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AGENDA ITEM 3

Credentials of representatives to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly (continued):

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee (A/4578) (continued)

1. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now continue the discussion on the report of the Credentials Committee [A/4578]. I call upon the representative of Bulgaria on a point of order.

2. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): As the Assembly knows, at the 922nd meeting, my delegation moved the adjournment of the meeting so that the Secretary-General could submit a report on the situation which has arisen in the Congo. As the Assembly is also aware, it appears from the latest radio reports that, far from being over, the disorders in the Congo have continued in the capital this morning and during the day. United Nations soldiers, officials and representatives have been arrested, harassed and beaten by Mobutu's soldiers.

3. In these circumstances, we consider it imperative to have the information we have requested, so that our Organization may know what is happening in the Congo before taking a decision on so important a question as the seating of a delegation from that country in this Assembly. Accordingly, we suggested yesterday—and the President also mentioned this—that the Secretary-General should prepare a report containing the necessary information. The Secretary-General told us this morning [923rd meeting] that he did not have sufficiently accurate and complete information to be able to review the situation. Instead of the Secretary-General, we have heard certain Members of this Assembly give us information on the situation. The United States representative, for example, told us at the same meeting that the situation in the Congo has improved and that the disturbances which Ghana has allegedly provoked in that country are behind the events which have occurred there. We have also heard another Member of the Assembly inform us on the situation in the Congo and tell us that all would be well in that country if we decided to seat the President of the Republic of the Congo, Mr. Kasa-Vubu, in the Assembly.

4. Nevertheless, as I said earlier, the situation in the Congo continues to be disturbed.

5. We had hoped that the Secretary-General would be able to assemble the required information and that we could hear his report before the end of the present debate. Unfortunately, it seems that that will not happen. The Secretary-General is not present in this hall, but we hope that he will be informed of what is said here. We would like him to do what is needed, as we are greatly concerned at the situation which has developed in the Congo, since the prestige of the United Nations is at stake. We accordingly ask that, before the end of the debate—and immediately, if possible—the Secretary-General should tell us what is happening in that country. It is incomprehensible to me that the United States representative and other representatives in the Assembly should have enough information on the situation to be able to tell us that it has improved, that all is quiet, whereas the Secretary-General knows nothing about it. Or, must it be admitted that there is something in the situation developing in the Congo which cannot be revealed? Is there information which the Secretary-General could supply which does not tally with the information that has been given us here?

6. If so, then the Assembly is more anxious than ever to obtain that information, because we cannot believe that the Secretary-General would withhold such information from the Assembly until, as one speaker said this morning, we had placed the halo over Mr. Kasa-Vubu's head. This would present us with a "fait accompli"; we should not grant a person a status he does not possess by conferring a halo on him in the name of the United Nations.

7. Consequently, unless the Secretary-General does not wish to furnish this information before the end of the debate so that we may, as it were, approve the appointment of a delegation which is not a delegation by giving it a seat here, we consider that he must supply the information to the General Assembly. In other words, if the Secretary-General needs time to prepare his report, we could perhaps make things easier for him by moving the adjournment of the meeting in order to give him the time he needs.

8. The PRESIDENT: No actual proposal has been made that the meeting should be adjourned. I understand that a report on the situation in the Congo may be ready for circulation later this evening. I am not in a position to say exactly when it will be circulated, but I understand that the Secretary-General intends to present a report to Members of the Assembly as soon as it can be prepared.^{1/}

9. Since there appear to be no further observations on that aspect of the matter, I now call on the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

10. Mr. GRYAZNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): Events in the

^{1/} Subsequently circulated as documents A/4587 and Add.1.

Congo, and particularly those of the last few weeks in Leopoldville, provide convincing evidence that the United States, in submitting its proposal that the credentials of the Kasa-Vubu group should be accepted, was far from being motivated by a concern for peace and an improvement in the political situation in the young Republic. Obviously, in the light of these events, the assertions that the General Assembly's decision to adjourn the debate on the situation in the Congo has no relevance to the question of the credentials of the Kasa-Vubu group we are now discussing are, to say the least, unfounded. It has been contended in this connexion that the truth of such assertions is borne out by the very fact that the question was referred to the Credentials Committee.

11. It is also claimed that the question of the Kasa-Vubu group's credentials is not a political matter, but is a purely technical or, according to the representative of the Philippines, a purely legal matter [919th plenary meeting].

12. Such a line can be taken only by the colonialists and all those who support their plans for establishing an anti-popular régime in the Congo with a view to reconstituting the colonialist system in the country. It must be clear even to those with little experience of major political issues that the question of the credentials of the Congolese delegation is closely linked to the question of the situation in the Congo, of which it forms an integral part, and that it cannot be considered in the abstract, outside the context of the general political situation in that country. The fact that the General Assembly referred the question to the Credentials Committee merely confirms this view. As the representatives here are aware, the decision to do so was taken on the suggestion of Mr. Boland, the President of the General Assembly, who gave as his reason the fact that the "constitutional and political situation in that country (the Congo) still remains, unfortunately, far from clear" [864th meeting].

13. The same explanation is even given in paragraph 2 of the report of the Credentials Committee [A/4578]:

"In view of the fact that the constitutional and political position in the Republic of the Congo remained far from clear and that the Assembly was faced with a difficulty in the implementation of this resolution (that is, resolution 1480 (XV) regarding the admission of the Republic of the Congo to the United Nations) it was decided, on 20 September 1960, on the proposal of the President, to refer this question to the Credentials Committee."

14. In view of the fact that the legal Government of the Congo and the Congolese Parliament are disputing the right of the Kasa-Vubu group to represent the country in the United Nations and are even protesting against its departure for New York, surely it is clear that the question of credentials is a major political issue and not a purely technical or legal matter, as has been contended here.

15. It should also be emphasized in this connexion that the unclear situation in the Congo mentioned in the Committee's report, and in the statement by the President of the General Assembly to which I have referred, is the outcome of a conspiracy by the colonialists, headed by the United States. The United States launched a campaign against the legal Government of the Congo as soon as it realized that that

Government would not come to terms with the colonialists and intended to pursue a firm and consistent policy of strengthening the territorial integrity and political independence of its country, imposing restrictions on the foreign monopolies lording it over the Congo and putting an end to Belgian aggression once and for all. The colonialists have been quite unscrupulous about the methods used to achieve their mercenary objectives: they have, among other things, recruited traitors, bribed members of the Government and Parliament, kindled political strife and fostered dissension among political parties and tribes; they have taken various steps to organize and consolidate a separatist movement. With the help of the colonialists and their accomplices in the Congo, a "coup d'état" was engineered in the Congo in September 1960; as a result of this, Colonel Mobutu came into power and established a military dictatorship in the country, a dictatorship which has little in common with a parliamentary régime.

16. The Command of the United Nations Force in the Congo, and the Secretary-General himself, have done much to help the colonialists in all these discreditable activities. They have sabotaged the Security Council decisions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960^{2/} concerning assistance to the Government of the Congo, and, while ostensibly pursuing a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo, have in reality acted as accomplices in the colonialists' conspiracy against the Congolese people and their legal Government. Complicity with the colonialists can be the only possible explanation for the fact that this Government was overthrown while United Nations forces were present in the country and that Mobutu's gangs are committing excesses in the Congo. According to press reports, highly placed representatives of the United Nations in the Congo recently took part in reviewing the troops of the impostor Mobutu and even congratulated him on his "successes"; these reports again serve to demonstrate whose interests the Command of the United Nations Force is protecting in the Congo and who stands behind it.

17. Having created political chaos in the country, the colonialists and the Secretary-General with them have begun to have "doubts" about the legality of the Lumumba Government, to question the credentials of the United Nations representatives appointed by the Central Government of the Congo. The United Nations and its allies in military and political blocs have done everything possible to prevent the admission of these representatives to the United Nations.

18. It may be asked why the United States is now so bent on rushing us into a decision to accept the credentials of the delegation Mr. Kasa-Vubu has brought with him to New York. There is no justification for such haste, or for the pressure the United States is bringing to bear on other countries with a view to securing approval of the report of the Credentials Committee, a report adopted by its supporters in that Committee, who constitute an automatic majority.

19. Has there in fact been any change in the situation since the decisions taken on the Congo question at the Fourth Emergency Special Session and at the present session? Of course, there has not, and everyone knows

^{2/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, documents S/4387, S/4405 and S/4426.

it. This point is even made in the report by Mr. Dayal, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo:

"The basic conditions prerequisite to such progress ... are still tragically lacking, and in many respects the situation both in Leopoldville and throughout the provinces markedly deteriorated during the period under report" and further "The financial and economic situation of the Congo has also grown steadily worse" [A/4557, paras. 2 and 6].

20. This document confirms earlier press reports that increasing numbers of Belgian colonialists are observed to be returning to the Congo and that armed aggression by Belgium against that country is being steadily intensified. All this is taking place in the presence of the United Nations Force, whose function is to assist the legal Government of the Congo to expel the Belgian intruders from the country.

21. However, despite all the efforts of the colonialists, their myrmidons such as Tshombé and Mobutu have been conclusively exposed. Mr. Dayal, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, admits in his report that the coup of Colonel Mobutu introduced a "new factor adding to the complexity of the situation" and that "the eruption of the army into the political scene constituted a new menace to peace and security, and actually inhibited peaceful political activity. Far from the ANC providing any measure of security or stability, it became the principal foment of lawlessness" [*ibid.*, para. 118].

22. The latest press reports concerning an attack by Mobutu gangs on units of the United Nations Force protecting the Ghanaian Embassy at Leopoldville show what a threat these operations by a fascist thug pose to the country and to world peace. There is good reason to ask whether this attack was not organized on the orders of Mr. Kasa-Vubu, who ranks as the Commander-in-Chief of the Congolese Army. At all events, Mr. Kasa-Vubu bears the primary responsibility for this state of affairs. In view of this, how can there be any question of accepting the credentials of the Kasa-Vubu group? How can it be asserted that this question has no connexion with that of the situation in the Congo? It is, therefore, no accident that those who advocate acceptance of the Kasa-Vubu group's credentials are saying nothing at all about Mobutu, whose activities are condoned by Mr. Kasa-Vubu.

23. In the report by Mr. Dayal which I have just mentioned it is stated that "In the confused political situation which prevails, the only two institutions whose foundations still stand are the office of the Chief of State and the Parliament" [*ibid.*, para. 127].

24. In accordance with the policy of the Secretary-General, no reference is made here to the legal Government of the Republic of the Congo, the Government of Mr. Lumumba, which is the only legal government of the Congo. The report, however, recognizes the role played by Parliament, which, as you know, supports the Lumumba Government.

25. Reports to this effect have appeared in the Press and, in particular, in that of the United States. The Leopoldville correspondent of the Associated Press, for instance, has reported that the majority of members of Parliament are still for Lumumba and that the pro-Western group which secured his expulsion

is rapidly dwindling. The correspondent expresses the view that Lumumba's return to power is only a matter of time. Fearing such a development, the United States has hastily brought Mr. Kasa-Vubu and his group to New York with a view to his being recognized without delay as the true and only representative of the Congolese people. In taking this step, the United States hopes to spur on the anti-popular forces behind Kasa-Vubu to new adventures.

