



General Assembly

Sixty-fifth session

First Committee

20th meeting

Wednesday, 27 October 2010, 3 p.m.
New York

Official Records

Chair: Miloš Koterec (Slovakia)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Agenda items 88 to 104 and 162 (continued)

Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chair: I shall now give the floor to those delegations that did not have the chance to speak in explanation of vote or position on the draft resolutions adopted yesterday under cluster 1.

Mr. Hoffmann (Germany): I take the floor to explain Germany's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.10*, entitled "Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia".

Germany supports nuclear-weapon-free zones as important contributions to regional peace and security and the global non-proliferation regime. In this context, Germany welcomes the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. However, we decided to abstain in the voting in order to show our disappointment at the lack of progress shown in resolving outstanding issues with regard to achieving full international recognition of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, including by all the nuclear-weapon States.

We call upon all States concerned to constructively consult and cooperate to resolve the outstanding issues, in line with the commitment made in the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and welcome recent declarations of intent in this regard. We hope to see progress in the year to come, allowing us to support the draft resolution in the future, as we intend to support the other draft resolutions concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones before the Committee.

Mr. Macedo Soares (Brazil): The Brazilian delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.26, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", even though the Brazilian position is well known, namely, that nuclear weapons need to be eliminated and not merely that their use be prohibited. We understand that a gradual, phased programme leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons can be a realistic approach to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

In its Final Document, the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), noted

"the proposals for nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to ... consider negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification" (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), para. 81).

The NPT Review Conference also noted, in paragraph 82 of its Final Document, that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process and other related measures should be pursued within an agreed legal

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framework which a majority of States parties, including Brazil, believed should include specified timelines. We consider that actions 3, 5 and 6 in the Final Document's action plan constitute the necessary way forward in promoting nuclear disarmament.

The delegation of Brazil voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.27, entitled "Reducing nuclear danger", because we believe that nuclear doctrines must be reviewed, as called for in paragraph 1, in order to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It is our view, however, that it is not the use, as mentioned in the first preambular paragraph, but the mere existence of nuclear weapons that poses the most serious threat to humankind and to the survival of civilization. In this context, measures such as de-alerting or de-targeting nuclear weapons, while relevant, cannot be a substitute for multilateral agreements conducive to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The delegation of Brazil voted in favour of the draft resolution entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", contained in document A/C.1/65/L.33. We did so, as we did last year, because we consider that commencing negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as called for in paragraph 1, would not prejudge the outcome of those negotiations, which in our view should also take into account the consideration of other aspects related to fissile materials. We believe that any treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices serves the objectives of both non-proliferation and effective nuclear disarmament.

The delegation of Brazil abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.43*, entitled "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons". We did so largely because of the introduction of a new paragraph — paragraph 12 — which seems to suggest that the unilateral statements made by the nuclear-weapon States in 1995, as reflected in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), exhausted multilateral approaches to the issue of negative security assurances. Brazil does not believe that those unilateral statements are sufficient to address the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States with regard to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. We would like the

draft resolution — in line with the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference — to support the immediate start of discussions within the Conference on Disarmament of effective international arrangements to guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States protection against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, not excluding a legally binding agreement.

In regard to paragraph 15, the Brazilian delegation would like to recall that the Additional Protocol is an instrument of a voluntary nature, agreed on between a member State and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that the concept of universalization applies solely to multilateral treaties. The language used in paragraph 15 could have benefited from the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which noted, first, that it is a sovereign decision of a State to conclude an additional protocol; secondly, that the Additional Protocol represents a confidence-building measure; and thirdly, that the Additional Protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

A less determining but also valid concern for my delegation was the language contained in the fourth preambular paragraph, in the phrase that reads: "while convinced that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear war". In our view, this language seems to consider that waging a nuclear war is a viable option at the discretion of a State. We believe that this paragraph could be strengthened in order to express abhorrence of the very existence of nuclear weapons and the possibility that they might be used.

Mr. Propper (Israel): I would like to take the floor to explain our position on two draft resolutions, A/C.1/65/L.1 and A/C.1/65/L.48.

Israel once again joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.1, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", despite its reference to this year's non-consensus resolution of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concerning the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, and notwithstanding our substantive reservations regarding certain elements of the draft resolution. We did so since Israel remains committed to a vision of the Middle East becoming a zone free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles. We also believe that, rather than stressing the

differences in our positions, there is a fundamental need to build confidence and create a common vision for all States of the Middle East. Israel has always maintained that such issues, as well as those related to regional security, can be realistically addressed only within the regional context.

As is widely recognized by the international community, the establishment of any nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate from within the region. It can be based only on arrangements freely arrived at through direct negotiations between the States of the region and with those directly concerned, applying a step-by-step approach. That process should begin with modest confidence-building measures, carefully selected so as not to undermine the security margins of any State in the region, followed by the establishment of peaceful relations, reconciliation, mutual recognition and good-neighbourliness, and complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures.

Such a process could in due course lead to more ambitious goals, such as establishing a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone. In this context, it should be recalled that in the Middle East, unlike other regions around the world where nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established, the proliferation realities pose a continuous threat to the very existence of the State of Israel. Those threats are significantly exacerbated by the irresponsible behaviour of certain States in the region that act in defiance of their non-proliferation obligations, as well as States outside the region that export weapons of mass destruction-related technologies to it.

The establishment of the Middle East as a zone free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles, is and remains a long-term vision to which Israel subscribes and aspires. Based on this fundamental approach, Israel supports the draft resolution entitled "The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East". It does so despite substantive reservations regarding certain elements of the draft resolution, including the absence of references to grave cases of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations in violation of Security Council resolutions by States in the Middle East. The international community should always bear in mind the fact that of the cases of non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a majority — three out of four widely

acknowledged cases — have taken place in the Middle East, while others are currently under investigation.

Recent events and developments in the Middle East demonstrate, unfortunately, that the basic prerequisites for reaching that vision do not exist. The hostile approach of some States of our region towards Israel demonstrates the lack of political will to promote an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation.

Israel has not abandoned the hope that the Middle East will one day become a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. However, our position is firmly based on the recognition that the attainment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East can be achieved only through an inclusive process in which all regional States take part. Those who wish to overlook the importance of an all-encompassing process will not bring the Middle East any closer to the realization of this goal. Israel will continue to dedicate all its efforts to achieving a stable environment of peace and reconciliation in the Middle East. We call upon our neighbours to do the same.

I would now like to give our explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.48, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". Israel decided to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.48 because of the importance it attaches to the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, Israel cannot support and has strong reservations regarding some of the new wording contained in the sixth preambular paragraph.

First, Israel has always emphasized that the CTBT and the NPT are not one and the same, and that a clear distinction should be maintained with regard to these two regimes. Acknowledging the NPT and its recently held Review Conference in a draft resolution devoted to the strengthening of the CTBT could undermine the CTBT and its goals.

Israel signed the CTBT in September 1996. This reflects its long-standing policy to bring itself closer, wherever possible, to international norms on nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. Since the establishment of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in November 1996, Israel has participated actively in the development of all elements of the CTBT verification regime. These activities demonstrate the importance Israel attributes to the

CTBT and its role with regard to the enhancement of international peace and security.

