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President: Mr. Víctor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 74:

Question of Hungary (concluded)

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE ON HUNGARY (A/4304) (concluded)

1. Mr. UMAÑA BERNAL (Colombia) (*translated from Spanish*): The Colombian delegation has co-sponsored the present draft resolution on the question of Hungary [A/L.273] just as it has co-sponsored all the other resolutions which the General Assembly has adopted on this item since November 1956 in the wake of the terrible events at Budapest which justly aroused the whole world.

2. In so doing, we consider that we are faithfully interpreting the views of the Government of Colombia and of its President, Mr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, who had the honour to be a member of the first committee set up to investigate these events and who, since then, has had to endure the negative, insolent and even insulting attitude of the authorities of the so-called Hungarian People's Republic towards the most qualified representatives of this Organization. We also feel that, by co-sponsoring this draft resolution and supporting it with enthusiasm and determination, we are interpreting the unanimous opinion of the Colombian people who, without distinction of opinion or political beliefs, have always, and in every possible way, expressed their passionate disapproval of the brutal repression of the liberation movement of 1956 and their indignation that this unjust and merciless

repression and this grave violation of human rights continue to exist.

3. The Colombian delegation has taken the occasion in previous years to comment at length on the events which occurred in Hungary in the autumn of 1956 and on the subsequent activities of the Government of Mr. Kádár. We do not, therefore, need to dwell upon those facts, which, in any case, are well known and on which world public opinion—to which reference has so frequently been made during this session and with so little sincerity—has already pronounced its irrevocable judgement.

4. The condemnation of that repression was supported not only by the democratic and liberal leaders of all regions and of all races, but also by social democrats, free trade-unions, and even many Communist sympathizers and militant Communists. I should never finish if I attempted to give names in support of this fact. I shall content myself with referring to the views of Jean-Paul Sartre, the renowned French philosopher and writer, who enjoys great prestige and whose intellectual independence and honesty have been praised many times in literary and political publications of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

5. There are many militant Communists who share these views, and the Communist organizations throughout the world have not yet been able to recover from the emotional shock produced by that upheaval. Dozens of books could be written containing sound and indisputable proof of this fact.

6. For this Assembly, however, the report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary [A/3592] is enough. This report shows that there was no uprising of fascists and reactionaries in Hungary and that those who fell in the streets of Budapest under the fire of the Soviet tanks and those who, according to the information from the United Nations Representative on Hungary, are still being shot or sentenced to life imprisonment in Hungary were, and still are, mostly workers, students, intellectuals and members of the middle class.

7. There likewise seems to be no need, at this stage of the debate, to dwell on whether the draft resolution we are discussing is or is not suitable and appropriate, or whether its adoption will prejudice the attempts which are being made to relax world tension and end the cold war.

8. When the Colombian delegation took part in the discussion on general and complete disarmament in the First Committee, it raised some doubts as to the success of negotiations for material disarmament so long as the determination to seek the peaceful co-existence so necessary for spiritual disarmament was not given tangible expression. We said at that time that situations unfortunately existed which did not allow us to be over-optimistic. We were thinking then, among other things, of Hungary and the continuing

oppression there and of the outrageous attitude of the Hungarian Government, which has defied the resolutions adopted by an overwhelming majority of this Assembly and has refused to admit the special representatives of the United Nations. We were thinking, too, of Hungary when we referred in our speech to the old proverb *homo homini lupus*.

9. What is really thwarting the spirit of peace is not proposals such as the one which we are discussing and which simply asks for clemency and moderation, but rather the violent rejection of the representatives and the resolutions of this Organization of peace. If the draft resolution under discussion has any defect at all, it is the excessively mild terms in which it has been couched. However, as the saying goes in every language, courtesy is no sign of weakness, so that any effort made towards peaceful coexistence is desirable and praiseworthy. What does seem to be going too far is that we should be asked to stop hearing and seeing and that the Assembly should, without any cause, revoke the authority of its special representatives.

10. It likewise seems inappropriate, at this stage, to dwell on the allusions which have been made in this debate to the principle of non-intervention and on the interpretations of the famous Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which is frequently quoted to fit the views of the speaker and which, according to a Spanish proverb, serves as a mop as well as a broom or, in other words, is a sort of Jack of all trades.

