

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME III

Index by subject and country of the  
Verbatim Records of the Conference  
on Disarmament in 1984



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.257  
10 April 1984  
ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on  
Tuesday, 10 April 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Dhanapala

(Sri Lanka)

GE.84-61605

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. TAFFAR  
Mr. A. BOUBAZINE

Argentina:

Mr. J.J. CARASALES  
Mr. R. GARCÍA MORITAN  
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER  
Mr. R. ROWE  
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. J. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U PE THEIN TIN  
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. R.J. ROCHON  
Mr. R. GRINIUS

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG  
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. LI WEIMING  
Mr. LIN CHENG  
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG  
Mr. CHIANG ZHENXI

Cuba:

Mr. LECHUGA NEVIA  
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. I. HASSAN

Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS

Ms. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. JOHANNES

France:

Mr. H. RENIE

Mr. G. MONTASSIER

Mr. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THIELECKE

Mr. F. SAYATZ

Mr. KRUTESCH

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. W.-E. VON DEM HAGEN

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. GRAFPFEIL

Hungary:

Mr. MEISZTER

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. H. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Mr. ANDRADJATI

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAMYAB

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. L. FERRARI BRAVO

Mr. B. CABRAS

Japan:

Mr. M. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. O. HILLALE  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. H. JAROSZEK  
Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. P. BALOIU  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. S. ERICSON  
Mr. L.E. WINGREN  
Mr. R. ANGSTROM  
Mr. O. DAHLMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBISH  
Mr. G.V. ANTSIFEROV  
Mr. T.F. DMITZITCHEV  
Mr. V.I. USTINOV  
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN  
Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mr. D.A. SLINN  
Mr. J.F. GORDON

United States of America:

Mr. N. CLYNE  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. C. PEARCY

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA-KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. J. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI



The PRESIDENT: The Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

At the outset, allow me to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Henryk Jaroszek, who is addressing the Conference today as first speaker. I should like to wish him a pleasant and fruitful stay in Geneva.

The Conference starts today its consideration of item 8 on its agenda, entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As indicated in the time-table for the present week, following the announcement made by my predecessor at the plenary meeting on 15 March, the Conference will today consider, and take action on, the reports of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in documents CD/448 and CD/449. After listening to statements by delegations in connection with those reports, as well as to any clarifications provided by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group if so requested by delegations, I shall invite the Conference to take note of the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group appearing in document CD/448. Afterwards, I shall put before the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 10 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group, as reflected in document CD/449. That recommendation suggests that the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, subject to approval by the Conference, should be convened from 30 July to 10 August 1984, in Geneva, to finalize instructions for the technical test and to review additional national investigations into relevant matters. May I also note that documents CD/448 and CD/449 were first circulated in English on 15 March.

Members will recall that the time-table for the present week contemplates an informal meeting, if necessary, to deal with organizational questions. After we have taken action on the reports of the Seismic Group, I intend to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting to consider the following questions: (a) a request for participation in our discussions received from a non-member; (b) our programme of work for the week beginning on 16 April; (c) the question of how to proceed in connection with proposals under agenda items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7; and (d) the opening date for the second part of the 1984 session.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, New Zealand, Sweden and Argentina.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, His Excellency Mr. Henryk Jaroszek.

Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): Mr. President, I wish first to express to you my thanks for your kind words of welcome to me. It is, indeed, a pleasure and an honour for me to be able again this year to address this important disarmament negotiating body. As you are well aware, Sir, Poland has always held this forum in high esteem and I myself treasure my personal long-standing association with it.

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My feeling of satisfaction is even further enhanced by seeing the helm of the Conference in the able hands of a distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, a country with which Poland has traditionally enjoyed friendly relations, a country whose dedication to the goals of both disarmament and non-alignment is well known to and appreciated by the international community.

I wish, therefore, to add my personal congratulations to those already conveyed to you on your assumption of the Conference's Presidency for this month.

Appreciating as I do the infrequent opportunity of taking the floor in this Council Chamber, I cannot help observing that in the days and months since I had the pleasure of addressing the then Committee on Disarmament, almost exactly a year ago, the international situation has, alas, seriously deteriorated. The principal root-cause of the critically negative course of events on the international scene has been the relentless pursuit by the United States and the NATO alliance of a policy of confrontation with the USSR and other socialist States. The accelerating, highly destabilizing and irrational nuclear arms race, and specifically the commencement of the actual deployment of the new United States intermediate-range nuclear missiles -- a first-strike weapon -- on Western European soil, led directly to the interruption of the Soviet-United States negotiating process in Geneva aimed at nuclear arms limitation in Europe and at strategic arms limitation and reduction. The United States missile deployment also could not help but force the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty to adopt the necessary counter-measures consistent with and adequate to their legitimate security interests.

In connection with these developments, in his address to the National Conference of Delegates of the Polish United Workers' Party in Warsaw on 16 March last, the First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, declared among other things, and I quote:

"We have repeatedly drawn attention to the dangerous consequences of the imperialist policy of confrontation. At present, with the military balance in Europe upset by the United States and the NATO alliance, the time is not so much to sound another warning but rather to draw concrete conclusions from the situation as it obtains today.

We have welcomed with satisfaction and approval the recent proposals of the USSR concerning the prevention of the threat of a nuclear conflict, in particular the proposals put forward by Comrade Konstantin U. Chernenko, on 2 March last, to subordinate the relations between the nuclear Powers to new norms. The removal of the spectre of confrontation and (the establishment of) a constructive negotiating platform are in the best interest of the world, of Europe and of Poland."

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Regrettably, we do not as yet detect any indication of a genuine willingness on the part of the United States to re-establish such a platform, or to embark upon a constructive dialogue in the critically important area of nuclear disarmament, on the basis of strategic parity, in accordance with the principles of equality and equal security.

As far as the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty -- among them Poland -- are concerned, their position has been clear all along. It remains unequivocal also today. We consistently come out in support of all constructive initiatives advanced with a view to checking and reversing the growing threat of nuclear conflict, halting the nuclear-arms race, promoting genuine and tangible disarmament and restoring the policy of détente and equitable co-operation between States.

For their part, the socialist States have time and again advanced constructive, imaginative and pragmatic proposals which are all too well known in this forum. As it will be recalled, in 1983 alone these proposals found ample reflection on several occasions: in January, in the Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty; in June, in the Joint Statement of their leaders; and in October, in a communiqué of the Committee of Foreign Ministers. These proposals have, moreover, become a matter of public and official record in the United Nations, at the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, at the Vienna talks and at the Stockholm Conference. Last but not least, they have been formally set forth in this forum, adding momentum and a sense of urgency to its work.

I hardly need to add that these proposals are still on the table in their totality. The validity of the measures which they espouse is unquestionable, while their need has been rendered even more pressing by the generally negative course of international relations. Indeed, it is the firm belief of the Polish Government that the international situation in Europe and throughout the world today adds particular relevance and urgency to the proposals advanced by the socialist States, especially those concerning:

- (a) the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and States Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, open also for other States;
- (b) the proposal, officially submitted to the NATO member States in a Soviet aid-memoire of 10 January last, for freeing Europe of chemical weapons; and
- (c) the proposal concerning negotiations on a freeze and reduction of military expenditures, which was contained in a memorandum of the Government of Romania of 5 March 1984.

The adoption and translation of these proposals into the language of practical policy of States would go a long way toward improving the political climate in the world and advancing the cause of genuine disarmament. Such a policy would gain added credibility from a firm and unequivocal condemnation of nuclear war, an

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immediate freeze of the nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon Powers, and the undertaking of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so. We also strongly believe that the cause of world peace and international security at the lowest possible, balanced level of military force would be well served by the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban, the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth, and, something to which Poland attaches particular significance, the earliest finalization of an international convention on the elimination of chemical weapons.

It cannot escape anyone's attention, however, that crucial and timely as these measures are, what is of overriding importance for the entire disarmament effort is clearly the need for a nuclear dialogue between the two major Powers concerned to be reopened. Obviously, for such a dialogue to succeed, it must be squarely based on the recognized principle of equal security, equality and strategic parity. As is well known, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty have placed on record that they do not seek military superiority over the NATO member States. But -- by the same token -- they are determined to prevent the NATO alliance from tipping the strategic balance in its favour and thus gravely threatening world peace. Therefore, as the representatives of the USSR and other socialist States have often stressed, the essential prerequisite of embarking on new USSR-United States nuclear talks is the return to the situation as it existed before the deployment by the United States of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles in some Western European countries.

Poland has a direct, vital stake in security in Europe and in the world at large. This was expressly confirmed in a statement of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic of 3 February 1984. Assessing the new political and military situation in Europe following the deployment of the new United States missiles, and expressing Poland's support for the countermeasures adopted by the USSR, the Council of Ministers declared inter alia that under the circumstances, the primary task was to ensure for the State and the people of Poland conditions of secure development and to reinforce, within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty, the bonds of alliance with the socialist community. An important element in efforts to restrain the confrontational and aggressive policy of the NATO alliance -- the statement continued -- would be Poland's contribution to the co-ordinated policy-line of the socialist community, especially through the promotion and implementation of the peace-oriented initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty and the disarmament proposals of the USSR.

Notwithstanding the dangerous turn in international affairs at present, one can think of reasons for cautious optimism. They include the fact that not all lines of contact and communication between the States concerned have succumbed to the crisis. Indeed, some have survived and stand out as a testimony to the heritage and enduring spirit of the climate of détente. In Stockholm, the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe met for its first session. On the day it adjourned its debates, the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe reopened. Likewise, the then Committee, and now Conference on Disarmament, kept meeting at its time-hallowed annual sessions. Through mutual accommodation, and largely owing to close

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co-operation between the delegations of the socialist States, on the one hand, and the delegations of the Group of 21, the non-aligned and neutral States, on the other, the Conference has adopted its agenda for 1984 and settled basic organizational matters without undue delay. Given political will of all its members, the Conference should be able to discharge its mandate and to devote its undivided attention to all pressing questions, including such priority problems as the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament.

It was generally believed that the Conference, thanks to yet another proof of flexibility and goodwill of the USSR, would be able to make this year substantive, perhaps decisive, progress towards its ultimate objective with regard to the elimination of chemical weapons. Unfortunately, as things stand now, the latest Soviet gesture seems not to be reciprocated with the same flexibility and goodwill.

Chemical weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of States has traditionally been a matter of special interest to Poland, an area to which our delegation has sought to make a special contribution, yet without detracting from the consideration of other important items on the Conference's agenda. The readiness of the delegation of Poland to continue making a meaningful contribution in all areas of endeavour in this forum is consonant with the invariable policy principles of the Polish People's Republic-- averting the threat of nuclear war, halting the arms race and promoting tangible measures of genuine disarmament.

Acting in concert with other members of the socialist community, within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty, Poland is determined to pursue its objectives here, in Geneva, at the United Nations and in the other forums to which I have referred earlier. This determination has been explicitly reaffirmed by the National Conference of Delegates of the Polish United Workers' Party which, in its Appeal for Peace, an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, stated as follows:

"In tune with the basic interests of the Polish nation and with the traditional line of the consistently pursued foreign policy, socialist Poland will spare no effort to continue making a constructive contribution to the consolidation of the structures of peace in Europe, the strengthening of world security and the development of broad international co-operation based on equal rights."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Thielecke.

Mr. THIELICKE (German Democratic Republic): First of all, my delegation would like to welcome in our midst the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic, Comrade Jaroszek. Mr. Jaroszek is well known as an outstanding expert in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

Today this Conference is dealing with the third report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which was submitted on 15 March.

My delegation would like to thank the Ad Hoc Group and its Chairman, Dr. Dahlman, for the arduous work done in elaborating the report.

The three reports which have been worked out by the Ad Hoc Group since 1976 provide an appropriate basis for establishing the international exchange of seismic data, the aim of which would be to contribute to verifying compliance with a future treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Thus, we now have clear ideas of the three main elements of the international exchange.

Firstly, the reports contain considerations on the network of seismic stations and the process of extracting data from them.

Secondly, the data would be distributed through the Global Telecommunication System of WMO. Trial exchanges have shown that this system has the potential of fully satisfying the aims of rapid and undistorted transmission of Level I data for the proposed global system. Moreover, document CD/448 contains in Appendix 8 preliminary instructions for a comprehensive experimental exercise of the global system to be carried out after a CTBT has entered into force.

Thirdly, an important part of the system would be the International Data Centres. Also in this regard document CD/448 contains detailed views, i.e., the "Preliminary operations manual for International Data Centres" contained in Appendix 7.

A close look at the state of affairs concerning a nuclear-test ban reveals a kind of paradox. Whereas technical work on parts of the verification system, i.e. the international exchange of seismic data, is quite advanced, there are no negotiations on a CTBT at present. Nobody can deny, however, that the proposed system for global data exchange is intended to operate on the basis of such a treaty and to serve its purposes. The aim, therefore, is not an international exchange of seismic data per se or in a vacuum, but to facilitate the implementation of a CTBT. The system cannot be set up in the absence of such a treaty, nor can it replace the treaty. From this angle it is obvious that technical work on verification aspects cannot go on endlessly as if it were an open-ended exercise. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has clarified all relevant questions concerning the international data exchange. Detailed arrangements for the international data exchange could be worked out, after the treaty is concluded, by the Expert Committee which is envisaged.

Having said this, we do not deny that the technical experiment planned for this year to test the exchange of Level I data through the Global Telecommunication System of WMO may be of some use. However, after this experiment the Conference on Disarmament will have to take a decision on the future of the Ad Hoc Group, taking into account the situation with regard to negotiations on a nuclear-test ban. Here again, much will depend on the position of the United States. The

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United States delegation on 8 March expressed its support of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. This can hardly suffice. As long as the United States refuses treaty negotiations, the work of the Ad Hoc Group could be used as a cover for the lack of the political will to negotiate.

With your permission, Mr. President, I should now like to address the item which provides the basis for the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, namely, a nuclear test ban.

Needless to say, such a ban is of crucial importance to stop the nuclear-arms race and to reduce the threat of nuclear war. Such a step has become more urgent in recent years in view of the accelerating nuclear-arms race, characterized inter alia by the creation of new destabilizing nuclear-weapon systems and the deployment of United States first-strike nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

At the same time there exists an excellent basis for elaborating a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Comprehensive proposals were tabled in 1982 by the Soviet Union and in 1983 by Sweden. The three reports presented by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts provide a wealth of material for establishing an international exchange of seismic data as an important part of the verification system of a future treaty.

Immediate steps to cease nuclear-weapon testing are advocated by the overwhelming majority of States. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests is also called for by many politicians in Western countries.

In view of the urgent need for a nuclear-test ban, and of all existing materials which show ways for solving the problems connected with it, world public opinion might rightly ask why a CTBT has not yet been concluded and why negotiations are not yet under way for that purpose.

Honesty and realism, so often demanded by one side in this Conference, allow only one answer: whereas the Soviet Union is prepared for such negotiations, two other nuclear-weapon States refuse any participation in activities to achieve a NTB, and the two remaining nuclear-weapon States are only prepared to engage this Conference in a futile debate on verification questions in order to cover their negative attitude to the slightest progress towards a CTB. Such an approach is by no means a new one. The so-called verification issue was and is still being used in many cases to block agreements on arms limitation and disarmament.

One side has repeatedly attempted in this Conference and elsewhere to foster the belief that verification problems were blocking the road to the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. Therefore, it was argued, the Conference should start from scratch and identify and examine issues of verification with the hope of achieving such a ban in a long-term perspective.

But have the proponents of such an approach forgotten history? Questions relating to a test ban have been considered for more than 25 years in different forums, and a large number of solutions, inter alia on verification questions, have been offered. "No other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much international concern, discussion, study and negotiation as that of stopping nuclear-weapon tests", as the United Nations Secretary-General emphasized in 1979. Moreover, in the trilateral report submitted in 1980 to the Committee on Disarmament, the three negotiating parties, among them the United States and the United Kingdom, expressed their belief that "the verification measures being negotiated -- particularly the provisions regarding the international exchange of

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seismic data, the Committee of Experts and on-site inspections -- break significant new ground in international arms limitation efforts and will give all treaty parties the opportunity to participate in a substantial and constructive way in the process of verifying compliance with the treaty" (CD/130).

Thus, since the submission of the trilateral report something must have happened which has forestalled further progress concerning the elaboration of the treaty, including its verification provisions. This development must have been so serious that the United States, which in 1980 together with its negotiating partners desired to achieve an "early agreement" as was stated in CD/130, today looks upon a comprehensive test ban only as an "ultimate objective".

Obviously, conditions for verification have not worsened. On the contrary, technical means of verification, including those in the possession of the United States, have considerably improved. The change in the United States position, however, is determined by political and military factors. The former Director of United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA) and chief CTB negotiator, Mr. Paul Warnke, has referred in this regard to internal pressures to continue testing for new nuclear-weapon systems and to improve old ones. In a letter sent by USACDA to Congress in 1983, it was underlined that "nuclear tests are specifically required for the development, modernization and certification of warheads, the maintenance of stockpile reliability and the evaluation of nuclear-weapon effects".

Last week, there was news of a long-term programme under way in the United States for the production of nuclear warheads which also involves a considerable increase in nuclear-weapon tests. That eight-year programme provides for additional underground tests as part of the so-called "Star Wars" plan, as well as for tests of warheads for the Trident missile, Cruise missiles, the Pershing-II missile, the neutron artillery shell and others. According to this report, the output of nuclear warheads in the United States, now already the highest it has been for 20 years, is expected to continue increasing.

Obviously, it is not an alleged verification problem that prevents progress towards a complete nuclear-weapon-test ban. As we all know, there is today every possibility to verify compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Nevertheless, we have been asked over and over again here in this Conference to study in depth the verification issues of a test ban.

Effective verification arrangements, however, can only be elaborated in the framework of the negotiation of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It cannot be done by a subsidiary body whose mandate has been limited by a few delegations to a mere examination of verification issues. In the absence of real negotiations, delegations can hardly be expected to bridge existing differences on certain issues of a nuclear-test ban only in a framework of discussions.

Thus, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban could hardly do more than it did in 1982 and 1983. As was stated in its report of last year (CD/412), "a large number of delegations considered that the Ad Hoc Working Group had fulfilled its mandate by discussing and defining all the issues relating to verification and compliance of a nuclear-test ban".

In view of this situation it is difficult to understand the position of the delegation of the United States which, on the one hand, is not ready to embark upon negotiations on a CTBT and, on the other, deplores that in the Ad Hoc Working Group



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"no agreements were reached on the items". It stands to reason that agreements on treaty elements can only be achieved in negotiations, that is, in a process of give and take.

Last year the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was chaired by the head of my delegation. In summarizing his views on the work of the Working Group, Ambassador Rose stressed on 23 August 1983: "In spite of all efforts made by most delegations, the Committee on Disarmament is still prevented from holding negotiations. Its relevant subsidiary organ is confined to mere discussions. Sometimes one may even get the impression that one side is very eager to focus the attention of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban on technical questions and to convert it into an institution for exchanging views on seismological details. When the side in question regards a complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as only a long-term goal and the time not propitious to negotiate a corresponding treaty, the discussion of technical problems might be used as a smokescreen to cover the lack of political will". This statement was contained in CD/PV.236.

This analysis is valid still today. In March, the question of a new mandate for an ad hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban as well as for other committees was considered in an informal way by this Conference. In spite of all the efforts made by the then President, Ambassador Datcu of Romania, no success was reached in this regard because of the attitude of some nuclear-weapon States. On 3 April, those States blocked consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to initiate negotiations on a CTBT.

It is our hope that this will not be the last word from the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom, in view of the position of the overwhelming majority of members of the Conference on Disarmament, who advocate the start of treaty negotiations. Those two delegations should review their positions and agree to negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Such a step by those States would enable a corresponding subsidiary body of our Conference to make real progress.

Here, as in other cases, this Conference faces a strange situation. Whereas nobody denies that the Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating forum, some delegations again and again raise objections when it comes to the working level, that is, when subsidiary bodies are to be set up and given a clear negotiating mandate in accordance with the purpose of this Conference.

It stands to reason that subsidiary organs should have such a mandate if the general mandate of the Conference on Disarmament is taken seriously. But, paradoxically as it may seem, some delegations are often not prepared to accept a negotiating mandate, but are prepared to negotiate a mandate! Such an approach has very often led us to protracted procedural debates which have complicated and blocked our work. So, why not from the outset agree on a negotiating mandate and leave it to the subsidiary body concerned to decide how to proceed and how to organize the negotiations? Such an approach would prevent us from long procedural debates and would very much further our work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 249th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Peren.

Mr. PERREN (New Zealand): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to be able to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. Since this is the first occasion on which New Zealand has addressed a plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament, it is of particular note that the Presidency is held by the representative of Sri Lanka, a small country like my own and one with which we have for long had very close and friendly ties.

Mr. President, your country's membership of this Conference demonstrates that small countries, as well as large, are concerned about disarmament. I wish also to pay a tribute to the work of Ambassador Datcu who guided the work of the Conference so skilfully during the month of March. Beyond that, Mr. President, I wish to commend the Conference itself for the efforts being made by all its members in this most important area of human endeavour.

Conventional warfare has not ceased. The arms race consumes a disproportionate share of global resources. Our world already has too many nuclear weapons, but still more are being produced. Early progress is needed to devise and negotiate tangible practical solutions and specific disarmament conventions. New Zealand hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will play an effective part in this process on a wide range of disarmament issues.

It might perhaps be thought that a country like ours, in the South Pacific with no land frontiers, is remote from the disarmament issues with which this body is grappling. In fact, our South Pacific region is one where a continuing deep-seated concern is shared by many countries. Moreover, our apparently "isolated" South Pacific region is the only one where nuclear testing is still being conducted outside the main metropolitan territory of a nuclear-weapon State.

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Although the joint resources of the South Pacific countries are modest, the strength of the commitment of the South Pacific region to total nuclear disarmament should not be underestimated.

My country, New Zealand, is certainly committed to doing all that can be done to hasten the implementation of meaningful disarmament agreements. New Zealand has long accorded top priority to seeking a complete ban on the testing or use of all nuclear weapons. For many years at each successive session of the United Nations General Assembly we have taken a leading role in promoting the adoption of a General Assembly resolution calling urgently for the conclusion of a treaty to implement a comprehensive nuclear-test ban (CTB). We will be working to that end again this year in New York. Meanwhile my presence here today demonstrates my Government's commitment to extend our efforts to include active participation in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

In fact, as most of you will know already, New Zealand is not altogether a new-comer in the Conference on Disarmament. Since 1977 New Zealand has participated actively in all sessions of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts whose Third Report is now before you. We take encouragement from the Ad Hoc Group's completion and adoption of that Report by consensus, because this signals to us that some progress, however modest and preliminary, is being made at a technical level. We see this as a small but significant new step towards the eventual establishment of an international network of seismic stations which, we believe, could later help towards monitoring compliance with a CTB. We look forward to the day when all the necessary technical requirements will have been completed. Then, given sufficient political goodwill, the verification of seismic and related events can become the basis for a sound, balanced, mutual and verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Peren, New Zealand)

New Zealand remains ready to play its part in this process. Here too our geographic location has relevance, for New Zealand and Australia are the only two Southern Hemisphere countries with a past and continuing capacity to contribute to the efforts of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts. Similarly, New Zealand and Australia are the only two countries that offer network data from seismograph stations in Antarctica. New Zealand thus contributes directly to the work of the Ad Hoc Group, and, we hope, also towards the creation of a CTB.

We hope that it will be the decision of this session of the Conference on Disarmament that the Ad Hoc Group will remain in existence, and will continue to meet at least annually. If so, New Zealand will wish to continue to participate in, and contribute to, the Ad Hoc Group's deliberations. Meanwhile members should continue the work necessary for a successful outcome of the proposed technical test for the exchange and analysis of Level I Data using the WMO/GTS under a regular use basis. The successful completion of this test, will, we believe, be a further tangible sign that progress continues to be made by the Ad Hoc Group at a technical level. However, to make further significant progress in future, it is now urgent that full agreement be reached on a "comprehensive experimental exercise" which would adequately test all aspects of the global system, including the full seismograph network, data transmission procedures and facilities, and data collection operations.

New Zealand has also indicated its wish to participate in other Working Groups within the Conference on Disarmament and especially in the subsidiary body that should be established to move towards the negotiation of a CTB. We call now on all parties to redouble their efforts to formulate a wider mandate for the NTB Group that will allow real progress to be made.

In the United Nations General Assembly New Zealand and Australia initiated and proposed resolution 38/63 which was adopted with 117 votes in favour and not one vote against. This resolution requested the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) to resume its examination of issues relating to a CTB with a view to the negotiation of a treaty on the subject and, in accordance with the 1983 Report on the work of the Committee under this item, to take up the question of a revised mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group during its 1984 session;

(b) to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system; and

(c) to initiate investigation of other international measures to improve verification arrangements under such a treaty including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity.

Our position is quite clear. We believe that there are many issues relating to a comprehensive test ban that deserve immediate consideration, and that positive progress can be achieved on some, even if hesitations remain on others. We also believe there will be widespread concern, disappointment and frustration if the Conference on Disarmament meets for another year without beginning this process. As in the United Nations General Assembly resolution, we urge all members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Conference in fulfilling these tasks.

(Mr. Peren, New Zealand)

In conjunction with this, New Zealand will be doing all it can to help discourage further vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons by supporting the strengthening of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We regard this as the most important international nuclear-arms-control agreement so far negotiated.

The international community as a whole must not miss the opportunity of the 1985 NPT Review Conference to ensure that the importance of this Treaty is not merely reaffirmed, but that a genuine effort is made to increase confidence in the NPT and to attract a larger number of States to adhere to its provisions. The review must be adopted by consensus even if only a small number of incremental advances are possible. Anything less could jeopardize support for the Treaty, especially among those who already feel that the nuclear-weapon States have not yet met their obligations under the original NPT.

When New Zealand signified its wish to participate actively in the work of the Conference on Disarmament it indicated that it hoped to participate in the work of the subsidiary bodies concerned with the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the elimination of chemical weapons.

On chemical weapons, the members of this Conference will know that New Zealand has in recent years been closely associated with efforts in the United Nations General Assembly to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The need to establish procedures for verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons is beyond doubt, and New Zealand has noted with appreciation the progress of the negotiations on this issue, as on the other elements of a chemical weapons convention, which were recorded in the Committee on Disarmament's Report to the General Assembly last year.

Recent reports of the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iraq and Iran have lent particular urgency and relevance to the work of the Conference in this field. The investigation into those reports initiated by the Secretary-General showed conclusively that fact-finding could be carried out expertly, impartially and with speed. If there are shortcomings in the Report, these only illustrate the difficulties that will be faced by any such mission until international verification procedures have been put in place. The Secretary-General and the specialist team are to be commended for their work.

If we may take satisfaction in the professional way in which the mission performed its task, we are at the same time dismayed at the results of the investigation. New Zealand condemns any use of chemical weapons. It is of paramount importance, as the Secretary-General has observed, that all countries strictly observe the rules of international conduct accepted by the international community. For this Conference to bring its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention to an early and satisfactory conclusion would be a substantial contribution to disarmament and to humanity in warfare. We hope that we may be able to assist in efforts to that end.

(Mr. Peren, New Zealand)

For New Zealanders the key steps towards nuclear disarmament are the creation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a massive reduction of military weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. We are grateful therefore to the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts for their constructive contribution to this process.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, permit me, first of all, to express my satisfaction in seeing you as President of the Conference for the month of April. There are many difficult and important matters to be solved. I hope that your skill and the careful manner in which you are handling the complex problem which remains to be solved during this month will help us successfully to conclude our business for the first part of the 1984 session. I assure you, Mr. President, of the full co-operation of my delegation in your important task.

Allow me also to express my warm thanks to your predecessor as President of the Conference, Ambassador Datcu of Romania, for his Presidency which he so ably handled, with his skill, long experience in international affairs and good humour.

I also join other speakers in welcoming to the Conference the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, His Excellency Henryk Jaroszek.

We have today the opportunity to consider the Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, and my comments will be limited to the work of this Group.

The basic aim behind the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in 1976 was, as we all know, a desire to facilitate the verification of a comprehensive test ban.

It is evident, and natural, that in international arms control and disarmament treaties all parties must have essentially equal possibilities to satisfy their verification requirements. These requirements might, however, differ from one country to another, depending inter alia on political and military factors. The national verification capabilities of individual countries might also vary considerably due to the geographic location of the country and available technology. International co-operation to establish and develop global verification systems is one way to give all countries access to high-quality verification data. Such systems are of fundamental importance for smaller countries and might also substantially improve the verification

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

capabilities available to the big Powers. To be useful, such a system must produce data that satisfy the needs and the capabilities of all countries. Their quite different requirements increase, however, the difficulties in obtaining a generally acceptable international verification system.

International discussions of a global seismological verification system over many years have illustrated both the desire, and the difficulties, to obtain a generally accepted international verification system for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this context the international co-operation measures worked out by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts constitute however an important step towards the achievement of an internationally acceptable system.

The Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group (CD/448) is a considerable achievement. An impressive amount of work has been carried out by the Group's experts and at observatories, laboratories and data centres in the participating countries. It might be difficult for us to understand and fully to appreciate the vast amount of scientific work in many countries that forms the basis for this report.

The Report contains a large amount of facts and information that deserves close consideration. My delegation shares the Ad Hoc Group's view that a significant technical development has taken place in the last few years and that it is important to fully incorporate this new technology into the proposed global system of exchanging seismic data.

The conversion of existing analogue stations relevant for CTB verification into digital systems and the establishment of new and highly sensitive stations at suitable locations in the Southern Hemisphere are important steps recommended by the Ad Hoc Group. Working Paper CD/491 presented by the Federal Republic of Germany on "Aspects of modern developments in seismic event recording techniques" contains a sound basis for a discussion of how advanced technology can be used to improve and simplify seismic recording. Concerning the establishment of new, high-quality stations in the Southern Hemisphere, Sweden has earlier introduced in the Committee on Disarmament the idea of so-called "sister-observatories". Such observatories are co-operative projects between countries that already have experience in establishing and operating modern seismological facilities and countries have less experience in this field, but with suitable geophysical situations. The present co-operation between Finland and Zambia, reported on to the Ad Hoc Group, is a good example of such co-operation.

The development in communication and computer technology has been more rapid than was possible to foresee only a few years ago. This has made it possible to exchange, rapidly and on a global scale, large amounts of information and simultaneously to handle such information in fairly small computer systems. The question of the exchange and use of the more voluminous original recordings of data, the so-called Level II data, has been a difficult problem in the present work of the Ad Hoc Group; however, it is likely to be less sensitive when such data gradually become more extensively used in general seismological practice.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

It is important that an international co-operative system for CTB verification should be advanced and modern, and that technical equipment and existing data are used in a way that is not inferior to those used in systems available to individual countries.

My delegation is pleased to note in the report that the Ad Hoc Group has elaborated a preliminary operational manual for international data centres. This manual gives comprehensive instructions on how such data centres should operate. The instructions are worked out in great detail, including the specification of the computer codes to be used.

In the Swedish draft on a Nuclear-Weapon-test-ban treaty (CD/381), presented in June 1983, operational manuals were foreseen for all the components of an international co-operative system. Operation manuals should give detailed instructions on how to operate participating stations, extract and exchange Level I data, and exchange Level II data, and on how the analysis should be carried out at the International Data Centres. The preliminary manual presented as an annex to the Third Report is a substantial step towards achieving such necessary detailed instructions. Further work remains to be done to make it possible to reach agreement on all the details of this preliminary manual and to prepare similar manuals for other components of the system. This is an important future task for the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

Additional experience is needed and my delegation therefore welcomes and fully supports the proposal of the Ad Hoc Group to hold an experimental test later this year. Such a test should result in further elaboration of operational procedures for Level I seismic data exchange and the envisaged International Data Centres.

The test will be conducted in co-operation with WMO. My delegation welcomes the decision by WMO to make available its Global Telecommunication System for regular exchange of seismic data. We are convinced that this experimental test, on a global scale, will give most valuable data and experience for establishing an international system to monitor a CTBT.

My delegation has noted with satisfaction that 23 countries have announced their intention to participate in the test. We know that many more countries have the capability to participate. The value of the test would increase substantially with more countries participating and with a wider, global distribution of these countries. I therefore

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

urge all countries that have not yet announced their intention to participate, to seriously consider to contribute to this important test.

Sweden will participate in the test by providing data from the Hagfors Observatory and by operating an Experimental Data Centre. At our centre in Sweden we will receive the reported Level I data and analyse these data using the procedures described in the preliminary operational manual. This experiment will thus not only give experience on the extraction of Level I data and the exchange of such data over the WMO system, but also on the procedures and computer programmes needed to process these data at International Data Centres.

We think it is important that such experimental data centres will be operated during the test in the United States and the USSR. We have also with great satisfaction noted the plans to establish data centre facilities in Australia. Sweden looks forward to close co-operation with these countries to further develop the procedures to be used at the envisaged data centres. We are confident that the forthcoming experiment will offer experience of great importance to reaching agreement on a generally acceptable verification system.

My country has for many years been dedicated to the task of achieving a CTB. We have conducted an extensive national research programme to facilitate the verification of such a treaty. We are convinced that the work of the Ad Hoc Group is an important contribution to our efforts in this respect. We are further convinced of the value of continued work to gain more experience through this experiment and to prepare operational manuals. In our view no efforts should be spared in paving the way for a CTB, including continued efforts in the technical field. The report just presented by the Ad Hoc Group shows clearly that most valuable work has already been accomplished towards satisfying reasonable verification requirements. It is now time for the Conference on Disarmament to address all issues relating to a CTBT. We therefore urge the Conference to reach agreement immediately on a mandate which would make this possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales.



Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my delegation takes note of the Third Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. It also takes note of the recommendation by the Ad Hoc Group contained in document CD/449. From their nature and importance, both documents, and especially the Third Report, require careful study by the competent departments of my Government, in view of the various technical and substantive aspects they contain.

Some eight years have elapsed since the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts was established by the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and subsequently maintained by the Committee on Disarmament. It is regrettable that the prospects on this issue which the international community faced towards the end of the 1970s have substantially altered — if they have not actually disappeared — owing to the lack of political will of some nuclear-weapon States to initiate negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests. At the recent plenary meeting of 3 April this lack of will once again emerged clearly.

Obviously, this continuing situation has repercussions on the task of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts. It is our opinion that the Ad Hoc Group and its planned exercises cannot continue to take place in a vacuum. Any activity performed must be directly related to the negotiating process which is taking place under item 1 of our agenda. Otherwise, it will detract from the mission of the Ad Hoc Group, which would then become a permanent body the purpose of which would be to consider and experiment with scientific and technical developments in the field of seismology. It is obvious that this cannot be the function of the Ad Hoc Group, nor was this the purpose for which it was established.

The objective which led the negotiating body to establish the Ad Hoc Group was to receive technical information and suggestions on a system suitable for verifying compliance with a nuclear-test-ban treaty. The considerable experience which we have accumulated shows us that the search for a perfect solution is preventing us from achieving an adequate one. It would also seem that, in the expectation of negotiations, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will continue with a series of experiments which, despite their scientific and technical value, will be of little importance if they are not accompanied by the relevant political negotiations.

As the Secretary-General said to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 29 February 1972, "The technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement". That opinion, which has been recalled countless times, was to be officially reiterated subsequently in 1972.

It is also our conviction that, as paragraph 31 of the Final Document states,

"Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement".

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The last sentence of the paragraph I have just quoted should be stressed. The form and modalities of the verification should be in keeping with the purposes, scope and nature of the disarmament agreement the observance of which it is wished to monitor. If that agreement does not exist, nor has even begun to be negotiated, it cannot be clear how studies and tests which must be carried out in a total vacuum can be useful and fruitful. It is not possible to go on working indefinitely on the basis of assumptions and out-of-date political data, as the Ad Hoc Group finds itself forced to do, as can be seen from paragraph 2 of its report.

In accordance with the broad experience already accumulated, only by making a start on substantive negotiations will it be possible to tackle all the pertinent aspects of a future agreement. And only in this context, too, will the Conference on Disarmament be able to make proper use of the technical and scientific contribution furnished by the Ad Hoc Group.

Having said this, my delegation is not opposed to acceptance by the Conference of the recommendation contained in paragraph 10 of document CD/449, but has wished to place on record its views concerning the present and future work of the Ad Hoc Group.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement. I understand that the representative of Australia would like to make a statement, and therefore give the floor to Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, at the plenary meeting of this Conference held on 15 March I welcomed the Third Report to the Conference of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and the Progress Report on the seventeenth session of the Ad Hoc Group, which the Chairman, Dr. Dahlman, introduced.

I wish today to reiterate that my delegation considers this report to be an important document.

The Report demonstrates clearly the valuable contribution the Ad Hoc Group has made and could continue to make to elaborating the verification regime of a comprehensive, nuclear-test-ban treaty. The specification of an international network of seismic stations, and the associated data exchange system in support of the detection and identification of seismic events is an integral part of the verification system for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The work that the Ad Hoc Group has been charged with undertaking, and should continue in the future, is of the highest significance.

The Third Report also demonstrates that the Ad Hoc Group has made a significant contribution towards the objective of achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and this is an objective to which my Government attaches extreme importance. For these reasons the work which has been carried out in the Group must be continued. It will have important responsibilities in the future in relation to finalizing the arrangements for the technical test to be conducted later this year which is being co-ordinated by Mr. Peter McGregor of Australia, and in assessing the results of that test. The Group will also have important work to do in giving effect to the recommendations contained in the final chapter of its Third Report.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

In the period since we last had the benefit of Dr. Dahlman's presence amongst us at this Conference, I had the benefit of visiting him at his research institute in Stockholm. The programmes he and his expert staff have designed are very impressive. I saw the Swedish seismic monitoring system in operation and it was clear that the information it gathers is of immense benefit to us all. May I also say, Mr. President, as it were somewhat in passing, that on the following day, on 29 March, during a visit I made to the Norwegian seismic monitoring facility in Oslo, the demonstration I saw there was unrehearsed but certainly dramatic. The Norwegian system had recorded earlier on that day a nuclear detonation of in pieces of 100 kilotons at a location identified as being within Soviet territory. I have had the opportunity to consult subsequently with Dr. Dahlman and he confirms too that the Swedish seismic system registered the same detonation on 29 March.

I subsequently saw no report of this event in the media, and so I thought at least for that reason you would not mind my mentioning it here today. It is in fact a matter of deep concern to my Government that our major public means of communication appear to have become so inured to the phenomenon of nuclear testing that it is no longer considered news. What this means is that we clearly need a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Australia will continue to give its full support to the work of the Ad Hoc Group. We will be taking part in the forthcoming technical experiment, and the Australian Government, as the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden kindly acknowledged this morning, proposes, subject to the allocation of the required funds, to establish a national monitoring capacity and an international data centre.

We urge the Conference on Disarmament to give its full support to the continuation of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? Are there any questions or requests for clarification that members might wish to address to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events? I see none.

May I now turn to the reports of the Ad Hoc Group, as contained in documents CD/448 and CD/449. In this connection I have been informed that there has been a delay in the circulation of the Arabic text of document CD/448. Unfortunately, it is not now available and therefore it seems to me to be better to take note of the report later, once all the languages have been distributed.

I now put before the Conference for adoption the recommendation appearing in paragraph 10 of the Progress Report contained in document CD/449, by which the Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session should, subject to approval by the Conference, be convened from 30 July to 10 August 1984, in Geneva, to finalize instructions for the technical test and to review additional national investigations into relevant matters. I hear no objection.

It was so decided.

(The President)

We have concluded our consideration of document CD/449. I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and convene, in five minutes time, an informal meeting to consider organizational questions.

The plenary meeting was suspended at 12.25 p.m. and reconvened at 12.45 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 April at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.258  
12 April 1984  
ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING  
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 12 April 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Dhanapala

(Sri Lanka)

GE.84-61630

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR  
Mr. A. BOUBAZINE

Argentina: Mr. J.J. CARASALES  
Mr. R. GARCÍA MORITAN  
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. BUTLER  
Mr. R. ROWE  
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium: Mr. M. DEPASSE  
Mr. J. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. C. PRAMOV  
Mr. N. MIHAILOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U PE THEIN TIN  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER  
Mr. R.J. ROCHON  
Mr. F.R. CLEMINSON

China: Mr. QIAN JIADONG  
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. LIANG DEFENG  
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG  
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. A. CIMA  
Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARAGI  
Ms. W. BASSIM  
Mr. I. HASSAN  
Mr. A. WAHER ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. JOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. H. RENTIE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. J. DEMBSKI  
Mr. H. THIELECKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W.-E. VON DEM HAGEN  
Mr. F. ELBE  
Mr. M. GERDTS

Hungary:

Mr. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GATDO  
Mr. H. TOTI

India:

Mr. DUBEY  
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAMYAB  
Mr. J. FALIPNEA

Italy:

Mr. M. PAVESE  
Mr. B. CABRAS

Japan:

Mr. M. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. O. HILLALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN  
Mr. A.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBLA  
Mr. A.F. OKOH

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. P. BALOIU  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. A. POPESCU



Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. R. ÅNGSTRÖM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. G.V. ANTSIFEROV  
Mr. T.F. DMITZITCHEV  
Mr. V.I. USTINOV  
Mr. V.E. PZLACHIN  
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mr. J.F. GORDON  
Mr. J.W.B. RICHARDS  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. N. CLYNE  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. C. PEARCY  
Mr. J. PLUNKETT

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCÍA GARCÍA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference continues today its consideration of item 8 on its agenda, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

You will recall that our time-table for this week includes the holding of an informal meeting, if necessary, to consider organizational questions. I intend, therefore, to suspend the plenary meeting after we have listened to those speakers inscribed to address the Conference today and to convene an informal meeting to consider the following questions: (a) our programme of work for the week beginning on 16 April; (b) the question of how to proceed in connection with proposals under agenda items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7; and (c) the opening date for the second part of the 1984 session.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Spain, Brazil, Bangladesh, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Senegal.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me, in the first place, welcome you as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. I can assure you that you will have the full support of my delegation in your effort to get the Conference on Disarmament dealing effectively with all the items of its agenda. At this juncture I should like to thank Ambassador Datcu of Romania for his persistent effort in the same direction last month.

It is my intention to address today a very old item -- that of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Next year we shall take note of the 70th anniversary of the notorious "Black Sunday" of 22 April 1915, when chemical weapons were used for the first time causing the suffocation of thousands of French soldiers under merciless green-brownish clouds of chlorine released from German trenches near Ypres. In the following years 113,000 metric tons of toxic agents were used causing 1,297,000 casualties, of which 91,200 were lethal.

It can be argued that the fear of possible use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes preceded by far their actual use. Thus we can find the first explicit mention of toxic weapons in the Declaration on Laws and Means of War, signed in Brussels 110 years ago. A number of other treaties dealt with this problem more or less extensively, for example, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the peace treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Neuilly, Trianon, Sèvres and Berlin, signed between 1919 and 1921, as well as the Washington Treaty of 1922. The significance of these treaties was later reflected in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which, until today, remains the most important international document aimed against chemical warfare. It remains fully valid despite the fact that the process of its ratification took, in some countries, half a century.

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It is the considered opinion of my delegation that today, virtually 60 years after the conclusion of the Geneva Protocol, the problem of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is fully ripe for its effective and definite solution. Not only because it is an old, almost an ancient, matter, but, above all, because it is about to acquire a new, dangerous dimension. I would hardly be saying anything new if I reminded distinguished delegates that on 27 June 1980 the United States House of Representatives approved the funds required for the erection of a new production facility for binary chemical weapons in the Pine-Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas. On 8 February 1982 the production of binary weapons was approved by the relevant presidential letter to the Congress. Thus, the United States programme of chemical rearmament was launched. The fact that the United States Senate had passed resolutions on freezing the funds for the production of chemical weapons should not obscure the intensive activities undertaken in the United States with a view to carrying through their binary weapons programme. According to United States sources, the development of binary weapons cost 3 to 4 billion dollars in the 1970s. The first such types of weapons to be produced are the 155 mm XM 687 binary artillery shell with GB-2 filling. The 8-inch XM 736 binary artillery shell and the 500 lb Big-Eye binary guided aerial bomb filled with VX-2 should soon follow suit.

This new round of the chemical arms race and plans for the modernization of the United States chemical arsenal supported by an envisaged 6-7 billion dollars over the next five years open a dangerous perspective for us all. A new super-toxic lethal intermediate-volatility nerve agent, IVA, combining the high percutaneous toxicity of VX with higher volatility and much higher penetration capability through a clothing barrier is the result of intensive military chemical research and development in the United States. This agent should replace present nerve agents in future.

There are also plans to use it widely in binary weapons mounted on Pershing II and Cruise missiles, as well as for remotely piloted vehicles, binary target-guided submunitions, aeriaily deployed land mines, long-range artillery munitions, and so forth.

If the United States were to proceed with its plans for chemical rearmament it would seriously undermine international efforts to prohibit and destroy chemical weapons. That would be highly regrettable since in recent years active negotiations have been under way, and now our Conference and its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons have, under the new mandate, a unique opportunity to respond to the urgent call to ban these cruel and inhumane weapons.

However, in order to succeed in doing so it would be necessary that we all approach the adopted mandate as a complex whole. Attempts to stress separately its various aspects cannot serve our purpose. On several occasions in the Working Groups it was remarked that we should not be engaged in the final drafting of the convention. Well, we never insisted on a final drafting in so far as the most important part of the mandate, calling on us "to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention", is reflected in our daily work. As is now clearly demonstrated in Working Group C, and to some extent in Working Group A, work based on concrete texts and formulations is more conducive to solve problems and to reflect ideas more clearly.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The progress achieved in Working Group C, dealing with the national implementation measures, speaks clearly in favour of the method chosen by its Chairman. In particular, work on the element "consultation and co-operation" was further advanced, and an understanding was reached on various aspects of "fact-finding". Constructive discussion is under way on "challenge procedure" and the structure of the relevant part was tentatively agreed upon.

The treatment accorded to the problem of "old stocks" found after initial declarations could also be considered as a positive sign. These stocks have finally been given the place corresponding to their very limited significance when compared to the operational chemical-weapon stockpiles. An understanding was reached to solve this problem as a special case in an annex with a different regime of destruction and verification than in the case of the operational chemical-weapon stocks.

My delegation looks eagerly for all positive signs in the treatment by the Conference on Disarmament of the problem of chemical weapons, and is always prepared to help them evolve and develop. At the same time, looking realistically at what has been achieved during the current spring session, we are certainly far from satisfied.

The reluctance of some delegations to take an active part in the process of negotiations, mentioned above, is most clearly reflected in Working Group B. We appreciate the effort of its Chairman who has engaged in a number of informal consultations, but these, it seems, have not brought any tangible results despite the fact that important constructive and compromise proposals were recently advanced concerning the questions falling within the ambit of Working Group B. This is a disquieting and dangerous phenomenon. This room is not the right place for ignorance or obstruction of acts of good faith. The price of the possible consequences will have to be paid by us all.

We conclude that it is now insufficient and meaningless simply to call, in general terms, for the intensification of the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention. The time has come to say aloud what and who is preventing us from doing so. We fully endorse what was said by Ambassador Issraelyan in his statement of 29 March, especially with regard to the negative role played by a new United States proposal heralded quite some time ago. In this connection I would like to recall what was said by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, K.U. Chernenko, in his answers to questions from the newspaper "Pravda" on 8 April, which you will find before you today. "For several months already the American leaders have been promising to table in Geneva some proposals on this score. But promises remain just promises; besides, nothing is known at all about what are they finally going to amount to, while in the meantime, as it follows from the President's remarks, a programme of building up and renovating chemical weapons, which are being deployed both on American territory and beyond it, is being accelerated in the United States."

As to the problem of verification, my delegation has always considered, and continues to do so, that verification provisions should be determined by the scope and specific nature of the disarmament measure involved. When applied to the process of destruction of chemical weapons, this principle means that the verification of stock destruction should be differentiated according to the types

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of chemical weapons being destroyed, to the volume of the stockpile and to the output of the destruction facility. Thus, we consider that the tightest verification provisions should be applied to the most dangerous chemical weapons, i.e., super-toxic lethal chemicals, both filled and in bulk, as well as their precursors and binary (multicomponent) ammunitions and devices. This principle as well as practical needs should always be taken into account when the relevant verification provisions are worked out.

In this respect we fully agree with the distinguished Ambassador of France who said in his statement of 5 April 1984 that "... a continuous and effective human presence is not necessary everywhere and in all cases ...". With respect to verification I would like to reiterate our opinion that a combination of national and international forms of control is necessary. International inspections must make use of the national executive and control systems, their documentation as well as their technical monitoring.

Let me also say that our delegation considers it necessary to be as precise as possible in determining the extent of the prohibition so as to ensure that nothing important, either today or in the future, escapes it. For this reason we also prefer the explicit mentioning of such systems as binary and other multicomponent weapons. At the same time we can hardly agree with the efforts to cover in the prohibition too wide a spectrum of chemicals, as reflected, for instance, in the lists of key precursors submitted by a number of delegations where we can find, inter alia, phosphorus trichloride or phosphorus oxichloride, which can be considered as irrelevant within the scope of the convention. As far as the definition of key precursors is concerned we see some merit in the approach suggested by the Federal Republic of Germany, which we continue to study thoroughly.

Recently, at a theoretical-tactical exercise calculated for the territory of Bavaria, it was assumed that the 21st United States infantry division received 14,000 rounds of GB ammunition. Consequently it was concluded that even well-trained and protected troops would suffer great losses from eventual chemical-weapon use. The civil population remaining in the combat area would suffer a death rate that would be almost 20 times higher. Theory aside, there remains the hard reality that on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, our neighbour to the west, huge stockpiles of United States chemical weapons are stored. According to J.P. Robinson, this amounts to about 2-4 per cent of total United States chemical-weapon stockpiles: no wonder that neither our people, with its historical experience, nor the people of the Federal Republic of Germany wish to accept this United States military chemical presence, as is witnessed by indignant protests from Hessen, Württemberg-Baden, Westpfalz and Bavaria, i.e. from those Federal States, where United States chemical stockpiles are deployed. My country knows only too well the data on "tactical exercises" by the United States Armed Forces, where it was assumed that daily some 2,000 tons or more of toxic warfare agents would be deployed on the Central European theatre. I hardly need to add anything to demonstrate that our interest in the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is nothing less than vital.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Before concluding, Mr. President, let me remind my distinguished colleagues that two days ago we noted the 12th anniversary of the opening for signature in Moscow, Washington and London of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. I should like to recall in this connection that my country, together with other socialist countries, originally proposed that the problem of biological weapons be solved together with that of chemical weapons. It would have been much easier to ban these weapons in 1972 than it is today or than it will be in the future. Let us therefore spare no effort in achieving now what we failed to do 12 years ago.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 249th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Spain, Ambassador de la Serna.

Mr. DE LA SERNA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first of all I should like to express here my satisfaction at participating as the representative of Spain in this single multilateral negotiating body of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. I should also like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the weighty responsibility you have shouldered in presiding over the Conference on Disarmament, a truly difficult task but one which, thanks to your well-known diplomatic abilities and the co-operation of the distinguished and highly qualified representatives gathered in this chamber, will, I am sure, be able to produce the positive results which the peoples of the entire world expect of this Conference.

The main objective of this United Nations body, the preparation of international disarmament agreements through multilateral negotiations, is complex but certainly also essential, in order to increase international security, and thereby enable mankind to live free of tension and even of fear of world nuclear conflict or of regional or bilateral wars.

It is all the more difficult to achieve this objective at the present time of dangerous international tension, but precisely for that reason the need to achieve positive results in this major forum is all the more crucial.

The success obtained by 35 States at the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) with the adoption of a Final Document which is both substantial and balanced after three years of valiant effort and in the midst of serious crises which rarified the international political climate, is a sign to all, including the distinguished members of this Conference, that despite the difficulties surrounding us, success can always be achieved if the political will of Governments exists. That political will must be offered intelligently and trustingly on behalf of the work of this body, in view of the vital importance of the items which the Conference on Disarmament is dealing with, and the appeal repeatedly expressed by the international community for the conclusion of international disarmament agreements.

Of course, this negotiating body would see its work made easier if viewpoints could be harmonized and agreements concluded in the other forums of negotiation on arms reductions and disarmament. The Spanish Government has already expressed in

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due time its concern at the decision to suspend the bilateral INF and START talks; my Government hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union will, in the manner and at the time they consider opportune, resume their negotiations aimed at achieving satisfactory agreements to establish nuclear armaments at the lowest possible levels. A new effort towards this objective is required. Furthermore, Spain notes with hope the negotiations on conventional arms and troop reductions in Central Europe which are being held in Vienna, and is working with dedication in the first stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures currently taking place in Stockholm.

In all these disarmament forums, co-operation and détente must replace tension and distrust.

All the items included in the agenda of this Conference are of great importance for maintaining and strengthening international security, some of them, indeed, for the very survival of mankind. I should now like to refer specifically to some of the issues to which my Government attaches the greatest importance.

In his statement during the general debate at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fernando Morán, recalled the need to conclude a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, as an effective barrier to the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons.

Spain agrees with the rest of the international community that the preparation by the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty for the complete and permanent prohibition of nuclear tests, and its adoption by the largest possible number of States, is an objective which we should attain. Such a treaty should prohibit all nuclear-weapon tests.

The development of a suitable international verification system, and its inclusion in the text of the treaty, is a matter of the utmost importance. Nevertheless, this should not stand in the way of tackling immediately and simultaneously, through multilateral negotiations, both the elaboration of such an international verification system and the negotiation of the remaining provisions of the treaty.

It is the wish of the Spanish Government that the exploration of space should be continued and indeed expanded, with the participation of an ever larger number of States, provided that the fruits of this great enterprise should rebound to the benefit of the international community as a whole. We are therefore firmly in favour of qualitative and quantitative progress in the exploration and utilization for peaceful purposes of outer space.

Nevertheless, the Spanish Government is concerned at the possible stationing of means of destruction in outer space, a possibility that is increasingly close at hand, which could represent yet another step in the arms race with unforeseeable consequences which should be studied in depth.

Satellites, the product of technological research and the instrument of space exploration, should be devoted to exclusively peaceful purposes: peaceful objectives include, inter alia, both those which contribute to mankind's present store of scientific knowledge, and those which strengthen international stability and security by facilitating the verification of compliance with the disarmament agreements entered into, or by serving as a secure network of intergovernmental communications which are so necessary at times of crisis and indeed once a conflict has already broken out.



(Mr. de la Serna, Spain)

It is the responsibility of each and every one of the States of the international community to preserve outer space in as peaceful a state as it has enjoyed since the beginnings of the universe, but this responsibility is particularly great in the case of States which have the honour to belong to this negotiating body, and even greater for the States which today possess developed space technology.

Spain will support the future work of this Conference aimed at developing the existing agreements on the exploration and use of outer space and at drawing up new arms control and disarmament agreements made necessary by the development of new technology.

Another disarmament issue to which Spain has attached the greatest interest in the past, and continues to do so at present, is the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Confining myself solely to this forum, I may recall that all the preceding statements by representatives of Spain have reiterated in this body my country's concern about the use of chemical weapons, as well as the urgent need to have an international treaty prepared in this Conference to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol and prohibit for all time the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, as well as providing for the destruction of existing stockpiles and production facilities. Spanish experts are working on this matter, and some of them are following the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons set up by the Conference and in previous years by the Committee on Disarmament. In connection with this item a Working Paper on precursors and key-precursors was submitted during the working meetings of 1983.

We hope that the progress achieved during 1983 in the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, ably chaired by Ambassador McPhail, will make it possible this year to take the decisive step which we need in this field. In this connection, we consider promising the statement made in February indicating the Soviet Union's readiness to give positive consideration to the permanent presence of international representatives responsible for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons. Likewise, the draft agreement shortly to be presented by the United States suggests a major contribution to reaching the final objective of this Conference's work on chemical weapons.

Spain wishes to place on record in this forum its full support for all efforts aimed at the total and universal suppression of the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. It also considers with interest other efforts made in the field of the limitation or elimination of such weapons.

In conclusion, I cannot fail to reiterate once again the Spanish Government's interest in participating in the important work of this organ. It is an interest which, in view of its present status, it cannot for the time being manifest through the working contribution it would wish but which it hopes to be able to increase enormously when the present member States take a positive decision on the announced possible increase in membership. Spain would then wish, as all representatives know, to participate as a full member of this key organ of the United Nations for disarmament negotiations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Spain for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Souza e Silva.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. President, since I joined this international forum almost five years ago, you are the third representative of Sri Lanka I have the pleasure to work with. Like your predecessors, my good friends Ambassadors Fonseka and Jayakoddy, you have already acquired the respect of your colleagues in this Conference, for your competence and seriousness in accordance with the high standards of your country's diplomacy. May I also express my appreciation for the endeavours displayed by Ambassador Datcu of Romania in the Presidency of the Conference during the month of March.

As the first part of the annual session of our Conference draws to a close, it seems to my delegation a timely opportunity to take stock of the achievements and failures in this long process of multilateral negotiations on disarmament that has been going on, without interruption, for almost a quarter of a century now. The proceedings of this international forum and its predecessors have encountered incentives and obstacles. One should acknowledge, however, the fact that those proceedings have been taking place for such a long time, in spite of adverse political odds, which constitutes an incentive that should not be overlooked. One might even say that the mere existence of this multilateral forum represents by itself an important achievement.

As for the concrete results of our endeavours, we must also recognize that some measures of non-armament have been agreed upon, which means that arriving at agreements is not beyond our reach. However, one might wonder, if non-armament agreements have proven feasible, why has this negotiating forum been unable so far to agree upon one single measure of disarmament? After 20 years of fruitless pursuit we find ourselves more distant than ever from our first and foremost duty: to negotiate agreements leading to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In the light of this fact we cannot but accept the evidence that our failures far outweigh our accomplishments.

Directly responsible for this state of affairs are the same Powers that share the main responsibility for the prevailing situation of increasing insecurity, universal apprehension and widespread fear. They have **condemned** mankind to live in a delicate balance of terror, in hope that the fallacious doctrines of deterrence will work forever through the threat of general and complete annihilation without any international control, not even their own.

At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, only two years ago, we were told that nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, and that thanks to their existence there has not been another world-wide conflagration for almost four decades. Maybe this is the reason why the Superpowers are expanding their nuclear arsenals to endless bounds, while the lesser nuclear-weapon Powers have decided to emulate them to the limit of their material and technological possibilities.

In accordance with their doctrines, as long as there are five nations self-appointed as responsible, yet capable of bringing about total and indiscriminate destruction, the rest of the world may be subject to local or peripheral conflicts, but world wars shall never occur again. It would almost seem that the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ushered in a new and more promising period of the history of humanity.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

It is precisely this kind of reasoning that explains the causes of our failure and has prevented any forum, multilateral, trilateral or bilateral, to achieve progress in disarmament negotiations.

As for the restricted fora, the experience of bilateral talks between the Superpowers has shown that one cannot expect more than agreements for the management of the arms race, to accommodate their own interests at higher levels of destructive might and of technological inventiveness. Not a single system of existing weapons has ever been banned or scrapped under any agreement concluded between them or among the nuclear-weapon Powers as a whole. They have, on the contrary, displayed much activity and effort at ensuring that the power at their command remains forever off-limits to any nation outside their exclusive circle. This unholy alliance thrives in perpetual confrontation, each entrenched in its ever-growing capability of devastation but all equally bent on denying any other nation access to the summit of responsibility which their might bestowed upon them.

In such circumstances, as long as weapons that can destroy the whole world are credited with the maintenance of peace, and as long as a handful of nations claim the right to be the only ones responsible enough to hold the instruments of such destruction and to supervise such peace, no progress will be reached on matters of vital interest for all nations alike. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why the nuclear-weapon Powers will always find one argument or another to prevent this forum from discharging its duty on any issue related to nuclear problems.

A comprehensive test ban is already doomed to failure, since one Superpower, the United States, has now transformed it into an "ultimate goal", a convenient euphemism to avoid any constraints, for an indefinite period of time, upon its programmes of testing, developing and improving its nuclear arsenals. Besides, two other nuclear-weapon Powers, China and France, also abiding by the same doctrines, decided to ignore the universal clamour for a halt in atomic explosions for military purposes. It is worth mentioning, en passant, that nuclear-weapon testing accounts for the overwhelming majority of all explosions conducted since the inception of the nuclear age. The only tests ever relinquished have been those which were no longer needed.

The prevention of nuclear war, and all related matters, can hardly be seriously tackled if one simply takes into account that the adoption of concrete legal measures to prevent nuclear war would run counter to the professed doctrine of nuclear deterrence, that is, the capability and the stated willingness to wage nuclear war as the only way to prevent it. As a contemporary thinker has correctly observed, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which ultimately rests on making a threat credible, deters even the possibility of its own discussion.

A similar conclusion may be applied to the state of play on the item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, this once undiscovered country that may become soon a new launching pad for threat and destruction, still for the sake of upholding and strengthening deterrence.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Last, but certainly not least, the item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, our first and main goal, cannot even be touched upon, lest its mere discussion might disturb the unconstrained freedom to expand and improve existing nuclear arsenals.