26. However, as indicated in the cables addressed to the United Nations on 7 November 1960 by Mr. Joseph Okito, President of the Senate, [A/4561/Annex III] and Mr. Joseph Kasongo, President of the Chamber of Representatives, [A/4561, Annex I] under the terms of the country's Constitution, "the Chief of State has no right ... to represent the country at international meetings without first obtaining the people's consent". These cables state that Mr. Kasa-Vubu has not obtained such consent either from the Senate or from the Chamber of Representatives.

27. In these circumstances, the United States proposal to accept the credentials of the Kasa-Vubu delegation to the United Nations would seriously prejudice a reconciliation in the Congo and the maintenance of international peace and security. Our task is not to exacerbate the situation in the Congo, but to facilitate a solution of the grave and thorny problems which face the people and Government of the Congo and the United Nations itself.

28. To accept the credentials of one side in the political struggle going on in the country would inevitably have the effect of aggravating the political situation in the Congo and would play into the hands of the colonialists, who, in making this proposal, are trying to use the General Assembly for their own nefarious purposes. To take such a decision would make it easier for the United States monopolies to impose a new yoke, the neo-colonialist yoke, on a people which has achieved its independence after so hard a struggle.

29. Approval of the report of the Credentials Committee would be tantamount to interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo, interference in support of the side which is striving to force on the peoples of the Congo the colonialist yoke they have just discarded.

30. In submitting its proposal for acceptance of the credentials of the Kasa-Vubu group, which supports the piratical régime of the impostor Mobutu, the United States has plainly demonstrated that it has absolutely no interest in bringing about an improvement in the situation in the Congo, but is doing everything in its power to strengthen the anti-popular régime in the Congo, first and foremost, by securing United Nations recognition of the representatives of this régime.

31. It is precisely for this reason that the convening of Parliament is being opposed by the United States, followed by Mr. Kasa-Vubu, who is obviously acting on its instructions. Clearly, the stand taken by Parliament, the country's sole organ of supreme authority, is impeding the colonialists in carrying out their plans in the Congo. This is being openly stated in the United States Press. The following statement appears in The New York Times of 14 November 1960: "United Nations officials are working toward a start with Parliament while American experts think the first step must be made with the President".

32. What complications would it create, and for whom, if the Congolese Parliament were given an opportunity to function normally? It would obviously create complications for the United States, Belgium and the other colonialists, who fear that Parliament would repudiate their plans which are aimed at a new enslavement of the Congolese people and that it would confirm the powers of the Lumumba Government.

33. In pursuing their sinister designs with respect to the Congolese people, the United States and the other colonialists, acting in concert with Kasa-Vubu, are opposing the despatch of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo to the Congo. They fear that if the members of this Commission see the situation in the Congo for themselves, they will give an objective picture of what is going on in the country and will help to bring about an improvement in the general political situation in the interests of the Congolese people. As we know, this would not suit the colonialists' book, for a return to normalcy in the Congo would mean the collapse of all their schemes for the establishment of the new forms of colonialist exploitation in that country.

34. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers that those who genuinely desire to help the Congolese people to achieve their objectives of independence and prosperity will not allow themselves to be led by the United States and the other imperialists and colonialists and will not support the decision of the Credentials Committee [A/4578, para. 13], which was taken under pressure from the United States.

35. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR will vote against that Committee's recommendations and will support the amendment of the delegation of Guinea which proposes [A/L.322/Rev.1] that a decision on the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) should be deferred.

36. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia): A few weeks ago, the General Assembly was convoked in emergency session to deal with the situation in the Congo. We are now called upon to consider the question of the Congo's representation, and, although this is a regular session, the sense of emergency which animated the convocation of that special session is still with us and prevails in our deliberations.

37. The United Nations is, therefore, faced with a set of questions that should be answered before the Assembly adopts the Credentials Committee's report. First, can the United Nations, under the present circumstances, consider the seating of a delegation to represent the Congo? How far would such a consideration serve the cause of the Congo? To what degree can our deliberations help extend to the Congo the assistance envisaged in the United Nations resolutions? What is the true nature of the present régime in the Congo? Lastly, what are the main prerequisites that should precede any consideration of the matter now under discussion?

38. The crisis still exists in the Congo. It is true that a number of results have been achieved, but they were rather on the negative side. They are none the less of paramount importance. In the first place, the Congo situation, thanks to the vigilance of the Security Council, has not touched off a world-wide conflict. Without any stretch of the imagination, such a peril was a real possibility. In the second place, the Congo situation, thanks to the United Nations Command, has

not developed, as it could have done, into a civil war, with all its misery and with all its destruction. In the third place, the Congo situation, thanks to the incessant efforts of our Secretary-General, has not slipped out of the hands of the United Nations, and it has thus been kept in motion and within the sphere of United Nations action.

39. All these are no little accomplishments. Nevertheless, on the positive side, there is little to report. In fact, the crisis still persists and the continuation adds to its aggravation. Should it further continue, the danger of an explosion must remain within the realm of possibility, not to say certainty. This is no evaluation based on pessimism; it is a well-founded appraisal of the dangers that lie ahead of us. Should the Republic of the Congo be wrongly represented, the accomplishments we have scored, negative as they are, would be eliminated. The international climate would become beclouded, and the situation would verge again on the sharp edges of a serious crisis indeed.

40. Therefore, it should be clear to all of us that, in the interests of international peace and security, in support of the political independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo, and in the spirit of human solidarity with the 14 million people of the Congo, we are in duty bound to examine the matter under consideration in all earnestness, conscientiousness and seriousness.

41. To arrive at an intelligent and balanced decision it is necessary to map the present situation and to trace the factors that are at work in the Congo.

42. In the first place, we are aggrieved to know that the Congolese Government which had requested the assistance of the United Nations is not now in power. It goes without saying that we have no particular sentiments towards one leader or the other; neither do we favour one party or the other. We do not harbour any special affiliation, any special liking, or even any admiration for one against the other. The affairs of the Congolese people are for the people of the Congo themselves to decide. Who should be the President, who should be the Premier, or who should be the Government of the Congo is the sole concern of the people of the Congo. The fact that the Congo is in a state of distress is no reason for us to interfere in the affairs of the Congo. The contrary is true. Because it is in a state of distress, we should not interfere. Interference adds insult to injury and an affront to distress.

43. These distinguished gentlemen—Kasa-Vubu, Lumumba, Mobutu and the rest—are high Congolese dignitaries whose status before us is measured by the degree of authority they actually derive from their people and from their people only. We here in the United Nations are not their judges nor are we their arbiters; neither do we profess that we can make their Constitution or establish their political, economic and social order. These are the affairs of the people of the Congo, just as the national affairs of the other ninety-eight States Members of this Organization are the concern of their peoples only. But the point should be noted that the Central Government, which was the first to bring the United Nations into the arena of the Congo, is not now on the stage. There is direct and circumstantial evidence, to use English legal terminology, that the Central Government then in power was unseated from power through no legal process and without the sanction of the will of the people of

the Republic of the Congo. Maybe at that time this conclusion had not been entertained or fully realized in many quarters, but subsequent developments in the Congo have disclosed beyond any shadow of doubt that it was the unwavering national stand of the Central Government which led to its eclipse, an eclipse brought about by foreign machinations taking advantage of the disturbed internal situation in that country.

44. However, the removal of the Central Government from the stage would not be of concern to us had there been a lawful government in succession. A newly independent country must have, first and foremost, a government capable of leading the country on the road to progress. This is a demanding necessity for the Congo, all the more so in view of the difficulties bequeathed to that State by Belgium.

45. On the side of the United Nations, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly can extend fruitful assistance to the Congo without a government that can hold the reins well in hand. The United Nations cannot function in the Congo with Belgium unskillfully disguised behind the ruins of the Congolese Government. Representation of the Republic of the Congo should not, therefore, be decided in detriment to the task of the United Nations. I said "the ruins of the Congolese Government", because the collapse of the Central Government has led to a virtual vacuum of power from which the Congo has not been able to recover. We know that many attempts have been made to fill that vacuum. A number of governments—or to be more precise, so-called governments—have been announced, but no sooner had such governments been announced than their composition was revised and they were subsequently liquidated by other governments, and so on, in a vicious circle. All these endeavours have failed to establish a government with sufficient authority to shoulder its national responsibilities, let alone the critical complexities that beset the Republic of the Congo at the dawn of its independence. The result has been the emergence of paper governments with no actual authority—for, in the words of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, these governments "existed on paper only". [A/4557, para. 118.]

46. Of these governments, the most interesting is that known as the College of Commissioners, appointed by the Chief of Staff. In a proclamation typical of a military order, the Chief of Staff of the Congo declared that the army "would take power, in view of the struggle going on between two opposing governments, until 31 December 1960 and that a Collège d'universitaires would be charged with the management of the ministerial departments, acting as technicians and not as ministers" [*ibid.*, para. 16]. This Collège d'universitaires, as reported by the Special Representative, was installed in office by a military occupation of the government buildings under orders of the Chief of Staff. It is true that those students were appointed by a presidential ordinance, professedly enacted in accordance with the powers of the Chief Executive of the State. Yet, it is obvious that this students' government was established by an arbitrary military power in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution of the Congo.

47. Such illegality in the establishment of the Collège d'universitaires could have been overlooked had its members been well qualified as to the culture and traditions of the university; the Republic of the Congo

would have been a fulfilment of the ancient dream of Plato: a republic of philosophers rather than of students. But these Congolese Commissioners were undergraduates, lacking in experience as well as in knowledge. We are glad that the United Nations Command in the Congo is dealing with this adolescent government only on the technical level. As is seen from his report, Mr. Dayal, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, has avoided, with the utmost of skilful neutrality and impartiality, involving the United Nations in the question of the recognition of a government for in the words of Mr. Dayal, "its existence does not derive any sanction from the 'Loi fondamentale'" [*ibid.*, para. 123].

48. It is a matter of pure law, of simple fact, that this government is outlawed by the "Loi fondamentale". The members of this government were first appointed by the Chief of Staff and later formally installed by the Chief of State, an action which the Chief of Staff then himself denounced as illegal on the grounds that he had "neutralized" the Chief of State. So that is the position of the government of the Republic of the Congo: it was appointed by the Chief of Staff and installed by the Chief of State, with the Chief of Staff later declaring that the Chief Executive, President Kasa-Vubu, had become "neutralized". If such a situation is of any use at all, it could only be as a useful case to be quoted in textbooks on constitutional law as a pure, classic example of unconstitutional government. Even without any forensic analysis, the tragic events that have taken place in the Congo in the past few weeks have shown that this students' government, far from providing security, has provided insecurity; far from creating stability, has created instability; and far from maintaining law and order, has maintained chaos and disorder. Suffice it to note that it was under such a régimeless régime that the "bands of lawless youths", as they were styled by Mr. Dayal [*ibid.*, para. 120], have been involved in a number of criminal acts ranging from physical assault to murderous assassination. This is only a glimpse, a general bird's-eye view of the situation in the Congo under the government of the students.