11. On several previous occasions, moreover, the General Assembly, in unambiguous terms and by a majority of votes far exceeding the minimum required by the rules of procedure, has already pronounced on the competence of the United Nations to deal with the question of Hungary. The Security Council has done likewise, and thus it seems to me that, as regards this aspect of the problem, decisions have been made which can justifiably be regarded as final.

12. It has also been said during this debate, and on a number of other occasions, that the entry of troops of the Soviet Union into Hungary and their continued presence there was and is a lawful act done at the request of the rightful Government of the country. It is interesting to note that many of those who hold this view maintained the very opposite in the debate on the question of Korea, when they denied the right of the Government of the Republic of Korea to request assistance and military support, not from a foreign Power, but from the United Nations itself.

13. The proposal before us needs no explanation. Its terms are crystal-clear, and there is nothing to be read between the lines, as has often been the case with other resolutions which we have discussed within these walls.

14. My delegation is not very optimistic about the effect which will be achieved by this new decision of the Assembly. We must not, however, lose hope that the Hungarian Republic and its allies will agree to modify their attitude and so remove this serious obstacle to the realization of plans for world peace. Above all, the Assembly cannot remain silent in the face of the report of the eminent United Nations Representative which it appointed just a year ago, and it must, for reasons which are plain to see, renew its confidence in him. We must also, by adopting this draft resolution, reaffirm our sympathy for the noble

people of Hungary, who are so worthy of a better fate but cannot, unfortunately, give free expression to their views.

15. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I call upon the representative of Hungary to exercise his right of reply.

16. Mr. PETER (Hungary): One of my main points was that, whatever the opinion of delegations regarding the origin and nature of the counter-revolution, it should be the main task in this respect of the United Nations to safeguard Hungary against being used in the cold war.

17. It was a continuously debated question during this discussion whether this is a cold war issue or not. Those who pressed for inclusion of this item in the agenda tried to defend themselves rather actively during the whole debate against being held responsible for renewed cold war tensions. The continuous self-defence is an indication in itself that they also are aware of the cold war effects of the matter under discussion. It cannot be otherwise; the effects are being experienced. This is a cold war debate and it is easy to demonstrate it.

18. The cold war was the main and comprehensive factor in the origin of the counter-revolution. One might even say that this was the last major act of the so-called cold war period. So it is the cold war itself which keeps this item on the agenda.

19. There is even more evident proof of the cold war character of this debate. What is the real meaning of the cold war in the present situation? To pose questions in such a way that the answer cannot but be negative; to invent and raise allegations in a way that makes clarification impossible; to speak about negotiations in such a way as to prevent narrowing the gaps; to show readiness for agreement in such a way as to intensify differences; to make proposals in such a way as to rule out, and even with the intent of ruling out, the possibility of their acceptance. Consequently, both substance and methods in this debate are reflections of the cold war spirit.

20. We have demonstrated that previous resolutions, as well as the present draft, are so outrageous that it is absolutely certain that there is not one Member State which would comply with them.

21. My delegation made it clear in the plenary meeting at which inclusion was debated that:

"If any further steps by the United Nations in any form whatsoever are in any way connected with previous resolutions, or with the honourable gentleman acting on the basis of resolution 1312 (XIII), they would predetermine their own fate." [844th meeting, para. 27.]

22. After this statement was made and before the present draft resolution was prepared, nobody consulted any competent representative of the Hungarian Government to find out what sort of solution could be admissible, if any.

23. It is up to the delegations to judge whether this is a correct way of dealing with matters in the General Assembly. One could even conclude that the basic intent of some was precisely to create such a situation as would rule out any possibility of solution. This is a real reflection of the cold war spirit.

24. As to the debate, I only wish to mention the following points: I have demonstrated with a true and clear picture of the counter-revolution that no foreign intervention, as described in the document before us [A/4304], took place in quelling the counter-revolution, and that in the whole matter there is a basic contradiction between the political intentions of the United States and the real interests and aspirations of the Hungarian people. I heard nothing in this debate that could have weakened the validity of my statement.

25. Just to illustrate how quotations were used in a misleading way in the debate, I refer to two instances.

26. Mr. Lodge quoted a part of a sentence by First Secretary János Kádár: "The Hungarian people still have a score to settle with the counter-revolutionaries" [848th meeting, para. 60]. If he had relied on the whole context of the speech, and not on misled or misleading reports, he would have realized that in the context of this sentence it was stated, on the one hand, that we dealt in a conciliatory way with the tremendous crimes of the counter-revolution, and, on the other, it was a warning against international reactionary forces.

