

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX II

VOLUME IV

List and text of documents issued by the Conference on Disarmament

LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE ITEMS ON THE AGENDA OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING DOCUMENTS OF THE
EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (ENDC: 1962-1969);
THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD: 1969-1978);
THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT AND THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
(CD: 1979-1984)

Table of Contents

<u>Agenda item</u>	<u>Pages</u>
1. Nuclear test ban	2 - 23
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	24 - 41
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters	42 - 44
4. Chemical weapons	45 - 84
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space	85 - 87
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear- weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	88 - 95
7. New weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons	96 - 110
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament	111 - 127

Note

The lists compiled under each agenda item contain: (1) documents presented to plenary meetings; (2) working papers and conference room papers presented to subsidiary bodies; and (3) papers presented at technical consultations.

The lists are not exhaustive. Their purpose is to assist delegations by providing them with background information and reference material. They contain proposals and views presented by delegations or groups of delegations in the negotiating body of relevance to the items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

This is offered by the Secretariat of the Conference in the hope that it might serve a useful purpose.

1. Nuclear Test Ban 1/

I. CONFERENCE OF THE ~~EIGHTEEN~~-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (ENDC)

- | | | | |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. ENDC/9 | United Kingdom/
United States | Draft Treaty on the
Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests dated
18 April 1961 | 21/III/1962 |
| 2. ENDC/11 | USSR | Statement by the Soviet
Government, dated
27 November 1961, in
connection with the resumption
of negotiations on the
discontinuance of nuclear
weapon tests and text of a
draft agreement on the
discontinuance of nuclear
and thermonuclear weapon tests | 22/III/1962 |
| 3. ENDC/28 | Brazil, Burma,
Ethiopia, India,
Mexico, Nigeria,
Sweden, United
Arab Republic | Joint Memorandum on the
question of the cessation of
nuclear weapon tests | 16/IV/1962 |
| 4. ENDC/29 | United States | Questions submitted by the
Delegation of the
United States with respect to
the Eight Power Joint
Memorandum (ENDC/28) | 17/IV/1962 |
| 5. ENDC/32 | USSR | Statement by the Soviet
Government dated 19 April 1962
(on the Eight Power Joint
Memorandum ENDC/28) | 19/IV/1962 |
| 6. ENDC/58 | United Kingdom/
United States | Draft Treaty banning nuclear
weapon tests in all
environments | 27/VIII/1962 |
| 7. ENDC/59 | United Kingdom/
United States | Draft Treaty banning nuclear
weapon tests in the
atmosphere, outer space, and
under water | 27/VIII/1962 |
| 8. ENDC/68 | | Report to the General Assembly
of the United Nations with
regard to the cessation of
nuclear weapon tests | 7/XII/1962 |

1/ The documents of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events have been listed under this item for practical reasons and because of their relevance to the item. However, it is understood that the mandate and terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Group were established independently of any agenda item.

- | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 9. | ENDC/73
and Corr.1 | USSR | Letters dated
19 December 1962 and
7 January 1963 from the
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR,
addressed to the President of
the United States, on the
question of on-site
inspection and the establishment
of automatic seismological
stations | 22/I/1963 |
| 10. | ENDC/74 | United States | Letter dated
28 December 1962 from the
President of the United States
of America to the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of
the USSR on the question of
on-site inspection and unmanned
seismic stations. | 23/I/1963 |
| 11. | ENDC/78 | United Kingdom/
United States | Memorandum of position
concerning the cessation of
nuclear weapon tests | 1/IV/1963 |
| 12. | ENDC/94 | Ethiopia, Nigeria,
United Arab
Republic | Joint Memorandum on the
question of the cessation
of nuclear weapon tests | 10/VI/1963 |
| 13. | ENDC/96 | Secretariat | Working Paper containing a
synopsis of suggestions by
the non-aligned members of
the Eighteen-Nation Committee
concerning a Treaty on the
Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests, 12 February-
10 June 1963 (Prepared by
the Secretariat and
circulated at the request of
the delegation of Sweden) | 19/VI/1963 |
| 14. | ENDC/99 | Mexico | Suggestion made by
Ambassador Padilla Nervo on
30 November 1962 at the
85th Plenary Meeting of the
Conference concerning an
interim arrangement
suspending all underground
tests <u>2/</u> | 2/VII/1963 |

2/ This suggestion should be read along with and in the context of the suggestion of Mexico made on 15 March 1963, and contained in the Synopsis of Suggestions by the Non-Aligned Members of 19 June 1963, under the heading "Interim Arrangement" (ENDC/96).

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 15. | ENDC/100/
Rev.1 | USSR | Treaty banning nuclear
weapon tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space
and under water | 30/VII/1963 |
| 16. | ENDC/145 | Brazil, Burma,
Ethiopia, India,
Mexico, Nigeria,
Sweden, United
Arab Republic | Joint Memorandum in
connection with the Treaty
banning nuclear weapon tests
in the atmosphere in outer
space and under water | 14/IX/1964 |
| 17. | ENDC/154 | Sweden | Memorandum on international
co-operation for the
detection of underground
nuclear explosions | 2/IX/1965 |
| 18. | ENDC/155 | United Kingdom | Notes on United Kingdom
research on techniques for
distinguishing between
earthquakes and underground
explosions | 9/IX/1965 |
| 19. | ENDC/159 | Brazil, Burma,
Ethiopia, India,
Mexico, Nigeria,
Sweden, United
Arab Republic | Joint memorandum on a
comprehensive test-ban
treaty | 15/IX/1965 |
| 20. | - ENDC/177 | Brazil, Burma,
Ethiopia, India,
Mexico, Nigeria,
Sweden, United
Arab Republic | Joint memorandum on a
comprehensive test-ban
treaty | 17/VIII/1966 |
| 21. | ENDC/182 | United States | Working paper on
determination of the location
of seismic events | 23/VIII/1966 |
| 22. | ENDC/191 | Sweden | Memorandum on the control
of an underground test-ban
treaty | 19/VII/1967 |
| 23. | ENDC/230 | Sweden | Letter dated 29 July 1968
from the representative of
Sweden to the Special
Representative of the
Secretary-General of the
United Nations concerning
seismic methods for monitoring
underground explosions | 29/VII/1968 |

24.	ENDC/232	United Kingdom	Working paper on the comprehensive test-ban treaty	20/VIII/1968
25.	ENDC/234	Italy	Working paper on underground nuclear explosions <u>3/</u>	23/VIII/1968
26.	ENDC/235	Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic	Joint Memorandum on a comprehensive test-ban treaty	26/VIII/1968
27.	ENDC/242	Sweden	Working paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests <u>4/</u>	1/IV/1969
28.	ENDC/244	Canada	Working paper listing recent Canadian scientific papers concerning the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means	17/IV/1969
29.	ENDC/246	Nigeria	Working paper on the comprehensive test-ban treaty	15/V/1969
30.	ENDC/248	Canada	Working paper listing recent Canadian scientific papers on seismological research with abstracts now available	21/V/1969
31.	ENDC/250	Italy	Additional suggestions on underground nuclear explosions, following the Italian working paper (ENDC/234) of August 1968	22/V/1969

3/ See also document ENDC/250, below.

4/ See also document CD/348, below.

32.	ENDC/251/ Rev.1	Canada	Revised working paper on requests to Governments for information about exchange of seismological data	18/VIII/1969
33.	ENDC/252	United States	Working paper on seismic investigation proposal	23/V/1969
34.	ENDC/257	Sweden	Working paper describing the Hagfors Seismological Observatory in Sweden	14/VIII/1969
35.	ENDC/258	United Kingdom	Further notes on United Kingdom research of techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions	14/VIII/1969
36.	ENDC/259	Canada	Remarks by G. Ignatieff, Representative of Canada at Informal Meeting on CTB, Wednesday, 13 August 1969	14/VIII/1969
37.	ENDC/260	Japan	Statement by Ambassador K. Asakai at the informal meeting of ENDC on 13 August 1969	14/VIII/1969
38.	ENDC/261	India	Statement by Ambassador M.A. Husain at the Informal Meeting of the ENDC held on 13 August 1969 to consider the question of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban	14/VIII/1969
39.	ENDC/262	United States	Remarks by Ambassador James Leonard on seismic data exchange and the Canadian Working Paper (ENDC/251) at informal meeting on 13 August 1969	14/VIII/1969

II. CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)

40.	CCD/296	United Kingdom	Working paper on verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty	28/VII/1970
41.	CCD/298	United States	Working paper introducing "Seismic data from Rulison"	4/VIII/1970
42.	CCD/305	Canada	Working paper on seismological capabilities in detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions	10/VIII/1970
43.	CCD/306	Sweden	Technical working paper on a comparison of two systems for verification of a comprehensive test ban	12/VIII/1970

44.	CCD/323	Netherlands	Working paper concerning seismic detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions	18/III/1971
45.	CCD/327 and Add.1	Canada	Working paper on the seismological detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions	29/VI/1981
46.	CCD/329	Sweden	Working paper on seismological verification of a ban on underground nuclear weapons tests	29/VI/1971
47.	CCD/330	United States	Working paper containing remarks of Dr. Stephen Lukasik, Director of the US Advanced Research Projects Agency, regarding research on seismic detection, location and identification of earthquakes and explosions, presented at Informal Meeting on 30 June 1971	30/VI/1971
48.	CCD/331	Italy	Working paper on the problem of underground nuclear explosions	1/VII/1971
49.	CCD/336	Canada	Working paper on possible progress towards the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	22/VII/1971
50.	CCD/340	Pakistan	Working paper suggesting some provision of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests	12/VIII/1971
51.	CCD/345	Japan	Working paper containing remarks of Dr. Shigeji Suyehiro, the Japan Meteorological Agency, concerning the usefulness of the employment of ocean-bottom seismographs and a universally acceptable means of determining the magnitude of seismic events, presented at the Informal Meeting on 30 June 1971	24/VIII/1971
52.	CCD/348	Sweden	Working paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a Treaty Banning Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (revised version of the Swedish working paper ENDC/242 of 1 April 1969)	21/IX/1971
53.	CCD/349	Netherlands	Working paper on the seismicity of the USA, the USSR and China	7/IX/1971

- | | | | | |
|-----|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 54. | CCD/351 | United Kingdom | Working paper containing comments on the Canadian study of the seismological identification of underground nuclear explosions (CCD/327) and on its implication for the expanded seismicity system outlined in the United Kingdom working paper CCD/296 | 23/IX/1971 |
| 55. | CCD/354 | Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, Yugoslavia | Joint memorandum on a comprehensive test-ban treaty | 30/IX/1971 |
| 56. | CCD/363/
Rev.1 | United Kingdom | Working paper on seismic yields of underground explosions - estimating yields of underground explosions from amplitudes of seismic signals | 25/IX/1972 |
| 57. | CCD/364 | Australia, New Zealand | Letter dated 20 June from the Permanent Representatives of Australia and of New Zealand to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a message from the Prime Ministers of Australia and of New Zealand to the Co-Chairmen concerning the imminent series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific | 20/VI/1972 |
| 58. | CCD/370 | Peru | Letter dated 14 June 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Peru to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the series of tests in the atmosphere with nuclear weapons in the Pacific | 20/VII/1972 |
| 59. | CCD/376 | Canada, Japan, Sweden | Working paper on measures to improve tripartite co-operation among Canada, Japan and Sweden in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means | 20/VII/1972 |
| 60. | CCD/378 | Canada | Working paper containing bibliography of Department of Energy, Mines and Resources papers relevant to seismological verification problems | 25/VII/1972 |

61.	CCD/379	Sweden	List of publications bearing on seismological discrimination of nuclear explosions and earthquakes and available from the Research Institute of National Defence, Stockholm, Sweden	27/VII/1972
62.	CCD/380	Canada, Sweden	Working paper on an experiment in international co-operation: short-period seismological discrimination of shallow earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions	27/VII/1972
63.	CCD/386	United Kingdom	Working paper on seismic data-handling and analysis for a comprehensive test ban	22/VIII/1972
64.	CCD/388	United States	A review of current progress and problems in seismic verification	23/VIII/1972
65.	CCD/397	Sweden	Working paper with points to be considered by experts on the verification of ban on underground nuclear explosions	24/IV/1973
66.	CCD/399	Japan	Working paper on problems in determining the body wave magnitude	24/IV/1973
67.	CCD/401	United Kingdom	Working paper on a review of the United Kingdom seismological research and development programme	28/VI/1973
68.	CCD/402	United Kingdom	Working paper on the estimation of depth of seismic events	28/VI/1973
69.	CCD/404	United States	A program of research related to problems in seismic verification	5/VII/1973
70.	CCD/405	Sweden	Working paper reviewing recent Swedish scientific work on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear explosions	10/VII/1973
71.	CCD/406	Canada	The verification of a comprehensive test ban by seismological means	10/VII/1973
72.	CCD/407	United States	Comments on CCD/399, concerning magnitude determinations	10/VII/1973
73.	CCD/408	Japan	Working paper on comparison between earthquakes and underground explosions observed at the Matsushiro Seismological Observatory	10/VII/1973

74.	CCD/409	Italy	Some observations on detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions - prospects of international co-operation	10/VII/1973
75.	CCD/411	Norway	Letter dated 16 July 1973 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Norway on seismic research at the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR)	31/VII/1973
76.	CCD/416	Netherlands	Some observations on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear test explosions	28/VIII/1973
77.	CCD/422	Pakistan	Some excerpts from the statement made on 19 May 1974 by the Prime Minister of Pakistan on the nuclear underground test explosion conducted by India on 18 May 1974	23/V/1974
78.	CCD/423	Pakistan	Statement issued on 19 May 1974 at Islamabad by an official spokesman of the Government of Pakistan on India's explosion of an underground nuclear device on 18 May 1974	23/V/1974
79.	CCD/424	India	Text of the official announcement made by the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, regarding the underground peaceful nuclear explosion experiment conducted on 18 May 1974	23/V/1974
80.	CCD/425	India	Statement made by the Minister of External Affairs of India on 21 May 1974 on the peaceful underground nuclear explosion conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission of India on 18 May 1974	23/V/1974
81.	CCD/426	Canada	Text of a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, on 22 May 1974	23/V/1974

82.	CCD/431	USSR	Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests	16/VII/74
83.	CCD/438	Sweden	Underground nuclear test activities in the United States and the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1973	1/VIII/1974
84.	CCD/440	United Kingdom	Working paper on a development in discriminating between seismic sources	13/VIII/1974
85.	CCD/441	Japan, Sweden	Working paper on the identification of seismic events in the USSR using seismological data from observatories in Japan and Sweden	13/VIII/1974
86.	CCD/442	Japan	Working paper on the accuracy of locating seismic events	13/VIII/1974
87.	CCD/454	Japan	Working paper containing views of a Japanese expert on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs)	7/VII/1975
88.	CCD/455		Letter dated 24 June 1975 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary General of the United Nations concerning the studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, and health and safety aspects	7/VI/1975
89.	CCD/456	United States	Working paper on arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs)	10/VII/1975
90.	CCD/457	Canada, Japan, Sweden	Working paper reporting the summary proceedings of an informal scientific conference held 14-19 April 1975 to promote Canadian-Japanese-Swedish co-operation in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means	14/VII/1975

91.	CCD/459	United Kingdom	Working paper on safeguards against the employment of multiple explosions to simulate earthquakes	24/VI/1975
92.	CCD/464	Mexico	Letter dated 6 August 1975 from the leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament containing the texts of two draft resolutions submitted to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	6/VIII/1975
93.	CCD/468/ Rev.1	Japan	Comments on the informal meetings of PNE experts by Ambassador M. Nisibori on 18 July 1975	21/VIII/1975
94.	CCD/474	India	Informal meetings on the question of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions within the framework of the CTB, note being taken of operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 3257 (XXIX) - Comments made by Ambassador Mishra of India on 18 July 1975	26/VIII/1975
95.	CCD/481	Sweden	The test ban issue	26/III/1976
96.	CCD/482	Sweden	Working paper on co-operative international measures to monitor a CTB	26/III/1976
97.	CCD/484	Norway	Letter dated 8 April 1976 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Norway to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper on some new results in seismic discrimination	9/IV/1976
98.	CCD/486 and Corr.1	United Kingdom	Working paper on the United Kingdom's contribution to research on seismological problems relating to underground nuclear tests	12/IV/1976
99.	CCD/487 and Corr.1	United Kingdom	Working paper on the processing and communication of seismic data to provide for national means of verifying a test ban	12/IV/1976
100.	CCD/488	United Kingdom	Working paper on the recording and processing of P waves to provide seismograms suitable for discriminating between earthquakes and underground explosions	12/IV/1976

101.	CCD/489	Japan	Working paper on the estimation of focal depth by pP and sP phases	13/IV/1976
102.	CCD/490	Canada	The verification of a comprehensive test ban by seismological means	20/IV/1976
103.	CCD/491	United States	Current status of research in seismic verification	20/IV/1976
104.	CCD/492	United Kingdom	Text of a statement on a comprehensive test ban made by Mr. Fakley at an informal meeting of the CCD on Tuesday, 20 April 1976	21/IV/1976
105.	CCD/493	Japan	Working paper containing statement by Dr. Shigeji Suyehiro at the informal meetings with participation of experts on a comprehensive test ban on 20 April 1976	26/IV/1976
106.	CCD/495	Sweden	Terms of reference for a group of scientific governmental experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	24/VI/1976
107.	CCD/496 and Corr.1	USSR	Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes	23/VI/1976
108.	CCD/509	Finland	Letter dated 28 July 1976 from Mr. Leif Blomqvist of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on Finnish capabilities of seismological detection of underground nuclear explosions	28/VIII/1976
109.	CCD/513		First Progress Report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and to identify seismic events	6/VIII/1976

110.	CCD/523	USSR	Draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests	22/II/1977
111.	CCD/524	Japan	Working paper on location capability of a multi-array stations system	24/II/1977
112.	CCD/526/ Rev.1	Sweden	Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments	5/VII/1977
113.	CCD/528 and Corr.1		Second progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	1/III/1977
114.	CCD/534		Third progress report to the Conference on Disarmament by the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	28/IV/1977
115.	CCD/536	New Zealand	Letter dated 20 July 1977 from the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i. of the Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the views of the Government of New Zealand on a comprehensive test ban treaty	22/VI/1977
116.	CCD/540	Japan	Working paper on focal depth resolvability of a multi-array stations system	3/VIII/1977
117.	CCD/542		Fourth progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	11/VIII/1977

- | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 118. | CCD/558
and Add.1 | | Letter dated 9 March 1978 from the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the final report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group | 9/III/1978 |
| 119. | CCD/562 | Sweden | Terms of reference for the continued work of the CCD <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events | 13/III/1978 |
| 120. | CCD/570 | | Terms of reference for the continued work of the CCD <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events | 4/V/1978 |
| 121. | CCD/576 | | Sixth progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events | 15/VIII/1978 |
| III. COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) | | | | |
| 122. | CD/7 | Netherlands | On the use of short-period initial motion data for discrimination purposes | 1/III/1979 |
| 123. | CD/18 | | Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Seventh Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events | 27/IV/1979 |
| 124. | CD/30 | Spain | Letter dated 2 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the decision adopted by the Committee on 15 February 1979 concerning the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of seismological experts | 3/VII/1979 |

125.	CD/43 and Add.1		Letter dated 25 July 1979 from the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operation measures to detect and identify seismic events to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the second report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group	25/VII/1979
126.	CD/45	Sweden	Working paper on international seismological datacentre demonstration facilities in Sweden	30/VII/1979
127.	CD/46	Sweden	Draft CD decision for a continued mandate to the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of seismic experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	31/VII/1979
128.	CD/61		Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the ninth session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	18/II/1980
129.	CD/64	Group of 21	Statement of the Group of 21 on the establishment of working groups on items on the annual agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980	27/II/1980
130.	CD/72	Group of 21	Statement of the Group of 21 on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty	4/III/1980
131.	CD/73	Germany, Federal Republic of	Working Paper - Workshop on the demonstration of procedures to obtain seismic data at individual stations under different conditions	5/III/1980
132.	CD/86		Letter dated 24 March 1980 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the Report on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, prepared pursuant to General Assembly Decision 32/44 of 11 December 1979	16/IV/1980
133.	CD/93	Belgium	Prohibition of nuclear tests: Proposal for an informal meeting of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of experts members of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	18/IV/1980

134.	CD/95	Australia	An illustrative list of subjects which might be examined by the CD in considering Agenda Item 1: Nuclear Test Ban	22/IV/1980
135.	CD/119		<u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts: Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Tenth Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	17/VII/1980
136.	CD/130	USSR	Letter dated 30 July 1980 from the Permanent Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America transmitting a document entitled "Tripartite Report to the Committee on Disarmament"	30/VII/1980
137.	CD/134	Group of 21	Statement of the Group of 21 on the Conclusion of the Annual Session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980	6/VIII/1980
138.	CD/135	Group of socialist States	Results of the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament: Statement by the group of Socialist States	7/VIII/1980
139.	CD/150		Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the eleventh session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	12/II/1981
140.	CD/181	Group of 21	Statement by the Group of 21 on Item 1 of the Agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled "Nuclear Test Ban"	24/IV/1981
141.	CD/192	Group of 21	Statement of the Group of 21 (Item 1: Nuclear Test Ban)	8/VII/1981
142.	CD/194	Group of socialist countries	Statement of a Group of socialist countries concerning a nuclear test ban	13/VII/1981
143.	CD/210		Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Twelfth Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	12/VIII/1981
144.	CD 257	Sweden	An International System for the Detection of Airborne Radioactivity from Nuclear Explosions	8/III/1982

145.	CD/259	German Democratic Republic	Draft mandate for <u>ad hoc</u> working groups on a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	12/III/1982
146.	CD/260		Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the thirteenth session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	18/III/1982
147.	CD/287	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Proposal for the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group under Item 1 of the Agenda entitled: "Nuclear Test Ban"	20/IV/1982
148.	CD/291		Decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group under Item 1 of its Agenda entitled: "Nuclear Test Ban"	21/IV/1982
149.	CD/310	Norway	Working Paper on a prototype system for international exchange of seismological data under a comprehensive test ban treaty	11/VIII/1982
150.	CD/312 and Corr.1	Netherlands	Nuclear Test Ban (also issued as CD/NTB/WP.1 and Corr.1)	11/VIII/1982
151.	CD/318		Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the fourteenth session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	19/VIII/1982
152.	CD/319	Japan	WMO co-operation in international seismic data exchange	23/VIII/1982
153.	CD/332		Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban	13/IX/1982
154.	CD/346	USSR	Letter dated 14 February 1983 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the "Basic Provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests	16/II/1983

155.	CD/348		Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the fifteenth session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	21/II/1983
156.	CD/358		Decision on the re-establishment of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Groups for the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament	20/III/1983
157.	CD/381	Sweden	Draft treaty banning any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment	14/VI/1983
158.	CD/383	United Kingdom	Working Paper: Peaceful Nuclear explosions in relation to a nuclear test ban (also issued as CD/NTE/WP.3)	17/VI/1983
159.	CD/384	Australia	Institutional arrangements for a CTB verification system: An illustrative list of questions (also issued as CD/NTE/WP.4)	20/VI/1983
160.	CD/388	Japan	Verification and compliance of a nuclear test ban	8/VII/1983
161.	CD/389	Japan	Views on a system of international exchange of seismic data	8/VII/1983
162.	CD/390	Japan	Working Paper on a contribution to an international monitoring system using a newly installed small seismic array of Japan	8/VII/1983
163.	CD/395	Norway	Working Paper: The role of international seismic data exchange under a comprehensive nuclear test ban	19/VII/1983
164.	CD/399		Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the sixteenth session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	22/VII/1983
165.	CD/400	Australia	International Management Panel (also issued as CD/NTE/WP.6)	22/VII/1983
166.	CD/402	United Kingdom	Verification aspects of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) (also issued as CD/NTE/WP.7)	1/VIII/1983

- | | | | | |
|------|--------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 167. | CD/403 | Sweden | Working Paper: International surveillance of airborne radioactivity (ISAR)
(also issued as CD/NTB/WP.9) | 3/VIII/1983 |
| 168. | CD/405 | Australia | Proposal for the scope of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty
(also issued as CD/NTB/WP.8) | 4/VIII/1983 |
| 169. | CD/412 | | Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on a nuclear test ban | 16/VIII/1983 |

IV. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

170.	CD/430	Sweden	Nuclear Explosions 1945-1983	7/II/1984
171.	CD/434*	Group of socialist States	Organizational Matters of the Work of the Conference on Disarmament: Memorandum of a group of socialist States	17/II/1984
172.	CD/438	Mexico	Draft Mandate for the (<u>ad hoc</u> subsidiary body) on a Nuclear Test Ban	24/II/1984
173.	CD/444*	USSR	Letter dated 6 March 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting excerpts from the speech of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. K.U. Chernenko,, deliberated on 2 March 1984 to voters of Moscow's Knibyshev district	19/III/1984
174.	CD/448		Letter dated 9 March 1984 from the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the third Report of the Ad Hoc Group	9/III/1984
175.	CD/449		Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Seventeenth Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events	9/III/1984
176.	CD/491	Germany, Federal Republic of	Working Paper: Aspects of modern developments in seismic event regarding techniques	28/III/1984
177.	CD/492	Group of 21	Draft Mandate for the <u>ad hoc</u> subsidiary body on a Nuclear Test Ban	28/III/1984
178.	CD/497*	USSR	Letter dated 11 April 1984 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the answers of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K.U. Chernenko to questions of the newspaper "Pravda"	11/IV/1984
179.	CD/501*	Hungary.	Letter dated 25 April 1984 from the Head of the Hungarian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the communique of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Budapest on 19 and 20 April 1984	26/IV/1984

* This document is listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

V. WORKING PAPERS OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN

- | | | | | |
|----|-------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. | CD/NTB/WP.1
+ Corr.1 | Netherlands | Nuclear test ban
(also issued as CD/312
and Corr.1) | 11/VIII/1983 |
| 2. | CD/NTB/WP.2 | Sweden | Working Paper on international
verification systems for a nuclear
test ban | 30/VIII/1982 |
| 3. | CD/NTB/WP.3 | United Kingdom | Working Paper: Peaceful nuclear
explosions in relation to a
nuclear test ban
(also issued as CD/383) | 17/VI/1983 |
| 4. | CD/NTB/WP.4 | Australia | Institutional arrangements for a
CTB verification system: An
illustrative list of questions
(also issued as CD/384) | 20/VI/1983 |
| 5. | CD/NTB/WP.5 | Belgium | Analysis of 20 years' observa-
tion of atmospheric radioactivity
in Belgium | 21/VII/1983 |
| 6. | CD/NTB/WP.6 | Australia | International Management Panel
(also issued as CD/400) | 22/VII/1983 |
| 7. | CD/NTB/WP.7 | United Kingdom | Working Paper: Verification
aspects of a comprehensive test
ban treaty (CTBT)
(also issued as CD/402) | 1/VIII/1983 |
| 8. | CD/NTB/WP.8 | Australia | Proposal for the scope of a com-
prehensive nuclear test ban
treaty
(also issued as CD/405) | 4/VIII/1983 |
| 9. | CD/NTB/WP.9 | Sweden | Working Paper: International
surveillance of airborne radio-
activity (ISAR)
(also issued as CD/403) | 11/VIII/1983 |

VI. CONFERENCE ROOM PAPERS OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN

- | | | | |
|----|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. | CD/NTB/CRP.1/Rev.1 | Draft Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban | 9/IX/1982 |
| 2. | CD/NTB/CRP.2 | Annotation by the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on a nuclear test ban on means of verification of compliance with a treaty on a Nuclear Test Ban | 27/IV/1983 |
| 3. | CD/NTB/CRP.3 | Programme of Work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban | 29/IV/1983 |
| 4. | CD/NTB/CRP.4 | Annotation by the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Nuclear Test Ban
Procedures and Mechanisms for Consultations and Co-operation as well as on Committee of Experts (items 3 and 4 of the Programme of Work) | 22/VI/1983 |
| 5. | CD/NTB/CRP.5 | Annotation by the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban on Procedures for Complaints and on-site inspections (items 5 and 6 of the Programme of Work) | 6/VII/1983 |
| 6. | CD/NTB/CRP.6/Rev.1 | Draft Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban | 12/VIII/1983 |

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

I. CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (ENDC)

- | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. | ENDC/14 | USSR | Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 26 September 1961 on measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and contribute to general and complete disarmament | 24/III/1962 |
| 2. | ENDC/16 | Czechoslovakia | Letter dated 27 March 1962, from the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, transmitting a Memorandum from the Government of the German Democratic Republic on an atomic-free zone in Europe | 27/III/1962 |
| 3. | ENDC/53 | United Kingdom | Preliminary Study of Problems Connected with the Elimination of Rockets as Nuclear Delivery Vehicles | 1/VIII/1962 |
| 4. | ENDC/54 | United Kingdom | Preliminary Study of Problems Connected with the Verification of the Destruction of Certain Nuclear Delivery Vehicles | 1/VIII/1962 |
| 5. | ENDC/60
and Corr.1 | United Kingdom | The Technical Possibility of International Control of Fissile Material Production | 31/VIII/1962 |
| 6. | ENDC/70 | United States | Working paper on reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication | 12/XII/1962 |
| 7. | ENDC/C.1/1 | Poland | Memorandum submitted by the Polish Delegation dated 28 March 1962, concerning the establishment of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone in Europe | 28/III/1962 |
| 8. | ENDC/75 | USSR | Declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons | 12/II/1963 |
| 9. | ENDC/84 | USSR | Note of the Soviet Government dated 8 April 1963 to the Government of the United States concerning plans for the creation of a combined NATO nuclear force | 17/IV/1963 |

10. ENDC/87	Brazil, Mexico	Declaration of 29 April by Five Latin American Governments on the Denuclearization of Latin America	6/V/1963
11. ENDC/88	Czechoslovakia	Statement of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in connection with the creation of a combined NATO nuclear force, 17 May 1963	22/V/1963
12. ENDC/89	United Kingdom	United Kingdom Note of 18 May 1963, in reply to the Soviet Government's Note of 8 April 1963	24/V/1963
13. ENDC/90	United States	Text of United States reply of 18 May, to USSR Note of 8 April	24/V/1963
14. ENDC/91 and Corr.1	USSR	Note of the Soviet Government of 20 May 1963 to the Government of the United States of America concerning a combined NATO nuclear force	27/V/1963
15. ENDC/93/ Rev.1	Ethiopia, Nigeria, United Arab Republic	Resolution adopted by the Conference of Heads of African States on 25 May concerning the denuclearization of Africa	18/IV/1963
16. ENDC/97	USSR/ United States	Memorandum of understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the establishment of a Direct Communication Link	20/VI/1963
17. ENDC/110	Canada	A comparison of some significant developments in the United States of America and the USSR proposals concerning the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, failure of communications or surprise attack (1958-1963)	16/VIII/1963
18. ENDC/123	USSR	Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension	28/I/1964

19. ENDC/124	USSR	Letter dated 3 February 1964 from the Chairman of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic and a draft Treaty on the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two German States	3/II/1964
20. ENDC/130	United Kingdom	Paper on observation posts submitted at the 178th meeting of the Conference	26/III/1964
21. ENDC/133	USSR	Letter dated 12 June 1964 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the draft Treaty on the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two German States	
22. ENDC/134	United States	Working paper on inspection of a fissionable material cut-off	25/VI/1964
23. ENDC/136	Nigeria	Working document on Nuclear Delivery Vehicles	14/VII/1964
24. ENDC/138	USSR	Item of the Agenda: "Prevention of a further spread of nuclear weapons" Statement by TASS of 24 December 1964	27/VII/1964
25. ENDC/144	Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic	Memorandum containing a brief resumé of the suggestions and proposals made by each delegation on measures of disarmament and collateral measures discussed during 1964 in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nations Committee on Disarmament	14/IX/1964
26. ENDC/152 and Add.1	United States	Draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons	17/VIII/1965 21/III/1966
27. ENDC/157	Italy	Draft of unilateral non-acquisition declaration	14/IX/1965

28. ENDC/158	Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic	Joint Memorandum on Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	15/IX/1965
29. ENDC/164	USSR	Letter dated 24 September 1965 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/5976) containing a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons	27/I/1966
30. ENDC/168	USSR	Letter dated 7 February 1966 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations containing a statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the conclusion of a treaty on the strict prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons	8/II/1966
31. ENDC/172	United States	Working Paper on Transfer of Fissionable Material Obtained by the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons	8/III/1966
32. ENDC/174	United States	Working Paper on an inspection method for verifying the status of shutdown plutonium production reactors	14/IV/1966
33. ENDC/176 and Corr.1	United States	Description of a Monitoring System for Shutdown Nuclear Reactors, Script of a Briefing given by a United States Expert to the Members of the Delegations to the ENDC at the United States Mission, 10 August 1966	11/VIII/1966
34. ENDC/178	Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic	Joint Memorandum on non- proliferation of nuclear weapons	19/VIII/1966
35. ENDC/180	Ethiopia	Memorandum concerning an approach to the realization of United Nations resolutions on banning of nuclear weapons, denuclearization of Africa and a World Conference on Disarmament	22/VIII/1966

36. ENDC/186		Final Act of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America. Held at Mexico City on 30 August 1966 and 31 January to 14 February 1967	21/II/1967
37. ENDC/192	United States	Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 5/	24/VIII/1967
38. ENDC/193	USSR	Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 6/	24/VIII/1967
39. ENDC/205	Italy	Working Paper: Proposal concerning the transfer of fissile material	30/XI/1967
40. ENDC/225	USSR/ United States	Report to the UNGA and the United Nations Disarmament Commission	14/III/1968
41. ENDC/227	USSR	Memorandum by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament	16/VII/1968
42. ENDC/240	USSR	Draft treaty on prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof 7/	18/II/1969
43. ENDC/241 and Add.1	Mexico	Establishment of nuclear-free zones: Working document	24/III/1969 24/III/1970
44. ENDC/243	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia Poland, Romania, USSR	Letter dated 2 April 1969 from the Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, of the Polish People's Republic, of the Socialist Republic of Romania and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations containing an appeal by the States Members of the Warsaw Pact to all European countries	2/IV/1969

5/ Additional documents relating to the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are: ENDC/194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200/Rev.1, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223/Rev.1, 278, 279/Rev.1, 280, 281, 282 and CCD/444, 448, 464 and 484 and CD/158.

