected and the wind speed and wind direction were measured continuously at a height of 10 metres. The variations in wind direction were used to estimate the stability of the atmosphere. A portable measuring instrument for sulphur dioxide and semi-continuous measuring instruments for sulphur dioxide and hydrogen chloride were used to check the concentrations of these gases on and outside the artillery shooting range. The incinerator was constructed on a concrete foundation and was provided with lightning conductors.

27. A safety manual was written and strictly adhered to. During pumping, full protective gear consisting of mask, permeable protective clothing, boots and gloves were worn. This outfit was also worn when connecting the transport tank to the incinerator. Under the circumstances of high temperature and high humidity this put a large physiological burden on the personnel and could only be sustained for relatively short periods. In other situations as mentioned above, therefore, a partial protected posture was adopted which was changed to full protection only whenever liquid mustard was suspected to be present. Means for detection of mustard in liquid or gaseous form were available.

28. Decontamination and cleansing stations were set up near the incinerator and on the storage site. First aid means were available and medical assistance was assured by the presence of a medical doctor and an ambulance for transport to the Cimahi Hospital during the incineration phase.

V. THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION

29. The concept of the operation was developed shortly after the return of the fact-finding mission to the Netherlands; it was worked out in detail in the months that followed. At the end of October 1978, after the Indonesian authorities had consented to the plan, work on the design and the construction of the incinerator, pump unit and auxiliary equipment as well as on the provision of protective and detection equipment, etc. was started. By mid-February 1979 the incinerator could be tested for proper functioning and beginning of March 1979, 22 tons of equipment and materials were shipped to Indonesia to arrive in Jakarta on 28 April 1979.

30. In the meantime, the PUSNUBIKAD (NBC - Corps) of the Indonesian Army had made the necessary arrangements and preparations in Batujajar, such as construction of the foundation of the incinerator, improvements in road conditions on storage site and artillery shooting range, provision of domestic oil for heating the furnaces, organization of the transport of materials and equipment from Tanjung Priok Harbour to Batujajar, etc. The security and logistics of the operation were taken care of by the Indonesian Army. Personnel to assist in the construction of the equipment was also provided, and a team of officials from PUSNUBIKAD and other competent services of the army joined the Netherlands' team in the execution of the task.

31. The construction phase was started immediately after the arrival of the materials and equipment at Batujajar on 2 May 1979. This phase which included the final testing of the equipment and the adjustment of the various controls of the incinerator lasted until 23 May 1979.

32. The incineration phase commenced on 1 June 1979. In the period that followed until 2 July 1979, 32,290 litres of mustard were destroyed on the average of 1,000 litres per day.

33. Incineration took place only in daytime, from about half an hour after sunrise till half an hour before sunset. At night meteorological conditions were found to be not suitable for meeting the requirements of the controlled incineration concept. In daytime the meteorological conditions were more favourable than expected, in particular the wind direction, which at the beginning of the dry season was predominantly along the axis of the terrain. In combination with the effect of plume rise, which was considerable, this made it possible to attain the maximum burning rate of 160 litres per hour throughout almost the whole period. The concentrations of sulphur dioxide and hydrochloric acid were never found to exceed the MAC or MIC values respectively on and outside the terrain.

34. Two problems were encountered during the incineration period. First, the magnetic valves in the mustard circuit got stuck on several occasions, due to polymeric substances being present in minute amounts in the mustard, and had to be replaced. This was, however, a minor problem compared to difficulties encountered because of corrosion of the mustard pumps. This corrosion was caused by strong acidic constituents resulting from partial hydrolysis in the storage tanks (a.o. ferric chloride was present as a result of reaction of acid with the storage tank wall). The presence of these acidic constituents was in contrast with the results of the analysis of the samples taken in 1978. No acidic constituents were found and the purity was estimated at about 95 per cent. This might be the result of penetration of rain water into the storage tanks in the year that elapsed after sampling, or more likely of superficial sampling by the fact-finding mission in the previous year. The corrosion problems were encountered throughout the whole incineration period. These were solved by replacing the simple pumps when they did not function anymore. The problem became only serious when the replacement of the pumps of the fourth tank became so frequent that the stock of pumps became exhausted and incineration had to be interrupted from 26 - 28 June 1979.

35. In this situation, on 2 July 1979, the decision had to be taken to stop burning the last 2,710 litres remaining in the fourth tank. This amount was strongly acidic and contained about 20 per cent ferric chloride. The disposal of these 2,710 litres of mustard was eventually carried out by the Indonesian team using the method of hydrolysis. For safety purposes, the bunker was sealed off completely and the only way for the air to escape from the bunker was through a hardened plastic tube which penetrated into the bunker and which was erected vertically to a height of 3 metres from the surface of the bunker's cover. The mustard agent was destroyed by hydrolysis through addition of small quantities of sodium hydroxide solution and by mixing the contents of the storage tank, using the pump unit and some improvised heating. The addition of sodium hydroxide had to be stopped when detection made at a distance of 5 metres from the edge of the hardened plastic tube showed a positive reaction (heat produced during the hydrolysis enhanced the evaporation of the mustard). The addition of sodium hydroxide was continued when the detection proved to be negative. The work was completed in one and a half months during which chemical and toxicological analysis of the samples taken at regular intervals indicated that hydrolysis was complete.

36. After the pumping, a few tens of litres of mustard remained in the storage tanks. These were decontaminated by the addition of about 200 kilogrammes of standard tropical bleach as a slurry in water. Mixing was done with air from the air compressor and the air escaping from the tank was analysed from mustard vapour with the available means for mustard vapour detection. It took about three days before the mustard detection reaction became negative. The tanks were then filled with water completely. Later on the shelters were filled with soil. The decontamination of the transport tanks was carried out in a similar way using standard tropical bleach. The decontamination of the mustard circuit at the incinerator was done by first passing oil through this circuit into the incinerator for some time and later on possibly remaining mustard was destroyed by fire after taking it apart.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

37. The described project (named OBONG, meaning "to burn" in Sundanese language) has demonstrated that for quantities of mustard and under the conditions as indicated, the destruction of the mustard can be safely carried out in a reasonable period of time, using the controlled incineration concept and the relatively simple equipment as described.


38. The technical difficulties encountered could have been avoided if the possible occurrence of acidic and polymeric products in stocks of mustard of about 40 years old had been taken into account. The existence of inorganic compounds and polymer products in the liquid had caused difficulties in its incineration. However, when a very good quality of detection equipment and analytical-chemical facilities are available, the elimination of limited quantities of such liquid can be carried out successfully by a simple method of hydrolysis.

39. The experience gained during this operation confirmed that on-site inspection during the destruction is the only effective means of verification of actual destruction.

40. The fact that the destruction was carried out before the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention has also demonstrated the sincere will of the two countries effectively to promote the cause of disarmament.

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The incinerator at Batujajar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED KINGDOM AND AUSTRALIA
TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF "RECOVER" TECHNIQUES FOR CW VERIFICATION

Background

In future CW discussions in the Committee on Disarmament it will be important:

- to focus attention on unresolved issues, particularly in the area of verification, and
- find specific areas in which technical experts could contribute to working out an adequately verifiable ban.

One CD activity which could be considered in this regard is a co-operative international technical effort to evaluate remote continual verification ("recover") techniques as a potential component of a CW verification system. This paper outlines the "recover" concept and discusses what activity might be undertaken at the CD.

"Recover" is a unique global data collection network developed with United States Government (ACDA) support for use primarily in nuclear safeguards; it is designed to transmit digital data securely, economically and reliably from sensors installed at a facility in any part of the world to a central facility. The integrity of the data is assured by a tamper-resistant design of its components and the encryption of the data during transmission.

A demonstration system has been deployed since 1980 with sensors at facilities in Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, United Kingdom, the United States and a central station at the IAEA in Vienna. Intensive testing was conducted during November 1980 with less frequent testing (weekly instead of daily) continuing to date. The results have confirmed the feasibility of secure, low-cost reliable and timely transmission of data.

The experimental operation of "recover" is under the auspices of the IAEA, which is evaluating it for possible operational use. Representatives of the seven countries have formed an informal group of the participants in the "recover" project under the chairmanship of an IAEA representative. The group is meeting annually to plan and supervise the demonstration, to evaluate the results of the test, to make plans for future activities and to advise the IAEA on the feasibility of incorporating remote monitoring into the international safeguards system. Among the benefits to the participants are the opportunity to contribute in a very tangible manner to the improvement of international safeguards, as well as access in some cases to technology not otherwise available to them.

*Reissued for technical reasons.

While the "recover" system is being developed for nuclear safeguards purposes, the concepts and technology involved may have utility for verification in other situations as well.

Outline of possible project

Co-operative international technical evaluation of "recover"

Agreement could be sought for a co-operative technical evaluation, conducted under the aegis of the CD, of use of "recover" techniques to aid CW verification. A technical panel open to all interested States — including non-CD members — could be established for this purpose. The panel could:

- explore possible specific applications for "recover" (for example, for assisting in the monitoring of mothballed CW facilities);
- promote co-operation in identification of suitable sensors and in development of new sensors which are compatible with the "recover" system; and
- sponsor an international demonstration project in which sensors would be installed in a few selected facilities to provide a realistic test of the monitoring system. (The cost for one facility might be roughly \$20,000.)

Two years are likely to be needed to accomplish these tasks. Of course, if it appeared useful to continue, such tasks as sensor development could be extended.

The panel would forward to the CD periodic reports which outlined the panel's technical findings. It would be up to individual States to decide whether to support the use of "recover" as one component of a CW verification system.

Such an effort would be analogous to the IAEA technical evaluation effort outlined above. It could assist in resolving verification issues. It could be a confidence-building activity in which States co-operate to develop and evaluate improved monitoring arrangements.

MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

WORKING PAPER ON THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

The consideration at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly of the proposal to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space and the adoption of a resolution on the subject have demonstrated the international community's desire not to allow outer space to become an arena for the arms race and a source of strained relations between States.

In its resolution 36/99, the United Nations General Assembly, referring to the existing draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, requests the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty.

Furthermore, the General Assembly has also adopted resolution 36/97 C, which includes, inter alia, a request to the Committee on Disarmament that it consider the question of conducting negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and, in particular, the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

Taking into account those recommendations of the General Assembly and the desire of the international community for the adoption of effective measures aimed at providing a comprehensive solution to the problem of preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space, the Committee on Disarmament has decided to include in the agenda of its 1982 session a new item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic deems it necessary for the Committee on Disarmament to embark immediately, in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly, on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of an appropriate international treaty.

In Working Paper CD/241, a group of socialist countries has already expressed its willingness to support the establishment, within the framework of the Committee, of ad hoc working groups on various questions, including the question of prohibiting the deployment in outer space of weapons of any type.

The Mongolian delegation proposes that an ad hoc working group should be established on that question for the second half of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

In an effort to facilitate the speedy establishment of such an ad hoc working group, the Mongolian delegation submits for the consideration of the Committee the following draft terms of reference for the group:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the second half of its 1982 session, an ad hoc working group for the purposes of conducting negotiations on item 7 of the agenda, 'Prohibition of an arms race in outer space', and agreeing on a text for a corresponding international treaty, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives in that respect.

The ad hoc working group shall submit a report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament before the completion of the second half of the Committee's 1982 session".

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/273

6 April 1982

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 APRIL 1982 FROM THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF INDIA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A NOTE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN RESPONSE TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 36/31 A AND B PERTAINING TO THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

1. I have the honour to submit, in two copies, the text of a Note, transmitted by the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in New York to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in response to General Assembly Resolutions 36/31 A and B pertaining to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. The Note conveys the views of the Government of India on the substantive issues related to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, and suggestions for the prevention of nuclear war.
2. I would be grateful if the text of the Note is circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed)

(A.P. Venkateswaran)

Ambassador

Head of the Delegation of India

1. The Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in response to General Assembly resolutions 36/31 A and B pertaining to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, has the honour to transmit Government of India's views on the substantive issues related to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and suggestions for the prevention of nuclear war.
2. In India's view, the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will need to build on the Final Document of the First Special Session. The adoption of the Final Document by consensus was a unique, significant and unprecedented development. It is noteworthy that this Document covered the whole range of questions in the field of disarmament, and was able to secure the support of the entire membership of the United Nations. The adoption of this Final Document, therefore, marked a truly historic landmark in disarmament efforts, and an epoch-making event in the forging of an international disarmament strategy.
3. The work of the Second Special Session will need to be organized as part of humanity's continuing quest for attaining the internationally agreed goal of general and complete disarmament (GCD) under effective international control with the highest priority being accorded to the objectives of nuclear disarmament and elimination of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction.
4. Since the existence of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to the very survival of mankind, world public opinion is increasingly veering to the view that the entire disarmament process leading up to the cherished goal of GCD would need to be completed within a fixed, short-time duration that should be agreed to in advance. The Soviet and United States draft treaties on GCD that had been tabled at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva in 1962 had envisaged a maximum total time-frame of four years and nine to ten years respectively for the entire disarmament process, and there appears no valid reason why the achievement of the goal of GCD including the highest priority objectives of nuclear disarmament and elimination of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction should be delayed any further.
5. The four basic and inescapable facts about nuclear weapons are:
 - (i) The existing nuclear armouries already contain large megaton weapons, every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered.
 - (ii) The present arsenals of nuclear weapons (believed to number 50,000 or so) have an overkill capacity, that is of destroying all life on earth several times over.
 - (iii) A nuclear war is unthinkable, since the escalation would be immediate and the destruction will be catastrophic. There can be no winners in a nuclear war, since the civilized life as we know it will cease to exist anywhere.

(iv) The very existence of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to the survival of mankind, because so long as nuclear weapons are allowed to remain in the armoury of any nation the danger of the use of such weapons by design, accident or miscalculation will be ever present, with the grim prospect of a nuclear holocaust.

6. It becomes obvious then that in this nuclear age the struggle for disarmament cannot be waged by the international community on the basis of out-moded concepts, theories or practices of the pre-nuclear-weapons days, which envisaged some kind of balanced regulation or limitation of armaments and which even earlier had proved to be of no avail, since they basically derive from bankrupt notions of balance of power (or so-called deterrence) and spheres of influence.

7. It is a matter of grave concern that systematic efforts are nevertheless being made on the basis of erroneous thinking on disarmament, in certain influential quarters to change the direction, shift the focus and distort the priorities from nuclear weapons to conventional weapons, from global approach to regional approach, from measures of real disarmament and arms limitation to the so-called confidence building measures (CBMs) and verification problems, from military alliances to non-aligned countries, and from the huge weapon stockpiles of the Great Powers to the legitimate means of defence of small countries. The cause of real disarmament can never be served if such misguided efforts are permitted or tolerated.

8. The focus of the international community must remain on nuclear weapons. This basic consideration has guided India's principal initiatives, namely, in 1954, for the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests; in 1964, for the stoppage of all proliferation of nuclear weapons, be it horizontal or vertical; and, in 1973, for the prohibition of any use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament.

9. India would now propose that there should be a freeze on nuclear weapons. Such a freeze would inter alia, consist of two inseparable elements, namely (i) a complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and (ii) a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Such a combined step would mean that all nuclear facilities everywhere in the world would become peaceful, and in that event the nuclear-weapon states would not have any reason, excuse or pretext for refusing to accept international safeguards on their own nuclear energy establishment, which they are asking non-nuclear-weapon States to accept on theirs, in the name of the so-called fullscope (or complete nuclear fuel cycle) safeguards. Also, in that event, an effective and yet economical safeguards system could be devised on the basis of objective, scientific and non-discriminatory criteria, since it will be applicable to all States. A freeze on nuclear weapons will greatly help in the prevention of nuclear war and will be an outstanding achievement of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/274
7 April 1982
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Letter dated 6 April 1982 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space submitted to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly

I transmit herewith the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space that was introduced by the USSR delegation at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this draft as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. ISSRAELIAN

Draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons
of any kind in outer space

The States Parties to this treaty,

Guided by the goals of strengthening peace and international security,

Proceeding on the basis of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,

Desiring not to allow outer space to become an arena for the arms race and a source of aggravating relations between States,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

1. States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type or of other types which States Parties may develop in the future.