At this point, it might not be out of order to recall some historical facts that could provide a better perspective of the doctrine under examination: the contention that weapons of mass destruction at the disposal of a few can prevent a world catastrophe that would engulf all. No less a personality than Alfred Nobel wrote in 1890, after the invention of dynamite, that "perhaps my factories will put an end to war even sooner than your congresses". He went on to state that "all war will stop short instantly" if war is made "as death-dealing to the civil population at home as to troops at the front".

Experience does not seem to warrant either the contention of deterrence or Alfred Nobel's well-intentioned hopes. In the history of wars never a weapon was spared, regardless of its destructive capability or the cruelty of its consequences. War did not cease to exist either. If we confine our recollection to the present century, two examples would suffice. Chemical weapons were employed by the major Powers involved in World War I as long as they were considered militarily useful; their use was discontinued in World War II not because of their cruel effects or out of moral considerations, but simply because of their self-defeating character. Likewise, in World War II, as soon as a nuclear bomb was available and there were military advantages to be gained from its use, no other consideration prevailed against it being actually dropped over population centres.

If the destructive or cruel effects of weapons have not proved to be sufficient deterrence to their actual use, what lessons can we learn from historical experience concerning the States that have today at their disposal the most destructive and cruellest of weapons, and which uphold security doctrines that contemplate their use? Again leaving aside the more remote past and confining ourselves to the twentieth century, experience and prospects are simply frightening.

In its nuclear expression, the doctrine of deterrence is not a new concept, but a modern variation of the policy embodied in the old Roman dictum: si vis pacem, para bellum. If you want peace, prepare for war. There is, however, one fundamental difference, that should be acknowledged without difficulty. The effects of the successive generations of conventional weapons, destructive and cruel as they might be, would be exhausted not too far away from the countries and peoples at which they were aimed.

The same, of course, cannot be said of the present generations of nuclear weapons, not to mention those still on the drawing boards of military engineers and scientists in the five nuclear-weapon States. Countries and peoples far away from the targeted objectives may become defenceless and innocent victims of their use. Indeed, as a recent study shows, above a certain level of detonated megatonnage the world as a whole might be the casualty of a nuclear conflagration. Those predictions have not been refuted by any of the advocates of the use of nuclear weapons as a means to deter war. The old Roman dictum has thus acquired

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

a new and sinister dimension which bears on military, political and ethical considerations. It might be paraphrased today as si vis vitam, para mortem. If you want to live, prepare for death.

To revert to historical fact, one should note that the States which possess such weapons and uphold such doctrines are the same ones that in the brief span of 31 years were engulfed in two world wars in which over 60 million people were killed and untold destruction was unleashed. Between those two wars national genocides were committed as a matter of policy in Western, Central and Eastern Europe, in the name of racial superiority or by compulsory ideology, as if civilization had turned back to its darkest ages. Furthermore, since the end of World War II not a single year has gone by without the eruption or continuation of some armed conflict elsewhere in the world, but always, or almost always, either with the direct participation of one or more of the nuclear-weapon Powers or by proxy. From the Far East to Central Asia, from the Middle East to Southern Africa, from Central to South America, we have witnessed in the past 39 years a constant display of naked force backed by the self-anointed guarantors of peace in our time.

Today, one might be even derided just for asking for strict compliance with the usual norms of international law as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations: juridical equality of States, territorial integrity, non-intervention, non-use or threat of use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes. Those legal rules seem to have been downgraded to rhetorical expressions sometimes useful for domestic consumption or international propaganda. The interests of the Superpowers have long outgrown their own boundaries or their geographic region, and now encompass the whole world which is reduced to the role of spectator and hostage of their confrontation. Support for the existence and continuity of this situation is referred to as "realism". One could not, however, be labelled as unrealistic by rejecting the prevailing structure of power and its theoretical foundations.

Past and present experience, as well as the dire prospect of the aggravation of the balance of terror, do not in any way warrant any assurance that a safer world will emerge because a handful of States acquired an unmatched superiority of power. As such historical experience clearly tells us, all States are subject, and some seem indeed prone, to make mistakes. If their mistakes are repeated to the same extent as in the all too recent past, the consequences will put in serious jeopardy not their own individual existence only, but the survival of every other nation as well.

Gone and seemingly forgotten are the days when a great statesman, over 40 years ago, dreamed of a post-war world in which all mankind would share four fundamental freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear. On three counts the promise of his dream has come partially true. There is considerable freedom of speech and religion in vast areas of the world, although in others they are still today being trampled upon and turned into a sad mockery. As for freedom from want, people in both East and West of the industrialized Northern hemisphere live comparatively free from material need, whilst most of the Southern half of the world sinks deeper in poverty and hunger. Technology and hopefully human solidarity may yet realize that fundamental freedom.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

But in the nuclear post-war world fear knows no boundaries. The lust for supremacy of power by a few has turned fear into a universal disease that infects all.

International relations based on fear can only lead to disaster. Let us hope that those responsible for this state of affairs will finally come to grips with reality and realign their ambitions with the fundamental aspirations of mankind, including their own peoples. Let us pray that their present statesmen will heed the lessons of the past and will seriously and responsibly address nuclear disarmament as the only path toward freeing the world from fear of its own extinction.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 249th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Bangladesh, Ambassador Morshed.

Mr. MORSHED (Bangladesh): Mr. President, the Bangladesh delegation would like to express through you our sincere thanks to the Conference on Disarmament for the opportunity to address it for the first time.

We deem it particularly auspicious that we should do so at a moment when the President is the representative of Sri Lanka, a close neighbour of Bangladesh to which we are bound by race and culture and shared history and values. My delegation would also like to acknowledge the proven skills, the dedication and the high sense of purpose that you bring to this important Presidency.

Permit me, Sir, also to pay our tribute to your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Ion Daciu of Romania, whose vast experience, broad sympathies and unfailing charm have made him a most valued colleague and whose brilliant handling of varied issues at hand have helped to steer the deliberations of the Conference in constructive and positive directions. His country has been an important contributor of economic and technical assistance to Bangladesh.

The first 13 years since our independence have been of necessity devoted to the task of national reconstruction and development. All our energies and resources have been turned to limiting our extreme vulnerability, inherent in our geographical situation to the effects of a fast-rising population and to meeting the growing demand for food. In many ways my country represents a social and economic limiting case. In a territory of 55,000 square miles is concentrated a population of 95 million people. This is easily the highest rural density of population anywhere in the world. Yet, from our very earliest days the Bangladesh people have shared the commitment of the Non-Aligned Movement, to which we belong, to the ideal of complete and general disarmament. Increasingly this area of international discourse and negotiation has become our central concern. The Government and the people of Bangladesh are determined to devote generously our existing resources in trained manpower, technical as well as diplomatic, to this field of endeavour in this unique multilateral negotiating body, in the General Assembly and in other fora including the Non-Aligned Conference, the Islamic Conference and the Commonwealth.

(Mr. Morshed, Bangladesh)

Several speakers in the present discussion have remarked on the present state of international relations -- the unrestrained arms race, wars in various regions of the world, hotbeds of international tension and the harsh global economic situation, marked by huge levels of unemployment and unutilized industrial capacity in the developed countries and escalating debt, stagnation and deepening misery in the poorest countries. These elements of the present situation both reflect and account for the degradation of the international climate, the palpable loss of trust and confidence and the ensuing breakdown and impasse in international multilateral as well as bilateral negotiations, especially in the field of disarmament.

In attempts to analyse the underlying causes of the present situation certain linkages suggest themselves and have indeed stimulated considerable debate and documentation. One of these linkages is that between disarmament and development which figures in the mandate of this Conference. The Honourable President of Bangladesh has already pointed out that the link between disarmament and development is based upon the theory of opportunity cost which itself is of undoubtedly modern origin. Our own experience suggests there are several other linkages, some well known and others perhaps unsuspected, which have yet to be fully investigated and whose relevance may, therefore, have been ignored. I refer for example, to the insidiously dreadful link between war and famine which is at least as old as human history.

In 1943 the people of Bangladesh glimpsed apocalypse. That was the year of the Great Bengal Famine which is authoritatively estimated as accounting for 3 million deaths. According to one authority the famine at its peak exacted 26,000 deaths a week, which must surely make it one of the most efficient killers of modern times.

There were many remarkable things about this famine. For instance, it was acknowledged on all sides that the famine was related to the war situation even though the area of its occurrence was not in the immediate vicinity of a theatre of operations. Another feature was that the famine was, in the vivid phrase of Professor A.K. Sen, "a boom famine". It occurred amidst historically high foodstocks.

The "excess rate of mortality" continued well after the peak in December 1943 which suggests parallels with the projected mortality rates and patterns of certain modern weapons of mass destruction. In 1943, in short, for the people of Bangladesh famine was war fought by other means. We believe therefore that a study of the relationship between war and famine may yet yield important insights for the programme of general and complete disarmament.

In 1967 the great scientist Professor Abdus Salam, Nobel Laureate in physics, issued a memorable warning. He warned against falling into what he called the "technological trap". My delegation respectfully believes that Professor Salam's warning, though voiced in a totally different context, continues to be of profound relevance, especially for disarmament negotiations today. There

(Mr. Morshed, Bangladesh)

is a tendency to believe that certain modern weapon systems are so awesome in their potential for annihilation that their very existence invalidates the living stock of human experience since nothing in that experience corresponds to the paradigm of ultimate destruction. In our view this is an apt example of the "technological trap". Disarmament negotiations are conducted by men for whom the available stock of living human experience remains the primary source of reference and of inspiration. To this stock of human experience countries small or great, militarily significant or militarily negligible, have something to contribute. It is in this sense that we understand the words of the Final Document where it says that disarmament is of universal interest, and later that all States have a right to participate in disarmament negotiations; and it is for this reason that Bangladesh believes that our own historical experience may be of some relevance.

In 1979 Bangladesh acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We did so in the conviction that this Treaty was one of the momentous steps forward in the field of disarmament and in the search of the international community for an adequate system of security. Bangladesh will actively participate in the Third Review Conference to be held in 1985 because we believe that the non-proliferation regime of the Treaty continues to be viable and contains elements of growth and vitality. It is also one of those areas where militarily negligible States have been able to make a significant contribution. Indeed, it is perhaps remarkable that of the over 100 States Parties to the NPT about half may be described as militarily negligible, including my own.

Bangladesh has consistently supported, with many other like-minded developing countries, the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In our view this constitutes one of the highest priorities of an eventual comprehensive programme of disarmament. It would, we believe, lead to the eventual freeze in the production, research and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. In our opinion the twin principles of verification and access have a key significance in this field. Naturally, we welcome the submission this week of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts. It is our hope that an early implementation of the recommendations of this Ad Hoc Group will contribute positively to the development of a global seismological verification system which is of paramount importance for the conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty itself.

Bangladesh has always believed that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction should constitute one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. We therefore feel encouraged by the positive efforts which have been undertaken in this Conference for the conclusion of a comprehensive Convention on Chemical Weapons. The time and atmosphere may have never been so opportune as it is now to achieve major breakthroughs in this particular field. Only recently the President of the United States of America declared that his country would be submitting a draft treaty on chemical weapons to this Conference. The distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan, for his part declared on 21 February 1984 before this august body the intention of his country



(Mr. Morshed, Bangladesh)

to permit the permanent presence of international controllers at sites for the destruction of chemical weapons. We welcome these positive developments and hope that they will lead to an early agreement.

Another disarmament issue which is of particular urgency is the prevention of an arms race in newer horizons namely, the extension and the escalation of the arms race in outer space. We believe that all attempts to use outer space for military purposes should be halted immediately and outer space declared to remain as the common heritage of mankind to be used only for peaceful purposes.

Bangladesh has also actively supported the creation of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. We have shown an active interest in the creation in the Indian Ocean of a zone of peace, and hope that we shall ultimately be able to attain this goal with the co-operation of all concerned, including the co-operation of all littoral States — big or small. In our own region we have also been making relentless efforts to promote peace and stability through the creation of a climate of trust, understanding and co-operation. Bangladesh has made a specific initial contribution to the creation of the South Asian Regional Forum, which has made significant and concrete progress against all expectations.

Mr. President, permit me to conclude my statement by reiterating our conviction that all States and all people in the world have a common stake in the preservation of peace and a common responsibility to promote the cause of peace through contributing positively to the process of disarmament. We for our part are wholly committed to discharging our share of this responsibility both here in this forum and elsewhere. We shall not fail to continue, as in the past, to offer all our assistance in this regard which will be of service to the collective effort of the international community to attain peace through mutual co-operation and negotiation and through the elaboration and implementation of effective disarmament measures.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bangladesh for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President. It is with great pleasure that I take the floor under your Presidency of our Conference. For myself and my delegation, I congratulate you and extend our best wishes. In keeping with the warm and friendly relations between our two countries, the United States delegation looks forward to continuing our work under your guidance for constructive progress in the discharge of the important tasks of the Conference.

I wish, through you, to salute your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Ion Datcu of Romania, and give him a hearty "Well done".

In my statement today, I wish to address the subject of item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

My delegation fully realizes the important uses of outer space. There are many peaceful uses which enrich mankind. These include: the exploration of neighbouring planets in our solar system, the establishment of reliable and economic world-wide communications, the prediction of weather, the accurate mapping of the earth's surface, and the discovery of the keys to unlock the mysteries of the earth's past and to help to predict its future. I have only mentioned a few of the benefits that mankind's efforts in space offer us. My country has, I am proud to say, contributed much in these and other peaceful endeavours in space. Furthermore, we recognize that other countries, including the Soviet Union, have also made significant contributions in these fields.

We likewise recognize that there is another side to man's use of outer space and it is clearly ambiguous. The same satellites that provide military intelligence information provide an important means of ensuring that parties comply with provisions of arms control agreements. Early-warning satellites contribute to international stability by making a surprise attack, nuclear or conventional, a more difficult and risky undertaking. Navigational satellites can assist both naval and civil maritime vessels. Finally, the same communication satellites used for the command and control of military forces for combat are of equal, or even greater, importance in crisis control to prevent war. It is this duality which often confuses our efforts to understand this extremely complex subject.

The United States is a party to the Outer Space Treaty which bans weapons of mass destruction from outer space and limits the use of celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes. We are also a party to the Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and, in fact, unlike the Soviet Union, chose not to continue to exercise the provision in that treaty allowing limited anti-ballistic missile system deployments. Long and tireless United States efforts to negotiate these agreements are historical evidence of my country's commitment to the principle of using outer space in ways that promote peace and international stability. We appreciate and value the contributions to security which they represent.

My delegation indicated over a year ago our willingness to consider the vast range of issues dealing with the "prevention of an arms race in outer space" and to that end co-sponsored document CD/413 which called for the identification, through substantive examination, of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In so doing, the proposed mandate specifies that the Ad hoc Subsidiary Body should take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

We therefore reject the assertion that we have held up significant work in this Conference on the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. The Conference's work has been held up by those who persistently strive to impose preconditions on our discussions. They believe the cart should be put before the horse. We can hardly talk about negotiations before we have a clear idea of the issues involved. My delegation was prepared a year ago, and continues to be prepared, to consider these issues in detail in an ad hoc committee. While I agree with those who seek a proper examination of these issues, appeals for immediate action, based on the notion that technology will soon pass us by, are not shared by my delegation. We simply do not see the logic in establishing an ad hoc committee which would not begin at the beginning in order to define clearly possible areas of negotiation.

On 22 March, my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, addressed this Conference on the subject of the spread of the arms race to outer space. The inconsistency on which his statement was premised is apparent and it is unnecessary to dwell upon it; however, I am concerned that some misperceptions could still remain, based on the exaggeration and distortions in that statement. For this reason, I feel it is necessary to set the record straight.

First, let me discuss the Soviet announcement of a unilateral moratorium on the launching of anti-satellite weapons. I think it is instructive to note that neither Ambassador Issraelyan nor any other Soviet official has yet acknowledged the existence of the operational Soviet orbital anti-satellite interceptor system. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has tested this weapon system over a dozen years. It is, and has been for over a decade, the world's only operational ASAT weapon system. In addition, this very system was tested in June 1982 in conjunction with a major exercise of Soviet nuclear forces, a co-ordinated test that military experts judge to have important strategic implications. Now, having established this military advantage in space, for the Soviet Union to propose a moratorium on testing of such systems strikes my delegation as monumental cynicism. The announcement was made practically on the eve of my country's first test of a system designed eventually to counterbalance this long-held Soviet advantage. The Soviet Union also proposes to eliminate existing ASAT systems. But the draft treaty text deals in generalities with the enormous verification problems involved in such agreement. The draft treaty provides for an unspecified combination of national and international verification measures as well as some undefined "additional measures" to be employed to solve these problems. The Soviet objective here is clear and not without precedent. Their objective is to preserve unchallenged a unilateral Soviet strategic capability in outer space.

I would like to call your attention to another case that brings into question Soviet intentions in outer space. I refer to the Soviet ocean surveillance satellites designed to provide targeting data for the attack of naval ships and maritime vessels. Their existence is well known since two of these nuclear-powered satellites caused world-wide alerts during their break-up and re-entries to the earth in 1978 and 1983. On one of those occasions considerable nuclear residue was spread on the territory of a nation represented in this body today.

These are two examples of Soviet deeds that are widely known and certainly at variance with the Soviet Union's exaggerated claims to a commitment to the preservation of outer space for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Mr. President, before closing, allow me to note Ambassador Issraelyan's considerable use of the free press of the United States as a source for criticism of my Government. He obviously places significant trust in the accuracy of opinions expressed in that medium. As we are all aware, a genuinely free press offers many views, often conflicting, in order for the reader to assemble the facts, assess the arguments and decide for himself. In this spirit, I want to offer additional material from a United States publication for the consideration of the representatives here. The following paragraphs are from a 1982 New York Times magazine article written on the 25th anniversary of the Soviet launching of Sputnik I which marked the debut of the Soviet Union's satellites into outer space:

"Last year alone, despite severe problems in its domestic industry and agriculture, the Soviet Union devoted an estimated \$18 billion to its space programme. In proportion to the size of the Soviet economy, that is five times the size of NASA's current budget. In absolute terms, the Soviet budget is three times the size of NASA's and about 30 per cent more than the combined space budgets of NASA and the Department of Defense."

"The United States last year launched a total of 18 satellites, the Soviet Union put a staggering 125 satellites into orbit. What do the Russians do with all of these satellites? Sixty-nine per cent are designed for military purposes, in the last two or three years, Moscow has launched 10 times as many military satellites as Washington."

"By undertaking a massive military space programme designed to gain control of space, Moscow is attempting to shift the balance of power substantially in its favor."

"How much significance should be attached to Russian space stations? Military uses of these stations are certainly a part of Soviet planning. Two of the seven Salyuts launched thus far have been singled out by the Russians themselves as military, and observers of the Soviet programme believe that others may be also."

These, Mr. President, are the opinions voiced in the New York Times in 1982.

There are numerous other articles along similar lines. Taken together they present a far different picture of Soviet intentions in space than what some would have us believe. We long for the day when we might see an article in Izvestiya by some prominent Soviet citizen criticizing the official line on the Soviet space programmes. We long for the day when everyone in the Soviet Union will have the ability, right and responsibility to judge the Soviet Government by their actions as well as by their noble-sounding calls for peace.

My purpose today has been to provide a different perspective from that portrayed by my distinguished Soviet colleague on 22 March. I leave it to our colleagues in this chamber to decide if his criticism of my country's actions is well founded, and if on the other hand his country has pursued only peaceful and humanitarian goals in outer space.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Since my mission today is to "set the record straight", I cannot let this opportunity pass without pointing out, through you, to the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia that the United States has not and does not produce chemical weapons, binary or otherwise; furthermore, we hope that we shall not be compelled to produce such weapons. The issue is to a significant degree in our hands here in the Conference on Disarmament.

When President Reagan proposed to the Congress the chemical modernization programme, he advised the Congress that he took this action only to redress a dangerous imbalance in chemical weapons which had taken place in the years since 1969 -- when President Nixon ordered the end of United States production of chemical weapons. Regrettably, the Soviet Union did not reciprocate this unilateral gesture, and we are now faced with the need to correct the gross imbalance in this category of weapons. The President took the action also in his words "to provide an incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate in good faith on a complete and verifiable ban on such weapons".

Thus, if we are successful here in a timely fashion in producing a verifiable ban on these odious weapons, there will be no binary weapons in the future!

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, today the Soviet delegation takes the floor in order to submit an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/497, distributed at our request, which contains the answers of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Konstantin Chernenko, to questions by the newspaper "Pravda", published in the Soviet press on 9 April 1984.

These answers touch upon the whole range of the most acute problems of the present-day international relations. They clearly lay down the position of the USSR on the basic problems of arms-race limitation and disarmament, including those which are on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

In particular, K.U. Chernenko recalled that it is not the first year that the Soviet Union is pressing for an accord directed at preventing the arms race from spreading to outer space. The USSR is constantly raising this question before the leadership of the United States. It is doing so because the Soviet Union clearly realizes the formidable consequences that the militarization of outer space would have.

"But meantime", Comrade K.U. Chernenko pointed out, "the American President officially informed the United States Congress a few days ago that the Government is starting the fulfilment of a broad programme of the arms race in outer space and has no intention of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on preventing the militarization of space supposedly because of the difficulties of verification".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This lack of any desire on the part of the United States to achieve an agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space is well known to the members of the Conference on Disarmament, where the United States thwarts the negotiations on this item. As Comrade K.U. Chernenko pointed out, the United States "is expressing readiness to talk with the sole aim of agreeing that accord on this issue is impossible". Different manoeuvres here in Geneva, as evidenced specifically by today's statement by the representative of the United States, are designed to impose upon the Conference's subsidiary body on the prevention of the arms race in outer space a mandate which would be confined to a fruitless examination of the existing norms of international law concerning the use of outer space.

Let us take another issue -- the prohibition of chemical weapons. It was already in 1972 that the USSR and other socialist countries proposed in the Disarmament Committee the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. It was also then that they submitted a draft of such a convention.

Subsequently the USSR returned to this matter more than once, specifying its proposals. But all these years the United States impeded the conclusion of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons, suspended in 1980 the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations, which as is well known to the members of the Conference produced many positive results.

In the answers of Comrade K.U. Chernenko, an important place is attributed to the questions relating to the state of bilateral Soviet-United States relations.

In this connection the Soviet leader pointed out that in spite of the fact that peace-loving rhetoric is sometimes heard from Washington it is impossible, now ever hard one tries, to discern behind it any signs whatsoever of readiness to back up these words with practical deeds; in other words, the introduction of new words does not mean a new policy.

The actions of the United States, stressed Comrade K.U. Chernenko, "do not tally in any way with the task of ending the arms race. And it is not at all by chance that the United States has deliberately frustrated the very process of limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and torpedoed the talks both on strategic arms and on nuclear arms in Europe".

Referring to the necessity for people to stop living in a state of constant fear for the world, Comrade K.U. Chernenko pointed out that first of all it is necessary for the policy of States, especially States possessing nuclear weapons, to be oriented at eliminating the danger of war, and at consolidating peace.

Along with the solution of the other major problems mentioned above, we are convinced that a resolute turn for the better in the world would have been facilitated by an undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear arms and also on the quantitative and qualitative freezing of nuclear arsenals.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It is extremely important in general that certain norms, directed towards aims of peace, shall be introduced in relations between States possessing nuclear arms. The position of the USSR and other socialist countries on these issues is laid down in detail in documents CD/444 and CD/484.

The task of creating an atmosphere of trust in international relations is an urgent one. This requires a responsible and balanced policy on the part of all States and also the adoption of relevant practical measures leading in this direction.

"The Soviet Union", Comrade K.U. Chernenko stressed, "is prepared to co-operate with all States in the attainment of these aims." Efforts should be directed first of all at stopping and reversing the arms race. It is time to move from generalities about the usefulness of talks to eliminating the serious obstacles that have been erected in the way of the limitation and reduction of armaments, the development of trust and mutually advantageous co-operation.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that the answers of Comrade K.U. Chernenko will be carefully studied by the delegations represented at the Conference.

With regard to the remarks contained in the statement of the representative of the United States at today's meeting, we would like to point out that they constitute yet another attempt to camouflage the United States unwillingness to negotiate on the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. However, we wish to comment on some points of that statement.

The representative of the United States attempted to demonstrate that the Soviet Union has an alleged superiority in anti-satellite weapons and that supposedly that is why the USSR is proposing the introduction of a moratorium on such weapons. As we may see, the method is the same as the one the United States uses in refusing, for instance, a freeze on nuclear weapons or a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing: the method of asserting the existence of a so-called "Soviet superiority".

The question must be asked, however, does the Soviet Union in fact have a so-called anti-satellite superiority? No, it does not. In the 1960s the United States already began testing such weapon systems. This idea began to be carried into practice 20 years ago with the development of the manoeuvrable SAINT (Satellite Inspector Technique) spacecraft. In the 1960s, two ground-based anti-satellite systems were developed: in 1963, on Kwajalein Island, in one of the Micronesian atolls, on the basis of Niki-Zeus anti-missile missiles, and in 1964 on Johnston Island using various modifications of the Thor missile. Currently, an airborne ASAT anti-satellite system based on the F-15 fighter is being completed. It is planned to establish two squadrons of F-15 jets equipped with interceptor missiles with self-guided warheads.

Or there is a very recent fact: the United States has just used the space Shuttle to remove an Earth satellite from its orbit. That is a fact. On this occasion it was done, we are told, for peaceful purposes. But who can guarantee that the United States will not do the same for military purposes at a convenient moment? As is well known, the Soviet Union has never done anything of the kind. Who then can be said to have the superiority in the development of anti-satellite systems? Ambassador Fields tried to create the impression that the Soviet Union

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

is in favour of an arms race in outer space, and quoted an article from the New York Times magazine concerning the 25th anniversary of the launching of the first Sputnik into space. To reciprocate, so to speak, I shall quote from the Soviet press, likewise from an article on the 25th anniversary of the launching of the Soviet Sputnik into space, and answering the question of the Soviet Union's purposes in space: "The Soviet Union, which 25 years ago opened the era of the peaceful use of outer space, today remains true to its position. This is illustrated by the successful activity of the Soviet section of the international COSMOS-SARSAT system for searching for ships or aircrafts which have suffered accidents. With the help of 'satellite rescue', as many United States sources call our 'COSMOS 1383', a number of aircraft which have been involved in accidents have already been found. The flights of the Soviet automatic spacecraft 'Venus-13' and 'Venus-14' which set off for that distant, entirely mysterious planet over a year ago, are of great usefulness for Earth sciences. Using Soviet, French and Austrian devices mounted on those spacecraft, the study of the atmosphere and surface of Venus is continuing, and they have carried experiments to study interplanetary space." Soviet experiments in outer space are widely used for peaceful purposes, and redound to the benefit of mankind. Clear evidence of this is provided by the large number of joint flights between Soviet cosmonauts and cosmonauts of other countries. And I am glad today to express our gratification that yesterday a joint flight of Soviet cosmonauts and an Indian cosmonaut came to an end; it had exclusively peaceful purposes, needless to say, as in the case of previous flights.

Another question may be raised: what is the position of the United States on the issue of outer space? Is the United States trying to achieve equality, so to speak, in this field or not? To this question we must answer with a clear negative: this is not what the United States is trying to do. They are trying to extend the arms race into outer space, to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union in this field too. And although my colleague, Ambassador Fields, clearly does not like it when I quote from the American newspapers, I cannot help quoting a very interesting article, which I recommend everyone to read carefully, that appeared in today's International Herald Tribune. The author is Peter Clausen. Allow me to read out a few extracts in the original:

[Speaking in English]: "Hiding behind dubious arguments about verification, the Reagan Administration refuses to negotiate with the Soviet Union to restrain anti-satellite weapons. In January, the US Air Force began testing an anti-satellite weapon which could wreck hopes of controlling these weapons. Meanwhile, the United States is pressing ahead with the President's star wars programme - an implausible quest for weapons to shield the American people from nuclear attack by intercepting Soviet missiles in flight. These ill-advised policies foreshadow a new space race at great peril to US security".

I quote from further on in the article: "Why then does the Administration shun negotiations?" asks the author of the article. And he replies: "For two reasons. The first is straightforward, if shortsighted: the Administration wants the option of attacking Soviet satellites, even if the price is to forfeit any restrictions on Soviet anti-satellite weapons. The second reason is the 'Star Wars' connection. Development and testing of the weapon offers technological stepping stones to missile defence systems operating in space".



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

And finally, the author draws the following conclusion:

"To prevent a new arms race in space, the United States must shift course. It must suspend testing of anti-satellite weapons and start negotiations to halt the further development of them, and give up the costly, futile and dangerous pursuit of 'Star Wars' missile defences".

[Speaking in Russian] I share the views of the author of this article, and should like to point out that whether Ambassador Fields wished it or not, today he has been drawn into a discussion of the draft Soviet treaty on the non-use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. This is merely an illustration of the fact that both the Soviet draft and the issue itself are of crucial topicality, and that the draft may be the basis of negotiations.

I should like to point out here that many other delegations have publicly, at the meetings of the Conference, and in talks with us put forward their remarks, observations and even amendments concerning the Soviet draft. Surely all this indicates that the time has come for negotiation: tomorrow may be too late.

Finally, I cannot pass over in silence something to which I have heard references too often: I mean the so-called "free press". I read this "free press", which every day throws mud at my country, my Motherland, my people; the "free press", in which a good word is rarely found for the Soviet Union. No one should wait for the day when Izvestiya would publish articles criticizing the position of the Soviet Government on the issue that outer space should be peaceful. That will not happen. The Soviet people wants outer space to be peaceful, and only articles to that effect appear in Izvestiya. But to have a correct perception of the Soviet press, I would strongly urge you, including my colleague from the United States, to read that press better. If you did so, you would know that it contains a considerable amount of critical material concerning various aspects of the life and activities of the Soviet people. The Soviet people is a self-critical people; and our press is self-critical. But to publish articles and reports which run counter to the spirit of the people, which has suffered from war, which abhors war, to publish articles which are at variance with the feelings of other peoples, which also call for a peaceful outer space, for a freeze, for a moratorium -- demands shared by the American people and by all the peoples of the earth -- that is something the Soviet press will not do.

I apologise, Mr. President, for having had to dwell on this question. It is one often raised in this Conference. As you know, the Soviet delegation endeavours not to involve in the Conference's work issues which are not concerned with disarmament. I believe, however, that my colleagues will understand me. From time to time unjustified and gratuitous reproaches have been addressed to the Soviet people and its press at this Conference. I considered it my duty to reply to them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement.

The time is almost 1 p.m. and we have not concluded our list of speakers. I am informed that the duration of the statement of the next speaker will be approximately half an hour. Bearing in mind our intention to convene an informal meeting to consider organizational questions, I propose to suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it at precisely 3 p.m. in the afternoon. The first speaker will be the representative of Senegal, Mr. Sy.

If I hear no objection, the plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 249th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Senegal, Mr. Sy.

Mr. SY (Senegal) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to extend to you my warmest congratulations on your becoming President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. My delegation is very happy to see you presiding over the Conference, since your country is one of the pioneers of the movement of non-aligned countries and as such has made a valuable contribution to the cause of peace, independence and equality of all States. You yourself, Mr. President, have demonstrated wisdom, skill and efficiency in the conduct of the work of the Conference.

Allow me also, Mr. President, to thank Ambassador Datcu of Romania for the masterly and competent manner in which he guided the work of the Conference during the month of March.

Mr. President, I should also like to express my gratitude to the delegations that were good enough to authorize the participation of my delegation in the work of the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

In deciding to take the floor in the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, my delegation wishes primarily to express its concern at the dangerous situation into which the world is being increasingly drawn.

Since the world entered the nuclear age 40 years ago, the spectre of self-destruction and of a final holocaust has remained ever present. The nuclear age has taken on the countenance of nuclear terror. As Orwell, the British writer, had foreseen, in the name of peace, the most destructive weapons are being constructed and, in the name of security, the lives of billions of people are being held hostage. Finally, in the name of the preservation of the right to life some \$800 billion are being swallowed up in the building of armaments stockpiles, while billions of persons are slowly wasting away because of poverty, malnutrition and famine.

While we are assured that nuclear weapons have helped to preserve the peace, we can only note that since 1945, the peoples of the South have experienced hundreds of armed conflicts, including colonial wars, wars by proxy and foreign occupation.

As to the peoples of the North, who generally belong to the developed countries, their enjoyment of the benefits of their economic prosperity is spoiled by the anguish of a sudden catastrophe.

That international situation, so uncertain, so fraught with threats, has suddenly become more serious today.

The period of détente between the Superpowers, which had proved to be full of promise, is now giving way to confrontation.

The arms race, which seemed to have slowed somewhat with the agreements on strategic weapons, is taking off again and being extended to outer space.

(Mr. Sy, Senegal)

Strategic doctrines are evolving towards the acceptance of the use of nuclear weapons. The disarmament negotiations have for the most part come to a standstill.

Lastly, the use of force in international relations is not only increasing but is taking place openly, without disguise. In some regions of the world, as in the southern part of Africa, racist and colonial regimes are in the process of acquiring nuclear weapons, thereby threatening the security of all African States.

That combination of situations and factors is leading mankind down the dangerous slope of a general conflagration.

That is why it is now important for measures to be taken urgently to halt the nuclear-arms race, to avert the danger of a nuclear war and to strengthen international peace and security.

If there is now an objective which should be pursued unceasingly and receive all our attention and all our efforts, it is indeed the halting of the nuclear-weapons race. It is something which is aggravating international tension, swallowing up vast material and human resources and is constantly calling into question nuclear deterrence, doctrines and measures. Such doctrines and policies, on which the nuclear-weapons build-up is based, are frequently justified by their alleged positive effect on international peace and security.

The old saying that he who wishes peace should prepare for war would thus be confirmed.

However, in listening to the many complaints by the Superpowers of the loss of parity or the strategic advantage of the adversary in a particular weapons category, one cannot help thinking that the arms race has destabilizing effects on the balance of power and that the nuclear deterrent is fundamentally precarious.

Therefore, how is it possible to be sure that such an unstable weapons build-up will always maintain the balance of power and guarantee the non-use of nuclear weapons?

And how can one help thinking that the nuclear deterrent, unlike the conventional means of deterrence, claims an unduly high price for the stability that it claims to give us?

In fact, everything indicates that it has the result of holding hostage the lives of millions of persons in order to preserve the security of a few States.

That is an option which is morally unacceptable and politically dangerous, since the slightest armed conflict can lead to a nuclear war and the annihilation of all life on Earth.

It is because we believe that there can be no stability as long as the nuclear-arms race continues that we consider that the international community cannot rely solely on the nuclear deterrent to ensure the security of all.

(Mr. Sy, Senegal)

In this regard, strengthening the system of collective security provided for by the Charter of the United Nations would be of considerable importance. The current deterioration in international relations is due, among other things, to the fact that the world is witnessing an increased use of force, particularly against the developing countries, but also because détente has been confined to one geographical region and has not been extended to the rest of the planet.

Thus, the process of the relaxation of international tension which was envisaged by the Superpowers and which was to accompany and stimulate arms limitation has proved to be fragile and inadequate. It has demonstrated the limits of bilateralism and shown that security is the business of all and requires the active contribution of all.

It is with these elements in mind that my delegation supports the position of the Group of 21 that multilateral negotiations on the halting of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament through the adoption of concrete measures are urgently required. In this regard, the States possessing the greatest nuclear arsenals have a very special responsibility and should facilitate the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the matter.

My delegation considers that the prevention of nuclear war is an urgent issue, although it recognizes that it is a highly complex one.

It depends to a large extent on an agreement concerning the identification of the potential causes of a nuclear conflict. In that regard, attention is focused primarily on the increasing tension between Superpowers, which gives rise to great concern.

This tension carries the risk of a slide into a nuclear conflict, a risk which has proved to be so great that various proposals have been made to promote the freeze on nuclear arsenals and the non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

My delegation endorses those proposals and considers that they can serve as a useful point of departure for negotiations aimed at reducing the danger of nuclear war.

However, the risk of nuclear war cannot be limited to the deterioration in relations between the Superpowers. Quite the contrary, my delegation considers that it is also necessary to bear in mind the case of countries such as South Africa which have acquired the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons and which refuse to renounce in a clear and verifiable manner the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The risk of the use of nuclear weapons in southern Africa is all the more probable since the Pretoria regime is pursuing a policy of enslaving non-whites which can only meet with resistance and stir up violence. The policy of apartheid is a form of violence and can only give rise to violence. So long as a minority of people of European origin deprives the African majority of its fundamental human rights, there can be no hope of a stabilization of the situation, whatever the efforts made by the apartheid regime to conceal its hideous face.

(Mr. Sy, Senegal)

It is because the situation in southern Africa remains one of conflict and because one of the parties is trying to acquire nuclear weapons that we believe that this question should be considered in the event that a working group on the prevention of nuclear war was established. We believe that among other measures all efforts should be made to bring South Africa to submit all its nuclear facilities to the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

My delegation wishes to join its voice to those which have expressed concern at the tendency to extend the arms race to outer space.

Until quite recently, space had been relatively spared by the arms race. There had been reason to be optimistic in that regard, since a set of agreements and treaties, both multilateral and bilateral, had made it possible to curb its militarization or the introduction of weapons of mass destruction. For example, the Outer Space Treaty, the partial nuclear-test ban treaty and the 1979 Treaty relating to the Moon are the most prominent examples in that regard. Similarly, the agreements concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union within the framework of the limitation of strategic weapons and the prevention of a nuclear war have played a positive and stabilizing role in that sphere.

Those agreements augur well for the possibility of space activities for the good and in the interest of all countries, whatever their stage of economic and social development.

Unfortunately, those positive factors are now threatened by certain advances in military space technology, particularly by the development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons and particle-beam weapons.

Outer space is thus becoming an area of military preparations with every passing day. Plans and programmes and considerable resources are being devoted to the development and deployment of weapons systems in outer space and from space against the Earth.

The immediate effect of anti-satellite weapons and other particle-beam weapons is to spur on the arms race, to increase international tension and to threaten the security of all countries in the world. As if land and sea were not sufficiently encumbered by dangerous weapons, the threat from outer space is now to be held over the heads of the peoples of the Earth.

They can only watch, in impotent anxiety, the ineluctable process of the deployment of anti-satellite and anti-missile weapons, soon followed by anti-anti-satellites and anti-anti-missile weapons, until the day when this dangerous escalation escapes the control of its creators and ends in the dreaded catastrophe.

The new space weapons are undermining the policy of deterrence of the Superpowers, since by making possible the destruction of their advanced warning systems, they thereby make possible a first strike. Who can say what temptations can arise in such a situation.

(Mr. Sy, Senegal)

However, the new weapons are not confined to undermining the system of mutual deterrence so carefully developed by the Superpowers. Those weapons circumvent some weapons control agreements, in particular the 1972 anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty.

Once again the dynamics of the quantitative arms race and technical progress has overcome policies aimed at the limitation of weapons. It is because these developments promise nothing positive that many delegations both at the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly have expressed their concern and requested that measures should be taken to halt this danger.

In this regard, it must be noted that the General Assembly adopted by a very large majority a resolution whereby it expressed its conviction of the need to take further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. It therefore requested the Committee on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc working group on the question at the beginning of its 1984 session with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.

Such a recommendation, which my delegation entirely endorses, should be implemented as rapidly as possible by the Conference on Disarmament.

Unfortunately, it seems that in spite of the proposals submitted with a view to undertaking negotiations on the prevention of the arms race in outer space, the Conference has not yet reached a satisfactory solution. Nevertheless, in view of the urgency of the question, prompt action is necessary.

As the history of the talks on nuclear weapons limitation has shown, it is easier to prevent the introduction of new weapons than to eliminate those already existing. Time is pressing, and my delegation hopes that the Conference will not let slip this opportunity, an opportunity which might not recur.

Turning now to the question of the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and utilization of all chemical weapons, my delegation wishes to recall that the General Assembly stated in 1978, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, that the matter concerned one of the most urgent tasks of the multilateral negotiations.

That position is all the more justified since vast stocks of chemical weapons exist throughout the world. Moreover, no one has forgotten that chemical weapons were used during the First World War and caused about 1,300,000 victims. At present, owing to scientific and technological advances, chemical agents have become so toxic that they would cause many more victims.

It was in order to prevent the frightful devastation caused by the use of chemical weapons that, in 1925, nations adopted the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. However, because that Protocol left aside the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons, it does not constitute an adequate barrier to halt the arms race in this field.

Chemical weapons have the particular characteristic, unlike nuclear weapons, of being relatively inexpensive and technologically less sophisticated. As a result, any country can acquire such weapons, a fact which considerably increases the opportunity for their use.

(Mr. Sy, Senegal)

Recent reports on the utilization of chemical weapons in some parts of the world shed light on this danger and should persuade this Conference to conclude without delay its negotiations relating to a convention on the prohibition and elimination of all chemical weapons.

In this regard, at its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly expressed its regret that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction had not yet been elaborated and urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify during its session in 1984 the negotiations on such a convention.

In that connection, my delegation has noted with pleasure the decision of the Conference to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

My delegation has also welcomed with satisfaction the announcement that the United States will submit a draft treaty on chemical weapons during the 1984 session of the Conference. Similarly, my delegation has taken note with pleasure of the announcement made on 21 January 1983 by the Head of the Soviet delegation that his country is now prepared to authorize on-site inspections to verify the destruction of chemical weapons within its territory.

Such proposals, together with those made by the United Kingdom, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, China and France, constitute valuable contributions to the elaboration of the convention.

Moreover, as Mr. Ekéus, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, has stressed, some progress has been made, particularly with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons and its verification.

Of course, difficulties remain, but my delegation considers that with sufficient political will, they can be overcome.

The adoption of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction would constitute an important disarmament measure, the first since the 1972 Convention relating to bacteriological weapons. This can have only positive effects on the current international atmosphere of tension, confrontation and deadlock in the disarmament negotiations.

It would also help to safeguard the lives of many people, particularly those in the Third World. There is no need to stress that since 1945, the Third World seems to have become the preferred area for the use of chemical weapons.

The negotiations carried out within this body on the prohibition of chemical weapons have given rise to great hopes. Their success would contribute considerably to accelerating the disarmament process and to increasing the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament. It is to be hoped that they will achieve the results expected by all peace-loving peoples.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Senegal for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President. My delegation is pleased to see you guiding our deliberations. As I said last month in the Group of 21, where you were acting as co-ordinator, you demonstrated truly extraordinary skill and exemplary equanimity and objectivity.

My congratulations are also addressed to Ambassador Datcu, who preceded you as President of our Conference and did his utmost to advance our work during the month of March.

I did not intend to take the floor today. However, the statements which were made this morning, particularly two of them, showed that this session, even though it has dealt with many questions, will enter the annals of the Conference as a session devoted mainly to the question of the prevention of the arms race in outer space. This is a question to which my delegation attaches special importance. Moreover, time is passing inexorably and quite soon the Conference will, I believe, have to take a decision concerning the establishment and mandate of an ad hoc committee. At that time, Mr. President, as has already happened in the case of the proposal for an ad hoc committee on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests, it would be appropriate if, unfortunately, it was not possible to set up an ad hoc committee this year and to give it a suitable mandate, it would be appropriate, I repeat, for the records of the Conference to indicate clearly who bears the responsibility. It is for that reason that since I have to date referred to this matter on only one occasion, in the statement I made at the opening meeting this year on 7 February, and I did so then only in a small part of my statement since I had to deal with various subjects, I thought it appropriate to begin to correct this lack of relevant or pertinent information in formal plenary meetings. I say this because it is clear that in informal meetings consisting of four or five or even more participants my delegation has already taken the opportunity to state its position more fully. However, I repeat, I believe that, as I have frequently said, spoken words fly away and it is the written word that remains, according to an old Latin proverb. That is why, at today's meeting, I should like to stress what I said in passing at the opening meeting, namely, that we are not going to deal with this matter as if nothing had happened during the last Assembly. Something very significant occurred at the last Assembly: there was a resolution which obtained the greatest number of votes of all resolutions concerned with disarmament: 147 votes in favour and only 1 against. That resolution was not the result of improvisation, as I also said at the opening meeting and I shall repeat now; it was the outcome of laborious and patient negotiations in which two delegations had to play a primary role: yours, Mr. President, and the delegation of Egypt. There were on that occasion three draft resolutions, one submitted by Mongolia, another by a group of Western European States, and the third was the draft of the Group of 21. Following those laborious negotiations, the co-sponsors of the first two draft resolutions did not press their texts and withdrew them. Then the Assembly adopted, by that truly extraordinary vote, the resolution bearing the number 38/70.

All those who are interested in the question will be able to consult the full text of this resolution in the document which the Secretary-General transmits to us every year and which contains, in an annex to his letter, all the texts of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly on disarmament matters. This document is CD/428. Nevertheless, in order that those who may not wish to take the trouble to consult this document can find in the record of today's meeting the main provisions of resolution 38/70, I shall take the liberty of reading them out now.



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In the second preambular paragraph, the Assembly recognized "the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes".

In the fourth preambular paragraph, it reaffirmed the will of all States "that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be exclusively for peaceful purposes".

In the sixth preambular paragraph, the Assembly reaffirmed, in particular, article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which stipulated that "States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner".

In the following, seventh preambular paragraph, the General Assembly reaffirmed also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly in which it is stated, as all will recall, that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty" on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

A little later, in the twelfth preambular paragraph, and this should follow from the seventh, the Assembly expressed its conviction that "further measures are needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Further, in the sixteenth paragraph, the Assembly stated that it was "Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States to the Committee on Disarmament, particularly concerning the establishment of a working group on outer space and its draft mandate which had been considered extensively by a contact group".

There is a foot-note here in which it is noted that from the date of commencement of the current session the working groups are to be known by another name. Of course, we know that we have already decided that they will be called ad hoc committees.

Lastly, the purpose of the eighteenth paragraph -- the last in the preamble -- is to express the Assembly's deep concern and disappointment that "although there was no objection, in principle, to the establishment without delay of such a working group, the Committee on Disarmament" -- now the Conference -- "has not thus far been enabled to reach agreement on an acceptable mandate for the working group during its 1983 session". The 10 operative paragraphs then follow. All of them are clearly important, but I shall confine myself at this point to quoting only four.

First of all, operative paragraph 2, in which the Assembly emphasized that "further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community".

Operative paragraph 3 in which the Assembly called upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to "contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Paragraph 5, in which the Assembly "Requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space".

Lastly, Mr. President, paragraph 7, which is perhaps the most pertinent for us, in which the Assembly, "Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group at the beginning of its session in 1984, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

If what I have just recalled is examined and compared with the draft mandate which was submitted by the Group of 21 on 29 February 1984 and which is reproduced in document CD/329/Rev.1, it will be seen that this draft faithfully reflects that resolution, adopted, let us not forget, by 147 votes in favour, and not 10 years ago but on 15 December 1983.

I should like, in concluding this statement, and in order to facilitate the comparison to which I referred, to read out this draft in its entirety. It is very brief and says the following:

"Reaffirming the principle that outer space - the common heritage of mankind - should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, and in order to prevent the extension of an arms race to outer space, and prohibit its use for hostile purposes; the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc [subsidiary body]" - there it said a subsidiary body, but we know now that it is to be an ad hoc committee - "with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement, or various agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. The Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? This does not seem to be the case.

As announced earlier, I intend now to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting to consider organizational questions. Immediately afterwards, we will resume the plenary meeting of the Conference.

The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 4.05 p.m. and resumed at 4.25 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The Plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

The secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing the time-table for meetings to be held by the Conference on Disarmament during the coming week. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference adopts the time-table.

It was so decided.

(The President)

I understand that there is general agreement that the second part of the 1984 session of the Conference should begin on 12 June. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Conference agrees to that date.

It was so decided.

I am informed that the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/448, is now available in all languages. Therefore, I will invite the Conference to take note of it at our next plenary meeting.

For administrative reasons it is necessary to make the following statement for the record:

The Committee on Disarmament, having been redesignated as the Conference on Disarmament from 7 February 1984, the following consequential changes of designation have taken place with effect from the same date:

- (a) The Chairman has been redesignated as the President,
- (b) The Secretary has been redesignated as the Secretary-General,
- (c) The Deputy Secretary has been redesignated as the Deputy Secretary-General.

These are changes in designation and have no financial or structural implications. The rules of procedure have been re-issued in document CD/8/Rev.2, containing consequential changes in designation.

As there is no other business I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 17 April at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.



**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.259  
17 April 1984  
ENGLISH

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**FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING**

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Tuesday, 17 April 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Dhanapala

(Sri Lanka)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR  
Mr. A. BOUBAZINE

Argentina: Mr. J.J. CARASALES  
Mr. R. GARCÍA MORITAN  
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. BUTLER  
Mr. R. ROWE  
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium: Mr. M. DEPASSE  
Mr. J. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. C. PRAMOV  
Mr. N. MIHAILOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U PE THEIN TIN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. QIAN JIADONG  
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. LIANG DEFENG  
Mr. LIN CHEN  
Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG  
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. A. CIMA  
Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt:  
Mr. I. HASSAN  
Ms. W. BASSIM  
Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS

Ethiopia:  
Mr. F. JOHANNES

France:  
Mr. H. RENIE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER  
Col. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:  
Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:  
Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W-E. VON DEM HAGEN  
Mr. F. ELBE

Hungary:  
Mr. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. H. TOTH

India:  
Mr. M. DUBEY  
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:  
Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Mrs. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. ANDRADJATI

Islamic Republic of Iran:  
Mr. N. KAMYAB  
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:  
Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. M. PAVESE  
Mr. B. CABRAS

Japan:  
Mr. M. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. O. HILLALE  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN  
Mr. A.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. A. THRONBERRY

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. P. BALOIU  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM



Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. S. ALEMYR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. T.F. DMITRITCHEV  
Mr. V.I. USTINOV  
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. N. CLYNE  
Ms. M.E. HOINKES  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. C. PEARCY  
Mr. J. PLUNKETT  
Ms. B. MURRAY

Venezuela:

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference starts today its further consideration of outstanding matters, as shown in the programme of work adopted by the Conference at the beginning of the session. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend to request the Conference today to take note of the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/448.

Our time-table for this week also includes the holding of an informal meeting to consider organizational questions. As usual, I intend to suspend the plenary meeting after we have exhausted our list of speakers and to convene an informal meeting to report to you on the following questions: (a) the establishment of an ad hoc committee on radiological weapons; (b) the consultations taking place on proposals for subsidiary bodies under agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 5.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Peru, Bulgaria and Japan.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Cannock.

Mr. CANNOCK (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, the delegation of Peru is particularly pleased to express its sincere satisfaction on seeing you preside over our work during this last month of the first part of the 1984 session of the Conference, since the skill with which you recently acted as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 augurs well for the results of the work of this body.

It is not only a question of recognizing your personal qualities but also of pointing out that you represent a country for which Peru has the greatest respect and friendship, a country which the international community remembers as a pioneer of the non-aligned movement.

My delegation also wishes to place on record its gratitude and appreciation for the unflinching dedication and ability with which Ambassador Datcu guided the Conference and also our admiration for the manner in which Ambassador Turbanski presided over its work.

In a previous statement before this plenary, my delegation has already referred to some of the items on the agenda of our Conference. On this occasion, Mr. President, after more than two months of the first part of the 1984 session have elapsed, and now that it is drawing to a close, I wish to make a brief statement expressing my views on the way in which we are carrying out our work.

Everyone is aware that at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we readily agreed to establish a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, because of the international community's deep concern at the intensification of the arms race and the need to find an urgent solution to this complex problem.

(Mr. Cannock, Peru)

In recent years, we have been faced with two truly alarming facts: on the one hand, an intensification of international tension and, on the other, a very considerable increase in the resources spent daily on armaments, in particular nuclear armaments, which endangers the very existence of mankind.

Let us not forget that total military expenditure exceeds \$650 billion, and that this figure is greater than the total income of 1.5 billion persons currently living in the 50 least developed countries of the world. I do not believe that it is necessary, Mr. President, to provide further illustration to stress the aberrant situation facing mankind as a result of the continuing arms race.

Despite that, we are not using this body for the purposes for which it was established. We are aware that the task of this Conference is not simple: far from it, for it may be said that by the nature of its objectives, we are faced with one of the most complex endeavours in the international field, a situation which should serve as a stimulus and challenge to undertake a task which would deserve the unqualified gratitude of the international community.

In his message to the Conference on Disarmament on 7 February last, the Secretary-General of the United Nations reminded us that "there is no assurance to be found in the recent sessions of the Committee on Disarmament or the course of the present world events that we are moving in the right direction". My delegation fully endorses that statement. Indeed, we regret to see that this Conference is not an authentic forum for negotiations, as desired by the great majority of its participants. We frequently become bogged down in lengthy and, it must be said, tedious discussions on procedural questions, and obstacles are placed in the way of any serious attempt at negotiation. It could well be said that we are engaged in an exercise in "stagnation diplomacy".

We believe that procedural problems can be avoided if we devote ourselves to studying with genuine concern the various useful proposals which have been submitted by various delegations to that end. In this connection, my delegation wishes to support the activity of the so-called Group of Wise Men, whose membership has recently been increased, who, in their personal capacity, can present to this body concrete and practical guidelines for more fruitful work by this Conference.

It has not been encouraging for my delegation to see in recent years that much time is being lost in discussions about the agenda of our work; now some countries -- fortunately an increasingly small number -- are placing obstacles in the way of the establishment of subsidiary bodies and the mandate of those bodies for fear of the word "negotiation". All this reflects a genuine lack of political will to negotiate, which cannot be attributed in any manner to the non-nuclear countries, which have always adopted a conciliatory attitude and repeatedly demonstrated flexibility. It is therefore necessary for us to be aware that in order to negotiate, this Conference should conform to what we agreed in the Final Document of 1978.

In taking stock of our activities, we see that little more than two months after having begun our work for 1984, of the two priority items before it the Conference has made progress on only one: the item referring to chemical weapons.

Moreover, we see with regret that a number of countries continue to refuse to agree to a mandate which would provide for the holding of negotiations in a subsidiary body on the prohibition of nuclear tests. This is rather serious, since the prohibition of nuclear tests would be a very positive step towards achieving the disarmament which we all desire, particularly when we consider -- as indicated by the delegation of Sweden in document CD/430 -- that the number of nuclear tests carried out between 1945 and 1983 has increased considerably.

(Mr. Cannock, Peru)

We cannot fail to regret the fact that on Tuesday, 3 April, the desire of a great majority of countries to negotiate on this issue was once again frustrated.

With regard to the prevention of a nuclear war, as pointed out in General Assembly resolution 38/183 G, my delegation considers that this is a matter of the highest priority and of vital interest, I repeat, vital interest to all peoples of the world.

The fact that this question is dealt with for the first time separately in the agenda of the Conference constitutes a step forward in our work, as recognition of what is a most critical and urgent task at the present time. It is for this reason that my delegation welcomes the fact that the necessary steps are being taken to set up an ad hoc subsidiary body which can, in some manner, begin work on the request made by the Group of 21 through document CD/341 and the recommendation contained in the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution, i.e. undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of a nuclear war.

Furthermore, we also regret that in spite of the great efforts made in this Conference by many delegations, it has not yet been possible to achieve the consensus necessary to set up an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This situation exists in spite of General Assembly resolution 38/70, adopted by an overwhelming majority of countries, with the sole exception of one country whose vote prevented a consensus.

My delegation attaches special importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, considering that it is a question of using as another area of militarization an environment which should serve peaceful purposes exclusively. It would, moreover, be simpler and preferable to prevent an arms race rather than to become involved later in a more arduous task of trying to disarm outer space, in which vast quantities of money are being invested for military purposes.

I do not wish to let slip this opportunity to congratulate very sincerely the delegations of Sweden and Argentina on their statements of 22 and 27 March last respectively for having drawn attention to important relevant elements in this field, which will undoubtedly help our future work in the Group of 21 and in the Conference itself.

I should also like to express my delegation's appreciation at the Report on the seventeenth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, recently submitted to the Conference.

My delegation attaches special importance to the work of this Ad Hoc Group of Experts, which would greatly facilitate verification of the prohibition of nuclear tests. It is for this reason that, without prejudice to transmitting the report to my country's authorities, I can already express my delegation's satisfaction that the Conference has decided to approve the continuation of the work of the Group of Experts.

(Mr. Cannock, Peru)

Lastly, bearing in mind that the work of the Conference on Disarmament will undoubtedly have an impact on the Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which is to be held in 1985 and the Preparatory Committee of which has just concluded its first session, I wish to say that although the subsidiary body on negative security guarantees has been re-established and that its work will, for obvious reasons, begin at a later date, my country's delegation regrets that on this question the nuclear-weapon Powers are still maintaining their position in relation to countries which do not possess such weapons, a position to which the Group of 21 has referred in document CD/407 of 4 August 1983 and which my delegation fully shares.

The 1985 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in which Peru will be represented as a State party to that international instrument, will have to make a genuine evaluation of the undertakings given by the nuclear-weapon Powers with regard to undertaking disarmament negotiations in good faith.

We cannot ignore the fact that the failure of the nuclear-weapon Powers in their negotiations on nuclear disarmament, as provided for in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, affects the attitude of many countries which should be able to accede to this international instrument. We also believe that if vertical proliferation is not halted, and responsibility for this must also be attributed to the two great nuclear-weapon Powers, the validity and force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be seriously threatened.

It is not too late, therefore, for the nuclear-weapon Powers to reconsider their position and to fulfil their obligations.

It is a question of choosing between "existence or extinction".

Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, allow me first of all to greet you, Ambassador Dhanapala, the respected representative of the fraternal Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, on your occupying the responsible office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to express our conviction that under your guidance the Conference will be able to make progress on the substance of the issues under consideration.

I should also like to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Datcu, for his tireless efforts to bring the organizational matters of the Conference to a successful conclusion.

In my statement today I should like to touch upon some of the items on our agenda and to express some views concerning the work done at the Conference thus far.

I should like to stress that the Presidents of the Conference in February and March, Ambassador Turbanski and Ambassador Datcu, succeeded, as everyone recognized, in creating favourable conditions for business-like work at the Conference on the substance of the issues before us. An appreciable role was played in this by the

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position of the socialist countries, which, at the very beginning of the session, declared their willingness to enter into negotiations on all the questions on the agenda and proposed draft mandates for the appropriate subsidiary bodies (CD/434). On the socialist countries' initiative, a change was made in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Yet, although this is an issue to which the delegations of the western countries claim to attach particular importance, real negotiations on it have, in substance, not yet begun. This cannot be regarded otherwise than as a direct breach of the agreed mandate to hold negotiations.

Today there is every ground for asking ourselves whether, in the two and a half summer months of the Conference's work, we shall be able to make up for all that we failed to do during the spring part of the session.

It seems to us that there are two approaches to assessing the results of the Conference. One is to judge by the outwardly objective intermediate and final reports in which groups of countries, or even individual States, try to have their points of view accurately reflected; the other is to start real work and to reach solutions of some of the issues. The Bulgarian delegation has always favoured the second approach and, together with the other socialist countries, has invariably and consistently striven for business-like, practical work. Proceeding from this position, our delegation wishes today, as it has done many times in the past, to draw attention to the lack of a responsible attitude towards multilateral disarmament negotiations on the part of certain States. Delegates in this responsible forum are more clearly and directly aware than our colleagues in other international forums that positions adopted on such simple matters as a subsidiary body's mandate, a new agenda item, a procedural or organizational discussion, are, in a practical sense, the reflection of policies on more complex and deeper problems. These positions are, in reality, the expression of a wish to a refusal to take practical steps towards a policy of detente, towards the restoration of trust in international relations, towards the solution of burning issues in the disarmament field. The political will of States to take practical steps in the disarmament field is the only criterion by which we should be guided in assessing the state of affairs at the Conference on Disarmament. Looking the truth straight in the eyes, we cannot but admit that the tangible result which peoples expect from us and which, if they were achieved, would exercise an important positive influence on the whole range of international relations are still outstanding.

In our view, the reason for stagnation this year, as in previous ones, is that nothing has changed for the better in the behaviour of the Western countries, and especially of the United States of America, in whose policy in the last few years the aggressive principle has become increasingly predominant. As before, there is nothing in United States policy that might be favourable to the disarmament process. On the contrary, facts which have been cited in our discussions testify to the implementation of ever new programmes of development and deployment of nuclear weapons.

This conclusion finds its most direct confirmation in an assessment of the results of our work on items 1, 2 and 3, which relate to vitally important problems of curbing the nuclear arms race and eliminating the nuclear threat.

It is no secret that the start of negotiations to reach agreement on the first three items of our agenda is impeded above all by the course steered by the United States of America towards building up nuclear arsenals. Another characteristic fact is that in matters of nuclear disarmament the western countries have not only rejected the possibility of setting up a subsidiary body but are also ignoring these problems in their statements.

