COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME III

Index of statements by country and subject and verbatim records of the Committee on Disarmament in 1983

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COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.205
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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 22 March 1983 at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. SKALLI (Morocco)

GE.83-60563

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. C. LAOUAR
	Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. J.C. CARASALES
	Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
	Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
Australia:	Mr. R. STEELE
	Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
	Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. TELLALOV
	Mr. B. GRINBERG
	Mr. P. POPTCHEV
	Mr. C. PRAMOV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
	U TIN KYAW HLAING
	U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
	Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN
	Miss C. de VARENNES
	Mr. W. OLIVIER
China:	Mr. LI LUYE
	Mr. TIAN JIN
	Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN
	Mr. PAN ZHENQIANG
	Mrs. ZHOU YUNHUA
Cuba:	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN
	Miss W. BASSIM
	Mr. A.M. ABBAS
Ethiopia:	Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
	Mr. F. YOHANNES
France:	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
	Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
	Mr. M. COUTHURES
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER
	Mr. H. THIELICKE
	Mr. F. SAYATZ
	Mr. M. NOTZEL
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. H. WEGENER
	Mr. F. ELBE
	Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN
Hungary:	Mr. F. GADJA
	Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. M. DUBEY
	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. S. SUTRESNA
	Mrs. P. RAMADHAN
	Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
	Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
	Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Iran:	Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI
Italy:	Mr. M. ALESSI
	Mr. B. CABRAS
	Mr. C.M. OLIVA
	Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI
	Mr. M. KONISHI
	Mr. T. KAWAKITA
	Mr. K. TANAKA
	Mr. T. ARAI
Kenya:	Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. BOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Netherlands:	Mr. J. RAMAKER
	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Nigeria:	Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
	Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
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	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Romania:	Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka:	Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Sweden:	Mr. C. LIDGARD
	Mr. C.M. HYLTENIUS
	Mr. S. ERICSON
	Mr. G. EKHOLM
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
	Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
	Mr. P. MALEV
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
United Kingdom:	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT
United States of America:	Mr. L.G. FIELDS
	Mr. M.D. BUSBY
	Mr. H.L. CALHOUN
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
	Mr. W. HECKROTTE
	Mr. J.J. HOGAN
	Mr. J. MARTIN
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
Venezuela:	Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA
Yugoslavia:	Mr. K. VIDAS
	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Zaire:	Mr. O. GNOK
Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. R. JAIPAL
Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 205th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I wish to inform the members of the Committee of the sad news of the death of the veteran United States Ambassador, Adrian Fisher, who was the first United States representative to the Committee on Disarmament and earlier had been accredited to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. He was a highly respected person with a vast knowledge and experience of disarmament negotiations and a strong faith in the common goal we are seeking. As I had the honour and privilege of knowing him and valuing his human and diplomatic qualities, I feel compelled to convey to the United States delegation and the members of Ambassador Fisher's family, on my own behalf and on behalf of the members of the Committee, our deeply-felt and sincere condolences. May I now request the members to rise and observe a minute of silence in memory of our dear departed colleague, Ambassador Fisher.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Mr. Chairman, it was with sorrow that the Soviet delegation learned about the demise of Ambassador Adrian Fisher. Ambassador Fisher devoted many years of his life to the noble cause of arms race limitation and disarmament. His contribution to the elaboration of the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in three environments, the non-proliferation Treaty and a number of other important international agreements is well known.

For a number of years I was co-operating with Ambassador Fisher in the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament. As the head of the United States delegation at the bilateral talks on a chemical weapons ban and on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, he made not a small contribution to the progress of those negotiations, as a result of which the USSR and the United States submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a joint proposal on the major elements of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons and a progress report on the talks on a chemical weapons ban which were highly appreciated by the Committee. Adrian Fisher was a man of extremely broad outlook. He was one of the recognized experts in disarmament issues. His deep knowledge, sharp intellect, sense of humour and kindness gained him respect among those who knew him. We shall keep forever a fond memory of Adrian Fisher. The Soviet delegation expresses profound condolences to the United States delegation and through it to his widow, Mrs. Laura Fisher.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): It was with great sadness that the French delegation learned of the death of Ambassador Adrian Fisher. Our former colleague played an important part in the Committee on Disarmament. His great knowledge of disarmament matters, his exceptional talents as a speaker and negotiator, his great intellectual gifts, his wide culture, his high principles and strength of character together with his brilliance and warmth of personality earned him the respect, admiration and friendship of all. Those who knew him will remember him always. For my part, I shall never forget the great friendship between us or the debt of gratitude I owe him. On behalf of the French delegation and on my own behalf I should like to offer our sincere condolences to our United States colleague and I should be grateful if he would convey to Mrs. Adrian Fisher our very deep and respectful sympathy.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I should like to add the sincere condolences of my delegation to the United States delegation on the death of Ambassador Adrian Fisher, who so ably led his country's delegation to this Committee when it first began its work after the special session on disarmament in 1978. I had the privilege of working with Adrian Fisher when I was here in the two predecessors of our Committee in the late 1960s. I have happy memories of his dedication to the cause of arms control and disarmament, his profound knowledge of the subject and the down-to-earth, practical approach to its problems which made such a major contribution to our work. He will be very much missed by his many friends in the world of disarmament.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, what has been said by the three speakers who have preceded me who, like myself, had the privilege of knowing Adrian Fisher, will allow my statement to be brief. I fully share what has been said here, as I am sure do all those who had the privilege of working with our illustrious former colleague. Adrian Fisher was indeed a man who combined qualities rarely found together. He had a vast knowledge of disarmament matters. He was at the same time a man of great breadth of view and excellent judgement. He was also one who believed in what he did and what he preached, and he realized that for progress to be made in the matter of disarmament, genuine negotiations are required, and that genuine negotiations necessitate reciprocal concessions. I, too, worked with him here in the same way as Ambassador Cromartie did, that is, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and subsequently in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and I can vouch for the invaluable contribution made by Ambassador Fisher to the drafting of such treaties as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Moreover, Ambassador Fisher had an independence of judgement, even with respect to his own country, which did him great honour. Everyone here will no doubt remember that in one of my statements last year I had the pleasure of quoting what he said with respect to the treaty we have been trying to achieve for a quarter of a century, the treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Ambassador Fisher was very fortunate in meeting the woman who was to be his life-long companion. I believe that all who knew Mrs. Laura Fisher will feel the same respect and affection for her as my wife and I do. I beg the United States delegation to accept my sincere condolences on this sad occasion and kindly to convey our sympathy to Ambassador Fisher's widow.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my delegation and other members of the group of socialist countries, allow me to join you and the other colleagues who paid tribute to the late Ambassador Adrian Fisher, who has passed away all too early. I personally had the privilege of working with him in this body over many years. His diplomatic skill and devotion to disarmament as well as his personal qualities were highly respected by all of us. May I express to the United States delegation, through you, Mr. Chairman, our deep condolences. May I also ask the United States delegation to transmit our condolences to his family and particularly to his wife Laura.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, like those colleagues who have spoken here before me, I have very fond memories of co-operating with Adrian Fisher in this Committee. I therefore wish to join them in expressing both my own and my delegation's profound sadness in learning about his passing away. We remember him as one of the outstanding personalities in the field of multilateral disarmament negotiations. There could never have been any doubts about his own very deep devotion to the cause of

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

disarmament. We also had the feeling that he never hesitated to use his influence in order to obtain decisions which could carry our work forward in a spirit of compromise. He also used his sense of humour and wit to lighten the atmosphere sometimes during discussions. His many qualities have been emphasized by my colleagues and I agree with every word of what they have said. We would ask you, Mr. Chairman, to transmit our condolences both to the United States delegation here and to Adrian Fisher's family, in particular his wife Laura, who herself was a very active and a very beloved member of what one could call the inner wheel of this Committee.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, your beautiful tribute and the generous comments of our distinguished colleagues who knew and worked with -- Ambassador Fisher were most moving and are deeply appreciated by the United States delegation. They will be much appreciated by Ambassador Fisher's widow and his family, who will find comfort in the esteem and affection which these warm expressions so eloquently reflect.

I had the great privilege of knowing "Butch" Fisher, as he was affectionately known by his friends, many of whom have spoken this morning, for many years, and I have the honour to serve the United States in the Committee, as he did so effectively from 1977 to 1980. "Butch" Fisher was a man of wit and wisdom in the great tradition of statesmen from the southern part of my country. His rich Tennessee accent and his folksy stories became his trademark, but it was his deep commitment to the fundamental objectives of this Committee that was and always will be his hallmark. There were points on which he differed with his colleagues, but his warm, good-humoured nature led even those with whom he differed most often to respect and admire him.

"Butch" Fisher was a man of enormous capacity. The law was his profession and he served it with great distinction. He entered his profession by serving as a law clerk successively to two venerated justices of the United States Supreme Court, Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter. He went thereafter into the Federal Government where he rose to become the youngest solicitor of the Department of Commerce, general counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission and legal adviser of the Department of State. He was only thirty-five years of age when Secretary of State Dean Acheson made him the legal adviser to the Department.

While the law was his profession, building a more peaceful world through arms control and disarmament became his passion. He was appointed as the first deputy director of the newly-created Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961, a position he occupied for eight years. Those were crucial years -- years which produced the so-called "hot line" agreement (June 1963), the limited test-ban Treaty (August 1963), the outer space Treaty (January 1967), the Treaty of Tlatelolco (February 1967) and the non-proliferation Treaty (July 1968). The fine hand and watchful eye of Adrian Fisher were a part of all these landmark agreements and they form a part of his great legacy to us.

As if these accomplishments were not enough, he endeavoured to reach the minds of young people through yet another career — teaching. In this pursuit he again excelled by attaining the deanship of the law school of the prestigious Georgetown University. When he left this Committee he returned to teaching and that was his vocation at the time of his death.

I wish to share with you and the members of the Committee our delegation's message of condolence to Mrs. Fisher and her family. It is, I trust, a eulogy in which all of us who knew him can share:

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

"A great, gentle voice for disarmament is now silent, but Ambassador Fisher's words, thoughts and deeds remain as a legacy and a challenge to those of us who are carrying on this cause here in the Committee. He was a strong leader and friend to many in both this delegation and the Committee and we will mourn his loss. Yet his spirit remains in us and we will press on with renewed vigor to accomplish many tasks which he labored on so tirelessly. May our accomplishments be another memorial to his dedication to the cause of disarmament and the country he loved and served so well."

On behalf of my delegation and, I am sure, the Fisher family, I thank you and my distinguished colleagues for the tributes paid today to the memory of this great and humble American.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. We shall now hear the statements planned for the plenary meeting. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of India, Nigeria, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Dubey.

Mr. DUBEY (India): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to echo the sentiments of grief and sorrow expressed by the previous speakers on the sad demise of the late Ambassador Adrian Fisher. We would like to offer our heartfelt condolences to the United States representative through you, Sir, and request him to convey them to Mrs. Fisher.

Mr. Chairman, since I am taking the floor for the first time this month, allow me to offer my congratulations to you, though belatedly, on your assumption of the Chairmanship of this Committee. We are all familiar with your diplomatic skill and your vast knowledge and experience in the field of disarmament. These qualities have already proved of considerable help to us in tackling the difficulties which this Committee has faced during the initial phase of its current session. Hopefully, under your stewardship, we are well on the way to resolving the procedural problems which this Committee has been grappling with and getting down to serious and substantive work without losing more time.

The main purpose of my taking the floor this morning is to introduce before the Committee document CD/354, which contains the text of the New Delhi Message and extracts from the Political Declaration of the Non-Aligned Summit Conference, entitled, "Disarmament, survival and co-existence in the age of nuclear weapons".

From 7 to 12 March 1983, the capital of my country, New Delhi, played host to the Heads of State or Government of over 100 non-aligned countries, who gathered together for the historic Seventh Non-Aligned Summit Conference. The documents unanimously adopted at the Summit Conference represent a unique achievement. For, in a world divided by

(Mr. Dubey, India)

ideological, political and economic barriers, their message is one of co-operation, of brotherhood and of common endeavour for global peace and security. This constructive and co-operative approach of the Summit has been succinctly summed up in the last sentence of the New Delhi Message issued by the Summit, which reads: "The earth belongs to us all — let us cherish it in peace and true brotherhood, based on the dignity and equality of man." This spirit pervades all the documents adopted by the Summit.

Distinguished delegates will find from this document that the leaders of the non-aligned movement have regarded disarmament and development as being among the central issues of our time. And in the field of disarmament, they have placed the emphasis where it belongs, i.e., on the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war. They have, therefore, called upon the nuclear-weapon States in the name of humanity to adopt urgent measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The leaders of the non-aligned movement have categorically rejected the doctrines of strategic balance and deterrence, the concept of limited nuclear war and of the balanced or equal security of a limited group of countries. They are convinced that the pursuit of these misconceived and obsolete doctrines will result in the annihilation of mankind. They have, therefore, given a call for the common security of all nations and peoples, not through the stockpiling of arms but through their elimination.

There is a clear-cut link in the document between disarmament and development, between peace and prosperity. The leaders of the non-aligned movement have also welcomed the upsurge of public opinion against the arms race and the triumphant march of the peace movements around the world, including in the nuclear-weapon States. Aligning the non-aligned movement with these peace movements, the Prime Minister of India, in her opening statement, said, "The non-aligned movement is history's biggest peace movement."

Among the measures recommended by the leaders of the movement in the field of disarmament, pride of place has been given to urgent steps for halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. In this context, a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons has been recommended. They have also called for a speedy finalization of a comprehensive treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons. Pending nuclear disarmament, the Summit Conference has called for an immediate prohibition of the use or threat of nuclear weapons. Reference has also been made to the obligation that the nuclear-weapon States have to guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. Among other measures called for in the Declaration

(Mr. Dubey, India)

are: a ban on chemical weapons, measures to ensure that outer space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes and the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament for submission to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

The above package of measures constitutes a serious effort on the part of the non-aligned countries to avoid a further deterioration in the existing situation, which is fraught with grave dangers. Almost all these measures are on the agenda of this Committee and have, therefore, an immediate bearing on its work. The leaders of the non-aligned movement have called upon our negotiating body to fulfil this mandate and adopt concrete measures of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. We hope that our Committee will live up to the expectations reposed in it by the non-aligned movement.

An important aspect of the document to which I would like to draw the Committee's attention is the recommendation made by the Summit Conference that the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly should be used for a collective appraisal by Heads of State or Government of all Member States of the United Nations with a view to finding speedy and just solutions to some of the major problems of the world. The input that this Committee is expected to provide is going to be of crucial importance for such a collective appraisal. This will, however, depend upon the outcome of its work between now and the next session of the General Assembly. We hope that the results of the Summit relating to disarmament issues will impart a sense of urgency and purposefulness to the work of this Committee.

In the New Delhi Message, the leaders of the non-aligned movement made an appeal to the great powers "to give up mistrust, engage in sincere, forward-looking negotiations in a spirit of shared good faith to reach agreement on various disarmament matters ...". They also stated: "Unitedly, the members of the non-aligned movement are prepared to do everything in their power to assist in this process."

The Prime Minister of India, Chairman of the non-aligned countries' Summit Conference underlined in her concluding remarks on 12 March: "The Non-Aligned Movement is not a mere or usual collection of individual States. It is a vital historical process. It is a mingling of many historical, spiritual and cultural streams. It is an expression of the aspirations of the long deprived and the newly free. It is the assertion of human kind's will to survive despite oppression, the growing arms race and ideological divisions."

We trust that the unanimous voice of the highest-level representatives of two thirds of humanity will find a positive response from our partners in this Committee so that our common objective of peace and prosperity for all humanity can be realized.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Dubey for his statement. I am sure that the members of the Committee have noted the importance of the message you have transmitted to us today from the last Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries, which was held in your country. Its high quality will no doubt prompt all members of our Committee to think about it very seriously. I would also like to thank the representative of India for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, let me, on behalf of my delegation, congratulate you, the distinguished representative of Morocco, a brotherly African country, on your presiding over the affairs of the Committee on Disarmament in the month of March. Nigeria is proud of her excellent bilateral and multilateral ties with the Kingdom of Morocco. No doubt, the task ahead of our Committee at this crucial time is an enormous one, but with your sense of purpose and wealth of experience in the diplomatic field no one doubts your ability to guide us successfully in our deliberations.

My delegation pledges its full support and co-operation throughout your tenure of office. I also want to congratulate your predecessor in the Chair, the distinguished Ambassador Erdembileg of the People's Republic of Mongolia for the able manner in which he steered the ship of the Committee through the turbulent month of February.

My delegation would like also to join in the generous tribute paid to the late Ambassador Adrian Fisher. We share with his friends, his colleagues, the United States delegation and members of his family a sense of loss and grief occasioned by the passing away of this great man. To my mind, the greatest tribute we can pay to such a man, having regard to the work he has done, is to work with relentless vigour and in good faith to achieve success in the field of disarmament.

My delegation notes with deep regret that seven weeks after the opening of its 1983 session, the Committee has not been able to adopt its draft provisional agenda and programme of work, owing to the lack of consensus on certain agenda items, particularly the inclusion of the subject of the prevention of nuclear war as a separate item on the agenda.

Since this year has been regarded generally as a crucial year for international peace and security, a lot is expected of the Committee in terms of fruitful negotiations. It is sad, however, to note that the question of the inclusion of an item on the prevention of nuclear war is one of the things that have stalled progress in the Committee's work this year. The question of the prevention of nuclear war has been dealt with in unambiguous terms in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Paragraph 8 of that Document states:

> "While the final objective of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace".

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

The operative word in that paragraph is "immediate". The document of the General Assembly did not say "eventual" or "long-term goal" as certain delegations now seem to regard even disarmament itself.

It appears to my delegation that those who are vehemently opposed to the inclusion of an item on the prevention of nuclear war want the Committee on Disarmament disbanded because to them it has become irrelevant.

We would accept that reasoning from them were we to see a progressive decline in nuclear armament as a result of negotiations being carried on elsewhere; but unfortunately, this is not the case. The concern of the Group of 21 on the question of the prevention of nuclear war was further amplified by the United Nations Secretary-General in his address to this Committee on 15 February 1983 when he said:

> "Since it poses a threat to the survival of the human species, nuclear war is a matter of concern to all".

We realize that war generally is dangerous but we believe that this Committee was set up to avert the threat of global war and particularly nuclear war.

My delegation wholeheartedly supports and endorses the position of the Group of 21 as contained in document CD/341. We feel that it is reasonable and considerate and speaks the minds of mankind, especially those who are genuinely concerned about the obvious consequences of a nuclear war.

Permit me to say that the Group of 21 is so concerned about what happens to mankind in the event of a nuclear holocaust because it cannot protect itself and its peoples in such a situation. As recently stated by a member of the Group of 21 before this Committee, when a malfunctioning nuclear satellite was on its way back to earth, the very powers responsible for the proliferation of nuclear terror mounted appropriate and timely protective measures for their various peoples. The rest of us could do little more than chest-beating between bouts of frantic prayers.

My delegation shares the view expressed by the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil on the vertical dimension of nuclear proliferation in his statement before the Committee on 3 March 1983. As he succintly put it: "The elusive search for superiority seems to be the mainspring of vertical proliferation".

The increasing build-up of nuclear arsenals by the two Superpowers, and their failure to honour the various nuclear freeze proposals they have made does not, in any way, help to promote the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament -- one of the priority items on the Committee's draft agenda.

As a matter of fact, the possibility of a nuclear war breaking out by mistake is very real. A few weeks ago, in this very Committee, we were reminded of occasions when, owing to computer error, the very buttons that could wipe off all life on earth were almost pressed.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

On the other hand, there is no doubt that before 10,000 troops of a country start marching into another one, the belligerent intentions of the aggressor country would be very obvious. In other words, conventional war could not just start by mistake or miscalculation as a nuclear war could. Such a nuclear war would engulf even those not involved in the confrontation.

My delegation initially felt that the prevention of nuclear war is such a vital issue as to constitute a separate item on the Committee's agenda, as proposed by the Group of 21 in document CD/341. However, in view of the present impasse over the adoption of our agenda and programme of work for the current session, we have decided to demonstrate some flexibility and goodwill by accepting the reformulation of the Group of 21's proposal being put forward by the group of Western countries in order that we can get down to concrete deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament.

Permit me to make a few comments on an important issue before the Committee: I have in mind the question of chemical weapons. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons has been a major concern of the Committee since its inception. My delegation welcomes the various proposals on a chemical weapons convention that have been presented to the Committee and considers them a useful basis for negotiation.

In the view of my delegation, a future convention should contain provisions aimed at a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. There should be provisions for both national as well as international means of verification but greater emphasis should be placed on international means. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons held a number of contact group meetings in January. Consultations on technical issues were also held and experts took part in them. It is our belief that the results of the contact group meetings as contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group (document CD/342) should be translated into action.

On the question of negative security assurances, my delegation is in support of the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is also our view that the Working Group set up to examine the issue under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan should be given a sufficient mandate to enable it perform effectively.

My delegation considers that effective measures taken to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. In this context, we would like to recall paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In that paragraph, the General Assembly urges the nuclear-weapon States "to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

My delegation considers that the issue of negative security assurances centres on two questions. First, which non-nuclear-weapon States should be eligible for assurances from nuclear-weapon States? Secondly, under what circumstances will nuclear-weapon States withdraw their assurances? In our opinion, nuclear-weapon States should give unconditional assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States that have undertaken firm commitments not to develop, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Furthermore, those countries outside the non-proliferation Treaty should be given conditional assurances by way of non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

My delegation notes with satisfaction the statistical information made available to this Committee by the leader of the Swedish delegation at the beginning of last month concerning the various nuclear tests carried out in 1982. We also note the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in respect of those tests. We believe that the assurances given by the leader of the Soviet delegation on 17 February 1983 are worth considering by other nuclear-weapon States. On that occasion, the leader of the Soviet delegation said:

> "We do not intend either to confirm or to deny these figures. We would only say to all the nuclear-weapon States, regardless of the number of nuclear-weapon tests they have conducted -- let us immediately halt them. Let us not conduct such tests during the negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty, as is demanded by the world community."

My delegation is of the opinion that that pledge should be taken seriously by all nuclear-weapon States as a basis for progress in the long overdue treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests. We feel that it will serve as a basis for the early conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty.

Finally, my delegation supports document CD/330 submitted by the Group of 21 in September 1982 on the establishment of subsidiary organs.

As a matter of fact, in view of the present uninspiring state of affairs within the Committee on Disarmament, does the present impasse in the Committee not demonstrate clearly that some groups of delegations are taking advantage of the weaknesses inherent in the rule of consensus? Is it premature, therefore, to consider examining the merits of document CD/330?

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, in my statement today I will refer to the subject which has -- with full justification -- dominated our proceedings from the beginning of this session: the prevention of nuclear war.

Many delegations have expressed their views on this problem, particularly during our most interesting special plenary meeting on 28 February, initiated and

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

chaired by Ambassador Erdembileg. The essence of the overwhelming majority of statements on this item can easily be described: prevention of nuclear war is the most urgent, legitimate, fateful and moral issue of our time.

At the beginning of this session, on 8 February, my delegation stated its viewpoint that to avert the danger of nuclear war is the most important objective. Without delay, relevant measures must be taken and all possible solutions must be explored. This central task, namely, to discuss and agree on measures to prevent nuclear war, should, therefore, also be reflected in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. Together with the delegations of the other socialist countries my delegation supported the proposal of the Group of 21, contained in document CD/341, to include an item on the prevention of nuclear war in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and to set up a corresponding working group.

This position is fully in line with the approach the socialist countries have taken consistently towards solving this issue of the highest priority. It is in line with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, whereby all States members of the Committee on Disarmament adopted the principle that all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war. This important commitment was reaffirmed at the second special session on disarmament and the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Consequently, the proposal made at the beginning of this session to include a new item, "Prevention of nuclear war", in the Committee's agenda and to establish a corresponding working group cannot have come as a surprise. It is all the more astonishing, however, that in view of the history this item has, it took certain delegations several weeks to define their exact position on such a fundamental item and the form of its inclusion in the agenda. One can only express astonishment and dismay at the way the formulation of an agenda item on the prevention of nuclear war has been treated by these delegations.

Nevertheless my delegation, as well as the delegations of other socialist countries, are encouraged by the fact that, after all, agreement on the treatment of the prevention of nuclear war in our agenda seems to emerge. This vital issue certainly cannot be reduced to a procedural question. Time is overdue for this Committee, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, to start serious consideration of concrete measures to prevent nuclear war.

Guided by these considerations, a group of socialist countries has requested the circulation of a working paper on the prevention of nuclear war, document CD/355, which I have the honour to introduce today. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will briefly explain the major considerations we have in mind, in order to initiate a constructive and action-orientated deliberation of this item.

In view, especially, of the present tense international situation, we believe that the prevention of nuclear war is the most important global problem of our time. It is a problem which concerns all peoples irrespective of differences in their social order, way of life or ideology. Mankind is, indeed, confronted with a choice: to halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or to face the danger of annihilation.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In their recent Prague Declaration, the Warsaw Treaty member States emphasized that "it is essential to act without delay, while there is still a possibility of curbing the arms race and moving towards disarmament. At the same time they assume that all States, if they are concerned for the fate of their peoples and of mankind as a whole, must necessarily be interested in avoiding war".

In the Final Declaration of the Seventh Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries, adopted on 12 March 1983, the leaders of the non-aligned countries equally expressed the growing concern of their peoples in view of the danger of nuclear war, which has been increased by an escalation of the nuclear arms race and doctrines of nuclear deterrence. We welcome the statement in the Declaration that in today's world there is no alternative to a policy of peaceful coexistence, détente and co-operation of States, irrespective of their economic and social systems. This should be considered the background against which the challenge of preventing nuclear war has to be met.

The answer to this challenge has already been given many times. In the Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, all United Nations Member States were urged to consider as soon as possible relevant proposals designed to secure the avoidance of war, in particular nuclear war, thus ensuring that the survival of mankind is not endangered.

Over the past few years the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions which, in fact, offer a broad basis for concrete negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war. In this regard the following resolutions should especially be taken into account:

36/81 B, "Prevention of nuclear war";

36/92 I, "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war";

36/100, "Declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe";

37/78 I, "Prevention of nuclear war";

37/78 J, "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war";

37/100 C, "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

Some of these resolutions were co-sponsored by the socialist States, while the others were supported by them.

Recent developments and the realities of a policy of nuclear superarmament adopted by one nuclear-weapon power have made the task of preventing nuclear war even more pressing. The increased danger of war is caused not only by growing nuclear-weapon arsenals, but also by qualitative developments, e.g. the introduction of ever newer nuclear-weapon systems with increased warhead accuracy. It must be of the utmost concern that the United States is placing increasing emphasis on the establishment of a nuclear first-strike potential based on qualitatively new nuclear-weapon systems which are destabilizing and greatly increase the risk of nuclear war breaking out.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In this connection allow me to reaffirm the conviction of the delegations of the socialist States that in order to prevent a world-wide nuclear war there must be no further escalation of nuclear confrontation in Europe. There can be no doubt: if a nuclear first-strike potential were to be established in western Europe through the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear systems, that would mean a decisive change in the strategic military situation.

Such deployment could only be considered by the socialist countries as a measure aimed at increasing the surprise factor of an attack.

Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that under present conditions even a coincidence, a mistake or technical imperfections connected with nuclear weapons would have catastrophic consequences for mankind. This can and must be avoided.

The socialist countries consider it necessary to emphasize resolutely that any calculations on winning a nuclear war after unleashing it are senseless. Once nuclear war breaks out, there can be no victors. Yet it cannot be overlooked that the introduction of the above-mentioned new military programmes is inseparably linked with the escalation of such ill-famed strategic concepts and doctrines as those of a "limited nuclear war", "protracted nuclear conflict", etc.

The basis of all those doctrines is the concept of nuclear deterrence, which aims in the last analysis at justifying the existence of nuclear weapons and making peoples used to them. Thus, this concept ultimately is opposed to nuclear disarmament and leaves no room for it. Therefore, it was with deep astonishment that recently we witnessed in this Committee attempts to justify nuclear deterrence. We rather agree with the conclusion drawn by the Group of 21 in document CD/341 that "doctrines of nuclear deterrence lie at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations".

As we have repeatedly stated, we are firmly convinced that the Committee on Disarmament is, indeed, the organ called upon to negotiate and achieve agreement on practical measures of a multilateral nature for the prevention of nuclear war. The procedural steps required for that should be obvious:

The inclusion of a corresponding agenda item;

The establishment of an ad hoc working group with a negotiating mandate;

The definition of a complex of measures for the prevention of nuclear war as a first step towards concrete negotiations within the framework of the working group.

In view of the urgency of the issue, the socialist countries are in favour of taking these steps immediately. In addition, we propose that the following priority measures should serve as a starting-point for discussions:

The renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons,

A freeze by all nuclear-weapon States on their nuclear arsenals,

The declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions until a comprehensive test-ban treaty is concluded.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

The delegations of the socialist countries also supported the proposal made by India and approved by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, other multilateral steps aimed at the prevention of nuclear war, such as preventing an accidental use of nuclear weapons or avoiding the possibility of surprise attacks, could be discussed.

As far as the general approach to the prevention of nuclear war is concerned, as has already been stated by several delegations, and we support their view, this does not exclude the possibility of a comprehensive approach to the non-use of military force. For instance, obligations concerning the non-first-use of nuclear weapons are in accordance with article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter. They are aimed at its strengthening and practical implementation.

An important step for the prevention of nuclear war could be the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. In this context, attention has also been drawn to the recent proposal by the Warsaw Treaty member States, addressed to the member States of NATO, for the conclusion of such a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. Thus, there is a broad range of questions which can serve as a basis for serious and concrete negotiations. We firmly believe that the Committee on Disarmament can and must play a positive role in this effort, without prejudicing relevant bilateral negotiations or agreements.

It is our hope that the proposals raised in the document tabled today will contribute to progress in our work in this area, so that we may leave the stage of procedural discussion and proceed without further delay to actual negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament with the aim of achieving agreement on concrete measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

Only in this way can we justify the expectations the international community has placed in this Committee.

Before concluding my statement allow me, Mr. Chairman, to express the conviction of the socialist group that the Committee will quickly achieve consensus on its agenda, so as to enable it to settle down to its work. As far as the working groups are concerned, we favour the immediate beginning of the work of the groups on a nuclear test ban, chemical weapons and radiological weapons, as was reaffirmed last week by Ambassador Tellalov. It stands to reason that in the case of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, an understanding on a negotiating mandate should be achieved. This would correspond to its previous mandate which stated that the Working Group "will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard". While the first part of this agreement was fulfilled, we are still waiting for action to be taken on the latter part. May I request you, Mr. Chairman, to make the necessary arrangements in order to hold the meetings and consultations required for elaborating the mandate of the nuclear test-ban Working Group, on the basis of the various proposals which have been submitted up to now.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, I, as others around this table, also had the privilege to know personally Mr. Adrian Fisher, whose demise we all deeply deplore. I fully subscribe to all that has been stated here about his excellent qualities both human and diplomatic. Allow me, therefore, to join the preceding speakers in expressing the most sincere condolences of my delegation and of myself to the United States delegation and to Mrs. Fisher and her family.

This is the first time my delegation is taking the floor in the month of March. I therefore seize with pleasure this occasion to express our deep satisfaction in seeing you, the distinguished representative of a friendly, non-aligned country, in the chair of the Committee on Disarmament. You came to this post at a difficult period when efforts are still being exerted to prevent the Committee from carrying out negotiations on the most important and vital priority problems of today's disarmament agenda.

During the month of February we witnessed a noble effort on the part of the distinguished representative of socialist Mongolia, Ambassador Erdembileg, who did his best to get the Committee working on the basis of an agenda which would reflect at least the basic requirements of the community of States and of world public opinion. We sincerely hope that you, Sir, actively continuing the efforts of your predecessor, will eventually succeed in launching us on business-like negotiations. Let me assure you of my delegation's full support in this respect.

Today I would like to address a top priority item the effective solution of which is long overdue. I mean the complete and general cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

It is exactly the cessation and prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments that would represent an effective means to stop the nuclear arms race. It is well known that the qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of these weapons are inseparably linked with their tests. Hence, for the real limitation of practical possibilities of the development and production of new types of nuclear bombs and warheads the achievement of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests stands as a key problem.

The cessation of nuclear tests would also represent an important contribution to the further strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime since it would prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States. Nor should we ignore the fact that nuclear explosions can seriously pollute the environment.

The problem of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is not a new one. But recently it has acquired an extreme urgency since its effective solution could substantially limit the new spiral of the nuclear arms race. Thus, it would represent a material barrier against the ever-increasing danger.

The problem of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests was in fact raised by the end of the 1940s. It was incomparably easier to ban nuclear weapons and their tests then than it is today. But the nuclear arms race, initiated by the United States of America, has also given birth to a race in nuclear testing.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

It should be pointed out that some positive results aimed at the solution of this crucial problem have been achieved. Twenty years have passed since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. This Treaty limited the possibilities of the development of new types of nuclear weapons. But the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty did not remove the achievement of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests from the agenda. Firstly, the Moscow Treaty was not signed by all the nuclear-weapon States. Secondly, underground nuclear explosions have not been prohibited, which allows for the continuation and intensification of the nuclear arms race.

Czechoslovakia has more than once expressed its concern in view of the fact that two decades after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty the problem of underground nuclear explosions has not been solved, in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its readiness to conclude an appropriate treaty and has advanced concrete proposals to this effect.

In 1975 the USSR submitted to the United Nations General Assembly a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which provided for a ban on all nuclear tests in all environments with unlimited duration. However, in view of the negative attitude of some nuclear-weapon States, the elaboration of the text of the proposed treaty was not undertaken.

The Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of 1974 could become a further important measure aimed at the achievement of a complete test ban. This Treaty, which prohibits underground explosions over 150 kilotons, narrows the possibilities for the development and improvement of the most powerful and dangerous types of nuclear weapons. Another measure in this direction could be the Soviet-American Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes of 1976. But the United States refused to ratify these two treaties. This negative attitude was explained by the fact that the verification provisions of the Treaty of 1974, elaborated and agreed upon jointly by the Soviet and American delegations, were no longer satisfactory to the United States. Moreover, in the International Herald Tribune of 14 March of this year, we found an article by a well-known American observer, Walter Pincus, confirming earlier reports suggesting that the United States intends, in fact, to revise the Soviet-American Treaty of 1974.

One should recall what Mr. Eugene Rostow, the former head of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had to say in this connection. He clearly expressed the view that the Pentagon will have to carry out nuclear tests for a long time and, possibly, even tests of weapons of a power exceeding the agreed limit of 150 kilotons.

In view of this evidence one cannot but come to the conclusion that the United States is not only against the prohibition of nuclear tests but also against their limitation by any restraint on the power of the weapons being tested. That is the only possible explanation of the refusal by the United States to let the Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976 enter into force.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

From 1977 to 1980, negotiations on a complete nuclear-test ban with the participation of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom were conducted in Geneva. As is clear from the tripartite report to the Committee on Disarmament of 30 July 1980, the participants in the negotiations overcame many difficulties, including those pertaining to verification. The whole text of the future treaty had practically been agreed upon, and only several provisions, mainly of a technical nature, remained to be formulated. It is well remembered that optimistic forecasts appeared then in the Western press, including American, that "the treaty will, apparently, be concluded within a year". The prospects for its conclusion became quite real. However, these forecasts did not prove true: the United States first unilaterally interrupted the tripartite negotiations and then decided not to resume them at all.

It is obvious that it was precisely these prospects for the achievement of the relevant treaty that did not suit the United States administration which came to power at the end of 1980, since it based its foreign policy on a reliance on force and openly declared its aim of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union. To this end the White House adopted a broad programme to build up nuclear forces, announced by the United States President on 2 October 1981. Within this programme the United States has developed new warheads for MX, Trident I and Trident II ballistic missiles, for long-range cruise missiles and for Pershing II missiles and also neutron weapons. It is also developing special weapons for B-1B and Stealth bombers. The United States defence directives envisage the production of at least 23,000 new nuclear warheads during the next 10 years.

New systems of strategic and other weapons require new nuclear warheads. Apparently, that is the real reason why the United States does everything to block the achievement of an agreement and even the commencement of specific negotiations on this question here in the Committee on Disarmament. The United States motivates its refusal to undertake these negotiations by the difficulties with regard to the question of verification. This was recently stressed again in the statement before this Committee by the United States Vice-President Bush.

However, it is quite clear that the real difficulty does not lie within the problem of verification but results from the United States intention to continue a broad programme of nuclear-weapon tests without limiting the power of the tested weapons.

The unilateral refusal by the United States to continue the trilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban, its tendency not to take into account some existing agreements on nuclear weapons limitation and the attempts to revise others, should impel the Committee on Disarmament to undertake immediately active negotiations for the elaboration of the relevant treaty.

The document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session by the Soviet Union, represents a practical basis for multilateral negotiations on this matter.

There is no doubt that the atmosphere for the elaboration of the treaty would be much more favourable if the relevant negotiations were not accompanied by nuclear-weapon tests. Rather, the full cessation of nuclear tests during the

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

negotiations would be a clear sign of goodwill. Precisely for this reason, Czechoslovakia welcomed the proposal by the USSR that all nuclear-weapon States, as a gesture of goodwill, should declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, including those for peaceful purposes, with effect from a mutually agreed date until the conclusion of the treaty itself. The adoption and realization of this proposal would allow the Committee to carry on concrete negotiations on the problem in a quiet, business-like atmosphere.

In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation the Soviet "Basic provisions" contain all the elements necessary to meet the requirements of the overwhelming majority of States.

It is envisaged that nuclear tests would be prohibited in all environments, that the treaty would be unlimited in time and would enter into force after its ratification by 20 governments including those of the permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time, the possibility of the treaty entering into force for an agreed limited period of time with the participation of only three States permanent members of the Security Council — the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom — is not precluded.

I would also like to note that the Soviet proposal pays special attention to verification provisions. Let me point out just some of them.

Firstly, it is the presumption that verification within the future treaty would be based on national as well as international procedures, while the "States parties which possess national technical means of verification may, where necessary, place the information which they obtained through those means, and which is important for the purposes of this Treaty, at the disposal of other parties".

This provision is of particular importance for those States parties to the treaty which as yet do not possess national technical means of verification.

The "Guidelines for the international exchange of seismic data", taking into account the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events, represent an important element of verification of an international nature. We also regard as useful the proposal to create a committee of experts which would consider questions relating to the international exchange of seismic data. In this connection, the "Basic provisions" state:

> "The Committee shall elaborate, in accordance with Guidelines, detailed arrangements regulating the establishment and operation of the international exchange; it shall facilitate its implementation and co-operation between States parties to enhance the effectiveness of such exchange.
>
> "The Committee shall facilitate more extensive international consultations and co-operation, the exchange of information and the provision of assistance in verification in the interests of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty."

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Another important element of verification is reflected in the part of the document dealing with on-site inspection. It defines the procedure for the assessment of compliance with the treaty and the procedure for sending requests for an on-site inspection and replies to them. The elaboration of procedures for on-site inspections, including the list of rights and functions of the inspecting personnel and the definition of the role of the receiving party during the inspection are also envisaged.

My delegation also welcomes the fact that the Soviet delegation expressed its readiness to offer any necessary clarifications on its document and to answer questions which might be raised in connection with the "Basic provisions" in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We hope that this Group will be accorded a mandate which will enable it to undertake without any delay negotiations for the elaboration of a treaty banning all nuclear tests in order to respond to the call by the United Nations General Assembly to the States members of the Committee on Disarmament "To exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty".

The discussions on a nuclear test ban and on the mandate of the relevant Working Group would confirm that the majority of delegations would like to see specific negotiations on a treaty instead of mere expressions of good intentions. Let us hope that the States members of the Committee will display the necessary political will in order to take a decisive step in the direction of the achievement of a nuclear test-ban treaty.

My country, together with the other socialist countries which adopted the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Prague, considers it essential to intensify negotiations on a number of specific questions, including in the Committee on Disarmament, with a view to accelerating the achievement of concrete results in the sphere of disarmament. The Declaration of the Non-Aligned Summit Conference presented to us today by the distinguished representative of India in document CD/354 also urges the speedy negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It also pertains fully to the deliberations on a nuclear test ban, which require a new, fresh impetus. It is our considered view that this problem can be solved and we speak in favour of the most energetic actions which might overcome the existing stalemate. And there is no other way to do this than to start immediately business-like negotiations on this matter in the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no further speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see that that is not the case. I should

(The Chairman)

like to assure the Committee that the Chairman is actively continuing his consultations in the hope of reaching a consensus both on the agenda and on the establishment of the working groups. I venture to express the hope that at the Committee's next plenary meeting, on Thursday next, given the understanding and co-operation of all delegations, it may be possible for the Committee to adopt its agenda and to re-establish all the working groups.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 24 March 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.206
24 March 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 24 March 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. Skalli (Morocco)

GE.83-60576

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. C. LAOUAR
	Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. J.C. CARASALES
	Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
	Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
Australia:	Mr. R. STEELE
	Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Mr. A. ONKELINX
	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
	Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. TELLALOV
	Mr. B. GRINBERG
	Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
	U TIN KYAW HLAING
	U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
	Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN
	Miss C. de VARENNES
	Mr. W. OLIVIER
	Mr. R. CLEMINSON
China:	Mr. LI LUYE
	Mr. TIAN JIN
	Mrs. GE YUYUN
	Mr. PAN JUSHENG
	Mrs. ZHOU YUNHUA

Cuba:	Mr. L. SOLA VILA
	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. A. CIMA
	Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN
	Miss W. BASSIM
Ethiopia:	Mr. T. TERREFE
	Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
	Mr. F. YOHANNES
France:	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
	Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
	Mr. M. COUTHURES
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER
	Mr. H. THIELICKE
	Mr. M. NOTZEL
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. H. WEGENER
	Mr. F. ELBE
	Mr. W. ROHR
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. M. DUBEY
	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. S. SUTRESNA
	Mrs. P. RAMADHAN
	Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
	Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
	Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Iran:	Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI

Italy:	Mr. M. ALESSI
	Mr. B. CABRAS
	Mr. C.M. OLIVA
	Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI
	Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
	Mr. M. KONISHI
	Mr. K. TANAKA
	Mr. T. ARAI
Kenya:	Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
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Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
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	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
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	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
	Miss I.E.C. UKEJE
Pakistan:	Mr. M. AHMAD
	Mr. T. ALTAF
Peru:	Mr. P. CANNOCK
	Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:	Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Romania:	Mr. L. TOADER
Sri Lanka:	Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Sweden:	Mr. C. LIDGARD
	Mr. C.M. HYLTENIUS
	Mr. S. ERICSON
	Mr. G. EKHOLM
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
	Mr. M.F. TREPIKHALIN
	Mr. G. VORONTZOV
	Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
	Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
	Mr. V.M. TATARNIKOV
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
United Kingdom:	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
	Mr. B.P. NOBLE
	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:	Mr. M.D. BUSBY
	Mr. H.L. CALHOUN
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
	Mr. W. HECKROTTE
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
	Mr. R. MIKULAK
Venezuela:	Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Yugoslavia:	Mr. K. VIDAS
	Mr. M. NIHAJLOVIC
Zaire:	Mr. O. GNOK
Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. R. JAIPAL
Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 206th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Belgium and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Onkelinx.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): The rather frustrating situation in the Committee as regards the organization of our work and procedural matters has discouraged my delegation from taking the floor at plenary meetings recently. This explains why I am speaking today, on 24 March, for the first time this month. This being so, it is perhaps a little late for me to offer you my congratulations, Mr. Chairman, but I have had plenty of opportunity to do so in private, and you know how glad we are to see the representative of Morocco presiding over our debates. In view of our personal and friendly relations it has been a great pleasure for me to see you directing our work and doing so, moreover, with great charm, courtesy and adroitness. In spite of all the efforts you have made, the desired results have not yet been achieved, but I should like to reassure you of our friendship and co-operation and to express the hope that in the remaining days of your chairmanship all of the many efforts you have been making so patiently over the last weeks will at last be crowned with success.

I shall devote my statement today to the subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

More than six weeks ago, when we initiated our work for this new session of the Committee on Disarmament, it seemed to me that at least general agreement prevailed among us. I think I am right in summarizing the elements of that agreement as follows:

First, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons is the one offering the most promising prospects for the Committee on Disarmament this year;

Secondly, the conditions for fruitful negotiations now exist;

Lastly, all the necessary resources must be devoted to those negotiations.

I do not intend now to go into the procedural reasons why, in spite of that broad convergence of views, the Committee on Disarmament has since then been totally incapable of resuming and pursuing the work it has done on this question in past years.

I do not think that I should be betraying the general feeling if I were to express the firm hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons — which should remain the centre of those negotiations — will be re-established without delay, on its own merits, that is to say, without any link being established between this matter and the other matters with which the Committee on Disarmament should concern itself and to which also Belgium attaches great importance.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

I should like here to interpose a confession, which is that I had a different first page prepared for my statement, in a much more optimistic vein, for I thought that today at last we might have been able to dispose of these organizational matters concerning the establishment of working groups and it is indeed with very much regret that I have had to use the more pessimistic scenario in my statement. I have to admit that I understand less and less what is going on, that I am truly surprised to see that again another week will have passed without our being able to establish these working groups, but I still hope, I repeat, that thanks to your efforts, Mr. Chairman, it will very soon be unnecessary to make such depressing and pessimistic remarks. I shall now go on with my statement.

Apart from our desire, which I hope is general, to work towards the speedy conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Committee on Disarmament now has the benefit of certain advantages, as follows.

First, the basic structure of the future convention is now well established, both in the compilation of the various elements and in the reports of the co-ordinators of the various contact groups.

Secondly, the views of the members of the Committee and of the Chairman of the Working Group in 1982 have been very fully expressed on many aspects of the convention. In this connection I should like to stress the particular importance we attach to the views of the two States which participated in the bilateral negotiations. And we now know the detailed positions both of the USSR and of the United States.

As far as the United States is concerned, we appreciated its willingness to try to reply to the questions raised by its proposals. Such exercises in clarification are a great aid to negotiations.

Thirdly, recent statements and declarations of position have also shown a development in the attitude of delegations. I am referring here in particular to the new proposals made by the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to the scope of the convention and the intentions expressed by the Soviet Union -- which will, I hope, be explained in greater detail -- as regards the on-site verification of the destruction of stocks and of the production of supertoxic lethal agents.

The taking into account of proposals made by others, as is shown, for example, in many instances by the document submitted by the United States delegation, and the adoption of new positions such as those just announced by the Soviet Union with respect to the scope of the prohibition, are actions which will give new impetus to the negotiations since they mean a relinquishing of positions on which there has not up to now been any agreement.

As we approach this new phase in our negotiations, I should like to express Belgium's views on various aspects of our work.

The method we adopt in attempting to move forward in this complex sphere will be one of the key elements in the negotiations.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

It therefore seems to me essential that we should continue our work within the structure that appears to have been generally accepted up to now. This structure is particularly well represented in documents CD/CW/WP.33 and CD/334. We ought to make sure that any proposals made later fall clearly within that framework.

It might also be useful if, on the basis of that structure, the secretariat were to make a compilation, element by element and point by point, of the various proposals that have been made since that time. In fact an effort at regrouping proposals appears necessary at the present stage. This compilation could then form the basis of our future negotiations. It would save us having to refer to the various different documents containing the many proposals made up to now.

Without such a compilation, our negotiations are likely to become more and more complicated by the very fact of their being undirected.

It has been unanimously agreed that the contact groups set up last year proved an excellent framework for our work. It would be useful if we could use this method again, rationalizing it where necessary so as to avoid an excessive proliferation of these contact groups but also so as to study the problems not only vertically — the approach we have followed up to now — but also horizontally.

Great flexibility will be needed in this sphere. The problems that might be called horizontal, as, for example, the relationship between the scope of the convention and its verification, or the question of the destruction of stocks or the dismantling of facilities, could be dealt with on an ad hoc basis and under the guidance of the co-ordinators of the contact groups concerned.

Apart from these questions of method, we also need to try to clarify our concepts.

What do we want to prohibit?

My delegation believes that we ought to enact as general a prohibition as possible of the production, stockpiling and development of chemical agents intended for use in armed conflicts by reason of their toxic properties and for purposes other than those authorized.

What this means, broadly speaking, is the application of the well-known general purpose criterion, that is to say, the intention to use chemical agents for non-authorized purposes.

Too often in our discussions there is an absence of any clear perception of the application of this general purpose criterion.

In practice, once the prohibition has been enacted — and without prejudice to the application of the definition of chemical weapons to animals and plants — we ought to organize the regime of the prohibition of chemical weapons accordingly.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In the first place, everything that exists that is in clear violation of the general purpose criterion, namely, stocks of chemical weapons and their production facilities, must be destroyed.

Secondly, it will be necessary to evaluate the consequences of the general prohibition as regards the lawful production of chemicals. We are already in broad agreement that in such production, the supertoxic lethal chemicals -- those which might otherwise be the most likely to be used in armed conflicts -- should be regulated, their production or retention for authorized purposes being strictly limited.

Up to now, in accordance with the general purpose criterion, we have assumed that no civilian production would be prohibited. The recent proposal of the Soviet Union for a complete prohibition of the production of substances containing the methyl-phosphorus synthesis raises many questions in this connection.

The third consequence of the regime of the prohibition of chemical weapons concerns the verification of compliance by States parties with the obligations they will have contracted under the convention.

This verification has two distinct aspects.

The first, and we believe the most important, is that of routine inspections, namely, those which will give States parties the security which they have decided not, or no longer, to ensure by means of chemical weapons.

Such security can basically only be provided by international means of verification, including, when necessary, on-site inspection.

The papers submitted, such as that of Canada in 1981 (document CD/167) and more recently that of the United Kingdom on the subject of the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons, have clearly indicated the widely differing needs as regards verification according to the different activities to be verified.

In the intentions it has expressed as regards verification of the destruction of stocks and of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals, the Soviet Union implicitly recognizes the need for such differentiated verification. The concept of general on-site inspection is thus now accepted. We still have to agree on the range of activities for which such inspection is needed and on the procedures for such inspection.

The work we did at the beginning of this year in the course of the technical consultations were particularly useful in this connection, and it is to be regretted that it did not prove possible to submit a report on them.

We made important progress in the identification of the key precursors which will call for special attention in the process of verification of non-production.

The recent contribution of the United Kingdom constitutes a very logical sequel to that work.

Similarly, the needs in the matter of verification of the destruction of stocks have certainly been made clearer. However, we have some doubts about the proposal made by the Soviet Union in document CD/CW/CTC/37 suggesting that the methods of verification of the destruction of chemical weapons should vary according to the type -- the Soviet Union proposes six categories -- to which they belong.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In our view, the first stage in the process of verification of the destruction of stocks should consist precisely in the identification, through on-site inspection, of the different types of chemical substances in question. This first stage could not, therefore, be predetermined, as the Soviet proposal implies.

At the same time, since a growing conceptual convergence appears to be developing in the sphere of the verification of the destruction of stocks, it seems to us necessary to make a similar effort with regard to the procedures for the **verification** of the destruction or dismantling of facilities.

I have just spoken about the routine aspect of verification. The other aspect concerns that part of the process of the settlement of disputes which the convention can organize before States resort, if necessary, to the machinery of the United Nations Charter. There will be fewer chances of this aspect of verification being employed the more routine inspections permit the removal of suspicions between the parties.

There will be fewer reasons to have doubts about the activities of a State party if the routine verification methods are sufficiently extensive to create confidence.

I would add that it would no doubt be useful for the convention to define the nature of the co-operation necessary between international means of verification, as represented by the consultative committee, and the organs for national implementation measures, which ought above all to form a point of contact for the activities of the consultative committee in the various States **parties**.

As regards national technical means of verification, we ought to ensure that, like the international verification means, they are not hampered.

I should like, in conclusion, to make some comments on the subject of the prohibition of use.

As we see it, the inclusion in the convention on chemical weapons of a general prohibition on development, production and stockpiling corresponds to the general prohibition of those same activities enacted under the 1972 Convention on bacteriological weapons.

As regards the prohibition of the use of weapons, whether chemical or bacteriological, this, in our view, has become a prohibition of a general nature deriving from the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It is because we consider that the regime of the prohibition of use is common to bacteriological and chemical weapons and that international customary law has established it sufficiently clearly that we have reservations as regards the repetition of that prohibition within the framework of the convention on chemical weapons. We believe that the real problem lies in the verification of compliance with the prohibition enacted by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and subsequently enlarged by international customary law.

It was for that reason that Belgium last year submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a proposal concerning the verification of compliance with the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological or toxin weapons.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

I should like to note in this connection that our proposal seems to me to meet the conditions put forward by my colleague from the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, in his statement of 22 February last, regarding the establishment of machinery for verification of compliance with the Geneva Protocol. Those conditions can be summed up as follows: the States parties to the international instruments concerned should negotiate about such machinery, and reach agreement through negotiation and on the basis of consensus, as is usual in matters of disarmament.

In the particular case of the convention on chemical weapons, we have noted with great interest all the new proposals and positions which have been expressed on this point. They bear witness to a conciliatory spirit which we fully share.

I should nevertheless like to make certain comments in this connection.

The first concerns the proposals suggesting that we should simply incorporate the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons within the scope of the convention.

If we were to do that, could we be sure that such a prohibition of use would be as general in application as that resulting from the customary international law deriving from the Geneva Protocol? Would there not, on the contrary, be a risk of creating a lacuna in the matter of the prohibition of bacteriological weapons? For if it is accepted that the regime of the prohibition of the use of both chemical and bacteriological weapons derives from the 1925 Protocol, would not a partial repetition of that prohibition, that is, solely in the context of chemical weapons, cause doubts with regard to bacteriological weapons?

Again assuming the inclusion of a prohibition on use in the convention on chemical weapons, will it be necessary to provide for specific machinery for the verification of compliance with that prohibition, or shall we be able to rely on the terse formula that any use of chemical weapons would constitute proof of the violation of the convention, and will its verification provisions apply also to such situations?

In the latter event, how would the fact of the use of chemical weapons be established? Ought there not to be some special machinery for the establishment of the facts, given the special nature of the verification procedures necessary in the matter of allegations of use?

My second observation concerns the proposals suggesting that with respect to chemical weapons alone we should extend the sphere of application of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Would there not be a danger that this would affect the customary character of the general prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons?

Would that not seem to imply that the prohibition of the use of bacteriological weapons is not absolute as regards the interpretation which international custom has given to the 1925 Protocol?

It is precisely because we have not up to now found adequate answers to these questions that my delegation has envisaged specific machinery for the verification of the prohibition of the use both of bacteriological and of chemical weapons.

As I have already said, these proposals were intended to stimulate our thinking on the subject. My delegation would be perfectly prepared to amend them if there was a possibility that they might then meet with the approval of all members of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Onkelinx, the representative of Belgium, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the current situation in the world cannot but cause growing concern for the future of mankind. A truly unprecedented situation now exists in which the nuclear weapons created by man are capable not only of causing tremendous destruction and of killing or mutilating dozens and hundreds of millions of people but also of annihilating mankind as a biological species and making the environment completely unsuitable for life.

That is why the subject of the prevention of nuclear war is the most urgent and the most important in the whole of world politics. It is not by chance that never before in the centuries-old history of mankind have there been such broad, mass anti-war movements as at present.

On the basis of their analysis of the international situation, the Warsaw Treaty Organization member States at the summit meeting held in Prague early this year, put forward an alternative to nuclear catastrophe and called for broad international co-operation in order to preserve civilization and life on earth.

The question of the prevention of nuclear war also occupied a central place at the summit meeting of non-aligned countries held in New Delhi. In its final declaration the New Delhi forum demanded an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict, the prevention of the catastrophe which threatens not only mankind at the present time but future generations as well. "The crisis which confronts our civilization today", the New Delhi Message says, "is unprecedented in history."

The demand for the removal of the threat of nuclear self-annihilation — this is the summa summarum of these official statements and spontaneous manifestations of the overwhelming majority of States and mankind as a whole. Millions of people throughout the world demand the use of every existing possibility, all the channels of multilateral, universal, bilateral, regional and any other negotiations in order to achieve real progress in preventing nuclear war.

The Soviet delegation expresses deep satisfaction that the Committee is finally ready to adopt a decision to include this item in the agenda of the current session. At the same time we are indignant at the fact that more than seven weeks (!) of our precious working time were needed merely in order to convince a small group of delegations of the necessity of fulfilling the Committee's mandate, entrusted to it by the world community. We hope that the inclusion of the item on the prevention of nuclear war in the agenda is not an empty formality but a prelude to serious and constructive talks.

The particular significance of this item consists in the fact that the nuclear arms race has entered a new stage which is characterized not by a quantitative but rather by a qualitative improvement in nuclear weapons.

The new stage of the arms race, in which the world is involved today has a fundamental and extremely dangerous distinction from all previous stages. Unfortunately, one can frequently hear cynical comments, mainly on the part of "disarmament nihilists", that the arms race has been going on for so long that a further development in it will not make much difference. This is a dangerous delusion. In what does the danger of the new round in the arms race consist?

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

First, the build-up of nuclear weapons on the basis of the latest discoveries and modern technology, including systems of weapons for striking in and from outer space, will steadily lead to increased levels of military confrontation and a destabilization of the situation. The situation in the world will become even less stable and extremely explosive.

Secondly, the current stage of the arms race is extremely dangerous owing mainly to the fact that it is aimed at the creation and deployment of first-strike nuclear systems with a high speed of action, precision in the delivery of nuclear charges to the targets and durability.

Thirdly, with the new round in the arms race nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction will become even more sophisticated. Thus, the elaboration of international agreements on their limitation and reduction and the verification of disarmament will become much more difficult.

The new systems of mass destruction lead, as a rule, to a decline in the time for the adoption of defence measures. While in the comparatively recent past, States' leaders had at their disposal a certain amount of time in which to adopt decisions in a situation fraught with a nuclear confrontation, at present in a number of cases they would have only a couple of minutes, upon which the destinies of entire countries and peoples would depend. In addition to that, experience shows the extremely dangerous character of possible technical failures and other chance occurrences which might lead to the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

All these dangerous trends will be considerably more complicated if the new United States medium-range missiles are deployed in the countries of western Europe, which are at present intensifying practical preparations for their deployment (particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy). The socialist countries consider this fact as a measure aimed at the preparation of a first strike against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries. There is no doubt that in the event of the implementation of NATO's plans, this will provoke a corresponding reaction on the part of the socialist countries.

The experience of history shows that the creation of new systems of nuclear weapons and their deployment in the vicinity of an adversary cannot provide a decisive superiority for a long time. The logic of the arms race is such that another spiral in it re-establishes the parity on a new, higher and more dangerous level (this is confirmed by the entire post-war period).

The only realistic way out is to lessen confrontation, to limit nuclear weapons. Peace and stability can be provided not by building up military might or attempts to upset the balance of forces, but rather by maintaining the balance on a lower level.

In what manner can nuclear war be prevented?

Some NATO countries justify and even advertise their conceptions of "deterrence" and "balance of fear", allegedly capable of saving peace. The Achilles heel of these doctrines consists in the fact that while not eliminating the danger of war but on the contrary increasing it they at the same time demand for their implementation more and more of the most lethal weapons capable of

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

"deterring" peoples owing to their capacity for the mass destruction of all kinds of life on earth. All the United States rearmament programmes are based on the ideology of "deterrence". The arms race is entering a qualitatively new and more dangerous stage, covering all types of weapons including nuclear, chemical and even conventional weapons. The escalation of strategic concepts and doctrines is connected with this ideology.

The countries of the socialist community and a wide range of other States have another approach to the prevention of the threat of nuclear war. It is not a "balance of fear" or an escalation of the "forces of deterrence" but the prevention of war, the curbing of the arms race and disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. It is not "deterrence" but the peaceful coexistence of States with different socialist systems, the strengthening of confidence among them, the strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security which has fully proved itself in the conduct of international relations and the maintenance of a dialogue — such a position is realistic and vital. This is a more reliable basis than the "balance of fear" or mere "deterrence".

What should be done in order to remove the sword of Damocles hanging over mankind?

First of all it is necessary for States, particular the nuclear-weapon States, to display political will and readiness to co-operate in order to elaborate concrete measures. It is necessary to break the deadlock as regards real arms limitation and reduction, to intensify the current negotiations and to resume those that have been suspended, and to achieve agreements on the reduction and elimination of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons.

One of the main ways of really lessening the threat of nuclear war is, of course, the achievement of an agreement between the USSR and the United States on strategic nuclear arms limitation and reduction and on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The delegations of the Western countries in the Committee on Disarmament, at a very high level, have referred to these talks in some detail and expended considerable effort in distorting the USSR position at these talks and generally rather freely interpreting many problems connected with them. Allow me to make some comments in reply.

Since the resumption of the talks on strategic weapons the Soviet side has been in favour of directing them towards a mutually acceptable agreement on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union proposes the reduction of the strategic weapons of both sides by approximately 25 per cent down to equal levels, a considerable reduction also in the number of nuclear charges on these weapons, and the prohibition of the deployment of the long-range cruise missiles and other new strategic systems. We have also made a number of proposals aimed at consolidating the strategic stability and increasing confidence between the USSR and the United States.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The American side, ignoring the principle of equality and equal security, proposes the reduction, not of all types of strategic arms but on a selective basis, as it would suit the United States. It proposes that the Soviet Union should destroy the majority of its ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, while at the same time the United States would implement its plans for the creation of new systems of strategic weapons. Thus, the United States would maintain its multiple superiority in heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles.

Thus, the aim of United States policy is not to reduce strategic arms but to legalize the race in order to gain unilateral advantages.

That is the objective situation in the matter of strategic arms limitation and reduction.

As to the question of the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, the Soviet-American talks on this subject have been continuing for sixteen months, very near the Palais des Nations. It would be natural, even taking into account the complexity of the questions under discussion, to expect that some progress would have manifested itself at the talks during that time. However, this is not the case.

But what is the cause of the continuing stalemate? The answer is that the American side does not wish to search for a mutually acceptable decision, a decision that would be fair and just.

Since the American side put forward its deliberately unacceptable "zero option" in the summer of 1981, it has not introduced anything new. In claiming that the United States is serious in its approach to the conduct of the talks, Washington is purposely misleading world public opinion. As is recognized even in the United States, Washington agreed to talks in order to buy time for the deployment of new American ground-based missiles on the European continent. At the same time the United States is doing everything to show that it is the Soviet Union which bears the responsibility for the existence of the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

The evidence reveals, however, that the problem dates back to 1948 when the United States deployed in Britain 90 B-29 strategic bombers each carrying one or two atomic bombs. Incidentally, it was bombers of the same type which were used in the raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Some time later the Matador, Mace, Thor and Jupiter nuclear medium-range missiles, as well as F-86, F-100 and other fighter-bombers able to carry nuclear weapons, were stationed in Europe. Thus, by the beginning of the 1950s, the United States had created in Europe and the adjacent waters a nuclear potential allowing it to carry out strikes against the Soviet Union and its allies. France and the United Kingdom were next to acquire nuclear capability. The Soviet Union responded five years later by deploying some similar systems on its own territory.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In 1975, NATO took a decision to update its medium-range weapons and to put into service the Pershing-II and cruise missiles. It will be recalled that at that time the USSR did not have SS-20 missiles, which the United States now claims to be the major reason for its plans to deploy in Europe medium-range nuclear weapons.

By deliberately singling out land-based medium-range missiles the United States is attempting to keep its forward-based nuclear forces from being discussed at the negotiations. But these include hundreds of planes stationed in Europe and on board aircraft-carriers in its waters. These are aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard and their target is the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Why should the Soviet Union ignore the numerous United States military bases on the territories of the European members of NATO and the United States aircraft-based planes? The United States does not want to have the French and British nuclear potential included in the total NATO nuclear force. What is involved is a significant arsenal numbering hundreds of sophisticated delivery vehicles — ballistic missiles and aircraft -- capable of reaching the territory of the USSR and of our allies. Both France and the United Kingdom are NATO allies of the United States which have been constantly building up and improving their nuclear weapons. Here is how they themselves assess their nuclear capabilities. The White Paper published by the British Government in 1981 says: "We maintain the up-to-date nuclear forces designed to be used within the framework of the NATO flexible response strategy. They are capable of causing such damage to the Soviet Union that the Soviet leaders have to take them into account". Well, the USSR does take them into account.

The President of France, in an interview published in the West German magazine, Stern, of 9 July 1981, said: "France will not hesitate to add its forces to the US deterrence". The patrol areas of French submarines are agreed on with the United States command; a common identification and logistics system is used by them. All this speaks for itself. Logically, the USSR is obliged to take counter measures.

What is involved is the considerable share of nuclear forces in Europe belonging to the United States' allies, and these must of course be taken into consideration in limiting nuclear weapons in the European region.

The basis for an agreement lies in taking fully into account all medium-range weapons deployed in Europe. Proceeding from this principle, the Soviet Union suggests the establishment of parity, not only in missiles but also in aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, at a much lower level than is now the case. The Soviet Union is prepared to have in the European area not one missile or one aircraft more than the NATO countries have.

In stating our views on these important issues, we are far from thinking that the time for their solution has gone by. Not by any means. The possibility of solving the problems of the limitation of strategic forces and the limitation of nuclear forces in Europe still exists. They can and must be solved taking into consideration both the interests of the negotiating parties on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security and the need to strengthen international security.

At the last plenary meeting the group of socialist countries introduced for the Committee's consideration a document (CD/355) on the prevention of nuclear war. The Soviet delegation hopes that a constructive discussion of these proposals in the Committee will contribute to the elaborating of concrete measures aimed at strengthening international security.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Now let me say in this regard a few words about the significance of the unilateral obligation assumed by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

What is the practical significance of this obligation assumed by the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union earlier stated that it was prepared not to use nuclear weapons against States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territory. Now this undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons extends to all States in the world without exception.

This undertaking places the nuclear arsenal and armed forces of the USSR within a more strict framework and necessitates rigorous control over nuclear weapons, such as to exclude any possibility of unauthorized use of both tactical and strategic weapons. In the training of the personnel of the armed forces, still greater attention is being paid to ways of preventing the escalation of a conventional conflict into a nuclear one. These are responsible and manifold tasks, and they have become the absolute rule for the activities of the armed forces of the USSR.

Our undertaking is a matter not of mere words but of concrete, practical actions aimed at strengthening the material basis of security which are being consistently carried out by the Soviet Government. If the other nuclear-weapon States were to assume a similar obligation and to undertake corresponding actions, a significant step would thereby have been taken towards eliminating the threat of nuclear war altogether. The world at large expects the Western nuclear-weapon powers to act in similar fashion.

The freezing by all nuclear-weapon States of their strategic nuclear arsenals would also contribute to the prevention of the threat of nuclear war. Many political and social leaders of various countries in the world have supported this idea in recent times. And this is only natural because a freeze could be the starting-point for a lowering of the levels of military confrontation, the first step towards genuine measures for the reduction and ultimate liquidation of nuclear weapons. The practical implementation of the freeze concept would also greatly contribute to the stabilization of the world situation and the strengthening of the security of the peoples. We regard people's demand for a freeze on nuclear weapons as an expression of their deep and justified concern for their fate. It could be said that people are voting for the preservation of the thing of highest value in the world — human life.

The freezing of the strategic arsenals of the nuclear-weapon powers would open up a real possibility for progress towards nuclear disarmament: the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purposes of the production of various types of nuclear weapons; the cessation of the production of nuclear munitions of all types and their delivery vehicles; the gradual reduction of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including delivery vehicles; the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union also supports the proposal for a freeze by the USSR and the United States only. Certainly a freeze with such a limited number of parties should be confined to a certain period of time, and the question of its prolongation should be decided in the light of the behaviour of the other nuclear-weapon States. As you know, at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union supported an appeal to the USSR and the United States "to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral statements or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear arms freeze", subject, naturally, to appropriate verification.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We are ready to do this but everything here is stalemated because of the refusal of the United States to take a constructive position on this issue. I should like to express the hope that the consideration of the question of the prevention of nuclear war in the Committee on Disarmament will help the leaders of the United States to weigh all the pros and cons of a freeze on nuclear weapons so as to take a position on this issue corresponding to the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of States.

The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is of primary importance in the range of negotiations aimed at the prevention of nuclear war. In this connection, particular significance attaches to the proposal that all States possessing nuclear weapons should declare a moratorium on any nuclear explosions, starting from a date to be agreed upon between them, which would remain in force up to the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This would be an effective barrier to the qualitative nuclear arms race, in particular as regards the most destabilizing systems designed for first-strike purposes. As you know, we also supported the appeal by the General Assembly to the States depositaries of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments and of the non-proliferation Treaty immediately to halt all experimental nuclear explosions as a provisional measure. Such a moratorium, of course, would be limited to a certain period of time, which could be prolonged depending on the behaviour of the other nuclear-weapon powers.