27. Some speakers referred to a statement Prime Minister Khrushchev made in Budapest, but they relied upon superficial journalistic reports and comments in the New York press instead of the text itself. For instance, in one of the points quoted here, Prime Minister Khrushchev stated just the opposite of what they alleged. The statement of Prime Minister Khrushchev in its true context pointed up a sharp contrast, saying that Western Powers are not shocked when illegal interventions take place for the sake of saving reactionary régimes, but they are shocked when, on the demand of a socialist government, aid is given for the sake of the workers' power, without the character of foreign intervention.

28. In response to allegations made against the Hungarian People's Republic during the debate, I only wish to recall the offer made to representatives by the Foreign Minister of Hungary to come and see Hungary for themselves. In this spirit, I should say that Mr. Lodge would be welcomed in Hungary and, in that case, he could see the true realities and he would not be obliged to rely on misleading reports.

29. Finally, regarding the demands made here, I wish to summarize very briefly what I understand and what I do not understand in this respect.

30. It is easy to understand that the NATO Powers would like to achieve the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. It is easy to understand that representatives of Governments intending to transplant subversive elements into Hungary are not pleased by the vigilance with which we guard our frontiers. It is easy to understand that propagators of the capitalist system would like to reimpose an obsolete social system on Hungary. It is easy to understand that those who supported the counter-revolution would like to protect their collaborators and are unable to discard them overnight for the sake of the relaxation of tensions.

31. One can understand all this, but one cannot understand on what basis the United Nations is used as an instrument of the bloc policy. On what grounds is the United Nations humiliated and transformed into an amphitheatre for those who thrive on world tensions? On what grounds and for what good is the United Na-

tions presented as if it were a subsidiary organ of United States foreign policy in this matter? When we oppose such actions contrary to the Charter, we do so for the sake of this Organization as well, and not only for the sake of Hungary.

32. In conclusion, I wish to recall that, in my intervention [848th meeting], by incontestable facts, I have demonstrated that Sir Leslie Munro has made it impossible for himself to represent the United Nations on any matter in any capacity in any connexion with Hungary. Therefore, those who vote in favour of the present draft resolution give the impression that they themselves do not take this draft resolution seriously. The resolution will only show to the Hungarian people that they should be vigilant in safeguarding the achievements of the workers' state and to continue their march with even greater strides in implementing the great humanitarian values of socialism which mean peace, freedom and justice in a new epoch of human existence.

33. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call on the United Nations Representative on Hungary, Sir Leslie Munro, to exercise his right of reply.

34. Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand), United Nations Representative on Hungary: Mr. President, I wish to thank you and the Members of the Assembly for permitting me to address you again.

35. I wish to correct the statement of the representative of Hungary on two points of fact. References to violation of the political independence of Hungary and to United Nations concern for its re-establishment will be found in several resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, and perhaps I can recount them: resolutions 1131 (XI) of 12 December 1956, 1133 (XI) of 14 September 1957 and 1312 (XIII) of 12 December 1958. The expressions in question, therefore, have not been taken from United States utterances as the representative of Hungary alleges. The part of my report, to which he had referred, like all other parts, is based upon the most careful attention to the terms of the General Assembly resolutions.

36. The representative of Hungary described as a scandalous invention paragraph 31 of the report. He observed that two correspondents visited a Hungarian spokesman on 17 October 1959 in connexion with a list of thirty-one people alleged to have been executed. He added that the spokesman informed them that, during the last three years, not one of the people on the list had even been up for trial or arraignment. The representative of Hungary stated that the report claimed that the Hungarian spokesman actually confirmed the news about these executions, that is, the execution of thirty-one named people.

37. In fact, my report makes no such claim. The paragraph in question does not relate to the question of the thirty-one executions. Reference is made to the thirty-one alleged executions only in paragraph 33 of my report and there—I think Members of the Assembly will recall—I give the full text of Mr. Kádár's denial. In paragraph 34, I say: "Mr. Kádár's denial is to be welcomed". Can anything be clearer?