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Mention must be made in this connection of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. On this point, the United States of America and the United Kingdom are maintaining their obstructionist line by blocking the expansion of the relevant subsidiary body's mandate. As the delegations of Argentina and the German Democratic Republic have so aptly remarked, to block negotiations towards the achievement of agreement on a comprehensive and complete nuclear test ban is, among other things, to deprive of all meaning the many years of activity of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts.

As we explained in detail last March, the Bulgarian delegation attaches particular importance to the problem of prevention of nuclear war. We continue to strive for the establishment of an ad hoc committee which would discuss and submit to the Conference specific measures of a political, international-law, or other nature. We are prepared to discuss all constructive ideas or proposals put forward at the Conference. Moreover, we are bound to feel satisfaction at the fact that approaches and proposals outlined by some delegations of the Group of 21, including Mexico, India and others, resemble or coincide with the approach of the socialist countries.

I should like to draw attention to the extremely important ideas and proposals contained in the speech of Mr. Konstantin U. Chernenko (document CD/444) relating to the need for the elaboration and adoption by the nuclear-weapon States of certain norms to regulate their relations.

The application of certain norms pursuing peace objectives in relations between nuclear-weapon States would by no means have the effect of separating them from the world community; it would not grant them special rights or opportunities of any kind. In our view, possession of nuclear weapons does not confer upon nuclear-weapon States any additional prerogatives in international affairs, but only imposes on them a special responsibility to present and future generations for the maintenance of peace.

It would be good if other nuclear-weapon States, too, showed a responsible attitude towards problems which touch upon the interests of the whole world.

It is surely correct to say that the most important practical issue on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for this session was the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The socialist countries, which have always regarded chemical disarmament as a most important task, adopted a serious and responsible attitude towards the interest expressed by other groups of States in achieving progress in that area. As is known, this year the socialist countries have detached experts from their capitals for a prolonged period and have submitted document CD/435 of 20 February 1984 entitled "Improved effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons". Many delegations welcomed the new far-reaching proposal made by the Soviet delegation on 21 February on matters pertaining to the verification of the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles. Individual socialist countries, including Bulgaria, put forward specific drafts in the Working Groups on the most important aspects of the future convention. We also gave serious consideration to proposals made by the delegations of the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, China, France, the United Kingdom and others. The Chairmen of the three Working Groups have demonstrated their competence and understanding of the tasks entrusted to them. Unfortunately, all these efforts have as yet failed to lead to the process envisaged



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in the new mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons: "To start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting" (document CD/440 of 28 February 1984). It is well known to everyone who it is that has exercised a restraining effect on these negotiations.

As we all know, tomorrow the United States delegation is to introduce a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The contents of the document will speak for themselves. One thing is obvious in advance: if the proposal suffers from one-sidedness, it will not serve the cause of chemical disarmament: especially if, as may be expected after hearing the statements of certain official western representatives, it conceals a prelude to the build-up of the United States military chemical potential.

The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space occupies an important place in our work. The growing attention devoted to this issue is fully understandable, since the point at issue is to nip in the bud a new and particularly dangerous round of the arms race, namely, its being carried into outer space, whose development and exploitation is one of mankind's greatest achievements in this century.

International agreements in force limit the use of outer space for military purposes only to a certain degree; they do not preclude the possibility of the deployment in outer space of types of weapons which do not fall within the definition of "means of mass destruction". There is need for a mechanism in international law reliable enough to thwart the designs of the proponents of an arms race in that sphere.

We share the concern of other delegations in connection with the elaboration in the United States of programmes for the development of space weapons to destroy objects in outer space, in the atmosphere and on the surface of the Earth and for the deployment in outer space of anti-ballistic missile systems based on the utilization of the latest scientific achievements in the field of laser and particle-beam technology. The implementation of these programmes would represent a gross violation of the Soviet-United States treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems signed in 1972.

At the beginning of this year, the new ASAT anti-ballistic missile system launched from F-15 fighters was tested in the United States of America. The development of a weapon of this kind carries a direct threat to the use of early-warning satellites and increases the danger of nuclear war.

The United States' openly stated unwillingness to engage in negotiations on questions related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space is also significant.

Such actions by the United States Government are having an effect on the work of our Conference. Problems of outer space have appeared on our agenda for almost three years. However, through the fault of the United States of America, consideration of and consultations on this question have not yet led to the establishment of a subsidiary body which might, in a serious and responsible way, devote itself to the elaboration of a comprehensive international agreement or agreements on the prohibition of an arms race in outer space. I subscribe to the view expressed by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, that we cannot treat the issue as if nothing had happened. The vote on resolution 38/70 at the latest session of the United Nations General Assembly convincingly confirms the international community's steadily growing concern in connection with the danger of outer space being transformed into an arena of the arms race. At the Conference on Disarmament

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there are enough ideas and proposals on this urgent issue -- all that is needed is to create the necessary preconditions in order to embark on specific negotiations within the framework of an appropriate ad hoc committee, which should be given a mandate of full value.

It may well be that to some delegates our position appears crude and simplistic; they think we are saying that the socialist countries are for disarmament and peace, and the western countries, on the contrary, are for an arms build-up and for war. Such assertions are unfounded. In a statement made on 22 March 1984, at which I had the honour of being present, Mr. Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian leader, said:

"It would be a serious political error to think that the adventurist course of militant imperialist reaction enjoys the complete and unconditional support of all party, State and public figures and all business circles in the United States of America and other NATO countries and that, therefore, the slide towards thermonuclear war is inevitable and irreversible".

The socialist countries, as has been said repeatedly by our leaders, continue to be convinced that common sense will prevail and are therefore ready to co-operate with all States towards the goal of maintaining peace and international security and achieving disarmament. Our efforts will continue and increase.

I should like to emphasize that the time has come for the United States of America and their allies to embark upon the removal of the serious obstacles they themselves have placed in the way of the limitation and reduction of armaments.

We are deeply convinced that if all nuclear-weapon States undertook to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, if they agreed to freeze their nuclear arsenals both in quantitative and in qualitative terms, they would be making a decisive contribution towards improving the international political climate.

The solution of these issues does not require complex negotiations.

There also exist other major proposals, among which the socialist countries' initiative for the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty member States and the NATO States occupies a prominent position.

In this room it is very often said that the main reason for the stagnation of disarmament talks is the lack of political will on the part of certain States. Whether they choose to admit this, or whether they seek to cover it up with nebulous and general declarations and promises, this fact remains a fact. In the presence of political will, even the most difficult questions can be resolved. The history of international relations is full of examples to prove it.

The tasks facing the Conference on Disarmament are numerous and complex but they are not insoluble. We should set about their practical solution with a sense of great responsibility and as quickly as possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, let me take this opportunity to congratulate you on the assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation would like to express its sincere felicitations in seeing the distinguished representative of a fellow Asian country in the Presidency. I am sure that under your experienced and skilled guidance, the Conference on Disarmament will be able to conclude the spring part of its session with achievements which will foster hopes for the succeeding part of its session. I would also like to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Datcu of Romania, for his Presidency during the month of March, and for his efforts to bring about a convergence of views within the Conference.

During the first week of this session in February, I had an opportunity to state the basic approaches and positions of my country regarding the problems of disarmament. I emphasized then that disarmament and national security are two sides of the same coin for all the countries of the world and that therefore meaningful results could be accomplished only through the accumulation of effective and verifiable steps. Indeed, we cannot deny the fact that the Conference on Disarmament, or the Committee on Disarmament which preceded it, did not achieve the sort of results expected of it in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This lack of achievement of the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament undoubtedly created a considerable sense of frustration in various quarters. Also, from the point of view of promoting nuclear disarmament, as well as in the context of fulfilling in good faith the obligations under Article VI of the NPT, we cannot ignore the fact that important bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have been suspended for almost half a year in spite of the urgent call for their resumption expressed by one of the parties and supported by the countries of the world.

When we look back over the more than two months of deliberations in the Conference on Disarmament, we have to express deep concern that a good deal of our work has been on procedural issues, and although these procedural debates might reflect various political motivations, they have not led to substantive progress in achieving disarmament measures.

Today, I have asked for the floor in the desire to express something of the fundamental principles and philosophy regarding the problems which the Conference on Disarmament is faced with.

From the long history of international negotiations, we are all aware that immediate and clearly visible giant steps to improve international peace and security are not always ready at hand. Disarmament is not an exception to the rule, and this means that there is always a need to build up small but effective steps with a great deal of patience. Allow me to recall that at a brief one-week session of the Preparatory Committee for the Third NPT Review Conference very recently, I had to make a repeated plea from the chair to all the delegations to be exceptionally patient in order to achieve meaningful consensus. Although we certainly expect that the procedural matters which the Conference on Disarmament is now working on would find solutions under the wisdom and guidance of you, Mr. President, as well as of your predecessors, at the same time I would like to emphasize that our patient efforts should be directed toward the solutions which would enable this forum to get on with the job for which this body has been created.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

In practical terms, the foregoing would mean that we have to find an appropriate compromise between two things. One of the two is a comprehensive approach based on expressions of disarmament ideals, while the other factor is various details of actual measures, including institutions and technologies of verification. In other words, if an agreement in the abstract on comprehensive and declaratory measures can achieve a goal of truly effective disarmament, that will indeed be a very welcome situation. That this is not always the case may be clear if we take the example of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. To think that the idealism and political will will be sufficient is unfortunately optimistic in today's world, and I made this point clear in the statement I delivered in February. In order that disarmament measures can be effective and credible as an arrangement among nations, it is essential that the member States can have confidence that others are faithfully observing the terms of such conventions. This is an understandable situation when national security is involved and when science and technology of modern weapon systems have become highly sophisticated and complicated as they are today.

As I emphasize the importance of verification, I would like to hasten to add that there is a danger also of extremism in this regard as well. If one starts by assuming the occurrence of all the violations which are theoretically possible, but practically unlikely, and insists that an agreement is meaningless unless all such cases are covered, then we are overstating the virtue of verification.

I would like to refer here to some of my own experiences regarding the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards which, as you are all aware, concern verification measures against nuclear proliferation. It took a very long time to distinguish what is useful and necessary from what may be less practical. There was a group of people who insisted that mere nominal arrangements to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to military uses were sufficient. This position was not accepted by most countries and as a result, detailed negotiations on institutional and technical arrangements for effective safeguards took place. On the other hand, from over-eagerness scenarios were sometimes depicted which, for those who are knowledgeable in the nuclear industry, could not even be visualized as practical possibilities. What exists today as the IAEA safeguards is the product of compromise between such extreme positions. I have mentioned this example not in any way as an attempt to make an assessment of our current discussion about verification on a nuclear-test ban or the prohibition of chemical weapons, but merely to indicate that in our view this is a general point worth remembering.

In this context, I would like to mention the following. For one thing, it is important that basic political agreement exists to form the ground for any disarmament arrangements. On the other hand, there should be a scientific and technical approach in putting such agreements into reality. These two elements must have a complete understanding of each other. It is possible, in the absence of such understanding, that the political circles and the technological circles may be speaking two different languages, and this is an assured way to confuse the situation. I recall, in the case of IAEA safeguards, that there were occasions in which scientists, in the absence of full comprehension of the basic political requirements, gave replies such as "What is required is technically possible in principle, if certain conditions are met". The political side ignored the conditions and only accepted "It is possible in principle". In fact, among these conditions were such items as "if the continuous presence of inspectors is possible", or "if determination of diversion can be accepted at an 80 per cent confidence level", or "if a certain amount of material per annum can be left unaccounted for as an accumulation of measurement errors". You can see that these conditions which are related to the political objective of the arrangements certainly required serious consideration.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

A number of statements have been made in this or other forums to the effect, for instance, that there are no more technical problems remaining with regard to verification of a nuclear-test ban. Some have even insisted that all the underground nuclear explosions can be detected and identified. I have had the opportunity to talk with some of the authors whose writings in this respect have been extensively quoted in this forum as well. I have been told by these very authors that the system of seismic detection they base their arguments on is not what is currently available and existing in the world. They have to be upgraded into a better network incorporating more advances in seismology, including a considerable number of so-called black boxes in the countries concerned. Furthermore, their argument is based on the assumption that geological conditions around the test sites as well as the mode of dissemination of seismic signals through the geological formation between the site of the explosion and seismic stations are known in detail. Of course, I am not an expert on the subject and the reports of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts give a description of some of these problems, while I believe that the upcoming seismic data exchange experiments will help clarify these points. I have merely mentioned this case to point out again the importance of satisfactory dialogue between the political and the scientific communities.

The example of IAEA seems to me to indicate another very important point. It was extremely convenient, and indeed fortunate, in the case of the NPT that an international organization was already in existence whose Statute specified the safeguards for the purpose of preventing diversion from peaceful to military purposes as its main function. Although not on the scale of today, the institutional arrangements to gather and apply necessary technology at the international level were already functioning. As the distinguished delegates are aware, this enabled the NPT merely to refer, in its Article 3, to the application of these arrangements. In spite of that, the parties to the Treaty had to spend more than a year in a conference to reorganize the system, establish the technological requirements, determine rights and duties of inspectors, agree on the methodology for determination of diversion possibilities, and to agree on the sharing of financial burdens.

This lesson indicates to me that we have to bear in mind, by the time we are at the actual stages of determining verification of a prohibition of nuclear testing or chemical weapons, as the case may be, that we have to get on, as the necessary first steps, with the job of establishing such international verification organs. Of course, by saying this, I do not mean to insist that the arrangements under the NPT are the best or even the most desirable formula in the case of other disarmament agreements. It is nevertheless important that within the negotiation process in the Conference on Disarmament, all due attention should be given to the nature of verification requirements as well as the structure of verification arrangements which would best suit the purpose of each agreement. Without such attention, I am afraid, disarmament agreements cannot function in such a way that the parties to them can place confidence in their effectiveness.

I have used earlier an expression "extremism", and implied that over-emphasis on political will alone, or on scientific details alone, would not lead to a meaningful disarmament arrangement. In our approach to problems, we should have in mind the expression about "the virtue of taking the middle-of-the-road position", which means not that the exact mid-point of two extremisms is necessarily the best solution, but that there is always a need to open our minds and eyes to different points of view. With regard to NTB considerations today, for example, efforts to understand the capabilities and limitations of the available multilateral

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verification measures seem to represent this virtue of a "middle-of-the-road" approach. This will enable us to take up various related matters that constitute elements of a future nuclear-test ban (NTB) agreement, including the problems of how to deal with nuclear explosions in the unverifiable range. I do not need to repeat that Japan considers the NTB as the highest priority item in disarmament. We have stated our position a number of times in this and other fora. It is in this context that the establishment of multilateral verification capabilities, given the existing technology, and then taking steps towards their gradual improvement, is in our view, what the Conference on Disarmament can meaningfully accomplish today as long as we are looking at the NTB as a multilateral measure. With regard to chemical weapons, we are all aware that the nations of the world are showing a very positive attitude towards their prohibition and elimination, and the related verification. As active negotiations are taking place, my delegation is second to none in pursuing the objective of an early conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention and we take pride in having made various contributions in the past. Here also, I should like to mention that a workable chemical-weapons agreement should take care to avoid the pitfalls of possible extremism. If the outcome of our negotiations would lead either to a very large loophole in verification or on the other hand to a claim for virtual international control over the entire chemical or pharmaceutical industries of the world, not only would that raise legal problems, but also it would mean either a very unreliable treaty or a highly impractical situation. I shall refrain from further references to the example of IAEA, but merely note that the willingness of the Conference on Disarmament to take its experience into account in defining the range of verification requirements regarding either chemicals or their precursors would be extremely important. I should like to take future opportunities again to present our detailed position to the Conference on Disarmament in due course. Here I would like to add very briefly that there is a similar problem with regard to the outer space. Peaceful outer space is obviously a very important item, to which Japan attaches high priority. However, as far as we are concerned, except for a limited knowledge and experience regarding exploration of outer space for peaceful uses, we have to confess that our understanding and knowledge of the related space activities are not at all based on our own experience. It is very difficult, therefore, for us to engage in detailed discussions on space arms control on the basis of published and often popular information. We believe that the examination of the problem of outer space starting from an exploratory approach at the outset, with those in a position to know providing information, would be most appropriate and meaningful.

What I have stated today may be more a way of thinking than detailed proposals. At a time when multilateral disarmament negotiations are not making visible progress, and at a time when the world is expressing deep concern at such a situation, we consider it useful to stop and examine the reasons for it. By removing such reasons, one by one, we should be travelling along the road to the final solution. My delegation does not hold illusions that disarmament can be achieved tomorrow, much as it may be desirable. At the same time, we do not hold the view that solutions are impossible. When we talk about a step-by-step approach, it is with this in mind; and certainly as far as our national position is concerned, we shall continue to make positive contributions in the process of accumulating meaningful steps towards the final success.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

(The President)

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

I intend now to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting to consider some organizational questions. We will, afterwards, resume the plenary meeting of the Conference. The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.55 a.m. and reconvened at 12.40 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

Working Paper No. 126, 1/ containing a draft decision on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on radiological weapons, is before the Conference today. Is there any objection to the draft decision which appears in Working Paper No. 126? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

May I extend to Ambassador Vejvoda our congratulations on his appointment. His experience and diplomatic skill will be of great assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee.

As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I suggest now that the Conference takes note of the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/448.

It was so decided.

As there is no other business, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held tomorrow, Wednesday 18 April, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.





FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Wednesday, 18 April 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Dhanapala

(Sri Lanka)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD-ROUIS  
Mr. A. TAFFAR  
Mr. A. BOUBAZINE

Argentina:

Mr. J.J. CARASALES  
Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN  
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER  
Mr. R. ROWE  
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE  
Mr. J. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. C. PRAMOV  
Mr. N. MIHAILOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U PE THEIN TIN  
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG  
Ms. WANG SHIYUN  
Mr. LIANG DEFENG  
Mr. LI WEIMING  
Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG  
Mr. SUO KAIMING  
Mr. LU MINGCHUN

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA  
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. A. CIMA  
Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. S. AL FARARGI  
Mr. I. HASSAN  
Ms. W. BASSIM  
Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Ms. K. SINEGIORGIS  
Mr. F. JOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. H. RENIE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER  
COL. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. J. DEMBSKI  
Mr. MARETZKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. F. ELBE  
Mr. W.-E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY  
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI  
Mrs. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. ANDRADJATI

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAMYAB  
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA  
Mr. SHAFI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI  
Mr. L. FERRARI BRAVO  
Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. M. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

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Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN  
Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. O.O. GEORGE  
Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEBIBIA  
Mr. F. OKOH  
Mr. F. ADESHIDA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. P. BALOUI  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. S. ALEMYR  
Mr. L.E. WINGREN  
Mrs. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. T.F. DMITRITCHEV  
Mr. V.I. USTINOV  
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN  
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mr. J.F. GORDON  
Mr. J.W.B. RICHARDS  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUSH  
Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. N. CLYNE  
Ms. M.E. HOINKES  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. C. PEARCY  
Mr. J. PUCKETT  
Ms. B. MURRAY  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. MIKULAK  
Mr. C. WELLS  
Mr. C. BAY

Venezuela:

Mr. T. LABRADOR-RUBIO  
Mr. O. GARCÍA GARCÍA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Director-General of the  
United Nations Office at Geneva:

Mr. E. SUY

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of  
the Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

At the outset I wish to welcome the presence among us today of the distinguished Vice-President of the United States of America, the Honourable George Bush, who will address the Conference as the first speaker. The Honourable Mr. Bush addressed the Committee on Disarmament last year on 4 February and needs no introduction, not only because of his high office but also because of the number of important diplomatic posts he has held before, including the post of Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations. Several members of the Conference may have known him earlier and I am sure that all members join me in welcoming him again to address the Conference.

The Conference continues today its further consideration of outstanding matters, as stated in the programme of work adopted at the beginning of the session. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mongolia, Australia, Mexico, the German Democratic Republic and France.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Vice-President of the United States of America, the Honourable George Bush.

Mr. BUSH (United States of America): Let me just first thank and pay my respects to those in the United Nations Organization, the Director-General and others, for the arrangements, for their wonderful way of receiving guests who put such inordinate pressures on the normal proceedings of this important Conference, and to you, Mr. President. I understand that there has been some accommodation of schedule to make it easier for me to come here and I am most grateful for that. And I should like to express to the Secretary-General of the Conference, my appreciation. And let me say that I regret that my schedule is such that, although I flew here last night, that when this is over I must leave for a press conference and fly right back to the United States. But that should in no way be interpreted as less than interest in the proceedings of this important Conference, but rather that the schedule dictates it. Our very able Ambassador, Ambassador Fields, and others will be here to follow-up and to discuss at the Conference's convenience some of the matters that I raise. You very generously mentioned, Mr. President, my having been here in February a year ago, and it is an honour to come before this Conference again today, on behalf of our President, to reaffirm our strong commitment to arms control.

And I have come to reaffirm, as well, a resolve that has dominated the American position in all arms control discussions over the last year: the resolve that the growth in the number of the most dreaded weapons of modern warfare must not simply be slowed; it must indeed be reversed. In the matter before us — chemical weapons — they must be totally banned.

I have brought with me today the latest expression of the firm United States resolve — a draft treaty banning entirely the possession, production, acquisition, retention or transfer of chemical weapons.



(Mr. Bush, United States)

This draft treaty includes an entirely new concept for overcoming the great obstacle that has impeded progress in the past toward a full chemical weapons ban, namely, the obstacle of verification. This new concept is part of a package of sound and reasonable procedures to verify compliance with all the draft treaty's terms.

Except on close inspection, chemical weapons, these insidious chemical weapons, are virtually identical in appearance to ordinary weapons; plants for producing chemical weapons are difficult to distinguish from plants producing chemicals for industry and, in fact, some chemicals with peaceful utility are structurally similar to some chemicals that are used in warfare. So verification is particularly difficult with chemical weapons.

Our new concept is an arms control verification procedure that we call "open invitation". But before I outline this unprecedented procedure, let me review some of the concerns that have led the United States to propose such a step.

When I appeared before you in February last year, I quoted Franklin Roosevelt's comment that the use of chemical weapons "has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind".

Unfortunately, despite the horror that these weapons evoke in all decent men and women; despite specific prohibitions such as the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, there have been repeated instances of use over the past six decades, against combatants and innocent civilians alike -- always, I might note, against those least able to defend themselves, those least able to retaliate against such an attack.

In the last three years alone the world has heard of frequent violations of these agreements from such places as South-East Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East, and one important reason that chemical weapons use continues is that neither the 1925 Geneva Protocol nor the 1972 Convention include any form of effective verification or enforcement.

Parties signed a piece of paper, attached some stamps and some seals of their own. Arsenals remained, ready for use against any who lacked a deterrent.

The United States has advocated reinforcement of the existing agreements. We, together with other countries, have long supported proposals to direct the Secretary-General of the United Nations to initiate investigations of reported violations.

We regret that some United Nations Members States have disputed the need for such investigations and have, to date, prevented or impeded enquiries. We believe that international investigations of this sort could serve as a step toward the kind of openness required for a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty that would work.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

Surely the consequences of the absence of effective verification, as seen in the reports of continued use of chemical weapons, can only provoke profound concern among all of us today:

First, there is this unspeakable horror visited upon the victims of such weapons, many of them innocents simply caught up in the path of war.

Second, the use of chemical weapons violates existing international agreements, and so undermines the arms control process.

Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, there is the chance that, as reports of use continue, the world might actually get callous, act hardened to this news. It might come numbly to accept these weapons and to abandon efforts to rid future generations of this peril.

We owe it to ourselves and to our children to prevent this from happening.

For more than a decade, the United States has exercised restraint in the field of chemical weapons, and we will continue to do so. We desire an arms control solution to the chemical weapons threat. But our restraint has not induced all other States to exercise comparable restraint, and this is why we are taking steps to prepare for the possibility that modern chemical weapons might have to be produced in the absence of a comprehensive ban. However, we must and we will do all we can to achieve a treaty that eliminates any need for new production.

The President asked me to come here again this year to stress the urgency of this issue. He believes that we must do all we can to eliminate the existing stocks of chemical weapons and the facilities that produce them. He wants to ensure that such weapons will never be developed or used again.

Now, to that end, the President has asked me to present to this Conference today the United States draft text of a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons, and I ask that this draft be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The provisions of the draft treaty closely follow the "detailed views" that my Government presented to this Conference last year, and they also incorporate the views of many other delegations which have given us the benefit of their thoughts.

This treaty would prohibit the development, the production, the stockpiling, the acquisition, the retention or the transfer of chemical weapons. The principal criterion for distinguishing between permitted and banned activities would be the purpose for which an activity is being conducted.

In recognition of the need for confidence in such an agreement, the draft also contains sound and reasonable procedures -- among these, "open invitation" inspections -- for verifying compliance with all its provisions.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

For a chemical weapons ban to work, each party must have confidence that the other parties are abiding by it. This elementary, commonsense principle is the essence of what we mean by verification. No sensible Government enters into those international contracts known as treaties unless it can ascertain -- or verify -- that it is getting what it contracted for.

Lack of effective verification and compliance mechanisms has been a major obstacles to achieving a true and effective ban on these weapons.

As I mentioned at the beginning, the technical similarities between chemical weapons production facilities and commercial production facilities, the similarity between chemical weapons agents and chemicals for peaceful uses, and the similarity between chemical munitions and conventional munitions makes discrimination impossible without very, very close observation.

And, perhaps most importantly, strict verification is needed to protect those who do not possess chemical weapons, or are willing to give them up, from those who might maintain possession surreptitiously.

The goal of our proposal is a treaty to require States to declare the sizes and locations of their chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities, to destroy the stocks and facilities and to foreswear creating any new chemical weapons.

If they are to sign such a contract, States must have confidence, in particular, that they can know:

First, that all stocks have been destroyed;

Second, that all declared production facilities have been destroyed;

Third, that the declared stocks really do constitute all the stocks;

And fourthly, that the declared facilities are all the facilities.

Without such firm assurance we cannot -- and I think everybody here knows this -- we cannot claim to have banned chemical weapons. In this regard, the United States Government has taken note of the Soviet Union's announced willingness to consider accepting the continuous stationing of international inspection teams at the locations where declared stockpiles are to be destroyed, and we welcome that.

We are encouraged by this recognition of the indispensability of on-site inspection, a matter that was tabled right here in this room, I think by Ambassador Issraelyan. The Soviet Union's announcement has advanced the negotiations toward establishing confidence in the first of the four critical requirements, that is, that all declared stocks be destroyed.

To address the second of the four criteria -- that all declared production facilities be destroyed -- we propose a similar continuous, on-site monitoring and periodic inspection.

The verification difficulties inherent in the problem of undeclared sites -- determining that there are no hidden stocks and no clandestine production facilities -- remain our most formidable challenge. It is formidable because the problem of undeclared sites can be resolved only if States commit themselves to a new, but absolutely necessary degree of openness.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

Let us face reality. Chemical weapons are not difficult to hide and are not difficult to produce in a clandestine manner. Many States have the capacity to do this. We can rid the world of these weapons only if we all make it difficult for anyone, for ourselves to do such things without detection.

The opportunity for undetected violations is the undoing of arms control. If that opportunity persists, it would render whatever chemical weapons ban we conclude illusory and really would set back the cause of peace.

And so, for that reason, the United States Government is putting forward the unprecedented "open invitation" verification proposal to which I referred earlier. As part of a chemical weapons ban, the United States is willing to join other parties in a mutual obligation to open for international inspection on short notice all of its military or government-owned or government-controlled facilities.

This pledge to an "open invitation" for inspections is not made lightly. We make it because it is indispensable to an effective chemical weapons ban. The essence of verification is deterrence of violations through the risk of detection. The "open invitation" procedures will increase the chances that violations will be detected and the chances that, in the event of violations, the evidence necessary for an appropriate international response can be collected. That is the heart of deterring violations.

If the international community recognizes that such a provision is the sine qua non of an effective chemical weapons ban and joins us in subscribing to it, we will not only have realized the noble longing for a treaty that actually bans chemical weapons, but we will have changed in an altogether salutary manner the way governments do business.

We will have set a bold example for overcoming barriers that impede effective arms control in other areas. And we will have engendered the kind of openness among nations that dissipates these ungrounded suspicions and allows peace to breathe and thrive.

We recognize that all governments have secrets. Some speak as if openness and effective verification cut against their interests alone. But openness entails burdens for every State, every single State, including the United States of America. Openness of the kind we are proposing for the chemical weapons ban would come at a price.

But an effective ban on chemical weapons requires this kind of "open invitation" inspections we propose. We, our President, the United States Government, are willing to pay the price of such openness. The enormous value of an effective ban warrants our doing so.

I know that the United States delegation to this body is eager for the process of negotiating a chemical weapons ban to begin to unfold. We hope and trust that the seriousness of this work, its urgency and perhaps most of all, the humane aspirations of the peoples represented here, will spur all in this Conference towards an early and successful agreement.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

We do not underestimate the difficulties that this task presents. I have said that the key to an effective convention — a convention that could eliminate the possibility of chemical warfare forever — is enforcement of compliance through effective verification.

Our emphasis on this point (and our "open invitation" verification proposal) springs from a desire that the ban work permanently and effectively, to provide the security that all of us seek.

The United States is encouraged that these negotiations to ban chemical weapons have already achieved broad international support. It is significant as well that the work on this treaty is widely recognized to offer a promising opportunity for enhancing not only East-West co-operation, but also co-operation among all nations.

Our delegation looks forward to serious consultations with the Soviet delegation, and to detailed discussions with all other participants, on the elaboration of these provisions and other necessary aspects of an effective agreement. Our aim in these negotiations will be a practical one — to work hard and in good faith; to build a mutual confidence — that, frankly, is lacking right now — and to achieve real results.

The President has asked me and I saw him just before I left for Geneva, to assure you again that the American commitment to work for effective arms control extends to all of the work of this Conference and to reassure you that it extends to the work beyond this Conference as well. We are pleased to be making progress in the multilateral negotiations in Stockholm on confidence-building measures in Europe pleased to have resumed East-West talks in Vienna on reducing conventional forces in Europe.

Our commitment to results is equally strong on the all-important issue of nuclear arms control, where the United States believes it is essential to accelerate effective, verifiable agreements, and as I think most people here know, we also seek deep reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals and the greater international stability that would follow.

Here, today, I again invite the Soviet Union to return to the two nuclear arms negotiations it suspended five months ago and to resume with us the crucial task of reducing nuclear arms. The United States remains ready to explore all ideas, without preconditions, at any time that the Soviet Union chooses to renew the dialogue.

We feel strongly about it, and in this Conference whose day-to-day work is dedicated in a multilateral way to arms reduction, I feel that I had to make that point — we are ready, here, bilaterally or whatever the form it takes.

As the President said in his 16 January address on United States-Soviet relations, "co-operation begins with communications". This concept is part of our entire approach to East-West relations and to all issues on the East-West agenda — be it arms control, or regional problems, or human rights or an improvement in mutual understanding. We are ready -- as the President has made clear in word and action -- to tackle the difficult work of genuine co-operation.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

The United States has in fact reduced the over-all size of its own nuclear arsenals over the last two decades, but, we are ready to work for solutions and results — in Geneva, in Vienna, in Stockholm or indeed in any place where men and women of good faith are willing to sit down and negotiate in earnest.

Since my visit here last year, the United States has laboured long and thought very carefully about the contents of this treaty. We really are hopeful that other countries will carefully study it and join us in serious negotiations.

I am saddened and disappointed that some — without even seeing a draft — have chosen to issue statements charging that the introduction of this treaty text here today is the result of some simple political motivation.

I hope that we can convince those who have those reservations, who have made those statements, that we are sincere and that they will come to see, through the negotiations, our sincerity. Isn't it time that we focused on the concrete, open and universal desire of all people for reducing the weapons and the risks of war?

The United States has repeatedly over the last several years demonstrated its determination not simply to slow the rate of growth of the world's arsenals, but to reduce these arsenals.

I mentioned that we have reduced the over-all size of our own nuclear arsenals over the last two decades I don't think a lot of people even in my own country understand this, but the number of nuclear weapons in the American inventory was one-third higher in 1967 than in 1983; while from 1960 to last year, United States nuclear megatonnage dropped by 75 per cent.

In the last year, we've heard a lot of talk about the NATO modernization programme. In 1979, the NATO countries decided to seek arms control negotiations, but in the absence of an arms control agreement, to deploy 572 Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles.

But agreement or no agreement, the NATO countries decided at the same time to remove 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe, and these 1,000 weapons are now gone. Last year at Montebello, the NATO allies decided to reduce their arsenal by another 1,400 nuclear weapons. And whenever a Pershing-2 or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile is put in place, an existing weapon will be taken out of service.

The result of all this is that, in the absence of a treaty, NATO will deploy the entire 572 new missiles. NATO will still have removed five nuclear weapons for every one that has been added.

In the nuclear arms control talks over the last several years, the United States has sought multilateral agreements that would make even deeper cuts possible.

In the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks two and a half years ago, we proposed the "zero option". The "zero option" would eliminate the entire class of land-based INF missiles, and later, we indicated our willingness to agree to an interim step involving more limited reductions.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks which you are all familiar with, we proposed, nearly two years ago, a one-third reduction in the number of warheads on Soviet and American ballistic missiles. We subsequently also proposed alternative paths of "building-down" and of "trading-off" in order to move the negotiations forward.

We regret profoundly that the Soviet Union chose to leave, to walk out of the START and the INF negotiations, even while their unprecedented, and, unparalleled deployment of strategic and INF systems continued. We know that we are joined by others here at the Conference on Disarmament in urging the Soviet leaders to resume these important negotiations on which the world's hopes depend so much.

At the same time, we look forward to genuine progress in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations in Vienna, and in Stockholm at those important talks in the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

We seek effective and equitable cuts in the world's nuclear, conventional and chemical forces. We want to prevent their use and that is our goal and the determination to which we shall continue to dedicate ourselves.

We are determined that future generations will not look back on these and the other arms control negotiations of our time, as we look back on those of generations past, and shrug and say: "Of course all they did was, perhaps, to slow the pace of the arms race of that period. They didn't stop it, or reverse it — and they probably couldn't have". We want to do better than that.

In conclusion, let me just say something about chemical weapons. There is a need, as I said in these comments, to reduce tension. If ever in the history of mankind there was something on which people from every single country agreed, not us, Government officials, Excellencies or all of that, but let us put it in terms of the people. In my view, as a father and grandfather who is getting older, (I served with many of you around this table when I was a father but not a grandfather) in my view there is no difference between a family walking along the streets of Vladivostock or Leningrad, Peoria, Illinois, or Paris or London, Caracas, Belgrade or anywhere else — every single family, every child, if they know about it, is scared to death of chemical weapons. And we have come here today with a proposal that is very very broad. It reaches way out, goes way beyond what I would have believed my own country (we pride ourselves on openness), way beyond what we would have done a few years ago. A lot of that is in response to the feeling of people. I have travelled to Africa, people mentioned it there, in all these different continents there is concern about all kinds of things, East-West relations, nuclear weapons and all of this, but everywhere there is agreement on chemical weapons. That is why I personally sound like I do. But as the second highest official in the United States of America, I came to this Conference today. We are not suggesting there will be no criticism of what we have suggested. We are not saying that we are perfect, that everything must be exactly the way, and will end up exactly the way, that that treaty is drafted. But I just didn't want to leave here without telling some former colleagues, some new friends, some with whom my country may have differences, that we come here in a spirit of goodwill, and we came here trying to address ourselves to perhaps the most fundamental question on arms existing in the world today, that is, how do we, as civilized rational people, eliminate, ban in entirety, in a verifiable way, all chemical weapons from the face of the Earth?

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, the Soviet delegation welcomes the presence of the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush at today's meeting of the Conference. We have listened to his presentation of the viewpoint of the United States of America on some arms limitation issues. As the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, Mr. K.U. Chernenko, stated: "Today too we are in favour of having normal, stable relations with the United States of America, relations based on equality, equal security and non-interference in each other's internal affairs".

In its statement the Soviet delegation would like to touch upon a question of great importance for any negotiations between States, including those on the issue of arms limitation. We have in mind the problem of confidence between States. It is well known that international confidence has recently been considerably undermined as a result of the attempts of the United States to obtain unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the other side, the Soviet Union, spreading various kinds of doctrines and concepts substantiating the possibility of victory in nuclear war and the first use of nuclear weapons to this end. It is important now to undertake concrete steps in order to restore the atmosphere of international confidence.

Peace-loving rhetoric and assurances of a desire to improve relations alone do not suffice; what is needed is a readiness to back up words with practical deeds, constructive proposals taking into account also the position of the other side, of all the participants in the negotiations, and not only those stemming from one's own particular selfish interests. We are in favour of a dialogue, but a dialogue which is honest and business-like, aimed at the elaboration of agreements corresponding to the principle of equality and equal security. At the same time we are opposed to talk about dialogue for the purposes of propaganda and internal policy.

There are possibilities for starting to tackle the scores of outstanding world problems; there are many such possibilities. What is needed is the political will and determination to strive constructively, and not by words, for the normalization of the international situation.

One of the measures to strengthen mutual confidence in compliance with disarmament agreements, and thus international confidence, is verification, as is well known, and we would like to dwell on this in particular today. The Soviet concept of verification is based on the following: the main function of the system assuring compliance with the disarmament agreements, an integral part of which is verification, consists in ensuring confidence in their implementation by all parties to the agreements, and through certain forms of co-operation facilitating the settlement of disputes, thus providing for honest implementation by all States parties of their undertakings, and building confidence between them. The forms and conditions of verification or control envisaged in any specific agreement depend upon the purposes, scope and nature of a given agreement and are determined by them.

We approach the questions of verification concretely and not in terms of general declarations or abstract views. This approach of ours has been enshrined in the strategic arms limitation agreements, as well as in other existing agreements in the field of disarmament. Our policy on questions of verification is far-reaching.



Mr. Issraelyan (USSR)

As Comrade K.U. Chernenko stressed recently, "considering the policy and practice of the United States we are interested not less but probably more than the United States in reliable verification, in adequate concrete measures of arms limitation and disarmament".

The Soviet Union has made recently many far-reaching proposals on the verification problems concerning compliance with various arms limitation agreements. As an example let us take the negotiations on a chemical-weapon ban. During those negotiations we propose agreement on a whole range of different verification methods. These include national control, control with the employment of different national technical means, based on the latest scientific achievements, mandatory systematic or permanent international on-site verification, and finally the "challenge" inspections. Of course, the selection of any particular verification method is entirely determined by the goals of the chemical-weapon ban which it is intended to further. There is no universal system of control: each verification method must be linked to a specific activity prohibited or permitted under the convention. We have no unjustified leaning in favour of any single verification method, and we do not play with verification in order in fact to block the negotiations. The complex approach of the USSR to the questions of verification of a chemical-weapon ban completely ensures, we are deeply convinced, the effective implementation of the future convention.

Experience of international negotiations confirms that the basis for the solution of verification problems always consists in whether or not different sides taking part in the negotiations have the political will to conclude an appropriate agreement. In spite of the great difficulties connected with the solution of complex verification problems, including technical problems, it turned out to be possible to conclude, for example, the strategic arms limitation treaties between the USSR and the United States, as well as the agreements on the limitation of underground tests of nuclear weapons, on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the whole set of multilateral international agreements containing the relevant provisions on verification.

"I wish to emphasize most firmly" stated A.A. Gromyko at a press conference on 2 April 1983 -- that for the Soviet Union verification has never been a stumbling block for the implementation of agreements or negotiations in the course of agreements, though we have heard from the other side a great deal of demagogy on that score, particularly away from the negotiating table.

However, verification is impossible without appropriate agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. Just as disarmament is hardly probable without control, likewise there cannot be control without disarmament. It cannot be considered feasible, on the one hand, to block the elaboration of appropriate agreements in the field of disarmament, oppose negotiations and block appropriate mandates for subsidiary bodies, and, on the other, achieve agreements on verification measures.

The course pursued by the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of a nuclear-weapon-test ban can serve as an example of such a distorted approach to the verification problem. These countries continue to block negotiations aimed at achieving an agreement on a nuclear-test ban, while insisting at the same time on the continuation of the discussion of verification.

Mr. Issraelyan (USSR)

They tell us that the time for negotiations has not come, not everything is clear in the field of verification. We decisively disagree with this manner of approaching the question. We are convinced, and this is confirmed by many reports from various sources, including United States ones, that behind it there are plans for expanded nuclear-weapon testing with a view to the development of new types of nuclear arms. In our opinion all problems of verification, without exception, could be solved during appropriate negotiations if all sides display political will to achieve an agreement. In order to show once again our goodwill, the Soviet delegation would like today to state the following.

In the event that the mandate of the Conference's subsidiary body on a nuclear-test ban is revised and the elaboration of a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is begun, the Soviet Union would be ready to consider the possibility of organizing, as has been proposed by Sweden, the exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses with the establishment of appropriate international data centres on the same basis as is envisaged in respect of the seismic data exchange. We could speak about this in detail within the framework of the subsidiary body.

It is not by chance that today we refer to the problem of a nuclear-test ban. Its solution will seriously hinder the qualitative nuclear-arms race, in particular the appearance of the most destabilizing types of such weapons, designed to carry out a first strike. One can therefore say that the cessation of tests without delay also reflects the military and political intentions of States, a kind of material expression of the readiness to renounce preparing for a nuclear attack. Finally, the renunciation of tests is also tantamount to verification of adherence to the non-proliferation regime, since conducting nuclear explosions represents a necessary link in the development of nuclear weapons. Under current conditions, the question of a nuclear-weapon-test ban has acquired particular importance and urgency.

Soviet policy in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, as in all other fields, is based on principle and is not subject to the fluctuations of expediency.

It is the Leninist policy of peace and friendship with all States and peoples. One of its distinctive features is its active and initiatory character. This has once again been confirmed by the views of the Soviet Union on the questions of naval activity and naval arms limitation contained in the letter of the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This letter lays down a number of concrete proposals aimed at reducing military confrontation in the seas and oceans of our planet. At the request of the USSR delegation, the letter has been circulated as an official document of the Conference (CD/498).

We are convinced that there are many possibilities, including within the framework of the Conference, to reduce the threat of nuclear war through concrete deeds today, and to promote the improvement of the international situation. As was stressed by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade K.U. Chernenko, "The USSR will in full measure interact with all States which are ready by practical deeds to help to reduce international tension, to create an atmosphere of confidence in the world. In other words, with those who will really strive not for preparing war, but for strengthening the foundations of peace".

The Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Bush, primarily devoted his statement to commenting on the United States draft which we, naturally, will study as we study all documents brought before the Conference for its consideration. At the same time, he briefly touched on issues relating to the START and INF talks.

Mr. Issraelyan (USSR)

In this connection, I should like to refer to the statement of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade K.U. Chernenko:

"Of course, it is the bridling of the nuclear arms race that is of key importance to peace and the security of peoples. The Soviet Union's position on that issue is clear. We are against rivalry in building up nuclear arms arsenals. We were and remain proponents of the prohibition and elimination of all types of those weapons. Our proposals on this score were submitted long ago, both to the United Nations and to the Geneva Disarmament Committee, but discussion on them is being blocked by the United States and its allies.

As for Europe, we still stand for it being free from nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical ones.

We stand for both sides making the first major step in this direction without wasting time. In so doing, the Soviet Union has no intention of strengthening its security at the expense of others but wants equal security for all.

Regrettably, the United States has turned its participation in talks on this subject [the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and the limitation and reduction of strategic arms] into a tool of propaganda to camouflage the arms race and cold war policy. We will not participate in this game. The Americans created obstacles to the talks both on 'European' and on strategic nuclear weapons by deploying their missiles in Europe. It is the removal of these obstacles (which would also remove the need for our measures taken in response). That offers the way to working out a mutually acceptable accord".

Consequently, the Soviet Union cannot regard the appeals addressed to us to renew talks, at the same time as the deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles continues in western Europe and such weapons remain there, otherwise than as a manoeuvre designed to divert attention from the activities of the United States to upset the military balance between the USSR and the United States. Peace-loving rhetoric concerning negotiations and dialogue is not enough; what are required are genuine steps and acts, which would demonstrate the intention of the United States to conduct business with the USSR on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia), (translated from Russian): Allow me first to welcome you, the representative of friendly Sri Lanka, to the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April and to wish you success in your responsible office.

The Mongolian delegation expresses its thanks to Comrade I. Datcu, the Ambassador of Romania, for the great efforts he exerted as President of the Conference in March.

The Mongolian delegation would like to begin its statement today by referring to matters under the first item on our agenda.

The problem of complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests should, in our view, be counted as one of the highest priority issues in the field of nuclear disarmament. The earliest achievement of agreement on this problem would constitute an important measure of a material nature.

Mr. Erdembileg (Mongolia)

A comprehensive solution of the problem of a nuclear-test ban would block all channels of further refinement and proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form and would ultimately erect a reliable barrier to the escalation of the nuclear-arms race. Failing such a solution, the large-scale development and production of new, still more destructive types and systems of nuclear weapons will continue in future and the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war will steadily increase.

As is known, a group of socialist States, including Mongolia, recently submitted to the Conference on Disarmament working paper CD/484, in which it again stated its firm and decisive position on the question of prevention of nuclear war. The document covers the main areas in which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are concentrating their consistent peace-loving efforts.

In this connection I should like to refer specifically to the important statement, approved at the recent session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by the Soviet Government on its future activities in the field of foreign policy. The document states, in particular, that agreement among the nuclear-weapon Powers on the joint adoption of a certain set of norms to govern relations among them would play an especially important role in ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war. As is known, this idea, which corresponds to the interest and hopes of all peoples, was put forward by the head of the Soviet State, K.U. Chernenko, in his statement to voters in Moscow on 2 March 1984.

In its statement, the Soviet Government reaffirmed, inter alia, its readiness and determination to seek ways of implementing the idea of a nuclear-weapon freeze, to intensify its efforts and to make use of all available possibilities of ensuring that the threat of the arms race spreading to outer space should cease to exist.

In our view, in the elaboration of measures on the freezing of nuclear weapons under appropriate verification, provision should be made, among other things, for measures on the establishment of a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems.

On the other hand, the socialist countries consider that the proclamation by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions until the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests would assist the earliest elaboration of such a treaty.

The adoption of such measures would undoubtedly serve the cause of halting the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons and the development of ever new types and systems of such weapons and would assist the cause of limiting the arms race and reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war.

It should also be added that there is urgent need for the adoption of decisive measures to strengthen the international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form, which means not handing over such weapons or control over them to anybody, not to deploy them in the territory of countries where there are none and not to spread the nuclear-arms race to new spheres.

The Conference on Disarmament has, at earlier plenary meetings, considered and taken note of the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. We feel that since 1976 the Group of Seismic Experts has, on the whole, done useful work.

Mr. Erdembileg (Mongolia)

Its reports are important documents whose use will be indispensable in negotiations in connection with the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Technical issues involved in the elaboration of the appropriate provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, in particular those connected with the development of an international system of seismic data exchange, the establishment of International Data Centres, and the transmission of seismic data through communication channels of the World Meteorological Organization have, in our view, been dealt with in the most detailed manner. That, of course, is a positive element. On the other hand, we are put on our guard by the lack, in this multilateral negotiating forum, of any kind of serious negotiations on the elaboration of the treaty itself. This situation has arisen, first and foremost, as a result of the unwillingness of certain States to advance towards the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In order to cover up their reluctance, the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are deliberately over-emphasizing the question of the system of verification, whose importance is recognized by all the parties in favour of considering the substance of the matter. In short, persistent attempts are being made to impose upon the Conference on Disarmament a limited and curtailed mandate for its subsidiary body called upon to conduct negotiations on a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests.

In accordance with the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly, a group of socialist countries and the Group of 21 continue to support the adoption of a mandate which would make it possible to embark without delay on negotiations with the aim of the elaboration of an appropriate international treaty. Two draft mandates have been presented, one by a group of socialist States (CD/434) and the other by the Group of 21 (CD/492). Despite these constructive efforts by delegations belonging to these two groups of countries, it has proved impossible, owing to the obstructionist position of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, to reach consensus on drafting a mandate and on the question of setting up an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban having a suitable mandate.

We are disturbed by the fact that China and France continue to stand aside from participating in the consideration of the substance of this important question.

I should like to stress that the delegations of socialist States, reaffirming their position of principle on questions of real disarmament proceeding from the need to reach agreement on radical measures towards the limitation and reduction of weapons on the just basis of the principle of equality and equal security, have always shown flexibility, taking account of mutual interests, and have striven to find a mutually acceptable solution.

In this connection, we note with satisfaction that in his statement at today's meeting the representative of the Soviet Union expressed readiness, in the event of the revision of the mandate of the Conference's subsidiary body on a nuclear-test ban and the beginning of the elaboration of a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, to consider the possibility of organizing an exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses with the establishment of appropriate international data centres.

Mr. Erdembileg (Mongolia)

We believe that this statement by the Soviet Union testifies yet again to its readiness to reach agreement on one of the priority issues on the Conference agenda.

Taking advantage of the opportunity given me today to speak at a plenary meeting, I should like to touch briefly upon the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

At the current session, the Conference on Disarmament, after prolonged and complicated consultations, at last re-established a subsidiary body which is now functioning under the name of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. A new mandate was agreed for this body, containing the provision "to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible". Such a mandate, we think, offers the possibility of starting an important new stage in negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

From the very beginning of this session of the Conference, the socialist countries have expressed their readiness to participate in the new stage of negotiations in a businesslike and constructive manner.

The socialist countries' approach of principle and their views on improving the effectiveness of the work of the Conference in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons are reflected in specific terms in working paper CD/435.

Mention should also be made of the topical nature of the proposal by the Warsaw Treaty Member States to the States members of NATO on the question of freeing Europe of chemical weapons. Mongolia firmly believes that this initiative provides yet another vivid confirmation of the socialist countries' sincere desire to remove the threat of chemical warfare from the States and peoples of Europe and the whole world and to speed up the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Evidence of its constructive and flexible position, genuine interest in making progress in negotiations and search for mutually acceptable solutions was the Soviet Union's readiness to give positive consideration to the proposal for the permanent presence of the representatives of international control at special facilities for the destruction of stocks.

In its statements the Mongolian delegation has repeatedly stressed the need for an approach to the definition of verification measures commensurate with the requirements of the future convention. It has been emphasized again and again that the socialist countries attach no less importance than, say, the western States to the exercise of effective control over compliance with the implementation of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. They have proposed a very broad range of verification measures. These include, for example, national control, international inspection by challenge, systematic international inspection and, in certain cases, permanent on-site inspections. The Soviet Union's numerous proposals and initiatives on verification, which enjoy broad support in the negotiating body in question, are of great interest and significance in this respect.

Mr. Erdembileg (Mongolia)

We believe that a sensible approach is called for towards determining the most efficient verification systems. It is out of place to suggest that some States are concerned with verification, are ready for it and open to it from every point of view, while others think of nothing but preserving loopholes and violating the future convention. Participants in the negotiations are well aware of the unrealistic demands of the United States of America in control matters, demands which are divorced from the requirements of the future convention. Today in the Conference on Disarmament we heard the statement of the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush. The United States presented its views on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Mongolian delegation is prepared to study this document in order to determine its position concerning it.

We are forming the impression that certain western countries, under cover of a touching solicitude for commercial interests, are in fact trying to remove from the scope of control a potentially dangerous form of activity, namely, the production at commercial enterprises of the most up-to-date and dangerous varieties of chemical weapons. They claim that many hundreds of tons of the most super-toxic lethal chemicals, allegedly proposed for peaceful uses can be freely traded on the market.

The socialist countries propose that the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for any permitted purpose whatsoever should be limited, for any State party, to one metric ton a year and that such production should be concentrated in a specialized facility. Such activities would be placed under strict international control. And what do the western countries propose? They are in favour of permitting the production of one ton of super-toxic lethal chemicals for anti-chemical protective purposes, and of imposing no limitation on the production of such chemicals in all other cases.

The socialist countries, anxious to find a way out of the genuinely difficult situation conditioned on the one hand by the emergence of binary weapons and the possibility of producing their components at practically any chemical plant and, on the other hand, by the inadmissibility of interference in the economic affairs of States, have submitted appropriate proposals. These amount to the complete exclusion from peaceful chemical production of one highly specific category of chemical compounds, namely, those containing the methyl-phosphorus bond. It is this category which, as it were, sustains all the most dangerous super-toxic lethal chemical weapons, including binary weapons, and this category is practically not used for peaceful purposes.

In conclusion, I should like to draw attention to a fact of considerable significance. It has become known that the Pentagon is seeking a Congress appropriation for the production of binary weapons. It is planned to increase stockpiles of chemical munitions from 3 million to 5 million units and to build stockpiling bases outside the confines of the United States of America. Up to 10 billion dollars is to be spent on the implementation of this programme. We doubt whether anyone would deny that such actions are not compatible with the confidence building necessary for negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In stating some of its views on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Mongolian delegation, like many others, is guided by a sincere desire to assist the progress of the Conference's efforts in connection with the elaboration of a future convention on the complete prohibition of this dangerous class of weapons of mass destruction.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): My delegation is inscribed on the list of speakers today to address the subject covered by the Vice-President of the United States of America, chemical weapons.

More than half a century ago, Australia acceded to the Geneva Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases. That action gave expression, in international law, to the abhorrence felt by the Australian people for this dreadful and indiscriminatory class of weapons.

The first involvement in wider international relations of the then newly unified Australian nation was by Australian troops who went to Europe in 1914-18, every one of them voluntarily, to assist in the defence of Europe. Many of those young Australians were gassed. They were amongst the first victims of the use of chemical weapons. That horrible experience endures indelibly in the Australian national consciousness and history. It was a deeply traumatic experience and it remains today a potent source of Australia's deep commitment against chemical weapons. These weapons are abhorrent. They must be outlawed and eliminated.

The Geneva Protocol was necessary and Australia continues to support it, but it must be recognised that the Geneva Protocol is an incomplete instrument. It fails, for example, to outlaw the development, production, or stock-piling of chemical weapons. These weapons continue to exist, reportedly in quantities and kinds greater than ever before. What is worse, these weapons continue to be used.

Four weeks ago the Secretary-General of the United Nations sent a team of experts to Iran to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons in the war in the Gulf. An Australian scientist was a member of that team. The experts' report was unambiguous, unanimous, and deeply disturbing. Mustard gas has been used in the Gulf war and, for the first time in documented history, a nerve agent has been used.

A new international convention preventing the use of chemical weapons and ensuring that such use is made impossible through the destruction of all chemical weapons is urgently required. The making of such a convention is a task of great magnitude. But it is a challenge we must accept.

The action of the Government of the United States in presenting to this Conference a comprehensive draft convention on chemical weapons picks up that challenge with courage and determination. The earnestness of the United States' intentions at this time has been demonstrated by the presence here today of the Vice-President of the United States of America. The length and detail of the document which has just been distributed and its presentation tell of the effort which has gone into its preparation.



(Mr. Butler, Australia)

It is sometimes said that "politics is the art of the possible". In our view it is more important in politics and in history that an opportunity lost, or not recognized in time, can be an opportunity lost forever.

In the present case of chemical weapons, my Government believes that this Conference now faces an unprecedented opportunity. It is an opportunity, and a possibility, that we should not let slip through our fingers. Our peoples, and succeeding generations, would fail to understand if we did not grasp it.

We have a solid foundation for developing the final text of a chemical weapons convention such as is demanded by all members of this Conference.

The Soviet Union and the United States held extensive bilateral discussions on outlawing chemical weapons from 1976 to 1980. Those discussions produced agreement on many issues fundamental to an all-embracing ban on chemical weapons and this was communicated to the Committee on Disarmament in a joint paper at the time. The conference and its predecessor bodies have also worked for many years towards this convention.

During the last three or four years this process has been carried further. A great deal of constructive work towards a convention has been done within the Committee on Disarmament. Many Member States have made significant contributions. Well over 100 working documents covering many different aspects of matters essential to the convention have been tabled and discussed in this Conference.

This process of bilateral and multilateral consultation has produced an impressive degree of consensus on such matters as definitions, the prohibitions needed, the need to destroy weapons stocks and decommission production facilities, and the identification of activities which need to be regulated by the convention.

Just how far we have come towards common views can be seen from the significant area of accord between the Soviet Union's 1982 basic provisions for a chemical weapons convention presented to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament-- and the United States draft that has been tabled today. Both documents of course draw on the work and achievements of this Conference. Our work towards eliminating chemical weapons has now been given added impetus and relevance by this United States initiative.

What will be of critical importance is that all concerned resolve now to negotiate in good faith. That negotiation will necessarily raise many issues of real contention and concern. But because of the stakes at issue, because the weapons concerned are terrible, because the security of all of our peoples is involved, we must not be daunted by the size of the job.

Negotiation of this Convention is no less ambitious an undertaking than was the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its associated institutional arrangements. That Treaty and its mechanisms were successfully negotiated despite the difficulty of the enterprise. There were an abundance of sceptics who said it could not be done, but it has been done. That Treaty is in force in 124 nations and in the opinion of most of us it works well. Similarly with the chemical weapons convention; it can and it must be done.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Australia believes that, for an effective chemical weapons convention, special emphasis must be given to three essential elements: first, an uncompromising prohibition of the use of chemical weapons; second, provision for the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and for the prohibition of the future development and production of such weapons; third, a verification regime that will ensure that these treaty commitments are being honoured.

Rigorous standards will be involved, particularly in the area of verification. There can be no security in such a convention unless the means of verification of compliance with the convention are effective and seen to be effective. We must negotiate the verification provisions with great care.

We are aware that there are differing views on what arrangements for verification would be required to ensure confidence that the obligations of the convention are being observed. The United States draft is particularly valuable in pointing to the standard of verification needed for this purpose.

We appreciated the statement by the Soviet Ambassador to this Conference on 21 February, with regard to verification of the destruction of stock-piles. That statement addressed one of the difficulties in the area of verification. It seemed to indicate a willingness to find negotiated answers to the problems of verification and my delegation heard again with great interest today further clarification from the Soviet Ambassador on this point.

It is critical that we proceed further to extend these negotiations, particularly with regard to verification.

My Government believes that it is not beyond the ingenuity of the members of this Conference to find the required solutions to these problems, without compromising our respective national interests.

Australia deeply appreciates the political commitment expressed today by the Vice-President of the United States in presenting this draft and the stated willingness of the United States to enter into negotiations with full commitment and good faith.

We also deeply appreciate that this draft convention has been presented here to this Conference on Disarmament. That action confirms the stated and acknowledged role of this Conference. It validates a principle to which all members of this Conference are deeply attached, that arms control and disarmament agreements can be negotiated multilaterally and must be because the interests of all of us are involved.

Australia accepts the present challenge. It will not fail to seize the present opportunity. It will participate with all possible vigour, with its fellow members of this Conference, to bring into existence, as soon as possible, a convention which will ensure that chemical weapons are never again used and which will eliminate those weapons for all time.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): We have listened with the utmost interest to the statement made today by the distinguished representative of the United States, who, on this occasion, has been the Honourable George Bush, the country's Vice-President, on the frequently heralded draft convention for the elimination of chemical weapons. We propose to consider that important document with the care it deserves, and in due course we shall present here whatever observations appear desirable in that regard.

Concerning the issues relating to nuclear weapons to which Mr. Bush also referred, my delegation's position has been set out on various occasions and I shall not repeat it. I shall merely mention the opening meeting of 7 February, the 255th meeting on Tuesday, 3 April, at which, as it will be recalled, the Conference on Disarmament was unable to adopt the draft submitted by the Group of 21 on account of the negative attitude of two delegations, and the item concerning the cessation of any arms race in outer space, concerning which I expanded my initial remarks, made at the opening meeting, at the 258th meeting on Thursday, 12 April. The statements of a general nature made today by Vice-President Bush do not suggest that we may perhaps witness shortly a more positive attitude on concrete issues on the part of the United States.

Meanwhile, and taking advantage of the fact that the third item on our agenda covers not only the prevention of nuclear war in the strict sense but also "all related matters", I shall broadly describe, using the faculty allowed by rule 30 of the rules of procedure, some of the events we consider most pertinent in this regard which took place during the recent Latin American trip of the President of Mexico, Mr. Miguel de la Madrid.

That trip, which took place between 26 March and 7 April and covered five countries of the Latin American subcontinent -- chronologically, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Panama, in other words, the other three countries which together with Mexico form the so-called "Contadora Group", and Argentina and Brazil gave rise to a number of statements and agreements at the highest level which will certainly help to strengthen basic principles of international co-existence, such as those set out in paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Those principles are "respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States", the faithful observance of which, moreover, is an essential condition for the achievement of one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations Charter, namely, the self-determination of peoples.

I shall therefore review very briefly the statements and agreements to which I referred above.

At the dinner offered for him by the President of Colombia, His Excellency Belisario Betancur, on 26 March, the day of his arrival in Bogota, the Head of the Mexican Government stated inter alia:

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"For the full exercise of our sovereignty, we must leave behind us the era of divergences, of submission to the hegemonic centres and the models which deny the originality of our historical and cultural heritage. Latin America has always been a grand design of liberation: the time has come to carry it out ...

In Central America, the flames of intervention are being fanned, but the conflicts in the area, in their origins and their long-term effects, are not the result of the East-West conflict. We demand that there should be no mystification of the facts...