The proposal of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO member States is aimed at preventing both nuclear and conventional war. This proposal offers a possibility for halting the present dangerous course of events, reverting to normal relations, building confidence and conducting disarmament negotiations in a calm atmosphere.

The delegations of socialist countries support the proposal for the conclusion of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons, which was approved by the United Nations General Assembly.

All the above-mentioned proposals form a constructive basis for developing measures on the prevention of nuclear war. An authoritative and representative working group is a wholly appropriate, and in many cases the only organ which provides the framework in which effective negotiations on this range of issues are possible.

The Soviet delegation is also ready to consider other multilateral measures aimed at the prevention of nuclear war, such as averting the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; excluding the possibility of surprise attack; concluding an international convention on strengthening security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, etc. Bilateral measures should, of course, be considered at appropriate negotiations between the States concerned.

The USSR does not claim a monopoly on proposals which could lead to a lessening of the danger of war. We are ready to discuss proposals emanating from any delegation in the Committee on Disarmament.

The Soviet position on this issue is absolutely clear: there should be no war — small, large, limited or global. The USSR is far from underestimating the increasing military threat. But at the same time it perceives the possibility for creating an insurmountable barrier to war, which is the gravest crime against humanity and must be outlawed.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, in an effort to facilitate an understanding and the subsequent decision of the Committee on Disarmament on the establishment of the working groups, my delegation has asked the secretariat to circulate a draft decision on behalf of a group of socialist States. It has appeared as Working Paper No. 81 and is entitled, "Draft decision on the re-establishment of ad hoc working groups for the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament: proposal by a group of socialist States". The adoption of this draft decision would allow the working groups to get to work immediately. This draft also reflects the possibility of having discussions on enlarging the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. This would be in full accordance with the decision of the Committee on Disarmament contained in document CD/291 which reads that "The ad hoc working group will ... report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session". And then this decision we took last year says, "The Committee will thereafter" — after this report to the Committee — "take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard".

May I request you, Mr. Chairman, to start immediately the necessary consultations in order to enable the Committee on Disarmament to take a decision on the re-establishment of the working groups at one of our next meetings.

Allow me now to say a few words on the question of our agenda for 1983. As is well known, my group has carefully considered all proposals which have been submitted up to now in this regard and we have taken an active part in the consideration of the draft agenda. In this connection, my group has shown flexibility and made considerable concessions. After further consultations with my group, I am now in a position to announce that in a spirit of compromise we do not insist any more either on the inclusion of the question of the safe development of nuclear energy in our agenda as a separate item or on mentioning the statement to be made by the Chairman after the adoption of the agenda. In so acting, we have taken into consideration the request addressed to us by the Group of 21 and also the declared intention to have the subject of the safe development of nuclear energy dealt with in a special sub-group. Mr. Chairman, we hope that if all the other groups and delegations show the same flexible approach to the problems of our agenda which are still pending, it may be possible to reach agreement on our agenda for 1983 and to formalize it without delay.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. Since the list of speakers for today has now been exhausted, and in view of the remarks just made by Ambassador Herder on behalf of the group of socialist countries, I should like to go on to certain questions concerning the organization of our work.

The representative of the United States of America has asked for the floor; I give it to him with pleasure.

Mr. BUSBY (United States of America): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I have asked for the floor in order briefly to respond to the rather long and detailed statement of our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union this morning, but certainly if it is your desire to proceed at this time to other matters, I can refrain from speaking until later in the meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank you. Do any other delegations wish to put their names on the list to speak before I go on to the question of the organization of our work? Apparently not. So, then, as I was about to say, I have every reason to believe that we should now be in a position to resolve some of the issues which have up to now remained in suspense. In accordance with our established practice, I suggest that we first hold an informal meeting to discuss organizational matters and then, in the light of the agreements reached, we could resume our plenary meeting in order to confirm our decisions. If there is no objection to this procedure, I shall now suspend the plenary meeting and we can hold the informal meeting immediately thereafter. If there are no objections, it is so decided. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.10 p.m. and resumed at 12.45 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): We shall now resume the 206th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I should like to take up the question of the Committee's annual agenda. The Committee has before it today Working Paper No. 80, which contains a revision of the agenda previously submitted to the Committee as Working Paper No. 79 in accordance with rule 29 of the Committee's rules of procedure. Before the Committee takes a decision on Working Paper No. 80, I should like to make the following statement:

> With respect to the adoption of the agenda for the year 1983, it is understood that the question of the nuclear neutron weapon is covered by item 2 of the agenda and can be considered under that agenda item.

If there are no objections, can I consider that the Committee is ready to adopt Working Paper No. 80?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I should like, if you would allow me, at this stage of our work, to express my gratitude and my very sincere thanks to all delegations in our Committee for the spirit of compromise and the desire for conciliation which they have shown throughout the past weeks, which have enabled us today to reach unanimous agreement on the Committee's agenda for the year 1983. I should merely like to add that I shall count on the same co-operation, conciliatory spirit and willingness to compromise in my further consultations on the subjects remaining to be settled. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of the United States who asked for it earlier but very kindly put off his statement for the time being until we had settled the question of the agenda. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. BUSBY (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, as I indicated in our previous plenary meeting, I would like to take the floor briefly to respond to the long and rather detailed statement which was made this morning by our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Issraelyan. My delegation will, of course, study the statement carefully and I would like to reserve our right to respond more fully at a later time. But I do feel compelled to make several points. First, with regard to the START negotiations, where the United States has called for deep and significant reductions which we see as being designed to reduce the threat which these most destabilizing systems pose, our position was characterized as follows: "the aim of United States policy is not to reduce strategic arms but to legalize the race in order to gain unilateral advantages". I do not think it will come as any surprise to our distinguished colleagues that I take exception to that, and I would simply point out one, I think, rather significant fact. The Soviet statement does not point out that the last time the United States introduced a new intercontinental ballistic missile was in 1969, when we deployed the Minuteman 3. And since that time we have unilaterally dismantled a number of older missiles. During that same period of time the Soviet Union has built five new classes of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and has upgraded these systems no less than eight times. In response to the Soviet Union's complaint that our position is unfair and that we are seeking unilateral advantage, I would say that it seems to me that what we are being asked to do is to reward them for this unprecedented build-up. Secondly, we had a recounting of what was called a "history of the problem". It was pointed out that at the beginning of the 1960s, the United States had created in Europe, by the deployment of Thor and Jupiter nuclear missiles, a threat against the Soviet Union. The history then jumps to 1975. Well, what is not brought out is the fact that those systems were removed.

Finally, there has been a reference to a 1975 NATO decision to upgrade and put into service Pershing-II and cruise missiles. Of course, no deployment decision was taken until 1979. What occurred in the intervening years was that by 1978 the Soviet Union had deployed 600 intermediate-range missiles. The SS-20s were beginning to be introduced. By the end of 1979 when Mr. Brezhnev announced that "a balance now exists", there were 800 warheads in place. At the present time we estimate that there are 1,300 warheads deployed. The NATO allies have none. Certainly, we have asked to remove these systems. The best answer that I can give to the statement of the Soviet Union on that score is to repeat the question which was put forward here by Vice-President Bush during his address: "Why not?"

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I should like to point out to my colleague from the United States delegation that everything that the Soviet delegation says is based on facts and not on fantasies. Unfortunately there is no reciprocity in this respect. I shall refer to one fact: the United States administration now claims, and this has just been repeated by the representative of the United States, that during the 1970s the United States took no measures to build up its offensive strategic forces. That is not true. The building up of those forces went on continuously. In particular, there was a sharp increase in the number of nuclear warheads and a substantial increase in their accuracy. In the first half of the 1970s alone, three completely new systems of weapons were deployed in large numbers. The United States put into service 550 Minuteman 3 ballistic missiles, each with three warheads, and 496 Poseidon C3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, each equipped with from 10 to 14 warheads, were deployed on 31 atomic submarines. The accuracy of these new strategic systems was more than twice that of the previous ones. Solely as a result of this, their striking capacity increased by no less than five times.

I could continue this list of new types of weapons which were put into service by the United States and its allies during the 1970s, but I think that we shall have the opportunity to do this at another time, perhaps specially set aside for the purpose. For the present, when we have just succeeded in adopting the agenda and have included in it the question of the prevention of nuclear war, I should like to invite my American colleague to a debate on this question within the framework of the working group on the prevention of nuclear war, the proposal on the establishment of which he will no doubt support.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for taking the floor at this late hour, but it was originally my intention to take the floor immediately after the adoption of the agenda. It was my intention to make a short statement in my capacity as co-ordinator of the group of socialist States in connection with the adoption of the agenda. This statement reads as follows:

With satisfaction the delegations of the socialist group have noted that, finally, it has been possible in the Committee to come to an agreement on the inclusion of the question of the prevention of nuclear war in our agenda. The delegations of the socialist countries have emphasized repeatedly that the prevention of nuclear war is the most urgent and pressing problem of our time. This is why we have been concerned and disappointed in view of the reluctance, to say the least, of certain delegations to come to an agreement on the inclusion of the long-standing problem of preventing nuclear war in our agenda, which held up our Committee's work for several weeks. This is to be regretted, all the more since it was not a new problem.

Now, the task is to act without further delay. That means to elaborate and put into practice measures to effectively exclude the danger of a nuclear catastrophe threatening mankind.

The delegations of the socialist countries are convinced that all States, if they are concerned for the fate of their peoples and mankind as a whole, should undertake all efforts — including in the framework of this Committee — in order to avoid nuclear war.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

It must be noted with satisfaction that thanks to the consistent and, at the same time, flexible position of the members of the socialist group and the Group of 21 it has been possible to come to an agreement on the inclusion of this question in the agenda of this single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.

This is undoubtedly an important step which creates the basis for proceeding to concrete negotiations on this item of the highest priority. But the adoption of an agenda item alone, of course, does not solve the problem. What matters now is not to postpone further action endlessly, but to establish an ad hoc working group on this question where appropriate negotiations can be held and concrete multilateral measures for the prevention of nuclear war agreed upon.

We expect that in this framework all important initiatives and proposals will be considered which are directly connected with this problem. In document CD/355 the socialist countries have submitted their detailed proposals.

Furthermore, it is our understanding that the discussion of "related matters" will include consideration of the proposal by the Warsaw Treaty member States for the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. In the same way, the proposal by the socialist countries on ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy should be taken into account, since the destruction of peaceful nuclear facilities would, in its consequences, be equal to the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): The French delegation and the French governmental authorities have repeatedly explained the reasons why the nuclear forces of my country cannot be considered as part of the general nuclear forces to which the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union referred a short while ago. It is my delegation's intention in the very near future to make a statement in reply to the one we have just heard.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador de la Gorce for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see that that is not the case. This concludes our work for today. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 29 March 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.207
29 March 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 29 March 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. SKALLI (Morocco)

GE.83-60698

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. J.C. CARASALES Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
Australia:	Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Mr. A. ONKELINX Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Brazil:	Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. B. GRINBERG Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U TIN KYAW HLAING U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. G.R. SKINNER Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN Miss C. de VARENNES
China:	Mr. LI LUYE Mr. TIAN JIN Mrs. GE YUYUN Mr. PAN JUSHENG
Cuba:	Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN Miss W. BASSIM Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia:	Mr. F. YOHANNES
France:	Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. H. THIELICKE Mr. M. NOTZEL
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. H. WEGENER Mr. F. ELBE Mr. W. ROHR
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. S. SUTRESNA Mrs. P. RAMADHAN Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Iran:	Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI
Italy:	Mr. M. ALESSI Mr. B. CABRAS Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI Mr. M. TAKAHASHI Mr. M. KONISHI Mr. T. TAKANO Mr. T. KAWAKITA Mr. K. TANAKA Mr. T. ARAI
Kenya:	Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. BOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Netherlands:	Mr. van den BROEK
	Mr. F. van DONGEN
	Mr. J. RAMAKER
	Mr. H. HEINEMANN
	Mr. A.J. MEERBURG
	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Nigeria:	Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
	Miss I.E.C. UKEJE
Pakistan:	Mr. M. AHMAD
	Mr. T. ALTAF
Peru:	Mr. V. ROJAS
Poland:	Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. T. MELESCANU
	Mr. L. TOADER
Sri Lanka:	Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:	Mr. C. LIDGARD
	Mr. G. EKHOLM
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON
	Mrs. G. JONANG
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
	Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
	Mr. G. VORONTZOV
	Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
United Kingdom:	Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
	Mr. B.P. NOBLE
	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT
United States of America:	Mr. L.G. FIELDS
	Mr. M.D. BUSBY
	Mr. H.L. CALHOUN
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
	Mr. W. HECKROTTE
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
	Mr. R. MIKULAK
	Mr. J. MARTIN
Venezuela:	Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Yugoslavia:	Mr. K. VIDAS
	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Zaire:	

Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament: Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 207th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Allow me, first of all, Ambassadors and dear colleagues, to welcome among us His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. Hans van den Broek, who has come to Geneva today to address the Committee. Mr. van den Broek is an eminent statesman who has occupied many important posts. As a member of parliament he participated in the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Development of Co-operation, and in September 1981 he became Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before being appointed to his present post in November of last year. I am sure that all members of the Committee will listen to the statement he is going to make to us with the utmost interest.

I have on my list of speakers for this morning the representatives of the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hans van den Broek.

Mr. van den BROEK (Netherlands) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to address a few words to you in French, a language you speak with such mastery and elegance, not surprisingly, moreover, for someone so well known not only in diplomatic circles but also in the world of letters. I am particularly pleased to have an opportunity to speak to the Committee on Disarmament when this important multilateral body is meeting under your chairmanship. I am thus able to pay tribute to the efforts you have been making during this past week to resolve the problem which had arisen in the Committee and which was preventing it from resuming its important work on the substance of its mandate. I can only congratulate the Committee on Disarmament on finding itself, during a month marked by particularly difficult negotiations, under the chairmanship of a seasoned diplomat, endowed with diplomatic skills which we have all had occasion to admire.

[speaking in English] Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me, I shall change to English now.

The world arms build-up in all its aspects, nuclear, chemical and conventional, constitutes a threat to our very existence and is therefore one of the most pressing problems facing us. We all share the conviction that the risk of war and in particular the inconceivable horror of a nuclear conflict must be reduced to a minimum and that our best efforts should be directed towards controlling and reversing the present trend towards ever more numerous and more lethal arsenals.

The close linkage of the various components of the arms build-up and the awareness that an armed conflict of one kind may easily lead to another at a higher level of destruction, obliges us to treat the whole complex of security, arms limitation and disarmament as a whole. However great may be our natural preoccupation with the growth of nuclear arsenals, we should not allow ourselves, to my feeling, to ignore the menace of quantitative and qualitative developments in the field of conventional armaments.

(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

This being our varied and complex task, how do we go about it? By their nature, all arms fulfil the dual role of a means of self-defence — and in the worst case, a means of aggression — and of a deterrent, but it was only the advent of nuclear weapons, with their inherent threat of total mutual destruction, that led to the full realization of their dual nature.

They pose an awesome threat. At the same time, and for the very reason of their terrifying character and the awareness that in a nuclear war there are no winners but only losers, their existence has contributed to the prevention of a major outbreak since 1945.

To be credible, deterrence requires the preservation of a stable balance, both in the nuclear and in the conventional field, but I hasten to add a second and equally essential condition for the preservation of peace, and that is a balance at the lowest possible level of armaments and of such a nature as to promote stability. To achieve this is the function of arms control, arms limitation and disarmament.

The requirement of stability at the lowest possible level makes it essential to consider arms limitation and disarmament as a comprehensive process. Steady work and systematic negotiations can diminish the role of nuclear weapons. Establishing a conventional balance will reduce dependence on nuclear weapons. Thus, nuclear and conventional arms control and limitation go hand in hand, and the different negotiations in this field, aimed at restraining qualitative as well as quantitative developments, should be seen in that perspective.

The START negotiations are, of course, a key element in the process of arms control and limitation. The Netherlands notes with satisfaction that both sides have expressed the wish for substantial reductions in strategic weapons, both launchers and warheads. We support the United States approach of focusing on the most destabilizing elements, that is, those weapons systems that put at risk the retaliatory capabilities of the other side.

START is a complex matter, but that certainly also holds true for the problem of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, in particular those Soviet land-based missiles that can reach western Europe in a matter of minutes and are specifically targeted on that area. Without an answer from the Atlantic alliance to these triple-headed mobile missiles, the misconception might grow in the minds of some Soviet military planners that in an armed conflict in Europe, Soviet territory would be sacrosanct, and such a misconception could in certain circumstances engender the outbreak of a devastating conflict. Neither side could afford to take such a risk.

In the face of this increased and massive Soviet threat to Europe, the Atlantic alliance had no other choice than to decide on countermeasures, but at the same time made a sincere offer to negotiate. As we know, negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are now under way and we fervently hope that they will lead to the complete elimination of a whole category of nuclear weapons.

Though these various negotiations primarily affect East-West relations, they are also of great importance to the world at large because of their influence on the prevention of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation policies have been reasonably effective since the 1960s, but this effectiveness runs

(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

the risk of being undermined by quantitative and qualitative developments in nuclear armament. It follows that non-proliferation, vital to all of us, requires the control and limitation of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers.

Nuclear arms limitation and disarmament can only be achieved if the States concerned are convinced that their security remains assured. This enhances the significance of other negotiations concerning Europe. In Vienna, East and West are discussing troop reductions in central Europe. How seriously the Western countries take these negotiations was borne out by their introduction a few months ago of a new proposal for a comprehensive treaty. A clear answer to that proposal is still being awaited. In this context, a reminder is in place that equality in central Europe does not yet mean a conventional military balance in Europe as a whole, and that the geographical advantages are unevenly divided between the two sides.

Yet another forum is the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It is to be hoped that balanced and substantial progress in all fields covered by the Final Act of Helsinki will make it possible to include in the concluding document of the Madrid meeting the mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe as an integral part of the CSCE process. This is so important because it could bring about confidence- and security-building measures that could have a positive over-all effect on the arms control and limitation process.

Concrete results of arms control and limitation negotiations could lead to a conventional balance, which we consider a prerequisite to the positive consideration of a declaration on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

I now come to the Committee on Disarmament. In the foregoing I stressed the comprehensive nature of the process of arms limitation and disarmament. In doing so, I referred in particular to negotiations of a bilateral and regional character, aimed at providing the northern hemisphere with a greater degree of stability and security.

The global dimension of the arms limitation and disarmament process is of no less importance. The advance in science and technology makes it less and less possible to think in regional terms only when addressing the vital issues of peace and security. As a result, the international community has an important role to play in the efforts to bring about arms limitation and disarmament measures of a world-wide character, essential to a peaceful future for our world and indeed to the preservation of mankind.

Seen in this perspective, the Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament, has a crucial role to play. One cannot sufficiently underline the great responsibility of this forum and its individual members in helping to bring about a better and safer world. The Committee has important issues on its agenda which it should address as constructively and efficiently as possible.

And these issues should not be seen in isolation -- none of them. A comprehensive test ban and negative security assurances are directly related to halting and reversing the nuclear arms race; they may also have a beneficial effect on the existing non-proliferation regime to which we attach so much importance. Chemical weapons, though perhaps best capable of being dealt with separately, are nonetheless part of the over-all military equation. The importance of arms control with respect to outer space is particularly relevant to the concept of stability.

(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

Before I go into these issues somewhat further, allow me to dwell for a moment on the tools and the methods of this Committee in dealing with these and other tasks it has been entrusted with.

Overcoming the inherent complexities of the problems the Committee on Disarmament is dealing with, and bridging the differences of opinion on subjects of a technical nature like verification, scope, etc., can only be achieved through painstaking negotiations. To those there is no alternative, but at least the Committee should be adequately equipped to deal with its task more efficiently. This spring session has shown only too clearly that there is considerable room for improvement in the field of methods and procedures.

In the past, the Netherlands has made concrete proposals for improvements in the working methods of this Committee. Recently, other delegations have voiced their ideas on this problem. It would seem to me that the various suggestions or proposals that have been made are worth considering, and that the Committee would be well advised to reserve some of its efforts for a serious discussion of its methods and procedures to avoid future loss of the precious commodity that is time.

Allow me now to make a few observations in some greater detail on the individual issues I mentioned earlier, starting with that of a comprehensive test ban.

Traditionally, my country has steadfastly favoured the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. The Netherlands continues to do so in the conviction that a comprehensive test ban would be an important contribution to the efforts to bring the qualitative arms race to a halt.

The question of a comprehensive test ban has been on the international agenda for a long time. This may be a source of disappointment, but no alibi for a slackening of the efforts to arrive at concrete results as a matter of priority. Though admittedly difficult, this target is not out of reach.

Although a lot of work remains to be done in the field of verification, this complex problem can in principle be solved. Last year, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban did valuable work on the question of verification of compliance with a test ban. It will have to continue its work on details of complaint procedures, the functioning of the consultative committee and on the conditions and means of on-site inspections.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events will have to indicate how an international seismic verification system, making use of the available advanced technology, could function. The former trilateral negotiating parties could perhaps contribute to this end by providing information on means to detect low-yield explosions.

(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

I cannot agree with those who maintain that there is no sense in negotiating the details of a comprehensive test ban without a clear prospect that an early agreement is within reach. Such a notion is, in my opinion, self-defeating. The Committee can and should perform as much preparatory work as can be done now. Only then will the rapid conclusion of a comprehensive test ban be possible as soon as the political conditions are favourable.

You will have noticed that in dealing with this issue I have consistently spoken of a comprehensive test ban. The use of the word comprehensive in this context indicates my country's conviction that a future test ban should include peaceful nuclear explosions. In a technical sense, a nuclear device for peaceful purposes cannot be distinguished from a nuclear weapon, nor for that matter can a nuclear test for peaceful purposes be distinguished from one which serves military goals.

I can understand the genuine opinion of a number of countries which claim that peaceful applications of nuclear explosives must be allowed, if only for reasons of principle. However, the different interests and considerations here at stake should be weighed against each other. Would the possible, but small and largely theoretical economic advantages of peaceful nuclear explosions outweigh their negative effect on the system of verification of a comprehensive test ban and on non-proliferation?

On several occasions, my country has put forward ideas concerning negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. We continue to believe that such guarantees can increase confidence and strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

For a variety of political, legal and practical reasons the conclusion of a convention on this issue seems to be difficult. Our delegation has been consulting with nuclear-weapon States to find out whether it would be possible to harmonize their unilateral assurances in order to incorporate them in a common formula, to be embodied in a Security Council resolution.

Aware of the fact that, in the final analysis, the nuclear-weapon powers have to come to terms amongst themselves, we, for our part, reiterate our willingness to contribute to the best of our ability to a possible resolution of the Security Council on this important matter.

So far I have dealt with issues actually on the agenda of the Committee. May I now ask your attention for a proposed measure that has not yet acquired that same status. Throughout the last four years, the General Assembly has asked the Committee to take up the matter of the cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes at an appropriate stage of its work. We believe that the time has come for informal explorations by the Committee of the so-called "cut-off" proposal.

(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

Contrary to some others, this particular freeze concept can be adequately verified by the indiscriminate application of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since four of the five nuclear-weapon States -- and why should the fifth not follow? -- have now accepted some kind of safeguards, a cut-off agreement seems easier to achieve.

In this context, I may recall the announcements made in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the United States and the Soviet Union on 20 April 1964, later joined by the United Kingdom, that these countries would take unilateral steps to restrict the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The footmarks of these steps seem to have been obliterated. Perhaps the distinguised representatives of the countries involved could shed some light on the fate of these unilateral measures.

On the subject of yet another category of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, I should like to say the following.

I reiterate that the Netherlands armed forces do not possess chemical weapons, that the Netherlands Government does not consider introducing those weapons into its armed forces and that it also rejects the stockpiling of chemical weapons on Netherlands territory.

Awareness has grown that the question of chemical weapons is not merely an East-West problem. These weapons can effectively be used against technologically less developed countries, which virtually lack any protection against such a threat. Though little proliferation in this field has taken place thus far, they can be also used by countries from the third world. A treaty must be concluded, before developments get out of hand.

One of the main obstacles to a chemical weapons treaty is the question of verification. I fully realize that. In the past year the Committee has started to tackle that problem seriously. This momentum should not be allowed to peter out.

I therefore welcome the recent important contribution by the United States. On verification we think along the same lines; individual elements, in particular regarding routine inspections, are of course in need of further refinement.

It is encouraging to note that the Soviet Union has somewhat modified its position regarding on-site inspections. Essential gaps, however, continue to exist and differences remain on the conditions for challenge-inspections. In our view, systematic international inspections are necessary both with respect to the destruction of stockpiles and to the closing and dismantling of chemical weapons plants. The full use of modern technical equipment can help to decrease the degree of intrusiveness of such inspections. Some random inspections to deter clandestine production in the civilian industry of the most dangerous chemicals can likewise not be dispensed with. In many respects, such inspections are preferable to a system of challenge inspections alone: it will often be difficult to acquire enough

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information to justify a request for a challenge inspection. In addition, the procedures regarding a challenge inspection could easily lead to mistrust and reciprocal reproaches of a dubious nature.

Verification is not an end in itself but a tool to strengthen confidence in the implementation of and compliance with a treaty, and to deter violations. Many ideas have been put forward to promote this verification. Perfect verification is neither possible nor wholly indispensable. And so a trade-off between scope, verification and protection against chemical attack could create the necessary confidence.

As for the question whether a chemical weapons treaty should include a provision against "use", we have always believed that any use would indicate a violation of the treaty and would therefore trigger an investigation. We have no objection at all, however, in accepting a specific ban on use in the convention itself. This seems to be the view of the majority of States in the Committee on Disarmament. Naturally, we must see to it that such a ban will not in any way detract from the obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Much to the contrary, the treaty should build on the Protocol and strengthen it.

We will study with interest the proposal made by the Soviet Union for a complete ban on all chemicals related to nerve agents with a particular structure.

I mentioned earlier the need for stability to maintain international peace and security and to prevent war. The notion of stability is particularly relevant to outer space.

Last year, the Committee on Disarmament held a first round of discussions on this subject. Since time is running out on us, the Committee should now probe more deeply into this complex problem and try to reach some conclusions.

At present, many artificial satellites fulfil military functions, wholly or partially. On the whole, these satellites have a stabilizing effect. Observation-, early-warning- and communications-satellites strengthen confidence that arms-control measures are being complied with, that no surprise attacks can be mounted and that communications can be maintained even in periods of tension and conflict.

This conclusion seems to me of the utmost importance. It means that for the foreseeable future complete demilitarization of outer space is not at all a good idea. It would, of course, not be very realistic either.

The development of anti-satellite weapons is quite another matter. Systems capable of destroying stabilizing satellites are by their very nature destabilizing. Both major space powers are developing such weapons, and the Soviet Union has even tested quite a number of them. In our opinion, this development should be halted. We know quite well that we are talking about a complex matter. Many different types of potential systems are involved, applying various techniques, operating

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either from the earth or from space. We realize that even under a complete and verifiable ban on anti-satellite weapons, some residual capacity in this field will remain since certain weapons and space-systems could also be used for anti-satellite warfare without being specially designed for that purpose. None of these complexities should discourage us.

After careful study of the major aspects of this issue we believe that two general measures should be taken which are mutually reinforcing and are meant to take away the threat of anti-satellite warfare. The first would be an investigation into the possibility of reaching an agreement to declare satellites inviolable. Parties should undertake not to damage, destroy or remove satellites and not to interfere with their functioning.

The second, meant to reinforce the declaration on inviolability, would consist of an agreement to prohibit the testing, stationing and use of specific anti-satellite weapons. We realize that both the definition of anti-satellite weapons as well as the development of adequate verification measures will be difficult, though not insoluble. For example, we regard a speedy ban on testing to be important, since that would be about the best way of verifying that anti-satellite weapons would not be deployed.

We eagerly look forward to intensive discussions on these matters in this body. The Netherlands Government also believes that discussion and subsequent negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament would greatly benefit by a speedy resumption by the United States of America and the Soviet Union of their bilateral negotiations on anti-satellite weapons. A ban on this type of warfare would be a first and urgent step, but not the whole story. We also have to reflect on other forms of actual and potential military use of outer space, which requires further examination and consideration from the point of view of arms control.

Recently, ideas have been expressed which could, in the long run, have a bearing on this subject. We shall have to study this complicated subject-matter most carefully.

More than ever before in history, questions of arms limitation and disarmament preoccupy people all over the world. In this age of science and technology no less than the survival of the human species is at stake. It is no exaggeration to say that the moment may not be far off when mankind will reach a critical branching of the road, one way leading to a finite human existence on this planet, the other leading to a safer and better world.

Much vision, intelligence, a sense of compromise, and -- why not say it? -- a daring and creative diplomacy will be needed to avoid our ever having to make that ultimate choice. May I express the hope that your Committee will live up to its great responsibility and contribute to the goal which I, for one, would define in few words: increased security through disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. van den Broek, for his important statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas.

Mr. VIDAS (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, may I, first of all, welcome the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, H.E. Mr. van den Broek, to whose statement we have just listened with great attention. I am also very pleased that we are beginning today's session on a better note, having in mind that through your efforts and the spirit of conciliation and co-operation, the Committee was able to adopt its agenda I am sure that with this spirit of co-operation and conciliation the Committee will be able to reach a consensus concerning the programme of work and the re-establishment of working groups and immediately proceed with their work which has already been delayed too much. In this connection, I wish to recall that my delegation has made a concrete proposal, and we think that it is in the interests both of disarmament efforts and of the Committee itself that we arrive at an agreed and lasting solution as soon as possible.

The prohibition of chemical weapons seems to be the only item on the Committee's agenda on which there is broad agreement that much has been achieved so far in the harmonization of views expressed and in the consideration of various elements proposed for the future convention. The Seventh Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in New Delhi emphasized that while nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, efforts should be made to conclude without further delay a treaty banning chemical weapons.

With political will and additional efforts within the Committee, it would be possible without much difficulty, as we have already pointed out in our previous statement, to take the next important step which should be the elaboration and the beginning of drafting of specific articles of the convention. Many delegations to the Committee on Disarmament, through their concrete proposals, either with regard to the issue as a whole or concerning some elements of the future convention, have made a significant contribution to that effect. Their active participation in the work of the contact groups has facilitated the elaboration, elucidation and harmonization of particular elements of the convention.

The reports on the activities of the Working Group as well as the views of the Chairman of the Working Group at the 1982 session represent a significant compilation of collective efforts that have been put into the preparation of the convention.

We would particularly like to refer to the proposals of the USSR, "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", that of the United States entitled "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban", and the United Kingdom working paper entitled "Verification of non-production of chemical weapons". All these proposals are the subject of careful consideration on the part of our experts.

Yugoslavia has also made its contribution to the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the course of 1982, we submitted two working papers, one on "Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification",

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and the other on "Some aspects of verification in a chemical weapons convention". In the consideration of verification matters, we have always proceeded from the standpoint that this problem should be solved in such a way as to inspire confidence in the implementation of an agreement banning chemical weapons. The discussions on verification procedures in the Committee's Working Group have indicated the complexity of this problem, both from its technical and political aspects. We also consider that it would not be practicable to devise verification procedures which would provide an absolute assurance that the convention is not being violated. At the same time, we share the view that a chemical weapons convention must provide for sufficient verification to deter the would-be violator and to provide a degree of assurance against violation by one party which is accepted as adequate by others.

The verification of chemical weapons should, in our opinion, be implemented on the basis of national and international procedures, where we consider that national verification does not preclude international verification but rather that they complement each other. In order to increase confidence among countries, it is possible that both national and international verification be based on an agreed, generally acceptable and unified identification system -- methods that would be standardized for particular chemical warfare agent categories. This, of course, does not preclude a separate national approach, especially when a country has qualified personnel, equipment and organization for the gathering of samples, data processing, etc. The standardizing of the methods of international verification can greatly facilitate the national verification system and chemical defence measures; in those countries as well which have no experience in developing their own verification methods. The standardizing of verification methods presupposes their periodical modification in accordance with scientific and technological progress. It is understandable that the introduction of new methods and procedures should be subject to agreement and acceptance on the part of an international organ created by the States parties to the chemical weapons convention. In our view, arms reduction and disarmament agreements must be founded on reasonable confidence, as is the case with some existing agreements. If there is a decrease in confidence or if there is doubt concerning the violation of agreements, then only verification measures can restore confidence among States parties to the agreements. This is particularly true for the countries which possess production facilities and stockpiles of chemical weapons.

Acknowledging the importance of the verification system in agreements concerning arms reduction and disarmament, we nevertheless deem unacceptable the condition that agreement should first be reached on verification provisions and that only then should we proceed to the elaboration of other parts of the convention. We accept, of course, and consider it useful to accord due attention to verification as well, parallel with the consideration of all relevant issues. However, we see no reason for emphasis to be placed exclusively on this question while all other equally important ones are left aside. Because important

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progress has been made in the consideration of some other issues, it is realistic to expect that they can easily be finalized with an added effort. After all, it would be difficult to consider in isolation only verification issues without having previously reached a firm agreement on what should be subject to verification.

The system of work applied so far in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has proved itself useful. Within the contact groups that simultaneously considered particular elements of the convention, fundamental material which ought to make up the future convention has been categorized. Alternative possibilities have been put forward for those questions which have not yet been cleared up, or indications have been made as to what direction should more or less be looked at in seeking solutions. It has also been shown to be necessary, in the process of examining particular proposals and, respectively, the views expressed by particular delegations, to require some clarification in order to accelerate even more the process of the harmonization of views. In this connection, we would consider it useful if the United States delegation were to explain certain questions which have emerged in the course of our preliminary examination of the United States paper. Perhaps some of the questions that will be posed in the meantime have already been clarified at informal meetings between the United States and interested delegations. We would be grateful if the United States delegation would find it possible to furnish further explanations at an appropriate time.

The first question concerns the basic prohibition, as stated on page 1 of document CD/343. Riot-control agents and herbicides have been excluded from the prohibition. Why is this so, when it has been previously stated that the provisions of the convention should cover super-toxic lethal, other lethal, other harmful chemicals (such as incapacitating chemicals) and their precursor chemicals?

The next question refers to the non-transfer/non-assistance under (b). The prohibition of the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals is envisaged only in relation to non-parties to the convention and not for the parties to it as well. What are the reasons for this and also for setting the limit at exactly 100 grams?

We understand the expression "permitted purposes" (page 2 of CD/343) to refer to the use of any toxic chemical and its precursor chemical in smaller concentrations for medical purposes as well as the protection of plants. If used in greater concentrations, then appropriate protective measures should be applied. Have we understood the meaning of "permitted purposes" correctly? Is not a metric ton too large a quantity for such purposes?

The proposed preparatory commission, which would come into existence soon after the convention is opened for our signatures and which should remain in existence until

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the convention comes into force and thereafter until the first meeting of the consultative committee, is given an important role in facilitating prompt implementation of the provisions of the convention. In view of the fact that it is uncertain when the convention will enter into force -- in unfavourable circumstances this could take some time -- would the preparatory commission in that case continue working without interruption or would another procedure be envisaged?

What is the relationship of the fact-finding panel to the consultative committee? Both organs could, for example, carry out on-site inspection, but it is not clear whether the panel has any obligations toward the consultative committee. Can it be assumed that this is a direct organ of the depositary, which appoints ten of its members and serves as chairman of the panel?

With regard to the panel's composition, we wish to state that we consider the proposed procedure for the election of permanent and non-permanent members as being unacceptable, as it introduces differentiation between permanent and non-permanent members, according greater rights to a small group of States.

Apart from the confidence-building measures referred to, are any other confidence-building measures considered?

Does the United States envisage -- and if so, what kind of role is envisaged for -- national technical means of verification, given that there is no mention of it whatsoever in the paper?

In the section on "Additional provisions", it is recommended under (a) that the convention should also contain a preamble and provisions regarding international co-operation in the field of chemistry. Would you also consider the possibility of international co-operation including the field of toxicology? We consider this also to be an important field of international co-operation.

The USSR proposal entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" (CD/294), apart from the many common points it has with other proposals, contains some differences as well. We would also appreciate it if the Soviet delegation would offer some additional information in order that we can better understand the proposal submitted.

In the part referring to the elimination or temporary conversion of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons (page 3), under paragraph 1, there is mention of the elimination or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons. However, no mention is

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made of filling facilities as well, which are part of the prohibition mentioned in the "United States detailed views". We assume that this has to do with separate technological production processes. On the one hand, chemical warfare agents and, on the other, filling facilities in which the final product -- i.e. the chemical weapon -- is obtained. If this is correct, we think that the Convention should encompass such filling facilities as well, bearing in mind particularly the binary weapons.

The Soviet proposal does not mention specifically the closure of production facilities which would have to precede their elimination or dismantling. In our view, each State party to the convention should start with activities in order to destroy or divert its stock of chemical warfare agents, munitions, devices and equipment specifically designed for chemical warfare immediately after it becomes a party to the convention, and complete them no later than ten years after that date.

The question previously raised whether one metric ton of super-toxic lethal chemicals which may be left for "permitted purposes" is an excessive quantity also applies to the proposal of tne USSR.

Our last question concerns the part having to do with the fact-finding procedure relating to compliance with the convention. To be more precise, it refers to the second paragraph of item 2 on page 8 of the proposal, in which it is said, inter alia, that "The State Party to which such a request is sent may treat the request favourably or decide otherwise". In view of the fact that this relates to requests for on-site inspection concerning the destruction of accummulated stocks of chemical weapons and concerning the destruction and dismantling of facilities, we would like an explanation of what particular situation is envisaged that would give a justification to the State party so requested to "decide otherwise".

We would also be grateful to the Soviet delegation if it would provide the necessary clarifications at an appropriate time.

We would like to express the hope that these and other questions will be considered in the deliberations of the Working Group, which will, we expect, begin its work without delay. In view of the results achieved so far in the chemical weapons contact groups, we are of the opinion that there is no need for all of them to be set up again. It would be much more rational if work were concentrated on a parallel consideration of some of the most important elements of the convention in appropriate contact groups, while at the same time one such group could immediately initiate the elaboration of those parts of the convention on which general agreement exists. We think that this year the Committee should complete the elaboration of the first draft of some of the future provisions of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons or of corresponding annexes.

Mr. ZAWALONKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, let me join the previous speakers in welcoming His Excellency Mr. van den Broek, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. We thank him for his important statement which we have just heard.

Permit me, now, Mr. Chairman, to congratulate you on the adoption of the agenda for the Committee's 1983 session. On one of the topics inscribed on the agenda, i.e. on the prevention of nuclear war, I wish to take the floor today.

In numerous statements in this Committee from the beginning of this session, and not only this one, and in many documents and working papers published for our benefit here, it has been very rightly emphasized that there is no task more important and more urgent today than the prevention of nuclear war. My delegation in this Committee not only fully shares this view but does everything it can to help take practical steps, in this forum and in all others where we participate, to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. Firstly, because we live with a real threat of its outbreak. And this reality concerns not only nuclear weapon States or selected targets. Unfortunately, we are all concerned. All of mankind is threatened. Secondly, we come from a country in Europe which has been hurt by all the horrors and destructions of wars. The destructive military actions of the Second World War were started on Polish soil and against the Polish people. We were not spared by the First World War either. The whole history of my country brings to one's mind a feeling of the tragic sequence of events, a sad reflection on the desperate aspirations of a nation to live in peace and freedom — in between wars. That is why the people in Poland follow with amazement and dismay the strategic concept and doctrines which make headlines in news reports, such as the doctrines of "a first disabling nuclear strike", "limited nuclear war", "protracted nuclear conflict" and others.

Document CD/355 submitted by a group of socialist countries, which was sponsored by my delegation, resolutely emphasizes that any calculations on winning a nuclear war after unleashing it are senseless. Yes, Mr. Chairman, any thinking that nuclear war can be won is, in our view, immoral and inhuman. There can be no victor in a nuclear conflict, and experts know and warn that there can be no limited nuclear war.

A long-term research and development programme, announced last week by the United States, and aimed at destroying strategic nuclear missiles before they reach their targets means nothing less than unleashing another round of an unprecedented arms race, including an arms race in outer space, to say the least. But it should be added that the announcement of such a decision is in violation of the legally binding 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

In the Political Declaration adopted by a solemn gathering in New Delhi, the Seventh Summit Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries, which was held at the beginning of this month, the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries pointed out with clarity and strength: "Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation". This short phrase contains a terrible truth. What then can be done to halt and reverse the present dangerous, suicidal arms race? What specific measures should be undertaken to prevent nuclear war? My delegation is in agreement with, and lends its support to many measures proposed in numerous resolutions and declarations, including those adopted at the New Delhi summit meeting. I would like to dwell particularly on one of them. We note with satisfaction paragraph 31, containing one such measure, which would lead to the prevention of nuclear war. I quote from

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document CD/354: "The Heads of State or Government affirmed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constituted an important disarmament measure. The establishment of such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons".

As is well known, the first such proposal, relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in central Europe, was presented by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Rapacki, over 25 years ago and went to the post-war history of political thought as the "Rapacki plan". It is also well known that that plan has never materialized in the region it was thought and proposed for. The idea itself has been living and bearing fruits in other parts of the world, as can be seen from the Antarctic Treaty and the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. Furthermore, it stimulated diplomatic activity aimed at the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones in northern Europe and the Balkan region, in the Middle East and the Mediterranean area, in Africa and the region of the Indian Ocean.

If I am devoting more attention to this matter, I am doing so primarily for the reason that the concept of the "Rapacki plan" as a disarmament measure par excellence, is still present under different forms also in the region of central Europe.

As I said earlier, in my statement on 17 February last, Poland welcomed the Swedish proposal put forward at the beginning of December 1982 to create in central Europe a 150-km-wide zone free from tactical nuclear weapons on each side of the border between the two political and military alliances. In its reply to the Swedish proposal, the Government of Poland stated, inter alia, the following:

> "Poland views the upholding of the NATO decision on the deployment at the end of 1983 of new American intermediate-range nuclear missiles on the territories of a number of western European States as the greatest danger posed to Europe. Thus the prevention of this new phase of the nuclear arms race in Europe is of essential importance and the Polish Government would welcome Sweden's activeness in this regard. The recent proposals of the Soviet Union in this respect constitute a constructive step which should bring progress in the Soviet-American negotiations held on this subject in Geneva, if it is reciprocated by the United States ... The proposal of the Swedish Government to create a zone free from theatre nuclear weapons in Europe, stretching from central Europe to the furthermost northern and southern flanks of both political military alliances, is a step in the right direction. Therefore, the Government of the Polish People's Republic looks at it with great interest and voices its willingness to take part in the talks on the establishment of the proposed zone.
>
> "Taking into account Poland's geographical location as well as the range parameters of theatre nuclear weapons and the ensuing threats, the Polish Government thinks that:

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The width of such a zone should not be 300 kilometres but considerably more in order to make its military significance effective. Respecting the principle of equal security, the zone could include a significant part of the territory of the Polish People's Republic;

The creation of the zone could be started from central Europe, making use of the fact that negotiations on the reduction of arms and armaments in this region are being held in Vienna."

Let me say in this context that Polish public opinion sets great hopes on the outcome of the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces in Europe which are being held in Geneva. Their results will be of decisive importance for the cause of peace. They may determine whether and to what extent it will be possible to avert the danger of nuclear war.

Let me also state that in the considered view of my delegation, effective international arrangements by the nuclear-weapon States to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would do very much for the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Of similar importance would be unilateral undertakings by nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, like those given so far by the Soviet Union and China. Unfortunately, the remaining nuclear-weapon States have neither assumed similar obligations nor favour the idea of zones free of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Quite a number of speakers in this Committee have referred to and commented on the Political Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee adopted in Prague on 5 January 1983, in which the States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization proposed to the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. In analysing the different comments and remarks made on the subject matter one is struck by at least one very common thread running throughout many statements. The delegations of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty unanimously emphasize that they do not want any military superiority over the other side. The same emphasis is echoed by the delegations of the NATO countries. What, then, is impeding the negotiation of a treaty on the mutual renunciation of force? The appropriate passages of the Prague Declaration containing the said proposal do not lack flexibility. What is underlined is the need for a mutual commitment of the States members of the two alliances and the necessity not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional arms against one another. We know and realize that such a principle is engraved in the United Nations Charter. What the heads of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty proposed, therefore, is the development of the said principle in a mutually approved document. It is our firm conviction that that could lead to a better climate in Europe. As such, the said proposal would also serve as an excellent measure for halting the arms race and the prevention of war. Furthermore, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty propose the mutual consideration of the possibility of the negotiation of such an agreement.

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This is not a propagandistic gesture but a working proposal the adoption and implementation of which would lead to better relations between European States and those other States which would be willing to adhere to such an agreement.

In concluding my intervention I should like to mention that in General Assembly resolution 37/78 I, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", the Committee on Disarmament is specifically requested to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Having inscribed the said topic on our agenda, it is now our duty, Mr. Chairman, to set up an ad hoc working group with a practical mandate, to have a negotiating forum and to negotiate, let me repeat again, practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. On some of them I have commented in this intervention. This is how my delegation would understand the implementation of the said resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, this is not the first time my delegation has taken the floor during the month in which you have been presiding over our work. But it is the first opportunity for me to deliver a prepared statement and I have reserved my warm tribute to you for this occasion. I would like to join the many other voices from our midst that have praised your consummate diplomatic skills and the unique mixture of firmness and gentleness with which you have guided us through a period beset by intricate procedural and political difficulties. As a warm admirer of your country, I recognize in your chairmanship the refinement and perspicacity which has always been a hallmark of Moroccan diplomacy. My delegation is particularly pleased that His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has today honoured the Committee by his presence. We attribute great value to his comprehensive statement.

My delegation has noted with particular gratification that the Committee has finally been able to agree on an agenda. The change from our previous assignment of work is clear: in the framework of agenda item 2 we have added a new topic, "prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". My delegation considers this addition to our agenda as positive: we are introducing into the work of this negotiating forum an important item which calls for collective international action and which also meets with genuine concern in many sectors of the public opinion of our respective countries. My delegation has attempted to contribute in a substantive fashion to the various debates on "the prevention of nuclear war" over the last year, both in the General Assembly and during the prelude to the adoption of this new agenda item here. In this context I would like to recall, for instance, a working paper entitled "Prevention of war, in particular nuclear war", which my delegation, together with the delegations of the Netherlands and Japan, introduced at the second special session of the General Assembly last year. In the same vein, my delegation anticipates that it will continue to contribute, to the best of its ability, to the further discussion of this item. The working paper contained in document CD/357, which I have the honour of introducing today, is a first tangible proof of this intention.

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The working paper is in large measure self-explanatory, and I shall limit my introduction to a few remarks of a general nature. In the view of my delegation, it is particularly important that our discussion on the prevention of nuclear war should get off to a good start, free from propagandistic noises and partial vested interests. It is important that we structure our debate well and give it a focus which allows for comprehensive and adequate treatment. Prior to the formulation of our agenda item many delegations, including mine, pointed to the necessity of inserting the prevention of nuclear war in the broader perspective of general war prevention. This is what the working document seeks to do.

The reasons for this broader perspective are manifest. Even with the present existing huge arsenals of nuclear weapons, it is our firm conviction that the immediate outbreak of a nuclear war proper is the least likely of all conceivable war scenarios. The two great dangers that exist in reality are, firstly, that a conventional armed conflict may break out which, by a fatal sequence of events, might degenerate into nuclear confrontation; and, secondly, that the existence of nuclear weapons and the overpowering stance which a State or group of States could gain from nuclear superiority could, in conjunction with expansionist, non-peaceful policies, lead to political subjugation as a result of the permanence and dimension of the threat. Both these frightening possibilities point us back to the causes of conflict. He who wants to prevent war, including nuclear war, must eliminate the causes for the accumulation of arsenals and for their potential political and military use. On the level of such causes of conflict, however, a systematic distinction between the various forms of weapons which might ultimately be used becomes quite impossible. This is why the present working document looks at the prevention of nuclear war, which all of us consider an essential objective, in the framework of broader policies of war prevention in general.

I should explain that in the opinion of my delegation this approach should in no way indicate that we consider the prevention of nuclear war as less vital or less pressing. Nor does it deny the specificity and horrifying destructiveness of the nuclear weapon as such. Least of all would it deny the necessity for the international community to fashion a comprehensive set of tools for the prevention of war, including nuclear war.

The working document which I am introducing is, in essence, a list of topics which, in our view, are essential to the discussion of the prevention of nuclear war and war in general. It organizes the material under 17 headings, starting with the significance of the United Nations Charter and its overriding stipulations on the non-recourse to force. The document attempts to direct the attention of the Committee to several spheres of international law and the mechanisms it provides to make war less likely. It stresses the possible significance of a renunciation of force, of various co-operative measures under international law, of the contribution

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of peace-making mechanisms and the peaceful settlement of disputes, of regional security arrangements and of the peace-making and peace-keeping capability of the United Nations. Under other headings, more closely related to the military sphere, the paper focuses on the necessity for all States to conduct a policy of restraint, on existing commitments to renounce the use or first use of specific types of weapons, on positive and negative security guarantees, on the significance of a rigorous policy for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States. In yet another chapter, the document seeks to highlight the contribution domestic policies and domestic legal systems can make to the prevention of nuclear war. The document then goes on to deal with measures for the prevention of the accidental outbreak of war, measures for the protection of civilian nuclear facilities, confidence-building measures as a particularly fertile field of action, and the significance of military balance, stability and the undiminished security of all States. The final heading stresses the vital significance of disarmament negotiations, especially as regards nuclear disarmament.

Admittedly, this is a broad list. I do not pretend that the Committee, in the consideration of agenda item 2, can make an equally fruitful contribution to all these various headings, especially since the operational emphasis of some of them lies with other international bodies. But that, indeed, is not the purpose of the paper. It rather purports to heighten the consciousness of delegations. It should stimulate us not to lose sight of the total environment in which a successful strategy for the prevention of war has to be worked out. In this sense, the document could serve as a useful basis for the identification of possible practical and appropriate negotiable measures for the prevention of war, including nuclear war.

Conceivably, it could be argued that such a broad perspective of war prevention, necessary as it may be for an adequate treatment of the topic, would somehow exceed the limits of our competency as a disarmament institution. I do not consider this a cogent argument. What disarmament is really about is the preservation of peace in its more technical, military-related aspects. In that sense this Committee has a broad assignment in the field of security policy. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly and the Concluding Document of the second special session take an equally broad view of the disarmament problem. I do not think that it would be wise to construe a difference in the subject-matters assigned to the General Assembly in its First Committee, and to the Committee on Disarmament. The criterion for our competency, within this realm, is rather the question of where practicable and negotiable measures can be identified and ultimately worked out in terms of binding prescriptions for the international community to follow.

As I indicated earlier, my delegation intends to participate actively in the debate on the prevention of nuclear war, in all its relevant aspects, and we are looking forward to this debate taking shape in an objective, dense and future-oriented way, free from propagandistic exercises, without useless one-sided recriminations and playing to outside audiences. We must all agree that the prevention of nuclear war and all armed conflicts is much too serious a matter to be treated otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, for his statement and for his kind words with respect to myself.

I have no further speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see that that is not the case.

I should now like to suggest that we hold an informal meeting of the Committee to continue our consideration of the organizational questions which are still in suspense. Depending on the results of the informal meeting, the Committee could then resume its plenary meeting in order to confirm any agreements we may have reached. If there are no objections I shall now, therefore, suspend the plenary meeting and ask you immediately thereafter to meet in an informal meeting.

It is so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 12.25 p.m. and resumed at 12.35 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): We shall now resume the Committee's plenary meeting.

Could we first consider the question of the work programme for the first part of the Committee's 1983 session?

The Committee has before it Working Paper No. 82/Rev.1 1/ submitted in accordance with rule 29 of the Committee's rules of procedure.

If there are no objections I shall consider that the Committee is prepared to adopt Working Paper No. 82/Rev.1.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Could we now pass on to Working Paper No. 81/Rev.1 2/ which concerns the re-establishment of ad hoc working groups for the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

In this connection I should like to remind you that an agreement was reached in the course of our informal consultations concerning the question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which will be discussed at our plenary meeting on Tuesday, 5 April. Working Paper No. 81/Rev.1 is before the Committee for decision. If there are no objections I shall consider that the Committee is prepared to adopt the draft decision.

It was so decided.

1/ CD/356/Add.1.

2/ CD/358.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I have been asked to announce that the contact group on the section, "Principles", of the comprehensive programme of disarmament will not be meeting this afternoon. The members of the group will be informed later of the date of the next meeting.

If there are no further questions, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, there is a question I should like to put to you. Our next plenary meeting is apparently to be held on Thursday. I should like to know if there are many speakers on the list for that meeting? If there are no speakers on the list, then perhaps we could use all the time available on Thursday, both morning and afternoon, for meetings of the working groups.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): For our plenary meeting on Thursday next we have at the moment one speaker on the list, and of course I shall myself want to bid you farewell, if you will allow me.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I would like to beg your indulgence to mention a difficulty which all small delegations like mine have, and to request you, Mr. Chairman, and the secretariat, in establishing a programme of work for the meetings of the working groups, to take into account the interests of small delegations and ensure that there are no simultaneous meetings of these working groups. In this connection, I would also like to state that many of the important issues are being discussed in certain contact groups — the one you mentioned which was supposed to meet this afternoon, for example. In the establishment of a calendar of work for the working groups, the meetings scheduled for the contact groups should also be taken into account and as far as possible, a contact group should not be meeting at the same time as another contact group or a working group. I would like to emphasize this point because my delegation has this particular problem and I am sure that it is shared by many other smaller delegations.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, of course the Committee can anticipate what the Kenyan delegation is going to say, after listening to the statement of the distinguished representative of India. My delegation belongs to that same category and I would strongly urge you to take his proposal very seriously into consideration because otherwise things will be too complicated for many of the small delegations which are also very much interested in and keenly and actively participating in the meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies. I therefore strongly support what our friend from India has said.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement. I am sure that the chairmen of the ad hoc working groups will take account of the small size of some delegations in organizing the work of their groups. In this connection I should like to ask the chairmen of the ad hoc working groups to give me a few minutes after the closure of this meeting so that we can discuss certain organizational matters. I thank them in advance for their co-operation. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, then I shall close the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 31 March, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.208
31 March 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 31 March 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. SKALLI (Morocco)

GE.83-60718

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
Australia:	Mr. R. STEELE
	Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Mr. A. ONKELINX
	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
	Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. TELLALOV
	Mr. B. GRINBERG
	Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
	U TIN KYAW HLAING
	U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
	Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN
	Miss C. de VARENNES
China:	Mr. LI LUYE
	Mr. TIAN JIN
	Mrs. GE YUYUN
Cuba:	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. A. CIMA
	Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN
	Miss W. BASSIM
	Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia:	Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
	Mr. F. YOHANNES
France:	Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
	Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER
	Mr. H. THIELICKE
	Mr. M. NOTZEL
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. F. ELBE
	Mr. W. ROHR
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI
	Mrs. P. RAMADHAN
	Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
	Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
Iran:	Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI
Italy:	Mr. M. ALESSI
	Mr. B. CABRAS
	Mr. C.M OLIVA
	Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI
	Mr. M. KONISHI
	Mr. K. TANAKA
Kenya:	Mr. D.C.C. DON NANJIRA
Mexico:	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. BOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN

Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Netherlands:	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Nigeria:	Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
	Miss I.E.C. UKEJE
Pakistan:	Mr. M. AHMAD
	Mr. T. ALTAF
Peru:	Mr. V. ROJAS
Poland:	Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Romania:	Mr. T. MELESCANU
	Mr. L. TOADER
Sri Lanka:	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Sweden:	Mr. G. EKHOLM
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mrs. G. JONANG
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
	Mr. M.F. TREPIKHALIN
	Mr. Y.M. MALEV
	Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
	Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:	Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
	Mr. B.P. NOBLE
	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT
United States of America:	Mr. L.G. FIELDS
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
	Mr. W. HECKROTTE
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
Venezuela:	
Yugoslavia:	Mr. K. VIDAS
	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Zaire:	Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA
Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. R. JAIPAL
Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 208th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The representative of Mexico has asked for the floor in her capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21. Mrs. Gonzalez, you have the floor.

Mrs. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The Group of 21 is convinced of the paramount need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament through the adoption of concrete measures. The Group of 21 considers that multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament should have started a long time ago: the fundamental prerequisite for their success is the political will of States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to initiate such negotiations.

The Group of 21 is convinced that the nuclear arms race thwarts efforts directed towards a greater relaxation of international tensions; that progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament would help ensure international peace and security and improve the international climate, which would in turn facilitate further progress, and that all nations, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons, have a vital interest in nuclear disarmament measures because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of powers directly and fundamentally threatens the security of the entire world.

The Group of 21 is also convinced that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security, are the source of the continual quantitative and qualitative escalation of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. These doctrines, which start from the hypothesis of the possible use of nuclear weapons, cannot serve as the basis for the prevention of nuclear war, a war which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The competitive accumulation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States cannot be justified on the ground that it is essential to their security.

This argument is patently false, for the increase in nuclear arsenals, far from helping to strengthen the security of all States, in fact weakens it and increases the danger of nuclear war. Furthermore, the Group of 21 considers it politically and morally unacceptable that the security of the entire world should depend on the state of the relations between the nuclear-weapon powers.

The Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament, whose members include all the nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, should continue and intensify its search for a common approach which will enable it to fulfil the tasks in the sphere of disarmament which have been entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly.

For all the above reasons, and with a view to the implementation of the resolutions adopted in this connection by the General Assembly, the Group of 21 reiterates the proposals it made in documents CD/180 and CD/341 regarding the setting up of an ad hoc working group to undertake negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and of a further working group on the subject of the prevention of nuclear war, and we would therefore ask you, Mr. Chairman, kindly to hold informal meetings on this question as well as on that of the formulation of mandates for such working groups.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for the statement she has just made as co-ordinator of the Group of 21.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I see that that is not the case.

I suggest that we now consider the question of requests from non-member States to be allowed to participate in the Committee's work. In accordance with our usual practice, I shall take the 12 requests submitted by non-member States one after the other, in chronological order.

The first request, dated 22 October 1982, is from Norway; you will find a draft decision in this connection in Working Paper No. 83. I believe that there are no objections to the adoption of Working Paper No. 83. 1/

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The second request, dated 14 January 1983, is from Finland, and you will find a draft decision in that connection in Working Paper No. 84 I believe that there are no objections to the adoption of Working Paper No. 84. 2/

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The third request, dated 21 January 1983, is from Burundi, and you will find the relevant draft decision in Working Paper No. 85. If there are no objections, I shall consider that Working Paper No. 85 3/ is adopted.

It was so decided.

1/ "In response to the request of Norway (CD/359) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1983 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1983 session, the representative of Norway is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Norway."

2/ "In response to the request of Finland (CD/360) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1983 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1983 session, the representative of Finland is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Finland."

3/ "In response to the request of Burundi (CD/361) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Burundi to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1983 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1983 session, the representative of Burundi is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Burundi."

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The fourth request, dated 24 January and 16 February 1983, is from Spain, and you will find a draft decision in that connection in Working Paper No. 86. If there are no objections on your part, I shall consider that Working Paper No. 86 4/ is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The fifth request, dated 24 January 1983, is from Turkey, and you will find the relevant draft decision in Working Paper No. 87. If there are no objections on your part, I shall consider that Working Paper No. 87 5/ is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The sixth request, dated 28 January 1983, is from Senegal, and you will find the relevant draft decision in Working Paper No. 88. If there are no objections, I shall consider that Working Paper No. 88 6/ is adopted.

It was so decided.

4/ "In response to the requests of Spain (CD/362 and CD/363) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working group on chemical weapons and any other working groups established for the 1983 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1983 session, and in addition to the item dealing with chemical weapons, the representative of Spain is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Spain."

5/ "In response to the request of Turkey (CD/364) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament and on a nuclear test ban established for the 1983 session."

6/ "In response to the request of Senegal (CD/365) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Senegal to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1983 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1983 session, the representative of Senegal is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Senegal."

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The seventh request is dated 31 January 1983 and is from Portugal. You will find a draft decision in this connection in Working Paper No. 89. If there are no objections, I shall consider that Working Paper No. 89 7/ is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The eighth request, dated 2 February 1983, is from Greece, and you will find a draft decision in that connection in Working Paper No. 90. If there are no objections, I shall consider that Working Paper No. 90 8/ is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The ninth request, dated 2 February 1983, is from Austria, and you will find a draft decision in this connection in Working Paper No. 91. If there are no objections on your part, I shall consider that Working Paper No. 91 9/ is adopted.

It was so decided.

7/ "In response to the request of Portugal (CD/366) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Portugal to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament and on chemical weapons established for the 1983 session."

8/ "In response to the request of Greece (CD/367) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1983 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1983 session, the representative of Greece is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Greece."

9/ "In response to the request of Austria (CD/368) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1983 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1983 session, the representative of Austria is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Austria."

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The tenth request, dated 8 February 1983, is from Switzerland. You will find the relevant draft decision in Working Paper No. 92. If there are no objections on your part, I shall consider that Working Paper No. 92 10/ is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The eleventh request is dated 17 February 1983 and is from Ireland. You will find a draft decision in that connection in Working Paper No. 93. If there are no objections on your part, I shall consider that Working Paper No. 93 11/ is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The twelfth and last request is dated 21 February 1983 and is from Tunisia. You will find a draft decision in that connection in Working Paper No. 94. I believe that there are no objections to the adoption of Working Paper No. 94. 12/

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): As regards the statement made by Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, at the Committee's 196th plenary meeting, on 22 February, my successor will continue the consultations which have so far been held in this connection. I now give the floor to Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic.

10/ "In response to the request of Switzerland (CD/369) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Switzerland to participate during 1983 in the discussions on agenda item 5, 'Chemical weapons', at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working group on that item established for the 1983 session."

11/ "In response to the request of Ireland (CD/370) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Ireland to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1983 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1983 session, the representative of Ireland is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Ireland."

12/ "In response to the request of Tunisia (CD/371) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Tunisia to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons established for the 1983 session."

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, in connection with the decisions just taken by the Committee concerning the participation of non-member countries in its work, I would like to make the following statement on behalf of the group of socialist countries.

The socialist States highly appreciate the contribution non-member countries can make to the accomplishment of the tasks of the Committee on Disarmament. Thus we fully understand the interest expressed by many States in participating in the work of the Committee. In this regard we fully take into account the relevant provisions of paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Accordingly, the socialist States determine their position on these questions fully taking into account the substantive contribution the respective country is in a position to make to the deliberations of the Committee. Such a contribution cannot be a question of delivering statements of a general political nature which sometimes, as we have experienced in the past, even touch upon questions not related to the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. In this regard full account must be taken by all, including the non-member States requesting participation in the Committee's work, of the provisions of rules 33 and 34 of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament. The group of socialist States firmly believes that contraventions of these rules should not be tolerated.

In the consideration of the participation of non-member States the socialist countries proceed from the assumption that there should be no discrimination against States which are in a position to advance our work. This will also apply, of course, to the proposal supported by the socialist group to invite a non-member State to make a substantive statement relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons, in accordance with rules 34 and 35 of the rules of procedure, if rejected. It has to be recalled that this would not be the first time that discrimination is displayed towards the socialist States. Unfortunately, this has happened in the past, too.

In concluding, I would like to add that at the same time, the mere fact of participation in the work of the Committee on Disarmament does not of itself constitute a basis for consideration of the question of the review of the Committee's membership. In this regard the need for a politically balanced composition of the Committee will and must play a most important role.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, for his statement.

I now give the floor to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, who wishes to make a statement concerning communications received from non-governmental organizations.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): I wish to inform members about the communications that we have received so far from non-governmental organizations. We have received a communication from eight French non-governmental organizations on halting the arms race. We have received 111 postcards containing a poem on peace. We have also received an appeal for world peace through international agreement from the World Federation for the Protection of Life, in the Federal Republic of Germany. There is another appeal for world peace signed by 420 persons from the Gruppi Servizi Anziani of Rome. We have also received an appeal for nuclear disarmament issued in the Italian weekly Il Sabato of 31 January 1983 and signed so far by 5,000 persons. We have also with us a resolution on nuclear disarmament adopted by the Council of Triulzi, Milan. We have received a letter from the World Citizens for World Peace, Albuquerque, New Mexico, fixing the date 24 October 1983 for ending the nuclear arms race and starting world peace. Furthermore, we have an appeal for the prevention of wars of mass destruction from the Internationale Friedensgruppe, Cologne, Federal Republic of Germany. We have an appeal for world peace and the cessation of the nuclear arms race from Il Centro Culturale Cattolico di Serracapriola, Italy, with 19 signatures. Lastly, we have a letter addressed by the women and mothers of the village of Flörsbachtal in the Federal Republic of Germany, expressing their fear that nuclear war may occur as a result of a misunderstanding, a human failure or a technical malfunction. These communications are all available in the secretariat for reading by interested members.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Jaipal, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee for his statement.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has asked me to inform the members of the Committee that the meeting planned for this afternoon at 3 o'clock will not take place. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working group had thought that it might be possible to convene the Group's first meeting this afternoon, but he is still holding the consultations necessary to ensure that the work of the Group gets off to a good start. Furthermore, it seems that some delegations would find it more convenient if the first meeting were not held before Wednesday next, 6 April. Accordingly, the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be held on Wednesday next, 6 April, at 3 p.m., as planned in the time-table for the Committee's meetings circulated on 30 March 1983.

If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I should now like to address you for the last time as Chairman of the Committee.

Distinguished Ambassadors, dear colleagues and friends, this plenary meeting is the last which Morocco will have the honour and privilege of presiding over. I should like to say right away that I am extremely gratified that we should have been able to resolve the various problems that were confronting us to the satisfaction of all.

After two months of negotiations and arduous consultations, the Committee was at last able to achieve positive results. Thus, we have adopted the agenda for this year. We have approved the programme of work for this session. We have re-established all the ad hoc working groups.

(The Chairman)

These results were possible only because of the understanding, the spirit of compromise and the desire for conciliation shown by all delegations, both individually and as groups, the tireless efforts and devotion of the co-ordinators and, lastly, the contacts established and preliminary work done by my predecessor, Ambassador Erdembileg. I was able to gather the fruits from the seeds that he planted throughout the month of his chairmanship.

You will easily understand, therefore, that I find it a very pleasant duty to pay a well-merited tribute to all delegations which have spared no effort in trying to find a way whereby the Committee might resolve the problems of the organization of its work, which will allow us at last to begin as soon as possible negotiations of substance on the questions on our agenda.

I believe that we are all agreed that it is unacceptable for the Committee on Disarmament to spend weeks or even months each year on questions of procedure and the organization of its work.

I should like to state that delegations have not missed a single opportunity to condemn this situation, which is not worthy of the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, for it is not commensurate with its responsibilities.

It therefore appears urgently necessary to find ways and means of improving our Committee's working methods so as to spare it any waste of time in the future and to make it more effective.

A number of proposals have been put forward to that end. I hope that when they have all been considered, satisfactory solutions will be found which will prevent us from reverting to the unsatisfactory methods we have followed up to now.

My dear colleagues, our Committee has taken an admirable initiative in including in its agenda the question of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. That was a very wise decision. We all know what threats hang over the world as a result of the nuclear arms race and the incalculable consequences which the unleashing of a nuclear war could have for humanity. It is our duty to spare no effort to avoid such a catastrophe. We must therefore undertake serious negotiations with a view to devising concrete and appropriate measures towards that end.

There are at the same time reasons to hope that the Committee may be able in the relatively near future to reach agreement on the drafting and adoption of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The various statements we have heard on this subject in the Committee since the beginning of this session give cause for optimism.

Other tasks no less important await us. They are certainly very complex. But in this long haul towards disarmament we should show the maximum degree of flexibility and goodwill. We ought constantly to remember that no position should be considered final.

There are, of course, in our Committee groups of delegations, and each group, and even each delegation, has its own views on the way in which one or another disarmament issue should be tackled. Each one has his reasons and his justifications for the positions he adopts and defends. But we should be aware that in the eyes of the outside world and of the international community as a whole we all here bear a joint and combined responsibility in the matter of disarmament.

(The Chairman)

We have, of course, to work against the background of a difficult international situation, but we ought to remember that the more time passes the greater the risk of a crystallization of positions, the exacerbation of feelings and the entrenchment of the parties in psychological fortresses, all of which would become major obstacles to the reconciliation of views, constructive dialogue, mutual concessions and, ultimately, compromise, which is the only thing that will enable us to overcome the difficulties and find harmonious solutions to the grave problems that are confronting us.

