
**Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction**

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**Consideration of the general status
and operation of the Convention**

Draft
**Achieving the aims of the Cartagena action plan:
The Geneva progress report 2009-2010**

**Submitted by the President-Designate of the Tenth Meeting of the
States Parties**

Introduction

1. From 30 November to 4 December 2009, the international community gathered at a high level in Cartagena, Colombia to reaffirm the commitment of States, international organisations and civil society to ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines and to achieving a world free of mines. At this historic event – the Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World – the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, while inspired by their collective achievements, expressed their will to strengthen their efforts to overcome remaining challenges.
2. With the aim of supporting enhanced implementation and promotion of the Convention in the five year period following the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties adopted the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014 and pledged to translate this action plan into sustainable progress while acknowledging their respective local, national and regional circumstances with regard to its practical implementation.
3. To ensure the effectiveness of the Cartagena Action Plan, the States Parties appreciate the need to regularly monitor progress of the application of the actions contained within. The purpose of the Geneva Progress Report 2009-2010 is to support the application of the Cartagena Action Plan by measuring progress made during the period 5 December 2009 to 3 December 2010 and, in doing so, to highlight priority areas of work for the States Parties in the period between the 2010 Tenth Meeting of the States Parties (10MSP) and the 2011 Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties (11MSP). It could be considered the first in a

* Reissued for technical reasons.

series of annual progress reports prepared by the States Parties in advance of the 2014 Third Review Conference.

I. Universalisation

4. At the close of the Cartagena Summit, there were 156 States Parties to the Convention. Moreover, most States not parties were adhering to the Convention's norms, with new use and production of anti-personnel mines rare and with transfers virtually non-existent. However, at the Cartagena Summit it was noted that while advancement toward universalisation has been impressive, challenges remain. It was further noted that several States not parties may still perceive that they derive utility from previously emplaced anti-personnel mines, that new use of anti-personnel mines had been recorded between the First and the Second Review Conferences on the part of three States not parties, and, that as long as States not parties possess stockpiled anti-personnel mines and have not indicated an intention to destroy them, the probability that they remain ready to make new use of these mines cannot be ruled out.

5. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties expressed the view that attracting further adherents to the Convention has grown more difficult in recent years and that future efforts to promote acceptance of the Convention and its norms will require intensive effort at as high a level as possible. They noted in particular that there is a dire need for States Parties, at the ministerial level or higher, to engage States not parties in order to complement the universalisation activities at the officials' level and advocacy by non-governmental and international organisations. It was further noted that the most prevalent barrier to universalisation remains a persistent view on the part of many States not parties that a perceived marginal military utility derived from anti-personnel mines is not outweighed by the grave humanitarian consequences of their use and that intensive efforts likely are needed, with new tools, to overcome outdated thinking about the utility of anti-personnel mines.

6. Since the Cartagena Summit, progress toward universalisation continued to be stalled. There remain 156 States Parties and no State has deposited an instrument of ratification or accession to the Convention since November 2007. In addition, two (2) of the Convention's 133 signatories have not yet ratified, accepted or approved the Convention: the Marshall Islands and Poland, notwithstanding that, in accordance with Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, these signatories are obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention. On the other hand there are signs that the situation will not remain stalled for long:

(a) At the Cartagena Summit the **United States of America** (USA) announced that it was carrying out the first comprehensive review of US landmine policy since 2003. In 2010, the USA continued its policy review, consulting many States Parties and international and non-governmental organisations.

(b) In its May 2010 reply to the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) "Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War", **Finland** reiterated its decision to accede to the Convention in 2012.

(c) At the June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, **Poland** reiterated its intention to ratify the Convention in 2012 and that "the relevant documents are being prepared and will be submitted to the Parliament".

(d) Also at the June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee, the **Lao People's Democratic Republic** (Lao PDR) recalled that in 2004 it announced that it would accede

to the Convention and that there is now a process in place of consultations with all concerned ministries to verify the Lao PDR's readiness to meet the Convention's obligations.

(e) In addition at the June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee, **Nepal** repeated its commitment to the Convention and indicated that it is fulfilling most of the Convention's obligations.

(f) On 28 September 2010, the Prime Ministers of Canada and Mongolia issued a joint statement in which Canada welcomed Mongolia's commitment to accede to the Convention.

7. Given their resolve to achieve universal adherence to the Convention and its norms, the States Parties agreed at the Cartagena Summit to seize every opportunity to promote ratification of and accession to the Convention, in particular in regions with low adherence to the Convention and to promote and encourage adherence to the norms of the Convention.¹ In light of the universalisation challenges noted in Cartagena and commitments we made to overcome these challenges, the President of the Second Review Conference appointed His Royal Highness Prince Mired Raad Al-Hussein of Jordan to serve as the President's Special Envoy on the Universalisation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. In his capacity as Special Envoy, Prince Mired visited the capitals of the Lao PDR, Mongolia and the USA and met in Geneva with the Permanent Representatives of Finland, Georgia, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

8. In reporting in June 2010 to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, the Special Envoy on the Universalisation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention observed that, while the effort of having a Special Envoy is working, high level engagement of States not parties must continue past 2010 and that sustained, strategic efforts are required until the Third Review Conference. The Special Envoy also observed that maintaining a cooperative spirit in the work of this Convention is important to promoting universalisation, noting that States not parties closely observe the work of the Convention and that they want to be part of movement that features States and other actors collaborating with one another and working together to overcome the complexities of implementation.

9. In addition to the effort undertaken through a Special Envoy, thanks to enhanced support provided by Norway through the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), other States Parties continued their efforts to promote acceptance of the Convention. Canada, for instance, continued to advance universalisation efforts through its coordination of the informal Universalisation Contact Group. It was noted, however, that the number of universalisation actors continues to be small and could be considerably reinforced if more States Parties became active.

10. The States Parties continued to use the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the universalisation and implementation of the Convention as one measure of States' acceptance of the Convention's norms.² On 2 December 2009, this resolution was adopted by 160 votes to none, with 18 abstentions and with two additional States subsequently advising the UN secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour. The following 19 States not parties voted in favour of this resolution: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tonga and the United Arab Emirates.

¹ Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #1 and #3.

² United Nations General Assembly Resolution 64/56.

11. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to encourage and support the universalisation efforts of all relevant partners, including international, regional and non-governmental organizations.³ The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued their involvement and active cooperation in universalisation efforts. ICBL member organisations in over 60 countries participated in an effort to promote accession to the Convention by the USA. In addition, the ICBL continued to promote the acceptance of the Convention by other States not parties, in particular by Georgia, Israel, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nepal and Sri Lanka. The ICRC continued to play a central role in universalisation efforts in every region of the world. The United Nations Secretary General and United Nations departments and agencies continued to appeal for all States to ratify or accede to the Convention. As well, the United Nations Mine Action Team in Nepal, the United Nations Develop Programme (UNDP) in the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in Geneva provided valuable support to the efforts of the Special Envoy on the Universalisation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

12. On 4 April 2010, the President of the European Parliament urged the international community "to create a new momentum" in efforts to eliminate anti-personnel mines and welcomed Finland and Poland's intention to ratify the Convention by 2012, remarking that "Europe's credibility in the fight against (AP mines) will be further strengthened." In addition, on 27 July 2010, the Council of Europe's Commissioner of Human Rights expressed that "it is high time that all European states ratify the (Convention) and respect its provisions."

13. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to condemn and continue to discourage in every possible way any production, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines by any actor.⁴ Since the Cartagena Summit, the ICBL has reported that one State not party – Myanmar – has made new use of anti-personnel mines and that armed non-State actors in the following six countries have done the same: Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Pakistan and Yemen. Also at the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to encourage States not parties, particularly those that have professed support for the humanitarian objectives of the Convention, to participate in the work of the Convention.⁵ In 2010, in keeping with the States Parties' tradition of openness, all States not parties were invited to participate in the Intersessional Work Programme and the 10MSP and its preparations. Seventeen (17) States not parties registered to take part in the June 2010 meetings of the Standing Committees and [...] States not parties were recorded as observers of the 10MSP.

14. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to continue promoting universal observance of the Conventions' norms, by condemning, and taking appropriate steps to end the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines by armed non-state actors.⁶ Since the Cartagena Summit, two additional armed non-State actors signed the Geneva Call's "Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action" bringing to 41 the number of armed non-State actors that have made this commitment. Nevertheless, the view was expressed that when engagement by non-governmental organisations of armed non-State actors is considered, vigilance is required to prevent terrorist organizations from exploiting the Ottawa Process for their own goals. One State Party reiterated its concern regarding a previous signing of the "Deed of Commitment" as being inconsistent with the view of some States Parties that,

³ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #2.

⁴ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #5.

⁵ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #6.

⁶ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #4.

when engagement with armed non-state actors is contemplated, States Parties concerned should be informed and their consent should be obtained in order for such an engagement to take place.

II. Stockpile destruction

15. At the close of the Cartagena Summit, there were four (4) States Parties for which the obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained relevant – Belarus, Greece, Turkey and Ukraine – with three of these States Parties having been non-compliant with respect to their stockpile destruction obligation since 1 March 2008. In addition, one (1) additional State Party – Equatorial Guinea – had not yet formally confirmed the presence or absence of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, although information from other sources indicates that this State Party does not hold stocks. Hence, 152 States Parties no longer held stocks of anti-personnel mines other than those mines States Parties are permitted to retain under Article 3, either because they never did or because they had completed their destruction programmes. At the close of the Cartagena Summit, together the States Parties had reported the destruction of more than 43 million mines.⁷

16. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties expressed the view that the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, while largely a great success story, persists as one of the Convention's most complex remaining challenges, noting that since 1 March 2008, Belarus, Greece and Turkey had not concluded implementation of their Article 4 obligations within the time frame prescribed by the Convention and that Ukraine had indicated that it would be unable to comply with its obligation to destroy its stockpiled anti-personnel mines by its 1 June 2010 deadline. Serious concern was expressed with respect to the failure by three States Parties to comply with their obligations by their deadlines as well as to provide a clear timeline for completion and concern was expressed with respect to the looming matter of non-compliance on the part of one State Party.

17. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties acknowledged that the complexity of destruction of PFM1-type anti-personnel mines combined with the limited number of entities capable of destroying these mines, the vast numbers of these mines held by Belarus and Ukraine, the inadvisability of transferring these mines for destruction and the high cost of destruction had resulted in a compelling implementation challenge for both States Parties. The States Parties recognised that the destruction of PFM mines is significantly more challenging and complex, technically and financially, than the destruction of other anti-personnel mines. The States Parties also recorded that both Belarus and Ukraine have sought assistance in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention and expressed the view that the matter of ensuring compliance on the part of Belarus and Ukraine is the business of all States Parties.

18. Since the Cartagena Summit, Belarus, Greece, Turkey and Ukraine have continued their efforts to ensure the destruction of their stockpiles. In addition, on 1 June 2010 Ukraine, as had been foreshadowed at the Cartagena Summit, missed its four year destruction deadline. Hence, there remain 152 States Parties that now no longer hold stocks of anti-personnel mines, either because they never did or because they have completed their destruction programmes. Given progress in stockpile destruction reported by these States Parties since the Cartagena Summit, States Parties have now reported the destruction of almost 44 million mines.

⁷ The total number of stockpiled anti-personnel reported destroyed in the final report of the Second Review Conference was 42,369,334 but, further to an amendment in the figures for the Turkish stockpile, the actual total at the close of the Second Review Conference / Cartagena Summit was 43,021,437.

19. Given their resolve to ensure the expeditious and timely destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines, the States Parties agreed at the Cartagena Summit that States Parties that have missed their deadlines for Article 4 implementation will comply without delay by destroying all stockpiles and provide a plan to ensure compliance as soon as possible and in strict conformity with relevant safety and environmental standards, including for this purpose relevant legislative measures taken, structures established, committed national resources, assistance needed and committed, and an expected completion date.⁸ They further agreed that all States Parties yet to complete their obligations under Article 4 will report on the progress of implementation, including steps taken at national level, anticipated particular technical and operational challenges, resources allocated and number of anti-personnel mines destroyed, to other States Parties through annual transparency reports, at every meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction and at every Meeting of the States Parties or Review Conference.⁹ Since the Cartagena Summit, a variety of actions have been undertaken by Belarus, Greece, Turkey and Ukraine concerning the above mentioned commitments

20. At the Cartagena Summit, it was recorded that the terms and conditions of the implementation of the PFM-1 mine destruction joint programme were identified and a schedule for the preparatory stage of the phase of the project had been agreed upon between **Belarus** and the European Commission (EC). It was further recorded that an EC assessment visit to the proposed destruction site was successful, that a tender was launched in July 2009 and that the EC was planning to sign a contract with the winner of the tender in January 2010.

21. On 30 April 2010, Belarus provided updated information in accordance with Article 7, paragraphs 1(b) and 2 of the Convention reporting that 3,370,172 stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained as of 31 December 2009.

22. On 21 June 2010, Belarus informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that while cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and the EC was ongoing, there had been setbacks since the Cartagena Summit which had delayed the commencement of the project. Belarus indicated that the Evaluation Committee of the EC had met during 8-10 December 2009 but had been unable to select an appropriate company to engage as a contractor to implement the project. Belarus further indicated that between December 2009 and May 2010 the EC had entered into negotiations with a potential contractor but that on 21 May 2010, the EC informed Belarus that the procedure had not been successful. As well, Belarus indicated that the EC had confirmed its willingness to continue its support to the project and to re-launch a tender "in the very near future". Belarus further informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction on 21 June 2010 that, in parallel to its efforts to acquire international assistance, a private Belarusian company called Stroyenergo had destroyed a limited number of PFM -1 type mines. Belarus also confirmed that 3,370,172 stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained to be destroyed (i.e., the same number as reported in its transparency report submitted in 2010).