We, the four countries of the Contadora Group, have proposed, through negotiation and dialogue, viable agreements aimed at reaching peace. We wish to eliminate tensions which have nothing to do with the root of the problem. We know the region well, and we know that without interference and with a genuine will for understanding such measures not only would avoid war but also could ensure the future stability and welfare of Central America. Contadora is a Latin American effort to resolve a Latin American conflict."

On the following day, 27 March, the two Presidents signed a joint declaration which stresses "the urgent need to foster an atmosphere of understanding which would help to reduce international tension" and reiterated "the need for the major Powers to conclude as rapidly as possible agreements on the limitation of strategic and intermediate-range weapons, and to undertake effectively to carry out general and complete disarmament under international control".

Further on, the joint declaration stresses that:

"The Presidents examined with particular attention the situation in Central America and carried out a broad review of the peace efforts undertaken by the Contadora Group, consisting of Panama and Venezuela as well as Colombia and Mexico. They reiterated their unswerving determination to continue their efforts for negotiated solutions and for full respect for the principles of non-intervention, the self-determination of peoples, the prohibition of the threat and use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes and co-operation for development. They agreed that the Contadora process was the Latin American response to the options of force which threatened to make Central America the setting for a generalized struggle and an arena for confrontation between the Great Powers.

They stated that while that process had certainly helped to avert the outbreak of war in Central America and to generate the elements for an honourable and equitable negotiation, they remained seriously concerned at the increase in the foreign military presence, in the arms race, in destabilizing activities, in displays of force and the violation of human rights ...

They therefore urged the States which exercised political influence and provide military assistance in the area to refrain from carrying out actions which might accentuate antagonisms, and to lend their active collaboration to the process of building peace".

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

In the following stage of the trip to which I am referring, President de la Madrid arrived in Brazil, in whose capital, Brasilia, he stated on 30 March in his speech before the Brazilian Congress:

"In the face of the conflicts raging in Central America, our countries clearly and decidedly urge the option of dialogue and negotiation, which they oppose to acts of confrontation, destabilization and interference. They are also opposed to the artificial involvement in the confrontation between the super-Powers of a conflict rooted in economic backwardness and social inequality."

In the Brazilian capital on the same day a joint declaration was also signed by the Mexican Chief of State and the President of Brazil, His Excellency Joao Baptista Figueiredo, which contains the following:

"The Heads of State noted with concern the deterioration in the world political setting ... observing that, unfortunately, peace has become more precarious and political negotiations between the major Powers have in fact been interrupted ... The arms race is absorbing an increasing amount of resources which are thus removed from use on behalf of development. Intervention and destabilization activities, which largely worsen the atmosphere of international relations, are on the rise ...

They therefore reiterated the urgent need for the restoration of dialogue at all levels between the super-Powers and, in particular, that disarmament negotiations should be resumed, leading to the curbing of the arms race and allowing general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The entire international community should participate in these negotiations through the bodies set up for that purpose, particularly the Conference on Disarmament."

With regard to the situation in Central America and its prospects, the Presidents held a detailed dialogue, as a result of which:

"They noted that in recent months peace had been very seriously threatened and the risk of a regional conflict had increased. If the latter should occur, international peace and stability would be jeopardized and relations in the hemisphere would be irreparably damaged. Consequently, the two Presidents agreed to stress the importance of strengthening the efforts of the Contadora Group on behalf of peace, the allaying of tensions and the economic and social development of the Central American countries. The President of Brazil reiterated his Government's firm solidarity and support for such efforts ...

They noted that in view of the prospects of peace and understanding stemming from the activities of the Contadora Group, it was essential that all countries with interests in the region and the Central American countries themselves should refrain from carrying out actions which could jeopardize them or further worsen the situation ..."

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

In Buenos Aires, where he arrived on 2 April, in his speech at the dinner offered on 3 April by the President of the Argentine Republic, His Excellency Raul Ricardo Alfonsín, the President of Mexico stated:

"Mexico does not admit any kind of tutelage which jeopardizes the capacity of peoples for self-determination. On the other hand, it advocates subordination to the law and the use of peaceful means to settle disputes ...

In calling for a renewal of détente, dialogue and negotiation, we are affirming our right to live in concord and harmony. We do not accept being hostages of the confrontation between the super-Powers. We reject the condition of being mere spectators of our time, which the conflict of interests of the super-Powers seeks to impose upon us ...

Pacification in Central America cannot be separated from the Latin American approach of the countries promoting dialogue ... hence the importance and significance of the Argentine Government's endorsement of the approaches and the work of conciliation and diplomatic negotiation fostered by the Contadora Group.

In the face of the growing and inadmissible threats of intervention and the reiterated displays of the absurd force of bayonets in Central America, Argentina and Mexico reaffirm their unshakeable faith in the final and decisive victory of solidarity, law and justice."

On the following day, the two Heads of State issued a joint declaration in which, after referring to the "broad exchange of views they had had on the complex and dangerous situation in the world", they asserted "the independent nature of the foreign policy of their countries"; noted that "the policy of confrontation of the blocs is a threat to mankind and runs counter to the aspirations of self-determination and democracy of peoples"; and condemned the arms race, "particularly the acquisition and accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, stressing the incoherence of the super-Powers' strategy of deterrence and the irrationality of allocating vast resources for destruction, when urgent problems of development, and in many cases problems of survival, exist in large areas of the planet". In reviewing the present international situation, they reiterated "their unswerving belief that relations between States should be based on the strict observance of principles of international law and co-existence", and agreed that "halting the arms race and preventing nuclear war constitute a priority task for the present". They expressed their "profound concern at the danger inherent in the constant qualitative and quantitative increase in nuclear arsenals and their propagation around the world", and declared "their commitment to promote effective measures aimed at achieving the final goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament on a non-discriminatory basis".

The two Presidents carried out a thorough analysis of the situation in Central America, and "pointed out that the Central American crisis was the most

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

disturbing problem on the immediate horizon" and therefore "there was an increasingly urgent need for solutions and channels of understanding which would eliminate the danger of an armed conflict, which, if it were to break out, would have repercussions for the stability and development of all the countries in the region and would irreparably damage relations in the hemisphere". Thus, they stressed "the fundamental role played by the Contadora Group which represents the Latin American response to what is clearly a regional problem". They recognize that "the acceptance by the Central American countries of the Document on Objectives, in September 1983, was a political commitment which had opened up real prospects for negotiation"; they expressed "their concern at the persistence of the intimidatory practices and destabilizing actions occurring daily, which were designed to impose a false military option and which hindered the work of the Contadora Group aimed at finding a just and honourable diplomatic solution for all parties", reiterating their "appeal to all countries with interests or links in Central America to suspend carrying out actions which would certainly aggravate the situation prevailing in the area".

Caracas was the fourth stop in the President of Mexico's itinerary. At the dinner offered for him on 5 April by his Venezuelan colleague, His Excellency Jaime Lusinchi, he said the following:

"A peaceful international atmosphere, free of tension and confrontation, is inconceivable if our region continues to be artificially converted into the battleground for alien conflicts, as is now the case in Central America...

"In Central America, through the Contadora Group, in which our countries participate together with Colombia and Panama, we are carrying out a sustained and tireless effort in the interests of peace, the alleviation of tension and development. We do not wish to see, in this area which is near to us and to our hearts, the outbreak of a conflict brought in from outside, but rather the common search for solutions, in solidarity, plurality and understanding. It is therefore particularly urgent that activities which exacerbate confrontation, jeopardize stability and hinder development, should be stopped."

As in the three previous cases, the visit to Venezuela culminated in the signing of a joint statement in which the two Heads of State noted that "East-West tension and the stagnation of North-South co-operation are aspects of the same critical situation, which has a negative impact on the political and economic development of the developing countries". They pointed out that "the advance of the nuclear and conventional arms race was an affront which threatened survival and absorbed financial and technological resources which were essential for development"; while "the virtual breaking-off of effective political communication between the major Powers worsened the international atmosphere and narrowed the field of co-operation". In the face of this situation, they stressed "the need for all States, and especially the most powerful States, faithfully to observe the

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

principles of non-intervention, self-determination of peoples, prohibition of the threat and use of force and peaceful settlement of dispute", as well as the need "to revitalize disarmament negotiations and make new efforts to alleviate existing tensions".

The Presidents examined the situation in Central America and noted that it entails very serious risks, since "events had occurred which, far from helping to alleviate tensions, tended to worsen them and to increase the danger of generalized conflict, which would affect the whole of the region and cause irreparable damage to relations in the hemisphere". The two Heads of State "reaffirmed their unshakeable will to continue, within the Contadora Group, the search for peaceful and negotiated solutions to the Central American conflict", stressing that "for that purpose it was essential to abandon the policy of destabilizing actions, frontier incidents and militarist projects which hindered the purposes of regional dialogue and conciliation. They also agreed on the urgent need for the countries with links and interests in the region to give effective support to the Contadora process, and that the Central American countries themselves should abide by the undertakings they had entered into when adopting the Document of Objectives, in order to consolidate the understandings and arrive at legal agreements which would finally establish an atmosphere of peace and co-operation".

Panama, whose Contadora island gave its name to the group of four Latin American countries formed there on 9 January 1983, was the country whose capital constituted the last stop on the President of Mexico's Latin American trip. On his arrival at "Omar Torrijos" airport on 7 April, he stated, when addressing his host, the President of the Republic of Panama, His Excellency Jorge Illueca:

"Latin America is currently facing problems and opportunities. The principle problem is the threat to peace in Central America ...

"Nothing durable, nothing healthy can be built on force and violence. Violence cannot be invoked to build democracy and freedom. Democracy and freedom need peace ...

"The solution of the Central American problem depends essentially on the political will of the Central American peoples and governments. This is the right which Mexico defends; this is the right which the Contadora Group affirms".

As a result of the broad exchange of opinions carried out, the two Heads of State on that day signed a joint communique in which, with regard to the world political situation, they deplored the deterioration in that situation and stressed the "need to restore the political dialogue between the Great Powers and to find channels of negotiation leading to a reconciliation of their differences and to achieving effective agreements, particularly in disarmament matters".



(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

With regard to the Central American situation, the two Presidents "agreed that the conflicts and disorders in the Central American countries were rooted in the economic, political and social conditions prevailing in each of them, and that it was unacceptable to set them in the framework of East-West confrontation". They expressed concern at the "intensification of the escalation of tension and conflict in Central America, destabilizing practices and the persistence of foreign interference and aggression which endangered international peace and security"; they stressed the importance, "for the purposes of pacification in the area, of the support given by the international community to the Contadora Group", considering it opportune to recall in that connection "the reiteration by the United Nations General Assembly of the right of all the Central American countries to live in peace and to determine their own future free from all foreign interference". They appealed both to the Central American governments and to "the countries with links and interests in the region to display by deeds their willingness to support the efforts of the Contadora Group".

The viewpoints expressed by the President of Mexico and the Presidents of the other five Latin American Republics he visited during his recent trip are so similar that it was possible without any difficulty to adopt the various joint declarations of which I have just quoted the paragraphs of greatest interest to such a body as the Conference on Disarmament.

The texts of those paragraphs are clearly what is usually described as self-explanatory. Nevertheless, I shall venture to emphasize that they clearly reflect the general opinion of all the Heads of State in question concerning the urgent need to restore the dialogue between the super-Powers and particularly to resume disarmament negotiations.

I also think it necessary to stress that, with regard to Central America, there is consensus in proclaiming that the conflicts and disorders in the area are rooted in the economic, political and social conditions of the countries concerned and have nothing to do with the East-West confrontation, as it is sometimes artificially claimed. It is therefore essential to desist from what are variously designated in the joint statements as "destabilizing actions", "intimidatory practices", or "militarist designs", and for the governments of those States "having links and interests in the region" or which "exercise political influence and provide military assistance" in the region to demonstrate through acts the support which they have proclaimed for the Contadora Group, and to refrain from any open or disguised interference in the affairs of the region.

As Mexico stated at the United Nations during the recent Security Council debates which culminated in the veto by one of its permanent members of a resolution which received 13 votes in favour, Mexico considers that the claim which has been made in Central America of "bringing about peace by making war"

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

is absurd. Therefore, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, as members of the Contadora Group, met in Panama on the day following the end of the President of Mexico's trip, on 8 April, and adopted a communiqué which contains the following three paragraphs:

"They noted that during recent weeks the regional scene shows signs of serious deterioration. The activities of irregular forces, supported by supplies and communication centres located in the territory of neighbouring countries and aimed at destabilizing the governments of the area, have been stepped up. Sophisticated arms, novel military methods, and dangerous forms of attack have been introduced. Actions such as the mining of ports have been undertaken which damage the economy, disrupt trade and jeopardize the freedom of navigation.

They also noted with concern the increasingly overt presence of foreign troops and advisers, the heightening of the arms build-up, the proliferation of military actions and manoeuvres, all of which contribute to intensifying tension and increasing mistrust.

They therefore consider it essential for the countries with links and interests in the region to demonstrate by concrete acts the support they have expressed for the Contadora Group, emphasizing once again that a wider conflict would have profound repercussions on all the countries of the region and would affect the entire continent."

The soundness of these remarks is clear if it is borne in mind that legally Security Council resolution 530 (1983) is still in full force. The resolution was adopted by unanimity by the Council's 15 Permanent Members and non-permanent members on 19 May last year. It endorsed the appeal of the Contadora Group "in that the deliberations of the Council should strengthen the principles of self-determination and non-intervention in the affairs of other States, the obligation not to allow the territory of a State to be used to commit acts of aggression against another, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the prohibition of the threat or use of force to resolve conflicts", and reaffirmed "the right of Nicaragua and all the countries of the region to live in peace and security free of external interference".

That is certainly why the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in his recent visit to Mexico, after referring specifically to resolution 530 which I have just mentioned, made the following statement:

"The conviction of the Contadora Group that it is necessary to seek solutions through negotiation, and in them to envisage the fundamental roots, social as well as economic, of the problems, has set them on a sound course and will lead them to just results. Their rejection of any

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

attempt to import into the region the factors of the present confrontation between East and West, with all its definitely negative repercussions, is also a matter for commendation. As Secretary-General, apart from my constant availability, my role, according to this resolution, is to support the Contadora Group, and to inform the Security Council."

As a member of this Group, whose activities for peace in Central America are based on "the observance of the principles of international law which govern the acts of States" and which were included in the so-called "Document of Objectives" adopted last September, Mexico is convinced that this right should be taken very seriously and that no attempt should ever be made, by sophistry and sleight of hand, to try to justify acts of State terrorism which are even more serious than individual terrorism.

That is why we venture to hope that the time may soon come for the implementation of the measures which the Contadora Group has promoted and which, as President Miguel de la Madrid recalled, in the message he addressed to his people on 9 April, on the occasion of his return to Mexico, are "the cessation of hostilities and of acts of war or preparations for war, the curbing of the arms build-up, the commitment of all countries of the region not to support subversion and destabilization in neighbouring countries, and the withdrawal of foreign military forces".

It should be borne in mind that the declarations and appeals in this connection which abound in the joint statements of the Latin American trip to which I have referred come from the highest-level spokesmen of six countries -- Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Panama and Mexico -- which represent 78 per cent of the surface area of Latin America and 75 per cent of its population, while their economies account for 77 per cent of the regional total. For those who consider statistics decisive or at least of capital importance, we believe that the above figures should encourage them not to treat these statements and exhortations lightly.

The PRESIDENT: There are two more speakers on my list, and in view of the lateness of the hour I propose to suspend the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament now and resume it at 3.30 p.m. Is there any objection? I hear none.

Before I suspend the Conference may I announce that the contact group meeting under agenda item number 5 will now not take place at 3.30 p.m. in Room C.108 as originally scheduled; it will take place after the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and reconvened at 3.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I have remaining on my list of speakers for today the German Democratic Republic and France.

I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, today, my delegation would like to dwell upon agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

In the efforts for achieving international security and disarmament, developments in outer space have increasingly entered the minds of the peoples during the past few years. These developments are playing an ever more important role in the policy of States. The time is now ripe to set a course in the interest of peace. Either we will be able to maintain and strengthen freedom for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, to the benefit of all States, or outer space will be included in the arms race, with all its dangerous consequences.

The launching of the first artificial earth satellite by the Soviet Union almost 30 years ago opened up the age of practical exploration and use of outer space. Utopian ideas of former generations came true. In international treaties, States undertook to use outer space for peaceful purposes. People all over the world followed with great sympathy the sensational success of scientists and cosmonauts. New dimensions for co-operation between States having different social systems became apparent. In particular, the joint space venture of the USSR and the United States was regarded as a promising sign in this respect.

However, the United States is now doing an about-turn: it is undermining world-wide consensus on freedom and peace in outer space by including space in its adventurous policy. Relevant facts have already been outlined here; there is no need to repeat them. We share the view that such activities cannot be separated from the deployment of Pershing-2 and Cruise missiles as nuclear first-strike weapons in Europe. Our continent is regarded as a potential nuclear battlefield, whereas the United States should be shielded by a large-scale and space-based anti-ballistic missile system against a retaliatory strike. Those plans and actions are now as before dominated by the doctrine of a limited nuclear war proceeding from the assumption that such a war is wageable and winnable.

The extension of the arms race into outer space cannot be justified by any argument whatsoever. On Thursday last week, the delegation of the United States has reiterated pretexts, which it has put forward for years now, against the conclusion of international agreements.

We have the following observations to make upon that statement. Firstly, it is remarkable that the representative of the United States confined his statement to the question of anti-satellite systems, i.e., he referred only to one aspect of his country's military activities concerning outer space. Once again, the attempt was made to allege an advantageous position of the Soviet Union in this field. Only the naive can believe that, for instance, the Shuttle project has nothing to do with military activities including actions against satellites belonging to other States. We also recall that in 1979, the United States broke off negotiations with the Soviet Union on anti-satellite weapons. This is another proof of the endeavour

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

to include outer space in the arms drive and war preparation. The rejection of all obligations likely to hinder this course is part and parcel of such a policy. The refusal to join the moratorium declared by the Soviet Union gives strong evidence of that conclusion.

Secondly, the delegation of the United States avoided any reference to the comprehensive plans known as the "Star Wars" concept which was proclaimed in March last year at the highest level, accompanied by a large propaganda campaign, and which became only recently, by Directive 119, a binding guideline of that country's policy. It stands to reason that in considering measures against an arms race in outer space, such dangerous plans deserve our special attention.

The following facts cannot be refuted. The creation of a space-based anti-ballistic missile system would upset the relationship between the limitation of strategic defensive and strategic offensive weapons and would thus inevitably increase the danger of nuclear war. This concern even became the subject of international agreements. The preamble of the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems of 26 May 1972 stresses that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons. That means, as a matter of logical thinking, that the envisaged anti-ballistic missile systems will render more probable a nuclear war. They are a firm part of a strategy of a nuclear first strike. This is in contradiction with international law. Article V, paragraph 1, of the aforementioned Treaty stipulates the fundamental obligation that "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy anti-ballistic missile systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based -- I repeat space-based -- or mobile land-based." To our understanding, this is the basic norm of the Treaty, which has also to be the guideline for all the other concrete stipulations.

It cannot be contested that the Outer Space Treaty of 27 January 1967 stipulates the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Moreover, it assures each individual State the concrete right to take part in these activities without any discrimination. The militarization of outer space as strived for by the United States will inevitably result in this right being restrained or even abolished. Therefore, we associate ourselves with all those delegations which regard the planned activities as incompatible with the Outer Space Treaty.

It should be possible to prevent an arms race in outer space since almost all States in supporting resolution 38/70 of the latest General Assembly favoured negotiations on the issue. It is our hope that in the United States too comprehension that the militarization of outer space will not bring the desired military and political advantages will gain the upper hand. The only feasible way towards strengthening national and international security is the cessation of the arms race and gradual disarmament by means of international agreements.

At this Conference, different approaches to the question became evident. The great majority of delegations request the establishment of a Committee with a negotiating mandate, as already provided for in resolution 38/70, which was also supported by my country. There is no "false bottom" to our policy. We, therefore, advocate the consistent implementation of that resolution. This applies, above all, to operative paragraph 7.

We may ask, what are the elements still to be identified or examined in non-committal discussions concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space as suggested by the delegation of the United States. We have at our disposal the text

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth, submitted by the Soviet Union. This treaty not only identifies all relevant problems but also offers concrete solutions. It fully corresponds to the complexity of the subject. The draft clearly and unambiguously provides that no weapon of any kind whatsoever shall be put into outer space. The main question is not whether to work out one or several agreements. What we need is a comprehensive solution. The draft treaty submitted, which takes into account constructive considerations of other States, offers the Conference a good basis for negotiations, and in this negotiating process, it is up to everybody to propose amendments or supplements. To speak in clear terms: My delegation does not at all want to come to a situation similar to that which has been created by the opponents of a comprehensive test ban.

It only can serve a useful purpose to clearly spell out how things are going. Official statements of the United States Administration reveal its great efforts and the immense material means it is investing in the development, testing and production of different types of space weapons. In contrast, considerations of preventing an extension of the arms race to outer space and concluding international agreements are evidently for appearances' sake only. In substance those agreements and negotiations are rejected. Consequently, this Conference should invite the United States to reconsider its position and take into account what the great majority of States demand in the interests of international security and disarmament.

My delegation will address the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons in the further course of our session. Today, I would like to make only a few remarks on this issue.

The German Democratic Republic, like the other socialist countries, is striving for a speedy and radical solution in this field. I may recall resolution 38/187A, of the last General Assembly, which was initiated by my country. The proposal on the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe is also aimed at this objective.

In order to reach a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, it is necessary to intensify the negotiations within the framework of this Conference. A number of proposals have improved the conditions in this respect. This applies, in particular, to the far-reaching Soviet initiative of 21 February 1984 concerning the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. The working paper of China on major elements of a future convention and that of Yugoslavia on national verification measures contain valuable ideas. The mechanism of verification proposed by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and France in different CD documents are the subject of thorough examination by us. This will also be our approach to the draft convention submitted today. In any case, the yardstick will be to what extent all the documents contribute to the speedy elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

However, it seems to us quite strange that one of the draft treaties was linked with a motion addressed to Congress for granting huge sume for a programme for the production of qualitatively new chemical weapons. It is well known how difficult it is to prohibit weapons once production of them has already started. Conducting negotiations in good faith means refraining from actions directed against the purpose of those negotiations.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): The French delegation wishes to express its profound satisfaction at the presentation today of the United States draft treaty on chemical weapons announced in January in Stockholm by Mr. George Shultz. We particularly appreciate the fact that it was presented by the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

This event certainly marks a very important stage in the negotiations undertaken here on chemical weapons. We are sure that this draft will provide a very constructive contribution to the negotiations.

France will do everything in its power to contribute to the success of the negotiations.

The chemical threat looms over the world. In Europe, it is an important aspect of security concerns.

Recent events have shown that chemical weapons were used in other parts of the world, and we know that the capacity to produce them is quite widespread.

Chemical disarmament is therefore not a matter for regional solutions but for a general solution: a multilateral treaty of universal scope.

The French Government has long advocated the conclusion of such a treaty which should include, in particular, a detailed time-table for the destruction of stocks and the dismantling of production facilities. A few days ago, the French delegation submitted a Working Paper on the subject. Needless to say, the treaty on chemical disarmament should include essential verification measures in order to create among States Parties the necessary degree of confidence in the respect for its provisions.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

I would like to repeat the announcement that the meeting of the contact group under item number 5 of the agenda will take place in Room C.108 immediately after the adjournment of this plenary meeting. As there is no other business for today, I intend to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 24 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.05 p.m.





# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.261  
24 April 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Tuesday, 24 April 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Dhanapala

(Sri Lanka)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN  
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. BUTLER  
Mr. R. ROWE  
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium: Mr. M. DEPASSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U PE THEIN TIN  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. J.A. BEESLEY  
Mr. G.R. SKINNER  
Mr. R.J. ROCHON

China: Mr. QIAN JIADONG  
Ms. WANG SHIYUN  
Mr. LIANG DEFENG  
Mr. LIN CHENG  
Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG  
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA  
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. A. CIMA  
Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I. HASSAN  
Ms. W. BASSIM  
Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS

Ethiopia: Mr. F. JOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. M. GERDTS

Hungary: Mr. D. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GAJDA

India: Mr. M. DUBEY  
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia: Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI  
Mrs. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. ANDRADJATI  
Ms. R. TANZIL

Islamic Republic of Iran: Mr. N. KAMYAB  
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA  
Mr. F. SHAHABI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan: Mr. M. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands: Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria: Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru: Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland: Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. P. BALOUI  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka: Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden: Mrs. M.B. THEORIN  
Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. L.E. WINGREN  
Mrs. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. T.F. DMITRITCHEV  
Mr. V.I. USTINOV  
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN  
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV  
Mr. G.A. ANTSIFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. N. CLYNE  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. C. PEARCY  
Mr. J. PUCKETT  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference continues today its further consideration of outstanding matters, as reflected in the Programme of Work adopted at the beginning of its 1984 session. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As you know, our last plenary meeting will be held on Thursday. On that occasion, I intend to convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider some pending organizational matters. If there is no objection, we will proceed accordingly.

It was so decided.

At that informal meeting we will consider the results of the consultations held in the contact groups, established to consider proposals under agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 5, which have been meeting up to now and that will continue between today and tomorrow. We should also consider the letter addressed to me by the Chairman of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That letter was circulated in delegations' boxes on 17 April and is being circulated again today for information of Members.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Cuba, Sweden, Burma, Romania, Pakistan, Senegal and China.

I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Lechuga.

Mr. LECHUGA HEVIA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Ambassador Dhanapala, allow me to begin by expressing our appreciation of the efforts which you have been making to promote the work of the Conference. Like your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Datcu, you have tried persuasion and have spent a good deal of time endeavouring to help us advance in our work.

It is, however, clear that we are very far from being in a serious negotiating process, very far from replacing demagogic rhetoric and propaganda devices by specific achievements helping us to attain the disarmament to which all mankind aspires, to lighten the atmosphere of war which today envelops the world and to establish sound bases for co-operation among all nations.

The serious and dangerous situation in which we find ourselves is certainly not due to the structure of the Conference. It is due to the warlike behaviour of a great Power, the United States, and the more or less enthusiastic support of some of its allies. One does not have to dig very deep to reach this conclusion, since the facts are there for all to see. As regards the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, there is an imposing amount of documentation and a wealth of experience accumulated over the 20 years during which the matter has been under discussion, yet the United States still considers that we are only just taking the first steps towards eventual negotiations. The situation is the same regarding the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. In this area, it has not even been possible to establish a subsidiary organ with a limited mandate. The question

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

of preventing an arms race in outer space encounters the same obstacles. There is simply no desire to negotiate. We could go on adding to the list of frustrations with which we and world public opinion are confronted.

At the close of this first part of the Conference's annual session, the so-called spring session, we do not present the fertile and flourishing picture which would be appropriate to the season but, rather, a grim polar landscape in which sleight of hand is used to trick us into seeing something which does not exist. Seldom before in the history of international relations has there been such a persistent and deceitful campaign to manipulate public opinion and distort the facts as the one which we are now witnessing.

The present juncture is characterized by a refusal to negotiate and, of course, to negotiate in good faith. There is not a single forum in which one can point to some positive achievement, whether in political, economic or military matters. Consequently, the virtual paralysis of this Conference has its origins elsewhere. There is an entire policy of avoiding bilateral or multilateral commitments. Understanding is shunned in the area of disarmament, because the aim is to gain military superiority and then negotiate from positions of strength. While there is talk of peace, new weapons of great destructive force are installed. At a recent NATO meeting in Turkey, the United States Secretary of Defense stated that his country would not negotiate any treaty prohibiting anti-missile weapons. The United States Department of Energy is requesting additional funds to ready a new underground nuclear-weapon-testing site in the State of Nevada as part of a long-term multi-billion-dollar plan to increase stocks of land-, air- and sea-based nuclear weapons.

While the Conference has, for the last two years, been attempting to initiate negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the United States Government has been preparing a testing site at Pahute Mesa in the State of Nevada with a view to carrying out approximately 30 nuclear tests in 1985, since there is no longer any room for such tests at the Yuca Flats site. It is here maintained that the obstacle is verification, when it is common knowledge that verification problems have basically been resolved, as has just been affirmed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and as was already stated 22 years ago by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is not verification that is hampering negotiations -- the fact is that there is a nuclear testing programme for the next few years and there is an unwillingness to abandon it.

Negotiations at the Conference on matters concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are opposed on the grounds that this is a question for bilateral discussions. However, this is to overlook the statement made in the Final Document of 1978, as reaffirmed in 1982, that "Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation". It is also to overlook the very *raison d'être* of this body -- although it receives self-serving praise on other occasions, as happened last week when the United States submitted the draft convention on chemical weapons. It is obvious that, to keep up appearances, a pretence is being made of respect for the Conference when in actual fact such respect does not exist.

It should be noted in passing that a vast publicity campaign has been mounted in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons. While nobody doubts that this is a very important question, it cannot serve as a smokescreen to conceal the

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

lack of constructive dialogue on other vital issues, which is really the 'aim.' The use of chemical weapons is so serious that the Vietnamese people is still suffering from the consequences of the chemical weapons used years ago on its territory by the armed forces of the United States. We are all interested in prohibiting chemical weapons, and none of us needs to be lectured on the desirability of a treaty for that purpose. What now needs to be examined is whether the draft is a serious document or a text with hidden pitfalls designed precisely to prevent it from being adopted.

The outlook for the Conference's next session could not be less promising. It has already been announced that the SALT II clauses will not be observed next year. The President of the United States has declared that no possible agreement beyond those already governing military activities in outer space is considered of global interest for the United States and its allies. The United States refuses to pledge non-first use of nuclear weapons. In no area is a window of hope for negotiation opening up.

The climate of confrontation in international relations which determines the course of the Conference is worsening daily. Dialogue has given way to threats, hostility and aggression. An outstanding example of this warmongering policy is provided by the situation in Central America and the Caribbean, which is serving to heighten tensions throughout the world. The praiseworthy efforts of the countries of the so-called Contadora Group to settle differences through dialogue and a peaceful solution are met by the mining of Nicaragua's ports, the vetoing of a Security Council resolution condemning this practice and the announcement that any ruling on this question will be ignored, the acceleration of the virtual military occupation of Honduras, recourse to State terrorism, intensified aggression, contempt for public opinion and the flouting of international commitments and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

We all know that the present international situation is unfavourable. Precisely for this reason, however, the countries interested in breaking the current deadlock in negotiations, which constitute the vast majority of the international community, as reflected each year in the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly calling for dialogue on an equal footing with a view to progressing towards the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, will go on pressing more and more forcefully and passionately for a fruitful outcome to the work of the Conference, despite the existing obstacles. The manipulation of public opinion to conceal the truth is ultimately doomed to failure, and there are already signs that this is happening.

It is important that the Conference should properly reflect this unproductiveness of the negotiations in its report to the General Assembly and should not, by omission, become a party to the deluding of public opinion, that the Conference should strengthen its own authority and recover its role as sole negotiating body, and that it should speak out about what is really happening and openly declare that productive agreements could be reached if the small group of States which is obstructing the negotiations were to show political will. This is the message we must convey to international public opinion as often as may be necessary.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin.



Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Mr. President, the first session of the Conference on Disarmament is coming to a close.

We are meeting at a time when the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union is continuing unabated. It has been given a free rein. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the United States has added the equivalent of one Hiroshima bomb (12.5 kt) to its arsenal about every 30 minutes since World War II, that is, one Hiroshima bomb every 30 minutes for 38 years, day and night, 7 days a week. The USSR has increased the explosive power of its nuclear stockpile to roughly the same level as the United States stockpile. Now, even more destabilizing nuclear weapons are being deployed and developed at an accelerating pace.

We are meeting at a time when new rungs are being added to the escalation ladder that might give rise to dangerous illusions that a nuclear war could be limited to Europe. Doctrines of horizontal escalation are threatening to spread military conflicts from one region to another.

The nuclear-arms race is being fuelled on the one side by illusory hopes of achieving supremacy and invulnerability and on the other by the mutual fear of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers that the other is seeking a first-strike capability.

The testing of new warheads and the efforts to use outer space in nuclear warfare play a major role in this context.

The foundation for an intensified nuclear-arms race in the years and decades to come is being laid in "the laboratories of death", on the test ranges of the major Powers and in the "think tanks" of nuclear-use theoreticians conceptualizing new strategic and tactic doctrines for the fighting of a nuclear war on Earth and in space.

We are meeting at a time when we have just learnt about findings indicating the devastating effects to the human species and to life-supporting systems that under certain conditions would follow on already a limited nuclear war. I refer to the warnings of the prospects of a "nuclear winter" settling over the Northern hemisphere and of the "nuclear cloud" spreading also to the Southern hemisphere threatening the very conditions on which human life on Earth is built.

We are meeting at a time when the citizens of this planet are increasingly questioning the right for any nation to use nuclear weapons and in particular to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

This challenge is coming from many directions; from the United Nations, from churches and trade unions, from international lawyers and from strategic thinkers.

Has this growing concern among the general public been adequately reflected in our work during this first session?

It has of course been present in many of the statements made at the Conference. But when it comes to our efforts to enter into and even to approach concrete negotiations on the nuclear issues, there has been a complete lack of progress.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

We have been unable to agree on when, how and even if to start. In some cases there seems to be an unwillingness even to enter into negotiations on the crucial issues concerning measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to disarmament.

I particularly refer to obstacles raised to our efforts to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons through a comprehensive test-ban treaty, to stop the emerging arms race in outer space and to start working on the prevention of nuclear war. This unwillingness to negotiate on nuclear disarmament issues in the Conference on Disarmament takes place at a time when no bilateral negotiations are going on between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers.

It is hard to see how the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can avoid judging this as a violation of article VI of the Treaty. Only decisive progress in "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" in the coming year is acceptable.

Fifteen months from now most of us will take part in the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That conference will be of importance for the future of the NPT regime in a world where the technical capacity "to go nuclear" is spreading. Before 1995 a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue to be in force. The decision will be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. If we want an extension of the Treaty — and Sweden considers it vital for international peace and security — the Third Review Conference must not be allowed to become yet another failure.

An agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty would greatly facilitate a successful outcome of the Review Conference, as well as a future extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

It is with the deepest concern that I call the attention of the Conference to the complete lack of progress during this session in the work towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The responsibility rests heavily on those nuclear-weapon States which are presently blocking progress to the reaching of such an agreement, thereby endangering peace and security.

It is of vital interest that we now start working on the CTB issue with the view to reaching agreement on a treaty in time for the NPT Review Conference. This goal is reflected in the mandate proposed by the Group of 21.

We all know that there are no insurmountable technical obstacles to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is, therefore, obvious to us that some States give priority to a continued development of new types of weapons instead of honouring their commitments in the limited test-ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is a dangerous and shortsighted attitude.

In our view every nuclear test constitutes in fact a rehearsal for a nuclear war that would risk to destroy conditions for human life on this planet. My question is: Who has given the nuclear Powers that right? An overwhelming majority of the citizens of this planet is asking the question: Who gave you the right to plan for and rehearse a nuclear war?

A comprehensive test-ban treaty is not only a priority for governments, but particularly for women and men of this planet. It is up to us to respond to that demand.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The latest United Nations General Assembly assigned to us the task, as a matter of priority, to address the question of the prevention of the arms race in outer space. The rapid technological development gives a particular sense of urgency to our work on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament. Our efforts to halt the arms race in outer space must not wait. Our task will be infinitely more difficult tomorrow if we fail to set our work in train today, at a time when enormous financial and scientific resources are already being used to fuel a threatening, destabilizing and expensive arms race in outer space.

This race touches upon fundamental aspects of international security. The major military Powers seem haunted by the temptation to seek security through an illusory invulnerability achieved by supremacy in space warfare. The consequence will however not be increased security. Instead the result will be increased insecurity.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have carried out tests of antisatellite systems. There is a close link between development of ASAT weapons and ABM systems. The construction of dual-capacity weapons, which can be used against both satellites and ballistic missiles, is indeed feasible. Development and testing of ASAT weapons could also be used for the circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

The Conference on Disarmament should now respond to the task entrusted upon it by the General Assembly. We should prepare for urgent negotiations on an international treaty banning all space weapons, including weapons directed against targets in space. An ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should urgently be set up. Time is pressing.

The nuclear-arms race and the deep suspicion between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers are factors characterizing in an ominous way the world today. No effort must be spared to break the evil circle of increasing tensions and an accelerating and unharnessed arms race. We must promote the creation and a gradual broadening of a dialogue between the two major nuclear Powers on security concepts. The non-aligned and the neutral States as well as all the members of the alliances should actively participate in such a dialogue. The aim of that dialogue should be to develop ways giving primacy to political dimensions of security such as détente and disarmament as well as improved development efforts to disarm the "social bomb".

Untiring efforts must be made to further the building of confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union through disarmament, arms control and military confidence building. Creative imagination, pedagogic and persuasive skills will be called for in these efforts. With regard to the Conference on Disarmament an ad hoc committee on the prevention of nuclear war should be the focal point for such efforts.

Five years ago the United States and the Soviet Union submitted identical draft treaties on Radiological Weapons entitled "Joint USSR-USA proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

Since 1979 the deliberations on a treaty prohibiting radiological warfare are being carried out at the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Last year exploratory discussions and negotiations were carried out in the Ad Hoc Working Group both on prohibiting development and production of radiological weapons and on the prohibition of radiological warfare in the form of attacks on nuclear energy facilities.

Sweden is prepared to participate actively in negotiations on both tracks.

Radiological weapons as such do not exist in the present. This fact provides us with an opportunity to negotiate a model convention on the prohibition of possible future means of warfare. Such a convention should contain provisions on concrete measures to halt research and development of new weapon systems and even weapon concepts. Our goal should be to reach provisions that are more ambitious than those developed in the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD).

My delegation would, in a spirit to facilitate the work on track A, like to reiterate a proposal, presented in the Ad Hoc Working Group in June last year for a formula for a positive definition on the concept of radiological weapons that in our view solves the problem of not legitimizing nuclear weapons.

Sweden is working on the problem of delimiting the concept of radiological weapons from that of particle-beam weapons not having mass destruction effects and based on the principle of accelerated radioactivity.

As to track A verification, we think that safeguarding the relatively few deposits of radioactive material that are large enough to be significant as potential sources for production of radiological weapons, should such weapons ever be produced, would be a relatively simple one. The experience gained regarding international safeguards aimed at preventing diversion of material from peaceful uses to weapons is considerable.

The most powerful means of conducting radiological warfare is an attack on nuclear facilities. Let me give you a few examples.

The radioactive effects of an attack on an ordinary power reactor could cause immediate effects comparable to the fall-out from a 20 kT nuclear-weapon surface explosion, while the long-term radioactive effects could be in orders of magnitude more severe than those for a nuclear explosion. It would be noted in this connection that the production rate of radioactive substances in a 1 000 MW nuclear electrical generating station is equal to that of one 60 kT atomic bomb every day. After some time of operation, the core of such a reactor is very dangerous indeed, if brought into the open.

Although only rather modest amounts of short-lived compounds would emanate from the burnt out reactor a substantial amount of long-lived compounds would be released, which would contaminate and render uninhabitable a considerable area for decades.

If an attack is carried out with a nuclear weapon the effects will be disastrous. Immense driving force for dispersal of radioactive substances would be added by the nuclear explosion. The radioactivity contained in the reactor would also be added to the radioactivity produced by the bomb itself.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The reactor contains relatively small amounts of short-lived radioactivity and would only contribute modestly to the total dose rate during the first week after the detonation. However, the amounts of the more long-lived compounds are very substantial in the reactor and after only one week the radioactivity that emanates from the burnt-out reactor would overshadow the radioactivity of the bomb itself.

If a one-megaton bomb is detonated, the area affected by a radiation dose exceeding 100 rads would be some 2,000 square kilometres. If the same bomb hits a nuclear reactor of 1,000 megawatt -- a common size -- the area affected by the same radiation dose of 100 rads perimeter would encompass an about 20 times larger area or about 30 to 40,000 square kilometres! The consequences of a nuclear bomb explosion on a storage tank could be even more disastrous and result in doses exceeding 100 rads in an area of more than 50,000 square kilometres.

It is thus quite obvious that the damage inflicted on countries where many reactors are in operation and many more are being built or planned would be disastrous indeed. Attacks on nuclear facilities would make practically the whole of these and neighbouring countries uninhabitable for years or decades.

Attacks on nuclear facilities involve risks for mass destruction in many countries where such facilities exist and in neighbouring countries as well. These risks exist right now. I do not have to remind anyone here that this is a means of warfare that does not necessarily require the possession of nuclear weapons on the part of the attacking side.

An agreement on the prohibition of attacks, including nuclear attacks on nuclear facilities should be simple and straightforward. Attacks on nuclear reactors, reprocessing facilities, spent fuel storages and waste deposits on land should be prohibited. My delegation will present a concrete proposal in these terms.

On the question of the link between tracks A and B, the Swedish position is rather flexible. Originally the Swedish delegation considered the track B proposal as a specification to draft article III in the United States/USSR proposal of 1979. But other solutions to secure the link are possible. Substance is more important than form.

Shocking events during the past months have emphasized the importance of our efforts to make a major breakthrough in the negotiations of a treaty on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

The Swedish Government condemns the use of chemical weapons, which has been established by the team of experts sent to Iran by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This constitutes a grave violation of international law and the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It has caused great human suffering and is contrary to fundamental rules of humanitarian law.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

It is of the greatest importance that international agreements and principles of international law are fully respected and that all alleged violations are investigated.

A heavy responsibility rests upon every Government committing such violations of the Geneva Protocol and international law. Every effort must be made to prevent any further use of chemical weapons.

Last week Vice-President Bush presented a draft convention on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. It was a valuable contribution to the ongoing negotiations. Another valuable input was made by Ambassador Issraelyan on 21 February when he developed the position of the Soviet Union with respect to the issue of verification of destruction of stockpiles.

New hopes have been raised by these contributions which we welcome as signs of commitment to serious negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching an early agreement.

It is important that this positive development be fully reflected in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee. The lack of confidence between the two major Powers must not be allowed to lead to a loss of this opportunity.

It is against this background that I would like to express our concern at any lack of constraints as regards the production of chemical weapons. History tells us clearly that disarmament never can be achieved through armament. There is no need for production of chemical weapons — binary or other chemical weapons. All States should refrain from producing chemical weapons during these important negotiations.

Let me end by expressing my hope that the start of our substantive negotiations on a treaty on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons will have a stimulating effect. Renewed efforts must be made during our break to prepare for an early consensus on the mandate for the work of the Ad Hoc Committees on the urgent issues related to the efforts to halt the nuclear arms race. Our efforts should be redoubled when seen in the context of the preparations needed to guarantee a successful Third NPT Review Conference.

New nuclear-weapon tests take place every week. The concern and anxiety of the peoples are growing. We, the members of the Conference on Disarmament, have been given a special task. We can only live up to the responsibility embedded in this task through negotiating efforts, pursued seriously and in good faith.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma):: Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to say how pleased we are to see you, the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, assume the Presidency for this month of April. The spring part of the session of the Conference is drawing to a close and my delegation wishes to express our appreciation to you for the effective manner in which you have conducted the duties of your office and the contribution you have made to overcome outstanding procedural issues. May I also express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Datcu of Romania for the able direction he has given to the Conference during his tenure of the Presidency.

Security and survival are the foremost concern of our times and the world community has never been more conscious of this concern; the challenge we now face is to find measures that will inhibit, reduce and ultimately eliminate the threat of a nuclear war. In so far as the work of this Conference is concerned, the item on nuclear war prevention has now been on the agenda for over a year. Since then, the Conference has accumulated a considerable wealth of ideas in the form of working papers and proposals presented by delegations and groups of delegations, which should provide us with enough material for the selection of specific and urgent measures that are necessary in our work on nuclear war prevention. If the Conference is to move forward on this item, my delegation considers it necessary to reiterate that a subsidiary body with an appropriate mandate should be created to make it possible to examine all proposals with a view to selecting measures that warrant foremost priority.

My delegation has on several occasions already expressed our views on what we consider to be priority measures necessary to reduce the risks of nuclear war, and it is not my intention to repeat them today; the purpose of my statement being to emphasize the important role that prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons plays in nuclear war prevention. Such a prohibition becomes particularly significant when we look at it from the perspectives of: the strengthening of the existing principles of international law; the practice of prohibiting the use of certain kinds of weapons before their reduction and elimination from arsenals of States are possible; and above all, the need to enhance global security through the rule of law.

There have been assertions that nuclear war prevention should be considered in the context of prevention of all wars, as it is assumed that the causes of war, whether conventional or nuclear, are the same. In a sense there is some validity to this concept, for seen in the broader context, wars arise out of the adverse consequences of relations between States, which are generally political in nature. However, in the age of nuclear weapons, when the security interests of the Great Powers are founded on the reliance on nuclear weapons, to assume that the causes of all wars, whether nuclear or conventional, are similar in nature, is to overlook the realities of the nuclear-arms race itself, with all its attendant risks. Doctrines of deterrence and their corollaries, far from providing security, are oriented towards the continuation of the nuclear-arms race. Such doctrines are predicated upon recourse to the use of nuclear weapons, and in times of crisis when decision-makers can no longer control events, the danger of a nuclear confrontation becomes imminent.

Since ancient times, mankind, while waging wars, has also contemplated its causes. During the war between Sparta and Athens, the Greek historian Thucydides differentiated between the immediate causes and the underlying causes of war. He said that the latter can be compared to the accumulation of a mass of combustible material, the former as the match which sets the accumulated material ablaze. What Thucydides said some thousands of years ago can aptly be applied to the situation

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

prevailing in the nuclear age, for the growing accumulation of nuclear weapons constitutes the combustible material which could precipitate a nuclear war in times of grave international crisis. International peace and security cannot be founded on the reliance on nuclear weapons, for in the final analysis nuclear war cannot be prevented by the possession and continued accumulation of the very instruments for waging such a war.

Many authoritative sources consider the use of nuclear weapons as contrary to the principles of existing international law. Nuclear weapons were not yet in existence when the laws of war came to be codified. However, the absence of express prohibitions is not tantamount to the lawfulness of the weapons in question for any new method of destruction must also conform to the fundamental principles of the laws of war and neutrality, and above all the principle of humanity. The indiscriminate and uncontrollable destructive effects of nuclear weapons far surpass those weapons and methods of warfare which were in existence and were prohibited when the laws of war came into existence, and there can be no ambiguous interpretation of the inadmissibility of their use on several counts. Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary has most incisively dealt with this issue in his statement of 15 March 1984.

The use of nuclear weapons would bring destruction and suffering to mankind on a scale much larger than the use of those weapons that are specifically prohibited under international agreements and declarations.

However, the need to strengthen existing laws through express prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons goes far beyond the need to consolidate the humanitarian principles of the laws of war, for it concerns the very survival of mankind. This need is clearly evident if we refer to paragraph 47 of the Final Document, which states that: "Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization." In addition, reference may also be made to paragraph 58 of the Final Document, which states that: "In particular, nuclear-weapon States should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible, through international agreements, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered." The Final Document has emphasized the prevention not only of nuclear war, but also of the use of nuclear weapons which embraces a broader concept than the former, and has specifically emphasized the need for legal prohibitions on the use of nuclear weapons.

Although the prevention of nuclear war and the non-use of nuclear weapons have recently been the focus of attention in the United Nations General Assembly and in this forum, which is the outcome of the growing concern by the international community on the danger of a nuclear war such efforts can in no way be interpreted as new developments. For over the years numerous initiatives at the international level have been made on the limitation and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Resolution 1653 (XVI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its sixteenth session, in 1961, has declared the inadmissibility and illegality of the use of nuclear weapons, as contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime under international law. The resolution inter alia declared that:

(a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization and, as such, is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity;



(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

(c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone, but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons;

(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization.

Resolution 1653 (XVI) has categorically declared the use of nuclear weapons as illegal under existing principles of international law and as a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The continuation of efforts on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war have an organic relationship with this resolution, the importance of which cannot be exaggerated.

We do not know to what extent the so-called doctrines of deterrence contribute to the avoidance of direct conflicts between the two Great Powers. But we share the belief with the majority of the international society that such doctrines are illusory in terms of securing a permanent system of world peace.

In looking at doctrines of deterrence from the broader perspective of international security, which also takes into account the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those of the Third World, it can be seen that although no wars have taken place between the nuclear-weapon States, deterrence has not prevented conflicts in which nuclear-weapon States were involved vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon States. This has been mentioned in the 1980 report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on nuclear weapons which states that:

"While it is difficult to state whether and to what extent it has contributed to avoiding war between the **super-Powers**, it is clear that it has not sheltered the non-nuclear-weapon States from the threat of others, nor prevented a number of conflicts involving both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers."

Bearing in mind this authoritative statement, it is evident that doctrines of deterrence, apart from other negative attributes, do not contribute to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Such doctrines and the blurring of the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, in which tactical nuclear weapons play a contributory factor, have deleterious effects on the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. From this perspective, commitments by the nuclear-weapon Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and the progressive development of prohibitions on the use of nuclear weapons, can contribute towards the strengthening of security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike.

My delegation believes that there is an objective approach by which we can subscribe to nuclear war prevention by drawing upon the progressive historical development of law on war prevention in general which arose out of the practical difficulties encountered in efforts to prevent wars through law. From the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, to the Charter of the United Nations, there has been a shift in emphasis from the prohibition of war to banning the threat of use of force.

Article 2 (4) of the Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force, avoids the technical difficulties which were encountered under previous instruments which arose out of the interpretation of the meaning of the term "war". If the objectives of nuclear war prevention are to be consistent with Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons becomes particularly significant.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Burma for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu.

Mr. DATCU (Romania) (translated from French): As the work of the first part of the annual session of our Conference draws to a close, the Romanian delegation would like to express some views on the topics relating to nuclear disarmament which appear on the agenda.

It has been a common keynote of the speeches made by most delegations that during the past period the international situation has deteriorated. The arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, has taken on fresh scope. Policies of force, threat of the use of force, and interference in the internal affairs of other States have been intensified.

The arms race has entered a new and extremely dangerous phase, more particularly after the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles by the United States of America in some countries of western Europe and the application of countermeasures announced by the Soviet Union. Scientists, including United States and Soviet ones, warn us that the utilization of even a part of the existing nuclear arsenals would lead to the disappearance of life on our planet. Nicolae Ceausescu, the President of Romania, has said that, this being so, the fundamental problem is to halt the nuclear-arms race, to succeed in stopping the deployment of United States nuclear missiles in Europe and the countermeasures announced by the Soviet Union, and to ensure the resumption of the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the elaboration of an agreement on the complete elimination of those missiles, as well as of all nuclear weapons in Europe. The appeal of the Grand National Assembly of Romania to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Congress of the United States of America, the parliaments of European countries on whose territories intermediate-range missiles are installed, and the parliaments of other European countries and Canada, giving expression to the feelings of the Romanian people, stresses the need to "concert our efforts and to act together to help reduce international tension, cease the nuclear-arms race and reach agreements opening the prospect of the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the continent and of the danger of a devastating nuclear war" (document CD/493 of 2 April 1984).

The fundamental interests of peace and of the very existence of mankind call for the rejection of any theory concerning the acceptance of nuclear weapons as a fatal necessity and, still more, the possibility of their use "within certain limits". Such theories should be rejected as immoral, and the General Assembly of the United Nations has done so by declaring, rightly, that recourse to nuclear weapons constitutes a crime against humanity; while history provides numerous examples showing how conventional wars end, there is no precedent as far as nuclear hostilities are concerned. Analysts emphasize the fundamental difference that exists between the two types of war, and most of them have arrived at the conclusion that in a nuclear war, any ending other than annihilation is difficult to foresee. This proves that it is impossible to formulate any credible theory on the "limitation" of nuclear war, especially since any nuclear war must, of necessity, be a world war, with all the tragic consequences that this entails. A nuclear war cannot be "limited", whether from the point of view of its effects, or of its intensity, or of the geographical area in which it takes place.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

This is why we cannot accept the argument that nuclear weapons are a fatality that mankind must learn to live with, for to do so would be tantamount to accepting an inescapable slide towards nuclear disaster.

To our great regret, nuclear disarmament topics are precisely those on which the work of our Conference is bogged down in a state of inertia, or even of paralysis, as several speakers, including today, have said before me. On the first item on our agenda, that of the nuclear test ban, the Conference has not succeeded in drawing up a unanimously acceptable mandate, thus preventing the establishment of an ad hoc committee. On the second item, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", informal consultations have shown that there is practically no chance of a subsidiary body beginning its work this year. As for item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", although some progress has been recorded with regard to the acceptance of the idea of establishing an ad hoc committee, the necessary consensus on the mandate of that body has not yet been achieved.

The Ad Hoc Committee established in connection with item 6 entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" is not functioning. What conclusion can be drawn? The conclusion is devastatingly obvious that the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, is prevented from playing a central role in matters of priority and of the greatest urgency, those of nuclear disarmament.

The full gravity of that conclusion can be measured by the ongoing accumulation and incessant modernization of nuclear weapons.

The Romanian delegation cannot accept, even tacitly, the Conference's lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament.

The deterioration of the international situation and the fact that there are no longer any bilateral negotiations on nuclear matters, the complexity of the problems involved, their impact on international security, the choices available to the military blocs and the strategic theories that have recently begun to be put forward, cannot, in our view, constitute arguments against starting negotiations. Quite on the contrary, they plead in favour of prompt and responsible action aimed at putting an end to the race towards disaster.

No argument can or should prevent us from acting without further delay at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

We should like on this occasion to reaffirm our full support of the tireless, competent and dedicated activities pursued by our distinguished President for April 1984, Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, with a view to the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items 1, 2 and 3 of the agenda relative to nuclear disarmament.

Nevertheless, I should like to inject a sense of urgency into the informal discussions on that subject. It goes without saying that, if at the beginning of the second part of this year's session, the Conference proves unable to address itself in a practical manner, through negotiations, to problems relating to the nuclear test ban, the prevention of nuclear war and security guarantees, we shall find ourselves in a situation of unprecedented gravity in the long history of the negotiations in Geneva.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

We are going to enter a stage where the fundamental concern will be with achieving "balance" or "parity". The upward balance, on which the doctrine and the theories of "deterrence" are based, is not only inoperative — encouraging, as it does above all, the trend towards superiority, each party being concerned with "redressing the balance" — but also exercises a destabilizing and demobilizing effect.

In the present situation where the structures of the defence forces of States are, by definition, asymmetrical, the exercise of comparing them in order to establish the types and the exact number of weapons capable of ensuring parity is tantamount to comparing things that are incomparable.

The equation seems to have no solution. Balance between whom and what? Between two or several States? Between military blocs? Between nuclear and conventional weapons? Between systems of weapons or between totalities of systems, on a global or a regional basis? etc., etc.

This process leads to nothing but the conclusion — an unacceptable one — that nuclear weapons are a fatality before which we are powerless.

To stop this process is not impossible. There is no shortage of concrete ideas. The tabulation of proposals concerning nuclear disarmament made between the establishment of the United Nations and the convening of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament alone (document CD/293) lists 355 specific initiatives of this nature.

We think that all these ideas, and others too, deserve to be analysed by our Conference, or — better still — that studying them is our reason for existence. This is why the Romanian delegation has proposed that all initiatives aimed at the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament should form the subject of the activities of a subsidiary body established to that end. This body should be entrusted with implementing paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and should identify basic issues to be dealt with in multilateral negotiations, including the elaboration and planning of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in the Final Document, as has been proposed by the Group of 21.

This subsidiary body would also facilitate the holding of structured discussions with a view to the establishment of ad hoc committees on specific aspects of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, we could use the framework offered by such a body in order to ensure the necessary correlation between various negotiations on nuclear and other topics taking place at the Geneva Conference or in other forums.

In a statement earlier this month I said: "If the subsidiary bodies on high-priority issues are not set up, the very credibility of our Conference will be seriously jeopardized".

The first part of our annual session will end shortly. We are convinced that all delegations will use the break in our work in order to analyse thoroughly, in their respective capitals, the status of the negotiations and the measures called for. We hope that this process will enable the Conference, from the outset of the second part of the session, to set up subsidiary bodies on high-priority issues of nuclear disarmament, so that real negotiations in good faith on the priority items on our agenda can get under way.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, it is a source of great pleasure for my delegation to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. The manner in which you have guided our deliberations has been entirely in keeping with the high standards of professional competence and diplomatic skill that we have come to associate with Sri Lankan diplomats. You represent, Mr. President, a friendly neighbouring country with which we not only have excellent relations but also share common perceptions on important regional and international issues.

May I also avail myself of this opportunity to express my delegation's deep appreciation to the distinguished representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu, for the great patience and determination with which he conducted the business of this forum during the month of March.

I intend to confine my statement today to item 6 of our agenda, namely, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", better known as "Negative Security Assurances". This subject has been under negotiation in this forum since 1979. Unfortunately, its initial promise petered out not long after it was taken up by the Committee on Disarmament. Today the possibility of any forward movement has diminished to a point where this item of our agenda has been virtually left to wither away.

The Pakistan delegation approached the commencement of negotiations on negative security assurances with the conviction that a successful conclusion of work on this item would significantly contribute towards defusing international tension and reducing the increasing risk of the use of nuclear weapons.

In our efforts to develop a uniform formula of security assurances which could be incorporated in an international legally binding instrument, the Pakistan delegation left no stone unturned. We explored endlessly various questions that were raised regarding the nature and scope of negative security assurances. We looked into the possibility of interim arrangements, e.g., a Security Council resolution. We examined both the form and the substance of such assurances but all to no avail.

While recognizing that the most effective assurance against the nuclear threat lay in the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons and in nuclear disarmament, Pakistan has been of the view that until the larger objective is achieved, some measures must be adopted to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

or threat of use of nuclear weapons. For us, negative security assurances constitute a first step towards ensuring the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States in a nuclear world which is not of their making. We believe that it is politically, legally and technically possible to provide such assurances. We have pointed out that if these are not provided, the alternative for non-nuclear-weapon States would perforce be to seek protection under the nuclear umbrella of one of the major nuclear Powers, thereby accentuating the already existing dangerous bipolarity. It could even mean creating conditions in which the number of nuclear-weapon States starts increasing.

The unilateral declarations of the five nuclear-weapon Powers extending security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States which were made in 1978 represented a promising beginning. In fact, the declaration by China was from our point of view entirely acceptable. Similarly, the recognition that there was no objection in principle to an international convention on the subject was in our view another important advance. But that is where the forward movement came to a grinding halt and for the last two years the efforts of the Group of 21 have been completely stonewalled. In fact what began as a legitimate demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States has become an issue between the two alliances and their special interests. I can do no better here than refer to the excellent analysis of the different unilateral declarations made by my distinguished colleague the Ambassador of Brazil in his statement before the plenary on 9 August 1983. His conclusions were fully confirmed, if such a confirmation was necessary, by paragraph 22 of the 1983 Report of the Working Group dealing with this subject (I refer to document CD/417) where it was pointed out that a State can use any means it deems appropriate in the exercise of its right of self-defence, even when the use of nuclear weapons has been specifically declared a crime against humanity by the United Nations General Assembly.

Pakistan's position of principle is that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be without qualification, not subject to divergent interpretations and unlimited in scope, application and duration. Recognizing the existence of the two alliance systems as a fact, my delegation has been ready to look at alternatives pragmatically. It was in this spirit that we proposed that those non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the security arrangements of the two opposing military alliances could be excluded from the ambit of negative security assurances. This proposal has not been made out of insensitivity to the nuclear concerns of these States. We felt that the case of those who belong to an alliance system in which the nuclear option has been kept open is different from the case of those non-nuclear-weapon States who are not members of such an alliance.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

In the circumstances it is basically for the former to make the choice as to whether they wish to ensure their security through the nuclear protection offered by the alliance to which they belong or whether they would like to do so by dissociating themselves from their respective security arrangements. Even this approach has for the time being been frustrated.

My delegation has looked askance at the suggestions made by some States that adherence to the nuclear-weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty should be a prior condition for extending negative security assurances. The rejection of the nuclear-weapons option is one that has been made solemnly by all non-nuclear-weapon States, adherents or otherwise to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a goal to which we are all deeply committed. For us the path towards that goal lies through the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. Negative security assurances to be extended by the nuclear-weapon Powers cannot require additional commitments from the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Let me also take this opportunity to comment very briefly on another distortion which has come to be injected into the discussion on the subject of non-proliferation. The States most staunchly critical of the non-signatories to the NPT are those who continue to maintain and improve their own nuclear arsenals. While lamenting the theoretical possibilities of horizontal proliferation, they do not appear at all concerned about the continuing qualitative and quantitative improvement of their own nuclear arsenals and the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The risk of a nuclear war will not disappear or even be reduced even if all 158 States of the United Nations family were to adhere to the NPT. That fatal possibility emanates exclusively from the possession of nuclear weapons by a handful of States and especially the ones whose security doctrines are based on the use of these weapons.