49. But the most dangerous phenomenon is that this Government is a shadow government with Belgium behind the scenes. It is a fact that, in this Government, we find the Congolese students as ministers and their Belgian teachers as advisers, reversing the order only for the title, as they were in the university. In practice, the Belgian teachers have maintained in the Government the authority they had in the university. They are the masters, and that is how the Congo is run by its old masters.

50. In the wider context, the question of Belgian teachers, however, must of necessity have its impact on the question of the representation of the Congo. The independence of the Republic of the Congo is the bed-rock of the policy of the United Nations, and we must not allow this bed-rock to be cracked down under the impact of foreign domination, whether it be Belgian or otherwise.

51. The resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly with regard to the Congo are based on the assumption that the political independence of the Congo is an untouchable fact, definitely immune and definitely inviolable. But we are forced to conclude with regret that the recent return of the Belgians to the Congo is undermining the very existence

of the Congo as an independent republic. Under such circumstances, we cannot consider the representation of the Congo without peril to the unity, integrity, sovereignty and independence of that country.

52. As shown in the report of Mr. Dayal—and this is the only document before the United Nations from which we can draw our information—it is clear that there has been a steady return in recent weeks of Belgians to the Congo, followed by the gradual participation of the Belgians in political and administrative activities, whether as advisers, counsellors or executive officials. In the Katanga and South Kasai provinces, Belgian military and para-military personnel, as well as civilian personnel, continue to be available. The Sabena Airlines service is bringing full loads of Belgians to the Congo. In Leopoldville alone, the number of Belgians has risen from 4,500 in July to 6,000 in October.

53. On the military side, official reports have disclosed that 114 Belgian officers and 117 other ranks are still serving in the gendarmerie of the Katanga authorities and that 58 Belgian officers are at present in the service of the Katanga police. In the Kasai province, the reports continue to assert that Belgian officers are engaged in the training of new military units in the service of the authorities of South Katanga. [A/4557, B, 2.]

54. I have listed these facts only to show that the return of the Belgians—civil or military—to the Congo is the core of the matter under consideration. The return of Belgium to the Congo, I submit, is a return of foreign domination.

55. We want a Congolese delegation with a Congo emancipated from Belgian and from any other foreign domination. In this regard, we regret to find that the United States Department of State has taken a position inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the resolutions that have been passed by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

56. In a statement issued on 4 November 1960, the Department of State has made known its support for the return of the Belgians to the Congo and its rejection of the Special Representative's report. This statement of policy by the United States, I submit, with all due respect, is erroneous in fact and is harmful in effect. It is harmful to the very question under our consideration. In the first place, I should say in all candour that we are unable to understand the wisdom that led to a statement of this nature on a matter which is, so to speak, sub judice in the hands of the General Assembly.

57. The Special Representative in the Congo submitted his report on 2 November 1960. It was known that the problem would be considered by the Assembly in due course. This question then springs to our minds: why should the United States issue a statement to declare its rejection of the report beforehand and to pronounce its confidence in the policies of the Belgians in the Congo?

58. The United States, I submit, has a very able delegation to the United Nations headed by Mr. Wadsworth, a very talented and distinguished diplomat. The United States could have waited for a few days to express its views in the United Nations when the question came up for discussion before the General Assembly. No doubt, the United States is free to make a statement of policy on any question at any time it

deems convenient, but we have the same freedom to question the reason for such a statement and the United States is certainly free to answer or to keep silent. This is what this forum is here for in the United Nations.

59. The United States, no doubt, is very conversant with the delicacy of this question, with the feelings of the people of the Congo and with the record of Belgium in this colonial issue. A statement made by the United States before the deliberations in this Assembly must be presumed to have been aimed at a great many targets. What are the targets? To put questions sometimes is more informative than forming conclusions, and we do ask the United States: is this statement intended to bolster the present régime, the Collège d'universitaires, which has fallen in the lap of Belgium, and should it be considered as fuel for the Credentials Committee to function in the required direction? We cannot preclude the United States' supporting Belgium as a colleague in NATO, but such support should in no way bring to the Assembly another Belgian delegation under the cloak of the Congolese Government.

60. The return of the Belgians to the Congo has been ably and impartially surveyed by Mr. Dayal, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo, and he is the only authority who can speak on this question and who can adduce for the Assembly facts which cannot be challenged. In his report, Mr. Dayal has stressed that a "purposeful return"—and I invite your attention to this word "purposeful" which was intelligently selected by Mr. Dayal—"is being staged by Belgian nationals, which has assumed serious significance in view of the key areas which they have penetrated in the public life of the country" [*ibid.*, para. 54]. The point which should not escape our attention is that this return is a major operation, highly organized and well planned. It is not an individual activity without a public object. Recent reports confirm the fact that a recruiting agency has been established in Brussels under the direction of certain professors of the University of Louvain. The object of this agency has been declared; namely, to send an ever increasing number of Belgian officials to the Congo.

61. Recently, there has been a joint application of 122 candidates from Belgium for posts in the Congolese judiciary. Could such a joint application have been made simply by coincidence? It is an action which stands as conclusive evidence of a concerted effort to carry out a premeditated policy to infiltrate into the Congo. Had this joint application been submitted by 122 Soviet candidates, the United Nations would have been alarmed at the danger of subversion from the Soviet Union. The fear that the Congo may fall victim to communism would have become a conspicuous item on our agenda. In fact, the dismissal from the Congo of the communist envoys was hailed as a great victory for the West. Now, the Belgian infiltration is hailed as a promising measure for the economic development of the Congo.

62. In our opinion, the return of the Belgians should be considered as a factor of disqualification for the Congolese delegation.

63. On the military level, United Nations reports have confirmed that light military equipment is being transported from one part of the Congo to another and that a Belgian businessman is engaged in arms traffic.

These are the reports of the United Nations that were transmitted to the General Assembly.

64. The return of the Belgians *per se* is not a matter which we dislike. We have no feelings of dislike towards Belgium, its Government or its people. Except as regards its policy in the Congo, Belgium to us is a State Member of the United Nations entitled to every courtesy, entitled to every right of "politesse". Neither do we have any grudge against the Belgians as individuals regarding their activities wherever they can find free expression, but it is the past relations of Belgium with the Congo which placed on Belgium a caveat as a caution against seating a Congolese delegation in the present circumstances. And let me just refer the Assembly to a few illustrations.

65. As a result of the activities of the Belgian recruiting agency, the task of the United Nations in the Congo has been made more difficult. In his report Mr. Dayal has stated that, in the Ministry of Economic Co-ordination and Planning, the "chef de cabinet adjoint", who was a Belgian, was responsible for delaying the submission of applications for United Nations technical aid. In the Ministry of Health, which is strongly manned by Belgians, a newly appointed Belgian adviser has publicly disclosed that there was no longer any need for the United Nations advisory team. In other ministries, co-operation with the United Nations has been hampered in various ways by high-ranking Belgians. In the field of telecommunications and civil aviation, Belgian officials have discredited the mission of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Even at the Ndjili airport, a Belgian national sought to interfere with United Nations work by withholding appropriate facilities from ICAO officials. In the Information Ministry, under Belgian influence, instructions were issued that international news on the Congolese radio was no longer to be given in the four main indigenous languages—a retrogression to the state of affairs under Belgian control. In the Ministry of National Defence, there is a Belgian colonel acting as an adviser, while another Belgian officer, with the rank of captain, is serving as aide-de-camp to Colonel Mobutu, who was highlighted in the General Assembly as the strong man of the Congo. In Brussels, there are now thirty-six Congolese lieutenants receiving military training. In the area of Thysville, Belgian military officers are training military units in the use of their equipment.

66. In South Kasai, Mr. Dayal reports that "there is also a considerable Belgian presence". These are the words used by him. [*Ibid.*, para. 52.] We can conceive of a United Nations presence in the Congo, but the presence of Belgium there, is inconceivable. Belgian presence is designed to combat United Nations presence. In the southern areas of the Congo, the Belgians are engaged in a wide campaign of false rumours and scandalous propaganda against the United Nations, spreading the news, or rather the downright falsehood, of a United Nations trusteeship over the Congo, and this is an occasion for me here to declare that no one in the United Nations envisages any trusteeship in the Congo.

67. Let us not forget, however, that secession movements in the Congo are to be found where the Belgian presence is found most and where Belgian influence is felt most. Mr. Dayal, in his report to the United Nations, has referred to Belgian influence in Katanga as "omnipresent". This is the word which he skilfully

used: "omnipresent". [*Ibid.*, para. 49.] There, the United Nations is "omni-absent". Also in South Kasai, Mr. Dayal speaks of a considerable Belgian presence. But the Belgian presence in these areas, apart from urging separation through influence and pressure, enforces separation by blood, fire and destruction.

68. It is a fact that the troops of these provinces are led by Belgian officers, and those troops have carried out wholesale massacres against all those who stand for the unity of the Congo. The Belgian-led Kalonji forces, to mention only one instance, have burned the village of Malunda and killed all its inhabitants. Mr. Dayal has enumerated a number of cases where armed troops under the command of Belgian officers have carried out massacres against tribes whose only defensive weapons are bicycle chains. This is something for the United Nations to ponder. Those people were attacked, and the only weapons they possessed were bicycle chains.

69. I have been obliged to go into some detail concerning these aspects of the Congo problem just to show that the return of the Belgians to the Congo is establishing a régime that cannot be seated in the United Nations. We must secure the withdrawal of Belgium before we consider Congolese representation. He who supports the return of the Belgians to the Congo, I submit with all respect, is an accomplice, whether or not he so wills. The United States, I submit, is too great a country to accept the role of accomplice—and with whom? With Belgium, a colonial Power. And what for? For a campaign of terror led by Belgian officers against the tribes of the Congo. This is a policy which is not in keeping with the noble traditions of the United States, nor with the will and the spirit of the resolutions of the General Assembly. Let no one, therefore, view the return of the Belgians to the Congo with a light heart, and let no one disregard its impact on the Congolese representation in the Assembly.

70. The report of Mr. Dayal has made it crystal clear that the return of the Belgians to the Congo has led to a further deterioration of the political situation and to the intensification of terror and chaos. This is the finding by the Special Representative. These are not our findings, but those reported by the Special Representative in the area who is dealing with the problem now. Thus, the choice is between the United Nations presence and the Belgian presence. The United Nations stands for independence, unity and sovereignty of the Congo. Belgium, as the Special Representative's report states, stands to defeat those noble objectives. It becomes, therefore, necessary to free the Congo from any foreign domination, be it Belgian or otherwise, if we are desirous of a representation of the Congo, by the Congo and for the Congo.

71. Under no circumstances should we forget the resolution [1474 (ES-IV)] we adopted a few weeks ago on the question of the Congo. The General Assembly has decided, *inter alia*, to request the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action with a view to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration of law and order and to safeguard the unity and territorial integrity and independence of the Congo. Specifically, the resolution has requested all States, without exception, to refrain from any action which might impede the restoration of law and order and which may undermine the unity, integrity and independence of the Congo. Regarding assistance to the

Congo, the resolution called upon all States, including Belgium, to channel any assistance, military or otherwise, through the United Nations.