My dear colleagues, I must say that my period of chairmanship has been a very fruitful experience for me. I have discovered the advantages of perseverance and I have learned through you the virtues of patience and the merits of silence.

I have also had the opportunity to discover some aspects of the submerged part of the immense iceberg of disarmament, and this has been very instructive for me in many ways.

I have come to realize that, apart from the functions conferred upon him by the rules of procedure, the Chairman of the Committee is required to play the part, to some extent, of a co-ordinator of co-ordinators. For what he has to do, in fact, with respect to each problem that arises, is to find the middle path and the common denominator among all the various proposals and suggestions that are made. And that is not the easiest of things to do.

I have also had the benefit of closer contact with the members of our Committee, of getting to know them better and appreciating them more, both professionally and personally. I am not likely to forget very soon all the tokens of friendship you have so kindly proffered me and the effective support you have given me. Your help and support have been decisive in the progress we have been able to make during the past month. Allow me once again to express all my thanks and gratitude to each of the groups in our Committee and to each delegation individually.

I cannot fail to mention the part played at the head of the Committee's secretariat by the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal. His great knowledge of disarmament matters and the workings of the Committee, his vast experience, his great good-heartedness, his calm exterior concealing considerable authority -- all these make him a veritable apostle of disarmament. I should like to offer him all my gratitude for the invaluable assistance he has given me and his constant wise advice.

I should like at the same time to thank our dear friend, Mr. Vicente Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary of the Committee, for his very kind assistance, which I have greatly appreciated.

I should also like to offer my sincere thanks to the interpreters, translators, technicians and conference staff.

I knew that I could count on their keen sense of duty and also on their kindness and helpfulness. As to the members of the Committee secretariat so ably led by Ambassador Jaipal, they not only at all times show total professional integrity but also daily demonstrate a boundless devotion to the cause of disarmament. I should like to offer each one of them my gratitude for the help they have given me during my period of chairmanship.

(The Chairman)

If I were to draw any conclusion from my contact with the distinguished members of our Committee, I would say that it has become clear to me that while the arms race is the responsibility of a few, disarmament, for its part, is the concern of everyone. In fact I have acquired the firm conviction that all delegates here present are fully aware of the very grave dangers inherent in the arms race itself, like a virus which can lead only to disease and death.

Lastly, in handing on the torch to my successor, Ambassador van Dongen, I am certain that he will conduct our work successfully, thanks to his great competence and his skill as a seasoned diplomat and thanks also to his natural good nature. I should like, from the bottom of my heart, to wish him good luck during the month of his chairmanship and to assure him here and now of the absolute and loyal co-operation of the Moroccan delegation.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.209
5 April 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND NINTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 5 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. van Dongen (Netherlands)

GE.83-60809

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. J.C. CARASALES
	Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
Australia:	Mr. D. SADLEIR
	Mr. R. STEELE
	Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Mr. A. ONKELINX
	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
	Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. TELLALOV
	Mr. B. GRINBERG
	Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
	U TIN KYAW HLAING
	U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
	Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN
	Miss C. de VARENNES
China:	Mr. LI LUYE
	Mr. TIAN JIN
	Mrs. GE YUYUN
Cuba:	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. A. CIMA
	Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN
	Miss W. BASSIM
	Mr. A.M. ABBAS
Ethiopia:	Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
	Mr. F. YOHANNES
France:	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
	Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
	Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER
	Mr. H. THIELICKE
	Mr. M. NOTZEL
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. H. WEGENER
	Mr. F. ELBE
	Mr. W. ROHR
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI
	Mrs. P. RAMADHAN
	Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
	Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
Iran:	Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI

Italy:	Mr. M. ALESSI
	Mr. B. CABRAS
	Mr. C.M. OLIVA
	Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI
	Mr. M. KONISHI
	Mr. K. TANAKA
Kenya:	Mr. D.C.C. DON NANJIRA
Mexico:	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. BOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Netherlands:	Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
	Mr. J. RAMAKER
	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Nigeria:	Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
	Miss I.E.C. UKEJE
Pakistan:	Mr. M. AHMAD
	Mr. T. ALTAF
Peru:	Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:	Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Romania:	Mr. T. MELESCANU
	Mr. L. TOADER
Sri Lanka:	Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Sweden:	Mr. C. LIDGARD
	Mr. G. EKHOLM
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mrs. G. JONANG
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
	Mr. M.F. TREPIKHALIN
	Mr. Y.M. MALEV
	Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
	Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
United Kingdom:	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
	Mr. B.P. NOBLE
	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:	Mr. M. BUSBY
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
	Mr. W. HECKROTTE
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
	Mr. R. MIKULAK
	Mr. J. HOGAN
	Mr. J. MARTIN
Venezuela:	Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER
	Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Yugoslavia:	Mr. K. VIDAS
	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Zaire:	Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA
Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. R. JAIPAL
Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 209th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The first task of a new Chairman, and undoubtedly the pleasantest, is that of thanking his predecessor. In the present instance there is all the more reason for doing so because His Excellency, Ambassador Ali Skalli, fulfilled his duties as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament so brilliantly and in the interests, at all times, not only of the Committee but also, and perhaps primarily, of the causes it serves. I think, therefore, that I can speak on behalf of all members of the Committee, to whichever group they belong, in offering Ambassador Ali Skalli the warm and very sincere thanks of the Committee on Disarmament. Ambassador Skalli discharged his tasks with a skill we all recognize, with a mastery of language, the prime instrument of diplomacy which again we all recognize, and with exceptional dedication and energy. I should therefore like to offer Ambassador Skalli once again, on my own behalf and I think on that of all members of the Committee, our most sincere thanks, and as the new Chairman I should like to reaffirm my feelings of admiration and friendship towards him.

In accordance with its Programme of Work, the Committee starts today the consideration of item 3 of its agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". As usual, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure. You will recall that, at our 207th plenary meeting, my predecessor announced that it had been agreed during informal consultations that the question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban would also be discussed at our plenary meeting today.

Today's speakers' list is a long one. I have on my list the United States of America, Mongolia, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Australia, Belgium, Argentina, Algeria, Pakistan, India, Mexico, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Burma, Sweden and Italy.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Mr. Busby.

Mr. BUSBY (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, it is a great honour to be the first speaker to have the opportunity to welcome you to the Chair of our Committee. Personally, and on behalf of the entire United States delegation, let me offer you our complete co-operation and express our pleasure at having the opportunity to continue our work under your experienced and able guidance. Let me also through you, express our admiration and appreciation to Ambassador Skalli for the skilful and imaginative manner in which he discharged his responsibilities as Chairman during a particularly difficult period in the work of our Committee.

My delegation has asked for the floor today to briefly outline our position regarding the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. In particular, we would like to give our views as to how that Working Group might proceed in order to fulfil the mandate upon which we all agreed last year. I do not intend to make a long rhetorical statement as to the adequacy or sufficiency of the mandate. That question was debated at length last year and it is for each delegation to decide for itself whether it is willing to begin work under the existing mandate.

(Mr. Busby, United States)

Rather, I would like to explain fully the position of my delegation regarding the mandate and what it requires: offer our views as to the relationship of the verification and compliance issues to other aspects of any future treaty banning nuclear explosions; discuss briefly the verification and compliance issues themselves; and finally make some suggestions as to how the Working Group might proceed.

First, let me speak about the mandate. It calls on the Working Group to "discuss and define ... issues relating to verification and compliance". This is clear and unambiguous language. It does not call for the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Rather, it requires the Working Group to bring issues relating to verification and compliance into sharper focus.

What do we mean by "issues relating to verification and compliance"? Last year concerns were expressed by some delegations that our proposal was too restrictive to allow substantive work to be done. But from the outset my delegation has viewed this language rather broadly. Clearly, any information relevant to the verification and compliance problem is within the mandate and is pertinent to our work. Although we would not like to see the Working Group diverted from its main task, in so far as any delegation holds a national position on a particular issue which affects its own view of verification and compliance, then it should bring these views forward and discuss that relationship. We will have no objection. I hope one thing is clear in the minds of all delegations. When the United States proposed last spring a mandate on verification and compliance, it was out of a genuine desire to have the Committee on Disarmament undertake discussions on these issues. And while it is true, as we have often stated, that we are not prepared to negotiate a CTBT now, we did not then, nor do we now, have any ulterior motives of avoiding reference to or discussion of other aspects of a test ban. So in all respects the mandate is broad enough for a full examination of the problem.

Perhaps I could share with you our own view of the relationship of verification and compliance to other aspects of any future treaty. We clearly see a relationship between verification and compliance questions and the scope of, the objectives of and participation in any comprehensive test ban. But does that mean that we must first decide on the scope of a future treaty before we can engage in meaningful work regarding verification and compliance? We do not believe that to be the case. The very term comprehensive test ban is self-defining when considered in a multilateral context. A CTBT is an agreement not to carry out any nuclear explosions, and therefore the problem is to verify the absence of nuclear explosions on a world-wide basis. By taking this broadest possible view of scope, the Working Group can begin discussing the problems surrounding the creation of a verification system in which any and all States parties can participate and in which all States parties will share both benefits and obligations. It has always been a United States objective that any future CTBT should be designed so as to attract universal adherence, and we need a verification and compliance system which will be effective on a world-wide basis.

Viewed in this context, it is clear what direction our discussions in the Working Group should take. The Group should undertake a serious examination of issues relating to the multilateral verification of compliance with a total ban on nuclear explosions on a world-wide basis. We envision a system that all States parties will be able to participate in, both in terms of the right to share in the system as well as the obligation to make it work. By its very nature, such a system will accomplish two purposes: first, it will verify the cessation of testing by all who have tested nuclear explosives, and, secondly, it will verify the absence of commencement of testing by those who have not done so. That is what we have in mind.

(Mr. Busby, United States)

Let me now be a bit more specific as to what the Working Group might do during this session of the Committee on Disarmament. There are two broad categories of issues. First, the degree of verifiability and how it might be raised to a level that each State party might consider to be acceptable; and, secondly, mechanisms for ensuring compliance. In the area of seismic means of verification, we would suggest a focus on four general topics:

International monitoring networks and how to fill gaps in existing systems;

The problem of identifying — as opposed to detecting — the origin of seismic signals;

Further needs regarding the detection of nuclear explosive signals in areas of high seismic activity; and,

Seismic data exchange and analysis mechanisms.

In the second category of issues, compliance, the purpose of any compliance mechanism is to ensure confidence in a legal regime by establishing a workable means to resolve disputes and eliminate misunderstandings.

Some elements of compliance which we believe should be examined are:

Obligations to ensure compliance with data-exchange provisions;

The role of fact-finding bodies or commissions;

The handling of allegations of violations; and,

The possible role of experts groups as advisers.

An additional issue which the Committee should address relates to the role of on-site inspection. This is an issue which cuts across both verification and compliance. Obviously, particular attention will have to be paid to the role of on-site inspection in any future CTBT.

My delegation has never argued that the mandate, to which we all agreed last spring, was sufficient to allow negotiation of a CTBT. In fact, we have repeatedly stated that this was not our purpose in proposing the creation of this Working Group. We have even gone further and stated that any future decision of the United States Government to negotiate a CTBT would have to take account of a broad range of factors relating to our national security and that no delegation should consider our willingness to participate in a Working Group here as indicating an intent to begin immediately the negotiation of a CTBT. It remains a long-term goal.

Given the nature of our debates last spring and the negotiations which led to the creation, by consensus, of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test-Ban, surely no one is under any illusion regarding our position. For this reason, we find the position of some delegations which argue that the mandate has been fulfilled as simply a politically expedient way of attempting to return this Committee to the stalemated situation of 1981 and 1982. This may suit their political purposes. But, if those delegations did not intend to do serious work under the mandate, why did they agree to it? We urge those delegations to sit down with us and begin what my delegation believes will be useful, productive work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his contribution, for his kind words addressed to the Chairman, and even more for the kind words addressed to the outgoing Chairman. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Erdembileg.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me to congratulate you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April.

I should like to express our sincere gratitude to Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, the Chairman for the month of March. During the period of his chairmanship the Committee succeeded in resolving a number of organizational problems. I should like to say in this connection that a timely decision on these questions in the Committee was prevented by the opposition of the group of Western countries. It should be said frankly that it was the constructive efforts and flexible approach of the group of socialist States and the Group of 21 countries which enabled the Committee on Disarmament, in the last days of March, under the guidance of Ambassador Skalli, to adopt its agenda and programme of work, to re-establish the ad hoc working groups and to settle certain other organizational matters. However, a number of other important issues, the solution of which would help to increase the Committee's effectiveness, remain unresolved.

Today's plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is to be devoted to a discussion of a very important subject relating to one of the key issues on the agenda, the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, namely, what mandate should be given to the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban so that headway can be made in this matter.

The problem of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests has been under discussion in the Committee on Disarmament for some two and a half decades now. But real results have yet to be achieved, in spite of the fact that the overwhelming majority of States are in favour of the speediest possible solution of this vital problem.

In present conditions of the exacerbation of the international situation, there is an ever greater need for the achievement of an international agreement which would effectively halt the further improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types and systems of such weapons. Such a measure would contribute to the limitation of the arms race and the reduction of the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war.

But the efforts of peace-loving States are frustrated by the dangerous activities of the States opposed to the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which are making vast military preparations and carrying out military programmes for the modernization of nuclear armaments and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. The United States administration is now allocating trillions of dollars for the purpose of achieving military superiority and in order to have even more weapons on land, at sea, in the air and in outer space. The President of the United States recently announced plans for a sharp build-up of all types of nuclear weapons, the development of a large-scale and effective anti-missile defence, the adoption of measures for the deployment of medium-range missiles in western Europe and the creation of qualitatively new systems of conventional weapons. The United States is using its so-called defensive concept as an excuse for the relentless continuation of the development and improvement of its offensive strategic forces in order to acquire a nuclear first-strike potential. These pretensions have provoked violent indignation and a widespread wave of protest on the part of the world community, including the peoples of west European countries whom the United States is trying to use as its nuclear hostages.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The persistent demands of the overwhelming majority of the members of the Committee on Disarmament finally led, last year, to the setting up of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. However, for reasons you all know, it was given a limited mandate which did not refer clearly and precisely to the need to conduct negotiations with a view to the drafting of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban confirmed the fears expressed by my delegation and many other delegations in connection with its limited mandate which was unjustifiably confined to questions relating to "verification and compliance".

The history of the negotiations on this question is replete with examples of the use of this matter of verification in order to delay the attainment of agreement or to avoid settling the issue altogether. This was clearly evident in the attitude of the United States with respect to the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. In this connection the United States resorted to the typical device, which we have seen before, of trying to give the discussions in the Group a purely "technical" character. At the same time it was argued that progress towards a solution of the problem of nuclear-weapon tests could be achieved only if there were preliminary consideration of and agreement on the "technical" aspects of verification. This was affirmed even by the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Bush, when he spoke to our Committee and called the process of drafting treaty texts a "fruitless exercise" if verification questions were not settled first. While trying to show that the United States is approaching the negotiations in a business-like manner and proposing that agreement should be reached on various "technical" aspects of verification solely as a basis for an agreement on the substance of the issue, the United States is in fact preventing the attainment of agreement. What happened in the Ad Hoc Working Group during the last session is clear evidence of what I have said.

Furthermore, after agreeing to the establishment of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban, the United States declared that it considered the drafting of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests not as an urgent matter but rather as a "long-term goal". We have just heard the statement of the distinguished representative of the United States of America, in which he made various observations with respect to questions of verification. We shall study his remarks carefully and give our views on them in due course.

The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is one of the most important problems in the broad complex of measures needed to avert the nuclear threat. The United Nations General Assembly has made this clear in innumerable recommendations.

With a view to the creation of more favourable conditions for the drafting of a treaty, the United Nations General Assembly also appealed to all nuclear-weapon States, as a demonstration of goodwill, to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions of any kind from a date to be agreed on between them until the conclusion of the treaty.

The General Assembly has repeatedly called upon the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, which ought now to be concentrating particular attention on the drafting

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, urgently to start practical negotiations on the elaboration of such a treaty. In resolution 37/72, for example, the General Assembly urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament

> "To assign to the Ad Hoc Working Group on item 1 of the Committee's agenda (nuclear test ban) a mandate which should provide for the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, to be initiated immediately after the beginning of the session of the Committee to be held in 1983".

Clearly, it will only be possible to implement this decision of the General Assembly if the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group is broadened and the Group is able to proceed to practical negotiations on this question.

We therefore consider that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group should be revised so as to permit the discussion in substance of the problem as a whole for the purpose of drafting the text of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Only a broad and clear mandate will enable the Committee to fulfil the relevant recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly.

The solution of this problem will be greatly helped by the document submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union containing the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". This document takes into account everything positive that has been achieved during the many years of discussion of the question of a nuclear test ban in various forums and also reflects the further views of many States, in particular on questions relating to the verification of compliance with the future treaty.

Today's discussion in the Committee on the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group has convinced us that it is time at last to pass from words to actions and embark urgently on negotiations on the drafting of the text of the future treaty under a broadened mandate.

We should like once more to emphasize that the extreme importance and urgency of this question necessitates the participation in the negotiations of all nuclear-weapon States without exception.

The Mongolian delegation considers that questions relating to the verification of compliance with the future treaty should be considered in close connection with the treaty itself, which should prohibit all nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments, be of unlimited duration, provide for a generally acceptable solution to the problem of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and include among its parties all nuclear-weapon States.

We feel compelled to point out that the draft of a very appropriate mandate was proposed by the socialist countries and is contained in document CD/259. And as we observed earlier, the wording for a mandate put forward by the Group of 21 in document CD/181 also merits attention.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Lastly, the Mongolian delegation wishes, on behalf of the group of socialist countries, to put forward the following new draft text of a mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which is fully in accordance with the recommendations made by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. The text is as follows:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to assign to the Ad Hoc Working Group on item 1 of its agenda, 'Nuclear test ban', a mandate providing for negotiations on a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

"The Ad Hoc Working Group will take into account in its work all existing proposals and future initiatives on this matter and will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the end of the 1983 session".

In accordance with the decision adopted by the Committee at its 207th plenary meeting on 29 March 1983, which states, inter alia, that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban for 1983 will be agreed upon not later than by 7 April 1983, I should like to ask you, on behalf of the socialist countries, immediately to conduct the necessary consultations in the Committee on the draft mandate so that the Committee can take a decision on it as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Mr. Zawalonka.

Mr. ZAWALONKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, it is with great pleasure that I welcome you on behalf of the Polish delegation in the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament. I am convinced that under your able and skilful guidance this Committee will use all the opportunities in the fulfilment of its responsible tasks which the whole international community is closely following.

I sincerely thank your predecessor, Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, for his valuable contribution to the work done by the Committee under his chairmanship in the month of March.

Taking the floor today, I would like to express my delegation's views on one of the most urgent questions at the present stage of the Committee's discussion on a nuclear test ban: the mandate of the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group. In accordance with the decision taken on 29 March last, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has been re-established on the assumption that its mandate "... may thereafter be revised, as decided by the Committee...". I quote from the decision contained in Working Paper No. 81/Rev.1 dated 29 March 1983. I understand that it is with this in mind that today's plenary meeting is being largely devoted to a debate on a possible revision of the mandate of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

(Mr. Zawalonka, Poland)

Last year's discussions, both in the framework of the said Working Group, during the informal consultations and in the statements in plenary, clearly revealed the limited character of this Group's present mandate. The subject of a nuclear test ban or a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which has been actively discussed for more than 20 years in many diplomatic forums, is today one of the subjects most ripe, politically and technically, for finalization — for negotiation and the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Many speakers, during this present session of the Committee on Disarmament alone, have stated that time and conditions are propitious and all premises exist for such negotiations now. However, the mandate adopted last year, as is well known, does not permit the conduct of full-scale negotiations. In other words, the Working Group had to limit its discussions to the issues relating to the verification and compliance. The delegations of socialist countries agreed to last year's mandate in order not to delay the establishment of the Working Group any longer and to facilitate its taking off after years of intensive efforts in this Committee and its predecessors. At the end of the 1982 session, however, they stated clearly that the Working Group had completed its examination of issues related to verification and compliance, as envisaged in its mandate. They furthermore expressed their view that the Committee should revise the mandate of the Working Group without delay so as to enable it "to negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, having in mind that this is a question of the highest priority...", as was stated in the report of the NTB Working Group to the Committee (document CD/332).

One of the most complex and controversial problems which impedes disarmament negotiations, and not only in the field of a nuclear test ban, is that of an adequate verification system. The delegations of socialist States have never underestimated the role of verification. Like all the members of this Committee, my delegation, too, is for negotiating — for elaborating in the process of negotiations — an adequate verification system for the nuclear test-ban treaty. But I would like to reiterate that the negotiation of any verification procedures should not and cannot be an end in itself. In other words, entering into negotiations on the assumption that they must be concentrated on verification procedures because they are the most important part of any disarmament treaty may well mean deliberately blocking the possibility of making any real progress in negotiations. It is only legitimate to question the intentions expressed in such an attitude towards the negotiations of a nuclear test ban. Let me state in this connection that my delegation would like to see the NTB Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban take up as soon as possible its negotiating task, i.e. negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, having a sound and balanced verification system, for which all the necessary technical prerequisites exist. Due account should be taken of all existing proposals and future initiatives in this connection.

We are realistic; we do not think that such a treaty will be ready overnight. But what we want and what we appeal for is to start the process now — the process of time-consuming but painstaking negotiations. It is indeed high time for that.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the representative of Poland, Mr. Zawalonka, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to express our profound gratitude to the Ambassador of Morocco, our friend Mr. Ali Skalli, for his successful conduct of the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament during the month of March, and for the fact that under his guidance the Committee was able to take decisions on certain important organizational matters, first and foremost the adoption of its agenda, with the inclusion in it of the extremely important question of the prevention of nuclear war, and also the re-establishment of the working groups, which will, we hope, undertake very active work during the month of April. I should like to wish you, Mr. Chairman, the representative of the Netherlands, all success in your work during April, in the hope that this month will prove no less satisfactory than the month of March which has just ended.

In view of the Committee's decision on 29 March that we should, at this meeting, consider the question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, I should like today to express the views of the Soviet delegation on this matter.

The question of a nuclear test ban has the highest priority among all the items on the Committee's agenda. This question has been under discussion for nearly 30 years in various international forums — in the United Nations, at the tripartite negotiations, at meetings of experts and in the Committee on Disarmament. Consequently, all aspects of it have been very carefully studied. Furthermore, they have been studied, not academically but in a strictly practical manner, with a view to dealing with them within the framework of an appropriate treaty. The tripartite negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom came very close to the completion of work on such a treaty; however, as you know, these negotiations were broken off in 1980 by the United States, which has refused to resume them. The prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would be a practical measure towards the limitation of the nuclear arms race, which has assumed unprecedented proportions at the present time and brought the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. This is why the Soviet Union, like the overwhelming majority of the other members of the Committee on Disarmament, attaches particular importance to the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The Soviet Union has always advocated and continues to advocate the fullest possible use of the opportunities offered by the Committee on Disarmament for the successful conduct of multilateral negotiations with a view to the halting of nuclear tests in all environments and by all those who are carrying them out. It was for this reason that the delegation of the Soviet Union last year supported the proposal for the establishment in the Committee of an ad hoc working group on this matter, and gave its agreement to a compromise formula for the mandate of such a group. In so agreeing, we acted on the belief that the discussion of questions of verification ought not to be used in order to put off the elaboration of an agreement as a whole, as has unfortunately happened in the past, and that such discussion can be useful only if it is not artificially isolated from the specific content of the arms limitation measure in question but is considered in very close connection with that measure.

Last year, the Ad Hoc Working Group held an exchange of views on basic aspects of verification. The delegations of many States interested in the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests made a useful contribution to the Group's work. At the same time,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

it has regrettably to be said that the United States delegation and the delegations of some of its close allies tried to drag the Working Group into organizational and procedural debates, and to drown the solution of the question of verification in a sea of abstract arguments about the importance of the technical aspects of control. Last year, when we agreed to the compromise formula for the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, it was on the understanding that that mandate was of a provisional character and would be revised the following year. This understanding was shared by many other delegations, as is clear from the fact that the following provision was specifically included in the relevant decision of the Committee:

> "The ad hoc working group ... will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard."

On the basis of this provision, efforts have been made in the Committee from the very beginning of this session to work out a new mandate. However, they have been blocked, primarily by the United States delegation. In order not to hold up the work of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies, we agreed that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should resume its work on the basis of the old mandate. At the same time, in the decision it adopted on 29 March, the Committee particularly emphasized that the mandate of that Group might thereafter be revised.

We believe that this should be done immediately, as a matter of urgency, as indeed is stated in the decision of the Committee to which I have referred. We consider that the wording for the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban which was put forward today on behalf of the delegations of the socialist countries, including that of the Soviet Union, by Ambassador Erdembileg of Mongolia, conforms most closely to the recommendation of the General Assembly. We appeal to other delegations to support that proposal.

The Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should begin its work in the next few days. It is the Soviet delegation's intention to take an active part in that work, with the aim of the speediest possible drafting, and I repeat, drafting, of an appropriate treaty, including, of course, provisions on verification. All the necessary prerequisites exist for the Working Group to proceed to practical negotiations on a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

We put before the Committee for its consideration not long ago a document containing the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" which in our view offers a practical basis for multilateral negotiations on this matter, a basis, moreover, which takes into account the views of a large number of States and the elements agreed on in the course of the tripartite negotiations. Many delegations have already, at the present session, spoken in favour of practical negotiations on the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group. We note with satisfaction that delegations interested in the speedy conclusion of a test-ban treaty have made and will evidently continue to make constructive proposals in this connection.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We have also taken note of the statement by the Swedish delegation of its intention to submit the text of a draft treaty on this question in the near future and we shall await this document with interest.

Thus, there are more than enough concrete proposals in the Committee, both of a general and of a specific character, for the conduct of business-like negotiations with a view to the speedy completion of the drafting of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the submission of the draft text of such a treaty to the United Nations General Assembly at its next session, as indeed is called for by General Assembly resolution 37/72. We are eagerly awaiting the start of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the experienced guidance of Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, so that all questions connected with the drafting of the treaty, including, of course, questions of verification, can be considered in their entirety in the Working Group.

Before I conclude my statement, I should like to make one or two comments on the remarks of the United States delegation. We shall, of course, have an opportunity to give our views in substance on the topics he proposed for consideration by the Working Group. For the moment I should like to pick out two thoughts, two themes from the United States statement. The first concerns the nature of the activity of the Committee and its working groups.

The United States representative in his admittedly short statement nevertheless frequently stressed the word "discussions". The holding of discussions in the Committee can indeed sometimes be useful, but as we have had occasion to point out once again only recently at a plenary meeting, this international body has a specific characteristic distinguishing it from all other international bodies in which discussions are held. This Committee is not a debating club. It is a negotiating body. This applies particularly to the working groups, which were set up not merely to conduct negotiations but to conduct negotiations leading to the drafting and conclusion of appropriate international agreements. Does this mean that we are opposed to discussions? No, of course not. Sometimes, I repeat, discussions are necessary. This applies to problems that have not been discussed before, to problems that are new and that have not been studied. But what is there to discuss, gentlemen, on the subject of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests? For 30 years various bodies, consisting of 157 States, of three States and even of two States, have discussed and studied the matter and, more than that, have even put on paper the greater part of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. And the United States delegation itself, at the tripartite negotiations, had a hand in this formulation of a treaty. But suddenly we are told that all this must be scrapped — none of it happened — forget about it, gentlemen, this problem has appeared only today and it is a long-term one. We could discuss it for another 30 years or even another 300 years. This is why we believe that the substance of our differences lies precisely in this word. Although we are not opposed to discussions in general, we object to discussions on this issue. There have been enough of them; it is now time to go on to the formulation, the drafting of a text.

My second comment concerns the very broad and important problem of the national interests of States. The distinguished representative of the United States referred repeatedly to the national interests of his country. He said, for example, the following:

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

"We have even gone further and stated that any future decision of the United States Government to negotiate a CTBT would have to take account of a broad range of factors related to our national security and that no delegation should consider our willingness to participate in a Working Group as indicating an intent to begin immediately the negotiation of a CTBT."

Of course, every State has its national interests, and naturally, every delegation representing its State takes great care to safeguard the national security interests of that country. But surely the whole question, distinguished representative of the United States, resides in the fact that the national security interests of the United States in this matter are at variance with the interests of all other States. That is the problem. No one can tell the United States delegation, or any other delegation, how to protect the national security interests of its country. That is a matter of the sovereign right of each State and the duty of each delegation. But the problem arises that there is a divergence between the interests of the United States and the interests, I can say without any risk, of all other members of the international community. To substantiate this I would recall that even on the draft resolution submitted by the group of western countries — I repeat, the western countries — at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly on the question of a nuclear test ban, there were 111 votes in favour and one vote against, and that was the vote of the United States of America. And again, on the draft resolution on a nuclear test ban submitted by the group of non-aligned States, which was supported by 124 votes, the United States once more voted against. That is the essence of the problem, and we would therefore ask the United States delegation to take due account of this absolutely unique, unprecedented and, to say the least, extremely regrettable situation in which one State places its national security interests above the national security interests of the whole of the rest of the world. This is the crux of the matter with respect to the mandate of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

The Committee has an important decision to take. In the last analysis, what we are concerned with is not mere words but whether the Committee is simply going to continue holding abstract discussions — and for how many more years — or whether it is going at last to do what the world community expects of it and draft a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Issraelyan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen. The Chair would, however, request the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in future to address himself to the Chair rather than make remarks direct to individual delegations, as is customary in this body. I now give the floor to Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I did not quite understand the advice you gave me.

The CHAIRMAN: Then I shall be pleased to enlighten Ambassador Issraelyan. When you discussed after your prepared statement some remarks made by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador, you addressed yourself directly to the representative of the United States. I think this is not customary in this body. Remarks are addressed to the Chair and not to individual delegations. Thank you.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have taken note of your helpful observation, but I do not see that I in any way violated the rules of precedure or the "customs" of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you Ambassador Issraelyan. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Grinberg.

Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria): Since this is the first time I am taking the floor in the month of April, allow me on behalf of my delegation to congratulate you as the new Chairman of this Committee. I can pledge to you the full co-operation of my delegation in the efforts following the many important issues on our agenda. I also take this opportunity to express our satisfaction with the efficient manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Ali Skalli from Morocco, conducted our business in March.

My delegation has already put forward its views on the substantive aspects of nuclear test-ban problems on a previous occasion. Now, I would like to explain briefly our position regarding the question of the mandate of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Last year the Bulgarian delegation was directly involved in the negotiations on the mandate of the nuclear test-ban Working Group. Now, after the passage of almost one full year, we are surprised that this Committee has to face up to the same type of situation with which it was confronted in 1982.

For a long time now, the overwhelming majority of States here and in the General Assembly have been of the opinion that a working group on a nuclear test-ban should have an unrestricted mandate if it is to elaborate and negotiate a treaty on this matter. One of the nuclear great Powers, however, with the support of a few other States, did everything possible to block such an arrangement: the results are well known. Having no other alternative, we had no choice but to agree on a temporary compromise solution, as formulated in the Committee's decision of 21 April 1982 (document CD/291). That decision, however, was taken with the clear understanding that the limited mandate was of a transitional nature. Even those who were responsible for singling out verification and compliance for special treatment did not deny that members of the Committee would be entitled to discuss any other aspects because verification could not be meaningfully considered in a vacuum. To confirm that the Committee's action was but a first step in a process of subsequent enlargement of the Working Group's responsibility, the mandate itself contained a provision that the Working Group would report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session and that the Committee would thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard.

Today we have an opportunity to arrive at an agreement on the enlargement of the Working Group's mandate.

Some representatives who argue against a change in the status quo maintain that in 1982 the Working Group did not resolve various issues relating to verification and compliance because, inter alia, the Working Group was not able to work on the basis of a structured programme. To this one could object in many respects. For one thing, the mandate of the Working Group did not confer on it the task of "resolving" issues, but merely of "discussing" and "defining" such issues. Apart from this, in spite of the absence of a formal work programme, the report of the Working Group is in itself proof that the Group was able, under the guidance of its Chairman, to undertake a wide-ranging, informative and useful consideration of the basic issues related to verification and compliance in a treaty on a comprehensive test ban. But, regardless of all this, could someone think that a wider mandate would in any way reduce the importance of the issues of verification and compliance? We believe that this would in no way be the case. A working group under a mandate which would enable it to reach a common understanding on the scope of the treaty, for instance, would no doubt be better equipped to solve the problems of verification and compliance.

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

In the light of these considerations, the Bulgarian delegation would like to express its strong support for the enlargement of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban as of the beginning of its work at the current session. As a co-sponsor of Working Paper No. 95 submitted today by the distinguished representative of Mongolia on behalf of a group of socialist States, my delegation would like to commend the formula contained therein as a good basis for reaching a consensus decision.

We can, however, go along with the draft decision contained in document CD/181 submitted on a previous occasion by the Group of 21.

The decision we could take as a result of the consultations which are to be conducted is far from being one of a procedural or technical nature. The choice is between two clear alternatives:

(1) To start at long last a process of serious and businesslike work and negotiation on the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early date, or

(2) To provide further opportunities for promoting an endless discussion which could only delay or preclude a conclusion on a nuclear test ban. Today, we heard from the distinguished representative of the United States a reiteration of his Government's declaration that it regarded a nuclear test-ban treaty as a long-term goal. The same position was previously put forward in this Committee by Vice-President George Bush. Taking into account all the options which the Committee has before it we should always keep in mind that on many occasions the General Assembly has assigned the highest priority to the question of a nuclear test ban because its solution is of key importance in the struggle to put an end to the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and to their proliferation. It is almost universally recognized also that the solution of all scientific and technical issues related to the verification of the future treaty has for a long time been at hand and that what has been lacking is a political decision by the leading Western nuclear Powers. There can be no doubt, therefore, that if this Committee is to give effect to the resolutions of the General Assembly and live up to its responsibilities, we have to opt today for the first alternative and secure proper conditions for the attainment of one of the most important and pressing objectives in the field of disarmament.

As a practical basis for the elaboration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Working Group would have before it a number of papers, including the basic elements of a treaty on a comprehensive test ban submitted by the USSR at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. My delegation is looking forward to practical participation in the work of the Working Group in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Grinberg, for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming Chairmen. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to join those who have wished you good luck on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April and express our hope that this month will be very fruitful for the closing of the spring session. We would, Mr. Chairman, also like to express our warmest thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Ali Skalli of Morocco, whose efforts contributed to the creation of possibilities for carrying out businesslike negotiations. Let us hope that we use these possibilities to the full. May I add how much I personally appreciated the fine words of Ambassador Skalli at the conclusion of our last meeting which showed clearly his wisdom and objectivity.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Today's plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is dedicated to the discussion of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been re-established in accordance with the Committee's decision of 29 March 1983.

Let me stress at the outset that it is the considered view of the Czechoslovak delegation that the mandate adopted by the Committee for the relevant Working Group last year has been exhausted, since it was too narrow and restrictive. In fact, it could become an obstacle to the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the adoption of which is urgently demanded by the majority of States.

The consideration of "verification and compliance" which took place last year in the Working Group convinced the majority of delegations here that the problem of the verification provisions of the future treaty, agreed on a multilateral basis, is basically solved, and that it is only political will that is necessary for the achievement of agreement.

The Czechoslovak delegation expressed serious reservations with respect to the mandate adopted last year. These reservations have been fully justified by the result, or more precisely by the lack of it, of the Working Group's deliberations last year. The restrictive mandate permitted the Group no more than a general exchange of views. The reason for this was that the consideration of "verification and compliance" was carried out in isolation from the specific treaty banning all experimental nuclear-weapon tests in all environments, that would be unlimited in time, that would envisage a generally acceptable solution to the problem of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and that would be adhered to by all nuclear-weapon States.

We maintain, however, that last year's deliberations of the Working Group gave us one good experience, namely, that they should not be repeated this year.

In order not to go once more through what has already been done the Working Group should be accorded terms of reference which would allow it to undertake specific negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Last year my delegation, and, I feel, many other delegations as well, missed a sort of comprehensive document which would draw on the experience gained through more than 20 years of negotiations on a nuclear test ban. We note with satisfaction that we have that kind of document now. I mean the Soviet "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". We reiterate our view that this document contains formulations which could well be used in the elaboration of the relevant treaty. We should bear in mind that the "Basic provisions" were recommended for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament by a decision of the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, which was supported by 115 States.

Moreover, United Nations General Assembly resolution 37/72 urges all States members of the Committee on Disarmament "To assign to the Ad Hoc Working Group on item 1 of the Committee's agenda (Nuclear test ban) a mandate which should provide for the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, to be initiated immediately after the beginning of the session of the Committee to be held in 1983". The same resolution further urges the member States of the Committee on Disarmament "To exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty".

Thus, a number of positive developments give us a fair chance to undertake specific, streamlined negotiations on the matter.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Firstly, we have a clear recommendation by the most authoritative international body — the United Nations General Assembly — to elaborate a nuclear test-ban treaty.

Secondly, we have the Soviet document on the basic provisions of a nuclear test-ban treaty which can contribute to overcome the existing stalemate.

Thirdly, we have the Ad Hoc Working Group, which has been re-established in order to fulfil this task. But the Group can only do it with an appropriate mandate, not only allowing for but in fact requesting specific negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty.

The Czechoslovak delegation has on numerous occasions expressed its firm belief that verification provisions, if they are to be taken seriously and be meaningful, can only be considered inseparably with other basic provisions of a given treaty. Some delegations speak against the elaboration of a nuclear test-ban treaty in the Working Group, saying that the envisaged verification provisions are insufficient. My delegation fails to understand this approach since, as I said last time in my statement on this subject, the tripartite report on this subject matter addressed to the Committee on Disarmament in 1980 contains a verification system elaborated to a great extent. And the representatives of two of the countries which signed the tripartite report lament today over the insufficiency of verification procedures. To be more specific I mean paragraph 19 of the report which states:

> "The three negotiating parties believe that the verification measures being negotiated — particularly the provisions regarding the International Exchange of Seismic Data, the Committee of Experts, and on-site inspections — break significant new ground in international arms limitation efforts and will give all treaty parties the opportunity to participate in a substantial and constructive way in the process of verifying compliance with the treaty".

The Soviet "Basic provisions" show rather clearly that the understandings achieved at the tripartite negotiations are taken into account. In this connection we would like to ask whether the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom continue to adhere to the conclusion contained in the tripartite report.

Before concluding, I would like to stress the importance we attach to the United Nations General Assembly's call addressed to all nuclear-weapon States, as a gesture of goodwill, not to carry out any nuclear explosions, starting from a date to be agreed among them and until a nuclear test-ban treaty is concluded.

The discussion on the subject-matter in the Committee on Disarmament showed clearly that the majority of delegations urge the early achievement of a treaty and are ready to actively contribute thereto. Those delegations speak firmly in favour of the expansion of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which is about to start its work. To speak more clearly, and the urgency of the matter compels us to do so, we maintain that it is high time that the United States delegation listened to the demands of the international community, showed respect for the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly and stopped blocking the enlargement of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban along the lines of the draft presented by the distinguished representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Erdembileg, on behalf of the group of socialist States. We also hope that during this month the good atmosphere which has until now prevailed in this Committee will remain.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Vejvoda for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming Chairmen. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Mr. Nunez Mosquera.

Mr. NUNEZ MOSQUERA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): My statement will be brief and I shall refer only to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, but I should like first, Ambassador van Dongen, to offer you the greetings of the Cuban delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. We hope that under your guidance this body will be able to adopt decisions of substance during the last month of the spring part of its session.

I should also like to congratulate your predecessor in that office, Ambassador Skalli, on his accomplishments in the sphere of the organization of our work during the month of March.

A number of documents, both official and unofficial, have been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of the mandate of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. In fact, we have just received such a document, Working Paper No. 95, presented by the group of socialist countries. In document CD/181, submitted to the Committee on 24 April 1981, almost two years ago, the Group of 21 suggested a form of wording for the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group which leaves no doubt as to the functions of this Committee and the urgency with which we should embark on negotiations on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. In that document, the Group of 21 suggested the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this subject to negotiate (and that is very important) — to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and the final clauses of a draft treaty relating to item 1 of the Committee's agenda.

No one can be unaware of the conciliatory character and the flexibility of this form of wording. Nevertheless it was rejected, in fact by a small group of countries which justified their attitude, as they are still doing, by the usual arguments about verification, in spite of the fact that that is no longer a problem as regards the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

There is, too, in document CD/259, submitted to the Committee by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on 12 March 1982, a considerable element of flexibility. That document states that the ad hoc working group will be responsible for negotiating on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. That draft mandate also was rejected, by the same small group of countries.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the element that is common to those two proposals, and which was the main reason for their being rejected, is the reference to the fact that the ad hoc working group will be responsible for negotiating (and I stress this) — negotiating on a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

I should like to recall that when we were discussing the possibility of convening a special plenary meeting of the Committee to discuss the question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, some delegations questioned whether it would not be a violation of the Committee's rules of procedure to limit statements by delegations to a specific subject.

Along the same line of thinking, it is legitimate to ask whether it is not a violation of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in three environments, of the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly, of those same rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament and of the resolutions on the subject of the United Nations General Assembly, to impose, with a "take it or leave it" attitude, a mandate precluding the starting of serious negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

In the 1963 Treaty those same States which are now opposing negotiations in this Committee undertook to pursue them in good faith, whereas in fact they have suspended

(Mr. Nuñez Mosquero, Cuba)

even those negotiations that were being conducted with the Soviet Union on this subject outside the framework of this Committee, in spite of the fact that they had achieved considerable progress, as is clear from the reports submitted to this body. The Final Document of 1978 recognized the priority and urgency of the need to achieve a prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and this was reaffirmed in the Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Lastly, the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament state that the Committee is a disarmament negotiating forum, and that when there is a basis for negotiating a draft treaty, the Committee may establish subsidiary bodies and should provide them with appropriate support for their work.

In the light of all these facts, and in the judgement of many delegations, there can be no doubt as to the motives that led a small number of States to impose on the Committee on Disarmament a limited mandate for the Working Group on the first item on its agenda.

It is enough to recall that throughout 1982 many States pointed out how and by whom the Committee was being prevented from fulfilling its negotiating function, and that the present mandate of the Working Group, an unsatisfactory hybrid of previous proposals, which has, moreover, already been exhausted, was proposed and adopted only a few weeks before the convening of the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, which was to make an assessment of the work done since 1978.

Now, when there does not appear to be anything in the near future involving a review of our work, the delegations which should be changing their attitude as regards the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests seem to be unconcerned about what may happen and are reverting to avoiding the starting of concrete negotiations on this subject in the Committee.

The word "negotiate" appears to be taboo in this connection, as it is with respect to many other items on our agenda, regardless of what the General Assembly asks of us. It is only necessary to look at what is happening in connection with item 2, or to remember that it took seven weeks to include a reference to the prevention of nuclear war in our agenda to see that we are right.

This is the reality confronting us every day, and we should let the international community know this if we want to fulfil the mandate that has been entrusted to us. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that negotiations of substance cannot be started in the Committee on specific subjects. There are General Assembly resolutions clearly indicating the activities we should undertake, and stating that the rule of consensus should not be used to prevent the adoption of appropriate mandates for subsidiary bodies. In our report to the General Assembly we are under an obligation to respond to these directives and we ought to do so. With a limited mandate for the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, the 1983 session is already doomed to failure, unless a flexible attitude is adopted by those who are obstructing our work so as to permit the initiation of concrete negotiations on this matter. It should be borne in mind that this is a subject of great priority, which also affects the adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament that we have been asked to submit by the end of this year, something we cannot possibly do in present conditions.

We hope that this situation will be corrected very quickly so that the Committee on Disarmament may begin without further delay actual negotiations on all aspects of a test ban treaty. There is a sufficient basis and sufficient experience for that purpose in this Committee, and all that is needed is to give the Working Group a mandate allowing it to start negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Cuba, Mr. Nuñez Mosquera, for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming Chairmen. I now recognize the next speaker on my list, the representative of Australia,

Mr. SADLEIR (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for the important concluding month of our spring session. Your long experience, many diplomatic skills and firm reputation for clear thinking will stand us in good stead in coping with the difficult issues of substance that lie ahead. May I, through you, Mr. Chairman, convey the thanks of the Australian delegation for the way in which your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Morocco, Mr. Skalli, discharged his heavy responsibilities. In particular, I should like to thank him for the agility with which he cut the Gordian knot of procedural difficulties which had brought the Committee to a standstill for eight weeks.

In my statement today I shall address myself to item 1 of the Committee's agenda, namely, a nuclear test ban. For Australia, the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a priority objective. On 4 April the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Bill Hayden, in the context of reports that nuclear testing would soon resume in the South Pacific, recalled that Australia was opposed to all forms of nuclear explosions by all States in all environments. The Australian Government intends to support international efforts to bring about an end to all such nuclear testing through, for example, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

In 1980 the Australian delegation was the first to propose a way of moving forward the work of the Committee on Disarmament on a comprehensive test ban by examining the institutional arrangements for the verification aspects of a treaty. In introducing a paper on this proposal (document CD/95), the then head of the Australian delegation, Sir James Plimsoll, called on the Committee on Disarmament to avoid a situation where, after there is political agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, there would be a delay of one or two years because no work had been done on an institutional structure to support the implementation and in particular the verification of such a treaty.

Can it be fairly said that the Committee has even begun to make a start on matters of verification, as the Australian delegation proposed? The answer, I am sorry to say, is in the negative. And yet some delegations suggest that we have somehow arrived at the end of the work we need to do under the heading of verification. They even go so far as to suggest that, by some miraculous process, the mandate so recently agreed on, and since barely applied, has been "fulfilled". How many meetings, in practice, have been devoted to the hard-won mandate? Of those that were held, what proportion focused on substantive issues rather than on the procedural, administrative and report-writing activities which tend to consume time in our working groups and, recently, in the Committee as a whole.

Those who have taken part in the Working Group will know that much of its energy during the short summer session last year was spent discussing a programme of work. The initial draft of the programme, prepared by the Acting Chairman of the Group, Mr. Hyltenius of Sweden, was balanced and fair, and prejudiced no-one's position as regards the Group's work — much less with regard to the eventual text of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Yet the Working Group, thanks to a group of countries apparently unprepared to move forward towards an eventual test-ban treaty, ended up without any programme of work at all for the session.

It was only on 27 August that the Chair was allowed to present an "oral" work programme to the Group. Only three meetings remained in the session to give effect to this programme. If there has been a miracle, it lies in the fact that the Group accomplished as much as it did. Ironically, it is the same group of countries which blocked agreement on a programme of work that now suggest that the mandate has been exhausted. Such a claim is simply implausible.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Having said that, I should add that the Australian delegation welcomes the decision of the Committee last week to re-establish the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban under its existing mandate. In this connection I wish to place on record our satisfaction that a new Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Gerhardt Herder, has, by the same decision of the Committee, been appointed to lead the Group's work. My delegation will give him our full co-operation in seeking progress at the fastest rate possible towards a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

Australia is anxious, indeed impatient for progress in this area. We recognize that, in that respect, we are by no means unique, but we make an important point: the rate of progress is not always proportional to the degree of clamour for it, the pressure exerted for it or the size of the steps advocated. Recent weeks have shown that the opposite proposition is equally true. In February and March this year, the Committee was a sounding brass for fine sentiments and strong speeches in favour of big steps, and at the end of those months what, as an outcome of all that, is there to show the world? By contrast, the Committee has made a lot of progress at other times and in other circumstances.

Since we are now discussing the mandates of working groups, I need only mention the progress made so far in the chemical weapons Working Group, when we got on faster as soon as we stopped arguing about whether or not our existing mandate would permit us to do so. Thus, my delegation urges speed, and it urges speed within the present mandate. Any other course would condemn us to move slowly, if at all. That is the lesson to be drawn from the Committee's past history.

In my statements of 8 and 22 February I dwelt at some length on an important area of nuclear test-ban verification, namely, seismic monitoring. In particular, I drew attention to the steady and very relevant technical work being done by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. As Ambassador Herder, in his statement of 3 March, pointed out:

> "There is enough material for setting up the international data exchange system within the framework of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and I underline 'a treaty'. The Group of Scientific Experts should contribute to such a treaty. It does not work in an 'ivory tower', neither should its work be regarded as an exercise in 'art for art's sake'. It is the purpose that counts".

I can agree with much of this. While I do not consider that the international seismic monitoring network can be swiftly set up on the basis of present material, I am convinced that work to that end must be linked to the objectives of the Committee as a whole. This indeed was the essence of my remarks on 22 February, when the report of the Group of Scientific Experts was tabled: I said then that "the Committee should begin to focus more acutely on the work done by this Group, and to consider its medium- and long-term relevance to the Committee's own work". Thus, I now formally propose, Mr. Chairman, that the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban debate the future of the Group of Scientific Experts before the experts meet again in July, under the existing NTB mandate.

There is much more to be done under the existing mandate. Last year, as others have pointed out, numerous items were put forward in the Working Group and were not fully addressed. At the same time the Working Group witnessed several interesting interventions and exchanges on matters which fell within its mandate. My delegation for example is ready, as no doubt is the Indian delegation, to investigate further the verification problems of peaceful nuclear explosions. More can be said, a lot of it technical, about low-yield detection.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

I have already mentioned that Australia submitted a working paper in 1980 setting out some institutional, financial and legal questions that the Committee on Disarmament should address. Much of that paper remains relevant. However, developments since then, particularly the presentation of the trilateral report to the Committee and the tabling of a draft treaty by the Soviet Union, have raised new and different questions. My delegation is looking, therefore, towards issuing a revised version of document CD/95. Some of the major new questions that come to mind are precisely those which have to do with the institutional arrangements for a verification system. Both the trilateral report and the Soviet draft treaty mention a committee of experts. Will this committee concern itself only with the seismic system? Would it also deal with other means of detecting nuclear tests? Would a separate group be required, say, for atmospheric detection? And what about alleged violations and complaints? Would they be channelled through the expert group, if only in the first instance? Or would it be a purely scientific body? Would a consultative committee be established to handle compliance matters? Who, then, would organize on-site inspections? What role would the Security Council or other United Nations bodies or the Committee on Disarmament itself have in all this? Would a separate CTB secretariat be required? And how would it be established? There is a rich field here for further exploitation.

On the other hand, my delegation is not willing, although we are prepared, if necessary, to participate in a tedious political discussion which revolves around the question of "will". The matter before us is quite a simple one. Adequate or not, rich or poor, the mandate of the NTB Working Group is the only one we have, by unanimous agreement, and it is one which offers us a chance to do some real work. Some day we will probably feel its limitations, and wish to have broader terms of reference. We can hasten that day by getting down to work or we can put it off by choosing another approach.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Sadleir for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing Chairman and to the Chairman for the month of April. Before giving the floor to the next speaker, the Chair would like to rectify an omission in not having properly thanked the distinguished representative of Cuba for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and to the outgoing Chairman. This omission of thanks was more regrettable since the thanks addressed to Ambassador Skalli are so generally recognized as being well deserved. I hope the distinguished representative of Cuba will accept these belated thanks.

I now recognize the distinguished representative of Belgium, Mr. Noirfalisse. You have the floor.

Mr. NOIRFALISSE (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I think that Ambassador Onkelinx will have ample opportunity to congratulate you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee and also to express the Belgian delegation's gratitude for the contribution made to the Committee's work last month by Ambassador Skalli. In the meantime, I will associate myself with those congratulations.

We are glad that the Committee on Disarmament has at last decided, after unduly lengthy hesitations and deliberations, finally to resume its work of substance where that was left at the end of the 1982 session.

The five working groups that have been established offer the best way of making progress on a number of well-identified topics. We ought not any longer to waste the possibilities which these tools afford us.

(Mr. Noirfalisse, Belgium)

One of the items for this plenary meeting is a consideration of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We are approaching this consideration without prejudice, for it is in accordance with the mandate of the Working Group, which requests the Committee to "take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard".

The Committee was wise in deciding last week to re-establish the Working Group with its 1982 mandate. We believe that at the present time that mandate offers us the best way of approaching the objective of the prohibition of nuclear tests, and Belgium attaches the utmost importance to the attainment of that goal. It hopes that the Working Group will establish the necessary basis for negotiations to be conducted, at the appropriate time, with a view to the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting all nuclear tests. We believe that the present mandate of the Working Group is entirely adequate for that purpose.

It is important, however, in order that we should draw closer to the time when genuine negotiations are possible, that we should ensure the maximum chances of success for the Working Group from the present moment. To proceed otherwise would, in the present circumstances, run counter to the objective, because the entire process could thereby be disrupted. In establishing the Working Group last year, we indicated the first step to be taken. Our goal this year should be to take that step.

We ought to recognize that our work in 1982 was very limited as to time, and I can reply to the question put by Ambassador Sadleir: first, we limited our efforts; we devoted only 10 meetings to the Working Group; of those 10 meetings, seven were concerned with procedural questions. And the consequence of that is that, as concerns substance, we were not even able to agree on a programme of work which would have allowed us systematically to discuss and define the issues relating to verification and to compliance with a prohibition. The results of our work last year are thus very limited. It is enough to read the report of the Working Group to be convinced of this. If we compare that report with those which were drawn up within the framework of the first mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, we can see that there is still much work to be done in the way of exploration, clarification and harmonization with respect to the verification of a prohibition on nuclear tests, before we go on to a more ambitious phase of our work.

Verification proved to be the stumbling-block in the negotiations that have been held in the past on the subject of a nuclear test ban, and in that connection I should like to say that I entirely agree with what our colleague from Poland said a few minutes ago when he stated that "one of the most complex and controversial problems which impede disarmament negotiations, and not only in the field of a nuclear test ban, is an adequate verification system". It is in fact good practice in a negotiating process to concentrate on the problems. To do otherwise would be to put up a smoke-screen, for we should be giving an illusion of progress while not talking about what is the essential element in the matter of a nuclear test ban, namely, the question of verification. If we read the various documents that have been submitted on this question, in particular the tripartite report and, most recently, the Soviet Union's proposals in document CD/346, we shall see that the greater part of the suggestions made, particularly by the Soviet Union delegation — 28 paragraphs out of 35 — concern verification and the provisions designed to ensure respect for the prohibition.

The States which in the Working Group last year felt it necessary — as was only natural — to refer to other matters connected with verification, and in particular the scope of the prohibition, had no difficulty in doing so from the outset of our work in 1982. Thus the present mandate is sufficiently flexible in that respect. It in no way prevents delegations expressing their particular concerns.

(Mr. Noirfalisse, Belgium)

In conclusion, we consider that the mandate has not been exhausted. It is far from having been exhausted. In fact it has barely been broached. We trust that the Working Group will be able, as soon as it resumes its activities, to agree on a method which will enable it to carry out its task in a rational manner.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Belgium for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen, and now recognizes the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I should like first of all to offer you the most sincere congratulations of the delegation of the Argentine Republic on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for the month of April. I wish you every success in your efforts — I am confident that they will be successful — and towards that end I should like here and now to promise you the fullest support of my delegation. At the same time I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation for the brilliant work done by your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, who made prolonged and intensive efforts to solve the problems of the organization of the work of this Committee for the current year — with success, as we all know.

The position of the Group of 21 with respect to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban is well known, and I shall therefore be very brief. I should like to point out in this connection that I always speak of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which is the language specifically used in the Final Document, with all that that means. The points made by the Group of 21 in the statement it submitted on 24 April 1981, almost two years ago, in connection with item 1 of our agenda, remain entirely valid. That statement contained a draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group and we still think that a mandate of such a kind offers the only possibility for the Group to accomplish truly effective work.

It is a secret to no one that the mandate given to the Ad Hoc Working Group when it was set up last year was far from satisfactory to a large number of delegations. They considered that the Group would be able to make little headway towards the objective set in paragraph 51 of the Final Document when its work was confined within such narrow limits that it was empowered to deal with only one aspect, an important aspect, certainly, but only part of what should be a whole, and when at the same time it did not have the possibility of conducting negotiations but was merely, to use the words of the present mandate, to "discuss and define".

The experience of the meetings held by the Group last year proved that these fears were not unfounded.

We ought not to deceive ourselves. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and the divergencies of views in this connection are really only a symptom of the differences that exist in the degree of priority which countries at present attach to the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. Until a few years ago it could be said that there was a consensus on the urgency of the need to put an end to such tests, a consensus clearly reflected in, among other documents, the preamble to the Moscow Treaty adopted in 1963, that is, exactly 20 years ago.

I do not intend to go into the reasons justifying the need for a total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. They are too well known and need no repetition. It is,

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

therefore, to be regretted that two nuclear-weapon Powers have radically modified their positions in this connection and now see the attainment of this goal, so ardently desired by virtually everyone, as a long-term objective.

In addition, two other nuclear-weapon countries, also adopting an attitude that is to be regretted, have decided to dissociate themselves from the multilateral effort towards this end which has been initiated in this Committee in spite of all the difficulties and restrictions. The reasons they have given to explain their attitude, although worthy, are nevertheless not sufficient, at least in my delegation's view, for their not participating usefully in the activity of a working group whose purpose is thereby directly affected.

Such a situation, in which four of the five nuclear-weapon Powers are maintaining what might be called a negative attitude with respect to such a matter as the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, about which the international community as a whole has no doubts, certainly does not encourage any optimism as regards the immediate future of the discussions being held in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

No one can guarantee the success of the efforts of a working group, nor can anyone deny the right of each delegation to express, in the group, its views, its perceptions of the problem and even its assessment of the priorities with respect to the item in question. However, it is neither just nor appropriate to subject the work of the group to such narrow and partial limits that the possibilities for its achieving anything worthwhile are thereby drastically curtailed.

If the Committee is fully to fulfil its responsibilities, it must give the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate that is adequate to that purpose, which obviously means the broadening of the present mandate.

That is the position of the Argentine delegation on this matter, a position that is obviously well known, but we wished it to be briefly reflected in the record of this meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair and to the outgoing Chairman.

Distinguished delegates, it is now close to 1 p.m. and there remain six speakers on the list; it will therefore be necessary to suspend the meeting rather than to adjourn. The Chair would propose then, that we suspend the meeting now and reconvene at 3.15 p.m. sharp this afternoon, if that is agreed.

If there are no objections, the meeting is suspended until 3.15 p.m. this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and resumed at 3.15 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 209th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is now resumed, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Algeria, Mr. Taffar. You have the floor.

Mr. TAFFAR (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament has decided to place the question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban on the agenda for today's meeting. My delegation is pleased at this decision and would like to make some comments on the subject.

Allow me first of all, however, Mr. Chairman, to perform the pleasant task of congratulating you on your accession to the chairmanship of our Committee for the month of April, and to assure you of the entire co-operation of my delegation in the fulfilment of your duties.

We should also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Skalli who, with the skill with which we are all familiar, presided over the work of the Committee on Disarmament at a critical moment in its history.

For more than a quarter of a century, the international community has been trying to achieve the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, rightly considered to be an essential measure towards the halting of the nuclear arms race. Unfortunately, the efforts made towards that end have not yet brought about the results hoped for. The tripartite negotiations, in which the international community placed great hopes, have been suspended. The Committee on Disarmament has still not been able to undertake negotiations on this question, which has the highest priority on its agenda.

It is, moreover, undeniable that the lack of agreement on the question of the prohibition of nuclear tests was one of the principal obstacles to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Meanwhile, the pace of nuclear-weapon tests is constantly increasing, thus contributing to the acceleration of the nuclear arms race by making possible, in particular, the development of new generations of ever more sophisticated and more deadly weapons.

All these facts compel us to seek the reason for this absence of results, which is in stark contrast with the degree of priority attached to the question.

We are unfortunately obliged to recognize that the principal obstacle preventing the attainment of this objective is indubitably the lack of political will on the part of certain nuclear-weapon States.

The argument about technical difficulties put forward to explain the absence of results in this sphere does not appear to us to be very convincing. For while it is entirely understandable that certain technical difficulties might explain the lack of progress in a negotiating process already under way, the existence of differences of views on technical questions cannot justify the absence of negotiations on such an important matter as the prohibition of nuclear tests.

(Mr. Taffar, Algeria)

All members of the Committee on Disarmament are agreed in recognizing that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban that was set up during the spring part of the Committee's last session is limited.

My delegation was among those which expressed serious reservations regarding the adoption of such a narrow mandate, which in fact confines the Committee on Disarmament to "discussing and defining" issues relating to one particular question, that of verification.

We nevertheless agreed to join in the consensus that emerged on that mandate, considering it as a first step towards the negotiation of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This in no way affected our reservations as regards the mandate itself, which arbitrarily isolates one aspect of the future treaty from the whole complex of elements that should comprise it.

We see today that our apprehensions were fully justified. During the summer part of the Committee's last session, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban found itself indeed confronted by the difficulty of discussing questions of verification without knowing the nature and the scope of the prohibition. The impossibility of reaching a consensus, if only on a working hypothesis concerning the nature and the scope of the treaty, prevented the adoption of a programme of work. Nevertheless the meetings held then had the merit of clarifying the respective positions of delegations on questions concerning verification.

My delegation considers that the time has come for the Committee on Disarmament to begin negotiating a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. We believe that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group set up under item 1 of the agenda must be broadened in order to permit the Committee on Disarmament to carry out its task as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. It is pertinent here to recall that the Group of 21 submitted a draft mandate which may be found in document CD/181 and which, in our view, offers a sound basis for the formulation of a new mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group. We believe that the broadening of the Group's mandate would be in no way detrimental to the interests of the delegations which stress the primary importance of questions concerning the verification of compliance with the treaty. Those delegations would in fact be entirely free to give these questions all the importance they merit during the negotiating process.

In stressing the need to broaden the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, we have no intention whatever of minimizing the importance of verification issues. We perfectly well understand the concern of delegations to devise a verification system which will assure them that their partners are respecting all the provisions of the treaty. In any case, it is surely in the interests of all parties to the future treaty to make provision for reliable verification measures that will guarantee the strict observance of all the treaty's provisions. We are, however convinced that these questions should be examined, not in the abstract, but in close connection with the other aspects of the treaty.

At its thirty-seventh session the General Assembly adopted three resolutions on the subject of nuclear tests. All three stressed the importance and urgency of this question. One of them, resolution 37/72, urges the Committee on Disarmament to assign to the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban "a mandate which should provide for the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, to be initiated immediately after the beginning of the session of the Committee to be held in 1983".

(Mr. Taffar, Algeria)

We earnestly hope that the delegations which have in the past shown reluctance regarding the initiation of a process of negotiation on this subject in the Committee on Disarmament will show sufficient flexibility to enable the Committee to respond to the appeal of the General Assembly through a broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

It is in large part the attitude they adopt to the question of the prohibition of nuclear tests that will indicate the degree of political will of the nuclear-weapon States with respect to the goal of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished delegate of Algeria for his contribution and for the kind words addressed both to the outgoing Chairman and the incoming Chairman. The Chair now calls upon the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Mr. Altaf.

Mr. ALTAF (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad will surely take a suitable opportunity to congratulate you on behalf of our delegation. In his absence, allow me to express my great pleasure on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. I believe that at this important juncture, when the Committee is finally starting the substantive work of its 1983 session, you, Mr. Chairman, a composite personality well regarded for your erudition, diplomatic skill, geniality and wit, will make an outstanding contribution to our important task.

I also wish to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Skalli, for the skilful manner in which he was able to settle the problems facing the Committee regarding the agenda and the programme of work.

I have requested the floor to express some views on the question of a nuclear test ban. In doing so, I have a foreboding sense of history. Countless United Nations resolutions and innumerable statements in the last quarter of a century urging the cessation of nuclear testing have not brought us any closer to this highest-priority goal. On the other hand, technological developments and feverish stockpiling have in the meantime imparted an awesome dimension to the consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. The hitherto metaphoric references to a nuclear holocaust have been invested by the actions of a handful of States -- and primarily, two of them -- with a literal and real possibility of an apocalypse. Continued opposition to the banning of nuclear-weapon tests by this Superpower today, by the other tomorrow, is a double-edged miscalculation which eventually we may never have time to look back and rectify. Conversely, in time, its value may diminish to a level of insignificance.

Our agreement last year to a limited mandate for the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was in the nature of a gesture indicative of the importance we attached to the commencement at long last by the Committee on Disarmament of the process for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. We also had in mind the undertaking contained in the mandate that after the conclusion of its 1982 session the Committee would "take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities". Our delegation understands the responsibility of this Committee solely in terms of negotiations, in this instance, on a CTBT. It would therefore be entirely justified that the Committee should be called upon to revise the mandate of the Working Group accordingly.

(Mr. Altaf, Pakistan)

The Working Group is at present mandated to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance. These issues have two dimensions, technical and political.

The technical aspects of a nuclear weapons test ban have already been adequately explored and examined by the seismological Working Group. The contours of an international verification system based on fully modern techniques of data collection and its proper evaluation have been very well defined. Of course we can endlessly argue on its capabilities. Each new day that dawns outdates the preceding day. The other option is to seize the hour and relate our present knowledge to the problems of the day. As a precaution, the CTBT could include provisions for an updating of its verification and compliance procedures in the light of later technological developments through review conferences or any other agreed universally non-discriminatory procedures.

Other aspects of verification and compliance issues relating to a comprehensive test ban cannot be fully defined, as called for in our existing mandate, let alone negotiated, without a prior agreement on the scope of the ban. That is the political aspect which indeed falls squarely within the competence of the Working Group. Nuclear technology has its peaceful uses and military application. Contrary to the recent Dutch suggestion, a fair agreement on the scope and purpose of the ban, keeping in view the requirements of the developing countries in taking full advantage of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to narrow the immense technological gap between them and the rest of the world will quickly pave the way to and help in the evolving of a mutually satisfactory verification and compliance regime for the CTBT.

These technical and political considerations apart, the existing mandate suffers from an internal contradiction. The Working Group has been asked to substantially examine issues which relate to the governance of the implementation of an agreement which itself is not envisaged except in the context of an unspecified long-range policy goal. It is obvious, first, that a truly substantial and in-depth examination of related issues, even psychologically, is not possible unless the negotiators are convinced that an agreement is actually intended. Such a work programme may be suitable to an academic, intellectual exercise; it is hardly fit for a serious negotiating effort. Secondly, even if a determined effort were to result in a consensus, its elements would surely become obsolete by the time, if ever, the issues defined by the Working Group are in practice related to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Unless, therefore, this internal contradiction is resolved, our work cannot assume the character of a genuine negotiating endeavour.

It follows, then, that the problem is a lack of political will; its rationale is unclear, perhaps incomprehensible. It is frequently said that systems performance could not be guaranteed without recourse to testing. Notwithstanding the fact that it is predicated on the actual use of weapons, the argument has been discounted by eminent scientists on the grounds that a variety of methods were available to detect and remedy performance deviations. I need only refer to the Bradbury-Mark-Garwin letter of 15 August 1978 addressed to President Jimmy Carter.

(Mr. Altaf, Pakistan)

Notwithstanding also our manifest doubts about the theory of deterrence, one may ask: will the test ban in any way restrict or diminish the value of deterrence? Clearly not. A nuclear-weapon test ban will do no more than prevent qualitative improvements of existing nuclear weapons and preclude the development of new types of such weapons. That, too, if we ignore the possibilities afforded by advanced simulation techniques and laboratory tests. The nuclear arsenals, consisting of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, will continue to exist, perhaps multiply, even after the conclusion of a test ban. A mere 5 per cent of the existing weapons are said to be sufficient to eradicate all life on earth. The requirements of deterrence, or for that matter of equal security, will thus continue to be fully underwritten. Why, then, the reluctance to negotiate the ban?

A conceivable answer perhaps lies in the desire for the retention of technological superiority. Historic experience indicates too few compromises, at least as far as this question impinges on qualitative parity in weapons. The inevitable result of such an illusory pursuit is the continuation of the arms race. No particular subtlety of mind is required to conclude, then, that the opposition to the banning of nuclear-weapon tests is an indication of unwillingness to terminate the arms race and proceed to genuine and meaningful disarmament. On the other hand, even at this stage, a nuclear-weapon test ban will provide concrete evidence of the determination to contain, and perhaps eventually eliminate, the danger that these infernal weapons pose to the survival of mankind.

At the outset I referred to the history of the issue. No efforts have been spared in negotiations to achieve a nuclear-weapon test ban. The partial test-ban Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty raised hopes, either by what had been achieved or by the commitments that were held out "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". Over a decade ago the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of a nuclear test ban had been fully explored; there even came a time when the negotiating parties were on the verge of an agreement. Although this may now be a part of history, its relevance is undeniable. We cannot but continue to urge the fulfilment of commitments, whether these emanate from existing treaties such as those I have recalled or from a strongly held belief in a moral approach to issues of disarmament and security such as that recently affirmed by President Reagan.