23. In June 2010, the EC proposed that Belarus sign the Addendum to the Financing Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and the European Commission on the implementation of the project "Destruction of PFM-1 Series Ammunition in Belarus", dated 22 January 2008. The Addendum to the Financing Agreement was signed by Belarus and it entered into force on 24 August 2010. On 30 June 2010, the EC announced a new tender to select a contractor to implement the project "Destruction of PFM-1 Series Ammunition in Belarus".

⁸ Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #7 and #9.

⁹ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #11.

24. At the Cartagena Summit, it was recalled that on 25 May 2009 **Greece** had informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that the total number of mines to be destroyed was 1,586,159, that 225,962 mines had been transferred to Bulgaria and were destroyed and that the transfer and destruction of all stockpiled mines “will be completed by the end of 2009.” Also at the Cartagena Summit, Greece indicated that while the transfer of mines to Bulgaria for the purposes of destruction had been delayed, all stockpiles had been gathered in specific locations to facilitate the quickest possible transportation and that between 24 October 2008 (when the first shipment was made) and 30 October 2009 the shipment of mines had “been constant” and that a total of 615,457 mines or 39.24 percent of the total stockpile had been transferred.

25. In April 2010, Greece provided updated information in accordance with Article 7, paragraphs 1(b), 1(d) and 2 of the Convention reporting that as of 31 December 2009 a total 1,566,532 anti-personnel mines remained to be destroyed and that as of 1 February 2010 a total of 615,362 mines had been transferred to Bulgaria for the purposes of destruction, including 599,052 that had been transferred in 2009. In April 2010, Bulgaria provided updated information in accordance with Article 7 paragraphs 1(d) and 2 of the Convention reporting that between 31 March 2009 and 31 March 2010 it had received transfers of 443,832 stockpiled anti-personnel mines from Greece. The discrepancy between the numbers reported by Bulgaria and Greece was brought to the attention of the June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction.

26. On 21 June 2010, Greece informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that the agreement between the Greek Ministry of Defence and the company selected to ensure the destruction of Greece’s stockpiled anti-personnel mines had been cancelled on 16 June 2010 due to non-fulfilment of the agreement as a result of an industrial accident which had taken place on 3 February 2010 and as a consequence Greece would be unable to complete destruction of its stockpiles of anti-personnel mines by the end of 2010. Greece further informed the Standing Committee that despite this setback, the Greek Ministry of Defence was proceeding rapidly to engage another company to undertake the work and thus enable Greece to meet its obligations. Greece also indicated that a new contract will specify that the destruction of all remaining mines must be concluded within six months of signing the agreement. Given this, Greece expressed that a realistic timeline for completion of Article 4 implementation would be early 2011. Greece also indicated that, in close collaboration with competent Bulgarian authorities, Greece had taken the necessary steps to ensure the destruction of the mines.

27. In October 2010, Greece indicated that 615,362 mines have been shipped to Bulgaria, of which 614,882 were destroyed between 15 Dec 2008 and 14 May 2010. In addition, Greece indicated that, with regard to the destruction of the remaining stockpile (60 percent) after the termination of the contract with EAS/ VINDEX, EAS filed an appeal against the Greek State, which is now under consideration by the competent Greek courts. This, however, has not prohibited the Greek authorities from preparing the preliminary groundwork for a new contract, pending the completion of the legal proceedings. The prospective new contractor will have the obligation to destroy the remaining anti-personnel mines within six months of the awarding of the contract.

28. At the Cartagena Summit, **Turkey** indicated that as of the end of October 2009, 956,761 mines remained to be destroyed. In April 2010, Turkey provided updated information in accordance with Article 7, paragraphs 1(b) and 2 of the Convention reporting that 730,458 stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained as of 31 December 2009. On 21 June 2010, Turkey informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that destruction of Turkey’s remaining anti-personnel mines is being carried out at “full speed” at the Turkish Munitions Disposal Facility with the facility running 24 hours a day on the basis of 3 shifts per day. Turkey further indicated that the destruction process is being

carried out with national resources only. Turkey also indicated that as of June 2010 a total of 266,143 stockpiled anti-personnel mines (including 22,788 ADAM mines) remained to be destroyed, that all DM-11 and M-16 mines have been destroyed and that remaining stockpile consists of M2, M14, and ADAM mines. On 10 August 2010, Turkey indicated that the number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines had been further reduced to 161,191 mines (including 5,416 M2, 132,987 M14 and 22,788 ADAM mines) and that 95 percent of Turkey's original stockpile has now been destroyed.

29. Turkey further informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction on 21 June 2010 that its stockpile destruction process is predicted to be completed this year. With respect to ADAM mines, which contain depleted uranium, Turkey indicated that destruction could not be done at the Turkish Munitions Disposal Facility as it would contravene national environmental regulations. Therefore the Ministry of National Defence is currently collaborating with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) to ensure the destruction of the 22,788 ADAM type mines.

30. At the Cartagena Summit, it was recorded that on 25 May 2009 **Ukraine** informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that it possessed 149,096 POM-2 mines and 5,950,372 PFM-1 mines. It was further recorded that, while Ukraine planned to destroy 1,500,000 mines in 2009 and 600,000 in 2010, a lack of financial resources was undermining the plan. The Cartagena Summit also recorded that in June 2009, the EC launched an experts' mission to assess available destruction facilities and to determine the type of assistance with this mission confirming that Ukraine has the technical know-how to destroy its stockpiled PFM type mines, albeit with significant investment in technology and equipment required. As well, it was noted that the destruction of anti-personnel mines had been identified as one of the Ukrainian priorities that could be financed under the European Union's European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), with further needs to be identified in the course of the negotiation between Ukraine and the EC in the framework of the Ukrainian National Programme (UNP) for 2011-2013. Finally, it was recorded that on 16 June 2009, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) received a request for assistance from Ukraine related to the destruction of Ukraine's stockpiled anti-personnel mines and that the two were discussing modalities for the provision of expert support.

31. In September 2010, Ukraine expressed its appreciation for the efforts of the President of the Second Review Conference in facilitating a decision of the Norwegian Government to provide up to US\$ 1 million in 2010-2011 for Ukraine's stockpile destruction efforts. Ukraine further noted that the modalities related to this financial assistance remain a matter of consultations between Ukraine and Norway.

32. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have missed their deadlines for completion of obligations under Article 4 will immediately communicate, to all States Parties, the reasons, which should be cases of force majeure, for failing to comply.¹⁰ On 18 May, Ukraine requested that the ISU distribute a note verbale to all States Parties informing them that Ukraine would be unable to comply with its Article 4 obligation to destroy all its stockpiled anti-personnel mines by its 1 June 2010 deadline. Through this note verbale and through a non-paper distributed by Ukraine at the 21 June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Ukraine expressed that a "lack of practical international assistance" did not allow Ukraine to implement its obligations under Article 4, particularly as a result of Ukraine's "European partners" unilaterally suspending a joint destruction project with the EC.

¹⁰ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #8.

33. Through its May 2010 note verbale and at the June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Ukraine elaborated on its plans to acquire the resources necessary to complete implementation of Article 4, noting that it will work to accumulate national resources, resume cooperation with the EC in the framework of the ENPI (with the new National Indicative Programme for 2011-2013, which will include a sub-priority on the implementation of the Convention, to be finalised through a Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine and the EC “in the nearest future”), and use, where appropriate, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to encourage and facilitate the destruction of its stockpiles. Ukraine noted in particular that it has made a proposal to initiate stockpile destruction in the framework of a NATO/PfP Trust Fund project, which is being considered by the USA. Ukraine further indicated that, given the current absence of international support and the economic situation in Ukraine, the destruction process is “on hold.”

34. In April 2010, Ukraine provided updated information in accordance with Article 7, paragraphs 1(b) and 2 of the Convention reporting that 5,951,785 stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained as of 1 April 2010. Taking into account the Cartagena Summit commitment to provide an expected completion date for destruction of these mines, Ukraine informed the June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that it is estimated that the one rotary kiln at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant could destroy 1 million PFM mines per year, implying that without international assistance to expand capacity it would take “six years at the soonest” for Ukraine to complete implementation of Article 4. Ukraine further indicated that with “proper financing”, the installation and operation of a second incinerator could see destruction completed within three years. Ukraine also indicated that the USA had recently agreed to purchase another incinerator for the Pavlograd Chemical Plant that could be used for the destruction of anti-personnel mines.

35. States Parties continued to express concern that four States Parties have failed to comply with the four-year deadline to destroy or ensure the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned, possessed or under their jurisdiction or control, encouraged the early completion of stockpile destruction programmes and recalled that the Cartagena Action Plan provides guidelines for getting back into the status of compliance. It was also noted that all States Parties have a role in being vigilant in ensuring that those with stockpile destruction programmes are on track to meet their obligations, including through the provision of international cooperation and assistance. In addition, it was noted that Belarus, Greece, Turkey and Ukraine each have expressed a deep commitment to the Convention and the fulfilment of their obligations.

36. It was noted that there is ambiguity with respect to Iraq’s stockpile status and that, should Iraq have stockpiled anti-personnel mines, Iraq would need to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled mines under its jurisdiction or control by 1 February 2012. In its initial Article 7 report submission made in July 2008, Iraq stated that it did not hold stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, but states that “this matter will be further investigated and if required, corrected in the next report.” In its May 2009 Article 7 submission, Iraq did not include any information on stockpiles or programmes related to their destruction. In its 15 June 2010 Article 7 submission, Iraq appeared to indicate that 690 stockpiled anti-personnel mines are held.

37. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that all States Parties will, when previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, and in addition take advantage of other informal means to share such information as soon as possible and

destroy these anti-personnel mines as a matter of urgent priority.¹¹ (“Informal means” could, for example, take the form of sharing information during the Intersessional Work Programme.) At the 21 June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Burundi reported that it had discovered 76 anti-personnel mines that were previously unknown. Burundi further reported that these mines have now been destroyed.

III. Mine clearance

38. There are 54 States Parties that originally had reported that they had to fulfil the obligation contained in Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention. Of these, by the close of the Cartagena Summit, 15 had reported that they had fulfilled their obligation to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control. Therefore, at the close of the Cartagena Summit, there were 39 that had to still fulfil this obligation.

39. Since the Cartagena Summit, **Nicaragua** – at the 22 June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies – informed the States Parties that it had completed implementation of Article 5. It was noted that Article 5 implementation by Nicaragua was a major milestone as it ensured that an entire region – Central America – previously riddled with anti-personnel mines is safe again. It was also expressed that other States Parties still in the process of addressing their mine clearance challenges should be inspired by Nicaragua, a country that had overcome great obstacles to do what some had thought was impossible – the full implementation of Article 5.

40. There are now 38 States Parties that must still fulfil the obligation contained in Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zimbabwe.

41. The Cartagena Summit recorded that compliance with the obligation to destroy all emplaced anti-personnel mines had been of heightened importance for the States Parties in recent years. While progress in implementing Article 5 on the part of many individual States Parties was also recorded at the Cartagena Summit, the Summit expressed the view that the large numbers of States Parties that have requested extensions on their deadlines suggests that there has been only minimal success in overcoming the challenge of clearing or otherwise releasing all mined areas.

42. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have been granted an extension to their initial Article 5 deadline will complete implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible but not later than their extended deadlines, ensure progress toward completion proceeds in accordance with the commitments made in their extension requests and the decisions taken on their requests, and report regularly on such progress.¹² A summary of progress made relative to the commitments made in extension requests and the decisions taken on these requests is contained in annex II. Since the Cartagena Summit, it was noted that several of the States Parties with extended deadlines have fallen short of the annual benchmarks or other commitments made in their extension requests. It was also

¹¹ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #12.

¹² Cartagena Action Plan, Action #13.

noted that increased funding had been identified as a requirement in order for several of the State Parties with extended deadlines to meet their commitments and that this funding had not materialised, from either national or external sources.

43. Of the States Parties that have been granted extensions on their Article 5 deadlines, one – **Nicaragua** – has had its deadline occur since the Cartagena Summit. As noted above, this State Party reported compliance with Article 5 obligations by its extended deadline. Of the States Parties that have been granted extensions on their Article 5 deadlines, three – **Chad, Denmark and Zimbabwe** – had been granted extensions for a period of time necessary to assess relevant facts and develop a meaningful forward looking plan based on these facts. Since the Cartagena Summit Denmark has indicated that it has now developed a meaningful plan forward and Chad and Zimbabwe have indicated that, due to various circumstances, they have not.

44. In the decisions taken on Article 5 extension requests, it was agreed that for one State Party – the **United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland** – there would be a dated commitment with the date for meeting this commitment occurring since the Cartagena Summit. The States Parties noted that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland agreed at the Ninth Meeting of the States Parties (9MSP) to provide as soon as possible, and not later than 30 June 2010, a detailed explanation of how demining is proceeding and the implications for future demining in order to meet the United Kingdom's obligations, including the preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programmes and financial and technical means available.

45. At the 22 June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reported that a four site pilot project started on 4 December 2009 and was completed on 4 June with 568 anti-vehicle mines, 678 anti-personnel mines, 2 sub-munitions and 9 additional unexploded ordnance destroyed. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland provided dates when mines were either emplaced or discovered in each area, the numbers and types of munitions found and destroyed, the amount of area released, the methods used to do so and steps taken to assure quality. In addition, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland indicated that it will now analyse the data gathered from this project, make recommendations for future work based on this analysis and report the findings of this analysis and agreed next steps to the 10MSP.