38. Paragraph 31 relates to the trial and execution of quite different people. It relates to people from Újpest, an industrial suburb of Budapest. The representative of Hungary tries to rebut paragraph 31 by applying to that paragraph a denial which his own

words show to have been related to quite a different matter.

39. During the course of the morning, there was some reference to a difference between Camp Goliath and Camp David. Coming from my own country, with its record, I prefer to be on the side of David. There is nothing possible in this grave matter that can be an occasion for either derision or mirth. I think back to the days of 1956 when I represented my Government at the Assembly, and I think back to the days of that holocaust and I think, as we all must think at this moment, of those who died, those who suffered, those who subsequently were hanged and put to death, because they had risen against an alien domination. And I think too of Imre Nagy. Is it seriously suggested by anybody here that Mr. Nagy was a fascist? And there are some who could hang their heads in shame when they think of the fate of that man who was taken in breach of the most solemn undertakings from a place of refuge in Budapest and then, as I understand it, he was taken to Romania and subsequently brought back to Budapest and hanged by the neck until he was dead.

40. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Assembly will now vote on the draft resolution submitted by Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, France, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay [A/L.273]. A vote by roll-call has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Romania, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal.

Against: Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland.

Abstaining: Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 53 votes to 10, with 17 abstentions.**

41. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The consideration of the so-called question of Hungary, renewed upon the initiative of a certain group of countries headed by

the United States, constitutes, as already pointed out by the Czechoslovak delegation in the General Committee [125th meeting], a flagrant violation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, especially Article 2, paragraph 7, which does not permit any interference on the part of the United Nations in the internal affairs of any Member State.

42. The advocates of the "cold war" are very much concerned about the continuing relaxation of international tension and by the results which the present session of the Assembly has achieved up to now. Therefore, they attempt in every possible way to prevent the complete liquidation of the "cold war" in international relations and, to this end, breed various provocations here in the United Nations. The provocative consideration of the so-called question of Hungary, just as the so-called question of Tibet, constituted, therefore, a further link in the chain of actions of the forces of the "cold war" and was undertaken with the intention of poisoning the atmosphere of the current session of the General Assembly and of aggravating the international situation.

43. It is a well known fact also that, in the past, these circles have always used the so-called question of Hungary to aggravate international tension and to divert attention both from their own aggressive acts in various parts of the world and from the solution of urgent international problems.

44. The consideration of the so-called question of Hungary in the United Nations was based on the report presented in document A/4304. This report represents nothing but a compilation of untruths and slanders about the Hungarian People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It betrays the disappointment and hatred of those aggressive circles in the world which still cannot reconcile themselves to the fact that the counter-revolutionary "putsch" of the Hungarian reaction in 1956, inspired and actively supported by international forces of imperialism, came to a miserable failure and that the Hungarian people ever resolutely embarked upon the road towards socialism.

45. The repeated consideration of the so-called question of Hungary in the United Nations forum was only another attempt at an inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries and the launching of slanderous campaigns against them.

46. The socialist countries, and among them also Czechoslovakia, have their own experience with the interference of imperialist quarters in their domestic affairs. Many times, and also from this rostrum, they have drawn attention to the fact that some countries, and in particular the United States, have been engaged in the systematic organization of varied forms of interference, including the sending out of spies and subversive agents, the organizing of slanderous campaigns, as was the so-called "Captive Nations Week", different forms of economic discrimination and similar aggressive actions.

47. In view of the fact that the consideration of the non-existent question of Hungary, as well as the draft resolution contained in document A/L.273, represented a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, especially Article 2, paragraph 7, and formed another example of inadmissible interference in the domestic affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary, the

*The delegation of Haiti, which was absent at the time of the voting, subsequently informed the President that Haiti would have cast its vote in favour of the draft resolution. See paragraph 51 below.

The delegation of Morocco, which was absent at the time of the voting, subsequently informed the President that Morocco would have abstained.

Czechoslovak delegation voted against this provocative draft resolution.

48. Mr. DE FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil): I disagree profoundly with my old friend, the representative of Czechoslovakia. It is not possible and it is not admissible, even if one admits you are tolerant, Mr. President, for a question that has been inscribed on the agenda, the question of Hungary, to be referred to repeatedly as the "so-called question of Hungary". It is impossible for me to admit that you would tolerate that.

49. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should like to tell the representatives gathered in this Assembly what I once told my distinguished friend, the representative of Brazil, namely, that, until there is a change for the better in the somewhat corrupted forms of diplomatic expression that have now become current, the greatest forbearance must be exercised by the President. That is why I did not consider it expedient to call the representative of Czechoslovakia to order. Moreover, the Assembly is well aware that I am exceedingly reluctant to call representatives to order. When I have done so, it has been in the form of a request that they do not press some matter which might cause offence in the Assembly.

50. I now call on the representative of Haiti even though no specific item is at present under discussion.

51. Mr. AUGUSTE (Haiti) (translated from French): I must apologize for arriving late. The voting had already taken place. I should like Haiti to be regarded as having supported the resolution which has just been adopted.

52. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The request of the representative of Haiti will be noted in the official record of the meeting.

AGENDA ITEM 26

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea

REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/4307)

Pursuant to rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the First Committee.

Mr. Fekini (Libya), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of that Committee.

53. Mr. ROBERTSON (United States of America): As one of the original co-sponsors of the draft resolution on Korea contained in the report of the First Committee [A/4307], the United States earnestly commends it to the Assembly for favourable action. The United States will vote for the draft resolution and hopes that it will be adopted by an impressive majority.

54. This draft resolution is the necessary minimum action which the Assembly must take in order to maintain the principles which the United Nations has determined are required to achieve a solution in which the people of Korea have genuine freedom of choice about their future. These principles are: first, that the United Nations under its Charter is fully and right-fully empowered to take collective action to repeal aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea; second, that, in order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely

free elections should be held, under United Nations supervision, for representatives in a National Assembly in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in all parts of Korea.

55. This is a just, positive and forward-looking policy. It can bring peace, independence and unity to the 31 million people of Korea if the Communists are willing to enter into negotiations on this basis. The Communist authorities, as we all know, have spurned these principles laid down by the United Nations. Instead, they have offered a thinly-disguised formula by which the United Nations would abandon its own principles and abandon Korea to Communist conquest in the bargain.

56. First, they want the United Nations to admit that all of our resolutions are null and void, that the United Nations was the aggressor in Korea—which is a fantastic distortion of its role as a world body to preserve peace—and that this Organization has lost all competence and moral authority to deal fairly with the Korean question. Obviously, we must reject this demand, since it directly attacks the authority of this Organization and the fundamental principles on which it was founded.

57. Second, the Communists demand that the troops of the United Nations Command—or as they put it, "foreign forces"—should leave Korea. There is not a single foreign military unit in the Republic of Korea except as a member of the United Nations Command and as a result of United Nations resolutions. In fact, General Assembly resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950, specifically calls upon United Nations forces to remain in Korea until the country has been unified in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly. To withdraw these United Nations forces while Korea is still divided and while events in North Korea remain hidden from view, would simply invite a repetition of the disastrous Communist aggression of 1950.

58. Finally, the Communists demand all-Korean elections under the supervision of what they call a "neutral-nations organization". If they want genuinely neutral and impartial supervision, they can certainly find it among the eighty-two Members of the United Nations. But they refuse this.

59. I am sure I speak for the vast majority of Member States in saying that our only wish for the Korean people is that they may live in peace and unity and be the masters of their own destiny. We profoundly hope that the Communist authorities will see the wisdom of co-operating with the United Nations to that end. The question is how that hope can be advanced. It cannot be advanced if the United Nations abandons its principles and leaves Korea exposed once again to military conquest. It can be advanced if the United Nations stands fast on the just and progressive policy which is embodied in this draft resolution. If others are stubborn for the wrong, let us be steadfast for the right.

60. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We have before us the report of the First Committee on the Korean question containing a draft resolution originally by fourteen countries. It is on this draft resolution in particular that the Soviet delegation wishes to explain its position.

61. One of the characteristic features of the debate on this question in the First Committee was the fact that the majority of delegations mentioned the present significant trend towards an improvement in international relations. This trend is in large measure due to the conversations between Mr. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and Mr. Eisenhower, the President of the United States of America.

62. According to the communiqué issued, during those talks "the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the United States agreed that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation".

63. The Korean problem is one such outstanding international question. What method for its settlement do the sponsors of the draft resolution propose? It is only necessary to look closely at operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution to be convinced that the method proposed in that paragraph for the settlement of the Korean problem has nothing in common with a spirit of co-operation or with the concept of peaceful settlement of all international questions through negotiation. In that paragraph, and indeed throughout the draft resolution, the note of dictation and the cold war is struck yet again.