Two of the most pressing issues in the world today are, first, the appalling economic conditions in the majority of the third world countries, and secondly, the nuclear threat to the survival of mankind. While the former unfortunately evokes little more than compassion and concern, the solution to the latter has been fortunately agreed upon by consensus in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. In the disarmament field a nuclear test ban, we are all agreed, is a matter of the highest priority. But that is not all. Along the path to real disarmament, it is the first step.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his contribution and for the generous words addressed both to the present Chairman and his predecessor. While his predecessor is concerned, of course, this is now a fact; the present Chairman can only hope to be capable of living up to these generous expressions of goodwill. The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of India, Mr. Saran, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the delegation of India, I would like to welcome you as Chairman of the Committee for the month of April. Familiar as we are with your diplomatic acumen, professional experience as well as personal qualities, we are assured of an intensive and productive period of negotiations during the month. May I pledge to you on behalf of the delegation of India our full support and co-operation in the discharge of your duties as Chairman.

Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, under whose leadership we were finally able to adopt both the agenda and the programme of work for the current session, deserves our sincere gratitude and utmost admiration. Under his gentle and persuasive chairmanship, we were able to resolve several difficult and controversial procedural questions. He has thus laid the basis for fruitful negotiations in the Committee during the rest of the session.

My delegation would like to offer its views on the question of a nuclear test ban. At the outset, I would like to put forward India's position concerning the nature of a future treaty on a nuclear test ban. In our view, such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time. It should be able to attract universal adherence and should include a verification system that is universal in its application and non-discriminatory in character and which provides for equal access to all States.

This is also the position adopted by the Group of 21, and in document CD/223 which contains a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, for example, this is the nature of the treaty that is clearly spelt out.

However, the delegation of the United States this morning put forward ideas concerning the scope of the treaty on a nuclear test ban which are not in consonance with the position adopted by the international community on this question for many years. In this connection, I would like to draw the attention of the distinguished delegate of the United States, Mr. Chairman, to the preamble of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, which says:

> "Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, ...".

It is also quite obvious from the passage I have just quoted that the position taken by the United States that it does not intend to engage in negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban is not in keeping with the obligations it undertook in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. The position is also at variance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the provisions of which were unanimously reaffirmed in June/July last year at the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. Paragraph 51 calls for the urgent conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban.

So far, we have not heard one good reason for retaining the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. There are those who argue that during its work last year, the Working Group was unable to fulfil its mandate because we could not get agreement on a work programme. That is a rather formal and unconvincing objection. My delegation, along with several others, was prepared to engage in a substantive discussion of verification and compliance issues relating to a nuclear test ban, despite our conviction that the available means of verification, both national and international, were already sufficient to ensure compliance with such a ban. However, to our dismay, we found that those very delegations which insist that the Working Group should first examine issues of verification and compliance were not prepared for a serious exchange even on these issues. Arguments that the mandate given to the Group has not been exhausted is merely a camouflage for the lack of political enthusiasm to deal with the real issues involved.

(Mr. Saran, India)

In the Working Group, we asked the delegations concerned, particularly those of the United States and the United Kingdom to elaborate for us what they regarded as "adequate" verification for a nuclear test ban. We also pointed out that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events has been operating so far on the assumption that the global seismic monitoring network they had been mandated to elaborate should be able to detect with 90 per cent probability events of bodywave magnitude 4 or greater in the northern hemisphere and bodywave magnitude 4.3 or greater in the southern hemisphere. We asked these delegations whether this capability and the probability of detection, which lies at the base of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, is considered sufficient by them in conjunction with national technical measures to ensure compliance with a treaty on a nuclear test ban.

These questions, as will be recalled by those who participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group, went unanswered. Instead, the Group was told that the "adequacy" or "sufficiency" of verification was a complex question involving a whole host of political and technical factors. Despite repeated questioning, no attempt was made to clarify what this "whole host of political and technical factors" consisted of.

It may also be noted in this connection that the delegation of India attempted to elicit from the erstwhile trilateral negotiators information concerning the progress achieved by them in their negotiations on issues relating to verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban. The Soviet Union stated that all aspects of verification and compliance relating to a multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban had been agreed upon among the three negotiators, and that only certain additional measures that would be applicable only to the three parties remained unresolved. The delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom challenged the Soviet contention but did not deem it fit to inform the Working Group of the specific aspects on which agreement could not be reached among the trilateral negotiators in the field of verification of a multilateral convention on a nuclear test ban.

In the absence of such clarification from the United States and the United Kingdom, the Working Group was naturally denied an opportunity substantively to explore unresolved issues relating to verification and compliance.

Given this experience of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban last year, which has nothing to do at all with our inability to agree upon a suitable work programme, we are entitled to ask those who insist on retaining the old mandate what they wish the Working Group to undertake under the old mandate. We have heard with interest the statement made by the representative of the United States this morning on the subject. He suggested that the Working Group should, in the area of verification, focus attention on four general topics. However, the four topics that he listed in his statement have already been dealt with exhaustively in the earlier consideration of the nuclear test-ban issue in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during most of the decade of the 1970s. The same areas have also been explored in great detail by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, which has been working on the issue of verification through a global seismic monitoring network since 1976. The results of these considerations are available to the Committee in the form of the various regular reports submitted by the Group of Scientific Experts to the Committee.

(Mr. Saran, India)

One may also draw attention to the detailed working documents put forward before the CCD by several delegations, including those of the United States and the United Kingdom. Not least, one may also take into consideration the reports submitted on the trilateral negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR between 1977 and 1980.

It is quite obvious that a vast amount of work has already been done precisely on the topics outlined this morning by the United States delegation. Unless we have some clear idea as to what the unresolved or pending problems are in this area, we cannot hope to proceed beyond a repetitive and academic exercise. It is precisely the refusal on the part of certain delegations clearly to specify what the pending problems are as far as they are concerned, which stands in the way of our making substantive progress. The same observation applies to the issues which have been raised by the United States representative with respect to compliance.

I would now like to take up some of the issues raised by Ambassador Sadleir of Australia this morning. The distinguished Ambassador of Australia stated that the Working Group ought to consider the institutional, administrative and financial arrangements necessary to sustain a multilateral verification regime for a future nuclear test-ban treaty. As we have had occasion to point out before, this is like putting the cart before the horse. The international community has recognized that questions relating to verification and compliance can only be considered in tandem with other aspects of a treaty. For example, paragraph 31 of the Final Document clearly states:

> "Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement".

In line with this generally accepted principle enshrined in the Final Document, we cannot agree to the Working Group getting bogged down in a rather peripheral exercise while the central issue of negotiating a treaty on a nuclear test ban remains unresolved.

The subject may be a rich area for fruitful exploration, as suggested by the Australian Ambassador, but the Committee on Disarmament is not the place for such exploration, since it is not an academic institution but a negotiating body.

We are also sceptical of the suggestions made by the distinguished Ambassador of Australia that the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should debate the relevance of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to the work of the Working Group. We believe that the question of whether or not the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should continue its work is for the Committee to debate and not the Ad Hoc Working Group. It is in the interests of all delegations in this Committee to permit the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban to deal only with substantive questions.

(Mr. Saran, India)

The Ambassador of Australia also referred to the question of exploring verification problems as related to peaceful nuclear explosions. I am sure Ambassador Sadleir is fully aware of the very detailed exposition that my delegation made in response to queries from his delegation concerning this question in the Working Group last year. Our views remain unchanged that attempts to raise peripheral issues such as those relating to peaceful nuclear explosions seem designed to side-track the Committee from its aim of achieving a treaty on a nuclear test ban at the earliest possible date.

The above consideration has encouraged us once again to propose to the Committee that it ought to adopt a mandate for the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban on the lines recommended by the Group of 21 in its working paper CD/181 of 24 April 1981. The formulation, suitably modified, could read as follows:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the 1983 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and the final clauses of a draft treaty relating to item 1 of its agenda, entitled 'Nuclear test ban'. The Ad Hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work at an appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1983 session".

It is our conviction that such a draft mandate would permit the Working Group to explore all the relevant aspects of a future treaty on a nuclear test ban including, of course, questions of verification and compliance. As several speakers have pointed out this morning, questions of verification and compliance are inevitably interrelated with aspects concerning scope as well as other parts of a future treaty on a nuclear test ban. This mandate will permit a more logical consideration of the entire issue. Those who claim that the Working Group was unable last year to fulfil its mandate are the ones who refuse to answer specific questions directed to them. If, as they claim, the questions of verification and compliance must take into account a whole host of political and technical factors, then it stands to reason that we should have a mandate for the Working Group which enables it to do so. The best way this can be done is to charge the Working Group with the task of negotiating a treaty on a nuclear test ban in all its aspects.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of India for his statement and for the well-deserved word of thanks to the outgoing Chairman and his generous wishes of goodwill to the present Chairman. The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Mexico, Mrs. Gonzalez y Reynero.

Mrs. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Since this is the first time that my delegation is taking the floor in the month of April, Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin by saying how pleased my delegation is to see you presiding over our work. We should like to express our conviction that your great knowledge of the subject and your diplomatic experience will enable you to bring the work of our Committee during the spring part of its session to a successful conclusion. At the same time I should like to reiterate our congratulations to Ambassador Skalli of Morocco on the brilliant and effective way in which he guided our work during the month of March.

(Mrs. Gonzalez y Reynero, Mexico)

The position of the delegation of Mexico on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests is well known. We have been stating it for many years, both in the First Committee of the General Assembly and in the negotiating bodies which preceded the Committee on Disarmament, as well as in the Committee itself.

I shall confine myself to saying that our position has not changed and that it will be that position which will inspire the "proposals" and "initiatives" which the Mexican delegation may present to the Ad Hoc Working Group, as suggested in the last paragraph of the mandate adopted for 1982.

My delegation's position regarding the question of "verification", which is given priority in the Group's mandate, is also well known. That position in essence coincides with the views expressed by no less a person that the United Nations Secretary-General as long ago as in 1972 when, speaking to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, he said the following:

> "I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement ...
>
> "When one takes into account the existing means of verification ..., it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban.
>
> "... the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests."

It is thus obvious that my delegation made a huge concession in agreeing to that mandate, and this we only did, as the head of my delegation said in the statement he made at the Committee's 173rd meeting on 21 April 1982, because the mandate itself states: "The ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session", and "The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard".

The Ad Hoc Working Group was given a very limited mandate which did not allow it to draft a treaty. We consider that that mandate has been exhausted and my delegation has therefore urged and will continue to urge that it should be revised so that the Working Group can conduct negotiations towards the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Lastly, I should like to express the hope that the Superpower whose future attitude on this question will, in our view, be decisive, will show the necessary flexibility and adopt a position on the substance of the matter that is in accordance with the undertakings it assumed in the 1963 and 1968 Treaties and with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions on the subject which were adopted with its affirmative vote, as for example, resolutions 32/78 of 12 December 1977, 33/60 of 14 December 1978 and 34/73 of 11 December 1979.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming Chairmen. I now call upon the distinguished representative of Brazil, Mr. Duarte, to take the floor.

Mr. DUARTE (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, the head of my delegation will have the occasion to welcome you to the Chair of the Committee. Let me on this occasion simply pledge to you the complete co-operation of the delegation of Brazil and I would like also, through you, to thank Ambassador Skalli for the untiring and very successful efforts that he displayed during his tenure of the chairmanship.

The position of the Brazilian delegation on the question of a nuclear test ban and particularly on the need for urgent multilateral negotiations on a treaty to prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions is well known to this Committee. I shall therefore refrain from a detailed statement and simply make a few remarks relevant to the current debate on the mandate of the Working Group established under item 1 of our agenda.

Brazil entirely agrees with the stand taken by the Group of 21 on this issue. The group position has been set forth on several occasions in a number of official documents of the Committee. My delegation intends to continue working constructively to achieve the start of multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This endeavour includes, naturally, the establishment of adequate and effective machinery for the conduct of such negotiations within the Committee. The mandate proposed by the Group of 21 would, in our view, enable the Committee on Disarmament to discharge fully its responsibilities in this regard.

We consider the present mandate of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban as too narrow and as too short a step in the direction of the solution of a question that has been thoroughly discussed by the international community as well as in closed quarters for more than 25 years now. But we do not share the view that the present mandate of the Working Group completely precludes the subsidiary body from undertaking any useful work. It is obvious that the Working Group could be immensely more productive were it allowed to begin forthwith negotiations on a treaty text. There is more than enough material available, including the "Basic provisions" recently submitted by the Soviet Union. We look forward to the presentation by the Swedish delegation of the revised version of the draft treaty it submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We also note, in this connection, the statement made this morning by the representative of the United States, Mr. Busby, that his delegation does not have "any ulterior motives of avoiding reference to or discussion of other aspects of a test ban". All delegations thus concur that the Working Group's activities need not be confined in a straitjacket.

My delegation still hopes, however, that those who insist on treating a nuclear test ban as a long-term goal will abide by the formal consensus in which they participated together with all Members of the United Nations, and which they reaffirmed last July, on the utmost urgency and priority of this issue. We also urge these countries to reflect more profoundly on the binding commitments they have freely undertaken in international instruments towards the speedy negotiation of a comprehensive test ban, and to give more serious thought to the consequences that their hesitation and reluctance in fulfilling such commitments may have upon the future of multilateral disarmament negotiations, particularly in the nuclear field.

The resumption of the activity of the Working Group, under the leadership of Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, should in no way hamper the effort toward the revision of its mandate, as contained in the decision taken by the Committee last week. My delegation trusts that under your own guidance, Sir,

(Mr. Duarte, Brazil)

this effort will be strongly pursued, in accordance with the stated wish of the majority of the members of this Committee, both this morning and now in the afternoon. Some suggestions have been made at this meeting that my delegation is sure will be pursued and taken up later. By the same token, however, the revision process entrusted to you should not serve as a pretext for preventing the Working Group from getting on immediately with the substantive task at hand, in all its aspects, even with its present mandate. My delegation believes that speedy progress in the Working Group's discussions can at least be conducive to progress towards what is this Committee's almost unanimous desire, the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of priority. We earnestly call upon those who still stand in the way of that goal to join all other members of the Committee on Disarmament, and for that matter the remainder of the international community, in that endeavour.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Brazil, Mr. Duarte, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming Chairmen. There are three more speakers on the Chairman's list and I am now pleased to call on Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom to take the floor. You have the floor.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin by welcoming you warmly to the Chair of the Committee for the month of April. At the same time I should like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Skalli, for whose hard work in solving our procedural problems we are all grateful.

I welcome this opportunity to put the views of my delegation on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban on record. In doing so I shall only go into the substance of the matter in so far as it is necessary in relation to the question of whether the mandate should be changed. But my delegation will be ready to enter into substance once the Working Group reconvenes.

In a statement on 14 September 1982 my predecessor, Mr. Summerhayes, summarized the view we took of the work which had been done in the nuclear test-ban Working Group during the summer session. Since that time my delegation has made further references to the nuclear test ban, in my statement of 8 February and in that made by the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Hurd, on 10 March. In his statement, Mr. Summerhayes said that the British delegation believed that the mandate of the Group was clear and precise, and that it would enable us "to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress towards a nuclear test ban".

The British delegation was fully aware that the mandate represented a compromise between differing viewpoints as to the possibility of beginning negotiations on this subject at that time, and that it was not considered satisfactory by a number of delegations. Nevertheless, it seemed to offer a chance of progress, because it concentrated on that issue which had always proved a stumbling-block to the successful completion of negotiations in this field, the question of verification. It had been our hope that delegations would, in spite of the limitations that they saw in the mandate, be prepared to co-operate during the summer session of 1982 in a detailed examination of the issues described in it. This hope remained

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

unfulfilled, not least because of the unwillingness of some delegations to agree, for reasons which we still cannot understand, to the simple work programme which the Chairman proposed. Nevertheless, in spite of this procedural, and largely artificial difficulty, the summer session was not wasted. If nothing else, it showed us how different were the viewpoints of many members of the Committee and the amount of work which remains to be done to harmonize them.

It seems to my delegation that it would be difficult for anyone who has read the Working Group's report to claim that the mandate has been exhausted; the differences of view exposed in the report are only too clear. If further illustration is needed, it has been given today by delegations which have repeated familiar substantive arguments which we do not accept. Nor is it correct to suggest that there was any understanding between delegations that the mandate would be revised this year.

Let me mention a few of the differences of view that became apparent in the Working Group. It has been claimed that the mandate is too restrictive. My delegation have never believed that this is so. It has been claimed that the mandate must be enlarged to allow us to consider the scope of the treaty. We would say that if we are to discuss verification, we must begin by deciding what it is we are going to verify. If some delegations want to say that is discussing the scope, we have no objection; but we do not need to change the mandate to do it. We suggested last year that we avoid getting bogged down on this point by making an assumption that we should verify the absence of all nuclear explosions. But it quickly became apparent that a fundamental difference of view existed between delegations on this subject. These differences have again become apparent in our debate today. We believe that to try to reconcile these viewpoints is a matter of primary importance. It is one thing if we have to construct for ourselves a verification mechanism to ensure that no nuclear explosions are occurring anywhere. But it is quite another problem to ensure that nuclear explosions described by their authors as peaceful do not in fact provide a military advantage to those carrying them out. This does not seem to my delegation to be a peripheral issue. If other delegations have ideas how such verification might be possible, let them tell us. We see no problem in discussing this issue within the framework of the present mandate.

There was also discussion in the Working Group of verification using seismic methods. There was a general agreement on the need for a world-wide system of seismic stations with an international exchange of data, but not on many points of detail. The Working Group did not complete its examination of the characteristics of the system and its technical capabilities. It did not agree on the need for the use of modern methods of data exchange, nor on whether such a system should be set up before or after a treaty enters into force. My delegation had hoped that the spring meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts would help us to resolve some of these problems, but we are all aware of the attitude taken by some delegations at that meeting and of the procedural problems that hampered the Group's work. Other aspects of verification, for example, the need for more systematic measurement of airborne radioactivity, were hardly touched upon in the Working Group; nor were questions relating to on-site inspection, nor was the role of a consultative committee considered in detail. This is by no means to say

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

that we wish to confine the Group to technical discussion, as has been alleged by some delegations; but we cannot see how we can make progress without a clear agreement on the technical foundations of our work.

Given the evidence of the Working Group report, we cannot see how it can reasonably be argued that the Working Group has fulfilled its mandate. We also fail to see how widening the mandate would help in resolving outstanding issues. The mandate already covers those key issues on which we must agree if we are to make progress towards a nuclear test-ban treaty. We are not convinced when delegations claim that all technical problems have been overcome, whatever authority they may quote; and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the object of some delegations in making such claims is to avoid any detailed discussion of matters which may not support their thesis. If some delegations fear that the mandate might be used to exclude consideration of proposals they have made or might make, let me assure them this is not the intention of my delegation. We are fully prepared to consider all proposals and to interpret the mandate as flexibly as possible to meet the wishes and concerns of all delegations.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Cromartie for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and the incoming Chairmen, and is now pleased to call on the distinguished representative of Burma, Ambassador Maung Maung Gyi , to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to take this opportunity to express our felicitations to you on your assumption of the chairmanship for this month and it is our earnest hope that we will be able to settle the remaining issues of a procedural nature under your able guidance. I should also like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Skalli of Morocco for the important contribution he has made in overcoming significant issues of a procedural nature which have a bearing on the substantive part of our work, which have proved to be more difficult to resolve this year than has usually been the case. Today my delegation proposes to join other delegations in the discussions concerning consideration of the mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, an issue which is crucial to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and which therefore deserves foremost priority as its solution is inextricably linked to the consideration of item 2 of our agenda. It may be recalled that the majority of delegations, including my delegation, have during the past several years proposed the setting up of an ad hoc working group and it was only during last year's session that the Committee was able to set up a Working Group whose mandate, we feel, falls far short of what is required, which is to conduct negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

In accepting this limited mandate, and despite its shortcomings, my delegation, like many other delegations, entertained the hope that this would permit the beginning of a process towards the initiation of substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, bearing in mind that this Committee is a multilateral negotiating body and that whatever work we do here, particularly in the working groups, should reflect its negotiating character.

(Mr. Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

Therefore in our consideration of the mandate it would be pertinent to ask ourselves whether it would permit the Committee to fulfil its essential functions. The first question is, does the mandate contain elements that would make it possible for the Ad Hoc Working Group to consider this issue in a substantive manner in order to facilitate negotiations on a test ban? In my delegation's view, the discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group during last year on the subject of verification and compliance were of a general and unstructured character, for the element of negotiation is missing from the mandate. Secondly, in drawing up a mandate we should ask ourselves whether we are dealing with it in a way that will not restrict or circumscribe consideration of the subject by confining it to certain aspects of the issue only or preclude consideration of other equally important and related matters. If we take account of these essential principles, I think we should be able to draw up a mandate that will not inhibit the effective functioning of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

In the text of the decision adopted last year by the Committee relating to the establishment of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban (document CD/291), due account was taken of the need to review the mandate, for the third paragraph of the decision, inter alia, states: "The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard". It is obvious to my delegation from this sentence that the mandate we adopted last year clearly recognized the need for a review of that mandate before the Ad Hoc Working Group begins its work this year.

In undertaking such a review we do not need to search very far, for United Nations General Assembly resolution 37/73 entitled, "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty", and in particular its paragraph 7, should serve us as guidelines. The text of paragraph 7 reads as follows:

> "Requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue the consideration of these issues and to take the necessary steps to initiate substantive negotiations in order that the draft of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date".

There is an interrelationship between the work we do in this Committee and the deliberations in the General Assembly which together form an integrated process of disarmament negotiations. The decisions reached by the General Assembly in its resolutions should serve as a mandate to guide us in our work, and it is with this thought in mind that I have referred to the General Assembly resolution quoted above.

At this morning's plenary meeting some delegations expressed concern that consideration of a more effective mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group would hamper our work and that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue its work under its former mandate. In this connection, we might recall that many delegations, in accepting last year's mandate, showed a flexibility of approach despite the fact that they considered that mandate to be inadequate for the purpose of negotiations. It therefore appears to my delegation that what is now required of all of us is to recognize the need for the formulation of an effective mandate that will enable us to conduct real negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Maung Maung Gyi for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the Chairmen for the months of March and April. I now call on the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, to take the floor. You have the floor.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I had not intended to make a statement today on the subject of a nuclear test ban, but the discussion has to a large extent centred around the experience of the Ad Hoc Working Group of which I had the honour of being the Chairman last year. Before I start my comments, which necessarily are of an impromptu character, I wish to express my best wishes to you, Mr. Chairman, on your assumption of the chairmanship for this month. I hope this will be a very busy month, busy in a productive sense, and I am confident that you will use your experience and skills to make it possible for us to accomplish a maximum of results.

Likewise I wish most warmly to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, on his success in leading us, through his unrelenting efforts as well as admirable tact and ingenuity, out of the morass of procedural issues.

As to the question of a nuclear test ban, I assume that the position of my Government is well known. At the previous session of the United Nations General Assembly we went as far as to co-operate in the elaboration of both the major resolutions on a comprehensive test ban, because we wanted to use the opinion-building resources of the world Organization to the maximum extent possible. The Swedish delegation has already this year expressed its great disappointment that a comprehensive test ban treaty seemingly is out of reach for the foreseeable future. It is, of course, the prerogative of each Government to build its policy upon its own national security considerations. Still, my Government regrets that the nuclear-weapon Powers do not sufficiently see the danger that the rest of the world is exposed to, because of the ongoing senseless nuclear arms race. The peace demonstrations in the past few days in countries where the right of free expression of one's opinion exists and where such public manifestations take place freely and without Government direction bear witness to the fact that this concern is very widely felt.

As to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group, my delegation already last year expressed its dissatisfaction. My delegation will give strong support to proposals which aim at providing the Ad Hoc Working Group with full power to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty, such as the mandate proposed by the Group of 21.

As regards the accomplishments of the Ad Hoc Working Group last year, it is not for me, as its Chairman, to make an assessment. I have with interest listened to what others have said on that subject. However, I want to state that of the short time that the Working Group had at its disposal, too much was devoted to the procedural discussion. I am clearly disappointed that the work plan proposed by the Chair could not be accepted, although it was elaborated in order to meet all demands with equity. I cannot hide my conviction that insistence on procedural points is hardly compatible with a true sense of urgency to get to grips with the substantive issues. As to this year's work of the Ad Hoc Working Group, I want to assure the Committee of my delegation's profound interest in seeing it devote all its time to the substantive issues. I am confident that my successor, Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, with his skill and experience, will accomplish his task successfully.

My delegation's preference clearly goes to a widened mandate. Until that can be achieved, I have noted with interest the statement of Mr. Busby this morning to the effect that his delegation views the language of the present mandate rather broadly and that "in so far as any delegation holds a national position on particular issues which affects its own view of verification and compliance, then it should bring these views forward and discuss that relationship. We will have no objection". Indeed, my delegation will take that opportunity and present its views on the entirety of the issues connected with a CTBT. I can confirm that it is my Government's intention to submit a draft treaty on the subject, most probably at the beginning of the summer part of our session. We hope it will be considered as a useful contribution to the work of the Committee and consequently speed up the achievement of a CTBT, whether the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group this year remains the same as last year or, as my delegation hopes, it is

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, for his statement and for the kind words addressed both to Ambassador Ali Skalli and to myself. I now call upon the last speaker on today's list, the distinguished Ambassador of Italy, Ambassador Alessi, whom I now invite to take the floor.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, it is with particular pleasure that I greet the accession to the chairmanship of the eminent representative of a friendly country. I am certain that under the guidance of a skilled and experienced diplomat like yourself the Committee will be able to resume its work on questions of substance with vigour and achieve the progress we all hope for.

I should also like to associate myself with the sincere expressions of thanks which you yourself, Mr. Chairman, and the speakers who have preceded me have addressed to your predecessor, Ambassador Skalli, for the tireless, intelligent and effective ways in which he guided the Committee with such success through the difficult problems of procedure.

As a party to the non-proliferation Treaty since 1969, Italy is anxious to see the conclusion of an agreement which will prohibit nuclear tests for all time and in all environments.

We believe that such a treaty would be a key element in international efforts designed to bring under control the proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, of nuclear weapons. Italy, which voted for resolution 37/73 adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, is also aware of the urgency of the need to negotiate a test-ban treaty likely to win the widest possible adherence among the members of the international community.

We are aware of the link that exists between a comprehensive test ban and the process of negotiation on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. The former would acquire its full importance within the framework of a genuine process of nuclear disarmament, and given a real prospect of a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals. However, its unique value as a measure designed to prevent proliferation, as well as the special political significance it has acquired in the eyes of the international community in the course of the years, commend it for priority action.

The decision adopted last year to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group on item 1 of our agenda provided the Committee with an appropriate framework for a consideration of the substance of this issue. That was an important achievement which had long been sought. It was accompanied by the adoption of a mandate whose content, while not satisfying everyone, was the fruit of difficult negotiations. For the purposes of the examination of substance we are called upon to undertake in the Working Group, the limits of that mandate ought not to be exaggerated. A broad interpretation of its terms -- an interpretation which was accepted by all delegations participating in the work and which was reiterated at the beginning of today's meeting -- in practice allows a meaningful discussion of all aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In any case, questions relating to verification and compliance are of crucial importance. It was not without reason that a large part of the statement of Ambassador Issraelyan on 17 February last, on the subject of a comprehensive test ban, was devoted to questions of verification. The same applies to the statement made on 22 March last by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The discussion we have had at this meeting proves that the mandate agreed on last year still today constitutes a realistic reflection of the lowest common denominator existing among the members of the Committee. The mandate -- it is true -- is not a mandate to negotiate. While it is to be regretted that the political conditions do not at present exist for such a mandate, we ought nevertheless not to underestimate the importance of the work that can be done under the present mandate. This work will in any case have to be done. And we earnestly hope that under the chairmanship of Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, which we welcome, and with the co-operation of all delegations, it will be possible to achieve progress.

In conclusion I should like to say that although I understand the reasons why some delegations say that they are not satisfied with the present mandate and want it to be broadened, I do not, on the other hand, see the force of the arguments of those who base their demand for a broader mandate on the claim that the present mandate was exhausted during the 1982 session. The fact is that, despite the laudable and tenacious efforts of Ambassador Lidgard, the Chairman of the Working Group last year, no real start was made on fulfilling that mandate. We earnestly hope that that can be done as soon as possible and that the present session will give us an opportunity for useful and constructive work.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Alessi for his statement and for the kind words addressed both to the outgoing and the incoming Chairmen. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this meeting?

Then, as Chairman, I can only gather from the statements made today that the main subject of discussion, that is, the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, has not led to a consensus for a revision of the mandate of that working group. However, we have now received a new draft mandate from the socialist group of countries and that, as well as the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21, will be the subject of informal consultations. There are a number of other subjects which lend themselves particularly to informal consultations. The Chair would, however, prefer to give an opportunity to the various groups to meet among themselves before taking up contacts with the co-ordinators to come to an agreement on the dates and form of informal consultations.

Many speakers have underlined rightly that my distinguished colleague Ambassador Skalli has, by solving a number of procedural problems, laid the foundation for this Committee now to start work on the substance of its mandate and the Chair will, of course, do its utmost to make this possible, being only too well aware of the fact that it owes a vote of thanks to the outgoing Chairman for having provided this opportunity. It is also obvious that since we have spent nearly two months largely on procedural matters, although not entirely, the month of April is likely to be a busy one, and I think today's proceedings have amply borne out that we do need a fair amount of time to get something substantive done. I would therefore like to appeal to all delegations to observe, as far as is reasonably possible, the hours set for meetings, so that particularly those delegates who not only have functions to fulfil in the sphere of disarmament but also have obligations of another character are not too much hampered in fixing their daily schedule of work. If there are no further remarks to the Chair, the next meeting, the 210th plenary meeting, will take place on Thursday, 7 April at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.210
7 April 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 7 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. van Dongen (Netherlands)

GE.83-60832

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. J.C. CARASALES
	Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
Australia:	Mr. R. STEELE
	Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
	Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. TELLALOV
	Mr. B. GRINDBERG
	Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Burma:	U TIN KYAW HLAING
	U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
	Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN
	Miss C. de VARENNES
China:	Mr. LI LYUE
	Mr. TIAN JIN
	Mrs. GE YUYUN
Cuba:	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. A. CIMA
	Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN
	Mr. A.M. ABBAS
Ethiopia:	Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
	Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
	Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER
	Mr. H. THIELICKE
	Mr. M. NOTZEL
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. H. WEGENER
	Mr. F. ELBE
	Mr. W. ROHR
Hungary:	Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI
	Mrs. P. RAMADHAN
	Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
	Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
Iran:	Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI
Italy:	Mr. C.M. OLIVA
	Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI
	Mr. M. KONISHI
	Mr. K. TANAKA
Kenya:	Mr. D.C.C. DON NANJIRA
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. BOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI

Netherlands:	Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
	Mr. J. RAMAKER
	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Nigeria:	Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
	Miss I.E.C. UKEJE
Pakistan:	Mr. T. ALTAF
Peru:	Mr. V. ROJAS
Poland:	Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. T. MELESCANU
	Mr. L. TOADER
Sri Lanka	Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Sweden:	Mr. C. LIDGARD
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mrs. I. SUNDBERG
	Mrs. A.M. LAU-ERIKSSON
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
	Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
	Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mr. B.P. NOBLE
	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT
United States of America:	Mr. M. BUSBY
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Mr. W. HECKROTTE
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
	Mr. R. MIKULAK
	Mr. J. HOGAN
	Mr. J. MARTIN
Venezuela:	Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER
	Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Zaire:	Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA
Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. R. JAIPAL
Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 210th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 3 of its agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and Romania.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, please allow me to associate myself warmly with those members of the Committee who have addressed you in the past few days in your capacity as our new Chairman, expressing gratification about your assumption of this high Office. I would also like to pay tribute to Ambassador Skalli for his exceptional performance during the month of March.

I would like to inform the Committee very briefly that the Federal Republic of Germany is depositing today with two of the depositary Governments its instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, thus becoming a contracting party to this universal disarmament agreement. The German Bundestag voted unanimously in this sense on 10 December 1982. At the same time, the Bundestag ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. The instrument of ratification of the ENMOD Convention will shortly be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

It would be an exaggeration to say that the Federal Republic of Germany has been among the early birds in ratifying these two important world-wide treaties. However, some internal legal hurdles had to be removed before the ratification procedure could be set in motion. The Federal Government has pursued the internal legal process with diligence, and now to good effect. I am pleased that my country is now on a par with the many members of the international community who are already parties to the two agreements. As regards the bacteriological weapons Convention, and the rationale of my Government in ratifying this measure, I would like to draw the attention of delegations to the statement in document CD/372. This document is now before you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.

I would like to use this opportunity to add a few remarks on the comprehensive discussion which the Committee held last Tuesday on the future activities and terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. My delegation did not participate in that debate, but listened with particular attention. In the two days that have elapsed since that thorough review, we have all had an occasion to reflect upon the wealth of arguments then proffered. In the view of my delegation, that precious exchange of views, in spite of the existing divergencies, justifies a number of forward-looking conclusions. While I admit that my summary may be somewhat subjective, let me recall the following points:

All delegations showed their firm determination to continue the substantive work of the nuclear test ban Working Group in a constructive spirit. They look forward to a well-structured debate, to be launched in the remaining weeks of our present session and to continue throughout the summer.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

There was widespread agreement that every effort should be deployed to prepare, through substantive work, the essential prerequisites for a future comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It has become clearer than heretofore that the existing mandate of the Group, couched as it is in broad terms, permits a far-ranging debate on all essential issues relating to a future treaty. While the existing mandate places particular emphasis on verification issues, delegations have agreed that all technical and political issues arising in that connection need to be, and can be, considered in their context. My delegation would like to welcome particularly the relevant passages of the statements by the United Kingdom and United States delegations. They made it clear that their preference for the existing mandate in no way implies an attempt to curtail our debate artificially, to the detriment of other important related aspects of our work.

Our debate also testified to the broad range of problems that are in reality still before us, problems which the brief span of our working period last year did not allow us to cover.

I have also inferred from the debate that the existing mandate would offer ample authority to deal substantively with all existing and future proposals in whatever form they have come or may come before this Committee.

In sum, our debate of Tuesday last seems to indicate very strongly that the political will to advance in our work with the existing procedural tools is now present. We should use it fully. In commending specifically the delegations of Brazil and Sweden for their wise and pragmatic statements, my delegation would like to appeal to all other delegations which have so far had difficulties in associating themselves with the further work of the Group under the present terms of reference to set aside their ultimate preferences for a reformulated mandate. There is sufficient work on hand. We should now embark upon it. Such a pragmatic approach, in view of the tasks before us, should be of particular value to the new Chairman of the Group, Ambassador Herder, who will need every support he can obtain to bring his assignment as a Chairman to speedy success. We wish him well on this path.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chairman thanks Ambassador Wegener for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen. The Chair now calls on the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu.

Mr. DATCU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me, on behalf of the Romanian delegation, to congratulate you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April. I am personally all the more pleased to see you in the Chair in that you are the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, a country with which Romania maintains relations of friendly co-operation, and at the same time a long-standing colleague whose professional and personal

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

qualities are well known. I am convinced that under your chairmanship the Committee will be able to make the progress we all hope for. I should also like to mention the efforts made by your predecessor, Ambassador Ali Skalli, the distinguished representative of Morocco, thanks to whose qualities, which we all greatly appreciate, the month of March was marked by achievements which were an encouragement to our Committee. I should like to assure Ambassador Skalli of the very great gratitude of the Romanian delegation.

In my statement today I should like to make some comments on the subject which appears in the Committee's programme of work for today, namely, Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons — the subject you yourself mentioned when you opened today's meeting.

In the view of the Romanian delegation, there are few items on the Committee's agenda which can rival this one in urgency. The present extremely difficult situation, which is constantly worsening, in the world in general and more particularly in Europe, where the great majority of weapons and almost all nuclear weapons are concentrated, is of the utmost concern to the Romanian people and Government, as to other countries on this continent. For, notwithstanding all the weapons that are in Europe, there is a danger of the deployment there of new nuclear missiles and the replacement of those already there by improved missiles. This once more underlines the urgency and immediacy that our discussions on the subject of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon countries should have. In the first place, there is the existence of huge arsenals whose destructive capacity can only be described as one of "overkill"; these arsenals constitute, in the words of the nuclear physicist and Nobel Prize-winner Niels Bohr, "a perpetual menace to human society". The "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" (document A/35/392) points out in its paragraph 492 that the explosive power now existing is the equivalent of more than three tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on earth. I will not go on quoting facts which have so often been reiterated in this Committee.

Secondly, in spite of the magnitude of the nuclear arsenals already existing, we are now witnessing developments and attitudes foreshadowing the grave danger of the occurrence in Europe of a qualitatively and quantitatively new stage in the nuclear arms race, in particular as regards intermediate-range missiles. My country and other countries of Europe attach such importance to these developments, which are also the subject of the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations taking place in Geneva and of recent public statements, because they directly affect the national security of every country on the continent, whether it is a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization or of NATO, or whether it is a neutral or a non-aligned country.

Lastly, it is urgently necessary to adopt measures to increase the security of non-nuclear-weapon States because these countries are confronted by an immense danger which they are powerless to influence in any way, as they are powerless to protect themselves against the devastating effects which a nuclear conflict would have on the billigerents and their civilian populations and also the peoples of neutral countries, for example, in Europe. In that connection, the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on nuclear weapons emphasizes that:

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

"Even if the balance of deterrence was an entirely stable phenomenon, there are strong moral and political arguments against a continued reliance on this balance. It is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security." (Document A/35/392, paragraph 497)

The international community has solemnly recognized the urgency of the need to increase the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the validity and importance of which were reaffirmed by the General Assembly at its second special session, states in its paragraph 20 that "it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems have been achieved ...".

Since its inception, the Committee on Disarmament has attached priority importance to this subject; furthermore, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances was the first working group to be established. In the Group's special report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, covering the substantive negotiations since 1979, the conclusion reached here by consensus was that "non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". The report also stressed the "urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, especially in view of the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament".

In spite of these conclusions and recommendations that were unanimously adopted, the work of the Committee has shown no noticeable advance in this connection. In fact what has happened has been rather the contrary. Yet there has been no lack of concrete proposals on this subject. Allow me to recall some of them: document CD/10, containing a draft convention submitted by Pakistan; document CD/23, containing a draft international convention submitted by the USSR; document CD/27, submitted by the United States of America, concerning a recommendation by the Committee to the United Nations General Assembly; document CD/75, submitted by Finland; document CD/120 containing a possible draft resolution for adoption by the United Nations Security Council as an interim measure in the sphere of security assurances, submitted by the delegation of Pakistan; document CD/153 submitted by Bulgaria on this sublect; document CD/177, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom; documents CD/207 and CD/278 submitted by China on the question of security assurances; document CD/321, containing an extension by France of its assurance not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, and the draft resolutions for the Security Council put forward in the Ad Hoc Working Group by the delegations of the Netherlands and Pakistan. In addition to all these, there have been many proposals put forward at plenary meetings of the Committee and in the Ad Hoc Working Group by many other delegations, including the Romanian delegation. This is an impressive list of proposals, but unfortunately it has not proved possible up to now to adopt any one of this wealth of ideas and initiatives. On the contrary, the work on this high-priority item has reached an impasse. As the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, said in the statement he made on 21 April 1982 (document CD/290):

"There is consensus that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that agreement on this item should be reached urgently. However, the evident divergence in the perceptions of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States continues to persist. And, although many of the issues involved have been clarified, the Working Group has been unable to fulfil its mandate."

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

This state of affairs places the Committee before its responsibilities in this matter. Furthermore, it seems to us obvious that merely going on discussing the subject as we have done in the past will lead us nowhere but where we have been before. The Romanian delegation therefore believes that the first task of the Working Group should be a frank and open exchange of views, with all the necessary sense of responsibility and political will, on concrete possibilities of action, on practical measures that could be undertaken in order to increase, in present conditions, the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The ever-increasing danger looming over these States makes this course of action extremely urgent.

We believe that the first objective of such a debate should be the conclusion of an international convention containing an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States never and in no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or force in general against States not possessing nuclear weapons.

The conclusion that such a convention is not acceptable to certain countries at the present time in no way exonerates the Working Group or our Committee from responsibility for exploring other possibilities.

On the contrary, within the framework of our flexible mandate, which refers to "effective international arrangements", we ought to consider any other measure capable of increasing the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Such arrangements, in the Romanian delegation's view, could include a set of measures ranging from the outlawing and destruction of nuclear weapons, and the prohibition of their use in general or of their first use, to the establishment of denuclearized zones with respect to which the nuclear-weapon powers undertake not to use their atomic arsenals. Other ideas, too, could be taken into consideration, such as those put forward by the Palme Commission in its report "Common Security", among them the establishment of zones free of tactical nuclear weapons, measures designed to increase nuclear withdrawal and to reduce the pressures towards the precipitate use of nuclear weapons, and substantial reductions in all categories of intermediate and short-range nuclear weapons.

The growing nuclear dangers, particularly in Europe, where there is increasing talk of the deadly game of nuclear weapons, and as well as the impasse in the negotiations on the subject of negative security assurances, have resulted, of late, in more and more attention being paid to the proposals for the denuclearization of certain regions and subregions, particularly on the continent of Europe. What is the explanation for this renewed interest in the idea of denuclearized zones? In the first place, we believe that it arises from the very understanding of the fact that, because of its complexity, disarmament must be seen as a gradual and long-term process in which limited and partial measures, both simple and complex, are more than necessary. Regional denuclearization commends itself as such a measure, in so far as it does not directly and immediately affect one of the most complicated components of disarmament, namely, the strategic arsenals of the major nuclear-weapon powers. Regional denuclearization presents fewer technical problems from this point of view and depends to a large extent on the political will of the countries directly concerned, as well, of course, as of the major powers.

There is also a current factor contributing to the increased interest in and urgency of the establishment of denuclearized zones. That is the acceleration of the arms race in the sphere of tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, together with changes in strategic thinking tending to make the inconceivable conceivable, namely, the limited use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

In these circumstances, it is more and more clearly in the interests of small and medium-sized countries to try to, let us say, disconnect their security from the nuclear danger.

Our colleagues will no doubt remember that Romania has always actively supported all proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world. We were among the first warmly to greet the success secured in Latin America through the Treaty of Tlatelolco. My country has consistently advocated the institution of an international military denuclearization regime in the zone in which we are situated geographically, the Balkans, ever since 10 September 1957, the date on which the head of the Romanian Government sent messages to the heads of Governments of the countries in the zone proposing an international conference on the subject. Recently — only a few days ago — Mr. Nicolae Ceaușescu, the President of Romania, in his message to the seventh summit meeting of the non-aligned countries, held in New Delhi, stated: "We are in favour of the establishment of denuclearized zones as an important part of the achievement of security in Europe, and we are making constant efforts to ensure co-operation and confidence in the Balkans and the conversion of this region into a zone of good neighbourliness and peaceful co-operation, without nuclear weapons and without foreign military bases".

In Romania's view, agreements for the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons should meet certain basic requirements, including the following: (a) they should provide equal security assurances for all the countries of the zone on the basis of a solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those countries and to respect the denuclearized zone status; (b) they should not restrict the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in any way but should, on the contrary, guarantee all States, on a footing of equality and without any discrimination, unlimited rights and possibilities as regards research in this sphere and the use of the achievements of nuclear science for their development; (c) they should provide for a clear and fair system of verification, based on the principle of the equality of States; (d) such zones should be seen as an integral part of a coherent system of measures designed to lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We have today dwelt on certain aspects of the establishment of denuclearized zones because of the importance attaching to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States within the broad framework of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on that subject (document A/10027/Add.1) states that one of the principal objectives of the establishment of denuclearized zones is to increase the security of the States comprising it. Some of the experts who took part in the drafting of that report pointed out in its paragraph 115 that the provision of formal assurances by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the States forming part of the zone was an essential factor for the effectiveness of the zone.

It is for these reasons that the Romanian delegation believes that in the consideration of approaches that might help us make progress in our negotiations on the subject of security assurances, the important experience represented by the denuclearized zones ought not to be forgotten. That experience could guide and encourage our joint efforts. I am thinking, of course, both of the experience of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone established in Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the other denuclearized territories and also of the many suggestions and proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been put forward. We believe that a comparative study of these from the point of view of negative security assurances could give us new ideas and perhaps offer new solutions and new possibilities as regards the subject of our concerns: the devising of effective international arrangements to increase the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Datcu for his contribution and for the words of appreciation addressed to the Chairman for the month of March and the good wishes addressed to the Chairman for the month of April.

This concludes the list of speakers for today. Is there any other member who wishes to take the floor?

If such is not the case I should like to announce that I have requested the Secretariat to circulate a time-table for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The time-table has, I believe, been distributed. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and may be adjusted as we proceed. Members may have noticed that there is some time available in the time-table for either informal meetings or informal consultations, particularly on Tuesday afternoon and Thursday afternoon. I intend to approach members to ascertain their views on how best to use the time available to us. If there is no objection, can the Chair consider that the Committee adopts the time-table?

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): I do not have any objection to the time-table, I merely wanted to say that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons will hold its first meeting, mainly for organizational purposes, tomorrow, and as a consequence of the decisions which may be taken at that meeting the time-table may have to be slightly amended as regards the work of the radiological weapons Group.

If I may, I would like to use this occasion to say, as well, that the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons tomorrow, will also give the opportunity to delegates to make statements of a more general character.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, our 209th plenary meeting, on Tuesday last, was devoted especially to a discussion of the question of the revision of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

During that meeting, the representatives of 19 States members of the Committee spoke, offering their views and proposals on the activity of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and its mandate.

The representative of India proposed a formulation for the Working Group's mandate which was based on document CD/181 of the Group of 21.

The delegation of Mongolia, acting as co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries and on its own behalf, submitted a new draft text for the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban (Working Paper No. 95).

At the end of my statement on 5 April I asked you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the group of socialist countries, to conduct consultations in the Committee on the draft mandate as soon as possible so that the Committee could take a decision on it very soon.

So far as I know, no consultations on this question have so far been held in the Committee.

In view of the urgency of the need for the Committee to work out a mandate for the nuclear test-ban Working Group, and in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament and our established practice, we should like again

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

to draw your attention, Mr. Chairman, to the need for the immediate holding of appropriate consultations on the draft mandate so that a decision can be taken on it as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his contribution. I may perhaps, before proposing the formal adoption of the time-table for next week, reassure the distinguished representative of Mongolia that it was the intention of the Chair, immediately after this meeting, to consult with the co-ordinators of the various groups on a number of outstanding issues which particularly lend themselves to informal consultations, and I can assure Ambassador Erdembileg that the topic he mentioned is one of the items which I had in mind to discuss in that framework, when, hopefully, we shall be able to reach agreement on the way of dealing with that matter.

If there are no further comments on the proposed time-table, may the Chair take it that it can be adopted?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In the same framework, at the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I should like to announce that the chemical weapons Working Group will meet in Conference Room V for both meetings scheduled next week.

Members will recall that at its 197th plenary meeting, held on 24 February, the Committee took note of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/348. Owing to an inadvertent omission, the Committee has not yet approved the suggestion of the Ad Hoc Group to the effect that it should hold its next meeting from 11 to 22 July 1983.

If there is no objection to this suggestion, may the Chair take it that this suggestion is now formally approved?

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (USSR) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask you to defer the adoption of a decision on that question until the Committee's next plenary meeting, to be held on Tuesday, 12 April.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall, then, defer this decision until the next plenary meeting at the request of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union.

It then only remains for me to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 12 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.211
12 April 1983

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 12 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. van Dongen (Netherlands)

GE.83-60356

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. J.C. CARASALES
	Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
Australia:	Mr. R. STEELE
	Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
	Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. TELLALOV
	Mr. B. GRINBERG
	Mr. P. POPCHEV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
	U TIN KYAW HLAING
	U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
	Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN
	Miss C. de VARENNES
China:	Mr. LI LYUE
	Mr. TIAN JIN
	Mrs. GE YUYUN
Cuba:	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. A. CIMA
	Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN
	Mr. A.M. ABBAS
	Miss BASSIM
Ethiopia:	Mr. T. TERREFE
	Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
	Mr. F. YOHANNES
France:	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
	Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE
	Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER
	Mr. H. THIELICKE
	Mr. M. NOTZEL
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. H. WEGENER
	Mr. F. ELBE
	Mr. W. ROHR
Hungary:	Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
	Mr. N. WISNOEMERTI
	Mrs. P. RAMADHAN
	Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
Iran:	Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI
Italy:	Mr. M. ALESSI
	Mr. C.M. OLIVA
	Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI
	Mr. M. KONISHI
	Mr. K. TANAKA
Kenya:	Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. BOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Netherlands:	Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
	Mr. J. RAMAKER
	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Nigeria:	Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
	Miss I.E.C. UKEJE
Pakistan:	Mr. T. ALTAF
Peru:	Mr. V. ROJAS
Poland:	Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
	Mr. J. VIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. T. MELESCANU
	Mr. L. TAODER
Sri Lanka:	Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Sweden:	Mr. C. LIDGARD
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mr. I. SUNDBERG
	Mrs. A.M. LAU-ERIKSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
	Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
	Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
United Kingdom:	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mr. B.P. NOBLE
	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT
United States of America:	Mr. L. FIELDS
	Mrs. M. BUSBY
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Mr. W. HECKROTTE
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
	Mr. R. MIKULAK
	Mr. J. HOGAN
	Mr. J. MARTIN
	Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Venezuela:	Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER
	Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Yugoslavia:	Mr. K. VIDAS
	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Zaire:	Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA
Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. R. JAIPAL
Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 211th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee starts today its consideration of item 5 of its agenda, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". As usual, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so, as provided for in rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

Before we start with our business for today, I wish to inform the Committee that as a result of consultations with the co-ordinators of the groups and the delegation of China, the Chair has come to the conclusion that it may be useful immediately after this plenary meeting to hold an informal meeting to consider some outstanding organizational questions. If there is no objection, I shall take it that you agree.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Indonesia.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic belongs to the overwhelming majority of countries which consider the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament matters of uppermost priority. Today, when the world has been forced to enter a qualitatively new stage of the nuclear arms race and the old concept of the policy of force is being revived, it is only the effective solution of these priority matters that can ensure the preservation of peace. There is a clear universal recognition of this fact. As the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Gustáv Husák, put it in his statement of 1 January 1983: "Peace, which is a basic condition for the safe work and life of the peoples, is seriously endangered. The reactionary forces of imperialism, first of all in the United States and in some of its NATO allies, have stepped up their aggressive policy and undermined the basis for peaceful relations between States. Peoples all over the world realize with urgency that the policy of a feverish arms build-up and confrontation advanced by these forces increases the danger of a world catastrophe".

As the 1960s gave way to the 1970s, an approximate parity between the United States and the Soviet Union was achieved. This fact was at that time universally acknowledged, also by the United States of America. In the first half of the 1970s, a number of Soviet-American agreements based on the existing balance was achieved, which raised hopes for permanent good relations among States.

Regrettably, the 1970s also witnessed negative developments. The more the United States-USSR negotiations brought concrete and tangible results, the more the military-industrial complex in the United States mobilized its forces against the agreements achieved, which culminated in the refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty. At the same time, the build-up of the United States nuclear arsenal continued unabated. Disquieting was the fact that new programmes were based largely, not only on a sharp increase in the number of nuclear weapons but also on their substantial qualitative improvement. Thus, through the 1970s the delivery vehicles for American nuclear weapons factually doubled delivery capability. The accuracy of nuclear weapons was also considerably increased. 550 Minuteman 3 ICBMs with triple warheads were put into service and 496 Poseidon C3 SLBMs armed with 10 to 14 warheads were installed on 31 nuclear-powered missile submarines. Additional "improvements" were undertaken,

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e.g. the warhead yield was increased, the missile silos were hardened, etc. The SRAM system introduced into the strategic bomber force multiplied several times the quantity of missiles the strategic as well as medium-range bombers could deliver. One should mention also the continued hectic development throughout the 1970s of new weapon systems which today represent a very real and definite danger, be it strategic cruise missiles, MX ICBMs, new types of SLBMs or strategic bombers.

The "strategic programme" for the 1980s, announced by President Reagan in October 1981, is indeed "impressive". By 1986 a first-strike weapon — the MX ICBM — should be deployed. A smaller and more mobile intercontinental ballistic missile to succeed MX by the end of the decade is also planned. Trident 1, apparently deemed not good enough for a first-strike attack, will eventually be replaced by Trident 2, a missile with practically as good a performance as the MX. 1986 should also witness the introduction of a sophisticated strategic bomber developed on the basis of the B-1, capable of carrying up to 30 cruise missiles. During the next decade, more than 20,000 nuclear warheads are to be produced in the United States.

There are also other aspects of the continuous arms build-up in the United States and in some of its NATO allies. The plan to deploy 572 new American missiles in some West European countries is one of the most dangerous. Those who are basically acquainted with the technical characteristics of the cruise missiles and the Pershing 2s, need not ask about the intentions of their masters.

Of extreme importance is the fact that these missiles, while technically of medium range would, in fact, be of strategic importance since they could reach targets deep into the territory of the USSR. The destabilizing effects caused by their deployment would thus be considerable. Unfortunately, recent developments show that the United States still sticks to its unacceptable, one-sided proposals.

The initiative to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war was raised by the Soviet Union at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly with the adoption of the Declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. But I think it is safe to say that this initiative was neither invented nor unilaterally introduced. Rather, it has been imposed on us by those who create concepts of limited and protracted nuclear war, who seek first-strike nuclear capability, who request more and more resources to boost and refine nuclear weapons in order to support their major aim, which also many West Europeans — as recent polls clearly indicate — rightly see as the protection and expansion of American business and investments in the world.

And so hardly a day passes without terrifying accounts of the developments of new, still more destructive nuclear weapons, of new concepts and doctrines which have aggression as their common denominator.

Just a few days ago we were informed about the ambitious plans of President Reagan to explore the possibilities of building a strategic defence system based in space. Our generation should not worry — this should be a long-term plan which can only be realized decades from now. It's a nice perspective: we are promised an arms race, extended into outer space, and also extended well into the future millennium.

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We are also being told that this plan would not violate the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972, since this Treaty allegedly bans the deployment of ABM systems but not their development. However, article V of the said Treaty is clear enough. Its first part reads as follows: "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, space-based, or mobile land based".

Any activity aimed at developing defence systems would be in sharp contradiction with the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the construction of a system of defensive nuclear weapons, paralleled by a substantial strengthening of the strategic offensive potential, has nothing defensive in itself. It may only serve the purpose of creating possibilities for the first-strike attack through, expectedly, substantially reducing the retaliatory capabilities of the other side. Let us briefly note that while President Reagan spoke of defensive systems, a member of his cabinet, Caspar Weinberger, advanced the directive referred to as Fiscal Year 1985-1989 Defense Guidance. In this directive the Secretary of Defense, and I quote the International Herald Tribune of 23 March, "instructed the military services to integrate plans for employing medium- and long-range nuclear weapons to enable them to fight a war more effectively".

What makes the problem of the prevention of nuclear war so urgent today is the fact that the United States has definitely rejected the notion of strategic parity with the Soviet Union, that it has forgotten all its commitments to work for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and that it has launched a quest for the achievement of an over-all military superiority.

The socialist countries have not only made it very clear, recently in document CD/355, why they consider the prevention of nuclear war a matter of the utmost priority but they have also pointed out some specific areas which could be discussed with the aim of adopting the necessary practical arrangements.

While we discussed our agenda for this year, some delegations ventured to remind us that we should seek not only the prevention of nuclear but also of conventional war, or, as it was said, war in general. I should like to make a point of clarification in this regard. My country, owing to its geographical position in the centre of Europe, has been directly involved throughout the centuries in numerous wars, including the two world wars. Our people have experienced all the horrors of war and we certainly need no persuasion to speak against war, be it nuclear or conventional. We are ready to participate actively in the elaboration of any measures which could effectively prevent all armed conflicts and exclude any war from international life.

But we can by no means agree with the view that efforts to prevent nuclear war must be conditioned by a rather unclear approach to the prevention of war in general. This is neither realistic nor constructive. Sticking to it would merely amount to blocking all efforts aimed at lessening the nuclear threat. We

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would tend to agree with Professor John Somerville of the University of New York City, who says: "The first thing that must be understood about nuclear war is that it is not war ... What we are dealing with is, first of all, a massive case of linguistic self-deception which arises out of the fact that we have gone on using an old and familiar word-war to denote a new thing that has a superficial resemblance to the old thing called war, but which in reality has been transformed into something qualitatively different".

No doubt there are matters related to the prevention of nuclear war. Since the use of nuclear weapons would also represent a use of force, the non-use of force in relations between States is a matter which is closely related to the prevention of nuclear war. All States Members of the United Nations are called upon, by the United Nations Charter, to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations".

The conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, as proposed by the socialist countries, would, owing to its universal participation, create a solid barrier against the use both of nuclear and of conventional weapons. We do not think that, as it is sometimes argued, the conclusion of legally binding international treaties on the non-use of force would weaken the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter or would, in any way, be superfluous. On the contrary, it would strengthen the notion of non-use by committing States in unequivocal, clear-cut terms. It would also eliminate any grounds for differing interpretations applied with regard to the United Nations Charter.

The global approach to the problem of the non-use of force could also be complemented by regional measures. The socialist countries have advanced proposals of that nature as well. At the recent meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Prague, the members of this alliance turned to the member States of NATO with a proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations. I would like particularly to emphasize here that the core of the treaty could be the mutual commitment of the member States of both alliances not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional arms against one another, and thus not to be the first to use against one another military force in general. This commitment would apply to the territory of all States which would be a party to the treaty, as well as to their military and civilian personnel, ships, aircraft and space-craft and other facilities belonging to them, wherever they may be.

It is desirable that the commitment on the renunciation of the use of military force should be supplemented in the treaty with a commitment to conduct talks in a spirit of goodwill on effective measures to halt the arms race and to limit and

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reduce armaments and on disarmament, and to help by other available means towards the successful conclusion of these talks with the aim of achieving practical results at them.

We consider it regrettable that so far no NATO country has responded to this proposal. It is surprising, since what we have proposed concerns the non-first-use of both nuclear and conventional weapons. When we discussed on earlier occasions various aspects of nuclear disarmament and when we proposed the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, our NATO partners spoke of the necessity of taking into account also the possibility of the use of conventional weapons. Since the WTO is a defensive alliance, we found it possible to propose the non-first-use of both nuclear and conventional weapons. What is the reaction of the NATO countries? So far they keep on studying it. One wonders whether all previous arguments calling for consideration of the "conventional aspect" of the problem were not used mainly in order to decline any serious discussion on the non-use of nuclear weapons and on nuclear disarmament.

The Czechoslovak delegation believes that the prevention of nuclear war could be ensured only through the adoption of specific, clear-cut commitments on the part of all nuclear-weapon States. An excellent example of such a commitment is that by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons announced at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

As far as related matters are concerned, we are far from underestimating their importance. We are studying carefully document CD/357 submitted recently by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany. No doubt this document deserves further thorough study. After the first reading it seems to us, however, that the paper does not point out clearly enough the major measures to be taken for the prevention of nuclear war. Rather, it deals with the subject on such a broad basis that the purpose of the prevention of nuclear war becomes rather obscure in it. We also miss an active role envisaged for the Committee on Disarmament.

Our concern is that given the complicated and dangerous state of international relations we simply cannot rely merely on different kinds of related matters or on technical means of communication and warning. This approach could only give us some more time to escape nuclear war, but hardly to effectively prevent it.

I would like to reiterate the readiness of my delegation to work actively towards the achievement of effective measures aimed at the prevention of nuclear war. We would continue to support the creation of a working body with a mandate to undertake the relevant specific negotiations. Though we see the present situation as dangerous and complicated, we are far from being fatalists. As we stated in the Prague Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization:

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"The States represented at the session are convinced that no matter how complicated the situation in the world may be, possibilities still exist for overcoming the present dangerous stage in international relations. The present course of events must and can be halted and diverted in a direction which would be in harmony with the aspirations of mankind.

"Towards this end, the socialist countries, whose commitment to peace emanates from the very essence of their social system, are laying on the scale of peace all their international authority as well as their political and economic potential."

Permit me now, Mr. Chairman, to draw the attention of delegations to document CD/373 submitted by my delegation. It contains extracts from the communiqué issued last Thursday at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which met in Prague.

The meeting paid special attention to the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe. The WTO countries supported the idea of a complete elimination from Europe of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons, and reiterated their readiness to work effectively for the achievement of this aim. They also supported firmly, as a large step in this direction, the radical reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The ministers of foreign affairs recalled the relevant proposals contained in the Prague Declaration and especially the Soviet proposals of 21 December of last year. The WTO member States expect a constructive answer to these proposals so that a positive agreement can be achieved at the Geneva negotiations. The problem of the medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe must be solved in a way that would exclude the deployment of new American medium-range missiles and that would ensure the preservation of a military-strategic balance on ever lower levels.

The ministers of foreign affairs also considered measures aimed at the realization of the important common initiative of the Political Consultative Committee contained in the Prague Declaration on the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations between the member States of the WTO and NATO. It was noted that this proposal, as was shown during contacts and consultations, had met with great attention in many countries — on the level of governments as well as within political and public circles. The hope was expressed that the NATO countries — to which this proposal was addressed and which are still studying it — would react to it constructively. The participants in the meeting also reiterated their readiness to discuss this proposal and to exchange views on its various aspects with all interested countries. This applies mainly to the content and the scope of possible commitments under the proposed treaty, their relationship to existing commitments under the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and other bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. Co-operation for the ensurance of compliance with the obligations under the treaty could also be discussed.

The communiqué issued by the meeting of the foreign ministers of the WTO member States deals also with the initiatives of the socialist countries concerning the reduction of military expenditures, the freeing of Europe from chemical weapons and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe.

All the proposals I have mentioned here are concrete and clear. Each of them is accompanied by a readiness on the part of the socialist countries to engage in specific negotiations. We therefore commend document CD/373 to the attention of all delegations.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, this is my first statement in plenary since your assumption of the Chair and I wish personally to supplement the remarks made on behalf of my delegation by Mr. Busby on 5 April. As you know, we have close ties, not only as representatives of countries which have long and cordial relations, but as individuals whose careers have intersected over the years. I recall most pleasurably both the occasion -- when fortunate circumstances found you in Washington -- of my swearing in as Ambassador in the State Department, and the luncheon which we co-hosted on the occasion of the bicentennial of the establishment of friendly relations between our countries. So it is a special pleasure for me to see you discharging the vital leadership of our Committee as we seek progress in our work in the closing month of our spring session, and let me renew the commitment of the United States delegation to be of every assistance and encouragement.

May I also pay my personal respects to your distinguished predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Ali Skalli of Morocco. His able leadership has won the respect of us all and his deft diplomacy led our Committee out of a most regrettable impasse which literally halted our substantive work. His important efforts have set the stage for the progress which we know will be made under your leadership.

I take the floor today to speak on the subject of chemical weapons.

My delegation is gratified by the positive interest shown in our document (CD/343) containing detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban. We have had fruitful and constructive informal exchanges with many delegations and have welcomed the questions of our colleagues. We have tried to respond promptly and clearly to such questions in whatever forum they were asked.

At the plenary meeting on 29 March we were pleased to have several thoughtful and serious questions put to my delegation by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas. Such interest in our paper is deeply appreciated and deserves an equally serious response, which I am pleased to provide today.

The United States holds the view that riot-control agents and herbicides should not be covered by this convention. Let me say at the outset that, although we hold this view, our objective is not to retain an option for waging chemical warfare with such chemicals. We ruled this out years ago. This fact is certainly well known. Most importantly, we do not see that including these chemicals in a ban on development, production, stockpiling and transfer would promote the ultimate objective of preventing their use in combat. In contrast to the military nerve gases, for example,

(Mr. Fields, United States)

herbicides are not developed, produced, or stockpiled for chemical weapons purposes but can easily be obtained through commercial channels. In fact, military forces may well have substantial quantities of herbicides readily available for vegetation control at bases, a perfectly legitimate purpose. Commercial spraying equipment, such as spray aircraft, can be quickly requisitioned. Quite probably, a State could be in full compliance with a provision banning the development, production and stockpiling of herbicides for chemical weapons purposes and yet be able to use herbicides for prohibited purposes within a few days.

A similar situation exists for riot-control agents. In many countries, military and paramilitary forces are equipped with substantial amounts of such agents for the purposes of maintaining internal order. We do not see how a provision against the development, production, and stockpiling of riot-control agents for military purposes could be effective in preventing their use for prohibited purposes when the substances are already available in significant quantities for permitted purposes.

Ambassador Vidas also dealt with the permitted transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes. It is well known that many countries use small quantities of such chemicals for research purposes to develop protection against chemical attack. In many cases the State obtains the necessary chemicals from an ally, rather than producing the chemical itself. It seems desirable to permit such arrangements to continue once a treaty comes into force. A ban on small-scale transfers could have the clearly undesirable effect of encouraging many States to set up production facilities in order to have super-toxic chemicals for protective research purposes. Of course, transfers should be permitted only under appropriate controls, which necessarily can apply only to parties. Thus, we can agree that even small-scale transfers to non-parties should be banned.

The proposed limit of 100 grams is a nominal one for purposes of discussion. We would welcome comments as to whether it is reasonable or not.

We have also been asked to clarify our understanding of the term "permitted purposes" as used in our document. This is a very broad term which covers industrial, agricultural, research, medical and other peaceful purposes, law enforcement purposes and protective purposes, as well as military purposes -- such as the use of chemicals as rocket fuels -- which are not related to chemical weapons. The one-ton limit would apply specifically to super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes, a legitimate activity which is closely related to chemical weapons. Again, one ton is an approximate figure for discussion purposes. We believe the one-ton limit is low enough to preclude waging chemical warfare on any militarily significant scale. In assessing whether it is reasonable, it should be kept in mind that one ton is a ceiling, not a quota. States should be required to justify whatever amount they used, even small quantities. Also, the one-ton figure is an aggregate for all super-toxic lethal chemicals used for protective purposes.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

The Yugoslav delegation also asked if in our view the proposed preparatory commission would continue working without interruption until the treaty entered into force, whether this occurred quickly or only after some time. Our hope is that the preparatory commission would be able to complete promptly the tasks assigned to it by the convention. But certainly it should work as long as necessary. As a legal matter, it would exist until the consultative committee was established, shortly after the entry into force of the convention.

A question was raised regarding the relationship between the fact-finding panel and the consultative committee. Our suggestion is that the fact-finding panel should be a subordinate body to the consultative committee, established for the specific purpose of looking into compliance questions. The intent is that the depositary would be involved only as the chairman of the consultative committee. In this regard, we would note that we simply assumed that, as in the case of the ENMOD Convention, the depositary should be the chairman of the consultative committee.

With regard to our views on any confidence-building measures beyond those mentioned in our paper, the subject has certainly not been exhaustively treated. Constructive suggestions have already been made by the delegation of Sweden and many others. We have an open mind on the question and would welcome further ideas from our colleagues.

It has been noted that national technical means are not mentioned in the United States paper. To our way of thinking, it was not necessary to include such a reference. Of course, States will continue to acquire information using whatever national technical means are available to them. But such means are not accessible to many States and, in any case, are hopelessly inadequate for verification of a ban such as is envisaged in this convention. The principal means for verification must be international in nature to ensure effectiveness and political acceptability and to inspire confidence.

Finally, Ambassador Vidas raised the question whether the provisions for international co-operation would include the field of toxicology. My delegation feels this would be entirely appropriate. Knowledge of the toxic effects of chemicals is becoming increasingly important.

I hope I have been successful in clarifying our position in response to the questions put by our Yugoslav colleagues and others. We hope that by doing so we have facilitated negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We look forward to similar clarifications from other delegations. Only if delegations clearly explain their views on the key issues shall we be able to move fruitfully ahead.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Fields for his contribution, for the well deserved words of praise addressed to the Chairman for the month of March, Ambassador Skalli, and for the warm wishes addressed to himself. May I now call on the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan?

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation today intends to refer once again to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Like other delegations we, of course, very much regret that at least two months of work have been lost and that the good start made in its work at the beginning of this year by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons under the guidance of Ambassador Sujka of Poland was not appropriately followed up.

As to the Soviet delegation, it has not wasted its time during this enforced break. The USSR delegation has submitted a number of new proposals on key issues of the future convention at plenary meetings of the Committee. In addition to that, in March we conducted intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations on various aspects of the complicated chemical disarmament problem. The main conclusion we have reached from these consultations is that progress in the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is entirely possible. A large number of questions was put to us, to which we tried to give exhaustive answers. We, for our part, put questions to our colleagues which were of interest to us. In addition, all those taking part in those consultations made interesting comments and observations, which will, we believe, help towards mutual understanding.