I would like to conclude by saying that a forward movement is possible. But it is possible only if four of the five nuclear-weapon Powers were to review their policies and to formulate revised positions so as to respond positively to the legitimate concerns of the neutral non-aligned group of countries. These concerns have been fully elaborated in document CD/280, dated 14 April 1982

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 249th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Senegal, Ambassador Sene.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on your accession to the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Romania, Mr. Datcu. My delegation takes pleasure in the fact that the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will hold their Third Review Conference next year. As a Party to the Treaty, my country attaches great importance to this event, and fervently hopes that it will give fresh impetus to genuine negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons, strengthen the present non-proliferation regime and provide reliable and legally binding assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

Negotiations have been pursued on this issue since 1979, as the distinguished representative of Pakistan has just reminded us. The strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States appears to us all the more pressing as the international situation has today deteriorated, with heightened tension and the increasingly frequent recourse to force.

As a result, the serious dangers of the vertical and continuous proliferation of nuclear weapons is now compounded by the increasingly great risk of horizontal proliferation. The probabilities of nuclear war are thus considerably increased. Besides the danger itself of a deliberate nuclear war, there is also a frightening increase in the danger of nuclear war by accident or by error of calculation or interpretation.

In such a nuclear war, the non-nuclear-weapon States might be the victims of nuclear attacks, despite their undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons. For the military installations of the super-Powers throughout the world, their navies and their communications and information facilities, are primary targets in the case of nuclear conflict. In the present conditions, there is nothing to guarantee that the exchanges would be confined to the nuclear-weapon Powers alone.

In the face of this danger, the non-nuclear-weapon States have, for the time being, no protection of any kind, not even legally. Although they have undertaken, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other international instruments, not to acquire nuclear weapons, they have received in return no firm and binding undertaking ensuring them that they will not some day be the victims of the use of nuclear equipment and technology for military purposes.

Furthermore, it must be deplored that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones has not progressed. Apart from the Tlatelolco Treaty, it has not been possible to set up such zones in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and other parts of the world.

Likewise, the establishment of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean has made no headway.

These scant results explain the demand put forward for several years now by the non-nuclear-weapon States to benefit from sure and reliable security assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, a matter not covered by the NPT but intimately linked with it.



(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

Furthermore, this demand has been recognized as perfectly legitimate by the United Nations General Assembly, which is the conscience of the international community. After having undertaken in a legally binding manner to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-weapon States are perfectly entitled to demand similar undertakings from the nuclear-weapon Powers.

Unfortunately, the nuclear-weapon Powers, while having forcefully asserted their aversion to use such weapons, have so far only given undertakings which are far from meeting the profound aspirations of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the first place, there is Security Council resolution 255 (1968) adopted on 19 June 1968 on the initiative of the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR.

In this resolution, the Security Council welcomes the intention expressed by the three nuclear-weapon States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

While this resolution contains positive elements, it is far from satisfying the security requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The question always arises whether the promise of assistance given in that resolution will not run into the same difficulties of application as chapter VII of the Charter, which has always come up against the obstacle of the lack of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council.

With regard to the second set of general measures which the nuclear-weapon Powers have had to undertake to guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, these consist of unilateral declarations made at different moments. These declarations, although formal and solemn, are somewhat heterogeneous, imprecise, conditional and, above all, insufficiently binding in our opinion.

Furthermore, some of them reflect the strategic doctrines of their authors and do not take sufficiently into account the security needs of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Finally, the last set of assurances given by the nuclear-weapon Powers concerns Additional Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. But here again, the nuclear-weapon Powers have linked their undertakings with interpretative declarations which restrict their obligations.

This overview shows that the assurances offered cannot fully satisfy the non-nuclear-weapon States, because they are heterogeneous, restrictive, non-contractual and non-legally binding. It was to remedy this state of affairs that the General Assembly, in paragraph 59 of the Final Document of its first

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

special session devoted to disarmament, requested the nuclear-weapon Powers to "pursue efforts to include, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Despite four years of talks and many proposals, the negotiations undertaken within the Committee on Disarmament on this matter have not yet given any satisfactory results.

Despite the efforts of many delegations, particularly within the Working Group of this item, chaired by Ambassador Ahmad, it has not been possible to find a common formula which could be set forth in a binding international instrument. The lack of consensus due to the attitude of some nuclear-weapon Powers has not made it possible to make the desired progress.

Nevertheless, this deadlock should not lead to any relaxation of the efforts deployed to find workable arrangements. The issue must be discussed in a more comprehensive manner, and an effort must be made to approach it within the framework of the strengthening of the current regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament.

With regard to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, the central pillar of which is the Non-Proliferation Treaty, my delegation notes that while the number of Parties to the Treaty has increased, a good number of States still remain outside it. This situation shows that it has not been possible to take the necessary measures to convince them, despite the fact that most of them are States capable of developing nuclear weapons within the not too distant future.

While the nuclear-arms race in which the super-Powers are indulging is potentially the greatest danger threatening humanity, a similar arms race by other nuclear-weapon States can only compound the risk of use of nuclear weapons. My delegation believes that in addition to the measures designed to correct the unequal and discriminatory nature of the Treaty, provisions must be adopted which assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. An additional protocol to the Treaty, for example, might serve this purpose.

In addition, the nuclear-weapon Powers should deploy all necessary efforts to encourage the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace, particularly in regions where a broad consensus on doing so exists.

In this connection, it is important that nuclear-weapon Powers should unconditionally undertake not to threaten to use or use nuclear weapons in such zones as long as they are denuclearized, and not to introduce nuclear weapons into them. This seems particularly important in the case of Latin America, whose status as a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be respected and strengthened in accordance with the wishes of the States of the region.

With regard to Africa, my delegation would like to recall that since 1964, the heads of State and Government of the OAU member countries have solemnly declared

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

their desire to see Africa become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This objective, which was approved by the General Assembly, is unfortunately now jeopardized by the efforts of the Pretoria regime to acquire nuclear weapons.

The 1980 United Nations report indicated that South Africa now had the capability to produce such weapons, thanks to the overt or disguised assistance provided by several countries. And yet co-operation in the nuclear field with a regime such as that of Pretoria cannot be innocent.

There is no need to stress that the Pretoria regime is based on racial discrimination, oppression and violence, and therefore constitutes a threat to peace and security of the region even if, apparently, the tensions with neighbouring countries are being allayed. Furthermore, all the South African nuclear facilities will apparently not be subjected to IAEA safeguards. Finally, the Pretoria Government has so far refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Thus, any co-operation in the nuclear field which does not take account of the special situation of that regime can only harm the objective of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

It is therefore urgent here that the Powers with nuclear links with the Pretoria Government should break off any co-operation in that sphere liable to assist it in producing nuclear weapons, and such countries should above all insist that the Pretoria Government accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject all its nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards.

There is no need to stress that the viability of the present non-proliferation regime depends above all on the active support of the nuclear-weapon Powers. That is why Africa, of which 36 States are Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is entitled to ask those Powers to take diligent steps to forestall the irreparable and prevent South Africa from jeopardizing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the continent.

Another important problem which fully justifies the adoption of urgent and effective measures to guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is the danger of nuclear war. This risk has become a major issue for the international community, affecting both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the face of this threat, at its thirty-eighth session the General Assembly adopted several resolutions aimed at limiting and prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

For a large number of States, the adoption of measures to restrict the right to engage in nuclear retaliation solely to cases of aggression with the use of nuclear weapons is perfectly sound and legitimate. There is a fundamental difference between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, and in addition a nuclear war can only have catastrophic effects both for the belligerents and for a large number of other States not directly involved in the conflict.

(Mr. Sené, Senegal)

My delegation therefore believes that the limitation of the use of nuclear weapons, pending their total prohibition and complete destruction, would not only have beneficial effects on the security of all States, but would also help considerably to reduce the risk of the use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

Without wishing to enter the realms of political fiction, it may be said that the latter group of States has reason to be concerned, simply bearing in mind that it is not impossible that since 1945 nuclear-weapon Powers may at some time or another have been prompted by some evil spirit to use the absolute weapon during conflicts opposing them to non-nuclear-weapon States. They certainly had second thoughts, considering the incalculable consequences of such an act and above all the horror and indignation it would have provoked. Nevertheless, the possibility may have been envisaged. Given this terrifying, to say the least, hypothesis, the non-nuclear-weapon States are duty-bound to pursue efforts aimed at the universal acceptance of the non-use of nuclear weapons, particularly against States which do not have them and which have given binding undertakings not to acquire them.

In the opinion of my delegation, the right of self-defence recognized by article 51 of the Charter does not contradict customary international law, which recognizes as one of the conditions for the exercise of that right that there should be proportion in the means of retaliation used. The use of nuclear weapons, even to resist aggression by a non-nuclear-weapon State, would seem to many to represent a dangerous escalation, an exaggerated and disproportionate response; especially bearing in mind that it is the nuclear-weapon Powers which have the largest arsenals of conventional weapons and therefore are in a position to repulse any aggression by a non-nuclear-weapon State without resorting to nuclear weapons.

Another factor which should be taken into consideration in connection with the prevention of nuclear war is the secret manufacture of such weapons. Today, with the dissemination of nuclear technology, some regimes in Africa and in the Middle East are in a position to acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, in this connection, South Africa is suspected on more than one ground of having carried out a nuclear explosion. In order to prevent such regimes from using nuclear weapons, it is therefore important to strengthen the provisions of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) on positive guarantees concerning the necessary assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

These assurances should take the form of genuine undertakings, and not merely declarations of intent. They should reflect an individual or collective undertaking to assist a State which is a victim of a nuclear attack, without thereby being an instrument of control or of impingement upon the sovereignty of the beneficiaries.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

The guarantees for the adoption of which we are pressing cannot, of course, replace the obligations of the nuclear-weapon Powers concerning negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. We believe that only the elimination of nuclear weapons would provide an adequate guarantee for all. Of course, the results obtained in this field are very small. However, we should not allow ourselves to be overcome by discouragement and weariness. The price of failure would be heavy and unbearable for the future of civilization. This, then, is the pressing future task which the Parties to the NPT, in particular the nuclear-weapon Powers, have the heavy responsibility to undertake in conformity with their obligations under the Treaty.

The current international situation has become too dangerous not to take new measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. For if nothing is done, there will be a great temptation for some States to cross the Rubicon and openly or secretly acquire nuclear weapons. Given current international tensions, there is a great risk that nuclear weapons would be used, particularly in regions where States, in desperation, are seeking to impose at any price policies of racial discrimination or territorial occupation.

In other words, it is therefore necessary to reach agreement in the efforts aimed at establishing legally binding arrangements which prohibit the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under which the nuclear-weapon Powers are required to provide their assistance in case of aggression with nuclear weapons.

In this connection, it is important that the nuclear-weapon Powers should display the political will to break the vicious circle leading from mistrust and hostility to the arms race in all its aspects. Without such a change of attitude, the worst may be feared. In seeking to maintain at all costs the advantages and privileges which the possession of nuclear weapons appears to confer, they may be led to neglect the rising tide of serious danger inherent in such a situation, which may lead inexorably to disaster.

To conclude, at the end of this spring part of our session, in the midst of all these dangers and risks, we continue firmly to believe that wisdom and reason will finally triumph. We hope above all that an awareness of the long-term interests of all peoples, the future of peace, the aspirations and requirements of development, and the forces of progress of mankind will carry the day over other considerations and open progressively broader prospects for genuine disarmament. Our duty towards the survival of our species and the continued existence of future generations and of society and civilization on our marvellous planet Earth certainly bears this price.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Senegal for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Qian Jiadong.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China): Mr. President, first of all, allow me to express to you my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. I am greatly satisfied to see that this month's work is conducted under the guidance of the distinguished representative of a country which enjoys high prestige in international affairs by firmly adhering to a policy of independence and non-alignment and which maintains friendly relations with China. The friendship between the peoples of Sri Lanka and China can be traced back to many centuries ago, and has stood the test of history. I am particularly pleased that you, Mr. President, are personally an old friend of China. You were once working in China and have contributed to promoting the friendship between the two countries. April, being the last month of the spring session, is loaded with heavy tasks. However, with your diplomatic experience and skilled organizational ability, as well as your untiring efforts, we have made new progress in our work.

While paying tribute to you, Mr. President, I would also like to take this opportunity to express again my gratitude to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Romania, Mr. Datcu, who guided the work of March with success.

In the past few weeks, a number of delegations have made statements on agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", which is an issue of real importance. Although the spring session is now drawing to its conclusion, the Chinese delegation still wishes to offer some of its views on this issue.

The importance of the issue of outer space is twofold: on the one hand, it is opening up an entirely new and bright prospect for mankind; and on the other hand, it may bring about to the mankind a horrible disaster with unimaginable consequences.

Over the centuries, in ancient mythology and legends, outer space has been described as a beautiful and harmonious paradise. With the development of science and technology, man has eventually freed himself from the bondage of gravitation, broken through the atmosphere and entered this mysterious world. In the 1950s, the first man-made earth satellite was successfully launched. Later, man set foot on the moon and space exploration extended almost to the edges of the solar system. Man is even now able to stroll in outer space as leisurely as in a courtyard. It is a remarkable achievement that man's ability to conquer and utilize the universe has been enhanced so rapidly in the short span of 30 years. Space technology has already been broadly and effectively applied to many aspects of human life, including communication, broadcasting, weather forecasting and earth resources surveys, etc. Yet, its great potential for the promotion of social progress is just starting to manifest itself. With such a bright future in perspective, how can one help feeling exulted and encouraged?

Unfortunately, however, the tranquillity of outer space is not exempt from the impact of the current turbulent and tense international situation; and it is overshadowed by the arms race too. Guided by the doctrine of "He who controls outer space dominates the earth", military activities in outer space are intensifying, with contending development of various kinds of space weapons. One system of space weapons has already become operational, another has entered the testing stage, and programmes for even more sophisticated weapon systems are being planned. If this trend is left unchecked, outer space, following land, sea and air, will before long very likely become the fourth fratricidal battlefield of mankind. Should this scenario come true, the paradise of our imaginations would then be turned into a hell, a fact about which people cannot but be concerned.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

I think I would not be exaggerating in saying that we are at a crossroads with regard to outer space: either measures must be taken immediately to stop an arms race in outer space so that it may serve exclusively peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind, or no measures will be taken at all, and outer space will turn into an arena for the arms race threatening mankind with an unprecedented holocaust. A false step here may lead to major failure. We can by no means take lightly an issue so vitally important to the future of mankind.

This is the third time that the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been included in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Since as early as the 1960s, the principles and purposes of "non-militarization of outer space" and "the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes" have already been widely accepted by States and enshrined in more than one international legal instrument. Yet, to date, the tendency of expanding the arms race into outer space has not only been unchecked but even increasingly exacerbated. If this issue was not yet crucially urgent a few years ago, now we must say that it has become so urgent that it brooks no delay. It was not by accident that the First Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session succeeded in combining three draft resolutions and adopted almost by consensus a single resolution requesting the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a priority item the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This indicates the great importance States have attached to this issue.

The Chinese delegation shares the view underlined by many delegates and by you, Mr. President, that once a weapon comes into being, it will be very difficult to eliminate it from arsenals, and that it is much easier to prevent militarization than to demilitarize. In his statement of 18 April, the distinguished representative of Australia said: "An opportunity lost, or not recognized in time, can be an opportunity lost forever". In China we have a similar saying: "Do not let slip an opportunity, for it may never come again". Ambassador Butler was referring to the elaboration of a convention on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. But I feel his words are also relevant to the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space. The question has indeed come to a critical juncture. If we are unable to do anything now, it will be even more difficult for us to do anything in the future. And although the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes has almost become a platitude, we still have to defend it vigorously. We must seize the opportunity before it is too late to make correct decisions, so as to save this common heritage of mankind -- outer space.

In this area, as in many other areas of disarmament, we cannot but emphasize the role of the super-Powers. No one can deny that these two countries, especially their scientists, engineers and technicians have made indelible contributions to the exploration and utilization of outer space. But it is equally undeniable that the same two countries are embarking on a dangerous path in outer space. They are the only two space Powers of today. It is fully justified to ask them to use the scientific achievement which embodies human wisdom and labour only for the benefit of mankind and not to abuse it for military purposes. They bear an unshirkable and special responsibility for preventing an arms race in outer space. In the common interest of mankind, including their own, they should not merely utter words of peace, but fulfil their responsibility by concrete deeds.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

While emphasizing the importance and urgency of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we do not in the least underestimate the complexity of the question. The systematic analysis of various existing space weapon systems, as well as those in the development stage, made by the distinguished Swedish Ambassador, Mr. Ekéus, in his statement of 22 March, and by Ambassador Theorin in her statement today, can be termed exemplary. The complexity of the question should serve all the more as a reason for us to start negotiations as early as possible and not a pretext for procrastination.

In our view, the primary task at present should be the prohibition of all space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons, which impair the stability of outer space. This should include a ban on the development, testing, production, deployment and use of such weapons and the destruction of existing space weapon systems. Admittedly, this can be achieved only through many concrete measures. In this connection, the series of measures which should and can be taken, as proposed by Ambassador Ekéus, merits our serious study and exploration.

We are aware that it is difficult to carry on a comprehensive discussion of the relevant issues all at once. However, we can at least begin with the most fundamental and least controversial ones. In our view, the definition of space weapons is one such fundamental question. A breakthrough on this question will give impetus to the whole process of negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The definition of space weapons is not a new subject. Proposals have been put forward by some delegations in the past. The Chinese delegation would also like to make an attempt here, and tentatively proposed the following:

Space weapons are devices or installations, either space-, land-, sea-, or atmosphere-based, which are specially designed to attack or destroy spacecraft in outer space or damage and disturb their normal functioning or change their flight trajectory, and devices or installations based in space (including on the moon and other celestial bodies) specially designed to attack, damage or disturb the normal functioning of objects in the atmosphere as well as on land and sea.

We do not regard this definition as perfect. Further thought and reflection may be needed for it to denote the characteristics of space weapons in concise and precise terms. Our aim is to draw attention to the matter and to facilitate joint exploration.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is indeed a difficult task. However, we must not lose sight of a more favourable aspect. Not a few delegations have enumerated and analysed the existing treaties, agreements and other international legal documents concerning or relevant to outer space. In spite of the shortcomings and loopholes, those documents have on the whole affirmed the fundamental principle that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes. The Treaty on Principles Governing State Activities in the Exploration and Utilization of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1967 provides further that the activities of States in outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law and the United Nations Charter. These are achievements resulting from the endeavours of countries for many years. With such a basis, it should be possible to elaborate through negotiations an international legal instrument on the comprehensive prohibition of space weapons.



(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

In the course of this month, under your leadership, further consultations on the establishment of a subsidiary body on this subject have been held; but regrettably, agreement still eludes us so far. As the spring part of our session is drawing to its conclusion, the Chinese delegation sincerely hopes that all delegations will, in the same spirit in which the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its thirty-eighth session the resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, seek common ground while reserving minor differences, so as to reach an agreement on the establishment of the said subsidiary body as early as possible during the summer part of the session, if not at the last moment of the present part of the session. The people of the world have entrusted this Conference with the important task of preventing an arms race in outer space. We must not let them down.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I have a few announcements. I wish to inform members that the meeting of the Contact Group on agenda item 1 "nuclear test ban", which was scheduled for 3.30 p.m. today, will now not take place since consultations are continuing. I shall inform representatives through the various groups of the new time and date of this Contact Group meeting.

At the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Vejvoda, I would like to inform the Conference that he intends to hold consultations with those representatives who will be attending the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in Conference Room I tomorrow, Wednesday, at 3.30 p.m. As members are aware, there is a long list of speakers for our plenary meeting on Thursday; may I therefore suggest that we start at 10 a.m. instead of at 10.30 a.m.?

As there is no other business for today, I intend to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 April 1984, at 10.00 a.m. The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.262  
26 April 1984  
ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 26 April 1984, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Dhanapala

(Sri Lanka)  
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GE.84-61721

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. J. CARASALES  
Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN  
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. BUTLER  
Mr. R. ROWE  
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium: Mr. M. DEPASSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U PE THEIN TUN  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. J.A. BEESLEY  
Mr. G.R. SKINNER  
Mr. R.J. ROCHON

China: Mr. QIAN JIADONG  
Ms. WANG SHIYUN  
Mr. LIANG DEFENG  
Mr. LIN CHENG  
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG

Cuba: Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA  
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:  
Mr. S. ALFARARGI  
Mr. I. HASSAN  
Ms. W. BASSIM  
Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS

Ethiopia:  
Mr. F. JOHANNES

France:  
Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER  
Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:  
Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:  
Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. F. ELBE  
Mr. M. GERDTS  
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:  
Mr. D. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. T. TOTH

India:  
Mr. M. DUBEY  
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:  
Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI  
Mrs. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. ANDRADJATI  
Ms. R. TANZIL

Islamic Republic of Iran:  
Mr. H. SHEIKHOESLAM  
Mr. N.K. KAMYAB  
Mr. F.S. SIRJANI  
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA  
Mr. SHAFEE  
Mr. MOTALEBI  
Mr. KALAMI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. M. PAVESE  
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Japan:

Mr. M. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Ms. Z. GONZALES Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L. O AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. P. BALOUI  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. L.E. WINGREN  
Mrs. A.M. LAU  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. T.F. DMITRITCHEV  
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN  
Mr. G.A. ANTSIFEROV  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L. FIELDS  
Mr. N. CLYNE  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. C. PEARCY  
Mr. J. PUCKETT  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Ms. B. MURRAY

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI



The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

At the outset allow me to extend a warm welcome to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, His Excellency Mr. Hossein Sheikholeslam, who will be addressing the Conference today as first speaker. May I wish him a useful visit to Geneva.

You will recall that, at our last plenary meeting, we agreed to hold today an informal meeting of the Conference to deal with some pending questions. After we have exhausted the list of speakers, I intend to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting to consider the following questions: a request for participation at plenary meetings of the Conference made by a non-member State; the results of the consultations held in the contact groups established to consider proposals under agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 5; and the letter addressed to me by the Chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

After that informal meeting, we will resume the plenary meeting in case further action might be necessary and we will also adopt a time-table for meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the week 12-15 June.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Iran, Mongolia, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Czechoslovakia, India, Canada, Indonesia, Australia and Hungary.

I now give the floor to the representative of Iran, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Mr. Hossein Sheikholeslam.

Mr. SHEIKHOESLAM (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, it is for me a great pleasure to have the opportunity to address the representatives of member States in an international meeting, to which a very important task has been assigned.

The disarmament issue and its role in the consolidation of peace and the ensuring of international security are clearly known to all of us gathered here. In the present circumstances and in view of the international situation of the world, the need for dealing firmly and seriously with the issues brought up in the Conference on Disarmament is felt much more than ever before. The great and important mission assigned by the international community to the representatives of 40 countries cannot be fulfilled without firmly believing in lofty and humanitarian and peace-loving ideals and without political will and the avoidance of political manipulation, which unfortunately is all too common in international fora.

Today, at the moment that I am speaking to you, many years have elapsed since the inception of this disarmament forum and you are on the threshold of achieving your first considerable success. I am referring to the convention on chemical weapons which, if realised in the form desired, would be deemed one of the important achievements of the present Conference.

(Mr. Sheikholeslam, Islamic Republic of Iran)

This is indeed a welcome opportunity for the representative of a country that has been the target and victim of the massive use of chemical weapons to take part in this meeting and to convey to you his feelings regarding the need for expediting the preparation of this convention.

During the whole lifetime of the United Nations Organization Iran has, I think, been the only victim of chemical weapons whose use against it has been confirmed by international authorities following investigations officially conducted by them. We have, therefore, more than anyone else, the right to urge the international community, and especially the Conference on Disarmament, to take more serious and rapid steps for the completion of this convention.

All of you, as Members of this Conference, are well aware that document S/16433, dated 26 March 1984, of the Security Council, which reflects the report of the on-site investigations, conducted by the experts despatched by the United Nations Secretary-General, clearly confirms the use of chemical weapons and poison gas, consisting of mustard gas and a nerve agent, prohibited by international conventions. This delegation, composed of Dr. Gustav Anderson, Senior Research Chemist from the National Defence Research Institute of Sweden, Dr. Manuel Dominguez, Professor of Preventive Medicine from the University of Madrid, Dr. Peter Dunn, Superintending Scientist of the Materials Research Laboratory of the Australian Department of Defence, Colonel Ulrich Imobersteg, Chief of the NBC Defence Division of the Swiss Defence Ministry, and Mr. Eqbal Reza, representing the Secretary-General, paid a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran from 13 to 19 March 1984. Members of the delegation visited and examined those injured by chemical weapons. They also collected samples of the substances used in such weapons. Besides examining fragments remaining from the weapons and munitions used, the delegation made films and photographs of such evidence.

Many of the Iranians injured by chemical weapons were sent to hospitals in the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Britain, Sweden, Japan, Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland for medical treatment. The treating physicians in these hospitals have confirmed the use of chemical substances; the medical reports of the University of Ghent, in Belgium, and German, Austrian and Swedish hospitals may be quoted as supporting evidence of this use of chemical weapons. In a few months' time a medical seminar will meet in Teheran. All physicians and experts from Government and non-governmental organizations are invited to go to Iran and examine the victims of this inhuman crime. I am sure that the deliberations of this seminar will be useful and of interest to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

The aggressor Iraqi regime, disappointed and frustrated by the ineffectiveness of its most sophisticated weapons obtained from certain major Powers, in return for the riches and wealth of the oppressed nations of the region, desperately committed these barbarous crimes.

A short time after the outbreak of the war, we announced the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime in various international fora and on 3 November 1983, we officially informed the United Nations that such weapons were being used by Iraq. This was reflected in the document S/16128 which was then distributed among member States. Further, one-and-a-half months before the promulgation of the report of the United Nations experts, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his address to this very Conference, informed the international community

(Mr. Sheikholeslam, Islamic Republic of Iran)

of the inhuman acts of Iraq. But what was the result? Nothing but silence and indifference on the part of the international community; this reaction encouraged the Baathist Iraqi regime to continue its crimes which have wounded human honour and dignity. Unfortunately not even the Non-Aligned Movement made any significant gesture. Does the Non-Aligned Movement no more subscribe to the Final Act of the Lusaka Summit Conference of 1970, in which the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons were clearly banned? If this were not the case would it so calmly remain silent?

As has been briefly mentioned, and as the distinguished members of this Conference know very well, there already exist international commitments and undertakings on the non-use of chemical weapons. But the basic fact that should be taken into consideration in the new convention is the promotion of such commitments by preventive and enforcement measures against any violator. Effective international measures and collective actions to punish violators should be envisaged on occasions when such violations occur. Otherwise the new Convention will suffer the same fate as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the Security Council will deal with the reports of on-site inspections under the new Convention as it did with the report of the team of experts despatched by the Secretary-General to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, apart from not being comprehensive, neglects such important aspects of the matter as verification systems.

As can be seen in the report of the United Nations experts, especially the last paragraph of page 7, one or several countries have helped Iraq in manufacturing chemical bombs; Iraq is not technically able to make even the casings which were described in this report. Those countries that supply Iraq with such weapons are equally if not more responsible than Iraq before the human community. The Islamic Republic of Iran calls upon the responsible members of the present Conference to urge in any possible way the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct investigations to determine which countries have participated in supplying these weapons to Iraq.

As we have repeatedly mentioned, negligence in taking serious measures against the violation of important international conventions will encourage the violator to continue his violations. The price of this negligence as regards the prohibition of attack on residential areas has been paid in the past three years by the Islamic Republic of Iran through the loss of the lives of so many of its innocent and defenceless citizens. For your information, only yesterday, 17 of my dear compatriots were martyred in the bombardment of the city of Piran Shar by the Iraqi regime. Another negative effect of such negligence is that the violator is encouraged to commit more crimes and aggressions. There is no doubt that this has been one of the main factors that has encouraged the Iraqi regime to use chemical weapons.

While in international legal terms we have a free hand to use chemical weapons against Iraq, we declare that, due to humanitarian considerations, we shall not embark upon such retaliatory action. But, as you know, while the United Nations experts were in Iran and even after the distribution of the United Nations report on the use by Iraq of chemical weapons against Iran, and the condemnation of this war crime by the people of the world, Iraq continued its use of lethal chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sheikholeslam, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Is the human conscience able to tolerate this attitude of negligence and failure on the part of the nations to take serious measures to this effect?

Mr. President, do you not think that, at a time when the people of my country are the target of extensive use of chemical weapons, the people of the world, especially my compatriots, should deduce that the super-Powers' long and inconclusive talks and negotiations and the many plans they propose are in fact hypocritical measures taken by the super-Powers, as the main producers of chemical weapons, in order to deceive world public opinion and evade their own direct responsibility for the use of chemical weapons? Is the indescribable enthusiasm of the super-Powers, especially in this Conference, anything but crocodile tears?

Should the silence of certain countries and their refusal to condemn the use of chemical weapons in general terms be interpreted as anything but their consent to the production and the extended use of chemical weapons? Is there any political consideration more important than the security of the whole international community?

The position of certain other countries that have somehow related the use of chemical weapons to the war is not much better than the position of the countries to which I have just referred. If this illogical linking between the two does not directly suggest that the use of chemical weapons is permissible in certain conditions, at least such a thing is indirectly understood from it. In this connection, I refer to the declaration of the European Community. It is astonishing for us to see that the victims of the inhuman use of chemical weapons in World War I, who have since then prohibited the use of chemical weapons have, while tacitly condemning Iraq, linked the stoppage of the use of chemical weapons to the conditions for ending the war. Of course we have a lot to say about the causes of the continuation of our legitimate defence, but this meeting is not the right place for such a matter to be discussed. We wish to ask the countries who have signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 if the continuation of the war for any reason could justify Iraq's commission of war crimes. Do you not think that in these circumstances, negotiating with such a regime would mean that chemical weapons are effective? Such an admission would certainly tend to encourage their use in the future.

We have all witnessed how certain countries, whose delegates are present in this very conference, refrained from the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution No. 37/98 D of 1982, concerning the use of chemical weapons. Is it not an adequate reason to suspect the goodwill of such countries as regards the adoption of the convention now being prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons? The lack of a verification system for continuous international control is an important defect in the existing international conventions that should be eliminated from the new convention. What is more important, we strongly call for guarantees and priority to be given to the inclusion of the question of the use of chemical weapons and the proper verification measures it requires in the future convention on chemical weapons. Otherwise what is the benefit of commitments undertaken on paper but not carried out and verified? Such verification should, in order to be effective, include all the different stages of development, production, stockpiling, acquiring and transfer of technology of such weapons, and more especially their use. We propose that the use of chemical weapons should be considered as a war crime for which the perpetrators would be internationally punished.

(Mr. Sheikholeslam, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Certain countries, especially the United States, argue that they are obliged to build up their arsenals of chemical weapons in order to oblige other countries to sit at the negotiating tables. This, we believe, amounts to the elimination of the bad by the worse. Such an argument is as baseless and pointless as the other side's claim that chemical-weapon-free zones, such as Europe for example, should be created. How is one to believe that the United States, which has allocated to chemical weapons some seven billion dollars by 1987 and some eight more billion dollars for the following five years, really means what it says concerning the need for the prohibition of chemical weapons? And how can we accept that the use of chemical weapons is prohibited in Europe while their production stockpiling and use is permitted in the Middle East or the Far East?

The vast gap between words and deeds has made the climate of international meetings gloomy and bleak and is frustrating the last rays of hope. The international community is still hopeful with regard to more positive future developments that the Conference on Disarmament may bring about in its efforts to face the great responsibility assigned to it.

Certainly the international community will follow the efforts of this Conference with enthusiasm.

I hope that the present Conference would respond positively to this expectation by expediting its deliberations.

In conclusion, I wish to express my gratitude to His Excellency Javier Perez de Cuellar, the United Nations Secretary-General, for the measures he has taken; I wish also to thank the experts of the United Nations team despatched to Iran and their respective governments as well as the countries that have condemned the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran and those countries that have supported the report of the Secretary-General's expert team. And finally I have to express appreciation to the countries that have provided medical care for the injured Iranians.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, this is the last plenary meeting of the spring part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament and it is now three months since this multilateral negotiating body began functioning under the title of "Conference on Disarmament". At this point in its work there is not much that can be said about forward movement. It is regrettable to have to note the Conference's inactivity in seeking solutions for such agenda items of the highest priority as the prevention of nuclear war, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, a complete and general nuclear test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The constructive efforts of a group of socialist States and the Group of 21 speedily to initiate real negotiations with a view to preparing appropriate international treaties and agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament have, as in the past, encountered stubborn resistance from the United States and its principal allies.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

From the very beginning of the Conference's work the socialist countries called for the effective organization of the work of this forum, stressing its character as a negotiating body. They again expressed their concern that the Conference was, in effect, not carrying out the tasks it had been assigned with regard to nuclear disarmament.

Guided by the sincere desire to facilitate the commencement of negotiations on the urgent questions of nuclear disarmament, a group of socialist countries put forward the specific proposals reproduced in document CD/434. The Conference is also well aware of the constructive efforts of the States of the Group of 21 in this regard.

Nevertheless, matters remain at a standstill. The principal reason for this deplorable situation, in our opinion, is to be found in the obstructionist position of the Western countries, which continue to act in a way that would convert this multilateral negotiating forum into a forum of academic discussion. In doing so, they put forward a series of preliminary conditions for engaging in negotiations, and try to impose a method of work unacceptable to the Conference. In the view of the socialist countries, such an approach is contrary to the very mandate laid down for the Conference on Disarmament in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. What is more, that approach also runs counter to this forum's own rules of procedure.

In our opinion, the obstruction of the Western countries condemns to inactivity the Conference on Disarmament, which has been called upon to examine and decide the most pressing problems of cessation of the arms race and disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, and thereby to justify the profound hopes of all peoples, who are longing for lasting peace on Earth.

It must be stated bluntly that owing to the absence of a desire on the part of the representatives of Western countries to enter into serious negotiations in this body, the Conference on Disarmament has again not succeeded in settling the question of establishing subsidiary bodies with appropriate mandates on such highly important agenda items as a nuclear test ban, prevention of nuclear war, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The communiqué of the regular meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, recently held at Budapest, stresses that "questions pertaining to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and the search for practical ways of putting an end to the arms race and proceeding to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, should occupy the most important place in the present-day political dialogue".

The participants in the Budapest meeting again emphasize that the socialist States are in favour of embarking more rapidly upon the businesslike consideration and solution of such important issues as the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, a quantitative and qualitative freeze of nuclear weapons, prohibition of the militarization of outer space and of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, and the complete prohibition of chemical weapons on a global scale.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

They also confirm that all of the proposals and initiatives on that score put forward jointly or individually by them remain in force, and that they are ready to study attentively, in a positive spirit, proposals by other countries aimed at reducing and eliminating the threat of nuclear war, halting the arms race, proceeding to disarmament and consolidating international security.

The results of the work of that meeting of socialist States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty met with full support in the Mongolian People's Republic. We consider those results another clear confirmation of the unalterable foreign-policy approach of the countries of socialism, aimed at strengthening peace and détente, at curbing the arms race and proceeding to disarmament, and at developing peaceful co-operation in Europe and throughout the world.

Allow me, Mr. President, to dwell for a moment on the question of establishing a subsidiary working body on agenda item 5.

During the 1982 and 1983 sessions, the socialist countries consistently adhered to their position of principle, namely, that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, should, in fulfilment of its responsibility, immediately begin negotiations and should for that purpose create a subsidiary body with an appropriate mandate. In keeping with that position, and with a view to carrying out a number of General Assembly recommendations, the socialist countries took further action, on the one hand, by putting forward proposals and specific drafts and, on the other, supporting the proposals and texts of other countries, in particular the non-aligned and neutral countries.

At the beginning of the 1984 session, a group of socialist countries proposed the following draft mandate, contained in document CD/434:

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, taking into account all relevant proposals, including consideration of the proposal for a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

This draft mandate is in full accord with resolution 38/70, the only relevant resolution of the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted as a result of intensive and persevering efforts by interested States and as a result of the withdrawal of two other draft resolutions. The record of the voting shows that resolution 38/70 was adopted by the overwhelming majority of 147 votes. The United States voted against, while the United Kingdom abstained.

At the current session of the Conference on Disarmament, various consultations were held under the guidance of its Presidents for March and April with a view to reaching consensus on drafting the mandate of the ad hoc committee on agenda item 5. During those consultations we again, as happened last year, encountered the obstruction of the group of Western countries, or more precisely, of one or two members of that group, who seek by every means and insist as before on limitation of the mandate of the future ad hoc committee by including the words "to identify, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The mandate proposed by the Western group, as we have repeatedly stated earlier, in particular on 30 August 1983 at the 238th plenary meeting, "does not take account of the interests and position of the group of socialist countries, since it makes no mention of the need for negotiations directed at the conclusion of an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space" (CD/PV.238).

The socialist countries continue to support the draft mandate contained in document CD/434.

Nevertheless, the socialist countries demonstrated flexibility during the consultations and expressed their readiness to take into account some of the views of representatives of Western countries. That is what happened when the Mongolian delegation was prepared to consider the draft of the Western countries with the amendment proposed on 20 March by the Group of 21 which contained the following provision: "With a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

Continuing its efforts to arrive at an agreed solution, the Mongolian delegation proposed an amendment to the first paragraph of the proposed mandate, so that it would read as follows: "The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee with a view to undertaking negotiations on agenda item 5, entitled 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space'".

To our deep regret, however, our proposal was not accepted by the group of Western countries. It should be added that the delegations of the Group of 21 were agreeable to the adoption of that amendment.

The Mongolian delegation considers that the draft mandate proposed by the Western countries is limited in that it fails to mention the principal objective, namely, negotiations with a view to preparing an appropriate agreement or agreements for preventing an arms race in outer space. That draft mandate which is inherently bogus, can in no way contribute to achieving the principal task of proceeding to negotiations on the substance of the matter.

In this connection I should like to return to what I said at the 251st plenary meeting on 20 March:

"The negative experience of the work in this forum, when its subsidiary body was set up with a deliberately restricted and narrow mandate, must not be repeated. If some delegations of the Western countries again insist on their obstructionist position, such an approach can only be seen as a pretext to avoid a businesslike solution of the problems facing the Conference."

Finally, I should like to add a few words to what I said in my statement of last Wednesday, 18 April, concerning the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Mongolian delegation attaches great importance to the question of verification in any real disarmament measures. In this connection we advocate a principled, reasonable and realistic approach to working out an effective verification system, but without going to extremes and without preconceptions. We have advocated and continue to advocate a verification system which takes into account mutual interests and is based on the principle of equality and equal security.



(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Seen from this viewpoint, the so-called "open invitation" inspection proposed in the United States draft convention does not, in our opinion, respond to the above principles. To agree to such an approach would be to harm the interests of States and would represent a crude violation of their sovereign rights.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. President, for the United States, the elimination of the threat of chemical weapons — and the elimination of the terrible reality of chemical warfare — is a paramount objective for strengthening international security. To this end, the United States is resolved to pursue a complete, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

The history of this effort is well known. In 1977, the United States and the Soviet Union began formal bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. In 1980, the United States moved its efforts to ban chemical weapons to this body, in recognition that the abolition of chemical weapons is an issue that concerns all States. In February 1983, after long and intensive discussions both here and in Washington, my delegation tabled its detailed views on the content of an agreement. Since then, we have elaborated our detailed views as we participated in the work of this Conference. In July 1983, my delegation also presented a comprehensive paper that set forth illustrative on-site verification procedures for destruction of chemical weapons. Last Autumn, further to accelerate work in this area, the United States invited member and observer delegations to this Conference to visit an operating facility for the destruction of our chemical weapons. Participants gained a first-hand look at the actual destruction procedures used by the United States and at the verification measures necessary to ensure effective verification of that destruction.

Then, last week, President Reagan once again sent Vice-President Bush to Geneva. In a new effort to create momentum in the negotiating process, the Vice-President came before this body and presented the draft United States convention for a chemical weapons ban. The Vice-President emphasized yet again the importance the United States attaches to the conclusion of such a ban. The Vice-President also spoke of his personal concern, as a father and a grandfather, and stated his personal resolve that chemical weapons be effectively eliminated for all time. This is a point on which surely we all can agree. In this context, I want to make it perfectly clear that the United States condemns any use of chemical weapons whenever and wherever it occurs.

This history shows a continuing United States effort to work hard and work sincerely for an agreement on the effective and verifiable ban of chemical weapons, the cornerstone of which effort is the draft convention which we presented here last week. Accordingly, I would like to take some time now to explain the major provisions of the United States draft convention.

The essence of the draft convention is in its first article, which contains the basic prohibitions. The parties would agree not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons. The parties would further agree not to conduct other activities in preparation for the use of chemical weapons, use chemical weapons in any armed conflict, or assist others to engage in prohibited activities. In including a ban on the use of chemical weapons, the United States has been mindful of the importance attached to such a provision by many delegations. Taken together, articles I and XIV would ensure that the convention would supplement, and not replace, the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Article II presents the definitions of terms which are necessary for the implementation of the convention. Chemicals which could be used in weapons are divided into three categories according to the danger they pose — "super-toxic lethal", "other lethal" and "other harmful". The convention would regulate these different categories in different ways. The most important of the definitions is that of "chemical weapons". We have formulated this definition using the definition that was agreed to in document CD/112. Furthermore, we have formulated the definition of "toxic chemicals" to take into account the points of view of China and other members of this Conference. The definition of "chemical weapons" is drawn very broadly so as to include all lethal and incapacitating chemicals and their precursors which are not justified for permitted purposes. It does not include chemicals which are justified for peaceful purposes, such as those used in agriculture, research, medicine and domestic law enforcement.

Permitted uses of toxic chemicals are specifically protected in article III, so that peaceful chemical activities will not be significantly hindered. In order that any misuse of these chemicals can be detected, article III also places limits on the amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors that any State party may possess for protective purposes. Similarly, the draft convention provides that the States parties may produce super-toxic chemicals for protective purposes only in a single facility, and must annually declare all toxic chemicals for protective purposes which could also be used for weapons. The parties also would be limited in the extent to which they may transfer super-toxic chemicals and key precursors to other States. Article III also provides special measures on certain types of chemicals that are used for peaceful purposes, as listed in schedules A, B and C to the convention, to ensure that these chemicals will not be diverted to use in weapons.

Once the convention enters into force, each party would file an initial declaration of its existing chemical weapons, production facilities and past transfers. Articles IV, V and VI stipulate the information that must be included in these declarations. The parties would be required to destroy any chemical weapons and production facilities over a 10-year period, and annually provide information concerning such destruction. There would be guaranteed access for on-site verification to monitor the chemical weapons and production facilities, as well as the destruction process. The effect of these various declarations and monitoring activities would be to provide confidence in compliance by giving the parties comprehensive knowledge of the chemical weapons and production facilities in existence, and by confirming their eventual destruction.

The proposed convention also contains a variety of other provisions to aid in its implementation. As suggested by this Conference, a Consultative Committee would be established pursuant to article VII to oversee the implementation of the convention and promote the verification of compliance with it. Through its subordinate bodies this Committee would conduct the on-site verification activities required by the convention. We have also adopted the concept of an Executive Council, as developed by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons last year. This body would be delegated the responsibility for the continuing work of the Committee.

Articles IX, X and XI provide procedures for resolving compliance issues. Under article IX, the parties are required to consult and co-operate on any matter which may be raised relating to the objectives of the convention, and to participate in fact-finding inquiries. Any party may request that the

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Consultative Committee conduct appropriate fact-finding inquiries, including on-site inspections. The fact-finding inquiries must be completed within two months, and if any party still has concerns about compliance which have not been resolved, it may request a special meeting of the Consultative Committee.

In article X, the parties would authorize special on-site inspections, whereby each party must consent, on 24-hour notice, to a special inspection of one of the sites for which inspection is authorized by articles III, V or VI, or of any military or government-owned or controlled location or facility. This provision has been the object of most of the comments which my delegation has heard during the past week. As Vice-President Bush stressed, the United States is offering an "open invitation" for inspection of many potentially suspect sites in its own territory. We recognize that this provision could open sensitive United States facilities and activities to international inspection. Nevertheless the United States is fully prepared to accept these risks in order to ensure an effective ban of this entire class of weapons of mass destruction. We have found no other approach which can satisfactorily deal with the problem of possible undeclared chemical weapons or clandestine production facilities. In view of the gains in relation to the costs involved — that is, the potential of some intrusion essential to resolve concerns that the convention is being circumvented — this step is both reasonable and prudent. There are some who have objected that the "open invitations" approach is unfair because it may place a greater burden on some States than on others. No imbalance is either contemplated or desired. The United States delegation is ready to work with others to ensure that the "open invitation" approach applies fairly to differing economic and political systems. Without this or a comparable measure, no State can rest in the knowledge that these weapons have been truly banished.

The next article in the United States draft convention, article XI, authorizes ad hoc on-site inspections. Such inspections may be made of all locations that are not covered by article X. A party must consent to an ad hoc inspection requested by the Consultative Committee except for the most exceptional reasons, which must be explained. Upon consideration the Committee may send the party another request, and if this is also refused, the Security Council would immediately be informed.

The convention would also require a number of detailed provisions for its implementation, which we propose to place in annexes to the main text. These annexes would be integral parts of the convention. Accordingly, in addition to the draft convention which was presented last week, the United States also presented its detailed views on the contents of these annexes.

Annex I provides many details concerning the Consultative Committee, including provisions for the working of that Committee. It also contains provisions for the creation of an Executive Council, fact-finding panel, and a technical secretariat, as well as provisions for the convening of special meetings of the Committee.

Annex II provides detailed views on verification. Section A of this annex stipulates the detailed information that would have to be provided in the various declarations required by the convention, such as the declarations concerning chemical weapons, production facilities, and destruction activities. Section B of annex II is concerned with procedures for on-site verification, including

(Mr. Fields, United States)

inspections. It provides detailed rules for on-site inspections and the use of on-site monitoring equipment, and provides rules to protect the rights of both inspectors and host States. It also provides for the inspection and monitoring of chemical weapons, production facilities, protective activities and destruction activities. Finally, this section stipulates criteria to be used by the Consultative Committee in evaluating requests for ad hoc inspections.

Annex III provides the basis for the three schedules which list the chemicals that have legitimate uses but which also pose a risk of diversion to chemical weapons purposes. In addition, there is a fourth schedule, embodying parts of document CD/CW/WP.30, to specify methods for measuring the toxicity of chemicals.

I also wish to draw attention to two actions which should be taken before the convention can enter into force. First, upon signature, every State should declare whether chemical weapons or production facilities are under its control anywhere or located within its territory. In fact, many States have already made such statements, including the United States. We would urge others to do so as well. Second, there should be a preparatory commission convened once the convention is open for signature to plan for the implementation of the convention. These actions would be agreed in a document associated with the convention, but separate from it.

This has been a brief summary of the contents of the United States draft. I would like to point out what has no doubt been obvious in your study of our draft: that much of it has been drawn from the agreements which we have previously reached in this Conference and the discussions we have held over the past several years in the Committee on Disarmament. My Government appreciates and recognizes the value of the work done in the Committee and the Conference on Disarmament, will continue to contribute to it, and has incorporated as much as possible into our draft. In view of the length and the complexity of the provisions of the draft convention, there will undoubtedly be many points on which further clarification may be helpful. The United States delegation is prepared to undertake this task and indeed is willing to do so. We have sponsored one question-and-answer session open to all delegations, and we are prepared to provide further such clarifications on a delegation-to-delegation basis.

Let me make it clear, the United States draft is not presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. It does however, illustrate our approach to a ban, and it will provide the basis for papers presented by United States representatives on specific aspects as they are discussed. But we have no monopoly on creativity. We are ready and willing to consider alternative approaches and alternative formulations, so long as these would provide an effective ban.

As Vice-President Bush emphasized, the United States delegation looks forward to close and serious consultations with all delegations in these negotiations. We are prepared to take an active and constructive role in the full and complete process of negotiation of the text of the chemical weapons convention.

It is disturbing that some chose to criticize the draft convention — and the motivations of the United States — before the draft was actually presented. Some have charged that this initiative is only a bit of political showmanship as part of our Presidential election campaign or is part of an effort to win approval for production of binary chemical weapons.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

These allegations are simply untrue. Our goal is to accelerate the negotiations in this body. Four times in a little more than a year the United States has made major initiatives toward that end. Twice during that period the second highest elected official of my Government has come to Geneva to emphasize the commitment of President Reagan and the United States, the people of the United States, to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons ban. The United States is not afraid of criticism. But we hope that before others criticize our draft they will read it carefully — and come forward with comprehensive proposals of their own.

The United States delegation is encouraged by the evidence that most delegations are approaching the negotiations seriously and that the work is beginning to intensify. The important Working Paper introduced by the delegation of China, CD/443, is being studied with careful interest by our experts. We were pleased by the statement of the distinguished Soviet representative, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 21 February regarding inspection of destruction of chemical weapons and further encouraged by his statement on 18 April that the United States draft convention would be carefully studied. We have also noted a number of constructive suggestions contained in the Working Paper submitted by a group of socialist States, CD/435, entitled "improved effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of prohibition of chemical weapons". We hope that these suggestions will be further explored and, as appropriate, implemented. A number of other very useful documents have been introduced in 1984, such as the working papers from the delegations of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, France, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the flexibility shown by a number of delegations has led to progress in formulating key definitions. Unfortunately, there remain important subjects which a few delegations are apparently not ready to discuss and resolve — for example, the declaration and elimination of chemical weapons production facilities. This is to be deeply regretted. We hope that our break will allow sober reflection on the urgent need for progress on all fronts in this negotiation.

For its part the United States delegation will do whatever it can, under the able leadership of Ambassador Ekeus, to ensure that the negotiations can be successfully completed as soon as possible. To quote Vice-President Bush "Our aim in these negotiations will be a practical one — to work hard and in good faith; to build mutual confidence; to achieve real results".

Humanity demands no less of us. Accomplishing real results will not be easy, but my delegation, myself, my Government and the people of the United States are committed to the achievement of an effective ban of chemical weapons once and for all. I know that the members of this Conference are equally dedicated to this goal, and with that dedication, Sir, I am convinced that we will succeed.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):  
Mr. President, the Soviet delegation takes the floor in order to give our assessment of the results of the first part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The USSR delegation, like the delegations of many other countries, this year also made new efforts in order to take the Conference on Disarmament out of the state of deep and protracted crisis. There is not a single topical problem of arms race limitation on which the delegation of the Soviet Union did not put forward constructive considerations, make concrete proposals and initiatives, or submit working papers. In doing so we have always endeavoured to take into account the security interests of all States, to comply with the principle of equality and equal security, on the basis of which alone one can conduct disarmament negotiations.

Let us take, for example, the range of questions on the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament, which are the priority items of the Conference's agenda. By undertaking unilaterally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union laid a good basis for negotiations in this field. Our subsequent proposals on a freeze of nuclear arsenals and moratorium on explosions have also been designed to achieve progress in the negotiations in this field.

During the current session of the Conference, the Soviet Union has developed these initiatives. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, K.U. Chernenko, in his statement of 2 March 1984 put forward new proposals on the elaboration of certain norms regulating relations between the nuclear-weapon Powers. We are ready to reach agreement at any time with the other nuclear-weapon Powers on the joint recognition of norms of this kind and on giving them a mandatory character.

We regard the problem of the prevention of nuclear war not as an academic one, but in terms of adopting concrete practical measures. Our proposals on this score have been laid down in concise form in the Working Paper of a group of socialist countries (CD/484).

During the session the Soviet delegation reaffirmed its interest in the earliest solution of one of the priority issues of present international politics — the prohibition of nuclear tests. In particular, we expressed our readiness to consider the question of data exchange on radioactivity of air masses within the framework of negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-test ban.

Constructive steps have been also made by us on the problem of a chemical-weapon ban. Hardly anyone will deny that the delegations of the USSR and other socialist countries were the main sources of impetus in the Conference's activity in considering the problems of a chemical-weapon ban.

The Soviet delegation submitted a whole set of proposals on another priority issue of our time — the prevention of an arms race in outer space. These took the form of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth, which is on the negotiating table. The Soviet draft caused considerable interest and was broadly commented upon by the delegations.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

An important step in the way towards eliminating the military threat and disarmament would be the implementation of the set of measures designed to curb the arms race at sea. The detailed proposals of the USSR on this issue are contained in a letter of the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, of 9 April 1984, of which the participants of the Conference have been notified.

Those are some of the new proposals put forward by the Soviet Union during the spring part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the same time, looking back at the spring part of the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament, one cannot but recognize that in spite of constructive steps undertaken by the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and the non-aligned States, the Conference continues to make no headway.

Moreover, one has to note with regret that in a sense today on many questions we are even further from agreement than a few years ago. The Conference de facto has lost all subsidiary working bodies, bar one or two. The state of the discussion of such important agenda items as the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States is utterly hopeless. To some extent, this also applies to the prohibition of radiological weapons.

On the highest priority issues, such as the prevention of nuclear war, the curbing of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Conference has not even been able to agree on organizational questions.

What are the reasons for this situation?

It is known that in order to conduct negotiations with a view to achieving constructive solutions, the desire and readiness of only one side do not suffice. It is necessary for the other side also to display an interest in constructive negotiations, to seek solutions to urgent problems, to clear up the obstacles recently piled up in the way of international dialogue in the field of disarmament. However, during the current session we have faced a policy of our negotiating partners which has taken precisely the opposite orientation. Here is the explanation for the absence of any notable results as we approach the conclusion of the first half of the 1984 session.

Within the Conference on Disarmament the opponents of progress use the entire range of different means designed to prevent the undertaking of constructive negotiations. They include the direct refusal to pursue negotiations, imposing ersatz mandates for subsidiary bodies of the Conference, and submitting proposals which are deliberately unacceptable to others on the questions on which talks have already been initiated.

In the first statement made by the Soviet delegation during the current session of the Conference on Disarmament on 7 February, we analysed in detail the international situation and United States policy on arms-limitation issues. We noted that, taking

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the course of triggering off a new spiral in the arms race, the United States and the NATO countries thwart negotiations, use them as a cover for their militaristic preparations, and recently, as experience shows, also for rhetorics aimed inter alia at achieving domestic political goals.

After that statement some delegations of Western States blamed us for what they considered an exceedingly gloomy assessment of the international situation as a whole and United States policy on arms-limitation in particular. However, the deliberations of the first part of the 1984 session confirmed that our assessment was correct. The United States continues to block any advance in the field of disarmament and uses its participation in the negotiations for propaganda purposes to camouflage its true course aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR, unleashing the arms race where it did not exist before, in outer space, for instance, and spurring it on in those areas where it was imposed on the world long ago by the United States military-industrial complex.

The latest, I would say, graphic example of this attitude on the part of the United States to arms-limitation and disarmament issues is the broadly-publicized draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons submitted by the United States delegation on 18 April 1984. Contrary to all promises, even if there are some changes in the obstructionist position of the United States on a chemical-weapons ban, they are in no way for the better. Previously, in order to bar the conclusion of an agreement on a chemical-weapon ban the United States insisted on a verification system under which other States should at the first request allow foreign inspectors access to any chemical facility regardless of whether or not it has anything to do with the production of chemical weapons. Now Washington proposes that States should agree in advance and unconditionally to unimpeded access of foreign inspectors "anywhere and at any time".

It hardly requires very keen insight to understand that what is involved here is not verification which is really necessary for confidence in strict compliance with agreements, in which, incidentally, the USSR is no less interested than the United States. The main point is the following — putting forward demands on unimpeded access to the territories of other States to continue to block the achievement of agreement on a chemical-weapon ban.

In reality, the United States draft can only throw the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban many years back. It not only suffers from extremism, it not only cancels the efforts of many years made by many States with a view to elaborating realistic solutions to verification problems, but it is built on a blatantly discriminatory basis, and places States with different social systems in unequal situations. This was also recognized in today's statement by the representative of the United States. Its implementation would inflict damage to the economic and defence interests of a number of States, first of all those of the socialist States, but not only theirs.

Today the representative of the United States referred to the statement of the Soviet delegation of 21 February. I should like to recall what was said in that statement. I quote from the English translation. "In declaring today our readiness in principle to consider in a positive manner the proposal for the permanent presence of the representatives of international control at the special facilities



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

for the destruction of stocks, we would like particularly to stress that our premise is that our partners at negotiations will also for their part prove their readiness, not in words but in deeds, to seek mutually acceptable solutions." And now we have before us the United States draft, which should have taken into account, as we hoped, the viewpoint of the Soviet Union as well, which is very well known to the United States inasmuch as we have been carrying on negotiations with the United States for eight years at least on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis.

The question must be asked: Why was it necessary for the United States to put forward such a proposal which is deliberately unacceptable for the Soviet Union and many other States? Incidentally, many high United States officials have said that it is deliberately unacceptable. In fact, they could not expect that agreement could be achieved on the basis of it. No, of course, nobody expected that. And the achievement of an agreement was hardly the goal of the authors of the draft. We are deeply convinced that the draft was submitted merely in order to try to cover by the noisy publicity around the United States draft the reality of what the American administration is engaging in— the intensive preparation of the implementation of the 10 billion dollar "United States chemical rearmament" programme proclaimed by President Reagan.

Those are the considerations which the Soviet delegation would like to share concerning the results of the spring part of the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament. As we see, the results do not inspire particular optimism.

But it would be dangerous to give way to desperate pessimism. The experience of the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament during the 1960s and 1970s shows that the work of the Conference on Disarmament may be effective and fruitful only when there exists a mutual will to pursue negotiations and achieve agreements and compromises on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.

The Soviet delegation does not lack that will. As was stated recently by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko, "The philosophy of fatal doom is alien to the Soviet Union and its policy. It rejects both the policy of 'balance of fear' and increasing tension. Peaceful Soviet foreign policy was reaffirmed by the recent session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. We continue to be convinced that there are possibilities of preserving and strengthening peace".

The Soviet delegation, together with other delegations, will continue its endeavours to achieve agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament during the second part of this year's session.

Mr. MIDDLETON (United Kingdom): It is, at this last plenary meeting of the spring part of our session, a little late to welcome you to the Presidency of the Conference. I should nevertheless wish to record the pleasure that my delegation has felt in seeing you preside over us this month, and our thanks to Ambassador Datcu of Romania for his guidance of our work in March.

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

The plenary debate in this session has been marred by polemics in which my delegation has no desire to join. But I would begin by commenting briefly on the repeated allegations of "support for concepts substantiating the possibility of victory in nuclear war and the first use of nuclear weapons to this end". Such remarks, I assume, were not directed at my delegation. The British Government's policy on the role of nuclear weapons was set out by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, on 23 June 1982. What she said at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is no doubt familiar to many of you, but it bears repeating. She said: "There would be no victor in a nuclear exchange. Indeed to start a war among nuclear Powers is not a rational option. These weapons succeed in so far as they prevent war. And for 37 years nuclear weapons have kept the peace between East and West. That is a priceless achievement. Provided there is the will and good sense deterrence can be maintained at substantially reduced levels of nuclear weapons". I would also recall the solemn collective undertaking given by NATO leaders that no NATO weapons, nuclear or conventional, would ever be used except in response to attack.

The British Government is firmly committed to achieving reductions in nuclear weapons. As Mr. Luce, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said in this Conference on 14 February, the first priority is for the Soviet Union and the United States, which control between them 90 per cent of the nuclear weapons on this planet, to negotiate deep reductions in their arsenals. The British Government has frequently stressed its desire to see bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which were broken off by the latter last year, resumed as soon as possible. The Vice-President of the United States in this Conference on 18 April urged the Soviet leaders to resume these important negotiations on which so much of the world's hopes depends. My delegation strongly supports that call.

My Government takes very seriously the growing danger posed by chemical weapons. Not only do some countries hold large and increasing stocks of these weapons, but they have recently been used in defiance of international condemnation. At this time, it is, therefore, more important than ever that we should secure a comprehensive ban on these weapons. Agreement on a treaty, I believe it is universally agreed, would constitute a measure of real disarmament and a major contribution to international security. My delegation was pleased that, at least in this area of our work, we have been able to make progress during the current session. We rapidly reached agreement on the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee and on the formation of working groups on particular topics. Within these groups some progress has been made. Mr. Luce tabled a paper on challenge inspection on 14 February, the latest in a series of proposals that have been made by the United Kingdom in the Committee and the Conference on Disarmament. We have been gratified by the interest shown in these proposals and by the serious way in which they have been discussed, both in the working groups and in bilateral conversations.

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

The tabling last week of the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons by the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, was an event of the highest significance. The British Government warmly supports this latest initiative by the United States, which will mark a milestone on the long path towards a total ban on these appalling weapons. My Government shares the United States view that strict verification is needed to assure all States that the prohibitions of any future convention are being observed. My delegation was glad to note from the statement on 18 April by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union that his delegation was prepared to agree, in negotiations on this subject, to a whole range of different verification methods, including mandatory systematic or permanent international on-site inspection, as well as inspections by challenge. My delegation believes that a combination of these two types of verification will be needed, both to give confidence that all chemical weapons stocks and production facilities are destroyed; and, on a permanent basis, to give confidence that they are not clandestinely restored or created. We hope that the United States draft, by virtue of its comprehensive character and wealth of ideas, will provide a major impetus to our work in spite of the negative reactions that we have heard from certain delegations this morning. The complex nature of the proposals, indeed of the subject itself, hardly needs stressing, but we continue to hope that all delegations to this Conference will give the draft most careful study in the weeks to come and will return, as my delegation intends to do, ready to undertake detailed negotiations.