6/ See foot-note 5.

7/ Additional documents relating to the Draft Treaty on Prohibiting the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed, Ocean Floor and the Sub-soil Thereof are: ENDC/247, 264 and CCD/267, 270, 271, 294, 297 and 543.

- | | | | |
|--------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| 45. ENDC/249 | United States | Draft treaty prohibiting the
emplacement of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass
destruction on the sea-bed and
ocean floor 8/ | 22/V/1969 |
|--------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|

II. CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)

- | | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| 46. CCD/268 | Mexico | Report of the First Session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (CPANAL) | 15/IX/1969 |
| 47. CCD/269
and Rev.1
and Rev.2
and Rev.3 | USSR/
United States | Draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the sub-soil thereof | 7/X/1969
30/X/1969
23/IV/1970
1/IX/1970 |
| 48. CCD/342 | Mexico | Working paper on some basic facts relating to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocol II | 19/VIII/1971 |
| 49. CCD/358 | Mexico | Letter dated 2 March 1972 from the Representative of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations containing, <u>inter alia</u> , a declaration by the Chinese Government on the zone established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America | 2/III/1972 |
| 50. CCD/359 | Mexico | Working Paper containing a list of documents of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and of the statements by the Mexican delegation dealing wholly or partially with that treaty | 14/III/1972 |

8/ See foot-note 7.

51. CCD/394 Mexico Letter dated 20 February 1973 from 20/II/1973
the Leader of the delegation of
Mexico to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General to the
Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament concerning
negotiations between the
United States and the USSR on the
limitation of offensive and
defensive strategic nuclear-
weapon systems
52. CCD/439 Mexico Letter dated 6 August 1974 from 6/VIII/1974
the Leader of the delegation of
Mexico to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General to the
Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament: General and
Complete Disarmament
53. CCD/448 USSR/
United Kingdom Joint Anglo-Soviet declaration on 12/III/1975
the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons
54. CCD/464 Mexico Letter dated 6 August 1975 from 6/VIII/1975
the leader of the delegation of
Mexico to the acting representative
of the Secretary-General to the
Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament
55. Letter dated 10 August 1975 from 18/VIII/1975
the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of
Governmental Experts for the Study
of the Question of Nuclear-free
zones in all of its Aspects to the
Co-Chairmen of the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament
56. CCD/470 Mexico Working paper containing a draft 20/VIII/1975
definition of the concept of a
"nuclear-weapon-free zone" and a
draft definition of the principal
obligations of nuclear-weapon
States in respect of such zones
57. CCD/476 Special report of the Conference 28/VIII/1975
of the Committee on Disarmament
transmitting a comprehensive
study of the question of nuclear-
weapon-free zones in all of its
aspects

58. CCD/559	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland Romania, USSR	Draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons	10/III/1978
-------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------

III. COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

59. CD/4	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed	1/II/1979
60. CD/13	Poland	Working paper on further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor	20/IV/1979
61. CD/20	Hungary	Letter dated 19 June 1979 from the Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979	20/VI/1979
62. CD/28	USSR/ United States	Letter dated 27 June 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the representatives of the United States of America and the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of the Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States of America and the USSR, the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms and the Joint United States-Soviet Communiqué	27/VI/1979

63. CD/29	United States	Letter dated 2 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the United States of America to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting additional documents relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the USSR on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms	2/VII/1979
64. CD/36 Rev.1	Group of 21	Working paper on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	12/VII/1979
65. CD/50	Group of 21	Statement of the Group of 21 on the conclusion of the annual session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979	9/VIII/1979
66. CD/51	Group of Socialist States	Results of the 1979 session of the Committee on Disarmament - Working paper submitted by a group of socialist States	10/VIII/1979
67. CD/54	Pakistan	Statement by Mr. Jamsheed Marker, Head of the Pakistan delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, dated the 14 August 1979	14/VIII/1979
68. CD/57	Romania	Romania's position on disarmament	11/II/1980
69. CD/58	German Democratic Republic	Letter dated 12 February 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held at Berlin on 5 and 6 December 1979	12/II/1980
70. CD/64	Group of 21	Statement of the Group of 21 on the establishment of working groups on items on the annual agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980	27/II/1980
71. CD/90	Australia Canada	The prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	17/IV/1980

72. CD/92	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the tasks of the Second Disarmament Decade	17/IV/1980
73. CD/98	Poland	Letter dated 9 June 1980 from the Chargé d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Representative of the Polish People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva enclosing the declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw on 15 May 1980	17/VI/1980
74. CD/99	Canada	Letter dated 10 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva forwarding a document entitled "Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals"	12/VI/1980
75. CD/109	German Democratic Republic	Working Paper: Proposal on behalf of a group of socialist countries concerning urgent steps for the practical implementation of "Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed" (CD/4)	30/VI/1980
76. CD/116	Group of 21	Working paper on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	9/VII/1980
77. CD/127	Canada	Letter dated 29 July 1980 from the Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva, forwarding a document entitled "A quantitative working paper on the compendium of arms control verification proposals"	29/VII/1980

78. CD/134	Group of 21	Statement of the Group of 21 on the conclusion of the annual session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980	6/VIII/1980
79. CD/135	Group of Socialist States	Results of the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament: Statement by the group of Socialist States	7/VIII/1980
80. CD/141	Group of Socialist States	Considerations on the Organization of Work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981 session	5/II/1981
81. CD/143	Mexico	Working paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"	11/II/1981
82. CD/160	USSR	Letter dated 2 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the USSR transmitting part of the report of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, entitled "To strengthen peace, deepen détente and curb the arms race"	3/III/1981
83. CD/162	Group of Socialist Countries	Considerations of a group of Socialist Countries in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests	11/III/1981

84. CD/170	India	Letter dated 26 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of India transmitting extracts from the section entitled "Review of the international situation" contained in the New Delhi declaration issued at the conclusion of the Ministerial Conference on Non-Aligned Countries held in New Delhi from 9 to 13 February 1981	31/III/1981
85. CD/171	Secretariat	Tabulation of proposals on nuclear disarmament since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	31/III/1981
86. CD/180	Group of 21	Statement by the Group of 21 on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled "Cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament"	2/IV/1981
87. CD/183	Canada	A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification, produced by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs and the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, Ottawa	12/VI/1981
88. CD/184	Pakistan	Letter dated 12 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting resolutions adopted by the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Baghdad from 1 to 6 June 1981	15/VI/1981
89. CD/188	Mexico	Working paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"	17/VI/1981

90. CD/193	German Democratic Republic	Considerations on the further proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament concerning item 2 of its agenda	9/VII/1981
91. CD/213	China	Some viewpoints on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	13/VIII/1981
92. CD/216	USSR	Letter dated 14 August 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a statement by Tass, dated 13 August 1981	17/VIII/1981
93. CD/219	A Group of Socialist Countries	Statement of a group of Socialist Countries on the need for the urgent establishment in the Committee on Disarmament of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons	17/VIII/1981
94. CD/225	Cuba	Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba concerning the United States decision to authorize the production of neutron weapons	20/VIII/1981
95. CD/226	Mongolia	Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic concerning the decision of the United States to begin production of neutron weapons	20/VIII/1981
96. CD/227	China	The Chinese delegation's denial to the Soviet allegation regarding China's position on the question of the neutron bomb	20/VIII/1981
97. CD/256	German Democratic Republic, Hungary	Working Paper: Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present	5/III/1982

- | | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 98. CD/259 | German
Democratic
Republic | Draft mandates for <u>ad hoc</u>
working groups on a nuclear
test ban, and the cessation of the
nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament | 12/III/1982 |
| 99. CD/268 | USSR | Letter dated 25 March 1982
addressed to the Chairman of the
Committee on Disarmament from the
Representative of the USSR,
transmitting part of the
statement of Mr. L.I. Brezhnev,
General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union and Chairman
of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, to the
Seventeenth Congress of Trade
Unions of the USSR | 26/III/1982 |
| 100. CD/269 | Germany,
Federal
Republic of | Letter dated 26 March 1982 from
the Head of the Delegation of the
Federal Republic of Germany
addressed to the Chairman of the
Committee on Disarmament
transmitting the text of a
decision taken by the Federal
German Government on 17 March,
on the present state of the INF
negotiations and Secretary-
General Brezhnev's proposals | 29/III/1982 |
| 101. CD/293
and Corr.1 | Secretariat | Tabulation of proposals
concerning nuclear disarmament
made between the establishment
of the United Nations and the
convening of the first
special session of the
General Assembly devoted to
disarmament | 1/VI/1982 |
| 102. CD/295 | India | Letter dated 22 July 1982
addressed to the Chairman of the
Committee on Disarmament from
the Permanent Representative
of India to the United Nations
Office at Geneva transmitting
the draft of a convention
submitted by India at the
second special session of the
General Assembly devoted to
disarmament | 23/VII/1982 |

103. CD/314	USSR	Message from L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	19/VIII/1982
104. CD/315	USSR	Memorandum entitled "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race"	19/VIII/1982
105. CD/327	Poland	The dangers of nuclear war: Declaration of the Pugwash Movement and 97 Nobel Laureates, issued at the 32nd Pugwash Conference held in Warsaw, Poland, from 26 to 31 August 1982	8/IX/1982
106. CD/340	USSR	Letter dated 3 February 1983 from the Representative of the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the replies of Mr. Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to questions from PRAVDA correspondent	7/II/1983
107. CD/344	German Democratic Republic, on behalf of a group of Socialist States	Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon: Working paper submitted by the German Democratic Republic on behalf of a group of Socialist States	10/II/1983
108. CD/345	Group of Socialist countries	Ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy: Proposal by a group of Socialist countries	18/II/1983
109. CD/347	France	Extracts from the statement by Mr. François Mitterand, President of the French Republic, before the Bundestag on 20 January 1983	18/II/1983

- | | | | |
|-------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 110. CD/351 | German Democratic Republic | Letter dated 2 March 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic transmitting texts of communications containing the reply of his Government to a recent Swedish initiative on the establishment in Europe of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons | 2/III/1983 |
| 111. CD/352 | Germany, Federal Republic of | Letter dated 7 March 1983 from the Alternate Representative of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a letter by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Kohl, to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker | 7/III/1983 |
| 112. CD/385 | USSR | Letter dated 23 June 1983 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the international situation and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union adopted in Moscow on 16 June 1983 | 23/VI/1983 |
| 113. CD/386 | USSR | Joint statement adopted at the meeting of Party and State leaders of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the USSR, held in Moscow on 28 June 1983 | 30/VI/1983 |
| 114. CD/394 | France | Freeze on nuclear weapons | 18/VII/1983 |
| 115. CD/409 | USSR | Answers of the Minister for Defence of the USSR, Marshall D.F. Ustinov to questions of a Tass correspondent | 8/VIII/1983 |

- | | | | |
|--------------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 116. CD/422 | USSR | Letter dated 8 December 1983 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of the statement made on 24 November by Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR | 8/XII/1983 |
| 117. CD/423 | Mongolia | Letter dated 10 January 1984 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the texts of the Declaration by the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic and the appeal by the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Parliaments of the countries of Asia and the Pacific dated 7 December 1983 | 17/I/1984 |
| 118. CD/427* | USSR | Letter dated 30 January 1984 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the replies given by Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to questions from the newspaper PRAVDA, published on 25 January 1984 | 31/I/1984 |

IV. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

- | | | | |
|-------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 119. CD/434 | Group of Socialist States | Organizational Matters of the Work of the Conference on Disarmament: Memorandum of a group of Socialist States | 17/II/1984 |
|-------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|

* This document is listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

- | | | | |
|--------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 120. CD/436 | Mexico, Peru,
Venezuela | Letter dated 20 February 1984
from the representatives of
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela
addressed to the President of the
Conference on Disarmament
transmitting the relevant
documentation of the eighth session
of the General Conference of CPANAL
held in Jamaica from
16 to 19 May 1983 | 21/II/1984 |
| 121. CD/444* | USSR | Letter dated 6 March 1984 from
the Representative of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics to
the Conference on Disarmament,
transmitting excerpts from the
speech of the General Secretary
of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Mr. K.U. Chernenko, delivered on
2 March 1984 to voters of Moscow's
Kuibyshev district | 19/III/1984 |
| 122. CD/493 | Romania | Letter dated 2 April 1984 from the
Permanent Representative of the
Socialist Republic of Romania to
the President of the Conference on
Disarmament transmitting the text
of an appeal of the Romanian
Parliament concerning the emplacement
in Europe of intermediate range
missiles | 2/IV/1984 |
| 123. CD/497* | USSR | Letter dated 11 April 1984 from
the representative of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
addressed to the President of the
Conference on Disarmament
transmitting the answers of the
General Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee, K.U. Chernenko
to questions of the newspaper
PRAVDA | 11/IV/1984 |
| 124. CD/501* | Hungary | Letter dated 25 April 1984 from
the Head of the Hungarian
delegation to the Conference on
Disarmament transmitting the text
of the communiqué of the meeting
of the Committee of Foreign
Ministers of the States Parties to
the Warsaw Treaty, held in Budapest
on 19 and 20 April 1984 | 26/IV/1984 |

* This document is listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters^{9/}

I. COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

1. CD/238 Venezuela Letter dated 3 February 1982 addressed 4/II/1982
to the Chairman of the Committee on
Disarmament by the Representative of
Venezuela, transmitting the result of
the study carried out in October 1981
by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences
at the request of His Holiness John
Paul II, entitled "Statement on the
consequences of the use of nuclear
weapons"
2. CD/273 India Letter dated 2 April 1982 from the 6/IV/1982
Head of the Delegation of India to
the United Nations in New York to
the Secretary-General of the United
Nations in response to General
Assembly resolutions 36/81 A and B
pertaining to the second special
session of the General Assembly
devoted to Disarmament
3. CD/282 Mexico Working paper containing the text 19/IV/1982
of the opinion of the Government of
Mexico on the prevention of nuclear
war, transmitted to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations in
accordance with the invitation
extended by the General Assembly
in its resolution 36/81 B of
9 December 1981
4. CD/295 India Letter dated 22 July 1982 addressed 23/VII/1982
to the Chairman of the Committee on
Disarmament from the Permanent
Representative of India to the United
Nations office at Geneva, transmitting
the draft of a convention submitted by
India at the second special session of
the General Assembly devoted to
Disarmament
5. CD/309 India Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Working 11/VIII/1982
Group on Prevention of Nuclear War,
under item 2 of the agenda of the
Committee on Disarmament

^{9/} Other documents which are considered by their authors to be relevant to this item may be found under item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 6. | CD/327 | Poland | The dangers of nuclear war.
Declaration of the Pugwash Movement
and 97 Nobel Laureates, issued at
the 32nd Pugwash Conference held in
Warsaw, Poland, from 26 to 31
August 1982 | 8/IX/1982 |
| 7. | CD/341 | Group of 21 | Working paper of the Group of 21
on the prevention of nuclear war | 4/II/1983 |
| 8. | CD/345 | Group of Socialist
Countries | Ensuring the safe development of
nuclear energy: Proposal by a group
of socialist countries | 14/II/1983 |
| 9. | CD/355 | A Group of socialist
States | Prevention of nuclear war | 21/III/1983 |
| 10. | CD/357 | Germany, Federal
Republic of | Working paper: Prevention of nuclear
war, including all related matters | 28/III/1983 |
| 11. | CD/380 | Belgium | The prevention of nuclear war:
Confidence building measures | 25/IV/1983 |
| 12. | CD/398 | Secretariat | Prevention of nuclear war, including
all related matters (Compilation of
existing agreements, resolutions of
the General Assembly transmitted to
the Committee on Disarmament and
proposals submitted to the second
special session of the General
Assembly devoted to Disarmament and
to the Committee on Disarmament,
prepared by the Secretariat) | 30/VIII/1983 |
| 13. | CD/406 | German Democratic
Republic | Working paper containing a list of
items which could be dealt with in
the course of informal meetings of
the Committee on Disarmament on the
prevention of nuclear war | 4/VIII/1983 |
| 14. | CD/411 | Australia, Belgium,
Germany, Federal
Republic of, Italy,
Japan,
Netherlands | Prevention of nuclear war, including
all related matters | 11/VIII/1983 |

* This document is listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

II. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 15. | CD/434* | Group of Socialist States | Organizational Matters of the Work of the Conference on Disarmament: Memorandum of a group of socialist States | 17/II/1984 |
| 16. | CD/444* | USSR | Letter dated 6 March 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting excerpts from the speech of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr.K.U. Chernenko, delivered on 2 March 1984 to voters of Moscow's Kuibyshev district | 19/III/1984 |
| 17. | CD/484 | Group of socialist States | Prevention of Nuclear War: Working Paper of a Group of Socialist States | 4/IV/1984 |
| 18. | CD/501* | Hungary | Letter dated 25 April 1984 from the Head of the Hungarian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the communique of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Budapest on 19 and 20 April 1984 | 26/IV/1984 |

* This document is listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

4. Chemical Weapons

I. CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (ENDC)

- | | | | |
|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. ENDC/254 | | Letter dated 1 July 1969 from the Secretary-General of the UN to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmitting the Report on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use | 7/VII/1969 |
| 2. ENDC/256 | Poland | Working Paper concerning the Report of the Secretary-General of 1 July 1969 on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use (A/7575) | 22/VII/1969 |
| 3. ENDC/265 | Argentina,
Brazil,
Burma,
Ethiopia,
India,
Mexico,
Morocco,
Nigeria,
Pakistan,
Sweden,
United Arab Republic,
Yugoslavia | Working Paper on a proposed declaration by the United Nations General Assembly regarding prohibition of the use of chemical and biological methods of warfare | 26/VIII/1969 |
| 4. ENDC/266 | Canada | Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Warfare: Draft United Nations General Assembly Resolution | 26/VIII/1969 |

II. CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)

- | | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 5. CCD/263 | United States | Working Paper on Chemical Warfare Agents and the Commercial Chemical Industry | 16/III/1970 |
| 6. CCD/285 and
Corr.1 | Hungary,
Mongolia,
Poland | Working paper submitted by the delegations of the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic and the Polish People's Republic in connexion with the draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons | 14/IV/1970 |
| 7. CCD/286 | United States | Working Paper on Toxins | 21/IV/1970 |

8.	CCD/288	Japan	Working Paper on the Question of Verification for Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons	30/IV/1970
9.	CCD/289	Italy	Suggestions regarding the possible convening of a group of experts to study the problem of controls over chemical weapons and the way in which such a group should function	30/VI/1970
10.	CCD/293	United States	Working paper comparing nerve agent facilities and Civilian Chemical Production Facilities	16/VII/1970
11.	CCD/295	Morocco	Working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons	28/VII/1970
12.	CCD/299	Czechoslovakia	Working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons	6/VIII/1970
13.	CCD/300	Canada	Working paper on the verification of prohibitions of the development, production and stockpiling and the use of chemical and biological weapons	6/VIII/1970
14.	CCD/301	Japan	Working paper on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons	6/VIII/1970
15.	CCD/302	Yugoslavia	Working paper on the elements for a system of control of the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons	6/VIII/1970
16.	CCD/303	USSR	Working paper on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons	6/VIII/1970
17.	CCD/304	Italy	Additional working paper on the problem of controls over chemical weapons	6/VIII/1970
18.	CCD/308	United Kingdom	Working paper on Verification of CW Arms Control Measures	18/VIII/1970
19.	CCD/310	Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia	Joint Memorandum on the question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Methods of Warfare	25/VIII/1970

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 20. | CCD/311 | United States | Working paper on economic data monitoring as a means of verifying compliance with a ban on chemical weapons | 25/VIII/1970 |
| 21. | CCD/314 | United Arab Republic | Working paper concerning suggestions on measures of verification of a ban on chemical and biological weapons | 1/IX/1970 |
| 22. | CCD/315 | Hungary,
Mongolia,
Poland | Working document concerning the introduction of a safeguard clause - CCD/285 - to the draft convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (Doc.A/7655) made by Mr. J. Winiewicz, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic at the 464th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament | 3/IX/1970 |
| 23. | CCD/320 | Netherlands | Working Paper concerning the prohibition of chemical warfare agents | 2/III/1971 |
| 24. | CCD/322 | Sweden | Working Paper on a model for a comprehensive agreement concerning the prohibition of chemical and biological means of warfare | 16/III/1971 |
| 25. | CCD/324 | Sweden | Working Paper on the destruction of chemical and biological means of warfare | 30/III/1971 |
| 26. | CCD/332 | United States | Working Paper on CW verification | 5/VII/1971 |
| 27. | CCD/333 | Sweden | Working Paper on aspects of the definition of "toxins" | 6/VII/1971 |
| 28. | CCD/334 | Canada | Working Paper on atmospheric sensing and verification of a ban on development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons | 8/VII/1971 |
| 29. | CCD/335 | Italy | Working Paper on some problems concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons | 8/VII/1971 |

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 30. | CCD/343 | Japan | Working Paper on a Biological Approach to the Question of Verification on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - Organo phosphorus Chemical Agents | 24/VIII/1971 |
| 31. | CCD/344 | Japan | Working paper containing remarks of Prof. Shunichi Yamada, the University of Tokyo, concerning the question of verification on the prohibition of chemical weapons, presented at the informal meeting on 7 July 1971 | 24/VIII/1971 |
| 32. | CCD/352 | Argentina,
Brazil,
Burma,
Egypt,
Ethiopia,
India,
Mexico,
Morocco,
Nigeria,
Pakistan,
Sweden,
Yugoslavia | Joint memorandum on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction | 28/IX/1971 |
| 33. | CCD/360 | United States | Work Programme regarding negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons | 20/III/1972 |
| 34. | CCD/361 | Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia,
Hungary,
Mongolia,
Poland,
Romania,
USSR | Draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics | 28/III/1972 |
| 35. | CCD/365 | United States | Working Paper on definitions of controlled substances | 26/VI/1972 |
| 36. | CCD/366 | United States | Working Paper on storage of chemical agents and weapons | 20/VI/1972 |
| 37. | CCD/367 | United States | Working Paper on the destruction of chemical weapons | 20/VI/1972 |
| 38. | CCD/368 | United States | Working Paper: Statistics relating to production and trade of certain chemical substances in the United States | 20/VI/1972 |

39.	CCD/369	United States	Working Paper on United States domestic legislation regarding chemical substances	20/VI/1972
40.	CCL/371	United Kingdom	Working Paper on remote detection of chemical weapon field tests	27/VI/1972
41.	CCD/372	Sweden	Working Paper on two groups of chemical agents of warfare	28/VI/1972
42.	CCD/373	Italy	Working Paper on identification and classification of chemical warfare agents and on some aspects of the problem of verification	29/VI/1972
43.	CCD/374	Japan	Working Paper on the question of a criterion to be used to characterize super-toxic chemical agents	5/VII/1972
44.	CCD/375	Yugoslavia	Working Paper on some aspects of the definition, classification and prohibition of chemical agents	5/VII/1972
45.	CCD/377	Yugoslavia	Working Paper on the elements of a system for the control of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons	20/VII/1972
46.	CCD/381	Finland	Letter dated 21 July 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on definitions of chemical warfare agents and on technical possibilities for verification and control of C-weapons with particular regard to a Finnish project on creation on a national basis of a CW-control capacity for possible future international use	27/VII/1972
47.	CCD/383	Netherlands	Working Paper on the possibility of delimitating nerve gases within the field of organophosphorus compounds	1/VIII/1972

48.	CCD/384	Sweden	Working Paper on domestic legislation in Sweden regarding chemical substances	8/VIII/1972
49.	CCD/387	Canada	Working Paper on toxicity of chemical substances, methods of estimation and applications to a chemical control agreement	24/VIII/1972
50.	CCD/395	Sweden	Working Paper on the concept of amplified verification in relation to the prohibition of chemical weapons - The principle role of verification in disarmament treaties	6/III/1973
51.	CCD/398	Sweden	Working Paper presenting the ways in which verification has been dealt with in various arms control and disarmament treaties and proposals	24/IV/1973
52.	CCD/400	Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden, Yugoslavia	Working Paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction	26/IV/1973
53.	CCD/403	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR	Working Paper on ways of implementing control over compliance with the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction	28/VI/1973
54.	CCD/410	Netherlands	Working Paper on an international organ for the support of a CW convention and other disarmament agreements	31/VII/1973
55.	CCD/412	Finland	Letter dated 9 August 1973 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a Working Paper by the Government of Finland - On the progress of the Finnish project for the creation on a national basis of a control capacity for possible future international use	14/VIII/1973
56.	CCD/413	Japan	Working Paper on the main points of an international agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction	21/VIII/1973

57.	CCD/414	Canada	The problem of defining chemical substances in a treaty prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons	21/VIII/1973
58.	CCD/420	Japan	Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction	30/IV/1974
59.	CCD/427	Sweden	Some observations on the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction presented by the Delegation of Japan on 30 April 1974 (CCD/420)	2/VII/1974
60.	CCD/430	Japan	Working Paper containing views of Japanese experts on the scope of prohibition and on the verification for organophosphorus compounds for the informal meetings with participation of experts of the CCD in 1974	12/VII/1974
61.	CCD/432	Finland	Letter dated 12 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on methodology for chemical analysis and identification of CW agents - Progress of a Finnish research project	16/VII/1974
62.	CCD/433	Canada	The problem of defining compounds having military significance as irritating and incapacitating agents	16/VII/1974
63.	CCD/434	Canada	Destruction and disposal of Canadian stocks of World War II mustard agent	16/VII/1974
64.	CCD/435	United States	Working Paper on toxicity of chemical warfare agents	16/VII/1974
65.	CCD/436	United States	Working Paper on chemical agent destruction	16/VII/1974
66.	CCD/437	United States	Working Paper on diversion of commercial chemicals for weapons	16/VII/1974
67.	CCD/452	Japan	Modification of the wording used in a draft convention (CCD/420) on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction	8/IV/1975
68.	CCD/453	Finland	Letter dated 2 July 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on methodology for chemical analysis and identification of CW agents - progress of a Finnish research project	4/VII/1975

69.	CCD/458	Germany, Federal Republic of	Working Paper on the definition and classification of chemical warfare agents	22/VII/1975
70.	CCD/461	Sweden	Working Paper on a model for delimitating chemical warfare agents in an international treaty	29/VII/1975
71.	CCD/466	Japan	Working Paper concerning the scope of chemical agents that have justification for peaceful purposes and an example of the national verification system	8/VIII/1975
72.	CCD/473	Canada	Working paper on use of measurements of lethality for definition of agents of chemical warfare	26/VIII/1975
73.	CCD/483	Japan	Working paper on the question of chemical warfare agents to be prohibited by the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	8/IV/1976
74.	CCD/485	Sweden	Working Paper on some aspects of on-site verification of the destruction of stock-piles of chemical weapons	9/IV/1976
75.	CCD/497	United States	Verification of destruction of declared stocks of chemical warfare agents	29/VI/1976
76.	CCD/498	United States	The use of seals and monitoring devices in CW verification	29/VI/1976
77.	CCD/499	United States	Review of proposals for defining chemical warfare agents in a CW Agreement	29/VI/1976
78.	CCD/501	Finland	Letter dated 1 July 1976 from the Ambassador in charge of Political Affairs at the Permanent Mission of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a Working Paper by the Government of Finland on Methodology for Chemical Identification of CW Agents and Related Compounds - Progress of a Finnish Research Project	2/VII/1976
79.	CCD/502 and Corr.1	United Kingdom	Working Paper on the Feasibility of Extra-territorial Surveillance of Chemical Weapon Tests by Air Monitoring at the Border	2/VII/1976
80.	CCD/503	Yugoslavia	Medical protection against nerve gases poisoning (Present situation and future possibilities)	5/VII/1976
81.	CCD/504	Yugoslavia	A method of categorization of chemical compounds regarding binary technology	5/VII/1976

82.	CCD/505	Yugoslavia	Working Paper on the definition of chemical warfare agents (CWA)	5/VII/1976
83.	CCD/506	German Democratic Republic	The catalytic detoxification of organo-phosphorus CW agents	6/VII/1976
84.	CCD/508	Czechoslovakia	Some medical aspects of the CW problem and its perspectives	8/VII/1976
85.	CCD/512 and Corr.1	United Kingdom	Draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction	6/VIII/1976
86.	CCD/515	Japan	Working Paper: Draft of one form of LD50 spectrum	16/VIII/1976
87.	CCD/529	Japan	Some thoughts on the international control of chemical weapons	22/III/1977
88.	CCD/531	United States	Working Paper concerning incapacitating chemical warfare agents	28/III/1977
89.	CCD/533	Netherlands	Working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants	22/IV/1977
90.	CCD/537/ Rev.1	Hungary	A possible method of defining toxic chemical agents	4/VIII/1977
91.	CCD/538	USSR	Some methods of monitoring compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons	3/VIII/1977
92.	CCD/539	USSR	Verification of the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons	3/VIII/1977
93.	CCD/541	United Kingdom	Prophylaxis against nerve agent poisoning	5/VIII/1977

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 94. | CCD/544 | Finland | Letter dated 19 August 1977 from the Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concerning chemical and instrumental verification of organophosphorus warfare agents | 19/VIII/1977 |
| 95. | CCD/569 | Sweden | Working paper on a methodological investigation for computerized scanning of chemical literature | 24/IV/1978 |
| 96. | CCD/577 | Finland | Letter dated 14 August 1978 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concerning an analytical technique for the verification of chemical disarmament - trace analysis by glass capillary gas chromatography with specific detectors | 22/VIII/1978 |

III. COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

- | | | | | |
|------|-------|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 97. | CD/5 | Italy | Working paper on chemical disarmament negotiations | 6/II/1979 |
| 98. | CD/6 | Netherlands | Some procedural questions with respect to the development of a ban on chemical weapons | 6/II/1979 |
| 99. | CD/11 | Group of 21 | Working paper on negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction | 9/IV/1979 |
| 100. | CD/14 | Finland | Chemical identification of chemical weapons agents; a Finnish project | 25/IV/1979 |
| 101. | CD/15 | United Kingdom | A visit to Britain by chemical weapons experts (14-16 March 1969) | 24/IV/1979 |
| 102. | CD/21 | Poland | Working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction | 20/VI/1979 |