In this connection we would like to express our gratitude to the delegations which took part in the consultations. This, of course, includes the delegation of the Netherlands, with which also we held consultations, and we should like, through you, Mr. Chairman, to convey our gratitude to the head of the Netherlands delegation.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its work a few days ago. First of all, the Soviet delegation wishes to congratulate Ambassador McPhail of Canada on his appointment as Chairman of this Group, and wishes him success. We should also like to make a few general comments on the Group's work.

We endorse a great deal of what Ambassador McPhail said in his interesting statement at the meeting of the Working Group on 6 April and in general the optimistic and business-like tone of his statement. We could go even further in expressing optimism. We continue to believe that the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons could be successfully completed this year.

What is our view of the general content and character of the future negotiations in the Working Group? It would of course be possible to choose the easy path and concentrate all the attention of the Working Group on questions on which there is a coincidence or similarity of positions. In fact, there is a large number of such questions, including many key, basic issues affecting the future convention. If we were to put agreed wordings on these issues on paper, we could blow the trumpets announcing to the world our great success and keeping quiet about those serious differences which continue to exist. Such an approach would rather delude world public opinion and would hardly contribute to the speedy conclusion of the negotiations.

But we could also go to the other extreme. We could concentrate all attention on the problems on which there are differences between us, including secondary ones, amplify and exaggerate them, gamble on them and thus lead all our work to a deadlock. Perhaps some are pursuing these goals, but certainly not the Soviet Union delegation. We are resolutely opposed to such an approach and will not follow this line.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We should go along the tested road of international negotiations. On the one hand, we should agree upon, formulate and draft those provisions, and first and foremost the key provisions relating to the general scope of the convention, the necessary definitions, verification and other subjects, on which there is a coincidence or similarity of positions. On the other hand, in close connection with this work, we should continue intensive negotiations in order to find the solutions to the problems on which there are still differences. We believe that the recording of similar positions on the key problems should keep ahead of the phase of finding solutions to unsolved questions. I will explain this idea. For example, what is the need to conduct negotiations on specific methods of conducting international on-site verifications of the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, on the basis of quotas or the drawing of lots or on any other basis, if there is no recorded agreement, even of a preliminary nature, on the mandatory conduct of systematic international on-site verifications of the destruction of stockpiles and on the method to be used? To be brief, we wish to construct the building starting from its foundation and not from the roof.

Now I would like to touch upon the comments on our proposals and the observations made by various delegations both at plenary and at other meetings. We shall also reply to the questions addressed to the Soviet delegation.

Our agreement with the proposal of a number of non-aligned and neutral States to include in the future convention a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons in general met with a positive response in the Committee. Some delegations at the same time stressed the need to be cautious so as not to prejudice the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We fully share this view and believe, like the delegations of Indonesia, Sweden and of many other countries, that the task is not merely to avoid unfavourable consequences for the Geneva Protocol, and in particular not to allow a limitation of the general scope of the prohibition in it, which covers also bacteriological weapons, but to make the regime of non-use of chemical weapons established by it even stronger, more reliable and more universal.

The Soviet delegation wishes the future convention to provide a regime of the non-use of chemical weapons that is unique and strictly mandatory for all States and based on the idea that there can be no justification for the use of chemical weapons either in war, in military conflicts or as a first or retaliatory strike, with the use of the completely prohibited supertoxic chemicals or the so-called "other lethal chemicals" which are and will always be produced in huge quantities for peaceful purposes.

Together with an agreement on the use, within the framework of the convention, of the verification machinery for the verification of compliance with the provision on the non-use of chemical weapons also, this would lead to a substantial strengthening of the non-use regime, and we believe that it should be our main goal.

The delegations of the United States and France have spoken here in favour of a "provisional" solution of the problem of verification of non-use based on resolution 37/98 D of the United Nations General Assembly. We believe that the earliest possible conclusion of the convention would be the most effective and complete guarantee of the non-use of chemical weapons. Proceeding from this premise, it is necessary to make every effort in order to speed up the elaboration

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of the convention, avoiding actions which might complicate the negotiations. By proposing the verification of compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the resolution enlarges the obligations of the States parties through a vote in the United Nations, with the participation also of States which were not signatories of the Protocol. We have already noted that slightly more than half of the States parties to the Geneva Protocol voted in favour of the resolution. Thus, a dangerous precedent could be created of the revision of an international agreement without taking into account and contrary to the opinions of a significant number of the parties to it. Such a practice would be in flagrant contradiction with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of international treaties, and in particular with article 39 thereof, which allows the amendment of a treaty only on the basis of an agreement between the parties.

That is why the Soviet Union will not take part in the implementation of the above mentioned resolution and we have stated so recently to the United Nations Secretary-General. We appeal to every delegation to think about the negative consequences that would result from an attempt to impose the solution of disarmament problems through a majority of votes.

I shall now pass on to another question. A number of the Committee's members put questions on the Soviet proposal for a renunciation, by the States parties to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, of the production of methyl-phosphorus bond compounds. We were asked whether such a decision is really necessary, whether it might not be harmful to progress in the sphere of the peaceful chemical industry in the distant future, and what is the point of such an action if there are other chemicals which are also used for chemical weapons production.

Unfortunately I cannot, in the present statement, reply in detail to these and similar questions. That will be done in the Working Group. For the moment I will make some general observations on our approach.

A number of delegations in the Committee believe that even after the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons enters into force, every State will in effect be entitled, if it so wishes, to produce supertoxic lethal chemicals and any other chemicals, including those capable of being the key precursors for chemical weapons, as well as particularly dangerous organophosphorus compounds with the methyl-phosphorus bond, provided that States intend to use them all, not for arms production but for peaceful purposes. We have been told that such facilities will be declared and be subject to verification -- to verification by the drawing of lots, what is more.

In this event, apparently, the sword of Damocles would be hanging over any declared facility in the form of the possibility of its becoming unexpectedly subject to verification. But this requires as a minimum that all such facilities be really declared, both those producing and those capable of producing such chemicals. If we follow this way proposed by some delegations, then the lists of the declared facilities will contain hundreds or even thousands of facilities of kinds various, both large and small, and the element of chance in the carrying out of verification by the drawing of lots will be so great that the potential violator of the convention is hardly likely to be disturbed by such a method. I do not even have to say that such a system, whereby the special lists would contain almost all chemical enterprises, might cause them to be discredited in the eyes of the consumers of their products. Thus the proposed approach is very complicated, vulnerable and, what is more, ineffective.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As far as our approach is concerned, it narrows down the range of the industrial facilities capable of producing any supertoxic lethal chemicals, as well as those chemicals -- "key precursors" (with the methyl-phosphorus bond) which are the most dangerous from the point of view of their use for chemical weapons production, practically to a single special facility in any State party. Regardless whether 30 kg or 300 kg of such chemicals are needed, they should be produced at the special facility subject to systematic international on-site verifications by quota, and nowhere else. The detection of the production of these chemicals by other enterprises on the basis of verification by challenge would prove the violation of the convention.

Now I come to the questions of distinguished Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia addressed to us on 29 March.

The delegation of Yugoslavia was interested in whether according to the Soviet position, facilities for filling chemical weapons should be eliminated or dismantled and enterprises producing the chemical weapons should be closed immediately after the convention enters into force. Naturally, our reply to both questions is positive.

One thing should be explained however. The verification procedure proposed by the USSR for the closing and elimination or dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities, as well as the timing for their declaration considerably differ from the approach contained, for example, in the "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban" and in the statement by the United States delegation in the Committee on 17 March, upon which we shall dwell in greater detail in the Working Group.

The delegation of Yugoslavia requested us to explain our position on specialized facilities for the permitted production of supertoxic lethal chemicals.

The Soviet Union believes that the upper limit of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes, i.e. for industry, agriculture, research, medicine and any other peaceful purposes, for the purpose of protection from chemical weapons as well as for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons, should be one metric ton for any State party. This means that the total quantity of such chemicals produced at the special facility, transferred from stockpiles or acquired in some other way every year or at the disposal of the State party at any moment should not go beyond this limit. It may be less, be only a part of this amount, but it should not be superior to it at any time. Taking into account all these features of our position, the one-ton limit does not seem to us to be too high.

Finally, the delegation of Yugoslavia was interested in how the Soviet Union understands the verification of a justified request on a voluntary basis. We confirm that we see this form of verification as universal and one which could be used especially for the verification of the non-production of chemicals for chemical weapons at commercial enterprises. As to the verification of the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

destruction of stockpiles, we believe that its main form will be systematic international on-site verifications on the basis of an agreed quota at a transformed or special destruction facility.

The decision of the State in the case of a request for verification by challenge will depend, to a large extent, on the nature of the request, the specific circumstances which provoked it, and so on. The request should be prompted by the real interests of compliance with the convention by all States, and not by any other reasons; it should be justified. It is only natural that a completely unjustified request submitted on the basis of considerations which are far removed from the convention's purposes will be met accordingly. Let us be realistic and ask ourselves — can we demand from a State to which a request is addressed that it should accept verification automatically? That would mean that verification could cover any enterprise which has nothing to do with the production of chemicals for the purposes of chemical warfare but which, let us say, is directly connected with military production, for example, the production of missile fuel, explosives, various types of armaments, military equipment, etc., since at present chemistry is used everywhere. Those who state that they are ready automatically to permit an international on-site verification in response to any request, even if unjustified, are demagogues. We have no doubt about it.

It is sometimes said that the Soviet Union, in proposing the prohibition of the production of methyl-phosphorus bond compounds at commercial enterprises, wishes to exclude the entire commercial industry from the scope of verification under the convention. Of course, this is a flagrant distortion of our position. We in no way eliminate the problem of the verification of the so-called key precursors. We are in favour of the elaboration of criteria and definitions for such precursors and the setting up of appropriate lists on the basis of these. We believe that the States parties to the convention should annually submit information on the precursors included in these lists that they have produced, acquired, retained or used for permitted purposes. We in no way eliminate, either, the question of the verification of chemicals which are particularly dangerous from the point of view of their possible diversion for purposes connected with the use of chemical weapons. We propose a similar approach to them. In both cases the system of on-site verification on the basis of a justified request could be applied.

Distinguished delegates, the Soviet delegation would now like to make some general comments on the prospects for the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Committee is on the eve of the decisive stage of the negotiations aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Of course, a lot will depend on the proper organization of the negotiations, on the time allocated for them, on the activity of all delegations and on other questions. But in the final analysis, success will be determined not by these factors but by the readiness of every delegation to search for mutually acceptable solutions and compromises, to display flexibility. It will also depend on whether attempts will continue to be made artificially to heat up the atmosphere at the negotiations and to turn them into an arena for various political speculations, or whether a business-like situation will prevail.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In this context I should like to draw your attention to the following. Since 7 July 1980, when the USSR and the United States submitted to the Committee their "Joint report" (document CD/112), the Soviet Union has repeatedly improved its approaches to certain aspects of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, come out with various initiatives, meeting half-way the other participants in the negotiations, including the Western countries, in order to achieve an early agreement. It is enough to recall that the Soviet Union, while believing that for the purposes of verification, national forms of verification, national technical means and international on-site verification on the basis of a justified request are adequate, nevertheless agreed that the verification of the destruction of stocks and of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes should be conducted on the basis of mandatory international on-site verifications. Quite recently, we agreed with the position of the non-aligned countries on the inclusion of a provision on the non-use of chemical weapons in the convention.

And what has happened during this time to the United States approach to the key questions of the prohibition of chemical weapons? Using as a cover the allegations invented by them in respect of the USSR and other socialist countries, the United States has moved away from some of its earlier positions, has toughened them, in particular on questions of verification, etc. Such a movement does not inspire great optimism, but on the contrary leads to the sad conclusion that what we are dealing with is no more than another political game. We cannot leave out of our reckonings the fact that chemical weapons have an important role to play in the Pentagon's plans for the next decade. Various American statesmen have said a great deal about this in recent times.

We also pay attention to the fact that sometimes proposals are put forward in the Committee which are known to be unacceptable to us and which in some cases have a quite unrealistic and demagogic character. Sometimes differences appear as if from nowhere, based simply, it seems, on a lack of desire to take into account the opinion of the other side. This happened recently when the tasks of contact group C were defined within the framework of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, when, in spite of the objections of the entire group of socialist countries, it was considered possible again to put forward an unacceptable range of such tasks at the Group's meeting on 11 April. There are also in the Committee those who are in favour of a method of negotiating with the Soviet Union which offers no prospects at all — the method of putting pressure on it. They believe that the greater the pressure on the Soviet Union, the greater are the chances for an agreement. This is a profound delusion. It was very convincingly stated by the USSR Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, at his press conference on 2 April.

We call upon all delegations and in the first instance the United States delegation to embark upon honest, constructive negotiations taking into account the mutual interests of the sides. Only such negotiations can lead to success. The Soviet delegation, at any rate, will resolutely follow such an approach to the negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Issraelyan for his contribution and, acting with the utmost speed, upon Ambassador Issraelyan's request, has already transmitted his kind words of thanks to the Netherlands delegation. The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Indonesia, Mr. Darmosutanto, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. DARMOSUTANTO (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, this is also the first time that my delegation is taking the floor within the term of your chairmanship. Ambassador Sutresna reserves the right to congratulate you, on behalf of our delegation, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April. In his absence, allow me to extend to you my warmest felicitations and likewise to assure you that my delegation will co-operate with you fully in the discharge of your duties. It is indeed fortunate that the Committee on Disarmament has as its Chairman a person of your wide and skilful diplomatic experience to preside over its deliberations during a period which is generally expected to be the first substantive month of its work for the 1983 session.

Your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Ali Skalli of Morocco, likewise deserves our sincere appreciation for the exemplary manner in which he successfully guided the Committee in its complicated search for a solution on the organizational aspects of our work. We owe largely to him the stage in which the Committee finds itself today.

The world is still witnessing a senseless and a very dangerous escalation of the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, and the total lack of meaningful negotiations on the halting and reversing of the arms race. The threat of a nuclear war due to accident, miscalculation or an act of strategy continues to persist. Technological innovations in the military sector are running ahead of the process of achieving meaningful disarmament agreements. An added impetus to the momentum of the former by one side, in the context of worsening relations between the Superpowers, would undoubtedly evoke a similar, if not identical reaction by the other side, the end-result of which would be that the latter will continue to be on the losing side. World military spending has risen continuously in recent years. Concurrently, the politico-strategic and the socio-economic contexts of the world situation have also deteriorated.

These distressing developments have led to an ever stronger demand by the world community, in particular the non-nuclear-weapon States, for concrete measures to reverse the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race. Successive declarations of non-aligned countries have reiterated the demand of the peoples and governments of the world for the redress of this otherwise more dangerous trend. At their recent summit meeting, these countries stated in the New Delhi Message, inter alia, that there has to be "an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens the well-being not only of humanity in our times but of future generations as well".

Permit me to address myself today to item 3 of our agenda: Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this context, my delegation cannot but first of all repeat its well-known position stated on earlier occasions in this Committee. Indonesia, being a non-nuclear-weapon State, considers that the most effective guarantee for the non-nuclear-weapon States is the complete prohibition of the production and use of nuclear weapons followed by their destruction, including a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing in all environments. Realizing that perhaps in the near future this most effective guarantee will remain regrettably unattainable, my country is of the view that an assurance, in a legally binding international instrument, of not resorting to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States is indeed of an imperative nature. The

(Mr. Darmosutanto, Indonesia)

demand for a credible and legally binding assurance on the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States has to be seen in the context that the existence of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat also to the security and survival of these States. These non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced their rights to acquire these deadly weapons of mass destruction have by that act made a significant contribution to curbing the proliferation of these weapons, and are therefore entitled to guarantees that these weapons will not be used against them under any circumstances. Subsequent appeals in this negotiating forum to the nuclear-weapon Powers calling upon them to accommodate the non-nuclear-weapon Powers by reviewing their policies and presenting revised positions have so far failed to evoke a positive response.

It seems an irony that while there has been so much talk among nuclear-weapon States about the so-called balance or parity between them, the common realization that nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war and that they are instruments of mass annihilation has not prompted some nuclear-weapon States adequately to meet the request by non-nuclear-weapon States for a credible guarantee for their being non-nuclear. Such a guarantee after all, as was stated by the distinguished representative of Pakistan on 15 February 1983, can only reinforce the resolve of these States to maintain their non-nuclear status.

That being said, my delegation is prepared to join other delegations which remain receptive to any indication of a desire on the part of the concerned nuclear-weapon States to resume serious negotiations in a constructive and fruitful manner. Security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through a multilateral legally binding instrument have long been overdue. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States will have to be a matter of urgent concern to all particularly the countries which possess such weapons, which in no way requires an interim measure or other preconditions. My delegation has on past occasions voiced its considerable difficulty as regards an interim approach. We are of the opinion that if such an approach were agreed upon, then the assurances to be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States sought from nuclear-weapon States by means of an international legally binding instrument, being the crux of the issue, would be even more difficult to negotiate. This in no way questions the competence of the Security Council in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security, within the context of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, but a Security Council resolution, in our view, will not constitute such an effective guarantee, since it does not provide a legally binding assurance. My delegation is hopeful that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, will be enabled to resume its substantive work during the summer session of the Committee.

It seems to have been argued in some quarters that non-nuclear-weapon States are not being realistic in their demands. Such an argument, in the view of my delegation, is indeed unfounded. Most of those States have adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty out of their conviction that the emergence of more nuclear-weapon States is tantamount to further endangering peace and security the world over. It hardly needs to be over-emphasized that persistent pronouncements to the effect that nuclear deterrence has maintained peace might eventually be interpreted as an inducement to non-nuclear-weapon States to go nuclear, if they also want to have peace and security in their respective regions.

(Mr. Darmosutanto, Indonesia)

I do not think that such an assumption is in the minds of the protagonists of nuclear deterrence, for after all, non-proliferation is essentially a concept of their own making. But I am afraid that the objective of the prevention of horizontal proliferation might be jeopardized if the obligation on the part of nuclear-weapon States to prevent vertical proliferation by adopting concrete measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race remains unfulfilled.

True to their words, the non-aligned countries have shown by real, concrete actions that they are committed to the achievement of nuclear disarmament measures. The case in point, among many others, is the nuclear-weapon-free zone. They have unequivocally stated their desire to establish such a zone in their respective regions. It is noteworthy that the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at their Seventh Conference, held in New Delhi recently, affirmed in paragraph 31 of their Political Declaration that "the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constituted an important disarmament measure. The establishment of such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons."

In this connection, it is to be recalled that the ASEAN States in 1971 declared the region of south-east Asia a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN). The Personal Representative of the President of the Republic of Indonesia and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, in his statement at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi recently reiterated the suggestion made at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that serious consideration should be given to the feasibility of such a nuclear-weapon-free zone in south-east Asia as an essential component in the realization of the ZOPFAN. As part of such a regional arrangement, the States of the region should, through mutual agreement among themselves and with the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon Powers, establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone so as to enhance the effectiveness of the ZOPFAN and reduce the likelihood of the region being drawn into or becoming the object of extra-regional confrontations. Such an arrangement for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in south-east Asia would be in the interest of all States, both regional and extrazonal. My delegation believes that such a regional approach to security constitutes a significant contribution towards global security and, likewise, regional arrangements may prove essential in bolstering the collective resilience of the smaller Powers vis-a-vis the pulls and pressures of the major Powers.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Mr. Darmosutanto for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and the incoming chairmen.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

The Committee will recall that, at our last plenary meeting, I suggested that we formally approve the suggestion of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/348, to the effect that the Group hold its next session from 11 to 22 July 1983. At the request of the representative

(The Chairman)

of the USSR, it was then agreed to postpone our approval until today. I hope that the Committee is now in a position to approve formally the recommendation contained in document CD/348, paragraph 13. I may add that the Secretary of the Committee has informed me that the Committee's formal approval of the date of the next meeting of its subordinate body is essential in order that secretariat services may be provided.

If there is no objection, may the Chair take it that this can now be approved?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting and, as agreed earlier today, to convene an informal meeting of the Committee in five minutes' time. It will perhaps be wise to add that it seems to the Chair unlikely that we shall get through all the subjects to be discussed at the informal meeting, and that it may be necessary, and in fact it is likely that we shall have to reconvene in an informal meeting at 3.30 p.m. this afternoon. Perhaps after a five-minute interval we could see how far we can get in an informal meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 14 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.212
14 April 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 14 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. van Dongen (Netherlands)

GE.83-60902

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. J.C. CARASALES
	Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
Australia:	Mr. R. STEELE
	Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
	Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. TELLALOV
	Mr. B. GRINBERG
	Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
	U TIN KYAW HALING
	U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
	Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN
	Miss C. de VARENNES
China:	Mr. LI LUYE
	Mr. TIAN JIN
	Mrs. GE YUYUN
Cuba:	Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. A. CIMA
	Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN
	Mr. A.M. ABBAS
	Miss W. BASSIM
Ethiopia:	Mr. T. TERREFE
	Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
France:	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
	Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE
	Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER
	Mr. H. THIELICKE
	Mr. M. NOTZEL
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. H. WEGENER
	Mr. F. ELBE
	Mr. W. ROHR
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. B. DARMOSUNTANTO
	Mr. N. WISNOEMERTI
	Mrs. P. RAMADHAN
	Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
Iran:	
Italy:	Mr. M. ALESSI
	Mr. C.M. OLIVA
	Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI
	Mr. M. KONISHI
	Mr. K. TANAKA
Kenya:	Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. BOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
	Mr. O. HILALE
Netherlands:	Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
	Mr. J. RAMAKER
	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Nigeria:	Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
	Miss I.E.C. UKEJE
Pakistan:	Mr. T. ALTAF
Peru:	Mr. V. ROJAS
Poland:	Mr H. JAROSZEK
	Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. GZEMPINSKI

Romania:	Mr. T. MELESCANU
	Mr. L. TOADER
Sri Lanka:	Mr. A.T. JAYOKODDY
	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Sweden:	Mr. C. LIDGARD
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mrs. I. SUNDBERG
	Mrs. A.M. LAU-ERIKSSON
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
	Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
	Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
United Kingdom:	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
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	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT
United States of America:	Mr. L. FIELDS
	Mr. M. BUSBY
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Mr. W. HECKROTTE
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
	Mr. R. MIKULAK
	Mr. J. HOGAN
	Mr. J. MARTIN
	Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Venezuela:	Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Zaire:	Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA
Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. R. JAIPAL
Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 212th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me to welcome in the Committee the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, His Excellency Mr. Henryk Jaroszek, who is well known to the members of the Committee because of his vast diplomatic experience, in particular in United Nations affairs. Before being assigned to his important duties as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, he served as Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations and held important posts in various United Nations bodies, including that of Chairman of the First Committee, and in his capacity as representative of his country in New York was also involved — deeply involved, I may say — in disarmament questions. Deputy Minister Jaroszek is listed to speak today and I am sure that members of the Committee will follow his statement with special interest. May I now call on His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland to take the floor.

Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): Mr. Chairman, let me at the outset express my sincere appreciation and thanks for your very kind words of welcome to me. I would like also to associate my delegation with the congratulations already expressed to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this important body for the month of April. I am confident that under your skilful guidance this Committee will be able to make the so much needed progress in its work.

It is a privilege for me indeed to be able to address the Committee on Disarmament, the important and respected multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Poland has consistently attached great significance to the Committee's endeavours and to those of its predecessors for over two decades now. It is with a feeling of pleasure and pride that I recall my own participation in its work, as chairman of my country's delegation in the late 1960s. You were very kind to refer to my involvement in disarmament matters. At present, when two policy lines are competing, that of confrontation and armaments on one hand, and that of peaceful co-existence and disarmament on the other, the Committee has a very important role to play and there can be no doubt which line it should follow.

Poland and other socialist States — as, I am sure, the international community at large — have been gravely alarmed and disappointed at the unprecedented delay and loss of time in working out the Committee's agenda for 1983. It is, indeed, regrettable that some States should deem it appropriate to bring this body to a virtual standstill over the legitimate proposal of an overwhelming majority of its members to include in the agenda — pursuant to the broadly supported resolution of the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly — the all-important question of the prevention of nuclear war. We would like to hope that with the compromise solution reached on the agenda and the resumption of business by the working groups, nothing should now stand in the way of the Committee's productive work.

Obviously, its pace will be largely determined by the evolution of the international climate. At present, that climate is characterized by tensions generated, as they are, by the confrontation and armaments-oriented policy of the NATO alliance, a policy espoused and implemented with particular dedication,

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

not to say abandon, by the present United States administration. On the other hand, there are highly encouraging indications in all parts of the world of the will to work for peace and return to détente. This has been manifested in particular by the Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty of 5 January 1983, as well as by the documents adopted at the recent Seventh Conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi.

The principal threat to world peace and international security stems from the imperialist policy of strength, pressure, interference in the internal affairs of States and encroachment on their national independence and sovereignty.

A part of this policy and its instrument are the ever-expanding armaments programmes pursued by the United States, both in the nuclear and the conventional fields, with a view to gaining military superiority. They bring the world dangerously close to nuclear catastrophe. A particular danger derives from the United States preparations to deploy in Western Europe a new generation of nuclear missiles, persistently carried on despite the pretended arms control formulas of a "zero option" or an "interim solution". Such schemes clearly aim at seriously upsetting the existing balance of forces, both in Europe and in global strategic terms. The so-called "interim solution" would result in a clear NATO superiority in nuclear warheads. It could therefore hardly be construed as designed to create premises for an agreement with the Soviet Union. It should not be a surprise to anybody that it has not been accepted. The just solution of the question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe should exclude the deployment of new American missiles while ensuring the maintenance of a military-strategic balance at an ever decreasing level.

The latest ordinance of President Reagan authorizing the development of entirely new weapons systems, involving an intensive militarization of outer space, further testifies to the scope and long-term character of United States awesome armaments designs.

The threat of a nuclear conflict in which — as it is widely realized — there could be only losers and no winners, is highlighted by the repeated references in United States official quarters to the dangerous doctrines of "limited", "protracted" or "winnable" nuclear wars, launched and spread around with an evident aim to rationalize the irrational — the use of nuclear weapons. The international community can therefore hardly be misled by Washington's claims that its latest doctrine is innocent and purely defensive and seeks nothing but to render nuclear weapons obsolete. That doctrine must and will be taken for what it is — a step aimed at ushering in a new and frightful dimension of the arms race, of the highest immediate danger to mankind.

Speaking of Europe, for which the impeding spiral of the nuclear arms race has particularly grave implications, one cannot overlook the fact that a country actively promoting NATO military designs shows ever less restraint in reviving the revanchist schemes that, in effect, aim at undermining the political and

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territorial realities in Europe, the basic premises of peace and security on our continent. The negative consequences of these tendencies for the political climate and for détente and co-operation in Europe have been indicated in the communiqué of the recent Prague meeting of the Foreign Ministers of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

Grave as the international situation is, however, it still carries — as I have observed — a prospect of possible reversal of the negative trends in international relations. Indeed, political forces and civic movements standing up against the nuclear menace are becoming ever more numerous and active. The socialist States, as well as the non-aligned countries, are more firm than ever in speaking up, and acting, to stop the international situation from sliding down the nuclear collision course. We note that next to formidable peace and anti-nuclear movements in western Europe and the United States, political parties, including some of those in power, are becoming vocal in insisting upon a nuclear freeze and effective disarmament.

The political declaration of the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit Conference succinctly describes the present-day situation by saying that "Disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, is no longer a moral issue: it is an issue of human survival".

Against that background, it becomes clear why the socialist States and the Group of 21 set so great a store by the agenda item in this Committee on the prevention of nuclear war. Its importance has been accurately summed up in document CD/341 of the Group of 21 which states that all nations have both the right and the obligation to work collectively to dispel the danger of a nuclear holocaust. It has also been forcefully underlined in document CD/355 of a group of socialist States.

As is well known, it was on the initiative of the USSR that the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its thirty-sixth session the "Declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe". The call to prevent nuclear war was approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. At the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Soviet Union undertook a unilateral commitment on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, a step of the highest significance.

Realizing the potential for nuclear conflict held by the increasingly ominous confrontation between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty States, the socialist countries have been persistently looking for ways to alleviate and ultimately eliminate this confrontation.

In the Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted in Prague last January they came out with a concrete and realistic alternative to the course of confrontation. Among other things, they proposed to the NATO States the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. The treaty would be open to all other interested States.

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Central to such a treaty would be a mutual commitment of the States members of the two alliances not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other, hence not to be the first to use military force at all. This commitment could be made to cover third countries also. It is evident that the conclusion of the proposed treaty would have a positive impact on the course of international affairs, and in particular on disarmament efforts. It would greatly help to restore mutual confidence, an indispensable premise of any effective disarmament effort.

At the meeting in Prague a few days ago, the Foreign Ministers of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty considered further measures to be taken for the implementation of this initiative. They noted the interest with which the proposed treaty has been received by Governments and public opinion throughout the world. The stated intention of the NATO countries to examine the proposed agreement has also been acknowledged. The ministers expressed the hope that the examination will be constructive. It is the intention of the socialist States to co-operate closely with all interested countries in a productive consideration of various aspects of the proposed agreement, including those concerning the scope and content of possible obligations, their relationship to commitments under the United Nations Charter, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as well as other bilateral and multilateral agreements and, last, but not least, the question of securing compliance with the treaty obligations. To this end, the participants in the Prague meeting deemed it useful to continue bilateral contacts with the States members of NATO and with other States, while also taking into consideration the possibility of dealing with some questions multilaterally at a level and in forms acceptable to all.

I have taken the liberty of speaking at some length on the topic of the proposed two-alliance treaty on the non-use of military force in view of its expected positive effect on the international situation, and in particular for maintaining and enhancing the policy of dialogue and understanding in Europe and in the world. Needless to say, it would also greatly increase the prospects of success of this Committee's endeavours.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to turn now to another pressing, high-priority item on the agenda of this body, namely, the question of the elimination of chemical weapons. As is well known, that question has traditionally figured prominently among the disarmament issues on which my country has focused its attention, both around this conference table and in the United Nations. At the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, I had the opportunity of putting on record Poland's satisfaction with the productive results which this organ, through its subsidiary body, had been able to score in 1982. Indeed, we hope that also in 1983, despite the regrettable delay in the reactivation of the chemical working group, it will prove possible to make a meaningful advance towards the long-overdue goal of a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

The Prague Declaration of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which — as will be recalled — addressed also a number of other priority items on the agenda of the Committee, urged this body to accelerate the elaboration of an international convention on banning and liquidating chemical weapons. We believe that constructive proposals and important concessions, especially with regard to the scope of prohibition and verification in a future convention, made by the USSR, both at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and again last February in the Committee on Disarmament, should greatly help in achieving early, positive results of the Committee's nearly 15 years of efforts. The question of chemical weapons has its specifically European aspect, too. There is the prospect of the imminent deployment by the United States of the most lethal, binary weapons in Western Europe, on the territory of some of its NATO allies. Bearing this in mind, in the Prague Declaration the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty offered a constructive, practical and far-sighted proposal. It provides for practical steps, parallel to the efforts of this Committee, to be taken in order to rid Europe of these weapons of mass annihilation. Poland and other States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty welcome the interest shown in this idea on the part of a number of European countries. Building upon this understandable interest, the socialist States are prepared to initiate meaningful contacts with all interested States, including States members of the NATO alliance, in order to arrange for a common consideration of practical problems with a view to achieving the goal of a Europe free from chemical weapons. This readiness of ours has been reaffirmed by the Foreign Ministers of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty meeting in Prague last week.

We have no doubt in our mind that the successful outlawing of these weapons from the continent of Europe would greatly contribute to the comprehensive ban on chemical weapons which we in this Committee have been tirelessly seeking for more than a decade.

I have referred in my statement only to selected matters connected with some of the priority items on the Committee's agenda. In the opinion of the Polish Government, these are matters of immediate urgency and utmost importance. Poland continues to stand determined to make its active and constructive contribution towards the cessation of the arms race, disarmament, the restoration and consolidation of détente and of the climate of confidence in international relations as well as the development of broad peaceful co-operation among States. This determination is based upon the invariable principles of the foreign policy of the Polish People's Republic, upon our historical experience and best-conceived national interest. This policy is being carried out in close collaboration with our allies, in co-operation with the non-aligned countries and all other States that are willing to go along this path.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. The Chair has five more speakers on the list for this morning — the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Sri Lanka, Kenya and the United Kingdom, and I now call on the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Thielicke, to take the floor.

Mr. THIELICKE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, the head of my delegation, Ambassador Dr. Herder, will soon take the opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April. Permit me today to address two items on our agenda.

This week is devoted to a consideration of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, which is by no means a new item.

Since 1975 it has been discussed at the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, in this Committee, in its predecessor and in other forums. Its urgency has been emphasized in quite a number of United Nations resolutions. Comprehensive and detailed draft treaties and working documents have been tabled by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament. Together with many other delegations, we have responded to arguments casting doubts on different aspects of the proposed approach.

So, there is no shortage of ideas concerning the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. But the question might be asked, why, then, have we not come to an agreement in this field?

Why have appropriate, business-like negotiations not even started, and why has it not been possible to set up a group of experts? Obviously, here as in other cases, one side is not yet ready to embark on such negotiations. Thus, one possible road to forestall the arms race has not been sufficiently explored, and no positive action has been taken.

But the vicious circle is going on -- new weapon systems provoke the creation of new dangerous warfare doctrines, undermine existing arms limitation agreements and ongoing negotiations, and, last but not least, lead to the channelling of ever more resources from peaceful to military purposes. In this forum of course it is not necessary to elaborate this in detail. Suffice it to mention one example which clearly illustrates this dangerous process. Only recently the Administration of the United States announced its intention to begin what was called an "aggressive" research and development programme on a ballistic missile defence system which is supposed to materialize toward the end of this century. Such a programme, obviously, is part and parcel of plans to achieve military superiority by creating in parallel an offensive nuclear first-strike capability as well as a defensive strategic potential which are to complement each other and make possible "successful" limited or protracted nuclear wars. At the ongoing Berlin International Scientific Conference, "Karl Marx and our time — the struggle for peace and social progress", the Head of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, emphasized that "the most recent plans of the United States to convert also outer space into a missile platform would only open the doors to another escalation of the arms race and increase the risk of war on Earth".

In advancing such a new ABM project, its inventors obviously hope to take advantage of the state of the art in the field of the military application of lasers, particle beams, microwave devices and others. It is alleged that the military use of such weapons and devices would be confined to purely defensive purposes, a kind of surgical operation against other weapons.

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But this seems to be only the tip of the iceberg. Particle-beam weapons, for example, could hardly be denied to have a mass destruction potential. Nearly two years ago, the head of my delegation, Ambassador Dr. Herder, underlined in this Committee:

> "Generally it is emphasized that particle-beam weapons should be used for defensive purposes against such targets as satellites and missiles. Very often it is forgotten that they could have a mass destruction capability against biological targets as well. Such a weapon could be space-based and operate like a large-scale neutron bomb. In this context a United States official was quoted as saying, 'This would destroy a population without breaking a single brick'." (CD/PV.136, 9 July 1981).

So, there is a clear necessity to prevent such dangerous concepts as particle-beam weapons, infrasonic weapons or weapons based on certain types of electromagnetic radiation from entering military arsenals as new weapons of mass destruction.

To embark upon serious work in this regard, we advocate the establishment of an expert group to clarify questions connected with the scope of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new kinds and systems of weapons of mass destruction and to review developments in this field, as called for by paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Scientists all over the world are concerned about the escalating arms race, particularly its qualitative aspect. Ever more they express their readiness to shoulder their responsibility for peace and disarmament. Another proof of this was a round-table conference which took place last week in Berlin, the capital of the German Democratic Republic, organized by the World Federation of Scientific Workers. About 40 scientists and peace researchers from 15 countries, including the United States and West European countries, addressed the subject, "Science and the qualitative arms race". Particular attention was directed to preventing the misuse of new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements for military purposes, including the creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. It was stressed that the use of science and technology for exclusively peaceful purposes should become a basic ethic principle.

Diplomats and politicians earnestly concerned about the future of mankind cannot afford to neglect such appeals.

Let me summarize. To tackle in a practical manner the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, my delegation favours the following approach:

(a) The adoption of a declaration by the permanent members of the Security Council as well as militarily significant States concerning the refusal to create new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction;

(Mr. Thielicke, German Democratic Republic)

(b) The establishment of an ad hoc group of experts;

(c) The conclusion of a comprehensive or "umbrella" agreement which would be supplemented by a list of single types and systems of prohibited new weapons of mass destruction;

(d) The conclusion of single agreements on the prohibition of specific new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, if this is deemed necessary.

Before I conclude, allow me to make some remarks with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the course of this session my delegation has already commented on recent regional initiatives which have been motivated by the danger of the production and deployment of new kinds of chemical weapons. At their recent Prague meeting, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States further developed the proposal to free Europe from chemical weapons. The Ministers expressed the readiness of the socialist countries to consider with other interested States practical questions related to this objective. This would especially apply to the scope and sequence of the relevant measures, the content of the commitments and verification of their observance.

In this connection I should like to draw your attention to the proposal made by my country on the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe.

These proposals have met with interest and response in many European countries. At the same time we heard here in this Committee arguments according to which the proposals in question would be bound to distract attention from a comprehensive solution of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The recent Prague meeting gave an unequivocal and pertinent answer to those arguments in stating that "the Warsaw Treaty member States continue to maintain that the radical solution of the problem of the prevention of chemical war would be the prohibition and the destruction of chemical weapons on a global scale". It was emphasized that the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone, as a parallel measure, should facilitate the achievement of this goal.

As far as the further negotiations on a chemical weapons ban in this Committee are concerned, my delegation outlined on 22 February its approach aiming at beginning a new phase in our negotiations. In the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, we noted with interest the ideas of its newly appointed Chairman, Ambassador McPhail of Canada, on the further proceedings of the Group. We will support all efforts directed at reaching quick results in drafting a chemical weapons convention. Having this in mind we see much merit in a kind of "double approach", i.e. to draft in the Working Group and its contact groups the basic provisions of the convention on which there is agreement, and to proceed with the clarification of unresolved questions as well as the elaboration of detailed provisions connected with the implementation of the convention.

In the Working Group, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic will actively take part in such work and elaborate on the issues in question.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April. I would like to assure you of the full support of my delegation in your efforts to achieve the results commonly desired.

My words of appreciation go also to Ambassador Skalli of Morocco for his efficient activity displayed as the Chairman for the previous month.

I would, in addition, like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Jaroszek, whose statement today was a contribution of great value to our work.

In my statement today, in connection with the item inscribed in our programme of work, I would like to deal with the qualitative aspects of the arms build-up and those of disarmament.

Let me start with a quotation. It goes like this: "... nothing was needed but the political will to make the Treaty and to carry it out." I am sure that there is nothing extraordinary in this statement, as we could witness similar ones here in the Committee on Disarmament, not to mention about other disarmament forums. Consequently, there is nothing interesting about the fact that it was made here in Geneva. But nevertheless what makes the above-mentioned statement so significant in the eyes of my delegation as to cite it, is that it was made in September 1933, that is, half a century ago, in the Assembly of the League of Nations, two months after the World Disarmament Conference had broken off as a result of the failure to come to an agreement, on other things, about a treaty on qualitative disarmament.

I do not want at this juncture to dwell upon the highly hypothetical question of how far different would have been the path of subsequent events in the 1930s had the conference adopted the treaty on qualitative disarmament. Let me rather point out that although 1933 is separated from 1983 by 50 years and -- I do not hesitate promptly to add -- by the second world war, with all the differences one can find many similar features in comparing the international situation now and then: similar rapidly deteriorating international relations, a similar continuing build-up of armaments, similar skyrocketing military expenditures, a similar stagnation of international trade and disorder in monetary relations, and a similar concern about the future on the part of world public opinion. And one should add legitimately to the similarities, the same lack of agreement or, to be more precise, the same lack of political readiness of some to come to an agreement about the limitation of the qualitative arms build-up and about qualitative disarmament. Even some of the arguments used nowadays to oppose qualitative disarmament seem to be really similar, as if the years that have passed since that time and the severe lessons of subsequent events have left them untouched.

Having made these introductory remarks, I would like to state the aims of my statement today: I would like to refute, on the one hand, those arguments which, alluding to the paramount character of national security, try to approve the justness of the qualitative arms build-up carried out to the detriment of international security, and on the other hand those counter-arguments which deny the feasibility of a comprehensive or specific approach to qualitative disarmament negotiations, referring to technical difficulties of different nature.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

If we examine the state of affairs in the field of qualitative disarmament from the point of view of efforts which have been displayed to that end, we might have the impression that significant steps have been taken in this field. As a proof of that point, it may be recalled that on the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction, Malta initiated resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly as far back as 1969. Since 1975, when the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of an international agreement on that question and submitted a draft of it as well, the General Assembly has been dealing regularly with the question and adopted several resolutions. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and this Committee have been considering the question since 1976. In spite of the fact that some delegations rejected the approach of the socialist States aimed at a comprehensive treaty, parallel with special agreements to be concluded on specific weapons, the Committee on Disarmament held a number of informal meetings on the subject with the participation of experts, although it is only to be regretted that certain members failed to agree to the establishment of a group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question.

Another set of examples of efforts to curb qualitatively the development of new weapons can be identified as well: there are agreements of that kind like the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, the 1972 ABM Treaty, the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1979 SALT II Treaty.

But if we consider the above-mentioned disarmament efforts, not in themselves, but in the degree to which they contributed to curbing the qualitative arms build-up, the whole situation is far from being satisfactory. If, for example, we take into consideration that after a quantitative arms build-up carried out in the course of the early 1960s, one of the great powers shifted the emphasis to qualitative factors, and has generated and maintained the process which was characterized by Edward Teller as "a race of technology", a process which until recently has not ceased to yield order-of-magnitude improvements of destructive capabilities. The sole multilateral negotiating body in the same period of time, because of the unwillingness of certain delegations, has not been able to address adequately the problem of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, either in a comprehensive or in a specific manner.

As for the agreements cited above as curbing the qualitative arms build-up, it speaks for itself that one of the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty still, in 1983, considers as a long-term objective the obligations assumed by the provisions of Article 1, subparagraph (b), of the Treaty. The threshold test-ban Treaty and the SALT II Treaty have not entered into force because of the reluctance of the same State to ratify them, and probably no one fails to recall that the fate of the ABM Treaty was brought into question not so long ago.

In order to assess the situation, let me review those technological developments initiated by one of the great powers which could not but generate a qualitative arms race in the past 10-15 years. In general, one may state that throughout that period of time developments were not characterized by revolutionary breakthroughs but by persistent and more or less steady advances in all the systems that constitute the whole range of strategic offensive armaments and anti-missile and space defensive systems.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

In more concrete terms, I would like to enumerate the following areas:

A major qualitative development called multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) resulted in the early 1970s in a substantial increase in the number of deliverable warheads on land-based and sea-based missiles.

Another development has been a significant increase of missile accuracy during the 1970s. That increased accuracy is to be further improved by the deployment of manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MARVs) in the 1980s. As a result of technological refinements, a twofold efficacity improvement in warhead yield has been carried out.

Significant advances were made in the field of anti-submarine warfare ensuring the attainment of a near real-time detection and location of submarines.

The air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles represent another technological development realized in the 1970s.

A new "stealth" technology has been developed during the same period of time which, by reducing the radar cross-section of bombers and cruise missiles, enables them to penetrate enemy air defence systems.

An additional item among major qualitative developments is the research and development of a ballistic missile defence system culminating in the high-level statement made on 23 March of this year about the objectives of the programme. This is a subject on which my delegation had ample opportunity to dwell in a statement made on 15 March.

Research and development have been carried out at an accelerating pace to achieve such near-term capabilities as ground-, air-, and space-based laser weapon systems.

One should not fail to add that the 1970s brought about such weapons as the enhanced radiation weapon (nuclear neutron weapon) and the binary chemical weapon.

As a logical result of the review of what has taken place in the field of military technology of strategic importance in the last 10-15 years, the question nearly automatically arises: How does the State that initiated so many new rounds in the arms race wish to have its security interest safeguarded by the utilization of those qualitative developments? The basic principle and endeavour behind those developments can be understood if we place the whole complex of technological advances in a double context: the first one is the characteristics and capabilities of those weapons; the second one is the effect they have on strategic concepts.

Having scrutinized the qualitative developments, we can state that as a result of the qualitative build-up during the period under review, more accurate, sophisticated and flexible weapon systems have emerged, breaking those technological limitations which earlier made nuclear weapons unthinkable as useful instruments of political and military power. As a result of that process and of some other changes in political-military concepts, greater emphasis than ever before has been placed on the possibility of fighting and winning nuclear wars to render the nuclear threat more credible. The above-mentioned process characterized by the continuous shift -- using the authors' terminology -- "from deterrence to counterforce strategy" is raising several questions.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The socialist countries, in statements delivered at the highest level, made it clear a long time ago that they oppose deterrence, that is, the basing of security on the nuclear threat, and they treat it as a situation historically and technologically imposed upon them. At the same time we should not forget that while the doctrine of deterrence at least reckoned with some kind of equality between States concerning possibilities, the shift in strategic concepts raises well-founded concerns as the qualitatively new weapon systems, both those already developed and those under development, fully coincide with the prerequisites of a pre-emptive first strike. Thus they can only be evaluated as an endeavour to obtain absolute strategic superiority. As a matter of fact, the following requirements necessary for a pre-emptive first strike are enumerated in the 1981 SIPRI Yearbook: "Most of an enemy's retaliatory capability must be destroyed quickly, efficiently and without warning. This requires offensive weapons which either reach their targets very quickly or can approach their targets without detection. It requires highly accurate and reliable weapons which possess a high one-shot kill probability". Further, it points out the necessity of the defence of both military and civilian targets against those retaliatory forces which do remain.

And thus we have come to the quintessence of the subject, namely whether the qualitative arms build-up at present being carried out really enhances the security of the State involved, and in what manner it influences the security of other nations and international stability as a whole. First of all, there is a solid empirical basis to prove that any kind of superiority, be it quantitative or qualitative, is only a temporary one. One can suppose that this axiom will retain its validity in the future as well. At the same time, the present endeavours to gain qualitative superiority are radically different from earlier ones as they direct the arms race along the path of an ever-growing increase in the relative advantages of a pre-emptive first strike. Thus, doubts about future intentions are becoming stronger than ever, resulting in a situation characterized by a total lack of confidence and general insecurity. A situation like this may become fatal in a military or political crisis. Even without bold fantasy one can imagine what consequences it would have in the event of false alarms, especially if, as a result of the deployment of new types of ballistic missiles in western Europe, the warning time were to be reduced to six minutes, a time-frame which has been necessary on several occasions to identify false alarms. All that means that such aspirations not merely fail to recognize the principle of equality and equal security which was generally agreed on in various treaties, but, as we can see, they are detrimental to the security of the State involved. It might sound paradoxical but it is true that a relative increase in qualitative superiority actually brings about a decrease in national security. The world has reached the stage in the development of military technology where the strengthening of national security cannot be artificially separated from the strengthening of international security. It is our firm conviction that in the period to come, national security can be enhanced only in organic connection with international security, and not through a qualitative arms build-up but through a qualitative arms limitation and disarmament. In order to achieve that aim, qualitative arms limitation and disarmament must be an integral part of disarmament

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

efforts so as to plug efficiently all future channels of the qualitative arms race. Such an approach should not exclude the qualitative limitation and prohibition of concrete types and systems of weapons. On the contrary, such an approach requires, for example, the negotiation and conclusion of a set of individual agreements. Another example of a comprehensive manner of handling the problem is to be found in resolution 37/77 B, in which the General Assembly called for the renunciation of the use of new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements for military purposes.

In the Political Declaration adopted in Prague on 5 January of this year, the leading representatives of the Warsaw Treaty member States emphasized that "the arms race is advancing into a qualitatively new and much more dangerous stage involving all kinds of weapons both nuclear and conventional and all types of military activity and affecting virtually all regions of the world" (CD/338, p.2).

In view of the great dangers inherent in a new round of the qualitative arms race, the world simply cannot afford to let meaningful negotiations on the subject be further blocked by some States which make allusions to technical problems of definition, classification or identification, as has been the case in the Committee on Disarmament in connection with new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. I do not think it is difficult to recognize that there are qualitatively new types and systems of weapons which are of strategic importance. The disarmament community should be able to match the challenge posed to world security by these weapons if States give up routine-like arguments over-emphasizing technical difficulties and abandon counter-arguments opposing real and meaningful negotiations. This is not an easy task, but results will justify our efforts if we succeed.

As an epilogue, permit me to single out the example of MIRV warheads to show what the world community might gain from curbing the qualitative arms race. Recently several politicians in the United States have realized that the technologically generated arms race might backfire. They are proposing a wide variety of steps to solve the problem. Former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in an essay published in Time magazine on 21 March, recommends a dramatic new approach to face the challenge of technology. His proposal deserves the utmost interest, not only because his plan would scrap all MIRVs and instead deploy single-warhead missiles, but because he was one of the foster-fathers of the MIRVs. One feels tempted to imagine how much the world could have gained had the decision-makers at the appropriate moment been able to resist the temptation of the illusion of greater security through technological superiority. Concerning the waste of material resources, it is a difficult and probably time-consuming task to evaluate it. One is probably not wrong in guessing that it is not a small amount of money. It is easier to tell the time-factor: it is nearly 20 years since the decision to put MIRV warheads on United States submarine-launched ballistic missiles was taken in 1964. It might mean as well that qualitative disarmament in that particular field lags behind the arms build-up by at least 20 years or, to put it in another way, it has taken nearly 20 years after identification to recommend concrete actions to abandon these weapons, an argument which is not really in favour of those opposing the comprehensive and preventive approach to new types and systems of weapons. The simplest task is to estimate how much the world community should win from it in terms of security, though security is not a category in the realm of the exact sciences. The answer is: incredibly much.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Komives for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen. I now call upon the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Jayakoddy, to take the floor. You have the floor, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): As this is the first time that the Sri Lanka delegation is addressing this Committee in the month of April, permit me to associate my delegation with the congratulations and welcome that have been extended to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for April. The effective manner in which you are presiding over our deliberations, Mr. Chairman, deepens our confidence in your wise and experienced handling of the manifold duties of the chairmanship of this Committee. My delegation wishes you further success and assures you of its fullest co-operation. Permit me also to extend my delegation's sincere appreciation to distinguished Ambassador Ali Skalli of Morocco for his outstanding stewardship of the chairmanship of this Committee in the month of March. The elegant skill and understanding with which he successfully guided this Committee's work was indeed confirmation of the excellence of the international diplomacy of the Kingdom of Morocco, for which all of us here have the highest regard. My delegation thanks distinguished Ambassador Skalli sincerely for his valuable contribution. Allow me also to extend a warm welcome to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, His Excellency Mr. Henryk Jaroszek, and express our appreciation of the contribution he has made to this Committee's work.

Mr. Chairman, as I may not be in Geneva for a few days next week, I seek the indulgence of the Committee to address it on item 7 of our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

At last year's summer session of this Committee, the delegation of Sri Lanka expressed in detail its views on item 7, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We tried to highlight what was taking place in the development of weapon systems that are designed for use in outer space. We emphasized that at least one system had reached operational capability, and that other weapon systems would fast reach their full development and thus become operational. Our concern was that these new weapon systems would soon be integrated into military doctrines and strategies that included their use, thus converting outer space into an arena of the arms race.

My delegation concluded that if the arms race in outer space had not commenced, then it was very close at hand, and if no concrete, urgent action was taken now to prevent it, the world would find itself very soon in the midst of a situation that would be far more complex and dangerous than what we face today.

In recent months, particularly during the last few weeks, there has been an incessant flow of information, analysis and comment which confirms that the apprehensions and fears that have been expressed in this Committee and outside it about the extension of the arms race into outer space have not been exaggerated. Many distinguished representatives in this Committee last year, and during the current session, have presented us with striking evidence of developments that are inevitably leading the world into an arms race outside this planet. I shall not try today to regale this Committee with details of these developments as we are now quite familiar with what is happening and what we can expect in future years up to and into the next millennium. I shall restrict myself to quoting a few sentences from an article entitled "The decisive frontier" appearing in Omni magazine in November 1981 in which the author, Mr. Jerry Pournelle, says as follows: "It is an unpalatable truth, but we must face it: before the end of this century — probably in this decade — space weapons will end the balance of terror that has made nuclear war all but unthinkable for the last 36 years. They will make

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possible a global conflict whose undamaged victor could dictate terms to a disarmed and helpless loser". I have no comment to offer on these words except to say I hope the author will not be proved correct. Since preparing this text I have seen this morning's Herald Tribune and it is worth quoting from an article by Flora Lewis on a recent conference held in London: "A small group of people, including some top experts on space war, has held a conference near here on the military use of space. Their chilling conclusion was that the military space age has arrived and cannot be revoked. The questions remaining are whether there will be weapons in space and war in space".

For my country, the prevention of the extension of the arms race into outer space is a major political issue of our times. It is both a political issue and a disarmament issue. Inherent in the political issue is whether the international community intends to shut off outer space once and for all from the arms race and thereby preserve it for peaceful purposes. Having saturated this planet with enough explosive and incendiary power to blow it up and roast it many times over, do we now intend to invade the heavens with new weapon systems so as to protect and safeguard our nuclear arsenals down below? There are philosophical and moral aspects to the issue, but they are not for this forum and therefore I shall bypass them. But we must face up to the political issue that is involved and we, as the Committee on Disarmament, the only forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations, are the appropriate body to negotiate on it as a disarmament issue.

Sri Lanka, a country without any space capability for the present or the foreseeable future, has welcomed with appreciation the achievements of all space powers in their civilian space programmes. We hope that they will continue and benefit the world as a whole. It therefore comes as a disappointment to us to know that a State with major space capabilities has decided to commence research on an anti-ballistic missile system to be used for defensive purposes in outer space. The concept underlying the system envisaged is not new and has been around for several years in different forms. But what is new and significant is that the decision to start research amounts to beginning the first stage in a familiar four-stage process with regard to new weapon systems. It begins with research, which of course comes out of what is felt to be a perceived need. Then follows development, with simulated testing followed by acquiring operational capability. Inevitably, there then arises the pressure to deploy. Once deployed and forming part of strategy and tactics, there is proliferation, quantitative and qualitative. And after a time-lag during which unlimited resources would have been spent will come moves to dismantle and eliminate the system, either through bilateral negotiations or perhaps as an item on the agenda of work of this Committee because more reliable, more effective, more destructive systems have been developed.

The decision I referred to, coming as it does at a time when concern and apprehension about the extension of the arms race into outer space are high and widespread, complicates even more the complexities that are involved in safeguarding outer space for peaceful purposes. We hope that reason, and the awareness of the responsibility that goes with being a State with major space capabilities, will prevent action that can lead to an extension of the arms race into outer space.

This Committee last year and earlier in this session has addressed item 7 both in plenary and in informal meetings. At the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, too, the issue has been examined. To my delegation it appears that there are at present three different approaches to the issue prevailing in the Committee. Let me take them up in ascending order.

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The first approach, which I regretfully characterize as the passive or do-little approach, suggests that item 7 remain on the Committee's agenda and that it is of some importance. At the same time, it is said that item 7 is a highly complex issue, very technical, and that the Committee has no experience of negotiating disarmanent issues relating to outer space. Inherent in this approach is the view that the item be discussed and debated further in the Committee both in plenary and informal sessions, but there is no willingness or readiness to recognize the need for setting up a subsidiary body of the Committee to negotiate on the issue. If this approach is followed by the Committee the outcome would be that all of us could have excellent opportunities for spelling out 1,001 scenarios of coming star-wars and perhaps transform this Committee into being a learned society on outer space. But the Committee will make no progress in tackling the substance of the issue. The Committee's immobility in adopting any meaningful action will be matched on the outside with the intense pursuit of developments which will make it even more difficult to initiate action, as desired by the great majority of States, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

My delegation regrets the continuation of this approach in the Committee. To limit ourselves to debating, discussing and exchanging of views on what is manifestly a serious concern about preventing a danger to humanity before it grows more threatening and irreversible, is an abdication of our responsibilities towards the living and the generations that are to follow. In the early years after the Second World War, countries such as mine were either newly independent or still colonies, and we had no voice in disarmament negotiations. We were innocent bystanders whilst the nuclear arms race started and gathered momentum. The mushroom-like clouds from the nuclear-weapon tests lifted and we found ourselves hostages of the nuclear-weapon States. But now the picture is significantly different. We have found seats in this forum — the only forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations — and it is our intention to act vigorously and persistently in pressing for meaningful action towards preventing an arms race in outer space before it is too late. My delegation is not alone in this. The majority of States members of this Committee have told us that they cannot rest satisfied with the passive approach of doing little. They have called for a more positive attitude to be shown. We trust that this call will not be rejected.

The second approach that we find, the intermediate one, contains more positive elements. It encompasses the desire to set up a subsidiary body of this Committee to negotiate an agreement related to one weapon system that is now operational or to a restricted number of aspects of the entire issue of preventing an arms race in outer space. The chief characteristic of this approach is that it fragments and compartmentalizes the main issue and presses for urgent action on aspects that it identifies as of highest priority. But it fails to give due consideration to the fact that in the prevention of an arms race in outer space there are many aspects that are interrelated and linked inextricably, aspects that must be taken up together, and that fragmentation contributes to delaying and avoiding a comprehensive look at the entire issue. Once again the argument of complexity and lack of expertise in the Committee on negotiating disarmament relating to outer space arises, but this in itself cannot be an insurmountable obstacle.

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My delegation welcomes the initiatives that have come from a number of States that can be identified as supporting this intermediate approach. These initiatives have helped to give better shape and direction to our deliberations and to shed light on the complexities that we shall face. But my delegation wishes to stress that a partial, fragmented approach avoids the main issue, viz., addressing ourselves to preventing an arms race in all its aspects, and I repeat, in all its aspects, in outer space. The information that has been presented to this Committee this year and last year, what is known publicly about developments that are now under way, the consequences of such developments and the repeated concern that has been expressed by the international community cannot be ignored or responded to by partial measures alone.

I now come to the third approach with which my delegation is fully associated. The elements in this third approach, the comprehensive one, are:

(i) It looks at the issue as a single integrated one that is made up of several aspects;

(ii) It addresses itself to sealing off outer space in its entirety as an arena of the arms race;

(iii) It calls for the setting up of a subsidiary body of the Committee as the vehicle for carrying out negotiations to draft an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space;

(iv) It is flexible in its formulation, providing for taking up on a priority basis, if that is called for, particular aspects of the issue within a comprehensive, all-inclusive framework;

(v) By being comprehensive it is not discriminatory or weighted to one side, and

(vi) It has the expressed support of the overwhelming majority of States members of the United Nations and in this Committee.

This approach, in our view, offers the best prospects for this Committee to respond as it should in working for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Group of 21 proposed this approach in this Committee last year and it is presented in document CD/329. It will be recalled that at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly a group of non-aligned and neutral countries and a group of socialist countries co-sponsored resolution 37/83 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was adopted by 138 votes in favour, 7 abstentions and one against. Paragraph 6 of that resolution states that the General Assembly

"Further requests the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its session in 1983, with a view to

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undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

The United Nations General Assembly has thus in clear terms communicated its request to this Committee. We are aware that in certain circles it is fashionable to attach little weight to United Nations General Assembly resolutions and to give them a minimum of attention or even less consideration. But the General Assembly still remains one of the main channels by which the wishes of member States can be communicated to this Committee. If we in the Committee pay little regard to the requests of the General Assembly, we might be confronted with a situation where all States Members of the United Nations would want membership in this Committee, or may choose to come here as observers, to get their concerns heard. My delegation defends very strongly the autonomous character of this Committee and its right to order and organize its work in independent fashion. But this Committee does not work in a world of its own -- in a vacuum that it might choose to create for itself. It works in the international political environment and must be responsive to and reflect the concerns of the overwhelming majority of mankind. It must listen to and respond constructively to what comes out of the annual gathering of States' representatives at the United Nations. It must therefore respond positively to resolution 37/83.

In this Committee there is very broad support for the approach contained in the Group of 21's proposal. This support comes not only from the Group of 21. The group of socialist countries in this Committee, which have submitted their own proposals here and which were co-sponsors of General Assembly resolution 37/83, I believe hold a view not different from that held by the Group of 21.

It is my delegation's view that the deliberations of this Committee on item 7 up to now have provided adequate substance and demonstrated strong political will to set up a subsidiary body, an ad hoc working group, on the basis of the Group of 21 proposal, with the kind of mandate suggested in document CD/329. The setting up of ad hoc working groups is now a tested and proven method for deepening this Committee's work on an agenda item, and for moving from the general area to the specifics of an issue. As we all know, disarmament negotiations when conducted through a subsidiary body of the Committee envisage a preliminary stage when we must deal with defining the issue with clarity and precision, identifying aspects and focusing on interrelationships and linkages. It involves fixing elements and priorities and profiling components with a view to giving the proper weight, dimensions and recognition to all aspects of the issue. The essential prerequisite of agreeing on language, to be sure that we all attach a common meaning to the words we use, must be heavily underlined at the beginning. The Committee has accumulated invaluable experience and expertise in negotiations through the subsidiary bodies. In calling for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on item 7, the Group of 21 proceeds from this experience. The lack of success on some items in ad hoc working groups need not deter us from choosing similar mechanisms for resolving the issues that still confront us.

May I now say a few words about the complexity of the issue and the need for technical expertise. Every issue that comes before us is complex and in different degree they all call for technical expertise. Several delegations in the Committee have already expressed their intention and even readiness to come before this Committee with the technical expertise that may be required on item 7. It is the view of my delegation that the members of the Committee can decide and organize

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the form and modalities by which it can benefit from technical expertise. No single method or form needs to be considered sacrosanct to the extent that it must be adopted because it was the mode in the past. The Committee must not be bound by past practice alone. It should be inventive and innovative in deciding on the modalities of securing the technical expertise that it may require.

My delegation therefore hopes that the Committee this year will reach a consensus on the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the basis of what is proposed in document CD/329. In the event of this being realized, my delegation would suggest that the ad hoc working group address itself to the following:

Firstly, negotiations to draft a comprehensive agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prohibit

(a) The stationing in orbit around the Earth, on any celestial body or at any other location in outer space of any weapon which has been designed to inflict injury or cause any other form of damage on the Earth, in the atmosphere or on objects placed in space; and

(b) The testing, production, deployment or use of any space-based, air-based or ground-based weapons system which is designed to damage, destroy or interfere with the functioning of any space-craft of any nation.

It is hardly necessary to emphasize that this work involves examining and establishing adequate and effective measures for verifying compliance with the terms of any agreement or agreements that will be negotiated.

Secondly, the ad hoc working group would start examining the feasibility of extending article IV of the outer space Treaty of 1967 to include a ban on all kinds of weapons from space, including all weapons based in space for use against any target and all anti-satellite weapons regardless of where they are based.

We are confident that such a start is feasible and reflects the desire of the United Nations General Assembly as expressed in resolution 37/83. The Committee, in our view, has an excellent opportunity either to begin on a meaningful course of action or to remain deadlocked and divided on the issue.

Finally, may I address a few words, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, to the distinguished representatives of the United States and the USSR. Your countries possess the major space capabilities. Through the excellence of your scientific, technical and technological cadres and the willingness of your two governments to invest very large resources, even in times of unprecedented world economic turmoil, you have contributed immensely towards realizing what is perhaps mankind's oldest dream -- discovering, exploring and benefiting from outer space. You have the biggest responsibility in preventing outer space from becoming a new arena of the arms race. That responsibility can be truly carried out by a resumption of your bilateral talks that faded away in 1979, and by assisting this Committee fully to initiate and follow through active, meaningful work on item 7 of the agenda. My delegation is confident that both your countries will respond positively to the challenge and the opportunity that is before you.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Jayakoddy, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman for the month of March and to the Chairman for the month of April.

Distinguished delegates, it has in the meantime become apparent that we shall not be able to conclude today's debate before 1 o'clock. Since there are not only two more speakers on the list, but also a number of procedural items to be dealt with, the Chair would therefore propose that we deal with the procedural items now, and ask the distinguished representatives of Kenya and the United Kingdom to reserve their interventions until 3.30 this afternoon, when the session will be resumed. This would also imply that the Contact Group on Principles of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament could only take place after — immediately after — the closure of this afternoon's continued plenary session, and that the meeting of the informal working party on procedures which was scheduled for 3.30 this afternoon will also commence only after the closing of today's formal session. If that can meet with the approval of delegates, I would then propose to invite the Committee now to consider two requests for participation in our work received from non-member States.

I have requested the secretariat to circulate draft decisions which are contained respectively in Working Papers Nos. 96 and 97. In conformity with the practice followed by the Committee, we shall take up those requests in chronological order. The first request is from Denmark; it is dated 6 April 1983, and the relevant draft decision is contained in Working Paper No. 96. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision in Working Paper No. 96. 1/ Is there any objection?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The second request, dated 7 April 1983, has been received from Viet Nam and the draft decision appears in Working Paper No. 97. 2/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee adopts the draft decision. Is there any? — the USSR.

1/ "In response to the request of Denmark (CD/376) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1983 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1983 session the representative of Denmark is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Denmark."

2/ "In response to the request of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (CD/377) and in accordance with rule 34 of the rules of procedure, the Committee on Disarmament decides to invite the representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to make a statement on item 4 of the agenda, 'Chemical weapons', at the 213th plenary meeting, to be held on 19 April 1983."

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should like to suggest a small drafting amendment to the text that has been distributed. I think it would be advisable to insert the words "the representative of", so that the third line of the text reads: "to invite the representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam ...".

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Mr. Nazarkin for that proposal. Would that small correction meet with any objections? It appears not — is there any delegation wishing to take the floor on this proposal? The distinguished representative of China, Mr. Tian Jin, you have the floor.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, the Chinese delegation wishes to make the following statement.

Concerning the request made by Viet Nam to allow it to send someone to speak at the Committee on Disarmament on the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War held in Ho Chih Minh City, we have had occasion to express our views. We do not think it necessary to bring up such a specific question time and again. Since other countries made no objection to the request by Viet Nam to make a statement at one of our plenary meetings, the Chinese delegation went along with the consensus. However, the Chinese delegation would like to reiterate that China's position towards the requests of non-member States to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament is consistent and unchanged and that it is also known to all the delegations.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of China for his contribution and I understand that it does not constitute an objection to a consensus decision on this issue. May the Chair therefore take it that the Committee adopts the draft decision?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Thirdly, the secretariat has circulated today at my request a timetable for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and may be adjusted as we proceed. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts this timetable.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In addition to the meetings scheduled in connection with the Committee's work, I may also note that informal consultations have been convened by the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in Conference Room I next Tuesday at 4 p.m. Finally, distinguished delegates, the Chair has been asked by several delegations to summarize the debates, both formal and informal, that took place on the issue of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, and believes that it would indeed be useful to do so.

(The Chairman)

After the debate that took place in the plenary sessions of the Committee on 5 and 7 April and last Tuesday's informal exchange of views, it has once again become clear that a number of delegations hold the view that the existing mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group is too narrow and that its scope should therefore be widened. Other delegations are of the opinion that the present mandate has not nearly been exhausted and that a great deal of useful work can still be done under this present mandate. Consequently, no consensus has emerged on a revision of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, either by drawing on the proposal tabled by the Group of 21 in 1981 (document CD/181), since then revised by India, or on the draft proposed by the group of socialist countries in Working Paper No. 95.

While recording this conclusion, which of course does not rule out further informal contacts on this issue, it would be remiss not to note some constructive trends that in my view emerged from our consultations. It became clear that:

(a) making further progress towards a nuclear test ban remains the undisputed goal of the Ad Hoc Working Group, and that

(b) the substantive elaboration of essential prerequisites for a treaty is recognized as specifically contributing to this goal.

Those delegations which supported the present mandate at the time of its conception, a mandate that lays emphasis on issues relating to verification and compliance, continue to do so. At the same time, these delegations have confirmed that they do not intend in any way to bar other delegations from forwarding views on particular issues that, in their opinion, have a bearing on the verification and compliance aspects of the prospective treaty as a whole. This flexibility would seem to open the way for a broadly ranging substantive examination by the Working Group, under its present mandate, of most, if not all, essential and relevant issues relating to that point on the agenda.

The Chair firmly hopes that the clarification thus obtained will assist the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group in carrying out his important task in a constructive spirit.