With the exception of chemical weapons, this has not been a good session. The hopes that we expressed earlier in the session that the change of name from Committee to Conference would be accompanied by a change of approach have not been realized. Of the four Ad Hoc Committees we have set up to deal with particular aspects of our work two have not met and one has been in existence only one week. We have failed to agree on mandates for three other Ad Hoc Committees after weeks of discussion and of extensive and praiseworthy efforts by successive occupants of the Presidency. We share the concern of other delegations at this state of affairs, even if we do not all agree on the reasons for it or the remedies to be applied.

There is, in our view, one basic reason for our failure to get over procedural hurdles and to begin substantive work— the fact that we have different concepts of "negotiations" and the role of the Conference in that respect. We discern an underlying train of logic in the attitude of some delegations. The Conference is a negotiating body; conferences have ad hoc committees as subsidiary bodies; therefore, all ad hoc committees must also be negotiating bodies. There is a deceptive simplicity about such a syllogism. Deceptive because it ignores the real differences of substance which divide delegations and the different levels of agreement which have been attained on different agenda items. My delegation approaches our work differently. We attach importance to the role of the Conference

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

as a negotiating body, but before negotiations can begin we believe that we must jointly identify an aim and then establish the basis on which it might be achievable. It is not acceptable to us to agree to enter into negotiations on a vague and ill-defined basis — that would certainly be a recipe for failure.

It is for this reason that we have not been able to agree to negotiate on "appropriate and practical measures" for the prevention of nuclear war before we have defined what form such measures might take. There is now agreement, I am glad to say, that the phase of identifying such measures is an essential preliminary and we recognize the flexibility shown by the Group of 21 in this respect.

We have, however, yet to reach agreement on a mandate. It still seems to my delegation that had the suggestion of informal meetings made by western States been taken up last summer, or indeed even if it had been taken up earlier this session, we could have at least made a start on the substance of the question. Instead, because of the insistence on form — because of the insistence on doing this work only in the framework of an ad hoc committee — we have yet to begin our study of the subject.

Similar considerations apply to the procedural debate on outer space, where although we have agreed in principle to form an ad hoc committee we are still caught up in arguments over its precise terms of reference. Once again it is the word "negotiation" which causes the difficulty; once again it is the attempt to enter into negotiations before we know what we are going to negotiate on and the attempt to resolve fundamental differences of approach within the terms of a mandate which prevents us dealing with the substance of the question. We believe that the proposals put forward by western States form a sound basis on which work might begin.

Our problems with the formation of an ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban are somewhat different. We know what needs to be done but we also know what fundamental differences of view exist on certain aspects of the problem. We do not believe that these differences can be resolved simply by entering into negotiations; nor can we pretend, as some do, that these differences do not exist. These difficulties will not be solved by selective quotation from reports of earlier negotiations or reliance on supposed authorities outside this Conference. It is right, in our view, that the Conference should, on a multilateral basis, try to establish basic common ground before negotiations are started. As Mr. Luce said on 14 February, "It would do no one any service to pretend that we can begin to negotiate the language of a treaty when we remain so far apart on basic principles". We remain ready to participate actively in an ad hoc committee, in the hope of resolving these difficulties.

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

A brighter note was struck in March with the submission of the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which my delegation joins others in welcoming. My delegation supports and will contribute to further work by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and would like to pay particular tribute to the work of the Chairman of the Group, Dr. Ola Dahlman, and of the Scientific Secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal. The contributions of Norway and other non-member States of the Conference on Disarmament have added greatly to the value of the work of the Ad Hoc Group.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has done valuable work but we think it over simplifying the matter to state that the Ad Hoc Group has "clarified all relevant questions". We see implicit in the report the considerable difficulties which remain even in data exchange. There is a substantial task before us in achieving greater compatibility in technical skills between different national seismic centres. There is a need for the installation of modern systems in participating seismograph stations and for the establishment of more high quality stations in the Southern Hemisphere. Improvements in this direction will only be possible if the States concerned are ready to take the necessary steps. There still exist differences of view as to the degree to which Level II data should be made available. And we must not forget that the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is concerned only with data exchange; it does not answer directly important questions relating to the detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

Finally, we can take some satisfaction in the fact that we succeeded at last in setting up an Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons on the basis of the former mandate last week. The outside observer might, however, justifiably ask why it took so long. The only obstacle was in fact the proposal of one group to alter radically the competence of the Ad Hoc Committee by suggesting that the mandate provide for the negotiation of a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction—a proposal consistently rejected by many delegations for reasons set out in successive annual reports. The only result of this tactic, whose motive remains obscure to us, was to delay formation of the Ad Hoc Committee until the last weeks of the session. We hope that after this delay a rapid start to the work of the Committee can be made under Ambassador Vejvoda's chairmanship when we resume in June.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 249th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Ambassador Pietinen.

Mr. PIETINEN (Finland): At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the Presidency of this Conference for the month of April. I also wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Datcu of Romania who so skillfully guided the work of the Conference during the month of March.

It is a sad fact of our times that the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, not only continues unabated, but is also in itself a growing threat to world peace. Distrust and fear instead of co-operation and confidence seem to govern the present international relations. Yet these burning problems of today should in the first place be addressed in a constructive dialogue between the leading military Powers, but apart from that, also in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating body of the world community.

My delegation has already had the opportunity to address some of the important issues on the agenda of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament. I will return to the question of a chemical weapons ban later in my statement, but I would first like to share with you some of our thoughts on agenda item 6 of the Conference, namely negative security assurances (NSA). I do so as a representative of a small and neutral non-nuclear-weapon State which has formally and in a most comprehensive way given up the so-called nuclear option and which should thus clearly qualify as a country whose status should be respected in all circumstances. We have noted with concern that this body has so far not been able to give a concrete content to the concept of negative security assurances either in a legally binding instrument or otherwise.

This is a matter of serious concern to Finland, which has actively sought to promote this concept in its disarmament policy and has also submitted its ideas on this subject in the earlier stages of the work of the Committee on Disarmament. I would, in particular, like to refer to document CD/75 submitted by Finland in 1980. In view of the importance of the subject we regret the absence of concrete negotiations on negative security assurances during the work of the Committee and the Conference on Disarmament last year and this year.

I would like to stress at the outset that there is no complete assurance as long as nuclear weapons exist. It is equally true that no assurances can replace nuclear disarmament, which should be our ultimate objective. But pending real nuclear disarmament measures, ways and means to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States should be actively explored. By committing themselves to a non-nuclear status the non-nuclear-weapon States have made a significant contribution to the strengthening of the international security. The strengthening of their status and the respect for it can thus only have a positive effect in international relations as a whole as a stabilizing factor and in lessening the risks of speculation concerning the intentions of the non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, the question of negative security assurances should be approached from the point of view of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Although the security concerns of the nuclear-weapon States are recognized we think that the objective of negotiations on the negative security assurances is and must be to do something in the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. Finland, for its part, welcomes all concrete ideas that can help to eliminate the risk of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Pietinen, Finland)

The rapid development of nuclear weapons technology and, in particular, strategic doctrines directly affect the security of other States, thus making their security situation a more complicated one. The possibilities of the States concerned to counteract this trend are understandably rather limited. The advancement of the concept of negative security assurances is one such measure.

This concept has so far been generally understood to encompass only the direct use or direct threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States themselves as objects of use or threat of use. It can, however, easily be seen that in certain cases the threat can be indirect, i.e., the non-nuclear-weapon State in question is itself not intended to be the object of use or threat of use. The Government of Finland therefore considers that the concept of negative security assurances should be comprehensive and cover not only the normally discussed use and threat of use, but also all other eventualities involving nuclear weapons through which the security of non-nuclear-weapon States can be affected. As examples of this indirect threat I can refer to the possibility of a nuclear missile that has strayed from its intended course as well as the danger of the radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions that have taken place far beyond international borders. The problem of delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons using the air space of the non-nuclear-weapon States is another case in point. Modern delivery systems are particularly problematic from the point of view of these States. International law already prohibits the use of force against another State, guarantees the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of States. But the existence of this legally binding norm notwithstanding, it seems indisputable that modern technology has by its rapid development brought new elements into the legal and political framework under which the concept of negative security assurances has to be considered. It would therefore seem particularly important to us that the scope of the problem of negative security assurances should be widened so as to include in international negotiations aspects of negative security assurances to which I have referred above. What is needed now is concrete negotiations aimed at keeping the non-nuclear-weapon States outside all nuclear strategic speculations.

Countries that have given up the nuclear option are entitled to no less than this.

The non-nuclear-weapon States have a right to stay outside the direct effects of the nuclear-arms race, of the development of military doctrines and of the strategic planning that sets the stage for the military posture of the States concerned. Unless counteracted, the ongoing development might undermine the whole concept of negative security assurances and frustrate the efforts that have been displayed in particular in this forum. It is the hope of my delegation that during the latter part of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament the question of negative security assurances can be addressed with the seriousness the problem deserves.

The question of a chemical weapons ban has been another basic priority in the disarmament policy of Finland. The results of our longstanding verification project in this field have been regularly presented in the Committee on Disarmament. I am this time in a position to announce that a new so-called "Blue Book", which will be entitled "Technical Evaluation of Selected Scientific Methods for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament" will be presented to the relevant Ad Hoc Committee in June.

(Mr. Pietinen, Finland)

The contribution of Finland will this year be presented in a form that is somewhat different from what has been the case before. It is our intention now to submit a comprehensive analysis of all the results that have been achieved in the course of this ten-year project.

The Working Paper is intended to cover all aspects of verification. In particular, it will discuss possible verification tasks that might be required in the future convention and the technical means for verification of chemical agents, containing automated monitoring sample collection, mobile field laboratories and a central laboratory. Applications are given describing combined use of the technical means. It does not give numerical data, but describes the technology and is thus comprehensible for a larger public.

Recent events involving the use of chemical weapons in a conflict have made the efforts to achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons more urgent than ever. We have noted with interest the latest developments in the Conference on Disarmament in this matter. These include, in particular, the statement by the Soviet Union in February on some aspects of verification and the presentation of a draft chemical weapons treaty introduced last week by the Vice-President of the United States. We see these developments as a sign of willingness of those governments to come to grips with the difficult problems faced by the Conference on Disarmament during the negotiations. As a further positive element we note that the relevant subsidiary body has been able to start actual negotiations.

We are looking forward to early concrete results from the Committee already during the course of the summer session. Finland is, as in the past, ready to give its contribution to these negotiations in particular in the field of verification technology.

In conclusion I would like to use this opportunity to recall the interest of Finland in full membership of the Conference. If elected, Finland would as a member intensify its co-operation with all parties in the Conference on Disarmament, in particular with other countries outside military alliances. We would then also ensure that the delegation of Finland to the Conference would be provided with the necessary personnel and other facilities in order to make immediately possible an active and constructive contribution to the work of the Conference in all fields of its activity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador de la Gorce.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, the delegation of France would like to make some remarks on this spring part of the session, which is ending today.



(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

How its outcome is assessed will naturally depend on delegations' positions with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, but, to some extent, we all have reasons both for satisfaction and for disappointment.

In terms of satisfaction, the delegation of France ranks the rather rapid resumption and expansion of the negotiations on chemical weapons first. We are all aware how much is at stake in these negotiations and how timely they are and we hope that, in the not too distant future, they will lead to the most important disarmament treaty ever concluded at the international level.

A great deal of time and effort has gone into the work on chemical weapons. Procedure has never prevailed over substance -- a rare occurrence indeed. Above all, extremely valuable contributions have been made to the negotiations. In chronological order, the first was the statement made on 21 February by our Soviet colleague, Ambassador Issraelyan. The position he put forward on the on-site inspection of operations to destroy stockpiles represents a major step forward in the reconciliation of views on a basic condition for verification.

We have also received other extremely valuable contributions, including that by China, which represents a remarkable attempt at clarification and conciliation, particularly with regard to the problem of definitions. The delegation of France also greatly appreciated the technical documents submitted by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It, too, was anxious to make its own contribution.

The submission by the Vice-President of the United States of the United States draft treaty was the highlight of this session and we welcomed it with the greatest satisfaction. This document is of considerable importance and we are studying it carefully.

The Ad Hoc Committee and its three Working Groups have adopted a serious and determined approach to the task entrusted to them. The results may appear to be uneven, but the difficulties themselves were not of the same order. Undeniable progress has been made on the question of definitions.

We have great hopes that, at the second part of the session, steps will be taken to overcome certain problems and derive the best possible advantage from the work already accomplished. In this connection, we expect a great deal from the Presidency. The delegation of France wishes to congratulate our Swedish colleague, Ambassador Ekéus, as well as the Chairmen of the Working Groups, Mr. Duarte, Mr. Akkerman and Mr. Thielicke, for their efforts. It has full confidence in them for the future.

We would also like negotiations to be held this summer on matters relating to the prohibition of use and its verification. These issues have not been entrusted to a working group, but will be discussed during the consultations to be conducted by our colleague from Canada, Ambassador Beesley. We have confidence in him as well and wish him every success in his work.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

This work and the progress that has been made should now pave the way for a new stage, namely, the drafting of a convention. The Conference now has the resources it needs to carry out this important task: the United States draft treaty and the documents prepared under the auspices of Ambassador Ekéus should all be taken into account in the formulation of the text.

The biggest disappointment for us has been the lack of success of the consultations relating to the mandate of a subsidiary body on the item of our agenda entitled "prevention of an arms race in outer space". The delegation of France attaches the greatest importance to this question and its consideration by our Conference. Although we still have an open-minded attitude towards the mandate in question, we are of the opinion that the formula worked out by the contact group would, together, if necessary, with an explanatory statement by the President, make it possible to do the necessary exploratory work in such a complex area; such work would, moreover, probably have taken up all the time set aside for an ad hoc committee at the current session. We deeply regret the fact that a group of delegations objected to an arrangement which would have made it possible for the work to begin.

In the first statement it made in plenary, the delegation of France said that it would be wiser at once to devote to essentially preparatory work the time we risk losing in a possibly fruitless discussion in an effort to attain a more ambitious mandate. We are sorry that we were right, but we still hope that a solution may be found during the summer session.

I would like to refer to the consultations that dealt with agenda item 3 on "prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". The delegation of France recalled its position on that question in the statement it made on 6 March. Last year, it agreed to the inclusion of that item on the agenda, despite serious reservations and in order to put an end to an abusive and deplorable obstruction of our work. It is of the opinion that the item relates specifically to disarmament only to the extent that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would, by definition, exclude the use of nuclear weapons.

We also note that item 3 does not relate to the prevention of nuclear war as a specific and separate issue, something to which we could not have agreed, but, rather, to "the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". As we have often stated, this clearly means that the prevention of nuclear war cannot be dealt with separately from the prevention of war itself, i.e. conventional war. What is at issue is the problem of security or, in other words, the political and military conditions for security. We will not go into all the often-stated reasons why the nuclear factor continues, in the present circumstances, to be a basic condition for the balance needed for security by my country and others. We take note of the opposition to which our concept of security gives rise in this body. We note that demands are being made in various quarters for the cancellation of the nuclear factor, not only by means of nuclear disarmament, but also without delay and primarily by means of the prohibition of the use or first use of nuclear weapons. We are, however, convinced that such measures would provoke political and strategic destabilization with incalculable consequences reaching far beyond the boundaries of the alliances.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

The opposing views we have heard in the Conference obviously limit the results we can expect from our consideration of item 3.

We are nevertheless of the opinion that this item must be considered. This is why we took an active part in the consultations which you held, Mr. President, to try to find an acceptable formula for the mandate of a subsidiary body, in case a consensus was reached on the establishment of a subsidiary body. The delegation of France wishes to pay a tribute to the serenity, goodwill and spirit of conciliation that characterized the consultations. It particularly appreciated the openmindedness and understanding demonstrated by our distinguished colleague from India, who spoke on behalf of the neutral and non-aligned countries.

We have given careful consideration to the proposals by Ambassador Dubey, which definitely offer substantial possibilities for a solution.

We agree with him that the adoption of a negotiating mandate is not possible and that only a very broad formulation which takes account of the concerns of all may offer a way out. We therefore endorse the proposal made by our colleague from Belgium, Ambassador Depasse. It refers to the concept of security, which is, by its very nature, linked to the prevention of nuclear war and war of any kind, and calls for consideration of all current and future proposals.

We are of the opinion that the contact group's consultations will now have provided a basis for a solution if the necessary spirit of conciliation finally prevails, particularly among the delegations that have called for the establishment of a subsidiary body.

We do not know whether the consideration of item 3 will identify issues that will lend themselves to specific negotiations, but we do not think that such negotiations can relate to matters that are within the competence of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

Regardless of the problems and differences of opinion that may arise and the procedures that may be chosen, however, we are in favour of in-depth consideration of all the matters covered by agenda item 3. These are issues that are of major interest to all States. Their discussion is a matter of legitimate concern to the international community and the Conference on Disarmament is for the time being the only body in which such a discussion can take place.

Mr. President, I would not like to conclude this statement without expressing the French delegation's congratulations and thanks for the authority, competence, courtesy and unfailing patience with which you have conducted our work during a period that has been full of problems and difficulties.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, our adjournment today is a mere matter of expediency, and has no meaning beyond that. We make room for an important disarmament meeting in New York. We do not have to report about the spring part of our session nor otherwise to assess our work in a formal manner. Yet, one is tempted to evaluate the first three months of our work as a Conference on Disarmament, and I see that I am not the only one to succumb to that temptation. The balance sheet, however, is not altogether favourable. Our session so far leaves an ambivalent impression. We note positive and negative elements side by side.

Let me start with the negative side of the balance sheet. Again, this assembly has wasted an excessive amount of its meeting time on procedure. Obviously, the lesson of the previous year, when almost the entire spring part of the session was wasted on such procedural issues, has not been heeded. The result is that in essential areas of our work assignment we have not gone beyond the preparatory stage. That has prevented us from creating an environment in which the Conference could conduct a serious discussion of issues, a serious common search for possible consensus areas in which regulatory, negotiating efforts could be launched. The consequence is that we remain on the level of monologue, and that our opportunity for true argumentative discourse, and thereby progress, is lost. My delegation regrets that too many delegations seemingly place formalism and semantics higher on their value scale than the contents of the problems before us. I do not purport to criticize anybody in particular, but to point to a general state of misery in our deliberations.

This situation should motivate us to look for possibilities of ameliorating seriously our working mode. Although no article of our rules of procedure compels us to do so, we have unfortunately established a practice by which subordinate organs of the Conference are in every instance to be equipped with terms of reference-- a mandate-- that reaches far into the substance matter of discussion. Do we not succumb there to a fallacy? Do we not attempt too much? Is it not impossible to try to reconcile fundamental differences of security philosophy in the few lines of a mandate even before in-depth discussion on the subject is undertaken? Would it not be preferable to settle for a broad description of the field of activity of each subordinate organ, leaving it to the working body itself to shape its assignment by lively debate between delegations? In this context I find the idea circulated by Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia particularly intriguing. A simple, non-specific model for the terms of reference of ad hoc committees and other conceivable subsidiary organs would, in the view of my delegation, be an appropriate subject of study for our Conference (and, possibly, for adoption), in order to allow the Conference to dispense with long-drawn discussions on mandates in the future. Let me express the hope that our group of seven so appropriately labelled "Group of Wise Men", will soon be in a position to provide us with concrete suggestions in this vein.

It is with particular regret that my delegation observes the failure of the Conference to agree on the terms of reference for a specific working organ on the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters. This subject which obviously encounters the interest of all delegations their differing perspectives notwithstanding that. It is therefore particularly preoccupying that, in spite of the flexibility displayed by so many delegations, a pragmatic organizational solution has eluded us. Our failure to deal with the pressing subject of war prevention has prejudiced our ability to deal with the major problems before the Conference in a balanced manner. It is perhaps not futile to anticipate that our

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

recess exerts a salutary effect on the further evolution of this issue. Here as in several other areas our failure to come to terms with the procedural difficulties are particularly saddening because they have deprived you, Mr. President, of the well deserved fruits of your patient labours. The diligence and inventiveness with which you have conducted a multifaceted consultation process behind the scenes has, however, not gone unnoticed. My delegation, as others, will remember the period of your Presidency as one of good political common sense and exceptional determination.

The negative side of our balance sheet is, however, happily compensated for by a number of positive aspects.

Let me first stress the fact that in spite of a particularly tense international climate at the turn of the year, the spring part of the session of our Conference under its new more prestigious designation--was able to embark on its work in a co-operative mode and emit a general willingness to foster ties and not to impair them. Predictions about an impending total standstill of all disarmament and arms control affairs proved untrue. Just as the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe and, more recently, the resume of Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe, our Conference managed to reach cruising speed after a very brief spell of hesitation, and, used to serious work and rational argument, the majority of delegations brushed aside the several examples of undifferentiated and unfounded polemics without which apparently one group of countries, although otherwise co-operative, could not do.

However, the major reason for satisfaction is the quantum leap which we have been able to make in the field of chemical weapons. The quick determined steps which the Conference took in February to establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a comprehensive and forward looking mandate provided the appropriate ambiance in which many delegations could go on record with new and constructive views. My delegation has, in several steps, attempted to contribute to that process. But I would also like to cite as an encouraging element that the delegation of the Soviet Union has again taken a more active interest in the subject of chemical weapons, designating it, in a statement in early February, as one of the priority subjects of negotiations of this Conference. The several suggestions which the Soviet Union has submitted, in particular in a major policy statement on 21 February, and its declared general readiness to contribute constructively to the solution of all pending verification problems of the convention have been helpful and will play an important role in future negotiations. My delegation has also noted with attention the undertaking given by Ambassador Issraelyan on 18 April 1984 that the United States draft on a chemical weapons convention will receive serious study by the Soviet side; even in his more critical remarks of this morning, I find nothing that contradicts this welcome undertaking.

Heralded by Secretary Shultz' formal announcement on 16 January, the introduction of the United States draft by the Vice-President of the United States of America on 18 April has certainly been the major event of the spring part of our session. There is no doubt that the draft represents an unprecedented endeavour by one of the two leading military Powers to provide complex solutions to the problems inherent in the problem of banning chemical weapons. My delegation has noted with satisfaction that the draft not only represents detailed United States views on all aspects of the future convention but also incorporates contributions of many other delegations in the Conference on Disarmament, and indeed the results of the collective negotiating process of last year. My delegation is convinced that the United States draft will become an important basis for future negotiations and,

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indeed, one of its determining elements. The document is proof of the political determination of the United States of America to see these negotiations to a good end in the shortest possible time. The assurance given by Vice-President Bush and, a moment ago echoed by Ambassador Fields that the United States have introduced their draft with every intention to provide negotiating flexibility when needed underscores the significance of the event.

As could be expected in such an immensely complex subject-matter, the United States draft contains many aspects that will evoke controversy within the Conference and in part have already done so. Some of the views concerning verification are new and bold. Whatever position delegations might take vis-à-vis certain parts of the recommended verification system it must be recognized that the draft provides new impulses that should stimulate serious argument.

In this context it is important that the United States views on verification and especially its new concept concerning special and on-challenge verification be taken at face value. The provisions on open-invitation mandatory inspections for verifying compliance demonstrate an unprecedented measure of audacity. Delegations that evaluate the proposal in this respect should not only look at what the United States demands from others but what they are prepared to give themselves. Openness is offered on the basis of reciprocity. It is a new phenomenon that a significant military Power is prepared to pay such a high price in order to ensure compliance with a disarmament convention. My delegation is impressed with the readiness of the United States delegation to join in a mutual obligation to open for international inspection a substantial segment of its sensitive military installations. Whatever the final outcome of negotiations will be, we should look at this offer as a strength of the United States approach, and my delegation would advise that all delegations remain mindful of the political dimension of this open-invitation philosophy. It provides for a far-sighted, indeed unique approach aiming at changing the way Governments deal with each other in an important field of national security. This new concept contrasts favourably with certain antiquated views pretending that mystification and excessive secrecy are the nucleus of States' sovereignty. This new creative approach deserves a thorough discussion and my delegation would wish that all delegations engage in such endeavour in good faith.

As far as we are concerned, we are prepared to accept the challenge that the United States draft contains. The forthcoming intersessional period will offer all of us the advantage to study more carefully certain provisions which on first sight appear at variance with views our respective delegations have taken in previous negotiations.

My own delegation has submitted several working papers on the question of verification, the latest, document CD/326, already couched in formal language, such as the drafting of the future treaty will require. We have always looked for a comprehensive and mutually balanced international verification system where levels of intrusiveness and inspection efforts would be carefully dosed and measured by the sole criterion of efficiency. From this vantage point, the detailed verification provisions of the United States draft deserve a generally positive assessment.

The destruction of chemical weapons is, from the position of a Central European country, a goal of foremost urgency. The mechanism for a verified destruction of stocks should, however, not be complicated in a way that is not

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

called for by the purposes of the Convention. In this respect we shall have to study thoroughly and with some hesitation those parts of the United States proposal that deal with the verification of the initial declarations. I have already referred to the statement by the Soviet delegation of 21 February 1984 with regard to verification of destruction of stockpiles. This is an area, where a consensus in principle appears now within reach. My delegation is cautiously optimistic that we shall find negotiated answers to the more detailed problems of verification of destruction of stocks.

We are equally concerned that the mechanisms envisaged for the verification of nonproduction, as laid out in the United States draft, should not entail unnecessary burdens for the civilian chemical industry. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the chemical industry is an important pillar of our over-all economic performance. It is therefore a legitimate consideration to seek to avoid intrusive measures that would not directly raise the level of effectiveness of verification. Our joint endeavours should be directed towards establishing a correct balance between two contrasting principles: the first, that the convention should function and international verification be effective, the other that the restrictions imposed by the convention upon the performance of chemical industry must not lead to excessive constraints and burdensome, costly controls. On the basis of our strong general endorsement for the relevant provisions of the United States draft concerning the verification of non-production on a selective and random basis, many of the details will have to be sorted out in an earnest endeavour.

The distinguished Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran has today forcefully reminded us that our negotiations on a permanent ban on chemical weapons are not conducted in a vacuum, but that the production and use of chemical weapons is a grim reality of our time, in his region as in others. The Federal Government has taken note with utmost concern of the report of the experts who went to Iran at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in order to investigate the alleged use of chemical agents in the war between Iran and Iraq. On the basis of this report it must be assumed that one side to the conflict has indeed used chemical weapons. The Federal Government has stated its position on these occurrences publicly, and in an unequivocal manner. It regrets and condemns the use of chemical weapons as a clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of such weapons in war. The findings of the United Nations mission underline, once more, the vital importance of the early conclusion of a comprehensive world-wide and reliably verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.

Let me return to a hopefully more positive aspect of our negotiations on chemical weapons. You, Mr. President, and colleagues are aware of the invitation issued to all members of the Conference as well as to interested observers to participate in an international chemical weapons workshop in Northern Germany, scheduled from afternoon of 12 to morning of 14 June 1984. As I stressed in my individual letters of invitation, it is the aim of the Federal Government to embed this workshop as closely as possible into the ongoing negotiation process. I am therefore particularly grateful for the lively response which the invitation has found and I should like to express gratitude to all delegations who have nominated their participants. Letters to all nominees acknowledging their kind response and specifying departure time, as well as other elements of the programme, are currently in the mail. My delegation is looking forward to welcoming the participants in the Federal Republic of Germany and hopes for an outcome of the workshop that will be conducive to our negotiations.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

In conclusion let me revert to the larger perspectives of the international disarmament process. A few days ago the States Members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization met and published a communiqué reflecting their proceedings. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has welcomed the constructive tone of the communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact and sees in them a confirmation of its own persevering efforts together with its partners in the Atlantic Alliance to intensify dialogue and co-operation on a broad basis with the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. It sees in the wording of the communiqué a positive sign to the effect that the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact have taken into account the signal contained in the Atlantic Alliance's Brussels Declaration of December 1983. The communiqué says that there are no problems that cannot be solved on the basis of negotiations and that no opportunity should go unused in attempting to return to negotiations. This is in keeping with the thinking of my Government. It must however also apply to the important nuclear negotiations that were recently interrupted by the Soviet Union. In this sense, the members of the Atlantic Alliance have emphasized, in their Brussels Declaration, and repeatedly since then that they are willing at any time and without any prior conditions to conduct negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. In view of the importance of the subject-matter for global security and for the work we have been assigned, I thought it fitting that I recall this offer at the time when we adjourn.

The PRESIDENT: We have now exhausted the time available to us this morning. If I hear no objection, I propose that we suspend now the plenary meeting and resume it at 3.00 p.m. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I suggest now that we listen to those speakers listed for this afternoon. I have on my list of speakers Czechoslovakia, India, Canada, Indonesia, Australia and Hungary.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, first of all allow me to say a few words of appraisal of your activities during this month. On a very personal note, I would also like to praise the fact that you pronounce my name so correctly.

Since this is our last plenary meeting of the spring part of our session, I, like several speakers before me, deem it appropriate briefly to look back at what has been achieved in the course of the last three months.

After the adoption of the agenda for this year, in which appropriate place was given to the priority items, including that of the prevention of nuclear war, my delegation hoped that the Conference would soon be in a position to deal effectively with all its agenda items. Our group demonstrated clearly what we mean by dealing effectively with items virtually at the beginning of the session.



(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Our memorandum of 17 February, issued as document CD/434, is explicit in this respect. It contains proposals for the establishment of working organs on individual agenda items as well as suggested mandates calling for the undertaking of relevant negotiations.

Regrettably, two months after the adoption of the agenda we are still far from having established subsidiary bodies on such priority items as the prevention of nuclear war, a nuclear-test ban, nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer space. This situation is, unfortunately, not new in this body and the leading roles, played by individual participants, have hardly changed. There again remains a couple of delegations which, contrary to the demands of the overwhelming majority of this Conference and the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly, continue to block the establishment of the Conference's subsidiary bodies with negotiating mandates on priority items mentioned above. And their attempts to introduce arbitrarily limited terms of reference are now only too obviously out of place.

One of the few positive signs of the spring part of our session was the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a mandate "... to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention ...". As to whether we have started to fulfil the mandate, looking at what has been done one has to admit that much more could have been achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee and its three Working Groups had all delegations taken an active part in their activity. At the same time, we appreciate the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus, as well as the chairmen of the three Working Groups. Further useful exchange of views has taken place and drafting on some aspects was undertaken. Certain progress has been made on several questions, for example, with regard to the scope and definitions of the future convention. We witnessed also demonstrations of goodwill on the part of many delegations as well as efforts to bridge remaining differences. However, on the whole it was again proved that a very limited number of delegations, even one delegation, can prevent us from substantially moving ahead. But let me remind distinguished colleagues that we offered our more detailed views on what has been achieved within the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in my statement of 12 April.

I would therefore limit myself now to reiterating the deep regret of my delegation that the important proposal concerning the verification of the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, introduced by Ambassador Issraelyan on 21 February has not been matched by a similar move on the part of western countries, especially the United States. Its draft convention, introduced on 18 April, failed to bring about such a constructive step. Moreover, while not moving an inch towards the positions of other countries, the draft raised new unfounded requirements especially in the field of verification. The authors of the concept of "open invitation" not only realized but undoubtedly proceeded from its obvious unacceptability for many countries. It is politically naïve to assume that States would be seriously prepared to open, on 24-hours notice, all their military installations, including those of strategic significance, to international inspectors looking at random for "hidden" chemical weapons. We believe that this fully applies also to the United States itself.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The United States draft convention is also somehow behind what has been achieved so far in the Conference on Disarmament. For example, the definition of "toxic chemical" used is scientifically unacceptable, using the term "chemical action" which is unknown to toxicologists throughout the world. The definition of precursors is related only to production which does not imply its use as component of binary or multicomponent weapon technology. We also miss a definition of key precursor. Instead one can only find an incomplete and arbitrary list of such compounds scattered in schedules A and C.

The concept of lists without definitions and the effort to relate various measures only to lists, as reflected also in the article dealing with permitted activities, is unacceptable for my delegation. We are convinced that at the time of signing the Convention, there must be a clear and binding line, which can be drawn only by means of definitions which are scientifically based, delimited by the purpose-criterion limited and concisely elaborated.

Binary chemical weapons have traditionally been a taboo subject in the United States newspapers. But it is still surprising that they are still ignored even in a comprehensive draft convention. At least in this regard, the United States draft is "consistent". This is very much apparent from schedule A, where the most dangerous chemicals are said to be summarized. We maintain that such a schedule should contain also all key precursors of super-toxic lethal chemicals, which, in the United States draft, it does not. For instance, the key precursor of the most toxic contemporary super-toxic lethal nerve agent forming a substantive part of the United States chemical arsenal, VX, that is, O-ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphinite has been "forgotten".

The draft convention is also lacking in its undifferentiated approach to destruction, with no schedule of destruction according to the danger of particular elements of chemical weapons aimed at avoiding one-sided military advantage during the destruction period.

With regard to old chemical weapons, this proposal conserves also the anachronistic and unreasonable view, which is unacceptable for small countries not possessing chemical weapons and having therefore no destruction facilities. Such countries (and they will form the majority of States parties to the future convention) need to have the right to address other States parties and the Consultative Committee in seeking know-how and/or assistance for the safe destruction of rarely-found old individual chemical weapons, rather than being submitted to verification concerning whether some kilograms of toxic material were really destroyed or illusory transferred to non-existing chemical arsenals. Besides, a number of delegations, including mine, have serious reservations with regard to a description in initial declarations of the exact locations of chemical weapons.

If we are to achieve some tangible results during the summer part of our session, all delegations should realize that the only way to do so lies through an effort to accommodate each other, to find mutually acceptable solutions and to bridge existing differences, instead of widening them.

Mr. DUBEY (India): Mr. President, it has indeed been very gratifying for my delegation to have you, the representative of our close neighbour, Sri Lanka, as the President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. With Sri Lanka, India has enjoyed centuries of fraternal ties based on history, culture, spiritual values and temporal philosophy. In this Conference on Disarmament, it is pertinent to recall that both our countries are the inheritors of the glorious tradition of Emperor Ashok who, 2,500 years ago, renounced war as an instrument of statecraft, disarmed his army and devoted the rest of his life to preaching peace and non-violence. Our countries thus learnt the lesson of disarmament not today or in this century, but thousands of years ago. As your Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament is coming to a close, I would like to place on record the deep appreciation of my delegation for the tireless effort you have made and the remarkable diplomatic skill you have displayed in helping us in our effort to resolve some of the procedural and substantive issues we have been grappling with since the beginning of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament.

I would also like to express my deep and sincere appreciation for the contribution made by the previous President, Ambassador Ion Datcu of Romania, to the work of the Conference. Through his numerous consultations and the able manner in which he conducted the deliberations in the plenary meetings, he did his utmost to help the Conference to move ahead in various areas of negotiations.

I intend today to speak on agenda item 5, Prevention of an arms race in outer space. The perils of the extension of the arms race into outer space were clearly seen at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Final Document that emerged from that session called for appropriate international negotiations in order to prevent such an arms race. It took four years after that to get an item on this subject included on the agenda of the then Committee on Disarmament. And during the last two years that this item has been on the agenda, in spite of the overwhelming desire of the international community, reflected in various General Assembly resolutions, to commence negotiations on this subject with a view to reaching an agreement or agreements, this body has not been able to commence any work at all on this crucial issue. During this period, the situation on the ground with regard to the arms race in outer space, has undergone a rapid and alarming transformation. Developments of catastrophic implications for the fate of mankind are taking place in this field. And, yet, the Conference on Disarmament remains paralysed for want of a mandate for the ad hoc committee to be set up to discuss this subject.

Some two thousand years ago, there was a king in Italy who was fiddling while Rome was burning. Today, there are forty distinguished representatives of sovereign governments members of the Conference on Disarmament and entrusted with perhaps the gravest responsibility of modern times, quibbling over a mandate for their work on this subject while outer space is on its way to being militarized to the point of saturation. The difference, however, is that whereas in spite of the Roman king's fiddling, the city of Rome survived, the consequences of our quibbling might very well deny the human race the last chance of its survival.

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There is more than adequate evidence to show that the militarization of outer space has already begun in a big way, and that if unchecked, it is soon going to acquire unmanageable and uncontrollable proportions. While it is true that since its very inception in the 1950s, advance in space technology has contributed to enhancing the force, accuracy and sophistication of the weapon systems of the nuclear-weapon Powers, the last few years have seen the development of directly and clearly identifiable military activities born out of space technology. What is more is that this increasing military orientation of space technology has led to the development of the war machines of the super-Powers containing some of the most dangerous weapon systems, such as the thermo-nuclear warheads, the strategic and intermediate-range missiles and bombers and the space-based means to manipulate a total planetary war. The latest to enter in the field are the anti-satellite weapons and the space-based ABM system.

These latest weapons are no longer confined to science fiction; they are fast becoming a reality. Pronouncements have been made at the highest level indicating intentions to develop these weapons. Sizeable amounts of resources running into billions of dollars have been allocated for the purpose of research and development of these weapons. One of the ASAT systems is already in place, whereas tests have been carried out for the development of a more sophisticated one. The repeated attempt to find loopholes in the existing legal instruments in order to go ahead with the development of these weapons is yet another proof, if proof is needed. Moreover we find that already the language of rationalization so far associated with the nuclear-arms race based on the doctrine of parity or deterrence, has begun to be used in the context of the arms race in outer space also. A highly placed official of one of the super-Powers has recently stated that his Government has decided to develop its ASAT system because the other side is also engaged in the race, making it necessary for his country to catch up and deny the other side unilateral control of outer space.

Against this background it is naive to believe that the programme already launched will remain confined to the stage of research and development. Technological developments of military significance have a momentum of their own that creates a forward drive for the deployment of the weapons once they become technically feasible. The technological problems that remain to be solved also do not constitute an insurmountable hurdle because the past experience of the development of sophisticated weapon systems have shown that given the commitment of Governments, such problems can be overcome and also because it has been publicly stated that these weapon systems are worth developing even if it may not be possible to solve all the technological problems.

It is, therefore, not too soon to examine the serious implications of these new weapon systems and explain these implications to the people of the world. It is my intention to devote most of the remaining part of my statement to this purpose.

A relatively less serious, but more talked about, implication of the deployment of these systems is that it will render the doctrine of deterrence redundant, and would on the whole have a destabilizing effect on the international security system. Many of us here would not shed tears on account of this

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consequence because of our belief that nuclear deterrence provides no stability at all and that, on the other hand, much to the contrary, by virtue of being the principal justification of the nuclear-arms race, it has already created a situation of extreme instability. The use of the word "stability" in the current inherently unstable situation is a cruel joke. Can one really think of security or stability in the presence of the massive and ever-mounting accumulation of nuclear weapons?

There is also a concern about the development of these new weapon systems resulting in a decoupling of the security of the alliance partners and rendering impotent and obsolete the nuclear deterrence systems of the nuclear-weapon Powers among these nations. It is also feared that no ABM protection will be able to save Europe — either Eastern or Western countries — from the devastations of a nuclear war with low flying Cruise missiles, short-range missiles, tactical nuclear weapons dropped from aircraft or used as artillery munition. In response to these concerns, assurances have been given in recent weeks that the new weapons system will be so designed as to deal not only with intercontinental missiles, but also with tactical missiles and other nuclear or conventional missiles which might be used in the European theatre.

There are, however, more serious implications of the development of these weapons which are less talked about. If the present trend is not reversed and the development of these weapons is not banned, by far the gravest consequence will be "total armament", culminating in a "total" nuclear holocaust. There is no justification for the claim that the possession of ABM system by the two super-Powers will make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. These weapon systems will make the world more dangerous than any weapon has hitherto done.

For it is just not true that these weapons are merely defensive. The fact is that they can neither remain merely defensive nor fully defend. In this context, the use of the term "Star Wars" in relation to the development of beam weapons is dangerously misleading. This term erroneously underlines the exotic nature of these weapons and seeks to convey a sense of remoteness about the impact of these weapons. The fact is that what happens in outer space is intimately connected with our fate on Earth. The use of the new ABM weapon system would not trigger a Stellar War, light years away from our planet, but a war on this very good Earth. In fact, even with the present-day technology, it would be only a matter of hours before a war in outer space would turn into a holocaust on Earth.

These so-called defensive weapons will, at the same time, be offensive, or weapons of first strike. This is clear from the fact that laser and particle beams can not only intercept and destroy missiles in flight, but also have the potentiality of destroying them in their silos. There is absolutely no guarantee that these dual-purpose weapons will remain only defensive.

Moreover, these weapon systems will open the floodgates of unprecedented and potentially uncontrollable arms race both in the outer space and on Earth. The development and deployment of an ABM system by one super-Power would naturally be sought to be matched by the other super-Power. Even the other

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nuclear-weapon Powers, finding that their independent nuclear deterrence has been rendered obsolete, may, either singly or jointly, go in for their own ABM system, irrespective of the cost it may involve.

Moreover, in spite of the hundreds of billions of dollars to be spent on them, the new weapon systems will not provide full protection. And to quote the words of the Italian Nobel laureate, Eugenio Montale, in a somewhat different context, it is not only the small fishes that would escape from the net. As already pointed out, some categories of missiles, such as the ground-hugging Cruise missiles and Stealth bombers are unlikely to come within the targets of the new ABM weapon system. Taking into account even the lowest percentage of leakage, enough nuclear weapons will escape the ABM weapons to reach their targets and wreak havoc with human civilization. Moreover, the new system would be vulnerable to counter-measures which can acquire a variety of forms. In spite of these loopholes, it is sought to justify the development of these weapons on the cynical ground that it would destroy the first-strike capability of the other side to the maximum extent possible and impose on it an intolerable financial and material burden in the process of developing its own ABM system.

Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that the development and acquisition of these new weapon systems will trigger nuclear war in the process. Taking the ASAT system first, the destruction of an adversary's satellite is not an event lost in the wilderness of outer space. It would be an attack on one of the most advanced components of the war machine of the other side which will most likely provoke retaliation.

As regards the new ABM system, a very dangerous situation will arise when one of the super-Powers is able to deploy its system and the other is still in the process of catching up — a situation which may prevail for a long time. One can visualise two scenarios in that event. In the first scenario, the former may decide that it can take out the missile force of the other side in a first strike and it can protect its own force from retaliation. The new ABM technology thus makes recourse to nuclear weapons relatively easier and safer for the Power enjoying superiority in this field. In the second scenario, the latter super-Power which has still not caught up, may be provoked into a panicky pre-emptive nuclear attack.

When both the super-Powers deploy their own space-based ABM systems, it will fundamentally change the entire international security situation and international power relations. The world will revert to the bi-polar era of the early 50s under conditions aggravated by the immense increase in the force and efficiency of the weapon systems. The reversal to the strategic bipolarity of the world will have such serious consequences as much strengthened technological, economic and political hegemony, reducing all other nations to security dependence, resorting to limited or protracted nuclear war in localized theatres far from any worry that such wars would engulf their own territories, and even encouragement to surrogate Powers to develop their own nuclear weapons to be used for the strategic purpose of the super-Powers. Disarmament will be the first casualty in such a situation.

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Finally, the basic motives which will lead the super-Powers or other technologically advanced nations to develop the new weapon systems and the attitude that the possession of these systems would foster, will be antithetical to the objective of the establishment of a new international economic or political order. The whole attitude behind such an arms race is that of gaining absolute power and dominance irrespective of the price that is to be paid for it. Such an attitude militates against the spirit of co-operation for equity, justice and fair play. This will change the very character of the North-South dialogue and other global negotiations.

Considering the colossal resource implications of these weapon systems, their competitive developments might very well shatter the very foundations of the world economy. No type of weapons and no field of their application will be as resources-consuming as the development and deployment of weapons in outer space. The estimates for the development of a complete new ABM system by one super-Power vary from 120 to 500 billion dollars. The current world economic problems will be greatly multiplied and aggravated if the massive resources required for the development of the new space weapon systems are to be mobilized. Moreover, the diversion of skilled manpower and material resources involved in the process would have a crippling effect on activities in the social and economic sectors. This may very well result in a setback for the recovery process, a continued stagnation of the economies of the advanced countries, or at best their just limping forward during the remaining part of this century. The impact of these developments on the already beleaguered economies of developing countries would indeed be devastating. Such a bleak economic prospect may frustrate the very purpose — gaining a position of absolute dominance and hegemony — for the attainment of which these weapons are being developed.

In an article in "Le Monde" of 27 March 1984, the French journalist Michel Tatu has quoted Mr. Keyworth, Scientific Adviser to the White House and a supporter of the new ABM system, as having said: "It is difficult to have stability under conditions of parity". From there to say that the programme for developing ABM system will permit the establishment of a superiority is but a small step. On the other hand, when an exhortation for developing the new weapons system was given at the highest level by the United States Government early last year, the response of the USSR, again at the highest level, was: "All attempts at achieving military superiority over the USSR are futile. The Soviet Union will never allow them to succeed". The net result is going to be, as in the case of the nuclear-arms race, neither superiority nor parity, but a new level of escalation of the arms race, both in outer space and on Earth, with all the grave implications which I have tried to outline.

A key question before this Conference is: Are these weapons verifiable, and if not, is it feasible to ban them? The expert opinion on whether the control or elimination of these weapon systems is verifiable or not is by no means unanimous. For example, the National Council of the Federation of American Scientists has stated in its November 1983 report that "further deployment and testing of USSR's ASAT system will be easily verifiable. If there is a verification problem, it is with the far more sophisticated United States system".

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On the other hand, some experts have stated that the more sophisticated United States system is easier to verify. Another expert view is that an absolute ban, including the development of ASAT systems, would certainly pose verification problems, but such a ban is not critical. The banning of testing and deployment could really be monitored and will achieve the key objectives of preventing the further development and proliferation of these weapons.

In any event, the way military technology, including that for space-weapon systems, is developing, most of the new weapon systems are likely to become unverifiable sooner or later. According to one expert opinion, the new arms will be based on a technology that has been miniaturized to an extent which will not make them amenable to verification. To develop weapon systems which could beat verification has now become a principal challenge of the nations engaged in the arms race in the mistaken notion of seeking security by this means.

What is going to happen in that event? Will there be no arms limitation or disarmament simply because such measures cannot be verified? In the opinion of my delegation, that will only demonstrate how mistaken this absolute emphasis on verification has been and how this has been used as a pretext for not engaging in serious and genuine negotiations for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race and now the arms race in outer space.

When we take all the implications of the recent developments into account, the conclusion is obvious, and it is that the present is the moment to act. If we can succeed in urgently negotiating an agreement or agreements, we will have prohibited the newest round of build-up of futuristic weapons which will take us to a point of no return. We should not be misled by the argument that there is no urgency because the new weapon systems are still at the phase of development and research. It is precisely at this phase that it will be feasible for us to ban this new arms race. If we miss this opportunity, these weapons will already become another frightening reality of our life and may be so integrated with the weapon systems as a whole and with the security doctrines of the powers possessing these weapons that negotiations for controlling or banning them will become as intractable and frustrating as the negotiations on nuclear disarmament. In fact, in some respects, particularly in the case of the ASAT system, it already seems to have reached that hopeless stage.

In such a situation how can we afford the luxury of a non-negotiating mandate for an ad hoc committee on this subject? How can any of us, in all honesty and sincerity, suggest that we should be content with merely identifying those space-weapon systems which could have a destabilizing effect, or the issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in the outer space, or by analysing the lacunae in the existing international agreements having a bearing on the arms race in outer space, or adopt a progressive approach starting first with the question of the immunity of satellites and later on going to new weapon systems? The latter suggestion could have been acceptable when it was made in the early 1960s, but not now. As regards our making an analysis of the existing relevant international treaties as a point of departure, such an exercise could have been of some value a few years ago, but not today. We now know that in spite of these treaties, the new weapon systems are being developed and tested. Our first and foremost task is to reverse this trend.



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All the conditions for starting serious negotiations on this subject are present. There are first of all the grave implications of the recent developments staring at our face. These developments have taken place in spite of and by means of a transgression of the existing legal regimes. Nothing short of a new regime will do in these circumstances.

There is also a draft treaty submitted by the USSR on the subject. Practically every delegation which has commented on this draft treaty has drawn our attention to its positive features and the tremendous improvement that it represents over the proposals submitted by the USSR on the same subject in 1981. Its provisions for banning not only the deployment of space-based weapons but also their testing and development, banning new anti-satellite systems and the elimination of the existing ones, and for verification are its particularly welcome features. Some questions have been asked about the adequacy of its provisions on verification. We have, here, the assurance of the leader of the USSR delegation that these provisions are negotiable with a view to being elaborated and improved upon. Draft legal instruments are not supposed to be only generally commented upon in the plenary statements in this Conference; the whole purpose of submitting them is to take them up as a basis for serious negotiation.

Since the dawning of the space era, we have had occasions to exult in successive human achievements in the conquest of outer space. In this we have shared with the nationals of the countries concerned, their excitement at each successful mission of the United States Space Shuttles, the USSR's Salyut and Soyuz, and the European Space Agency's Ariane, as though these were our own achievements. Very recently, our whole nation became, through the television network, an active participant in the glory of the achievements in outer space of two Soviet cosmonauts and the first Indian cosmonaut, Rakesh Sharma.

We, therefore, shudder even to think about, let alone accept the fact of, these great adventures of the human spirit being turned to use for destructive purposes, having the potentiality of triggering a nuclear holocaust. We urge with all the force and conviction at our command that we must arrest this trend and prevent the development of these space weapons. We must without further delay commence negotiations for elaborating a new instrument, or instruments, the need for which is established beyond any shred of doubt. Space technology fortunately does not as yet carry the stigma of a Hiroshima, and the world still cherishes Yuri Gagarin's first space exploration and Neil Armstrong's great leap for mankind. By arresting the militarization of outer space and preventing the arms race there, not only will we be able to pull the human race at least a few inches away from the brink of disaster, but also we will contribute to disarmament and to Man's continued exploration of the peaceful potentialities of outer space.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement, and would like to express my genuine and sincere gratitude for the kind words addressed to the President by the representative of a friendly neighbour who is also the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor to stress the urgency and importance which the Canadian Government accords to certain of the arms control and disarmament issues before us and in so doing to take stock of our progress on them.

Before doing so, I would like to join others in congratulating you on the assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Canada and Sri Lanka have had a long and fruitful association, cemented by Commonwealth ties, going back well beyond the origin of the Colombo plan and indeed our shared views on world peace and security were most recently publicly proclaimed in the Declaration at the end of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit held at Goa last year.

The method of consultations with the President has been, in our view, both welcome and effective in dealing with the procedural issues before us. Your initiative and determination in this regard have been and are particularly valuable.

In commenting on some of the issues we consider most urgent and important now before the Conference on Disarmament, we propose to address both substance and procedure.

As a general comment, we deeply regret that it has not proved possible to make more progress in the Conference on Disarmament this year, even on matters of procedure. It is open to serious question whether we can afford to maintain the present practice of reviewing each year, as if all items were new, the necessity for and the terms of reference of, each of the Conference on Disarmament's subsidiary bodies. Most will agree that the time expended is disproportionate to the results obtained and indeed, as many have suggested, may well be unnecessary. We fully support efforts now underway to improve our work methods. This said, process cannot be confused with progress.

There is no point either, as we see it, in repeating the need for governments to implement in a concrete fashion the rhetoric they have so often voiced on arms control. This need is obvious, and has been expressed many times. What is needed, if this body is to retain its credibility, is to begin to register, as the result of decisions made in capitals, the progress that so many have demanded and which is so clearly required for the maintenance and strengthening of mutual security.

The process in the Conference on Disarmament as it pertains to the chemical-weapons issue had apparently developed and matured and had succeeded in concluding for the year on an up-beat note. Some dared to suggest, perhaps optimistically, that for the 1984 session, the experience gained in that area might inject itself into other areas of immediate concern.

I must confess however that if this has occurred, it is not immediately apparent. The impression of the process -- and the public impression, I have no doubt -- is that there is a danger of spreading even more thinly our limited resources over a proliferation of issues many of which are not central to the significant issues of the day. In this body there is no lack of commitment, and indeed no absence of world-wide deeply held concerns, but this contrasts strongly with the lack of practical progress in the negotiation of matters that are among the most complex, urgent -- and vital -- issues of our times.

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It is, however, in our view pointless and unfair to criticize the Conference on Disarmament for this lack of progress. In the final analysis, difficulties experienced in this Conference nearly always reflect substantive concerns arising out of perceptions concerning national security, and those difficulties can only be resolved in capitals. Unfortunately, what is lacking in all too many cases is the willingness to negotiate seriously on those very issues on which informed public opinion the world over is demanding urgent action.

I now wish to turn to three of the issues which we consider of paramount importance, on which, I suggest, our major efforts could be concentrated during the summer part of our session. These issues are a chemical weapons treaty, a nuclear test ban and outer space. I propose to comment also, very briefly, on the question of radiological weapons.

It is common ground that it is in our negotiations on a chemical weapons ban that the greatest progress has been made. All members of the Conference have contributed: first, through the more than 200 working papers which had been submitted to form the basis for our negotiation and, secondly, through the negotiating process from which the consensus report (CD/416) emerged last summer. The momentum has been sustained by a number of significant developments since the first of the year. There are, of course, at least three draft treaties dating back to 1972 and more than 20 other working papers, including four from Canada, pertaining to specific aspects of a convention. But certainly the United States submission on 18 April 1984 of their draft treaty is the most comprehensive and detailed draft treaty and one which, if it could be put into force tomorrow, would virtually assure a chemical-weapon-free world within ten years.

Many have commented on the recent initiatives undertaken by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the field of chemical weapons. In our view, they reflect a common desire to proceed with a serious negotiation aimed at achieving concrete results.

Earlier this session, in our statement of 21 February, we welcomed the Soviet proposal for on-site inspection of destruction of chemical weapons stocks. At the time, speaking immediately after Ambassador Issraelyan, we said that this Soviet initiative was a most welcome development in the ongoing negotiating process on a ban on chemical weapons, and represented a significant step forward. We also said that we hoped that this Soviet proposal had broader implications. We reaffirm our satisfaction at this Soviet initiative, which we are confident will assist in providing impetus, along with the recently-tabled United States draft on a chemical weapons ban, to our negotiations on this subject.

The unpalatable truth about chemical weapons is that restraint in their use in many cases has been motivated more by fear of retaliation than by legal considerations. Whatever one's legal position may be about the universality of the legal principles embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, we must assume that there is sufficient general agreement on the need for the banning of the development, production, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons that there is a realistic prospect for agreement. Similarly, however,

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it is our view that there must be acceptance of the principle that unless there is adequate assurance of verification of compliance with the terms of the Convention by all parties, States will be extremely fearful of giving up their deterrent.

Many are still studying the United States draft treaty submitted by Vice-President Bush last week; many are also awaiting further elaboration of the Soviet position on on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical-weapon stocks. The test is now whether these two related proposals will give the needed impetus to the negotiation -- and, we trust, general acceptance -- of the essential agreement we are pursuing.

The United States proposal is, as already pointed out, the most comprehensive and, not surprisingly, the most detailed. Like the USSR approach, it also embodies a bold step forward on the path we all wish to follow. With respect to the United States proposal, we should recognize this initiative as a genuine attempt on the part of a super-Power to bring about disarmament on chemical weapons. Whatever the reaction to the specific provisions, the draft treaty must be recognized as a development of major importance. While there are stipulations, particularly in the compliance aspects of the treaty, which may be viewed as stringent, nevertheless, these provisions are intended as mutually applicable, indeed generally applicable. By including them in the draft, the United States has signalled, in advance, its willingness to comply. It is fundamental, in our view, to recognize at the outset of our negotiations on treaty language that the alternative to effective verification is either complete trust or continuing reliance on a State's own capabilities; the former is perhaps the ideal, but is unfortunately unrealistic; the latter is the reverse of the ideal, and it is obviously undesirable. Clearly, only very stringent verification measures would motivate States to put their faith -- and their national security -- in treaty provisions rather than self-help. This is an apparent truism, but one which warrants most careful consideration. Stringent verification provisions may be not only our best alternative to self-help, with all the attendant horrors, but the only alternative.

The United States initiative, which is directed at replacing deterrent stockpiles of chemical weapons by treaty safeguards, thus constitutes a very significant contribution towards our common goal of achieving a global ban on chemical weapons, a long-standing Canadian objective of prime importance. We pledge our readiness -- indeed our determination -- to participate actively in achieving this objective, and we encourage all members of the Conference on Disarmament to approach the proposal in an open-minded and co-operative manner. We must bear in mind that we are all here not only as representatives of our respective governments but in a broader capacity representing the international community as a whole. If problems are encountered, they should be met with alternative practical suggestions.

It is essential also as we see it that we recognize that a chemical weapons convention could serve a double objective. If successfully negotiated and concluded, it will contribute to mutual security by defining and controlling a ban amongst those who now possess chemical weapons. Of equal importance, however, a treaty banning chemical weapons would have a horizontal dimension to

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complement this vertical dimension: it would regulate and control the enforcement of a ban amongst countries not now possessing chemical weapons. It is in this sense of non-proliferation as a fundamental objective, that such a treaty could have truly universal implications. Its effectiveness, however, and even the degree of its universality, could be proportional to its enforceability, a point we have already emphasized.

There is yet another consideration of potentially far-reaching importance: while our negotiating process on chemical weapons is significant in its own right, it may have implications going well beyond chemical weapons. Even our progress to date provides evidence that mutual security -- and the mechanisms necessary to ensure it -- are not simply the product of a process whereby gains in security by one or more parties result in a lessening of the security of others. Surely it is obvious that the successful negotiation of a generally acceptable convention prohibiting the proliferation of chemical weapons would contribute to the security of all.

There are, of course, political and even legal as well as practical technical and procedural difficulties. Each government has its own perception of its respective national interests as regards a chemical weapons Convention, and understandably so. All these interests must be fully taken into account through the negotiating process in order to create a document representing the highest common denominator of agreement on the essential goals we are pursuing. If the negotiating process is to work, these difficult issues mentioned must be faced squarely and honestly, without, I suggest, resorting to polemics or casting doubt upon one another's motives.

The reality of the use of chemical weapons in some areas of the world serves to underline the urgency and importance of the task which confronts us. This Conference has, we think, been wise to isolate such tragic events from our ongoing negotiations, except as a constant reminder of the immediacy of our work.

Before concluding our comments on the subject of chemical weapons, I should like to point out that our experience in this matter proves definitively that we can overcome procedural problems when there is a common desire -- in this case, perhaps a determination -- to do so.

We are, of course, gratified that procedural problems were overcome, and that the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group for the period 16 January - 6 February was adopted by consensus at this session. We are mindful of the fact, however, that notwithstanding the recommendation in that report that negotiations on a chemical-weapons convention begin immediately, procedural difficulties again prevented such an immediate commencement of negotiations by this body. That such procedural difficulties should occur, in the light of a carefully-negotiated pre-existing consensus document -- one of the major aims of which was to avoid such delays -- is particularly regrettable, and, I suggest, provides a lesson to all of us concerned to preserve both the effectiveness and credibility of this forum. This is a matter to which we should give most careful consideration,

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not merely because, as I mentioned earlier, we are here in a representative capacity, but because we are all answerable -- admittedly to varying degrees -- to our respective publics. Like it or not, we are collectively answerable to world public opinion, and we would do well to remember this and ensure that this forum is not misused.

I should like to take this opportunity of singling out Ambassador Ekéus as a classic example of a "servant of the Conference" who, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, has shown us how it is possible, given patience and perseverance, coupled with concern and commitment, to move our work along, in the face of a series of procedural problems, some familiar and some new. It is to his credit, and to his Working Group Co-ordinators, Messrs. Akkerman of the Netherlands, Duarte of Brazil and Thiélicke of the German Democratic Republic, that we have been able to resume our work which was as we see it unnecessarily interrupted. Indeed, Ambassador Ekéus has shown us, as did his predecessor Ambassador McPhail, how we can pick our way through a procedural maze, when we are sufficiently motivated to do so.

I might mention that we are honoured that Ambassador Ekéus has asked Canada to undertake consultations on his behalf to determine how the question of use may best be incorporated into the terms of the convention. We for our part shall undertake these consultations objectively and impartially with a view to achieving the best possible result for all.

Turning now to the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, I need hardly remind this Conference that an NTB was one of the four basic elements of the strategy of suffocation proposed by Prime Minister Trudeau at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. It remains a fundamental objective of the Canadian Government. As the Prime Minister observed at the time, such a ban could be implemented only by the mutual agreement of those nations carrying out such tests. Unfortunately, it is not realistic in present conditions to expect a unilateral acceptance of a comprehensive test ban.