46. At the Cartagena Summit, it was recorded that one of the first challenges faced by many States Parties that must still complete implementation of Article 5 is to undertake or complete the task of making every effort to identify all areas under a State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced. It was further recorded that several States Parties, including some for which the Convention entered into force several years ago, had not yet provided clarity pursuant to their obligation to report on the location of all mined areas that contain or are suspect to contain, anti-personnel mines. To address this challenge, it was agreed that States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control will do their utmost to identify, if they have not yet done so, the precise perimeters and locations, to the extent possible, of all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or are suspected to be emplaced, and report this information, as required by Article 7, no later than the 10MSP.¹³ A summary of information reported by States Parties in accordance with this commitment and the obligations contained in Article 7 is contained in annex III.

¹³ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #14.

47. It was noted that many States Parties in the process of implementing Article 5 have still not provided information, as is called for in Article 7, paragraphs 1(c) and 1 (f), on “the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under (a State Party’s) jurisdiction or control” and on “status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with (Article 5).” It was further noted that while many States Parties in their extension requests had provided a detailed accounting of the size, location and nature of remaining mined areas, they had not since submitting their extension requests reported relative to the benchmark information contained in their requests.

48. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties expressed the view that Landmine Impact Surveys and other efforts have resulted in an imprecise identification and significant overestimation of the size of mined areas and have led to inappropriate allocations of time and resources. The States Parties also recorded that they are now greatly aided by understanding the limitations of Landmine Impact Surveys and by applying the recommendations that they have embrace on applying all available methods to achieve the full, efficient and expedient implementation of Article 5, including by releasing land through non-technical means, technical survey and clearance. In this context, at the Cartagena Summit the States Parties agreed that States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control will do their utmost to ensure that all available methods are applied where and as relevant, by developing and implementing applicable national standards, policies and procedures for releasing land through technical and nontechnical means that are accountable and acceptable to local communities, including through the involvement of women and men in the acceptance process.¹⁴ It was also agreed that such States Parties would provide information on the areas already released, disaggregated by release through clearance, technical survey and nontechnical survey.¹⁵

49. Since the Cartagena Summit, **Bosnia and Herzegovina** reported that since the beginning of mine action in the country, 95 percent of the suspected mined areas have been reduced by non technical land release methods which include systematic and general survey and that these methods were defined in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s standing operating procedures which were adopted in 2003. **Cambodia** reported that since 1992, all operators have been using all available means, including clearance, technical and nontechnical survey to release land and that the Cambodian has developed standards that include chapters on clearance, baseline survey and land release. **Chile** reported that it prepared a demining field manual and a handbook on the application of land release procedures. **Colombia** reported that it has adopted the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and is adapting methodologies and procedures for land release. Colombia has also made available lists of areas where nontechnical survey is taking place and of areas that have been released through technical survey and clearance. **Croatia** reported that it has developed national mine action standards that are in accordance with the IMAS, that all Croatian standing operating procedures are publicly available on the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) website, and that non-technical survey and the combination of non-technical survey and clearance are used in Croatia. Croatia also reported on the amount of area released through demining and the amount released through general survey.

50. The **Democratic Republic of the Congo** reported that operators under the coordination of the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) are using demining and technical and non-technical means to release lands and that the Democratic Republic of the Congo does not yet have national standards. **Ethiopia** reported

¹⁴ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #15.

¹⁵ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #17.

that standard operational procedures are used to secure the standard of released land by non-technical means, technical survey and clearance. **Jordan** reported that it utilises the latest methods and standards for demining, technical survey, quality assurance and quality control, and, that these methods are governed by national technical standards and guidelines which are based on IMAS Version 4 and were modified to reflect the reality of Jordan. **Mozambique** reported that it has developed national land release standards to ensure that suspected hazardous areas will be released in a more efficient and cost effective manner, that these standards require demining organisations to apply non-technical means to release land in addition to applying full clearance method, and, that Mozambique's National Demining Institute (IND) will ensure that decisions to release land are made through a consultative process involving communities and by applying appropriate quality assurance procedures. Mozambique further reported that all the existing standards have been reviewed to ensure the land release concept is integrated throughout Mozambique's national standards in compliance with the IMAS, that it is expected that through proper non-technical and technical survey there will be a significant reduction to the estimated suspect hazardous area, and, that this reduction will ensure a more efficient use of time and resources for demining operators, which could reduce the estimated completion timelines of in various provinces and districts.

51. Senegal indicated that since 2009 it has implemented its own standards, which include standards for land release by non-technical means and technical survey. **Tajikistan** reported that it uses non-technical means, technical survey, and clearance to release land, that it has national standards for non-technical land release and for technical survey operations and that mechanical mine clearance standards are under development. **Thailand** reported that it is in the process of revising its national standards on mine clearance with this process expected to be completed in 2011. Thailand has also reported on the amount of area released using its "Locating Minefield Procedure" and the amount released through manual clearance methods. **Uganda** reported that national standards were approved in February 2009, that these standards spell out procedures for non-technical and technical surveys, and, that non-technical and technical surveys are being used in the field. **Yemen** reported that land is released through technical survey and clearance in accordance with international and national mine action standards. **Zimbabwe** reported that all land release that has been done so far has been through technical survey and clearance only and that it is working on a project to establish national standards for land release based on the IMAS.

52. At the Cartagena Summit the States Parties agreed that States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control will do their utmost to take full national ownership of their Article 5 obligations by developing, implementing and regularly reviewing national mine action strategies and associated policies, plans, budget policies and legal frameworks, and inform the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies on their implementation.¹⁶ It was also agreed that these States Parties would provide annually, in accordance with Article 7, precise information on the number, location and size of mined areas, anticipated particular technical or operational challenges, plans to clear or otherwise release these areas.¹⁷ With respect to these commitments, **Bosnia and Herzegovina** reported that Bosnia and Herzegovina's Council of Ministers adopted Bosnia and Herzegovina's Mine Action Strategy 2009-2019, based on which annual operational mine action plans are developed. **Cambodia** reiterated that it has developed a national mine action strategy, which will soon be made available on the website of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA). **Chile** reported that it has a national demining plan and that annual directives bring the

¹⁶ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #16.

¹⁷ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #17.

programme up to date. **Colombia** indicated that its request for an extension of this Article 5 deadline contains its prospective plan of action to implement Article 5.

53. Croatia reported that, on 16 September 2009, the Croatian Parliament adopted a 2009-2019 mine action strategy, that an abstract of this is publicly available on the CROMAC website, and that annual plans containing projections of areas to be cleared are also prepared and made available on this website. The **Democratic Republic of the Congo** reported that while no national demining strategy has yet been developed, a United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) 2010-2012 strategy outlines UNMACC objectives for this period. **Ethiopia** reported that the yearly plan of action and the national demining strategic plan (2006/7-2010/11) came to effect through participatory priority settings involving local authorities, beneficiaries, and project stakeholders. **Jordan** reported that it has a National Mine Action Plan for 2010-2015. **Mozambique** reported that, in accordance with its extension request, it developed a national mine action plan (2008-2014), which includes an annual action plan per province and district, including financial implications for both operations and coordination.

54. Senegal reported that its mine action strategy was revised in 2007 and that an action plan for 2007-2015 and a demining action plan were also developed. **Tajikistan** reported that demining is taking place with accordance to its Article 5 extension request, which was granted in 2009, and that annual work plans are developed containing tasks for the year. **Thailand** reported that it has developed a national mine action strategy 2010-2014. **Uganda** reported that it has a demining plan, which is part of the Integrated Mine Action Programme document 2010-2012, and, that the plan highlights how Uganda can be in a position to reach its August 2012 Article 5 deadline. **Yemen** reported that it has a strategic mine action plan for six years, 2009-2014. **Zimbabwe** reported that, since its Article 5 extension request was granted in 2008, it failed to get the assistance necessary to carry out surveys that would enable it to develop plans for dealing with the remaining contamination.

55. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties recalled that Article 5 implementation, particularly along borders, has an important relationship to the obligation contained in Article 1 of the Convention and noted the need to proceed with Article 5 implementation along borders and in other areas to avoid the semblance of violating Article 1. The States Parties also noted the importance, where a border dispute exists over land that is considered a “mined area”, to do the maximum to coordinate work with the relevant State, be it a State Party or a State not party, in such a way that clearance can proceed even where the border is not delineated or demarcated. Given these understandings, it was agreed at the Cartagena Summit that States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control will do their utmost to provide access to all mined border areas where access may be difficult or contested, without prejudice to potential border delineation, to ensure that clearance can proceed as soon as possible, making use of the good offices of Presidents of Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences or other third parties as appropriate.¹⁸

56. Since the Cartagena Summit, **Cambodia** reported that, while it still faces some challenges due to the slow process of demarcation along its border with Thailand, where land is not contested clearance is taking place in accordance with community priorities. It further reported that areas which are being contested will be subject to clearance upon request by the Joint Border Committee. **Chile** has reported that one of its priorities is to clear the mined areas close to border crossings, thus allowing better integration and exchanges between Chile and neighbouring States. Chile further highlighted that demining operations have allowed for a safe passing across its borders with Peru, Bolivia and

¹⁸ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #18.

Argentina and that on 30 July 2010 the Ministers of Defence of Chile and Bolivia met to declare two areas along their common border free of mines and that this effort will allow for the construction of a new border crossing.

57. Thailand has reported that most of its mine clearance work takes place in border provinces but that there are contaminated areas along borders that have not yet been accessed as the demarcation process is ongoing between Thailand and its neighbouring countries and that Thailand looks forward to collaborating with its neighbouring countries on the work on the border area. **Tajikistan** has reported that mine action personnel are permitted to enter to the mined Tajik-Afghan border areas to conduct any type of operation relating with land release and survey but that the national demining programme still does not have official permission to conduct operations along the Tajik-Uzbek border. **Zimbabwe** has reported that it has mined areas that straddle its border with Mozambique, that issues of access and responsibility for clearance of these mined areas have been discussed at the technical level between the two countries' respective national mine action authorities, that these issues will be subject to discussion in due course at bilateral high level government forums that already exist between the two countries and that no problems in dealing with these issues are anticipated and therefore the involvement of third parties is not warranted at this stage.

58. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties updated their understandings related to mine risk education (MRE) and agreed that States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control will do their utmost to provide mine risk reduction and education programmes, as part of broader risk assessment and reduction activities targeting the most at-risk populations, which are age-appropriate and gender-sensitive, coherent with applicable national and international standards, tailored to the needs of mine-affected communities and integrated into ongoing mine action activities, in particular data gathering, clearance and victim assistance as appropriate.¹⁹ Since the Cartagena Summit, **Bosnia and Herzegovina** reported that MRE is conducted according to its standards adopted in 2004 and its standing operating procedures adopted in 2006, that annual MRE plans are made based upon its 2009-2019 MRE Substrategy, that there are 15 accredited MRE organisations, and that MRE programmes and activities are planned and carried out according to the needs of affected groups in mine impacted communities based on age. **Cambodia** has reported that MRE remains an important component to achieve the goals of Cambodia's National Mine Action Strategy, that messages and activities tailored to the needs of the remaining male and female high-risk groups as well as children and that steps have been taken to improve coordination in the delivery of MRE.

59. Ethiopia reported that the Ethiopian Mine Action Office is providing gender and culturally sensitive MRE and that efforts are undertaken in accordance with the IMAS, customised to local and national requirements. Ethiopia further reported MRE efforts have led to populations demonstrating behavioural, reporting explosive hazards and providing other pertinent information regarding mine action. **Mozambique** reported that MRE activities focus on communities affected by landmines, that it is implemented by all humanitarian operators during their clearance tasks, that focal points are instructed to communicate information on the risk caused by mines, and that MRE has resulted in information on suspected areas, accidents and victims. **Uganda** reported that MRE is conducted by two accredited international non-governmental organisations, that their activities are coordinated by Uganda's Mine Action Centre and that these activities include direct presentations by MRE teams in affected communities, teaching schools, training

¹⁹ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #19.

drama groups for mobile live performances and the use of small and mass media to communicate messages.

60. Since the Cartagena Summit, the International Mine Action Standards on Mine Risk Education (IMAS-MRE) were revised and updated with support from UNICEF and GICHD and within the framework of International MRE Advisory Group and the IMAS Review Board. The revised standards will assist states and mine action organizations develop and implement more effective mine risk education interventions. UNICEF in collaboration with GICHD has also developed a Training Manual on implementation of IMAS-MRE that will facilitate easy application of the revised standards at national and local levels.

61. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control will do their utmost to ensure that all relevant mine action actors inform and actively involve affected local communities and survivors in the assessment of needs, planning and prioritization of activities, and handover of cleared land, by utilising community liaison or other similar means to ensure meaningful participation of all stakeholders.²⁰

62. [National updates on these matters]

63. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties recalled the decisions taken at the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties (7MSP) establishing a process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extensions of Article 5 deadlines, noted the suggested outline provided by the ISU to assist requesting States Parties in organising the content of their requests and expressed the view that the Article 5 extensions process has led to the establishment of an orderly and predictable calendar for submitting, analysing and considering extension requests. With respect to such requests, at the Cartagena Summit it was agreed that States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control but due to exceptional circumstances need to request an extension to their 10-year deadline will inform the States Parties of these exceptional circumstances in due time, develop the extension request in line with the recommendations made by the 7MSP and utilise the opportunity for informal dialogue with the group mandated to analyse the extension request.²¹

64. The Article 5 extensions process implies that if a State Party with a 2011 deadline believes it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas that it has reported by its deadline, it should have submitted a request in March of 2010. At the Cartagena Summit, it was noted that in 2008 and 2009 many requesting States did not adhere to such a timeline and that States Parties should adhere to the March submission date or otherwise inform the President of circumstances that may prevent timely submission. Since the Cartagena Summit, requests were received by the President from **Colombia** (on 31 March 2010), **Mauritania** (on 10 April 2010), **Denmark** (on 18 June 2010), **Zimbabwe** (on 3 August 2010), **Guinea Bissau** (on 8 September 2010), and **Chad** (on 20 September 2010). In keeping with the decisions of the Cartagena Summit, Chad, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe all informed the President of the circumstances that prevented timely submission. In keeping with the decisions of the 7MSP, the President informed the States Parties of the receipt of these requests and instructed the ISU to make these requests available to all interested actors on the Convention's web site.