103.	CD/26	Secretariat	Compilation of material on chemical weapons from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament working papers and statements, 1972-1979	1/VII/1979
104.	CD/37	Germany, Federal Republic of	Working paper on some aspects of international verification of non-production of chemical weapons; Experience gained in the Federal Republic of Germany	12/VII/1979
105.	CD/39	Finland	The identification of potential organophosphorus warfare agents - an approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data	16/VII/1979
106.	CD/41	Netherlands	Working paper containing questions relevant to a Convention prohibiting nuclear weapons	25/VII/1979
107.	CD/44	Poland	Working Paper on an outline of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction	26/VII/1979
108.	CD/48	USSR, United States	USSR-United States Joint report on progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	7/VIII/1979
109.	CD/49	Netherlands	Chemical weapons - answers to questionnaire contained in CD/41	8/VIII/1979
110.	CD/52	France, Italy, Netherlands	Chemical weapons - Evaluation of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 with respect to a prohibition of chemical weapons	13/VIII/1979
111.	CD/59	Australia	Chemical weapons: Proposal for informal meetings with experts	12/II/1980
112.	CD/66	Poland	Chemical weapons - a possible procedural approach to the tasks facing the Committee on Disarmament: Working paper	28/II/1980

113. CD/80 Decision adopted by the Committee 17/III/1980
on Disarmament, during its
69th plenary meeting, to establish
an Ad Hoc Working Group on
Chemical Weapons
114. CD/82 Viet Nam Letter dated 18 March 1980 from 20/III/1980
the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
of the Permanent Mission of the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
transmitting a document entitled
"Memorandum on the use of chemicals
by the United States of America
in Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea"
115. CD/84 Netherlands Draft initial work programme of the 26/III/1980
ad hoc working group on chemical
weapons
116. CD/85 Democratic Letter dated 26 March 1980 from the 27/III/1980
Kampuchea Permanent Representative of the
Permanent Mission of Democratic
Kampuchea transmitting two documents
entitled "Statement of 5 February 1980
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Democratic Kampuchea on the
intensification by Hanoi of the use
of chemical weapons and other
activities to exterminate the
Kampuchean people" and "the use of
chemical weapons by the Vietnamese
aggressors in Kampuchea; Report
issued by the Ministry of Information
of Democratic Kampuchea on
25 February 1980"
117. CD/89 Afghanistan Telegram dated 13 April 1980 from 14/III/1980
the Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan transmitting a
"Declaration of the Government of
the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan issued on 11 April 1980"
118. CD/94 Belgium Proposed definition of a chemical 18/IV/1980
warfare agent and chemical
munitions

119.	CD/96	Poland	<u>Ad Hoc</u> working group on Chemical Weapons - Initial work programme: working document	22/IV/1980
120.	CD/97	Sweden	Working paper on the prohibition of chemical warfare capability	24/IV/1980
121.	CD/102	China	Letter dated 19 June 1980 from the Acting Head of the Chinese Delegation, transmitting a working paper on the "Chinese Delegation's proposals on the main contents of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons"	19/VI/1980
122.	CD/103	Finland	Letter dated 24 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Finland transmitting a document entitled "Identification of degradation products of potential organophosphorus warfare agents"	24/VI/1980
123.	CD/105	France	Elements of a reply by the French Delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/41)	27/VI/1980
124.	CD/106	France	Control of the non-manufacture and non-possession of agents and weapons of chemical warfare	27/VI/1980
125.	CD/110	Yugoslavia	Working paper on medical protection against nerve gas poisoning (present situation and future possibilities)	2/VII/1980
126.	CD/111	Yugoslavia	Working paper on the definition of chemical warfare agents (CWA)	2/VII/1980
127.	CD/112	USSR, United States	USSR-USA joint report on the progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	7/VII/1980
128.	CD/113	Canada	Organization and control of verification within a chemical weapons convention	8/VII/1980
129.	CD/114	Australia	Reply at this stage submitted by the Australian delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament in document CD/41	9/VII/1980

130.	CD/117	Canada	Definitions and scope in a chemical weapons convention	10/VII/1980
131.	CD/121	Poland	Some of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a chemical weapons convention: working paper	17/VII/1980
132.	CD/122	Morocco	Proposed definition of chemical weapons	21/VII/1980
133.	CD/123	Mongolia	Interrelationship between the future convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the Geneva Protocol of 1925	21/VII/1980
134.	CD/124	Indonesia	Some views on the prohibition of chemical weapons	24/VII/1980
135.	And Rev.1		Revision of CD/124 on the definition of chemical agent and chemical warfare agent	24/IV/1981
136.	CD/131 Rev.1		Report to the Committee on Disarmament - <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons	4/VIII/1980
137.	CD/132	Pakistan	Views of the Government of Pakistan submitted in response to the circulation of document CD/89	1/VIII/1980
138.	CD/142	Sweden	Working paper: Prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons	10/II/1981
139.	CD/164	Finland	Creation of chemical weapons control capacity - present phase and goals of the Finnish project	19/III/1981
140.	CD/167	Canada	Verification and control requirements for a chemical arms control treaty based on an analysis of activities	26/III/1981
141.	CD/168	China	Working Paper - Prohibition of chemical weapons: On the definition of chemical warfare agents	27/III/1981
142.	CD/169	China	Working Paper - Dismantling of production facilities/means of production for chemical weapons	27/III/1981
143.	CD/173	Canada	Disposal of chemical agents	3/IV/1981
144.	CD/178	Finland	Invitation of the Finnish Government to a chemical weapons verification workshop	16/IV/1981

145.	CD/179 and Add.1		The Chairman's progress report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons	23/IV/1981
146.	CD/183	Canada	A conceptual working paper on arms control verification	12/VI/1981
147.	CD/195	Yugoslavia	Working paper: Incapacitating agents	14/VII/1981
148.	CD/196	Finland	Trace analysis of chemical warfare agents	16/VII/1981
149.	CD/197	Romania	Working paper - suggestions for elements of a chemical weapons convention: Definitions and Criteria	17/VII/1981
150.	CD/199	Czechoslovakia	Working paper: Definition and characteristics of the toxins	24/VII/1981
151.	CD/203	Netherlands	Consultation and co-operation, verification measures and complaints procedure in the framework of the convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stock-piling of all chemical weapons and their destruction	30/VII/1981
152.	CD/211	Cuba	Extract on Chemical Weapons from the statement made on 26 July 1981 by Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz.	13/VIII/1981
153.	CD/212	China	Some viewpoints on the prohibition of chemical weapons	13/VIII/1981
154.	CD/220		Report of the <u>ad hoc</u> working group on chemical weapons to the Committee on Disarmament	17/VIII/1981
155.	CD/244	United Kingdom	Working paper on verification and the monitoring of compliance in a chemical weapons convention (also issued as CD/CW/WP.26)	18/II/1982
156.	CD/258 and Corr.1	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Working paper: Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons (also issued as CD/CW/WP.28 and Corr.1)	9/III/1982
157.	CD/263	Finland	Working paper on the relation of verification to the scope of a ban on chemical warfare agents	22/III/1982

158.	CD/264	United States	The United States Programme to deter chemical warfare	23/III/1982
159.	CD/265	Germany, Federal Republic of	Working paper on principles and rules for verifying compliance with a chemical weapons convention	24/III/1982
160.	CD/266	Yugoslavia	Working paper: Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification (also issued as CD/CW/WP.31)	24/III/1982
161.	CD/270	Indonesia, Netherlands	Letter dated 31 March 1982 from the Heads of the Delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands transmitting a document entitled "Indonesia and The Netherlands - Working document - Destruction of about 45 tons of mustard agent at Batujajar, West-Java, Indonesia	31/III/1982
162.	CD/271	Australia, United Kingdom, United States	Technical evaluation of "Recover" techniques for chemical weapons verification (also issued as (CD/CW/WP.32)	1/IV/1982
163.	CD/275	Canada	Letter dated 5 April 1982 from the Deputy Representative of Canada to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament forwarding a document entitled "Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals - Second Edition"	7/IV/1982
164.	CD/277	Sweden	Working paper - the concept "Precursor" and a suggestion for definition for the purpose of a chemical weapons convention	7/IV/1982
165.	CD/279	Sweden	Working paper - suggestions for measures to enhance confidence between the parties negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons	14/IV/1982
166.	CD/281 and Rev.1		Special report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament - <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons	26/IV/1982
167.	CD/288		Statement made by Amb. Bogumil Sujka, Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the report of the Group.	21/IV/1982

168.	CD/294	USSR	Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction (also issued as CD/CW/WP.35)	21/VII/1982
169.	CD/298	Yugoslavia	Working paper on some aspects of verification in a chemical weapons convention (also issued as CD/CW/WP.37)	26/VII/1982
170.	CD/299	Finland	Letter dated 27 July 1982, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Finland, transmitting a document entitled "Systematic identification of chemical warfare agents; identification of non-phosphorus warfare agents"	29/VII/1982
171.	CD/301	Belgium	Memorandum on monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons (also issued as CD/CW/WP.39)	4/VIII/1982
172.	CD/306	Netherlands	Working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants	10/VIII/1982
173.	CD/307	Netherlands	Working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants	10/VIII/1982
174.	CD/308	Germany, Federal Republic of, Netherlands	Letter dated 9 August 1982 from the Heads of the Delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a document containing preliminary questions concerning CD/294 (also issued as CD/CW/WP.40)	10/VIII/1982
175.	CD/311	Norway	Working paper on verification of a chemical weapons convention - sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions	11/VIII/1982
176.	CD/313	Canada	A proposed verification organization for a chemical weapons convention	16/VIII/1982

177.	CD/316	France	Working paper on the monitoring of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons (also issued as CD/CW/WP.42)	19/VIII/1982
178.	CD/324	Sweden	Working paper on toxicity criteria for key CW precursors	6/IX/1982
179.	CD/325	Sweden	Working paper on monitoring destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents	6/IX/1982
180.	CD/326	Germany, Federal Republic of	Chemical weapons - working paper: Proposals on "declaration", "verification", and the "Consultative Committee"	6/IX/1982
181.	CD/333	Poland	Views of the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons on possible compromise wordings of the elements of a future convention (also issued as CD/CW/WP.44)	14/IX/1982
182.	CD/334		Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament	15/IX/1982
183.	CD/338	Czechoslovakia	Letter dated 24 January 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia transmitting the text of the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member States adopted in Prague on 5 January 1983	1/II/1983
184.	CD/342		Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 17-28 January 1983	8/II/1983
185.	CD/343		United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban	10/II/1983
186.	CD/349	Cuba	Letter dated 21 February 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cuba transmitting the final summary report of the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The long term effects on man and nature, held in Ho Chi Minh City from 13 to 20 January 1983	21/II/1983
187.	CD/350	Spain	Working paper on technical aspects of a convention on chemical weapons	28/II/1983
188.	CD/353	United Kingdom	Verification of non-production of chemical weapons	8/III/1983
189.	CD/378	China	On the prohibition regime of the future convention banning chemical weapons	21/IV/1983

190. CD/387	United States	Illustrative on-site inspection procedures for verification of chemical weapons stockpile destruction	6/VII/1983
191. CD/392	Finland	Letter dated 11 July 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, transmitting a document entitled "Systematic identification of chemical warfare agents: Identification of precursors of warfare agents, degradation products of non-phosphorus agents, and some potential agents"	13/VII/1983
192. CD/393	Yugoslavia	Working paper on some technical aspects of the verification process in a chemical weapons convention (Also issued as CD/CW/WP.55)	13/VII/1983
193. CD/396	Norway	Working paper on verification of a chemical weapons convention: Sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions	19/VII/1983
194. CD/397	Norway	Working paper on verification of non-production of chemical weapons	19/VII/1983
195. CD/401	Yugoslavia	Precursors - Key Precursors (Also issued as CD/CW/CRP.82)	29/VII/1983
196. CD/408	Egypt	Proposals to promote respect for the chemical weapons convention and compliance with its provisions	9/VIII/1983
197. CD/416		Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons	22/VIII/1983
198. CD/419	United States	Workshop on verification of CWs stockpile destruction	23/VIII/1983
199. CD/424	United States	Verification of Chemical Weapons Stockpile Destruction (also issued as CD/CW/WP.61)	20/I/1984
200. CD/425	Sweden	Verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons (also issued as CD/CW/WP.60)	18/I/1984
201. CD/426	Sweden	The prohibition of military preparations for use of chemical weapons (also issued as CD/CW/WP.62)	23/I/1984

IV. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

202. CD/429		Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 16 January-6 February 1984	7/II/1984
203. CD/431	United Kingdom	Chemical Weapons Convention: Verification and Compliance - The Challenge Element	10/II/1984
204. CD/432	Islamic Republic of Iran	Letter dated 30 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a report containing a description of an attack with chemical weapons in Piranshahr, Iran	13/II/1984
205. CD/435	Group of Socialist countries	Improved effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons	20/II/1984
206. CD/437	Czechoslovakia	Letter dated 23 February 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia transmitting a proposal of Warsaw Member States to the Member States of NATO on the question of freeing Europe from chemical weapons, presented at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 January 1984	23/II/1984
207. CD/439	Germany, Federal Republic of	Proposals on 'Prohibition of Transfer' and 'Permitted Transfers' in a future CW agreement	24/II/1984
208. CD/440		Decision on the re-establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> subsidiary body on chemical weapons	28/II/1984
209. CD/443	China	Proposals on Major Elements of a Future Convention on the Complete Prohibition and Total Destruction of Chemical Weapons (also issued as CD/CW/WP.68)	5/III/1984
210. CD/444*	USSR	Letter dated 6 March 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting excerpts from the speech of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. K.U. Chernenko, delivered on 2 March 1984 to voters of Moscow's Kulybyshev district	19/III/1984

* This document has been listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

211.	CD/445	Netherlands	Size and Structure of a Chemical Disarmament Inspectorate	7/III/1984
212.	CD/446		Decision on the designation of <u>ad hoc</u> subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament	8/III/1984
213.	CD/447	Islamic Republic of Iran	Letter dated 2 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament containing information on missile attacks and bombardments in both military and civilian areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran	9/III/1984
214.	CD/482	Yugoslavia	Working Paper - National verification measures (also issued as CD/CW/WP.73)	26/III/1984
215.	CD/483	Islamic Republic of Iran	Letter dated 20 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament containing proposals on some elements of a future convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons (also issued as CD/CW/WP.74)	27/III/1984
216.	CD/494	France	Elimination of stocks and of production facilities (also issued as CD/CW/WP.79)	3/IV/1984
217.	CD/496	Germany, Federal Republic of	Considerations on including a ban on the use of chemical weapons and the right of withdrawal in a future chemical weapons convention	4/IV/1984
218.	CD/497 *	USSR	Letter dated 11 April 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the answers of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K.U. Chernenko, to questions of the newspaper <u>Pravda</u>	11/IV/1984
219.	CD/500	United States	Draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons	18/IV/1984
220.	CD/501*		Letter dated 25 April 1984 from the head of the Hungarian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the communique of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Budapest on 19 and 20 April 1984	26/IV/1984

* This document is listed under the agenda items to which it is also relevant.

V. WORKING PAPERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | CD/CW/WP.1 | | Working paper introduced by the Chairman | 15/VII/1980 |
| 2. | CD/CW/WP.2
and Add.1
& 2 | | "List of Documents" containing a list of Committee on Disarmament documents relevant to the work of the <u>ad hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons, circulated between July 1979 and July 1980 | 28/IV/1980
and
17/VII/1980
and
29/VII/1980 |
| 3. | CD/CW/WP.3 | United States | Issues to be defined by the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Chemical Weapons Working Group | 28/IV/1980 |
| 4. | CD/CW/WP.4 | Sweden | Issues to be dealt with in the negotiations on a Convention on Chemical Weapons | 18/VI/1980 |
| 5. | CD/CW/WP.5 | Germany,
Federal
Republic of | The impact of on-site inspections of current civilian production on the chemical industry | 11/VII/1980 |
| 6. | CD/CW/WP.6 | France | Criteria for the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents | 18/VII/1980 |
| 7. | CD/CW/WP.7
and Rev.1 | | Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 1 | 16/II/1981
4/III/1981 |
| 8. | CD/CW/WP.8
and Corr.1 | | Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 2 | 24/II/1981
17/III/1981 |
| 9. | CD/CW/WP.9 | Canada | Verification and Chemical Weapons | 25/II/1981 |
| 10. | CD/CW/WP.10
and Corr.1 | | Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 3 | 3/III/1981
11/III/1981 |
| 11. | CD/CW/WP.11 | Mongolia,
Poland,
USSR | Chemical Weapons: types of activity to be covered by a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons | 5/III/1981 |
| 12. | CD/CW/WP.12 | | Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 4 | 10/III/1981 |
| 13. | CD/CW/WP.13 | | Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 5 | 16/III/1981 |

14. CD/CW/WP.14		Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 6	16/III/1981
15. CD/CW/WP.15	Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland	Chemical weapons: definitions	25/III/1981
16. CD/CW/WP.16	France	Declarations and destruction of materials and facilities	26/III/1981
17. CD/CW/WP.17	France	Chemical weapons - definitions, criteria	27/III/1981
18. CD/CW/WP.18	Australia	Initial Comments on the Consolidated Outline suggested by the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons</u>	16/IV/1981
19. CD/CW/WP.19		Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention	23/IV/1981
20. CD/CW/WP.20		Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention	15/VI/1981
21. CD/CW/WP.21		Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention	15/VI/1981
22. CD/CW/WP.22 and Corr.1 and Rev.1		Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held on issues relating to toxicity determinations	13/VII/1981 15/VII/1981 23/VII/1981
23. CD/CW/WP.23	Australia	Chemical Weapons Verifications: Consultative Committee of Experts	21/VII/1981
24. CD/CW/WP.24	Australia	Chemical Weapons Convention: Assistance to Parties	21/VII/1981
25. CD/CW/WP.25	Australia	Chemical Weapons Verification: The Methyl-Phosphorous "Finger Print"	27/VII/1981
26. CD/CW/WP.26	United Kingdom	Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention (also issued as CD/244)	18/II/1982

27. CD/CW/WP.27 and Rev.1		Suggestions by the Chairman on the draft programme of work of the <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons</u> for the first part of its 1982 session	23/II/1982 26/II/1982
28. CD/CW/WP.28 and Corr.1	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Working paper: Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons (also issued as CD/258)	9/III/1982
29. CD/CW/WP.29	Bulgaria	Questions related to the ban of binary chemical weapons	12/III/1982
30. CD/CW/WP.30 and Corr.1		Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held on issues relating to toxicity determinations	22/III/1982
31. CD/CW/WP.31	Yugoslavia	Working paper: Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification (also issued as CD/266)	24/III/1982
32. CD/CW/WP.32	Australia, United Kingdom, United States	Technical Evaluation of "Recover" Techniques for CW Verification (also issued as CD/271)	1/IV/1982
33. CD/CW/WP.33 and Corr.1		Compilation of revised Elements and Comments thereto (CD/220), proposed new texts and alternative wordings as well as comments on new texts	28/IV/1982 23/VII/1982
34. CD/CW/WP.34		The Chairman's closing statement (first part of 1982 session)	16/IV/1982
35. CD/CW/WP.35	USSR	Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction (also issued as CD/294)	21/VII/1982
36. CD/CW/WP.36		Consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons	23/VII/1982

- | | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 37. CD/CW/WP.37 | Yugoslavia | Working paper on some aspects of verification in a chemical weapons convention (also issued as CD/298) | 26/VII/1982 |
| 38. CD/CW/WP.38 | Yugoslavia | Suggested alternative definition of Chemical Weapons | 28/VII/1982 |
| 39. CD/CW/WP.39 | Belgium | Memorandum on monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons (also issued as CD/301) | 4/VIII/1982 |
| 40. CD/CW/WP.40 | Germany,
Federal
Republic of,
Netherlands | Letter dated 9 August from the Heads of the Delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Kingdom of the Netherlands addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a document containing preliminary questions concerning CD/294 (also issued as CD/308) | 10/VIII/1982 |
| 41. CD/CW/WP.41
and Corr.1 | | Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held with experts on technical issues. | 10/VIII/1982
25/VIII/1982 |
| 42. CD/CW/WP.42 | France | Working paper on the Monitoring of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons (also issued as CD/316) | 19/VIII/1982 |
| 43. CD/CW/WP.43 | | Draft Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament | 6/IX/1982 |
| 44. CD/CW/WP.44 | Poland | Views of the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on possible compromise wordings of the elements of a future convention (also issued as CD/333) | 14/IX/1982 |
| 45. CD/CW/WP.45 | | Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 17-28 January 1983 | 28/I/1983 |

46. CD/CW/WP.46	Netherlands	Suggested list of key precursors - including those usable in multicomponent chemical weapon systems	12/IV/1983
47. CD/CW/WP.47	United States	United States Delegation impressions of the CW technical consultations held in January 1983	18/IV/1983
48. CD/CW/WP.48	United States	Working hypothesis on systematic, international on-site inspection of the destruction of declared stocks	18/IV/1983
49. CD/CW/WP.49		Statement by the Co-ordinator of Contact Group A	26/IV/1983
50. CD/CW/WP.50	Poland	Views of the Polish Delegation on the results of the consultations with delegations on technical issues held in the framework of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the period 17 January - 4 February 1983	27/IV/1983
51. CD/CW/WP.51	United States	Preventing illegal production of key precursors of nerve gas	30/VI/1983
52. CD/CW/WP.52	United States	Verification of non-production of chemical weapons	30/VI/1983
53. CD/CW/WP.53	Bulgaria	Working hypothesis on verification of destruction of declared stocks	28/VI/1983
54. CD/CW/WP.54	France	Precursors - Key Precursors	12/VII/1983
55. CD/CW/WP.55	Yugoslavia	Working Paper on some technical aspects of the verification process in a chemical weapons convention (also issued as CD/393)	13/VII/1983
56. CD/CW/WP.56 and Rev.1 and Add.1		Draft Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament	16/VIII/1983 22/VIII/1983 16/VIII/1983
57. CD/CW/WP.57	United Kingdom	Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons	17/VIII/1983

58. CD/CW/WP.58		Indicative programme of work for the period 16 January - 3 February 1984	18/I/1984
59. CD/CW/WP.59	Netherlands	Verification of non-production of chemical weapons	18/I/1984
60. CD/CW/WP.60	Sweden	Verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons (also issued as CD/425)	18/I/1984
61. CD/CW/WP.61	United States	Verification of chemical weapons stockpile destruction (also issued as CD/424)	20/I/1984
62. CD/CW/WP.62	Sweden	The prohibition of military preparations for use of chemical weapons (also issued as CD/426)	23/I/1984
63. CD/CW/WP.63	Belgium	Verification of non-production of chemical warfare agents	27/I/1984
64. CD/CW/WP.64 and Corr.1	Finland	On instrumental monitoring of incineration of CW agents	31/I/1984
65. CD/CW/WP.65	France	Verification of non-production of chemical weapons	31/I/1984
66. CD/CW/WP.66		Draft report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 16 January - 6 February 1984	6/II/1984

VI. WORKING PAPERS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

67. CD/CW/WP.67		Chairman's suggestion for a Working Structure for the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention	28/II/1984
68. CD/CW/WP.68	China	Proposals on Major Elements of a Future Convention on the Complete Prohibition and Total Destruction of Chemical Weapons (also issued as CD/443)	5/III/1984
69. CD/CW/WP.69		Programme of work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons for the first part of the 1984 session	14/III/1984
70. CD/CW/WP.70		Outline for the organization of work	9/III/1984
71. CD/CW/WP.71	Yugoslavia	Suggested alternative definitions	22/III/1984

- | | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 72. CD/CW/WP.72 | USSR | Proposal concerning the content of the provision of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons relating to the procedure to be followed in considering a request for an on-site inspection by the State which receives it (amendment to para. 4.3 of the Report of the Co-ordinator of Contact Group B (document CD/416, annex II, p.14)) | 23/III/1984 |
| 73. CD/CW/WP.73 | Yugoslavia | Working Paper - National verification measures (also issued as CD/482) | 26/III/1984 |
| 74. CD/CW/WP.74 | Islamic Republic of Iran | Letter dated 20 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament containing proposals on some elements of a future convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons (also issued as CD/483) | 27/III/1984 |
| 75. CD/CW/WP.75 | China | Some aspects on "Small-Scale Production Facility" | 26/III/1984 |
| 76. CD/CW/WP.76 | Islamic Republic of Iran | Proposal concerning the content of chemical weapons relating to the procedure to be followed in considering a request by a Member State for an on-site inspection. (Amendment to Article 4 of the Report of the Co-ordinator of Contact Group B (document CD/416, annex II, p.14)) | 30/III/1984 |
| 77. CD/CW/WP.77
and Rev.1 | | Programme of work of the <u>Ad Hoc Committee</u> for the month of April 1984 | 2/IV/1984
5/IV/1984 |
| 78. CD/CW/WP.78 | USSR | Proposal concerning the content of procedures for the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles | 2/IV/1984 |
| 79. CD/CW/WP.79 | France | Elimination of stocks and of production facilities (also issued as CD/494) | 3/IV/1984 |

- | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 80. CD/CW/WP.80 | Programme of work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u>
Committee on Chemical Weapons
for the second part of the
1984 session | 17/IV/1984 |
| 81. CD/CW/WP.81 | Proposals by the Chairman of
the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on
Chemical Weapons for draft
Articles for parts of a
chemical weapons convention | 26/IV/1984 |

VII. CONFERENCE ROOM PAPERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- | | | | |
|----|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 1. | CD/CW/CRP.1
and Add.1 | Issues raised at the 4th meeting
of the Working Group on Chemical
Weapons under the general heading
of "Scope" (Aide-memoire from
the Chairman). | 4/VII/1980 |
| 2. | CD/CW/CRP.2 | Issues raised in the Working Group
on Chemical Weapons under the
general heading of "Verification"
(Aide-memoire from the Chairman) | 9/VII/1980 |
| 3. | CD/CW/CRP.3 | Issues raised at the meetings of
the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on
Chemical Weapons (Aide-memoire from
the Chairman) | 17/VII/1980 |
| 4. | CD/CW/CRP.4/Rev.1 | (Parts I, II, III) Draft Report to
the CD of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group
on Chemical Weapons | 22/VII/1980
24/VII/1980
30/VII/1980 |

Conference Room Papers of the Ad Hoc Group on Chemical Weapons

5.	CD/CW/CRP.5 and Rev.1 and 2		Suggestions by the Chairman for particular technical issues to be addressed during CD's 1981 work on chemical weapons	25/II/1981
6.	CD/CW/CRP.6		List of topics to be discussed with regard to the definitions and criteria of importance for a chemical weapons convention	25/III/1981
7.	CD/CW/CRP.7	Belgium	Proposed definitions (revision of document CD/94)	26/III/1981
8.	CD/CW/CRP.8	France	Criteria for definition	26/III/1981
9.	CD/CW/CRP.9		List of questions put to the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America at the meeting of 30 March 1981 with respect to the bilateral report CD/112, and outlines by the Chairman for the work of the Working Group	30/III/1981
10.	CD/CW/CRP.10 and Add.1 and 2 and Corr.1 and Rev.1		Draft Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament	16/IV/1981
11.	CD/CW/CRP.11		Note by the Chairman	21/IV/1981
12.	CD/CW/CRP.12		Suggestions for consultations on toxicity determinations	17/VI/1981
13.	CD/CW/CRP.13 and Corr.1		Consolidated text of suggestions for elements I, I (bis) and Annex I of a Chemical Weapons Convention, received as at Friday, 26 June 1981	29/VI/1981 30/VI/1981
14.	CD/CW/CRP.14	Australia	Delegation amendments to CD/CW/WP.191/VII/1981 and CD/CW/WP.20, subject to revision	19/VII/1981
15.	CD/CW/CRP.15 and Add.1		Revised suggestions by the Chairman for elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention	21/VII/1981 28/VII/1981
16.	CD/CW/CRP.16 and Corr.1 and Add.1		Compilation of suggested amendments to the draft elements and annexes proposed by the Chairman in documents CD/CW/WP.19 to 20	21/VII/1981 31/VII/1981 28/VII/1981

17.	CD/CW/CRP.17/Rev.1, Add.1 and 2 and Rev.2 and 3 and Corr.1		Draft Report of the <u>Ad Hoc Working</u> Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament	31/VII/1981 12/VIII/1981
18.	CD/CW/CRP.18		Suggestion by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for recommendation by the Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament regarding decision on further work to be undertaken on methods for toxicity determinations for a Chemical Weapons Convention	29/VII/1981
19.	CD/CW/CRP.19	Bulgaria	Suggested alternative wording for Element I - General Provision	1/III/1982
20.	CD/CW/CRP.20	USSR	Suggested alternative wording for Element II - General definition of chemical weapons	1/III/1982
21.	CD/CW/CRP.21	USSR	Conference Room Paper relating to Element II - Use of the general purpose criterion for the determination of the scope of prohibition of chemicals	1/III/1982
22.	CD/CW/CRP.22	Poland	Suggested alternative for Element II.2	1/III/1982
23.	CD/CW/CRP.23		Note by the Chairman - Suggestions for consultations on toxicity determinations - Draft time-table	3/III/1982
24.	CD/CW/CRP.24	Argentina, Australia, China, Indonesia, Pakistan	Suggested alternative wording for Element I - General Provision	3/III/1982
25.	CD/CW/CRP.25	USSR	Text proposed for new Element III <u>bis</u> - Prohibition of stationing	6/III/1982
26.	CD/CW/CRP.26	USSR	Suggested alternative wording for Element IV - Declarations	6/III/1982
27.	CD/CW/CRP.27	Bulgaria	Text proposed as a continuation to the wording for a new Element III (<u>bis</u>) contained in CD/CW/CRP.25	11/III/1982
28.	CD/CW/CRP.28	Nigeria	Text proposed in relation to Element IV.1(b) - Declarations	11/III/1982

29.	CD/CW/CRP.29	Sweden	Conference Room Paper - Abolition and non-acquisition of chemical warfare capability after destruction of chemical weapons	15/III/1982
30.	CD/CW/CRP.30	Poland, USSR	Proposals with respect to document CD/220, Element IV, comments 1 and 4, and Annex II, comments 1 and 3	16/III/1982
31.	CD/CW/CRP.31	United States	Precursors	19/III/1982
32.	CD/CW/CRP.32	Australia	Suggested alternative wording for Element IV - Declarations	18/III/1982
33.	CD/CW/CRP.33	Australia	Suggested alternative wording for Element V - Destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion	18/III/1982
34.	CD/CW/CRP.34	Australia	Suggested alternative wording for Annex III - Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production	18/III/1982
35.	CD/CW/CRP.35	Australia	Suggested alternative wording for Element IX - General provision on verification	23/III/1982
36.	CD/CW/CRP.36	Australia	Suggested alternative wording for Element XI - National technical means of verification	23/III/1982
37.	CD/CW/CRP.37	Yugoslavia	New text proposed as a continuation to suggested alternative wording for Element II.2 contained in CD/CW/CRP.22	24/III/1982
38.	CD/CW/CRP.38	Yugoslavia	Comments in relation to document CD/220, Annex I, paragraphs 3 and 4 - Definition and criteria	24/III/1982
39.	CD/CW/CRP.39	Yugoslavia	Proposal for new subparagraph for Element IV - To be inserted between (b) and (c) in document CD/220, page 14 - Declarations	24/III/1982
40.	CD/CW/CRP.40	Yugoslavia	Suggested alternative wording for Element V - Destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion	24/III/1982

- | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 41. | CD/CW/CRP.41 | Yugoslavia | Annex III - Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production - Suggested alternative wording for paragraph 3 | 24/III/1982 |
| 42. | CD/CW/CRP.42 | German Democratic Republic | Annex IV - Recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system | 25/III/1982 |
| 43. | CD/CW/CRP.43 | German Democratic Republic | Suggested alternative wording for Element XI - National technical means of verification | 25/III/1982 |
| 44. | CD/CW/CRP.44 | German Democratic Republic | Some observations concerning the definition of "precursors" for the purposes of the Convention | 29/III/1982 |
| 45. | CD/CW/CRP.45 | German Democratic Republic | Suggested alternative wording for Element X | 29/III/1982 |
| 46. | CD/CW/CRP.46 | German Democratic Republic | Suggested alternative wording for Elements XII-XIII | 29/III/1982 |
| 47. | CD/CW/CRP.47 | | Draft Preamble as suggested by the Chairman | 1/IV/1982 |
| 48. | CD/CW/CRP.48 | Czechoslovakia | Alternative wording for Element XVII, paragraph 3 | 1/IV/1982 |
| 49. | CD/CW/CRP.49 | Bulgaria | Suggested text to be added at the end of existing Element XVI - Duration and withdrawals | 1/IV/1982 |
| 50. | CD/CW/CRP.50 | United States | Declaration of stockpiles and facilities | 1/IV/1982 |
| 51. | CD/CW/CRP.51 | Netherlands | Suggested alternative wording for Element XIV and paragraph 1 of Element XV | 2/IV/1982 |
| 52. | CD/CW/CRP.52
and Rev.1,
and Rev.2 | | Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament | 6/IV/1982
14/IV/1982 |
| 53. | CD/CW/CRP.53 | Sweden | Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons | 6/IV/1982 |