2. Each State Party to this treaty undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 2

States Parties shall use space objects in strict accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding.

Article 3

Each State Party undertakes not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States Parties, if such objects were placed in orbit in strict accordance with article 1, paragraph 1, of this treaty.

Article 4

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each State Party shall use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each State Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

3. In order to promote the objectives and provisions of this treaty, the States Parties shall, when necessary, consult each other, make inquiries and provide information in connection with such inquiries.

Article 5

1. Any State Party to this treaty may propose amendments to this treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party to this Treaty which has accepted it, upon the deposit with the depositary of instruments of acceptance by the majority of States Parties. Thereafter, the amendment shall enter into force for each remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 6

This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 7

Each State Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the decision adopted six months before withdrawing from the treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events which the notifying State Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article 8

1. This treaty shall be open to all States for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This treaty shall enter into force between the States which have deposited instruments of ratification upon the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the fifth instrument of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and accession, the date of entry into force of this treaty as well as other notices.

Article 9

This treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

LETTER DATED 5 APRIL 1982 FROM THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE
OF CANADA TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
FORWARDING A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "COMPENDIUM OF ARMS CONTROL
VERIFICATION PROPOSALS - SECOND EDITION"

On 12 June 1980 the Canadian Delegation had the honour to table in the Committee on Disarmament a Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals (CD/99) the purpose of which was to survey as many verification proposals as possible using the records of official bodies and academic literature, with the view to creating a quick reference catalogue. The work on this volume, which was completed in 1978 has subsequently been revised and updated, and is now reflected in the second edition.

We believe that the Compendium (second edition) may have for members of the Committee on Disarmament the same interest and utility as the first edition, and I would accordingly ask that it be circulated. The Canadian Mission has additional copies should any delegation wish to receive more than one.

(Signed) Gerald R. Skinner,
Deputy Representative

1/ A limited distribution of this document in English has been made to the members of the Committee on Disarmament.

NOTE VERBALE DATED 29 MARCH 1982 FROM THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF TUNISIA ADDRESSED TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

The Permanent Mission of Tunisia in Geneva presents its compliments to the Committee on Disarmament and has the honour to inform it that the delegation of Tunisia to the first session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1982 would like to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Working Groups on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons respectively.

SWEDEN

Working PaperThe concept "precursor" and a suggestion for definition for the purpose
of a Chemical Weapons ConventionIntroduction

During the consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group for Chemical Weapons regarding standardized toxicity determinations, the Swedish delegation presented a Working Paper, CD/CW/CTC/4. In response to the ensuing discussions on the matter the Swedish delegation now wants to submit a revised version taking into account points of views which were then raised by other delegations.

Several working papers have been submitted on the subject during the spring session 1982. Some of them are summarized and commented upon in Working Paper CD/266, 24 March 1982, presented by Yugoslavia, entitled Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification.

The main reason why the concept of "precursors" has a particular importance in connection with the Chemical Weapons Convention relates to the question of "binary chemical weapons". The idea of binary weapons, described below, is not new. It has for a long time been realized that these types of weapons have to be provided for under a CW-convention. The discussions on the matter in the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessors have been relatively vague until the imminence of production of such weapons spurred the discussion.

However, as a matter of fact precursors will have to be provided for under the convention also in order to monitor non-production of some chemical warfare agents. These relations are discussed below.

Binary and "classical" chemical weapons

The term "binary chemical weapon" should be used to denote the complete warhead or other disseminating device, which includes two more or less toxic chemicals, and which is constructed to let a chemical reaction take place between these chemicals to form a (super-)toxic chemical warfare agent immediately before and in connection with delivery to the target. The term should not be used to describe the (main) chemical end product, i.e. the chemical warfare agent itself, which is produced within the warhead. This production technique may be called the "binary technique", and the term be reserved for this purpose.

The same chemical warfare agent might also be produced from the same or other chemicals by means of other techniques, e.g. on a laboratory scale or in a large scale production of the warfare agent aimed at stockpiling the warfare agent in "bulk" stocks, or for charging "classical" chemical warheads.

Reactants, precursors and "key (CW) precursors"

In the science of chemistry the starting chemicals in a chemical reaction forming a particular chemical compound are usually called "reactants". In the case of production of chemical warfare agents the starting chemicals or "reactants" are sometimes called "precursors". Any unequivocal definition of this expression seems not to have been established. Sometimes both the reactants in a chemical reaction, forming the chemical warfare agent, are called precursors, but often only one of them. In the latter case, one usually chooses to denote the reactant "precursor" which in some respects is more unique than the others, i.e. it may be more difficult to produce, or it may not be readily available from commercial sources (usually because there is no peaceful use for the compound), or, in some cases e.g. regarding nerve agents, it mainly determines which class of compounds the final product will belong to.

In the case of the nerve agents, it is natural to denote the organophosphorus reactants "precursors". The other component in a reaction, which usually is a common commercial chemical, which need not concern us here, is then called "reactant". There can also be more than one such "other reactant".

It is suggested that this latter approach is followed when defining "precursor" for the purpose of a chemical weapons convention. The term "precursor" could also be made still more specialized for the purpose of a CW-convention by additional words, e.g. "key CW precursor", which has been proposed in the discussions during the consultations.

This approach could apply not only to the "binary technique" for production of chemical warfare agents, but also to other production processes. It would then refer to the "key CW precursor", which is used in the final step, or in starting the final consecutive steps in a "one pot synthesis" for the production of the chemical warfare agent, irrespective of the possibility that intermediate products may still be formed during the reaction process.

Obviously, there must exist "precursors" to the "key CW precursor". Even if it would be desirable to "catch" such "pre"-key CW precursors, with no peaceful uses, in an early part of the production chain, this seems to be impossible from a practical point of view.

Further, it is clear that in different types of production processes, different "key CW precursors" (as well as different "reactants") may be used to form the same chemical warfare agent. The method of definition suggested here would imply that they would be defined as "key CW precursors" irrespective of the method of production, i.e. irrespective of whether different precursors were used to obtain the same

Suggestion for definition of "key CW precursors"

A tentative suggestion for a definition of "key CW precursors" follows below. The Swedish delegation is open for comments and suggestions to improve the definition, which reads as follows:

"Key CW precursor" is the starting reactant in a one pot chemical synthesis forming a super-toxic lethal, other lethal, or other harmful chemical, which determines the main characteristics (class of compound, toxicity etc.) of the chemical formed, when the reaction is taking place:

1. in a chemical weapon warhead or other disseminating device for chemical weapons, immediately before the dissemination of the final, toxic product, i.e. the chemical warfare agent,
2. in a production facility producing super-toxic lethal, other lethal, or other harmful chemicals.

Purpose and quantity criteria

It is clear that one would also in the case of "key CW precursors" have to resort to the "purpose criterion", possibly together with the "quantity criterion" insofar as occasionally some "key CW precursor(s)" might find use for "peaceful purposes". To our knowledge, this is very rare with respect to organophosphorus compounds, i.e. "key CW precursors" of nerve agents. It would thus not constitute any serious obstacle to treat the "key CW precursors" to super-toxic lethal chemicals in the same way as these chemicals to be subject to the same verification provisions under a convention.

The purpose and quantity criteria should, of course, in the same way apply also to such "key CW precursors" as could form "dual-purpose" chemicals.

Toxicity criterion

With respect to the applicability of the toxicity criterion to "key CW precursors" this should not be applied to these chemicals themselves, since there is no correlation to their toxicities and those of the final products. One could choose to let the toxicity criterion relate to the mixture containing the chemical warfare agent as an end product of the "one pot synthesis". One would then have to consider the fact that this final mixture would contain less of the warfare agent because of the presence of some other chemicals also formed during the reaction, which should lessen the toxicity as compared with the pure agent. On the other hand, the mere presence of other chemicals than the warfare agent in the final mixture might either enhance or diminish the toxicity. In the case of nerve agents the toxicity range would, however, refer these mixtures to super-toxic lethal or other lethal chemicals. It is sometimes presented as an unacceptable difficulty that toxicity tests on reaction mixtures, whether emanating from the "binary technique" or from an ordinary production process, would not result in sufficiently exact results to allow a clear cut dedication of the reaction mixture to one or another of the types of chemicals, (super-toxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals) to which the toxicity criterion applies. The technical solution to that problem is of course to analyse chemically the reaction mixture containing the formed chemicals. Once these formed chemicals are identified, samples of them could be tested for their toxicity, if such values had not already been established by agreed standardized toxicity tests. Such tests would lead to sufficiently exact results.

One might also apply a rule that when the tested toxicity of the reaction mixtures falls within the category of super-toxic lethal chemicals, the mixture itself as well as the identified "key CW precursor(s)" be referred to this group of chemicals.

If the toxicity was already known, the categorization of the formed chemical would already be clear, and the established presence of it in the reaction mixture by means of chemical analysis would make further toxicity tests unnecessary.

Conclusions

The consequence of this reasoning is that also the "key CW precursor", which took part in the reaction and which decided the character of the toxic chemical, i.e. the chemical warfare agent, can be related, even if indirectly to the toxicity criterion. Thus, if a "key CW precursor" by means of a chemical reaction with other reactants gives rise to e.g. a super-toxic lethal chemical, the precursor itself should be subject to the same provisions under the convention as the super-toxic lethal chemical.

Another conclusion is that this reasoning applies also in the case of unknown and undeclared chemical warfare agents. (Since they should be declared under a convention, we are here talking about a possible violation of the convention). If a binary chemical warhead, containing different precursors and reactants, was found, it would be possible first to identify the precursors chemically, then to let them react with each other and analyse chemically the formed chemicals, and, finally, if necessary, isolate them (if unknown) from the reaction mixture and test their toxicities. It would then be possible to decide which one (or more) of the precursors would be characterized as the "key CW precursor" to be subject to the provisions of the convention.

CHINA

Working Paper**On Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-
Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of
Nuclear Weapons**

Since its establishment over two years ago, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has held detailed and intensive discussions on the substance and form of negative security assurances. Faced with grave nuclear threat, numerous non-nuclear-weapon States call upon the nuclear-weapon States to provide unconditional assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, and to conclude an international convention of a legally binding character. The Chinese delegation supports this reasonable demand. In the past two years and more, because the major nuclear powers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals imposed various conditions on non-nuclear-weapon States, no concrete result has been achieved so far in the negotiations on security assurances. The Chinese delegation believes that it is a minimum obligation of all the nuclear-weapon States to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with adequate security assurances, and in particular that the major nuclear powers with the largest nuclear arsenals bear primary responsibility in this respect. What the non-nuclear-weapon States ask for is unconditional assurances. They have rightly pointed out that demanding conditional assurances is tantamount to seeking security assurance for nuclear-weapon States from non-nuclear-weapon States. This is obviously unfair and unjust.

The Chinese delegation wishes to reiterate its position as follows: the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons are essential for the elimination of nuclear war and nuclear threats. Pending the achievement of this goal, the nuclear-weapon States should at least undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear free-zones. China has already, on its own initiative and unilaterally, declared that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. In connection with this fundamental position, China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

Resolution 36/95 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

It is our hope that the major nuclear powers shall not proceed from their own narrow interests and shall refrain from imposing various conditions with regard to security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, they should respond positively to the reasonable demands voiced by a great number of non-nuclear-weapon States and demonstrate their political will to shoulder responsibilities with a view to ensuring progress in negotiations on security assurance. Together with the representatives of other countries, the Chinese delegation is ready to make further efforts to seek a "common formula" in consonance with demands of non-nuclear-weapon States and acceptable to all States.

SWEDEN

Working Paper

Suggestions for measures to enhance confidence between the Parties negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons

In all disarmament negotiations a certain degree of trust between the Parties concerned is an important prerequisite for results. This seems to be particularly true with respect to the efforts to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. One of the characteristics of the negotiations to prohibit these weapons is the difficulty to obtain an effective verification system. Any agreement banning chemical weapons must, therefore, to some extent rely on mutual confidence.

Recent developments have caused increased distrust and a generally deteriorated atmosphere, particularly between the military powers possessing the largest quantities of chemical weapons. In order to improve prospects of ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons there is, therefore, an obvious need to take measures intended to enhance mutual confidence between the countries concerned already during the negotiating stage. Such "preconvention measures" would facilitate and shorten the time needed for negotiations.

It should be noted that some countries have already undertaken such measures in connection with the CD negotiations on chemical weapons.

Having in mind what has previously been undertaken and in order to go forward and intensify these efforts the Swedish delegation considers that it would be useful to discuss the matter in the framework of the CW negotiations in the CD. By way of examples the following preconvention measures could be considered.

1. Declaration of possession or non-possession of chemical weapons.
2. Visits to destruction plants and exchange of information regarding methods for destruction of chemical weapons.
3. Co-operation between States regarding protection of civilian and military personnel against chemical warfare.
4. Exchange of information on methods for monitoring scientific and technical development relevant to chemical weapons.

The declarations mentioned under point 1 have been called for virtually since the beginning of the negotiations on biological and chemical weapons in the late sixties.

Such declarations would in principle put all negotiating Parties whether they possess weapons or not on an equal footing with regard to the availability of relevant information about each other and demonstrate the commitment by possessing Parties to serious negotiations. Such declarations have already been made by many negotiating Parties.

The kind of visits and information exchange suggested under point 2, have already been organized both within and outside the CD context. The Swedish delegation considers that efforts to show that preparations already are under way to destroy chemical weapons, even if so far only with regard to obsolete and aging munition, would enhance the confidence in the ongoing negotiation. It is important that all possessing States contribute to these efforts. This would particularly be the case in relation to the destruction of chemical weapons, which is a problem that will have to be dealt with already during the negotiating phase.

The question of co-operation regarding protection referred to under point 3 has already been raised several times by negotiating Parties. Discussions about possible concrete measures to be taken should, therefore, be encouraged.

The item listed under point 4 has been subject to some preliminary discussions dating back to 1968. Further technical discussions on this issue should be initiated with a broad and comprehensive participation of the negotiating delegations.

It is the opinion of the Swedish delegation that a suitable starting point would be an exchange of views of the versatility of the suggested measures.

STATEMENT^{1/} OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AGAINST
THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. The Group of 21 believes that the most effective assurances of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon States should refrain from any activity in the nuclear field which would jeopardize the security and well-being of the peoples of non-nuclear weapon States. The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to guarantee that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. The Group of 21, therefore, welcomed the establishment of an ad hoc Working Group to reach agreement on "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".
2. Most regrettably, three years of negotiations in the ad hoc Working Group have produced only marginal progress. This is due principally to the inflexible positions taken by some nuclear weapon States.
3. The Group of 21 is firmly convinced that the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in the unilateral declarations of some nuclear weapon States reflect their subjective approach and that these declarations are based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Taken together, these conditions, limitations and exceptions have the effect of severely restricting such positive features as may be contained in these unilateral declarations and they are, therefore, unacceptable to members of the Group of 21. The declarations do not offer a credible assurance to non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.
4. The Group of 21 notes that in accordance with paragraph 62 of the Final Document, the nuclear weapon States have given undertakings to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which are members of the existing nuclear weapon free zone. Besides these States, other neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances are committed not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. There is therefore every reason for these States being covered by the same legally binding assurances, especially if one takes into account that the nuclear weapon States were urged in paragraph 59 to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
5. The Group of 21 emphasizes that an agreement on the question of "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" should be based on the following principles:
 - (i) The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to assure the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

^{1/} The Statement represents the common denominator of the positions of the members of the Group of 21.

- (ii) Non-nuclear weapon States have the right to be assured by the nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (iii) Such assurances should be provided in a legally binding and multilaterally negotiated international instrument. The Group of 21 notes with satisfaction that there is no objection, in principle, within the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention;
- (iv) A common formula or common approach to be included in an international instrument on this question should be clear and credible, and respond both to the legitimate security concerns of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States as well as to the views of the Group of 21 stated above;
- (v) The agreement on this question should encompass commitments by the nuclear weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. The Group of 21 considers that further negotiations in the ad hoc working group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. The Group, therefore, urges the nuclear weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States. Such an undertaking would facilitate the task of elaborating an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It would also contribute towards progress in achieving an international agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament.