²⁰ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #20.

²¹ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #21.

65. Further to the commitments made at the Cartagena Summit, representatives of each requesting State Party and the group mandated to analyse the extension requests engaged in informal dialogue with a view to the analysing group to seek a better understanding of the requests and to offer advice and suggestions to requesting States Parties. This cooperative process resulted in requesting States Parties clarifying many questions about their requests and with some (**Colombia**, on 13 August 2010 and **Mauritania**, on 6 September 2010 and **Zimbabwe**, on 28 September 2010), submitting revised, improved requests.

66. It was noted that one State Party with an Article 5 deadline in 2011, **Congo**, neither submitted a request for an extension of its deadline nor confirmed that it would comply with its obligation by its deadline.

67. It was noted that the following States Parties with Article 5 deadlines that occur in 2012 believe that they will be unable to comply with their obligations in a ten year period and hence will submit extension requests in 2011: **Chile**, the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** and **Eritrea**. It was further noted that there are four additional States Parties – **Algeria**, **Jordan**, **Nigeria** and **Uganda** – that have deadlines that occur in 2012.

68. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that all States Parties will, when previously unknown mined areas are discovered after reporting compliance with Article 5 (1), report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information and destroy the anti-personnel mines in these areas as a matter of urgent priority.²² Since the Cartagena Summit, no State Party has reported such discoveries.

IV. Victim assistance

69. At the Cartagena Summit, it was recorded that in the preceding five years, for the first time clear objectives had been established and national plans developed by States Parties that are ultimately responsible for the well being of significant numbers of landmines survivors and that the aim of assisting landmine survivors had been taken into account in broader disability and human rights approaches. Between the 2004 Nairobi Summit and the 2009 Cartagena Summit, 13 of these States Parties had revised their objectives to be more specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound – SMARTer: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda. In addition, between these two summits, 13 of these States Parties had developed, or had initiated an interministerial process to develop and/or implement, a comprehensive plan of action to meet their objectives: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, El Salvador, Jordan, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. As well, 23 of the States Parties that are ultimately responsible for the well being of significant numbers of landmines survivors had reported progress in the achievement of specific objectives: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Jordan, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen.

70. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties reaffirmed their understandings on victim assistance which have evolved through ten years of implementation of the Convention and the evolution of international human rights law. They reiterated their understanding of the paramount importance of the principles of national ownership,

²² Cartagena Action Plan, Action #22.

equality, non-discrimination, full inclusion and participation, an integrated and comprehensive approach, a gender perspective, transparency, efficiency and accountability in all victim assistance efforts. In addition, they recalled that victim assistance should be part of public health, rehabilitation, social services and human rights frameworks and that efforts should be integrated into broader national policies, plans and legal frameworks related to disability, health, education, employment, development and poverty reduction, noting again that victim assistance efforts should not exclude any person injured or disabled in another manner while ensuring that services are provided where they are needed.

71. At the Cartagena Summit, while noting the progress that has been made in achieving the victim assistance aim of the Convention, the States Parties recognised that the most identifiable gains had been process-related and that the real promise of the Convention is to make a difference on the ground, in the lives of survivors, the families of those killed or injured, and their communities. The States Parties expressed the view that a persistent challenge remains in translating increased understanding on victim assistance into tangible improvements in the quality of daily life of mine victims.

72. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties expressed their resolve to provide adequate age- and gender-sensitive assistance to mine victims, through a holistic and integrated approach that includes emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support, and social and economic inclusion in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, with the aim of ensuring their full and effective participation and inclusion in the social, cultural, economic and political life of their communities. To this end, the States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, agreed to reinforce their efforts and do their utmost to facilitate measurable progress by applying 11 specific actions relating to assisting the victims.²³ To promote the application of these actions, the then-Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration (Belgium and Thailand) presented specific recommendations on national implementation of relevant aspects of the Cartagena Action Plan.²⁴ To enhance their usefulness at the national level, these recommendations have been made available in the following languages: Albanian, Arabic, Dari, English, French, Khmer, Pashtu, Portuguese, Spanish and Tajik. In addition, at the Cartagena Summit the States Parties were presented with the “Survivors’ Call to Action”, which spells out landmine survivors’ expectations of States Parties during the period 2010-2014 and the commitments that survivors themselves have made to advance the aims of the Convention.

73. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, will reinforce their efforts and will do their utmost to ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of mine victims and their representative organisations as well as other relevant stakeholders in victim assistance related activities, in particular as regards the national action plan, legal frameworks and policies, implementation mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation.²⁵ Since the Cartagena Summit, [...] States Parties reported the inclusion of mine survivors and other persons with disabilities in national workshops and/or implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms: [...].

74. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims,

²³ Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #23 through #33. In addition to these 11 actions listed under the heading “assisting the victims”, several actions under the “international cooperation and assistance” and “transparency” headings relate to victim assistance.

²⁴ Assisting the Victims: Recommendations on Implementing the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014. APLC/CONF/2009/MISC.6

²⁵ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #23.

will establish, if they have not yet done so, an inter-ministerial/inter-sectoral coordination mechanism for the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of relevant national policies, plans and legal frameworks, and ensure that this focal entity has the authority and resources to carry out its task.²⁶ There are now [...] States Parties that have established such a coordination mechanism: [...]. In addition, there are now [...] States Parties have designated a focal entity to strengthen victim assistance-related activities: [...].

75. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, will collect all necessary data, disaggregated by sex and age, in order to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate adequate national policies, plans and legal frameworks including by assessing the needs and priorities of mine victims and the availability and quality of relevant services, make such data available to all relevant stakeholders and ensure that such efforts contribute to national injury surveillance and other relevant data collection systems for use in programme planning.²⁷ There are now [...] States Parties that collect data in accordance with this agreed commitment: [...]. Examples include [...]. States Parties have also expressed that the following challenges remain in being able to collect and make available all necessary data [...].

76. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, will develop (or review and modify if necessary) and implement national policies, plans and legal frameworks with a view to meet the needs and human rights of mine victims, and, develop a budget related to carrying out these tasks.²⁸ It was further agreed that plans should contain objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time bound and that these plans should be integrated into broader relevant national policies, plans, and legal frameworks.²⁹ Since the Cartagena Summit, [...] States Parties have reported on the development, review or modification of policies, plans and legal frameworks: [...]. Of these States Parties, [...] have reported on the integration of victim assistance plans into broader relevant national policies, plans, and legal frameworks: [...]. Examples include [...]. States Parties have also expressed that the following challenges remain in being able to live up their commitment to develop (or review and modify if necessary) and implement national policies, plans and legal frameworks [...].

77. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, will monitor and evaluate progress regarding victim assistance within broader national policies, plans and legal frameworks on an ongoing basis.³⁰ There are now [...] States Parties that have developed a such a monitoring and evaluation mechanism: [...]. Examples include [...]. States Parties have also expressed that the following challenges remain in being able to monitor and evaluate progress [...].

78. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, will ensure the continued expert involvement and effective contribution in all relevant convention related activities by health, rehabilitation, social services, education, employment, gender and disability rights experts, including mine survivors, inter alia by

²⁶ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #24.

²⁷ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #25.

²⁸ Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #26 and #27.

²⁹ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #27.

³⁰ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #28.

supporting the inclusion of such expertise in their delegations.³¹ At the June 2010 meetings of the Standing Committees, 16 States Parties included such an expert in their delegation: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Guinea Bissau, Jordan, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand and Uganda. At least nine landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities participated in these meetings. At the 10MSP, [...] States Parties included an expert, as defined above, in their delegation: [...]. At least [...] landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities participated in the 10MSP. It was noted again that the informal Sponsorship Programme plays an indispensable role in ensuring the participation of States Parties' health, rehabilitation, social services, education, employment, gender and disability rights experts.

79. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, will strengthen national ownership.³² At the June 2010 meetings of the Standing Committees, during a special session held to discuss international cooperation and assistance, it was proposed that national ownership in relation to victim assistance could comprise the following six elements: (a) a high level commitment to addressing the rights and needs of mine victims and other persons with disabilities, (b) a national coordination mechanism empowered and provided with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out its responsibilities, (c) a comprehensive plan, and, legislation to address the rights and needs of persons with disabilities including mine victims, (d) a regular, significant commitment to implement the policy, plan and legislation and to provide services, (e) capacity to implement the policy, plan and legislation or steps taken to acquire the resources necessary to build this capacity, and, (f) a national focal entity for disability-related issues. It was noted that such an expression of what might be expected from States Parties in terms of "national ownership" may provide a more specific means of evaluating progress in this area in the future.

80. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, will develop and implement capacity building and training plans to promote and enhance the capacity of the women, men and associations of victims, other organisations and national institutions charged with delivering services and implementing relevant national policies, plans and legal frameworks.³³ Since the Cartagena Summit, [...] States Parties have reported on activities to develop and/or implement capacity building and training plans: [...]. Examples of initiatives undertaken include [...]. States Parties have also expressed that the following challenges remain in being able to live up their commitment to develop and implement capacity building and training plans [...].

81. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, will increase availability of and accessibility to appropriate services and ensure that appropriate services are accessible.³⁴ Since the Cartagena Summit, [...] States Parties have reported on activities to increase the availability of and accessibility to appropriate services: [...]. Examples of initiatives undertaken include [...]. States Parties have also expressed that the following challenges remain in being able to live up their commitment to increase availability of and accessibility to appropriate services and ensure that appropriate services are accessible [...].

³¹ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #29.

³² Cartagena Action Plan, Action #30.

³³ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #30.

³⁴ Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #31 and #32.

82. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, will raise awareness among mine victims about their rights and available services, as well as within government authorities, service providers and the general public to foster respect for the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities including mine survivors.³⁵ Since the Cartagena Summit, [...] States Parties have reported on awareness raising activities to promote understanding of and progress in achieving the aims of this commitment: [...]. Examples of initiatives undertaken include [...]. States Parties have also expressed that the following challenges remain in being able to live up their commitment to raise awareness among mine victims about their rights and available services, as well as within government authorities, service providers and the general public to foster respect for the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities including mine survivors [...]. It was also noted that in addition to States Parties' efforts to raise aware to promote understanding of and progress in achieving the aims of the Cartagena Action Plan, non-governmental organizations, such as Handicap International and Survivor Corps, have taken the initiative to do the same.

83. Since the Cartagena Summit, the primary focus of the work of the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration has been to continue the work of their predecessors and assist national authorities responsible for healthcare, rehabilitation, social services, employment, or disability issues more generally in the process of setting their own specific and measurable objectives and developing, implementing and monitoring plans of action. When plans for the disability sector already exist, the focus has been on ensuring that mine survivors have access to the services and benefits enshrined within those plans and that the relevant ministries are aware of their States' obligations under the Convention. The ISU has continued to support the work of the Co-Chairs through the provision of advice to all relevant States Parties and through process support visits. Seven (7) States Parties – Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mozambique, Peru, Tajikistan and Uganda – have benefited from such visits since the Cartagena Summit.

84. With financial support provided by Australia through the ISU, the Co-Chairs continued to facilitate a parallel programme for victim assistance experts on the margins of the meetings of the Standing Committee and the 10MSP. The programmes are intended as a forum in which health, rehabilitation, social services, disability rights and other experts can share experiences, priorities and challenges in addressing the rights and needs of landmine victims and other persons with disabilities and provide a clearer picture of the reality on the ground in many affected States Parties. In 2010, particular emphasis has been given to resource mobilisation and utilisation, capacity building of survivors and their organisations, community based rehabilitation, and challenges and opportunities in implementing the Cartagena Action Plan.

85. The Co-Chairs have also taken steps to strengthen linkages between the work of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration and implementation mechanisms developed under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Seventy-two (72) States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention are also parties to the CRPD, including 12 of the States Parties reporting responsibility for significant numbers of mine survivors – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen. At the June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, the Co-Chairs invited Professor Ron McCallum AO, Chair of the CRPD's Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to speak on the

³⁵ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #33.

work of the Committee and its relevance for the application of the victim assistance aspects of the Cartagena Action Plan, including on matters related to reporting and monitoring.

V. Other matters essential for achieving the convention's aims

(a) Cooperation and assistance

86. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties recognised that the need for partnerships to achieve the aims of the Convention had become more important than ever. They expressed the view that strong national ownership is essential for ensuring that cooperation can flourish and developed a clear understanding of what national ownership means. In addition, at the Cartagena Summit the States Parties recorded that ensuring sufficient resources exist and seeing that available resources meet well expressed needs by States Parties demonstrating strong ownership over their implementation efforts may be the most significant challenge facing the States Parties during the period 2010 to 2014.