72. Pursuant to this resolution, the Secretary-General addressed four communications to Belgium—not one, but four. The Secretary-General asked Belgium to withdraw all military, para-military or civilian personnel which Belgium placed at the disposal of the authorities in the Congo. He has called the attention of Belgium to the decision of the General Assembly that every assistance should be furnished within the framework of the United Nations. Furthermore, the Secretary-General expressed his anxiety over the arms traffic carried out in Katanga through the instrumentality of Belgian business men. He also explained his fear arising from the activities of the Belgian recruiting agency, which came close to subversion against the United Nations [A/4557, B].

73. This action on the part of the Secretary-General, I submit, is a straightforward and upright implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly and should not only command our admiration, but our whole-hearted support.

74. The question now under consideration is a test case to fathom our loyalty to the Charter, our faith in the resolution of the General Assembly and our respect for the authority of the United Nations. What is involved here is not only the stand of the Secretary-General in implementing the express directives of the General Assembly. The question before us is whether the authority of the United Nations, as translated by the actions of the Secretary-General, should be upheld and honoured or defeated and dishonoured. As long as the United Nations resolutions are not carried out and as long as the demands of the Secretary-General are not accepted by Belgium, we cannot consider the question of the Congo representation.

75. In stating its position on the matter Belgium has chosen to defeat the authority of the United Nations. The reply [ibid., B.3] of Belgium to the communications of the Secretary-General is nothing but a defiance of our Charter and our resolution. It is an open challenge to the action taken by the Secretary-General on the strength of the resolution of the General Assembly. In brief, Belgium has contended that the Secretary-General is not entitled to insist that all technical aid to the Congo should be channelled through the United Nations and that the position of the Secretary-General constitutes an interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic of the Congo.

76. Belgium went even further to claim that the 200 United Nations experts do not stand up to comparison with the 2,000 Belgians in the Congo. Such contentions on the part of Belgium are groundless. First, it is a distortion of the General Assembly resolution to claim that Belgium is at liberty to provide assistance to the Congo behind the back of the United Nations. If any State were to send assistance to the Congo, Belgium should be the last to do so. Belgium's past record in the Congo as a colonial Power places an embargo against its activity there.

77. Second, the actions of the Secretary-General are no interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo. The Secretary-General is putting teeth in the policy of the United Nations, lest Congo fall victim to Belgium or any foreign domination. It is Belgium's presence which is a flagrant interference in the affairs

of the Congo, taking advantage of the situation of chaos prevailing at present.

78. Third, and last, assistance to the Congo is not measured by the number of experts. We should not measure such assistance by number or by quantity, but by quality. It is the aim of assistance which counts. The 200 United Nations experts are more useful, more dependable and more trustworthy, I would say, than the 2,000 Belgian experts, who, in the light of the findings of the United Nations representatives in the area, are a fifth column in the Congo intended to subvert the will of its people and undermine the territorial integrity and the unity of the country. If testimony be required, the report of the Special Representative is sufficient evidence.

79. The representation of the Congo—the question we are considering—must stay arrested until Belgium has withdrawn its military and civilian personnel from the Congo. The resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly must be respected; their implementation must come first and the consideration of the question of representation second. The ink of the resolutions is still fresh and has not yet dried. It is our duty not to block the action of the United Nations in mid-stream. Mighty and invincible, the River Congo might drown the United Nations in its torrential rapids, and such danger we must avoid at all cost.

80. The United States position, as revealed in the statement of the State Department, expresses confidence in Belgium. We shall not interfere in the bilateral sentiment going on between the United States and Belgium. This political affection is not our concern. We are concerned with the policy of the United States on the Congo as far as it relates to the representation of the Congo in the United Nations.

81. We recall—and I stress this point—that, when the Soviet Union criticized the stand of the Secretary-General on the Congo, the United States resisted with great vigour such criticism. On more than one occasion, the United States has stood strongly in support of the United Nations authority and the actions taken by the Secretary-General. It is now incomprehensible for the United States to support a régime in the Congo in defiance of the United Nations and with a challenge to the Secretary-General. The United States has expressed hope that Belgium and the United Nations—and this is the paradox in the wording of the statement of the United States State Department—can collaborate in such a manner as to benefit the Congo. This is an amazing position taken by the United States, indefensible on any ground.

82. Belgium should not be allowed to stand comparison with the United Nations. It is not worthy for the whole of the United Nations to be placed on one side of the table and Belgium just on the other side of the table. Belgium is no party at all. It is the Congo which is the main party.

83. This brings me to the final aspect of the problem. What action should the United Nations take under the present circumstances to ensure that the Congo is duly represented by the Congo and by the Congo only. We believe the report of the Special Representative and the communications of the Secretary-General have pointed out the way for us in dealing with the item at present under consideration. The situation is tragic in the Congo and most disturbing. But we are not lacking

in hope and not wanting in comfort. We have in the Congo the United Nations forces doing their best under the most trying and provocative circumstances. We have the African States, all, without distinction, without discrimination, ready to play their role in upholding the unity, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of their sister State. We have Mr. Hammarskjöld determined to carry out the directives of the General Assembly. And lastly, we have Mr. Dayal, unwavering in his effort to serve the cause of peace in the Congo, with talent, with neutrality and with impartiality. All these factors play their part in assisting the Congo to maintain its independence, preserve its unity and bring about a lawful representation of the Congo.

84. Unfortunately, the political picture in the country is to the liking of Belgium and not to the liking of the United Nations. There is now a political vacuum which Belgium is trying to fill itself. Thus, the first task to be discharged is to call upon Belgium to quit the Congo immediately so that the United Nations can function in the Congo without obstacles and without impediments—and this is the vigorous action which has been suggested by our Secretary-General in implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly. At the same time, the Assembly should contemplate the adoption of effective measures to meet the defiance of Belgium should Belgium continue its defiance to the demands of the Secretary-General, which he is carrying out under the authority of the Assembly.

85. With Belgium withdrawing, the Congo can start to lay the groundwork for the emergence of a truly representative government and a truly representative delegation. At present, President Kasa-Vubu can, no doubt, represent the Congo because he is the Chief of State. We take that to be a fact. But for constitutional reasons which have been ably explained by our colleagues from Ghana, Guinea, India and others, the rest of his delegation cannot be seated here with us or with him in the United Nations. This is a point which must be clear in the minds of our colleagues in this Assembly.

86. As to the political situation, we regret the non-existence of a lawful government in the Congo; and this is the gist of the report of the Special Representative in the area who has said in the most unequivocal terms that there is no lawful government with effective authority in the area. The present régime is not Congolese as it stands, nor has it lawfully emerged. But the promising hope lies in three factors: first, the office of the President is still intact; secondly, the Constitution remains operative; and thirdly, the Parliament possesses the potentials to function. All that is needed is to establish conditions conducive to the activation of these institutions.

87. The Parliament is the final depository of the power and authority for the people of the Congo. The Parliament, convening and acting under the Constitution, can be the starting point to bring about a lawful government and a lawful delegation. The United Nations is no Organization to install or to "destall" governments. This is a matter for the people of the Congo themselves. But it is part of our duty, as a United Nations, in discharging our responsibilities as assigned to us by the United Nations resolutions, to create conditions that will help the emergence of a lawful government, a government not of our choice or favoured by us, but one which would reflect the will of the people of

the Congo after being freed from any foreign domination.

88. Such a course, consistent with our Charter, in keeping with our resolutions and our considerations, would provide the necessary climate for a lawful government to emerge from the ruins of the present situation in the Congo. It is then, and only then, that a Congolese delegation can occupy its worthy seat in the United Nations with dignity, authority and with constitutionality.

89. Finally, permit me to end with a note of warning. The current events themselves are the danger siren if we are to hearken. The New York Times today has carried the ill-tidings in the Congo. An armed clash has taken place between the Congolese army and the United Nations forces, with a number of soldiers on both sides reported killed, including the second in command of the Congolese army. A week ago, ten Irish soldiers of the United Nations Force were killed in ambush; the whole situation is fraught with peril. What the Congo needs at the present moment is conciliation and not representation. What the Congo craves for is to seat law and order, rather than to seat Kasa-Vubu or Lumumba.

90. We have come to the end. The debate is over and we shall be called upon to cast our votes. I ask my friends to cast the vote with a cold mind and with a warm heart. Let us not vote as Africans, Asians or Europeans. Let us not vote as communists, as capitalists or as socialists. Let us not vote as committed or as neutralist countries. But let us all vote as Members of the United Nations with nothing in our minds, nothing in our hearts except the peace in the Congo, the peace in Africa, and indeed in the whole world. Had this been a political question, our votes would not extend beyond the four walls of the Assembly hall. But on the matter under consideration, our votes, immediately after being cast, would be vibrated not only in the Congo but in the whole of Africa.

91. To seat a Congolese delegation at the present moment, any delegation, whether that of Kasa-Vubu or that of Lumumba, may touch off a serious conflict not only in the Congo but also in Africa and maybe in the whole of the world. So I appeal to you, my friends, to avoid the catastrophe at this very last moment. Let us seat none, until conciliation is done, and is well done.

Mr. Fekini (Libya), Vice-President, took the Chair.

92. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I now call upon the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

93. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In his statement at the 923rd meeting the United States representative raised a number of issues and brought a number of charges against certain delegations, including that of the Soviet Union.

94. The position of the Soviet delegation on the main points of the present debate is well known and I shall not therefore re-state it. I propose to confine myself to giving a brief answer to some of the charges made by the United States representative, particularly as we are now coming close to the final stage of our debate and to the point of taking a decision on the question which was forced upon the Assembly by the United States.

95. There are three points in Mr. Wadsworth's statement which call for an answer. In the first place, he asserted that many delegations which have spoken here, including that of the Soviet Union, are making the question of the seating of a Congolese delegation in the General Assembly a "cold war" issue. The assertion by the United States representative that the Soviet Union delegation is interested in pursuing the "cold war" and in projecting it into the Congo is not only devoid of any foundation, but is an attempt to place a completely false construction on the whole course of events here in the General Assembly and to whitewash the position of the United States itself.

96. We are indeed all witnesses to the fact that this issue was raised on the initiative of the United States and we have all seen for ourselves the course the discussion has followed. As we know, the African-Asian countries, which have shown themselves particularly anxious for a settlement of the Congo question, submitted a proposal for the adjournment of the debate. Why did they do so? In order to facilitate the task of conciliation in the Congo. With a view to avoiding an acrimonious discussion of the Congo question and preventing a deterioration in the situation in the country itself, where a fierce political struggle is in progress, a Conciliation Commission of fifteen African and Asian States was set up and was preparing to leave for the Congo. One would have thought that this idea of action by a Conciliation Commission, which planned to work, not through the use of armed force, but through painstaking and peaceful negotiations within the country, would have been acceptable to those anxious for an end to the bitter controversy both in the General Assembly itself and within the country.

97. As events turned out, however, this peaceful mission of the African-Asian countries has been obstructed by a country, or rather by a group of countries, headed by the United States. This is something which the United States cannot gainsay. No matter how hard it may try, it cannot evade responsibility for its ill-judged move, which is prejudicial to peace and to the people of the Congo. This is an objective fact. An acrimonious discussion of all the problems relating to the Congo has been forced upon us because the United States has declined to accept the only sound and peaceful method of settling the Congolese disputes, that of despatching the Conciliation Commission of the African-Asian countries.