SPECIAL REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
PREPARED IN VIEW OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons

I. Introduction

1. Taking into consideration paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament which, while noting that negotiations had been proceeding for several years stated that the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons was one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations, the Committee on Disarmament has consistently included the item "chemical weapons" on its agenda since 1979. In 1979, before the establishment of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the item was dealt with in plenary meetings. In considering this item on its agenda, the Committee has been taking into account the provisions of existing international instruments on the subject as well as all proposals and documents, including draft texts of chemical weapons conventions and joint United States-USSR reports on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CD/48, CD/112), presented within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the Committee on Disarmament (CD), the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. A list of all the documents of the Committee on Disarmament submitted under the agenda item entitled "Chemical Weapons", as well as of the documents of the Working Group which included working papers and conference room papers, is contained in the annex to this report.

II. Mandate and substantive considerations of the Working Group in 1980 and 1981

2. In 1980, the Committee on Disarmament established an ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons by the following decision:

"In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1980 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to define, through substantive examination, issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives."

3. Under its 1980 mandate, the Working Group, having agreed to structure its work under the three general headings of "scope", "verification" and "other matters", undertook a substantive examination of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. On the basis of this examination, the issues on which convergence of views among participating delegations emerged and those where no convergence of views existed were ascertained (document CD/131/Rev.1).

4. The Working Group was re-established by the Committee in 1981, to continue its work on the basis of its former mandate.

5. In 1981, the Working Group carried out a detailed examination of draft Elements of a chemical weapons convention, as proposed by the Chairman. These draft Elements covered the following issues: general provision; general definition of chemical weapons; prohibition of transfer; declarations; destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion; super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes; relationship with other treaties; international co-operation; general provision on verification; national legislation and verification measures; national technical means of verification; consultation and co-operation; consultative committee; amendments; review conference; duration and withdrawals; signature, ratification, accession; and the distribution of the convention. The questions related to definitions and criteria, declaration of possession of stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of chemical weapons, plans for their destruction or diversion for permitted purposes in time frames as well as forms of making such declarations were dealt with in annexes to the Elements. The same approach was suggested by the Chairman with respect to the destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production, the recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system, as well as the details of the organization and procedures of the consultative committee. The Chairman revised the draft Elements on the basis of statements as well as of that of oral and written comments of delegations. These Elements, as revised by the Chairman, did not, however, reflect all the views which emerged on certain issues. The revised text of the Chairman's Elements, together with comments reflecting views put forward by delegations, were attached to the Group's 1981 report to the Committee (document CD/220).

III. Present state in the elaboration of a convention

6. In 1982, the Committee on Disarmament decided on the following mandate for the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons:

... "In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiative with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date." ...

7. The Group, during the first part of its 1982 session, began the elaboration of the provisions of a convention. At the suggestion of the Chairman, it carried out another detailed examination of the revised Elements and of the Comments thereto, with a view to elaborating alternative and supplementary formulations in particular corresponding to the views originally expressed in the Comments. These considerations of the revised Elements were grouped under the three previously agreed headings of "scope", "verification" and "other matters". A number of delegations submitted conference room papers containing new wording corresponding to their views originally reflected in the Comments. In addition, some delegations submitted related proposals in plenary statements and CD documents. Wording was also proposed for certain Elements and Annexes which had not been dealt with during the 1981 session. The Chairman submitted a proposal for the Preamble to a future convention.

8. The process of resolving differences of views continued. There was common understanding that the scope of the prohibition should include all existing and possible types of chemical weapons. The ad hoc Working Group examined in greater detail the major outstanding problems of the scope of the prohibition and of questions related to verification. The main differences regarding the scope concern the inclusion of provisions in the convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, provisions regarding the applicability of the convention with respect to animals and plants, whether it should include the prohibition of planning, organization and training for the purpose of utilizing the toxic properties of chemicals in combat, and provisions on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States. Questions regarding the balance between national and international verification, the appropriateness of the inclusion of a provision on the use of national technical means of verification, the organization and functions of the Consultative Committee and the national verification or implementation system, as well as the issues of when on-site inspection shall take place and how a prohibition of binary chemical weapons should be verified remain to be agreed upon. A better understanding was reached of the need to ensure that verification of compliance with the convention be based on an adequate combination of national and international means. Measures relating to the implementation of the convention, such as declarations, were examined in more detail. Specific proposals were also put forward by a number of delegations with a view to improving the possible structure of a future convention. The revised Elements and Comments included in the 1981 report of the Working Group to the CD as well as the proposals and suggested texts submitted during the first part of the Committee's 1982 session will constitute a valuable basis for the Group's future work.

9. Following the practice introduced in 1981 by the Chairman to hold consultations on certain technical questions relevant to the future convention, the Chairman, at the Group's 1982 session, convened consultations on issues recommended for further examination in the Group's 1981 report. The 1982 consultations dealt specifically with methods to be agreed upon for toxicity determinations in connection with a chemical weapons convention. The Chairman reported to the Working Group that the participants in these consultations unanimously recommended standardized operating procedures for two specific types of toxicity determinations. The Working Group took note of the Chairman's report on the consultations and of the recommendations for standardized operating procedures. The Group agreed on the desirability of continuing consultations to allow for the examination of additional technical questions including some outstanding toxicological issues in relation to a chemical weapons convention.

10. The urgency of achieving real progress towards the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons was unanimously recognized by the Working Group especially in the light of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Accordingly, the Working Group endorsed the appeal of its Chairman for even more substantive contributions to advance the process of elaborating provisions of the convention at the earliest possible date.

ANNEX

List of Documents on Chemical Weapons

A. Documents of the Committee on Disarmament

In 1979

- Document CD/5, dated 6 February 1979, submitted by the delegation of Italy, containing a working paper on chemical disarmament negotiations.
- Document CD/6, dated 6 February 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, concerning some procedural suggestions with respect to the development of a ban on chemical weapons.
- Document CD/11, dated 9 April 1979, submitted by the Group of 21, containing a working paper on negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.
- Document CD/14, dated 25 April 1979, submitted by Finland, containing a working document entitled "Chemical identification of chemical weapons agents; a Finnish Project".
- Document CD/15, dated 24 April 1979, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom, on a visit to Britain by chemical weapons experts (14-16 March 1979).
- Document CD/21, dated 20 June 1979, submitted by the delegation of Poland, containing a working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction.
- Document CD/26, dated 1 July 1979, submitted by the Secretariat in compliance with the decision of the Committee at its 31st plenary meeting, containing a compilation of material on chemical weapons from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament Working Papers and Statements, 1972-1979
- Document CD/37, dated 12 July 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Working Paper on some Aspects of International Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons: Experience gained in the Federal Republic of Germany".
- Document CD/39, dated 16 July 1979, submitted by Finland, concerning the identification of potential organophosphorus warfare agents -- an approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data.
- Document CD/41, dated 25 July 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled "A working paper containing questions relevant to a Convention prohibiting chemical weapons".
- Document CD/44, dated 26 July 1979, submitted by the delegation of Poland, containing a working paper on an outline of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

- Document CD/48, dated 7 August 1979, submitted by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, entitled "USSR-United States Joint Report on Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons".

- Document CD/49, dated 8 August 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled "Chemical Weapons -- Answers to Questionnaire contained in CD/41".

- Document CD/52, dated 13 August 1979, submitted by the delegations of France, Italy and the Netherlands, entitled "Chemical weapons -- Evaluation of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 with respect to a prohibition of chemical weapons".

In 1980

- Document CD/59, dated 12 February 1980, submitted by the delegation of Australia and entitled "Chemical weapons: Proposal for Informal Meetings with Experts".

- Document CD/68, dated 28 February 1980, submitted by the delegation of Poland and entitled "Chemical weapons -- a possible procedural approach to the tasks facing the Committee on Disarmament: working paper".

- Document CD/82, dated 20 March 1980, entitled "Letter dated 18 March 1980 from the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam transmitting a document entitled 'Memorandum on the use of chemicals by the United States of America in Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea'".

- Document CD/84, dated 26 March 1980, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, containing a working document entitled "Draft Initial Work Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons".

- Document CD/85, dated 27 March 1980, entitled "Letter dated 26 March 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea transmitting two documents entitled 'Statement of 5 February 1980 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea on the intensification by Hanoi of the use of chemical weapons and other activities to exterminate the Kampuchean People' and 'The use of chemical weapons by the Vietnamese aggressors in Kampuchea; Report issued by the Ministry of Information of Democratic Kampuchea on 25 February 1980'".

- Document CD/89, dated 14 April 1980, and entitled "Telegram dated 13 April 1980 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan transmitting a 'Declaration of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan issued on 11 April 1980'".

- Document CD/94, dated 18 April 1980 submitted by the delegation of Belgium and entitled "Proposed definition of a chemical warfare agent and chemical munitions".

- Document CD/96, dated 22 April 1980, submitted by the delegation of Poland and entitled "Ad Hoc working group on CW -- Initial Work Programme: Working Document".

- Document CD/97, dated 24 April 1980, submitted by the delegation of Sweden and entitled "Working Paper on the Prohibition of Chemical Warfare Capability".

- Document CD/102, dated 19 June 1980, entitled "Letter dated 19 June 1980 from the Acting Head of the Chinese delegation, transmitting a working paper on the 'Chinese Delegation's proposals on the main contents of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons'."
- Document CD/103, dated 24 June 1980, entitled "Letter dated 24 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Finland transmitting a document entitled 'Identification of degradation products of potential organophosphorus warfare agents'."
- Document CD/105, dated 27 June 1980, entitled "Elements of a reply by the French delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/41)".
- Document CD/106, dated 27 June 1980, submitted by the delegation of France, containing a working paper entitled "Control of the non-manufacture and non-possession of agents and weapons of chemical warfare".
- Document CD/110, dated 2 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia and entitled "Working Paper on Medical Protection Against Nerve Gas Poisoning (Present Situation and Future Possibilities)".
- Document CD/111, dated 2 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia and entitled "Working Paper on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA)".
- Document CD/112, dated 7 July 1980, submitted by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, transmitting a document entitled "USSR-United States Joint Report on the Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons".
- Document CD/113, dated 8 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Canada and entitled "Organization and Control of Verification Within a Chemical Weapons Convention".
- Document CD/114, dated 9 July 1980, entitled "Reply at this stage submitted by the Australian Delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament in document CD/41."
- Document CD/117, dated 10 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Canada and entitled "Definitions and Scope in a Chemical Weapons Convention".
- Document CD/121, dated 17 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Poland and entitled "Some of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a CW convention: working paper".
- Document CD/122, dated 21 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Morocco and entitled "Proposed definition of chemical weapons".
- Document CD/123, dated 21 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Mongolia, containing a working document entitled "Interrelationship between the future convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the Geneva Protocol of 1925".
- Document CD/124, dated 24 July 1980, submitted by the Delegation of Indonesia and entitled "Some views on the prohibition of chemical weapons".

- Document CD/131/Rev.1, dated 4 August 1980, entitled "Report to the Committee on Disarmament -- Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons".

- Document CD/132, dated 1 August 1980, containing a working paper entitled "Views of the Government of Pakistan submitted in response to the circulation of Document CD/89".

In 1981

- Document CD/142, dated 10 February 1981, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled "Working Paper: Prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons".

- Document CD/164, dated 19 March 1981, submitted by Finland, entitled "Creation of chemical weapons control capacity -- present phase and goals of the Finnish project".

- Document CD/167, dated 26 March 1981, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Verification and control requirements for a chemical arms control treaty based on an analysis of activities".

- Document CD/168, dated 27 March 1981, submitted by the delegation of China, entitled "Working Paper -- Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents".

- Document CD/169, dated 27 March 1981, submitted by the delegation of China, entitled "Working Paper: Dismantling of Production Facilities/Means of Production for Chemical Weapons".

- Document CD/173, dated 3 April 1981, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Disposal of Chemical Agents".

- Document CD/178, dated 16 April 1981, submitted by Finland, which addressed an invitation of the Finnish Government to a Chemical Weapons Verification Workshop.

- Document CD/124/Rev.1, dated 24 April 1981, submitted by the delegation of Indonesia, entitled "Revision of CD/124 on the Definition of Chemical Agent and Chemical Warfare Agent".

- Document CD/179 and Add.1, dated 23 April 1981, entitled "The Chairman's Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons".

- Document CD/183, dated 12 June 1981, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification".

- Document CD/195, dated 14 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia, entitled "Working Paper: Incapacitating Agents".

- Document CD/196, dated 16 July 1981, submitted by Finland, entitled "Trace Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents".

- Document CD/197, dated 17 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of Romania entitled "Working Paper - Suggestions for Elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention: Definitions and Criteria".
- Document CD/199, dated 24 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of Czechoslovakia, entitled "Working Paper: Definition and Characteristics of the Toxins".
- Document CD/203, dated 30 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled "Consultation and Co-operation, Verification Measures and Complaints Procedure in the framework of the Convention on the complete and effective Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of all Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction".
- Document CD/212, dated 13 August 1981, submitted by the delegation of China, entitled "Some Viewpoints on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons".
- Document CD/220, dated 17 August 1981, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament".

In 1982

- Document CD/244, dated 18 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, entitled "Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention".
- Document CD/253, dated 25 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Tass statement".
- Document CD/258, and Corr.1, dated 9 March 1982, submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Working Paper: Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons".
- Document CD/263, dated 22 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Finland, entitled "Working Paper on the Relation of Verification to the Scope of a Ban on Chemical Warfare Agents".
- Document CD/264, dated 23 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled "The United States Programme to Deter Chemical Warfare".
- Document CD/265*/, dated 24 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Working Paper on Principles and Rules for Verifying Compliance with a Chemical Weapons Convention".
- Document CD/266, dated 24 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia, entitled "Working Paper: Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification".
- Document CD/270, dated 31 March 1982, submitted by the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands, entitled "Letter dated 31 March 1982 from the Heads of the Delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands transmitting a document entitled 'Indonesia and the Netherlands -- Working Document -- Destruction of about 45 tons of mustard agent at Batujajar, West-Java, Indonesia'."

- Document CD/271, dated 1 April 1982, submitted by the delegations of the United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia, entitled "Technical Evaluation of 'Recover' Techniques for CW Verification".

- Document CD/275, dated 7 April 1982, entitled "Letter dated 5 April 1982 from the Deputy Representative of Canada to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament forwarding a document entitled 'Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals -- Second Edition'".

- Document CD/277, dated 7 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled "Working Paper -- The concept 'precursor' and a suggestion for definition for the purpose of a Chemical Weapons Convention".

- Document CD/279, dated 14 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled "Working Paper -- Suggestions for measures to enhance confidence between the Parties negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons".

- Document CD/281/Rev.1, dated 26 April 1982, entitled "Special Report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament -- Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons".

- Document CD/288, dated 21 April 1982, entitled "Statement made by Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the Report of the Group".

B. Working Papers and Conference Room Papers of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons

In 1980

Working Papers

- CD/CW/WP.1 entitled "Working paper introduced by the Chairman".

- CD/CW/WP.2 and Add. 1 and 2 entitled "List of Documents" containing a list of Committee on Disarmament documents relevant to the work of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, circulated between July 1979 and July 1980.

- CD/CW/WP.3 submitted by the United States of America entitled "Issues to be defined by the Ad Hoc Chemical Weapons Working Group".

- CD/CW/WP.4 submitted by Sweden entitled "Issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a Convention on Chemical Weapons".

- CD/CW/WP.5 submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled "The impact of on-site inspections of current civilian production on the chemical industry".

- CD/CW/WP.6 submitted by France entitled "Criteria for the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents".