64. The draft resolution demands that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should unreservedly accept principles unilaterally set forth by the nations that participated in the war against that country. The application of such principles would mean nothing more or less than the extension to the whole of the Korean peninsula of the reactionary Syngman Rhee régime.

65. What remains of the idea of negotiation when, at meetings of the First Committee, the reasonable proposal to invite representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take part in discussion of the Korean question is mechanically rejected again and again? And, after that, a paragraph is included in the draft resolution asserting that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is unwilling to recognize the validity of any United Nations resolution on the Korean question. It is, however, a well-known fact that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has frequently stated that it refuses to recognize, not any United Nations resolution on the Korean question, as is maintained in the present proposal, but any resolution illegally adopted without the participation of its representatives.

66. It is logical to ask the sponsors of the draft resolution whether they themselves would be ready to accept a resolution adopted without their participation. It seems to me that in these days it would be difficult to find a Government which would voluntarily agree to accept a decision taken without its participation, particularly when it contains a demand for capitulation.

67. All of you heard the impudent statement made by the gentleman from South Korea at a meeting of the First Committee. He categorically and unashamedly stated that the Syngman Rhee Government would not allow elections in South Korea, that elections should be held only in North Korea, while foreign troops are still present, and then only to fill the vacant seats in the South Korean Parliament. We do not seem to have heard any protest by the States sponsoring the draft

resolution against this wild demand, nor do we seem to find anything in the draft resolution to condemn this sort of aggressive policy. Indeed, the draft resolution before us does not in fact conflict with such demands but rather supports them.

68. This is how the countries sponsoring the draft resolution approach the settlement of the Korean question. We reject this approach as unrealistic and as a product of the "cold war". It is an inflexible approach based on the bankrupt "positions of strength" policy, and its only purpose is to perpetuate the dead-lock on the Korean question, to consolidate the division of Korea and to maintain foreign troops in the southern part of the Korean peninsula.

69. Clearly, influential circles in some countries are anxious that the United Nations should retain its role as a "belligerent" in defiance of the Charter, which clearly states that the United Nations is to be an organ for reconciliation and co-operation among countries.

70. In this connexion, one cannot but recall the following statement made by Mr. Khrushchev at the beginning of the General Assembly:

"The distinguishing feature of a properly functioning international body is that such a body decides issues not by formally counting up votes, but by searching intelligently and patiently for a just solution which is acceptable to all." [799th meeting, para. 99.]

He went on to say:

"Our generation, and the historians of the future, will recognize decisions of that kind as being the only correct and only possible ones." [Ibid.]

71. If we wish to ensure a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, it is necessary to discard a dictatorial policy once and for all and to adopt the realistic course of searching for mutually acceptable solutions designed primarily to promote the interests of the Korean people themselves and to establish conditions for a lasting peace in the area. This is the approach which would be in accordance with the aims and spirit of the United Nations Charter.

72. An example of a constructive approach, a desire for negotiations and a readiness to pave the way for the peaceful unification of Korea was given by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea when, as far back as February 1958, it put forward realistic proposals for the peaceful unification of Korea. The proposals provided for the withdrawal of foreign troops from South and North Korea and for the subsequent organization of free elections throughout the country. The proposals of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were supported by the Governments of many States. They were warmly approved and supported by all those who genuinely seek a just settlement of the Korean problem, the speediest possible end to the division of the country and the establishment of lasting peace in the Far East.

73. The whole world knows that the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were not mere paper proposals. The Chinese people's volunteers left the territory of the Republic. It must be pointed out in this connexion that the sponsors of the draft resolution have preferred to omit mention of this most important step towards the unification of the country. That is no accident, as the sponsors of this proposal

are trying to justify by every possible means the continuance of the foreign occupation of South Korea either under the United Nations flag or under cover of a military treaty between the United States and South Korea.

74. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has made repeated proposals for the organization of free elections under genuinely unbiased and impartial supervision, after the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Korean peninsula. That Government is consistently seeking to develop economic and cultural ties with South Korea.

75. But what steps have the Western Powers taken for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question? All that they can show in reply to that question is a pile of unproductive resolutions, which have been foisted upon the United Nations year by year and which have done nothing and can do nothing to bring the Korean question even one stage closer to solution.