Mr. NUNEZ MOSQUERA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has taken note of the summary you have just given us, and I should like to state that we deeply regret that, in spite of the extensive support given to the proposal of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/181, it has not proved

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possible to reach a consensus in the Committee on the establishment of a working group to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and the final clauses of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests.

Since we are discussing questions of procedure, I should like to take advantage of the occasion to ask you a question about a proposal made at an earlier plenary meeting by the distinguished alternate representative of Mexico, acting in her capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21, when she requested the Chairman of the Committee to hold consultations at informal meetings with a view to the setting up of two working groups on item 2 of our agenda, one on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the other on the prevention of nuclear war. My delegation would be grateful if you could tell us, Mr. Chairman, as far as you are able, how you intend to proceed with respect to that request.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Cuba for his intervention and is pleased to reply to Mr. Nuñez Mosquera's question. This matter is indeed the subject of informal consultations; it will be further discussed at a meeting of the co-ordinators of the various groups and China which is scheduled for tomorrow morning, when this will be a specific issue to be dealt with in that informal consultation. The Committee will, of course, be informed as early as possible of the plans that exist or may emerge in that respect. The distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic has asked for the floor: I am pleased to give it to him.

Mr. THIELICKE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, you just made a statement on the mandate of the nuclear test ban Working Group. Could I request you kindly to distribute that statement?

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair will be pleased to comply with that request. If there are no further requests for the floor at this moment, I will suspend the meeting until 3.30 this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 12.45 p.m., and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 212th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

The Committee will now listen to those speakers who very kindly agreed to defer their statements this morning in view of the time limitations imposed upon us, and I am pleased to call upon the first speaker for this afternoon, Mr. Don Nanjira of Kenya. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, it is amazing how paradoxes and paradoxical situations have become so overwhelmingly numerous in the discussions and negotiations held on the problems of disarmament, development and international security. The expression "great powers" or "major powers" is a political expression which, for the past 38 years at least, has been associated with those States members of the international community which, because of their "greatness" in wealth and political status and power in the world, and the "victorious" role they played in the Second World War, were given the heavy and primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. So, they proudly accepted their baptism of "custodians of the peace", the "victorious powers" and the like. And obviously, proudest among them were two which, for very obvious reasons, assumed the super-name of "superpowers". It is fascinating to note the definition of the expression "superpower". An authoritative dictionary has defined superpower as power, especially mechanical or electric power on an extraordinary scale secured by the linking together of a number of separate power systems, with a view to more efficient and economical generation and distribution.

If I may paraphrase this definition, it is not difficult to see the conditions for the successful functioning of a system to which the superpowers belong. First, they ought to cultivate trust and confidence in each other and collaborate through contact, consultation and co-ordination, as well as harmonization of their activities. Secondly, they should not use their potentials and potentialities for destructive purposes. And thirdly, they ought to aim at efficiency and not extravagance, as well as sharing their possessions with others for peaceful purposes.

For, what greatness is there in being wealthy in the midst of poverty, inequality and human misery? What greatness is there in talking about world peace and security and in claiming to be a custodian of the peace when insecurity surrounds all, and wars and armed conflicts occur while the great and the powerful watch and are unable to assure even a durable cease-fire? What greatness is there in squandering colossal amounts of money on armaments which are incapable of buying enduring peace and security?

Sentiments have been expressed herein and elsewhere that "1983 is going to be a crucial year for disarmament". But, if I may ask, what is going to make 1983 "a crucial year" for disarmament, and when exactly will this be? Will the year be "crucial" for disarmament, or for armament? How can it be "crucial" for disarmament when the war of words and tensions in East-West relations and over nuclear weapons are already exceptionally intense? We are already in mid-April, and before long the summer will arrive, and soon thereafter, in the autumn, we shall have to report to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the work of

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this Committee for 1983. What will have happened by then? Shall we be in a position to present to the General Assembly this coming autumn a revised text of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, even with less brackets than it has now? If we cannot answer this question in the affirmative, then why talk about 1983 being a crucial year for disarmament? Surely, we would be better off to wish that 1983 be a critical year for disarmament. But words alone will not bring this about. The significance of such a year for disarmament can only lie in action — the type of action that has been called for by the recently concluded seventh summit Meeting of the non-aligned nations and the type of action that is called for by those who are genuinely and seriously interested in disarmament negotiations.

It so happens that the Committee on Disarmament has a list of "permanent" areas of work, better known as the "decalogue", and that the flexibility of the Committee's rules of procedure allows us to address any of the items in the decalogue at any time and in any form we deem fit. A grand design indeed. But supposing we did not have such rules of procedure, how on earth would we have justified the kind of situation that persisted in this Committee for seven to eight long weeks? If the Committee cannot agree on mere procedural issues for such a length of time — and I would add here that it was 16 weeks altogether, if we take into account the informal consultations that were held on the Committee's agenda and work programme for 1983, beginning on 30 November 1982 in New York — if it has taken so long and to date we have not been able to resolve these issues the way we should, then I wonder how long it will take us to agree on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; I wonder how long it will take us to agree on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; I wonder how long it will take us to agree on a comprehensive programme of disarmament; I wonder how long it will take us to agree on the prevention of nuclear war, to mention but several of the issues before the Committee for negotiation, and, most of all, I wonder how long it will take us to agree on and attain complete and general disarmament under effective international control.

Procedure, then, and the lack of commitment on the part of some, as well as their unwillingness to negotiate and translate into concrete action their utterances and even decisions and resolutions of the international community, have become the greatest enemy and the greatest impediments to progress in the work of this Committee. By the time the Committee convened on 1 February for the first part of its 1983 session, I had sensed the mood reigning then among the delegations and that was why I hastened to make my delegation's first statement at the very first meeting of this session of the Committee. In that statement, I said, among other things:

> "Thus ... I have the following practical proposals to make: —
> One: we should dismiss, i.e., decide on, procedural issues as soon as possible and adopt our work programme for this session of the Committee this week ...
> Two ... I hold the view that the existing subsidiary bodies should be re-established on an automatic basis at the beginning of every session of the Committee, unless a decision is taken to the contrary prior to the convening of the session, which decision would, for instance, call for the suspension or abolition of a given subsidiary body of the Committee."

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

That sentiment was expressed once again by the Yugoslav delegation a month and two days later, on 3 March, and has since then been cited as the Yugoslav proposal, in the following words:

> "The Committee should, in the view of my [i.e. the Yugoslav] delegation, reach an agreement most urgently ... Such an agreement should stipulate that, once an item has been placed on the agenda or a working group with an already existing mandate established, they should be automatically renewed at the beginning of each year's session of the Committee."

My delegation looks forward impatiently to participating in discussions aimed at enhancing the competence of the Committee on Disarmament to tackle the questions brought before it for resolution. No one who is genuinely and seriously concerned about the early conclusion of the work of this Committee — the single multilateral Committee charged with the heaviest responsibility of paving the way for the very survival of humankind itself — can be proud of the Committee's performance, when it takes 15 weeks to finalize its agenda, and 16 weeks to finalize a work programme for its current session. One hopes that that will never happen again. We hope that the Committee will find and indeed devise a better and faster way of disposing of such difficulties. We hope, Mr. Chairman, that you will do your utmost to secure agreement on procedural issues before the Committee meets for its summer session. Even if it would mean your initiating now informal consultations on the agenda and work programme for the Committee's summer session of 1983, my delegation would fully support such a move. Even if it would mean subjecting these questions to a separate discussion now, in order to avoid future procedural wrangles on these issues within the Committee, I would fully support such a move. Even if it would mean adopting now a procedural rule which would obligate the Committee to decide at its previous session on the agenda and work programme for the Committee's next session, I would fully support such a move.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you most sincerely on your assumption of the Committee's chairmanship for the month of April. I am fully aware of the valuable contribution your delegation has made to the work of the Committee. My delegation hence looks forward to the impartial and effective leadership you will be giving us during this session and indeed in the intersessional period. I pledge to you, Sir, the fullest co-operation and support of the Kenya delegation.

Permit me also, Mr. Chairman, to express the deep and sincere gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, for the outstanding job he did during the month of March. We are proud of his untiring efforts which resulted in the removal of the impasse and in the meeting of minds on the agenda and work programme for the Committee's spring session of 1983.

The item concerning disarmament and development is almost dormant on the agenda of the Committee. In fact, it is so very rarely talked about in the Committee that it appears as if it were non-existent! Thanks to the efforts of a few observers, however, delegations are reminded about the item from time to time. And here, permit me to pay a sincere tribute to the work done by Mr. and Mrs. Whittle of the Quaker Liaison Office in Geneva. Peter and Margaret Whittle have regularly and consistently organized informal get-togethers to discuss issues of disarmament,

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including the fundamental question of disarmament and development. I very much appreciate your efforts, Mr. Chairman, and my delegation urges you and of course the Whittles, whom I don't see -- I thought they would be here this afternoon -- and I urge you, Mr. Chairman, and I urge them to continue with your efforts and their involvement because I do know that the sentiments and words expressed at meetings -- those meetings which Mr. and Mrs. Whittle organize at their house -- those words and those sentiments do not fall on deaf ears as they do so often in this Committee.

Let us make no mistake about this: the talk about peace and security has little or no meaning, and world peace and security are unattainable, unless and until the problems of poverty, hunger and inequality, malnutrition and ignorance, illiteracy and ill-health, unemployment, you name them all -- the socio-economic problems that cause human misery -- are tackled and resolved. Ignorance breeds fear and violence; hunger breeds desperation and violence; poverty and inequality breed envy, demoralization, crime and violence; unemployment breeds deprivation, want, civil disobedience and violence. Poverty, hunger, ignorance, inequality and their derivatives breed insecurity, and the latter always calls into being, always prompts national as well as international consequences.

Today, then, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, and of course under rule 30 of the Committee's rules of procedures, I wish to address myself to the question of disarmament and development. I must hurriedly add that, as a delegation, we attach the greatest importance to this item VII on the Committee's decalogue. The reduction of military budgets, item V of the decalogue, is closely related to item VII. We shall discuss it here and elsewhere, in the appropriate forums of the United Nations. To the great surprise of many of us, some delegations herein participating have refused to acknowledge the close interconnection that exists between disarmament and development. They have even argued that attainment of socio-economic development and of the over-all New International Economic Order is not, and cannot be, an objective of our disarmament negotiations! For those delegations, the advice is simple: take trouble to consult the numerous and relevant literature, including United Nations documentation on the subject. Let us look at a few examples.

For many years, the General Assembly of the United Nations has called for the reduction of military budgets in favour of the social and economic development of all nations and peoples, but in particular of the developing countries. Already in 1950, in its resolution 380 (V) of 17 November 1950, for instance, the General Assembly stressed, in operative paragraph 2, point (2) (d), the necessity for every nation to agree "to reduce to a minimum the diversion for armaments of its human and economic resources and to strive towards the development of such resources for the general welfare, with due regard of the under-developed areas of the world". For ten years, between 1954 and 1964, the call for reductions in military budgets was constantly made at the United Nations, and whether the reductions would be made unilaterally or through legally binding international agreements, the central message was always the same: it makes absolute sense to deploy the scarce resources (human, material and financial resources) on socio-economic development rather than for destructive purposes.

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In another resolution, 1516 (XV) adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1960, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was requested to examine, among other things:

The national economic and social consequences of disarmament in countries having different economic systems and being at different stages of economic development, as well as in different economic situations, in order to absorb the human and material resources released from military uses;

The possibility of adopting corrective measures with respect to structural imbalances in national economies through, inter alia, expanded capital assistance to underdeveloped countries;

The impact of disarmament on international economic and trade relations, and especially its impact on the trade of the underdeveloped or developing countries; and

The utilization of resources released by disarmament for the purpose of economic and social development, in particular of the developing countries.

The question of reductions in military expenditures was also the subject of a proposal contained in a memorandum on disarmament presented by the French delegation as far back as July 1955 at the so-called Geneva Summit of July 1955, which was attended by the Heads of State of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The French initiative was most welcome, because it proposed that the resources made available by reductions in military budgets be used in whole or in part to assist underdeveloped countries. Another similar initiative was crowned with a General Assembly resolution 914 (X), adopted later in the same year (1955), in which a request was made for the publication and exchange of information regarding military expenditures and budgets, and the States concerned, especially Canada, France, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom — which had become members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that was formed on 19 April 1954 — were urged to study the French proposals for the allocation of funds resulting from disarmament for improving the standards of living everywhere in the world but in particular in the developing or less developed countries. The subsequent years saw many other calls for such allocations and reallocations for socio-economic development.

But unfortunately, the popularity of the idea of reducing military expenditures was overshadowed by a new phase of the arms race. The turning point occurred in 1962. On the one hand, tensions in East-West relations intensified the mistrust between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty alliances and thereby prompted an acceleration of the arms race. (Today, 20 years later, we seem to be experiencing a similar situation!) On the other hand, around 1962 decolonization had reached a point of no return and had, in fact, become an irresistible force on the international scene. Thenceforth, the demands for decolonization, disarmament and development became very closely interrelated and had, as they have now, their fortress in the third world.

Since then, the most earnest call for disarmament in favour of development, in particular of the developing countries, has always come from the third world. Only very rarely indeed, as I have said, does one hear of a genuine pronouncement on the issue from the countries of the North. When Mr. Andreani of France addressed this Committee on 10 March 1983, he raised my hopes, but he did not, unfortunately,

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elaborate on his remark. He said: "The question of disarmament and development today constitute the two main objectives of co-operation between the nations. Mrs. Gandhi has just reaffirmed this at the opening of the summit meeting of the non-aligned countries". Again, two important statements emanating from the North which were among the very few well-balanced and meaningful statements delivered at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament touched on this issue. One was by Mr. Claude Cheysson, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the other was by Mr. Helmut Schmidt, the then Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In his statement, Mr. Cheysson said in part:

"Lastly, can one speak of the third world and its independence without also speaking of development? .... My Government believes that it is time to begin the transfer to development of the human and financial resources now fuelling the arms race .... I want to say that among the many inequalities to which the third world is condemned by the international order — or rather, the present international disorder — the inequality in security is one of the most shocking. To provide for their security, too many third world countries must draw upon their necessary minimum for life, whereas the superpowers finance their over-armament by skimming off the top of their higher quality of life ....".

Talking about what he called the "open challenge", Mr. Helmut Schmidt said in part:

"An impenetrable web of secrecy sows the seeds of mistrust and impedes the conclusion of concrete agreements .... This year, for the third time my country has submitted its figures to the standardized reporting system of the United Nations for military expenditure .... Up to now the countries of the Warsaw Pact have not participated at all .... I appeal to all Governments to join in these important efforts aimed at greater openness in military expenditure ....".

We very much hope to hear more from those two Governments and indeed from the other governments of developed and industrialized as well as centrally planned countries, on the questions of reduction of military expenditures (budgets) and the interconnection between disarmament and development.

I stress this point because the available and competent literature contains shocking revelations on global expenditures on the arms race and on armaments in general. In his statement, for instance, to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly on 12 October 1979, Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba and President of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, said inter alia:

"According to statistical data, as I stated at the inaugural session of the Sixth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, world military expenditures amount to more than $300 billion a year. This sum could build 600,000 schools, with a capacity for 400 million children; or 60 million comfortable homes for 500 million peoples or 30,000 hospitals, with 18 million beds; or 20,000 factories, with jobs for more than 20 million workers; or an irrigation system

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for 150 million hectares of land that, with the application of technology, could feed a billion people. Mankind wastes this much every year on military spending. Moreover, consider the enormous quantities of young human resources, technicians, fuel, raw materials and other items. This is the fabulous price of preventing a true climate of confidence and peace from existing in the world ...".

I did, on that occasion, count the number of applauses given in the General Assembly in support of President Castro's assertions: there were 17 applauses and a long standing ovation at the end of his statement. That was in 1979, and barely three years later — by the end of 1982 — the total world expenditures on armaments had increased by more than 200 per cent; it amounted to 650 billion United States dollars. Imagine the amount of developmental activity for peaceful purposes the $650 billion could accomplish. Is peace assured now more than it was in 1979? Of course not! On the contrary, the world was a safer place to live in then than it is now. What a paradox! It is incredible; it is insane, it is indeed inhuman that $650 billion should be squandered per year on the arms race, when tens of millions of people throughout the world live in absolute poverty, when more than 800 million people suffer from chronic hunger and malnutrition, when more than 900 million people — close to 1 billion people — are illiterate, when 250 million children are deprived of school education, and and when 1,500 million people are denied medical facilities.

In 1982 alone, 23 States — the 16 members of the NATO and the 7 members of the Warsaw Treaty military alliances combined — spent $260 billion, which was 40 per cent of the total amount of money squandered on armaments in that year alone. China spent $110.5 billion on armaments in 1982, and that was 17 per cent of the total amount of dollars spent on armaments last year. The rest of the members of the international community spent $247 billion on armaments in 1982, i.e. 38 per cent of the total military expenditures in that year. These shocking revelations also indicate that the total military expenditures of 1982 were much more than the total income of 1.5 billion people living in the 50 poorest countries of the world. Furthermore, it has been established that the price of one modern fighter plane would suffice to innoculate 3 million children against major childhood diseases. The price of one nuclear submarine with its missiles would provide 100,000 working years of nursing care for old people. Also, more than $1 million per minute is spent on the arms race. And the total world military spending per day is currently $1.66 billion.

But despite these colossal amounts of dollars wasted annually on the crazy arms race, no genuine security has been bought so far, and the clear indication — the truth — is that the more the expenditures on armaments, the higher will be the interests and unemployment of the developed countries, the lower will be the economic growth and productivity growth rates of these countries, the higher will be inflation, the more the human misery and, consequently, the less the security of all peoples and nations.

So far I have been examining the financial resources wasted on the arms race. Let me now say something about the human resources squandered on the arms race. Currently, about 50 million people are directly or indirectly engaged in military activities all over the world. A breakdown in this figure indicates that 25 million people serve in regular armed forces; 10 million in paramilitary forces; 4 million are civilians; 5 million are workers directly engaged in defence production; and 500,000 scientists and engineers are engaged in military research and development. This includes the world's topmost scientists and engineers and in fact the figure

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represents, as we all know, 20 per cent of all qualified scientists and engineers in the world. The total annual expenditure on military research and development is about $35 billion. This is about 25 per cent of the total annual expenditure on all research and development. And as we all know, the monopoly in the world's total research and development rests with a handful of countries — the Soviet Union, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Japan. The other personnel directly engaged in military activities throughout the world number 5.5 million people.

The third dimension of the scarce resources squandered on armaments consists in non-renewable energy and mineral resources. Anybody interested in finding out details about the use of these resources for military purposes should read the competent study made by E.E. Hughes and others, entitled Strategic resources and national security: an initial assessment (publ.: Menlo Park, Stanford Research Institute, 1975). There is a general consensus, even in other documentation dealing with the same subject, including the United Nations study contained in document A/36/356 and The global 2000 report to the President: entering the 21st century (publ. Government Printing Press, 1980), vol. II, pp. 206-207. All these studies indicate that 5 to 6 per cent of the total global consumption of petroleum is used world-wide for military purposes; and that from 3 to 11 per cent of the vital minerals are used world-wide for military purposes in this order: copper - 11.1 per cent; lead - 8.1 per cent; aluminium - 6.3 per cent; nickel - 6.3 per cent; fluospar - 6 per cent; zinc - 6 per cent; silver - 6 per cent; the platinum group - 5.7 per cent; tin - 5.1 per cent; iron ore - 5.1 per cent; mercury - 4.5 per cent; chromium - 3.9 per cent; tungsten - 3.6 per cent and manganese - 2.1 per cent.

International trade in arms consumes about $26 billion per year. It has been estimated that, on average, 1 United States tax dollar in 6 is devoted to military expenditure, which means that at the present levels of military spending, the average taxpayer can expect over his lifetime to give up 3 or 4 years of his income to the arms race. And yet this will not at all bring him peace and greater security. It has also been estimated that if the current world expenditure on armaments of $650 billion per annum continues, then by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the total annual global military expenditure will be $2 trillion. And yet this will not bring mankind greater peace or greater security!

And so, if I give you all these facts and figures, it is not because I want to overwhelm you with them; it is not because I want to bother you with them. No; it is because I want to share with you and with everybody else seated around this table, my strongest conviction that genuine and lasting world peace will never ever be found in military competition; it will never ever be found in military confrontation and conflict which currently dominate relations among nations. Rather we must seek enduring world peace and security through consultation; we must seek it through conversation, through compromise; through confidence-building efforts and trust; through co-operation and understanding and good will among nations, and we must seek it through commitment to political agreements and decisions taken in the political, military and socio-economic fields. Reductions in military spending and the redeployment of the resources squandered on the arms race to social and economic development would not only increase the prospects for resumed growth in the world economy; they would also convert to civilian uses the scientific, technological and technical resources now being used for destructive military purposes. Such reductions would also be consistent with the repeated call of the international community for structural changes to be brought about in the existing unjust and inequitable system of international economic relations. They would, in short, facilitate and accelerate the attainment of the New International Economic Order.

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Those who oppose spending more resources on development rather than on armaments always associate the expression "development" with the developing countries and believe that the talk about socio-economic development favours the developing countries and should be their business. Anybody who holds this view is terribly wrong. Granted that the South is characterized by underdevelopment whose constituent elements include poverty, chronic hunger, disease and squalor, the fact still remains that there is no society on earth and no country in the world which does not experience poverty. Even in the midst of the overdevelopment, wastage and affluence of the North, poverty is not at all lacking. It is, paradoxically, one of the greatest evils of affluence. Most of the people in the world are poor because they inhabit countries in which per capita national income and output in general are very low relative to population. In the affluent countries, very many people are poor, not because of low per capita income, but because of the unjust system of distributing or dividing output among the country's residents and also because of governmental policies of wastage — for instance, wastage of resources on the arms race.

This is why the resounding outcry against armament favours the social and economic development firstly of all nations and their peoples, and then in particular of the developing countries. Why "in particular of the developing countries"? Why should the North assist in the socio-economic development of the developing countries? The reasons for such assistance are many and varied and are very well known to all of us. The question of greater equality between the North and the South, between the "haves" and "have-nots", between the peoples of the various countries, has been very widely recognized and proclaimed as the main and fundamental moral imperative of our time.

From time immemorial, the history of family relations, of international relations and of community relations is full of the recognition and application of the principle that the interests of the community, whether that is a family, a community of a nation or all nations, must be protected by all, and that the rich and powerful have a socio-moral obligation to assist the poor and the weak. Abraham Lincoln, that eternal model of justice and equality, once said, 121 years ago: "I hold that while man exists, it is his duty not only to improve his own condition but to assist in ameliorating mankind's ...".

Secondly, if the scarce resources spent by the North on the arms race were to be diverted and reallocated to the South, the resources would substantially improve the South's per capita gross domestic product, industrial employment and capital stock, and would provide significant economic gains for all regions of the world, including the most developed region among them, i.e., the North.

Thirdly, the South provides an enormous market for the North. The South also has many markets in the North. In the field of raw materials, for example, the North consumes far more aluminum, copper, nickel, platinum, tin, rubber, manganese, tungsten and cobalt than the over-all demand of these commodities in Africa, Asia and Latin America combined. And yet it is these third world regions that are the main producers of these minerals. I must hasten to add that the economies of the developed countries increasingly depend on the ability of the developing countries both to purchase the former's exports and to supply them with important raw materials, including in particular those minerals which the developed countries use for military purposes. With the intensification of the arms race, the North's

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consumption of minerals and energy (petroleum) for military purposes has in fact been steadily and dramatically growing, particularly its consumption of aluminium, titanium, beryllium and other relatively exotic minerals. In energy terms, petroleum is much more important for the military sector than for the economy as a whole. Most people are not aware of this fact. And most of the oil is, of course, imported from the third world.

Fourthly, the question of national security and national interests is a complex and sensitive issue, which entails domestic as well as foreign policies, especially in the military, political and economic spheres. Therefore, the mutuality of political, strategic and economic interests and vulnerability, as well as national security interests and the shrinking of the world by modern science and technology, dictate that the North should help the South overcome its economic problems and this in turn will help to improve the international political climate and to bring about universal political stability and peace.

The close relationship existing between disarmament and development was recognized by the international community long before the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, for instance, the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade adopted on 24 October 1970, stipulated as follows:

> "Progress towards general and complete disarmament should release substantial additional resources which could be utilized for the purpose of economic and social development, in particular that of developing countries. There should, therefore, be a close link between the Second United Nations Development Decade and the Disarmament Decade".

The provisions in the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, adopted on 5 December 1980, are more specific, and the attainment of development through disarmament was recognized as an important objective. Paragraph 39 of the Strategy for the 1980s reads thus:

> "There is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and should contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries".

The relevant provisions of the Final Document are too well known to be cited here by me, but what is important is not the existence of these paragraphs, including paragraphs 16, 35 (which is identical with paragraph 39 of the Third Development Strategy), 89 and 90, but the application of these provisions — the translation into concrete action of the relevant paragraphs and chapters of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of the United Nations Charter and of any other document adopted by the International community. The time to act is now!!

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for his contribution and in particular for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen. His generous words of praise to my predecessor are of course well deserved. As for the present Chairman, he can only promise that he will do his utmost not to disappoint the distinguished representative.

I should like to add that Mr. Don Nanjira's words of appreciation for the work of Mr. and Mrs. Whittle were, I believe, a timely reminder of the fact that this Committee does not work in a vacuum, and a well-deserved tribute to the efforts of the many non-governmental organizations and individuals, whatever their political, geographical or ethnic background, who often, without official recognition, have dedicated themselves to the cause of disarmament. I thank Mr. Don Nanjira for this reminder and would like to associate myself with it.

This having been said, I now give the floor to the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I wish this afternoon to speak briefly on the subject of radiological weapons, which figures on our programme of work for this week, and to introduce the working paper (document CD/374) which was on our tables this morning, setting out the views of my delegation on certain questions relating to the scope and definition of a radiological weapons treaty. This paper was in fact the fruit of our reflections on the discussion that took place in the radiological weapons Working Group in the spring session of last year, but it did not seem appropriate to introduce it until the Group had begun its substantive work again. Fortunately this is now the case, and I believe that it is now timely to share these thoughts with the Committee.

The working paper deals first with the definition of radiological weapons as we believe they were originally conceived by the joint authors of the draft treaty tabled in 1980. There are obvious difficulties in defining a weapon which does not exist; but it seems to us that the key features of such a weapon would be that it would function by dispersing or disseminating radioactive material in the environment, and that it would be so designed that the primary danger would arise from exposure to the dispersed radioactive material. The means of dispersion might be an explosion but our definition must include sprays, aerosols or any other method of dispersing radioactive material in large quantity.

A major point of difficulty in defining a radiological weapon lies in how to make clear that nuclear weapons are excluded from the treaty. It has not so far been possible to find language acceptable to all delegations on this point. The United Kingdom delegation has, as the Committee will be aware, made some suggestions as to a "positive" definition, but neither this definition nor others which have been put forward have been found to be wholly satisfactory. We have come to the conclusion that the "positive" definition which some delegations wish to have may be unattainable. Those put forward so far are really "negative" definitions in another guise. We have not been able to find a method of saying only what a radiological weapon is, without at the same time saying what it is not. The United Kingdom delegation would prefer, therefore, that the definition adopted should specifically exclude nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in so many words, i.e. that we should have what has been termed in the Working Group a "negative" definition. Such a definition has, in our view, a greater possibility of being unambiguous and unmistakable in intent.

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The working paper that we have tabled also considers the scope of a treaty as it relates to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. I will only summarize briefly the arguments on this point because they are set out fully in the paper. Firstly, we draw attention to the fact that the question of attacks on nuclear electricity-generating stations are already covered in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, and to the risk of confusion if this question were also dealt with in another legal instrument. Secondly, we argue that there are fundamental dissimilarities between the use of radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities which make it inappropriate for these two matters to be dealt with in a single legal instrument. In the first case, an attack would employ a weapon or means of dispersal specifically designed to disseminate radioactive material, and this material would presumably be contained in the weapon itself. In the second case, an attack on a nuclear facility, not only is the radioactive material not delivered by the weapon system, but the immediate vehicle of attack could be a weapon of a conventional type which would not, of course, be banned by the treaty. We find serious conceptual difficulties in bringing together these two ideas. We conclude that the fact that both the use of radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities would have the effect of causing damage by dispersal of radioactive material is too narrow a reason for attempting to prohibit them within a single legal instrument.

Finally, our paper comments on the differences of view which were expressed in the Working Group last year among those delegations which wish in principle to see a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities included within the scope of the treaty. In particular it draws attention to the differences as to whether military facilities should be excluded from the treaty, and whether there should be a lower limit on the size of facilities which should be included in any prohibition. It seems to my delegation that these questions must be resolved if any progress is to be made.

However, the fact that we have agreed that there should be further exploratory discussions with this aim in mind and that these should be held separately within the radiological weapons Working Group should not be taken as acceptance on the part of my delegation of the idea that the Committee on Disarmament is necessarily the most appropriate body in which any subsequent negotiations on attacks on nuclear facilities, if such were agreed to, should be completed. We retain, as hitherto, an open mind on this question.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should first of all like to express our gratitude for the distribution this afternoon of the text of the statement you made at our meeting this morning. In connection with that statement concerning the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, the Mongolian delegation, on behalf of the group of socialist countries, would like to state that we understand that statement as expressing the intention of the Chair, in accordance with the Committee's decision of 29 March, to continue its efforts to reach a positive solution to the question of the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We of course assume that the discussion of the question of the broadening of the mandate of the Working Group will continue, and that the Committee will continue to have that matter constantly under its purview until it is finally settled. On that basis, we consider your statement, Mr. Chairman, as an interim report, for which we are extremely grateful to you.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, shortly before suspending today's plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, you said that in your view there was a lack of consensus on the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. You also said that you had noted certain constructive elements and a greater flexibility on the part of the delegations which are opposed to the broadening of the mandate and that this would allow the Ad Hoc Working Group to hold a wide-ranging substantive consideration of the questions within its competence.

My delegation has already expressed its view regarding the urgent need to broaden the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. I regret to have to state that we find it difficult to be optimistic about the future of the work of that Group. You spoke about flexibility on the part of certain delegations, Mr. Chairman. If that flexibility is constant and real, what, then, prevents it being adequately expressed in a specific mandate? The only thing that appears to be preventing this the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body from initiating appropriate negotiations towards the conclusion of a treaty on that subject -- a treaty which the international community is demanding more and more urgently -- is the persistent and systematic opposition of two delegations to the starting of such negotiations in this Committee.

But there are other questions also. In your statement today, Mr. Chairman, you said that certain constructive trends had emerged in the course of the discussions at the Committee's formal and informal meetings, and in this connection you indicated in your point (b) that it had become clear that "the substantive elaboration of essential prerequisites for a treaty is recognized as specifically contributing to this goal". I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, what these words mean. Are you trying to tell us that verification is an essential prerequisite for the Ad Hoc Working Group to be able to negotiate? You also said that the delegations opposed to the broadening of the mandate "do not intend in any way to bar other delegations from forwarding views on particular issues that, in their opinion, have a bearing on the verification and compliance aspects ...". It would seem that the magnanimity of those delegations that are opposed to the broadening of the mandate has made them forget two things. The first is that rule 30 of our rules of procedure says that "it is the right of any member State of the Committee to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention". I think it is necessary to recall that this rule applies also to the subsidiary bodies -- that is, to the ad hoc working groups, and in this instance to the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. The second point is that last year, in the report which the Committee on Disarmament submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, it was recognized that the Working Group was going to discuss questions related to verification and compliance. In this connection allow me to recall paragraph 9 of the report of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which states: "It was generally recognized that in the examination of issues relating to verification and compliance, consideration should be given to all relevant aspects of a nuclear test ban". What, then, is the meaning of the statement that the delegations that are opposed to the broadening of the mandate will not bar the discussion of other issues within the framework of the Working Group?

In order not to prolong this meeting, allow me to conclude by indicating the position of the Group of 21 concerning the urgent need to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In that connection I should like to recall the views of the Group of 21 on the elements which should constitute such a treaty, as set forth in document CD/223. We believe that multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test-ban treaty should be undertaken without further delay. The object of such a treaty should be the general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by all

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States in all environments and for all time. It should be equitable and non-discriminatory so as to be able to win universal adherence.

It is almost 20 years since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. There have been 50 General Assembly resolutions indicating to us the urgent need to conclude such an instrument. This is the negotiating body par excellence; the means for negotiating is the Working Group. In order to function properly and begin negotiations, the Working Group must have a specific mandate. It is up to this Committee to give it such a mandate. If there is a political will to negotiate an instrument, this Committee should do so. Otherwise, the Committee will, in time, be responsible for the choice between the following alternatives which are inexorably taking shape: either a treaty is concluded prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests or the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons will inevitably increase.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Mr. García Moritan for his contribution and would like to reply briefly to the questions that were asked. First, it is, of course, clear to all members of the Committee that the summary which the Chair presented this morning is, and remains, the view of the Chair -- the view of the situation as seen from the Chair in its exclusive responsibility. It does not present or pretend to represent everyone's views around the table; it is not what I would call a negotiated document. Secondly, the foremost intention of the Chair was to go a little beyond the mere statement that on the question of a possible revision of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban no consensus could be found so far. Such a bold statement would, in the view of the Chair, have the effect of a purely negative statement, and might have given the erroneous impression that therefore work on that very important issue was virtually impossible. This is not the view of the Chair. However unsatisfactory the present mandate may be in the eyes of some delegations, it still allows for a quantity of useful and necessary work to be done, while -- and this is of course open to all members of the Committee -- informal contacts, consultations or whatever is necessary, can simultaneously be pursued to see whether perhaps now or later a revised mandate could come into operation. The Chair could only state that this, at present, is not the case, while indicating that even so -- and particularly in view of the many words of regret that have been expressed around this table at the fact that we have lost so much time in discussion of procedure that little time remains for the work on substance -- there is an amount of work on substance that can be done under the present mandate. The Chair believes that it voiced the opinion of many around this table that it is time we got down to that substantial work. It is, of course, true that when I used the word prerequisite, I meant it in a fairly general sense: there are a number of subjects, a number of elements that will be of importance to any form of nuclear test ban which will, hopefully, eventually emerge and on which useful work can be done. It is equally true that, under rule 30, any subjects can be brought up by any delegation in this forum or in its subsidiary bodies, but if we apply that rule too widely, why, then, would a working group need a mandate? In fact, I believe the mandate serves the purpose of orienting the work of a working group towards a specific target and as such, is of importance and, it is only too true, must be a negotiated document. I shall leave my comments at that, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles. You have the floor Sir.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation had from the outset interpreted the statement you made to us this morning in the way you have just indicated, that is, as one through which you hoped to encourage the members of the Committee by showing them that in spite of all the difficulties some useful work could still be done in this sphere. My delegation shares that view and would simply add that what the distinguished representative of Argentina has just said is an accurate reflection of the facts. This subject is different from many others in which the delegations that it is customary to call those of the East are on one side while those of the West are on the other side. Here, as we all know, the delegations of the Group of 21, the delegations of the socialist countries and a number of delegations from western Europe and other countries have for many years been anxious to secure progress on this matter of the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

I share and applaud the aim you had in mind in your statement, Mr. Chairman, but I should like at the same time to express certain reservations with respect to it. The first paragraph is merely factual, and calls for no comment. The second paragraph says the following: "After the debate that took place in the plenary sessions of the Committee on 5 and 7 April and last Tuesday's informal exchange of views, it has once again become clear that a number of delegations hold the view that the existing mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group is too narrow and that its scope should therefore be widened". This is a very concise but current description, and it is also right that this description should come before that of the other position, since it is, I believe, the position of some 35 or 38 delegations. You then describe the position that is principally that of two delegations, in the following way: "Other delegations are of the opinion that the present mandate has not nearly been exhausted and that a great deal of useful work can still be done under this present mandate". I do not know whether this description satisfies the other group -- that very small group I mentioned, but that is a matter for them to decide. Your statement, Mr. Chairman, continues: "Consequently, no consensus has emerged on a revision of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, either by drawing on the proposal tabled by the Group of 21 in 1981 (document CD/181), since then revised by India, or on the draft proposed by the group of socialist countries in Working Paper No. 95". Your statement then goes on as follows: "While recording this conclusion, which of course does not rule out further informal contacts on this issue, it would be remiss not to note some constructive trends that in my view emerged from our consultations. It became clear that: (a) making further progress towards a nuclear test ban remains the undisputed goal of the Ad Hoc Working Group" -- no one can object to that -- "and that (b) the substantive elaboration of essential prerequisites for a treaty is recognized as specially contributing to this goal". Here everything depends, as the distinguished representative of Argentina said, on what is meant by "essential prerequisites". But since it is up to each delegation to interpret this as it sees fit, I would have no difficulties with this either. After that, however, I believe that, as you did in the second paragraph, you ought to have begun by saying something about the position of those delegations that want to broaden the mandate. I shall tell you what I would have said had I been in your place. I would have begun by saying the following: "Those delegations which consider that the present mandate should be revised, stressed that they do not intend in any way to bar other delegations from stating their views on the verification and compliance aspects of the prospective treaty. They reaffirmed that they only desired that the mandate be drafted in terms consistent with paragraph 31 of the Final Document, which provides that 'the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement'". The paragraph would then have continued with what you have said: "Those delegations which supported the present mandate at the time of its conception, ...". I would then have concluded with your last paragraph: "The Chair firmly hopes that the clarification thus obtained will assist the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group in

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carrying out his important task in a constructive spirit". I would simply add that since reference has been made here to informal meetings, it might perhaps have been advisable to complete that reference by expressly mentioning the suggestion made by a distinguished member of the Group of 21, which was supported by a number of delegations, including my own, that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group should begin, through informal consultations with the various members of the Group, to try to find a way out of the impasse which has unfortunately been reached.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Garcia Robles for his remarks. Without wishing to turn this meeting into a dialogue between individual members and the Chair, I would like to say that the Chair never cherished the illusion that a summing up of this character would be, to the letter, acceptable to every single delegation around this table, nor would the Chair claim to be capable of doing work to absolute perfection, certainly not when matching itself against such long-standing experts as yourselves. But the Chair is very glad to note that at least the general intention of its summing up could find approval. The distinguished representative of the United States of America has asked for the floor. Ambassador Fields, you have the floor.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I find it personally distasteful to have to exercise a right of reply to statements made in the Committee by distinguished visitors who come here to present the views of their governments; however, I cannot let stand unchallenged inaccurate allegations directed against my country and the security policies of my Government. Hence, I feel compelled to respond to the remarks made this morning by the distinguished Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland. He inaccurately characterized the security policies of my Government as an attempt to achieve military superiority and to undermine the political and territorial realities in Europe. He also questioned the sincerity of the United States Government's proposals designed to reduce the burden of armaments in the world, and particularly in Europe.

We regret the tone and content of this statement and the distortions that it unfortunately contains. My delegation categorically rejects these assertions. United States national security policy and the NATO intermediate-range nuclear force decisions are designed to meet a very real threat to our security and the security of our allies. That threat results from the unprecedented military build-up of the Soviet Union.

A statement such as we heard today may serve the political interests of some countries. Indeed, it appears to be another in a lengthening list of such statements. But it is not a constructive way to seek solutions or advance the substantive work of this Committee. That can only be done within the negotiating process. In the INF negotiations, to which the Deputy Minister referred, my Government recently presented a new proposal for an interim solution designed to improve substantially the chances for success in the face of rejection by the Soviet Union of the zero-option solution, which remains our real goal. It was a proposal which was arrived at after months of patient negotiations, extensive consultation with our allies and careful study of all options to achieve progress on the long and difficult road to a real reduction in nuclear arsenals. As is well known, it was the immediate object of public criticism by the Soviet Foreign Minister. This also is not helpful. Instead of polemics and rhetoric, we should negotiate to arrive at an accommodation. Instead of statements such as we heard today, we should address the real problems of peace and international security in a serious way at the negotiating table.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have asked for the floor, Mr. Chairman, in order to make some comments on the statement you made at today's meeting. The Soviet delegation takes note of your report on the state of affairs as regards the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We do not agree with certain aspects of your statement, in particular your assessment of the numerical relationship between the delegations for and against the broadening of the mandate, and also your remarks on the need to elaborate the prerequisites for a test-ban treaty, as contained in your point (b). However, in view of your explanation that your statement did not claim to reflect the views of all delegations in the Committee, I shall not dwell on these aspects. I should like to go on to the principal assessment you gave and, precisely, to your conclusion that at the present time there is no consensus in favour of the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. Naturally, this situation can hardly satisfy us. Quite the contrary. We therefore expect you, Mr. Chairman, to use your energy, diplomatic skill and artistry to bring the question of the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group to a positive conclusion. The remarks you have made in this connection at this part of our meeting have inspired in us a certain hope on this score. If the question of the revision of the mandate is settled in April, this will make it possible for the Working Group to begin working on the basis of a new mandate from the very first days of the summer part of the session, and this should bring us nearer to the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The Soviet delegation also wishes to say that even before the mandate is broadened it intends to continue actively participating in the work of the Group on the basis of the interpretation of the existing mandate which you gave this morning. We particularly noted your statement that the delegations that are opposed to the broadening of the mandate do not intend to bar other delegations from expressing their views on particular issues that have a bearing on the future treaty. We presume that these delegations, too, for their part, will express their views on those issues.

In conclusion, I should like once more to stress that of course no broadened interpretation of the present mandate can be a substitute for the broadening of that mandate itself, a question on which the Committee took an appropriate decision on 29 March 1983.

Mr. DUARTE (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I do not intend, Sir, to review the declaration which you made this morning: other delegations before me have done that and if I were to attempt to comment on the declaration there would certainly be many traits in common with those that were made before by Ambassador García Robles and Mr. García Moritan. I take it, Sir, as you stated this morning, and as you repeated this afternoon, that these are your views and I respect your views, although my delegation does not always agree entirely with them.

I would only like, at this moment, to express the wish and the hope that your declaration, even if it does contain many aspects which are not completely shared by many delegations around this table, will contribute to making this Committee progress in endeavours which are very important to all of us around this table. My first wish is that the continuation of the efforts to improve the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group will be pursued by you in your capacity as Chairman, with the utmost energy, and I trust that you will do exactly that. The second is that the Working Group will continue to exert its efforts, even with a mandate that is considered by an overwhelming majority of us as inadequate, that it will continue its work, and that the result of whatever endeavours we continue in the Working Group will bring us closer to a treaty that will ban all nuclear-weapon tests.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, my statement will be very brief indeed: it was simply to associate my delegation with the remarks of Mr. Duarte of Brazil about the helpful contribution you have made in your statement. The dimensions of the statement's helpfulness, I think, is readily apparent by the exchange of views we have had on this subject this afternoon. As we have seen, it is an exceedingly difficult issue, a very controversial one. Thank you for your efforts.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Skinner, for your kind words to the Chair. Ambassador Maung Maung Gyi, you have the floor.

Mr. MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. Chairman, I shall be brief. I have today listened carefully to the distinguished representatives who have spoken about the mandate of the Working Group and the statement made by you with regard to this matter. One conclusion that we can draw from this is that there is no consensus with regard to the mandate, and for this reason, to be objective, the real issue that concerns us now is that you, as well as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, should devote your endeavours with a view to enhancing the mandate. While this is going on, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it will not be possible to continue the substantive work of the Group. That is what my delegation believes.

Mr. ALTAF (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, just to say a few words on your statement, even if you have reiterated that it essentially remains your statement. I should like to draw a degree of satisfaction from the fact that what I see as the main feature of the statement, which is the observation on page 2 that "This flexibility would seem to open the way for a broadly ranging substantive examination by the Working Group, under its present mandate, of most, if not all, essential and relevant issues relating to that point on the agenda", has remained unchallenged. I hope that this expression can be built upon by the Chairman of the Working Group while drawing up the programme of work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement. If there are no further speakers, then I should like to announce that, as agreed this morning, the Contact Group on Principles of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet in this conference room immediately after the adjournment of this plenary meeting. Although time is short I believe that the Chairman would still appreciate the meeting to take place. The Group which will deal with proposals for the improved and effective functioning of the Committee will also meet immediately, but instead of meeting in the secretariat offices it will meet in Conference Room C.108 next door.

It remains for me to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 19 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.213
19 April 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 19 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. van Dongen (Netherlands)

GE.83-60936

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. OULD-ROUIS Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. J.C. CARASALES Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
Australia:	Mr. R. STEELE Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Ms. C. FUNES-NOPPEN
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. B. GRINBERG Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U TIN KYAW HLAING U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. G.R. SKINNER Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN Miss C. de VARENNES
China:	Mr. LI LUYE Mr. TIAN JIN Mrs. GE YUYUN
Cuba:	Mr. L. SOLA VILA Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN
	Mr. A.M. ABBAS
	Miss. W. BASSIM
Ethiopia:	Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
France:	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
	Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE
	Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER
	Mr. H. THIELICKE
	Mr. M. NOTZEL
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. F. ELBE
	Mr. W. ROHR
Hungary:	Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. M. DUBEY
	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
	Mr. N. WISNOEMERTI
	Mrs. P. RAMADHAN
	Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
Iran:	Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI
Italy:	Mr. M. ALESSI
	Mr. C.M. OLIVA
	Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI
	Mr. M. KONISHI
	Mr. K. TANAKA
Kenya:	Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. BOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
	Mr. O. HILALE
Netherlands:	Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
	Mr. J. RAMAKER
	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Nigeria:	Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Mr. I.E.C. UKEJE
Pakistan:	Mr. T. ALTAF
Peru:	Mr. P. CANNOCK
	Mr. V. ROJAS
Poland:	Mr. ZAWALONKA
	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Romania:	Mr. T. MELESCANU
	Mr. L. TOADER
Sri Lanka:	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Sweden:	Mr. C.M. HYLTENIUS
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mrs. I. SUNDBERG

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
	Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
	Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN
United Kingdom	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mr. B.P. NOBLE
	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT
United States of America:	Mr. L. FIELDS
	Mr. M. BUSBY
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Mr. W. HECKROTTE
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
	Mr. R. MIKULAK
	Mr. J. HOGAN
	Mr. J. MARTIN
	Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Venezuela:	Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER
	Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Zaïre:	Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

NON-MEMBER STATES

Viet Nam:	Mr. NGUYEN THUONG
Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. R. JAIPAL
Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 213th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee starts today its consideration of item 7 of its agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". As usual, members of the Committee wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Sweden, Kenya, Algeria and Mongolia.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 212th plenary meeting, I shall presently give the floor to the representative of Viet Nam, Ambassador Nguyen Thuong. But before we start the meeting may I, from the Chair, express my sympathy to the delegation of the United States of America, whose Mission in Beirut was the victim of an act of indiscriminate terrorism resulting in a heavy loss of life. I think we can all agree that such acts of terror are to be condemned and can in no way contribute to the pursuit of peace, a cause to which we, as diplomats, are all dedicated. May I also ask the distinguished representative of the United States to convey my condolences to the families of the victims of that attempt. May I now, in accordance with the decision taken at the 212th plenary meeting, invite the representative of Viet Nam, Ambassador Nguyen Thuong, to take the floor.

Mr. NGUYEN THUONG (Viet Nam) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to offer you my congratulations on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee. I am certain that, thanks to your experience and your diplomatic skill, you will be able to guide the work of this Committee to the hoped-for results. I should also like to express my deep gratitude to the distinguished members of the Committee on Disarmament for granting me the possibility of speaking at this plenary meeting. For reasons which you know, my delegation was unfortunately deprived of that possibility during the years 1980-1982. Nevertheless, we have always followed with great interest the discussions taking place in this room and the multifaceted work of the Committee, which is of the utmost importance for peace and for the present and the future of all mankind.

The agenda of the Committee on Disarmament contains many important questions. However, as the countries of the non-aligned movement, of which Viet Nam has the honour to be an active member, stated at their last summit meeting, which was held in New Delhi: "... while nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, efforts should be made to conclude without further delay a treaty banning chemical weapons". Viet Nam is convinced that the question of the prevention of a nuclear war is at the centre of the work of this important multilateral negotiating body: it is clearly the most urgent of all the world problems of the present time, a problem common to all peoples regardless of differences of social systems, way of life or ideology. All States Members of the United Nations ought to respond to the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and take, as soon as possible, adequate measures for the prevention of war, and in particular nuclear war, thereby safeguarding from that danger the very existence of mankind. The Committee on Disarmament ought to spare no effort to reach an agreement on the practical measures to be taken towards that end.

At the same time, the Committee also has before it a question to which the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, like all the non-aligned countries and many other countries, pays very close and sustained attention, namely, the question of the

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prohibition of chemical weapons. No other people in the world in recent decades has suffered as much as the people of Viet Nam the horrible and lasting consequences of the use of toxic chemical substances in war. This barbarous weapon of mass extermination ought to be prohibited as soon as possible.

In connection with this urgent need for a strict prohibition of chemical weapons, I feel it to be my duty, as the representative of the people of Viet Nam and of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, to present to this Committee in this statement some additional information concerning Viet Nam's experience, which is still continuing, of the long-term consequences of the massive and repeated use of chemical substances in the war in Viet Nam during the years 1961 to 1971. I am doing so in the fervent hope that after hearing me the Committee and the countries represented here will be even more determined to spare no effort to accelerate the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, so that the tragedy which struck my country may never be repeated anywhere, against any people.

As you know, an International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature, was held in Ho Chi Minh City at the beginning of this year. The symposium dealt with a subject which is far from being an outmoded theoretical exercise. The emotion caused in recent months in many European countries by the transfer of toxic wastes from the Seveso factory, and the apprehensions of countless veterans of the Indo-Chinese war in America and Australia are evidence of the present-day relevance of the problem. The Ho Chi Minh City symposium was attended by more than 160 scientists and experts, nearly half of whom came from 21 foreign countries, including the United States of America, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, India, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Mongolia, to mention only those countries that are members of this Committee, and in one week the participants heard 72 scientific reports and papers and held very frank exchanges of views, both at plenary meetings and in working groups the rapporteurs of which were all well-known foreign scientists, American, English and Dutch. The symposium was strictly a working conference of scientists whose object was not only to make an objective assessment of existing scientific information but also to identify and encourage the research-work needed and to promote international co-operation to that end. The final summary report of the symposium, which was adopted unanimously, was put before the Committee on 21 February 1983, and shortly thereafter, in order to take advantage of the presence in Geneva of a well-known scientist from my country, Professor Dr. Ton Duc Lang, a meeting was arranged between him and the experts in this Committee, during which he presented additional information on the results of the symposium. In that connection, I should like to say that we are very grateful to the delegations which took part in that meeting, and we should also like to thank the secretariat of the Committee for its help in organizing the meeting.

As was indicated at the symposium, various compounds of toxic chemical substances were used in Viet Nam, including in particular dioxin, a substance known for its great toxicity. The total quantity of all these herbicides and defoliants used against my country is estimated by different scientific authorities at some 100,000 tons. According to the United States biologist, Arthur H. Westing, this total included 57,000 tons of the famous agent orange, containing up to 170 kg of the terrible dioxin. Other authorities even put forward the figure of 500 kg.

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These toxic chemical products which were sprayed on a vast scale, in strong concentrations and in large quantities, have caused serious damage to the environment of South Viet Nam: 43 per cent of the forests were destroyed, including 70 per cent of the coconut groves and 150,000 hectares of tropical forests, and 13 per cent of the agricultural land, which it has not yet been possible to restore in spite of the passage of 10 years. Ecological systems were seriously damaged. The systematic sprayings over vast areas of South Viet Nam totally or in large part destroyed extensive areas of forests in the provinces of Tiên Giang, Ben Tre, Cûu Long, Hâu Giang and Minh Hai and in the environs of Ho Chi Minh City. This fact was already noted in 1974 by a group of American scientists from the Academy of Sciences who considered that, as a result of the extensive damage caused to the forests, the process of natural recovery could take 100 years and even more in certain regions.

The massive and repeated sprayings over large areas changed the structure of the soil, reduced its fertility and caused a decline in agricultural production, aggravating the difficulties of feeding the population. Many areas, such as the valley of A Sâu, formerly populated with an abundant and varied fauna and covered with rich forests and other useful vegetation, were transformed into infertile savannahs covered with wild grasses and secondary vegetation of little economic value, as a result of which many species of animals, both large and small have completely disappeared and there remain only hordes of small rodents, which are disease-carriers.

Thus, the tropical forests in the areas heavily sprayed with herbicides are on the point of disappearing. The destruction of foliage, the considerable reduction in the country's forest areas and the contamination of the soil have caused changes in the water run-off system, aggravating further the periods of flood and drought.

Considerable damage, difficult to remedy, has also been caused to the river, maritime and coastal ecological systems. Certain types of aquatic animals have disappeared and reserves of sea and river fish have been considerably reduced.

As a result of all these harmful effects of toxic substances on nature, Viet Nam is at present confronted with an extremely difficult task, that is, how to restore the fertility of the soils and transform these dead savannahs into crop-growing areas or to repopulate them with animal species and useful plants.

The famous operation known as the chemical clean-up of the jungle, through the use of herbicides containing a high proportion of dioxin, also had harmful effects, which are still continuing, on the health of the Vietnamese people: 2 million Vietnamese have been victims, of whom 3,500 have died and the rest are still today suffering their consequences. Professor Ton Duc Lang gave a scientifically detailed report on this subject during his meeting with the distinguished experts from delegations; I shall therefore be brief in this connection.

Numerous investigations and tests by Vietnamese scientists confirm that the massive use of these toxic substances containing dioxin has had extremely harmful

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effects on the genes of the population inhabiting the regions concerned, including the children born there. Even a number of years after contamination, genetic aberrations and abnormalities have been found among the victims.

At the Symposium, 12 reports were submitted giving strong evidence of a direct link between the use of chemical substances and the increased number of congenital abnormalities, monstrosities and malformations among children born in the areas that were sprayed with such substances.

Thus investigations in the province of Ben Tre, which was subjected to massive and repeated sprayings, show that in comparison with the pre-war years, the number of extra-uterine pregnancies has increased six to eight times, the number of sterile marriages eight times, and the number of congenital abnormalities and monsters among new-born children 10-15 times. These are terrible figures.

In the opinion of our experts, the use of chemical substances has also caused an increase in the frequency of cases of cancer of the liver. In a Hanoi hospital it has been noted that between the period 1955-1961 and the period 1962-1968, the incidence of cancer of the liver among persons subjected to those sprayings increased from 2.89 per cent to 9.07 per cent. Furthermore, many statistical investigations carried out in different countries have shown the carcinogenic effect of dioxin in minute doses (in particular the work done on behalf of the Dow Chemical Company and the work of the cancer research group of the Environmental Protection Agency). Studies made in recent years in Viet Nam have also shown that the incidence of primary cancer of the liver among subjects exposed to sprayings with defoliants is five times higher than among subjects not so exposed.

These facts represent only a small part of the information contained in the reports submitted at the Ho Chi Minh City Symposium. While further research is still needed on certain aspects, at the conclusion of the Symposium everyone was agreed that the use of herbicides and defoliants in the Vietnamese war had resulted in grave and harmful long-term consequences for man, nature and the economy of Viet Nam. Professor Arthur W. Galston of the United States said so as long ago as on 9 February 1977 at a Congressional hearing, when he stated that he was convinced that the destructive effects of toxic chemical products on Viet Nam, including the environment and the country's entire civilization, were unforeseeable.

The International Symposium held at Ho Chi Minh City, nearly half of the participants in which came from foreign countries, in its conclusions appealed to the international community to take urgent measures to help the Vietnamese people to eliminate the terrible consequences of the use in war of herbicides and defoliants. We believe that we can count on international co-operation in the solution of this problem, a very difficult one and extremely costly in material and financial resources, clearly far beyond the possibilities of our country. We believe that this will be for the benefit both of the Vietnamese people and of mankind as a whole.

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Viet Nam)

To come now to the work of the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to emphasize how much these preliminary results of the Symposium underline the importance and urgency of finding a successful solution to the problems posed in this sphere of chemical weapons.

It seems to me that at the present time a sound basis exists for the speedy drafting of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons: a number of important documents and concrete and practical proposals have been submitted, including in particular the document entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", presented by the Soviet Union, a document rich in constructive ideas for solutions to the specific problems connected with the prohibition of such weapons. Many countries among the Group of 21 have also put forward useful ideas.

Allow me, on the basis of the results of the Symposium, to put certain thoughts before the Committee. In my view, the prohibition of chemical weapons should be universal; each State party to the convention should undertake never and in no circumstances to develop, produce, acquire in any way, retain, transfer or use chemical weapons, and to destroy its stocks of them or redirect them into authorized purposes as well as to destroy or dismantle facilities for the production of chemical weapons.

As regards the question of what chemical substances should be prohibited, my delegation considers that the future convention should prohibit all chemical substances for purposes of war without, however, placing unnecessary difficulties in the way of the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes.

Certainly, the future convention ought to contain provisions giving an assurance of its strict application. As regards the question of what specific methods of verification should be used with respect to the various aspects of the activities prohibited, my delegation is of the view that verification measures should be effective but should not be such as to lead to interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States or the creation of obstacles to the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes; in other words, they should be very carefully thought out from every point of view. Thus what is needed is a rational and effective combination of national and international means of verification.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that all the States members of the Committee on Disarmament, through their distinguished representatives here present, will make greater efforts in order to complete as soon as possible the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is urgently called for both by the lesson of the tragedy of the Vietnamese people and by the interests of all mankind.

The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, for its part, would like to be able to take a more active part in the drafting of this future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We could thus make available to the Committee the knowledge we have acquired and the results of the research being carried out by our Vietnamese experts, among others, on the basis of the experience suffered by the Vietnamese people, the harmful consequences of which are still being felt even today in the lives of our people.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Nguyen Thuong for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the Committee and to the secretariat. The next speaker on my list is the distinguished delegate of Sweden, Mr. Hyltenius, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, the agenda of this Committee may be seen as a reflection of the most urgent problems in the field of disarmament. It contains a number of items which have been with us for many years and which still await a solution. It would seem that the longer an item has to wait for real negotiations the harder it is to come to grips with it. Few would deny that the technical problems and complexities of disarmament questions have become greater over the years.

It is against this background that one should see the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Today I shall devote my statement to that item. It has been referred to the Committee on Disarmament by overwhelming majorities in the United Nations General Assembly. The support for the request to the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group to deal with this matter comes from all political quarters. It was, furthermore, clear at the UNISPACE Conference last summer that the question of the increasing militarization of outer space was a major concern for the participating countries. This was clearly expressed in the final report of the Conference, in which it was recommended that this Committee give high priority to this grave concern.

The Committee on Disarmament should take concrete action on this item in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions and with the Committee's role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

It is in the interest of maintaining stability and preventing the unleashing of another round of the arms race that the Swedish delegation urges that an ad hoc working group be established without delay. We cannot accept the assertion that negotiations on this matter would be to the disadvantage of any country. On the contrary, we are convinced that further delays will complicate an already very complex problem to the disadvantage of us all.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth and the stationing of such weapons in outer space or on celestial bodies. Several other treaties limit or prohibit various other military uses of outer space, for instance, the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty, the SALT I Agreement and the ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, it is obvious that a number of conceivable

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

military uses of outer space, which are likely to have destabilizing or otherwise threatening effects, are not covered by existing international legal instruments. There is, therefore, a need to identify areas and activities which so far have not been covered, in order to consider to what extent there exists a need for international agreements aiming at the prevention of undesirable developments in this field.

There is, in the opinion of the Swedish delegation, still a good chance to tackle these problems, but time is quickly running out. Rapid technological developments do not wait. As in so many areas, disarmament negotiations are likely to become more complicated for every lost month. Action must be taken before financial and political investments in new weapons systems become so important that the process becomes irreversible.

It is an understatement to say that the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space is a complex one. Apart from the many technical intricacies, there are the problems of distinguishing between civilian and military applications and between the stabilizing and destabilizing effects of various military space functions.

Another dimension is the distinction between whether a spacecraft is geared to "active" or "passive" military use. So-called "killer satellites" and space-based ABM or BMD systems are examples of devices which are designed actively to interfere with the adversary's military capabilities.

Obviously there are important military applications of space technology which contribute to a more stable military balance and a lower risk of war, in particular between the two major alliances. I have in mind, for example, military satellites, which are used to provide early warning of missile launches, and satellites for verification of arms control agreements and for fast and reliable communications. There are, however, certain developments which give cause for particular concern. One such trend is that of efforts to acquire or improve the capability to destroy one another's satellites. Another concern is that an increased launching capacity, for instance in the form of re-usable space vehicles, may also be used for the further militarization of outer space.

As the military balance is becoming increasingly dependent on satellites for communications, command, control and intelligence, the ability of such functions to survive is also becoming increasingly threatened by the development of anti-satellite weapons systems. The Soviet Union has launched a number of interceptor/destructor satellites during the last several years and, in earlier years, also fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS), and the United States is planning to begin operational testing of its ASAT system in 1983. Moreover, both Superpowers are investigating the possibility of using high-energy laser and particle beams for ASAT applications.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

I have already mentioned the problem of lacunae in existing international agreements regarding the prohibition of military uses of outer space. It seems natural that one of the first tasks of an ad hoc working group in the Committee on Disarmament should be to analyse such gaps in present treaties against the background of existing and conceivable military applications of space technology. The next step may be to determine which of the space systems or activities should be prohibited or subject to regulations. It would seem natural to the Swedish delegation that, for example, anti-satellite weapons systems should be banned. Perhaps, as a complement to such a prohibition, in order to exclude the possibility of the military use of otherwise legitimate civilian space vehicles, it might also be desirable to ban certain activities, for example, the destruction of satellites of other countries. We have noted with interest what the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. van den Broek, said in this context in his statement in this Committee on 29 March, and we will carefully consider it.

My delegation has taken note with great interest of the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. However, the draft gives rise to some important questions, such as, for instance, how to define the concept of "weapon" in this context. This issue would obviously have to be tackled at an early stage.

As is well known, many satellites form integral parts of weapons systems which are not themselves stationed in outer space. Perhaps, for practical reasons, we may have to focus on such systems or "weapons" as are intended for warfare exclusively in outer space. Such weapons, as we know them today, are based on the earth. The discussion must, therefore, encompass all weapons which are meant to be used in outer space and not only those which are stationed there.

As long as the leading military powers build their security on a precarious nuclear balance and hold the rest of the world hostage, it is vitally important that nothing should upset this balance. The peoples of the world demand serious disarmament proposals from the Superpowers in order to reach a balance at lower levels of armaments. Instead we have learned with grave concern that the United States plans to embark upon a research and development programme with the ultimate goal of obtaining the capability of destroying ballistic missiles launched by the adversary. The only safe way of avoiding the nuclear threat is to abolish the nuclear weapons. To develop and deploy weapons for the purpose of obtaining the capability of destroying the adversary's strategic missiles while keeping one's own strike capability intact, would create a dangerously unstable situation. This would be the case at least as long as only one party has such a capability. It should also be

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noted in this context that such a major undertaking would entail the spending of enormous funds and a waste of precious scientific resources. The initiation of such a research and development process will be destabilizing in itself and increase the level of nervousness and tension. It would also initiate research for similar weapons in other States and lead to countermeasures, and hence give rise to a new cycle in the senseless arms race.

The SALT I and II agreements between the Superpowers acknowledged the right of the parties to use national technical means to verify compliance with their provisions. In addition the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space refers exclusively to national technical means of verification. However, it is hardly likely that such a limitation would be accepted by the international community. If a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space is to stand a chance of being universally adhered to, it must have a system of international verification. A first step in this direction was taken by France in advancing the idea of an international satellite monitoring agency. This is a matter of principle to many countries. Moreover, it must also be realized that the present virtual duopoly of the two Superpowers in this technology is about to be broken.

The further development of anti-satellite weapons is a most threatening perspective. The Swedish Government, therefore, attaches great importance to the early initiation of negotiations with a view to prohibiting the establishment of such systems and the dismantling of existing ones in order to preclude such a new phase of the arms race. We cannot share the view that if one of the Superpowers has acquired a certain lead in one area, the other should be entitled to catch up before any negotiations can be embarked upon in that field. The experiences so far of "the bargaining from strength" philosophy are anything but encouraging. My Government acknowledges the need for an over-all balance in the military field, but that balance must be sought and achieved at lower and not higher levels of armaments. If one Power or a few Powers have achieved a certain capability, which may become threatening to others, negotiations should start without delay in order to do away with such unilateral advantages. As we all know, experience shows that once a new military technology has become established, the temptation to exploit it in

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the form of the production and deployment of new weapons in most cases becomes irresistible. The case of anti-satellite weapons is not likely to be any exception.

Although there is clearly a need for multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, this, of course, does not exclude the possibility of the two leading space Powers negotiating between them on matters of particular bilateral interest in this field. This view is consistent with the opinion my delegation and many others have expressed regarding other disarmament questions also, such as a nuclear test ban and the prohibition of chemical weapons. Sweden, therefore strongly urges the United States and the Soviet Union to resume their bilateral talks with a view to finding solutions to some of the most pressing problems in the field of space warfare, notably the prevention of anti-satellite warfare.

Sweden was able to co-sponsor both General Assembly resolutions last autumn on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Resolution 37/83, submitted by non-aligned and socialist countries, contained, inter alia, a clear request for the establishment of an ad hoc working group in the Committee on Disarmament with the task of opening multilateral negotiations on this item. This is important. Negotiations must no longer be delayed. Resolution 37/99 D, adopted on the initiative of western countries, put special emphasis on the need to tackle the problem of an emerging race in anti-satellite weapons. This seems to us to be the most immediate concern. Both resolutions, therefore, had merits which we considered important. The distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka, in his statement of 14 April, made a clear presentation of the possible approaches to the decision now facing the Committee on this matter. As far as the Swedish delegation is concerned, it is flexible on the organization of a forthcoming negotiation within an ad hoc working group in this Committee. A constructive proposal regarding the establishment of such a working group has been made in document CD/329, submitted by the Group of 21.

Security is basically a political concept. Security problems must, therefore, be solved not by increased armaments or confrontation between adversaries but in co-operation and negotiations between parties for their mutual advantage and our common security. Time is getting short, but it is still possible to prevent an arms race in outer space if negotiations start now. If this fails, all countries will suffer. All countries thus have a legitimate interest in this matter. An overwhelming majority among them demand negotiations in this Committee before it is too late. Such a demand must not pass unheeded.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, it would not be an understatement to say that the words "peace" and "security" have the widest usage in contemporary inter-State relations. And yet the principles which should govern peaceful relations among nations enjoy the widest disregard, the widest violation within the community of nations. The talk about disarmament and international security is not novel either, but one wonders whether and where a line can be drawn in reality between disarmament and international security on the one hand, and armament and international insecurity on the other!

On several occasions already, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, has expressed his serious concern about the paying of lip-service to issues of the greatest importance to the survival of mankind. In the statement he delivered to this Committee on 15 February last, for instance, the Secretary-General re-emphasized the point he had made in his first annual report dated 7 September 1982, namely, that the escalation in the arms race was and is guaranteed by the lack of a credible and effective system of international peace and security. What was essential, he stressed, was "to find ways to enhance the collective security machinery afforded by the United Nations Charter and by the Security Council in particular". We could not agree more with the Secretary-General. The fact is that the League of Nations had to collapse the way it did precisely because it had not been founded on a sound and solid system of collective security. Any architect who starts with, and aims at, constructing what he believes to be a strong and durable roof for a house but neglects to lay the required solid foundation for it engages in a futile construction exercise. No wonder, then, that the Second World War, like the First World War before it, could not be prevented.

Most regrettably, the United Nations, like the League of Nations before it, also lacks an effective collective system of international security. No wonder, then, that the United Nations has not succeeded in its primary responsibility of preventing all kinds of war and assuring enduring peace and security. As Keeper of the Peace, the United Nations is still to evolve an effective machinery for the peaceful resolution of international disputes and for the effective governance of the behaviour of sovereign States in their relations with one another. The structure and system of the United Nations are such that only some of its Members bear the primary task of maintaining international peace and security. The argument, then, that the United Nations has failed as Keeper of the Peace because of the behaviour of certain of its Members, who have not discharged their responsibilities the way they should, is not only logical; it is indeed sound and credible.

In short, the system of international peace and security envisaged in the United Nations Charter has not been fully and successfully applied primarily because the provisions of the Charter have not been strictly adhered to. Thus, as it has been argued time and again, the Second World War resulted from the lack of a system capable of ensuring lasting peace and security. We, like the other Members of the international community, are charged with the responsibility of making the system work and thereby preventing a third world war from erupting. The First World War was a European war and we all know the reasons that led to it. The Second World War was broader in character and scope than World War I, but the main war stage still remained Europe, and we all know the reasons that led to that war. But we all know that a third world war would not be limited to one region. We all know that the battleground for such a war would be every inch of our earth, and its victims would be mankind itself. We all know that World War III would not only result from "grave reasons"; it would not only result from politico-military and security reasons. Such a war would result from a combination of factors, a combination of reasons, some of which would be simple and honest mistakes; others would even be irrational, trivial and ridiculous, such as mere suspicion and mistrust; mere miscalculation among the supposed custodians of world peace and security; mere misuse of scientific and technological achievements of our day, and the mere arrogance of power by certain States members of the international community, and of course, the resulting arms race and violations of the United Nations Charter.