98. Thus, the policy of settling all disputes in the Congo by peaceful means has been countered by a policy of exacerbating the discussion and of fomenting the "cold war" not only in the United Nations, but in the Congo itself.

99. Who was, and is, responsible for this policy of fomenting the "cold war"? I do not think there can be two opinions on this point. The United States initiated the "cold war" policy and is now reaping as it has sown.

100. The acrimonious course the discussion of this issue has taken could have been foreseen. The fact that the United States has adopted such a line merely goes to show that it is pursuing a specific policy which is aimed at securing, not a peaceful settlement of the Congolese disputes, but a settlement in keeping with its own wishes through the exercise of pressure by itself and by its closest allies in military blocs.

By whom has this policy been opposed? By the African-Asian countries. Most of the speakers in this debate have been representatives of the African-Asian countries who have criticized this policy of fomenting the "cold war" and aggravating the situation. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have supported this stand by the principal African-Asian countries.

101. In the circumstances, what justification is there for the charge that the Soviet Union and the other countries which have opposed the United States policy are in favour of fomenting the "cold war"? It is now obvious to everyone who the true culprit is for this deterioration in the situation both in the General Assembly and in the Congo. Furthermore, the United States in supporting the illegal Mobutu régime, has not only followed a "cold war" line here, but has followed a "cold war" line in the Congo itself and a line which is leading to a "hot war", as has been clearly demonstrated during the last few days by the armed clashes between Mobutu's gangs and United Nations troops.

102. The Soviet Union and many Asian and African countries condemn the lawless activities of the Mobutu gangs in the Congo. The United States is giving this illegal military dictatorship every possible support; it receives delegations from it, maintains contact with its representatives and is now trying to secure acceptance of its representatives as the delegation of the Congolese people to the United Nations.

103. All this can only lead to the outbreak of armed conflict in the Congo, to further clashes within the country. This is the answer to Mr. Wadsworth's first point and to the first charge he made.

104. In the second place, Mr. Wadsworth spoke of interference by the Soviet Union in the affairs of the Congo and of non-interference by the United States. He said that the United States is not interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo, that it has not sent a single soldier, is not sending equipment there and so on and so forth. He tried to give the impression, on the other hand, that the Soviet Union has as good as sent troops and military equipment there and that it is continually interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo.

105. I would, however, draw Mr. Wadsworth's attention to the fact that all representatives have before them an official report on what the Soviet Union has sent to the Congo. This report has been circulated to all delegations, including that of the Soviet Union. I refer to document A/C.5/837 of 27 October, a "note verbale" addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If Mr. Wadsworth will take this document—which he has undoubtedly seen—and read it through, he will find a statement of what the Soviet Union has sent to the Congo. It has given the Congo assistance to the total value of 14,649,000 roubles. This sum includes:

(1) Foodstuffs (sugar, 1,000 tons; wheat, 9,000 tons; condensed milk, 300,000 standard cans; food rations, 300,600 units). Total: 3,461,000 roubles.

(2) Means of transport, including 100 GAZ-63 trucks, an auto repair shop, and fuel and lubricants. Total: 1,465,000 roubles.

(3) Medical supplies, including the cost of medicines and medical equipment and the maintenance and transport of medical personnel and interpreters (15 doctors, 5 nurses and 4 interpreters). Total: 690,000 roubles.

(4) Services, including: (a) freight charges for two ships (transport of foodstuffs and trucks)—1 million roubles; (b) operating costs of five IL-18 aircraft used for delivering part of the foodstuffs and for the transport required by the Government of Ghana under the Security Council decisions on the Congo, and maintenance of the aircraft crews—5,207,000 roubles; (c) operating costs and crew maintenance costs in respect of ten IL-14 aircraft despatched with food supplies to the Congo at the request of the Congo Government—2,700,000 roubles; (d) maintenance and travel costs of four radio specialists sent to the Congo at the request of the Government of the Congo, and cost of spare parts and equipment—100,000 roubles; (e) maintenance costs of five instructors for GAZ-63 trucks—26,000 roubles. Total: 9,033,000 roubles.

The five IL-18 aircraft are civilian aircraft, which were used for delivering part of the foodstuffs and the supplies despatched with the group of medical personnel. They also transported a number of Ghanaian military units to the territory of the Congo. The costs of maintaining the aircraft are also included.

106. All these facts are given in this document which all representatives have read or with which they should at least be familiar if they speak on these matters. Furthermore, the last two lines of this "note verbale" read as follows: "The Government of the USSR hereby states that the Soviet Union has no intention of charging the United Nations for any of the above-mentioned items."

107. This was the voluntary assistance we provided in response to the appeal by the Security Council and by the legal Government of the Congo.

108. Why then does Mr. Wadsworth try to confuse the picture? The Soviet Union has given help to the Congolese people; its help was disinterested and peaceful, and was given in accordance with the Security Council decision and with the request for help from the legal Government of the Congo. In these circumstances, the assertion that the Soviet Union has interfered in the domestic affairs of the Congo is pure slander.

109. By way of contrast, Mr. Wadsworth argued—or tried to argue—that the United States is not interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo, as it has not sent a single soldier or a single piece of military equipment there. The only possible comment on that statement is that the United States had absolutely no need to send its own officers and men to the Congo because, thanks to the connivance of the Command of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it has had every opportunity to send any number of officers and men from other NATO countries and any number of its own employees who are certainly not carrying out only the duties assigned to them by those in charge of the United Nations Secretariat, but also those directly assigned to them by the United States Government and its Embassy in Leopoldville. It is moreover a matter of common knowledge that the Congo is now flooded with Belgian experts and, as the Saudi Arabian representative who spoke immediately before me very rightly pointed out, these 2,000 Belgian advisers

constitute a fifth column in the Congo, which is undermining the country's unity, and are dutifully fulfilling the orders both of their own and of the United States Government, which is acting in concert with Belgium in the Congo.

110. In these circumstances, it is quite unnecessary for the United States to send its own officers and men to the Congo. Its dirty work is being done for it by the officers and men of its allies and now also by so-called Congolese contingents with which Belgian advisers are serving under Colonel Mobutu's command. The dirty work of the United States is being done for it, and it does not need to send its own officers and men.

111. While we are on the subject of United States political influence and interference in the affairs of the Congo, I think it must be obvious to everyone present here that, even in raising this issue of forcing acceptance of a delegation which is connected with the régime now in force and which does not have the support of the Congolese Parliament and people, the United States is guilty of flagrant interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo. No thoughtful and sober observer of recent events can come to any other conclusion.

112. Lastly, the United States contends that the Soviet Union is undermining the United Nations and that it must be prevented from doing so both in the Congo and in general. But if we are talking about undermining the United Nations, there is no better illustration of action designed to undermine the United Nations, its authority and effective influence in Africa and the world than what the United States has done and is now doing in the United Nations.

113. What we are now witnessing in the United Nations is the use of its machinery, and in the present instance of the General Assembly, for the purpose of achieving the political objectives of the State Department in the Congo: the United Nations is being used by the United States for such acts of interference in Congolese affairs as are dictated by the colonialist requirements of its ally Belgium, its own colonialist requirements and those of the colonial Powers. If we are discussing the subject of undermining the authority of the United Nations and its activities as a whole, the people we are being asked to accept as representatives of the Congolese people, of the Republic of the Congo, are a case in point.

114. I should like to quote a brief report issued only today by the United States agency, the Associated Press. I am compelled to do so because, unfortunately, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, whose duty it is to keep the General Assembly informed of all matters relating to United Nations operations in the Congo, has so far not found either the time or the opportunity to provide this information, although he was asked to do so both yesterday and today. We consider such a situation abnormal, but we are compelled to note this objective fact and to point out once again that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who has on several recent occasions provided information on less urgent matters, has not found it possible to do so at a time like the present when an extremely tense situation prevails both in the Congo and the Assembly.

115. The Associated Press today transmits a despatch from Leopoldville which states that after the departure

of the Ghanaian "chargé d'affaires", soldiers (the reference is to Mobutu's soldiers) arrested and beat up dozens of United Nations officials in revenge for the death of their commander, Nkokolo. Some United Nations officials were dragged from their automobiles, others from their homes. Thirty persons were held at gun-point all night and at least twelve officials are still being detained by the army after a day of fruitless attempts by the international Organization to secure their release.

116. This is not our report, but a report by the United States agency, Associated Press. It goes on to report that machine guns are being set in position in premises occupied by the United Nations throughout the city, in which the situation is tense and highly confused. This is what the Associated Press despatch has to say.

117. The United States is proposing that we should approve and accept, here in the United Nations, representatives of a régime which is committing such acts of lawlessness and open opposition to the United Nations.

118. The United States enjoys a majority of votes in the General Assembly. It will no doubt force a decision on the Assembly in this matter. But it should not have the temerity to assert that such a decision will enhance the authority of the United Nations. It cannot make such an assertion, for to impose representatives of this régime on the Congo is to impose from above a dictatorship which will act in accordance with the orders of the United States and not in accordance with decisions in keeping with the interests of the Congolese people and the United Nations as a whole. If we wish to enhance the authority of the United Nations, we cannot take this disastrous course which is fraught with danger to peace. If anyone is undermining the authority of the United Nations at the present time, it is the United States.

119. All those who now oppose so imprudent a decision and who urge the need to follow the course of action of settling the internal disputes in the Congo by peaceful means will be—and are—arguing in favour of strengthening the United Nations and enabling it to fulfil its great mission of achieving a peaceful settlement of all issues. On the other hand, those who speak and vote in favour of this United States proposal will be assuming a very heavy responsibility for all developments in the Congo and throughout Africa and for the future course of events in the United Nations. The Assembly can, of course, take a decision on this question, but it should remember what the consequences will be for the Congo and for the world.

Mr. Boland (Ireland) resumed the Chair.

120. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Guinea on a point of order.

121. Mr. TOURE Ismael (Guinea) (translated from French): Mr. President, in speaking on a point of order at this stage of the debate, my delegation feels that it must respectfully draw your attention and that of the Assembly to a new fact of great importance. This new fact, whose exceptional importance we would stress, has a direct bearing on the debate now proceeding. I refer to a letter bearing today's date, 22 November 1960, from the Chief of State of the Congo, Mr. Kasa-Vubu, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

122. My delegation feels that this letter to the Secretary-General from the Chief of State of the Congo, in which once and for all he categorically opposes any Conciliation Commission in the Congo and clearly indicates that very serious consequences might ensue if the Commission left despite his views, constitutes a stand on the part of the Head of the Congolese State which has a direct bearing on the present debate.

123. We therefore request that you intervene personally to induce the Secretary-General to communicate the contents of this letter to the General Assembly before the end of this debate. It seems to us essential that we should know the contents of the letter and the Secretary-General's comments on it before a vote is taken, because the letter from the Chief of State of the Congo casts doubts upon all the arguments put forward during our debate. It is essential, therefore—more essential than ever—to clarify the explosive situation which now seems to be emerging in the Congo and which will inevitably be brought to a head if a vote is taken without such a clarification.