For this Conference there are two sides of the nuclear test ban which must be addressed. There is the procedural dimension, that is, the need for the establishment of an ad hoc committee, which is the responsibility of member nations represented here. The goal of a nuclear test ban has been a basic goal for all of us -- at least I assume it is the goal of all of us -- for two decades. Indeed, two treaties implemented, or at least observed, over the last 20 years, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, have moved us some distance in the right direction. On 9 February this year, in Canada's House of Commons, Prime Minister Trudeau stated that ratification of the latter treaty by both the United States and the USSR would have both a practical and symbolic effect in raising the clouds of suspicion which seem to continue to hinder the negotiating process. A halt to all testing was, of course, the original goal of the negotiations that led to the 1963 Treaty. It is worth recalling that the Threshold Test Ban was described by the United States President in 1976 as a "wholly inadequate step beyond the limited test ban". As a result,

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he was instrumental in establishing the trilateral talks with the aim of achieving a total ban in 1977. The ability to verify compliance became a central area of dispute and, regrettably, these talks were suspended in 1980.

The contested legacy of these talks has fallen to the Conference, and the achievement of a nuclear test ban remains the goal, distant or otherwise, of this Conference. From the Canadian perspective, it is essential that an ad hoc committee be established as a matter of urgency to address the political dimension and our efforts will be directed towards that objective. At the same time it is equally essential, in our view, that we recognize that progress will be negligible unless the practical aspects of verification of compliance are resolved. Let us set up the mechanism as soon as possible to enable us to determine if we have resolved that problem.

It follows that from the standpoint of this Conference, the significance of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts and its continuing work programme cannot be over-emphasized. We intend to intensify our support of the Ad Hoc Group's activities and we look forward to participating in the International Seismic Data Exchange exercise in the autumn of 1984. It is the development of practical demonstrations such as this which will provide the essential data to support the political and diplomatic work of the Conference in achieving a global nuclear test ban, thus helping to suffocate weapon development.

In our view, our debate over the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban is so rarefied as to be almost artificial. Some argue that our present mandate has not yet been fulfilled, while others maintain that progress toward a test ban cannot be made unless the Committee is immediately accorded a mandate to negotiate. That substantive progress can be registered, and that agreement is indeed possible, is illustrated by the accomplishments of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, itself working within a limited mandate. Must we continue to mark time, and even retrogress, because of differences, for example, over the inclusion of the word "negotiations" in the mandate? Is it not possible to get on with our work without doing violence to the position -- expressed as a matter of principle -- of any participant?

If we look at our work on chemical weapons as an instructive example -- a precedent, if you wish -- we were able to do much useful work, culminating in a consensus document, under a mandate which did not include the word "negotiate". Let there be no misunderstanding. We can accept a "negotiating" mandate on NTB. Indeed, we strongly support it. But is this issue worth foregoing any useful work of any kind?

Such a stalemate is tailored to order for anyone -- and I trust there is none such here -- who wants no progress whatsoever on the matter. On this single issue we may be in danger of destroying the credibility -- and thus the effectiveness -- of the Conference on Disarmament.

We support a step-by-step approach: let us first of all agree on a mandate. It is our view that we should then seek to establish common understanding as quickly as possible in one area, which may be a pre-condition to further progress,

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namely the means of verifying an agreement, and then move quickly on to the next area. Clearly, negotiations must be our objective -- certainly that is the Canadian position -- but the necessary foundations for concrete negotiations can and should first be laid.

I must now address an issue whose importance and urgency can hardly be over-emphasized. I refer to the question of arms control and outer space.

We have viewed with considerable apprehension and regret the apparent inability of the Conference on Disarmament to come to grips with the very real and pressing problems of arms control and outer space, an issue with a potential for seriously destabilizing effects, not to mention the possible financial outlays of almost unimaginable dimensions. It would be unproductive, as we see it, to attempt to attribute responsibility for lack of movement in this issue. The fact is that no ad hoc working group was established last year and we have not yet been able to agree on the creation of a subsidiary body at the current session. Let me suggest that, as in the case of our goal of a nuclear test ban, we use the experience gained in other areas of negotiation to recognize the essentials required. We are facing an almost unique situation in that this Conference is being offered an opportunity -- and a challenge -- to tackle a new, substantive and vital issue. No matter what the scope of the mandate agreed to, initially, surely no one would deny that certain basic research is required. It is not unreasonable to assume that a survey of existing treaties and international law as it pertains to the subject is a necessary first step. It follows that the definitional aspects also constitute basic and essential elements which must be addressed at the outset.

I suggest therefore that we can and should agree immediately to the format of an ad hoc committee to take up these aspects and if possible other aspects of the outer space issue. If past experience is an example, there is more than enough work to occupy an ad hoc committee with such a mandate for the remainder of the summer part of the session. In any case, upon the successful and, we hope, speedy fulfilment of this initial mandate, the Conference could then move to other and more detailed consequential aspects of the issue.

In case there is any doubt as to where Canada stands on this matter, I would remind the Conference that Prime Minister Trudeau at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in June 1982, urged the international community to undertake the negotiation of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space. This remains one of the most important Canadian arms control objectives. Indeed, Canada was one of the first delegations to table, in this Conference, a substantive working paper on the subject in 1982. That paper dealt with the stabilizing and destabilizing features of systems in space. Our message then was that in dealing with the outer space issue, it would be necessary to consider, with all due deliberation, the over-all net effects on a system-by-system basis. For example, the arms control aspects of reconnaissance satellites might well outweigh their targeting capabilities.



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Since then, however, the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons on 9 February 1984 his intention to circulate in the Conference on Disarmament a proposal to ban high-altitude anti-satellite systems. The Canadian Government has now initiated a number of long-range studies on certain aspects of the outer space issue. It is our intention to contribute in an innovative manner to the deliberations of the proposed ad hoc committee, making use of the resultant research. We propose to deal with outer space as a whole as well as specific aspects related to low and high altitude. The distinction between low and high altitude is one which we believe merits particular attention, and is one which Prime Minister Trudeau drew attention to in a speech in Montreal last November in relation to ASATs. We intend, at an appropriate stage, to contribute a number of working papers which will provide a more detailed discussion of the approach, particularly as it pertains to high altitudes.

I propose now to comment very briefly on the question of radiological weapons. This issue, in which progress has long appeared possible, is one on which we seem to have shown a singular lack of imagination and commitment. The effort expended by successive chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, and I single out as a particular example Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, has been nothing short of prodigious. Last year, the Soviet Union and the United States chaired contact groups which attempted to reach consensus but ultimately fell short of the mark. I suggest that we should all review our positions with the objective of coming to an agreement and approving a draft treaty during the summer session. Let us consider the opportunities. First, it is an area in which the Soviet Union and the United States are in agreement, as indicated in their 1979 proposals. Surely this in itself is an important fact of life for this Conference. Secondly, a draft treaty would effectively ban a weapon system before it has been developed and deployed. Indeed, it would preclude the research and development of such a system. Finally, and of no small importance, it would give a psychological lift to the international community, which by all accounts not only needs but deserves it. We could provide a message of hope, where one is badly needed, and on a future-oriented problem which might contain lessons applicable to other issues.

We recognize that there are deeply-held convictions that the joint treaty of 1979 should deal with other aspects. While not disagreeing with those who argue that such other matters should be addressed, we suggest that such questions be addressed in subsequent negotiations. The Canadian delegation supports a review of the issues pertaining directly to radiological weapons with the objective of simplifying the negotiating process. Indeed, we could agree to a draft based on the original 1979 submission. It is in fact an embarrassment to us and, we suggest, to the Conference, that this relatively straightforward issue should remain unresolved. It would serve us all well to remove radiological weapons from our agenda by reaching consensus on a draft treaty. This would permit us, in turn, to focus our attention on other substantive issues.

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Before closing, I would like to draw the Conference's attention to the fact that last week the Canadian Government introduced into Parliament a draft bill to create an independent, publicly funded, "Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security". The purpose of the Institute is two-fold. First, it would increase knowledge of issues related to international peace and security, with particular emphasis on defence, arms control and disarmament through the collection and dissemination of information and ideas on these subjects. Second, it would encourage public discussion on international peace and security issues. This would be achieved through the promotion of scholarship, the fostering, funding and conducting of research, as well as by the sponsoring or convening of conferences or seminars in all parts of Canada.

It is the Canadian Government's intention that the Institute will have maximum flexibility and independence and will be free to engage in research, information gathering and dissemination, as well as publishing, as it sees fit. Our hope is to create a world-class institute which will make a major contribution to deepening and widening Canadian consciousness and understanding of the fundamental question of international peace and security and in the process enhance our ability to contribute at the international level to the solution of the vital problems of arms control and disarmament.

In closing, I would now like to offer some further very brief comments on public perceptions of this Conference and its ability to negotiate conventions. I think we would all agree that the international community has a right to expect progress on urgent arms control and disarmament matters from a forum which is, after all, entitled "The Conference on Disarmament". Whether the blame lies with governments or their representatives here, including ourselves, or both, regrettably, we have little to show for our labours during this spring session. It is our conviction that we must make better use of the summer part of our session so that we can give evidence of tangible progress to the peoples of the world, who expect so much of us -- so much more than we have thus far delivered.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutowardoyo.

Mr. SUTOWARDOYO (Indonesia): Mr. President, since I am speaking today for the first time in this august body, allow me, first of all, to congratulate you on the excellent manner in which you have been conducting the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during the present, last month of our spring session. It gives my delegation great satisfaction to see you, the distinguished representative of a fellow Asian country, with which Indonesia maintains the best of relations, in the Chair.

My delegation will continue, as always, to give its wholehearted support and full co-operation to the Presidency.

I should also like to express my delegation's sincere appreciation to your distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland and Ambassador Datcu of Romania, for the exemplary way in which they have acquitted themselves of the exacting task in the previous two months.

Allow me further, as a newcomer, to express my gratitude to the distinguished representatives, including you yourself, Mr. President, in your capacity as Head of the Delegation of Sri Lanka, who have extended a warm welcome to me and the other new arrivals in their earlier interventions. To them I pledge my delegation's continued readiness to maintain the best possible working relationship and to collaborate in the pursuit of our common goal in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

My thanks also go to the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, to the Deputy Secretary-General and to the other members of the secretariat for their kindness and unfailing assistance to me and to the members of my delegation.

Personally I consider it an honour and a great privilege indeed to join this single multilateral negotiating body for disarmament matters, which counts among its members many illustrious personalities. I must confess that it was not without trepidation that I left my country for Geneva.

Having said that, I hope I do not sound disrespectful or cynical if I immediately proceed to add my voice to the lamentation and reproach which have been heard inside and outside of this Chamber deploring the scant progress, or lack of substantive progress, in our collective work so far.

Speakers before me have taken stock of what has been achieved, and what has not been achieved, at our current session, and during the time this Conference was known as the Committee on Disarmament. There is no denying that, by any standard, the result achieved so far has been dismally little indeed. Do we have to accept the defeatist view that disarmament negotiations, including our deliberations here, are inescapably fated to fail or can, at best, only achieve limited results?

Several speakers have given us the benefit of their analysis of the situation or explained the philosophy behind disarmament negotiations, telling us if not who are to blame, then what not to expect or why we should not persist in this or that course or how we should proceed in order to be constructive. If you asked me, Mr. President, I should say that in my simple and still confused mind, I tend to agree with most if not all of them. I tend to agree because, I must confess, I have difficulty detecting any flaw in their reasoning. Their rationality is, so to say, unassailable.

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But then, if I act accordingly and take a position which leads to acceptance of, or resignation to, what would amount to inaction on most of what to my delegation and many other delegations, notably of the Group of 21, constitute high priority items on our agenda, I will have trouble with my conscience, because it would imply recognizing that the overwhelming majority of the world's population behind the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the various General Assembly resolutions which guide our work had been wrong.

So here I feel I must sound a warning against "rationalism", or "excessive rationalism" if you like, by which I mean the attitude of taking what is rational -- or, more correctly stated, given man's limited faculty, what may appear to be rational at any given time, including the present, for instance -- as the ultimate truth and of dismissing anything else as being not worthy of further consideration.

Perhaps I can make myself clear by citing this piece of ancient wisdom from my country. One single thing, for instance, something that we do which may be disturbing to other people, may draw different reactions from different people even though the message they want to get across to us is actually the same. A man of instruction may come to us and tell us that what we are doing is wrong. He may even tell us the reason why it is wrong. A less educated man may just call on us to stop what we are doing. Another man of still less instruction will probably get angry and heap abuse on us.

The reactions of the three different people are different, but what all of them want of us is the same. It is up to us how to respond. A wise man, according to the ancient teaching, will not return the third man's anger, will not ignore the second, or fail to give heed to the first. Irrespective of how the case is presented to him, on the substance of the issue, he will respond in the same manner. He will do what is reasonably expected of him, that is, stop what he is doing.

So much for this piece of Oriental wisdom. The point I want to make is that lack of sufficient knowledge and or experience on the part of some of our members on some subject matters should not be a valid reason for some other members to hold up discussions or to prevent negotiations altogether on that particular subject.

In my delegation's view, contrary to what has been alluded to in this Chamber, the process of learning, if it ever comes to that, can take place at the same time as the process of discussion and negotiation. This view, of course, predicates a readiness to acquire the necessary knowledge in order to be able to take part in the processes if not intelligently then at least reasonably, and certainly with the best of intentions to be constructive. Another point, a corollary to what I have tried to explain, is that one should keep an open mind. One must always be ready to try to see other people's viewpoints, to recognize any merit one may find in their arguments and to change one's own point of view accordingly whenever subsequent events or a new development in human comprehension prove the other party's view to be the correct one.

An open mind, realism and idealism are necessary requisites for fruitful discussion. In the light of the present state of our deliberations, and disarmament negotiations in general, I should say that a heavy dose of idealism is what is particularly needed at present. I am still realistic enough not to expect that everybody could be induced to behave in consonance with the spirit of one other piece of Oriental wisdom which says that truth can be arrived at through the performance of deeds involving self-sacrifice.

However, in this connection, I cannot help being reminded of the slogan much employed by peace demonstrators for many years exhorting that "peace be given a chance"

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implying that some "sacrifice" should be made, in the form of what may appear as "less security", in order to ensure lasting peace. The same spirit, I would surmise, must have more or less inspired the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Harold MacMillan, who said, when commenting on the still uncompleted comprehensive test ban treaty in 1959, "We ought to take risks for so great a prize".

In the light of the present situation in which, as has been alluded to in this Chamber, the opportunity still existing at the moment to halt the inexorable slide of the world towards holocaust may be the last, and if not now seized may never come back again, and as there is no better alternative, would not such "risk-taking" prove to be realistic after all, and rational too?

On the items of our agenda, I will spare the Conference a restatement of my delegation's well-known position. Suffice it for me to say that on all those eight items the position of my delegation, as explained by my predecessor in last year's session, remains unchanged. Moreover, on such subjects as the comprehensive test ban, prevention of nuclear war and related matters, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and prevention of an arms race in outer space, other speakers of the Group of 21 have stated our common views with greater eloquence and clarity than I would ever dare hope to be able to do. My delegation fully supports the position of the Group of 21, on those and other items as elucidated by its spokesmen, including the demand for the establishment of the relevant ad hoc committees, which must be given adequate mandates.

My delegation welcomes the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts and thanks its members for the excellent work done. We hope it will bring us nearer to the commencement of real work by this Conference on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On the matter of chemical weapons, I should like to say a few words. First of all I wish to express my delegation's sincere appreciation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, for his exemplary devotion and untiring efforts in the preparation of a working structure for the negotiations on chemical weapons.

My delegation welcomes the readiness of the Soviet Union, announced by Ambassador Issraelyan last February, concerning the position of the Soviet Union on the question of the permanent presence, for verification purposes, of representatives of international control at specialized facilities during the process of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks. My delegation likewise welcomes the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons presented by United States Vice-President on 18 April. We hope these two important developments will facilitate the work of the Conference so that we may have an agreed text, acceptable to us all, soon. The urgency of a convention on chemical weapons has been brought home to us once again in the statement of the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran which we all have heard here this morning.

My delegation stands ready to do its part in that process of attaining a convention on chemical weapons. But let me emphasize here that my delegation is not prepared to do that if it would involve in practice assigning lesser importance to other items on the agenda to which my delegation attaches high priority.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): A number of delegations have spoken today in order to comment on this spring part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union offered what he described as his delegation's "assessment" of the situation. Now, I will not pretend to make such an "assessment" but my delegation does want to put onto the record of this last plenary meeting some views of the issues we have faced and on the task that lies ahead.

There is a heroic metaphor used in the English language, which speaks of a man surviving almost overwhelming difficulties as having "snatched victory from the jaws of defeat". In my delegation's view, our work during the last three months cannot be so described. Indeed, we fear that it may more aptly be described as our having exerted great but unrewarded effort with the result that we have possibly snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.

Australia deeply values its membership of the Conference on Disarmament. That membership enables us to take part in the negotiation and the discussion of the vital issues on today's international political agenda and, to take part in the attempt to solve the greatest challenge of our time -- to bring about an end to the arms race, to assure peace and security through arms control.

This work is designed to fulfil the basic promise we believe all responsible governments make to their people, one which is the central meaning of the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations: that is, that all people have a right to pursue a decent standard of living and to live in a framework of peace.

Our Conference is unique both in its origin and its mandate. It has two functions, to negotiate agreements on disarmament and to provide a multilateral forum for political discussion of the vital issues which indeed shape that framework of peace. The latter discussion is all the more important under present circumstances of heightened political tension, because the only way to reduce that tension is to discuss the issues and the concerns which are at its source. This must lead to the practical step of negotiation. Negotiation is the way we give reality to our actions. That is what our mandate calls upon us to do.

In the first statement I made on behalf of my Government at this Conference, on 14 February, this year, I asked the question "What is there to be feared in the process of negotiation?". I repeat that question today -- what is to be feared?

The Australian view of negotiation is different from the view once attributed to Lenin, who said, "Never enter into a negotiation when vital interests are at stake". Who can doubt that the vital interests of all of us are at stake in the subjects on the agenda of this Conference? It is precisely because vital interests are at stake that we must negotiate. The Australian view of negotiation is that it should be a process through which the real nature of those vital interests is first explored and defined, and which then leads to the realization of shared interests and common goals.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

One of the greatest of those goals is surely the reduction, and where possible the abolition, of those arms which so terribly threaten us all today. Entering into a negotiation in these terms does not threaten anybody. If at the end of the day it proves that a particular approach to the solution of an arms control problem is ineffective, or does not work, then, even in that sense, the negotiation has been fruitful because it would have shown us that we need to start again to take another approach, to be more creative.

If on the other hand a negotiation is successful, that is, if an arms control objective has been achieved in a way that is acceptable to everyone and which does not threaten security, then the next step is open to us all, that is to adopt and implement such an agreement.

A number of speakers have today sought to apportion blame to certain delegations for the lack of progress during the past three months. In the view of my delegation, it is deeply regrettable to apportion blame. What does it achieve? Does name-calling help us find the consensus that we all seek? Does it create a better atmosphere for negotiation? I think we all know the answer. It is negative and destructive behaviour, and it should not occur. And what is worse, this has been done sometimes without regard to the truth. One delegation, and I won't name it, said here this morning that the entire blame for the lack of progress on the nuclear-test-ban issue rested with one delegation and the group of which it is a member. The charge that was made was simply untrue. It ignored the fact in addition that the group of countries of which the delegation that made that charge was itself preventing progress on the outer space mandate.

Such claims are sterile, they are counter-productive, and they do not help us. They are doubly destructive when they in fact rest upon a distortion of the truth.

I want it to be clear that my delegation is instructed to do whatever it can to minimize the extent to which procedural or formal disputes, disputes about rules and not substance, are allowed to divert us from our real job. This Conference made a good start in the first two weeks in adopting an agenda and programme of work, but that programme of work has barely been started because we continue to argue about the procedural conditions under which we should start our work. Australia deeply regrets this situation. We are not so naive as to fail to recognize that procedural or formal disputes are often a shield for issues of real substance. But there must be some proportion to this.

Some delegations seem to be more concerned, as our Canadian colleague pointed out a few minutes ago, to define one particular word in a draft mandate than to get on with the work at hand. Too often such delegations are in fact unable to explain convincingly why that word is so important or are unable to demonstrate that the work could not proceed in a practical way if some other compromise of the relevant mandate language were found.

We must all be active in the recess ahead of us so that these outstanding procedural issues can be cleared away and we can start real work on our whole agenda immediately at the beginning of the summer part of our session.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

One clearly positive development during the part of the session that is closing today was the presentation to the Conference by the United States Government of a draft treaty on chemical weapons. On the day that that treaty was presented to the Conference I spoke on behalf of my Government saying that the United States Government has given us an opportunity that we must not lose, and that we would not be forgiven if we lost it. This remains my Government's view.

We reject utterly the assertions that have been made here today, that the United States has acted in some way insincerely and that the terms of its draft suggest that it is not serious in wanting a chemical weapons convention. In our view the United States has acted in good faith and Australia proposes to take part vigorously in the negotiation of an effective chemical weapons treaty, and we assume that the substantial majority of all other delegations in this Conference will do the same.

Our deepest concern is the failure of this Conference during its present session to work on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. That work has not yet started precisely because of one of the formal disputes I have already mentioned. Simply, this must not continue. We must not overlook the clear and vital connection between what is required and what we do on this issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban and the review process of the NPT.

I think it is a sound principle in life that one should always do what one does for the right rather than the wrong reasons. I think it is also important to draw the correct conclusions from any given body of data with which we are presented. I am reminded of a story of a scientist who wanted to study the characteristics of the common fly. As part of this study he first trained the fly to jump over a pencil. Then he wondered what would happen if he removed one of its legs. Could it still, at his command, jump over the pencil, as he had taught it to do scientifically? He removed one of its legs, told it to jump over the pencil and the fly managed to do so again. He continued the experiment and after the removal of each of the legs, one by one, the fly could still jump over the pencil. Then came the last leg. He removed it and commanded the fly to jump over the pencil. The fly remained motionless and the scientist had to draw his conclusion. With riveting logic, the conclusion he drew was that if you remove the legs from a fly it goes deaf.

We must draw the right conclusion from the situation that we face, but with better logic than the scientist. The conclusion of my Government is that we cannot interpret the present lack of substantial progress in our Conference as showing that we are not committed to the negotiation of disarmament measures. At the risk of stretching my story too far, none of us wants a dialogue of the deaf.

I said that my Government attaches great importance to its membership of this Conference, and that is undoubtedly true. Arms control and disarmament has been assigned a very high priority in Australian foreign policy by the Australian Labour Government. My Government's policies in this field are deeply supported by the Australian people.

On Sunday 15 April, over a quarter of a million of those people voluntarily took part in public meetings around Australia, that is, about one in 32 Australian voters. The main purpose of those public meetings and rallies was to demand an end to the arms race, and in particular the nuclear-arms race.



(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Precisely the same spirit and the same aspirations exist in all of the countries represented at this table and in a great many of those which are not, which in a sense we represent. We must not disappoint those people. We must fulfil our mandate; we must negotiate; and we must begin to do so with a clear and renewed purpose when we return here on 12 June.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, at this late hour of our spring session I have asked for the floor to introduce document CD/501, which contains the communiqué of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty which, as you know, was held on 19 and 20 April 1984, in Budapest.

In the course of the meeting it was noted that an already tense situation has become still more acute owing to the deployment of United States medium-range nuclear missiles which has begun in certain NATO countries, initiating a new and particularly dangerous stage in the nuclear-arms race on the continent of Europe. As a result of the escalation of the nuclear-arms race that is taking place, the threat of nuclear war with all its catastrophic consequences for mankind has sharply increased.

Emphasis was placed at the meeting on the conviction of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty that an improvement of the situation and a return to détente call for a dialogue between States on fundamental problems of the preservation and strengthening of peace. At the same time, the participants in the meeting express the firm conviction that there are no questions which cannot be resolved by negotiations, provided they are conducted on the basis of a constructive approach and political will to achieve positive results, taking full account of the vital interests of peoples, the interests of peace and international security.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty proceed from the fact that questions pertaining to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and the search of practical ways of putting an end to the arms race and proceeding to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, should occupy the most important place in the present-day political dialogue. Not considering the present course of events to be irreversible, they emphasize that the question of the reduction of both intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe until their complete elimination can be resolved by constructive negotiations.

The vital requirement for peace and security in Europe under today's conditions is the cessation of the accumulation of new nuclear weapons on the continent. In that connection, the States represented at the meeting insist on the cessation of deployment in western Europe of United States intermediate-range nuclear missiles and declare that if such measures, leading to the withdrawal of missiles already deployed, are adopted, steps for the cancellation of countermeasures will be put into effect simultaneously. This will create a basis for the renewal of negotiations with the aim of reaching appropriate agreements to free Europe from nuclear weapons, both intermediate-range and tactical. Not a single possibility, not a single chance must be missed for a resumption of negotiations.

In this connection, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty address a special appeal to the States Members of NATO to co-operate in the interests of stopping the deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the withdrawal of those already deployed, and the implementation of effective nuclear disarmament measures in Europe.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

All the earlier proposals and initiatives put forward jointly or individually by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty on nuclear disarmament, prohibition of the militarization of outer space, the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons on a global scale, remain in force. As regards the work of our Conference, the conviction was expressed at the meeting that agreements of importance to international security can be reached at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, if all participants work towards this end in a persistent and purpose-oriented manner. At the request of the Hungarian delegation, document CD/501 will be circulated by the secretariat in all the official languages of the Conference.

I welcome the fact that my neighbour on the right, the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, has already commented on the work of the meeting and I am confident that a study of the document by members of the Conference will have a positive effect on the work of the summer part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conclusion, I should like, on behalf of the group of socialist countries, to express our gratitude for the tireless and resourceful way in which you have endeavoured to guide the work of our Conference in the direction of practical activities and for the composed and balanced nature of your chairmanship. With your permission, Mr. President, I should like to express our thanks to Ambassador Jaipal and Mr. Berasategui, as well as to the entire secretariat for their indefatigable efforts to ensure the necessary conditions for our work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. DUBEY (India): So far as I understand, it is your intention to convert the plenary into an informal meeting and to reconvene the plenary thereafter. If that is so, then I would prefer to make a brief statement in that meeting of the plenary. If that is not the case, then I would like to do so now.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of India. It is my intention to convene an informal meeting now and thereafter to resume the plenary session, at which stage I will give the distinguished Ambassador of India the opportunity of making a statement.

I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and convene in five minutes time an informal meeting of the Conference to consider those pending questions to which I referred at the opening of this plenary meeting. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 5.25 p.m. and reconvened at 5.45 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I put before the Conference the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 127, concerning a request from the representative of Iraq to participate in plenary meetings of the Conference. Is there any objection to the draft decision?

Mr. SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): The question of Iraq's request to participate or make a statement in the plenary meetings of the Conference on Disarmament is being raised at a time when the world has condemned Iraq's massive use of chemical weapons against military targets as well as the civilian population, and the Government of Iraq has still not desisted from the use of such inhumane weapons which the United Nations Organization has profoundly deplored.

Some two thousand military as well as civilian persons have been the victims of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. This does not merely concern the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran; rather, what is at issue is the damage done to the common human conscience. The contemporary civilized human community cannot and should not tolerate such crimes; we are sincerely thankful and appreciative to those delegation who share our view and have expressed their condemnation of the continuous use made of chemical weapons by Iraq. The Government of Iraq has used chemical weapons also in the last week, and the latest use of such weapons has been made early this week. Iraq has never desisted from the use of such weapons although it has requested the Conference on Disarmament to give it the opportunity to participate in its work — it did not even desist from using chemical weapons when the mission of the Secretary-General was in Iran in order to investigate the use of such weapons. It did not even refrain from using chemical weapons on that occasion. This august body, is a disarmament conference, and it respects and honours the very humane responsibility assigned to it. It is not an armament conference that Iraq is going to address. In the face of the grave assault done to the conscience of all men due to the use of internationally prohibited chemical weapons by Iraq and the continuation of that crime, we oppose any kind of participation of Iraq in the Conference's 1984 session. We do not believe that the Conference should accept the humiliation done to it by this request.

Mr. HASSAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): During this session, the Conference has received numerous requests from various States not members of the Conference to participate in its plenary meetings and make general statements on the various agenda items. The Conference has, so far, acceded to all of those requests and, although it was sometimes felt that some delegations might have reservations concerning some of those requests, no delegation has objected to their acceptance since the Conference fully recognizes the interests of all, as well as the right which the Final Document gives to all States to express their views on issues of vital importance such as disarmament. In accordance with this principle and in keeping with this tradition, we had hoped that Iraq's request would be treated in the same manner and that Iraq would be permitted to make general statements before the Conference. However, since we are working on the basis of consensus, the objection of a single State implies rejection of that request. Nevertheless, we hope that informal consultations will continue in an attempt to find a solution to such problems in the future.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): We recently learned that Iraq wished to make a statement to our Conference. Already, on 2 April 1984, that country submitted a request to us that it should be allowed to participate in our work. As everyone is aware, as a result of the objection of a member State of the Conference, it was not possible to reach a consensus to accede to this request. Today, the point at issue is a request different from the preceding one. Indeed, in a gesture of goodwill, Iraq wishes to express its views on a matter which concerns us all, since there is every reason to believe that the statement by the Iraqi representative will focus on the problem of the use of chemical weapons. It seems to us that all the members of the Conference, without any exception, would find it useful to hear the Iraqi point of view in order to be in a position to form a clear opinion and also in order to define the responsibilities in that regard.

The Moroccan delegation would like to express its sincere regrets that it was not possible, as the result of the attitude of one delegation, to reach a consensus on the request made by Iraq to participate in our work, particularly since thus far the Conference has never barred representatives, who so desired, from addressing us.

In view of the serious charges that have been made against Iraq, it would have been fair and equitable to allow the Iraqi representative to come before us and to present the point of view of his Government on the unquestionably important issue of the use or non-use of chemical weapons.

Mr. SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I will make a brief statement to respond to the statements of the distinguished delegates of Egypt and Morocco.

With regard to my Egyptian colleague who said that the Conference has accepted, on many occasions, such requests, I think that is a very good point; I think that should be the case. But, the very fact that the Conference has to decide on such requests reflects the concern that the Conference should have the option of making a selection with regard to such requests. Not every State can have the right to comment, to take the time of this important body, when it is itself violating the very principle that this body is going to promote. Who is going to address the vital matters discussed in the Conference? I ask my Egyptian colleague: Who is going to address these vital matters that the Conference has before it? The State which is openly violating it? And what does it want to say here? My colleague from Morocco says that the representative of Iraq should be given a chance to come here to bring clarifications concerning the accusations levelled against it. I think, and I think everybody knows here, that the report of the Secretary-General's mission to Iran to investigate the use of chemical weapons is very clear and contains

(Mr. Sirjani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

all necessary clarifications. I think only that the participation of the Iraqi representative in this Conference is nothing but a humiliation of this august body. We reiterate once again that as long as Iraq is using chemical weapons, and I said that early this week Iraq again used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, as long as this continues, there is no chance of Iraq taking part in this honoured body.

The PRESIDENT: Is there any other distinguished representative who would like to take the floor on this matter?

I see none. In view of the statement just made I have to announce that there is no consensus at present on the request made by the representative of Iraq.

I now turn to the letter addressed to me by the Chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which, I believe, has been circulated to all delegations. I understand that the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico would like to have the floor.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President. I believe, like you, Mr. President, that all the distinguished members of the Conference are in possession of the letter which Ambassador Imai, in his capacity as Chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, addressed on 16 April to you, in your capacity as President of the Conference. The letter is very straightforward and alludes to a request made by the Preparatory Committee that the Conference should prepare for the Committee's second session, which will take place in Geneva from 1 to 12 October 1984, the three working papers specified in it. One is related to what is known as the Nuclear Test Ban; one is concerned with item 5 of the Conference agenda; and the third refers to the so-called negative guarantees which also appear on the Conference agenda.

Since this request, as you will recall, Mr. President, was adopted by consensus in the Preparatory Committee and since the second session of the Committee for which this working document was requested will not take place until October, from 1 to 12 October, I would suggest that the members of the Conference should make use of the recess which will start tomorrow in order to exchange views informally on what the best procedure for meeting the request of the Preparatory Committee would be, and that when we resume our work in June we should examine this matter in either a formal or an informal meeting.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico. A formal proposal has been made that we defer taking a decision on this request made to the Conference until the summer part of our session. I give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): I have taken note of the proposal just made by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico that the decision be deferred until the summer part of the session of our Conference. Meanwhile, I wish to express the opinion of my delegation, which applies today as much as when we take up this matter again. I read with great attention the letter sent us by Ambassador Imai just as I read with great attention everything that comes from our distinguished colleague from Japan. I would have welcomed that the situation should be the other way round, that is, a letter from the Parties to the NPT stating what they have done according to their commitments under that Treaty concerning the nuclear test ban, the arms race and so on. With regard to a request for the preparation of a report by this Conference to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the NPT, I find a technical difficulty in that respect: I do not know how my delegation can concur in preparing a document for a Committee to which we do not belong. For that matter, Sir, I think that the recess might be useful for finding another solution, such as the one adopted in 1980 whereby the Conference put at the disposal of every member of the Committee, governmental or private, the Final Report of the Conference. My delegation would have no objection to that.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): My delegation has... certainly no objection to the postponement proposed by the Ambassador of Mexico for taking a decision on the note addressed to us by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In any case, my delegation would like to place on record that the note presented by an organ extraneous to the Conference containing requests to it would, if agreed to, involve questions of principle in respect of the relations of the Conference with other international organizations. Moreover, if accepted, the consequence would be the process of preparing such reports, the difficulties of which we can easily visualize. My delegation believes that the procedure adopted on the earlier occasion, namely, the transmission to the requesting organ of the relevant annual report of the Conference through the appropriate Secretariat channels, might constitute a suitable solution for resolving this situation. Further, in such an eventuality and regard being had to the future, the report of our Conference might be suitably detailed in respect of the specific aspects which are germane to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the NPT.

Mr. HASSAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): I shall be extremely brief. We have now listened to a number of views concerning the request which the Conference has received from the Chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since those views contain various proposals, there is a need for further consultations and exchanges of views before the Conference takes a decision in this respect. Consequently, my country's delegation supports the proposal made by the Ambassador of Mexico that a decision on this matter should be deferred until the summer part of the session. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt. Is there any objection to the proposal of the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico that we defer taking a decision on the request we have received until the summer session? I see none.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Dubey.

Mr. DUBEY (India): I have sought the floor for the second time today in my capacity as the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for informal consultations that have been taking place for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment, with an appropriate mandate, of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3: prevention of nuclear war and all related matters. I want to place on record the extent to which the Group of 21 went towards finding a solution to this problem, the understanding that they showed, the accommodation that they made and how, in spite of a sustained effort lasting for more than two months, we are now back to the point where we started.

I do not have to emphasize the supreme urgency of this Conference starting its work on this subject. This has been clearly driven home by General Assembly resolution 38/183/G on this subject, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations, without opposition by any Member State. This resolution requested the Conference on Disarmament, to undertake, as a matter of highest priority, negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

In the consultations, therefore, the Group of 21 naturally reiterated its request for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this subject, and submitted the mandate contained in the General Assembly resolution for acceptance by other groups. The Group of 21 also emphasized the urgency of setting up the ad hoc committee and formulated an agreed mandate for it well before the end of the spring part of the session of the Conference. At the same time, we made it clear from the very beginning that we were willing to negotiate and do our utmost to accommodate the points of view of the Group of western countries, given the fact that there was already a convergence between, if not identity of, the positions of the Group of 21 on the one hand and those of the socialist countries and China on the other.

Without losing any time, in the very initial stage of the consultations, we told the Group of western countries that we were conscious of their concerns expressed in the plenary statements and the working papers submitted by them on this important issue. We, therefore, offered to revise our draft mandate and go more than half way in meeting the concerns of that Group in the following important respects.

Firstly, we were prepared to accept a non-negotiating mandate for the ad hoc committee so long as it was recognized that the objective of undertaking negotiations on this subject would be reflected in some form or another and so long as the basic thrust of the mandate was to allow a thorough consideration of all the proposals for appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

Secondly, we unequivocally stated that it was our intention that all the proposals, including those submitted by the western countries, should be considered without assigning any priority among them.

(Mr. Dubey, India)

Thirdly, we also explained that at this stage our objective was to examine all aspects -- legal, political, technical, military -- of each of the proposals before the Conference and each of the approaches to this problem, and on that basis present a well-structured and comprehensive report to the Conference, and through it to the General Assembly.

We indicated that we would be glad to make available a revised text of the mandate given to the other Groups as soon as the Group of western countries indicated to us they agreed in principle to the establishment of an ad hoc committee. After waiting for a good three to four weeks, we were told by the Western Group that though they were not necessarily opposed to the establishment of an ad hoc committee, their final agreement to it would depend upon whether it would be possible to agree upon a mandate which they found satisfactory. Thereupon, we immediately made available to them and the other Groups a revised draft mandate on our behalf. The initial response of the Group of western countries to this mandate was generally positive. The socialist countries and China were willing to go along with the draft mandate suggested by us.

A draft mandate for the ad hoc committee was also made available by the Co-ordinator of the Western Group. This draft differed from the draft submitted on behalf of the Group of 21 in two important respects. Firstly, it did not contain any provision relating to the longer term objective of undertaking negotiations on this matter, and secondly, it purported completely to change the very nature of the agenda item by providing for undertaking a comprehensive review of the conditions of peace and security in a nuclear age. This was, therefore, not acceptable to the Group of 21. For the very core of the concern of more than two thirds of mankind about the prevention of nuclear war lies in adopting measures for ensuring the survival of human species on this planet, and not the security of a handful of States. The Group of 21 has stated on numerous occasions in the Conference and in other forums that survival must take precedence over security.

We, however, did not reject the draft presented on behalf of the Western Group but, in a spirit of accommodation, suggested two alternative texts. In both these alternatives, in order to accommodate the position of the western countries, reference to the General Assembly resolution for keeping in mind the objective of undertaking negotiations, was deleted and in place of this the phrase "as a part of the negotiating process" was inserted. In one of the alternatives, the main focus on the consideration of appropriate and practical measures was considerably modified, again in order to meet the point of view of the Group of western countries. In the second alternative, in order to take into account the concern of the western countries regarding security, it was suggested that the consideration of the proposal will take place "in the general context of the objectives of the international community of strengthening international peace and security and ensuring human survival."



(Mr. Dubey, India)

The Group of western countries took the first alternative suggested by the Group of 21 as a basis. They reformulated the core mandate so as to shift the focus further away from practical and appropriate measures and they did not include any formulation on the longer term objective of undertaking negotiations except in so far as it was implied in the very mandate of the Conference on Disarmament.

Yesterday, the Group of 21, after giving very careful consideration to the final version of the Western Group draft, decided to adopt an extremely flexible and positive attitude in the discussion on this subject in the Contact Group which met in the afternoon, so as to conclude an agreement without further delay. Unfortunately, they were told by the Co-ordinator of the Group of western countries right at the beginning of the meeting of the Contact Group, that their own draft was not acceptable to some of their member countries. I would like to clarify here that this draft was submitted on the responsibility of the Co-ordinator and that it was, of course, done so ad referendum.

Thus, the consultations which held out the best promise so far for reaching agreement, have come to naught. We will, of course, continue our effort after the resumption of the session of the Conference on Disarmament in June. I would like here to express my deep gratitude and pay tribute for the painstaking effort made and the remarkable understanding shown by the Co-ordinator of the Western Group, the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium, and by other representatives, including the distinguished Ambassador of France who helped him.

However, there is no denying the fact that the last minute developments yesterday have thrown the entire consultations on this subject out of gear and into a state of uncertainty. It is very difficult to predict what will happen when we resume our session. However, one thing is certain and it is that time is not on our side. Unless we are able to take a decision within the very first week after the resumption of the session of the Conference, there will just not be enough time between then and the preparation of the report of the Conference for conducting a really thorough discussion from all angles on this subject, which has been long overdue.

It is also extremely important that our point of departure for the consultations after we resume, should be the two alternative drafts submitted by the Group of 21, the response to that draft submitted by the Western Group and the draft of the socialist countries. If an attempt is made to go back on the latest positions as reflected in these drafts, we would never succeed in our effort.

I would appeal to the representatives of the western countries not to return to their old positions, that the subject should be discussed in informal meetings of the plenary. I do not want to waste the time of the Conference by repeating the arguments as to why such an approach cannot be considered as a serious response to the importance and the urgency that the vast majority of the nations of the world, as well as a large section of

(Mr. Dubey, India)

public opinion in the western countries themselves, attach to this subject. I would also like to stress that the draft mandate must reflect in an appropriate and mutually acceptable manner, that the exercise we will be undertaking should be but a step towards identifying negotiating issues and for facilitating such a negotiation.

In the forthcoming consultations, the Group of 21 will maintain the same spirit of understanding and accommodation as it has displayed until now. However, the negotiation until now has involved a successive erosion of the original position of the Group of 21 in an attempt to accommodate the point of view of other Groups. There is, therefore, no "give" left in our position. Unless the Western countries show an understanding of the extent to which we have gone in accommodating their point of view and persuade their governments that the Group of 21 has already been as flexible and reasonable as is possible in the circumstances, it will not be possible to reach an agreement.

I would like to stress that the mere placing of a separate item on this subject on the agenda of the Conference does not represent any change from the situation that has prevailed so far. It does not still enable us to respond to the question being asked from all quarters: What is this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament doing to prevent a nuclear war?

This morning I was reassured to hear from the distinguished Ambassador of France -- and his remarks were reinforced by the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany -- that his Government was in favour of a thorough discussion of the subject. I would like to submit that all that the various drafts of the mandate presented by me on behalf of the Group of 21 sought to do was to provide for such a discussion. We wanted the text of the mandate to remain as general and wide as possible and not to emphasize in the text itself the aspects to which we would like priority to be given or the approach we would like to be favoured. I would, therefore, once again appeal that we should work for a general mandate without raising issues in the context of the drafting of the mandate itself, on which different groups of countries have different positions.

I would request those Western countries which could not go along with the consensus that was within our grasp last evening to shed their misapprehension. I would like to assure them that we are not going to use the consideration of this subject in an ad hoc committee as a weapon against them, and therefore, there is no reason for them to come forward with their deterrence and deploy it at the stage of the formulation of the draft mandate itself.

The PRESIDENT: I have two more speakers who have requested the floor, and before I give them the floor may I announce that the Secretariat has advised me that we should conclude our meeting as early as possible since the interpreters have already exhausted the three-hour period that they have worked.

I now give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Bulgaria.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Let me briefly touch upon the question of the prevention of nuclear war as I had the honour to represent the socialist countries in the consultations on this subject.

The socialist countries deeply regret the failure of the efforts to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Our disappointment is easy to understand since the socialist countries not only contribute a new detailed Working Paper on the issue, document CD/484, and put forward a draft of an appropriate mandate in document CD/434, but also showed maximum flexibility in order to start practical work on this item.

Any delegation which has followed these efforts closely cannot but acknowledge our flexibility. In displaying readiness to seek a compromise formula for a draft mandate, the socialist countries had in mind the conceptual proximity with the goals and positions of the members of the Group of 21. The statements made by representatives of that Group, notably by the distinguished Ambassador of India today, is another proof of the wide political support which exists for undertaking practical steps to solve the problem of nuclear war. I avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Dubey for his personal involvement and efforts in this context.

The whole responsibility for the failure of the Conference to initiate practical work on the item "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" rests with the western States possessing nuclear weapons, which displayed complete disregard for the views and positions of others. Our experience in these consultations places a major questionmark on the ability and desire of those States to conduct business in good faith, without trying to deceive other participants. We have no choice but to take this attitude into account and draw the appropriate conclusions. The outcome of the consultations has deferred the beginning of practical work on the subject more than ever before. We lost a real chance, and no one can say when such a chance will appear again.

The situation regarding agenda item 3 has confirmed the conclusion that the efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war are being obstructed by the militaristic policy of the leading western State and its closest allies. This dangerous situation should not be allowed to prevail. The socialist countries stand ready to pursue and multiply the efforts to begin real practical work on agenda item 3 and will work consistently for an appropriate mandate.

Mr. PROKOFIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to make use of its right of reply in connection with the statement just made by the representative of Australia.

The Soviet delegation notes the attention paid by the Australian delegation to the theoretical heritage of the founder of the Soviet State, Mr. V. I. Lenin.

I should like to point out to the Australian representative the impossibility of quoting in any way from an original source out of context, without reference to the particular historical occasion on which the words were said. This is all the more true in the case of events which occurred more than half a century ago.

The following quotation from the works of the noble Lenin, contained in the work entitled "Concerning the disarmament slogan": "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism", is still appropriate -- and I would emphasize that fact -- to the work of our Geneva Conference on Disarmament, just as for any other international forum.

(Mr. Prokofiev, USSR)

The entire history of our participation in the disarmament negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, speaks for itself. We do not need lessons from any quarter on how we should conduct our negotiations. We are in favour of negotiations, but honest, constructive, business-like and serious negotiations. This is proved by those numerous important Soviet initiatives and proposals on questions of limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament, which implement in a consistent manner the Soviet Leninist concept of disarmament. Our proposals enjoy wide support and meet with a broad response throughout the world because they consider the chief problem of our times -- the removal of the threat of nuclear war; because they make a real contribution to the cause, not only of arresting the arms race, but of curtailing it; proceed from the principle of the equality and equal security of both sides; presuppose the goodwill and co-operation of States belonging to different military and political alliances; take account of the will and interests of other nations and of wide sectors of the entire world community; and help to improve mutual understanding and the general international atmosphere.

The PRESIDENT: I have had two more requests for the floor. May I announce now that I have been advised that unless we conclude our proceedings in 10 minutes we will be constrained to have another plenary meeting tomorrow in order to continue our work.

Bearing this in mind, I now give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium.

Mr. DEPASSE (Belgium) (translated from French): I shall be all the more brief and to the point, since I have no general criticism concerning the report made to us by the Ambassador of India. I consider his chronological account of the discussion concerning the mandate of the ad hoc committee on the prevention of nuclear war to be completely accurate, indeed so much so that, while I am not entirely in agreement with every one of his shades of opinion, I believe that the spirit in which he presented it is such that it is completely pointless to quibble over points of detail. The main factor in this affair is the willingness shown by the Group of 21 to take account of the basic concerns of the western countries, and I believe that there is no possibility of disagreement between it and ourselves in that regard.

My statement now will be extremely straightforward. I do not think that anything has been lost because the intervening incident that led to what I believe is a temporary setback in the quest for a mandate on the prevention of nuclear war was mainly due to the lack of time. We were compelled to adopt certain positions without having the complete freedom to notify the authorities in the capitals of the way in which the discussion had evolved. That discussion turned on an unusually sensitive aspect of the security of the western countries. The aspect is one on which it is necessary to hold very high-level consultations, such as are not readily accessible. This feedback between capitals and delegations here may not always have been as simple as we would have wished. I continue to believe that while the western countries have fully appreciated the open-mindedness shown by the Group of 21, the latter, through its representative, Ambassador Dubey, to whose patience, tenacity and graciousness I should like to pay tribute, has unquestionably on its side the fact that the western countries which in the past rejected the establishment of a committee or working group on this topic, are now finally committed to it, with the firm will to succeed in the quest for a mandate. The exercise will go on, and it is entirely inappropriate at this juncture to try, as the Ambassador of Bulgaria has done, to add fuel to the fire, to assign responsibilities and to make charges. This is certainly not the place to do so.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

I categorically object to these charges, which I am glad to see have not been taken up by Ambassador Dubey. I am convinced that with the patience and flexibility we have all decided to employ, there is a very good chance of bringing this mandate to a point where it will be able to achieve a consensus here.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): I will be very brief, Mr. President, and I hope non-controversial. I merely wanted to say that, in spite of the lateness of the hour, I would like to express the view which I hope is not considered too radical, that we in the Canadian delegation, and indeed the Canadian Government itself, do not consider the concept of security of States, whether Western or otherwise, and the concept of survival of mankind as mutually exclusive concepts. We fail to see the logic in any such train of thought, and I hope we can pick up that point when we meet again. Now it may be that these phrases have become buzz words that have a particular meaning to some people or some delegations, but not for us, and it remains, only on that issue perhaps, to say that in the light of what was just said by the distinguished representative of Belgium it would be presumptuous for me to add anything concerning the good faith and the moderation shown by the Group of 21. One other point I would like to make; and that is that it is for these very reasons that we do not consider security as attainable unilaterally, and we express so often the concept of mutual security. I do not care if others like a different phrase, such as "common security", but I would like to be able to use the term "security" without having it turned into a dirty word.

One other point I would like to make, and it was again made here in February 1983 by Canada's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, is that this multilateral forum cannot really involve itself deeply in other negotiations that go on outside it, for instance on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which my country regards as beneficial to all States, and that is easily seen if one regards the situation we would find ourselves in if we did not have that Treaty; I think we would all be scrambling to acquire nuclear weapons; and I am thinking also of the bilateral negotiations which were going on here. Nevertheless, even though we are not involved in either the INF or START negotiations, we stress, in the words of our Deputy Prime Minister, that "those negotiations affect the fate of all of us", and we all have a very direct and vital interest in them, whether we come from Europe or North America or any other part of the world. And I wanted merely to conclude with a very sincere plea that those negotiations which we consider to be directly relevant to this question of the prevention of nuclear war be resumed.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Canada for his statement. May I now turn to the time-table which the secretariat has circulated today for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies from 12 to 15 June, the first week of the second part of the annual session. The time-table has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees of the Conference. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Distinguished colleagues, this will be the final plenary meeting for the month of April when the delegation of Sri Lanka has the privilege of being in the Chair. I will not attempt to sum up the work of the Conference for the month of April or for the first half of our session. Many speakers today have done so from their individual points of view. We have had a full programme of work in our plenary sessions during which we were addressed by many distinguished personalities, enhancing the importance of this body as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under the able Chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus, has continued its work and I am glad that we were able to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia this month.

I would like to thank all delegations for the unstinted co-operation extended to me. I would like to pay tribute to the patience and skill of my two predecessors, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland and Ambassador Datcu of Romania. To the secretariat, and especially to our Secretary-General, Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, and Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Berasategui, I express my deep appreciation for their courteous assistance. I also thank the interpreters and the technical staff for their co-operation.

Finally, I wish to offer my congratulations to the Ambassador of Sweden and to welcome him as the President of the Conference for the month of June when we return after our recess. I extend to him my sincere good wishes for a successful tenure and pledge the support of my delegation to him in his task.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 12 June, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 12 June 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mrs. B. Theorin

(Sweden)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. Ould ROUIS  
Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. ROWE  
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium: Mr. M. DEPASSE  
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. De SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. C. PRAMOV  
Mr. N. MIHAILOV

Burma: U Maung Maung GYI  
U Hla MYINT

Canada: Mr. J.A. BEESLEY  
Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. Qian JIADONG  
Ms. Wang ZHIYUN  
Mr. Liang DEFENG  
Mr. Lin CHENG  
Mr. Zhang WEIDONG  
Mr. Yang MINGLIANG  
Mr. Suo KAIMING  
Mr. Lu MINGJUN

Cuba: Mr. E de la CRUZ



Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. I. HASSAN

Mr. Marawan BADR

Mr. A. HELMY

Ms. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Ms. K. SINEGIORGIA

Mr. F. JOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE

Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. Rose

Mr. W. Kubiczek

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. M. GERDTS

Mr. W.E. Von Dem HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Mr. KALAMI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan: Mr. S. ABE  
Mr. M. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya: -

Mexico: Mr. Z. GONZALES Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands: Mr. R.J. Van SCHAIK  
Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria: Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. F.O. ADESHIDA

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru: Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland: Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. A. POPESCU  
Mr. M. BICHIR

Sri Lanka: Mr. J. DHANAPALA

Sweden: Ms. B. THEORIN  
Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. L.E. WINGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. I.V. SCHERBAK

United Kingdom: Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. D.A. SLINN  
Mr. J.F. GORDON

United States of America: Mr. L. FIELDS  
Mr. N. CLYNE  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. A. HOROWITZ  
Mr. R. MIKULAR  
Mr. R.O. WATERS

Venezuela: -

Yugoslavia: Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC  
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire: Mrs. Esaki KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament: Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

At the outset, allow me to extend, on behalf of the Conference, a warm welcome to His Excellency Mr. Shin'iro Abe, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, who is addressing the Conference today as first speaker. His presence among us today is further evidence of the interest taken by Japan in the work of this multilateral negotiating body. We are looking forward to hearing his statement, and we wish him a useful visit to Geneva.

May I also cordially welcome Ambassador Robert Jan van Schaik, the new representative of the Netherlands, who joins us today for the first time. I am sure we are all looking forward to co-operating with him in advancing the work of the Conference.

I am convinced that I represent the whole Conference when expressing appreciation of and gratitude for the highly qualified services of Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary-General of the Conference, as well as of Mr. Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary-General, and of all the other members of the secretariat. We count on their unfailing support also for this summer's work.

It is indeed an honour and a challenge for my delegation to take up the presidency of the Conference of Disarmament for the month of June. In preparing for this task we have had the valuable help of Ambassador Dhanapala, the outgoing President, who has shared with us his experiences, impressions and advice.

I think it is fair to say that the first part of this year's session was probably — apart from some encouraging progress in the work on a chemical weapons convention — one of the most disappointing in the whole history of this negotiating body. When we should have dealt with the real task of this Conference, that is, to negotiate multilateral disarmament agreements, we instead lost much time and effort in deliberations on procedural matters. As a consequence, we now face an extraordinarily long list of unsolved problems for the rest of the session. However, this perspective should not discourage us in our work. It makes imperative still greater efforts. In this context, I would like to urge delegations to present their positions clearly and in substance here in the Conference and in its subsidiary bodies, rather than to try to disguise them in a continuing and fruitless debate over the establishment or not of such bodies.

I take it for granted that basically all Governments here represented consider it to be in their self-interest, as it is in the common interest of mankind, to pursue real and serious disarmament. I do not have to remind anyone here that nuclear war is — without comparison — the greatest threat the world has ever had to face, that there is indeed a risk that the use of nuclear arms would constitute global suicide.

We have recently, on 22 May, seen one expression of this urge to stop the arms race in the form of a Joint Declaration by Heads of State and Prime Ministers of India, Mexico, Tanzania, Greece, Argentina and Sweden. The political leaders of these countries stress the increased risk of nuclear war caused by a lack of constructive dialogue among the nuclear States. They point out the fact that the

(The President)

people they represent are no less threatened by nuclear war than the citizens of the nuclear States. They warn that the probability of nuclear holocaust increases as warning time decreases and weapons become swifter, more accurate and more deadly. They appeal for general and complete disarmament and assure the nuclear States of their good offices to facilitate agreement. The Declaration concludes that today the world hangs in the balance between war and peace.

It is the responsibility of this Conference to contribute to avoiding the unspeakable tragedies of war. This is what is expected from us and it is with this in mind that we must now resume our work. Among the items on the agenda—~~v~~ all of them important—there are three which I would like to mention particularly because of the urgency of the subject-matters as well as the attention they attract among the general public. I am thinking of the nuclear test ban, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prevention of nuclear war.

The test-ban issue is the number one item on our agenda and in essence the classic task of this body. The continuing failure to achieve any progress is of serious concern. It must be our immediate task and constant preoccupation to establish a mutually acceptable work format for this issue in order to make it possible to solve the remaining substantive problems with regard to a treaty on a nuclear test ban.

The arms race in outer space is a relatively new item on the agenda of the Conference. The urgency of bringing the development of weapons and the use of force in space under control of international law by creating appropriate agreements should be obvious to us all. The accelerating pace of uncontrollable military technology and absurd military spending would, if unhampered, further seriously threaten an already precarious international peace.

Nuclear weapons and the possibility of their use have brought the very survival of humankind into jeopardy. With this frightening prospect, it must be the duty of nations to make all efforts to prevent a nuclear war. It is obvious that the Conference on Disarmament must give its full attention to this priority question.

In our view, and for the reasons I have mentioned, it is essential that we reach agreement soon on how to tackle these three issues in a substantive way. All delegations must bring their efforts to bear to that end. It is, however, obvious that without preparedness to compromise and co-operate we will not achieve progress. If we succeed now in establishing an agreed framework for these items, we will stand a good chance of seeing some concrete progress by the end of the session. If we fail, we will, I am afraid, face one of the gravest crises of multilateral disarmament talks, and this at a particularly serious moment in history, when concrete negotiations are absolutely necessary, and only a year before the next NPT Review Conference. Such a situation cannot be permitted to develop. It must be avoided through our collective effort.

Another item of importance during this session will, of course, be continued work on a chemical weapons convention. We are obviously faced here with the eminent risk of uncontrolled proliferation of these weapons to more and more countries. It is therefore necessary that these negotiations are carried on swiftly and efficiently

(The President)

and in a spirit of constructive co-operation. If so, a draft convention can be put together soon and be presented to the members of the Conference and other States for their consideration.

It is gratifying that the Conference has been able to establish an ad hoc committee for the item of radiological weapons. With the skilled and experienced chairmanship of Ambassador Vejvoda, there are good prospects for some tangible progress with regard to this question.

Finally, let me mention one remaining issue that the Conference should face as soon as possible during this session, that is the review of the membership of the Conference. A number of States, deeply committed to the cause of disarmament, have announced their interest in being members of the Conference. We have an obligation to react in a proper and expedient way to these demands.

I have mentioned some but not all of the important issues in front of us. My delegation offers you its services during its presidency. We must all take our responsibility so that the Conference can embark upon the substantive tasks at hand.

Let us now go to work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Japan, Yugoslavia and France.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, His Excellency Mr. Shintaro Abe, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.

Mr. ABE (Japan): Madam President, it is indeed a great pleasure for me to attend this Conference on Disarmament today.

On behalf of the Government of Japan, I should like to express to you my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the heavy responsibilities of the Presidency for this month. I hope that this Conference will produce fruitful results under your wise guidance and with the benefit of your great knowledge and experiences.

I should also like to express our appreciation to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, your predecessor and President for the month of April, for his valuable contribution to the Conference.

The question of peace and disarmament has never been so serious as it is now for the peoples of the world.

The tense international situation in recent years is hanging heavily on the minds of all people. In this situation, several important bilateral disarmament negotiations and even this Conference, the sole body for multilateral disarmament negotiations, have, frankly speaking, failed of late to make such progress as will meet fully the expectations of the people of the world.

Since I took office as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, I have energetically toured many countries, in consideration of Japan's attitude of pursuing the peace of the world, not only as a member of Asia, but as a member of human society on Earth, and had the opportunity of exchanging views with United States, Soviet and other leaders on the course mankind should follow in the future. The honest impression I

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obtained from those dialogues is that the world is permeated with the sense of frustration and impatience and that the inmost concern and profound apprehensions of the people of the entire world are bent to this question of peace; in particular, there is a strong desire for ensuring peace and security against the ever-intensifying arms race and its unchecked continuation.

Bearing in mind such a sense of unrest shared by so many people of the world, I have come to attend this Conference on Disarmament as the first Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to do so, in this fifteenth year of Japan's membership of the Conference, in order to express my views on peace and disarmament and to stress that it is high time for this Conference, which has successfully made several brilliant achievements, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to take action in concrete terms and become a driving force for the advancement of world-wide disarmament.

What is the cause of all this tenseness of the current international situation?

It goes without saying that its fundamental cause lies in the fact that East-West relations, particularly those between the United States and the Soviet Union, have never been so cold in recent times as they are now, because of the vicious cycle of unerasable feeling of distrust between the two sides, causing them to seek their security in the expansion of armaments, which in turn gives rise to renewed distrust.

Of course, I am inclined to believe that the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union at the present time are not in such a critical condition as they were at the time of the Berlin or Cuban crises. But I do believe that the present tensions in East-West relations have especially serious implications of an unprecedented nature for the survival of the whole human race.

Mankind now possesses highly developed scientific technologies that make free movement in outer space possible, and yet, or because of that, it has not succeeded in preventing the vast quantitative increase and the appalling qualitative advance of the modern weapons systems. Consequently, there exist on Earth large accumulations of nuclear weapons, said to be the ultimate weapons, and numerous other dreadful modern weapons in such volumes as will annihilate the human species several times over.

In this state of affairs, if the tensions in East-West relations should continue as they are and a nuclear war should break out, intentionally or accidentally, the Earth would undergo, within a matter of ten minutes or so, a holocaust on an unimaginable scale and from this the whole of mankind would be the loser, being brought to the verge of total annihilation, as every informed person all over the world points out.

How wisely we, as human beings, should cope with such a situation; in more concrete terms, how we should control and reduce the instruments of horror mankind has created with its own civilization, without ruining ourselves overwhelmed by such instruments, and how we should maintain peace and transmit peace and prosperity on Earth to posterity; that is the most crucial problem facing us today.

This is the very consideration, I believe, that should be the starting point of disarmament.

In considering this problem, I cannot but call upon the United States and the Soviet Union, the Powers possessing the majority of the existing nuclear arsenals

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and the capabilities of most modern weapons systems in space and other non-nuclear fields, to realize their very special responsibility to mankind. It is earnestly required of the two Powers that they should indeed take the initiative in practicing disarmament in concrete terms, accompanied by effective verification measures, and that is the way they should respond to the hopes and expectations of mankind. In other words, the world peace rests first and foremost with the leaders of these two Powers.