54. CD/CW/CRP.54 Netherlands Suggested alternative wording for paragraph 3 of Element IX, paragraph 1 of Element XI, Element XII, Element XIII and text proposed for new Element XIII bis 6/IV/1982
55. CD/CW/CRP.55 USSR Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons 8/IV/1982
56. CD/CW/CRP.56 China Suggested alternative wording for the second paragraph of the draft preamble as suggested by the Chairman contained in CD/CW/CRP.47 8/IV/1982
57. CD/CW/CRP.57 Sweden Suggested wording for the report of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament concerning consultations held during the first part of the 1982 session 14/IV/1982
58. CD/CW/CRP.58 Summary by the Chairman of initial comments made with respect to the draft preamble (CD/CW/CRP.47) 15/IV/1982
59. CD/CW/CRP.59 Australia Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons 15/IV/1982
60. CD/CW/CRP.60 Summary by the Chairman of initial comments made with respect to the suggested wording for Annex IV: Recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system (CD/CW/CRP.42) 15/VII/1982
61. CD/CW/CRP.61 Opening statement by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on 20 July 1982 20/VII/1982
62. CD/CW/CRP.62 China Suggested alternative wording for Element II and Annex I 4/VIII/1982
63. CD/CW/CRP.63 Germany List of questions addressed to the delegation of the USSR on 22 July 1982 by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany with respect to document CD/294 (CD/CW/WP.35) 26/VIII/1982
Federal Republic of
64. CD/CW/CRP.64 Time-table for the Chairman's consultations with experts on technical issues as presented in document CD/CW/WP.36 on 23 July 1982, to be held 2-6 August 1982 30/VII/1982
65. CD/CW/CRP.65 China Suggested alternative wording for Element IX, 2(a) and (d) 11/VIII/1982
66. CD/CW/CRP.66 Programme of work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons from 17-28 January 1983 18/I/1983

- | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 67. | CD/CW/CRP.67 | | Time-table for the Chairman's consultations on technical issues as presented in the report of the Working Group, CD/334, para. 12, on 15 September 1982, to be held 17 January-4 February 1983 | 18/I/1983 |
| 68. | CD/CW/CRP.68 | | Work Schedule - April 1983 | 12/IV/1983 |
| 69. | CD/CW/CRP.69 | Sweden | Statement made by Dr.J.Lundin of the Swedish delegation in the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Monday, 11 April 1983, on the question of "no military preparation for use of chemical weapons" | 12/IV/1983 |
| 70. | CD/CW/CRP.70 | | Contact Group C: Paper presented by the Co-ordinator | 26/IV/1983 |
| 71. | CD/CW/CRP.71 | | Contact Group C: Paper presented by the Co-ordinator: Criteria for the objective and impartial verification of a prohibition of use of chemical weapons | 26/IV/1983 |
| 72. | CD/CW/CRP.72 | | Chairman's summary of the discussions held in Contact Group A in April 1983 | 27/IV/1983 |
| 73. | CD/CW/CRP.73 | | Progress Report by the Co-ordinator | 30/VI/1983 |
| 74. | CD/CW/CRP.74
and Rev.1
and Rev.2 | | Proposals by the Co-ordinator: Procedure for declaring possession or non-possession of chemical weapons and their possible components | 14/VII/1983 |
| 75. | CD/CW/CRP.75 | | Proposals by the Co-ordinator: The destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons | 5/VII/1983 |
| 76. | CD/CW/CRP.76
and Corr.1 | Yugoslavia | Definition of "Key" Precursors | 6/VII/1983
25/VII/1983 |
| 77. | CD/CW/CRP.77 | Australia | Diversion of chemical weapons stocks | 7/VII/1983 |
| 78. | CD/CW/CRP.78 | Australia | Questions relating to the possible civilian use of chemicals containing the methyl-phosphorus bond | 7/VII/1983 |
| 79. | CD/CW/CRP.79 | | Report by the Co-ordinator on the "Criteria for the objective and impartial verification of a prohibition of use of chemical weapons" | 8/VII/1983 |

80.	CD/CW/CRP.80 and Rev. 1 and Rev. 2 and Rev. 3 and Rev. 4		Proposal by the Co-ordinator: Issues relevant to the incorporation of a use prohibition in the scope of the Convention	14/VII/1983
81.	CD/CW/CRP.80/Rev.5		Report of the Co-ordinator on issues relevant to the incorporation of a use prohibition in the scope of the Convention	16/VII/1983
82.	CD/CW/CRP.81/Rev.1	Australia Netherlands	List of precursors for super-toxic lethal chemicals and incapacitating chemicals	21/VII/1983
83.	CD/CW/CRP.82	Yugoslavia	Precursors - "Key" Precursors (also issued as CD/401)	19/VII/1983
84.	CD/CW/CRP.83	Czechoslovakia	Concept of precursors in the CW Convention	19/VII/1983
85.	CD/CW/CRP.84	Germany, Federal Republic of	List of Key precursors	25/VII/1983
86.	CD/CW/CRP.85/Rev.1		Report of the Co-ordinator on the result of the work of Contact Group A	11/VIII/83
87.	CD/CW/CRP.86		Report of the Co-ordinator on the work of Contact Group D	16/VIII/1983
88.	CD/CW/CRP.87		Report of the Co-ordinator on the structure and functions of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs	9/VIII/1983
89.	CD/CW/CRP.88	Canada	Precursor and key-precursor	25/I/84
90.	CD/CW/CRP.89	Canada	Small-scale production facility for protective purposes or for all permitted purposes	27/1/84
91.	CD/CW/CRP.90	Germany, Federal Republic of	Concerning chemicals containing the methyl-phosphorus bond	26/1/84

VIII. PAPERS PRESENTED DURING THE CHAIRMAN'S CONSULTATIONS ON TECHNICAL ISSUES

1.	CD/CW/CTC/1	United Kingdom	Chairman's consultations on toxicity criteria	11/III/1982
2.	CD/CW/CTC/2	Italy	Working Paper on toxicity of mustard gas, nitrogen mustard and lewisite for subcutaneous administration and cutaneous application on rats	15/III/1982
3.	CD/CW/CTC/3	China	Working Paper on the definition and criterion of "other harmful chemical"	15/III/1982
4.	CD/CW/CTC/4	Sweden	Suggestion for definition of "precursor" for a Chemical Weapons Convention	16/III/1982
5.	CD/CW/CTC/5	Norway	Norwegian Working Paper	16/III/1982
6.	CD/CW/CTC/6	Poland	Standard operating procedures in acute inhalation toxicity determinations	16/III/1982
7.	CD/CW/CTC/7	Poland	Standard operating procedures in acute subcutaneous toxicity determinations	16/III/1982
8.	CD/CW/CTC/8	Czechoslovakia	Chairman's consultations on toxicity criteria	17/III/1982
9.	CD/CW/CTC/9	German Democratic Republic	Radioactive labelled compounds for testing procedures in toxicology	17/III/1982
10.	CD/CW/CTC/10	Australia	Toxicity criteria and testing methods	17/III/1982
11.	CD/CW/CTC/11	Norway	Comments on apparatus to be used for vapour inhalation experiments	18/III/1982
12.	CD/CW/CTC/12		Later became CD/CW/WP.30	
13.	CD/CW/CTC/13	United States	Precursors (also issued as CD/CW/CRP.31)	19/III/1982
14.	CD/CW/CTC/14	Canada	Mixtures of chemicals	23/III/1982
15.	CD/CW/CTC/15	Sweden	Toxicity criteria for "Key CW precursors"	26/VII/1982
16.	CD/CW/CTC/16	Sweden	Monitoring destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents	26/VII/1982
17.	CD/CW/CTC/17	Hungary	Certain problems of toxicity determination	3/VIII/1982
18.	CD/CW/CTC/18	Germany, Federal Republic of	Destruction of stocks of chemical warfare agents and means of verification	3/VIII/1982

19.	CD/CW/CTC/19	China	On the question of the definition of "precursors" and the control of binary weapons	5/VIII/1982
20.	CD/CW/CTC/20	France	Chairman's consultations on questions of verification of the destruction of chemical weapons	5/VIII/1982
21.	CD/CW/CTC/21	Finland	Progress in systematic identification of chemical warfare agents: Identification of non-phosphorus agents	5/VIII/1982
22.	CD/CW/CTC/22	Norway	Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention: Sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions	5/VIII/1982
23.	CD/CW/CTC/23	United States	Destruction of chemical weapons	5/VIII/1982
24.	CD/CW/CTC/24	United States	Technical evaluation of remote monitoring of on-site sensors	5/VIII/1982
25.	CD/CW/CTC/25	United States	Technical procedures for verification of the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles	5/VIII/1982
26.	CD/CW/CTC/26	German Democratic Republic	Suggestions regarding toxicity determination of CW-agents	6/VIII/1982
27.	CD/CW/CTC/27	USSR	Some problems associated with the prohibition of binary weapons and the verification of compliance with such prohibition	9/VIII/1982
28.	CD/CW/CTC/28	United States	Verification techniques for destruction of declared CW stockpiles	11/I/1983

29.	CD/CW/CTC/29	United States	Precursors and key- precursors	11/I/1983
30.	CD/CW/CTC/30 and Corr.1	Sweden	Identification of "key precursors" under a CW Convention	13/I/1983
31.	CD/CW/CTC/31	United States	Verification procedures for CWs production and filling facilities	17/I/1983
32.	CD/CW/CTC/32	United Kingdom	Precursors and key precursors	18/I/1983
33.	CD/CW/CTC/33	USSR	Possible approaches to a solution of the problem of precursors in the frame- work of a convention on the prohibition of CWs	21/I/1983
34.	CD/CW/CTC/34	China	Definition of precursors and key precursors	21/I/1983
35.	CD/CW/CTC/35	Australia	Lethal and incapacitating chemicals: Definitions for prohibition	21/I/1983
36.	CD/CW/CTC/36	Germany, Federal Republic of	Definition and treatment of precursors	25/I/1983
37.	CD/CW/CTC/37	USSR	Technical issues of verification of stocks of CWs	28/I/1983
38.	CD/CW/CTC/38	USSR	Certain aspects of verification of the pro- cess of destruction of CWs	31/I/1983
39.	CD/CW/CTC/39	Japan	The toxicity of trichothecene compounds	1/II/1983
40.	CD/CW/CTC/40	Yugoslavia	Organophosphorous precursors	3/II/1983
41.	CD/CW/CTC/41	German Democratic Republic	Illustrative list of binary chemical systems	4/II/1983

5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

I. CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (ENDC)

- | | | | |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1. | ENDC/17 Canada | Statement by the Hon. Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, in the 18-member Disarmament Conference, Geneva, March 27 1962 | 28/III/1962 |
| 2. | ENDC/98 Mexico | Working paper for the consideration of the 18-Nation Committee. Outline draft treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons | 21/VI/1963 |
| 3. | ENDC/100 USSR/United Kingdom/
United States
Rev.1 | Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water <u>10/</u> | 30/VII/1963 |

II. CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)

- | | | | |
|----|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 4. | CCD/394 Mexico | Letter dated 20 February 1973 from the Leader of the Delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (transmitting General Assembly document A/C.1/1026 containing the text of a treaty between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. | 20/II/1973 |
|----|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|

III. COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

- | | | | |
|----|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 5. | CD/9 Italy | Additional protocol to the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space: Memorandum. | 26/III/1979 |
| 6. | CD/272 Mongolia | Working paper on the prevention of an arms race in outer space | 5/IV/1982 |

10/ Additional documents relative to the "Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water" are listed under subject heading "Nuclear test ban".

- | | | | | |
|-----|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 7. | CD/274 | USSR | Letter dated 6 April 1982 from the Representative of the USSR addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space submitted to the 36th session of the General Assembly | 7/IV/1982 |
| 8. | CD/320
and
Corr.1 | Canada | Arms control and outer space | 26/VIII/1982 |
| 9. | CD/322 | USSR | Message of greetings from L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Second UN Conference on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space | 1/IX/1982 |
| 10. | CD/329
and Rev. 1 | Group of 21 | Draft mandate for <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Item 7 of the Agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" | 13/IX/1982
29/II/1984 |
| 11. | CD/375 | France | Prevention of an arms race in outer space | 14/IV/1983 |
| 12. | CD/410 | Mongolia | Prevention of an arms race in outer space | 9/VIII/1983 |
| 13. | CD/413 | Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States | Draft mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Item 7 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" | 17/VIII/1983 |
| 14. | CD/418 | Group of 21 | Statement on prevention of an arms race in outer space | 23/VIII/1983 |

IV. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 15. | CD/427* | USSR | Letter dated 30 January 1984 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament Transmitting the Replies given by Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to questions from the newspaper <u>PRAVDA</u> , published on 25 January 1984 | 31/I/1984 |
| 16. | CD/434* | Group of Socialist States | Organizational Matters of the Work of the Conference on Disarmament: Memorandum of a group of socialist States | 17/II/1984 |
| 17. | CD/476 | USSR | Letter dated 20 March 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, transmitting the text of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth | 20/III/1984 |
| 18. | CD/497* | USSR | Letter dated 11 April 1984 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the answers of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K.U. Chernenko, to questions of the newspaper <u>PRAVDA</u> | 11/IV/1984 |
| 19. | CD/501* | Hungary | Letter dated 25 April 1984 from the Head of the Hungarian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the communique of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Budapest on 19 and 20 April 1984 | 26/IV/1984 |

* This document is listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

I. CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (ENDC)

- | | | | | |
|----|----------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1. | ENDC/222 | USSR/
United Kingdom/
United States | Draft Resolution of the Security Council on Security Assurance | 7/III/1968 |
| 2. | ENDC/225 | | Report of the Conference of the ENDC to the UN General Assembly and the UN Disarmament Commission | 14/III/1968 |
| 3. | ENDC/226 | Secretary-General | Letter dated 20 June 1968 from the Secretary-General of the UN to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmitting Resolution 2373 (XXII) of the General Assembly and Resolution S/RES/255 of the Security Council | 16/VII/1968 |

II. CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)

- | | | | | |
|----|---------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 4. | CCD/428 | Pakistan | Strengthening the security of non-nuclear States | 11/VII/1974 |
| 5. | CCD/462 | Pakistan | Strengthening the security of non-nuclear weapon States | 29/VII/1975 |

III. COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

- | | | | | |
|----|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 6. | CD/10 | Pakistan | Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons | 27/III/1979 |
| 7. | CD/23 | Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR | Working paper on draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States | 21/VI/1979 |
| 8. | CD/25 | Pakistan | Working paper on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons | 26/VI/1979 |
| 9. | CD/27 | United States | Working paper on a proposal for a CD recommendation to the UN General Assembly concerning the security of non-nuclear weapon States against nuclear attack | 2/VII/1979 |

10. CD/47 Ad Hoc Working Group to Consider, 2/VIII/1979
and Negotiate on, Effective
International Arrangements to Assure
Non-nuclear weapon States Against
the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear
Weapons - Report to the Committee on
Disarmament
11. CD/75 Finland Letter dated 12 March 1980 addressed 14/III/1980
to the Chairman of the Committee on
Disarmament from the Permanent
Representative of Finland to the
United Nations Office at Geneva
submitting a working document
containing the views of the Finnish
Government concerning the item
"Effective International Arrangements
to assure non-nuclear weapon States
against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons"
12. CD/77 Decision adopted at the 69th plenary 17/III/1980
meeting (establishment for 1980 of an
ad hoc working group)
- CD/120 Pakistan Working Paper - Possible draft 17/VII/1980
resolution for adoption by the UN
Security Council as an interim measure
on "Effective international arrangements
to assure non-nuclear weapon States
against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons" (also issued as
CD/SA/WP.3/Rev.1)
13. CD/125 Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to 7/VIII/1980
negotiate with a view to reaching
agreement on effective international
agreements to assure non-nuclear
weapon States against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons.
Report to the Committee on Disarmament
14. CD/151 Decision adopted by the Committee on 13/II/1981
ad hoc working groups at its
105th plenary meeting on
12 February 1981
15. CD/153 Bulgaria Working Paper: Effective 18/II/1981
international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear weapon States against the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
16. CD/161 Pakistan Working Paper: Effective 4/III/1981
international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear weapon States against the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

- | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 17. CD/176 | USSR | Letter dated 7 April 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the USSR transmitting the reply of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L. Brezhev, to the question put by the Greek newspaper, <u>Ta Nea</u> | 10/IV/1981 |
| 18. CD/177 | United Kingdom | Working Paper on the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons | 10/IV/1981 |
| 19. CD/184 | Pakistan | Letter dated 12 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting resolutions adopted by the 12th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Baghdad from 1-6 June 1981 | 15/VI/1981 |
| 20. CD/207 | China | Working Paper on the question of Security Assurances | 6/VIII/1981 |
| 21. CD/215
and
Corr.1 | | Report to the Committee on Disarmament of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons | 14/VIII/1981 |
| 22. CD/243 | | Decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on <u>ad hoc</u> working groups at its 155th plenary meeting on 18 February | 19/II/1982 |
| 23. CD/278 | China | Working Paper on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons | 7/IV/1982 |
| 24. CD/280 | Group of 21 | Statement of the Group of 21 on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons | 14/IV/1982 |

25. CD/285 Special Report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the SSOD II: Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear weapon States against the Use or Threat of use of nuclear weapons 27/IV/1982
26. CD/290 Statement made by Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, on the occasion of the submission of the special report of the Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament 21/IV/1982
27. CD/321 France Working paper on Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 1/VII/1983
28. CD/358 Decision on the re-establishment of ad hoc working groups for the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament 20/III/1983
29. CD/407 Group of 21 Statement of the Group of 21 on Effective International Arrangements to Assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 4/VIII/1983
30. CD/417 Report to the Committee on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure non-nuclear weapon States against the Use or Threat of use of nuclear weapons 22/VIII/1983

IV. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

31. CD/441 Decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 28/II/1984

32. CD/444 */ USSR

Letter dated 6 March 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting excerpts from the speech of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. K.U. Chernenko, delivered on 2 March 1984 to voters of Moscow's Kuibyshev district 19/III/1984

33. CD/446 */

Decision on the designation of ad hoc subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament 8/III/1984

*/ This document is listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

Restricted Document

1. CD/L.3/Rev.1 Ad Hoc Working Group to consider, 10/IV/1979
and Negotiate on, Effective
International Arrangements to
Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States
against the Use or Threat of Use
of Nuclear Weapons - Revised Draft
Report to the Committee on
Disarmament

- VI. Working Papers of the Ad Hoc Group on Effective International Arrangements
to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of
Nuclear Weapons

1. CD/SA/WP.1/Rev.3 List of Documents on the Question 23/II/1982
of International Arrangements to
Assure non-nuclear-weapon States
against the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons

2. CD/SA/WP.2 Effective International 25/VI/1980
Arrangements to Assure non-
nuclear-weapon States against the
Use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons - Scope and Nature of the
Arrangements

3. CD/SA/WP.3 Pakistan Working Paper - Possible draft 15/VII/1980
resolution for adoption by UN 7/IV/1982
Security Council as an Interim
Measure on "Effective international
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons"
(also issued as CD/120)

4. CD/SA/WP.4 Bulgaria Working Paper - Forms of 17/VII/1980
arrangements to assure non-
nuclear-weapon States against the
use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons

5. CD/SA/WP.5 Chairman's Working Paper: 26/III/1981
Stages of consideration of the
substance of effective
international arrangements to
assure non-nuclear-weapon States
against the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons

6. CD/SA/WP.6 Netherlands Working Paper: Suggested "Common 8/VII/1981
formula" for negative security
assurances to be incorporated in
a Security Council resolution
(also issued as CD/SA/CRP.6) 13/VII/1981

- | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 7. | CD/SA/WP.7 | Pakistan | Working Paper: Proposal in connection with Alternative in Stage Two of document CD/SA/WP.5 (also issued as CD/SA/CRP.8 and Corr.1) | |
| 8. | CD/SA/WP.8 | Bulgaria | Consideration in connection with "Alternative D, Stage Two, document CD/SA/WP.5" and the suggestions made under it. (also issued as CD/SA/CRP.8 and Corr.1) | 21/VII/1981 |
| 9. | CD/SA/WP.9 | Netherlands | Working Paper: Draft Resolution of the Security Council embodying a common formula to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons | I/IV/1982 |
| 10. | CD/SA/WP.10 | Secretariat | Declarations on Security Assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States made by the Five Nuclear Weapon States, including references to nuclear weapon-free zones; and Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America | 30/VI/1983 |

Conference Room Papers of the Ad Hoc Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. | CD/SA/CRP.2/Rev.1 | | Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament | 24/VII/1980 |
| 2. | CD/SA/CRP.3 | Pakistan | Working Paper | 3/III/1981 |
| 3. | CD/SA/CRP.4/Rev.2 | | Chairman's Working Paper: Stages of consideration of the substance of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons | 18/III/1981 |
| 4. | CD/SA/CRP.5 | | Chairman's Working Paper: Identification of the various features of the assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States | 7/IV/1981 |
| 5. | CD/SA/CRP.6 | Netherlands | Working Paper containing a "common formula" on negative security assurances to be incorporated in a Security Council resolution (also issued as CD/SA/WP.6) | 8/VII/1981 |
| 6. | CD/SA/CRP.7 | Pakistan | Working Paper: Alternative D - A common formula for security assurances containing such elements as may be raised in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and agreed upon by all concerned (CD/SA/WP.5) (also issued as CD/SA/WP.7) | 13/VII/1981 |
| 7. | CD/SA/CRP.8 and Corr.1 | Bulgaria | Alternative D (Stage Two, document CD/SA/WP.5) (also issued as CD/SA/WP.8) | 21/VII/1981 |
| 8. | CD/SA/CRP.9/Rev.2/PART I and PART II | | Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament | 7/VIII/1981
12/VIII/1981 |
| 9. | CD/SA/CRP.10 | | Chairman's Working Paper: Programme of Work for the first part of 1982 session | 22/III/1982 |
| 10. | CD/SA/CRP.11/Rev.1 | | Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament | 14/IV/1982 |
| 11. | CD/SA/CRP.12/Rev.2 | | Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament | 22/VIII/1983 |

7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;
radiological weapons

A. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

I. CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)

- | | | | | |
|----|-------------------|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. | CCD/292 | Netherlands | Working Paper concerning
United Nations General Assembly
resolution 2602 D (XXIV) | 14/VII/1970 |
| 2. | CCD/511/
Rev.1 | USSR | Draft agreement on the prohibition
of the development and manufacture
of new types of weapons of mass
destruction and new systems of such
weapons | 8/VIII/1976 |
| 3. | CCD/514 | USSR | On definitions of new types of
weapons of mass destruction and new
systems of such weapons | 10/VIII/1976 |
| 4. | CCD/564 | USSR | Draft decision of the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament on the
establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> group of
qualified governmental experts to
consider the question of possible
areas of the development of new
types and systems of weapons of
mass destruction | 28/III/1978 |
| 5. | CCD/575 | Hungary | Working Paper on infrasound weapons | 14/VIII/1978 |

II. COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

- | | | | | |
|----|--------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 6. | CD/35 | USSR | Letter dated 10 July 1979 from the
Representative of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Committee on Disarmament addressed
to the Chairman of the Committee on
Disarmament on the Negotiations on
the Question of the Prohibition of
New Types of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and New Systems of Such
Weapons | 10/VII/1979 |
| 7. | CD/118 | USSR | Draft decision of the Committee on
Disarmament on the establishment of
an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Experts to
prepare a draft comprehensive
agreement and to consider the
question of concluding special
agreements on individual new types
and systems of weapons of mass
destruction | 15/VII/1980 |

- | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 8. | CD/174 | Hungary | Working Paper: Proposal for informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of qualified governmental experts on the prohibition of development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons | 7/IV/1981 |
| 9. | CD/261 | Hungary | Working Paper: Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons | 15/III/1982 |
| III. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) | | | | |
| 10. | CD/434 */ | Group of socialist States | Organizational Matters of the Work of the Conference on Disarmament: Memorandum of a group of socialist States | 17/II/1984 |

*/ This document is listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

B. Radiological Weapons

I. CONFERENCE ~~OF~~ THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)

1. CCD/291 Netherlands Working Paper concerning 14/VII/1970
United Nations General Assembly
resolution 2602 C (XXIV)

II. COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

2. CD/31 USSR Letter dated 9 July 1979 addressed 9/VII/1979
to the Chairman of the Committee on
Disarmament from the Representative of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
transmitting a document entitled
"Agreed Joint USSR-United States
Proposal on Major Elements of a Treaty
Prohibiting the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Radiological
Weapons"
3. CD/32 United States Letter dated 9 July 1979 addressed 9/VII/1979
to the Chairman of the Committee on
Disarmament from the Representative of
the United States of America
transmitting a document entitled
"Agreed Joint US-USSR Proposal on Major
Elements of a Treaty Prohibiting the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Radiological Weapons"
4. CD/40 Hungary Working Paper on the draft 23/VII/1979
preambular part of the Treaty on the
Prohibition of the Development,
Manufacture, Stockpiling and Use of
Radiological Weapons
5. CD/42 German Working Paper on draft paragraph XI, 25/VII/1979
Democratic subparagraph 3, and paragraph XII,
Republic subparagraph 3, of the Treaty on the
Prohibition of the Development,
Manufacture, Stockpiling and Use of
Radiological Weapons
6. CD/79 Decision adopted at the 69th Plenary 17/III/1980
Meeting held on 17 March 1980 (Originally
submitted as Working Paper No.9/Rev.1)
7. CD/104 Secretariat Compilation of relevant documents on 26/VI/1980
radiological weapons covering the period
1979-1980 (Prepared by the Secretariat at
the request of the Committee on Disarmament)
8. CD/133 Ad Hoc Working Group established 8/VIII/1980
with a view to reaching agreement on a
convention prohibiting the development,
production, stockpiling and use of
radiological weapons: Report to the
Committee on Disarmament

9. CD/151 Decision adopted by the Committee 13/II/1981
on ad hoc working groups at its
105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981
10. CD/218 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group 14/VIII/1981
on Radiological Weapons
11. CD/243 Decision adopted by the Committee on 19/II/1982
Disarmament on ad hoc working groups
at its 156th plenary meeting on
18 February 1982
12. CD/284/Rev.1 and Corr.1 Special Report to the Committee on 23/IV/1982
Disarmament in view of the Second
Special Session Devoted to Disarmament:
Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological
Weapons
13. CD/289 Statement made by Ambassador Henning 21/IV/1982
Wegener, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Radiological Weapons, on the
occasion of the submission to the
Committee on Disarmament of the Report
of the Group
14. CD/323 Japan Working Paper: Prohibition of 1/IX/1982
and Corr.1 Attacks against Nuclear Facilities
(also issued as CD/RW/WP.37)
15. CD/328 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group 9/IX/1982
on Radiological Weapons
16. CD/331 Germany, Working Paper: Issues Relating to 13/IX/1982
CD/RW/WP.40 Federal a Prohibition of Attacks Against Nuclear
Republic of Facilities in the framework of a
Radiological Weapons Treaty
(also issued as CD/RW/WP.40)
17. CD/345 Group of Ensuring the Safe Development of 14/II/1983
socialist Nuclear Energy (Proposal by a group
Countries of socialist countries)
18. CD/358 Decision on the re-establishment of 20/III/1983
ad hoc working groups for the 1983
session of the Committee on Disarmament
(adopted at the 207th Plenary Meeting
held on 29 March 1983)
19. CD/374 United Definition of Radiological Weapons 13/IV/1983
Kingdom and the scope of a Radiological Weapons
Treaty
(also issued as CD/RW/WP.14)
20. CD/414 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group 18/VIII/1983
on Radiological Weapons

III. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

- | | | | | |
|-----|-----------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 21. | CD/434 */ | Group of
socialist
States | Organizational Matters of the Work
of the Conference on Disarmament:
Memorandum of a group of socialist
States | 17/II/1984 |
| 22. | CD/499 | | Decision on the establishment of
an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological
Weapons | 17/IV/1984 |

*/ This document is listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

IV. WORKING PAPERS OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

- | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 1. | CD/RW/WP.1 | Secretariat | Compilation of relevant documents on radiological weapons covering the period 1979-1980 | 26/VI/1980 |
| 2. | CD/RW/WP.2/
Rev.1 | Chairman | Main elements in the negotiations of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons | 20/VI/1980 |
| 3. | CD/RW/WP.3 | Canada | Comments on major elements of a Treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons | 18/VI/1980 |
| 4. | CD/RW/WP.4 | Germany,
Federal
Republic of | Proposal for a new Article V | 23/VI/1980 |
| 5. | CD/RW/WP.5 | Germany,
Federal
Republic of | Comments on major elements of a Treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons | 25/VI/1980 |
| 6. | CD/RW/WP.6 | Sweden | Proposal for Articles I, II and III, of a Treaty prohibiting radiological warfare including the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons | 30/VI/1980 |
| 7. | CD/RW/WP.7 | Italy | Comments on major elements of a Treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons (CD/31 and CD/32) | 30/VI/1980 |
| 8. | CD/RW/WP.8 | France | Proposed amendments to the agreed joint USSR-USA proposal on major elements of a Treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons | 8/VII/1980 |
| 9. | CD/RW/WP.9 | Pakistan | Proposals for a revised Article V and a new article after Article V | 8/VII/1980 |
| 10. | CD/RW/WP.10 | Yugoslavia | Proposal for an article of the Treaty related to the definition of radiological weapons | 8/VII/1980 |

- | | | | | |
|-----|------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 11. | CD/RW/WP.11 | Argentina | Observations on a Treaty prohibiting radiological weapons | 9/VII/1980 |
| 12. | CD/RW/WP.12 | Venezuela | Proposals for a title and for substitution of the Articles I, II and III of the "agreed joint USSR-USA proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons" | 11/VII/1980 |
| 13. | CD/RW/WP.13/
Rev.2 | Secretariat | List of documents, working papers and conference room papers | 21/VIII/1980 |
| 14. | CD/RW/WP.14 | Sweden | Proposal for a study on IAEA safeguards | 14/VII/1980 |
| 15. | CD/RW/WP.15 | Secretariat | Tabulation of the texts of all proposals concerning the provisions of a treaty on radiological weapons | 21/VII/1980 |
| 16. | CD/RW/WP.15/
Add.1/Rev.1 | India | Proposals for amendments of Articles I, II, III, V and VII of the elements of the proposed Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons | 16/III/1981 |
| 17. | CD/RW/WP.15/
Add.2 | Indonesia | Statement delivered by the delegation at the 4th meeting of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons held on 13 March 1981 | 16/III/1981 |
| 18. | CD/RW/WP.15/
Add.2/Supp.1 | Indonesia | Comment on the agreed joint USSR-United States CD/31-CD/32, especially para.3, Article VIII, concerning compliance and verification and on the French proposal contained in CD/RW/WP.8 | 30/III/1981 |
| 19. | CD/RW/WP.15/
Add.3 | Yugoslavia | Proposal for amendments to Article II of the elements of the proposed Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons | 23/III/1981 |
| 20. | CD/RW/WP.16/
Rev.1 | | Report to the Committee on Disarmament | 1/VIII/1980 |
| 21. | CD/RW/WP.17 | Chairman | Brief delivered at 1st meeting of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons held on 20 February 1981 | 25/II/1981 |