Israel appreciates the significant progress made in the development of the CTBT verification regime, the completion of which is a prerequisite to the entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. However, completion of the verification regime still requires additional efforts. Major steps required include, inter alia, continued build up and testing of the international monitoring system stations and the completion of the on-site inspections operational manual, equipment purchase and training.

For Israel, the regional security situation in the Middle East, including adherence to and compliance with the Treaty by States in the region, is a major consideration for ratification.

Secondly, it is Israel's view that the Treaty's verification regime should be robust enough to detect non-compliance with its basic obligations and be immune to abuse, and at the same time allow each State signatory to protect its national security interests. For Israel, completion of the verification regime constitutes a major consideration for ratification, as we would like to ensure that it is adequate, including robust on-site inspections and coverage of the Middle East by the international monitoring system.

Thirdly, Israel's status in the policymaking organs of the Treaty, including those connected to the geographical region of the Middle East and South Asia, and the Executive Council of the future CTBTO must be addressed. Sovereign equality must be ensured.

As it has done in previous years, Israel voted in favour of this draft resolution. Our position arises from the importance Israel attaches to the objectives of the CTBT.

Mr. Suda (Japan): I would like to make a statement in explanation of vote on two draft resolutions.

First, on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.5, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." Japan voted in favour of this draft resolution, as we think that deepening substantive discussions on ways to increase the effectiveness of negative security assurances is essential to the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons.

However, the draft resolution should not prejudice the discussions in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan strongly hopes that each Conference member State will demonstrate flexibility, and that the Conference will break the long-standing stalemate and advance its substantive work on the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty and discussions of other important issues.

Secondly, I would like to deliver a joint statement in explanation of vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/65/L.10*, entitled "Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia", on behalf of the following delegations, which have all voted in favour of the draft resolution: Austria, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.

Our eight delegations welcome the entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia on 21 March 2009. Such a zone is the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the northern hemisphere and will encompass an area where nuclear weapons previously existed.

As stipulated in the principles and guidelines of the 1999 Disarmament Commission report (A/54/42), consultations with nuclear-weapon States during the negotiations on a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone are important. In this regard, we welcome the expressed readiness of the five Central Asian States to continue consultations on a number of provisions of the Treaty. We also welcome the readiness of the United States, expressed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, to consult with the parties to the Treaty in an effort to reach an agreement that would allow the United States to sign its protocol. We encourage such consultations to take place as soon as possible in the hope that progress will be possible in the near future. In this regard, we would like to encourage the five Central Asian States to keep countries with an interest in this process informed on the developments of their consultations.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation regarding draft resolutions A/C.1/65/L.1 and A/C.1/65/L.3*, respectively entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" and "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", which the Committee adopted yesterday.

As a result of Iran's initiative in 1974, the General Assembly has continuously endorsed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and recognized that such a zone would greatly enhance international peace and security. Yet the Zionist regime, with its clandestine nuclear weapon programme and its secret nuclear facilities, remains the only impediment to realizing such a zone in the Middle East.

My delegation regrets that, by pursuing counter-productive policies, certain nuclear-weapon States are actively hindering any meaningful action in international forums to address the real threat posed by the Israeli nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, the contradictory approach of certain European Union members — as well as a few countries like Canada — towards the non-proliferation regime has sent the wrong message to the Zionist regime.

These countries, instead of focusing on the peaceful safeguarded nuclear facilities of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), should address the real proliferation threat posed by the unsafeguarded, covert nuclear weapons installations of the Zionist regime. The inaction imposed upon the Security Council over the past several decades by the United States, and supported by certain European Union member countries, in addressing the well-documented nuclear weapon programme of that regime has given it the audacity to explicitly acknowledge the possession of nuclear weapons, which has been condemned by the 118 members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Zionist regime should be forced to eliminate all its nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such measures should be taken against this regime in different international forums, including in the upcoming 2012 conference, in order to pave the way for the long-sought goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the materialization of peace and security in the world.

Yesterday's adoption by a majority of 155 Member States of the draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, naming Israel as the only party in the region not to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, was a manifestation of the international

community's real concern. Therefore, those few countries claiming to represent the international community and taking action against some NPT Member States are on the wrong path and should rectify their actions and change their policies, which have already failed.

While categorically rejecting the baseless allegations against its exclusively peaceful nuclear programme, including those made yesterday, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its commitment to the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Mrs. Ledesma Hernández (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Cuba would like to explain its vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/65/L.43*, entitled "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", and A/C.1/65/L.48, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".

Cuba has always maintained a clear, transparent and consistent position with regard to nuclear disarmament as the highest priority in the area of disarmament and to the need to adopt concrete actions that facilitate progress towards that objective. On previous occasions, my delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution submitted this year under the symbol A/C.1/65/L.43* because we believed that it lacked the substantive elements that would effectively achieve that end. Our delegation has so stated and reiterated to the authors of the draft resolution on a number of occasions.

New controversial elements have been introduced to the draft resolution submitted this year. For that reason, Cuba presented various specific constructive proposals to the authors. Unfortunately, those proposals have not been reflected in the text. Therefore, the Cuban delegation had no option but again to abstain in the voting on that text. We hope that our remarks will be duly taken into account next year, and we reiterate our readiness to work constructively towards our possible future support for the draft resolution.

Cuba has also maintained a clear position in opposition to all kinds of nuclear-weapon tests, including those carried out by means of supercomputers and other sophisticated explosion methods. For that reason, Cuba has always voted in favour of the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) introduced every year in the First Committee, which we again supported this

time. However, we believe it important to point out that the reiteration of paragraph 5 of the draft resolution detracts from the primarily technical nature it should have.

We are all aware of the inherent complexities of that delicate matter, and the decisions taken in the Security Council in that regard have not helped to resolve the problem. We firmly believe that diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means should continue with a view to finding a long-term solution to the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula.

Moreover, we reiterate our deep concern about the slow movement towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by nuclear-weapon States towards the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals. We hope that the sponsors of the draft resolution will in the future keep the text focused on relevant issues concerning the CTBT and avoid the inclusion of easily manipulated controversial elements, which will make it possible to achieve the necessary consensus on that issue.

Mr. Hallak (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.48, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”. Syria will always underscore that such an important and sensitive Treaty, and the future commitment that it requires of all Member States, must not ignore the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, which are the overwhelming majority of countries in the world. These countries have not been offered guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons or allowed to acquire advanced peaceful technology in all forms that are essential to accelerating development in such countries.

The important and fair observations that have been made on the Treaty all agree that its text does not include a commitment on the part of nuclear-weapon States to dismantle their arsenals within a reasonable time frame. The text does not mention the illegal use or threat of use of nuclear weapons or underscore the need to achieve the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in order to put an end to such proliferation in all its aspects.

It is generally agreed that the text is limited to prohibiting nuclear tests without banning laboratory nuclear tests or the qualitative development of new weapons systems. Observers also agree that the inspection and verification systems could open the way

for the misuse of the data received from national monitoring systems and be used arbitrarily for political ends. The strangest aspect of the text of the Treaty is that it allows signatory States to take measures against non-signatory States, which could include measures taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, in violation of the sovereign right of countries to accede or not to accede to the Treaty.