In 1981(i) Working Papers

- CD/CW/MP.7 and Rev.1 entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 1".
- CD/CW/MP.8 and Corr.1 entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 2".
- CD/CW/MP.9 submitted by Canada entitled "Verification and Chemical Weapons".
- CD/CW/MP.10 and Corr.1 entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 3".
- CD/CW/MP.11 submitted by Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Chemical Weapons: types of activity to be covered by a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons".
- CD/CW/MP.12 entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 4".
- CD/CW/MP.13 entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 5".
- CD/CW/MP.14 entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 6".
- CD/CW/MP.15 submitted by Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland entitled "Chemical weapons: definitions".
- CD/CW/MP.16 submitted by France entitled "Declarations and destruction of materials and facilities".
- CD/CW/MP.17 submitted by France entitled "Chemical weapons -- definitions, criteria".
- CD/CW/MP.18 submitted by Australia entitled "Initial Comments on the Consolidated Outline suggested by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons".
- CD/CW/MP.19 entitled "Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention".
- CD/CW/MP.20 entitled "Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention".
- CD/CW/MP.21 entitled "Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention".
- CD/CW/MP.22 and Corr.1 and Rev.1 entitled "Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held on issues relating to toxicity determinations".

- CD/CW/WP.23 submitted by Australia entitled "Chemical Weapons Verification: Consultative Committee of Experts".

- CD/CW/WP.24 submitted by Australia entitled "Chemical Weapons Convention: Assistance to Parties".

- CD/CW/WP.25 submitted by Australia entitled "Chemical Weapons Verification: The Methyl-Phosphorous 'Finger Print'".

(ii) Conference Room Papers

- CD/CW/CRP.5 and Rev.1 and 2 entitled "Suggestions by the Chairman for particular technical issues to be addressed during CD's 1981 work on chemical weapons".

- CD/CW/CRP.6 entitled "List of topics to be discussed with regard to the definitions and criteria of importance for a chemical weapons convention".

- CD/CW/CRP.7 submitted by Belgium entitled "Proposed definitions (revision of document CD/94)".

- CD/CW/CRP.8 submitted by France entitled "Criteria for definition".

- CD/CW/CRP.9 entitled "List of questions put to the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America at the meeting of 30 March 1981 with respect to the bilateral report, CD/112, and outlines by the Chairman for the work of the Working Group".

- CD/CW/CRP.10 and Add.1 and 2 and Corr.1 and Rev.1 entitled "Draft Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament".

- CD/CW/CRP.11 entitled "Note by the Chairman".

- CD/CW/CRP.12 entitled "Suggestions for consultations on toxicity determinations".

- CD/CW/CRP.13 and Corr.1 entitled "Consolidated text of suggestions for elements I, I (bis) and Annex I of a Chemical Weapons Convention, received as at Friday, 26 June 1981".

- CD/CW/CRP.14 submitted by Australia entitled "Delegation Amendments to CD/CW/WP.19 and CD/CW/WP.20, Subject to Revision".

- CD/CW/CRP.15 and Add.1 entitled "Revised Suggestions by the Chairman for elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention".

- CD/CW/CRP.16 and Add.1 entitled "Compilation of suggested amendments to the draft Elements and Annexes proposed by the Chairman in documents CD/CW/WP.19 to 20".

- CD/CW/CRP.17/Rev.1, Add.1 and 2 and Rev.2 and 3 and Corr.1 entitled "Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament".

- CD/CW/CRP.18 entitled "Suggestion by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for recommendation by the Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament regarding decision on further work to be undertaken on methods for toxicity determinations for a Chemical Weapons Convention".

In 1982(i) Working Papers

- CD/CW/WP.26 submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled "Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention" (also issued as CD/244).
- CD/CW/WP.27 and Rev.1 entitled "Suggestions by the Chairman on the draft programme of work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for the first part of its 1982 session".
- CD/CW/WP.28 and Corr.1 submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Working Paper: Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons" (also issued as CD/258).
- CD/CW/WP.29 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled "Questions related to the ban of binary chemical weapons".
- CD/CW/WP.30 and Corr.1 entitled "Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held on issues relating to toxicity determinations".
- CD/CW/WP.31 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled "Working Paper: Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification" (also issued as CD/266).
- CD/CW/WP.32 submitted by the United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia, entitled "Technical Evaluation of 'Recover' Techniques for CW Verification" (also issued as CD/271).
- CD/CW/WP.33 entitled "Compilation of revised Elements and Comments thereto (CD/220), proposed new texts and alternative wordings as well as comments on new texts".
- CD/CW/WP.34 entitled "The Chairman's closing statement" (first part of 1982 session).

(ii) Conference Room Papers

- CD/CW/CRP.19 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element I -- General Provision".
- CD/CW/CRP.20 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element II -- General definition of chemical weapons".
- CD/CW/CRP.21 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Conference Room Paper relating to Element II -- Use of the general purpose criterion for the determination of the scope of prohibition of chemicals".
- CD/CW/CRP.22 submitted by Poland, entitled "Suggested alternative for Element II.2".

- CD/CW/CRP.23 entitled "Note by the Chairman -- Suggestions for consultations on toxicity determinations -- Draft timetable".
- CD/CW/CRP.24 submitted by Argentina, Australia, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element I -- General Provision".
- CD/CW/CRP.25 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Text proposed for new Element III bis -- Prohibition of Stationing".
- CD/CW/CRP.26 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element IV -- Declarations".
- CD/CW/CRP.27 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled "Text proposed as a continuation to the wording for a new Element III (bis) contained in CD/CW/CRP.25".
- CD/CW/CRP.28 submitted by Nigeria, entitled "Text proposed in relation to Element IV.1.(b) -- Declarations".
- CD/CW/CRP.29 submitted by Sweden, entitled "Conference Room Paper -- Abolition and non-acquisition of a chemical warfare capability after destruction of chemical weapons".
- CD/CW/CRP.30 submitted by Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Proposals with respect to document CD/220, Element IV, comments 1 and 4, and Annex II, comments 1 and 3".
- CD/CW/CRP.31 submitted by the United States of America, entitled "Precursors".
- CD/CW/CRP.32 submitted by Australia, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element IV -- Declarations".
- CD/CW/CRP.33 submitted by Australia, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element V -- Destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion".
- CD/CW/CRP.34 submitted by Australia, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Annex III -- Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production".
- CD/CW/CRP.35 submitted by Australia, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element IX -- General provision on verification".
- CD/CW/CRP.36 submitted by Australia, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element XI -- National technical means of verification".
- CD/CW/CRP.37 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled "New text proposed as a continuation to suggested alternative wording for Element II.2 contained in CD/CW/CRP.22".
- CD/CW/CRP.38 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled "Comments in relation to document CD/220, Annex I, paragraphs 3 and 4 -- Definition and Criteria".

- CD/CW/CRP.39 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled "Proposal for new subparagraph for Element IV -- To be inserted between (b) and (c) in document CD/220, page 14 -- Declarations.
- CD/CW/CRP.40 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element V -- Destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion".
- CD/CW/CRP.41 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled "Annex III -- Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production -- Suggested alternative wording for paragraph 3".
- CD/CW/CRP.42 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled "Annex IV -- Recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system".
- CD/CW/CRP.43 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element XI -- National technical means of verification".
- CD/CW/CRP.44 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled "Some observations concerning the definition of 'precursors' for the purposes of the Convention".
- CD/CW/CRP.45 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element X".
- CD/CW/CRP.46 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Elements XII-XIII".
- CD/CW/CRP.47 entitled "Draft Preamble as suggested by the Chairman".
- CD/CW/CRP.48 submitted by Czechoslovakia, entitled "Alternative wording for Element XVII, paragraph 3".
- CD/CW/CRP.49 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled "Suggested text to be added at the end of existing Element XVI -- Duration and withdrawals".
- CD/CW/CRP.50 submitted by the United States of America, entitled "Declaration of Stockpiles and Facilities".
- CD/CW/CRP.51 submitted by The Netherlands, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for Element XIV and paragraph 1 of Element XV".
- CD/CW/CRP.52/Rev.1 and Rev.2 entitled "Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament".
- CD/CW/CRP.53 submitted by Sweden, entitled "Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons".
- CD/CW/CRP.54 submitted by The Netherlands, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for paragraph 3 of Element IX, paragraph 1 of Element XI, Element XII, Element XIII and text proposed for new Element XIII bis".

- CD/CW/CRP.55 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons".
- CD/CW/CRP.56 submitted by China, entitled "Suggested alternative wording for the second paragraph of the draft preamble as suggested by the Chairman contained in CD/CW/CRP.47".
- CD/CW/CRP.57 submitted by Sweden, entitled "Suggested wording for the report of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament concerning consultations held during the first part of the 1982 session".
- CD/CW/CRP.58 entitled "Summary by the Chairman of initial comments made with respect to the draft Preamble (CD/CW/CRP.47)".
- CD/CW/CRP.59 submitted by Australia, entitled "Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons".

Working paper containing the text of the opinion of the Government of Mexico on the prevention of nuclear war, transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the invitation extended by the General Assembly in its resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981

In response to the invitation which the General Assembly extended to Member States in its resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981, the Government of Mexico has pleasure in setting forth below some basic observations concerning what is used as the title of the resolution, namely, "Prevention of nuclear war".

The first two preambular paragraphs of the resolution -- which, in fact, simply repeat almost word for word views expressed in the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly by consensus at its first special session devoted to disarmament held in 1978 -- would in themselves appear to be sufficient to highlight the pressing need to take seriously the adoption of effective measures to prevent a nuclear holocaust.

In the Final Document, the General Assembly expressed its alarm at the "threat to the very survival of mankind" posed by the mere existence of nuclear weapons and stressed that "removal of the threat of a world war, a nuclear war, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

Furthermore, many other categorical declarations of this nature are to be found in the Final Document; as an example of such declarations suffice it to reproduce the following four:

"... the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind."

"Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth."

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority."

"Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation."

On the basis of this premise, the Assembly reiterated in its resolution two other elements which also **figured** prominently in the Final Document: the "vital interest" of all the peoples of the world in disarmament and the "special responsibility" of nuclear-weapon States in the task of achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament, and, as a consequence of all the foregoing, it stressed that "prevention of nuclear war and reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority, which should be considered by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

Although, as might be expected, no one could doubt the validity of the foregoing declarations by the organ which is most representative of the international community, it will be clearly understood that this organ wished to take the necessary steps to ensure that the special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is to open on 7 June 1982, will have the greatest possible number of "views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war" from Member States. It is also very understandable that the request made for this purpose in operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the resolution should have been made with much greater urgency vis-à-vis the nuclear-weapon States, to which the request is addressed in the form of an "exhortation", than in the case of the non-nuclear-weapon States to which the Assembly has addressed a simple "invitation".

The need for the nuclear Powers to submit to the Assembly proposals and practical suggestions for the objective defined in paragraph 8 of the Final Document as "the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war" will readily be appreciated if one bears in mind the fact that the number of nuclear warheads which exist at present is greater than 50,000, with a power of approximately 16 billion tons of dynamite. This enormous destructive power represented by the nuclear arsenals to which reference has just been made would be sufficient, on the basis of the results of the bomb which flattened Hiroshima, to annihilate the total population of the earth not once but 50 times.

As can be seen, although the arms race is not a new phenomenon, the agonizing situation in which mankind currently finds itself is indeed unusual. More than a quarter of a century ago, in the historic document known as the "Russell-Einstein manifesto", which was to become the starting-point for the fruitful Pugwash Conferences, it was emphasized that if many hydrogen bombs were actually used,

there would be universal death: sudden death for a minority, and slow death for the majority subjected to the torture of sickness and gradual disintegration". Two years later Arnold Toynbee, the eminent historian and philosopher, stated that mankind had not been in a similar situation since the end of the palaeolithic era. It was then that man had succeeded in dominating lions, tigers and similar wild beasts. From that time on the survival of the human race had appeared assured. But since 1945 man's survival had again become uncertain because people had become, so to speak, their own lions and tigers. In fact, the threat to the survival of mankind had been much greater since 1945 than it had been during the first million years of history.

Another extremely alarming factor must be borne in mind: the increasingly important role that technology has been playing in the sphere of nuclear weapons, the inevitable failures of computers and the false alarms deriving from such failures. In this connection, suffice it to mention that in October 1980 the United States Senate Armed Services Committee published a report which constitutes the most conclusive proof of the extremely relative and aleatory nature of man's control over nuclear weapons and the vehicles which carry these terrible instruments of mass destruction. This report, with the irrefutable authority conferred on it by its origin, stated that, within a period of 18 months, the United States Defense Command had recorded 147 nuclear false alarms which were sufficiently serious to require evaluation whether or not they represented a potential attack, while another four alarms had been much more serious and had required the issuing of orders to the crews of B-52 bombers and the units responsible for intercontinental ballistic missiles to ready themselves for action.

Referring to the three most serious of these alarms, Robert C. Aldridge, a recognized authority on military technology, stated in an article published on 26 July 1980 that three times in seven months, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States had been placed on alert owing to errors in electronic apparatus. On 9 November 1979, the NORAD computer had announced an attack with missiles launched from submarines. On 3 June 1980 it had announced a mass attack again including missiles launched from submarines. Three days later it had signified that missiles from submarines lurking about 1,000 miles off the coast of the United States could reach their targets in approximately 10 minutes. The November shock had lasted six minutes and the June alarms had lasted three minutes, which represented a considerable portion of the time available for taking decisions. It is terrifying to think of the consequences which the alerts might have had if they had lasted just a few crucial minutes more.

If one bears the foregoing in mind, one can very clearly understand why measures such as the only ones that the nuclear Powers have so far managed to agree on, measures such as those relating to the establishment of direct communication lines between the Heads of State of the nuclear super-Powers, however laudable they may be, may be termed, within the context of the terrifying situation confronting the world, cosmetic measures.

What all peoples of the earth whose vital interests are at stake have been awaiting for some time are effective measures which will enable the threat of a nuclear war to be permanently removed. The Government of Mexico is convinced that the recipe for achieving this is very simple: it would be sufficient to take seriously the provisions which were adopted by consensus in 1978 and which were outlined in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

If one had to choose from among the numerous provisions making up the Final Document those which are most relevant to the case under consideration, the provisions of paragraphs 47 and 50 could be singled out without any hesitation. As is well known, these paragraphs read:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons" (paragraph 47).

"The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for.

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems,

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes,

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time" (paragraph 50).

As can be plainly seen, it has not been the lack of clearly defined methods and procedures which has so far obstructed the adoption of measures to prevent nuclear war. There has simply been a complete lack of political will on the part of the States which bear the greatest share of responsibility for remedying the alarming situation confronting the world.

The Government of Mexico is therefore firmly convinced that "the pressing need now is to translate into practical terms" the undertakings already assumed and those which may be assumed at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and "to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament", as provided for in paragraph 17 of the Final Document, and to adopt, in as binding a manner as it may be possible to agree on, a "comprehensive programme of disarmament" which, beginning with nuclear disarmament, also encompasses, as expressly provided for in paragraph 109 of the Final Document, "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

It is to be hoped that the nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, the two nuclear super-Powers can reach the same conclusion and bring their international conduct into line with it. We believe this will not be difficult for them if they consider that it is absurd to try to achieve national security by increasing universal insecurity, that the nuclear arsenals accumulated are more than sufficient to produce, not once but many times, total death on the planet -- whether it be instant death or death through slow and agonizing disintegration, and that, as stated in one of the conclusions of the most recent report of the Secretary-General on nuclear weapons (A/35/392 of 12 September 1980), it is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization should be used by some States to promote their security, which means that the future of mankind "is then made hostage ... to a few nuclear-weapon States and most notably ... the two super-Powers".

Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, the Committee decided to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981, the Committee on Disarmament decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue its work during the 1981 session. In its report on that session, the Working Group, bearing in mind that considerable work remained to be done in resolving several important and complex issues and that the Committee on Disarmament had been called upon to conclude negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, agreed to recommend to the Committee that the Working Group should resume its work on 11 January 1982. The Committee on Disarmament adopted that recommendation at its 148th plenary meeting on 20 August 1981. In accordance with that decision, the Working Group resumed its work on 11 January 1982. At its 150th plenary meeting on 2 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament confirmed that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue its work during the first part of the the 1982 session.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. During the 1980 session, Ambassador Olu Adeniji (Nigeria) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico) was the Chairman during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. Mr. Guennady Efimov, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Working Group in 1980 and Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, did so in 1981 and 1982.