22.	CD/RW/WP.18	Chairman	Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on definition and scope of prohibition of a future treaty	11/III/1981
23.	CD/RW/WP.18/ Add.1	Chairman	Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on activities and obligations and peaceful uses	24/III/1981
24.	CD/RW/WP.18/ Add.2	Chairman	Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on relationship with other Disarmament measures and agreements and compliance and verification	31/III/1981
25.	CD/RW/WP.18/ Add.2/Supp.1	Chairman	Working Paper containing alternative text for Annex	3/IV/1981
26.	CD/RW/WP.18/ Add.3	Chairman	Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on Amendments, Duration and Withdrawal, Review of Conferences, Adherence, Entry into Force, Depositary	6/IV/1981
27.	CD/RW/WP.19	Sweden	Memorandum on certain aspects of a convention prohibiting radiological warfare	16/III/1981
28.	CD/RW/WP.20	Chairman	Working Paper containing consolidated text based on proposals submitted by the Chairman	21/IV/1981
29.	CD/RW/WP.20/ Add.1	Sweden	Proposal for Article VI of the consolidated text by the Chairman	6/VII/1981
30.	CD/RW/WP.20/ Add.1/Supp.1	Morocco	Proposal for Article VI of the consolidated text by the Chairman	10/VII/1981
31.	CD/RW/WP.20/ Add.2	Japan	Proposed amendment to Article V of CD/RW/WP.20	7/VII/1981
32.	CD/RW/WP.20/ Add.3	Germany, Federal Republic of	Proposal for Article VII and Annex of the consolidated text by the Chairman	23/VII/1981
33.	CD/RW/WP.20/ Add.4	Sweden	Proposal for Article VIII of the consolidated text by the Chairman	27/VII/1981
34.	CD/RW/WP.20/ Add.5	Venezuela	Proposed amendment to Article IX of document CD/RW/WP.20	27/VII/1981

35.	CD/RW/WP.20/ Morocco Add.6	Proposed amendment to Article VII of document CD/RW/WP.20	30/VII/1981
36.	CD/RW/WP.20/ Chairman Add.7	Working paper on definition and scope of prohibition	30/VII/1981
37.	CD/RW/WP.20/ Chairman Add.8	Working paper on peaceful uses	30/VII/1981
38.	CD/RW/WP.20/ The Netherlands Add.9/Rev.1	Proposed amendments to Articles VIII and X	7/IV/1982
39.	CD/RW/WP.21 Chairman	Working Paper containing time-table for the work of the Working Group during the Second part of the CD 1981 session	18/VI/1981
40.	CD/RW/WP.22 Australia	Working Paper on the scope and definition of the future Treaty on Radiological Weapons	1/VII/1981
41.	CD/RW/WP.23 Group of 21	Working Paper on certain elements of the Convention on the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons	15/VII/1981
42.	CD/RW/WP.24/ Rev.1	Draft Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons	10/VIII/1981
43.	CD/RW/WP.25 Chairman	Statement (of 9 March 1982)	9/III/1982
44.	CD/RW/WP.25/ Chairman Add.1/Rev.1	Amended Proposal for the organization of work during the opening session (adopted by the Working Group on 15 March 1982)	15/III/1982
45.	CD/RW/WP.26 Chairman	Working Paper: Positive formulations of a RW definition	10/III/1982
46.	CD/RW/WP.27 Chairman	Tentative programme of work	15/III/1982
47.	CD/RW/WP.28 Chairman	Working Paper: Suggested formulation of the provision on scope of the Radiological Weapons Treaty	15/III/1982
48.	CD/RW/WP.29 Chairman	Working Paper: Suggested formulation of the provisions on peaceful uses	22/III/1982
49.	CD/RW/WP.30 Yugoslavia	Definition of Radiological Weapons - Article II	18/III/1982

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 50. | CD/RW/WP.31
and Add.1 | Australia | Proposal on Definition and
Scope of Prohibition (giving
two alternative texts) | 19/III and
2/IV/1982 |
| 51. | CD/RW/WP.32 | Chairman | Working Paper: Suggested
mechanism of compliance and
verification (following on
document CD/RW/WP.20) | 22/III/1982 |
| 52. | CD/RW/WP.33 | Chairman | Summary of suggested issues of
initial relevance relating to
protection of nuclear facilities
for discussion during Working
Group meetings on 26 March and
2 April 1982 | 30/III/1982 |
| 53. | CD/RW/WP.34 | Sweden | Memorandum of certain aspects
of a convention prohibiting
radiological warfare | 5/IV/1982 |
| 54. | CD/RW/WP.35 | Chairman | Draft Report to the Committee
on Disarmament in view of the
Second Special Session devoted
to Disarmament (Introduction)
(Parts A and C) | 13/IV/1982 |
| 55. | CD/RW/WP.35/
Add.1 | Chairman | Discussions on the provisions
of the Draft Treaty on
Radiological Weapons
("traditional" RW subject-matter)
(Part B) | 16/IV/1982 |
| 56. | CD/RW/WP.36 | Group of 21 | Text proposed for an Article in
the Draft Treaty on Radiological
Weapons | 14/IV/1982 |
| 57. | CD/RW/WP.37
and Corr.1 | Japan | Working Paper: Prohibition of
attacks against nuclear
facilities (also issued as
CD/323) | 1/IX/1982 |
| 58. | CD/RW/WP.38 | Chairman | Statement (of 6 September 1982) | 6/IX/1982 |
| 59. | CD/RW/WP.39 | Chairman | Working Paper: Compilation of
Radiological Weapons | 9/IX/1982 |
| 60. | CD/RW/WP.40 | Germany,
Federal
Republic of | Working Paper: Issues relating
to a prohibition of attacks
against nuclear facilities in
the framework of a radiological
weapons treaty (also issued as
CD/331) | 13/IX/1982 |
| 61. | CD/RW/WP.41
CD/374 | United Kingdom | Definition of Radiological
Weapons and the scope of a
Radiological Weapons Treaty
(also issued as CD/374) | 13/IV/1983 |

62.	CD/RW/WP.42	Chairman	Working Paper: Meetings in the First Part of the 1983 session	14/IV/1983
63.	CD/RW/WP.43	Chairman	Working Paper: Meetings in the Second Part of the 1983 session	26/IV/1983
64.	CD/RW/WP.44	Chairman	Working Paper containing Co-ordinator's progress reports of Groups A and B	29/IV/1983
65.	CD/RW/WP.45 and Corr.1	Sweden	Compliance and Verification	13 and 21/VI/1983
66.	CD/RW/WP.46	United States	Proposal by the delegation of the United States	16/VI/1983
67.	CD/RW/WP.47	United Kingdom	The prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities	30/VI/1983
68.	CD/RW/WP.48	Group of 21	Proposal for an Article on "Peaceful Uses"	30/VI/1983
69.	CD/RW/WP.49	Japan	Proposal for Article I ("Definition"), Article II ("Scope of Prohibition") and the related Article	6/VII/1983
70.	CD/RW/WP.50/ Rev.1		A compilation of types or categories of nuclear facilities to be considered	12/VIII/1983
71.	CD/RW/WP.51		A compilation of alternative mechanisms for the linkage between "traditional radiological weapons subject-matter" and "prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities"	11/VIII/1983

V. Conference Room Papers of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons

1. CD/RW/CRP.1 and Corr.1 Definition: Proposals by USSR-United States, Netherlands, France, Sweden, Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan, Canada and Italy 30/VI/1980
2. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.1 and Corr.1 Definition: Proposals by Egypt, Pakistan, Italy and Australia 1 and 7/VII/1980
3. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.2 Definition: Proposals by India 3/VII/1980
4. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.3 Definition: Proposal by Yugoslavia 7/VII/1980
5. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.4 Definition: Proposals by Venezuela and Argentina 14/VII/1980
6. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.5 Definition: Proposal by Morocco 15/VII/1980
7. CD/RW/CRP.2 Scope of Prohibition: Proposals by USSR-United States, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands and Australia 1/VII/1980
8. CD/RW/CRP.2/Add.1 Scope of Prohibition: Proposal by France 7/VII/1980
9. CD/RW/CRP.3 Activities and Obligations: Proposals by USSR-United States, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Pakistan and India 7/VII/1980
10. CD/RW/CRP.3/Add.1 Activities and obligations: Proposals by Australia and France 7/VII/1980
11. CD/RW/CRP.4 Peaceful Uses: Proposal by USSR-United States, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy and Pakistan 7/VII/1980
12. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.1 Peaceful Uses: Proposal by France 7/VII/1980
13. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.2 Peaceful Uses: Proposal by Pakistan 7/VII/1980
14. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.3 Peaceful Uses: Proposal by Romania 11/VII/1980
15. CD/RW/CRP.5 Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposals by USSR-United States, Pakistan, Egypt, Canada and France 7/VII/1980
16. CD/RW/CRP.5/Add.1 Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposal by Australia and France 7/VII/1980
17. CD/RW/CRP.5/Add.2 Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposal by Pakistan 14/VII/1980
18. CD/RW/CRP.6 Compliance and Verification: Proposals by USSR-United States, Belgium, France and Sweden 8/VII/1980

19.	CD/RW/CRP.6/Add.1	<u>Compliance and Verification:</u> Proposal by Pakistan	14/VII/1980
20.	CD/RW/CRP.7	<u>Annex:</u> Proposals by USSR-United States and France	8/VII/1980
21.	CD/RW/CRP.8	<u>Amendments:</u> Proposals by USSR-United States and France	9/VII/1980
22.	CD/RW/CRP.9	<u>Duration and Withdrawal:</u> Proposals by USSR-United States and France	9/VII/1980
23.	CD/RW/CRP.10	<u>Review Conferences:</u> Proposals by USSR-United States, German Democratic Republic, Australia and France	9/VII/1980
24.	CD/RW/CRP.10/Add.1	<u>Review Conferences:</u> Proposal by Morocco	15/VII/1980
25.	CD/RW/CRP.11	<u>Adherence, Entry into Force, Depositary:</u> Proposals by USSR-United States, German Democratic Republic, Australia, France and Pakistan	9/VII/1980
26.	CD/RW/CRP.12	<u>Preamble:</u> Proposals by Hungary, Sweden, Egypt and Belgium	9/VII/1980
27.	CD/RW/CRP.12/Add.1	<u>Preamble:</u> Proposal by Bulgaria	14/VII/1980
28.	CD/RW/CRP.12/Add.2	<u>Preamble:</u> Proposals by Sweden and Germany, Federal Republic of	17/VII/1980
29.	CD/RW/CRP.13	<u>Invitation to the International Atomic Energy Agency:</u> Proposal by The Netherlands	9/VII/1981
30.	CD/RW/CRP.14	<u>Scope on Prohibition:</u> Proposal by The Netherlands	17/VII/1981
31.	CD/RW/CRP.15	<u>Amendments to text of Draft Report</u>	13/VIII/1981
32.	CD/RW/CRP.16	<u>Definition of facilities to be protected:</u> Proposal by Pakistan	30/III/1982
33.	CD/RW/CRP.17	<u>Draft Consolidated Radiological Weapons Treaty Provisions:</u> Submitted by the Chairman	6/IV/1982
34.	CD/RW/CRP.18 (CD/328)	Draft Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons	6/IX/1982
35.	CD/RW/CRP.19	Suggestions by the Co-ordinator on the Issues of Definition, Peaceful Uses, and Relationship to Other Agreements	28/IV/1983
36.	CD/RW/CRP.20	Suggestions by the Co-ordinator for the Structure of a Treaty Prohibiting Radiological Weapons	23/VI/1983
37.	CD/RW/CRP.20/Rev.1	Submission by the Co-ordinator of Group A	3/VIII/1983

- | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 38. | CD/RW/CRP.21/Rev.1 | Report of Group A | 9/VIII/1983 |
| 39. | CD/RW/CRP.22/Rev.2 | Report of Group B on the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities | 12/VIII/1983 |
| 40. | CD/RW/CRP.23 | Draft Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons | 2/VIII/1983 |
| 41. | CD/RW/CRP.24 | A list of proposals regarding the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities | 10/VIII/1983 |

VI. In addition, during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Secretariat prepared and circulated to the Working Group on Radiological Weapons a number of informal papers relating to proposals made by Members under the item as follows:

- (1) Compilation of texts regarding "Definition" and "Scope of Prohibition" as contained in CD/31, CD/32, CD/RW/WP.20 and CD/RW/WP.39
- (2) Compilation of texts regarding "Peaceful Uses" as contained in CD/31, CD/32, CD/RW/WP.20 and CD/RW/WP.39
- (3) Compilation of texts regarding "Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements" as contained in CD/31, CD/32, CD/RW/WP.20 and CD/RW/WP.39
- (4) Compilation of texts regarding "Compliance and Verification" as contained in CD/31, CD/32, CD/RW/WP.20 and CD/RW/WP.39
- (5) A list of proposed draft treaties on radiological weapons
- (6) A list of proposals on the draft preamble part of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons
- (7) A list of proposals on "Definition" and "Scope of Prohibition" parts of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons
- (8) A list of proposals on "Peaceful Uses" part of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons
- (9) A list of proposals on "Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements" part of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons
- (10) A list of proposals on "Compliance and Verification" part of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons
- (11) A list of proposals on "Amendments", "Review Conferences", "Duration and Withdrawal", "Adherence, Entry into Force, Depositary" parts of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons
- (12) A list of proposals on "Annex" part of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons
- (13) A list of proposals regarding the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities

- (14) A compilation of texts of provisions contained in certain existing legal instruments regarding the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities
- (15) Compilation of specific proposals which may facilitate the formulation of a list of criteria regarding the scope of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities
- (16) A preliminary list of types or categories of nuclear facilities to be considered
- (17) A compilation of alternative mechanisms for the linkage between "Traditional radiological weapons subject matter" and "prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities"

8. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

I. CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (ENDC)

- | | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | ENDC/2 USSR | Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control | 19/III/1962 |
| 2. | ENDC/2 USSR
and Add.1 | Addendum to ENDC/2
(also issued as ENDC/48) | 16/VII/1962 |
| 3. | ENDC/2 USSR
and Rev.1
and
Corr.1
and
Add.1 | Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control | 26/IX/1962

20/XII/1962

4/II/1964 |
| 4. | ENDC/3 USSR | Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on disarmament negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Committee | 19/III/1962 |
| 5. | ENDC/4 USSR
and Rev.1 | Statement by the Foreign Minister of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko, at the meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, on 15 March 1962 | 19/III/1962 |
| 6. | ENDC/5 USSR, United States | Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations | 19/III/1962 |
| 7. | ENDC/6 United States | Declaration on Disarmament: A programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world | 19/III/1962 |
| 8. | ENDC/14 USSR | Memorandum of the Government of the USSR of 26 September 1961 on measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and contribute to general and complete disarmament | 24/III/1962 |
| 9. | ENDC/13 United States | Outline of provisions of a basic treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world: Preamble (Draft Preamble previously submitted as ENDC/L.3). Part I: Objectives and principles | 4/IV/1962 |
| 10. | ENDC/19/ Canada
Rev.1 | An outline review, USSR and USA disarmament proposals | 6/IV/1962 |
| 11. | ENDC/30 United States
and
Corr.1
and
Add.1
and
Add.2
and
Add.3 | Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world | 18/IV/1962
25/IV/1962
6/VIII/1962
8/VIII/1962
10/III/1964 |

12.	ENDC/36 and Rev.1	Canada	An outline comparison: USA and USSR disarmament proposals	4/V/1962 20/VIII/1963
13.	ENDC/40 and Rev.1	USSR, United States	Working draft of Part I of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (in a Peaceful World) proposed by the USA and USSR	31/V/1962
14.	ENDC/48	USSR	Additions and amendments to the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control submitted by the USSR delegation on 15 March 1962 (ENDC/26) (Also issued as ENDC/2/Add.1)	16/VII/1962
15.	ENDC/55	USSR, United States	Working draft of article 4 of Part II of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (in a Peaceful World) proposed by the USA and USSR	7/VIII/1962
16.	ENDC/69	United States	US draft of treaty on general and complete disarmament, article V	10/XII/1962
17.	ENDC/L.1	Sweden	Observations on the drafting of the preamble of the treaty	30/III/1962
18.	ENDC/L.2	United Kingdom	Amendments of the UK delegation to the preamble of the Soviet draft treaty	31/III/1962
19.	ENDC/L.3	United States	Outline of provisions of a basic treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. Draft preamble	2/IV/1962
20.	ENDC/L.4	Canada	Draft preamble to a treaty on general and complete disarmament	2/IV/1962
21.	ENDC/L.5	India	Draft preamble for a treaty on general and complete disarmament	2/IV/1962
22.	ENDC/L.6	Italy	Memorandum concerning the preamble to the treaty on general and complete disarmament	2/IV/1962
23.	ENDC/L.7	USSR, United States	Working draft: Draft preamble to outline of provisions of a basic treaty on general and complete disarmament (in a peaceful world)	6/IV/1962
24.	ENDC/L.8	Brazil	Comments by the delegation of Brazil on the draft preamble to the treaty on general and complete disarmament proposed by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America	12/IV/1962

25.	ENDC/L.9	Italy	Memorandum (Draft amendment to the document ENDC/18)	16/IV/1962
26.	ENDC/L.10	United Kingdom	Comments of the UK on Part I of the US and Soviet proposals for a treaty on general and complete disarmament	16/IV/1962
27.	ENDC/L.11/ Rev.1	USSR, United States	Working Draft: Draft preamble of the treaty on general and complete disarmament(in a peaceful world)	17/IV/1962
28.	ENDC/L.12	United Kingdom	Further comments on Part I of the US and Soviet proposals	27/IV/1962
29.	ENCD/L.13	Sweden	Draft amendments to the USSR draft treaty (ENDC/2) (Part I - general)	27/IV/1962
30.	ENDC/L.14	Sweden	Draft amendments to the outline of basic provisions submitted by the USA (ENDC/30) (Objectives)	27/IV/1962
31.	ENDC/L.15	Canada	Comments on Part I of the USA and proposals for a treaty on general and complete disarmament	27/IV/1962
32.	ENDC/L.16	India	Observations on Part I of a treaty on general and complete disarmament	27/IV/1962
33.	ENDC/L.17 and Rev.1	Bulgaria	Working paper: Draft article 4 of the treaty on general and complete disarmament Part II: First stages of general and complete disarmament. Article 4 - First stage tasks	25/VII/1962 31/VII/1962
34.	ENDC/L.18	United States	Working draft of article 4 of treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world proposed by the United States of America - Part II - Stage I. Article 4 - Basic obligations and time limit of Stage I	
35.	ENDC/79	Canada	Comparison of some significant developments in USA/USSR disarmament plans, 1960-1963	3/IV/1963
36.	ENDC/93/ Rev.1	Ethiopia, Nigeria, United Arab Republic	Resolution adopted by the Conference of Heads of African States and Governments, Addis Ababa, 22-25 May 1963 on general and complete disarmament	18/VI/1963

37.	ENDC/109	United States	Draft articles VI to XII (relating to nuclear disarmament in Stage I) of US draft of treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. Article VI, production and use of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons	14/VIII/1963
38.	ENDC/143	Burma	Communication on behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and United Arab Republic concerning a memorandum of the eight delegations.	14/IX/1964
39.	ENDC/144	Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic	Memorandum containing a brief resumé of the suggestions and proposals made by each delegation on measures of disarmament and collateral measures discussed during 1964 in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	14/IX/1964
40.	ENDC/245	Italy	Working paper setting forth suggestions for the adoption of an organic disarmament programme	21/IV/1969

II. CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)

41.	CCD/276	Netherlands	Working paper containing some introductory remarks on steps towards a comprehensive disarmament programme	24/II/1970
42.	CCD/309	Italy	Working paper on a comprehensive programme of disarmament	19/VIII/1970
43.	CCD/313	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia	Draft comprehensive programme of disarmament	27/VIII/1970
44.	CCD/449	Romania	Steps to be taken within a disarmament programme	25/III/1975
45.	CCD/522	USSR	Memorandum of the Soviet Union on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament	15/II/1977
46.	CCD/545 and Corr.1	Mexico	Working paper containing a preliminary draft comprehensive programme of disarmament	23/VIII/1977
47.	CCD/548	Italy	Working paper on the question of the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament	31/I/1978

48.	CCD/549 and Corr.1	United Kingdom	Draft programme of action for the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament	2/II/1978
49.	CD/550 and Corr.1	Argentina, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zaire	Working document containing a draft declaration, programme of action and machinery for implementation	16/II/1978
50.	CCD/552	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	21/II/1978
51.	CCD/553	Romania	Working paper on the draft programme of disarmament	21/II/1978
52.	CCD/554	Sweden	Elements for inclusion in the programme of action of the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament and in its documents relating to the machinery for disarmament negotiations	21/II/1978
53.	CCD/555	Nigeria	Suggestions for inclusion in a comprehensive programme of disarmament	24/II/1978
54.	CCD/556	Pakistan	Working paper to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament: Declaration on disarmament	6/III/1978
55.	CCD/557	Pakistan	Working paper to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament: Programme of action on disarmament	6/III/1978
56.	CCD/560	Mexico	Some fundamental principles and norms for inclusion in the "Declaration on Disarmament" envisaged in the draft agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, approved by the Preparatory Committee on 18 May 1978	10/III/1978
57.	CCD/561 and Add.1	Mexico	Outline of a draft final document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament	10/III/1978

58.	CCD/565	Netherlands	Study on the establishment of an international disarmament agency	30/III/1978
59.	CCD/566 and Add.1	Secretariat	Compilation of documents and proposals submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament relevant to the consideration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament	4/IV/1978
60.	CCD/567 and Add. 1	Secretariat	Tabulation of working papers and proposals on a comprehensive programme of disarmament	18/IV/1978
61.	CCD/568	Italy	Working paper on international mechanisms for disarmament	24/IV/1978
62.	CCD/571		Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to discuss and elaborate a comprehensive programme for disarmament to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	10/V/1978
63.	CCD/572		Terms of reference for the CCD <u>Ad Hoc</u> working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament	10/V/1978

III. COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

64.	CD/78		Decision adopted at the 69th Plenary Meeting held on 17 March 1980 (Originally submitted as Working Paper No. 8/Rev.1)	17/III/1980
65.	CD/126/ Rev.1		Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	7/VIII/1980
66.	CD/128	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia	Proposal for the main elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament	4/VIII/1980
67.	CD/151		Decision adopted by the Committee on <u>ad hoc</u> working groups at its 105th Plenary Meeting, on 12 February 1981	13/II/1981
68.	CD/155	Italy	Working paper: comprehensive programme of disarmament - 'Objectives'	24/II/1981
69.	CD/160	USSR	To strengthen peace, deepen détente, and curb the arms race	3/III/1981
70.	CD/166	USSR	Peace, disarmament and international security guarantees	23/III/1981

71.	CD/172	China	Working paper on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament	2/IV/1981
72.	CD/198	Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, United Kingdom	Working paper: Comprehensive programme of disarmament	20/VII/1981
73.	CD/205	Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, United Kingdom	Draft comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/CPD/WP.52)	31/VII/1981
74.	CD/208	Group of 21	Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/CPD/WP.55)	10/VIII/1981
75.	CD/214	China	Working paper on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament	13/VIII/1981
76.	CD/217 and Corr.1		Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	17/VIII/1981
77.	CD/223	Group of 21	Working paper on the chapter entitled "Measures" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament	19/VIII/1981
78.	CD/229	Group of 21	Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/CPD/WP.56)	27/I/1982
79.	CD/230	Group of 21	Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/CPD/WP.57)	27/I/1982
80.	CD/232	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/CPD/WP.58)	29/I/1982
81.	CD/233	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/CPD/WP.59)	29/I/1982
82.	CD/239	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/CPD/WP.60)	8/II/1982
83.	CD/245	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Working paper on the agenda item entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament"	19/II/1982

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 84. | CD/255 | Group of 21 | Working paper on the chapter entitled "Machinery and procedures" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/CPD/WP.63) | 3/III/1982 |
| 85. | CD/283 | | Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament | 26/IV/1982 |
| 86. | CD/286 | | Statement made by Amb. Alfonso Garcia Robles, Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the Report of the Group and the draft comprehensive programme annexed thereto | 19/IV/1982 |
| 87. | CD/296 | Romania | Considerations of the Grand National Assembly of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, presented to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament | 26/VII/1982 |
| 88. | CD/305 | | Decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on the re-establishment of its <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament | 5/VIII/1982 |
| 89. | CD/415 | | Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament | 19/VIII/1983 |

IV. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------|--|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 90. | CD/442 | | Decision on the re-establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> subsidiary body on the comprehensive programme of disarmament | 28/II/1984 |
| 91. | CD/446* | | Decision on the designation of <u>ad hoc</u> subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament | 8/III/1984 |

*This document is listed under other agenda items to which it is also relevant.

V. WORKING PAPERS OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME
OF DISARMAMENT

1.	CD/CPD/ WP.1	Secretariat	List of documents	28/IV/1980
2.	CD/CPD/ WP.2/ Rev.1	Chairman of the Working Group	Outline of a comprehensive disarmament programme (Paper prepared by the Chairman)	30/VI/1980
3.	CD/CPD/ WP.3 and Rev.1	Mexico	Draft text for the section of the programme entitled "Objectives"	30/VI/1980 16/VI/1981
4.	CD/CPD/ WP.4	Pakistan	Working paper	30/VI/1980
5.	CD/CPD/ WP.5	Czechoslovakia	Working paper entitled "Draft text of the section of the programme headed "Objectives"	4/VII/1980

6.	CD/CPD/WP.6	Mexico	Draft text for the section of the programme entitled "principles and guidelines"	7/VII/1980
7.	CD/CPD/WP.7 and Add.1	USSR, United States	Documents of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee	8/VII/1980 11/VII/1980
8.	CD/CPD/WP.8	China	Chinese Delegations' proposal on the main principles of a comprehensive programme of disarmament	9/VII/1980
9.	CD/CPD/WP.9	Czechoslovakia	Draft section of a comprehensive programme of disarmament concerning the general guidelines for efforts to limit the arms race and achieve disarmament	11/VII/1980
10.	CD/CPD/WP.10	Venezuela	Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	11/VII/1980
11.	CD/CPD/WP.11 and Corr.1 and Corr.2	Secretariat	List of specific measures as contained in the final document of the Tenth Special Session and Reports of the Disarmament Commission, 1979 and 1980	15/VII/1980
12.	CD/CPD/WP.12	Poland	Comprehensive programme for disarmament and the concept of education for peace: Working Paper	17/VII/1980
13.	CD/CPD/WP.13 and Add.1	Czechoslovakia	Draft text for the "Principles" section of the comprehensive programme of disarmament	18/VII/1980 15/IV/1981
14.	CD/CPD/WP.14	Secretariat	List of specific measures as envisaged in the Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1962 (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, submitted by the United States of America in 1962 (ENDC/30)	18/VII/1980
15.	CD/CPD/WP.15	Czechoslovakia	Working paper on forms and machinery	21/VII/1980
16.	CD/CPD/WP.16 and Rev.1		Report to the Committee on Disarmament	22/VII/1980 28/VII/1980
17.	CD/CPD/WP.17	Nigeria	Working paper on "Stages of implementation" prepared by the Representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman	24/II/1981

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------------|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 18. | CD/CPD/WP.18 | Nigeria | Working paper on the nature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Amb. Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman | 24/II/1981 |
| 19. | CD/CPD/WP.19 | United Kingdom | Working paper on the "Stages of implementation" prepared by the representative of the United Kingdom, Amb. Summerhayes, at the request of the Chairman | 25/II/1981 |
| 20. | CD/CPD/WP.20 | USSR | Statement prepared by the representative of the USSR on 5 March 1981 in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control", submitted to the ENDC in 1962 | 9/III/1981 |
| 21. | CD/CPD/WP.21 | United States | Statement by the representative of the USA on 5 March 1981, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", submitted to the ENDC in 1962 | 9/III/1981 |
| 22. | CD/CPD/WP.22 | Italy | Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, "Objectives" | 9/III/1981 |
| 23. | CD/CPD/WP.23 | Secretariat | Tabulation of measures that are not explicitly included in the tabulations contained in documents CD/CPD/WP.11 and 14 | 13/III/1981 |
| 24. | CD/CPD/WP.24 | China | Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, Supplementary proposals on "Measures" | 30/III/1981 |
| 25. | CD/CPD/WP.25 | China | Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Further proposals on the "Measures" | 6/IV/1981 |
| 26. | CD/CPD/WP.26 | Pakistan | Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament | 3/IV/1981 |

27.	CD/CPD/WP.27	Secretariat	Results of the preliminary examination of chapters V (Measures) and VI (Stages of implementation) of the comprehensive programme of disarmament	6/IV/1981
28.	CD/CPD/WP.28	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament: "Measures"	15/IV/1981
29.	CD/CPD/WP.29	Secretariat	Tabulation of the principles contained in the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	16/IV/1981
30.	CD/CPD/WP.30	Italy	Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	24/IV/1981
31.	CD/CPD/WP.31	China	Working paper on "Objectives" of a comprehensive programme of disarmament	15/VI/1981
32.	CD/CPD/WP.32	Secretariat	Tabulation of the "Objectives" contained in the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	16/VI/1981
33.	CD/CPD/WP.33	Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, United Kingdom	Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	17/VI/1981
34.	CD/CPD/WP.34	Secretariat	Tabulations of the provisions concerning "Machinery and procedure" contained in the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	23/VI/1981
35.	CD/CPD/WP.35	Bulgaria	Proposed text for the section of the comprehensive programme of disarmament entitled "Objectives"	23/VI/1981

36.	CD/CPD/WP.36 and Corr. 1 and Add.1 and Add.2 and Add.3	Group of 21	Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	1/VII/1981 15/VII/1981 5/VIII/1981 10/VIII/1981
37.	CD/CPD/WP.37	Australia	Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	1/VII/1981
38.	CD/CPD/WP.38	Australia	Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	1/VII/1981
39.	CD/CPD/WP.39	France	Proposed amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27	7/VII/1981
40.	CD/CPD/WP.40	USSR	Proposed amendments to the section "Nuclear Weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27	7/VII/1981
41.	CD/CPD/WP.41	Secretariat	"Machinery and procedure". Compilation of certain proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the final document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly	7/VII/1981
42.	CD/CPD/WP.42	Poland	Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	9/VII/1981
43.	CD/CPD/WP.43	German Democratic Republic, Venezuela	Draft text for the section of the comprehensive programme of disarmament entitled "Machinery and procedure"	13/VII/1981
44.	CD/CPD/WP.44	China	Working paper on the first stage of nuclear disarmament measures of the comprehensive programme of disarmament	13/VII/1981
45.	CD/CPD/WP.45	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Proposed amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27	20/VII/1981
46.	CD/CPD/WP.46	German Democratic Republic	Proposed amendments to the sections "Conventional weapons and armed forces" and "Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27	21/VII/1981

47.	CD/CPD/WP.47	German Democratic Republic, USSR	Proposed amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27	24/VII/1981
48.	CD/CPD/WP.48	Poland	Proposed amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27	31/VII/1981
49.	CD/CPD/WP.49	Bulgaria	Proposed amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27	31/VII/1981
50.	CD/CPD/WP.50	Mongolia	Proposed amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27	31/VII/1981
51.	CD/CPD/WP.51	USSR	Proposed amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27	31/VII/1981
52.	CD/CPD/WP.52	Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, United Kingdom	Draft comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/205)	31/VII/1981
53.	CD/CPD/WP.53	Nigeria, Poland, Venezuela	Proposed amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27	3/VIII/1981
54.	CD/CPD/WP.54	Secretariat	Results of the examination of Stage I measures contained in document CD/CPD/WP.27 and of written and oral proposals made in connection therewith	10/VIII/1981
55.	CD/CPD/WP.55	Group of 21	Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/208)	10/VIII/1981
56.	CD/CPD/WP.56	Group of 21	Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/229)	27/I/1982
57.	CD/CPD/WP.57	Group of 21	Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (also issued as CD/230)	27/I/1982

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 58. | CD/CPD/WP.58 | Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia,
German
Democratic
Republic,
Hungary,
Mongolia,
Poland,
USSR | Working paper on the chapter entitled
"Objectives" of the comprehensive
programme of disarmament
(also issued as CD/232) | 29/I/1982 |
| 59. | CD/CPD/WP.59 | Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia,
German
Democratic
Republic,
Hungary,
Mongolia,
Poland,
USSR | Working paper on the chapter entitled
"Priorities" of the comprehensive
programme of disarmament
(also issued as CD/233) | 29/I/1982 |
| 60. | CD/CPD/WP.60 | Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia,
German
Democratic
Republic,
Hungary,
Mongolia,
Poland,
USSR | Working paper on the chapter entitled
"Principles" of the comprehensive
programme of disarmament
(also issued as CD/239) | 8/II/1982 |
| 61. | CD/CPD/WP.61 | China | Working paper: Proposed addition to
the chapter entitled "Principles"
of the comprehensive programme of
disarmament | 9/II/1982 |
| 62. | CD/CPD/WP.62 | | Text of the chapter entitled
"Priorities" of the comprehensive
programme of disarmament approved by
the Working Group at its 55th meeting
on 1 March 1982 | 1/III/1982 |
| 63. | CD/CPD/WP.63 | Group of 21 | Working paper on the chapter entitled
"Machinery and procedures" of the
comprehensive programme of disarmament
(also issued as CD/255) | 3/III/1982 |
| 64. | CD/CPD/WP.64 | Yugoslavia | Draft text for the section on
"Conventional weapons and armed forces"
of the comprehensive programme of
disarmament | 16/III/1982 |

- | | | | |
|-----|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 65. | CD/CPD/WP.65 | Text of the chapter entitled "Principles" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament approved by the Working Group at its 56th meeting on 18 March 1982 | 23/III/1982 |
| 66. | CD/CPD/WP.66 | Text of the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament approved by the Working Group at its 56th meeting on 18 March 1982 | 23/III/1982 |
| 67. | CD/CPD/WP.67 | Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia,
German Democratic Republic,
Hungary,
Mongolia,
Poland,
USSR
Working paper on the chapter entitled "Measures" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament | 6/IV/1982 |
| 68. | CD/CPD/WP.68 | Text of the chapter entitled "Machinery and procedures" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament approved by the Working Group at its 57th meeting on 8 April 1982 | 13/IV/1982 |
| 69. | CD/CPD/WP.69 | United States
Working paper on verification | 14/IV/1982 |
| 70. | CD/CPD/WP.70 | German Democratic Republic
Working paper on verification | 14/IV/1982 |
| 71. | CD/CPD/WP.71 | Text of the chapter entitled "Measures and stages of implementation" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament adopted by the Working Group at its 58th meeting on 15 April 1982 | 16/IV/1982 |

VI. CONFERENCE ROOM PAPERS OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE
COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

- | | | | |
|----|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. | CD/CPD/CRP.1 | Draft report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament | 10/VIII/1981 |
| 2. | CD/CPD/CRP.2 | Draft report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament | 14/IV/1982 |
| 3. | CD/CPD/CRP.3
and Add.1 | Draft report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament | 17/VIII/1983
18/VIII/1983 |

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/529 */

2 August 1984

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

DRAFT MANDATE FOR AN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ITEM 5 OF THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, SUBMITTED BY A GROUP OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the remainder of its 1984 session, an Ad Hoc Committee to conduct negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking account of all relevant proposals, including the proposal concerning a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth. The Ad Hoc Committee will submit a report on its work to the Conference on Disarmament at the end of the 1984 session."