The Syrian Arab Republic views such major loopholes as a source of grave concern because Israel alone possesses nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It strives to increase their quantity and quality, while refusing to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under the verification and safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. All of that impedes and jeopardizes efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and exposes the region and the world to the Israeli nuclear threat without any international response.

My delegation would also like to put on record its reservations with regard to the references to the NPT in all paragraphs of all draft resolutions adopted so far.

Ms. Adamson (United Kingdom): I would like to give the United Kingdom explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.25, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”. The representative of France has already delivered a common explanation of vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/65/L.10* and A/C.1/65/L.24*.

Yesterday, the United Kingdom abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.25. I want to provide some background to that decision, especially as my delegation had a number of very positive consultations with the authors of the draft resolution in the course of the First Committee’s work. We hope that this positive engagement will continue.

At the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May, we agreed for the first time to action plans across all three pillars of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses. This achievement was unprecedented, and many of the countries represented in the New Agenda Coalition were instrumental in achieving that outcome. The United Kingdom regards that comprehensive set of action plans as the new agenda that should guide our

work over the next few years. So we were pleased to hear the statement delivered by the representative of Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition yesterday in which it expressed commitment to the NPT in all its aspects.

But in general, we have been disappointed to see that a number of draft resolutions here in the First Committee have focused almost exclusively on the nuclear disarmament agenda. We would hope that all the countries that signed onto the NPT Review Conference outcome would always consider the NPT action plans as a whole. If 2000 was the year of the 13 steps, then 2010 was the year of the three pillars. The draft resolution calls on the nuclear-weapon States to report back a certain level of progress by a specified date, which goes beyond the language agreed in the Final Document of the Review Conference itself (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)).

We would also like to have seen in this and other draft resolutions in this cluster a greater emphasis on the need for all States that possess nuclear weapons, not just the nuclear-weapon States, to undertake activities that are consistent with the shared objective of making the world safer and more secure. This comment in no way confers any particular status on any countries, but rather reflects the fact that all States should contribute to the shared objective.

Mr. Wang Qun (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I would like to explain China's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.33, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". Yesterday, the Chinese delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution. I would like to take this opportunity to explain China's principled position on this issue.

China supports negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and has always held that the Conference on Disarmament is the only appropriate forum to reach a negotiated FMCT with the participation of all sides concerned. China supports concluding a viable FMCT through good negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on the basis of a comprehensive programme of work. The definition of "good negotiations" is intergovernmental negotiations based on a procedure agreed in the Conference on Disarmament with the participation of all sides. A good FMCT is defined as an FMCT that all sides can eventually join.

I would now like to explain China's vote on the three draft resolutions on nuclear disarmament. Yesterday, the Committee voted on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.25, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", and draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.43*, entitled "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons". Today, the Committee will consider and vote on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.22, entitled "Nuclear disarmament". I would like to take this opportunity to explain China's voting positions on these issues.

China has always advocated the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons and supports a gradual process of nuclear disarmament, effectively reducing the risks posed by nuclear weapons so as to ultimately achieve the goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free world. Based on that position, China is in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.22 on nuclear disarmament.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.25, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", China is in favour of the draft resolution's purposes and objectives and voted in favour of it. At the same time, China believes that the relevant contents of the draft resolution can be further improved. Some elements go beyond the provisions of the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) of the 2010 eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). China believes that the relevant sides should gradually implement concrete measures on nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Final Document.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.43*, entitled "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", China does not support paragraph 9 on the declaration of a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons because that is not conducive to building consensus or the early launching of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on an FMCT. Therefore, China voted against paragraph 9 and abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as whole.

With your permission, Sir, and in the interest of saving time, I should now like to speak in explanation of vote before the voting on draft resolution

A/C.1/65/L.42, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”.

China will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.42. At the same time, the Chinese delegation believes that efforts to implement nuclear disarmament measures, including any intermediate steps, should abide by the two important principles of maintaining global strategic stability and not harming any country’s security. The relevant intermediate steps should also be implemented at the right time and under the right conditions during the nuclear disarmament process. The ultimate goal should be the total prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Toro (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation wishes to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.43*.

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.43*, entitled “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, based on our country’s pacifist orientation and tradition and our commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in accordance with the relevant legal instruments in this area to which my country is party.

In this context, we recognize that the draft resolution, with its own particular features, is part of multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which should at the same time contribute to United Nations efforts aimed at the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela feels, however, that the text is not sufficiently emphatic about the steps that should be developed in order to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament. Notwithstanding the change in the title of the draft resolution, it still essentially focuses on non-proliferation and lacks any compelling appeal for nuclear disarmament and the responsibilities and plans that nuclear-weapon States should undertake in order to reach that goal.

Compared with the text adopted last year, the draft resolution has been diluted. Important references, such as those to the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, have also been deleted. Furthermore, the draft resolution calls simply for the commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and does not mention the

many other issues that should be covered by the Conference. That one specific reference to a single agenda item may be seen as retrogressive compared to last year’s text, which called for a more balanced, comprehensive treatment of all of these issues.

Venezuela also has reservations about the reference to the Nuclear Security Summit in the resolution’s fourteenth preambular paragraph. The limited attendance at that event meant that major issues of great importance to the international community were addressed outside the basic multilateral framework of disarmament and non-proliferation matters. Venezuela reiterates that such issues will have a definitive and comprehensive solution only if the commitment to resolve them is truly multilateral. Venezuela hopes that the text will be re-examined in the First Committee at its next session to ensure that it contains a more compelling appeal for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Aly (Egypt): I am taking the floor to explain Egypt’s vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/65/L.43*, entitled “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

Egypt voted in favour of the draft resolution while fully aware of two specific weaknesses it contains. The first weakness is represented in the failure of paragraph 12, which addresses the issue of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States in a manner reflecting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and unilateral security assurances as a satisfactory basis for such assurances, while failing to mention the urgent need for negotiations on a legally-binding instrument that would provide non-nuclear-weapon States with unconditional negative security assurances, as acknowledged in the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), adopted by consensus in May.

The second weakness relates to paragraph 13, which “encourages the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate” and in which we could find no mention of the specific urgency of establishing such a zone in the Middle East, consistent with the outcomes of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences and the annual consensus resolution of the General Assembly entitled

“Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”.

However, in support of a number of other important elements of the draft resolution and intending to work closely with the delegation of Japan to address both weaknesses mentioned in paragraphs 12 and 13 next year, Egypt decided to support the draft resolution and voted in favour this year.

Mr. Wilson (Australia): I take the floor to explain my delegation’s vote on the two draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/65/L.3* and A/C.1/65/L.26.

Australia is committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. As a strong supporter of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we will continue to promote these objectives in all relevant forums. Our strong advocacy for the universalization of the NPT and for the universal application of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, including the additional protocol, is a matter of record.

Australia has long been a supporter of effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at by Member States. We have consistently supported the General Assembly resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Australia supports the practical steps endorsed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

However, draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.3*, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, which only refers to Israel without any reference to Middle East States of current proliferation concern is, in our view, unbalanced. We therefore, regrettably, had to abstain in the voting.