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Other factors and reasons of a more serious nature from which a new world war could result would certainly include the existing economic imbalances and inequities between the rich and the poor; between armament and underdevelopment; between the "haves" and the "have-nots" of the North and South; between the evolutionary and the revolutionary; and, of course, the East-West conflict in the third world — the sole battleground for all the 140 or so armed conflicts and wars which have occurred since the end of the Second World War.

Dag Hammarskjöld was right when he expressed his strong conviction that a third world war could very easily have started in the Congo, now Zaire, in 1960. One thing is certain, however, and is universally recognized: World War II was fought for six years; World War III would last for less than six days, and it would annihilate the greatest and most precious gift of all time — our very life!

If, then, one talks about the relationship among disarmament, development and international security, what exactly does one mean? Well, the answer to this question is necessarily complex because the question itself is a complex one. First, we must establish what these expressions actually mean. What is disarmament? What is development? What do we mean by "security" or "national interests"?

In my intervention of 14 April 1983, I dwelt at length on the close interconnection that exists between disarmament and development. Today, I wish to address myself to the question of the international system of security and how it is closely interconnected with the questions of disarmament and development. These interconnections are better described as a "triangular relationship".

For all practical purposes, disarmament is the process of reduction in the size of, and expenditures on, armed forces; of the destruction or dismantling of weapons, whether deployed or stockpiled; of the progressive elimination of the capacity to produce new weapons, and of the release and integration into civilian life of military personnel. The ultimate objective in this process is, of course, general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Development is, on the other hand, a multidimensional process involving the reorganization and reorientation of entire economic and social systems. It aims at attaining improvements in incomes and output. It involves radical changes in social, institutional and administrative structures, as well as in popular attitudes and even in customs and beliefs. It also aims at the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality (in the distribution of income and wealth as well as of status and power), and the eradication of absolute poverty. Poverty is part of inequality because poverty and wealth are the two extreme positions of income distribution in society. And as I have said before, no contemporary society, irrespective of its economic development, social situation, political system, or anything else, is free of inequality.

My understanding of "national interest" is that it is whatever a nation feels to be essential to its security and well-being. National interests are thus national goals, the first among them being the maintenance and protection of national security.

National security refers, as we all know, both to physical and to psychological security, which security may be subject to threats, both internal and external. The constituent elements of national security include: the promotion and maintenance of national economic and social welfare, the preservation of national health and safety; the promotion and maintenance of national integrity, national independence and the liberty of peoples to choose their own economic and political destiny and their cultures, and to exist with others; freedom from the fact and menace of military attack and freedom from the fact of menace.

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Thus, for any system of international security to be viable, it must recognize, and adhere to the aforementioned constituent elements of national security. It must also recognize and respect the right of all to exist in freedom and stability, justice and equity, and in safety. Genuine and lasting international peace and security thus essentially means equitable socio-economic development and survival, as well as recognition of the multidimensional interdependence which must exist between and among nations. This fact was recognized by the international community when it agreed to the following paragraph in the Second United Nations Development Strategy for the 1970s:

> "(6) In the conviction that development is the essential path to peace and justice, Governments reaffirm their common and unswerving resolve to seek a better and more effective system of international co-operation whereby the prevailing disparities in the world may be banished and prosperity secured for all."

In summary, then, disarmament is a means to an end, the end being lasting world peace and security; but disarmament must be attained first and disarmament will never be an effective vehicle to that end unless the unavoidable triangular relationship existing among disarmament, development and security, i.e. survival, is fully and unreservedly recognized and promoted by all. Disarmament must also be recognized as a vehicle for attaining the New International Economic Order, since the latter is the instrument whose main objective is to bring about structural changes in inter-State relations, with a view to eliminating the inequities existing in the current international economic relations. Continued disagreement on disarmament, as indeed on development issues, can only intensify the arms race and the conflicts so dominant these days in inter-State relations, and thereby render impossible the attainment not only of the New International Economic Order, but in particular of a lasting world peace and security.

Development is a process which entails social and economic changes in society, and the ultimate goal of development is to attain justice through an improvement in the quality of life for all; the provision of the basic material requirements for a productive and dignified existence for all; and the granting to everyone of equal opportunities fully and effectively to participate in the economic and social progress and to share in its benefits. Development is, hence, by definition, a global necessity and possession unlimited to any region or some regions of the world. Development of the poorer countries of the South, through disarmament, will certainly bring benefits to the North as well, whereas an arms escalation will bring social misery to all nations and peoples. Development represents the entire gamut of changes by which an entire social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory, and towards a situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually "better".

What, then, must be done to attain, promote and maintain an enduring system of international peace and security? What sacrifices must be made for this cause? There is a lot that can and must be done to attain this goal. We need, all of us, first and foremost, to develop a sense of genuine belonging to the disarmament process; a sense of duty to this process; a sense of commitment to disarmament negotiations; a sense of urgency in the disarmament process; a sense of hatred for the arms race, and a sense of survival through disarmament. We need, all of us, to recognize the close relationship existing between disarmament, development and survival. We need to abide strictly by the United Nations Charter provisions. No system of durable international peace and security is possible without the genuine co-operation in the establishment of such a system and the positive involvement of the United States and the USSR and their respective military alliances. Of the 50,000 or so nuclear weapons existing in the world today, 95 per cent belong to the United States and the USSR. These weapons have the power of some 1 million Hiroshima

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bombs. Ten thousand of these are deployed for use in Europe. Sixteen thousand of them are strategic, capable of crossing the globe in only 30 minutes and landing within a few hundred yards of their intended targets. Of course, all the facts are not easy to determine, because they are not freely accessible. But we know what the consequences would be, if an accident, or a miscalculation, or even a deliberate pressing of the war button were to occur in the nuclear field.

Thus, no system of world peace and security can last for long if it does not recognize the important role which disarmament must play as the fundamental means to over-all human survival, and if the super Powers and the other militarily significant Powers refuse to undertake serious and genuine negotiations leading to the conclusion, as soon as possible, of binding international legal instruments in the field of disarmament. The "linkage" approach, whereby progress on one disarmament aspect, for example in a limited forum, is conditioned by the results of the talks on another aspect of the disarmament process, has so far proved to be very obstructive to progress in general. The terms of reference of the various negotiating forums should provide the sole necessary guidelines for such negotiations.

Our talk about security should not be limited to the military aspects of security. The fact is that military aspects are but a small fraction of over-all security. As I have stated before, no arms escalation can or will ever lead to genuine and enduring security. The non-military aspects of security entail the provision of the basic conditions for peaceful relations between and among States: global co-operation leads to global economic stability and welfare and that means global security; global equitable distribution of resources, and global co-operation on safeguarding the environment. We cannot afford to ignore all these factors.

Perhaps there is no better measure in the global quest for peace than through the enhancing of the effectiveness of the United Nations as Keeper of the Peace. It has been estimated that more than 120 wars were fought in 71 States between 1945 and 1971 and that since the Second World War, 30 million or so people have died in armed conflicts, and all this during the time that the United Nations has existed as a political organization charged with the primary responsibility of keeping the peace. Making the United Nations effective essentially means stopping all wars and conflicts from occurring. It means enforcing and applying the original security role given to the United Nations in Chapter VII of its Charter, under which the United Nations must take action with respect to "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression". It means applying the "enforcement" provisions of Articles 12, 26 and 39-51 of the United Nations Charter, which require the Security Council to take action.

Enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations as Keeper of the Peace also means that the General Assembly must be given and must play an increasing role in the maintenance of international peace and security as envisaged in Article 11 of the Charter, and in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly. Let me refer to only three of them. In its resolution 290(IV), adopted in 1949, and entitled, "Essentials of peace", the General Assembly stated that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations "is primarily responsible for the continuance of international tension ...".

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In its resolution 380(V), adopted at its 308th plenary meeting on 17 November 1950, and entitled, "Peace through deeds", the General Assembly declared that all goals for lasting peace and security were attainable, provided all Governments and members of the United Nations strictly observe their obligations under the Charter, and demonstrate by their deeds their will to achieve peace. In the same resolution also, the General Assembly reaffirmed that, whatever the weapons used, any aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power, or otherwise, "is the greatest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world".

Of particular importance, and relevant to my argument for enhancing the role of the United Nations in keeping the peace, is resolution 377(V), adopted by the General Assembly at its 302nd plenary meeting on 3 November 1950, and entitled "Uniting for peace". We all know the circumstances that led to the adoption of that resolution. Many have argued that the United Nations Security Council lacks the power to act, that it lacks the teeth to bite with, or even gnaw wars and conflicts in the world, precisely because of the use of the veto. The "Uniting for peace" resolution was thus designed to enable the United Nations to act by getting around the stultification of the veto power. The relevant paragraph of the resolution provides that:

"The General Assembly, ...

A.

1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permament members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace or security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;".

This is one of the most meaningful resolutions the General Assembly has ever adopted. The misuse and abuse of the veto power has grown with time. The right application of the "Uniting for peace" resolution would contribute to the enhancement of the effectiveness of the United Nations in its peace-keeping duties. Similarly, the original mandate of the Military Staff Committee should be restored, and the Committee's role in the maintenance of international peace and security, as envisaged in Articles 26 and 47 of the Charter, should be enhanced. Unless, therefore, the United Nations is given the central authority of deterring conflicts and wars through the enforcement of the Charter provisions, the achievement of a viable system of international peace and security will continue to be remote. Many good resolutions have been adopted, and good statements delivered on the strengthening of the United Nations as an instrument of peace. The problem, however, has been in their application.

In June 1963, for instance, President John F. Kennedy had the following to say about the United Nations at the American University in Washington, D.C.:

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"We seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make it a more effective instrument of peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system ... capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished ... This will require a new effort to achieve world law ...".

President Kennedy had been even more explicit in his belief and trust in the United Nations, when he delivered his inaugural address in January 1961. He said:

"To that world assembly of sovereign States, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support — to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective — to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak — and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run ...

So let us begin anew — remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belabouring those problems which divide us. Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms — and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations ...

And if the beachhead of co-operation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in a new endeavour, creating, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved. In your hand, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course".

That was a mighty statement, and President Kennedy must be very uncomfortable in his grave with the present performance of "that world assembly of sovereign States", as keeper of world peace and security.

The talk about disarmament, development and international security is incomplete if it does not include the role of the non-aligned movement in that triangular relationship. As I have indicated on other occasions, neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism have always attributed the existence of "underdevelopment" and the dependence of the South primarily to the historical evolution of a highly unequal international capitalist system of poor country-rich country relationships. The co-existence of the rich and poor nations in an international system dominated by such unequal power relationships between the rich and the poor renders all efforts by the poor nations to be self-reliant and independent in their development efforts not only difficult but almost impossible.

The non-aligned movement is 22 years old. But at its first summit meeting held in Belgrade in 1961, the movement declared, inter alia, that:

"War has never threatened mankind with greater consequences than today. On the other hand, never before has mankind had at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument of policy in international relations".

Thus, from its very inception, the non-aligned movement did see a clear relationship between disarmament and international security on the one hand, and between these and socio-economic development on the other. The Belgrade declaration stressed the top priority the movement attached, as it is now, to the necessity of preventing nuclear war, and the arms race in general. By deciding to send an official

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

representation to the capitals of the Superpowers -- Moscow and Washington, D.C. -- to urge them to cease nuclear testing, the non-aligned movement thus took the first step ever towards a world-wide nuclear disarmament. The movement's very birth was, in fact, a rebellion against the arms race instituted by the world war in East-West relations.

Already in 1940, Jawaharlal Nehru talked about complete disarmament and its relationship to development and international security. He said, inter alia: "Disarmament ultimately depends on far-reaching changes in the political and economic structure of the world leading to a removal of the basic causes of war". Nehru continued with his tireless campaign for peace throughout the 1950s. In 1954, for instance, he wrote in National Herald about the arms race which he described as "the way to madness, and the great men who contest our destinies are dangerous self-centred lunatics, who ... will rather rain death and destruction all over the world than give up their petty opinions and think and act aright ... Peace and co-operation and well-being for all the peoples of the world were well within grasp. But the gods perhaps envied the lot of man and drove him mad ...". Thus, the topic of disarmament has been on the agenda of practically every non-aligned summit meeting since the birth of the movement. And we are all familiar with the pronouncements on this subject of the recently concluded seventh non-aligned summit meeting.

The third world is right to be articulate on the question of disarmament because the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the very survival of mankind so require, and because, as is very well known, the third world has been the battleground of all wars waged since 1945. We all have a stake in disarmament and common security entails collective responsibility.

From the foregoing, it is evident that security cannot be guaranteed either by the use of force or by military preparedness. Security can never and will never be bought by military hardware, by billions of dollars, or by mere advanced technological attainment. The very notion of security means that excessive and extravagant military spending is not only a waste of scarce resources in the midst of an ever-deteriorating global economic crisis -- resources which are so very badly needed for productive social and economic purposes -- but such spending merely enhances insecurity, and all the chances of war. And this is the paradox, years ago, military spending on armaments was much less than it is today; and yet the world was a safer place to live in. Now, military expenditures have reached insane proportions, and yet the world is a much more dangerous place to live in than it was then!

Let us, then, all work for the translation of the Final Document provisions into concrete action. Let us all work for the progressive strengthening of the peace-keeping role and machinery of the United Nations. Let us all work for the removal of local and global tensions in relations among nations. Let us all work for the eradication of poverty and deprivation, and inequality and hunger and malnutrition and ill-health, and under-development. Let us all work for the establishment of national and regional security arrangements and assurances; for the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Let us all work for the political and economic security of every nation. Let us all work for our common survival in dignity through our common disarmament, our common development, and our common security. Permit me now, Mr. Chairman, to express the deep and sincere gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, the distinguished Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, for the constant assistance and advice he has given us during our deliberations. And I would also like to express my appreciation to his deputy, Mr. Berasategui, and all the other members of the secretariat for the great devotion and patience which they have demonstrated in rendering services to this Committee. My delegation is fully appreciative of all these valuable services. I also wish to thank the interpreters, the engineers and everybody else who has participated in the provision of valuable services to us. I want them all to know that we do not at all forget what they are doing; we do not take for granted what they are doing. We value their services very much.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chairman thanks Mr. Don Nanjira for his statement, for his kind words addressed to the Chair and for his very generous words of thanks to the secretariat, the interpreters, the technicians and all members of the staff servicing this Committee. May I now call upon the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of Algeria, Ambassador Oul Rouis. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. OUL ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, since the beginning of this session the Algerian delegation has had the opportunity to express its views on the various items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. I shall confine myself today to offering some comments on the subject of item 7 of our agenda, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Recent years have been marked by the appearance of signs foreshadowing a new phase in the militarization of outer space.

The extension of the logic of conflict to outer space, now considered by the strategists of the major powers as a potential battlefield, could not but engender a race in the development of space weapon systems.

The current programmes of research and development relating to anti-satellite interceptor systems, laser weapons and particle-beam weapon systems are all part of this perpetual endeavour to secure military superiority.

The integration of outer space into the strategic concepts of the major powers greatly reduces the distance between the fictional "star wars" scenario and the sphere of reality.

These dangerous shifts further complicate the disarmament equation. There is no doubt that an arms race in outer space will have unforeseeable consequences for the security of the world, unless the international community, in a healthy reaction, succeeds in preserving outer space, and the peaceful activities for which it provides support, from the warlike antagonisms of the major powers.

This is still possible, for, unlike nuclear disarmament, where the goal is to eliminate weapons which unfortunately exist, it would seem that space weapons are not yet operational.

We therefore consider that it is neither naive nor idealistic to believe that there is still time to prevent the conversion of outer space into a future battlefield.

It is still possible, if the powers in question show political will and embark upon a process of negotiation with a view to the adoption of concrete measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

This task is urgent, for experience in disarmament matters shows that, once it has been started, the arms race in a given sphere develops in an action-reaction spiral and makes it all the more difficult to adopt measures to stop the escalation and reverse the trend.

The injunctions of the international community in favour of this objective are numerous.

Almost five years ago the General Assembly, meeting at its first special session devoted to disarmament, stated in its Programme of Action, which was adopted by consensus, that further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in order to prevent an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Oul Rouis, Algeria)

In its resolutions 36/99 and 36/97 C, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake negotiations on this question. That request was, moreover, reiterated by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, in its resolutions 37/83 and 37/99 D.

Speaking at the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held at Vienna last August, the Secretary-General of the United Nations echoed the concerns of the international community in declaring that the growing militarization of outer space was alarming and inviting the forces of reason and peace to oppose what would be a dangerous escalation of the arms race.

The same Conference adopted by consensus a report which places the emphasis on the maintenance of peace and security in outer space, and in which it urgently recommends the competent bodies of the United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament, to give this matter the requisite attention and high priority.

Apart from the fact that it runs counter to the efforts being made by the international community to put an end to the arms race and to prevent nuclear war, the extension of the arms race to outer space can and should be avoided for certain very obvious reasons.

It ought to be avoided in the first instance because it is likely to increase the risks of the breakdown of international peace and security.

It ought to be avoided, secondly, because it is unacceptable that a small number of States should not merely cause danger to all mankind by reason of the huge nuclear arsenals they hold but in addition place the security of all States at risk by converting the common heritage of mankind into an advanced defence position for their own security.

It ought also to be avoided because that is an essential precondition for the development and continuation of international co-operation in the sphere of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

Lastly, it is no secret to anyone that space programmes for military purposes absorb vast resources whose size is in shocking contrast with the meagreness of the financial flows devoted to what is known as development aid.

There can be no doubt that the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral disarmament negotiating body, is the proper place for multilateral negotiations on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The discussions which took place in this Committee on this question at the last session had the merit of showing the interest that exists in achieving the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Delegations were able to conduct a very broad exchange of views on the substance of the question as well as on the structural framework for dealing with item 7 of the agenda.

Almost all delegations stressed the need to set up a working group on this item; unfortunately, differences of views about its mandate prevented the establishment of such a group at the last session.

(Mr. Oul Rouis, Algeria)

Anxious to help promote disarmament in all possible ways, the Group of 21, in document CD/329, submitted a draft mandate for an ad hoc working group on this question.

Basing itself on the principle that outer space, which is recognized as the common heritage of mankind, ought to be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, the Group of 21 proposed a mandate which favours a global approach designed to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

The Algerian delegation, for its part, continues to support that proposal, which it recommends anew.

On the eve of the unleashing of an arms race in outer space which would assuredly be as dangerous as it would be costly, it seems to us that the best way of eliminating this danger is the global approach, which recognizes the interdependence of all aspects of this question and takes into account the interests of all parties to the negotiations.

While we do not wish to minimize the difficulties of the task confronting the Committee on Disarmament, we nevertheless find some of the arguments that have been advanced for putting off the negotiation of an international instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects unconvincing.

It has first of all been claimed that this is only a theoretical possibility because the weapons in question do not yet exist. It is surely hardly necessary to point out that in matters of arms, the temptation to convert theoretical possibilities into reality is great because it is inherent in the dynamics of the search for military superiority.

The argument has been put forward of the complexity of the issue and the lack of experience in this field. This should in no way prevent the Committee from embarking on negotiations on this matter, taking advantage of all the experience gained in this sphere, particularly during the bilateral negotiations, as well as calling upon all the requisite expertise. It is, moreover, to be noted that putting off the negotiations because of the complexity of the question would mean deferring the solution of this matter indefinitely, because it is obvious that these problems become more complex as time passes.

The argument of complexity and technical difficulties is very often used to cover the unwillingness of certain powers to engage in negotiations in the / Committee on Disarmament.

As to the Algerian delegation, we are firmly convinced that the will to negotiate is primarily something political. Although technical difficulties may possibly explain the slowness of a given negotiating process, they cannot affect the essentially political nature of the process itself.

In establishing a working group with a global mandate, the Committee on Disarmament would be responding to the appeals of the United Nations General Assembly as well as to the demands of our peoples, who insist that measures should be taken to prevent outer space becoming a battlefield endangering the very survival of mankind.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, my statement today will be devoted to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the item the Committee is to discuss this week in accordance with its programme of work. It is to be noted that the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is becoming all the more urgent and pressing in view of the dangerous trend towards the conversion of outer space into a theatre for such a race.

If we look at history and turn some of its pages, we shall be convinced anew of the importance and timeliness of the efforts that have been made to prevent outer space being used for military purposes.

Three months after the beginning of the space era in the history of mankind, which was opened by the launching of the first Soviet satellite in March 1958, the USSR put before the United Nations General Assembly at its thirteenth session a proposal on the prevention of the use of outer space for military purposes and on international co-operation in the matter of the exploration of outer space. That was the first proposal in the history of mankind for the limitation of military activity in outer space. With the active participation and significant contribution of the socialist States and other peace-loving countries, certain international legal instruments now in force, limiting the use of outer space for hostile purposes, were worked out and concluded, for example, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, of 1963, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 1967, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 1979, and others.

Important provisions aimed at limiting military activity in outer space were included in the strategic arms limitation agreements reached between the USSR and the United States in the 1970s -- the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Salt-I Agreement. These constituted an impressive achievement in this sphere, substantially limiting the use of outer space for military purposes. The agreements contained qualitative limitations concerning specific military space systems. Thus, for example, in the United States -- USSR ABM Treaty of 26 May 1972, the parties undertook "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based".

The conclusion of these agreements constituted real steps forward in the demilitarization of the celestial bodies and a positive limitation of the use of space for military purposes. However, the existing limitation measures are not complete, because there is no effective international instrument placing a reliable barrier in the way of attempts to extend the arms race to outer space.

It has unfortunately to be observed that those who want to militarize outer space in order to secure absolute supremacy are hastening to take advantage of the absence of such measures of prohibition. It is no secret that the United States has prepared a vast programme in this sphere the basic principles of which have been confirmed by a special presidential directive. In this programme, outer space is regarded as a theatre for military activities and a special military space command has been set up to take charge of operations there.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

A particular danger resides in the preparation of innumerable projects for the development of space weapons designed to attack targets in outer space, in air space and on the earth. Among these, special priority has been given to the development and deployment in space of anti-ballistic missile defence systems, based in particular on the use of the latest scientific and technological achievements in the sphere of laser and charged particle technology.

As you know, the Washington administration has announced the start of work on a large-scale and highly effective anti-missile defence system using military vehicles in space. This programme of extensive military preparations in outer space provides for the establishment of 100 military orbital stations equipped with laser and particle-beam weapons and also sensors for detecting ballistic missiles. It is planned to spend $500 billion on these purposes. We believe that if the United States carries out these plans that will mean in fact the deployment in space of anti-ballistic missile defence systems for the purpose of destroying the strategic weapons of the other side, that is, depriving it of the possibility of taking retaliatory measures. In essence what this amounts to is the intention to create a strategic first-strike potential.

A large part is also played in these plans by various manned spacecraft capable of carrying out purely military tasks in the placing in orbit of space-earth strike systems, anti-satellite systems and reconnaissance, navigation and other types of satellite for military purposes under the orders of the United States military space command. As has been stated in the Western press, out of 331 planned flights of such craft, more than a third will be destined for military tasks.

The idea of the militarization of outer space in violation of the agreements existing in this sphere did not come from the minds of contemporary science-fiction writers but originated in the highest military and political circles of the United States. For example, it has been said more than once in American military circles that, depending on the results of its work in the sphere of anti-ballistic missile defence systems, the United States might ask for the revision or even the renunciation of the Soviet-American treaty of 1972 that was concluded at the same time as the SALT-I Agreement. As we understand it, both sides legally recognized at that time that mutual restraint in the development of anti-missile defence systems would permit progress to be made in the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons as a whole. Thus there is now in effect a threat to remove one of the cornerstones of the entire strategic arms limitation process.

I should like to add that the carrying out of a programme for the development of a "perfect" ABM system in space would constitute a violation of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972. Under article V of that Treaty, the parties undertook not to develop, test or deploy in space ABM systems or components. Furthermore, the distinguished representative of the United States confirmed this in his statement to the Committee on 2 September 1982.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We also wonder how such actions can be in conformity with the provisions of other important international treaties and agreements. As is stated in the United States press with reference to such authorities as the "father" of the hydrogen bomb, the physicist Edward Teller, the provision of the energy for the powerful X-ray lasers necessary for the proposed ABM system is possible only through nuclear explosions in space. The magazine Newsweek, in its issue of 4 April 1983, in particular states: "Although information on the X-ray laser remains classified, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory reportedly created an X-ray pulse with the system in a recent underground test in Nevada".

Thus, questions are now being raised about the fulfilment of obligations assumed under two important international legal instruments, namely, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in three environments, including outer space, and the 1967 Treaty on the non-deployment in outer space of weapons of mass destruction.

We believe that any violation of generally recognized international legal norms will entail far-reaching consequences.

What dangers do we see in the arms race in outer space?

In the first place, military space vehicles would cause extreme destabilization of the strategic situation. Plans for the development of so-called "perfect" defence systems against strategic missiles are nothing but a screen covering the real intentions of the authors of these plans. Talk about their defensive purpose is deliberately designed to deceive public opinion.

In the second place, the deployment of military vehicles in space would lead to the creation of yet another type of global weapon, the creation of an excessive military first-strike potential which would inevitably increase the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war.

In the third place, as I have already said, an arms race in outer space would entail colossal material expenditures.

Fourthly, and this should be particularly emphasized, the new programme for the development of a "defensive" ABM system violates the specific system of international legal norms to which I referred earlier.

The Mongolian delegation, like the majority of other delegations in the Committee, is firmly in favour of the adoption of constructive measures aimed at the prevention of the extension of the arms race to outer space. There are on the negotiating table in the Committee on Disarmament a number of documents which could serve as the basis for the detailed consideration of and the conduct of negotiations on the substance of the issue. In particular, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space (document CD/274). The Mongolian delegation

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

submitted a proposal on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this subject (document CD/272); the group of delegations of the non-aligned and neutral States put before the Committee a draft mandate for the ad hoc working group (document CD/329); a document on arms control and outer space (CD/320) was submitted by the delegation of Canada.

We believe that towards the end of the second part of its 1982 session the Committee was very near to the achievement of a consensus on the setting of an ad hoc working group to discuss questions connected with the prevention of an arms race in outer space on a solid basis, with the participation of qualified experts. This did not happen, however. Certain delegations, and more precisely one delegation, blocked the setting up of an ad hoc working group, declaring that it was necessary to hold an exhaustive discussion of the views of all delegations and to carry out extensive preparatory work of substance. The Mongolian delegation, like many other delegations, is in favour of the practical consideration of the substance of the issue, that is to say, the conduct of genuine negotiations. All the necessary prerequisites exist for this. Apart from the working papers containing specific proposals to which I have already referred, the Committee has been considering item 7 of its agenda from every point of view for more than two years now, both at plenary meetings and at informal meetings. We believe that the majority of delegations have expressed their views on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this connection I should like particularly to draw attention to the statement made by Ambassador Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka at our last plenary meeting, which contained a whole series of practical and useful suggestions which could form the subject of careful study and further consideration in the initial phase of practical negotiations in the Committee.

The Mongolian delegation, which is in favour of the speediest possible starting of actual negotiations, hopes that the Committee will soon agree on a mandate for the ad hoc working group. The wording of the mandate should, in our view, be based on the provisions of resolution 37/83, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. In the course of the negotiations, all existing proposals and possible future initiatives should undoubtedly be taken into account.

At the same time we consider that the main object should be a comprehensive solution of the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This does not mean that we wish to leave to one side the question of the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

To conclude, I should like to make some comments on item 4 of the agenda.

By contrast with the consideration of other substantive issues, the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in this Committee have made considerable headway as far as the scope of the work done is concerned. Like many other delegations we believe that if all participants in the negotiations were prepared to contribute to the successful completion of the work on a convention prohibiting chemical weapons this year, that would be a completely attainable objective.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The important thing, as we see it, is that the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be conducted in a practical way. In this connection we wish fully to support the proposal made by a number of delegations for a parallel approach consisting, on the one hand, of the formulation of those key provisions of the future convention on which there is a coincidence or similarity of views and, on the other hand, in close connection with this work, the continuation of the search for mutually acceptable solutions to questions on which there are still divergencies of views. We think that such an approach will speed up and bring us significantly nearer to agreement on the final text of a convention.

As regards questions of substance, the Mongolian delegation would like particularly to note certain constructive proposals that have been made during the present session. I am thinking primarily of the support given by the Soviet delegation to the proposal of a number of non-aligned and neutral States for the inclusion in the future convention of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, of the Soviet proposal for a renunciation of the production of chemicals with the methy-phosphorus bond, and of the proposal of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic for the declaration and liquidation of stocks of binary weapons during the initial phase after the entry into force of the convention. These proposals are undoubtedly extremely important from the point of view of facilitating the negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

After the prolonged interval between the end of January of this year and last week, the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has at last managed to resume its work. The Mongolian delegation would like to express the hope that under the chairmanship of Ambassador McPhail of Canada this Working Group will be able to complete the task before it.

The Committee on Disarmament has today heard the important statement of Comrade Nguyen Thuong, the Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. In that statement he dwelt in detail on the results of the International Syposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature, which was held in Ho Chi Minh City from 13 to 20 January 1983. The Mongolian delegation wishes to express its gratitude to the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for its noble efforts and its great contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

We consider that the statement by the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam usefully supplements the document which was distributed in the Committee at this session (CD/349), and will serve an important source of information in the consideration of questions of substance in the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chairman thanks Ambassador Erdembileg for his contribution, and his statement concludes the list of speakers for today. Is there any other delegation that wishes to take the floor?

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for your words of condolence addressed to the United States delegation for the heavy loss of life in the terrorist bomb explosion at our Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. I shall convey them to the bereaved familes and to my colleagues in the Department of State.

It is a tragedy of our time that diplomatic personnel and establishments have become the target of terrorists. This reflects the callous and cynical disdain which terrorists have for those who are the conduits of international dialogue, who seek solutions to the problems which those same terrorists cite as the reasons for their acts. Civilized people everywhere must reject such mindless acts.

May I also, through you, Sir, extend the heartfelt appreciation of my delegation to the many other colleagues who have similarly expressed their shock and sympathy over this vicious and cowardly act. Let me assure you, Sir, and the Committee, that, as President Reagan said, this criminal act against a diplomatic establishment will not deter us from our goals of peace in the region.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chairman thanks Ambassador Fields for his statement and will be glad to comply with his request.

Is there any other delegation that wishes to take the floor? If not, I may recall that we have already agreed, at our 207th plenary meeting, when the programme of work of the Committee was adopted, to close the first part of the session on 29 April. The Chair has been holding consultations with the co-ordinators of the various groups and with individual delegations concerning the opening date for the second part of the 1983 session. As a result, a consensus seems to be emerging in favour of 14 June as the most appropriate date to start the second part of the annual session. If there are no objections, may the Chair take it that the Committee agrees to that opening date?

It was so decided

The CHAIRMAN: Concerning the closing date of the 1983 session, the general feeling seems to be that this question should be decided during the second half of July, when we shall have a better idea of how the work of the Committe is proceeding.

Before we adjourn this plenary meeting, I should like to inform the Committee that, in consultation with the co-ordinators as well as individual delegations, it has been agreed to devote an informal meeting, on Monday, 25 April, at 3 p.m., to consideration of the question of the establishment of working groups under item 2 of the agenda. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee agrees to that informal meeting.

It was so decided

The CHAIRMAN: In connection with item 7, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", the Chair has also been conducting consultations on how best to consider this item, taking into account the limitations of time and the large number of meetings requested by the various working groups. After careful consideration of all possible alternatives, it has been agreed with the co-ordinators and other interested delegations that, after listening to the members listed to speak at our plenary meeting on Thursday next, we will suspend the plenary meeting and continue in an informal meeting to examine how best to consider item 7. After an exchange of views on that question, we could then resume the plenary meeting in order to give members an opportunity to express views for the record, in the light of the discussion held at the informal meeting. Since we may need to devote some time to the item under consideration, the secretariat will also make arrangements to provide for an extended meeting of the Contact Group on Principles of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which was originally scheduled to meet at 3 p.m. As the new arrangements concerning item 7 might take additional time, that Contact Group would meet immediately after the plenary adjourns.

The Group of 21 contact group on chemical weapons will meet on Wednesday, 20 April, at 9.45 a.m., in Room C.108.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 21 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.214
21 April 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. van Dongen (Netherlands)

GE.83-60954

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. J.C. CARASALES Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
Australia:	Mr. D. SADLEIR Mr. F. STEELE Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE Mr. P. BERG Miss HARROY
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. L. GOTZEV Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. B. GRINBERG Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U TIN KYAW HLAING U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. G.R. SKINNER Miss C. de VARENNES
China:	Mr. TIAN JIN Mrs. GE YUYUN Mrs. WANG ZIYANG Mr. LIN CHANG
Cuba:	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia:	Mrs. M. SLAMOVA Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN
	Mr. A.M. ABBAS
	Miss W. BASSIM
Ethiopia:	Mr. T. TERREFE
France:	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
	Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
	Mr. M. COUTURE
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER
	Mr. H. THIELICKE
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. W. ROHR
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. M. DUBEY
	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
	Mr. N. WISNOEMERTI
	Mrs. P. RAMADHAN
	Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
Iran:	
Italy:	Mr. M. ALESSI
	Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI
	Mr. M. KONISHI
	Mr. K. TANAKA
Kenya:	Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. DOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
	Mr. O. HILALE
Netherlands:	Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
	Mr. J. RAMAKER
	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Nigeria:	Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Mr. I.E.C. UKEJE
Pakistan:	Mr. T. ALTAF
Peru:	Mr. P. CANNOCK
	Mr. V. ROJAS
Poland:	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Romania:	Mr. T. MELESCANU
	Mr. L. TOADER
Sri Lanka:	Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Sweden:	Mr. C.M. HYLTENIUS
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mrs. I. SUNDBERG
	Mr. R. ANGSTRÖM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
	Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
	Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
	Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN
United Kingdom:	Mr. B.P. NOBLE
	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT
United States of America:	Mr. L. FIELDS
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
	Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
	Mr. J. DURHAM
Venezuela:	Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Zaire:	Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA
Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. R. JAIPAL
Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 214th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, may I welcome His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, who is listed to address the Committee today as the first speaker. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs is a career diplomat with a vast experience in multilateral diplomacy, and in particular United Nations affairs, and I am sure that the Committee will follow his statement with particular interest.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 7 of its agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". As usual, members of the Committee wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

In connection with item 7, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", members will recall that the Committee agreed at our last plenary meeting that, after listening to the members listed to speak today, we will suspend the plenary meeting and continue in an informal meeting to examine how best to consider item 7. After an exchange of views on that question, the Committee will resume its plenary meeting in order to give members an opportunity to express views for the record, in the light of the discussion held at the informal meeting.

May I recall that we also agreed that the Contact Group on Principles of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would meet immediately after the plenary in this conference room. Unfortunately, the Chairman of the Contact Group, Ambassador Grinberg, will not be able to convene the meeting for reasons of health, and consequently the meeting of the Contact Group is cancelled. I am sure that all members join me in wishing Ambassador Grinberg a quick recovery so that he can join us again soon.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Bulgaria, India, Australia, Egypt and China. It is now the Chair's pleasure to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. Lyuben Gotzev. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. LYUBEN GOTZEV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, I have the honour of addressing the Committee on Disarmament for the first time. Therefore, allow me at the outset to congratulate you and, through you, all representatives of member States.

The attention and hopes of many Governments and above all of millions of people throughout the world have been turned towards Geneva, not only because it is here that the important Soviet-American negotiations to limit and reduce strategic arms and to limit nuclear weapons in Europe are being held, but also because here is the site of the main multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations which has been entrusted by the international community with so many important tasks. Your work is a highly noble, difficult and responsible one. May I, however, be allowed not to withhold from you our disappointment that for the fifth consecutive year this Committee has been unable to accomplish some progress in the elaboration of international agreements limiting armaments. A great deal of time is still devoted to discussions on procedural and organizational matters, something that is being misused by some delegations so as to divert attention to secondary and less urgent issues. In our opinion, in many cases drafting work is being impeded or delayed by certain Western delegations. The Bulgarian delegation will continue its efforts to overcome such shortcomings so that the Committee's long-standing commitment to the cause of disarmament does yield results.

(Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, Bulgaria)

The People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches particular importance to the activities of the Committee on Disarmament and strives to take an active part in them. You are all familiar with the consistent policies pursued by socialist Bulgaria in favour of peace, understanding and co-operation in the Balkans, in Europe and in the world.

The necessity of exerting efforts to halt the arms race and bring about disarmament is, today, immeasurably greater than ever before, since the forces of confrontation and militarism have succeeded in inflicting major harm on détente, in aggravating the political environment and increasing the danger of war. There can be no other task facing all States, their Governments and political leaders more noble than that of militating against war, so as to arrest the current menacing turn of events and bring them back to the avenue of détente and mutually beneficial co-operation, and to arrive at a solution to the problem of the limitation and reduction of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments.

In a recent speech devoted to foreign policy matters, the first Party and State leader of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, stated, inter alia: "We are endeavouring to ensure and we believe that war can be prevented, that peace can be strengthened. We are deeply convinced that peaceful co-existence is the only sensible alternative to thermonuclear war, that it corresponds to the interests of all States and peoples, of all mankind".

In another speech Mr. Zhivkov said: "Turning the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone would correspond to the interests of the peoples of the Balkans. This would constitute a tangible contribution in the healing of the international atmosphere, in the gradual transformation of Europe into a continent free from nuclear weapons; this would be yet another victory for the cause of peace".

For the people and Government of Bulgaria, a significant expression of this policy course are the latest proposals and initiatives put forth jointly with the other socialist States at the Prague meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

As is well known, the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member States considered, earlier this month, subsequent steps to carry out these proposals and initiatives, as well as practical measures concerning negotiations with States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other States, on the fundamental problems related to the preservation of peace, disarmament and security in Europe and in the world. Both documents have been circulated in this Committee. I was informed that they are enjoying their place and share of attention in your discussions and are valued for their merits.

We in Bulgaria have welcomed with satisfaction the announcement that your Committee, although only after lengthy discussions and negotiations, has adopted the proposal of the socialist countries and the countries of the Group of 21 to include on its agenda a question entitled: "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

It is our deep conviction that there is no problem more topical in today's world politics, in the everyday thoughts and preoccupations of all citizens of the globe than that of the prevention of nuclear war.

Allow me to dwell in my statement today briefly upon this major issue. I take this opportunity today also because next week, when it is to be dealt in accordance with your programme of work, I shall not be able to be among you.

(Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, Bulgaria)

The singling out of the task of preventing a nuclear war in a clear-cut way is based on the following premises which, we believe, are worth recalling here.

First, nuclear weapons have specific characteristics which set them apart from all other weapons.

As is known, there are people in the West who deliberately minimize the magnitude of the consequences of a possible nuclear war. Those few but influential people calculate the probable number of human losses in a nuclear exchange at several dozen million lives alone. Such so-called "optimistic" calculations are meant, of course, to allay fears and to condition the population in the West to accept nuclear war as a thinkable alternative. The same objectives are pursued by the publicity given to strategic doctrines based on the possibility of waging and winning "limited nuclear wars", "protracted nuclear wars", etc.

We, for our part, share the generally recognized view that unlike any other weapons nuclear arms, taking into account the stocks accumulated so far, have the potential of killing all the people of the world many times over and maybe even of annihilating all life on our planet. By its very nature, nuclear war cannot be limited. Any use of nuclear weapons will inevitably escalate into a full-scale nuclear war whose fatal consequences will affect the whole world.

Secondly, the danger of nuclear war is real, present and increasing alarmingly.

The danger of nuclear war is not new, but in recent years it has been growing at an alarming rate. What makes today's situation different from yesterday's?

During the 1970s, when the policy of détente reached its peak, trends in international relations were positive. A series of bilateral and multilateral agreements were reached in the field of disarmament and other areas, and co-operation among nations was constantly on the increase. In such an atmosphere of trust and confidence, the prospects for eliminating the threat of war and attaining lasting peace were real and promising.

At present, however, one of the leading nuclear-weapon powers is deliberately trying to undo the positive achievements of the past and is pursuing a policy of rearmament and confrontation, of attaining military superiority and a position of strength and domination. With the support of its close allies, the United States has now embarked on a new round in the arms race which will lead to a further accumulation of weapons of mass destruction.

In assessing the reasons for the present state of affairs, one has to pay particular attention also to the imminent emergence of new types and systems of weapons. I understand that last week the Committee took up this problem and a number of statements have referred to how science and technology are subjected to the development of ever more sophisticated weapons. May I just mention the introduction of the MX missile and the development of several other weapons of a new, advanced generation in the United States. This could be interpreted, as is rightly pointed out by many knowledgeable people, including members of the United States Congress, as the adoption of a first-strike nuclear strategy. The unveiling in Washington of plans based on "Star Wars" scenarios has evoked frightening visions of a future world which will be constantly tottering on the brink of nuclear annihilation.

(Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, Bulgaria)

As Europeans, we emphasize also the serious consequences for world peace which will flow from the planned deployment of new American medium-range missiles in some countries members of NATO. A part of these missiles are clearly first-strike weapons and may usher our continent and the world into a period of greatly increased risks of nuclear war.

Thus, it is clear beyond any doubt that the danger of nuclear war is real and present. It is also intolerable. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that everything should be done to eliminate this danger without delay.

The Bulgarian delegation believes that if this Committee is to contribute to the achievement of this objective, it should embark on the consideration of the item on the prevention of nuclear war with maximum concentration, and with no preconditions or linkages with other issues. In an academic exercise the issue of nuclear war can, of course, be considered in a very broad context and there can hardly be a problem of international politics which would not be found to be in some sort of relationship to it. However, the Committee does not have a theoretical but a practical task; and it is a negotiating and not a deliberative body. Therefore, in our opinion, this forum should try to limit itself to the identification and elaboration of such measures alone which have a direct bearing on the elimination of the nuclear threat.

Having said this, I should like at the same time to emphasize that our over-all approach to the question of nuclear war is not a narrow one. Consequently, the socialist countries are firmly against any war, be it nuclear or conventional, and they have come forward with several initiatives for practical measures aimed at the total prohibition of the use of force in international relations, both in the regional context of Europe and on a global scale.

Of particular importance and topicality in this respect is the recent proposal by the Warsaw Treaty member States, addressed to the countries members of NATO, to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. In the communiqué published after the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States held on 6 and 7 April in Prague, it was stated that the problems related to the proposal for a treaty on the renunciation of the use of military force could be considered on a multilateral basis, on a level and in forms that would be acceptable to all. It is to be hoped that the countries concerned will take a constructive approach to this proposal.

In the document submitted by a group of socialist countries, an attempt has been made to outline a possible framework for the Committee's action under the item on the prevention of nuclear war. The principal practical measures suggested in that document include:

(a) the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons. This has already been done unilaterally by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's decision, taken in the current complicated international setting, is yet another reaffirmation of the USSR's peaceful policy course, of the markedly defensive character of its military doctrine. This decision corresponds to the vital

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interests of all nations, which have every right to insist that the other nuclear-weapon powers, too, should follow the example of the Soviet Union and undertake clear-cut obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This would be an expression of goodwill and readiness for co-operation, of a military policy which is genuinely proceeding from defensive objectives only, and which is taking into account the security of all States. So, if all other nuclear-weapon powers act accordingly, this would in practice amount to the full prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

The same effect could be achieved by the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a measure which enjoys the full support of the socialist States;

(b) a freeze by all nuclear-weapon States on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as well as on the production of fissionable material for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons. Such a first step would prepare the ground for the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of all nuclear arsenals;

(c) the declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. This measure would greatly facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which is of key importance in the efforts to stop the qualitative development of these weapons.

What these measures have in common is above all the fact that they can effectively contribute to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. In addition they are ripe for solution, and enjoy undeniably broad international support. What is needed to put them into effect is the political will of the States concerned.

Clearly, there may be other useful steps. We are ready to discuss any other multilateral measures which could contribute to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, such as measures for the prevention of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, of surprise attack, etc.

The identification of the whole range of such steps can best be done in an ad hoc working group to be established by the Committee on Disarmament with a view to conducting negotiations for their elaboration.

The Bulgarian delegation is willing to co-operate with all delegations for the speedy establishment of such a body and the immediate starting of its work.

Allow me to conclude by expressing the opinion that with the inclusion on the agenda of the item on the prevention of nuclear war, the Committee on Disarmament has set before itself a new, most responsible and challenging task whose solution will require multiplied efforts on the part of all delegations in the unique art of disarmament negotiations. To solve this task is to fulfil a historic responsibility. I wish you, dear colleagues, every success in your future work.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, for his contribution and for the kind good wishes addressed to this Committee.

I now call on the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Dubey. You have the floor, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. DUBEY (India): Thank you Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor.

I would begin by welcoming in our midst His Excellency Mr. Gotzev, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria. We have heard his statement with great attention and we will give it the most serious consideration in our work here.

During the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in June-July 1983, the delegation of India submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly. For reasons well known to all, the special session ended in failure, without adopting a single meaningful measure for the prevention of nuclear war and for disarmament. The proposal from India was transmitted to the thirty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly for consideration and necessary action. The proposed draft convention was also circulated among the members of the Committee on 23 July 1982, in document CD/295.

At the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, India along with 20 other countries co-sponsored a draft resolution entitled, "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", which called upon the Committee on Disarmament "to undertake, on a priority basis, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances", taking as a basis the text of the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. This resolution (37/100 C) was adopted by 117 votes in favour, 17 against and 8 abstentions. It was supported by two of the five nuclear-weapon States, China and the Soviet Union. It was also supported by Sweden, which in the past had abstained on similar resolutions. Two other countries which had voted against previous resolutions on the subject decided to abstain instead. Thus, support for the idea of prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances has been growing steadily each year.

The case for a total prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons rests on strong moral and legal grounds. It is morally and ethically abhorrent that a State or group of States should seek to pursue its national security by means which constitute a threat of mass annihilation. Often, it is said that as a result of the nuclear threat, mankind is on the brink of self-extinction. This kind of statement erroneously conveys a sense of inevitability of the nuclear threat and the meek submission of all the nations to this threat. The fact is that it is a handful of nations, armed with nuclear weapons, which threaten the world with mass destruction. The majority of the nations of this world are not perverted participants in some kind of a multilateral suicide pact. They are the involuntary intended victims of a strategy of mass annihilation.

Recently, one distinguished visitor to this Committee justified a proposal put forward by his country in the context of the ongoing bilateral negotiations on medium-range weapons as being based on a moral position. We are glad to note that a major nuclear-weapon power regards morality as a valid consideration in such

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matters. However, in the light of this avowed moral position, it is difficult for us to see how this country or any other nuclear-weapon State could possibly object to a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.

The option to use nuclear weapons, which is what the strategy of nuclear deterrence is all about, is often justified in terms of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which guarantees nations the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations". But can the right of self-defence be extended to justify the destruction of the entire planet, the annihilation of the whole of mankind? And in any event, will there be anything left to defend once nuclear war breaks out? It is, therefore, a mockery of the United Nations Charter, a blatant perversion of its high principles, even to suggest that it sanctions the use of nuclear weapons. The Charter of the United Nations was conceived as a blueprint for mankind's survival, not as its death-warrant, as some here would seem to suggest.

If two nations or two groups of nations are at war, the consequences of that war should be confined to the belligerents. If any nation, as a matter of policy, decides not to be involved in a conflict among other States, it has the right to be spared the consequences of such a conflict. No one questions this principle. In fact it is applied almost routinely to matters relating to relations among States in contemporary international life. Why is it that this principle is suspended when we come to deal with nuclear weapons? After all, in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the entire membership of the United Nations stated collectively and unanimously that a nuclear war would have "devastating consequences for belligerents and non-belligerents alike". Can any nuclear-weapon State or any State allied to it guarantee that the effects of the use of nuclear weapons would be strictly limited to the national or regional boundaries of States possessing nuclear weapons or those protected by their so-called "nuclear umbrella"? A vast number of studies have been conducted in this field, and the unanimous verdict of these studies is that such control over the effects of the use of nuclear weapons is not possible. The excellent comprehensive study on nuclear weapons conducted under the aegis of the United Nations (A/35/392) provides ample proof of this undeniable fact, were such proof needed.

States which oppose a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons claim their right as sovereign nations to pursue their security interests as they deem fit. We all hold our sovereignty very dear to us. We also know that the sovereignty of one State or group of States is as inviolate and inalienable as that of other States. But in the name of this self-same principle of sovereignty, I would like to ask: who gave a handful of nuclear-weapon States the right to trample on our sovereignty, the sovereignty of the vast majority of nations which are non-nuclear-weapon States? What principle justifies the placing in jeopardy of the vital security interests of our States? No, those who justify the option to use nuclear weapons on the basis of the principle of sovereignty are in fact engaged in its perennial negation.

It is for this reason that in the Declaration adopted by the Seventh Non-aligned Summit Conference in March this year, it was stated that "Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation. The Heads of State or Government therefore find it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests of a handful of nuclear-weapon States".

It is thus obvious that the use of nuclear weapons would violate the principles of the United Nations Charter. It would also be a crime against humanity. These words are carefully chosen, because they are based on legal provisions relating to

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the laws of war. I am here referring as a basic source to the Hague Conventions of 1907, the fundamental tenet of which is the prohibition of wanton or indiscriminate destruction. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, which updated and reinforced the Hague Conventions, impose obligatory restrictions on all belligerents to ensure the essential requirements for the minimum well-being and sustenance of the civilian population. Reviewing these provisions, the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, based in the United States, came to the conclusion that "The use of nuclear weapons of any type would inevitably result in massive violation of both the 1907 and 1949 rules".

It has sometimes been argued that there are no explicit legal instruments specifically forbidding the use of nuclear weapons and hence their use is legitimate. Have we really come to such a deplorable and anarchical stage of human behaviour that we will refrain from acting in a prejudicial and irresponsible manner only if we are legally enjoined upon to do so? Is there not a positive obligation imposed on us by higher morality and the dictates of the survival of the human species which ought to prevent us from engaging in activities whose inevitable outcome is going to be the extinction of the human race? In the third century B.C., an emperor of India, Ashoka, had the following definition of religion engraved on a stone pillar. It reads in Sanskrit: "Dharam dharti sa dharmah", which means, "Religion is that which holds the world together". Is it not, therefore, our sacred duty or religion to take a modest step towards holding the world together by banning the use of nuclear weapons? For those who would not be satisfied with anything less than a legal argument, I can do no better than once again quote from what the Lawyers' Committee has to say in this regard:

> "Aware of the continuous evolution of war technology, the 1907 Hague Regulations contain a general yardstick intended exactly for situations where no specific treaty rule exists to prohibit a new type of weapon or tactic. In such cases, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and rule of the principle of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience. In short, this general rule, known as the Martens Clause, makes civilized usages, the demands of humanity and the dictates of public conscience obligatory by themselves -- without the formulation of a treaty specifically prohibiting a new weapon".

To claim legality for the use of nuclear weapons would make utterly meaningless the efforts pursued throughout the entire past century to limit the consequences of armed conflict through the laws of war. Some may still argue, however, that in the era of "total war" in which we live today, even such fundamental rules may have to be disregarded if this improves the chances of victory or at least the avoidance of defeat. This argument, the Lawyers' Committee reminds us, "was urged in another context by some of the Nuremberg defendants, and indignantly rejected by the International Tribunal. The Tribunal's judgement warns that this Nazi conception of total war would destroy the validity of international law altogether". The "total war" that the defenders in the Nuremberg trial were talking about ended in victory for some and defeat for others. But "total war" in the form of a nuclear holocaust will leave no victors and vanquished and will result in the extinction of the entire human race. In the context of such a "total war" which threatens the present and succeeding generations, this legal argument is not only invalid but also utterly irrelevant.

(Mr. Dubey, India)

There is one last argument put forward against the proposed ban on the use of nuclear weapons which should also be disposed of. It has been said that a legal commitment not to use nuclear weapons is not verifiable and hence cannot be enforced. This, I submit, is an absurd argument. There are indeed very few legal commitments which are verifiable. If this argument of only verifiable commitment being enforceable is applied strictly, then most of our treaties, conventions and contractual commitments would have to be declared infructuous and the whole body of international law will be shorn of its substance. I shall cite just one example to bring out the absurdity of this argument. The nuclear-weapon States, which have been resorting to this argument, are also the ones which have loudly trumpeted the solemn assurances that they have given to non-nuclear-weapon States, selectively and conditionally, of course, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Are these assurances verifiable? Even if these assurances, or the negative security guarantees, are embodied in legal instruments, could they possibly be verified? Where is, then, the question of only verifiable legal commitments being enforceable? In another context, under the terms of the Additional Protocols to the Tlatelolco Treaty, nuclear-weapon States have undertaken legal obligations not to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. No provisions have been made to verify such obligations. Does this mean that the nuclear-weapon States do not regard the commitments they have made in the context of this Treaty as valid or enforceable?

Before concluding, I would like to emphasize that the proposal advanced by the non-aligned countries for a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is in no way a substitute for a genuine process of nuclear disarmament. As the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament acknowledges, the only effective guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of such weapons. What we seek to achieve through the proposed convention is the reduction of the risk of nuclear war, pending nuclear disarmament. Even this limited goal, you will agree, is critical for human survival.

The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, at their Seventh Summit Conference, lent their strong support to the proposal for concluding an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They "in the name of humanity demanded an immediate prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States". They called upon the nuclear-weapon States to agree on the proposed international convention on the subject. The draft convention proposed by a number of non-aligned countries is before this Committee, and we hope that the appeal to nuclear-weapon States emanating from New Delhi will not go unheeded and will provide an impetus to the consideration of this subject by this Committee. Two nuclear-weapon States have already responded in a positive manner to this initiative. We await the considered reaction of other nuclear-weapon States.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of India for his contribution and now calls on the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Sadleir.

Mr. SADLEIR (Australia): Mr. Chairman, may I join in welcoming the Deputy Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, to the Committee. We have listened to his statement carefully and will study it closely.

Today I address myself to the question of chemical weapons. At the outset I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction that the lengthy and unnecessary complications which prevented a start on work in this important and promising area have been resolved, and that the Ambassador of Canada, Mr. McPhail, has been appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. My delegation congratulates him on his appointment and looks forward to working closely with him at this session.

Ambassador McPhail has promised to speed our work, putting the focus on negotiation. In this he deserves our full support. Frankly, his task is no easy one. In the first place, proceedings have passed beyond the testing but still relatively straightforward phase of identification, to the much harder stage of trading off firmly held positions. Secondly, important procedural brakes are active.

Under the last Chairman, various circumstances, including the General Assembly's special session on disarmament, conspired to give the Committee on Disarmament something of a free run on chemical weapons. We were able to schedule concentrated periods of work, even outside the regular spring and summer sessions. We were able to take advantage of an imaginative idea of Ambassador Sujka for contact groups, convened with maximum informality. My delegation, with many others, went on record in favour of that approach.

Since then, several delegations have legitimately pointed out that to do business only in English, as happened in the contact groups last year, placed them at a disadvantage. Accordingly, they have asked for full interpretation services. As a result, the contact groups are better serviced and better managed, but they have lost something of their informality — in a sense their youth, innocence and dynamism. It is my delegation's strong recommendation that some element of this be restored and that contact group co-ordinators be allowed, as they see fit and as the need arises, occasionally to resort to informal methods of business. There is a further good reason for this, namely, the absolute limit on the number of rooms available in any one week for full secretarial services, and the ferocious competition for them. The competitiveness will only increase. It would be an enormous pity if progress towards a ban on chemical weapons became the price we had to pay. If the secretariat is able to provide additional facilities, notably increased availability of interpretation, this would be a real contribution.

When I last spoke on the question of chemical weapons, on 8 February, the United States delegation was on the point of tabling its detailed views on a chemical weapons convention. We have since studied these with profound interest: there is no doubt that the substantive matter which is to be found in document CD/343 will advance our negotiations. On 22 February, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union announced a new policy of his Government under which it could agree to include a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in a future treaty. This, too, is a major development, and one which my delegation welcomes as advancing our efforts in the elaboration of an international convention to ban chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

The issue of prohibiting use is the central problem in a cluster of questions bearing on the scope of a future convention. I turn now to some of these questions.

The first point at issue is what chemicals are covered in a chemical weapons ban. Diagrammatically one could represent as a large square all the chemicals in production in the world, and then shade in, say, a quarter of the square to represent the toxic chemicals. Since almost all of these have legitimate civilian or commercial applications one could represent the very small remainder in a darker colour. An even smaller subdivision therein would represent the most acute chemical weapons threat, i.e., the supertoxic lethal chemicals, or nerve agents. Unfortunately, having neatly categorized chemicals in this way, we are unable simply to use the model for prohibition. First, in our smallest, darkest corner — mainly those chemicals of very high toxicity which have only one purpose, that is, to be used in war, we must section off a fraction for permitted purposes, such as medical or protective research. An oblong in that same corner, not covering all of it and sticking out into the much larger area of permitted toxic chemical production, would represent those chemicals with the methyl-phosphorus bond, most being, recognizably, nerve agents but some having civilian uses. In the larger toxic area would be found chemicals like phosgene with proven effectiveness as weapons but now produced in huge quantities for sound economic reasons. And there would also be other chemicals like herbicides and riot-control agents which may have military applications but which need to be stockpiled for non-hostile purposes.

Since it is not possible to isolate individual chemicals to be prohibited, those who have long negotiated on this issue have evolved the concept of the "general purpose criterion". While agreement on this concept is incomplete, there is broad consensus that the criterion excludes from the prohibition those chemicals produced, possessed or used for non-hostile purposes. The problem with the criterion is that it is a subjective one, as is inherent in the very concept of purpose or intention. It needs to be supplemented by other criteria, including the toxicity criterion, to make manageable and even understandable what purposes are and are not covered by the prohibition. In the view of my delegation, early attention needs to be given to the question, beginning with the very definition of the terms "chemical weapon" and "non-hostile purposes". Criteria or lists could be drawn up as part of this exercise, initially to simplify the negotiating task; perhaps eventually such criteria or lists might be integrated in some way into the treaty itself. Delegations will be familiar with the "understandings" associated with the Environmental Modification Treaty, negotiated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Although not incorporated in ENMOD itself, they do provide a frame of reference. We need something similar here.

The general purpose criterion encapsulates the real objective of the proposed convention: to ban the use of chemicals as weapons. The chemicals themselves are not weapons: as I have stated, in almost every case they have legitimate economic purposes. The effort put in to transferring chemicals from one purpose to another — "weaponizing" them, if you like — might to some extent be checked by a prohibition on the manufacture, stockpiling, etc. of chemical weapons. But the use of chemicals as weapons can, in the last resort, only be checked by a ban on use itself: this is logical. Until chemicals are actually used, they may be, or seem to be, or be held to be chemicals manufactured or stockpiled for permitted purposes.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

The arguments for not following this logic and for rejecting the concept of a prohibition on use really boil down to one: there is already in place a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Other arguments flow from this — that ambiguities could arise in relation to the Protocol, or the Biological Weapons Convention which derived from it. Delegations might wish to refer to two comprehensive statements in this regard, one by the head of the Polish delegation in 1981 (CD/PV.138) and the other by Ambassador Onkelinx of Belgium last month (CD/PV.206).

I do not intend now to attempt a detailed counter-argument, particularly as I addressed the matter last year (CD/PV.168). It might help delegations, however, if I simply tabulate some of the major points made in support of including a prohibition on use in a future convention. These derive from statements by the Ambassadors of Argentina (CD/PV.167), China (CD/PV.118), Indonesia (CD/PV.169 and 180) and Pakistan (CD/PV.171). Since our five delegations have in recent years worked together on this issue, I trust they will excuse my borrowing from them in this way. The points that I might tabulate are the following:

1. A new convention containing a distinct ban on use would be truly comprehensive;

2. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, rather than being weakened in this regard, can be strengthened;

3. Treaties build on each other: there are numerous precedents;

4. The 1925 Protocol logically should have ended the use of chemical weapons, but unfortunately it did not — indeed the potential for the use of chemical weapons exists under the Protocol;

5. The Protocol did not anticipate that the concept of "war" would evolve into the larger concept of armed conflict;

6. The Protocol allows for ambiguity on the chemicals to be covered;

7. The protocol is limited (by reservation and interpretation) to no first use, and to States that are parties to it;

8. The logic of future verification mechanisms (verification is not itself provided for under the Protocol) is that use should be included in a future ban.

I have mentioned logic more than once, for example, in the additional argument that the general purpose criterion should lead to including a ban on use. The logic of the concept that the future convention should base itself on purpose rather than capability should lead to the inclusion of a ban on use: it is use which transforms purpose from something subjective and debatable to objective reality. On the other hand, there are arguments, good ones, that chemical weapons capability itself should also be restricted by the future convention and here, too, logic leads to including a ban on use. Without a restraint on chemical weapons capability, the convention might actually add to the risk that States could develop a threatening chemical posture, within the law. The threat of use will be much more apparent than the threat of manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and so on.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Of all the arguments, verification is the main one. Let me assure those delegations which have expressed the fear lest the verification cart be put before the convention horse that the correct order is being observed. The chemical weapons area is a good example of the proposition that disarmament and arms limitation conventions aim to increase security, and that verification contributes to this as a consequence. States give up partially and/or temporarily some of their national security when they adhere to a convention so that they might benefit from a general consequential improvement in security. The reassurance that the process is worth it comes largely through the methods available to them of verifying that all States are complying. In the sphere of chemical weapons, there will have to be an extended and delicate period during which States reduce their chemical weapons profile, actual or potential. There will be asymmetries and uncertainties. There will be a need to ensure — in stages or phases — that complex obligations are being honoured. How this verification is achieved will require continuous regulation in the course of negotiating the convention, but it will of course be subordinated to the objectives of the convention itself.

There has been a wide measure of agreement that the future convention must provide a means to verify that chemical weapons have not been used. The basis of this agreement is that the 1925 Protocol's prohibition on use has no verification mechanism. It might be possible to verify something under one convention which is prohibited in another but, to put it mildly, that would be untidy. My delegation argues a simple proposition: let the future convention ban the possibility of the use of chemicals as weapons, and let it provide a verification mechanism to ensure compliance with this ban.

I said earlier that we were moving into negotiations proper. This is a stage which calls for flexibility. The Soviet delegation has indicated the maximum flexibility on this key question. The United States delegation earlier, in its detailed views submitted as document CD/343, also demonstrated an adjustment of its position on the issue of explicitly prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The French delegation, too, has recently considered ways in which its own concerns, as well as the concerns of those seeking a ban on use, might be met by some formula which affirmed the enduring validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. My delegation is ready to negotiate on this issue. We sense that the basis for consensus is there: one which protects the undeniable and lasting achievement of the Protocol and yet one which will of itself effectively ensure against the use of chemical weapons.

Concretely, my delegation proposes that in our new negotiating phase we do not, as in the past, exclude "use" from our terms of reference. On the contrary, we should build it in, by brackets, unwritten agreement or any other device. As we proceed, we should ask ourselves: what would inclusion of a specific reference to use involve? What would be the legal and other implications? What verification procedures would be affected? I do not discount the possibility that as a Committee we shall eventually conclude that a specific reference to use is not necessary in the prohibition itself. But such a conclusion should only come after we have convinced ourselves — and have a consensus to this effect — that our future convention will rule out the use of chemicals as weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Sadleir for his contribution and has taken due note in particular of his remark on the services of the secretariat. Ambassador Sadleir has put his finger on what, indeed, does seem to be a problem of some considerable importance, and we will take this up with the secretariat.

I now call on the next speaker on our list, the distinguished representative of Egypt, Mr. Ibrahim Hassan. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. HASSAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, this is the first time the delegation of my country is taking the floor at a plenary meeting during this month. For this reason, allow me first of all to express our pleasure at seeing you presiding over the activities of our Committee during this month of April. Although I was among the last delegates to offer you congratulations, I may be among the first to convey to you our admiration and appreciation of the constructive efforts you are exerting and the wise way in which you are conducting the work of our Committee.

I should like also, on this occasion, to express to Ambassador Ali Skalli of the brother country of Morocco our great gratitude and our appreciation of the high ability and great wisdom which characterized the performance of his duties when he was Chairman of this Committee last March. The success of Ambassador Ali Skalli in overcoming, with the Committee, all the difficulties that have obstructed its way, is new evidence — if any were needed — of his wide experience and his many capabilities, while being at the same time a source of pride to all of us and especially to my delegation.

I should like also to take this opportunity to associate myself with those who have preceded me in welcoming Mr. Gotzev, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, to whose statement before this Committee today we listened with great interest.

I shall deal in my statement today with item 7 of the agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

When man succeeded, more than a quarter of a century ago, in conquering outer space for the first time, the whole world welcomed this important event which asserted the creative power of man and his ability to open up new horizons for exploration, development and construction, thus ensuring prosperity and well-being for the whole world. Since that remote date, Egypt has been among the States that have drawn attention to the importance of action for reaching international agreements on establishing the proper international legislation so as to ensure the use of this new breakthrough for the benefit and well-being of man and for peaceful purposes along and to exclude outer space from the sphere of rivalry and competition among the major powers and of military uses and the arms race.

When the leaders of the non-aligned countries convened at their first summit meeting in Belgrade in September 1961, they issued their final statement which included in its paragraph 17 the following: "The participating countries call upon all States in general, and States at present exploring outer space in particular, to undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes". Since that time, the efforts exerted have succeeded in achieving positive steps on this path, and it has in fact been possible to conclude a number of agreements dealing with some aspects pertinent to outer space, the most important of these

(Mr. Hassan, Egypt)

being the 1963 Treaty on the partial banning of nuclear-weapon tests and the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

In spite of the importance of these agreements and other measures that dealt with the subject of outer space, they remained, on the whole, insufficient to establish an integrated international legal system providing a real guarantee against the use of outer space for military purposes and excluding it from the arms race. This has given the world the opportunity to witness, in the last few years consecutive attempts to militarize outer space, and the involvement of the States possessing the greatest technological potentials in a race for the creation and development of space equipment with a view to achieving military and strategic goals which would give them supremacy in the field of the arms race between them.

The Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament drew attention to these gaps when it said, in its paragraph 80, that "In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies".

There is no doubt that the risks of the permanent threat of seeing the arms race spread to outer space do not apply solely to the Superpowers, which possess the greatest technological potential in this field, but in fact represent a serious threat also to the security of the whole world. Perhaps the risks to which the States of the third world are exposed surpass those which threaten the developed countries, because the latter possess the requisite means of defence and protection, while the developing countries lack the potentials and technological means to ensure their security and to protect their people.

For this reason, while recognizing the special responsibility falling in this field on the Superpowers, we insist on the fact that the task of negotiating the halting of the arms race in outer space should remain in a collective multilateral framework.

Before the subject was raised in the Committee on Disarmament, there were attempts to bring the issue of the peaceful uses of space and preserving it from the arms race before the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. However, some objected to this, arguing that the subject is beyond the terms of reference of that Committee and is fully within the competence of the Committee on Disarmament.

Hence, all hopes were placed on the Committee on Disarmament as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Then there were the resolutions of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, convened in Vienna in August of last year, which were adopted by consensus and which emphasized this role while calling upon the Committee on Disarmament to undertake the proper steps to prevent an arms race in outer space, clearly indicating the need for the participation of all nations, and especially those possessing the greatest space potential, in contributing actively to the achievement of this goal.

(Mr. Hassan, Egypt)

The Committee's session last year was an opportunity for a broad exchange of views on the importance of action to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space, and it was obvious that interest was given to the risks issuing therefrom and the increasing threats to international peace and security it represented.

The United Nations General Assembly also, in its resolution 37/83, which was supported by 138 States and sponsored by my delegation with a number of non-aligned and socialist countries, including 21 States members of this Committee, requested the Committee on Disarmament "to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its session in 1983, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

During the Committee's session last year, the Group of 21 called for the setting up of a working group which would deal with item 7 of the agenda, and it submitted document CD/329 containing a draft mandate for such a group. The Group of 21, in its suggestion, called for the adoption of a comprehensive approach in dealing with the subject, so that it could be examined in its various aspects with the necessary flexibility and allowing the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Those who at that time opposed the setting up of a working group argued the new character of the subject and its complexity, with its intricate technical aspects, and called instead for it to be dealt with at informal meetings and sessions called "instructive", with a view to exchanging views and information about it. We nevertheless cannot but disagree with this opinion, for the following reasons.