3. In the course of its 1980, 1981 and 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 59 meetings, 10 in 1980, 24 in 1981 and 25 in 1982.

4. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

* / Re-issued for technical reasons.

5. In addition to the official documents of the Committee on Disarmament circulated under the agenda item entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", the following working papers were submitted by Member States in the course of the three sessions of the Ad Hoc Working Group:

- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Mexico. (CD/CPD/WP.3 and Rev.1)
- Working paper on the outline of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Pakistan. (CD/CPD/WP.4)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.5)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Principles and guidelines", submitted by Mexico. (CD/CPD/WP.6)
- Working paper on the main principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.8)
- Working paper entitled "Draft section of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concerning the general guidelines for efforts to limit the arms race and achieve disarmament", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.9)
- Working paper on the principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Venezuela. (CD/CPD/WP.10)
- Working paper entitled "Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament and the concept of education for peace", submitted by Poland. (CD/CPD/WP.12)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Principles", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.13 and Add.1)
- Working paper on forms and machinery, submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.15)
- Working paper on "Stages of Implementation", prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/WP.17)
- Working paper on the nature of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/WP.18)

- Working paper on "Stages of Implementation", prepared by the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/WP.19)
- Statement by the representative of the USSR on 3 March 1981, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control", submitted to the EMDC in 1962. (CD/CPD/WP.20)
- Statement by the representative of the United States of America on 5 March 1981, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", submitted to the EMDC in 1962. (CD/CPD/WP.21)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the section "Objectives", submitted by Italy. (CD/CPD/WP.22)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing supplementary proposals on the measures, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.24)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing further proposals on the measures, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.25)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Pakistan. (CD/CPD/WP.26)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the section "Measures", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.28)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Italy. (CD/CPD/WP.30)
- Working paper on the objectives of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.31)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (CD/CPD/WP.33)
- Working paper containing a text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Bulgaria. (CD/CPD/WP.35)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CPD/WP.36 and Corr.1 and Adds. 1-5)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing proposals with respect to nuclear weapons, submitted by Australia. (CD/CPD/WP.37)

- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing proposals with respect to zones of peace, submitted by Australia. (CD/CPD/WP.38)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by France. (CD/CPD/WP.39)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.40)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Poland. (CD/CPD/WP.42)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Machinery and Procedure", submitted by the German Democratic Republic and Venezuela. (CD/CPD/WP.43)
- Working paper on the first stage of nuclear disarmament measures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.44)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.45)
- Working paper containing amendments to the sections "Conventional weapons and armed forces" and "Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the German Democratic Republic. (CD/CPD/WP.46)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.47)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Poland. (CD/CPD/WP.48)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Bulgaria. (CD/CPD/WP.49)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Mongolia. (CD/CPD/WP.50)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.51)
- Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (CD/CPD/WP.52)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures". (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Nigeria, Poland and Venezuela. (CD/CPD/WP.55)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CPD/WP.55)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CPD/WP.56)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CPD/WP.57)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.58)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.59)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.60)
- Working paper containing an addition to the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.61)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Machinery and Procedures" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CPD/WP.63)
- Draft text for the section on "Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Yugoslavia. (CD/CPD/WP.64)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Measures" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.67)
- Working paper on Verification, submitted by the United States of America. (CD/CPD/WP.69)
- Working paper on Verification, submitted by the German Democratic Republic. (CD/CPD/WP.70)

In addition, the secretariat prepared the following documents:

- List of documents. (CD/CPD/WP.1)
- Compilation of documents submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in 1962 (EMDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1, EMDC/5, EMDC/18, EMDC/30 and Corr.1). (CD/CPD/WP.7 and Add.1)
- List of specific measures contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session and the 1979 and 1980 reports of the Disarmament Commission. (CD/CPD/WP.11)
- List of specific measures envisaged in the Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1962 (EMDC/2/Rev.1), and the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, submitted by the United States of America in 1962 (EMDC/30). (CD/CPD/WP.14)
- Tabulation of measures that are not explicitly included in the tabulations contained in documents CD/CPD/WP.11 and 14. (CD/CPD/WP.23)
- Results of the preliminary examination of chapters V ("Measures") and VI ("Stages of implementation") of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.27)
- Tabulation of the Principles contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.29)
- Tabulation of the Objectives contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.32)
- Tabulation of the provisions concerning Machinery and Procedure contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.34)
- Compilation of certain proposals concerning Machinery and Procedure listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. (CD/CPD/WP.41)
- Results of the examination of Stage-I measures contained in document CD/CPD/WP.27 and of written and oral proposals made in connection therewith. (CD/CPD/WP.54)

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK

6. In 1980, the Ad Hoc Working Group adopted an outline of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CD/CPD/WP.2/Rev.1) consisting of the following chapters: Introduction or Preamble; Objectives; Principles; Priorities; Measures; Stages of Implementation; and Machinery and Procedures. ^{*}/ That outline constituted the basis for the consideration of the Programme in 1981 and 1982.

^{*}/ A full account of the work carried out in 1980 may be found in the Working Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament which is an integral part of the Committee's 1980 report (CD/139, paragraph 66).

7. In 1981, the Ad Hoc Working Group completed a preliminary examination of the substantive chapters of the Programme. It decided to defer the consideration of the Introduction or Preamble pending the elaboration of those chapters in view of the fact that the form and substance of the latter would determine its character and content. In the case of the chapters concerning measures and stages of implementation, which were considered in conjunction with each other, the Working Group was also able to have a second round of more detailed discussions on measures for a first stage. */
8. In 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group focused on the task of elaborating the texts of the various substantive chapters of the Programme.
9. With respect to the objectives of the Programme, the Ad Hoc Working Group, at its 49th meeting on 3 February 1982, established a contact group to elaborate the relevant chapter and designated Ambassador François de la Corce (France) as its co-ordinator. The contact group submitted to the Working Group a text that reflected different views on some points. At its 56th meeting on 18 March 1982, the Working Group adopted that text (CD/CPD/AF.66).
10. At its 50th meeting on 11 February 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group established a contact group to elaborate the principles of the Programme and, at its 51st meeting on 15 February 1982, it designated Ambassador Gerhard Herder (German Democratic Republic) as its co-ordinator. As in the case of objectives, it did not prove possible to reach agreement on all questions of substance. In addition, differing views were held regarding the appropriateness of including certain paragraphs in the chapter on principles. The contact group agreed that questions concerning the placement of those paragraphs should be decided at a later stage in the context of the whole Programme, bearing in mind that duplication should be avoided. At its 56th meeting on 18 March 1982, the Working Group adopted the text submitted by the contact group (CD/CPD/AF.65).
11. With respect to priorities, the Ad Hoc Working Group, at its 49th meeting on 3 February 1982, established a contact group to elaborate that chapter of the Programme and designated Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil) as its co-ordinator. The contact group submitted an agreed text which was adopted by the Working Group at its 55th meeting on 1 March 1982 (CD/CPD/AF.62).
12. With respect to measures and stages of implementation which, as previously, were considered in conjunction with each other, at its 54th meeting on 25 February 1982, the Working Group established a contact group to elaborate that part of the Programme and requested the Chairman to act as co-ordinator of the contact group. The contact group prepared a text that grouped measures in a first, an intermediate and a last stage, it being understood that this was without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation. An informal drafting group was convened, with Mr. Tariq Altaf (Pakistan) as co-ordinator, with a view to reconciling the alternative formulations contained in

*/ A full account of the work carried out in 1981 may be found in the Working Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament which is an integral part of the Committee's 1981 report (CD/223, paragraph 127).

that text. The Drafting group narrowed the areas of disagreement and, to the extent possible, unified and streamlined some of the alternative texts that were under discussion in the contact group. The text it elaborated was adopted by the contact group on 14 April 1982 with some changes. At its 53th meeting on 15 April 1982, the Working Group adopted the text submitted by the contact group as orally amended at that meeting (CD/CPD/WP.71).

15. The same contact group was also charged with the task of elaborating the chapter on machinery and procedures. It submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group a text reflecting differences of view on some points. At its 57th meeting on 8 April 1982, the Working Group adopted that text with some additions and amendments (CD/CPD/WP.68).

14. At various stages of its consideration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Working Group focused attention on the question of time frames and nature of the Programme. Divergent views were advanced since the initial stage as indicated in the Working Group's report covering its 1980 session (CD/139, paragraph 68 (13) and (15)). In 1982, these two matters were examined at meetings of the Working Group and of the contact group referred to in paragraphs 12 and 15 above. Concerning the question of time frames, it was generally agreed that the Programme should be implemented in the shortest possible time. Beyond that, different views continued to be maintained. On the one hand, it was again stressed that there should be a time frame for the implementation of each stage, as well as the Programme as a whole. It was felt that, otherwise, there would be no standard by which to judge whether progress was being made towards the full realization of the Programme. It was also argued that the acceptance of time frames would be a manifestation of political will to implement the measures contained in the Programme. It was further argued that the implementation of the Programme in an agreed time frame would generate the requisite confidence of the international community and have a positive influence on the climate of international relations by introducing an element of predictability in the process of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, it was recognized that only an indicative time frame should be set since in the course of the implementation of the Programme changing circumstances might call for readjustments. On the other hand, it continued to be argued that it would be inappropriate to set a time frame, whether indicative or not, for the implementation of the stages included in the Programme, because the setting of such time frames was not compatible with the conditions of a negotiation, a fortiori with the requirements of a series of interdependent negotiations. In this view, periodic reviews, envisaged as part of the machinery and procedures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, would give impetus for continued progress in the implementation of the Programme, provide a standard by which to assess such progress, permit its evaluation and the readjustment of the Programme, if necessary. Regarding the nature of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, various views were advanced. One view was that the Programme should be embodied in a legally binding instrument. It was proposed that a solemn Declaration should accompany the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. A concrete proposal was made that the Declaration and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should then be signed by Heads of State or Government of all Member States of the United Nations, and finally noted by the Security Council in a resolution adopted under those provisions of the Charter that are designed to create obligations for States. Another view was that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should not be embodied in a legally binding agreement since States cannot be bound to the success

of negotiations before such negotiations have begun. But it was considered that a strong political undertaking by States to implement the Programme, for example, in the form of a resolution adopted by consensus at the special session of the General Assembly, would create the necessary impetus for the completion of the implementation of the Programme at the earliest possible time. Still another view was that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should represent an agreed set of measures aimed at halting the arms race and at disarmament and should serve as an incentive for the broad development of constructive collective efforts in the disarmament field. It was noted that under the United Nations Charter the General Assembly may make recommendations with regard to principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and that the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament may serve as a precedent for the adoption of the Programme. While no conclusions were reached on these two matters, it was recognized that the discussions had served to clarify the questions at issue and would thus facilitate the search for generally acceptable solutions.

15. The view was generally held that the deliberations at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will contribute to the harmonization of the divergent positions reflected in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Some delegations also felt that their final position with regard to the formulations contained in the draft Programme could only be determined in the light of the content of the Programme as a whole. Other delegations felt that the progress made in the Working Group should have a bearing on the future work, and that their final position on the entire Programme would be determined in the light of the agreement reached on the specific provisions of the Programme, the time frames and a binding commitment to the implementation of the Programme.

IV. CONCLUSION

16. The Ad Hoc Working Group agreed to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that is annexed to this report, with the recommendation that it be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

ANNEX

DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

I. Introduction or Preamble

(To be elaborated subsequently)

II. Objectives

1. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to [prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war] [eliminate the danger of [war, in particular] nuclear war], to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim:
 - to maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
 - [- to consolidate and develop the positive results achieved so far, in particular in the sphere of the curbing of the arms race and of confidence-building measures and of détente;]
 - [to [initiate [,] [or] resume] [provide for the initiation of] and [to] expedite] [at the initiation and expediting of] urgent negotiations on halting the arms race in all its aspects, in particular the nuclear arms race;
 - to open and accelerate the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis.
2. [The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the New International Economic Order is fully realized] [The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme should be to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, to avert the danger of war and to create conditions for a just and stable international peace and security and the full realization of the new international economic order]
3. Throughout the implementation of the Programme towards the progressive reduction and final elimination of armaments and armed forces, the following objectives should be pursued:
 - to strengthen international peace and security, as well as the security of individual States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [, bearing in mind that genuine security can be guaranteed only by the limitation, reduction and elimination of weapons through disarmament] [, bearing in mind that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control (paragraph 13 of the Final Document)];
 - to contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;

- [- to make, through the implementation of the Programme, an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States;]
- to increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension;
- [to [consolidate the foundations of the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems and] strengthen the development of co-operation between all States with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme] [to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme (based on paragraph 12 of the Final Document)];
- [to stimulate in all countries the contribution that public opinion could make to the cause of disarmament] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament].

III. Principles

1. [The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]
2. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.
3. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.
4. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.
5. [In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the

political will to reach agreements.] [In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament.]

6. [It must be recognized that the political will of States is a decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament. States should therefore display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.]

7. [The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.]

8. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

9. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

10. [Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.]

11. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

12. Negotiations should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere.

13. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.
14. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States [, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals,] have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation. [All States are obliged to promote efforts in the sphere of disarmament. This applies first and foremost to the States possessing nuclear weapons and to other militarily significant States. The existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced.]
15. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. [It must therefore be recognized that a continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the New International Economic Order based on justice, equity and co-operation.]
16. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.
17. Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples [, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.].
18. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.
19. The process of arms limitation and disarmament must be carried out without interruptions and proceed at a rapid pace, so as to outstrip the qualitative development and build-up of weapons which are the subject of the negotiations and, where possible, prevent the development of new types and systems of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.
20. [The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be in accordance with the [fundamental principles enshrined in] [relevant provisions of]

the Final Document and should be carried out in such a balanced and equitable manner as to ensure the right of each State to security through the adoption of appropriate measures, taking into account the importance of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the States with the largest military arsenals, the specific requirements of regional situations and the necessity for adequate measures of verification. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.]

21. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage [, taking into account the existing situation regarding armaments of different kinds, and in particular the situation of nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects.]. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. [In the negotiations between parties approximately equal militarily the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.]

22. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

23. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

24. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

25. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

26. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. [The negotiations on the [balanced] reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.]

27. [States with the largest military arsenals have the primary responsibility for disarmament. They should immediately halt their arms race and take the lead in reducing their nuclear and conventional armaments. After they have substantially reduced their armaments, the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States should join them in reducing armaments.]
28. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.
29. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security. [All arms control and disarmament agreements must provide for effective international verification, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties.]
30. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control [, proceeding from the fact that there is no type of weapon that could not be eliminated on a mutually agreed basis].
31. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.
32. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would also contribute to the attainment of that goal.
33. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

34. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

35. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. [It must therefore be recognized that a continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the New International Economic Order based on justice, equity and co-operation.]

36. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

37. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

38. [Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.]

39. [As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situation, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.]

40. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

41. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

42. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

43. Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

44. [Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.]

45. [In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament.]

46. [Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.]

47. [In particular, publicity should be given to the decisions of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.]

48. [Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, States hereby declare that they will respect the principles stated above [and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme in strict adherence to them] [in full implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament].]

IV. Priorities

1. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal, the priorities which reflect the urgency attached to the measures for negotiations are:

- nuclear weapons;
- other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;
- conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and
- reduction of armed forces.

2. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. Along with negotiations on these measures, effective measures should be negotiated to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments.

3. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently. Bearing in mind these priorities, negotiations should be pursued on all measures which would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

V. Measures and stages of implementation

First stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear Weapons */

(1. Nuclear test ban

[The conclusion of an equitable and non-discriminatory treaty on a nuclear test ban would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- (i) The Committee on Disarmament should undertake [without further delay] multilateral negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear [weapons] tests by all States in all environments for all time. It should be able to attract universal adherence. The treaty should include a verification system satisfactory to all parties concerned and provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process.
- (ii) The parties who have been engaged in trilateral negotiations on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of the treaty" should [immediately resume and intensify their negotiations [and submit full information on the progress of their talks to the Committee on Disarmament, so as to] contribute to and assist multilateral negotiations on the treaty].) **/

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

[Substantial progress towards] the cessation of the nuclear arms race in all its aspects and [substantial progress towards] the achievement of nuclear disarmament at the beginning of the implementation of the Programme would constitute a major contribution to the rapid achievement of general and complete disarmament. [In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.]