Australia does not support draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.26, entitled, “Convention on the Prohibition of the use of Nuclear Weapons”. However, this does not diminish in any way the strong commitment Australia has made to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons or our determination to continue to contribute to practical initiatives that are intended to help realize this ambition. We note that the

draft resolution calls on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Like all Member States, Australia is dedicated to returning the Conference on Disarmament to work and, like the majority of Conference members, we see negotiation of a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) as a priority for the Conference. Moreover, we firmly believe that the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT on the basis of the Shannon mandate are essential steps towards achieving nuclear disarmament and should be pursued with vigour and determination.

We will work with Conference on Disarmament members to have the Conference commence negotiations on an FMCT in 2011, and undertake substantive discussion on the Conference on Disarmament’s other core issues.

Ms. Kennedy (United States of America): I would like to explain the vote of the United States of America on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.25, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”. The United States delegation engaged in thorough consultations with the sponsors of the draft resolution, and we appreciate the seriousness and goodwill of the sponsors. We listened with great interest to the statement made by the representative of Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. However, we were unable to reach agreement on changes that would have made the draft resolution acceptable to the United States.

We agree with many of its elements, particularly those reflecting language in the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) of this year’s Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We voted against the draft resolution for several reasons.

First, the draft resolution contradicts our position, stated again by President Obama after the Review Conference, strongly opposing efforts to single out Israel. Secondly, the draft resolution ignores the threat to the Middle East and to the NPT posed by Iran’s failure to comply with its NPT obligations. Thirdly, the draft resolution does not contain the balance, in our

view, among the NPT's three pillars that so many of the Treaty's parties believe is vital and that is found in the Review Conference Final Document. Finally, we found it surprising and disappointing that a draft resolution so focused on disarmament would omit a reference to the critical next step, in our view, in the multilateral agenda represented by the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

While we voted against the draft resolution and against paragraph 12 for the reasons stated, we look forward to continuing our contacts and dialogue with the countries in the New Agenda Coalition on issues of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Chair: We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote.

The Committee will now proceed to the draft resolutions in cluster 1 listed in informal paper No. 2: A/C.1/65/L.22, A/C.1/65/L.42 and A/C.1/65/L.54.

The Committee will now take action on the draft resolutions contained in cluster 1 listed in informal paper No. 2. Before doing so, I shall call on those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote before the voting.

Mr. Catalina (Spain) (spoke in Spanish): I refer to draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.54, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty".

The entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty in 2009 was a major contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. For that reason, Spain has always expressed its unequivocal support for the objectives of the Pelindaba Treaty and welcomes again its entry into force. Spain is also ready to make the efforts to help the States party to the Pelindaba Treaty acquire sufficient capacity for the proper and effective implementation of the Treaty in their respective territories.

The Spanish Government has thoroughly studied the invitation extended to it to become party to the Treaty's third protocol. My Government consulted Parliament and took into account the guidelines adopted by consensus in the Conference on Disarmament at its 1999 substantive session on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones pursuant to freely agreed arrangements among the countries of the region in question. Having done so, the Government of Spain decided not to proceed to signing the Treaty,

which was then reported to the depositary. In that respect, I wish to highlight two issues.

First, the Pelindaba Treaty contains no provision, obligation, guarantee or safeguard in the areas of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation that Spain has not already adopted for its entire national territory. Indeed, Spain has adopted and observed for several years now a number of measures and safeguards under the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty and the Safeguards Agreement complemented by the Additional Protocol signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which go substantially further than those contained in the Pelindaba Treaty.

I would like to point out that the entirety of Spanish territory has been militarily denuclearized since 1976. The prohibition to introduce, install or stockpile nuclear weapons on Spanish territory was reiterated by Parliament when Spain joined NATO in 1981 and was approved in a consultative referendum held in March 1986. Consequently, Spain has already taken all the necessary steps for the provisions of the Pelindaba Treaty to be applied throughout its national territory.

Spain has joined the consensus on this draft resolution ever since it was introduced for the first time in 1997. However, the Spanish delegation does not consider itself associated with the consensus with regard to paragraph 4 and calls once more on the sponsors of the draft resolution to hold transparent discussions in good faith in order to find more balanced wording that would prove acceptable to all interested parties. I would like to reiterate once more that Spain wishes not to modify the Pelindaba Treaty or its protocols, but only paragraph 4 of the draft resolution.

Mrs. Ledesma Hernández (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Allow me to refer to draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.22, entitled "Nuclear disarmament", of which Cuba is once again a sponsor this year.

My delegation believes that the draft resolution is one of the texts before the First Committee that most fully covers the question of nuclear disarmament, which is and should continue to be of the utmost priority in the disarmament sphere. Reference is made in the draft resolution to the modest progress achieved at the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) held in May 2010, which should serve as an impetus to continue

to work in support of nuclear disarmament and the full implementation of all the provisions of the NPT.

Cuba reiterates that nuclear disarmament cannot continue to be an objective that is constantly postponed and subject to conditions. We therefore support undertaking, as a matter of priority in the Conference on Disarmament, negotiations on a programme for nuclear disarmament that will culminate in the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a programme should include a transparent, irreversible, verifiable and legally binding timetable.

Nuclear-weapon States must also commit to ending their development of such weapons and to immediately withdrawing them from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States. Until that happens, universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances must be urgently provided to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.22. A recorded vote has been requested. A separate, recorded vote has been requested on paragraph 15. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.22, entitled “Nuclear disarmament”, was submitted by the representative of Myanmar. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/65/L.22 and A/C.1/65/CRP.3/Rev.3. In addition, Suriname has also become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

A separate vote has been requested on paragraph 15 of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.22, which reads as follows:

“Calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein”.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin,

Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino

Abstaining:

Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uzbekistan

Paragraph 15 was retained by 135 votes to 22, with 8 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegations of Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia,

Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, San Marino and Serbia advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour; the delegations of France and the United Kingdom advised the Secretariat that they had intended to abstain.]

The Chair: We shall now vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova,

Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Guinea-Bissau, India, Ireland, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Serbia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.22 as a whole was adopted by 107 votes to 44, with 20 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.42. A recorded vote has been requested. A separate, recorded vote has been requested on paragraph 1. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.42, entitled "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems", was introduced by the representative of New Zealand at the 20th meeting, on 27 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/65/L.42 and A/C.1/65/CRP.3/Rev.3. In addition, Malta has also become a sponsor.

A separate vote has been requested on paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, which reads as follows:

"Welcomes the adoption by consensus of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia, considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security, and looks forward to the report of the nuclear-weapon States, in terms of that undertaking, to the Preparatory Committee of the Review Conference in 2014".

A recorded vote was taken

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,

Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, India, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia

Paragraph 1 was retained by 145 votes to 1, with 18 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of the United Kingdom advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.42 as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.42 as a whole was adopted by 144 votes to 3, with 22 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.54. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.54 is entitled “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/65/L.54 and A/C.1/65/CRP.3/Rev.3. In addition, Australia and Norway have also become sponsors.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.54 was adopted.

The Chair: I shall now call on delegations wishing to make statements in explanation of vote on the draft resolutions just adopted.