124. In conclusion, my delegation formally requests you to exert your influence so as to allow the General Assembly, under rule 72 of the rules of procedure, to hear the Secretary-General himself tell us the exact contents of the message from the Chief of State of the Congo before the present debate is closed. In making this proposal, my delegation is prompted solely by the desire to make it possible for representatives to take a decision at the conclusion of this debate with a knowledge of all the facts.

125. The PRESIDENT: The Chair will invite the attention of the Secretary-General to the observations just made by the representative of Guinea.

126. A number of delegations have expressed the desire to explain their votes before the voting. I will now call on these in order, and I call first on the representative of India.

127. Mr. JHA (India): My delegation has had the occasion to express its views on the inappropriateness of discussing the Credentials Committee's report [A/4578] at this time, a report which recommends the seating of one of two contending delegations even though not only has there been no solution of the constitutional and political difficulties which led the Assembly at its 864th meeting on 20 September 1960 to decide to defer the seating of either of the contending delegations in the General Assembly in the seat of the Republic of the Congo, but the situation during the last few days has so tragically declined as to menace the United Nations operations in the Congo and, indeed, the entire position of the United Nations now and in the future.

128. I would like to reiterate the position of my delegation on the problem of the Congo. We fully support the United Nations action in the Congo. We are deeply distressed at the grave internal conflicts in the Congo, which threaten the disruption and disintegration of the young Republic. We deplore the present chaotic situation and the foreign intrigues and interference that are going on there. We deplore such intrigues from whatever quarter these may come. It is for the Congolese people themselves to solve their difficulties without outside interference or pressure and with the disinterested assistance of the United Nations.

129. Conciliation, indeed, is the prime need in the Congo. This can be done only within the framework of

the legal and constitutional structure of the Congo. The most important legal and constitutional element in the Congo, from which all authority flows, is the Parliament. It is the Parliament that elects the Head of the State and the Prime Minister. There exists a duly constituted Parliament of the Congo, elected on the basis of universal franchise. As the Prime Minister of India pointed out from this rostrum on 3 October:

"... it should be the function of the United Nations to help this Parliament to meet and function so that, out of its deliberations, the problems of the Congo may be dealt with by the people themselves. Decisions must be those of the Parliament as representing the people of the Congo, and not of others. The functioning of Parliament may itself lead to the ironing out of internal differences." [882nd meeting, para. 139].

130. Everything that has happened in the six or seven weeks since has only served, as is clear from the second progress report of the United Nations Special Representative in the Congo [A/4557], to emphasize and reinforce the urgency, indeed the indispensability, of the restoration of parliamentary institutions in the Congo and the convening and reactivation of the Parliament. It has been our hope that, through the efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission and through the dawning of good sense among the Congolese leaders, Parliament would meet soon and become the forum of conciliation and solution of the internal conflicts in the Congo in a democratic and constitutional manner.

131. My delegation considers that any decision to seat one of the contending delegations at this time will amount to the by-passing of the Parliament, perhaps even a subversion of that body. It will lead to the hardening of attitudes and positions within the Congo, increasing internal strife and making future solutions immeasurably more difficult.

132. The first task of the United Nations should be to use all its influence and authority for bringing about the restoration of parliamentary institutions, the convening of the Parliament which, whatever the legalistic arguments to the contrary, today stands suppressed.

133. While saying all this, let me repeat what I said on behalf of my delegation at the 923rd meeting. We accept the position and status of President Kasa-Vubu as Head of State. We are not interested in the personalities in the Republic of the Congo. These facts, however, cannot justify our turning a blind eye to all that has happened and is happening in the Congo—and the facts are well known to us. Our only interest is to see the United Nations initiative in the Congo successful, and to see the people of the Congo settle their differences in unity so that they may realize the destiny that rightfully belongs to their country.

134. The recommendation of the Credentials Committee amounts to a revision of the decision which was very wisely taken on 9 November [913th meeting] to adjourn the debate on the situation in the Republic of the Congo and on the draft resolution aimed at seating the representatives of the Central Government of that country. My delegation considers that it is unwise to have revised the decision to adjourn the debate. The revision of the Assembly's decision among other things is likely to prejudice the work of the Commission going to the Congo under United Nations auspices, if indeed the mere discussions here have

not already prejudiced the chances of that Commission's ever attaining success. It is clear that the constitutional and political complexities which led to a postponement of the decision to seat representatives of the Republic of the Congo in the Assembly, on 20 September are still there even today, and in the present situation, to vote for the Credentials Committee's recommendation would be tantamount to taking sides in the internal political and constitutional conflict in the Congo. We do not think that would be in conformity with justice. It is our view that any decision in this sense would be a false step which might have serious consequences. We consider that the initiative embodied in the Credentials Committee's report at this time is wholly misconceived.

135. For these reasons my delegation will vote in favour of the amendment proposed by the delegation of Guinea [A/L.322/Rev.1], and if that amendment is rejected we will vote against the Credentials Committee's recommendation [A/4578, para. 13].

136. Dato KAMIL (Federation of Malaya): When the motion was made by the representative of Ghana last week for the adjournment of this debate [913th meeting], my delegation voted in favour of it. We did so with deep sincerity and in good faith. It was not our intention to block the debate with a view to blocking the seating of the Congolese delegation headed by President Kasa-Vubu, and the fact that the delegation that has been recommended for seating in the Assembly is headed by President Kasa-Vubu has nothing whatever to do with our decision on that procedural question. Indeed, my Government has the highest respect and recognition for President Kasa-Vubu as the incontestable Head of State of the Republic of the Congo. But we feel that a debate at this stage and the taking of decisions at this juncture would not be in the best interest of the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations to assist the Congolese people in resolving their present differences.

137. The Secretary-General's Advisory Committee on the Congo has decided, under the terms of paragraph 3 of resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of the emergency session of the General Assembly of 20 September 1960, to send to the Republic of the Congo a United Nations Conciliation Commission composed of appointees of African and Asian States. We are convinced that this Commission, if given moral support from all quarters, can accomplish much towards contributing to the fulfilment of the purposes of the Assembly's resolution. We feel, therefore, that this Assembly has the duty and obligation to give its whole-hearted support to the Commission established under its own resolution, and, to that end, to withhold any discussion and decision respecting the seating of the Congolese delegation.

138. It is for this reason, and for this reason alone, that my delegation has supported the motion for adjournment. However, the General Assembly has decided to proceed with the debate. As can be seen, considerable heat has been generated in the discussion. This is regrettable. Our task at the moment should be to establish confidence and harmony in the Republic of the Congo, to conciliate differences among the Congolese parties, and certainly not to engage in acrimonious charges and counter-charges that can serve only to aggravate complications in the Congo. For this reason my delegation has chosen to refrain

from participating in the substantive discussion of the matter before the Assembly now.

139. Our stand regarding the recommendation of the Credentials Committee is therefore governed by these fundamental considerations. We have accordingly decided to abstain when it is put to the vote.

140. My country is one of those that has placed troop contingents at the disposal of the United Nations Command in the Congo. When we dispatched our battalion, it was on the understanding that the basic philosophy of the United Nations operation in the Congo was to maintain law and order in the country and to conciliate differences among the contending parties in the interests of the unity and political integrity of the Congo. We believe that this must still remain the task and objective of the United Nations.

141. In the context of the political conflict now obtaining in the Congo, the problem of the seating of a Congolese delegation in the United Nations has become a highly controversial issue. In our view, it is most inadvisable for this Assembly at this stage, when the Conciliation Commission is about to leave for the Congo, to take a stand on this issue in favour of one party as against another, a stand which might have the effect of hampering the work of conciliation. Partly because of this and partly because the Federation of Malaya is an appointee on the Conciliation Commission, my delegation has decided not to take a decision which might expose it to allegations of partisanship. We sincerely believe that the Conciliation Commission has a useful role to play in the evolution of a peaceful settlement of political differences in the Republic of the Congo; but to be successful in its efforts, it is imperative that the Commission undertake its task with an open mind.

142. For this reason and for the other considerations which I have stated earlier, my delegation has decided that the only course open to it as regards the recommendation of the Credentials Committee is to abstain.

143. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): I should like to explain briefly the position of my delegation on the recommendation of the Credentials Committee concerning the credentials of the delegation of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) issued by the Head of State.

144. Under normal—I repeat normal—conditions, a delegation appointed either by the Head of State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs is seated in this Assembly even before the Credentials Committee has examined and passed judgement on the validity of its credentials. However, with respect to the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), we are confronted with quite a different situation. Everyone agrees that the present situation is indeed an abnormal one. A solution has not yet been found of the clashes and conflicts concerning different personalities and political concepts among the Congolese themselves. On the contrary, the situation as a whole is badly deteriorating from day to day.

145. It is not my intention to dwell upon this tragedy which sets brother against brother. Let me just say here that this does not involve, at least as far as Indonesia is concerned, the position of President Kasa-Vubu as the Head of State of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville). We fully recognize his high office. In fact, no one in this Assembly has disputed President Kasa-Vubu's position as Head of State.

146. But while we do not question his high office, we are all aware that his actions are a matter of controversy in the Congo. They have aroused grave differences between the Head of State and the Congolese Government. Therefore, though at first sight the matter before us may seem to be a procedural one, the seating of the Congolese delegation in the United Nations touches upon the core of the political situation in the Congo. As we all know, there are two Congolese delegations—one appointed by the Head of State and the other by the Head of Government.

147. What is our responsibility in these circumstances? From the very beginning, the efforts of the United Nations have been directed at assisting the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) in overcoming the national crisis created and nurtured by foreign intervention. As far as we know, nothing has changed in this respect since this Organization responded positively last July to the joint appeal of President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Lumumba. Indeed the resolution unanimously adopted by the emergency special session on 20 September last, and the decision taken by this Assembly less than two weeks ago, reconfirmed the conciliatory and constructive task of the United Nations in the Congo.

148. General Assembly resolution 1474 of 20 September 1960 appeals to all Congolese:

"... to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation."

149. In conformity with this resolution, and after lengthy and thorough discussion, the Advisory Committee appointed a Conciliation Commission of Asian and African nations. This Commission is to leave for the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) within the course of this week and is scheduled to hold its first meeting in Leopoldville this coming Saturday. Its primary task is to bring the contending parties in the Congo together.

150. Against this background, it is abundantly clear that our efforts here must be directed toward creating the most favourable atmosphere for the success of conciliation. We must refrain from taking any decisions which at this juncture would not only prejudice the task of the Conciliation Commission, but would also actually add confusion to an already tense situation. We must not add fuel to the fire. It is not for us to choose between the personalities in the Congo. Our responsibility and obligation are to strive to bring all the personalities together so that, on the basis of national unity, peaceful conditions may be re-established in the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville).

151. Moved by this sincere hope that all the leaders can again co-operate with one another to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo in the interest of the Congolese people, my delegation will vote in favour of the amendment submitted by Guinea contained in document A/L.322/Rev.1 to defer its decision on the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville). In the event this amendment does not receive the votes necessary for adoption, we will vote against

the recommendation of the Credentials Committee [A/4578, para. 13].