87. To address this and related challenges, over one-quarter of the commitments agreed to in the Cartagena Action Plan concern international cooperation and assistance.³⁶ In acting upon this clear expression of interest in reinvigorating international cooperation and assistance in the life of the Convention, and, paying particular regard to the commitment made at the Cartagena to ensure that the Convention and its informal mechanisms include and provide a specific and effective framework for identifying needs and mobilising national and international resources to meet these needs, the President of the Second Review Conference placed a high priority on this matter in 2010.³⁷ With the cooperation of the Co-Chairs, the President convened a special session on international cooperation and assistance during the week of meetings of the Standing Committees in June 2010 as well as an experts' workshop on this matter in May 2010. Numerous important points were raised at this special session which provided the States Parties with a rich agenda on cooperation and assistance for possible follow up.

88. The June 2010 special session on international cooperation and assistance highlighted the need for two distinct discussions – one that concerns Article 5 implementation and one that concerns victim assistance. It was noted that while both matters belong to the larger family of mine action, mine clearance and victim assistance have different timelines, involve distinct national and international actors and relate to different national institutional and regulatory frameworks and budget lines. It was further noted that the whole notion of mine action as an integrated field of practice may have hampered attempts to utilise available resources in the most effective manner. In addition, it was noted that there is a need for an increased focus on results in addition to demands for increased efficiency and effectiveness.

89. With respect to enhancing international cooperation and assistance as concerns victim assistance, it was recalled that victim assistance is the most complex and challenging issue for the States Parties and it is fundamentally distinct from the collection of activities referred to as humanitarian demining. It was also recalled that at the Cartagena Summit the States Parties recognised that guaranteeing the rights and addressing the needs of mine victims requires a long term commitment and that this involves sustained political, financial and material commitments, both made by affected States themselves and through international cooperation and assistance, in accordance with Article 6 obligations. It was

³⁶ Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #34 through #52. In addition, part of Action #28 concerns cooperation and assistance.

³⁷ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #48.

further recalled that three actions in the Cartagena Action Plan's cooperation and assistance section relate specifically to assisting the victims.³⁸

90. The June 2010 special session on international cooperation and assistance highlighted a number of issues and opportunities concerning victim assistance:

(a) It was recalled that the ultimate responsibility of guaranteeing the rights and meeting the needs of landmine victims within a particular state rests with that state. Within a particular affected State, we must appreciate that victim assistance-related activities concern a wide range of ministries and agencies responsible for health, social affairs, labour, education, transport, justice, planning, finance, and possibly others. In States in a position to assist, the main actors are usually development agencies and ministries that engage in international cooperation efforts. However, within these agencies, there could be multiple relevant sub actors, including those responsible for bilateral development assistance or for providing assistance through multilateral entities.

(b) It was noted that States Parties in a position to assist include any State Party that has any form of assistance that it could offer to another to help in improving its response to landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities. It was highlighted that cooperation and assistance is not only about financial resources, with the provision of technical support, support for national capacity building and contributions of equipment and supplies all considered important.

(c) It was noted that in addition to there being potentially 156 States Parties in a position to fulfil Article 6.3 obligations, other actors such as international organisations play a key role in generating resources or implementing programmes and that, like States, these organisations can be complex with several aspects of the work of any particular organisation being relevant to what the States Parties consider "assisting the victims". It was also noted that associations of landmine survivors and disabled persons organisations are important stakeholders in victim assistance-related activities, as are other non-governmental organizations. It was further noted that while some of these organisations are well known members of the Convention community, others that are actively involved at the national level working on disability and/or development issues may not see themselves as working on what the States Parties define as "victim assistance". It was suggested that in order to better understand the scope of services available in affected States, a comprehensive mapping of all actors involved in services relevant to "assisting the victims" is needed.

(d) It was highlighted that with respect to victim assistance there is no clarity on the true magnitude of what is provided by States Parties in a position to assist with the bulk of what is made available for activities considered consistent with "assisting the victims" not captured in any assessment of mine action funding. It was noted that the bulk of what is provided is through bilateral cooperation between States to enhance healthcare systems, physical rehabilitation programmes, mental health services, the exercise of rights by persons with disabilities, et cetera. In this regard, it was suggested that a dialogue on enhanced cooperation and assistance on victim assistance could itself be enhanced if those giving and receiving development assistance, including core budget support, could provide greater clarity regarding the true magnitude of the effort being made to assist States in developing the responses necessary to meet the rights and needs of all individuals who are injured or who live with disabilities.

(e) It was noted that while the vast majority of resources to support activities considered consistent with "assisting the victims" undoubtedly flows through development

³⁸ Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #39, #41 and #46.

cooperation, the States Parties had previously recorded that more than US\$ 232 million had been reported invested between 2004 and 2009 in support of emergency medical care, physical rehabilitation and other assistance carried out by international service providers such as the ICRC including in some instances with national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Handicap International, other NGOs and relevant UN agencies. It was suggested that a dialogue on cooperation and assistance and the further mobilisation of resources could benefit from knowing how effectively these resources have been used, how such efforts could be part of national CRPD implementation and what lessons have been learned.

(f) It was noted that while some have called for a specific percentage of mine action funding to be dedicated to victim assistance, others have pointed out that doing so may be counterproductive, in particular because this may result in diverting funds from humanitarian demining, which is one of the main activities to address the victimisation of communities in war-torn societies and to prevent additional victims. It was suggested that what is required is to gain a better understanding of the true level of need and then to fund accordingly, rather than robbing from one aspect of Convention implementation to support another.

(g) It was recalled that while the States Parties, at the Cartagena Summit, adopted an understanding regarding “national ownership” as concerns Article 5 implementation, there was an opportunity to do the same in defining what the Convention community expects from affected States in terms of “national ownership” as concerns victim assistance. As noted above, at the June 2010 special session on international cooperation and assistance, elements for national ownership in relation to victim assistance were proposed.

91. The June 2010 special session on international cooperation and assistance highlighted a number of issues and opportunities concerning Article 5 implementation:

(a) It was recalled that 32 of the 38 States Parties that must still complete implementation of Article 5 obligations have indicated a need for assistance in fulfilling their obligations and that the gap between projected needs and anticipated contributions poses several challenges in for the effort to ensure compliance by these States Parties.

(b) It was acknowledged that States Parties and mine clearance operators have come far in their understanding of the challenges posed by the obligation to clear all mined areas, that impressive progress has been made in making mine clearance more efficient and effective, and that the amount of area cleared or otherwise released in recent years has increased substantially. It was noted that, while many States Parties have not yet defined the precise locations of mined areas despite massive investments made in surveys, there is a great potential for increasing productivity by employing the full range of methods previously recognised by the States Parties to release suspected hazardous areas. It was also noted that there is scope to increase efficiency across the breadth of the humanitarian demining sector.

(c) It was suggested that the definition of national ownership as concerns Article 5 implementation which was adopted at the Cartagena Summit, along with the relevant commitments made in the Cartagena Action Plan, provide the States Parties with a roadmap for the practical implementation of Article 6 in support of mine clearance, with this roadmap including the following components: (i) claiming national ownership, (ii) identifying the task,³⁹ (iii) mapping the resources needed to address the task,⁴⁰ (iv)

³⁹ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #14.

⁴⁰ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #34.

communicating the needs for international cooperation and assistance,⁴¹ (v) making the case for assistance,⁴² (vi) responding to the needs,⁴³ and, (vii) seeking peer support.⁴⁴

(d) It was noted that while mapping financial requests for and contributions to mine clearance may draw attention to a problem in a manner that is easy to communicate, it does not provide information that can help determine how needs in affected States Parties can be matched with relevant resources. It was suggested that meaningful discussions on Article 6 as concerns Article 5 implementation must have a broader scope than just money and move towards a better understanding of what effective and efficient international cooperation entails.

92. While time did not permit a discussion on stockpile destruction during the June 2010 special session on cooperation and assistance, it remained clear in 2010 that addressing questions related to cooperation and assistance were central to ensuring that two States Parties could fulfil their Article 4 obligations. It was recalled that as these two States Parties had sought assistance in accordance with Article 6.1, the matter of ensuring compliance on the part of both is the business of all States Parties.

93. At the Cartagena Summit, Zambia, with the support of other actors, proposed that a new Standing Committee be established to address the challenges related to international cooperation and assistance in the context of the Convention. Support for this proposal was expressed by several delegations at the June 2010 special session on cooperation and assistance.

94. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties with obligations to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines, identify and clear mined areas, and assist mine victims will, without delay, and no later than the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties, develop or update national plans as well as map the national resources available to meet their obligations and the needs for international cooperation and assistance.⁴⁵ Since the Cartagena Summit [updates on this commitment].

95. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties with obligations to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines, identify and clear mined areas, and assist mine victims will make their needs known to other States Parties and relevant organisations if they require financial, technical or other forms of international cooperation and assistance to meet obligations under the Convention, and identify these activities as a priority in relevant development goals and strategies.⁴⁶ Since the Cartagena Summit, the United Nations Mine Action Team, and in particular the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNICEF, have continued to apply the UN Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy 2006-2010 with a view to promoting achievement of the UN's Millennium Development Goals and full adherence to and compliance with the Convention and other relevant instruments. Since the Cartagena Summit, the UNDP, UNICEF and UNMAS have provided support to 25 States Parties that are in the process of implementing Article 5 of the Convention. The Organisation of American States (OAS) has indicated that it has standing agreements with Colombia, Ecuador and Peru for financial and technical support for mine clearance and related activities. The details of support are planned and agreed upon on an annual basis.

41 Cartagena Action Plan, Action #35.

42 Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #35 and #50.

43 Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #37 and #38.

44 Cartagena Action Plan, Action #36.

45 Cartagena Action Plan, Action #34.

46 Cartagena Action Plan, Action #35.

96. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties with obligations to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines, identify and clear mined areas, and assist mine victims will promote technical cooperation, information exchange on good practices and other forms of mutual assistance with other affected States Parties to take advantage of the knowledge and expertise acquired in the course of fulfilling their obligations.⁴⁷ Since the Cartagena Summit.[updates on this commitment].

97. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties adopted commitments to ensure the continuity and sustainability of resource commitments, to provide where possible multi-year funding, and to provide where possible multi-year financial, material or technical assistance.⁴⁸ Since the Cartagena Summit, **Australia** began to implement its Mine Action Strategy 2010-2014 including by providing multi-year financial commitments. **Switzerland** expressed that it is maintaining its firm commitment to Convention implementation through its 2008-2011 mine action strategy. **Norway** highlighted its strategic partnership with Mozambique as an example of a long-term partnership between States Parties. **Germany** both expressed that it will stay committed to mine action based on the Cartagena Action Plan with its strong preference to contribute to States Parties to the Convention and signalled a possible global decline in mine action budgets. In addition, **Austria** indicated that it is currently elaborating a new mine action strategy to take effect in 2011.

98. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties in a position to do so will, in the spirit of the Convention's aims, endeavour to continue supporting States Parties that have completed their Article 5 obligations in their efforts to address the humanitarian consequences resulting from mine and explosive remnants of war contamination.⁴⁹ With respect to this commitment, **Zambia**, which reported completion of its mine clearance obligations at the Cartagena Summit, received support from **Norway** for Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) to follow up on each UXO report obtained through the course of executing Zambia's 2009 landmines survey.

99. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties in a position to do so will ensure that international cooperation and assistance, including development cooperation, is age-appropriate and gender-sensitive and inclusive of, and accessible to, persons with disabilities, including mine survivors.⁵⁰ It was also agreed that all States Parties will ensure that assistance in mine action is based on appropriate surveys, needs analysis, age-appropriate and gender-sensitive strategies and cost-effective approaches.⁵¹ Since the Cartagena Summit, States Parties have continued to support the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines' Gender and Mine Action Programme which in turn has continued to promote the necessity of a gender perspective in executing mine action projects in an equal way. Non-governmental organizations such as the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) have used gender balanced interview teams to better reach out to all community members communities regarding the process of clearance and handover of land. In addition, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has continued to support gender sensitive strategies through inter-departmental and inter-agency collaborations. In addition, in March 2010, the United Nations developed new "Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes to help mine-action policymakers and field personnel incorporate gender perspectives into all operations of mine action.

47 Cartagena Action Plan, Action #36.

48 Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #37, #38 and #39.

49 Cartagena Action Plan, Action #40.

50 Cartagena Action Plan, Action #41.

51 Cartagena Action Plan, Action #52.

100. Most recently, UNMAS contributed in drafting the DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating Gender Perspective in early 2010. In addition, a new Gender Guidelines for Mine Action was published representing an agreed strategy to further promote gender mainstreaming in mine action. In conjunction with UNICEF and UNDP, UNMAS is planning the Middle East Gender in Mine Action Workshop in early 2011 to have country specific gender sensitive actions plans, learn good practices and lessons, and review the new Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes.

101. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that all States Parties will contribute to further development of the International Mine Action Standards to be used as a frame of reference to establish national standards and operational procedures for addressing all aspects of mine and other explosive ordnance contamination.⁵² Since the Cartagena Summit, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has continued to manage, on behalf of the UN, the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) project. This consists of a review of existing standards, the development of new ones and outreach to assist in the design of national mine action standards. Since the Cartagena Summit, Afghanistan, Guinea Bissau and Iraq received GICHD support for the development of their national standards. There now are 11 examples of national standards posted on the IMAS website.

(b) Transparency and the exchange of information

102. At the close of the Cartagena Summit, one (1) State Party – Equatorial Guinea – had not yet complied with the obligation to report as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the Convention for that State Party, on the matters for which transparency information is required in accordance with Article 7. In addition, 94 States Parties had and 61 States Parties had not in 2009 provided updated information, as required, covering the previous calendar year. At the close of the Cartagena Summit, the overall reporting annual rate in 2009 stood at just under 60 percent.

103. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties expressed the view that while it is an obligation for all States Parties to provide updated information on implementation, this is particularly important for States Parties in the process of destroying stockpiled anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 4, those that are in the process of clearing mined areas in accordance with Article 5, those that are retaining anti-personnel mines for purposes permitted by Article 3 and those undertaking measures in accordance with Article 9. The States Parties noted that several States Parties that are in the process of implementing Article 5, that have retained anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes and / or that have not yet reported having taken legal or other measures in accordance with Article 9 are not up to date in providing transparency information as required.

104. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties expressed the view that while it is an obligation for all States Parties to provide updated information on implementation, this is particularly important for States Parties in the process of destroying stockpiled anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 4, those that are in the process of clearing mined areas in accordance with Article 5, those that are retaining anti-personnel mines for purposes permitted by Article 3 and those undertaking measures in accordance with Article 9. The States Parties noted that several States Parties that are in the process of implementing Article 5, that have retained anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes and / or that have not yet reported having taken legal or other measures in accordance with Article 9 are not up to date in providing transparency information as required.

⁵² Cartagena Action Plan, Action #49.

105. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have not submitted their initial Article 7 report will immediately fulfil their obligation to initially submit and annually update Article 7 transparency reports.⁵³ Since the Cartagena Summit, **Equatorial Guinea** has remained non-compliant with its obligation to report as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the Convention for that State Party, on the matters for which transparency information is required in accordance with Article 7. In addition in 2010, the following [66] States Parties did not provide updated information covering calendar year 2009 in accordance with Article 7.2 as required: [Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Cook Islands, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Nauru, Niger, Niue, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uruguay, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe]. As of 3 December 2010, the annual reporting rate for 2010 stood just over [57] percent.

106. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that all States Parties will maximise and take full advantage of the flexibility of the Article 7 reporting process as a tool to assist in implementation, including through the reporting format "Form J" to provide information on matters which may assist in the implementation process and in resource mobilization, such as information on international cooperation and assistance, victim assistance efforts and needs and information on measures being taken to ensure gender sensitization in all aspects of mine action.⁵⁴ In addition, it was agreed that relevant States Parties would be encouraged to report on the progress made, including resources allocated to implementation, and challenges in achieving their victim assistance objectives, and that States Parties in a position to assist would be encouraged to report on how they are responding to efforts to address the rights and needs of mine victims.⁵⁵

107. Since the Cartagena Summit, the following States Parties made use of "Form J" to provide information on matters which may assist in the implementation process and in resource mobilization: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and Uganda. Of these States Parties, the following provided information in mine victims, efforts to address the rights and needs of mine victims and / or international cooperation and assistance in this sphere: Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Croatia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Japan, Norway, Senegal, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey.

108. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that all States Parties will regularly review the number of anti-personnel mines retained for purposes permitted under Article 3 to ensure that it constitutes the minimum number absolutely necessary for these purposes and destroy all those exceeding that number.⁵⁶ Since the Cartagena Summit, **Cyprus**, on 29 April 2010, wrote to the President of the Second Review Conference to inform her that "in

⁵³ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #54.

⁵⁴ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #55.

⁵⁵ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #28.

⁵⁶ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #56.

demonstrating its commitment to the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan”, Cyprus has reviewed the number of mines retained under Article 3 of the Convention and, as a result, has taken the decision to proceed with the destruction of 494 of the mines retained. On 8 October 2010, Cyprus held a ceremony marking the destruction of these mines. **Indonesia** reported that 2,524 anti-personnel mines that it had reported retained for permitted purposes were destroyed on 15 December 2009 and the remaining anti-personnel mines that it retains are used as instructional materials to enhance the ability of officers to identify, detect and destroy mines for the purpose of preparing for Indonesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations. **Thailand** reported that, as the number of mines retained is high compared with the number of mines used for permitted purposes, it will review the plans for mines that have been retained to comply with its commitment of total mine eradication by 2018.

109. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that all States Parties will annually report, on a voluntary basis, on the plans for and actual use of antipersonnel mines retained, explain any increase or decrease in the number of retained antipersonnel mines. Since the Cartagena Summit, **Algeria** reported that on 20-21 October 2009, 30 anti-personnel mines were used for permitted purposes. **Argentina** reported that 126 mines had been used for training (116 mines) and for field testing (10 mines) and provided information on the plans for the use of 485 anti-personnel mines during the period 2011 to 2015. **Australia**, in 2010, reported 40 fewer M16 type mines than it had reported in 2009 and that stock levels are regularly reviewed and assessed. **Belgium** reported that 41 mines had been used in 2009 for educating and training explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts and deminers. **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, in 2010, reported 145 fewer mines than it had reported in 2009. **Brazil**, in 2010, reported 935 fewer mines retained than it had reported in 2009 and that it retains mines for training to allow the Brazilian Army to participate adequately in international demining activities. **Bulgaria**, in 2010, reported 10 fewer mines than it had reported in 2009. **Canada** reported that anti-personnel mines are retained to study the effect of blast on equipment, to train soldiers on procedures to defuse live anti-personnel mines and to demonstrate the effect of landmines and that during the period 19 April 2009 to 20 April 2010 Canada used three (3) anti-personnel mines for research and development and for training purposes.

110. **Chile** reported that 725 mines had been used in 2009 in training courses for deminers. **Croatia** reported that 84 anti-personnel mines had been used in 2009 for testing and evaluating demining machines and that it anticipates using 175 anti-personnel mines in 2010 for the same purposes. **Cyprus**, in addition to having reported that it destroyed 494 anti-personnel mines that had been retained, reported that it transferred six (6) mines for permitted purposes. The **Czech Republic** reported that 24 mines were used in 2009 to train and educate current and new EOD personnel. **Denmark**, in 2010, reported 40 fewer mines retained than it had reported in 2009 and that it retains mines for educating and training army recruits and engineering units. **Eritrea**, in 2010, reported 63 more mines than it had reported in 2009. **France**, in 2010, reported 27 fewer mines retained than it had reported in 2009. **Germany** reported that 176 anti-personnel mines had been used in 2009 for training of personnel and dogs and for testing and evaluating mine action equipment, systems and technologies, including testing multiple sensor mine detection and search technology. **Greece**, in 2010, reported 1,066 fewer mines than it had reported in 2009 and that mines are retained to train soldiers in mine detection and clearance and canine detection. **Indonesia**, in 2010, reported 2,524 fewer mines than it had reported in 2009 and that mines have been used as instructional / teaching materials to further enhance officers in identifying, detecting and destroying landmines in general and particularly for the purpose of preparing for Indonesia’s participation in peace keeping operations.

111. **Ireland** reported that it had used one (1) anti-personnel mine for permitted purposes in 2009 and that the Irish Defence Forces use anti-personnel mines in the development and

validation of mine render safe procedures and in training personnel in these procedures, and, as part of the testing and validation of mechanical mine clearance equipment and in the training of personnel in the use of such equipments. **Italy**, in 2010, reported 15 fewer mines than it had reported in 2009 and that mines are used for bomb disposal and pioneers training courses (4 every year) to give to the attendees (35 per course) the know-how and the chance to live the experience as in a real action. **Japan** reported that 297 anti-personnel mines had been used for permitted purposes in 2009 and that it retains anti-personnel mines for education and training in mine detection and mine clearance. **Jordan** reported that 50 anti-personnel mines had been used in 2009 for the purpose of mine detection training for new deminers and mine detection dog teams that are working on Jordan's northern border demining project. **Latvia** reported that 781 anti-personnel mines had been destroyed in 2009 as part of training and demilitarisation. **Mozambique**, in 2010, reported 20 fewer mines than it had reported in 2009 and that 520 of the 1,943 mines that remained would be destroyed in the course of 2010. **Namibia**, in 2010, reported 1,000 fewer mines than it had reported in 2009. The **Netherlands**, in 2010, reported 199 fewer mines retained than it had reported in 2009.

112. **Nicaragua** reported that 41 anti-personnel mines had been used for to train deminers in 2009. **Peru**, in 2010, reported 1,987 fewer mines retained than it had reported in 2009. **Portugal**, in 2010, reported 63 fewer mines retained than it had reported in 2009 and that it retains anti-personnel mines for EOD training purposes. Serbia reported that in 2009, of the mines that the Ministry of Defence was authorised to retain, 10 were used to test demining protective equipment and 25 were destroyed due to damage caused in training. Serbia did not provide new information with respect to the mines (395) that, in 2008, it reported the Ministry of Interior was authorised to retain. **Spain**, in 2010, reported 62 fewer mines retained than it had reported in 2009. **Thailand**, in addition to committing to review the number of anti-personnel mines retained, reported that 12 anti-personnel mines had been used for training in 2009 by the Royal Thai Police and that the Royal Thai Air Force has a plan to use landmines for training once every three years. **Turkey** reported that 25 anti-personnel mines were used in 2009 for mine detection and clearance and techniques and for training and research purposes. **Ukraine** reported that 24 anti-personnel mines were used in 2009 to continue training and testing activities and that mines have been used to test personnel protective clothing and devices and to train military engineers and deminers. The **United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**, in 2010, reported 70 fewer mines retained than it had reported in 2009 and that it retains anti-personnel mines for EOD / demining training. **Yemen** reported that 240 anti-personnel mines were used in 2009 for training dogs.

113. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have maintained, under the provisions of Article 3, the same number of anti-personnel mines over periods of years, and have not reported on the use of such mines for permitted purposes or on concrete plans for their use, would be encouraged to report on such use and such plans and to review whether these anti-personnel mines are needed and constitute the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes and to destroy those that are in excess of this number.⁵⁷ Since the Cartagena Summit, **Afghanistan** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (2,618) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Angola** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (2,512) that, since 2007, it has reported retained. **Bangladesh** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (12,500) that, since 2007, it has reported retained. **Belarus** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (6,030) that, since 2005, it has reported retained and that the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Belarus intends to use retained anti-personnel mines for the

⁵⁷ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #58.

purpose of training of a Byelorussian demining unit to prepare for participation in international humanitarian demining operations. **Benin** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (16) that, since 2007, it has reported retained. **Bhutan** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (4,491) that, since 2007, it has reported retained.

114. **Burundi** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (4) that, since 2008, it has reported retained. **Cameroon** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (1,885) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Colombia** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (586) that, since 2007, it has reported retained. **Congo** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (322) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Ecuador** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (1,000) that, since 2008, it has reported retained. **Ethiopia** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (303) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Guinea-Bissau** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (9) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Honduras** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (826) that, since 2007, it has reported retained. **Kenya** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (3,000) that, since 2001, it has reported retained. **Luxembourg** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (855) that, since 2008, it has reported retained. **Mauritania** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (728) that, since 2004, it has reported retained. **Niger** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (146) that, since 2003, it has reported retained. **Nigeria** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (3,364) that, since 2009, it has reported retained.

115. **Romania** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (2,500) that, since 2004, it has reported retained. **Rwanda** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (65) that, since 2008, it has reported retained. **Senegal** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (28) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Slovakia** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (1,422) that, since 2008, it has reported retained. **South Africa** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (4,356) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Sweden** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (7,364) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Tanzania** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (3,638) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Tunisia** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (4,980) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Uganda** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (1,764) that, since 2005, it has reported retained. **Uruguay** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (1,764) that, since 2008, it has reported retained. **Venezuela** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (2,120) that, since 2005, it has reported retained. **Zambia** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (2,120) that, since 2009, it has reported retained. **Zimbabwe** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (550) that, since 2009, it has reported retained.

(c) **Measures to ensure compliance**

116. At the close of the Cartagena Summit, there were 59 States Parties that had reported that they had adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations and that there were 33 States Parties that had reported that they considered existing national laws to be sufficient to give effect to the Convention. The remaining 64 States Parties had not yet reported having either adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations or that they considered existing laws were sufficient to give effect to the Convention.

117. At the close of the Cartagena Summit, there were 59 States Parties that had reported that they had adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations and that there were 33 States Parties that had reported that they considered existing national laws to be sufficient to give effect to the Convention. The remaining 64 States Parties had not yet reported having either adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations or that they considered existing laws were sufficient to give effect to the Convention.

118. The States Parties had previously acknowledged that the primary responsibility for ensuring compliance rests with each individual State Party and that Article 9 of the Convention accordingly requires each State Party to take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress prohibited activities by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. With this in mind and with over 40 percent of States Parties not having yet reported on legislative measures to prevent and suppress prohibited activities, at the Cartagena Summit the States Parties expressed the view that it remains an important challenge for the States Parties to act with greater urgency to take necessary legal measures in accordance with Article 9.

119. To overcome challenges concerning the application of Article 9 of the Convention, it was agreed at the Cartagena Summit that States Parties that have not developed national implementation measures will, as a matter of urgency, develop and adopt legislative, administrative and other measures in accordance with Article 9 to fulfil their obligations under this Article and thereby contributing to full compliance with the Convention.⁵⁸ It was also agreed that all States Parties will share information on implementing legislation and its application through reports made in accordance with Article 7 and the Intersessional Work Programme.⁵⁹

120. Since the Cartagena Summit, no additional State Party has reported that it has established legislation in accordance with Article 9 or that existing laws were sufficient to give effect to the Convention. (See annex) However, some States Parties reported either through Article 7 reports or through the Intersessional Work Programme that they were in the process of establishing legislation or have taken other measures. **Afghanistan** reported that its constitution requires the country to respect all international treaties it has signed and that the Ministry of Defence has instructed that all military forces to respect the comprehensive ban on anti-personnel mines by militaries or individuals. **Algeria** reiterated that its legislation fulfils the requirements of Article 9. Algeria further indicated that since 2006, there have been eight cases involving illegal possession of anti-personnel mines that have been brought to the attention of relevant legal authorities in Algeria and that in accordance with the relevant procedures, these anti-personnel mines had been seized and destroyed by the national police. **Malawi** reported that it has drafted a "Land Mine Prohibition Bill" that is consistent with the definitions under Article 2 of the Convention, includes all acts prohibited by Article 1 of the Convention, makes mention of the Article 3 exceptions, provides a framework for information gathering in the context of Article 7 obligations and provides for means to facilitate the application of Article 8.