Mr. Tarar (Pakistan): I have requested the floor to explain our vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/65/L.22, entitled “Nuclear disarmament”, and A/C.1/65/L.42, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.22, Pakistan has consistently supported the goals of nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Our delegation agrees with several elements of the draft resolution, including the call for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and the need to conclude a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances and to take into account the security interests of all States during negotiations on disarmament treaties.

We note, however, that the draft resolution contains unnecessary references to recommendations and documents of the review conferences of the Parties

to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on which our position is well known.

We therefore decided to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole. Paragraph 15 calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Pakistan, in line with its clear and unambiguous position on an FMCT, decided to vote against that paragraph.

As for draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.42, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”, Pakistan voted in favour. We agree with most of the elements referred to in the draft resolution. Moreover, we wish to underline that the notion of decreasing the operational status of nuclear weapons must be based on reciprocity. The draft resolution notes only one bilateral initiative.

For over a decade, Pakistan has proposed the establishment of a strategic restraint regime in South Asia, which, inter alia, encompasses the rationale and objective of this draft resolution. We hope that the sponsors of the draft resolution will also recognize and support the proposal for a strategic restraint regime in South Asia.

In our view, the draft resolution contains an unnecessary reference to the conclusions and recommendations of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. As a non-member of the NPT, our support for this draft resolution should not be taken as an endorsement of the decisions of that Conference.

Mr. Rao (India): I have asked for the floor to explain India’s vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/65/L.22, entitled “Nuclear disarmament”, A/C.1/65/L.42, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”, and A/C.1/65/L.54, entitled “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.22, India attaches the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. We share the main objective of this draft resolution, which is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time. We were constrained to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution because of certain references to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), on which India’s position is well known. However, our vote should not be seen as representing opposition to other provisions of the draft resolution, which we believe are consistent with the position of the

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as well as India's national positions on nuclear disarmament. Those provisions include the reference to the Final Document (resolution S-10/2) of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I); NAM summit statements; the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice; the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time; the role and work of the Conference on Disarmament, including the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference as a high priority; as well as the call to convene an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects at an early date to identify and deal with concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

We compliment Myanmar for retaining in the draft resolution these vital principled positions, which are supported by the vast majority of countries.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.42, entitled "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems", India has been sponsoring a draft resolution entitled "Reducing nuclear danger" (A/C.1/65/L.27), adopted by the Committee by a large majority again this year, for more than a decade now. When the draft resolution on decreasing operational readiness was introduced for the first time in 2007, and again in 2008, India supported it, given the common objectives and congruence of the two draft resolutions.

Unlike some of the sponsors of this draft resolution, India's approach is to assess resolutions by objective standards and on their own merits. Despite the votes cast against draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.27 by some of the sponsors of A/C.1/65/L.42, India voted in favour of the latter in view of the importance we attach to de-alerting as an important step in the process of delegitimizing nuclear weapons.

However, we abstained in the voting on paragraph 1 of the resolution. India's position on the NPT is well known. India is not a party to the Treaty and did not participate in the 2010 Review Conference. We are therefore not bound by its outcome. Furthermore, the issue that this draft resolution seeks to address is not limited to the context of a specific treaty — a point that some of the sponsors have themselves made to us with regard to our draft resolution.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.54, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone", India

respects the sovereign choice of non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. This principle is consistent with the provisions of SSOD-I and the 1999 Disarmament Commission guidelines.

India enjoys friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the countries of the African continent. India shares and supports African aspirations to enhancing the region's well-being and security. We respect the sovereign choices of States parties to the Pelindaba Treaty, and offer our congratulations on the successful entry into force of the Treaty. As a nuclear-weapon State, India conveys its unambiguous assurance that it will respect the status of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

Mr. Propper (Israel): I would like to explain Israel's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.54, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty".

Israel joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/54/L.54 based on its principled support of the vision of the Middle East evolving into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Such zones should be established through direct negotiations based on arrangements freely arrived at by all States of the region concerned. Israel believes that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was established in accordance with those essential principles, and we support the strengthening of such nuclear-weapon-free zones.

It is regrettable that Egypt, one of the most vocal supporters of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, has refrained from ratifying the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. Our hope is that, instead of engaging in useless political disputes, countries in the Middle East can learn the relevant lessons demonstrated by other regions, eventually leading to meaningful discussions on security in our region.

Mr. Danon (France) (*spoke in French*): Speaking on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, I would like to explain our votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/65/L.42 and A/C.1/65/L.54.

We continue to disagree with the basic premise of resolution A/C.1/65/L.42, which is that the current level of readiness of nuclear weapons increases the risk of their unintentional or accidental use. We would like

to restate that the operational readiness of our countries' respective nuclear-weapon systems is maintained at a level in keeping with our national security requirements and consonant with our obligations to our allies, within the larger context of the current global strategic situation. To that end, we have decreased the operational readiness and alert levels of our respective forces since the early 1990s. In addition, our respective nuclear-weapon systems no longer target any State. Collectively, in our view, those measures have reduced the value of further de-alerting as a priority for nuclear disarmament.

Unfortunately, the present draft resolution proceeds from the notion that lowering alert levels will automatically and in all cases lead to heightened international security. In reality, while alert levels can be and have in fact been lowered in response to an improved international security climate, the relationship between alert levels and security is a complex one, and not reducible to simple formulas. We would also like to reiterate that our nuclear-weapon systems are subject to the most rigorous command, control and communications systems in order to prevent the possibility of accidental or unintentional use, to guarantee that such weapons could only be used under the sole direction of the proper national authority, and to maximize that authority's decision time.

In addition to stating this clarification of our national policies, we would also like to see greater emphasis placed on the need for all States possessing nuclear weapons — not just the nuclear-weapon-State parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — to undertake activities consistent with our shared objective of making the world safer and more secure. This in no way confers any particular status on such countries, but rather reflects the fact that all States should contribute to this shared objective.

Turning now to draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.54, we have joined the consensus on the draft resolution on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty — the Pelindaba Treaty. In a few days, the States parties to the Treaty will meet for the first time in Addis Ababa, an initiative we regard as a new demonstration of commitment by Africa's States to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty. We wish to take this opportunity to recall that the protocols annexed to the Pelindaba Treaty specifically stipulate that nuclear-weapon States commit to not using or threatening to

use nuclear weapons against any African State party to the Treaty.

We would also like to recall that France and the United Kingdom are already in compliance with their obligations pursuant to the Treaty, having signed and ratified the relevant protocols related to the Treaty. We see the recent announcement by the United States of its intention to start the process of ratifying the protocols annexed to the Treaty as a promising development.

The Chair: The Committee has thus concluded action on cluster 1 draft resolutions, as contained in informal papers No. 1* and No. 2.

The Committee will now proceed to cluster 2, "Other weapons of mass destruction". Before the Committee takes decisions on the draft resolutions contained in cluster 2 of informal working papers 1* and 2 respectively — namely, A/C.1/65/L.20, A/C.1/65/L.23, A/C.1/65/L.29 and A/C.1/65/L.12 — I shall give the floor to those delegations wishing to make either a general statement, other than an explanation of vote, or to introduce draft resolutions other than those mentioned.