In this connection, I now wish to point out several matters.

First, I would like to take up the very important issue of nuclear disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, that is, the START and the INF negotiations. These negotiations have been suspended since the end of last year, and regrettably there is not even the faintest sign of their possible resumption now.

At the London Summit held a few days ago, the participating Western democracies, including Japan, expressed their conviction that international problems must be resolved through reasoned dialogue and negotiation and stated that they would support all efforts to that end. They also expressed their wish to see the speedy resumption of the now suspended disarmament negotiations.

I have been advocating, on every occasion, a resolution of the INF negotiations on a global basis and in a manner that will not injure the security of Asia, including Japan. I may take this opportunity to re-emphasize this point and urge strongly the Soviet Union to recognize its heavy responsibility as a major nuclear Power and return to the negotiating table at the earliest possible time for substantive progress of nuclear disarmament negotiations with the United States.

It goes without saying that progress in the nuclear disarmament negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States is vitally important also for maintaining and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

Many non-nuclear-weapon States, including Japan, have chosen to count on the nuclear-weapon States' will to take every precaution to control nuclear weapons and to make every effort to promote nuclear disarmament. On that account, the non-nuclear-weapon States renounced on their own the so-called nuclear options. With the Third Review Conference of the NPT scheduled for next year, I am convinced that it is a matter of historical significance in eliminating the sense of distrust of the non-nuclear-weapon States and the non-NPT-member States toward the regime that the nuclear-weapon States should pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for the realization of nuclear disarmament.

Now there are 120 countries which have joined the NPT. We should correctly evaluate the important role the NPT regime has played in preventing the increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. We should also reaffirm the need for positive efforts of various countries to enhance the universality of the treaty and the strength of the NPT regime. For this reason, I would also like to urge all the non-member States to the NPT, including China and France, to accede to this Treaty at the earliest possible opportunity.



(Mr. Abe, Japan)

Let me now turn to another major nuclear disarmament issue: nuclear test ban.

This issue has been taken up as a matter of first priority in response to honest wishes of people for a long time since the dawning of the Nuclear Age. Nevertheless, it is regrettable to note that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is in reality still very far away.

To our knowledge, as many as some fifty underground nuclear test explosions were conducted in the course of the past year. Japan has been steadfastly opposed to any nuclear test explosions conducted by any States. Accordingly, I wish to urge strongly again that the nuclear-weapon States should do their best to restrain themselves from conducting nuclear test explosions.

It is to be regretted that negotiations on a nuclear test ban at this Conference should have come to standstill, owing to the lack of consensus on solutions to the verification problems. In order to find a breakthrough in this impasse, I believe that now is the time when the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the Soviet Union and the United States, should exert their maximum efforts to find a way towards a more "realistic" solution.

Therefore, I would like to submit the following proposal:

If a CTB cannot be achieved at one stroke, we should make an in-depth study on a second-best measure, namely, a step-by-step formula, under which underground nuclear test explosions of a yield now considered technically verifiable on a multinational basis will be taken as the threshold, an agreement will be reached on banning test explosions overstepping this threshold and then the threshold will be lowered by improving the verification capability itself.

Needless to say, the objective of this proposal is nothing but the acceleration of the process for a CTB, in view of the fact that no substantial progress has been made toward that goal over a long period. Therefore, in addition to improvement of technical verification capability, it should naturally be accompanied by a search for a means by which effective verification and inspection, based on trust among States, is made possible. I honestly believe that, in the present situation, this formula is the most realistic option left to us and I earnestly hope that it will open a way for an early realization of a CTB. I also take this opportunity to assure all of you that Japan is prepared to make available even further our advanced technology of seismic detection to increase the verification capability in this field, when such an approach has been accepted.

Next, I must not fail to mention the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons as well.

Chemical weapons cause far-reaching injuries and effects, extensively as well as indiscriminately, not only on combatants but also on ordinary citizens. The fact

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that chemical weapons are actually incorporated in the weapons systems of a number of countries and are stockpiled in enormous quantities on this Earth poses a grave threat to the peace and security of international society. In fact, there occurred this year an inadmissible event in that chemical weapons were actually used in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

This is eloquent testimony of the need for us not only urgently to reduce and destroy the existing large amount of chemical weapons stocks, but also to seek the early conclusion of a global and comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons so as to preclude their development and production.

In April this year, Vice-President Bush of the United States, by attending in person a meeting of this Conference and presenting a draft convention, expressed the positive attitude of the United States Government toward this particular issue. Prior to this, in February of this year, the Soviet Union also gave a positive sign regarding verification matters, though limited in scope to the destruction of chemical weapons stocks.

I appreciate and welcome such concrete proposals put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union. Japan will continue to participate actively, as in the past, in the deliberations and negotiations on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons at this Conference. I wish Japan's advanced technologies would make some contribution in this field.

Finally, I would like to touch briefly upon the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space. Outer space, which we may call the last remaining frontier for mankind, has infinite potentiality as a stage for our future activities. As a country promoting various projects for the peaceful use of outer space, Japan is keenly interested in the prevention of an arms race in it. I hope that in this field, too, a study in concrete terms will be made at the Conference on Disarmament. To that end, also, it is desirable that the United States and the Soviet Union both take a positive stance.

I have now expressed my earnest desire that the United States and the Soviet Union, of all countries, address themselves, seriously and ahead of other countries, to accelerating disarmament.

By this I do not mean to say that other countries, including my own, can remain idle with folded arms. Various multilateral agreements which this Conference on Disarmament is trying to conclude as its goal must be acceptable to all of the 40 member countries that the distinguished delegates in this Chamber represent and, therefore, the concerted and positive efforts of all the countries are required for the attainment of this goal.

Japan had the greater part of her land ravaged and the lives of millions of its people were lost during the last war. From this sad experience, the

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determination that "the scourge of war must never be repeated again" is firmly imprinted in the mind of every Japanese. The Government of Japan, on the basis of this commitment of its people to peace, has constantly made it its basic foreign policy not to become a military Power that may menace the neighbouring countries, to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan, and thus to strive for the promotion of disarmament.

Preservation of peace is a common desire shared by all mankind. It is essential that we should realize, steadily and patiently, feasible and concrete disarmament measures one after another, while fully recognizing the reality of international society. To that end, I believe we can choose no other way than to increase mutual understanding and mutual trust through constant dialogue and contact, bilateral and multilateral, and seek points of agreement. In this sense, I am strongly reminded of the importance of the role to be played by this Conference on Disarmament and of the responsibility to be borne by every one of us here taking part in the Conference.

Geneva is a city where, since the beginning of the modern age, people have gathered and conferred on numberless occasions in search of international understanding and co-operation and of ways for overcoming difficulties, whenever mankind has stood at the crossroads of war and peace. Their noble spirit is engraved in every corner of the town and will never fade away. Now we must recall anew the painstaking efforts of our predecessors who have left their footprints in this city and seriously think of the heavy responsibility we bear not only for ourselves, but also for the prosperity and well-being of our posterity.

The future of mankind depends on us who are living today. Our road ahead will not be flat and smooth. Let us make further efforts together for the attainment of our common ultimate goal, a general and complete disarmament, by transcending differences of our positions, in a spirit as expressed in an oriental saying, "Constant dripping wears away a stone".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas.

Mr. VIDAS (Yugoslavia): Madam President, at the outset of the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like, first of all, to congratulate you, the representative of friendly Sweden, on your appointment as President of the Conference for the month of June and to wish you success in carrying out your responsible task. By its initiatives, particularly in the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, Sweden has significantly

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contributed to disarmament negotiations. The Conference on Disarmament has benefited a great deal on many occasions from the expertise offered by the Swedish experts. The delegation of Yugoslavia has always had very close co-operation with the delegation of Sweden, sharing the same views and having the same preoccupations on the magnitude of disarmament problems. I would like to assure you this time again that you may count on my delegation's full support and co-operation in the discharge of the tasks facing you.

I would also like to express our appreciation to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, for the successfully accomplished task as President for the month of April. His efficient stewardship and personal qualities greatly contributed to unimpeded work by the Conference.

We have listened with great attention and interest to the statement by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Japan, His Excellency Mr. Shintaro Abe, and it is, indeed, a great pleasure for me to welcome him.

The Conference on Disarmament, during the spring session as in the past years, has been prevented from achieving any substantive progress in negotiations on the items of the agenda under consideration. More specifically, since May 1977, when the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was signed in Geneva, this forum has not concluded any new agreement. All efforts made to that effect by the majority of members have been of no avail. In the first part of its 1984 session the Conference achieved less than in the same period last year. Out of all subsidiary negotiating bodies, only the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons continued its work. It took, however, more than one month to agree on this.

At the same time, the arms race continues unabated. World military expenditures will reach this year the fantastic amount of 970 billion dollars. This figure by far exceeds the total debt of all developing countries, which amounts to some 800 billion dollars. According to the published information, spending for armament in real terms is increasing an average of 3.1 per cent a year, while development finance is encountering many insurmountable difficulties. The high level of spending on arms has reached such drastic proportions that, if continued, will have grave consequences for both East-West and North-South relations as well as for peace and security in the world.

Failure to halt the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons, in which a comprehensive test ban would be the first necessary step leading to their gradual reduction, reflects a complete lack of responsibility for the destiny of mankind. Our age has seen the most dangerous development of nuclear weapons in terms of their unimaginable destructive capabilities. If we are to avoid a nuclear catastrophe and its aftermath and destruction of all life on Earth, the current insane arms race must be stopped. The use of nuclear weapons would bring about an ecological and demographic catastrophe. Given the present

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level of nuclear weapons in the world, no nuclear-weapon State, particularly not those which are most heavily armed, can shirk its share of responsibility. The excess of nuclear weapons is no guarantee of an increased security, nor does it remove the danger of world holocaust. Quite the opposite. The world is one and indivisible. Therefore, the threat of its total destruction is hanging over all of us. In such circumstances, military or political alliances become completely irrelevant. The consequences of nuclear catastrophe will be borne by East and West, North and South, developed and developing alike. It is hard to imagine that anyone who survives the nuclear catastrophe will be able to rejoice in the victory won by the superiority of his arms or his social system.

Scientists, politicians and military experts have long ago drawn attention to the possible consequences of nuclear war. We are reiterating this here today because we, as members of the Conference on Disarmament, are responsible not only before our own Governments but also before the whole world for doing everything in our power to prevent such catastrophe. We believe that this task is not unattainable. What is needed is more determination and political will to open up the negotiating channels, as well as concerted political action to overcome the present impasse through negotiations conducive to specific weapons agreements and gradually leading to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

The first and most important step to be undertaken now by the Conference should be to establish without delay an ad hoc committee on prevention of nuclear war. On the basis of the proposals submitted or to be submitted to the Conference when it resumes its work, the ad hoc committee should elaborate its programme of work. My delegation in the statement to the Conference on 21 February of this year has already made some suggestions in that respect. Such a process is long overdue.

Instead of such a pragmatic approach, we have witnessed that many initiatives and concrete proposals submitted to the Conference with respect to the prohibition and elimination of specific types of weapons are a priori rejected, even before the minimum effort is made to see their merits and to amend them, if necessary. The proof, in fact, the only proof that somebody is willing to curb the arms race and contribute to the strengthening of world security at a lower level of armaments are negotiations on arms reduction and limitation and on disarmament. It is the reasons which are usually stated as excuse for the research, production and deployment of new weapons systems, particularly in areas where they do not exist, that should be the driving force behind the launching and maintenance of negotiations. The restoration of military balance of power is most often used to justify the increase of one's own weapons arsenals or military budgets. The re-establishment of the disturbed balance of power is, as a rule, sought at a higher level of armaments. This, in turn, invariably causes suspicion by the protagonists of the arms race that the other side is trying to achieve military superiority and, consequently, to acquire the nuclear "first-strike" capability. This is the logic of no return, of a vicious circle of the arms race, of constant interaction of causes and consequences. There is no end to this process. Instead of making

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counterproposals, through the process of negotiation, and instead of the search for acceptable compromise solutions, rejection is often chosen as a response to the concrete draft agreement proposed to the Conference. What is, perhaps, seen by one side as a proposal exclusively motivated by propaganda reasons, or as a proposal aimed at solving only one of the many requirements of the agreement, must not be the reason for easily dismissing the proposals put forward by the sovereign Governments equal members of the Conference.

The re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban is the most urgent task the Conference should proceed to as soon as possible. The Conference should most seriously undertake the consideration of the draft agreements submitted to it in 1983 by the Soviet delegation and by the Swedish delegation. The consideration of these drafts would be an opportunity for those delegations which have reservations on some parts thereof to make their counterproposals. The draft convention banning chemical weapons submitted by the United States delegation is proof of such an approach. This is the only way in which a negotiating forum can work.

The Yugoslav delegation has repeatedly pointed out that the prevention of an arms race in outer space has acquired particular urgency. Today we are even more confirmed in our conviction that urgent steps are needed to prevent the process of militarization of outer space from assuming irreversible proportions. The contribution that could be made by the Conference in the consideration of this question through an ad hoc committee, which should be set up as early as possible, is both timely and indispensable. The first task, however, should be to discontinue immediately any existing plans and programmes to militarize outer space. Instead of carrying on discussion on who might or might not be in possession of sophisticated weapons systems in outer space, it is indispensable for the respective Governments to announce publicly and as soon as possible their political decisions not to develop such systems and to assume, as a first step, the obligation not to use the existing ones, if any, under any conditions. A second urgent step immediately following the above decision would be the negotiation and adoption of a verifiable agreement between the Governments concerned on the dismantling or removal of such systems. No protracted negotiations are necessary to achieve the foregoing because what is at stake are the political decisions of Governments to put an immediate stop to the new arms race in outer space, with its unforeseeable consequences for humanity. After this indispensable initial step, the Conference, as an appropriate forum, could undertake the preparation of adequate instruments.

The last contribution during the spring session to the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction was made by the United States delegation through the submission of their text of a draft convention. In our view, this and other proposals considered in the Ad hoc Committee offer a sound basis for the Conference to present already this year in its report to the General Assembly the first agreed provisions of the convention and to finalize it next year. Less than this would be equal to failure of the Conference.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

The Yugoslav delegation is awaiting with interest the renewal of the work of the Ad Hoc Committees on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Radiological Weapons and so-called Negative security assurances. These are the problems to which the Conference gave much attention in the past period, questions on which it has gone beyond the mere identification of problems and positions of individual countries. What remains to be done is the most difficult task -- to translate what has been accomplished into the language of an agreement or the text of a disarmament programme. We believe that any of these subsidiary bodies can go a step further in comparison with their last year's performance. This is particularly true of the Ad Hoc Committees on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and Radiological Weapons. As far as the organization of work of ad hoc committees is concerned, we believe we should be more pragmatic. Taking into account the resolution adopted by the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly concerning radiological weapons, it seems that the first step to be taken by the Conference would be to resolve the situation with regard to the prohibition of radiological weapons per se. In view of the limited number of meetings of the ad hoc committees, we should, in our opinion, try to agree, at this stage, on the text of the agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons, without prejudicing the final positions of States. The next step would be to address all unresolved issues related to the ban on any attack on nuclear installations. Of course, this order of things can be reversed. When this is achieved, and depending on the agreement reached in connection with the relationship between these two conventions, we should either adopt the former or defer its adoption if agreement is achieved on the elaboration of a single instrument.

Regarding negative security assurances, we consider that in conditions of widespread deployment of nuclear weapons on land, in international seas and oceans, it would be illusory to expect anyone to be spared their disastrous effect in case of a nuclear conflict. The only security assurance is to completely eliminate these weapons. Because of their properties as well as evaluations that the use of nuclear weapons could lead to global escalation, the nuclear threat cannot be viewed in isolation. The attempts to adopt a common legally binding formula for effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have failed, among other things, because all non-nuclear-weapon States do not find themselves in the same position. There are different categories of these States, and different legal, political and other considerations which have to be taken into account. Therefore, it might be useful if the Ad Hoc Committee adopted a new approach when it renews its work. If we agree that the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons would be equally dangerous for all, that they would be global, then the solutions for security assurances should be sought on that same global basis. To give a non-nuclear-weapon State security assurances today, in conditions of global deployment of nuclear weapons, against the use of such weapons is a very poor consolation. If used in other parts of the world, let alone in the immediate neighbourhood, the effects of nuclear weapons would be also very drastically felt on the territory of the State which has been given security assurances. It appears that, under the present circumstances, until nuclear weapons are totally eliminated, the only real and politically and morally justifiable security assurances is the prohibition of nuclear weapons. This should be the first necessary step parallel to a joint or unilateral declaration of the nuclear-weapon States that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such declarations have already been made by the Governments of China and the USSR. These steps should then be followed by others, constantly expanding the scope of common security assurances.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

The Yugoslav delegation has on several occasions expressed its views and made concrete proposals in relation to the need for promoting the effectiveness of the Conference. Several other delegations have also put forward useful proposals in that respect. The Conference, as is known, has appointed an informal group of representatives to consider a number of issues whose solution could promote the work of the Conference. We hope that this informal group will, at this session, succeed in preparing proposals which, if adopted by the Conference, could help it to carry its work smoothly, without standstills over the adoption of the agenda, continuity of its work, establishment of the subsidiary working bodies, participation of non-members in the work of the Conference and the preparation of the annual report to the General Assembly. We are confident that this group will discharge its tasks speedily and effectively so that the Conference will be able to take necessary decisions at the end of the current session in order to commence its work next year without any hindrance. My delegation will spare no effort to contribute fully to that end.

And, before concluding, I also wish to extend our welcome to the new representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador R.J. van Schaik, and to assure him that our two delegations will continue in fruitful co-operation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador de la Gorce.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): Madam President, my delegation would like to begin by extending to you its congratulations and its best wishes. We are happy to see you presiding over the resumption of our work and are certain that, under your guidance and that of Ambassador Ikeus, it will proceed under the best possible conditions.

Assurance of this is given by the outstanding qualities displayed by our Swedish colleague, especially at the head of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. The Swedish delegation is pursuing here with the greatest distinction a lofty national tradition to which the French delegation is pleased to pay tribute. Sweden has, indeed, won for itself a leading place in the international community by reason of its participation in co-operative efforts, particularly in the field of disarmament.

Today we open the second part of our annual session. It is the firm hope of the French delegation that it will be marked by progress. First of all in the sphere of chemical disarmament. We are resuming our task with proven methods and on the basis of particularly comprehensive documentation. Our wish is the same as regards radiological weapons, an item on which negotiation must be continued in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee that we have re-established. We also hope that the committee dealing with negative security assurances will be able to resume a task in which we continue to be very keenly interested. Finally, the Conference will have to consider



(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

what is to be done with regard to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, concerning which we have also re-established an ad hoc committee.

Further tasks await us in the days ahead: the resumption of consultations concerning the establishment of subsidiary bodies in relation to other items on our agenda and the definition of their terms of reference. Among those items, there is one to which the French Government attaches major importance, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The French delegation, acting on instructions from its Government, would like today to set out France's views on this matter. It has already referred on several occasions to the problems of the military use of space and last year devoted a working paper, CD/375, dated 14 April 1983, to the subject.

The French delegation has also taken note with the greatest interest of the positions and ideas expressed by other delegations. It remarks the importance and interest which the international community now attaches to this question.

I should now like to explain:

Why my Government feels it necessary to set out today, on the occasion of the resumption of our session, its over-all position on these problems;

What are its concerns in connection both with the aspects relating to the deployment of anti-satellite systems and with the prospects of the development of anti-missile defense systems.

France is worried about the new turn, whether as regards anti-missile systems or as regards anti-satellite devices, that competition for the military use of space is likely to take. Anti-missile systems and anti-satellite devices alike eventually entail serious risks of destabilization because of the scope of the efforts that the USSR or the United States have undertaken or are preparing to undertake. Such a development would naturally have direct implications for France, for her security and for that of Europe. It would also affect the balance of East-West relations and international security. It is therefore of relevance to the entire international community, if only because of its impact upon the prospects for co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of outer space to which France remains deeply attached.

International opinion is justifiably disturbed at such developments, which seem to introduce a new and dangerous dimension into the arms race. It is important to assert that they do not constitute the only possible outcome in this respect and that there is an alternative in the form of negotiations with a view to specific and verifiable results.

If we have chosen to take a stand today in order to express as clearly as possible the conclusions we have reached, it is because there is a consensus that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate multilateral forum. Such an approach naturally does not preclude direct contacts between the United States and the USSR. At the recent ministerial session of the Atlantic Alliance, on 31 May last, France,

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

like its allies — and I quote the communiqués — welcomed "the United States willingness to discuss with the Soviet Union programmes of research on strategic defence".

Whether it be with regard to the limitation of anti-satellite systems or to that of anti-missile systems, we consider that appropriate contacts between those two countries should be encouraged. The question is none the less of concern to all the countries in the world, and the Conference on Disarmament, which is representative of the entire international community, is therefore the appropriate body for its discussion.

I shall now turn to the second point: what are France's thoughts and proposals?

Firstly, the prospect of the development of new anti-ballistic missile technologies is disturbing in several respects.

Deterrence, which has played a vital role in the maintenance of peace in Europe, is based on the maintenance, in the face of an attack, of an assured strike-back capability. The various technological developments notwithstanding, it has so far been possible to maintain such a capacity.

But nowadays France, like the entire international community, is inevitably disturbed at the appearance of new technologies that might jeopardize the stability — and hence the peace — that has so far resulted from the very high degree of invulnerability of the means for nuclear second strikes and from the direct control of those means by the political authorities.

A situation in which each of the two main Powers sought to render its territory totally invulnerable, that is to evade all second strikes — without, incidentally, being at all sure of success in that respect — would be fraught with danger.

On the one hand, the mere announcement of an intention to press ahead with the development of such systems would itself constitute an incitement to the revival of the offensive arms race: each Power would seek to saturate the anti-ballistic missile systems planned by the other and to multiply its non-ballistic delivery vehicles (such as cruise missiles).

Hence, far from promoting the reduction of offensive systems, the prospect of the deployment of new defensive systems is likely to lead to contrary developments.

On the other hand, the devices in question, some of which would be automatic, might, for reasons having to do with the technologies involved, uncontrollably replace political decision-making.

The substantial research programmes in question have so far developed on each side without infringing the provisions of the existing international agreements, notably the United States-Soviet treaty on anti-ballistic missile systems that was concluded in 1972. They are nevertheless of such a kind as to create, henceforth, a momentum that would be contrary to the restoration of strategic balances at the lowest possible level.

That is why the French Government is concerned at the efforts undertaken both by the United States and by the USSR to hasten the development of these new anti-ballistic missile systems.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Secondly, the French Government would like the new and future anti-ballistic technology to be the subject of serious negotiation with a view to reaching agreement on verifiable limits that would come into effect before irreversible developments have occurred.

All the countries of the world have a common interest in seeing the restoration and maintenance of the strategic balance, followed by the reduction of the level of armaments and, therefore, to see the successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations initiated between the United States and the USSR.

That interest is, of course, shared by France, too. My country confirmed last September, before the United Nations General Assembly, the conditions under which it, in its turn, would be able to participate in the efforts to reduce nuclear weapons; it emphasized the vital importance of maintaining a limit on ABM systems.

To return to the past, France paid tribute to the effort and reciprocal limitation that characterized the bilateral United States-Soviet treaty of 1972 on anti-ballistic missile systems, even though that document permits the retention, in each country, of a not inconsiderable capacity for whose modernization it provides.

Further, France, as a party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, is very anxious that it should be observed. But, as the President of the Republic pointed out in his statement to the thirty-eighth United Nations General Assembly, that treaty provides only a partial response to the questions raised by the development of space technologies, since it does not prohibit the permanent stationing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Thirdly, France proposes that all the countries concerned, and first and foremost the United States and the USSR, should engage in a genuine multilateral dialogue with a view to the duly monitored limitation of new anti-ballistic technologies.

In view of the interaction between anti-satellite systems and ABM systems, France believes that it is the resultant whole that should be the subject of thorough examination.

It is already unrealistic even now, and it would not necessarily be desirable, to fix as the objective the complete demilitarization of space. It is, however, desirable and possible to achieve undertakings that would have the following features:

They would be limited, having as their objective the forestalling of destabilizing military developments without affecting the military activities that contribute to strategic stability and those that can be of assistance in the monitoring of disarmament agreements, account being taken of the joint nature of certain civil and military uses of space;

They would be progressive, with a view to limiting as a matter of priority those developments that would be likely to create a state of affairs that would be irreversible because it would not lend itself to subsequent verification;

Finally, they would be verifiable; all States must feel confident of respect for the application of such limitations and none must find itself in a position to

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

benefit from a violation or the evasion of the agreed limits. There is a need to this end for the rapid initiation of an effort at international consultation covering the following points:

- (1) The very strict limitation of anti-satellite systems, including in particular the prohibition of all such systems capable of hitting satellites in high orbit, the preservation of which is the most important from the point of view of strategic balance;
- (2) The prohibition, for a renewable period of five years, of the deployment on the ground, in the atmosphere or in space of beam-weapon systems capable of destroying ballistic missiles or satellites at great distances and, as the corollary to this, the banning of the corresponding tests;
- (3) The strengthening of the present system of declaration as established by the Convention of 14 June 1975 on the registration of space objects, with each State or launching agency undertaking to provide more detailed information on the specifications and purposes of objects launched so as to improve the possibility of verification;
- (4) A pledge by the United States and the USSR to extend to the satellites of third countries the provisions concerning the immunity of certain space objects on which they have reached bilateral agreement between themselves.

The action proposed by the French Government therefore aims to preserve the great prospects for progress held out to the international community by the peaceful use of outer space. It also seeks to preserve in the actual military sphere the observation, communication and monitoring tools that contribute to stability and, as a result, to security and peace.

We cannot resign ourselves to the introduction and proliferation in space of new weapons that would create serious risks of destabilization and would trigger a new and ruinous arms race.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I now give the floor to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Jaipal, who will make a brief statement for the information of the Conference.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): Madam President, I wish to inform the members of the Conference that last month, when the Conference was not in session, we received 75 letters from various persons in the United States of America supporting the United States proposals for banning the production of chemical weapons and also supporting the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary bodies on nuclear test ban, prevention of nuclear war and prevention of an arms race in outer space. These communications are in my office and may be read by interested delegations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference for his statement.

I would now like to turn to another subject. The secretariat has circulated today two working papers. Working Paper 128 contains a draft programme of work for the second part of the 1984 session of the Conference. I do not intend to take up this working paper today, since members would need time to consider it. I would like, however, to say that the draft programme of work follows closely the order of the programme for the first part of the session and I hope we shall quickly reach consensus on it. The allocation of time for the second part of the session, as for the first part, is divided equally among each substantive item, i.e. one working week for each item. I should also note that items are listed in the same order in which they appear in the annual agenda for the present session.

It is hoped that by 10 August, the subsidiary bodies of the Conference will have concluded their work, so that the plenary may then consider their reports. By that time, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events would also have concluded its work and submitted its report to the Conference. The period from 13 to the end of August covers consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies, organizational questions, and consideration and adoption of our annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In grouping together these three topics, it is intended to provide some flexibility in their consideration.

You will also notice that no closing date has been given in the draft programme of work. In accordance with past practice, it is presumed that the Conference will not extend beyond 31 August, and the Conference may be able even to adjourn earlier. The decision on the closing date may be taken nearer the time.

The second Working Paper, No. 129, deals with a draft decision on the request received from Norway, which was circulated in document CD/451. When that request was received, the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons had not been established and, accordingly, the Conference could not extend an invitation to Norway to participate in the Radiological Weapons Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has now been established and will meet next Friday. The Conference may now approve the request made by Norway.

You will recall that at the last plenary meeting of the first part of the session we adopted a time-table for meetings to be held during this week and it was agreed that we would hold an informal meeting on Thursday, 14 June, to consider organizational questions. I intend to convene that informal meeting at 3.30 p.m. on 14 June to consider the draft programme of work and other organizational matters. We could then take up Working Papers 128 and 129. In that connection, may I recall that consultations have been proceeding for some time in contact groups concerning the question of the establishment of additional subsidiary bodies under various items on the agenda. I intend to consult members as to how best to pursue this question further.

As there is no other business, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 14 June, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.



ERRATUM TO CD/PV.263

On page 21 of the English version, paragraph 5 should read as follows:

Further, France, as a party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, is very anxious that it should be observed. But, as the President of the Republic pointed out in his statement to the thirty-eighth United Nations General Assembly, that treaty provides only a partial response to the questions raised by the development of space technologies, since it only prohibits the permanent stationing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.





# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.264  
14 June 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 14 June 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mrs. M.B. Theorin (Sweden)

GE.84-62269

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. ROWE  
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium: Mr. M. DEPASSE  
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. C. PRAMOV  
Mr. N. MIHAILOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U HLA MYINT

Canada: Mr. J.A. BEESLEY  
Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. QIAN JIADONG  
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. LIN CHENG

Cuba: Mr. E. DE LA CRUZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I. HASSAN  
Mr. MARAWAN BADR  
Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. W. KUBICZEK

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI

Mr. I.M. DAMANIK

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Mr. F. QASIM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. KONISHI

Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Mr. K. TANAKA

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. V. FLORES OLEA  
Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Ms. Z. GONZALES Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Mr. L.M. CHABLAIS GARCIA

Mongolia:

Mr. T. ZORIGTBAATAR

Morocco:

Mr. MAHMOUD RMIKI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. VAN SCHAİK  
Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. F.O. ADESHIDA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. M. BICHIR

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIKAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. M.B. THEORIN  
Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. L.E. WINGREN  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BEHDENNIKOV  
Mr. I.V. SCHERBAK

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. D.A. SLINN  
Mr. J.F. GORDON

United States of America:

Mr. L. FIELDS  
Mr. N. CLYNE  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. R. SCOTT  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Ms. M.A. WINSTON

Venezuela:

Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC  
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

At the beginning, allow me to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Víctor Flores Olea, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, who is addressing the Conference today. Ambassador Flores Olea is an experienced diplomat who has also served in other important positions in the Mexican Government. I wish him a successful visit to Geneva.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico, Peru, Italy and the German Democratic Republic.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Flores Olea, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico.

Mr. FLORES OLEA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Madam President, I should like, first of all, to extend to you my congratulations at your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of June. Sweden's firm and traditional support for disarmament, and your own proven dedication to that cause, on which all the peoples of the Earth agree, are today the best augury of the achievement by the Conference of concrete results in the crucial task entrusted to it by the international community.

I would also like to address my congratulations to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, who so skillfully guided the discussions of the Conference during the month of May.

For me, it is an honour to attend this forum for multilateral negotiations on disarmament in order to demonstrate once again the concern of Mexico for the peace and security of nations. The voice of my country has been heard here on many occasions, through the intelligence, erudition and unshakeable will of one of our era's greatest champions of the noble cause of reason and dialogue between States, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles. My words will be but an attempt to reflect the line of thought and the proposals put forward at previous sessions by that illustrious maestro and representative of Mexico.

The Conference on Disarmament undoubtedly incarnates the highest interests of the international community. It is a further honour for me to address distinguished delegates who have devoted their efforts and a considerable part of their lives to the ideal of disarmament.

We are meeting at a time of grave tensions that endanger the stability of the international system. In the sharp confrontation between East and West, there looms once again the spectre of war. Various regional conflicts are undermining peace and are in danger of becoming global confrontations. The present escalation of the arms race is both the cause and the effect of the present-day insecurity.

(Mr. Flores Olea, Mexico)

Since 1962, the international community has created various institutions for debating and negotiating disarmament issues. Paradoxically, this organic effort, to which we have all contributed, has not stopped the arms race, much less channelled the resources now being used to kill towards improving the quality of life.

In the past two decades, we have been preparing a legal framework which, although clearly inadequate, represents appreciable progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and various regional agreements, including, in particular, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, have established the bases for broader future agreements.

However, since 1979, we have been unable to fulfil our mandate to achieve in this forum international treaties or agreements on disarmament. To this paralysis of multilateral negotiations was added, recently, the breakdown of the talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on strategic and intermediate-range weapons. Thus, because of the absence of a political will, the goals established by the international community in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are receding further and further into the distance.

On that occasion, the member States declared that "genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces".

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the present spiralling of the nuclear and conventional arms race is leading to the accumulation of enormous arsenals and promoting the production of more powerful weapons of destruction. Technological development, at the service of an irrational thirst for extermination, has created a generation of more accurate and swifter nuclear weapons that are bringing us to the brink of annihilation. The doctrines that would have us believe in the feasibility of a limited nuclear war increase the possibility of conflict. Today a false alarm can provoke the holocaust.

Today, more than ever, the doctrine of mutual deterrence, based on a balance of terror, makes disarmament difficult and threatens the existing tenuous peace. Fear only breeds distrust and the sterile temptation to speed up the arms race. In view of the present capacity for retaliation, including the lethal range of modern weapons, the outbreak of nuclear war also presupposes the destruction of the aggressor; dialogue and détente constitute the only firm foundation for genuine and lasting security for all States.

In view of the deterioration of the international situation, it is urgently necessary to make a persistent and conscientious effort to banish the danger of the complete destruction of life on this planet. Mexico has always been firmly committed to disarmament. For that reason, on 22 May last, President Miguel de la Madrid, together with the Heads of State of Argentina and Tanzania and the Prime Ministers of Greece, India and Sweden, announced their commitment to "take constructive action towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race". He went on to say that, while it was primarily the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, the "problem is too important to be left to those States alone".

(Mr. Flores Olea, Mexico)

This Declaration -- which has already been reproduced as a document of the Conference on Disarmament -- is aimed at stimulating the political resolve of all States and, through its wide circulation, at calling once more on world public opinion to realize fully the grave threat confronting us. It is, however, not only a question of mobilizing broad sectors, but of supporting the deliberations on disarmament in the various United Nations forums. My country, with the other signatories of that Joint Declaration, has expressed its intention of continuing the consultations necessary to facilitate agreement among the nuclear-weapon States.

In this Conference, we reiterate our call for the Powers to halt the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery systems. That is an essential first step for initiating negotiations leading to a substantial reduction in the existing arsenals.

The road to disarmament has never been easy, but we are certain that the measures we propose would be useful and practicable in the short term, provided there is the necessary will for their adoption. Parity between the two super-Powers should permit the immediate freezing of the existing arsenals. The suspension of nuclear tests would halt the advance of a technology which, with each passing day, is moving closer to the extermination of mankind. It is absurd and contradictory that Man's spectacular dominion over nature should be used for purposes of annihilation, instead of for resolving the immense problems affecting the greater part of the Earth's population.

The measures we suggest must be accompanied by other specific initiatives which Mexico has been advocating for years in this forum. I refer, in the first place, to the desirability of nuclear-weapon States' undertaking unilaterally not to be the first to use those weapons. If the five Powers assumed that obligation, the agreement could be spelt out in an instrument which, through the law, would remove the cause of the present fear.

The Conference cannot remain passive in face of the lack of communication between the two super-Powers. We must create mechanisms appropriate to the multilateral negotiation of concrete disarmament measures. My delegation, therefore, insists on the need to establish suitable subsidiary bodies for the efficient discharge of our mandate. In our view, the formation of an ad hoc Committee to deal with the item relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is particularly important.

The negotiations to prevent the build-up of arsenals destined for outer space deserve special attention. We consider it essential and extremely urgent that preventive action should be taken by this Conference so as to avoid, from the outset, a climate of mounting uncertainty which could defeat all efforts to arrest the arms race in that region.

Resolution 38/70, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, reiterated "that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has a primary role in the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

Recent events compel us, likewise, to accord priority to the conclusion of a treaty that would completely remove the danger of chemical warfare. We are encouraged by the proposals submitted in this connection by the two super-Powers.



(Mr. Flores Olea, Mexico)

We hope that, on the basis of the promising fundamental convergence of views, the relevant ad hoc committee will soon overcome the differences expressed in regard to the means of verifying agreements.

Mexico will relentlessly pursue its efforts to achieve the peace and security of the nations. We are convinced that the arms race blocks off all the roads to development; disarmament is, in consequence, an ineluctable condition for the economic and social welfare of all peoples.

My country considers that, at the regional level, the Latin American disarmament experiment of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be extended to other parts of the world. As pointed out by Mr. Alfonso García Robles, "The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was the spontaneous fruit of the will of the Latin American States, was the first -- and so far remains the only -- instrument whereby it has been possible to establish a regime of the complete absence of nuclear weapons in densely populated territories". We consider that the denuclearization of Central Europe, an area of strategic confrontation, would contribute decisively to the cause of peace.

At the seat of the community of nations, we exhort all States to co-operate unequivocally in efforts to achieve the success of the Third Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This is a fundamental instrument for preventing nuclear war, demanding a fair balance between the obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon States and those of the nuclear Powers. Horizontal non-proliferation is closely linked to a twofold obligation: that of the vertical non-proliferation of those terrible instruments of mass destruction, a concept that is expressly embodied in article VI of the Treaty, which provides for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and that of the promotion, in conformity with the provisions of article IV, of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in order to help meet the needs of the developing world.

The future of disarmament depends in large measure on an understanding between the great Powers. We would repeat, therefore, the universal call to the United States and the Soviet Union to renew, on mutually acceptable bases, their negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range weapons. Mexico is aware of the bilateral nature of that dialogue but, in a constructive spirit, once again proposes that such talks should be merged in a single forum and include what are called the tactical weapons as well.

We also reaffirm my country's decision to do its utmost to promote multilateral disarmament negotiations. In them, the interests of the international community as a whole are duly considered. This Conference has the fundamental responsibility of achieving legal agreements that will check the march towards self-destruction. The peoples of the world today are imperiously demanding that we ensure the survival of humanity and remove forever the threat of nuclear war.

Disarmament is the vital concern of all nations. We are confident that negotiation and the resources of the human mind are bound to prevail over the rule of force. Human beings can create a world free from the spectre of annihilation. Faced with the choice between war and peace, the community of nations must choose without hesitation the path dictated by reason.

President Miguel de la Madrid, speaking before the United States Congress on 16 May last, declared:

"The talks that may lead to a significant reduction in nuclear arsenals and, ultimately, to their complete destruction must be resumed without delay. The great Powers have an inescapable duty to guarantee the continuity of history and to co-operate in the task of eliminating the distressing consequences of backwardness and deprivation".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Mr. Castillo Ramírez.

Mr. CASTILLO RAMIREZ (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Madam President, permit me first to express the particular satisfaction of the delegation of Peru at having you as President of this forum at the beginning of the second part of the 1984 session, for Sweden has distinguished itself by its valuable and continuous contributions to disarmament. We wish you every success and can assure you that our delegation stands fully ready to co-operate with you in what we know will be your unflagging efforts to further the objectives of this Conference.

I should also like, through you, to extend the warmest welcome to Licenciado Víctor Flores Olea, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, to whom my delegation wishes to express its sincerest congratulations for his statement to this plenary, in which he expressed ideas that merit our closest consideration.

Today, the distinguished representative of Mexico informed this Conference of the important Declaration issued on 22 May last by Licenciado Hurtado de la Madrid, President of Mexico, together with Dr. Raúl Alfonsín, President of Argentina, Mr. Andreas Papandreu, Prime Minister of Greece, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, Mr. Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden and Mr. Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, in which they call upon the major nuclear Powers to halt and reverse the arms race.

In this connection, I should like to read the substantive portion of the communication which Dr. Sandro Mariátegui, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, addressed on 31 May last to Licenciado Bernardo Sepúlveda, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, offering the fullest support of the Peruvian Government for this important peace initiative:

"Whether in the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament or other international forums, Peru has constantly expressed its serious concern at the growing tension in the world and at the serious threat posed by nuclear weapons, which, in an extravagance of expenditure and sophistication, are daily being multiplied and refined, draining resources that could very well be directed to meeting the pressing needs of mankind.

"Aware of the need for an effort on the part of the entire international community to ward off the latent danger of nuclear war, my country has fully assumed its responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

"It therefore considers as extremely important the call that has just been made, urging the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, to be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces.

"The danger of a nuclear war, which would affect the entire human race, makes it essential to co-ordinate action to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race -- action that requires a radical change of attitude.

(Mr. Castillo Ramirez, Peru)

"In this spirit, I am happy to express to Your Excellency, on behalf of the Government of Peru, the fullest possible support for the initiative taken in the declaration which Your Excellency transmitted to me."

It is logical that the call by the six Heads of States or Government from various regions of the world should begin by urging the five nuclear Powers to halt all types of nuclear weapon tests, for that is unquestionably the most significant and important concrete measure to be taken to reinforce and universalize the nuclear non-proliferation regime since it would prevent the perfecting and manufacture of new weapons.

The latest statistics from institutions in which we have every confidence have confirmed the incessant increase in nuclear testing and that is why there is an urgent need to reach agreement in this unique multilateral negotiating forum on a treaty that will indeed prohibit all types of nuclear-weapon tests.

This forum must, therefore, begin, once and for all, concrete negotiations in that respect, to which end the nuclear-weapon States should give a clear undertaking to reach agreement as a matter of urgency and, if possible, within a specified time-limit, on a treaty banning nuclear tests.

For that treaty to be effective, all the nuclear Powers would have to be the first to accede to it, an act by which they would demonstrate their faithful compliance with the obligations assumed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty; they should be followed by the non-nuclear-weapon States that are not parties to the NPT, particularly those among them that are on the point of acquiring -- if they have not already acquired -- a nuclear capacity; to that would be added the accession of the non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT.

As indicated in the appeal by the Heads of State or Government, the cessation of nuclear testing should be paralleled by the suspension of the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; inconceivable though that may seem, nuclear weapons now exceed the destructive capacity of the universe. These vital steps in favour of disarmament must be followed immediately by the substantial reduction of nuclear forces and, thereafter, by the pursuit of an uninterrupted programme of arms reductions until such time as general and complete disarmament has been achieved.

The appeal by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, to which my Government has given its fullest and firmest support, was made in view of the necessity of demanding of the nuclear Powers that they should take account of their solemn responsibility pursuant to the obligations placed upon them by the treaties now in force, particularly the NPT, to conduct negotiations in good faith in order to make a reality of cessation of the arms race and of nuclear disarmament. It is now for the great Powers, especially the nuclear Powers to give evidence of that good faith and to prove to us the credibility of their resounding declarations.

I would not wish to end this statement without emphasizing the words of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who has described the peace initiative by the six Heads of State or Government as a significant contribution to the reduction of the danger of nuclear war because the nuclear arms race is one of the most pressing aspects of present day international relations. We entirely agree with that view.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to my country.

I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Alessi.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Madam, I should like first of all to congratulate you on your accession to the lofty and responsible post of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of June. You are the worthy representative of a country that is justly the object of very high esteem in the international community for the major contribution it has made to the cause of disarmament. I am convinced that, under your guidance, the Conference will set to work very soon and I wish you every success.

I also want to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor Ambassador Dhanapala, for his praiseworthy and persistent efforts during the month of April to advance our work.

Permit me also to associate myself with your expression of welcome to His Excellency Mr. Flores Olea, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, from whom we have heard this morning a statement of the greatest interest.

I also wish to extend a very warm welcome to the new representative of a friendly country, Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands, and to offer my best wishes for his mission in Geneva.

The atmosphere in which the Conference on Disarmament is resuming its work is scarcely encouraging. The negative factors which have stood in the way of an improvement in the international situation are unfortunately still present. They are to be found not only in the mistrust which, today, dominates the international scene, but deeper than that, in the causes underlying that mistrust: uncertainty about the other side's intentions and motives, continuing serious violations of fundamental principles of international law.

For our part, however, we do not believe that the way of dialogue is blocked. The offer of an unconditional resumption of the Geneva nuclear talks put forward many times by the countries of the Atlantic Alliance to the Soviet Union is still valid. It was reiterated once again in the Washington declaration on East-West relations adopted at ministerial level by the NATO Council on 31 May last.

It is the Italian Government's earnest hope that the leaders of the Soviet Union will not wish to persist in their refusal and that they will return to the negotiating table. We care to see in some of the remarks contained in the declaration issued by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest on 20 April 1984 positive signs that may, we hope, lead to more tangible developments. As Mr. Andreotti, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, said on 16 May following his visit to Budapest and Moscow, "the most urgent task", while waiting for the conditions for such resumption to mature, "is to work towards a substantial improvement in the climate of East-West relations".

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The very fact of the the absence of bilateral dialogue increases the responsibility of multilateral forums, both as regards the pursuit of the specific objectives laid down by their mandates and as regards the maintenance of a channel of communication between super-Powers on questions of security and disarmament. Here I should like to recall that both in Stockholm and in Vienna the western countries have put forward specific proposals designed to advance the negotiations.

The responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament, distinguished as it is by its universal nature, are also increased, and significantly so. We must take cognizance of this fact and try to see, with realism and determination, which of the items on our agenda offer genuine prospects of progress. This will mean disposing rapidly of organizational and procedural problems so as to make thorough use of this multilateral body's full potential and to ensure that our work does not suffer too much from the deadlock to which some disarmament sectors are condemned today.

The Italian delegation is convinced that in the field of prevention of nuclear war, with all the issues pertaining thereto, the Conference on Disarmament can and must enter henceforward upon an operational stage without dwelling any further on questions of the drafting of the mandate of an ad hoc committee. The terms employed in a mandate will not, after all, alter certain basic facts. The first of those facts is the unanimity of views as to the importance of the topic and the need to give it thorough study; the second is that the variety of the proposals which have been submitted makes it essential to set aside a preliminary stage for discussion and the identification of those among them that can lend themselves to negotiation. We all know that some of those proposals will not command the necessary consensus.

In our view, work on this agenda item should be conducted from the point of view of problems of international security in the nuclear age. It is from that angle that we consider the prevention of nuclear war as an aspect of the prevention of all war and, consequently, relate it to the obligation not to resort to the use -- or the threat of use -- of force. The principle of non-use of force is a universal one to which all countries Members of the United Nations have subscribed by acceding to the Charter; all efforts aimed at establishing confidence between States, increasing security, improving mechanisms for dealing with crises, averting the risk of nuclear war due to accident or error, pursuing a more stable strategic balance at the lowest level of armament and ensuring the verification and observance of all past and future disarmament agreements should lead towards strengthening the universal respect and application of this principle.

The Italian Government has already had occasion to express publicly its interest in all proposals that seriously and specifically aim at this goal. In this context it has stressed the timeliness of agreeing to the holding of a debate in the appropriate forum on a declaration of non-use of force. President Reagan's speech before the Irish Parliament has opened new perspectives in that connection and may offer the preconditions for a resumption of the East-West dialogue.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

In the same context, I should like to recall that, in the Washington declaration I have already mentioned, the countries of the Atlantic Alliance solemnly reaffirmed that none of their weapons will ever be used unless it be in response to an armed attack.

The Italian Government regards the nuclear non-proliferation regime as one of the pillars on which international security and the prevention of nuclear conflicts rest today.

In view of the approaching date of the Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, special importance must be attached to the effort our Governments will make to achieve progress on those items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament that are more or less directly connected with the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. Besides the item on prevention of nuclear war, that unquestionably includes the items on guarantees for non-nuclear States and on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

With regard to the latter topic, my delegation would have no difficulty in accepting for the subsidiary body broader terms of reference embracing, in addition to the issues of verification and implementation, the problems relating to the scope of a future nuclear test ban treaty.

My delegation must, however, deplore the fact that the ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda has not been re-established, owing to the inadequacy of the previous mandate. While working upon the review of the mandate desired by a large number of delegations, we could have avoided, and still can avoid completely sterilizing the debate on this priority topic and presenting the NPT Review Conference with a negative balance at even the procedural level.

In that connection, we listened with the keenest interest to the proposal advanced at our meeting of 12 June by Mr. Shintaro Abe, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, for a gradual and realistic approach to the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. We think this proposal deserves the most serious attention and believe that it could open up new perspectives for our work.

In the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, some progress was achieved during the spring session, particularly in the drafting of certain key definitions. Progress should also be possible in the field of the elimination of stockpiles and of their verification. Most of us have just returned from Munster, where the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany organized, admirably, a seminar on these issues. I wish warmly to congratulate Ambassador Wegener and, through him, his authorities on the success of that initiative. I was, unfortunately, unable to participate personally in the seminar, but I know that it fully achieved its objective: consequently, far from being an academic exercise, it represents a part of the negotiating process and will, I am sure, prove a positive contribution to its progress.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Just before the end of the spring session, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee submitted to us document CD/CW/WP.81 containing compromise proposals drafted in the form of treaty articles. My delegation supports that initiative by Ambassador Ekéus. At the present stage, the impulse-giving and mediating role of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee may prove of capital importance. Document WP.81 recognizes that no thorough consideration has been given to the structure of the future convention. We think that this question, as well as that of the procedure to be followed in embarking upon the drafting of the convention, should be tackled forthwith. Working paper CD/435 submitted by a group of socialist countries contains useful suggestions in that respect.

The negotiations which will be held during the summer session will have the benefit of the draft treaty that the Vice-President of the United States presented to the Conference on 18 April last. This draft contains a coherent set of provisions regulating all aspects, down to the smallest details, of the highly complex problems of a universal and global prohibition of chemical weapons. It therefore takes the negotiations a stage further. It is, so far, principally the provisions on verification that have been the subject of preliminary reactions.

It has to be recognized that the production of chemical weapons is intimately linked with production for peaceful ends in civil industry. For the monitoring of the non-manufacture of chemical weapons to be effective, States parties to the convention must accept international inspection.

The problem of possible clandestine stockpiling and that of possible clandestine production exist and are formidable indeed; the United States draft treaty supplies a courageous and efficient answer to them. That answer compels us to think seriously, since it represents not only a technical solution but also, above all, a new approach to inter-State relations in the security field.

In his statement on 26 April last, Ambassador Fields furnished important explanations, stating that the "open invitation" approach was not intended to impose a heavier burden on some States than on others. We hope that this clarification, which indicates that the "open invitation" approach is to be applied fairly to differing economic and political systems will be rightly understood. It bears witness to the readiness of the draft's authors to negotiate in a constructive spirit.

Chemical weapons remain weapons of fearful efficiency. The use made of them in the conflict between Iran and Iraq and, probably, in other parts of the world as well, has surprised and aroused public opinion. The specialized press recently reported the testing of new missiles specially designed to carry chemical charges. This shows once again to what an extent chemical weapons remain an important element in General Staff plans and in the qualitative development of military arsenals.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Before acceding to a convention prohibiting chemical weapons for all time, each State will wish above all to make sure that the convention will be strictly respected by all parties.

With the exception of chemical weapons, the other matters appearing in our programme of work still await substantive consideration. The appointment of so experienced a colleague as Ambassador Vejvoda to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons ensures that a fresh impulse will be given to negotiations on that subject. A convention prohibiting radiological weapons would, in the present poor international climate, have a political significance well above its intrinsic value. A success in this field would testify to a revival of confidence.

Agreement on agenda item 5 is possible, as we all know. All that is needed is to want it. By comparison with last April, I see at least two new reasons which should induce us to try to reach a positive conclusion to our consultations and to establish an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. First, there is the session of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which is taking place in Vienna at this very time. Owing to a confusion as to competence that we consider deplorable, the question of what is termed the "militarization" of outer space appears as the first item on the agenda for that session. It must be admitted that the lack of any progress in the Conference on Disarmament, the appropriate forum for discussing matters of this kind, is obviously conducive to such regrettable dispersion of effort.

The second reason is the contents of the report to the United States Congress on United States space policy which was distributed to us on 12 April last. I am sure that all delegations found that document as instructive and interesting to read as did my own. It is a document of a global and detailed nature which tackles frankly the salient aspects of the military uses of outer space. It explains, inter alia, the factors which, in the view of the authorities in Washington, stand in the way of the identification of effective measures that could be negotiated at once. Differing opinions are, of course, possible, but they ought to be expressed with a comparable degree of precision. If a discussion of that kind took place within the framework of an ad hoc committee with a general mandate of an exploratory nature, we would be able to perform the important background work that is required. By doing so we would accomplish the first step which, at this stage, can only be the identification of the questions connected with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. A whole session would not suffice for an in-depth discussion of all the issues raised by the report I have mentioned.

The penultimate chapter of this report contains a preliminary evaluation of initiatives taken by the Soviet Union with regard to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. If, within the framework of an ad hoc committee, the Soviet delegation could reply to the comments made in the report, we could do the work which the distinguished representative of India eloquently requested on 26 April last.

Furthermore, some detailed views on the subject were put forward by our distinguished French colleague, Ambassador de La Gorce, on behalf of his Government at our last meeting. They deserve our full attention.



(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

In these circumstances, insistence on the insertion of one word rather than another in a mandate becomes incomprehensible. If it is desired to reach agreements, there is only one way of going about it: engaging in a dialogue. My delegation takes the liberty of appealing once more to the reason and moderation of all so that such a dialogue may commence in this crucial field.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to my country.

I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Madam, it gives me particular pleasure to congratulate you on the assumption of the Presidency of this Conference for the month of June. We are convinced that your dedication and skilful diplomacy will enable the Conference to have a good start of the second part of its 1984 session. The excellent record of your country in disarmament negotiations, especially in the CD, is well known. The German Democratic Republic and Sweden enjoy close good neighbourly relations which, we are sure, will be further strengthened by the forthcoming visit of Premier Olof Palme to my country at the end of June. I should also like to take this opportunity to convey to your predecessor, Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, my thanks and appreciation for the manner in which he carried out his tasks as President of the Conference for the month of April. And let me also welcome in our midst a new Ambassador for the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik; we wish him much success.

At the end of the spring session, the Conference on Disarmament was said to have got into a crisis. This is unfortunately no exaggeration, but a sober characterization of the situation. How else to describe a situation such that already for several years no substantial results have been achieved?

Moreover, negotiations on priority questions of the agenda, which today move all mankind, have not yet started.

A turning-point in the activity of the conference is imperative. To this goal our efforts should be even more persistently directed at achieving tangible progress at this summer-session.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic will do its utmost to reach this. This corresponds to the principles of the foreign policy which my country has been pursuing since its hour of birth 35 years ago.

The special geographic situation and the historic pledge to ensure that never again a war starts from German soil particularly determine our commitment to peace and security.

However, the conditions for the activities of this conference have in no way improved over the last few months. Nothing indicates the readiness of the United States Administration to change its adventurous course of confrontation and massive arms build-up and to keep an honest balance in the interest of the cessation of the arms race.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

As was to be expected, the deployment of the new nuclear first-strike weapons in some countries of western Europe has proved to be an especially heavy blow against European and global security. The international trust based on the principle of equality and equal security and particularly the relations between the USSR and the United States, which are decisive for world peace, have been heavily undermined.

Nobody could seriously think that the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty would accept this attempt at the destruction of the military balance and the acute threat to their security. All those who believed in the promises from overseas should have known that the socialist States could not be blackmailed.

In order to resume negotiations worthy of the name, logically their basis must be restored. That means a stop to any further deployment of nuclear medium-range weapons and the return of those already deployed to their country of origin. The sooner, the better. It has been proved: more weapons do not mean more security to anybody. On the contrary, the danger of a nuclear war, which could start in Europe and which would bring down death and destruction upon the peoples, is growing.

Together with the other socialist States, the German Democratic Republic is determined to make every effort to strengthen peace and security.

When talking about the unfavourable conditions for our conference, we also have in mind the recent NATO meeting in Washington.

Instead of a positive reaction towards the constructive proposals made in 1983 and this year by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty in Prague, Moscow and Budapest, the final communiqué of that NATO meeting reaffirmed the so-called policy of strength and the continuation of a massive arms build-up. We are also looking in vain for proposals which could constitute concrete points of departure for solving the tasks of this Conference.

The same applies to the recent London Summit of Western countries. For instance, no attention was paid to the devastating consequences of the arms race to economic and social development. This arms race is shaking the international economic life more and more. The close connection between financing the huge arms expenditure of the United States, the high interest rates and the growing debts of the developing countries is obvious. Once again the poor fill the pockets of the armaments monopolies. From whatever angle you might consider the consequences of this arms mania, they are a heavy burden on the peoples and increasingly endanger their very existence. This but underlines the necessity to consistently use all possibilities of this disarmament conference.

For this summer session, my delegation reaffirms that we regard measures aiming at the prevention of a nuclear war as the task of highest priority. There is no sensible reason to further postpone the consideration and elaboration of these measures in a committee.

As to the contents, we would again like to refer to the working paper CD/484, which was introduced by my delegation on behalf of a group of socialist countries. We repeat our readiness to talk about any other relevant proposals. The urgency of this matter has only recently been underlined in the Joint Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of India, Mexico, Tanzania, Greece, Argentina and

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Sweden and which was explained so convincingly just a few minutes ago by His Excellency Mr. Flores Olea, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico. In this Declaration, the propaganda according to which the probability of nuclear war has diminished has been rightly rejected. It states, inter alia, that "The probability of nuclear holocaust increases as warning time decreases and the weapons become swifter, more accurate and more deadly. The rush towards global suicide must be stopped and then reversed."

The strong appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to stop the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and to start with their reduction has found a broad, positive response in my country and we hope that it will also stimulate the activities of this Conference.

The start of negotiations aiming at a treaty on the complete stop of nuclear weapon testing is overdue. In the past two years, my delegation, as well as many other delegations, has taken part in the discussions on the basis of a limited mandate despite considerable doubt.

These concessions have in no way been reciprocated. On the contrary. The opponents of negotiations obviously intend to continue this useless exercise and may even maintain in the end that the Conference seriously deals with this matter.

We therefore insist on a negotiating mandate for the committee which will have to be established. Now it is up to those who have so far prevented any progress to show the necessary readiness to come to an understanding.

In view of the unrestrained territorial extension of the arms race by the United States Administration, the worries concerning the fate of outer space have been growing. My delegation dealt with that matter in the plenary during the spring session. Today we would just like to refer to the fact that the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, with only one vote against, adopted resolution 38/70 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and demanded negotiations on a corresponding treaty with high priority. Time is pressing, much is at stake. The militarization of space would not only mean a quantitative increase of highly sophisticated weapon systems, but it would also undermine existing treaties and generally impede the verification of any future agreements on disarmament. In this way, the arms race would get completely out of control.

Our Conference should immediately set about the elaboration of an agreement. The draft treaty of the Soviet Union, to which the aforementioned resolution 38/70 refers, constitutes a solid basis. This draft does not only identify the relevant matters, but it also offers suggestions for their solution.

Talking about the territorial dimension of the arms race, and in this connection my delegation will study very carefully the interesting ideas which were outlined last Tuesday by Ambassador de La Gorce of France, one must not leave out of account the growing use of the seas and oceans for military purposes. Their misuse for imperialist expansion of power, especially by deploying nuclear weapons and by gun-boat diplomacy have considerably increased.

Connected with that are assaults on sovereign States. New conflicts are kindled and those already existing are aggravated. The recent decision of the International Court of Justice against well-known military activities in Central America proves that the militarization of the seas and oceans is closely

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

linked with mounting violation of the basic principles of international law. Consequently, agreements on the reduction of military activities on seas and oceans are imperative. Therefore the German Democratic Republic supports the Bulgarian motion to the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss this matter as a separate item of the agenda.

My delegation is going to address this Conference concerning the single items of the agenda, in particular in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons. We consider it feasible that, with a serious and reasonable approach of all sides, progress could be reached. The chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, by Working Paper 81 supplied a good foundation for further negotiations.

Before concluding, allow me, Madam President, to make a remark as to the procedural aspect of our work. As it was not possible to reach agreement on establishing a number of subsidiary bodies and their mandates during the spring session, we are faced with that task again. The controversies do not concern matters of procedure in its proper sense. They much more reflect the contradictory positions towards the substance itself. We reject all attempts to hold responsible for lacking results those delegations which only demand what was decided on by consensus in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and what the agenda of our Conference calls for. Once again my delegation wants to state clearly: those States which refuse negotiations about the most important items of the agenda violate their obligations under international law.

They are pushing this Conference even more into a stalemate. The simple truth remains: those who really want our Conference to fulfil its proper function, namely the elaboration of agreements on reduction of armament and for disarmament, must be ready for negotiations. This readiness for negotiations is a crucial criterion for the attitude of the States towards the basic questions of our time.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to my country.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

The secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing a time-table for meetings of the conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The time-table has been prepared in consultation with the chairman of the ad hoc committees of the Conference. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the informal paper.

It was so decided.

I intend now to suspend this plenary meeting and resume it in the afternoon at the end of our scheduled informal meeting, so that we may adopt formally certain decisions on organizational matters. If there is no objection, that procedure will be followed.

It was so decided.

(The President)

The informal meeting will begin this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. to consider the draft programme of work and other organizational questions. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.05 p.m. and reconvened at 4.40 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I wish now to put before the Conference for decision Working Paper 128, as amended. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts its programme of work for the second part of the session.

It was so decided.

May I now turn to Working Paper 129, 1/ containing a request from Norway to participate in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. I presume that there is no objection. If this is the case, the request is accepted.

It was so decided.

As there is no further business for today, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 19 June at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

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1/ In response to the request from Norway (CD/451) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1984 in the subsidiary body established under item 7 of its agenda.

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