*/ Some delegations reserved their position with respect to the division of the chapter "Nuclear weapons" into separate sub-sections.

**/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

[Measures designed to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war should continue to be considered as a matter of urgent priority in the first stage.]

[Integrated] measures for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems, for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems should include:

- (i) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems:

Negotiations, during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, to achieve an agreement or agreements, to bring about a halt to [qualitative improvement,] [research, development, production and testing] [research, development, testing and qualitative improvement] of nuclear weapons systems [and of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons], [in parallel with the measures to reduce nuclear weapons and as appropriate integrated with such measures].

These negotiations should [address] [achieve an agreement or agreements for the prohibition of]:

- (a) [the development, production, deployment and stockpiling of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles and on the complete destruction of their stockpiles,]
- (b) [research,] development, [testing] and deployment[, including for replacement purposes] of all new types and new systems of nuclear weapons;
- (c) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons systems];
- (d) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems];
- (e) [the development, production, deployment and stockpiling of intermediate and medium range missiles as well as tactical nuclear weapons];
- (f) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-submarine warfare capabilities that could endanger the central strategic stability;]
- (g) [conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.]
- (ii) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes:

Commencement of negotiations [with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States] [on an agreement] [to halt the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery along with a cessation of production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes].

[Such an agreement could be negotiated in the following step by step manner:] [Such negotiations could address:]

- [(a) [Declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, at a mutually agreed date, of their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of their existing and proposed facilities for the production of [all] nuclear weapons, delivery systems of such weapons and for fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes to be submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General.]
- (b) Negotiations on measures of verification, both by national technical means and international measures, including on-site inspections, as part of [the agreement] [or agreements] to be negotiated, to establish the base on which [the agreement] [or agreements] prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes, would be implemented.
- (c) [Measures aimed at [eventually] bringing about the general and complete cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes along with [the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons] [measures to reduce nuclear weapons, and as appropriate integrated with such measures] involving the application of [international] [full fuel cycle] safeguards [under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency] to [all] nuclear facilities in all States to prevent the diversion of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes. Such international safeguards would be applied [as a first step to the civil nuclear programmes of all States] [to all States on a universal and non-discriminatory basis].]]
- [(a) The cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons which should cover the cessation of manufacture of means of delivery and fissionable materials for the purposes of weapons development;
- (b) The gradual reduction of stockpiles of all types of nuclear weapons;
- (c) The complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

Parallel with the above, measures should be taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.]

- [(iii) Reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time:

Such measures would include at the appropriate time and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned the progressive and balanced reduction of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

- (a) as a starting point, the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of negotiations [already begun] [between the two States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals] on intermediate range nuclear forces and also on the process of strategic arms reduction:
- a continuation of the process aimed at agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic nuclear arms [belonging to these two States];
 - pursuit of negotiations on the limitation and reduction of [their] intermediate range nuclear forces based on the principle of equality within the framework of strategic arms control efforts;
- (b) (once [these reductions have reached an agreed stage] [the reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two parties concerned have reached a dimension such as to justify the acceptance by the other nuclear-weapon States of the principle of a limitation or reduction of their own nuclear forces], initiation of further negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States with a view to reaching agreement on the progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.) */

3. Limitation and reduction of strategic arms

Continuation of [negotiations on] [the process of] further limitation and reduction of strategic arms [between the USSR and the United States]:

[(a) Immediate ratification by the USSR and the United States of the SALT-II Agreement.]

(b) [The initiation, without delay, of further negotiations [on] [aimed at]] [measures for further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms] [the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments between the USSR and the United States leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitation on, strategic arms. [These negotiations should culminate, as soon as possible, in the first stage, in a treaty which should achieve:

- a reduction of at least 20 per cent in the numbers of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery vehicles in the arsenals of the USSR and the United States.
- comprehensive limitations on the qualitative improvement of strategic armaments, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic armaments.]]

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

4. [Intermediate range nuclear forces]

[The early conclusion of an agreement negotiated between the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to achieve on the basis of the principle of undiminished security, [inter alia,] a substantial reduction of [intermediate and] medium range and other nuclear weapon delivery systems and warheads deployed with respect to the European theatre.]

[As a starting point, the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations already begun on intermediate range nuclear forces and on strategic arms reduction:

Pursuit of negotiations on the limitation and reduction of their intermediate range nuclear forces based on the principle of equality within the framework of strategic arms control efforts.]

[The early conclusion of an agreement to limit and reduce medium range nuclear weapons in the region of Europe based on the principle of equality and equal security. The first step in this direction could be the agreed freeze on such weapons in Europe.]

5. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament for which negotiations should be vigorously pursued and bearing in mind the devastating results which a nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, urgent measures should be negotiated to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons. In this context, in the first stage [negotiations should address] [the following measures should be undertaken without delay]:

(a) [A binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States, [that are committed to a non-nuclear status,] without any conditions, qualifications or restrictions, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [The conclusion of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear weapon States, and, as a first step, the issuance by nuclear-weapon Powers of declarations of similar contents undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no such weapons on their territories, with approval of such declarations by the Security Council.]

(b) [An undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.]

(c) [An international agreement prohibiting the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [Measures to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, bearing in mind various proposals designed to secure these objectives and in accordance with paragraphs 57 and 58 of the Final Document, and thereby to ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered.]

(d) Measures to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas and periods of tension, by the establishment of hot lines and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict, especially a nuclear conflict including through [unauthorized] or accidental use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the respective

roles of nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, especially through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications should be clarified. [Measures should also be undertaken for the prevention of a possibility of surprise attack.]

6. [Nuclear non-proliferation] [Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document]

The nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States [---(horizontal proliferation)---] and on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether [---(vertical proliferation)]. The international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation should include effective measures at the national level and through international agreements to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such measures should include: [(a) measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament mentioned above;] (b) [the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs] [universal adherence to and full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] [adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy]; (c) [unhindered access for all States to nuclear technology, including its latest achievements, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries] [the full implementation and strengthening of agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis]; (d) [respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements or contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy]; (e) [agreed measures of verification applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis].

7. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure and should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the characteristics of each region. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated, in particular: (i) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone; (ii) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conference of OPANAL and other relevant fora, and including ratification of Additional Protocol I by all States concerned.

(b) In Africa the Organization of African Unity has affirmed the denuclearization of the continent. The United Nations General Assembly in successive resolutions has supported the African initiative for the denuclearization of the continent and at its tenth special session the General Assembly, by consensus, called upon the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective. [The threat to nuclear non-proliferation in Africa and to the peace and security of the continent arises from the nuclear capability of South Africa. To assist the implementation of the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa, therefore, all States should:

- (i) keep a constant watch on South Africa's nuclear capability;
- (ii) refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field which would assist the apartheid regime in manufacturing nuclear weapons.]

(c) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in compliance with General Assembly resolution 35/147 would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(d) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.

(e) [The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the European continent [at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone].]

(f) Efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world should be promoted [at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone].

(g) Ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

8. Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present

Conclusion of a treaty on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present; the renunciation by nuclear weapon States of further actions related to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of other States.]

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. [Promotion of] universal adherence to and strict compliance with the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed in Geneva on 17 June 1925.
2. [Promotion of] universal adherence to and strict compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.
3. (a) [Renunciation of the manufacture and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons and also of the stationing of chemical weapons in countries where there are none at present.]

(b) Conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling [and use] of all chemical weapons and their destruction.
4. Conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological [weapons] [warfare] [and the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes].
5. Commencement of negotiations [, when appropriate,] with a view to an early conclusion of a [comprehensive] agreement or specific agreements on [the prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of] such weapons [of mass destruction which may be identified], taking into account recent developments in science and technology. [As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, the permanent members of the Security Council and other States of military importance should make similar declarations of renunciation of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; those declarations would be approved by a decision of the Security Council.]

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

Agreements and other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis relating to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be achieved throughout the Programme, taking into account the right of all States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

[1. Renunciation by the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements of increasing their armed forces and conventional weapons as a first step towards the eventual limitation of armed forces and conventional weapons.]

1. The States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional arms reduction and disarmament and accordingly by the end of the first stage [the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States] [the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements] should negotiate to [significantly] reduce their conventional armaments and armed forces [by at least 25 per cent].

2. Other militarily significant States shall [negotiate to] undertake an agreed [smaller proportion of] reduction in the levels of their conventional weapons and armed forces.

[2. (a) In the course of the process of conventional disarmament emphasis should be placed on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments which are predominantly for offensive purposes, primarily tanks, airplanes, as well as airborne assault forces, amphibious forces and rapid deployment forces.]

3. A more stable and secure situation in Europe at a lower level of armed forces and armaments on the basis of approximate equality and parity should be achieved through negotiations by the end of the first stage. This will involve [besides the above-mentioned reductions by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States] mutual reductions in the armed forces and [conventional] armaments of [other] members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization leading to agreed lower levels of armed forces and armaments. This would be achieved through the on-going negotiations in Vienna [and/[or]] at a broader [European Conference on Security, Disarmament and Confidence Building Measures] [Conference on Military Détente and Disarmament] [Conference on Disarmament in Europe]. */ [Negotiations as appropriate on the development of effective security and confidence building measures and disarmament measures on the basis of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, taking into account all other aspects of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. To those ends, the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe should be decided in a concluding document of a CSCE follow-up meeting.]

[The above-mentioned measures of conventional weapons disarmament will involve:

(a) The demobilization of personnel and withdrawal of forces from foreign territories and the dismantling of foreign military bases;

(b) the destruction of agreed categories of conventional armaments and other military equipment especially weapons of great destructive capacity;

(c) measures for confidence building and security including restrictions on mobility of forces.]

4. [The above-mentioned measures should also include agreements for a reduction in the production of conventional weapons proportionate to the reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons agreed upon.] [The above-mentioned agreements should include as appropriate measures for a gradual reduction of the production of conventional weapons.] [Reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces of States would facilitate an agreed reduction in the production of conventional weapons.]

5. During the first stage, consultations and conferences should also be held at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level, among States for the consideration of various initiatives and proposals for confidence building and for the control, restraint or reduction of conventional armaments, particularly in regions of arms concentration, areas of tension, etc.

*/ The mentioning of the Vienna talks and the European Conference under the heading "Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces" is without prejudice to the content of the negotiations in those forums.

[In this context,] consultations should also be held among [major] arms suppliers and recipient countries with a view to the conclusion of agreements on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons on the basis in particular of the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

6. Prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects:

- (i) Signature and ratification by all States of the agreement adopted by the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
- (ii) Broadening of the prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, either through amendments to the existing Protocols or through the conclusion of additional Protocols, in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
- (iii) [The result of the above-mentioned Conference should be considered by all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.]

7. [An agreement for the cessation of the development, production and deployment of new types of highly destructive conventional weapons.] [Agreements for the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments and the development of new means of warfare, in particular highly destructive conventional weapons.]

D. Military Expenditures

Reduction of military expenditures

1. [Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means for its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.]

2. [Upon the commencement of this Programme, [the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States] [the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States] should agree to an immediate freeze in the current levels of their military budgets. [All other nuclear-weapon States are invited to follow this example.] [During the first stage, these States should reduce their military budgets in both absolute and percentage terms.]]

- [- Achievement of greater transparency of military postures, i.e. the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures enabling their comparison as a step to their balanced reduction on a multilateral level;
- Establishment of registers within the framework of the United Nations for the recording of data necessary for transparency and comparability of military postures.]

3. [The nuclear-weapon States [,] [and] other militarily significant States [and other States] will make reductions during the first stage in their military expenditures [in proportion to] [taking into account] their reductions of nuclear, conventional and other weapons, reductions in the production of such weapons, reductions in their armed forces and dismantling of military facilities, bases, etc.] [Multilateral gradual and balanced reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, ensuring transparency and comparability of military postures through the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures.]

4. [Other States] [States] [may] [shall] also make reductions in their military expenditures in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament agreements; [or] [and] reach agreement to freeze the levels of their military spending at certain levels.

[5. The above-mentioned States should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.

6. Agreements on reduction of military expenditures should be elaborated on the basis of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between different countries and include, as an integral part, provisions for verification, satisfactory to all parties. All member States, particularly the most heavily armed States, should endeavour [, whenever feasible,] to make use of the reporting instrument, contained in document A/35/479, in reporting their military expenditures as a means to increase confidence between States by contributing to greater openness in military matters. In light of future experiences gained through a wider participation, the reporting system may be further refined.]

[The basis for implementing the above-mentioned measures will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means for its implementation acceptable to all of them, including the continuation of efforts, within the framework of the United Nations, to identify and elaborate on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures.] */

*/ This text has been proposed as an alternative to paragraphs 5 and 6.

- [1. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other military significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.
2. Upon the commencement of this Programme, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States should agree to an immediate freeze in the current levels of their defence expenditures. All other nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States are invited to follow this example.
3. During the first stage, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should start to negotiate agreements concerning reductions in their military expenditures leading to reductions of their nuclear, conventional and other weapons, their armed forces and their production of such weapons and to the dismantling of military facilities, bases, etc.
4. Other States may also make reductions in their military expenditures in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament agreements; or reach agreement to freeze the levels of their military spending at certain levels.
5. The above-mentioned States should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.
6. Agreements on reduction of military expenditures should be elaborated on the basis of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between different countries and also include provisions for verification, satisfactory to all Parties.
7. An international standardized reporting system has been devised and adopted by the United Nations thirty-fourth General Assembly as recommended in document A/35/479. On this basis all States and particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should endeavour to make use of the reporting instrument and report annually their military expenditures to the United Nations. In light of future experiences gained through a wider participation the reporting instrument may be further refined.]

E. Related Measures

1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques:

Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the adoption of further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.

(2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

[Elaboration and adoption] [Consideration] of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in that environment [, taking into account the emerging régime under the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference].) */

(3. Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. Negotiations should be undertaken during the first stage on an international agreement [or agreements] prohibiting States from [developing, testing and] deploying weapons [of any kind] [including] [in particular] [anti-satellite weapons systems] in outer space.

[3. Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

(a) In order to preserve the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. In particular such negotiations should aim at preventing, by verifiable means, the development of anti-satellite weapons and anti-ballistic missile capabilities.

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

(b) Further negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aiming at the conclusion, in the first stage, of an agreement to ban anti-satellite weapons.

(c) Further negotiations to conclude an agreement to establish an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA);

(d) An agreement by States concerned to provide advance information of the launching of space vehicles to permit inspection;

(e) Measures to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration of outer space.]] */

4. The establishment of zones of peace, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document

(a) The Indian Ocean

[Concrete action should urgently be taken to ensure conditions of peace and security within the region, and to the early establishment of the Zone of Peace as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and taking into account the decisions of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.] [In this connection, the Conference on the Indian Ocean should be convened not later than the first half of 1983.]

(b) South-East Asia

[Steps should be taken by interested States in this region to further elaborate the concept of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" with a view to concluding an agreement on its establishment.] [The establishment of a zone of peace and stability in South-East Asia.]

(c) [establishment of a zone of [stable] peace [and co-operation] in the Mediterranean.]

5. [[Promotion of] adherence to existing international agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament by all States which are not yet parties to those agreements.]