I give the floor to the representative of Indonesia to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.12.

Mr. Percaya (Indonesia): I am privileged to take the floor on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.12, entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol".

The Movement has made efforts for the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons, and will continue to do so. We reaffirm our strong support for the measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. The devastating and lingering consequences of chemical and biological weapons for humans and property are abundantly clear and should have everyone condemn the use of these weapons. There should not be any place for their use.

NAM reissues its call on all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and reaffirms the critical necessity

of upholding its provisions. I would like to also applaud the contribution by civil society and non-governmental organizations that have worked persistently to create awareness about these deadly weapons and mobilize public opinion in favour of banning their use.

Finally, NAM hopes that this vital draft resolution, with its very serious humanitarian dimension, will receive wide support in this Committee.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on the draft resolutions contained in cluster 2. Before doing so, I give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.29, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”.

As a victim of terrorist acts, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always supported measures to confront terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. In this context, we have supported this draft resolution since its introduction by India in the First Committee.

However, the draft resolution proposed this year contains a reference to the so-called Nuclear Security Summit, a closed, select gathering for a selective approach towards nuclear security, based on the assumption that the possession of nuclear weapons by a few countries should be continued and the only major problem is how to secure the weapons and needed materials for the production of such weapons.

A thorough review of the documents of that gathering shows that there is not even a single word about nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the only absolute guarantee against the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Furthermore, a nuclear-weapon State hosting the aforementioned meeting is used to going outside the United Nations, drafting some documents and coming back to the United Nations for their endorsement, which is the wrong approach for multilateral issues.

Despite full sympathy with the thrust of the draft resolution, the reference to that gathering obliged my delegation, while joining the consensus, to disassociate itself from the paragraph contained therein on the so-called Nuclear Security Summit.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.20. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.20, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”, was introduced by the representative of Hungary at the 18th meeting, on 25 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is indicated in the document.

With the permission of the Chair, I shall now read out for the record the oral statement by the Secretary-General regarding the financial implications that accompany draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.20. This oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraph 8 of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.20, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences, including all assistance to the annual meetings of the States parties and the meetings of experts, and to render the necessary assistance and provide such services as may be required for the seventh Review Conference and the preparations for it.

The Secretary-General wishes to draw the attention of Member States to the fact that in 2006 the sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention approved the cost estimates for servicing the annual meetings of States parties to the Convention and the meetings of experts for each of the four years from 2007 to 2010.

Similarly, it is expected that the States parties to the Convention, at their annual meeting in December 2010, will approve the cost estimates prepared by the Secretary for servicing the seventh Review Conference and the Preparatory Committee in 2011.

It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under respective legal arrangements, ought to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations may be undertaken by the Secretariat only when sufficient funding is received in advance from States parties and

States not parties to the convention participating at the meeting.

Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.20 would not give rise to any financial implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011, nor under the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that it be adopted without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.20 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.23. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.23 is entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”. It was submitted by the representative of Poland at the 18th meeting, on 25 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is indicated in the document.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that it be adopted without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.23 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.29. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.29, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, was submitted by the representative of India at the 10th meeting, on 14 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/65/L.29 and A/C.1/65/CRP.3/Rev.3. In addition, Kyrgyzstan has also become a sponsor.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.29 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.12, as contained in informal paper No. 2. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.12, entitled “Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol”, was introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement earlier at this meeting today. The sponsor of the draft resolution is indicated in document A/C.1/65/L.12.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,

Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Israel, Marshall Islands, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.12 was adopted by 168 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

The Chair: I shall now call upon those delegations that wish to explain their position or vote on the draft resolutions just adopted.

Mr. Tarar (Pakistan): I have requested the floor to explain our vote on the draft resolution entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", contained in document A/C.1/65/L.29.

We support the objective of the draft resolution, although we continue to believe that its language could have been improved to convey a more objective reflection of reality. The fear that terrorists and non-State actors may acquire and use weapons of mass destruction is a recent phenomenon.

However, this danger must be viewed in perspective. Terrorist organizations or non-State actors are more likely to acquire and use chemical weapons and biological-weapon capabilities. The acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and non-State actors is much less likely. This concern should not become an excuse for discrimination against selected countries. However, the international community must not lower its guard to prevent the possibility of the development and use of dirty bombs. Increased international cooperation, including the initiation of negotiations on a radiological weapons convention, should be given serious consideration.

As regards denial of means to terrorists to acquire, possess and use weapons of mass destruction, it is necessary for all States to enact and enforce national physical protection and export control measures to prevent the technology for weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists. International assistance and capacity-building are areas requiring urgent attention. To lend greater legitimacy to international efforts in this area, interim measures such as the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), which were designed to fill the gap in international law, need to be taken up by a more inclusive and representative United Nations forum.

We agree with the widely held view that the best guarantee against the threat of the possible use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons is in their elimination. The faithful implementation of existing treaty regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention can effectively address most of these threats. An early disarmament of chemical stocks would enhance confidence in the lack of likelihood of their acquisition and use by terrorists. However, as long as the process of dismantling chemical weapons proceeds at a slow pace and huge quantities of chemical weapons exist, the possibility of their falling into terrorist hands remains as well.

The control of biological weapons should be of more concern, particularly to the industrially advanced States, due to their extensive use of biological agents. The Biological Weapons Convention should therefore be strengthened, in particular by reviving the biological weapons verification protocol, which was negotiated over eight years. We are convinced that a revival of that process would fully serve the goal of promoting international peace and security and would address the concerns expressed, for example in this draft resolution.

We are convinced that a comprehensive strategy must be evolved to prevent the possibility of terrorists getting access to weapons of mass destruction. Such a strategy must include depriving terrorist organizations of their operational and organizational capabilities, strengthening the relevant existing multilateral regimes, negotiating a universal treaty to fill the gaps in current international instruments and augmenting the capacity of States to implement global treaty obligations, as well as addressing the root causes of terrorism.

A distinction must be maintained between counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. This draft resolution quite appropriately mentions the final document of the Fifteenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement as the Movement expressing itself on the issue of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. We would like to underline that, in the context of the issue of terrorism, the same document also stresses the need to address the causes that sometimes lead to terrorism, which lie in suppression, injustice and deprivation.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): My delegation joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.23, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

However, my delegation would like to put on record that all the State parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should fully comply with all their obligations under the Convention, in order to uphold its integrity and credibility.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is concerned over the delay indicated by a major possessor State party that it would not comply with its obligation for the completion of destruction activities within the final extended deadline adopted by decision of the Conference of the States Parties. We call on major possessor States parties to make every effort necessary to meet the final extended deadline for destruction. It is strongly recommended that no action be taken to rewrite, amend and/or reinterpret the Convention. Instead, it is suggested that the relevant States parties seriously bear the burden of non-compliance.

The Chair: The Committee has thus concluded action on cluster 2.

We will now move on to cluster 3, “Outer space: disarmament aspects”. There is only one draft resolution indicated in informal working paper No. 1, namely, A/C.1/65/L.2*.

Before the Committee takes action on the draft resolution in cluster 3, I shall give the floor to delegations wishing to make a general statement or an explanation of vote before the vote, or to introduce a draft resolution.