76. Any attempt at an objective evaluation of the existing situation inevitably leads to the following conclusions.

77. Firstly, the Governments of the People's Republic of China and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have in recent years made a number of serious efforts to settle the Korean problem on a just basis. The most important contribution to that end is the withdrawal of the Chinese people's volunteers from North Korea. These efforts have been persistently ignored by the Western Powers.

78. Secondly, the one-sided resolutions in the nature of ultimatums, which have been foisted on the United Nations from year to year, have proved to be scraps of paper and even their sponsors never believed or have lost faith in their effectiveness.

79. Thirdly, if the Western Powers are not in fact at present engaged in evolving plans for the forcible unification of Korea, then the draft resolution before the General Assembly can only be interpreted as evidence of its sponsors' desire to perpetuate the division of Korea and to maintain their forces there.

80. This is an objective and realistic evaluation of the situation, and none of the high-sounding references to peace and security, free elections and democracy, in which the draft resolution abounds, will hide the true facts, the true state of affairs.

81. Accordingly, the Soviet delegation believes it essential to emphasize once again that the continued presence of foreign troops in South Korea is the chief obstacle to the settlement of the Korean problem. Attempts to justify the retention of those troops on one ground or another are without foundation.

82. In his report to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government, convincingly showed that circumstances are now favourable for proceeding step by step towards a settlement of the Korean question. In his view, the first step in that direction should be the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea.

83. The initiative now lies with the United States.

84. The Soviet delegation will vote against the draft resolution, as it is designed to continue the division of Korea and to maintain foreign troops on Korean soil.

85. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Assembly will now vote on the draft resolution contained in the report of the First Committee [A/4307]. A vote by roll-call has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Chile, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon.*

Against: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Abstaining: Finland, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 54 votes to 9, with 17 abstentions.***

Statement by the President

86. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): With regard to the question of Algeria, I understand that the report of the First Committee has not yet been transmitted to the Secretariat by the Rapporteur and, as a result, could not, of course, be circulated. As the Pledging Conference for Extra-Budgetary Funds is scheduled for tomorrow, and as the report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East must be considered at a plenary meeting before that Conference is held, I suggest, if there is no objection, that we devote the remainder of this afternoon to the consideration of this item, which is the fourth on today's agenda.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 27

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

- (a) Report of the Director of the Agency;
- (b) Proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees: document submitted by the Secretary-General

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE
(A/4342)

Pursuant to rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Special Political Committee.

*The delegation of Ceylon subsequently informed the President that Ceylon wished to be included among the countries which had abstained from voting on the draft resolution. See 852nd meeting, para. 2.

**The delegation of Morocco, which was absent at the time of the voting, subsequently informed the President that Morocco would have abstained.

Mr. Tettamanti (Argentina), Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee, presented the report of that Committee and then spoke as follows:

87. Mr. TETTAMANTI (Argentina), Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee (translated from Spanish): In the interest of brevity, I shall merely say that after a break of seven days in the discussion the Committee adopted on 8 December a revised draft resolution submitted by the Indian and Pakistan delegations, which, in its operative part, provides for an extension of the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a period of three years with a review at the end of two years. In addition, it requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), and it directs attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes.

88. The draft resolution was adopted by 71 votes to none, with only one abstention, that of Israel.

89. I wish to point out that after the vote the Costa Rican delegation stated that it would have voted for

the draft resolution and also that it would have abstained on operative paragraph 4.

90. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Assembly will now vote on the draft resolution contained in the report of the Special Political Committee [A/4342].

The draft resolution was adopted by 80 votes to none, with one abstention.

91. Mr. COMAY (Israel): In the Special Political Committee my delegation explained [171st meeting, para. 21] why it had voted against operative paragraph 4 of this draft resolution and had thereupon abstained on the draft resolution as a whole. I wish merely to reaffirm here that paragraph 4 is unacceptable to my Government, for the reasons that have already been given. The fact that in a separate vote on paragraph 4 in the Committee, nineteen other delegations abstained, indicates that wide-spread misgiving is felt about it.

92. My delegation wishes to repeat also that it supports the provisions in the resolution concerning the mandate and the operations of the Agency, and that our vote does not imply any reservation regarding those provisions.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.