Informal meetings of the Committee cannot be a substitute for a working framework for the carrying out of its basic task which is that of negotiating agreements on disarmament. The working group has proved to be the best framework to achieve this goal.

Most — if not all — of the subjects with which the Committee is concerned are by essence complex subjects where technical aspects interfere with political considerations; but this fact has not prevented us, in the past, from attempting to make progress in these subjects and try to reach agreements about them, and we must not be prevented from doing that now or in the future.

While we are living in a period when man is becoming increasingly anxious as a result of the dreadful armaments on land, in the air and at sea, and when efforts to stop and curb this race are faltering, we are requested today to undertake steps to ensure the prevention of the extension of this danger to new horizons, which threatens the future and the security of mankind.

Our race against time calls upon us to speed up the pace of our action and step forward to assume our responsibilities — today rather than tomorrow, without hesitation or delay.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Egypt for his contribution and for his warm and generous words addressed to the Chair and to the distinguished Chairman for the month of March, Ambassador Ali Skalli.

May I now call on the last speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of China, Mr. Tian Jin. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China)(translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time for the Chinese delegation to make a formal statement at a plenary meeting in the month of April, please allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship for the current month. We are confident that with your vast experience and under your able guidance, we shall be able to achieve further progress in our work for the month. We would also like to thank Ambassador Skalli, the Chairman for last month, for his contributions. His diplomatic skills have left a strong impression upon us.

At the meeting this morning the distinguished Ambassador Sadleir of Australia made a comprehensive and convincing statement on the reasons why prohibition of use should be included in the future chemical weapons convention. The Chinese delegation supports his statement. It is our hope that the Committee on Disarmament will arrive at an early agreement on the important subject of the scope of the future convention, so as to speed up the pace of negotiation and elaboration of the convention. It is in this spirit that the Chinese delegation has tabled a working paper today concerning the scope of prohibition, namely, the question of the prohibition regime of the convention. We hope this paper will soon be distributed in different languages.

Now, I wish to make a few comments on this subject.

Over the last few years, there have been fairly deep differences of opinion between countries on the question of whether or not the scope of the future convention should contain a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. The Chinese delegation is pleased to note that quite a number of delegations have come to accept the idea of including such a prohibition. However, there are still some delegations which express varying degrees of reservation and doubt on the subject. One of the questions they have raised is, if such a prohibition is included in the future convention, what will its relationship be with the prohibition regime of the 1925 Geneva Protocol? My delegation believes a solution to this question can be found.

First, in statements in the plenary and again in the contact group, quite a number of delegations have pointed out that the prohibition regime of the 1925 Geneva Protocol should be in line with that of the future convention. We associate ourselves with this view. Should there be any difference between the two, problems would arise which would be similar to those we encountered during negotiations when the prohibition of use was not supposedly to be included in the scope of the convention. For instance, it would be necessary to differentiate which areas come under the prohibition regime of the Protocol and which would

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

come under the regime of the future convention; then it would be necessary to solve the problem of verification of compliance with the Geneva Protocol prohibition regime. As everyone knows, such matters involve many complicated issues, making their solution rather difficult. However, all the above difficulties could be resolved, if a prohibition of use of chemical weapons were to be included in the future convention, and it could be brought in line with that of the Protocol, because on the common ground of the two regimes, any failure of compliance with one regime would simultaneously be a failure of compliance with the other. And this failure of compliance could be dealt with according to the verification or other possible relevant provisions of the future convention.

Secondly, how to bring these two prohibition regimes in line with each other? It is our view that this can be done on the common basis that both regimes prohibit the direct and indirect use of the toxic physiological effects of chemical substances for fighting purposes. (Here we do not refer to biological warfare, because it is outside the scope of our present debate.)

Such a basis not only conforms to the obligations provided for in the Geneva Protocol, but is also in full accord with the "general purpose criterion" of the future convention. At the same time it can suitably resolve the differences of opinion on herbicides and irritants, that is, it prohibits their use for fighting purposes while permitting their use for purposes of peace and law enforcement. And it naturally follows that research, development, production, transfer, acquisition by other means and stockpiling which are in conformity with these two purposes are also legal.

Thirdly, as we have previously pointed out, the best way to unify the two regimes is to use the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in the definition of chemical weapons to be included in the convention, and also to include its definition in the convention. This concept of "chemical warfare agents" embodies the fundamental characteristics of chemical weapons and also reflects the content of the "general purpose criterion". As such it can aptly become the basis for unifying the two prohibition regimes mentioned above. In our view, the term "chemical warfare agents" sums up in the most precise and appropriate term the whole concept of the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol (of course, this does not refer to biological warfare either). And what lies at the centre of the prohibition by the future convention is exactly "chemical warfare agents", whether they be super-toxic lethal, lethal, other harmful substances or any other kind of substance, as long as they are used for fighting purposes.

Consequently, the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in itself contains the basis for unifying the prohibition regimes of the two international instruments.

The Chinese delegation has always advocated using the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in the future convention. In the course of the previous negotiations, many other delegations have also submitted working papers on the definition of this term. At this stage, when we are attempting to examine and settle the question of the relationship between the two regimes, the adoption of this concept becomes even more necessary. It is our belief that by straightening

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

out the relationship between these two regimes, we will be in a better position to achieve an agreement on the question of the scope of the future convention. The Chinese delegation stands ready to exchange views with all other delegations on this issue.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of China for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen.

This concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? If such is not the case, I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Committee in five minutes' time to examine how best to consider item 7 of the agenda.

The meeting was suspended at 12.20 p.m. and resumed at 5.05 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 214th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is reconvened.

Is there any delegation that wishes to take the floor? This does not seem to be the case. Therefore, in pursuance of consultations undertaken, the Chair would announce that it is pursuing further consultations on the question of the handling of item 7 of the agenda with a view to arriving, at an early stage during the summer part of the session, at a formal decision to be taken by this Committee on how item 7 of the agenda is to be further handled, including a possible decision on the formation of a working group and the definition of its mandate.

We then come to the final point, which is the informal paper on the timetable of meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week 25-29 April 1983. The secretariat has circulated this informal paper and as usual it is a tentative timetable which may be subject to changes if needed. In that connection may I note that demands for meetings have been so high for the next week that the secretariat has been able to secure this programme only on a tentative basis. I may recall that the Trade and Development Board, the Economic Commission for Europe and other bodies are meeting at the same time, and that our own requirements need to be harmonized with requests by those bodies. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts this tentative timetable.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, this is not an objection but a question for clarification. On Friday, 29 April, when, presumably, the Committee will be closing its spring session, I see that there will be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban, at 3 p.m. There is nothing indicated, even tentatively, about a provision for closing the session on that day. Does this mean, therefore, that in the event of the Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban ending at 8 p.m., or even 11 p.m., on 29 April that we would anticipate meeting on 30 April formally to conclude the session? I just wanted to find out as this is important, Sir, for certain delegations, including mine, and I would appreciate some explanation as to how we are to interpret this.

The CHAIRMAN: May the Chair reply to the distinguished representative of Kenya that we are not closing the session; we are entering into the recess between the spring part of the session and the summer part of the session, but it is still the 1983 session, and therefore no formal closing is required.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I agree with that, but I presume that the Chairman will make some final remarks, at least to formally go into recess. That is the practice, is it not? We would expect that, Sir.

The CHAIRMAN: That would indeed be a correct expectation by the distinguished delegate of Kenya — and any such remarks would be made at the close of the last formal plenary meeting, on Thursday next.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a brief observation about the programme for next week. The first thing I would like to do is express my gratitude to the secretariat for squaring a virtually impossible circle. I recognize how difficult this has been for them because of the conflicting demands upon their time and resources, particularly the interpreters, as well as the question of rooms, and so on. I am particularly sensitive about this question myself because I am afraid our delegation is one of the main instigators of the difficulties the secretariat has had. That is, of these meetings, you will notice that a good part of them are associated with the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. I think we all agree in this room that these meetings are indeed necessary, despite the difficulties they are causing not only to the secretariat but to each one of our delegations. You will notice, I think, that each contact group of the chemical weapons Working Group is now scheduled to meet twice before the winding up of business on Wednesday. This, I think, is an achievement on the part of the secretariat. There is, however, one exception, and that is Group B of Mr. Duarte. As you said yourself, Mr. Chairman, this schedule is a notional schedule and we will discuss with the secretariat whether it is indeed possible to have a second meeting of Group B. If this is the case, we would try to inform members of the Committee through the secretariat, in due course.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada. Are there any other speakers? If that is not the case then it remains for the Chair to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 26 April at 10.30 a.m. Ambassador Erdembileg, you have the floor.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): I apologise for interrupting you, Mr. Chairman. Basically I agree with what the distinguished representative of Kenya said, and I should like simply to develop his thought. I entirely agree with you that we are not closing the current session but merely suspending it for a time. Nevertheless it might perhaps be more logical if we were in fact to end the first part of the Committee's session with a plenary meeting, so as not to give the impression that after the plenary Committee has declared a recess, some working groups seem to be going on working.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We could perhaps, therefore, transfer the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban planned for Friday at 3 p.m. to Thursday, 28 April, at 10.30 a.m. so that we can hold the final plenary meeting on Friday afternoon. We would then be concluding the first part of this session in an orderly manner.

If other members of the Committee object, we shall of course not insist on our proposal. But the main thing I wanted to draw attention to is that we ought to avoid a situation where, in spite of the declaration of the interruption of the session, the activity of the ad hoc working groups, that is to say, the work of the session, is nevertheless continuing. From the organizational point of view that would seem to us illogical.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Erdembileg for his statement and may perhaps be permitted to react to it, off the cuff.

I may recall what I said when this tentative work programme was introduced — that it was very much tentative and, the demand of meetings being enormous, largely because the Committee lost a considerable amount of time in the earlier part of the spring session, an effort has been made, a very laudable effort, by all working groups to achieve as much work as possible on substance in the remainder of the month of April. I do see a slight problem — and can sympathize with the wish of certain delegates to end, as I believe the expression was, "with a flourish", and with a plenary meeting, but I take the liberty of reminding the distinguished representative of Mongolia that many, in fact the majority of the members of the Committee on Disarmament have a large number of other obligations and a very pressing time-table — particularly true for the month of April — when many important meetings take place simultaneously. I would rather fear that many of the members of the Committee would find it difficult to readjust their conference schedules at fairly short notice, to such an extent that we could change the customary day of the plenary meeting from Thursday to Friday. Nevertheless, the Chair is quite prepared to consult members on this and to explore the possibilities, but it must in all fairness warn that it may prove to be very difficult and that in fact the perhaps less than elegant ending of the spring session is one of the unfortunate results of the fact that during earlier months we lost a great deal of time over procedure. This is perhaps a relatively modest price we have to pay for that. If there are no other speakers the meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.215
26 April 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 26 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. van Dongen (Netherlands)

GE.83-60994

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. A. TAFFAR
Argentina:	Mr. J.C. CARASALES
	Mr. GARCIA MORITAN
Australia:	Mr. D. SADLEIR
	Mr. R. STEELE
	Mr. T. FINDLAY
Belgium:	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
	Mr. P. BERG
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
	Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. L. GOTZEV
	Mr. K. TELLALOV
	Mr. B. GRINBERG
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
	U TIN KYAW HLAING
	U THAN TUN
Canada:	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
	Miss C. de VARENNES
China:	Mr. LI LIUYE
	Mr. TIAN JIN
	Mrs. GE YUYUN
	Mrs. WANG ZIYANG
	Mr. LIN CHENG
Cuba:	Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mrs. M. SLAMOVA
	Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:	Mr. I.A. HASSAN
	Mr. A.M. ABBAS
	Miss W. BASSIM
Ethiopia:	Mr. T. TERREFE
	Ms. K. SINEGIORGIS
France:	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
	Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
	Mr. M. COUTHURES
German Democratic Republic:	Mr. G. HERDER
	Mr. H. THIELICKE
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. H. WEGENER
	Mr. W. ROHR
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. T. TOTH
India:	Mr. M. DUBEY
	Mr. S. SARAN
Indonesia:	Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA
	Mr. N. WISNOEMERTI
	Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
	Mrs. P. RAMADHAN
	Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
Iran:	Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI
Italy:	Mr. M. ALESSI
	Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI
	Mr. M. KONISHI
	Mr. K. TANAKA
Kenya:	Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. BOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
Morocco:	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
	Mr. O. HILALE
Netherlands:	Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
	Mr. J. RAMAKER
	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Nigeria:	Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Miss I.E.C. UKEJE
Pakistan:	Mr. T. ALTAF
Peru:	Mr. P. CANNOCK
	Mr. V. ROJAS
Poland:	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. T. MELESCANU
	Mr. L. TOADER
Sri Lanka:	Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Sweden:	Mr. C. LIDGARD
	Mr. C.M. HYLTENIUS
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
	Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
	Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
	Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
	Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
	Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN
United Kingdom:	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mr. B.P. NOBLE
	Mrs. J.I. LINK
	Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT
United States of America:	Mr. L. FIELDS
	Mr. P. CORDEN
	Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
	Mr. R.L. HORNE
	Mr. J. DURHAM
Venezuela:	Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Zaire:	Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA
Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. R. JAIPAL
Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 215th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee starts today its consideration of the question of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, which is inscribed as part of item 2 of the agenda of the Committee. However, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina, China, Morocco, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Nigeria and the United States of America, and may I now invite the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales, to take the floor. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament is at present considering the questions of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prevention of nuclear war and in particular how to deal with these two subjects procedurally. I shall refer in this statement to both topics.

Representatives will recall that at the beginning of last year the inclusion in our agenda of a new item on the peaceful use of outer space was not easy. Furthermore we were told bluntly at that time that that in no way meant agreement to give substantive consideration to this question in a working group because that would be premature and because the complexity of the subject was such that it would be necessary first to identify the areas in which useful work might be done.

We were obliged then to accept the procedure which appears to have become customary where there is no political will to initiate negotiations, namely, the holding of informal meetings. My delegation has growing doubts as to the real value and usefulness of these meetings of which no proper record is made and which usually consist simply of a repetition, often in a diffuse and disorderly way, of positions and views already expressed at plenary meetings. They appear to be simply a subterfuge designed to fill time and to give the impression -- a very poor one, it is true -- that something is being done. This way of approaching the consideration of an item presupposes that the question is not urgent and that the Committee has years in which to begin to deal with the subject in greater depth.

In 1982 informal meetings were held to consider the existing and foreseeable situation in outer space and the subject was also referred to repeatedly in formal statements. One thing constantly emphasized at those meetings by the vast majority of delegations was the urgent need to act promptly in this matter, with the utmost speed, because the range of activities then developing in outer space and of those that seemed likely to be carried out in the immediate future was expanding at such a rate that it would soon be too late -- if it was not so already -- to adopt measures to put a stop to or regulate those activities. As usual, a minority of delegations gave no sign of sharing that appreciation and showed no interest in bringing nearer the moment when the international community represented in this Committee on Disarmament would apply itself seriously to this objective.

Barely a year has passed since those discussions and I am wondering if there can be any doubt that the situation that so many of us warned against has occurred and that, as regards outer space, developments of various kinds have taken place, all of them increasing the possibility and likelihood of the use of outer space for warlike purposes.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

In spite of the repeated declarations at every level of the need to preserve outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, it has already become militarized to such a degree that the delegation of France was able to say, in the interesting document, CD/375, which it put before us, that of the three possible roles it identified for outer space, the first, "that of absolute sanctuarization or demilitarization, is something that is no longer possible. It is therefore unrealistic to try to revert to such a situation.".

I very much fear, in view of the reluctance of some delegations to allow the Committee on Disarmament to discuss this item in substance, that the day is not far off when we shall be told: the arms race in outer space is a reality and there is no longer the possibility of pursuing the goal of preserving it for purely peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.

The Group of 21 was always forthright as regards the need to set up a working group to conduct negotiations on item 7 of our agenda, and in September 1982 it submitted document CD/329 containing a draft mandate for such a group, a proposal which my delegation of course fully supports. The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic had earlier submitted document CD/272 containing a similar proposal.

Certainly, the mere establishment of a working group does not of itself guarantee useful and much less successful work. But at least the possibility exists and experience has shown that to be so. The Committee has not yet found any better method for dealing in depth with the questions on its agenda. It has already become clear that informal meetings lead to nothing concrete. This is why the setting up of a working group is interpreted -- rightly, in my view -- as a clear sign that the Committee has decided to tackle the subject seriously. A working group may function effectively or not -- time will tell -- but what I am certain of is that if we do not set up a working group and continue to confine ourselves to casual conversations and informal consultations, the item will simply remain on the agenda, giving the illusion that the Committee is dealing with it whereas in reality little or nothing is being done.

When we talk about setting up a working group it is -- obviously -- on the understanding that the group will have a meaningful mandate. For no one is against working groups "in principle". Reservations appear with respect to the desirability of setting up a given group and its function.

I have not the slightest doubt that the negotiation of a mandate for an ad hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space will not be easy. The question of the mandates of working groups is becoming an exercise absorbing a large part of the best energies of the Committee on Disarmament. The position of some delegations is habitually such that we may well ask ourselves what is the real meaning of their acceptance of the establishment of a working group when they insist that the mandate of such a body should be so limited that its practical consequences for the achievement of effective measures of disarmament are virtually nil. Its work may be useful as an illustration for the representatives who take part in its discussions, but it contributes very little to the negotiation of international agreements on disarmament, which is the essential task of our Committee.

We should ask ourselves if the time has not come to change the practice followed by the Committee on Disarmament up to now, which is that of deciding in each case, with absolute precision, what a working group may do and what it may not do. This practice means that the group starts with its hands tied, and it then spends a good deal of its available time trying to secure the broadening of its mandate.

(Mr . Carasales, Argentina)

Would it not, in the long run, be more productive to establish working groups with simple mandates merely assigning to them a given item, without going into details?

The group could then devote itself exclusively to the subject assigned to it and could decide, as its work proceeds — and we should not forget that the rule of consensus always applies — what it can hope to achieve and what is not yet possible. The process of the work itself will decide the rate of progress that is possible towards the ultimate objective, which can be nothing other than the negotiation of one or several international agreements. But before that goal can be reached, many intermediary stages must be passed through, and the working group can accomplish them gradually, according to the progress and the convergencies of views achieved, without being limited from the outset by a restrictive mandate and without then having to spend a large part of its time discussing the amendment of that mandate.

Resolution 37/83 of the last session of the General Assembly clearly reflects the thinking of the international community on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Its various paragraphs plainly indicate the urgency of this task and what is expected of the Committee on Disarmament in this connection. The number of votes which that resolution won is important, but what is more important, I believe, is the realism and timeliness of the thinking that inspired it. It is certain that there are few subjects where time is such a vital factor as it is in the matter of outer space. Outer space is a new world that is already being used, and not always for peaceful purposes, but whose possibilities for military use, both direct and indirect, are increasing day by day. Every hour of delay in tackling the regulation of this sphere will be lost for ever and may prove fatal.

As has already been noted a number of times, the military use of satellites is already a reality. Some 75 per cent of the satellites in orbit in 1980 had a military purpose, and an extremely high proportion of military communications are conducted by means of satellites.

Attempts have been made to convince us that military satellites are good and positive. We are told — and I recall a statement made on 29 March last — that "these satellites have a stabilizing effect" and that they ought therefore to be protected. We were also told that "for the foreseeable future the complete demilitarization of outer space is not at all a good idea. It would, of course, not be very realistic either".

This last statement is perhaps "realistic" — to borrow the term — but I beg to disagree with the claim that the complete demilitarization of outer space would not be a good idea. I think that it would be. The satellites carrying out tasks connected with the verification of compliance with disarmament agreements could very well be controlled by an international agency. But military satellites can also carry out a vast range of tasks whose ultimate results would be an increase, at times very substantial, in the destructive capacity of a combat force. My country has had a direct and painful experience of the consequences of the military use of satellites.

The questions of the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in that sphere should be dealt with in a comprehensive manner. The problems are many and various, and in our view there is no reason for determining preferences and priorities now, as some want to do in connection with anti-satellite systems,

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

particularly when the objects which it is intended to protect, military satellites, can fulfil hostile functions far too important to warrant their immunity and impunity.

From the procedural point of view, many of the comments I have made in connection with the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space could equally well be applied to that of the prevention of nuclear war.

Both items refer to the future in so far as the goal is to "prevent" something which has not yet happened but which could very well happen. There is the difference that, if either of these possibilities were to become a reality, the extent of the consequences would in the second case be even more catastrophic.

As the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries stated at their seventh summit meeting held recently in New Delhi, "the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war". The New Delhi Message likewise contains a paragraph pointing out that "the non-aligned countries, speaking for the majority of the world community, want an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens the well-being not only of humanity in our times but also of future generations as well".

At the root of the problem there is an undeniable fact. As the Political Declaration of New Delhi says, "Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation." Until full recognition is given to this essential difference between nuclear weapons and other types of weapons and between nuclear war and other types of war, and until the logical conclusions are drawn from this difference, the nature of the question of the prevention of nuclear war will be distorted and all the efforts based on the unique character of nuclear weapons will be fruitless.

Document CD/341 of the Group of 21 is explicit as regards the nature of the problem and the way to deal with it, namely, through the setting up of a working group with an adequate mandate.

I shall not, therefore, dwell further on this question, so as not to repeat ideas already expressed. Furthermore, I spoke about this matter in my statement of 28 February last. The need to adopt the measures advocated by the Group of 21 is, in my view, indisputable.

I feel obliged, however, to state that what has happened so far with respect to items 2 and 7 of our agenda, which concern two issues of the utmost importance for the future of mankind, does not, in my view, constitute a model of what the action of the sole multilateral negotiating body in this sphere ought to be. When the attention of the international community, justifiably and deeply concerned at the possibility of an arms race in outer space and even more at that of the outbreak of a nuclear war, is directed with well-founded expectations towards the Committee on Disarmament in the hope of seeing a serious and thorough consideration of these problems and the gradual emergence of concrete and realistic measures for dealing with them, it is deplorable that all the Committee can offer is protracted and meaningless discussions on procedural questions: the inclusion of the item in the agenda, whether or not a working group should be established, the formulation of mandates with or without substance. The international community has the right to expect something different from the body to which it has given specific and unique competence in order precisely that it should not repeat once more another round of sterile debates but should find practical solutions to the problems of the world today.

The Committee on Disarmament has a tremendous responsibility. If it does not manage to fulfil that responsibility fully and effectively, that will be no victory for anyone but the defeat of all.

Mr. LI LUYE (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, at today's meeting, the Chinese delegation would like to submit some of our views on the question of the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament.

At the beginning of this session, many delegations requested that the issue of the prevention of nuclear war be included in our agenda. This is a reflection of the ardent desire of the people of the world to oppose the nuclear arms race and to prevent nuclear war. The recent non-aligned summit meeting also appealed for urgent and practical measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. We hope that the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament on the question of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war will give this priority item a new sense of urgency and vitality, so as to contribute to promoting the process of nuclear disarmament and the lessening of the danger of nuclear war.

China has always attached great importance to the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament. In our view, to assure the effectiveness of the measures against nuclear war, one must first be clear about the source of the threat of nuclear war. In its reply to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 28 April 1982, on the prevention of nuclear war, the Chinese Government pointed out that "the threat of nuclear war comes from the two Superpowers which are intensifying their nuclear arms race and stepping up their deployment and preparations for a nuclear war". This fundamental view of the Chinese Government is by no means based on our subjective presumption but rather on an objective evaluation of the present state of the world's nuclear armaments and the international situation.

One of the main features of the current international situation and world armaments is that the two Superpowers possess far greater military strength than the rest of the world. They are relying on this enormous military strength to engage in rivalry all over the world. They not only possess the most advanced massive conventional armaments but also have the largest nuclear arsenals. Their military build-up has far exceeded the military forces needed for their national defence and security. Yet even under such circumstances, a full-scale arms race and particularly a new round of the nuclear arms race between them has once again been gathering momentum. The present round of the arms race is centred on qualitative competition. As a result, while the number of delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons may be somewhat reduced and some weapon systems may even become obsolete, the number of nuclear warheads will increase substantially; the accuracy and the ability to survive and ability to attack military targets will improve to an unprecedented level; and new breakthroughs in the means and capabilities of command, communication and control in a nuclear war will be achieved through their respective new weapons updating programmes. All these important qualitative improvements will again multiply their nuclear strike capabilities. These facts have shown clearly to the world that the two Superpowers are preparing themselves for a nuclear war, and only they have the capability to launch such a war.

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

Historical facts and present reality demonstrate that the growing threat of war comes not only from the acceleration of the arms race and the increase in armaments, but what is more important, it comes from the policy pursued by the States that possess such weapons and are engaging in the arms race. For many years, the two major Powers have used their massive armaments, and especially their nuclear arms, as an important means for external expansion and rivalry for spheres of influence. This is the main reason why the two Superpowers are trying desperately to achieve military superiority, especially nuclear superiority, which is causing an increased danger of nuclear war. In our opinion, the identification of this fundamental reason will be of key importance to the formulation of measures to prevent a nuclear war.

At present, the two major nuclear-weapon Powers are both stepping up their deployment of nuclear weapons and preparations for a nuclear war. Under the pretext that it does not have sufficient nuclear armaments, one has openly declared that it is readjusting its nuclear strategy to build up its nuclear strength on the basis of attempting to win a nuclear war. Although the other appears to be quite active on the question of preventing a nuclear war, yet it has quickened its tempo of nuclear arms expansion instead of slowing it down. In addition, it has already deployed large numbers of new types of medium-range missiles which are targeted on European and Asian countries. The two Superpowers have based their foreign policies on nuclear blackmail. They are talking about preventing a nuclear war, yet what they have been doing is just the opposite. Such discrepancy between words and deeds constitutes the greatest obstacle to nuclear disarmament and the formulation of measures to prevent a nuclear war.

While opposing the threat of nuclear war, people must also be aware of the real threat posed by conventional war to various countries. Since the Second World War, many wars and armed conflicts in different parts of the world have been fought with conventional weapons. Besides, with the rapid development of military technology, modern conventional weapons are highly injurious and destructive. The two nuclear-weapon Powers, while intensifying their nuclear arms race, have also been updating and expanding their conventional armaments and preparing for a conventional war. They are both reinforcing their war command mechanisms and increasing their capacities for projecting troops to other regions. At present, certain sovereign States are still victims of aggression and military occupation by conventional forces. This is a harsh fact that cannot be overlooked. Therefore, it is also important to reduce the threat of conventional warfare. There exists no unbridgeable gap between a conventional war and a nuclear war, but a possibility for the former to escalate into the latter. We therefore hold that during our discussion on the prevention of nuclear war, we have to pay due attention to the question of reducing the threat of conventional war. This is in no way to understate the importance of preventing nuclear war, but more effectively to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war.

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

In short, in order to prevent war, either nuclear or conventional, the Superpowers that possess the largest arsenals and have the capability to launch a world war should be asked to undertake their special responsibility earnestly. They should immediately stop the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and take the lead in reducing their colossal arsenals. They should and can do this to prevent nuclear war. However, what has been done in this respect is far from encouraging. It has been noted that during the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear weapons, neither is willing to make any concession and both find their excuses in maintaining "equilibrium" and "equal security". Consequently, the negotiations are deadlocked. And in this multilateral forum, one Superpower advocates that "a freeze on nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States will help prevent the threat of nuclear war". Apparently, in their eyes, the concepts of "equilibrium" and "equal security" are not applicable in their relations with other nuclear-weapon States, still less with other States of the world. While emphasizing "equilibrium", they are in fact trying to maintain their nuclear superiority over the other countries. Their "security" is based on the insecurity of other countries. Therefore, it is not conducive to reducing the threat of nuclear war if we do not identify the source of the threat of such a war, but generally call for all the nuclear-weapon States to undertake nuclear disarmament without distinguishing between the nature and size of the nuclear forces. On the contrary, it will become a shield or an excuse for the Superpowers to refuse to shoulder their special responsibility.

Of course, the other nuclear-weapon States also have a share in the responsibility for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. But we cannot ignore the fact that in the world today, those countries with few nuclear arms are facing the same military threats as all the non-nuclear-weapon countries. As far as China is concerned, it is faced with the threat of massive conventional armed forces deployed along its borders as well as the threat of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we have to maintain our necessary defence capabilities while stepping up our economic construction. This is entirely different in nature from the nuclear arms build-up by the Superpowers.

What is more, from the first day we possessed nuclear weapons we solemnly declared that we would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. This amply shows the defensive character of our limited nuclear force. Therefore, we are prepared to assume an obligation to reduce our nuclear weapons according to agreed ratios following substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two Superpowers.

Up to now, various countries have advanced specific ideas and proposals for preventing nuclear war. In our view, pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons can serve to reduce the danger of a nuclear war. The pressing demand of the non-aligned countries for

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of use and threat to use nuclear weapons is justified and reasonable. If the nuclear-weapon Powers are sincere about reducing the danger of a nuclear war, it will not be difficult for them to assume the obligation of non-use. On the other hand, in view of the large quantity and high quality of today's nuclear arsenals, a prohibition of use by itself cannot completely remove the danger of a nuclear war. During the second special session on disarmament of the General Assembly, the Chinese delegation proposed that the two States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals stop the development and production of nuclear weapons, and reduce by one half the number of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, thereby creating the conditions for all the other nuclear-weapon States to halt the development and production of their nuclear weapons and hence to proceed to the proportional reduction and eventual destruction of all such weapons. This is an important measure for reducing the threat of nuclear war.

In view of the above-mentioned root cause of the threat of nuclear war, we are of the opinion that the prevention of such a war not only requires us to take disarmament measures but also requires each country to adhere strictly to the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and the norms of international relations. A point of particular importance is that no country should use military force to commit aggression or engage in expansion against another country. In this connection, some delegations have emphasized that all States must comply with Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State in international relations. This is absolutely justified. We express the hope that during its summer session the Committee on Disarmament will further discuss the ways and means to prevent nuclear war.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time that I have the pleasure of taking the floor under your chairmanship at a plenary meeting of the Committee, allow me to offer you my warm congratulations on your accession to that chairmanship and to tell you how pleased my delegation is to see you directing our work with such talent and efficiency. The perception, wisdom and courteous authority you have shown have undoubtedly been to good effect and have resulted in the progress the Committee has made this month.

With your natural goodheartedness, Mr. Chairman, you have not missed a single occasion to praise the part I was able to play during the period of Morocco's chairmanship of our Committee. I believe that that is in large part due to the great friendliness you have always shown me and for which I am extremely grateful.

Allow me also to take this opportunity in my turn to thank all those delegations which have been so generous in their words of praise for my chairmanship. While expressing my great gratitude I should like to say how much their words have touched me.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to deal in my statement today with the question of the prevention of nuclear war and also that of "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee on Disarmament is today beginning its consideration of the question of the prevention of nuclear war.

The Moroccan delegation has already welcomed the agreement reached in this Committee on the inclusion of that item in our agenda. We can well be pleased with this happy initiative, which should enable us without further delay to undertake serious negotiations on a subject of whose gravity we are all aware.

It is obvious that the primary problem confronting mankind today is that of its own survival. Indeed, the threat of the annihilation of all life from the earth as the result of a nuclear war seems to us an absolutely real one, and the greatest peril threatening our world.

The source of this unprecedented threat lies in part in the frenzied arms race we are witnessing, which is out of all proportion to the security needs of the States engaging in it. When we know that the destructive power of the States possessing nuclear weapons has reached a capacity to annihilate the entire population of the planet dozens of times over, we cannot but wonder what is the true significance of this flouting of logic and common sense on the part of those who are continuing feverishly to develop their nuclear arsenals, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Furthermore, some nuclear-weapon powers are trying to gain credence for ideas that are, to say the least, dangerous, like the doctrine of deterrence or the possibility of a limited nuclear war.

Is not all this, in the last analysis, designed to prepare for and justify the use of nuclear weapons? My delegation has already stated before this Committee that it cannot share these ideas which, it is obvious, seriously threaten international peace and security.

In its working paper on the prevention of nuclear war, document CD/341 of 4 February 1983, the Group of 21 declared in this connection:

> "Doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being the cause of the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations ... Concern for common security and global survival should be the basis of international peace rather than the concept of deterrence".

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was adopted by consensus and whose validity is still recognized by all countries, states in its paragraph 47 that nuclear weapons are those which pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. That paragraph also declares that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons.

The Final Document also states, in paragraph 18: "Removing the threat of a world war — a nuclear war — is the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

(Mr. Skalli. Morocco)

Should we remain indifferent to the warnings and the many appeals made to us or should we, on the contrary, react and take the measures necessary to remove the threat of extermination hanging over us?

It seems to my delegation that we must take such action in order to spare the world a catastrophe which would certainly affect, if not annihilate, belligerents and non-belligerents alike.

Just recently the General Assembly, in its resolution 37/78 I, requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

In its working paper CD/341, the Group of 21 recommended the setting up of an ad hoc working group to undertake negotiations to that end. The Moroccan delegation considers that that is the best way for our Committee to accomplish its task.

The Moroccan delegation earnestly hopes that the consultations under way on this subject will be crowned with success so as to enable us to begin the work of substance on this crucial matter.

The question of the security assurances which should be given by the nuclear-weapon Powers to the States not possessing nuclear weapons is one of fundamental importance for the latter countries. It is only fair that the countries which have voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons should be concerned about their own security. They are therefore entitled to expect that that security should be reliably ensured.

The efforts that were made towards this end for many years produced the results which you all know, namely, resolution 255 of the Security Council and the unilateral declarations by the five nuclear-weapon Powers. But these results are rightly considered inadequate and in many ways unsatisfactory because neither resolution 255 nor the unilateral declarations offer real and credible assurances.

It was for that reason that the General Assembly, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, after noting the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, urged them "to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Since 1979, the question of so-called negative security assurances has been on the agenda of this Committee, which set up an ad hoc working group to conduct negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements for that purpose, on the basis of paragraph 59 of the Final Document, which I have just quoted.

During a preliminary phase, the Ad hoc Working Group sought to identify the various elements of the undertakings not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. At its more recent sessions the Ad hoc Working Group has concentrated its attention on and devoted its efforts to the question of elaborating a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

In that connection the Moroccan delegation would like to recall that it has constantly supported the idea of the adoption of a legally binding international instrument, which might take the form of an international convention. Such a convention would, in our opinion, provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with tangible protection from the nuclear threat.

We are, moreover, pleased to note that in the Ad Hoc Working Group there is no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention, although we are perfectly well aware of the difficulties still standing in the way of the formulation of such a convention.

Since it has still not been possible to find a common formula acceptable to all, the Ad Hoc Working Group has very wisely given thought to the possibility of interim arrangements. In that connection, my delegation has already had occasion to speak in favour of the adoption of a resolution of the Security Council which could, in our view, constitute a valuable interim arrangement, pending, of course, the conclusion of effective international arrangements, which remains our primary objective in the matter.

We believe, indeed, that it is extremely desirable for the Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to try to find a formula acceptable to all and for the various solutions envisaged in this connection to be explored further, with a will to succeed in resolving the issue.

Everyone is agreed on the importance of this question. Unfortunately, four years of negotiations have not led to any positive results. The progress made during this period has been purely marginal and in no way commensurate with the entirely justified concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The responsibility for this lies primarily and particularly with certain nuclear-weapon Powers, which are quite obviously concerned above all with their own security interests and deliberately ignore those of others.

Many delegations, including my own, have frequently expressed their anxiety and apprehensions in this connection. In a statement I made before the Committee in June 1981, I said that at the conclusion of the discussions which had taken place in the Working Group my delegation had had the impression that certain nuclear-weapon Powers were more concerned about their own security than about that of the non-nuclear-weapon Powers. And yet it was for the benefit of the latter that the Ad Hoc Working Group was set up, with a mandate to negotiate international security arrangements. We are still hoping that our apprehensions and doubts will soon be dissipated; for the States which have voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons rightly expect the Powers which possess such weapons to provide them with quite clear tangible assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Since the impasse now reached is in large part due to the fact that there are fundamental divergencies in the security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon States and in the content of their unilateral undertakings, it is up to those States to make further efforts and to improve the substance of the present assurances, so that the Committee can reach agreement on this essential matter.

It should be recognized that it is unreasonable to ask the non-nuclear-weapon States to make further concessions and further sacrifices. In any event my country,

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

which through its adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty has committed itself to a non-nuclear-weapon status, finds it inconceivable that additional commitments should be expected from it.

But however important it is, the question of the granting of so-called negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States cannot make us forget the need for and the urgency of nuclear disarmament. In fact, as we see it, there can be no complete and absolute assurances so long as nuclear weapons continue to exist. As the Group of 21 rightly stated in document CD/280, which it submitted to the Committee last year, "The most effective assurances of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

Nuclear disarmament, the task to which the international community attaches the very highest priority, is in our view the only thing that will restore a climate of confidence and guarantee peace and security in the world.

My delegation appeals to the nuclear-weapon Powers to show the political will necessary to reach a satisfactory agreement on the question of negative security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon countries. This would undoubtedly be in the interests of all.

In an important statement he made to the committee last year, the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, very properly drew our attention to the fact that a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States had referred to the relationship that exists between the attitudes of the nuclear-weapon Powers and the risk of horizontal proliferation.

It must indeed be recognized that the credibility of the non-proliferation regime is being placed in doubt by the behaviour of the nuclear-weapon States themselves. Those who have adhered to the regime have lost their faith in it. Those who have not adhered to it, seeing the experience of the others, are hardly tempted to follow their example.

For in fact this international legal instrument has in practice proved to be ineffective and discriminatory.

It is ineffective because it has no real meaning for the States to which it was supposed to give assurances and advantages so as to prove to them that it was pointless for them to plunge into the nuclear arms race and to show them the benefits they would derive from adhering to the non-proliferation regime. Unfortunately, neither of these two objectives has been attained.

The non-proliferation Treaty is discriminatory because what it does in effect is to establish a club of countries arrogating exclusively to themselves the possession and production of nuclear weapons.

In order to coax and entice the other States into resigning themselves to such a situation, the nuclear-weapon Powers have dangled before their eyes the rewards of the security they would obtain, together with access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

But what has happened in reality?

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

The Powers already possessing nuclear weapons have continued with impunity to possess, test, produce and stockpile nuclear weapons without the slightest limitation or constraint. The States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty find themselves with their hands tied because they have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons without at the same time securing access to the advantages of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Are not these States justified in thinking that in adhering to the Treaty they have simply been swindled?

This being so, has not the time come to reconsider the Treaty with a view to making it more credible and better able to ensure the security of all States?

We would then have a treaty which, instead of creating an exclusive club of countries which retain entire freedom of action in the matter of nuclear weapons after persuading other States to renounce the possession of such weapons for all time, would provide sure and reliable assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States, strengthen the non-proliferation regime and open the way to nuclear disarmament.

To conclude, the Moroccan delegation would like to make one observation on the subject of the adjective "negative" which we sometimes attach to the word "assurances".

In fact, as you all know, effective international arrangements are commonly called "negative security assurances" in the jargon used by our Committee. True, that is merely a question of style, but my delegation has always wondered why such assurances have been called "negative". I cannot hide from you the fact that my delegation has always felt uncomfortable at the use of the word "negative" in company with the word "assurances", since it seems to us there is a veritable contradiction between these two terms.

Furthermore, the word "negative" in our view has a pejorative sense, whereas assurances ought and must essentially be something positive, and not only for the States which benefit from them but also for those which provide them.

Although the word "negative" was employed by contrast with the expression "positive assurances" which we use elsewhere, it would certainly in this case have been better to speak of passive assurances or, simply, security assurances.

As I have just said, this is a matter of form and not of substance, but it is nevertheless of some importance if we want the words we use to express appropriately and correctly the ideas we wish to convey. Perhaps some of our eminent colleagues, members of this Committee, who are very distinguished linguists, might be good enough to give some thought to this question and to provide us with a more adequate formulation. My delegation will certainly be grateful to them for the attention they may kindly give to this observation.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The Chairman thanks the distinguished representative of Morocco, Ambassador Ali Skalli, for his statement and for the very kind and, indeed, far too generous words addressed to himself -- words valued all the more in that they were based on feelings of friendship which the Chairman greatly appreciates.

[Speaking in English] The next speaker on the list for today's plenary meeting is the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai, whom I now invite to take the floor.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor today primarily to introduce a working paper entitled "Verification of compliance in arms control and disarmament agreements" which unfortunately is not available as yet, but I am told that it will be available today as document CD/379. I believe that this subject has relevance to all the items taken up by this Committee.

But first of all, since this is my first intervention in the plenary this month, I would like to start by congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, on your assumption of the important office for the month of April. My delegation is very much pleased that under your experienced guidance the Committee on Disarmament is making steady progress. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation to the Chairman for last month, Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, who exerted such great efforts to lead the Committee out of a very difficult procedural impasse.

I do not need to re-emphasize here the importance of verification procedures in any disarmament agreement. Without proper arrangements in this respect, it is very difficult to work out effective and credible disarmament accords. In this sense, verification is an integral part of any such agreement. At the same time, verification is a complex matter, as many of us who have had experiences in either its formulation or its implementation have been made painfully aware.

There are a number of reasons for this situation, and one might enumerate some of them in the following manner. For one thing verification is most closely connected with the specific prohibition and/or other commitments undertaken in an agreement, which, needless to say, are the main theme of any such agreement. Secondly, verification measures, which are often heavily technical, are the actual interface between the letters of the agreement and the functioning real world. As such, verification measures have to encounter various restraints and limitations, of a technical, legal and other nature. In other words, and in most of the cases, there have to be strong feedbacks from viable and effective verification possibilities to the main body of the text, especially with regard to scope. Here, I would like to recall a very fine working paper on the subject presented to the Committee on Disarmament by the Canadian delegation in 1981, namely, document CD/167 and its appendix. Although the paper was presented in connection with chemical weapons, it also represented one of the most comprehensive descriptions of the various methodologies involved. That paper with its appendix stated that absolute verification, or 100 per cent effectiveness of verification, although desirable, is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. The problem then is: "how many per cent uncertainty may be acceptable in what case?", and here, in addition to the consideration of political judgement, one has to exercise a certain amount of cost/effectiveness judgements as well. What complicates the matter further is that different techniques of verification have different curves of so-called diminishing returns vis-à-vis the input of increasing costs and efforts. One has to work out a delicate balance between priorities and the relative importance of particular provisions of treaty commitments against the cost/effectiveness of the

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associated verification measures, and here, obviously, I am not talking only of monetary cost, but include in this concept social and political costs.

The third reason for the complexity arises from the somewhat philosophical approaches to the verification exercise themselves. Within the community of verification experts, there has been a long-standing debate as to whether or not the exercise in question is a game played in a hostile atmosphere between the two adversaries. This is the so-called zero-sum approach, in which the verification side's loss is a gain on the side of those who carry out violation strategies. Of course, this game theory approach has problems of its own, in that loss and gain may not be assigned the same value. Another approach is to focus our attention on that aspect of verification which is related to the confidence-building measures. This idea has a number of merits; for example, in reality, the effectiveness of verification will greatly increase with good co-operation from those whose activities are being verified. This is the basis on which national activities, including record-keeping and report-making and, if and when appropriate, some measures of national self-inspection, can be very useful. Although it is obvious that these national measures cannot take the place of international on-site inspection, they can nevertheless greatly facilitate international inspection, if carried out in good faith. It will allow us to plan random-based international on-site inspection more effectively, and may contribute to reducing the number of such inspections required. In some cases, such international co-operation is a prerequisite for fact-finding. The minimum stipulation along the line of such co-operation is an undertaking not to wilfully obstruct the employment of national technical means. One can realize also that the effective discharge of verification measures would greatly increase the co-operative atmosphere and would be conducive to the furtherance of the cause of disarmament in general.

This leads us to another and possibly more basic reason for the confidence-building measures type approach, namely, that any disarmament agreements have to be based on a measure of mutual confidence among the contracting parties, and that verification is a means to maintain such confidence, and to restore it whenever there arises a case of suspicion of violation of the agreement by any one of the parties. Unless there is this basic element of confidence, in other words, if an agreement is to be based on deep suspicion among the parties, it is difficult to see that any disarmament agreement could be workable. In this sense, verification is often conceived of as a means to deter violation by providing credible technical means to detect possible violations. This means that verification measures should be able to deal with various scenarios of possible violations and, I should add, with an adequate level of confidence of detection capabilities. It also means that the text of an agreement should be very clear as to what activities are prohibited and, as the case may be, what specific actions are promised with regard to, say, the disposal or destruction of the existing stock of prohibited material or weapons. This is because the scenarios for possible violations are different from one prohibited item to another, and thus different concepts of verification approaches should be already in the minds of those who write the text of an agreement. When one takes this confidence-building measures approach to verification, then there are two things that stand out very clearly. They are: (a) a trend of suspicious events, including continued attempts to avoid verification application, may be

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a more serious symptom of violation of confidence than an isolated case of suspicious evidence, and (b) the parties should co-operate toward quick restoration of confidence by accepting ad hoc on-site inspections whenever sufficiently well-established challenges are presented.

Another pertinent question is what happens when and if violation has been definitely proven to have taken place. This is undoubtedly a very delicate issue, for one thing because it means that the basic confidence upon which the disarmament agreement has been built may no longer hold. One may talk about retaliation or abrogation, but that means that the agreement itself was a failure, although such measures will obviously have to be retained as the last resort of deterrence. One may be able to talk about the application of sanctions, but historically, sanctions under such circumstances are a very complicated matter, including the institutional problems of their implementation. What complicates the situation further is the question whether one can talk about conclusive evidence of violation or not. Some problems regarding the use of prohibited weapons, or their deployment, may be easier to handle, because these are often cases of counting a number of discrete events. I would, however, not overly discount the difficulties involved in these cases either. More troublesome are the cases in which measurement of material plays the major role.

Here, allow me, Mr. Chairman, to indulge in a bit of technical discussion. In any scientific exercise of measurement of bulk material, one has to first take a representative sample from the bulk. Whether or not this sample represents the chemical or other composition of the entire bulk is an issue in which a certain degree of uncertainty is inevitable. The sample is then put to measurement or analysis in which various instruments are employed. There is no such thing as absolutely accurate measurement or analysis, and they are always associated with a certain error band or range of uncertainties. The compound effects of instrumental and human uncertainties can become of considerable order, especially with those instruments actually employed in the field. Then, again, verification procedures carried out on random sampling bases can provide confidence only on a probability basis. One makes such statements as "the material produced (or destroyed) was so many tons plus or minus so many kilograms, and I make this statement with 90 per cent certainty". Similar problems of the representativeness of samples have been raised a number of times regarding the use or after-effects of certain chemicals in the actual areas of hostilities.

I have no intention of over-emphasizing the technical problems of this nature, and indeed in many cases, or, I should say, most cases, arrangements have been devised adequately to circumvent these particular problems. But all solutions worked out have accepted this uncertainty range and probability statement, and therefore the need for international co-operation to keep the uncertainties to the minimum as the starting point. It might be important to be always aware of this point when we talk about various modes of verification.

The above discussion about inherent uncertainties associated with random on-site inspection does not necessarily lead us to the need for continuous and resident on-site inspections all the time, which is undoubtedly very costly and very cumbersome. The "black box" approach is one of the devices to circumvent this difficulty, and can be very effective in certain cases. I will merely mention

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the case of a tamper-proof camera employed as part of IAEA safeguards, which takes a picture of plutonium-containing fuel movements (but nothing else) as an effective black box actually in use.

In fact, there are many cases in which direct access to the material, equipment or facilities in question is genuinely not recommended. I would mention only four examples. The object in question may contain militarily sensitive information, the revelation of which might endanger national security or invite an undesirable proliferation of such technology. The arrangement adopted in the SALT negotiations regarding MIRVed ICBMs is an example of how to solve this type of problem. Secondly, the material or facility may involve grave safety hazards. Highly radioactive nuclear material can be an example. In this case, the measurement of radiation energy and calculation back to the composition of various isotopes in the nuclear fuel takes the place of direct measurement. The third example is when the material or facility is located in the middle of an industrial complex, in association with other activities which are not included in the disarmament agreement, and often full of proprietary information. The problem can be solved, for example, by designating a limited area of permitted access and designing the plant in such a way that all the necessary measurements may be taken in these access-permitted areas. The fourth and last example is the well-known one of underground nuclear testing, where seismic signal analysis is adopted as the major instrument of detection.

I do not want to plunge the Committee into any further technical issues. The whole purpose of exposing distinguished delegates to the above brief discussion is to emphasize certain types of complications which the verification procedures may involve, so that when the job is given to the technical experts to work out the details, the original agreement should have sufficient clarity in defining the scope of the prohibition and its interaction with verification procedures to allow the technical community to proceed with the given assignment with as clear and objective an approach as possible. For one thing, the most important characteristic of effective verification is that it is objective and can keep the extent of reliance on subjective human judgements to the minimum possible.

In our working paper, we have also taken up the problem of undeclared or clandestine activities, as follows:

> "On the first instance, only those activities that are meaningfully verifiable may be included in the scope. In this context, in most of the cases only those materials and facilities declared by a State party may effectively be taken up for the purpose of verification activities. Undeclared or clandestine activities, materials or equipment do not usually come into the picture except when they happen to affect visibly the portion under verification activities, or happen to be detected through national technical means.
>
> "At the same time, verification should be so designed that effects from clandestine activities, if any, are bound to become as visible as possible so that by-challenge verifications may be triggered. It is the basic assumption of the arms control and disarmament agreements that any undeclared or clandestine activities are also prohibited".

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

In summarizing the considerations regarding clandestine activities, there are all the more reasons why (i) routine, random on-site inspections have to be carried out, preferably based on records and reports to be prepared by the national control system, (ii) national technical means have to be encouraged, and (iii) whenever a plausible challenge has been made, the parties in question should arrange for an ad hoc on-site inspection so that the particular issue may be dealt with immediately and, as I said at the outset, so that the basic confidence embodied in the original disarmament agreement may be quickly restored.

In our working paper we have also touched upon the question of an international body which would be given the task of co-ordinating the various verification activities. To what extent such a body should be authorized to conduct various verification-related activities, including checking national reports, dispatching international inspectors, receiving information obtained by national technical means, carrying out an analysis of collected data, and making a preliminary evaluation of the results of such analysis, may depend upon the nature and scope of individual disarmament agreements.

There is one thing that needs to be emphasized, however, and it is that the existence of such an international body is very much desirable and may indeed be necessary in order to maintain any particular verification scheme as a viable, effective and ongoing component of the disarmament regime.

It was based upon this firm conviction that Japan proposed, during the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the formation of an international verification unit within the framework of the United Nations, which should, as a first step, begin to accumulate all available information and knowledge on verification techniques and applications. And I would like to remind the distinguished delegates that Japan at that time submitted a working paper entitled 'Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification".

In an attempt to introduce our working paper on the subject of verification, I have taken the liberty of emphasizing some of its salient points. This is because we believe that verification is a very important subject, and that it probably forms the central issue in our negotiations both on chemical weapons and on a nuclear test ban, and on whatever other disarmament measures the Committee on Disarmament may take up in future. One cannot talk about verification in the abstract because, as I said earlier, the subject is so closely interlinked with the specific commitments. At the same time, it is very difficult to talk about disarmament measures which are not linked with specific measures of verification. None of us are naïve enough to claim that by solving the issues of verification and compliance we have almost finished the work on a disarmament agreement. At the same time, it seems to me that by looking very closely at these issues and achieving agreement on a substantial portion of them, we shall indeed make very major progress towards the achievement of the goal.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai, for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman for the month of March, Ambassador Ali Skalli, and to himself.

The next speaker on the Chair's list is the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, whom I now invite to take the floor.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, my delegation spoke extensively on the prevention of nuclear war on 12 April. Today I would like to touch briefly upon one more aspect of this problem, namely, ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy. This item has recently been placed high on the agenda of international relations although, unfortunately, not yet on the agenda of this Committee.

Czechoslovakia belongs to these countries which are, already now, vitally interested in the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Geological oil and natural gas reserves in my country are extremely limited and offer no hope of a substantial increase in output. Most of the hydroelectric energy resources which can be exploited economically are already being utilized. In the case of coal-mining, which has been our major source of energy, the prospects for further growth are also very limited. Current forecasts drawn up in Czechoslovakia for the period to the year 2000 show that the future development of our fuel and energy structure should be based primarily on the expansion of nuclear power. And this is by no means a forecast for the distant future. Already this year we are about to reach a limit beyond which any increase in energy consumption will have to be covered by nuclear power.

There are at present two nuclear reactors functioning in Czechoslovakia. An additional six reactors are to be put into service between 1983 and 1986.

Special attention is being paid to the smooth and safe functioning of nuclear power plants both in our domestic legislation and in our relations with our neighbours. At the end of last year we signed an agreement with Austria which envisages a considerable and regular exchange of information and the carrying out of consultations aimed at maintaining the safe operation of nuclear power plants in the proximity of our common borders. Let it be noted that this is the first agreement of the kind between two States with different social systems.

But it is certainly not only my country which has problems with the shortage of energy resources. Rather, this has become a universal phenomenon. The world's needs in energy have gone up more than 10 times since the beginning of the twentieth century and they continue to rise by 4-5 per cent each year. At the same time, it is clear that the constant depletion of the limited reserves of organic fuel will soon bring about a significant gap between the required and available quantities. This gap will not be bridged by the so-called alternative energy resources such as the energy of wind or of the tide, solar energy, etc., since their efficiency is low. Hence, before a new source of energy is found there is only one solution -- the development of nuclear energy.

From the historical point of view the nuclear power industry is a very young branch. The first nuclear power plant in the USSR produced electricity just three decades ago. Since then that industry has witnessed a dynamic development and today it produces electricity in many countries. By January 1981 there were more than 250 nuclear power plants all over the world, with an aggregate power of about 140 million kilowatts which is expected to rise to 300 million kilowatts by 1985. The Tenth Congress of the International Conference on Energy which took place in Istanbul in September 1977 estimated that the aggregate power of all nuclear power plants in the world in the year 2000 would amount to 1,300-1,650 million kilowatts.

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Nuclear power plants are, if I may say so, distributed throughout the world irregularly. Most of them are situated in western Europe, principally in France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The nuclear power plants in these countries represent about 25 per cent of all nuclear power plants in the world. The USSR, the United States, Canada and Japan also have an efficient nuclear power industry. It is also being actively developed in a number of socialist countries.

The dynamic development of the nuclear power industry entails the danger of the possible release of radioactive substances and the radioactive contamination of wide areas through the deliberate destruction of nuclear power plants.

According to specialists, the destruction of one such plant with a power of 1 million kilowatts would be comparable to the radioactive contamination resulting from the explosion of a 1 megaton bomb as far as the short-term effect is concerned and would be tens of times higher for the period of a year or more. A different set of radioactive isotopes would make the consequences of nuclear contamination through the destruction of nuclear facilities more lasting as compared with the consequences of the explosion of a nuclear weapon.

According to B. Ramberg, an American specialist who deals with the problem in his book entitled Destruction of nuclear energy facilities in war, the radioactivity remaining from a nuclear weapon of 100 kilotons is lower than that resulting from the destruction of a reactor of 100 megawatts. Upon the destruction of a reactor of 580 megawatts doses exceeding the highest admissible level would be formed within an area of 10,000 km^2. Some 60 days after the destruction of a reactor, there would be 100 per cent mortality within 70 km from it.

Mr. Ramberg also says that had nuclear power plants existed during the Second World War in Europe, the major part of its territory would not be suitable for human beings.

For these reasons, the Czechoslovak delegation considers that the question of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy is organically linked to the problem of the prevention of nuclear war. It has in fact been discussed in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums for several years. It goes hand in hand with the proposals of many countries advanced in the Committee. Thus, the statement of the Group of 21 (document CD/187) issued in connection with the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981, says that the Group of 21 "considers that this unprecedented attack, and the untenable reasoning used to justify it, are matters of special concern to the Committee on Disarmament".

It has also been discussed within the United Nations and is dealt with in several resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

We consider that the Committee on Disarmament is the best place for multilateral negotiations on this problem. My delegation has also taken an active part in the Committee's discussion on the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities. The only thing we objected to and continue to object to is the linkage between this problem and that of the prohibition of radiological weapons. We consider that these are two different questions which are at different stages of negotiation. The prohibition of radiological weapons is a thoroughly studied subject which is now at the stage of the preparation of a treaty, while the problem of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy is, as far as specific considerations are concerned, in its initial stage.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

All attempts to combine these two questions into one international agreement cause many difficulties and have represented, for four years already, an obstacle to the elaboration and adoption of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

We would like to express our satisfaction at the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has started its deliberations and is dealing, at least for the time being, with these two problems separately. We welcome the creation of the two respective subgroups.

It is our considered view that during the summer part of the Committee's session we should put aside all disagreements of a procedural or legal nature and focus on the substantial consideration both of the problem of the safe development of nuclear energy and of the prohibition of radiological weapons.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to join those who have taken the floor before me to congratulate you on the occasion of your assumption of office as the Chairman of our Committee for the month of April. You have left no one in doubt about your qualities as an experienced diplomat and a great leader. We have seen, under your Chairmanship, and as demonstrated this morning, that it is possible for this Committee to start its work at 10.30 a.m. sharp. May I also seize this opportunity to place on record our appreciation of the very valuable contribution made to our work by your predecessor, Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, who took sufficient pains to ensure that we adopted our agenda during his tenure of office in March after almost two months of procedural problems.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall confine my short remarks on this occasion to two main subjects on our agenda, namely, chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

On the first topic, chemical weapons, I would like first of all to express our thanks to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador McPhail of Canada. Like his predecessor, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, he has approached his task with remarkable seriousness of purpose and sense of direction. His method has made it possible to minimize drift and interminable arguments. It is our fervent hope that the expectations expressed by various delegations regarding the elaboration of a convention aimed at a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons will not be misplaced.

My delegation is of the view that the extensive work carried out in the month of January this year within the chemical weapons Working Group and in which technical experts participated, the many proposals of various delegations, including those of the Superpowers and the ongoing deliberations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons constitute a sound basis for concrete negotiations that could produce a comprehensive ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The distinguished representative of the

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USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan, in his intervention on 12 April said, "The Committee is on the eve of the decisive stage of the negotiations aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons". I hope that the two Superpowers will demonstrate with concrete results that the adage "to whom much is given much is expected" holds true for them too.

Let me reiterate my delegation's firm conviction that the technical issues of verification and compliance are not insurmountable, and that the time has now come for the two Superpowers to demonstrate with a sense of urgency the much-needed political will with a view to reaching agreements on a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty under effective international control.

In the process of working out the details of a convention, my delegation favours a general purpose criterion rather than selecting certain substances only for prohibition. In the view of my delegation, the latter could provide a fertile loophole. Though most of the chemicals or substances in this regard may not be weapons in themselves, one can liken them to nuclear facilities which may be military or peaceful, depending on who is making the declaration. Most delegations seated around this table have expressed willingness to proceed seriously with progress on a convention banning chemical weapons. In particular it is reassuring to note that the Soviet Union has indicated flexibility on its once-hardened position and also the United States delegation's detailed proposals made at the beginning of this session have come a long way to providing a live picture of a future chemical weapons convention. So the ball is now in the Committee's court; we have the ingredients for what looks like a chemical weapons convention. My delegation therefore urges the Committee to seize the bull by the horns now.

It is the belief of my delegation that the present momentum in favour of the elaboration of a chemical weapons ban should be maintained. In order to advance the cause of our work on this question, may I suggest that a chemical weapons convention drafting group be set up within the Committee. Such a body, made up of representatives of various groups within the Committee, should be charged with the responsibility of elaborating a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty. Such a drafting group should concern itself with identifying those areas where agreement has been reached, while the remaining provisions can be inserted in the draft as soon as final agreement on them is reached. We should not let this momentum slip away. The merits of this proposal, we believe, are psychological and procedural in nature; by collating those areas where there is a consensus, it will help to focus attention on those topics needing further treatment.

I would now like to address another agenda item of the utmost priority to all mankind, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Although the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, in resolution 37/83, requested the Committee on Disarmament to "establish an

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ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its session in 1983, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space", it is a matter for regret that this Committee has not even started setting forth on the hard and difficult road of result-oriented negotiations.

Events in recent years have shown that the extension of the arms race to outer space poses a real threat to international peace and security. For instance, the growing rivalry between the two Superpowers over the development of space-based anti-satellite defence systems such as destroyer systems or ASAT has introduced a new dimension into space warfare prospects. The destabilizing consequences of such space weapons with regard to international security and the maintenance of our fragile peace are only too obvious.

In the opinion of my delegation, the increase in the use of anti-satellite weapons, high energy lasers and particle-beam weapons runs counter to the spirit and letter of the outer space Treaty of 1967 and other relevant legal instruments whose objective is to promote the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

At this point, my delegation feels concerned about the announcement coming from Washington earlier this month urging American scientists to forsake the three-decade-old doctrine of deterring nuclear war through the threat of retaliation and instead pursue a defensive strategy based on space-age weaponry designed to "intercept and destroy" incoming enemy missiles. According to the opinion of some experts, this proposal "raises the spectre of an arms race in space which ultimately could be more expensive and dangerous than the one taking place on earth". In a reaction the Soviet leadership was quoted as saying, "Should this conception be converted into reality this would actually open the floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive".

The arms race is a live issue and one should approach the problem of disarmament with a sense of realism and honesty. Nobody doubts that the United States is the richest country on earth but my delegation believes that a proposal for a $2 trillion military expenditure for a five-year period is, to say the least, disturbing, especially in a world where most people can hardly afford three square meals a day, and where ignorance and disease ravage societies that we consider members of the same human family.

Let us think of the funds to be involved in such a monumental and ambitious project; let us think of the tests that will be carried out -- and here we chide ourselves thinking of a nuclear test-ban treaty! Unfortunately, figures are not available to know how much the other Superpower spends on its own "defence", if the word defence can be appropriate in this context.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

On 3 March 1983, Ambassador C.A. de Souza e Silva of Brazil eloquently spoke of vertical proliferation among the Superpowers in his statement to this Committee. Inventing a weapon to destroy another weapon only draws back the hands of the clock of disarmament. A defensive arms race would only escalate the offensive one already under way. Each side would feel compelled to increase the number and destructiveness of weapons with which to penetrate the defences of the other.

My delegation feels that instead of the star war epitome, the two Superpowers should engage in serious, objective and honest negotiations to achieve a meaningful disarmament and peace.

Since virtually no "scientific wizardry" on the part of either one of the two Superpowers can assure any long-term superiority in absolute terms, let the Superpowers hearken to the voice of reason by undertaking meaningful negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament and other forums with a view to concluding an effective and comprehensive treaty aimed at preventing the further militarization of outer space. It is therefore in this context that my delegation fully endorses the views of the Group of 21 as contained in document CD/329 to the effect that negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should aim at concluding "an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects". We would also like to associate ourselves with those delegations that have called for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the issue under an appropriate mandate.

In the opinion of the Nigerian delegation, the voice of reason suggests that the Committee take immediate measures aimed at engaging in practical negotiations in order to elaborate a comprehensive agreement to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, in consonance with the provisions of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 37/83 and 37/99 D, if outer space, the common heritage of all mankind, is not to be turned into a cataclysmic battlefield.

Now is the time to establish, firmly and legally, outer space as a common heritage of mankind. May I conclude by calling to mind the words of Harry Truman: "All through history it's the nations that have given the most to the generals and the least to the people that have been the first to fall".

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere, for his contribution and for the kind and well-deserved words addressed to the Chairman for the month of March and the good wishes to the Chairman for the month of April.

The last speaker on the Chair's list is the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, as we come to the close of our spring session, permit me a brief survey of the state of the Committee from the perspective of the United States delegation.

This session began on a high note with the visits to the Committee by many distinguished government officials, including the Vice-President of the United States, the Minister for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, and the Foreign Minister and Deputy Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. These important visitors were followed later by the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, the Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, and the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria joined this distinguished host of visitors and also addressed the Committee. Aside from the prestige of their respective high offices, each brought to the Committee their expressions of respect and encouragement for the Committee. For our part, Vice-President Bush brought a major new initiative on chemical weapons to the Committee. However, despite the auspicious beginning and the attention devoted to our work, the Committee wasted almost two months of precious time -- virtually two-thirds of its spring session on futile debate. Consideration of agenda items and procedural arrangements were linked to important substantive measures awaiting its consideration. This was a deplorable situation which prevented any real progress for this half of our 1983 session. Our performance this spring can only serve the interest of our critics and depreciate their opinion of our role as a negotiating body. Let us learn a lesson from these mistakes, lest we, as Santayana cogently warned, "are damned to repeat them".

We have, however, taken some small steps in this session. Our agenda finally settled, we re-established our working groups, elected their chairmen, and finally began to settle down to the substantive work of the Committee.

The achievement of a ban on chemical weapons, a priority item for the Committee -- and certaintly of my delegation -- got off to a promising start. The Working Group, under the capable leadership of Ambassador McPhail of Canada, moved quickly to organize itself and set about the important task of resolving differences. Continuing the extremely useful method of work begun under Ambassador Sujka last year, contact groups were established to focus on key issues. The Working Group is considering the wealth of material developed on this subject -- and, in particular, the "basic provisions" tabled by the Soviet Union last summer (CD/294) and the United States "detailed views" tabled this year on 10 February (CD/343). The Chairman, aided by his consultations and the energetic work of his contact group leaders, has placed us in a good position to make significant progress in the coming summer session. Let us all dedicate ourselves to this vital task.

Similarly, the radiological weapons Working Group, under the skilled chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, has been organized into two sections -- one to continue work on the traditional convention under negotiation in the Committee, and one to deal with the collateral question of attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities. This approach will hopefully move the Committee toward creative solutions to the problems which face it. Again, the prospect of progress is at hand, so let us grasp it firmly.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

The working groups on negative security assurances and a comprehensive programme of disarmament, continuing under the experienced chairmanships of Ambassadors Ahmad of Pakistan and Garcia Robles of Mexico, respectively, have tended to rely more on informal consultations in pursuing these goals but seem to be now in an operational mode. The same can be said for the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban under the chairmanship of our departing colleague, Ambassador Herder. I would be misleading you, Mr. Chairman, however, if I expressed any satisfaction regarding the work of this particular Group. Today, it still has not reached agreement on a programme of work and, thus, has not yet begun consideration of the important issues under its mandate. My delegation hopes that the Working Group will settle this procedural problem once and for all at its next meeting so that this important Group can begin useful work at our summer session.

We have also had useful and informative discussions on the subjects of the prevention of nuclear war and outer space. Informal meetings on these subjects have reflected the keen interest of some delegations in the immediate creation of working groups with full negotiating mandates and a more cautious approach to these subjects by other delegations. The Committee has through this process made some progress in reconciling these opposing approaches. My delegation has tried to keep an open mind on these questions, but has not, as yet, heard compelling arguments that we have definitvely established the existence of a dangerous void in international law which demands the urgent attention of the Committee or a precise focus on concrete issues on which negotiations can take place. It seems to my delegation that there is a perception by some delegations that the creation of a working group somehow in and of itself solves these complex and often obscure problems. If we were to accept this approach, we would have a proliferation of working groups -- well beyond the resources of most delegations in the Committee to cover adequately. We believe it would be better to concentrate on the completion of the work before us, while at the same time exploring the substantive issues relating to these complex subjects on which we can develop a common approach. As the sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, we must always be vigilant to those areas where disarmament negotiations are necessary and appropriate.

I began my statement on a somewhat pessimistic note. Our performance has not been something of which we could be proud. But let me end on a note of optimism. We are now facing a six-week recess. I believe that there is at this time a common view as to our tasks during the summer session. Unlike last year, when we faced a shortened session, we will have a full 11 weeks of concentrated effort to move forward on the issues confronting us. The procedural questions are, hopefully, behind us, and I detect in the Committee a strong desire to approach the coming session in a workmanlike fashion and get down to serious business. I pledge my delegation to this effort.

As this will be the final intervention of my delegation in plenary for this spring session, I should like, through you, Sir, to extend the congratulations and best wishes of my delegation to Ambassador Gerhardt Herder on his new posting as the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic to the United States. He leaves the Committee after over eight years of distinguished service here, and he will be well remembered for his efforts. We are happy that he is going to Washington and know that he will be an effective member of Washington's diplomatic corps. We wish him the very best.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields, for his contribution. That concludes the Chair's list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

If such is not the case, it remains for the Chair to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 27 April, at 10.30 a.m. Once again we shall be faced with a situation where, for technical reasons, it will be impossible to interrupt the meeting for lunch and to go on in the afternoon. I would therefore once again appeal to delegations to enable the Chair to start the meeting on time.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

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