Mrs. Ledesma Hernández (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Under this cluster, Cuba is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.2*, entitled “Prevention of an

arms race in outer space”, and draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.38, “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”.

An arms race in outer space would pose grave dangers to international peace and security. For that reason, Cuba feels that it is appropriate and necessary to continue working to achieve international transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. We commend the texts of the draft resolutions as an important contribution to efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space, including specific measures, such as prior notice, verification and monitoring, aimed at ensuring greater transparency in space activities. At the same time, Cuba feels that the Conference on Disarmament must play a major role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

We hope that as in previous years, the draft resolutions will be adopted with the support of Member States.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.2*. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.2*, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the 18th meeting, on 25 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/65/L.2* and A/C.1/65/CRP.3/Rev.3. In addition, Uzbekistan has also become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark,

Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Israel, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.2 was adopted by 170 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

The Chair: The Committee has thus concluded action on cluster 3.

We will now move on to cluster 4, "Conventional weapons". Before the Committee takes action on the draft resolutions under cluster 4, I shall give the floor to those representatives wishing either to make a general statement, other than an explanation of vote, or

to introduce a draft resolution within the cluster. I would like to remind representatives that the draft resolutions we will take action on are A/C.1/65/L.11, from informal working paper No. 1, and A/C.1/65/L.8, A/C.1/65/L.31 and A/C.1/65/L.44*, from informal working paper No. 2.

Ms. Skorpen (Norway): I am taking the floor with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.8, on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, which was submitted by Switzerland, Albania and Norway. Although the draft resolution is not open to sponsors, we certainly hope to see it adopted by consensus as an expression that we all share the humanitarian aims of the resolution, independent of whether one is a party to the Convention or not.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on the draft resolutions listed under cluster 4. I shall first give the floor to those delegations wishing to explain their positions or vote.

Mrs. Ledesma Hernández (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): As in previous sessions, the Cuban delegation will abstain in the voting on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/65/L.8, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

Cuba fully shares the legitimate humanitarian concerns associated with the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines. Our country is a State party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, including its Amended Protocol II, and strictly complies with the prohibitions and restrictions set out therein on the use of anti-personnel mines.

As we have stated in the past, for more than 50 years Cuba has been subjected to a policy of ongoing aggression and hostility by the military super-Power. Consequently, it is not possible for our country to denounce the use of mines to preserve our territorial integrity and sovereignty, pursuant to the right to legitimate defence recognized in the Charter of the United Nations.

Cuba will continue to support all efforts that maintain the necessary balance between humanitarian

issues and national security and are aimed at eliminating the terrible effects caused to the civilian population and to the economy of many countries by the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. Likewise, we join in the call to all States that are in a position to do so to provide the necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance for the removal of mines and for the socio-economic rehabilitation of victims.

Mr. Kim Bonghyun (Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.8, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

As we have repeatedly expressed on many occasions, the Republic of Korea fully sympathizes with the spirit and objectives of the Ottawa Convention and the draft resolution. We believe that this important Convention plays, and will continue to play, an essential role in alleviating human suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. However, due to the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula, we are compelled to give priority to our security concerns and unable to accede to the Convention at this point. Therefore, we will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

Nevertheless, we are no less concerned about the problems associated with anti-personnel mines and are committed to mitigating the suffering caused by them. The Republic of Korea exercises tight control over anti-personnel landmines and is enforcing an indefinite extension of the moratorium on their export.

We have responded regularly to the annual questionnaire of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, providing all relevant information on our landmine policies and activities. Furthermore, the Republic of Korea has joined the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II, under which we are actively participating in a range of discussions and activities to ensure only limited and responsible use of landmines. We also joined its Protocol V, on explosive remnants of war, and are implementing all relevant obligations.

In addition, since 1993 our Government has made meaningful contributions totalling more than \$7.1 million for demining and victim assistance through the relevant United Nations mine action

programmes, including the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action and the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance. The Republic of Korea will continue to contribute to international efforts for mine clearance and victim assistance.

Mr. Aljaedi (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation will abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.8, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction", because we believe that the international mechanisms currently in effect neither take into account the use of anti-personnel mines in a systematic and impartial manner, nor take into consideration the security needs of some States or the concerns of affected States with regard to explosive remnants of war.

Studies of the Ottawa Convention, which unfortunately completely bans anti-personnel mines to some States, show that it deprives those States of the simplest defensive weapons available to them to defend their borders. The Convention does not address the repercussions of explosive remnants of war in countries that have been subject to colonialism, aggression or territorial occupation. Such conduct should be prohibited to obviate the need to possess mines.

We believe that the Ottawa Convention should be revisited if it is to be considered an efficient instrument, and that it should take into account the need of some States of assistance in removing landmines and war remnants left by colonial countries, as well as compensation to affected States. It should ban the planting of landmines in the territories of other States. It should also take into account the security and defence need of some States to possess weapons that are appropriate for their capabilities and their geographic location.

The 1997 Ottawa Convention is not balanced in its present form. It does not guarantee the interests of all. We believe it should be revisited and reworked in order to more thoroughly take account of States' concerns and demands.

Mr. Seruhere (United Republic of Tanzania): During the general debate, my delegation invited the United Nations and Member States to make use of the cost-effective and safe technology of using rats to

detect anti-personnel mines and identify them for disposal (see A/C.1/65/PV.5). We mentioned that this technology had been developed jointly by Tanzania and a non-governmental organization called APOPO. I wish to reiterate that invitation.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.11. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.11, entitled “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them”, was introduced by the representative of Mali on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States at the 14th meeting, on 19 October 2010. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/65/L.11 and A/C.1/65/CRP.3/Rev.3. In addition, Panama and Suriname have also become sponsors.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.11 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.8. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.8, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”, was submitted by the representative of Norway, also on behalf of Albania, Ireland and Switzerland. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/65/L.8. In addition, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has also become a sponsor.

With the permission of the Chairman, I shall now read out for the record the oral statement by the Secretary-General regarding the financial implications that accompany draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.8. This oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraph 9 of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.8, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General in accordance with article 11,

paragraph 2, of the Convention, to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the eleventh Meeting of the States Parties, pending a decision to be taken at the tenth Meeting of the States Parties, and on behalf of the States parties and in accordance with article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention, to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations, to attend the tenth Meeting of the States Parties and future meetings as observers.

In accordance with article 14 of the Convention, the costs of the next Meeting of States Parties to the Convention would be borne by the States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating in that meeting, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted appropriately. The Secretariat will prepare preliminary cost estimates for the eleventh Meeting of the States Parties for the approval of the States parties, following planning missions to assess the requirements for conference facilities and services.

It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, are to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations may be undertaken by the Secretariat only after sufficient funding is received, in advance, from States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating in the meeting.

Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.8 would not give rise to any financial implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011 or under the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte

d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.8 was adopted by 155 votes to none, with 18 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.31. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.31, entitled "Information

on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms", was submitted by the representative of Argentina. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/65/L.31 and A/C.1/65/CRP.3/Rev.3. In addition, Georgia has also become a sponsor.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.31 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.44*. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.44*, entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects", was introduced by the representative of Sweden at the 14th meeting, on 19 October 2010. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/65/L.44*.