*/ Revised for technical reasons.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/530
CD/RW/WP.52
3 August 1984

Original: ENGLISH

Ad Hoc Committee on
Radiological Weapons

WORKING PAPER: SWEDEN

Proposals for parts of a Treaty Prohibiting Radiological
Weapons and the Release or Dissemination of Radioactive
Material for Hostile Purposes

In 1979 the Soviet Union and the United States of America presented a joint draft treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. In June 1980 Sweden proposed that the scope of the draft treaty should be broadened to include also the prohibition of radiological warfare (CD/RW/WP.6). Since then extensive discussions have taken place in the CD penetrating the issues involved in great depth. Much work has been done and a great number of detailed proposals have been put forth. This process has deepened the understanding of the issues and has therefore been of great value, while at the same time bringing into the picture a number of complicated problems not originally foreseen. On some aspects progress has been made while on others the problems have tended to become ever more intricate. Here solutions have yet to be found. Time has now come to revert to a search for simple and straightforward formulas based on the accumulated insight acquired during the last couple of years' work and on a genuine willingness by all to compromise and negotiate past positions.

In this spirit Sweden has endeavoured to elaborate new text proposals concerning some of the major still outstanding problems. A fundamental idea on which these proposals are based is that the treaty should prohibit the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes, be it by using radiological weapons or by attacking nuclear facilities in such a way that radioactive material is released. Working papers and proposals from individual countries have been carefully considered and the progress already made has been taken into account. In elaborating the new proposals the text put forward in August 1983 (CD/421) by the co-ordinator of Group A of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Mr. Busby, has served as the basis. Changes in that text have only been made as regards some of the key issues where Sweden feels that progress has so far been too limited or non-existent.

GE.84-64555

The new draft proposals presented here are an honest attempt to find compromise solutions which could be acceptable to all as a basis for serious negotiations. Just because the overriding concern has been to find a compromise basis for the continued negotiations some changes in earlier Swedish positions have been made.

For the sake of facilitating the study of the new proposals they are presented below parallel with the text of the co-ordinator of Group A in 1983 as presented in CD/421.

* * *

Preambular text

In the preambular part only such changes have been made which are logical consequences of the substantial changes proposed in the new Articles I, II and III or prompted by reformulations elsewhere in the text.

1983 Report from Group A,
Co-ordinator's text (CD/421)

Swedish proposals

"TREATY PROHIBITING RADIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS"

TREATY PROHIBITING RADIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS AND THE RELEASE OR
DISSEMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL FOR HOSTILE PURPOSES

"The States Parties to this Treaty,
"Determined to strengthen international
peace and security and to preserve
mankind from the danger of new means
of warfare,

"Desiring to contribute to the cause of
halting the arms race and recognizing
that an agreement on the prohibition
of radiological weapons would contribute
to this end,

Desiring to contribute to the cause
of halting the arms race and
recognizing that an agreement on the
prohibition of radiological weapons
and of the release or dissemination
of radioactive material for hostile
purposes would contribute to this
end,

"(Affirming the obligation of all States)
(Determined) to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating
to the prohibition of recognized weapons
of mass destruction and to bring about
general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international
control,

"Reaffirming in this regard the urgency
of the pursuit and early conclusion of
negotiations on effective measures aimed
at the cessation of the nuclear arms
race and nuclear disarmament,

"Noting the provisions contained in
other agreements relating to this
objective,

"Conscious that the use of (any form
of) radiological weapons could have
devastating consequences for mankind,

"Stressing therefore the particular
importance of accession to this Treaty
by the greatest possible number of
States,

"(Affirming the principle that the
benefits of peaceful applications of
radioactive materials should be available
to all States Parties to this Treaty,
with due consideration for the needs of
the developing countries, and recognizing
the need for peaceful uses of sources of
radiation from radioactive decay in
different fields of human activities,)

Conscious that the use of
radiological weapons and the release
or dissemination of radioactive
material could have devastating
consequences for mankind,

Recognizing the need for peaceful
uses of sources of radiation from
radioactive decay in different fields
of human activities, and the need for
international co-operation in this
field, and affirming that the benefits
of peaceful applications of radioactive
materials should be available to all
States Parties to this Treaty, with
due consideration for the needs of
the developing countries.

"Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has urged the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,

"Have agreed as follows:

* * *

Articles I, II, III and Annex III

Only minor adjustments have been made in the text of the Co-ordinator's Article I. However, it has been supplemented with new additional Articles. The new Articles I, II and III are proposed to take the place of the Co-ordinator's Article I.

In the proposed new Article I the scope of the prohibition of use of radioactive material for hostile purposes has been broadened to encompass also release or dissemination caused by attacks on nuclear facilities.

These facilities have been defined in Article II:b. A number of very detailed proposals and counterproposals on different aspects of this question have been thoroughly discussed in the CD, but so far no agreement on suitable criteria has been reached. Believing that preventing mass destruction should be the overriding concern, Sweden proposes criteria based on the nuclear facilities' potential to cause mass destruction through the release or dissemination of radioactivity, if attacked. An attempt has been made to formulate as simple a model as possible with set threshold limits for the different kinds of facilities.

Furthermore, it is proposed in Articles II and III that in order for a nuclear facility to qualify for protection under the Treaty it should be carefully identified, registered and open to inspection. A simple procedure to this end is proposed in a new Annex III. A special register of the nuclear facilities in question maintained by the Depositary is envisaged, as well as a list at the Depositary's disposal of qualified experts whose services could be made available to undertake Inspection Missions. No changes in the procedures for verification and compliance with the Treaty as proposed in the Co-ordinator's text (Article VI, VII, Annexes I and II) will be needed.

For the sake of facilitating the study of these new proposals Annex III is here presented in conjunction with the Articles I-III.

1983 Report from Group A,
Co-ordinator's text

Swedish proposals

"Article I

"1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire or possess, transfer, or use radiological weapons.

For the purposes of this Treaty, the term 'radiological weapon' means:

Article I

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes never under any circumstances to release or disseminate radioactive material for hostile purposes causing destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material, neither by using radiological weapons nor by attacking nuclear facilities.

2. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire or possess, or transfer, radiological weapons.

3. Each State Party to this Treaty also undertakes not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any person, State, group of States, or international organization to engage in any of the activities which the States Parties to the Treaty have undertaken not to engage in under the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

Article II

For the purposes of this Treaty, (a) The term "radiological weapons" means:

"(a) Any device, including any weapon or equipment, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material;

"(b) Any radioactive material specifically (designed) for employment, by its dissemination, to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.

(i) Any device, including any weapon or equipment, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material;

(ii) Any radioactive material specifically designed for employment, by its dissemination, to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.

(b) The term "nuclear facilities" means nuclear facilities on land which are either

(i) Nuclear reactors designed for a thermal effect which could exceed 10 Megawatts;

(ii) Intermediate spent fuel storages designed for storing radioactive material exceeding 10^{18} Bq;

(iii) Reprocessing plants, or,

(iv) Waste deposits containing radioactive material exceeding 10^{18} Bq,

and which are included in a register maintained by the Depositary.

Article III

The Depositary shall maintain a register of nuclear facilities covered by the provisions of this

Treaty and shall transmit certified copies thereof to each State Party to the Treaty.

States Parties to the Treaty wishing to have nuclear facilities under their jurisdiction as specified in Article II:b included in this register shall for each such facility communicate to the Depositary a request for inclusion in the register. Such a request shall contain written information as specified in Annex III which constitutes an integral part of the Treaty.

Information contained in requests for the inclusion of nuclear facilities into the register shall be subject to verification, in accordance with procedures spelt out in Annex III.

"2. Each State Party to this Treaty also undertakes never under any circumstances to employ deliberately, by its dissemination, any radioactive material to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material, whether or not such material is specifically defined as a radiological weapon in paragraph 1 of this article.

(Replaced by the proposed Article I:1)

"3. Each State Party to this Treaty also undertakes not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any person, State, group of States, or international organization to engage in any of the activities which the States Parties to the Treaty have undertaken not to engage in under the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

(This paragraph is identical with the proposed Article I:3)

ANNEX III

Register on nuclear facilities and
Inspection Missions

1. Upon receipt of a request for an inclusion in the register provided for in Article III of this Treaty the Depositary shall without delay satisfy himself that the nuclear facility or facilities concerned can be defined as such in accordance with Article II:b. To this end the requests for the inclusion of nuclear facilities in the register as stated in Article III of the Treaty shall contain the following written information:

- (a) Details on the exact geographical location of the nuclear facility/facilities,
- (b) Identification of the type of nuclear facility i.e. if it is a reactor, intermediary spent fuel storage, reprocessing plant or waste deposit,
- (c) Detailed specifications as applicable on
 - (i) the thermal effect in Megawatts for which a nuclear reactor is designed,
 - (ii) the capacity (in Bq) for which an intermediate spent fuel storage is designed,
 - (iii) the content (in Bq) of a waste deposit.

2. The Depositary shall in consultation with the requesting State initiate an Inspection Mission. An Inspection Mission, constituted by one expert or more, shall by on-site inspection verify that the facility or facilities concerned are nuclear facilities as defined under Article II:b.

3. The Depositary shall, with the co-operation of States Parties to the Treaty, compile and maintain a list of qualified experts, whose services could be made available to undertake such Inspection Missions.

4. The Depositary shall include in the register the requested details on the facilities concerned as soon as the Inspection Mission has confirmed that the relevant definition under Article II:b is applicable, and shall immediately notify States Parties to the Treaty of any new inclusion in the register.

* * *

Article IV

Following the proposals above, the Co-ordinator's Article II dealing with different aspects of peaceful uses of radioactive materials is numbered Article IV in the Swedish proposal.

Bearing in mind that the main purpose of this paper is to bring about a compromise, acceptable as a basis for further negotiations of a treaty prohibiting radiologically caused mass destruction as well as the difficulties involved in so doing, the Swedish proposal only includes undertakings falling directly within the scope of such a prohibition. This is reflected in the following:

1983 Report from Group A,
Co-ordinator's text

Swedish proposals

"(Article II

"1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to contribute (to the fullest possible extent) (fully) to the strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of radioactive materials and of sources of radiation from radioactive decay (, and to the development of adequate measures of protection for all States against harmful effects of radiation).

"2. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to facilitate, and has the right to participate in, the (fullest possible) (full) exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information regarding the peaceful uses referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, taking into account the needs of the developing countries.

"3. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of the States Parties to this Treaty to develop and apply their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to international co-operation in this field (, consistent with the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons); and no provisions of this Treaty shall hinder the use of sources of radiation

Article IV

1. Each State Party to this undertakes to contribute to the fullest possible extent to the development of adequate measures of protection for all States against harmful effects of radiation.

2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of the States Parties to this Treaty to develop and apply their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to international co-operation in this field, and no provisions of this Treaty shall hinder the use of sources of radiation from radioactive decay for peaceful purposes, in accordance with generally recognized principles and applicable rules of international law concerning such use.

from radioactive decay for peaceful purposes,
in accordance with generally recognized principles
and applicable rules of international law
concerning such use.)

* * *

Articles V and VI

The Co-ordinator's Articles III and IV would as a consequence of the above proposals be numbered as Articles V and VI.

* * *

Article VII

This article is based on the Co-ordinator's two Articles V and V bis. Again the proposed changes are to be seen as an attempt to concentrate only on issues falling within the immediate scope of the proposed prohibitions.

1983 Report from Group A,
Co-ordinator's text

Swedish proposals

Article V

- (1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not apply to nuclear explosive devices or to radioactive material produced by them.)
2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from any existing rules of international law applicable in armed conflict or limiting or detracting from obligations assumed by the States Parties under any other relevant international agreement.

Article VII

1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not apply to nuclear explosive devices or to radioactive material produced by them.
2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as in any way legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons or detracting from obligations to prevent the use or threat of use of such weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament, nor as in any way limiting or detracting from any existing rules of international law applicable in

(Article V bis

The States Parties to this Treaty undertake to pursue urgently negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion of effective measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the achievement of nuclear disarmament.)

armed conflict or limiting or detracting from obligations assumed by the States Parties under any other relevant international agreement.

* * *

Articles VIII-XIV

No specific proposals are made concerning the Co-ordinator's Articles VI-XII. However, they would be numbered VIII-XIV.

* * *

Annexes I and II

No new proposals.

* * *

Annex III

A new Annex III is proposed, the text of which is presented in its substantial context, page 9.

* * *

AUSTRALIA

WORKING PAPER

PRINCIPLES FOR THE VERIFICATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

1. The verification system should verify the complete absence of all nuclear explosions in all environments.
2. The multilateral elements of the system should be non-discriminatory and based on equality of rights and obligations of the Parties to the Treaty.
3. The system should be negotiated in a multilateral forum, the Conference on Disarmament.
4. The Treaty should guarantee to all States Parties equal access to all information emanating from the multilateral elements of the verification system.
5. States Parties should be permitted to make additional bilateral arrangements between themselves in order to provide added mutual assurance that the Treaty is being complied with.
6. The basic elements of a verification system should be based on a combination of national and international measures and should include, inter alia:
 - A. national technical means
 - B. an international seismic detection network
 - C. an international atmospheric detection network
 - D. any other international detection arrangements deemed necessary (i.e. using other technologies)
 - E. on-site inspection
 - F. a multilateral organ or organs of States Parties to deal with consultation, co-operation and complaints.
7. All elements of the verification system should employ the most advanced and efficient technology available.
8. All elements of the verification system should provide for the widest possible global coverage.

9. All elements of the verification system should be in place and operational at the time a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force, and maintained without interruption or deterioration.
10. In establishing the various elements of the system the negotiations should draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations, in particular the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events.
11. On-site inspection should be compulsory.
12. The international seismic monitoring system should comprise:
 - A. a network of seismic stations
 - B. an international exchange of seismic data
 - C. international data centres.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/532
CD/CW/WP.84
8 August 1984
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Working Paper

submitted by a group of socialist States

The organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee

I. General provisions and structure

1. With a view to ensuring broader international consultations and co-operation, exchanging information and promoting verification in order to obtain compliance with the provisions of the Convention, a Consultative Committee shall be established by the States Parties to the Convention within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force.
2. Each State Party shall be entitled to designate a representative to the Consultative Committee who may be accompanied at the meetings by one or more advisers. The Chairman of the sessions of the Consultative Committee shall be elected by the Consultative Committee itself.
3. The Consultative Committee shall meet in regular sessions annually unless it decides otherwise. Every five years the Committee shall review the implementation of the Convention to ensure that its objectives and provisions are being fulfilled. An extraordinary (special) session of the Consultative Committee may be convened to consider matters of urgency at the substantiated request of any of the States Parties within 30 days of the receipt of such a request.
4. The Consultative Committee shall take its decisions on matters of substance by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached during the session, each State Party may record its opinion in the final report of the session for subsequent study by the Governments of the other States Parties to the Convention. Decisions on procedural matters related to the organization of work of the Committee shall be taken by consensus where possible, and otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.
5. The results of the sessions of the Consultative Committee shall be reflected in the records of its meetings and in the final report which shall be circulated to all the States Parties.

GE.84-64647

6. In the intervals between sessions, questions relating to promoting the implementation of and compliance with the Convention shall be dealt with by the Executive Council acting on behalf of the Consultative Committee.

The Executive Council shall be composed of 15 members representatives of the States Parties and a Chairman, who shall be the Chairman of the last session of the Consultative Committee. Ten members of the Council shall be elected by the Consultative Committee after consultation with the States Parties, taking into account the principle of equitable political and geographical representation, for a term of two years, five members being replaced each year. The remaining five seats shall be reserved for the permanent members of the Security Council parties to the Convention.

7. The Executive Council shall take its decisions on matters of substance by consensus. If consensus with regard to a request for on-site inspection cannot be reached within 24 hours, the State subject to the request shall be informed of the individual opinions expressed by all the members of the Executive Council on the matter. The Executive Council shall take its decisions on procedural matters related to the organization of its work by consensus where possible, and otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.

8. The Technical Secretariat shall be staffed proceeding from the principle of equitable political and geographical representation of States Parties. It shall be composed of inspectors and experts who shall be nationals of the States Parties.

9. The Consultative Committee may establish such subsidiary technical bodies as may be necessary.

II. Functions

The Consultative Committee shall:

1. Provide a forum for discussion by all the States Parties concerned of all issues related to implementation of and compliance with the Convention;
2. Co-ordinate all forms of verification and provide for communication between national and international verification bodies;
3. Elaborate, in agreement with all Parties, standard verification techniques;
4. Receive, store and disseminate information presented by the States Parties in accordance with the Convention, including declarations, notifications and statements on chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities, plans for the destruction or diversion of such stockpiles and for the elimination (destruction, dismantling or diversion) of the facilities, and annual declarations concerning chemicals for permitted purposes that are produced, diverted from stockpiles, used, acquired or transferred;

5. Provide the States Parties, at their request, with services in respect of holding consultations among themselves on questions with regard to implementation of and compliance with the Convention, as well as in respect of exchanging information on a bilateral or multilateral basis or obtaining services from relevant international organizations;

6. Adopt, at its first session, the criteria that it will subsequently use to determine the modalities and time frames for on-site inspections at each facility for the destruction of stockpiles or for the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes;

7. Verify, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, reports on the use of chemical weapons;

8. Determine, on the basis of the information presented by the States Parties on chemical weapon stockpiles and the technical characteristics of the facilities for their destruction, as well as on the technical characteristics of the facilities for the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes, the modalities and time frames for the implementation of international on-site inspections at each individual facility, proceeding from the agreed criteria;

9. Consider requests for on-site inspections filed by States Parties and, in the event of a positive decision, carry out the inspection, subject to the consent of the host State;

10. Assign, in cases of on-site inspections by challenge, conducted by agreement directly between the States Parties concerned, inspectors from its Technical Secretariat to participate in such inspections, if this is requested by one or several States Parties;

11. Approve the reports of the Executive Council containing information on implementation of and compliance with the Convention, recommendations on particular technical matters and the factual report on the work done by the Executive Council between the sessions of the Consultative Committee;

12. Consider and decide upon administrative and financial questions and approve the budget on the basis of an agreed scale of financial contributions.

III. Co-operation with the national verification bodies of the States Parties

The Consultative Committee shall:

1. Hold regular meetings, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, with the national bodies of the States Parties in order to enhance the effectiveness of co-operation in ensuring compliance with the Convention;

2. Provide, within a specially established technical body, training for the personnel of the national verification bodies in standard international verification techniques and the use of the relevant equipment;

3. Elaborate, in agreement with the States Parties, procedures for sealing chemical weapon production facilities (or their key points), design the sealing devices and formulate recommendations for their possible use by the national verification bodies of the States Parties;

4. In the course of inspections the inspecting personnel shall have the right to request assistance from the officials of the national bodies in charge of the implementation of the Convention on any matters related to such inspections;

5. A State Party which has received a notification of a regular international systematic on-site inspection or of a challenge on-site inspection specifying the concrete purpose of such an inspection, the approximate time of the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry into the territory of the State Party concerned and the qualifications and names of the inspectors and their nationalities, shall acknowledge receipt of the notification within two days and shall provide in its turn (in the case of a challenge inspection — subject to its agreement thereto) a list of officials representing the national body in charge of the implementation of the Convention who could, for their part, facilitate and provide support for the conduct of the inspection.

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE
ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

CORRIGENDUM

On page 5, in line 5 of paragraph 12:

Delete the words "in its latest working paper" and insert "in CD/530".

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament at its 259th plenary meeting held on 17 April 1984, as contained in document CD/499, the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons was established for the duration of the 1984 session with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Conference further decided that the Ad Hoc Committee would report to it on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1984 session.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 259th plenary meeting on 17 April 1984, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Milos Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Victor Slipchenko, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee held 11 meetings from 15 June to 10 August 1984. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations.

4. At their request, the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee: Finland, Norway and Spain.

5. In carrying out its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee took into account paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It also took into consideration the relevant recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in particular those adopted in connection with the Second Disarmament Decade in 1980. In addition to various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its previous sessions, the Ad Hoc Committee took into account in particular resolution 38/189D of the General Assembly of 20 December 1983. Paragraphs 1 to 3 of that resolution read as follows:

"1. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to a prompt conclusion of the elaboration of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons in order that it may be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

"2. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue its search for a prompt solution to the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, including the scope of such prohibition, taking into account all proposals submitted to it to this end;

"3. Takes note of the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to re-establish an Ad Hoc Working Group at the beginning of its 1984 session to continue its work and in that context to review and assess how best to make progress on the subject matter."

6. In addition to the documents of previous sessions, the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following new documents for consideration:

- CD/530, dated 3 August 1984, submitted by Sweden, entitled "Proposals for parts of a Treaty Prohibiting Radiological Weapons and the Release or Dissemination of Radioactive Material for Hostile Purposes" (also issued as CD/RW/WP.52 of 18 June 1984)
- CD/RW/WP.53, dated 20 June 1984, submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled "A definition relevant to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities"
- CD/RW/WP.54, dated 12 July 1984, submitted by Sweden, entitled "Notes from the intervention by Ambassador Ekéus on 21 June 1984 concerning criteria and definitions used in CD/RW/WP.52" (also issued as CD/RW/CRP.27)
- CD/RW/WP.55, dated 19 July 1984, submitted by Sweden, entitled "Answers to questions raised by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Swedish proposal for draft provisions prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities contained in CD/RW/WP.52" (also issued as CD/RW/CRP.29)
- CD/RW/WP.56, dated 3 August 1984, submitted by Sweden, entitled "Notes from the intervention by the Swedish delegation on 1 August in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons concerning some definitions of nuclear facilities in document CD/530 - CD/RW/WP.52"
- CD/RW/WP.57, dated 2 August 1984, submitted by the Chairman, entitled "Criteria and categories of nuclear facilities regarding the scope of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities"
- CD/RW/WP.58, dated 10 August 1984, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Questions addressed to the Swedish Delegation with respect to the draft provisions regulating the prohibition of attacks in Document CD/RW/WP.52"

- CD/RW/CRP.25, dated 21 June 1984, entitled "Proposals by the Chairman for the items to be discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons during the summer session"
- CD/RW/CRP.26, dated 6 July 1984, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Questions addressed to the Swedish Delegation with respect to the draft provisions regulating the prohibition of attacks in Working Paper CD/RW/WP.52"
- CD/RW/CRP.28, dated 12 July 1984, entitled "Programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons"

III. WORK DURING THE 1984 SESSION

7. The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons proceeded to review and assess how best to make progress on the subject matter entrusted to it. The Ad Hoc Committee agreed that during the 1984 session it would continue its substantive examination of questions relating to "traditional" radiological weapons subject matter and questions relating to prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, without setting up two subsidiary bodies to deal with these questions or prejudging the relationship between them.

8. In that context, the Ad Hoc Committee devoted two meetings to the continued review of the question of linkage between the two major issues before it. Although no delegation disputed the importance of those issues and the need for their solution, differences of approach persisted with regard to the procedure to be followed in resolving them as well as to the form of any eventual agreement. In the absence of consensus, the Ad Hoc Committee agreed to concentrate its work on the substance of the issues involved.

9. At its 5th meeting, on 12 July, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted the following programme of work for its 1984 session:

"Within the questions of the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, the following problems should be discussed without prejudging the final positions of delegations as regards the "link"

between the two aspects of the issue:

- Definitions
- Scope
- Peaceful uses
- Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
- Compliance and verification".

10. The Ad Hoc Committee discussed and examined various documents, inter alia, those submitted to it during its 1984 session by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany (CD/RW/CRP.26), Sweden (CD/530, CD/RW/WP. 54, 55 and 56) and the United Kingdom (CD/RW/WP.53). Many delegations held that the approach proposed by Sweden in its draft provisions of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons and the release or dissemination of radioactive material for hostile purposes (CD/530) provided the best negotiating framework for making progress on all the major aspects of the issue and thus in the fulfilment of the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate. Other delegations, however, reaffirmed their conviction that proposals aimed at resolving the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in the context of prohibition of radiological weapons could only result in a failure to make progress on either of them.

11. The Ad Hoc Committee devoted four meetings to the consideration of the questions of definitions and scope in accordance with its programme of work. With respect to these questions, it concentrated its work on consideration of criteria which would apply in determining which nuclear facilities might fall within the possible scope of a prohibition of attacks as well as on definitions of such facilities. In order to allow for a more structured discussion of that issue, the Chairman, upon request of some delegations, prepared a working paper (CD/RW/WP.57) which reflected some of the proposals made by delegations during the session in this regard. Proposals for scope and definitions contained in the Swedish proposal (CD/530) were examined. In particular, attention was focused on the criterion used, i.e. the potential to cause mass destruction for determining the four categories of facilities proposed to fall within the scope of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. The Ad Hoc Committee also discussed the suggested definitions, capacity thresholds and other possible delimitations as well as other related questions such as the distinction between military and non-military facilities, protective zones, physical identification (marking) of nuclear facilities, the definition of "attack", verification, legal and other aspects. The documents CD/RW/WP.53, 54, 55, 56 and CD/RW/CRP.26 were valuable contributions in this respect. With regard to

the definition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense, some delegations reaffirmed their views concerning the so-called "negative" or "positive" approach. Divergent views were also expressed on what should be considered a radiological weapon. While some delegations maintained that it should include radioactive material as well as devices and containers, other delegations held that radioactive material should not be included since any known radioactive material has a utility for civilian peaceful purposes, and that the term "specifically designed device and equipment" will be sufficient as the definition of a radiological weapon. In this connection a suggestion was made to the effect that the prohibition of configuration of radioactive material to weapon use might be envisaged.

A number of delegations maintained that a definition of radiological weapons should not imply any restrictions on the use of radioactive material for peaceful purposes. They also held the view that such a definition should not provide a basis for any provision which might be interpreted as legitimizing nuclear weapons.

The exchange of views, which was generally considered to be useful and constructive, contributed to a better understanding of the substance as well as of the positions of various delegations. Although some divergences of views continued to exist, the deliberations revealed that more delegations than previously supported the criterion of mass destruction as the most appropriate one for the identification of facilities to be covered by the provisions of a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

12. With regard to the questions of peaceful uses and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, delegations generally reaffirmed the views reflected in their earlier proposals to this end. Some delegations noted that the compromise formulae proposed by Sweden in its latest working paper could serve as a basis for an eventual agreement on those two outstanding questions. Other delegations, however, pointed out that a compromise should be sought in the context of all provisions of that paper which could not be considered separately. Several delegations emphasized the close link between the treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Some other delegations, however, reaffirmed their view that it would be unrealistic to expect States Parties to a future agreement on radiological weapons to undertake obligations which did not relate directly to its subject matter. It was noted in this connection that a "delineating provision" might be used in order

to find a solution to this problem. Some delegations reaffirmed the importance they attached to the issues of verification and compliance. In that context, they expressed the view that existing proposals on those issues were not sufficient and should therefore be further thoroughly examined. They regretted that the Ad Hoc Committee was not able to devote more attention to this problem during the session. Some delegations reiterated that, as provided in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of SSOD I, the question of verification had to be examined taking into account the scope of a convention. In their view, this factor had an obvious bearing on the nature of the verification provisions to be included in a convention. They reiterated that, in the case of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, the question at issue was only that of establishing the fact that an attack had occurred.

13. Some delegations expressed their regret that the work of the Committee had not concentrated more on the available draft texts, including the drafts submitted by the Chairmen of the two preceding annual sessions, as well as the Swedish proposals (CD/530), and that the work pattern had rather been one of a prolonged general debate. They also felt that, despite the efforts by the Chair, this had not only caused delegations to lose sight of certain common positions that had been achieved in the earlier sessions, but entailed the risk that the negotiations might altogether lose their earlier momentum. Other delegations on the contrary believed that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee was useful and helped to clarify further positions of delegations. More progress could not be achieved in view of the basic differences as to the framework for the solution of the two major issues. They also considered that due attention was paid to the existing draft texts, especially to the proposals by Sweden contained in CD/530. They further maintained that the provisions of the draft texts by the previous Chairmen could not be considered as reflecting common positions.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14. It was generally recognized that the discussion held during the session contributed to a better understanding of the issues involved as well as to a further search for their solution.

15. In view of the fact that the Committee's mandate was not fulfilled, it is recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons at the beginning of its 1985 session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/534

13 August 1984

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 AUGUST 1984 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PAPER ENTITLED "PROCEDURES FOR THE GSE TECHNICAL TEST (GSETT) 1984" ADOPTED AT THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE AD HOC GROUP

I have the honour to forward to you, in your capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament, a paper entitled "Procedures for the GSE Technical Test (GSETT) 1984" which was adopted at the eighteenth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Ad Hoc Group agreed to conduct a technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data using the WMO/GTS under a regular use basis, pursuant to its mandate adopted by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament on 7 August 1979. This paper contains an overview of the agreed procedures for conducting and evaluating the technical test and includes references to nine separate appendices contained in Conference Room Paper 134 of the Ad Hoc Group.

The Ad Hoc Group of Experts requested me, as its Chairman, to transmit on its behalf, this paper which was adopted unanimously.

(Signed)

OLA DAHLMAN
Chairman

PROCEDURES FOR THE GSE TECHNICAL TEST (GSETT) 1984

1. PURPOSES AND OVERVIEW

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has authorized the use of the Global Telecommunication System (GTS) for the exchange of Level I seismic data on a regular basis from 1 December 1983.