121. **Mozambique** reported that a proposed law was submitted to Parliament for further analysis, that the subject has been discussed by the Council of Ministers and that the law likely will be approved by the end of 2010. The **Netherlands** reported that the Council of State has advised on a bill providing for the implementation arms control and disarmament treaties, that this advice has led to a reconsideration of a proposed bill and that at present the Convention is implemented on the basis of existing legislation, such as the Import and

⁵⁸ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #59.

⁵⁹ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #60.

Export Act, the Military Penal Code and the Weapons and Munitions Act. The **Philippines** reported that, in March 2009, the Philippines Congress held public hearings on the Philippine Landmine Bill (House Bill No 1595) and that the bill remained at the Technical Working Group level.

122. Since the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties were informed about an allegation that may relate to compliance with the Convention's prohibitions within the territory of **Turkey**. Turkey indicated that it was investigating this matter and would subsequently inform the States Parties of the outcome of its investigation. Concern was expressed about this allegation, the commitment to investigate was welcomed and a high level of transparency was encouraged. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that all States Parties will, in case of alleged or known non-compliance with the Convention, work together with the States Parties concerned to resolve the matter expeditiously in a manner consistent with Article 8 (1).⁶⁰ Concerning this commitment, the President of the Second Review Conference informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that, in keeping with the practices employed by her predecessors, she had engaged those concerned in accordance with Article 8.1 on the above mentioned compliance question.

123. Since the Cartagena Summit, the UNODA continued fulfilling the UN Secretary General's responsibility to prepare and update a list of names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts designated for fact finding missions authorised in accordance with Article 8.8. Since the Cartagena Summit, [...] States Parties – [...] – provided new or updated information for the list of experts.

124. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed that all States Parties will recognize that when armed non-State actors operate under State Parties' jurisdiction or control, such non-State actors will be held responsible for acts prohibited to States Parties under the Convention, in accordance with national measures taken under Article 9.⁶¹ Since the Cartagena Summit, Colombia again advised the States Parties that armed non-State actors are carrying out acts in a contravention of the Convention's prohibitions on Colombian territory.

(d) Implementation support

125. At the Cartagena Summit, the increasing appreciation on the part of the States Parties for the work of the ISU was recorded as was the evolution in terms of the support provided by the ISU. The Cartagena Summit also recalled that the States Parties have agreed to assure that, on a voluntary basis, they would provide the resources necessary for the operations of the unit. In addition, the Cartagena Summit highlighted that a challenge for the States Parties remains to ensure the sustainability of funding of the operations of the ISU, through either the existing method or another manner. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties also highlighted that without a sustainable means of financing, the ISU will have to drastically reduce its service offerings, which no doubt would adversely affect the implementation process.

126. Also at the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties endorsed a President's Paper on the establishment of an open ended task force with a mandate to develop terms of reference for an evaluation of the Implementation Support Unit. It was agreed that an independent consultant would be hired to execute the evaluation, and, that the evaluation should address

⁶⁰ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #53.

⁶¹ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #61.

issues related to (a) the tasks and responsibilities of the ISU, (b) the financing of the ISU, and, (c) the institutional framework for the ISU.

127. The “ISU Task Force” met for the first time on 10 February 2010 at which time the Task Force agreed on its working methods and terms of reference of an independent consultant, approved the proposal that Mr. Tim Caughley serve as the independent consultant and was presented with cost estimates for the evaluation which totalled US\$ 83,000. The ISU Task Force met for a second time on 10 March 2010 at which time the independent consultant presented his work plan and the Chair of the Task Force indicated that she would write to all States Parties to solicit voluntary contributions to cover the costs of the evaluation. On 15 April 2010, the independent consultant delivered his preliminary report to the Task Force and on 2 June 2010, at the Task Force’s third meeting, the independent consultant presented this preliminary report. On 21 June 2010, the Chair of the Task Force presented a preliminary status report to the meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

128. On 1 September 2010, the independent consultant delivered his final report to the Task force and on 8 September, at the Task Force’s fourth meeting, the independent consultant presented this final report. This final report contained options reflecting “a range of views expressed to the consultant” which the consultant recommended “should be considered against the overall finding that there are high levels of satisfaction with the ISU and with the manner in which its staff carry out their work to support the States Parties in implementing the Convention.” Also at the 8 September 2010 meeting, the Task Force received comments on the report presented by the Director of the GICHD, the ICBL, the ICRC, the United Nations Mine Action Team and the Director of the ISU. In addition at this meeting, the Task Force focused on the options identified in the consultant’s final report and on how to take these further in order to arrive at a report and recommendations for the 10MSP.

129. [At its fifth meeting on 3 November 2010, the Task Force...]

130. The evaluation of the ISU was funded on a voluntary basis with contributions having been provided by Albania, Canada, [Germany], New Zealand and [Norway].

131. With respect to its substantive efforts, in 2010 the ISU carried out its activities in accordance with its 2010 work plan and budget, which was adopted by the Coordinating Committee in November 2009. This included providing advice to State Parties on matters related to implementation and compliance (including in-country support to States Parties regarding Article 5 implementation and applying the understandings adopted by the States Parties on victim assistance), assisting States Parties in maximising participation in the Convention’s implementation processes, providing strategic direction to Co-Chairs and the Coordinator of the Sponsorship Programme, supporting the States Parties mandated to analyse Article 5 extension requests, supporting States Parties in preparing transparency reports, leading seminars and providing training on understanding the Convention and its operations, supporting the President and individual States Parties in undertaking universalisation efforts, providing advice on applying the lessons learned from implementing the Convention, supporting the 10MSP President-Designate and the presumed 11MSP President-Designate and host, continuing to serve as the authoritative source of information on the Convention and maintaining the Convention’s Documentation Centre.

132. In addition to carrying out its core work plan, the ISU executed other activities, in a manner consistent with its mandate, when additional funds are made available to fully fund these efforts. This activities included providing enhanced support to the President of the Second Review Conference and her Special Envoy on the Universalisation of the Convention (funded by Norway) and providing enhanced victim assistance support

including by organizing parallel programmes for victim assistance experts (funded by Australia). In addition, funds were received from Australia to provide enhanced support to universalisation and implementation in the Pacific. The Director of the ISU regularly reported to the Coordinating Committee on these enhanced activities. As well, the ISU administered the financing of the ISU evaluation.

133. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties recorded that voluntary contributions to the ISU in 2009 were no longer keeping pace with the costs of services demanded by the State Parties. In response, the President of the Second Review Conference placed a high priority on monitoring the ISU's financial situation in 2010. The President of the Second Review Conference wrote twice to all States Parties to encourage them to contribute to the ISU's core work plan in 2010 and raised the matter of the ISU's finances at every meeting of the Coordinating Committee.

134. At the 7 September 2010 meeting of the Coordinating Committee, the Director of the ISU reported that, while the ISU should have the resources necessary to complete most of its intended work plan in 2010, cuts would have to be made. The Director of the ISU further noted that planning for the remainder of the year cannot be divorced from planning for 2011. In this context the Director indicated that a structural change would need to be made that will result in a significant cut in support that the States Parties have come to expect and appreciate – in-country victim assistance advisory services and a dedicated expert advisory service in Geneva. The Director further indicated that as of 1 December 2010, the position of "victim assistance specialist" will no longer be staffed and it will remain vacant until such a time as States Parties provide the necessary resources to cover the costs of this position and related services. In addition, he indicated that in 2011, the ISU will be able to provide intensive in-country victim assistance support to only 3-4 affected States Parties, down from the normal level of approximately 9-12.

135. Also at the 7 September 2010 meeting of the Coordinating Committee, the Director of the ISU remarked that, while there will be a dramatic diminishment in the services that affected States Parties have come to greatly appreciate, the ISU, thanks largely to one State Party having made a multi-year commitment, will still do what it can to support States Parties in applying the victim assistance understandings that they have adopted. In addition, he expressed the hope that the ISU could return to a staffing and service level that States Parties have come to expect as the norm in recent years.

136. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed that those in a position to do so would provide necessary financial resources for the effective operation of the Implementation Support Unit.⁶² Contributions in support of the ISU's 2010 core work plan were received from the following States Parties: Albania, Australia, Austria, [Belgium], Canada, Chile, [Croatia], Cyprus, Denmark, [Germany], Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, [Norway], [Sweden], Switzerland, [Thailand] and Turkey.

137. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties recorded that the Intersessional Work Programme had continued to provide a valuable forum for the informal exchange of information, thus complementing the official exchange of information under Article 7. The States Parties also remarked that, while the Intersessional Work Programme had continued to play an important role in supporting implementation of the Convention, there had been no thorough assessment of the Intersessional Work Programme since 2002. In this context, at the Cartagena Summit the States Parties agreed to call upon the Coordinating Committee to review the operation and status of Intersessional Work Programme, with the Chair of the

⁶² Cartagena Action Plan, Action #66.

Coordinating Committee consulting widely on this matter and, if necessary, recommendations to the 10MSP.

138. The Coordinating Committee assessed the Intersessional Work Programme to some degree at each of its meetings in 2010. At the 25 June 2010 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention and at the 7 September 2010 informal meeting convened to prepare for the 10MSP, the Chair of the Coordinating Committee provided updates on this assessment. It was concluded that the States Parties consider that the Intersessional Work Programme has functioned well since it was last reviewed in 2002. It was noted that the 2002 recalibration of the Intersessional Work Programme had succeeded in providing the space for States Parties in the process of fulfilling key obligations to share their problems, plans, progress and priorities for assistance and, consequently, in provide greater clarity on and more precise knowledge of the status of the implementation of the Convention. It was also concluded that the principles on which it was founded in 1999 continue to be important. That have contributed to an effective work programme to date – namely coherence, flexibility, partnership informality, continuity and effective preparation – remain valid as do additional principles, namely, transparency and inclusion.

139. While it was concluded that there is general satisfaction with the operation of the Intersessional Work programme, it was also noted that the implementation process has evolved in recent years. Given this evolution, the Coordinating Committee sought to develop recommendations for consideration by the 10MSP that would relate to: (a) the importance of continuing to addressing pressing implementation concerns in an effective manner; (b) the strong desire expressed by States Parties that a more intensive focus be placed on international cooperation and assistance; (c) the value of providing space to explore new ways to carry out intersessional work; and, (d) the potential of maximising synergy between related instruments. In developing recommendations, the Coordinating Committee considered the the heavy burden associated with being a Co-Chair or Co-Rapporteur and hence member of both the Coordinating Committee and Article 5 analysing group, and, the proliferation of demands on States to assume roles of responsibility related to conventional weapons more generally.

140. As noted, Zambia, with the support of other actors, proposed that a new Standing Committee be established to address the challenges related to international cooperation and assistance in the context of the Convention. Support for this proposal was expressed by several delegations at the June 2010 special session on cooperation and assistance.

141. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to support the efforts of the President and Coordinating to ensure effective preparations and conduct of meetings of the Convention.⁶³ Since the Cartagena Summit, the Coordinating Committee met [six] times to fulfil its mandate to coordinate matters relating to and flowing from the work of the Standing Committees with the work of the 10MSP. Summaries of these meetings were made available to all interested actors on the Convention's web site.

142. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed that those in a position to do so would contribute to the Sponsorship Programme thereby permitting widespread representation at meetings of the Convention, particularly by mine-affected developing States Parties. In 2010, the following States Parties contributed to the Sponsorship Programme: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and [Norway]. At the June 2010 meetings of the Standing Committees, 39 representatives of 26 States Parties were sponsored as were 4 representatives of 3 States not parties. At the 10MSP, [...]

⁶³ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #63.

representatives of [...] States Parties were sponsored as were [...] representatives of [...] States not parties. In 2010, the Sponsorship Programme helped enable States Parties live up to the commitment they made at the Cartagena Summit to ensure the ensure the continued involvement and effective contribution in all relevant Convention related activities by health, rehabilitation, social services, education, employment, gender and disability rights experts.⁶⁴

143. Since the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties, in keeping with their Cartagena Summit commitment, continued to recognise and further encourage the full participation in and contribution to the implementation of the Convention by the ICBL, ICRC, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, the UN, the GICHD, international and regional organisations, mine survivors and their organisations, and other civil society organisations.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #29.

⁶⁵ Cartagena Action Plan, Action #62.

Annex I

Stockpiled anti-personnel mines

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported at the close of the Cartagena Summit</i>	<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported destroyed since the close of the Cartagena Summit</i>	<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines remaining</i>
Belarus	3'371'984	1'812	3'370'172
Greece	1'340'570		1'340'570
Turkey	956'761	795'570	266'143
Ukraine	6'099'468	147'683	5'951'785
Burundi	0	76	0
Totals	11'768'783	945'141	10'823'718

<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported destroyed by all States Parties as of the close of the Cartagena Summit</i>	<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported destroyed by all States Parties since the close of the Cartagena Summit</i>	<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported destroyed by all States Parties as of 3 December 2010</i>
43'021'437 ¹	945'141	43'966'578

¹ The total number of stockpiled anti-personnel reported destroyed at the Cartagena Summit was recorded as 42,369,334 but further to an amendment in the figures for the Turkish stockpile, this number increased to 43,021,437.