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

OTHER MEASURES

1. Confidence-building [and security] measures

- (a) All States [, especially the militarily significant States,] shall undertake confidence-building [and security] measures such as the following and other measures yet to be agreed upon, as a contribution to preparing for further progress in disarmament:
- (i) (a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;
 - (b) Measures relating to the prevention of a possibility of surprise attack.
 - (ii) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.
 - (iii) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.
- (b) States shall seek to reach agreement on [effective] confidence-building measures at a global and regional level, taking into account the specific needs and the situation of the region, [e.g.:
- publication and exchange of information on security-related measures including matters of arms [control] [limitation] and disarmament;
 - [- regular bilateral and/or regional consultations of governmental representatives on such security-related matters;]
 - [- provisions of scholarships in military schools for the military personnel of other States;]
 - [- exchange of military delegations and military attachés;]
 - indication of normal military conduct and information on scope and extent of specific military activities like manoeuvres, specified movements etc. according to pre-established procedures;
 - limitations of certain military activities and movements;
 - establishment of procedures for the containment of conflicts, including the establishment of hot lines;]
 - negotiations [as appropriate] on the development of [effective security and] confidence-building measures [in the military field] [contained in] [on the basis of] the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [and the achievement of agreement on new confidence-building and disarmament measures] [, taking into account all other aspects of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe]. To those ends, the convening of a conference on [military détente and] disarmament in Europe [should be decided in a concluding document of a CSCE follow-up meeting];

- [- the extension to the Mediterranean Sea area of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory;]
- [- development of confidence-building measures in the Far East and the holding of negotiations to that end among all interested countries,]

In adopting such confidence-building measures, States will bear in mind the study on the subject to be prepared by the United Nations Group of Intergovernmental Experts.

Such measures should include agreements providing for the advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres. [Such measures should include agreements for the advance notification of large [as well as small] scale military manoeuvres [and of manoeuvres containing amphibious and/or airborne troops].]

2. Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension

In addition to measures aimed at the strengthening of international peace and security at lower levels of forces by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments, the following measures, which would contribute to the relaxation of international tension, should be undertaken during the first stage:

- (a) Withdrawal of all foreign [occupation] [aggression] forces from the territories of other States in accordance with the relevant United Nations [Security Council] resolutions and observance of the principles of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States.
- (b) [An international agreement for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal and elimination of the military presence [and rivalry] of foreign powers from various regions of the world] [including the sea areas in particular the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the region of the Persian Gulf.]
- (c) [Mutual limitation of the activities of navies of the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Conclusion of an agreement to the effect that missile-equipped submarines of both sides should be withdrawn from their current extensive military patrol zones, that navigation by such submarines should be limited by mutually agreed lines. Negotiations with a view to the extension of confidence-building measures to the surface of the seas and oceans, especially to the regions that contain the busiest sea lanes so that the largest possible proportion of the world's oceans could become, in the very near future, a zone of peace.]
- (d) [An undertaking not to enlarge existing or to establish new military alliances.]
- (e) [The ending of the division of Europe into military-political alliances and, as a first step, the abolition of the military activities.]
- (f) [Conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.]

3. Preventing the use of force in international relations

[[An international agreement or solemn understanding] [Legal undertakings] by all States, particularly the militarily significant States, to [strictly observe] [strengthen the observance of] the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law regarding respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, to conduct inter-State relations on the basis of sovereign equality and to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations.]

[Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.]

[Conclusion among all States participants in the European Conference of a treaty all parties to which would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another.]

4. [Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament] [Promotion of public awareness of disarmament] */

(a) In order to [mobilize world public opinion] [promote public awareness] on [behalf of] disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted.

(b) Throughout the implementation of the Programme, therefore, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connection with Disarmament Week. These actions should [constitute a large-scale programme to] further alert world opinion to the danger of war in general and nuclear war in particular.

(c) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

It is important to show the disastrous consequences for mankind to which war, in particular nuclear war, would lead. To that end, [an authoritative international committee should be set up which would] [it is imperative to] demonstrate the necessity of averting a nuclear [or conventional] catastrophe. [The holding of a

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.

world disarmament campaign, the collection of signatures in support of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, and the implementation of the principles of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace would also be of great significance in this respect. [All Governments should take steps to prohibit war propaganda in any form.]

As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. [Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research established by Assembly resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.]

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT */

[1. Peace and development are indivisible. In order to ensure that the process of disarmament envisaged in the comprehensive programme makes an effective contribution to economic and social development, especially of the developing countries, and to the full realization of the [N]ew [I]nternational [E]conomic [O]rder:

[A close relationship exists between disarmament and development. Disarmament can and should make an effective contribution to economic and social development on a just and democratic basis and to the establishment of a new international economic order, inter alia by switching resources from military purposes to purposes of development, particularly of the developing countries.]

- (i) [The militarily significant States shall undertake concrete measures at the national level to reallocate resources from military purposes to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of the developing countries, and report to the United Nations and/or the international disarmament authority on the measures contemplated or undertaken.] [All States, especially the militarily significant States, shall create the necessary prerequisites, including preparations and, where appropriate, planning to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes, especially to meet urgent economic and social needs, in particular, in the developing countries. They shall consider making the results of experiences in their respective countries available by submitting reports from time to time to the United Nations General Assembly on possible solutions to conversion problems.]
- (ii) [A significant part of the savings from the reduction of military expenditures particularly by the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States shall be provided as an additional flow of resources for

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

the economic and social development of the developing countries. Immediately after the adoption of the comprehensive programme, a separate account for the transfer of savings resulting from disarmament should be set up under the aegis of the United Nations Development Programme.] [Funds released as a result of the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction of their stockpiles should not be used under other expenditure headings of the military budgets of nuclear-weapon States. The allocation of funds set aside for the benefit of developing countries should be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the aid-receiving countries, and without any discrimination. A special committee should be set up for the allocation of such funds.]

In the elaboration of measures under subparagraphs (i) and (ii) above, adequate consideration will be given to the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

[2. Concrete measures shall be undertaken by all States to strengthen international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, taking into account the provisions of all relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, in particular to ensure the success of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy to be convened in principle by 1983, as decided upon in General Assembly resolution 34/63 of 29 November 1979, as well as other promotional activities in this field in the United Nations system including those within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency.]

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY^{*/}

[Disarmament represents a material guarantee of international security and must play a decisive role in preventing war and affording genuine security to peoples. Genuine security can be guaranteed only through arms limitation, reduction and elimination -- through disarmament.]

1. All States shall [undertake a solemn commitment to] support [all] measures for strengthening [the structure, authority and operation of] the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security. In this context, the conclusions of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security should be borne in mind.

2. All States shall undertake to utilize all appropriate means envisaged in the United Nations Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

^{*/} This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

Intermediate stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear Weapons

(1. Nuclear test ban

[The conclusion of an equitable and non-discriminatory treaty on a nuclear test ban would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- (i) The Committee on Disarmament should undertake [without further delay] multilateral negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear [weapons] tests by all States in all environments for all time. It should be able to attract universal adherence. The treaty should include a verification system satisfactory to all parties concerned and provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process.
- (ii) The parties who have been engaged in trilateral negotiations on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of the treaty" should [immediately resume and intensify their negotiations [and submit full information on the progress of their talks to the Committee on Disarmament, so as to] contribute to and assist multilateral negotiations on the treaty].)*/

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

- (i) (a) ([Continuation of negotiations, if necessary, to conclude an agreement or agreements to bring about a halt to [qualitative improvement] [research, development, production and testing] [research, development, testing and qualitative improvement] of nuclear weapons systems and of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons. [in parallel with the measures to reduce nuclear weapons and as appropriate integrated with such measures] [as well as on gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons leading to their complete destruction].) */
- (b) effective implementation of the agreement or agreements concluded [to ensure the complete and universal halt to the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems.]
- (ii) (a) ([steps to halt the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery:]) */

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (b) [Conclusion of negotiations on an agreement to bring about the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as well as [on an agreement to halt] the production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapon purposes in accordance with the process outlined in the first stage;]

[Negotiations on measures of verification, both by national technical means and international measures, including on-site inspection, as part of the agreement or agreements to be negotiated, to establish the base on which agreement or agreements prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, would be implemented.]

- (iii) Further reduction, through an international agreement or agreements, of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, including:
- (a) [a further reduction by 50 per cent in the strategic, tactical and other nuclear weapons and delivery systems of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States;]
 - (b) an agreed [proportionate] reduction in the nuclear weapons and delivery systems of [other] nuclear-weapon-States;
 - (c) [destruction of the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons reduced or dismantled by the nuclear-weapon States and transfer of surplus weapons-grade materials to peaceful purposes.]

[At the end of the intermediate stage, the nuclear-weapon States will register and serialize the nuclear weapons remaining with them and register the remaining fissionable materials for use in such weapons.]

- [(iii) Reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time:
- (a) (once [these reductions have reached an agreed stage] [the reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two parties concerned have reached a dimension such as to justify the acceptance by the other nuclear-weapon States of the principle of a limitation or reduction of their own nuclear forces], initiation of further negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States with a view to reaching agreement on the progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.) */
 - (b) effective and verifiable destruction of particular nuclear weapons components.]

- ((iv) Conclusion and implementation of an international [agreement] [or agreements], including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all the Parties by the end of the intermediate stage, providing for:

* / This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (a) the elimination of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon States;
- (b) the dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons;
- (c) the transfer of all fissionable [and fusionable] materials remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon or any other States to peaceful purposes.) */

3. Limitation and reduction of strategic arms

Continuation of [negotiations on] [the process of] further limitation and reduction of strategic arms [between the USSR and the United States].

4. [Nuclear non-proliferation] [Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document]

Universal application of the international consensus to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons developed jointly by the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States during the first stage.

[Adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.]

[The full implementation and strengthening of agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis.]

5. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones

- (i) Measures to further strengthen the nuclear-weapon-free zones which are established and those which may be established during the first stage;
- (ii) Creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. Universal adherence to and strict compliance with the international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling [and use] of all chemical weapons and their destruction.

2. Universal adherence to and strict compliance with the treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological [weapons] [warfare] [and the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes].

3. (a) [Adoption of] [Universal adherence to and strict compliance with] [any specific] [an international comprehensive agreement] or [agreements] [on the prevention of the emergence of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction] [on weapons of mass destruction which may have been identified].

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (b) Further efforts with a view to identifying and prohibiting [other] new weapons of mass destruction.

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

1. Negotiations on and conclusion of a multilateral agreement or agreements providing for:

(a) Further reductions [of fifty per cent] in the armed forces and conventional weapons of [the two major] [militarily significant States] [the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements] during the intermediate stage.

(b) Further [proportionate] reductions of the conventional weapons and the armed forces of other militarily significant States during the intermediate stage.

(c) [Consistent with reductions made by the above-mentioned States a freeze of the conventional weapons and armed forces of other States at agreed levels during the intermediate stage.]

(d) [Proportionate] reductions in the armed forces and conventional weapons of all other States during the intermediate stage.

(e) [Proportionate] reductions by the above-mentioned States of their production of conventional armaments during the intermediate stage.

2. Based on the results of the consultations held during the first stage, negotiation on and conclusion of appropriate agreements between arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons [to a level designed to ensure the limitations and relative balance agreed upon under paragraph 1 above].

3. [Negotiation of measures aimed at] [Conclusion of a multilateral agreement on] the cessation of the qualitative development of [all] [highly destructive] types and systems of conventional weapons [in parallel with the above agreements on the reductions of conventional weapons and armed forces, and as appropriate integrated with such measures].

D. Military expenditures

Reduction of military expenditures

1. Throughout the intermediate stage, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States will make further reductions in their military expenditures [proportionate to] [taking into account] [or leading to] the reduction in their armaments, armed forces, production of armaments and [any] dismantling of military facilities.

2. [In the course of] [throughout] the intermediate stage, [the] other States [will] [may] make reductions in their military expenditures [proportionate to] [taking into account] [or leading to] the reductions in their armaments, armed forces, production of armaments and [any] dismantling of military facilities.

[3. [The above-mentioned States] should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.]

4. All States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should continue to submit annually a fully itemized report on their respective military expenditures to the United Nations and/or the appropriate international authority.]

[The implementation, throughout the Programme, of the measures with regard to military expenditures should take place on the basis to be agreed upon by all participating states during the first stage.] */

5. [Human and material] resources released as a consequence of the reduction of military budgets should be reallocated for economic and social development especially [for the benefit] of the developing countries.

([Multilateral gradual and balanced reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, ensuring transparency and comparability of military postures through the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures.]) **/

E. Related Measures

1. (Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

[Elaboration and adoption] [Consideration] of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in that environment [, taking into account the emerging régime under the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference].) **/

2. ((a) Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. Negotiations should be undertaken during the intermediate stage on an international agreement [or agreements] prohibiting States from [developing, testing and] deploying weapons [of any kind], [including] [in particular] [anti-satellite weapons systems] in outer space.) **/

*/ This text has been proposed as an alternative to paragraphs 3 and 4.

**/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (b) [Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:
- (i) an agreement by States concerned to provide advance information of the launching of space vehicles to permit inspection;]
 - (ii) measures to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration [and use] of outer space;
 - (iii) [an international agreement by States to place all activities for the peaceful exploration [and use] of outer space under international supervision;]
 - (iv) [further attention to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.]

3. Further steps to establish and strengthen zones of peace and prevent military competition [on the seas]: establishment of zones of peace in [other] appropriate regions of the world.

4. Further steps to prevent military competition [on the high seas and international air space].

5. [[Promotion of] adherence to international agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament by all States concluded during the first stage.]

OTHER MEASURES

1. Confidence-building [and security] measures

All States shall endeavour to further elaborate and extend confidence-building measures, especially in regions of arms concentration and where international tensions and disputes exist.

2. Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension

([An international agreement for dismantling of all foreign military bases and elimination of all foreign military presence from all the regions of the world by the end of the intermediate stage.]) */

3. Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament
Promotion of public awareness of disarmament **/

Continuation of the programmes by governments, governmental and non-governmental international organizations to [mobilize world public opinion in favour of] [promote public awareness of] general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

**/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT */

[[1. [All States concerned, especially the militarily significant States, shall submit periodically full and detailed reports to the United Nations on the measures undertaken by them to reallocate from military purposes to economic and social purposes, especially for the benefit of the developing countries;] [All States, especially the militarily significant States, shall consider making the results of experiences and preparations in their respective countries available by submitting reports from time to time to the United Nations General Assembly on possible solutions to conversion problems.]

2. An International Disarmament Fund for Development shall be established under the aegis of the United Nations to which contributions shall be made principally by the most heavily armed States [in proportion to their military expenditures as a means of generating sizeable additional flow of resources for the economic and social development of the developing countries];]

[Funds released as a result of the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction of their stockpiles should not be used under other expenditure headings of the military budgets of nuclear weapon States. The allocation of funds set aside for the benefit of developing countries should be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the aid-receiving countries, and without any discrimination. These funds should be distributed by the special committee to be established during the first stage.]

3. [States shall undertake to support full and unhindered international co-operation in all fields of scientific research to promote economic and social development particularly in the developing countries and, in this context, to engage in free exchange of scientific and technological information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel and to provide full access to technology.]

4. [A substantial part of the savings resulting from the various disarmament measures envisaged in this stage of the Programme shall be placed at the disposal of an International Disarmament Fund for Development as an additional flow of resources for the economic and social development of the developing countries.]]

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY **/

1. [States shall conclude appropriate agreements with the United Nations to provide United Nations peace-keeping forces in accordance with Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.]

2. Commencement of negotiations by States with the United Nations with a view to concluding agreements to [place their internal security forces as required, at the completion of general and complete disarmament, at the disposal of the United Nations for the purposes of peace-keeping] [provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force].

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

**/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

Last stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear weapons

(Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

Conclusion and implementation of an international [agreement] [or agreements], including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all the Parties by the end of the last stage, providing for:

(a) the elimination of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon States;

(b) the dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons;

(c) the transfer of all fissionable [and fusionable] materials remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon or any other States to peaceful purposes.) */

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

(Efforts should continue with a view to identifying and prohibiting [other] weapons of mass destruction.) */

C. Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces

1. Negotiations on and conclusion of an agreement or agreements on the elimination of conventional armaments and armed forces, including: the disbanding of armed forces, the destruction of all armaments by all States, the cessation of military production and the dismantling of production facilities, the abolition of military establishments, recruitment and conscription, planning and training and the prohibition of appropriation of funds for military purposes.