With the permission of the Chair, I shall now read out for the record the oral statement by the Secretary-General on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.44*. This oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraph 14 of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.44*, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the fourth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V, to be held on 22 and 23 November 2010, for the twelfth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, to be held on 24 November 2010, and for the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, to be held on 25 and 26 November 2010, as well as for any continuation of work after the meetings.

The Secretary-General wishes to draw the attention of Member States to the fact that the respective cost estimates for the servicing of the three meetings of the States parties to be held from 22 to 26 November 2010 have been prepared by the Secretariat and were approved by the eleventh Annual

Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, held in Geneva on 11 November 2009; the third Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V, held in Geneva on 9 and 10 November 2009; and by the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, held in Geneva on 12 and 13 November 2009.

The Secretary-General also wishes to draw the attention of Member States to the fact that the cost of the twelfth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, the fourth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V and the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention will be borne by the States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating in the meetings, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted appropriately.

The request that the Secretary-General render the necessary assistance and provide services to the twelfth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, the fourth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V and the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention should thus have no financial implications for the regular budget of the United Nations.

Following the established practice, the Secretariat will prepare cost estimates for any continuation of the work after the meetings for the approval of the high contracting parties.

It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties, under their respective legal arrangements, are to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations. These activities would be undertaken by the Secretariat only after sufficient funding is received, in advance, from States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating in the meetings.

Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.44* would not give rise to any programme budget implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011 or under the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.44 was adopted.*

The Chair: I give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. Hallak (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): There is global consensus that the only true nuclear threat in the Middle East lies in Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to areas far removed from the region. Nevertheless, some who reject the evidence would like to open fictitious fronts for sterile, Byzantine argumentation of suspect, non-objective and dishonest intent. This exposes the falsehood of their claims that they are eager to see the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

It is ironic that the representative of Israel would make false claims and throw stones at others from Israel's glass house, even as it refuses to comply with an arsenal of hundreds of resolutions adopted by the United Nations, its agencies and main bodies over the decades. It also refuses to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to subject all of its nuclear facilities to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Here, we would remind those who ignore this fact that the most recent NPT Review Conference, held in New York from 3 to 28 May, saw the effective participation of Member States that supported Israel's wrongful possession of nuclear weapons and impeded the request of Arab States and the world to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. At the Review Conference, Israel was explicitly cited as a State that possesses nuclear weapons in the Middle East and impedes international efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone there.

We were sorry to hear confirmation of this undeclared alliance with Israel in the statement delivered by the representative of Belgium on behalf of the European Union (EU). That statement sought to cast doubt on the position of my country with regard to cooperation with the IAEA. This inference is out of place, unfortunate, does not reflect the facts, is provocative and shields Israel from meeting its nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities in the Middle East.

The representative of Belgium is not in a position to give advice or criticize others. I find myself obliged to recall that his country, like others of the European

Union, has long been out of compliance with all the provisions of the NPT, given the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory.

Syria preceded many countries of the EU in acceding to the NPT in 1968 and in abiding by its provisions. It is committed to those provisions and to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Syria receives IAEA inspectors periodically and all the reports of the Agency confirm Syria's full adherence to its agreements.

In September 2007, Israel attacked Syrian territory and destroyed a military building under construction — a building that had nothing to do with nuclear activities — in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the national sovereignty of Syria. The EU should have clearly and strongly condemned that act of aggression, especially since the IAEA considers that the unilateral destruction of the site by Israel has undermined the Agency's ability to verify the nature of the building.

In this connection, if his country and other members of the EU truly wish to uphold international law pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations as they claim, my colleague from Belgium should give us his frank opinion about Israel's aggression against another State Member of the United Nations. His failure to do so when talking about international legitimacy was quite unsavoury and sent an inappropriate message. The representative of Belgium ignored the evidence on purpose.

Here I would mention, for example, the following several points. First, Israel has not yet acceded to the NPT, despite the passage of 40 years since its conclusion. More than any country or group, the EU is very well aware of this fact. Many EU countries have assisted and continue to assist Israel in developing its nuclear programme, the military implications of which threaten the peace and security of all peoples of the Middle East. I will not go into the details of this fact, which have been well documented internationally.

The fabricated claims with regard to the nature of the building destroyed in Syria have no credibility, especially since they were made only after several months of the Israeli aggression against Syria. This exposes the underlying political agenda. I note that those who claim to be interested in ensuring that the IAEA can discharge its functions should have made that clear before the Israeli aggression against Syria

and not many months thereafter. Syria underlines the fact that it is cooperating closely with the IAEA on all issues pursuant to the statute of the Agency and our international obligations under our comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.

On another level, the statement made by the representative of Canada yesterday confirmed our serious concern with regard to the distribution of roles among false witnesses who play the devil's advocate. I suggest that my Canadian colleague review the reports of the IAEA confirming its positive cooperation with Syria so that he might learn lessons and be more accurate in his comments. If he fails to do so, his statements risk validating the reluctance of international support for his country's nomination to the Security Council because its policies are not understood and give the impression that his country supports Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and its violation of the sovereignty of a Member State, in contravention of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The nuclear hypocrisy that dominates the statements and minds of the representatives of some countries is not conducive to progress on nuclear non-proliferation.

The Chair: I give the floor to the representative of Egypt in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. Aly (Egypt): I am taking the floor to respond to the statement made by the Israeli representative, wherein he attempted to imply that there is an inconsistency between Egypt's position as a strong supporter of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime and of its universality and the fact that Egypt has not ratified the Pelindaba Treaty. During the general debate, a colleague of the Israeli representative made a similar claim, which was immediately and most objectively invalidated when the Israeli representative was referred to the comprehensive statement delivered by Egypt in exercise of the right of reply concerning exactly that issue (see A/C.1/65/PV.5).

In the interest of time, I shall refrain from repeating that earlier right of reply, or from quoting the response sought by the Israeli representative from our national statement. I will only encourage the Israeli representative to avoid making such rather weak rhetorical statements and to engage instead in the collective, regional and international effort to effectively address the security and stability of the

Middle East on the basis of equal security for all in a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

That goal cannot be seriously served by Israel's persistence in refusing to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State, and is certainly not helped by Israel's continued unsafeguarded activities, which are in point of fact sure to provoke a nuclear arms race and seriously destabilize the security of all peoples of the region, including the people of Israel.

We therefore believe that the references to the Middle East in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) represent an extremely valuable opportunity for all States. Again, we are committed to working closely with all countries concerned and those of the region in particular, including Israel. We invite Israel to do the same for the sake of the future and a more secure Middle East.

The Chairman: At its next meeting, the Committee will continue to take action on the draft resolutions contained in three informal papers, starting with cluster 5. We will merge the remaining items from clusters 5, 6 and 7 contained in the three informal papers into a single paper, which will be available on QuickFirst tonight. That paper, listing all the draft resolutions on which we will vote tomorrow, will be distributed to delegations tomorrow.

At the opening of our next meeting, we will hear statements by those representatives who have requested to speak in explanation of vote on the draft resolutions adopted under cluster 4. Subsequently, we will continue with clusters 5, 6 and 7 from all three informal papers.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.