Annex II

Progress in meeting commitments made in article 5 extension requests and decisions taken on these requests

Argentina

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Cambodia

Chad

Croatia

Denmark

Ecuador

Jordan

Mozambique

Nicaragua

Peru

Senegal

Tajikistan

Thailand

Uganda

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

Yemen

Zimbabwe

[Content to be provided at the 10MSP]

Annex III

Overview of States Parties' reporting on the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines

Afghanistan	Algeria
Angola	Argentina
Bhutan	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Burundi	Cambodia
Chad	Chile
Colombia	Congo
Croatia	Cyprus
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Denmark
Ecuador	Eritrea
Ethiopia	Gambia
Guinea-Bissau	Iraq
Jordan	Mauritania
Mozambique	Nigeria
Peru	Senegal
Serbia	Sudan
Tajikistan	Thailand
Turkey	Uganda
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Yemen	Zimbabwe

[Content to be provided at the 10MSP]

Annex IV

Support provided since the Cartagena Summit by the UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAS and the OAS to States Parties that are in the process of implementing article 5 or that have reported the responsibility for significant number of landmine survivors

	<i>OAS</i>	<i>UNDP</i>	<i>UNICEF</i>	<i>UNMAS</i>
Afghanistan			X	X
Albania		X	X	
Algeria		X		
Angola		X	X	
Bosnia and Herzegovina		X	X	
Burundi		X		
Cambodia		X	X	X
Chad		X		X
Colombia	X	X	X	X
Cyprus		X		X
Democratic Republic of the Congo			X	X
Ecuador	X			
Eritrea		X	X	
Ethiopia		X		X
Guinea-Bissau		X		
Iraq		X	X	
Jordan		X		
Mauritania		X	X	X
Mozambique		X		X
Peru	X			
Senegal		X	X	X
Sudan		X	X	X
Tajikistan		X	X	
Thailand		X	X	
Uganda		X		
Yemen		X	X	
Zimbabwe		X		

Annex V

Mines reported retained for purposes permitted under article 3 of the Convention

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>
Afghanistan ¹	1076	1887	2692	2680	2618	2618
Albania	0		0	0	0	0
Algeria	15030	15030	15030	15030	6000	5970
Andorra	0	0	0		0	
Angola	1390	1460	2512			2512
Antigua and Barbuda						
Argentina ²	1680	1596	1471	1380	1268	1142
Australia	7395	7266	7133	6998	6785	6947
Austria	0		0	0	0	0
Bahamas	0				0	
Bangladesh	15000	14999	12500	12500	12500	12500
Barbados						
Belarus	6030	6030	6030	6030	6030	6030
Belgium	4176	3820	3569	3287	3245	3204
Belize						
Benin		30	16	16		
Bhutan			4491			
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0					
Bosnia and Herzegovina ³	2755	17471	1708	1920	2390	2255
Botswana ⁴						
Brazil ⁵	16125	15038	13550	12381	10986	10051

1 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2005, Afghanistan indicated that the Government had yet to develop a formal policy on the number of mines retained for development and training purposes. The Government on a case-by-case basis approves the number and type of APMs retained by UNMACA on behalf of the MAPA.

2 In its report submitted in 2002, Argentina indicated that 1160 mines were retained to be used as fuses for antitank mines FMK-5 and that 1000 will be consumed during training activities until 1 April 2010. Additionally, in Form F, Argentina indicated that 12025 mines would be emptied of their explosive content in order to have inert mines for training.

3 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2010, BiH indicated that 2,255 mines were without fuses.

4 In its report submitted in 2001, Botswana indicated that a "small quantity" of mines would be retained.

Brunei Darussalam ⁶			0			0
Bulgaria	3676	3676	3670	3682	3682	3672
Burkina Faso ⁷						
Burundi				4	4	4
Cambodia	0		0	0	0	0
Cameroon ⁸	3154				1885	
Canada ⁹	1907	1992	1963	1963	1939	1937
Cape Verde					120	
Central African Republic						
Chad	0	0	0		0	0
Chile	5895	4574	4484	4153	4083	3346
Colombia	886	886	586	586	586	586
Comoros						
Congo	372	372	372		322	
Cook Islands			0			
Costa Rica	0					0
Cote d'Ivoire	0	0	0		0	0
Croatia	6400	6236	6179	6103	6038	5954
Cyprus	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	500
Czech Republic	4829	4829	4699	4699	2543	2497
Democratic Republic of the Congo ¹⁰						
Denmark	1989	60	2008	2008	1990	1950
Djibouti	2996					
Dominica	0					
Dominican Republic					0	
Ecuador	2001	2001	2001	1000	1000	1000

5 In its reports submitted in 2006 and 2009, Brazil indicated that it intends to keep its Article 3 mines up to 2019.

6 In its report submitted in 2007, Brunei Darussalam indicated that there were no live anti-personnel mines prohibited by the Convention retained for the development and training in Brunei Darussalam. For these purposes, the Royal Brunei Armed Forces is using anti-personnel mines that are not prohibited by the Convention.

7 In its reports submitted in 2005, 2007 and 2008, Burkina Faso indicated that "nothing yet" was retained.

8 In its report submitted in 2009, Cameroon indicated in Form B that 1,885 mines were held and in Form D that some thousands of mines were held for training purposes.

9 84 of the 1941 mines reported in 2007 are without fuses.

10 In its reports submitted in 2008, 2009 and 2010, the Democratic Republic of the Congo indicated that the decision concerning mines retained was pending.

El Salvador	96	72			0	
Equatorial Guinea						
Eritrea ¹¹	9		109	109	109	172
Estonia	0		0	0	0	0
Ethiopia				1114	303	303
Fiji						
France	4455	4216	4170	4152	4144	4017
Gabon						
Gambia					0	
Germany	2496	2525	2526	2388	2437	2261
Ghana						
Greece	7224	7224	7224	7224	7224	6158
Grenada						
Guatemala	0				0	0
Guinea						
Guinea-Bissau ¹²		109		109	9	9
Guyana		0				0
Haiti					0	
Holy See	0	0	0		0	0
Honduras		815	826			
Hungary	1500		0		0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0		
Indonesia				4978	4978	2454
Iraq				9	TBC	TBC
Ireland	85	77	75	70	67	66
Italy	806	806	750	721	689	674
Jamaica	0		0			
Japan	6946	5350	4277	3712	3320	2976

11 In its report submitted in 2005, Eritrea indicated that the mines retained were inert. In its report submitted in 2007, Eritrea indicated that 9 of the 109 mines retained were inert. In its report submitted in 2008, Eritrea indicated that 8 of the 109 retained mines were inert. In its report submitted in 2010, Eritrea indicated that 71 of the 172 mines retained for training were inert.

12 In its reports submitted in 2006 and 2008, Guinea Bissau indicated that amongst the 109 retained mines, 50 POMZ2 and 50 PMD6 did not contain detonators or explosive. In its report submitted in 2009, Guinea Bissau indicated that the 50 POMZ2 were transferred for metal use and the 50 PMD6 were eliminated and used as wood.

Jordan	1000	1000	1000	950	950	900
Kenya		3000		3000		
Kiribati						
Kuwait				0	0	0
Latvia		1301	902	899	899	118
Lesotho						
Liberia						
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	956	956	900	855		
Madagascar						
Malawi	21				0	0
Malaysia	0				0	0
Maldives		0				
Mali	600					
Malta	0	0		0	0	
Mauritania	728	728	728	728	728	728
Mauritius	0	0	0	0		
Mexico	0	0	0	0	0	0
Monaco	0	0	0	0	0	0
Montenegro			0	0	0	0
Mozambique ¹³	1470	1319	1265		1963	1943
Namibia	6151	3899			1734	1634
Nauru						
Netherlands	3176	2878	2735	2516	2413	2214
New Zealand ¹⁴	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nicaragua	1040	1021	1004	1004	1004	963
Niger	146	146			146	
Nigeria	0	0			3364	3364

¹³ In its report submitted in 2009, Mozambique indicated that 520 of the retained mines were inherited from an NPA mine detection training camp. This camp is not used as training falls outside of the IND scope of work so the mines will be destroyed in June 2009.

¹⁴ In its report submitted in 2007, New Zealand indicated that it retains operational stocks of M18A1 Claymores which are operated in the command-detonated mode only. Other than the M18A1 Claymores, the New Zealand Defence Force holds a very limited quantity of inert practice mines, used solely in the training of personnel in mine clearance operations, in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention.

Niue						
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0
Palau				0	0	
Panama					0	
Papua New Guinea ¹⁵						
Paraguay		0	0			0
Peru	4024	4012	4012	4000	4047	2060
Philippines	0	0	0			0
Portugal	1115	1115	1115		760	697
Qatar						
Romania	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500
Republic of Moldova	249	249	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	101	101		65		
Saint Kitts and Nevis						
Saint Lucia						
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines						
Samoa			0			
San Marino	0		0	0	0	0
Sao Tome and Principe				0		
Senegal ¹⁶	0		24	24	28	28
Serbia ¹⁷	5000	5507		5565	3589	3159
Seychelles	0					
Sierra Leone						
Slovakia	1427	1427	1427	1422	1422	1422
Slovenia	2994	2993	2993	2992	2991	
Solomon Islands						
South Africa	4388	4433	4406	4380	4356	4356
Spain	2712	2712	2034	1994	1797	1735

¹⁵ In its report submitted in 2004, Papua New Guinea indicated that it had a small stock of command-detonated Claymore mines for training purposes only by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.

¹⁶ In its reports submitted in 2007 and 2008, Senegal indicated that the 24 mines it retains under Article 3 were found during demining operations or in rebels stocks held before they were destroyed in August-September 2006. These mines have been defused and are used to train deminers. In its report submitted in 2010, Senegal indicated that 4 of the mines retained for training had been defused.

¹⁷ In its report submitted in 2009, Serbia indicated that all fuses for 510 PMA-1 type and 560 PMA-3 type had been removed and destroyed.

Sudan	5000	10000	10000	4997	1938	
Suriname	150	150	150	0		
Swaziland		0				
Sweden ¹⁸	14798	14402	10578	7531	7364	7364
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tajikistan	255	225	105	0	0	0
Thailand ¹⁹	4970	4761	4713	3650	3638	3626
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	4000	0	0	0	0	
Timor-Leste						
Togo						
Trinidad and Tobago		0			0	0
Tunisia	5000	5000	5000	4995	4980	4980
Turkey	16000	15150	15150	15150	15125	15100
Turkmenistan	0	0				0
Ukraine		1950	1950	223	211	187
Uganda	1764			1764	1764	1764
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1937	1795	650	609	903	833
United Republic of Tanzania	1146	1146	1102	950	1780	
Uruguay				260		
Vanuatu		0		0		
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	4960	4960	4960	4960	4960	4960
Yemen	4000	4000				3760
Zambia	3346	3346	3346	2232	2120	2120
Zimbabwe ²⁰	700	700	700	600	550	

18 In its reports submitted in 2004 and 2005, Sweden indicated that 2840 mines were without fuses and could be connected to fuses kept for dummies. In its report submitted in 2009, Sweden indicated that 2780 mines were without fuses and could be connected to fuses kept for dummies.

19 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2010, Thailand reported the transfer of all its mines for training and destruction.

20 In its report submitted in 2008, Zimbabwe reported 700 mines retained for training in Form D and indicated that 100 had been destroyed during training in 2007 in Form B.

Key:

Number of mines reported retained in a particular year:

Numeric value

No report was submitted as required or a report was submitted but no number was entered in the relevant reporting form:

No report was required:

Annex VI

Legal measures taken in accordance with Article 9

(a) States Parties that have reported that they have adopted legislation in the context of article 9 obligations

Albania	Australia	Austria
Belarus	Belgium	Belize
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Brazil	Burkina Faso
Burundi	Cambodia	Canada
Chad	Colombia	Cook Islands
Costa Rica	Croatia	Cyprus
Czech Republic	Djibouti	El Salvador
France	Germany	Guatemala
Honduras	Hungary	Iceland
Ireland	Italy	Japan
Jordan	Kiribati	Latvia
Liechtenstein	Luxembourg	Malaysia
Mali	Malta	Mauritania
Mauritius	Monaco	New Zealand
Nicaragua	Niger	Norway
Peru	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Senegal
Seychelles	South Africa	Spain
Sweden	Switzerland	Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Yemen
Zambia	Zimbabwe	

(b) States Parties that have reported that they consider existing laws to be sufficient in the context of Article 9 obligations

Algeria	Andorra
Argentina	Bulgaria
Central African Republic	Chile
Denmark	Estonia
Ethiopia	Greece
Guinea-Bissau	Holy See
Indonesia	Kuwait
Lesotho	Lithuania
Mexico	Montenegro
Namibia	Netherlands
Papua New Guinea	Portugal
Republic of Moldova	Romania
Samoa	Slovakia
Slovenia	Tajikistan
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Tunisia
Ukraine	United Republic of Tanzania
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	

(c) **States Parties that have not yet reported having either adopted legislation in the context of Article I legislation or that they consider existing laws are sufficient**

Afghanistan	Angola	Antigua and Barbuda
Bahamas	Bangladesh	Barbados
Benin	Bhutan	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Botswana	Brunei Darussalam	Cameroon
Cape Verde	Comoros	Congo
Côte d'Ivoire	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Dominica
Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea	Fiji	Gabon
Gambia	Ghana	Grenada
Guinea	Guyana	Haiti
Iraq	Jamaica	Kenya
Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi
Maldives	Mozambique	Nauru
Nigeria	Niue	Palau
Panama	Paraguay	Philippines
Qatar	Rwanda	Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia	San Marino	Sao Tome and Principe
Serbia	Sierra Leone	Solomon Islands
Sudan	Suriname	Swaziland
Thailand	Timor-Leste	Togo
Turkmenistan	Uganda	Uruguay
Vanuatu		