This technical test will be the first one conducted making regular use of the WMO/GTS. It should further the development of procedures for the use of the WMO/GTS for seismic data exchange, and of procedures related to the use of the WMO/GTS at envisaged international data centres. The technical test has the following purposes:

- to develop and test procedures (with the WMO) for the regular transmission of Level I data from temporary national facilities to experimental international data centres (EIDCs). These will be established during the technical test to provide the services of both the national facilities and the IDCs first envisaged in CCD/558;
- to transmit bulletins from EIDCs to participating temporary national facilities using the WMO/GTS;
- to test procedures for retransmission of Level I data messages over the WMO/GTS;
- to provide an opportunity for testing procedures for extracting Level I parameters at seismic stations;
- to develop and test procedures for transmission of Level I parameters to temporary national facilities;
- to test proposed procedures at EIDCs for receipt and archiving of Level I data and for compilation and distribution over the WMO/GTS of event bulletins and parameters using Level I data.

For the duration of the technical test, participating States will contribute data from the stations which they have previously nominated for this purpose. The Level I parameters should be extracted for all seismic events and signals recorded at these stations according to the instructions outlined in the Appendices and collected at the temporary national facilities.

Temporary national facilities will prepare seismic messages for the WMO/GTS according to detailed instructions developed in co-operation with the WMO. On a scheduled basis these messages should be transmitted globally over the WMO/GTS.

The EIDCs will receive Level I messages from all participants and generate and distribute on a scheduled basis over WMO/GTS event lists and bulletins based on the data received. The EIDCs will also request retransmissions of missing or garbled messages when necessary.

2. PARTICIPANTS

At present, 27 States have agreed to take part in the technical test and will provide data from 50 or more seismograph stations. A list of participating States, seismograph stations and a directory of participants are given in Appendices 1, 2 and 3. Figure 1 is a map of the contributing stations.

Experimental international data centres will be operated at Lima, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington.

The international communications circuits of the WMO/GTS which will be used during the technical test are shown in Figure 2. These circuits have been arranged by the WMO.

The technical test is co-ordinated over-all by Mr. Pete McGregor, Australia. To resolve questions arising during the technical test, contact should be made with the co-ordinator.

3. SCHEDULE

The technical test will cover seismic Level I data for the period from 0000 UTC 15 October 1984 to 2400 UTC 14 December 1984. Note that the dates for the test refer to UT-data-days, i.e., the commencement date is for data from 0000 UTC on 15 October and transmissions end with data for 2400 UTC on 14 December. This means that messages will not start to flow until after 15 October and will continue to flow for some days after 14 December. Detailed schedules for activities in the temporary national facilities and EIDCs are given in Appendices 6 and 8, respectively.

The period 15 October to 26 October 1984 will be a preparatory phase to establish reliable communications. Data from this period will therefore be treated separately in the evaluation of the performance of the WMO/GTS. The main reason for having this preparatory phase is to give the co-ordinator and the participants of the test a possibility to detect and solve communications and other problems.

4. TEMPORARY NATIONAL FACILITIES

The temporary national facilities should co-ordinate national activities comprising:

- seismic station operations
- extraction of Level I parameters
- compilation of WMO/GTS messages
- dissemination of messages to and from national GTS centres
- responses to retransmission requests
- provision of information to the co-ordinator for evaluating the technical test.

As an exception, national facilities which are unable to send messages over the WMO/GTS, should instead transmit messages by telex to each of the EIDCs.

It is recommended that a minimum set of the Level I parameters are read for all recorded events at all participating stations. In addition to this minimum set it is recommended that those participating countries which have adequate resources available try to extract an extended set of Level I parameters as described in Appendix 4 for all events at least at one station. The parameters of the minimum set are listed in Table I. It includes 13 parameters and one comment field (qualitative remarks) for non-array stations. The complete analysis of a large well-recorded event would result in more than 50 reported parameters.

Instructions for the extraction of Level I parameters are given in Appendix 4. This appendix includes worksheets which facilitate the preparation of the WMO/GTS data messages.

TABLE I: Minimum Set of Level I Parameters

SEISMIC PHASE	PARAMETER	CODE	GSE PARAMETER NUMBER
			(Reference: CD/448/Add.1 Table A8.III)
P-wave SPZ	First arrival time	-	1
"	First motion sign and clarity	-	2
"	Maximum amplitude	M1X if reading is 0-6 sec M2X if reading is 6-12 sec M3X if reading is 12-18 sec M4X if reading is 18-300 sec	3
"	Arrival time corresponding to maximum amplitude measurement	-	4
"	Period of phase of maximum amplitude	-	5
"	Noise amplitude prior to first arrival	NSZ	6
	Period corresponding to noise prior to first arrival	-	7
	Qualitative remarks	LA, LB, R, TA, etc.	-
Rayleigh Wave LPZ	First arrival time	LR	36
"	Maximum amplitude	MLRZ	37
"	Arrival time corresponding to maximum amplitude measurement	-	38
"	Period corresponding to maximum amplitude	-	39
"	Noise amplitude	N2LZ	43
"	Period of noise amplitude (10-30s)	-	44

TABLE I (continued)

SEISMIC PHASE	PARAMETER	CODE	GSE PARAMETER NUMBER
P-wave SPZ	Apparent slowness determined from an array	SLO	17
"	Azimuth from array to epicentre	AZ	18

1. Detailed instructions for the reporting accuracy of these parameters are given in Appendix 4.

2. Note on Parameter No. 3 measurement. This parameter is to provide a measurement of the largest amplitude of the initial P arrival, not necessarily the amplitude of the largest phase within the specified time windows.

3. It is recommended that comments be provided where there is a possibility of ambiguity.

Procedures for preparing WMO messages of Level I data and of retransmission are described in Appendix 5.

The temporary national facilities are responsible for sending messages with Level I parameters, receiving event lists and bulletins, and responding to requests of retransmission from the EIDCs. This is described in section 5 below on WMO/GTS communication.

The temporary national facilities should provide the co-ordinator the information necessary for the preliminary evaluation of the test as specified in section 8 below. As much of the information as practicable should be supplied during the test.

5. WMO/GTS COMMUNICATION

The Global Telecommunications System (GTS) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) will be used for:

- the exchange of Level I messages between participating States and experimental international data centres;
- the distribution of event bulletins from EIDCs to national centres;
- requests from EIDCs and temporary national facilities for retransmission of missing parameter-messages.

The WMO has approved the use of the GTS for general exchanges of seismic bulletins, and has made specific arrangements for the different types of messages during the course of the technical test. Examples of all types of messages to be exchanged are given in Appendix 5.

All messages will be distributed globally over the WMO/GTS. Individual States should make their own arrangements to receive or discard incoming messages, however,

all messages requesting retransmissions must be received. Such arrangements are made locally between the temporary national facility and the national WMO/GTS centre.

Level I parameters are sent in the WMO-approved International Seismic Code which has been extended by the GSE to cope with the extra parameters required. The messages are completed by the addition of GTS headings and closures: these are fixed code-groups, specific to each State-GTS centre, and must be used exactly as prescribed in Appendix 2. Similarly, messages from the experimental IDCs (event-bulletins, retransmission requests) will carry their national headers.

6. EXPERIMENTAL INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTRES

The instructions for experimental international data centres (EIDCs) are given in Appendix 7, and are based on the Preliminary Operations Manual of CD/448.

It is important that the EIDCs as far as possible follow the schedule prescribed in Appendix 8 to carry out the following:

- monitoring and receiving WMO/GTS messages
- requesting retransmissions from temporary national facilities
- preparation and distribution of Preliminary Event Lists (PELs)
- preparation and distribution of Final Event Bulletins (FEBs)
- responding to retransmission requests from temporary national facilities
- communicating with other EIDCs.

The EIDCs collect messages of Level I data sent by participants via WMO/GTS and telex.

An archive of true copies of all messages and message logs (Appendix 7) should be maintained.

If an EIDC detects one or more missing messages (from gap in message numbers) or receives one or more garbled messages it requests retransmission. An example of such a retransmission request is given in Appendix 5. This example also shows how the message retransmitted from a contributor in response to the request looks.

The four EIDCs will be given the following identifiers:

LIMA	LIMAIDC
MOSCOW	MOSCIDC
STOCKHOLM	STOCIDC
WASHINGTON	WASHIDC

Some participants cannot transmit or respond to requests via WMO/GTS. As an exception in such cases the transmissions and requests for retransmission are made via telex if possible.

From the incoming messages of Level I data the EIDC prepares an input file. Each EIDC maintains a record of the corrections (like typographical errors) and other editing it makes of the originally received messages to prepare the input file. A computer program has been developed and distributed which will carry out the PEL calculation. The schedule for calculating PELs is given in Appendix 8.

An edited PEL is then sent out to participants over the WMO/GTS, with a delay of about 5 days. The format of the PEL messages is described and illustrated in Appendix 5.

For a period of 5-6 days after the PELs for a given day have been sent out the EIDCs make 'updatings' as additional data for that day are received, compare one another's PELs and attempt to reconcile the results, and prepare an FEB.

Each EIDC sends an FEB over the WMO/GTS usually after 13-14 days (Cf. Schedule in Appendix 8). A description and example of an FEB is given in Appendix 5.

A detailed final event bulletin containing complete information on defined and located events together with associated station data is mailed on a weekly basis to participants with a delay of about 17 days. An example of such a detailed bulletin is given in Appendix 5. This bulletin also contains a list of unassociated arrivals.

7. MONITORING THE TEST

It is essential that all participants in the technical test keep the co-ordinator informed of any significant problem that they may encounter or observe and that they co-operate with the co-ordinator in solving such problems. Problems that should be immediately reported include interruption in the reporting from a station or an EIDC, non-receipt of a sequence of messages from a station or an EIDC and problems at EIDCs in preparing seismic bulletins. To facilitate a rapid communication of such information between the co-ordinator, the EIDCs and the temporary national facilities it is important that telephone, telex or electronic mail can be used, if available. Appendix 2 gives telephone and telex numbers to the temporary national facilities, and the EIDCs and also notes if these facilities are using the electronic mail system.

As the preparatory phase is aimed at solving initial problems a very close co-operation with the co-ordinator is most essential during this period.

Any problem in receiving or transmitting data on the WMO/GTS should also immediately be taken up with the WMO agency in the actual country. The co-ordinator may also, if he considers it necessary, contact the WMO in Geneva in case of major problems.

8. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE TEST

It is envisaged that a preliminary analysis and evaluation of the results of the test will be conducted at a forthcoming GSE meeting during the CD spring session of 1985. To make an integrated evaluation of the entire experiment possible it will be necessary that participants provide the Co-ordinator with various types of information during and after the test.

In order to evaluate the performance of the WMO/GTS communications channels and the procedures developed by the Ad Hoc Group for its regular use it will be necessary for each participating national facility and each EIDC to keep a variety


of logs on messages sent and received. A suggested format for these logs and a schedule for sending them to the Co-ordinator is given in Appendix 9.

The Ad Hoc Group, in CD/448, made a number of recommendations for further studies related to the extraction of Level I parameters. The experience gained by participants in the GSETT will be very valuable to these studies and suggestions for the type of information that will be required are also given in Appendix 9.

The procedures to be used by the EIDCs during the GSETT are based on the Level I analysis procedures described in Appendix 7 of CD/448 and summarized in Appendix 7 of this report. The experience gained by the EIDCs individually and collectively during the GSETT, which will be the first test of the procedures, will provide a basis for evaluating the "Preliminary Operations Manual for International Data Centres". It is expected that each EIDC will report on its experiences at the forthcoming GSE meeting.

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Title</u>
1	List of participating States, stations and schedules
2	Directory of participants
3	Summary of seismograph stations participating in the GSETT
4	Technical instructions for the extraction of Level I data
5	Instructions for preparing WMO/GTS messages
6	Schedule of activities at national facilities
7	Instructions for experimental international data centres
8	Schedule of activities at experimental international data centres
9	Instructions for analysing/evaluating GSETT

Figure 1. Geographical distribution of participating stations




IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
GLOBAL TELECOMMU-
NICATION SYSTEM

MISE EN OEUVRE DU
SYSTEME MONDIAL DE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS

EJECUCION DEL
SISTEMA MUNDIAL DE
TELECOMUNICACION

ОСУЩЕСТВЛЕНИЕ
ГЛОБАЛЬНОЙ СИСТЕМЫ
ТЕЛЕСВЯЗИ



Any designations employed on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the World Meteorological Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Les appellations employées dans cette carte et la présentation des données qui y figurent n'impliquent de la part du Secrétaire de l'Organisation météorologique mondiale aucune prise de position quant au statut juridique des pays, territoires, villes ou zones ou de leurs autorités ni quant au tracé de leurs frontières ou limites.

Las denominaciones empleadas en este mapa y la forma en que aparecen presentados los datos que se contienen no implican la expresión de ninguna opinión por parte del Secretario General de la Organización Meteorológica Mundial sobre la condición jurídica de países, territorios, ciudades o zonas o de sus autoridades ni respecto de la delimitación de sus fronteras o límites.

Упомянутые на этой карте обозначения и форма, в которой представлены данные, не выражают мнения Секретариата Всемирной метеорологической организации относительно юридического статуса какой-либо страны, территории, города или района или его власти, а также не выражают мнения относительно очертания его границ.

EIGHTEENTH SESSION

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS

1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, initially established in pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976, held its eighteenth formal session from 30 July to 10 August 1984 in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. This was the tenth session of the Group convened under its new mandate by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 48th meeting on 7 August 1979.
2. The Ad Hoc Group continues to be open to all Member States of the Conference on Disarmament as well as upon request to non-Member States. Accordingly, scientific experts and representatives of the following Member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.
3. At their request and on the basis of previous invitation by the Committee on Disarmament, scientific experts from the following non-Member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Norway.
4. A representative of the World Meteorological Organization also attended the session.
5. Under the current mandate of the Ad Hoc Group, information on national investigations related to the work of the Group has been presented by experts from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America.
6. During its tenth session, the Ad Hoc Group agreed to establish five study groups in order to achieve an appropriate compilation, summarization and assessment of the experience acquired through national investigations and

co-operative studies in areas relevant to its work. These open-ended study groups each deal with a specific issue, and are each headed by a convenor and a co-convenor, as follows:

- (1) Seismological stations and station networks:
Dr. Basham (Canada), Dr. Schneider (German Democratic Republic)
- (2) Data to be regularly exchanged (Level I data):
Dr. Harjes (Germany, Federal Republic of), Dr. Fiedler (Czechoslovakia)
- (3) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level I data through WMO/GTS:
Dr. McGregor (Australia), Dr. Mori (Japan)
- (4) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level II data:
Dr. Husebye (Norway), Dr. Christoskov (Bulgaria)
- (5) Procedures to be used at international data centres:
Dr. Israelson (Sweden), Dr. Alewine (United States of America)

7. The Ad Hoc Group worked out and agreed on detailed procedures and time schedule for a technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data using the WMO/GTS under a regular use basis. The purposes of this technical test are:

- to test procedures for extracting Level I parameters at seismic stations;
- to develop and test procedures (with the WMO) for the regular transmission of Level I data from temporary national facilities to experimental international data centres including procedures for requesting and retransmitting lost or garbled messages;
- to test proposed procedures at experimental international data centres for receipt and archiving of Level I data and for compilation and distribution over the WMO/GTS of event bulletins and parameters based on Level I data.

8. The technical test will cover seismic Level I data for the period from 0000 Universal Co-ordinated Time (UTC) 15 October to 2400 UTC 14 December 1984. The time period from 15 October to 26 October 1984 will be a preparatory phase to establish reliable communications.

9. At present, twenty-seven States have agreed to take part in the technical test and will provide data from 50 or more seismograph stations. Experimental international data centres will be operated at Lima, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington.

10. The international communications circuits of the WMO/GTS will be used during the technical test. These circuits have been arranged by the WMO.

11. The technical test is co-ordinated overall by Dr. Peter McGregor, Australia. The Group recognizes that the successful conduct of such a large technical test on a global scale requires a close co-operation among all participants to solve any possible technical problems that might arise.

12. The Group expects that the technical test will provide a large amount of information and experience. The Group recognizes that collection and compilation of this information and the analysis and evaluation of the results will be a substantial undertaking.
13. An overview of the agreed procedures for conducting and evaluating the technical test has been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/534. This document contains references to nine separate appendices giving information about, inter alia, the participants, detailed procedures, schedules, data formats and data worksheets. These appendices are contained in document Conference Room Paper 134 of the Ad Hoc Group. Much of this material was developed during informal meetings led by the Co-ordinator, Dr. McGregor, and subsequently discussed and approved during formal meetings of the Group.
14. In order to make the test more successful, the Ad Hoc Group encourages and is prepared to accept additional participation. The instructions that have been provided are sufficiently detailed to enable States who wish to participate in the technical test to make the necessary preparations. It is, however, important that the Co-ordinator of the technical test be notified as soon as possible of any additional participation.
15. The Ad Hoc Group agrees that all participants should submit the results of their investigations to the Group's Scientific Secretary before 1 March 1985.
16. The Ad Hoc Group envisages the completion of a first draft of a report on the results of the technical test during its next session, and also envisages the submission of a final report on the test to the Conference on Disarmament in 1985. The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 25 to 29 March 1985, in Geneva.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/536/Corr.1
22 August 1984
Original: ENGLISH

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Report to the Conference on Disarmament

CORRIGENDUM

1. Page 3, paragraph 12, the penultimate line should read:
"... on their territories was effective and reliable and met the vital interests of non-...".
2. Page 3, paragraph 14, the last sentence should read:
"In this regard different aspects as to the form and substance of such arrangements were analysed."
3. Page 4, paragraph 19, eighth line, the sentence should read:
"They also underlined the importance of the question of ...".
4. Page 6, paragraph 25, the penultimate line should read:
"... weapon States towards the issue, as stated in paragraph 12 above, before any ...".

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AGAINST THE USE OR
THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Report to the Conference on Disarmament

I. Introduction

1. At its 245th plenary meeting, on 28 February 1984, the Conference on Disarmament decided to re-establish for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on the basis of its former mandate. The Conference further decided that the ad hoc subsidiary body would report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1984 session. The term "ad hoc subsidiary body" was used pending a decision by the Conference on its designation (document CD/441).

2. At its 248th plenary meeting, on 8 March 1984, the Conference decided to designate the ad hoc subsidiary body as an "Ad Hoc Committee" (document CD/446).

II. Organization of work and documents

3. At its 270th plenary meeting, on 5 July 1984, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Borislav Konstantinov (Bulgaria) as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. M. Cassandra, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary to the Ad Hoc Committee.

4. The Ad Hoc Committee held 11 meetings between 16 July and 15 August 1984.

5. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee during the 1984 session: Colombia, Democratic Yemen, Finland, Norway, Senegal and Spain.

6. In carrying out its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee took into account paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in which "... the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". During the course of its work, the Committee also took into account other relevant paragraphs of the Final Document.

7. In addition to the documents of previous sessions related to the item, 1/ the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following two documents prepared by the Secretariat:

(a) A compilation of statements made and action taken during the thirty-eighth regular session of the General Assembly in 1983;

(b) A compilation of statements made in plenary meetings of the Conference on Disarmament during the Spring session of 1984.

III. Substantive work

8. Bearing in mind the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the item to the Committee on Disarmament in 1983 (CD/417), consultations and discussions took place with a view to overcoming difficulties faced ever since the inception of discussions on this item in 1979.

9. Many delegations stated that so long as nuclear weapons exist and can be used, there will be no security for anyone. They further reiterated their belief that nuclear disarmament constituted the most effective security assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

10. Other delegations, including three nuclear-weapon States, expressed the view that, while nuclear disarmament was undoubtedly of the greatest importance, vital significance was attached to the unconditional adherence by all States to the commitment contained in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force except in the exercise of their inalienable right to individual or collective self-defence. In this context, they reaffirmed the position of their States that none of their weapons, nuclear or conventional, would ever be used except in response to armed attack. In the opinion of other delegations including one nuclear-weapon State the United Nations Charter cannot be invoked to justify the first-use of nuclear weapons. Those same delegations expressed their regret that despite the repeated declarations of one group of States about its peaceful intentions it had failed to respond adequately to the proposal for concluding a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the Warsaw Treaty Member-States and the Member-States of the North Atlantic Alliance, a treaty which would be open to all other States as well.

11. A number of delegations generally regretted the fact that there had been no forward movement in the negotiations on the question since last year and they reiterated the Group of 21's view, contained in document CD/280, and again in document CD/407, that further negotiations in the Committee were unlikely to be fruitful so long as nuclear-weapon States did not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. They were of the view that nuclear-weapon States were under the obligation to guarantee in clear and categorical terms that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be subjected to attacks or threats of attacks with nuclear weapons.

1/ The list of documents of previous sessions up to and including the 1982 session is contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament, in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/285). The list of documents submitted to the 1983 session is contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/417).

12. One nuclear-weapon State reiterated its unconditional guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-free-zones. Another nuclear-weapon State stressed the importance of its unilateral obligation never to use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territory. Three other nuclear-weapon States underlined that the unilateral declarations they had made were credible and reliable and amounted to firm declarations of policy. Many of the delegations from non-nuclear-weapon States, however, held that the inflexibility of the concerned nuclear-weapon States to remove the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in their unilateral declarations reduced to nothing the credibility of these declarations. Those delegations further stated that with only one exception the so-called "assurances", that had been unilaterally proclaimed, were more in the nature of permissible scenarios for the use of weapons that may end human civilization. Three nuclear-weapon States rejected this argument and stated that the assurances they had provided had been solemnly and formally given and remained fully in force. One nuclear-weapon State declared that its unilateral commitment never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories was effective, reliable and met the vital interests of non-nuclear weapon States.

13. In the view of many delegations the point of view expressed above by four nuclear-weapon States confirmed their opinion that the question of negative security assurances continued to be approached by nuclear-weapon States from the narrow point of view of their security perceptions vis-à-vis each other, and not as a provisional measure aimed at providing effective guarantees to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States pending concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

14. The importance of effective security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was reaffirmed. Some delegations held that there was an urgent need to reach agreement on a "common formula" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. There was no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Some delegations suggested that pending agreement on those matters elements of interim arrangements should be explored. In this regard different aspects as to the form and the substance of such arrangements were analysed.

15. Some delegations were of the view that, since nuclear-weapon States had not revised their positions, the Ad Hoc Committee had exhausted the present possibilities of discussion on the subject. Several delegations expressed the view that further ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations to reach an appropriate agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

16. The question of how to harmonize different views and find a common formula was considered. A number of delegations expressed the view that the common formula should be based on a non-use or non-first-use clause. Other delegations, including three nuclear-weapon States, maintained that the common ground should embody two elements - the status of non-nuclear-weapon States and a non-attack provision. It was stressed that the common formula should first of all meet the wishes of the non-nuclear-weapon States and be conducive to the strengthening of their security.

17. Many delegations felt that the very term "non-nuclear-weapon States" was unambiguous and self-explanatory and it ruled out, by definition, any further need to elaborate on the status of such States. In connection with the non-attack provision, many delegations expressed the view that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter cannot be invoked to justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence in the case of armed attack not involving the use of nuclear weapons, since nuclear war would threaten the very survival of mankind. Other delegations maintained that no provision of the United Nations Charter limits the right of States to make use of the means they deem the most appropriate, subject to existing international agreements, in exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized in Article 51.

18. Some delegations considered that a resolution of the Security Council containing a common denominator could be an acceptable interim solution but not a substitute to a final solution. Many delegations expressed the view that a common denominator should be an unconditional guarantee similar to that given by one nuclear-weapon State. Some delegations bearing in mind the difficulties involved in formulating a common approach suggested that interpretative statements might be envisaged. At the same time views were expressed that such statements should be similar, if not identical, but at least not mutually exclusive. Many delegations stated that a common formula was politically, legally and technically possible if four of the five nuclear-weapon States were to review their policies and formulate revised positions so as to respond positively to the legitimate concerns of the neutral and non-aligned States.

19. A number of delegations proposed that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States be considered in a broad perspective. To that effect, they suggested an examination of the relevance of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons commitment to the granting of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. It was pointed out that a non-first-use undertaking if agreed by all nuclear-weapon States and applied generally had global bearing. They also suggested that a mutual non-use of force commitment would serve to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They also underlined the importance to the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in Europe, which should be subject to security assurances. Many delegations considered that for the establishment of such zones to be effective, they should be fully complied with and nuclear-weapon States should effectively respect the status of such zones through adequate verification procedures, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons. In that connection they further stated the view that the security of non-nuclear-weapon States would be enhanced if the nuclear weapons deployed by nuclear-weapon States in oceans and in other territories should be withdrawn. They also expressed the view that nuclear-weapon States should refrain from military manoeuvres with nuclear weapons in close proximity to States not possessing nuclear weapons, thus endangering their security.

20. Other delegations were of the view that an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons did not constitute an effective and credible guarantee to non-nuclear-weapon States, in so far as its validity erga omnes may at any moment be called into question by the actions of another nuclear-weapon State. These delegations furthermore argued that a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, by its very nature, could only be thought of in the context of the relations between the nuclear-weapon States themselves, and therefore had no relevance to the subject matter. They also maintained that a mutual non-use of force commitment was already contained in the Charter of the United Nations. Other delegations pointed

out in that respect that a unilateral non-first-use undertaking, if assumed by all nuclear-weapon States without exception, would constitute an effective guarantee erga omnes and thus it would strengthen the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States. Those same delegations expressed the view that a non-first-use commitment assumed by all nuclear-weapon States would amount to a clear guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used against non-nuclear-weapon States since these States by virtue of their non-possession of nuclear weapons could never provoke retaliation. A number of delegations pointed out that it was precisely for this latter reason that they had stated that the notion of non-first-use was not relevant in connection with the relations between nuclear-weapon-States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

21. Many delegations strongly felt that because of the obvious vulnerability of the non-nuclear-weapon States to attacks or threats of attacks with nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States were under an obligation to undertake a legally binding commitment, without any pre-conditions or caveats, not to attack or threaten to attack the former with nuclear weapons. These States were further of the view that such assurances should not be subject to divergent interpretations. They also rejected the option to use nuclear weapons contained in some declarations, and felt that all States not in possession of nuclear weapons qualified irrespective of any other considerations. Moreover, the provision of negative security assurances did not require any further commitments from those receiving such assurances. These delegations also held that provision of conditional guarantees could not extenuate the danger posed by the existing nuclear arsenals, and that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons were essential to remove the danger of nuclear war.

22. Some delegations argued that the question of non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States could not form an additional criterion for the eligibility of non-nuclear-weapon States. These delegations appealed to the nuclear-weapon State that had so far insisted on the non-stationing criterion to drop it from its security guarantee so as to bring it in line with other guarantee declarations and move closer to a common formula. In this connection, these delegations argued that the addition of a non-stationing criterion deviated from the definition of a non-nuclear-weapon State as contained in Security Council resolution 25 of 19 June 1968, as well as in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other internationally binding commitments, definitions on which a great number of non-nuclear-weapon States had predicated their renunciation of the nuclear option. They also pointed out that the credibility of the non-stationing criterion was undermined by the fact that the same nuclear-weapon State that had introduced that criterion had subsequently deployed nuclear weapons on the territory of several other non-nuclear-weapon States. The importance of the non-stationing criterion was stressed by a number of delegations. They expressed the view that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States was in full conformity with the vital interests of those States and represented a credible and realistic basis for the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. These delegations felt that attempts by some delegations to complicate discussion and detract the Ad Hoc Committee from its main task by addressing various aspects of the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe were firmly rejected. These delegations expressed the view that the policies pursued by some countries represented in the Ad Hoc Committee led to further worsening of the situation in Europe. These delegations strongly appealed to the nuclear-weapon States that had so far insisted on the non-attack and alliance or association criteria to drop them from their declarations on security assurances and to bring them in line with the other commitments of security assurances by adopting the non-stationing criterion thus making it possible to move towards a common formula. They also pointed out that it was wrong to interpret the non-stationing criterion as in any way deviating from the non-nuclear-weapon status since it constituted an important additional element for providing effective security assurances. In this connection

they also argued that the addition of the non-attack and alliance or association criteria contradicted the security assurances as contained in Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968. They also emphasized that the stationing of new medium range nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States and the subsequent increase in the danger of nuclear war had made the non-stationing criterion even more relevant. They also stressed that the absence of the non-stationing criterion in negative security assurances which would open the way for deployment of nuclear weapons in different regions of the world, cannot but have an adverse effect on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

23. Some delegations pointed out that another contradiction existed in the security guarantee of the nuclear-weapon State that had also insisted on the non-stationing criterion. They also felt that, while that nuclear-weapon State did not include in its declaration a non-attack clause, collateral utterances by high representatives of that country, as well as a declaration of that country made on adhering to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco suggested that that nuclear-weapon State would practice a non-attack clause almost identical with that contained in three other security guarantee declarations. However, other delegations simultaneously pointed out that the utterances by several delegations expressed above were completely unfounded. The subjective interpretation of matters relevant to a specific international instrument of a regional nature only further complicated the search for a common formula of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. A number of delegations expressed strong preference for positions of countries to be advanced and explained by the representatives of the respective countries themselves.

24. One delegation observed that the issue of negative security assurances which had started as a legitimate demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States was increasingly becoming an East-West question, thus making any progress even more difficult. This delegation, therefore, was of the opinion that a possible way out of the existing impasse could be to provide negative security assurances only to those non-nuclear-weapon States which were outside the two major alliance systems of the present world. This delegation argued that the States parties to these alliances had already made their choice and were enjoying positive security assurances, i.e., the nuclear protection offered by the super-Power to which they were aligned. However, in case any State from any of these two alliances was interested in negative security assurances it could qualify for the same by opting out of its alliance system.

25. The discussion of the suggested approaches and proposals remained inconclusive. Hence, regarding the future work of the Conference on Disarmament on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, several delegations expressed the view that it should be determined whether there has been a change in the positions of nuclear weapon States toward the issue, as stated in paragraph 10 above, before any substantive progress can be achieved.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

26. The Ad Hoc Committee reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament. Work on the substance of the effective arrangements and discussion on various aspects and elements of an interim solution however revealed that specific difficulties relating to differing perceptions of security interests of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States persisted and that the complex nature of the issues involved continued to prevent agreement.

27. Against this background, the Ad Hoc Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that ways and means should continue to be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work and to carry out negotiations on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it was generally agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established at the beginning of the 1985 session on the understanding that consultations should take place in order to determine the most appropriate course of action, including the resumption of the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee itself.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/537 */

17 August 1984

Original: ENGLISH

Letter dated 14 August 1984 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Denmark, transmitting a working
paper on the verification of non-production of chemical
weapons

Please find enclosed a Danish working paper on the verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

My authorities submit this paper for circulation as an official conference document.

(Signed) Henrik Skouenborg
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

GE.84-64882

Denmark

Verification of non-production of chemical weapons

In document CD/353 of 8 March 1983 the United Kingdom delegation made proposals for verifying that certain chemicals, the key precursors for super-toxic lethal chemicals, produced by the civil chemical industry are not being diverted for hostile purposes. At the same time the United Kingdom drew up a list of companies for which on-site inspections could be carried out. Quite a few countries have also provided information of a similar kind showing the number of companies to be monitored at the present stage of the definition of key precursors.

As a contribution to this joint survey at which the British proposal is aimed, Denmark has compiled some preliminary data concerning the Danish companies producing and marketing the chemicals classed as "key precursors". These data are given in the table annexed to this document.

ANNEX

Danish production of key precursors for civil purposes

<u>Key precursors for super-toxic lethal chemicals</u>	<u>Number of companies in Denmark producing and marketing these precursors</u>
Phosphorus trichloride (pcl ₃)	1
Phosphorus oxychloride (pocl ₃)	0
Chemicals containing the p-methyl and/or p-ethyl bond	0
Methyl and/or ethyl esters of phosphorous acid	0
Pinacolyl alcohol	0
N.n disubstituted beta - amino ethanol	0
N.n disubstituted beta - amino ethane thiol	0
N.n disubstituted beta - amino ethyl halides	0
<u>Key precursors for other super- toxic chemicals</u>	
Phenyl, alkyl or cycloalkyl substituted glycolic acid	0
3- or 4-hydroxy piperidine and their derivatives	0

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/538

20 August 1984

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 17 AUGUST 1984 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A TASS STATEMENT PUBLISHED IN THE
SOVIET PRESS ON 16 AUGUST 1984

Sir,

I transmit herewith the text of a TASS statement published in the Soviet press on 16 August 1984.