152. Before concluding, I wish to address an earnest appeal to all the leaders in the Congo: Do not look to the instigators of foreign intervention, to the sowers of conflict in your land, particularly when they seek to speak with the voice of the charmer. But do look to the United Nations, whose interests are truly altruistic, whose interests are the same as your interests and those of your people. Do not jeopardize our efforts of conciliation but help us, co-operate with us.

153. It is not in our interest, and certainly it cannot be in your interest, which is that of your people, to bring the internal conflicts of the Congo into these very halls. At this session of the General Assembly, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) and fifteen other African sovereign States were unanimously welcomed to this Organization. That was a happy occasion. Let us not spoil that unanimity now. We want the participation of the Congolese people in our deliberations, through their representatives, to be a matter of unanimity. We do not want to see division. That is not our aim. We appeal to everyone, therefore, to allow conciliation to proceed so that the seating of a Congolese delegation amongst us will not be a question of votes but will be welcomed by acclamation. This is in the true interests of the United Nations, of Africa as a whole and—first and foremost—of the people, the Head of State and the Government of the Republic of the Congo.

154. With this explanation of vote, I wish to make it clear for the record that Indonesia, without taking sides in the internal conflict, stands squarely and whole-heartedly for conciliation in the Congo to restore the national unity. Every country must safeguard its national unity like the pupil of its eye. With national unity there will be a strong Congo. Without national unity the only prospect is chaos.

155. Mr. ASHA (United Arab Republic): Before explaining the vote which my delegation will cast on the question before us I wish, on behalf of my delegation, to express our deep regret at the tragic events which have taken place in Leopoldville yesterday and today. We particularly deplore the loss of life and the shedding of blood and, therefore, we wish to offer our sincere condolences to the bereaved families of those who lost their lives.

156. As a member of the Credentials Committee, my delegation has had the opportunity to define its position during the meetings of that Committee, as is clearly stated in the Committee's report; and our position remains the same. My delegation is of the opinion that this question should be postponed until the Conciliation Commission, composed in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1474 (ES-IV) has had the opportunity to help to reconcile the various political factions, as has already been decided by the Assembly.

157. The Commission's mandate is a most delicate and difficult one and we believe that the General Assembly should not at this time take any decision which might create additional difficulties. Any action taken by this august body will serve no purpose and might delay the objectives of the United Nations in establishing peace and stability and in restoring normal conditions throughout the entire territory of this African Republic. Let us not aggravate the already serious situation obtaining there, and let us give the

Conciliation Commission the time needed to perform its delicate task.

158. We are saddened to see that the seat of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) in the General Assembly and in our main Committees is still unoccupied. Nothing would have pleased us more than to see a representative of this young Republic participate in our work and make his contribution to it. But in the present circumstances and under the prevailing conditions, we question the wisdom of a hasty decision by the Assembly.

159. In taking this stand, let me assure the Assembly that we are not taking any stand for or against anyone. We are in no way contesting the status of Mr. Kasavubu as Head of the State and President of the Republic of the Congo; nor are we reflecting in any manner on his person, since we hold him in high esteem and respect. On the contrary, we would willingly have voted in favour of the report of the Credentials Committee if the Fundamental Law permitted the President of the Republic of the Congo to represent his country by issuing credentials. But we honestly believe that the time is not opportune for the Assembly to decide on such an important issue which involves very delicate political problems that must be resolved speedily and without further delay. This was clearly demonstrated by the regrettable debate during the last few days which, in our opinion, is not in the interests of the Republic of the Congo and certainly does not render service to the cause of this young African Republic. The tragic events to which I have just referred fortify our stand.

160. In conclusion, let us consider for a moment the future of this Organization and of the peace of the world. It is an unhappy fact, about which none of us is easy, that the world is divided. To every measure which we propose here, to every decision which we take, we must apply the following criterion and ask of it the following question: does it increase and accentuate that division? Does it widen the gulf, or does it help to break it down? I am afraid that in this case the answer must be that the recommendation of the Credentials Committee, if adopted here, will aggravate the situation, widen the gulf and accentuate the conflict. No one can shut his eyes to the fact that on his recommendation sister States from Africa and Asia have become divided, a most regrettable and deplorable fact. Will this division enhance world peace and co-operation? Will it help the Conciliation Commission in its effort to find a just and equitable solution to the present difficulties?

161. Let us think again very carefully before committing ourselves to a course of action in its nature unjust, in its application impracticable, and in its consequences disastrous. That is why my delegation will cast a negative vote on the recommendation of the Credentials Committee.

162. Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): It is with a heavy heart that I come to make the statement which I want to make now. Before I make that statement I will read something from The New York Herald Tribune of Saturday, 19 November 1960, on the front page. I think this should cause the representatives of the African States in the United Nations, particularly, to think. It is on the very front page in bold print. It reads as follows:

"Africans split in fight for UN Congo seat. Mobutu expells Ghana. Kasavubu wins point. Reds lose. Pro-Lumumba manoeuvre fails."

For a few days now we have been listening to a very painful series of displays of eloquence in this Assembly, the net result of which means great agony for Africa and the people of Africa. When I sat and listened to what representatives of various African States said here, that was a very painful scene and a painful spectacle.

163. In 1884 the great Powers of Europe sat in Berlin and divided up Africa amongst themselves. They did not consider the interests of Africa, they did not consider the interests of Africans. In 1960 we see Africa coming back to her own; independent States coming to life again, the black races of the world beginning to have hope; the subjugation that has continued for centuries has hopes of coming to an end.

164. But what do we see? We come to the United Nations; we are admitted. But it appears that we are not accepted as equals. I think this is a matter which African States and African-Asian States should think over very seriously. I want to say, as the chairman of my own delegation—and I am also now the chairman of the United Nations Conciliation Commission to the Congo—that I find it absolutely impossible for me to participate in this disgraceful display in this Assembly. I see the Heads of African States being insulted and abused, I see distinguished representatives of independent African nations abusing themselves, and I see the great Powers wrangling amongst themselves, and perhaps using the smaller countries as pawns in their power politics.

165. Under such circumstances, how can we expect the United Nations to work, to carry out the purpose for which it has been created? This is a question which every representative here must ask himself. I think the time has come when we should give up power politics and think in terms of service politics, service politics to our nation, service politics to the world and service politics to humanity. It is in that spirit that when I was elected to serve in the Commission as chairman I supported the motion—as the chairman of my delegation—that all debates concerning the Congo should be deferred to enable the Commission to work in peace and tranquillity, and I expected that the great Powers would have used their experience and the power at their disposal, their good offices and influence, to make all concerned in the dispute see reason, but I was disappointed.

166. We are the youngest nation here, the ninety-ninth nation. I expected to learn something from those who arrived here before me, but I was badly disappointed. I cannot see how I can participate in the voting one way or the other without destroying the very essence and the basis of peace-making. If I vote one way, the parties to the dispute will say, "Well, you should have supported us. Where is the justice?"

167. In the law justice must not only be done, but it must appear to be done. If I vote on one side, surely, the other party to the dispute will not see me as an impartial chairman of the Commission and, therefore, the only avenue open to me is to refrain from participation either in the debate or in the voting.

168. The Advisory Committee, which was set up by this Assembly, had been given work to do and they have decided that a number of us should go to do this work on their behalf, which ultimately means on behalf of the United Nations. Is it not a sad spectacle, very sad indeed, to see that this same Assembly, the chief

organ of this Organization to try to settle disputes, should take it upon itself to make it impossible for the Committee it has set up to do its work. Under those circumstances it becomes impossible for me, as the chairman, to participate in the debate.

169. The other point is this: Nigeria, as I have said, is the ninety-ninth country in the United Nations. We just got our independence. Whatever had been the ulterior motives, the squabbling that had been going on before we got our independence, we were not participants in the game. We do not see any reason why we should now, at this stage, get ourselves mixed up in the conflict that was created before we arrived. Surely, there must be a spot where that certain sanity still exists.

170. Since we came here, and before we came here, we have been told that we were expected by this Organization to play an important role in Africa. We cannot play that important role if we, without knowing the facts, without knowing the circumstances, decide to jump into somebody's bandwagon one way or the other. I think it is fit and proper that, before Nigeria makes a decision in this great Assembly, we must know the facts. We must be assured in our own mind that we are doing what is in our own conscience. We must not be led by the nose. We believe that every State here is a friendly country, and we must be able to make a decision based on our own judgement. We must not carry out the orders of other people. We should be able to contribute to this Organization because we believe we have the capacity to reason.

171. Having followed the incidents that have taken place in that unfortunate country, the sad effects that have been produced and the losses sustained by some Members of this Organization in that territory, in their mission of help and succour, due to our miscalculations, misjudgements and unwillingness to do the right thing at the right time, and desiring to avoid the extension of this carnage to other sections of the African continent, Nigeria regards the suffering of the Congo as its suffering; Nigeria looks at the success of the Congo as its success, and therefore it is not prepared to soil its hands when a great responsibility has been entrusted to its representative.

172. I know that the spirit that animates the two factions is genuine. Each faction believes that it is doing the right thing. But surely what we want for the Congo is what is best for the people of the Congo and not so much for the person who is placed on the throne to rule. If he must rule successfully, he must rule in accordance with the will of the people and not according to his own caprice.

173. Today, I know and I believe that the delegation proposed by the President of the Republic of the Congo will be seated, but after seating the delegation, have we solved the problem of the Congo? Have we found the Government with which the United Nations can treat? Certainly, we still have the major part of the work to do.

174. Mr. President, with your permission, I am using this opportunity to appeal to the various African States to consider Africa. Let not the heat that has been generated here go deeper than the skin of our body, because to allow it to sink into the bone means laying a foundation for the future destruction of Africa.

175. I think we belong in a democratic body. In any struggle, somebody must win. I take it that representa-

tives here are also sportsmen and sportswomen. You play to win, but if you happen to lose, bide your time; sometime you will win.

176. I take it that the Congo, according to its constitution, is a democratic State. No government is perpetual. And whatever government may be installed now, will only be temporary, according to the constitution, which is also temporary. There may be a face-saving game being played here. But, surely in a democratic society there is always room for change and transformation. The people always have an opportunity to speak their mind.

177. I do not want what I read out, when I started here, to become permanent: "Africans split." I do not want this debate in this Assembly over the report of the Credentials Committee of the United Nations to produce effects which will make the African representatives in this Assembly continue to be split. I am using this opportunity to appeal to all concerned in this matter, the African-Asian groups, not to allow yourselves to be split. The moment you are split you become a pawn in the hands of power politics. The problems of the Congo at the moment should not become an excuse for brothers to become bitter enemies.

178. We read what has happened in the Congo in relation to Ghana, Tunisia and others. These are African States. We also read what happened to Ireland a small, peace-loving State which went on a mission of peace and assistance, and yet suffered casualties. Surely, this should teach us a lesson.

179. I have taken this opportunity to say this as the youngest of the lot because I want guidance; and if I feel that the guidance I am getting is not the type that I expected, I will say so. And I will say so without any fear because I know, Mr. President, that your gavel is there behind me, ready at all times to call to order anybody who disturbs my peace.