2. In the course of these negotiations, agreement should be reached on the level of a strictly limited number of personnel, equipped with light firearms, and the necessary support facilities, for the maintenance of internal order, which would include policing of borders and safeguarding the personal security of citizens. The level of such personnel and facilities should also provide for compliance by States with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

D. Military expenditures

Reduction of military expenditures

1. By the end of the last stage, all States shall cease all military expenditures and prohibit appropriation of funds for military purposes. Appropriations, as

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

expressly agreed upon, shall be permitted for the maintenance of internal security forces [within their own territories] and in order to meet obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

2. [All States shall submit detailed reports annually throughout the last stage regarding the progressive reductions made in their military expenditures and plans for further cuts leading at the end of the stage to complete cessation of military expenditure.]

E. Related Measures

[States would undertake to report to the appropriate international authority any scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance. The international authority would make appropriate recommendations after examination and study of such reports and developments.]

OTHER MEASURES

(1. Confidence-building [and security] measures

All States shall endeavour to further elaborate and extend confidence-building measures especially in regions where international tensions and disputes may exist.

2. [Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament] [Promotion of public awareness of disarmament] */

Continuation of the programmes by governments, governmental and non-governmental international organizations to [mobilize world public opinion in favour of] [promote public awareness of] general and complete disarmament under effective international control.) **/

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ~~****/~~

[[A substantial part of] the further savings resulting from the achievement of general and complete disarmament, at the end of the Comprehensive Programme, shall be placed at the disposal of an International Disarmament Fund for Development.]

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ~~****/~~

Conclusion of agreements by States with the United Nations to [place their internal security forces as required, at the disposal of the United Nations for the purposes of peace-keeping] [provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force].

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.

**/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

***/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

****/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

VI. Machinery and procedures

1. In order to assure the most effective implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, two kinds of bodies will continue to be required in the field of disarmament — deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.
2. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. (Further provisions regarding the special role of the United Nations on the various aspects of the process of disarmament envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be elaborated subsequently, including the relationship between disarmament and development and its practical consequences.)
3. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures.
4. The First Committee of the General Assembly should continue to deal only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions. (Further possible provisions regarding the manner in which the First Committee should annually consider the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament may be elaborated subsequently.)
5. The Disarmament Commission shall continue to function as a subsidiary deliberative body of the General Assembly. The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly. (Further provisions regarding the specific responsibilities of the Disarmament Commission in relation to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and its procedures are to be elaborated subsequently.)
6. The Committee on Disarmament shall continue to be the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. (Further provisions relating to the Committee on Disarmament are to be elaborated subsequently.)
7. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.
8. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.
9. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it in the most effective manner, [the performance of the] disarmament Secretariat of the United Nations shall be [strengthened and developed in the light of the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/36/592)] [improved further]. (Further provisions on this aspect are to be elaborated subsequently.)
10. (This chapter on Machinery and Procedures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should include provisions concerning the mobilization of public opinion to be elaborated taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 15, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 and 129 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and the fact that, pursuant to resolution 36/92 C, the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, is to take decisions with respect to the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign.)

11. [As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. (Further provisions regarding studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations and on the possible role of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research are to be elaborated subsequently.)]

[As part of the process of facilitating and preparing the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken, whenever their result can be expected to have a positive influence on the course and outcome of negotiations. Studies should be envisaged especially in order to identify priority areas for arms control and disarmament measures, where negotiations seem necessary in view of a present or imminent destabilization of the relation of forces, and such fields where negotiations seem opportune in view of the existing political and security situation. Moreover, studies can also be undertaken to consider the contents and scope of collateral and other measures.

Decisions to prepare studies should be taken in conjunction with the periodic review of the Programme's implementation. They should be endorsed by the General Assembly, so as to provide the necessary link with other activities in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The studies should be pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, either by the Secretary-General, if necessary with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him on an equitable geographical basis or by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Further procedures, such as the delegation of specific studies or parts of them to other bodies, may be envisaged should the need arise.

The studies to be undertaken within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be concluded in time so as to permit the review to take its results into account and base its further recommendations for negotiations on these findings. Whenever feasible, studies should contain concrete proposals and suggestions for negotiations to be held or other steps to be taken.]

12. (Provisions regarding the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies are to be elaborated subsequently.)

13. [In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened [every five years at the end of each stage of the Programme] to review its implementation. The first special session devoted to the review of the Programme's implementation shall be held in [June/July 1987]. Such special sessions of the General Assembly shall assess the implementation of the measures included in the stage under review. Should the assessment reveal that the full implementation of those measures has not been achieved, consideration would be given to the re-adjustments that need to be made and to the steps that are necessary to stimulate progress in the implementation of the Programme. In addition, the review shall also serve the purpose of elaborating in more concrete terms, the measures to be implemented in Stages II, III and IV of the Programme, taking into account the existing situation, including developments in science and technology. [United Nations studies could make an important contribution to the task of elaborating the specific measures to be negotiated in the second and subsequent stage.]]

[Conferences for the review of the operation of agreements play a substantial role in maintaining the viability and efficiency of fulfilment of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. Taking account of useful experience in that respect, it is advisable to provide for a possibility of periodic review of the progress of implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament may be convened, as required.]

[The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is based on a phased step-by-step approach. Negotiations on disarmament and arms control measures which are specified in the Programme will be carried out in a sequence of phases. Each phase is to comprise negotiations on various interrelated measures which, taking into account the prevailing international political and security situation, aim at going one step further in lowering the level of armaments and military forces, while providing for the undiminished security of all States during that stage. Collateral and other measures, in particular confidence-building measures, will, during that stage, strengthen and consolidate the results achieved during the previous stages and, at the same time, prepare the ground for the successful outcome of negotiations during the next phase by further building and enhancing confidence among States. Studies will be undertaken in order to facilitate recommendations for which disarmament and collateral measures should be included in the next phase.

The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be periodically reviewed until general and complete disarmament under international control will have been achieved. The first review could take place at the conclusion of the Second Disarmament Decade.

The review should be undertaken in an appropriate existing form of the United Nations with the participation of all Member States. The recommendations emerging from the review are to be taken by consensus. They should take into account progress reached in implementing the measures agreed upon previously, the state of negotiations in progress, and external events.

The objectives of these reviews will be to consider the implementation of measures agreed upon in previous phases and, where necessary, propose ways and means to ensure or enhance their strict observance, to decide on the question of when a current phase can be declared as concluded and if the following one can begin as well as to consider the measures which might most appropriately be pursued thereafter. The date of the next review will also be examined.]

14. In addition to the periodic reviews [to be carried out at the end of each stage] of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there should be a continuous review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included in the agenda of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General, with the assistance of United Nations Disarmament Secretariat, should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

15. During its annual review, or at its periodic special sessions to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, provide for further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme. [, including verification of agreed measures]. In this connection, the proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will, inter alia,

be taken into account. (Further relevant provisions related to this question may be elaborated subsequently.) [The establishment under United Nations auspices of an international organization charged, inter alia, with the following tasks with respect to existing and future arms control and disarmament agreements:

- implementation
- verification including fact finding
- organization of review -- and amendment conferences
- provision of information.] [The creation of an international satellite monitoring agency would make an important contribution to the verification of the implementation of disarmament agreements. The negotiations should be pursued with a view to the conclusion of an agreement for the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency.]

([Verification is one cornerstone for progress in disarmament and arms control. Because arms control and disarmament measures concern the vital security interest of the States involved, such measures must be effectively verifiable. They should also make the situation with respect to the remaining armaments more transparent and contribute to the strengthening of confidence between the States concerned. Without means of strict international and national verification, as appropriate, a sufficient degree of confidence of States in the observance of agreements cannot develop.]

Effective verification is of paramount importance for the maintenance of the undiminished security of States during the disarmament process. States should therefore take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate measures of verification for each particular arms control and disarmament agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures without exaggerating any difficulties involved in their implementation.

Negotiations on specific disarmament and arms control measures should therefore encompass the inclusion of appropriate verification arrangements, and States should accept appropriate provisions for adequate verification. Where the scope of agreements and their verification have reciprocal influence on each other, questions concerning verification should be taken up and negotiated concurrently. During treaty negotiations, progress on verification measures can have a positive effect on the negotiation of other elements of the treaty.

The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in specific agreements depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or, where appropriate, through the United Nations system in the verification process. A combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Suitable procedures, including on-site inspection, must therefore be envisaged.]] 3/

([Agreements on arms limitation and disarmament should provide for adequate reliable monitoring of their implementation so as to ensure compliance with the agreements by all parties. The forms and conditions of monitoring depend on the purposes, scope and nature of the specific agreement. Questions relating to

3/ This text is provisionally included in the chapter on "Machinery and procedures" with the understanding that its placement requires further consideration.

monitoring should be considered and decided upon simultaneously and in a manner organically linked with the consideration of specific disarmament problems rather than separately from them.

Accumulated experience shows that national technical means form a reliable basis for monitoring compliance with agreements. Where necessary, different methods of verification and other monitoring procedures, including international ones, should be combined on a voluntary basis. The strengthening of confidence would assist the application of additional monitoring measures.

A most important pre-condition for the application of specific agreed measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament is the political will of Governments; references to technical difficulties of monitoring should not be used as a pretext for refusing to reach agreement on measures for halting the arms race.)) */

([Adequate and effective verification is a key prerequisite to any progress towards arms control and disarmament. Acceptance of this principle, and application of it to specific steps undertaken towards disarmament will therefore facilitate over-all progress towards general and complete disarmament. The role of verification in the comprehensive programme of disarmament is threefold: as a principle upon which progress towards disarmament is based, as a part of the specific measures to be undertaken by States; and as an objective to be carried out by means of the over-all machinery and procedures called for in a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Arms control and disarmament measures concern the vital security interests of the States involved and the advantages accruing to any State party to an arms control and disarmament agreement comes from the fulfilment by the parties to such an agreement of the obligations and responsibilities contained therein. Thus, States must be confident that such obligations and responsibilities are being adhered to, and verification is the means by which such assurance is gained. Without effective verification, the confidence of States that agreements are being observed cannot sufficiently develop. In addition, since any agreement must be designed in such a way to ensure the security of the States party to it, and as it is through adequate verification measures that States can develop confidence that the agreement is being complied with, it therefore follows that effective verification is of paramount importance for the maintenance of undiminished security of States during the disarmament process.

The principle of effective verification must, in practice, be reflected by the inclusion of necessary and appropriate verification measures and arrangements in specific disarmament and arms control agreements. Negotiations must therefore include consideration of effective measures of verification, which will form a part of the agreement or agreements to be negotiated. Such verification measures should encompass, as appropriate, both national and international means, and include provisions, as necessary, for on-site inspection. Through the inclusion of appropriate measures of verification a sound basis will be established for the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements.

In the negotiation of specific arms control and disarmament agreements, where the scope of agreement and verification measures have reciprocal influence, questions of scope and verification should be taken up and negotiated concurrently. And as verification measures are a vital part of any arms control and disarmament agreement, progress in the development of verification measures during the course of negotiation can have a positive effect on the negotiations of other elements of the agreements. The form, conditions, and modalities of verification to be provided for in specific agreements depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope, and nature of the agreements.

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Measures designed to ensure effective verification of compliance with agreements will, as noted, contribute to the increased confidence of States. Such measures should, in addition, also make the situation with respect to the remaining armaments more transparent. States should therefore take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate measures of verification for each particular arms control and disarmament agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures without exaggerating difficulties involved in their implementation.

A combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Suitable procedures, including on-site inspection, must therefore be envisaged.

The multilateral aspects of disarmament negotiations have become more significant, and experience has increasingly demonstrated the need for closer attention to the development by parties to agreements of appropriate machinery and procedures to ensure verification of compliance with multilateral agreements. Therefore, the possibility of establishing requirements and criteria of an institutional and procedural nature with broad application for effective machinery to ensure implementation of individual multilateral disarmament agreements, in particular their verification, should be considered. In this context, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should provide for examination of the various possibilities available in this regard. In the consideration of various possibilities, the experience accumulated by already functioning agencies, as they provide working prototypes from which an effective organization could be developed, should be of benefit.

The review processes for agreements already in effect vary widely, and many, as appropriate, rely to some extent on national evaluations. Many States may not, however, possess a national capability to effectively make national evaluations of compliance with agreements to which they may be a party. The consideration outlined above may serve to promote an improved verification process by providing for an evaluation of the implementation of agreements and a report to the involved parties at periodic review conferences.]] */

([Verification forms an important part of measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, is inseparably linked with such measures, and must stem from a precise and clear agreement on them. Consequently, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should contain basic provisions on verification, proceeding thereby from the principles enshrined in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. These principles should find their concrete application in the elaboration of measures for verifying compliance with each specific agreement on arms limitation and disarmament to be concluded and implemented at the different stages of the CPD and within indicative time-frames. Due consideration should be given in this regard to the experience gained until now with the elaboration and implementation of agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

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Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. Thus, in order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements. In enhancing confidence in the observance of disarmament agreements, appropriate verification measures would contribute to attracting other States to adhere to them and promote the general disarmament process.

At the same time, a certain minimum of confidence is necessary as a basis for devising an effective verification system. Thus, normal relations between States based on détente and recognition of mutual interest are very conducive to the elaboration of reliable verification procedures, whereas a policy aggravating international tension and accelerating the arms race is not likely to promote agreement on far reaching verification measures. Verification is likely to be most successful in an atmosphere of co-operation.

The settlement of verification issues depends on whether or not the various parties have the political will to conclude the relevant disarmament agreements. It is universally recognized that strong political will is a prerequisite to reaching agreement on any significant or meaningful measure in the field of disarmament. Once such political will has been built up, it will not be difficult and certainly not beyond human ingenuity, to devise controls appropriate to any requirement in the field of disarmament, no matter how complex it may be.

Strong political will combined with a degree of mutual trust has to exist in respect of any measure in the field of disarmament, before a practical, least-onerous and fair system of verification can be devised and effectively implemented.

Disarmament negotiations should not be involved in an abstract verification discussion, diverting their attention from substantive disarmament problems. Arguments concerning complexities in regard to verification or controls should not become a camouflage for the lack of political will and a priori refusal to trust others. With regard to disarmament measures of the highest priority, such as a comprehensive ban on the testing of all nuclear weapons and the elimination of chemical weapons, it is clearly the lack of political will, rather than the complexities involved in verification, which is holding up the conclusion of negotiations in this area.

In general, one may proceed from the assumption that a State becomes a party to a disarmament agreement in order to abide strictly by the obligations it has assumed under it, and therefore verification should not be built upon the principle of total distrust by States of one another, and should not take the form of global suspiciousness.

The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend on and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. To proceed the other way round would involve disarmament negotiations in endless debates on detailed and highly technical aspects of verification and lead to an actual postponement, if not prevention, of disarmament agreements.

Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures of verification which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

Verification measures should be an important link in the chain of the other measures ensuring confidence in the observance of a given disarmament treaty by all parties. Thus, they constitute an integral part of the broader system for ensuring compliance with such an agreement. The main function of this system is to give the parties to those agreements assurance of their observance by other parties, and through the employment of certain forms of co-operation to facilitate the resolution of questions in dispute. Therefore, where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

It is universally recognized that a system of controls, guaranteeing 100 per cent verification, is not possible, nor can a completely fool-proof system of verification be designed. The whole complex of available and possible verification methods, ranging from national control to certain forms of international verification, provides a high degree of assurance that violations of disarmament agreements could be detected. It is most doubtful that a militarily important violation could be concealed.

Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process.

Against this essential general background, it is clear that it would be wrong to make a fetish of verification. It would be equally wrong to devise or establish a machinery of controls in the absence of genuine measures of arms limitation or disarmament. To do that, would be like putting the cart before the horse. There can be no merit, either, in sterile and abstract discussions of the complexities of verification issues, kinds of verification régimes, or in stressing the need for some kind of an international verification organization, without reference to any concrete measure of real disarmament or serious arms limitation.]) */

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