180. I have come here to explain to the Assembly that Nigeria will not be a participant one way or the other. Some may suggest, "Well, you were elected in your personal capacity as Chairman of the Commission, but you are a representative of your country and your delegation." It becomes absolutely impossible for anybody in my position to draw a fine distinction between the leadership of the delegation and chairmanship of the Conciliation Commission. Since I am not able to draw that distinction now, and have no intention of drawing that distinction, I have decided to combine myself in one person, combining two categories, but as only one human being with one judgement at this moment.

181. For this reason, before the vote is taken, in case anybody may be under any illusion lest my vote be misunderstood, I thought it meet and proper to explain myself.

182. The PRESIDENT: The list of speakers which was closed yesterday is now exhausted. Before the Assembly proceeds to the vote, however, I give the floor to the Secretary-General.

183. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: My attention has been drawn to an intervention on a point of order this afternoon by the representative of Guinea. In his intervention he referred to a letter of today from President Kasa-Vubu addressed to me, and he wanted this letter to be communicated to the General Assembly. The letter is the fourth in a correspondence which has

taken place between President Kasa-Vubu and the Advisory Committee, on the initiative of the Advisory Committee. It should thus be read in the context of the previous letters. Further, I received it, not in my capacity as Secretary-General, but as representative, indeed, Chairman of the Advisory Committee. I must regard it so far as the property of the Advisory Committee.

184. I have called a meeting of the Advisory Committee for this evening; then the letter will be communicated to the Committee and discussed. I have, however, already communicated it to the Conciliation Commission. The question of communication of the letter, at this stage, to the General Assembly was raised and discussed, and I think that the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission will bear me out that the conclusion of that discussion was that it would be in good order if the letter was first given to, and discussed by, the Advisory Committee.

185. Further, I must add that I have received later in the afternoon an oral communication from President Kasa-Vubu regarding the same letter which, in most important respects, throws light on his intention and on the right interpretation of the letter.

186. In these various circumstances, I feel, to my regret, that I am not in a position to comply with the request to communicate the letter now to the General Assembly.

187. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Mali on a point of order.

188. Mr. AW (Mali) (translated from French): I apologize for taking the floor after so much discussion and hasten to state that I have no intention whatever of trying to delay the proceedings, for I know that a vote will be taken, if not this evening then tomorrow morning.

189. I asked to speak on a point of order following the Guinean representative's statement; in view of the Secretary-General's statement, I consider that my point of order is still valid.

190. The Secretary-General mentioned a letter about which the Guinean representative has given us certain information. He told us—not having read the letter myself, I must refer to what he said—that, in his opinion, this letter dealt with very important matters and he gave us an inkling of them.

191. I should, therefore, like to ask the Assembly not to proceed to the vote until it has had an opportunity to learn the contents of this letter. The Secretary-General has just informed us that it would be discussed first of all by the Advisory Committee; after that it would be decided whether the letter would be communicated to the Assembly.

192. This letter would seem to be of very great importance because, in addition to what the Guinean representative had to say about it, we find a comment on the same lines in a newspaper—*Le Monde* of 20 November 1960. It concerns the Conciliation Commission. The Assembly will recall that many arguments have been based on this Conciliation Commission, and everyone has acknowledged that probably the only way still open to us if we are to make any progress, is to send a Conciliation Commission. Everyone has agreed that, as soon as the delegation appointed by Mr. Kasa-Vubu takes its seat in this Assembly, the

Conciliation Commission could leave for Leopoldville, since its date of departure has already been arranged. Consequently, there is a clear link between the Conciliation Commission and the seating of the delegation whose credentials have been submitted to us.

193. As I said, *Le Monde* of 20 November contained certain comments on this subject. I quote the following passage, attributed to a certain Mr. Nussbaumer who, I believe, acts as Minister of the Interior in the Congo: "We shall do everything in our power to prevent the members of the Conciliation Commission from landing. If we have to send the 5,000 troops who took part in the march past to the airport at Leopoldville, we shall do so..."

194. The PRESIDENT: The Chair gave the floor to the representative of Mali just before the voting because it understood he had a point of order to raise. I would ask him to be good enough to make clear what his point of order is.

195. Mr. AW (Mali) (translated from French): I thought that I had indicated what my point of order was, but I shall repeat it. It is that the Assembly should not proceed to the vote until it has seen the contents of the document that has been referred to. I am not specifying the length of the suspension or adjournment. I am merely saying that the Assembly should be able to examine this letter. But the Secretary-General has informed us that the Advisory Committee is to consider this document first of all, at a meeting to take place this evening, and that its contents will then be communicated to the Assembly.

196. I formally propose, therefore, that the Assembly should not proceed to the vote until it has examined this letter. I apologize for having digressed slightly, with the object of showing the close link between this letter and our discussion.

197. The PRESIDENT: I am not sure that I quite understood the point of order, but I understood it to be that we should suspend or adjourn this meeting until the Assembly has had an opportunity to see the letter. If this proposal is made under rule 78, as I take it to be, I will put the proposal to the Assembly, that it should suspend its meeting and should not proceed until it has read the letter. As members will be aware, under rule 78 this has to be put to the vote immediately, and I now put it to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Cuba, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Togo, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon.

Against: Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cam-

eroun, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica.

Abstaining: Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, Sweden, Venezuela, Austria, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic.

Present but not voting: Nigeria.

The motion was rejected by 47 votes to 32, with 16 abstentions.

198. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now proceed to vote on the proposals before it—namely, the draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in its report [A/4578, para. 13] and the amendment [A/L.322/Rev.1] to that draft resolution proposed by the delegation of Guinea.

199. In accordance with rule 92 of the Assembly's rules of procedure, I shall put to the vote first the amendment [A/L.322/Rev.1] proposed by the delegation of Guinea. A vote by roll-call has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Greece, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana.

Against: Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroun, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon.

Abstaining: Iran, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, Tunisia, Venezuela, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic.

Present but not voting: Nigeria.

The amendment was rejected by 50 votes to 32, with 14 abstentions.

200. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now proceed to vote on the draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in its report [A/4578, para. 13].

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Bulgaria, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Cameroun, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pana-

ma, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania.

Abstaining: Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela.

Present but not voting: Nigeria.

The draft resolution was adopted by 53 votes to 24, with 19 abstentions.

201. The PRESIDENT: Two delegations have asked for the floor to explain their votes after the voting. I call on the first of these, who is the representative of Mali.

202. Mr. AW (Mali) (translated from French): Although I have already had an opportunity to explain here the reasons which compelled my delegation to vote against the resolution of the Credentials Committee, I have asked for the floor in explanation of vote in order to make a brief statement.

203. It will be recalled that I concluded my statement in the general debate [920th plenary meeting] by making express reservations on behalf of my Government concerning our participation in the Conciliation Commission. In view of the result of the vote which has just been taken, I must officially announce to the Assembly the decision of the Government of the Republic of Mali to withdraw from the Conciliation Commission. President Modibo Keita, the Head of the Government of Mali, has instructed me to convey to the Assembly his very great disappointment at the new turn given by the United Nations to the Congo crisis. The Government and the people of Mali express their concern at the Congolese test case which may create a terrible precedent—that of the independence and integrity of a young African State being jeopardized under the flag of the United Nations.

204. Africa is certainly the continent that expects the most from the United Nations, the continent where the areas critical for world peace are increasing in number under the pressure of the irresistible liberation movement in the colonized countries which the colonialist nations are trying to hold back. The consequences if the United Nations were to lose prestige in the eyes of the African peoples would be extremely grave. The road along which this vote is now leading the United Nations is not an African road, it is not the road to peace; it is one of the most serious threats to the Organization's prestige.

205. That was the brief message which I was instructed to convey to the Assembly on behalf of the President of the Government of the Republic of Mali.

206. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) (translated from French): The Belgian delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution accepting the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)

not only because that resolution was based on the conclusions of the Credentials Committee but also because, under rule 27 of the Assembly's rules of procedure, the validity of the credentials issued by the Head of State of the Congo cannot be challenged.

207. The long and venomous diatribe which the Saudi Arabian representative just launched against Belgium in characteristic style, a diatribe totally irrelevant to the present debate, left my delegation completely unmoved and had no influence on our vote. My delegation considers this collection of slanderous charges as unworthy of consideration. It is amazed, however, that a representative who a short time ago voted in favour of the adjournment of the debate on the Congo question should have seen fit to express his views at such length on the Second Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo.

208. The Belgian Government will, in due course, make known its position and its views regarding this report which, in any case, was not scheduled to be discussed today.

209. The accusations made against Belgium by the Soviet and some other delegations have also failed to move my delegation. It regarded them as merely a diversionary and provocative manoeuvre which it wishes to denounce publicly. It did not allow itself to be led astray by this manoeuvre, and refrained from lengthening the discussion by intervening but, since the Soviet delegation has seen fit to repeat the trite charge of Belgian aggression for the hundredth time, my delegation finds itself compelled once again to reject those slanderous allegations. May we remind the Assembly that no United Nations organ has ever condemned Belgium as an aggressor in the Congo. On the contrary, on 14 July 1960, when the Soviet amendment to add the words "Condemns the armed aggression by Belgium against the Republic of the Congo" was put to the vote in the Security Council, only the Soviet Union and one other delegation which, in all circumstances, votes in the same way as the USSR, voted in its favour. The amendment was thus rejected by an overwhelming majority in the Security Council.^{3/} At the emergency special session of the General Assembly on 19 September 1960, the USSR representative deemed it preferable, in order to avoid defeat, to evade a vote on a draft resolution which included a condemnation of Belgium [863rd meeting, para. 267].

210. But if the USSR thus persists in repeating its accusations against Belgium, my country is entitled to recall the condemnations of the USSR expressed in resolutions which, in this case, were adopted by the General Assembly.

211. A resolution of 14 September 1957 condemns the Soviet Union, in particular for having "deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights" [resolution 1133 (XI)]. It also condemns the USSR's continued defiance of the Assembly's resolutions.

212. Those resolutions *inter alia* called on the USSR to withdraw all its forces from Hungarian territory without delay. But, as everyone knows, the USSR has refused to withdraw its troops from Hungary. The

^{3/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, 873rd meeting, paras. 223-226.

situation of Belgium and my country's attitude to the United Nations resolutions was quite different. Belgium complied with those resolutions. The Security Council, without condemning my country in any way, called upon it to withdraw its troops from the Congo. Paragraph 35 of the Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Dayal, contains the following statement:

"The withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga, with the sole exception of technical personnel temporarily required at Kamina base, has been completed." [A/4557, para. 35.]

I must add that, as early as 8 August, Belgian troops had withdrawn from the rest of Congolese territory.

213. The Soviet Union representative is hardly in a position to give lessons to Belgium in the matter of compliance with United Nations resolutions. The Soviet representative adds a further complaint: he asserts that, according to recent statements, the Belgian Government intends to continue its opposition to the Organization's resolutions and refuses to co-operate with it. Those assertions are completely without foundation. In fact, the Belgian Government has expressed its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations on the basis of the respect due to a sovereign nation and a Member of the Organization.

The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m.