I would request you to have this statement circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. ISSRAELIAN

GE.84-64910

TASS STATEMENT

American radio networks which were recently taping United States President Ronald Reagan's regular election statement recorded the words he spoke prior to reading out the text of his statement, which were not intended for the public.

As has become known, Mr. Reagan literally said the following: "My fellow Americans, I am pleased to tell you I just signed legislation which outlaws Russia for ever. The bombing begins in five minutes."

The White House is now trying to make it appear that the Head of the United States Administration was just indulging in "cracking a joke".

In fact, Mr. Reagan has not signed any such legislation, and no orders to bomb have been given this time. But it is no accident that the President's words have been received with serious concern both in the United States and elsewhere.

The episode has been justly seen as a manifestation of the same frame of mind which has already been expressed officially before in calls for a "crusade", in the doctrines of limited and protracted nuclear war, and in the military-political plans for securing world domination by the United States. The United States Administration now prefers to keep silent about all this, but its practical actions speak for themselves. The intensive effort to build up nuclear, chemical and conventional arms is continuing, and a new class of weapon - space strike systems - is being developed.

All ways and means are being employed, including a policy of State terrorism and the direct use of armed force against independent countries whose domestic and foreign policies do not suit Washington.

Simultaneously, the process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction and other talks aimed at ending the arms race and achieving disarmament are being blocked.

The unwillingness of the United States to work for peace and stronger international security was again manifested in Washington's refusal to seek agreement on preventing the militarization of outer space.

The policy of the incumbent United States Administration runs counter to the vital interests of the peoples. It is futile and at the same time extremely dangerous. This calls for extreme vigilance on the part of all those who cherish peace.

No one should be misled by any of the pseudo-peace-loving rhetoric which is used from time to time in Washington for election purposes. The fact that this rhetoric is not matched by real actions is obvious. If anyone has any doubts on this score, President Reagan's recent "frankness" should be an eye-opener for them as well.

TASS is authorized to state that the Soviet Union deplores the United States President's invective, which is unprecedentedly hostile towards the USSR and dangerous to the cause of peace.

This conduct is incompatible with the high responsibility borne by the leaders of States, particularly nuclear Powers, for the destinies of their own peoples and for the destinies of mankind.

Proceeding from this responsibility, the Soviet Union has been doing and will continue to do everything it can to safeguard world peace. The peoples expect the leaders of the United States also at long last to start acting with awareness of their responsibility.

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 245th plenary meeting on 28 February 1984, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the following decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons (CD/440):

"The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind that the negotiation of a Convention should proceed with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest possible date, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 38/187/B; and in discharging its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention, decides to re-establish, in accordance with its rules of procedure, for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. This agreement, if possible, or a Report on the progress of the negotiations, should be recorded in the report which this ad hoc subsidiary body will submit to the Conference at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

2. The term "ad hoc subsidiary body" was used in this connection pending a decision by the Conference on its designation. Subsequently, at its 248th plenary meeting on 8 March 1984, the Conference on Disarmament decided to designate as "Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons" the subsidiary body.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

3. In accordance with the decision mentioned above (CD/440), Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden was appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as Secretary of the Committee.

4. The Ad Hoc Committee held 22 meetings from 29 February to 28 August 1984. The Ad Hoc Committee benefited from the inclusion in delegations of national experts. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations.

5. At the 250th plenary meeting on 15 March 1984 of the Conference on Disarmament, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee reported on the progress of its work.

6. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Colombia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and United Republic of Cameroon.

7. During the 1984 session, the following official documents dealing with chemical weapons were presented to the Conference on Disarmament:

- CD/429, dated 7 February 1984, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 16 January-6 February 1984"
- CD/431, dated 10 February 1984, submitted by the United Kingdom entitled "Chemical Weapons Convention: Verification and Compliance - The Challenge Element"
- CD/432, dated 13 February 1984, submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, entitled "Letter dated 30 January 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a report containing a description of an attack with chemical weapons in Piranshahr, Iran"
- CD/435, dated 20 February 1984, submitted by a group of socialist countries, entitled "Improved effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons"
- CD/437, dated 23 February 1984, submitted by Czechoslovakia, entitled "Letter dated 23 February 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia transmitting a proposal of Warsaw Member States to the Member States of NATO on the question of freeing Europe from chemical weapons, presented at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 January 1984"
- CD/439, dated 24 February 1984, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Proposals on 'Prohibition of Transfer' and 'Permitted Transfers' in a future CW agreement"
- CD/440, dated 28 February 1984, entitled "Decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons"
- CD/443, dated 5 March 1984, submitted by China, entitled "Proposals on Major Elements of a future Convention on the Complete Prohibition and Total Destruction of Chemical Weapons" (also issued as CD/CW/WP.68)
- CD/444, dated 19 March 1984, submitted by the USSR, entitled "Letter dated 6 March 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting excerpts from the speech of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. K.U. Chernenko, delivered on 2 March 1984 to voters of Moscow's Kuibyshev district"

- CD/445, dated 7 March 1984, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled "Size and Structure of a Chemical Disarmament Inspectorate"
- CD/446, dated 8 March 1984, entitled "Decision on the designation of ad hoc subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament"
- CD/447, dated 9 March 1984, submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, entitled "Letter dated 2 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament containing information on missile attacks and bombardments in both military and civilian areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran"
- CD/482, dated 26 March 1984, submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled "Working Paper - National verification measures" (also issued as CD/CW/WP.73)
- CD/483, dated 27 March 1984, submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, entitled "Letter dated 20 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament containing proposals on some elements of a future convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons" (also issued as CD/CW/WP.74)
- CD/494, dated 3 April 1984, submitted by France, entitled "Elimination of stocks and of production facilities" (also issued as CD/CW/WP.79)
- CD/496, dated 4 April 1984, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Considerations on including a ban on the use of chemical weapons and the right of withdrawal in a future chemical weapons convention"
- CD/497, dated 11 April 1984, submitted by the USSR, entitled "Letter dated 11 April 1984 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the answers of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K.U. Chernenko, to questions of the newspaper 'Pravda'"
- CD/500, dated 18 April 1984, submitted by the United States, entitled "Draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons"
- CD/501, dated 26 April 1984, submitted by Hungary, entitled "Letter dated 25 April 1984 from the Head of the Hungarian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the communiqué of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Budapest on 19 and 20 April 1984"
- CD/505, dated 13 June 1984, submitted by Finland, entitled "Letter dated 12 June 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Finland, transmitting a document entitled 'Technical Evaluation of Selected Methods for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament'"
- CD/508, dated 15 June 1984, submitted by Norway, entitled "Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Sampling and Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents under Winter Conditions"

- CD/509, dated 15 June 1984, submitted by Norway, entitled "Letter dated 13 June 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Norway transmitting a research report entitled 'Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Sampling and Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents under Winter Conditions'"
- CD/514, dated 9 July 1984, submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled "Verification of non-production of chemical weapons"
- CD/516, dated 12 July 1984, submitted by the United States, entitled "The declaration and interim monitoring of chemical weapons stockpiles"
- CD/518, dated 17 July 1984, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Verification of the Destruction of Chemical Weapons"
- CD/519, dated 18 July 1984, submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, entitled "Letter dated 16 July 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the response of His Excellency Seyyed Ali Khamenei, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to a message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations"
- CD/532, dated 8 August 1984, submitted by a group of socialist States, entitled "The Organization and Functioning of the Consultative Committee" (also issued as CD/CW/WP.84)
- CD/537, dated 15 August 1984, submitted by Denmark, entitled "Letter dated 14 August 1984 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Denmark, transmitting a working paper on the verification of non-production of chemical weapons"

8. In addition, the following Working Papers were circulated to the Ad Hoc Committee:

- CD/CW/WP.67, dated 28 February 1984, entitled "Chairman's suggestion for a Working Structure for the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention"
- CD/CW/WP.68, dated 5 March 1984, submitted by China, entitled "Proposals on Major Elements of a Future Convention on the Complete Prohibition and Total Destruction of Chemical Weapons" (also issued as CD/443)
- CD/CW/WP.69, dated 14 March 1984, entitled "Programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the first part of the 1984 session"
- CD/CW/WP.70, dated 9 March 1984, entitled "Outline for the organization of work"
- CD/CW/WP.71, dated 22 March 1984, submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled "Suggested alternative definitions"
- CD/CW/WP.72, dated 23 March 1984, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Proposal concerning the content of the provision of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons relating to the procedure to be followed in considering a request for an on-site inspection by the State which receives it (amendment to para. 4.3 of the Report of the Co-ordinator of Contact Group B (document CD/416, annex II, p.14))"

- CD/CW/WP.73, dated 26 March 1984, submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled "Working Paper - National verification measures" (also issued as CD/482)
- CD/CW/WP.74, dated 27 March 1984, submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, entitled "Letter dated 20 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament containing proposals on some elements of a future convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons" (also issued as CD/483)
- CD/CW/WP.75, dated 26 March 1984, submitted by China, entitled "Some aspects on 'Small-Scale Production Facility'"
- CD/CW/WP.76, dated 30 March 1984, submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, entitled "Proposal concerning the content of chemical weapons relating to the procedure to be followed in considering a request by a Member State for an on-site inspection. (Amendment to Article 4 of the Report of the Co-ordinator of Contact Group B (document CD/416, annex II, p. 14))"
- CD/CW/WP.77, dated 2 April 1984, entitled "Programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee for the month of April 1984"
- CD/CW/WP.77/Rev.1, dated 5 April 1984, entitled "Programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee for the month of April 1984" (English only)
- CD/CW/WP.78, dated 2 April 1984, submitted by the USSR, entitled "Proposal concerning the content of procedures for the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles"
- CD/CW/WP.79, dated 3 April 1984, submitted by France, entitled "Elimination of stocks and of production facilities" (also issued as CD/494)
- CD/CW/WP.80, dated 17 April 1984, entitled "Programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the second part of the 1984 session"
- CD/CW/WP.81, dated 26 April 1984, entitled "Proposals by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for draft Articles for parts of a chemical weapons convention"
- CD/CW/WP.82, dated 6 July 1984, entitled "Preliminary structure of a Convention on chemical weapons"
- CD/CW/WP.82/Rev.1, dated 6 August 1984, entitled "Preliminary structure of a Convention on chemical weapons"
- CD/CW/WP.83, dated 16 July 1984, entitled "Programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the remainder of the 1984 session"
- CD/CW/WP.84, dated 8 August 1984, submitted by a group of socialist States entitled "The Organization and Functioning of the Consultative Committee" (also issued as CD/532)
- CD/CW/WP.85, dated 8 August 1984, entitled "Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament"

- CD/CW/WP.85/Add.1, dated 15 August 1984, entitled "Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament - Annex I"
- CD/CW/WP.85/Add.2, dated 14 August 1984, entitled "Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament - Annex II"
- CD/CW/WP.86, dated 10 August 1984, submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled "Verification of non-production of chemical weapons"

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1984 SESSION

9. In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee started the full and complete process of elaboration and negotiation of the convention, except for its final drafting, on the basis of existing material and new proposals made by delegations. To this effect, the Ad Hoc Committee accepted the Chairman's proposal to set up three Working Groups which dealt with specific aspects of the following spheres of the Convention as follows:

- (a) Working Group A: Scope
(Chairman: Mr. S. Duarte, Brazil)
- (b) Working Group B: Elimination
(Chairman: Mr. R.J. Akkerman, The Netherlands)
- (c) Working Group C: Compliance
(Chairman: Mr. H. Thielicke, German Democratic Republic)

In addition, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee was assisted by Ambassador J.A. Beesley (Canada) and Ambassador S. Turbanski (Poland) in dealing with the issues of prohibition of use of chemical weapons and the structure of the Convention.

10. On the basis of the results achieved in the Working Groups, and the proposals put forward by the Chairman, preliminary drafting was undertaken on some of the provisions of the Convention. These preliminary draft articles or parts thereof are included in Annex I and structured according to the preliminary structure of the Convention (CD/CW/WP.82/Rev.1). The Committee took note of the intention of the 1984 Chairman to revise the record of positions on substantive issues contained in CD/CW/WP.67 using material submitted by delegations concerned so as to reflect changes in positions. */ Annex II contains reports by the Working Group Chairmen. Annex III contains some proposals introduced during the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament as formulated and presented in Conference Documents.

*/ Some delegations expressed doubts about the necessity of updating this document.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11. The content of Annex I reflects the stage of negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention, but it does not bind any delegation.

12. The Ad Hoc Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) that Annex I be used for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention;

(b) that the reports of the Chairmen of the Working Groups as contained in Annex II, including their proposed draft formulations, together with other relevant present and future documents of the Conference also be utilized in the further elaboration of the Convention;

(c) that the Ad Hoc Committee resume its work under the Chairmanship of Ambassador R. Ekéus (Sweden) and under its present mandate, for a session of limited duration during the period 14 January - 1 February 1985; that the work cover the two specific issues of Permitted Activities and Verification on challenge including related issues with regard to the Consultative Committee, as well as further negotiations on the material in Annex I which has been subject to preliminary drafting; furthermore that consultations be undertaken by the Chairman in the meantime in preparation for the resumed session, and that the Committee present to the Conference on Disarmament a report on its work during that period;

(d) that the Ad Hoc Committee be re-established before the end of the second week of the 1985 session with the 1984 mandate, and that Ambassador S. Turbanski (Poland) be appointed as its Chairman;

(e) that a decision be taken early in the first part of the 1985 session on the continuation of the process of negotiation on the Convention after the closure of the 1985 session, with a view to holding a resumed session of a duration which will ensure that the time available in the period between September 1985 and January 1986 is more fully utilized for negotiations.

ANNEX I

ANNEX I

This Annex to the report of the 1984 session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has been structured so as to reflect the work accomplished by the Ad Hoc Committee in discharging its mandate (CD/440). The preliminary character of the texts presented is to be stressed. The different stages of the preliminary drafting process within the negotiations on the text of a Convention are reflected as texts having different status as explained below. In accordance with the mandate of the Committee, the texts, whatever their status, are not binding for any delegation. Due to the extensive and complicated nature of the substance and the limited time available, it was not possible to consider a number of the parts of the Convention during this session. The texts reproduced in this Annex therefore do not contain all positions or reflect changes in them.

The text is arranged following the preliminary structure of a future Convention in CD/CW/WP.82/Rev.1, which has been used on the understanding that it is still tentative. The placement of provisions within the structure has not been discussed in most cases. Thus Annex I does not reflect all proposals regarding placement which have been made; the issues remain open and will be discussed at a later stage.

In the texts, differing views appear within brackets in cases where alternative formulations were suggested. Other views, expressed in a more general way, are presented in footnotes.

The differing types of texts, reflecting the different stages of the preliminary drafting process within the negotiations are as follows:

1. On the basis of the reports of the Chairmen of the Working Groups and the proposals by the Chairman of the Committee, some texts have been subject to extensive consultations and drafting efforts conducted by the Chairman of the Committee. Such texts are marked with two lines in the margin.
2. Other texts, based on the same material, have not been subject to extensive drafting but the Chairman of the Committee or the Working Groups Chairmen were to a varying extent able to consult with delegations on substance but not necessarily on formulations. Such texts are marked with one line in the margin.
3. Some issues, dealt with in the report of the previous session (CD/416) which was re-edited at the beginning of the session as CD/CW/WP.67, have not been further considered during this session. These are indicated at appropriate places with the headings from CD/CW/WP.67 and marked "67" in the margin.

Preliminary structure of a Convention on chemical weapons*/

Preamble

- I. General provisions on scope
- II. Definitions and Criteria
- III. Declarations
- IV. Measures on chemical weapons
- V. Measures on chemical weapons production facilities
- VI. Permitted activities
- VII. National implementation measures
- VIII. Consultative Committee
- IX. Consultations, co-operation and fact finding
- X. Assistance
- XI. Economic and technological development
- XII. Relation to other international agreements
- XIII. Amendments
- XIV. Duration, withdrawal
- XV. Signature, ratification, entry into force
- XVI. Languages

Annexes and other documents

*/ Discussions are still continuing on where different issues like verification measures are to be placed under this structure.

Preamble

.....

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely and forever the possibility of chemical weapons [which utilize the toxic properties of toxic chemicals, to cause death, or temporary or permanent harm to man and animals,] being used.

.....

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON SCOPE

Each State Party undertakes not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone.

Each State Party undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to Parties under this Convention.

Each State Party undertakes not to use chemical weapons [in any armed conflict] [in any conflict^{*/}] [in any circumstances], and also not to use herbicides [for other than/non-hostile/ permitted^{**}/purposes] [for methods or means of warfare].

[Each State Party undertakes not to [conduct other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons] [engage in any military preparations for use of chemical weapons].]

^{*/} With this alternative is suggested the following reservations:

- a) except for the use of irritants for the purpose of riot control;
- b) other exceptions.

^{**/} It was noted that the definition of "permitted purposes" refers only to the definition of chemical weapons. Such a reference may not be applicable in this context. In such a case the permitted purposes would have to be spelt out in full in these undertakings.

Each State Party undertakes to [destroy] [destroy or divert for permitted purposes] chemical weapons which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control.*/

Each State Party undertakes to [destroy] [destroy or dismantle] chemical weapons production facilities which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control.**/

II. DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

For the purposes of this Convention:

1.***/ The term "chemical weapons" shall apply to the following, together or separately:

(i) toxic chemicals and their precursors, [including components of binary or multicomponent chemical weapons] except those intended for permitted purposes as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes.****/

*/ An alternative formulation and placement of this undertaking is given under "Measures on chemical weapons" on page 15.

**/ An alternative formulation and placement of this undertaking is given under "Measures on chemical weapons production facilities" on page 19.

***/ The definitions of chemical weapons are presented on the understanding that problems related to irritants used for law enforcement and riot control, and also to chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of chemical weapons if their inclusion in the convention is agreed could be handled outside the definitions of chemical weapons if this will result in a more clear and understandable definition. Preliminary suggestions made to solve these problems are given below and consultations on them will be continued.

****/ Toxic chemicals and their key precursors not intended for permitted purposes are also called chemical warfare agents.

(ii) munitions and devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals referred to under (i) above which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices.

(iii) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

- [The term "chemical weapons" shall not apply to those chemicals which are not super-toxic lethal, or other lethal chemicals and which are used by a Party for domestic law-enforcement and domestic riot control purposes.]
- [States Parties agree not to [develop, produce, stockpile or] utilize for chemical weapons chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of such weapons.]

[2. "Toxic chemicals" means:

chemicals [regardless of the method of their production] [whether produced in plants, munitions or elsewhere] whose toxic properties can be utilized [in armed conflicts^{*/}] to cause death or temporary or permanent harm, to man or animals [or plants], involving:]

[2. "Toxic chemical" means:

any chemical, regardless of its origin or method of production, which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to man or animals

^{*/} Depending on the formulation of the prohibition of use.

Toxic chemicals are divided into the following categories:]

(a) "super-toxic lethal chemicals", which have a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method^{*/} set forth in

(b) "other lethal chemicals", which have a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) and less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method^{*/} set forth in

[(c) "other harmful chemicals", being any [toxic] chemicals not covered by (a) or (b) above, [including toxic chemicals which normally cause temporary incapacitation rather than death] [at similar doses to those at which super-toxic lethal chemicals cause death].]

[and "other harmful chemical" has a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation).]

3. Permitted purposes means:

[(a) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, law enforcement or other peaceful purposes; and]

[(a) industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, law enforcement; and]

(b) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to [means of] protection against chemical weapons,^{**/}

^{*/} It was noted that after such measurements had actually been performed, the figures mentioned in this and the following section might be subject to slight changes in order to cover sulphur mustard gas under the first category.

^{**/} The suggestion that such permitted protective purposes should relate only to "an adversary's use of" chemical weapons was removed pending a decision on where in the Convention the question of prohibiting other military preparations for use of chemical weapons than those mentioned under scope should be dealt with.

(c) military purposes which [are not related to the use of chemical weapons] [do not rely upon the toxic properties of toxic chemicals or which are purposes otherwise permitted under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph].

4. "Precursor" means:

a chemical reagent which takes part in the production of a toxic chemical.

5. "Key precursor" means

a precursor which poses a significant risk to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of a toxic chemical. It may possess [possesses] the following characteristics^{*/}.

- (a) it may play [plays] an important role in determining the toxic properties of a [toxic chemical] [super-toxic lethal chemical].
- (b)' it may be used in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of production of the [toxic chemical] [super-toxic lethal chemical], whether in large scale production or in binary or multi-component weapons [or elsewhere].
- (b)'' it may be [is] used [in one of the chemical reactions] at the final stage of production of the [toxic chemical] [super-toxic lethal chemical], whether in a production facility, in a munition or device, or elsewhere.
- (b)''' it may be used in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of formation of the [toxic chemical] [super-toxic lethal chemical].

^{*/} Although different opinions exist on the place for these characteristics, there is no disagreement that they have to be taken into account when drawing up the list of key precursors forming part of the Convention.

[(c) it may [is] not be used, or [is] used only in minimal quantities, for permitted purposes]

Key precursors are listed in

[The list in ... shall be subject to revisions according to ... taking into account the above characteristics as well as any other relevant factor^{*/}.]

[The list in ... may be subject to revisions according to ... taking into account the above characteristics.]

[For the purpose of the relevant provisions in a Chemical Weapons Convention key precursors should be listed according to the characteristics.]

[As an exception to the rule, chemicals which are not key precursors but are deemed to pose a threat [particular risk] with regard to a Chemical Weapons Convention should be included in a list, if an understanding to this end can be reached.]

6. Chemical weapons production facility means:

[Chemical weapons production facility means any building or equipment designed, constructed or used (in any degree) for the production of chemical weapons or for filling chemical weapons.]

["Chemical weapons production facility" means any building or any equipment which in any degree was designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946, for:

- (a) the production for chemical weapons of any toxic chemical, except for those listed in (Schedule B), or the production for chemical weapons of any key precursor; or
- (b) the filling of chemical weapons.]

^{*/} It seems generally acceptable that this para. could appear in the list of key precursors.

III. DECLARATIONS

Declarations of chemical weapons

Each State Party undertakes to submit not later than 30 days after entry into force for it of the Convention declarations to the Consultative Committee, stating:

- whether it possesses or does not possess any chemical weapons^{*/};
- whether it has on its territory any chemical weapons under the [jurisdiction or] control of anyone else;
- the composition of stocks of chemical weapons, i.e.:^{**/}
 - toxic chemicals and their [key] precursors comprised in such stocks by their chemical names, [structural chemical formulae,] toxicities where applicable and weights in metric tons in bulk and filled munitions;
 - munitions by types, calibres, quantities and chemical fill;
 - [other delivery] devices by types, quantities, [volume], [size] and chemical fill;
 - equipment [or chemical] specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or [other delivery] devices;
- [- the precise location of chemical weapons under its control and the detailed inventory of the chemical weapons at each location]

[Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee declarations stating the location of storage depots adjacent to destruction facilities [within 3 months after entry into force of the Convention].]^{***/}

^{*/} Regardless of quantity or location.

^{**/} It has been proposed that some of this material could be placed in an Annex.

^{***/} [Within 6 months with respect to binary weapons and within 24 months for other chemical weapons.]

[Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee declarations on the detailed composition of each batch of chemical weapons to be destroyed upon arrival at the storage depot adjacent to the destruction facility.]

[Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee declarations on the detailed composition of each batch of chemical weapons to be diverted for permitted purposes before it is transported to the facility which will assure its diversion.]

Plans for [destruction] [destruction or diversion for permitted purposes] of chemical weapons

Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee, not later than [30 days] [3 months]^{*/}[6 months] after entry into force for it of the Convention, initial plans^{**/} for the [destruction] [destruction or diversion for permitted purposes] of chemical weapons containing^{***/}

- types of operation;
- schedules with respect to quantities and types of chemical weapons to be [destroyed] [destroyed or diverted to permitted purposes] and end products;
- [location of destruction plants to be used]
[schedules for declaration within two years after entry into force for it of the location of destruction plants^{*/} to be used]

Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee [three] [six] months before the [destruction] [destruction or diversion] operations are to begin detailed plans containing the information needed by the Consultative Committee as provided for in

^{*/} The [3 months] timeframe is a working variant subject to further consideration taking into account the results of elaboration of specific contents of the initial plans.

^{**/} To be based on agreed principles.

^{***/} It has been proposed that some of this material could be placed in an annex.

Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee [periodic] [annual] progress reports on implementation of plans for the [destruction] [destruction or diversion for permitted purposes] of chemical weapons and a notification of the completion of [destruction] [destruction or diversion] of chemical weapons within 30 days thereafter.

Old Stocks

"67"

Initial declaration of chemical weapons production facilities

"67"

Submission of plans and notifications

"67"

IV. MEASURES ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Each State Party undertakes to [destroy] [destroy or divert^{*/}] for permitted purposes as defined in]
[1. to destroy and 2. have the right to divert for permitted purposes as provided for in ...] [as rapidly as possible] [all] chemical weapons if any under their [jurisdiction or] control.
[All chemical weapons stocks should be totally destroyed except for dual purpose toxic chemical and dual purpose key precursors which, as agreed upon, may be diverted to permitted purposes.]

[[Destruction] [destruction or diversion for permitted purposes] shall commence within 6 months and be completed within ten years after the Convention's entry into force for the Party, in accordance with the schedule^{**/} specified in]

[[Destruction] [destruction or diversion for permitted purposes] shall be carried out in accordance with the schedule specified in ... within the overall timeframe beginning from 6 months and ending within 10 years after the Convention's entry into force.]

^{*/} Diversion is suggested not to relate to super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors, except as allowed in with respect to permitted activities admitting possession of an aggregate amount of up to one ton a year.

^{**/} It is understood that such a schedule is based on the principle that during the entire stage of [destruction] [destruction or diversion for permitted purposes] no Party that has declared the possession of chemical weapons shall gain any military advantage. Some delegations suggested that the most toxic chemicals such as VX, soman, sarin, tabun, mustard gas etc. shall be destroyed in the first place.

Elimination of stocks

"67"

[The Consultative Committee shall consult with Parties no later than [three months] [between three to ... months] after entry into force of the Convention with a view to co-ordinate their plans for destruction or diversion of chemical weapons submitted in accordance with...]

[Destruction] [destruction or diversion for permitted purposes] shall employ non-reversible procedures which will [allow] [not artificially hinder] the systematic international on-site inspection by the Consultative Committee provided under ...

Each State Party undertakes to protect population and environment in fulfilling the obligations connected with the [destruction] [destruction and the diversion for permitted purposes] of chemical weapons.*

Each State Party undertakes

- to declare within... days any chemical weapons which might be found [after the initial declarations] [and which were left without its knowledge] [anywhere] [on its territory] under its [jurisdiction or] control, submitting to the Consultative Committee all relevant data in its possession about the found chemical weapons and planned methods, timetables and the place of their destruction, according to

*/ It is understood that the protection of population and environment should also be observed in the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities.

- to destroy such weapons in a manner which would ensure the safety of population and environment, taking into account the quantity and the state of the discovered chemical weapons.

Non-removal of stocks

"67"

Verification measures

"67"

V. MEASURES ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

Each State Party undertakes to destroy its chemical weapons production facilities.*/

Destruction of production facilities can be carried**/ out by any of the following methods***/ alone, or as appropriate together:

1. dismantling and physical destruction of all components and structures;
2. dismantling and physical destruction of certain components, while reusing other components for permitted purposes;
3. dismantling and physical destruction of certain structures.

The specific method or combination of methods to be used in respect of each production facility shall be determined by each State Party according to the nature of the facility concerned and in accordance with the principles laid down in

Each State Party shall indicate in its plan(s) for destruction of production facilities the specific methods of destruction envisaged.

*/ To be defined elsewhere; this text refers only to "single-purpose" facilities.

**/ It has been proposed that this paragraph might be placed in an annex.

***/ It is an understanding that the methods mentioned may not be exhaustive and that further consideration should be given to this problem, taking into account the future definition of chemical weapons production facility.

Elimination of Production Facilities

"67"

Cessation of production activities

"67"

Non-construction and non-conversion of production facilities

"67"

Verification measures

"67"

VI. PERMITTED ACTIVITIES^{*/}

Each State Party has the right, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, to [develop], produce otherwise acquire, retain, transfer^{**/} and use toxic chemicals and their precursors^{***/} for permitted purposes, in types and quantities consistent with such purposes, subject to the following [restrictions]:^{****/}

^{*/} It is generally felt that a provision stating that nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as hampering the activities of Parties in the chemical field should be formulated. The precise formulation and placement of such provision should be further discussed. (Formulations on this matter appear under XI. "Economic and technological development")

^{**/} A provision on transfer should be elaborated.

^{***/} "Toxic chemicals and their precursors" used here with reference to the section on "definitions".

^{****/} In accordance with procedures set forth in ... and, as appropriate, on the basis of lists of chemicals, including those of particular risk, to be determined according to agreed criteria.

1. Super-toxic Lethal Chemicals

- (a) a limitation to an amount which is the lowest possible and in any case does not exceed one metric ton of the aggregate quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals [and their precursors] [and key components of binary systems] produced, diverted from stocks, or otherwise acquired annually or possessed at any one time [for protective purposes] [for all permitted purposes];
- (b) a limitation of the production of these chemicals to a single small-scale facility having a capacity limit of
- (c) a notification to the Consultative Committee of the location and capacity of the small-scale production facility within 30 days after entry into force for a State Party, or when constructed later days before the date of commencement of operations;
- (d) monitoring of the small-scale production facility by annual data reporting with justification, on-site instruments, and systematic international on-site inspections [periodically] [on a quota basis].

+/

+/ This material was put together by the Chairman of the Working Group following consultations with some delegations as a presentation of positions.

- [2. a prohibition of the production of compounds with methyl-phosphorus bond in commercial production facilities [and to restrict such production to the single small-scale facility].]
- [(e) monitoring of all facilities producing super-toxic lethal chemicals by regular reporting which would include description/justification of the civil uses for which the chemical is produced and systematic international on-site inspection.]
- [(f) a prohibition of production and use of listed super-toxic lethal chemicals, except for the production and use of such chemicals in laboratory quantities, for research, medical, or protective purposes at establishments approved by the Party.]
3. Other Lethal and Other Harmful Chemicals
- (a) monitoring of production and use by annual data reporting [according to the level of risk posed by particular chemicals whether per se or as precursors];
- [(b) a declaration to the Consultative Committee of the location of facilities for the production of certain other lethal and other harmful chemicals deemed to pose a particular risk.]
4. Key precursors [which are not key components of binary systems and/or which do not contain methyl-phosphorus bond]
- Monitoring by annual data reporting of production and use [and declaration to the Consultative Committee of the location of facilities for the production of key precursors] [and systematic international on-site inspection on a random basis.]
- [5. Precursors (to be elaborated)]

+/

RESTRICTIONS ON ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER

"67"

Cessation of acquisition and transfer

"67"

Permitted Transfers

"67"

VII. National Implementation Measures

Each State Party undertakes to adopt measures necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to implement the Convention, and in particular, to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the Convention and to monitor compliance with the Convention anywhere under its [jurisdiction or] control.

It undertakes to inform the Consultative Committee^{*/} of the legislative and administrative measures taken to implement the Convention.

Each State Party undertakes to co-operate with the Consultative Committee in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide, through any national organization or authority assigned to implement the Convention, assistance to the Consultative Committee including data reporting, assistance for international on-site inspections and a prompt response to all requests for the provision of expertise, information and laboratory support.^{**/}

National Technical Means

"67"

^{*/} Any mentioning of the Consultative Committee may also relate to its appropriate subsidiary organ, whichever may be decided.

^{**/} It has been proposed to place this paragraph under Section VIII.

VIII. CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE*/

1. For the purpose of facilitating the implementation of the Convention by assisting States Parties in consultations and cooperation, as well as by promoting verification of compliance with the Convention, a Consultative Committee shall be established. It shall consist of the representatives designated by the States Parties to the Convention.**/
2. The first session of the Committee shall be convened by the Depositary at [venue] not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention.
3. The Committee shall
 - a) consider any matter raised, related to the objectives or the implementation of the Convention;
 - b) review scientific and technical developments [which could affect the operation of the Convention and consider other technical matters] related to the implementation of the Convention;
 - [c) consider measures to be taken by States Parties at the emergence of any situation which poses a threat to the Convention or impedes the achievement of its objectives;]***/
 - [d) consider practical measures to be taken by States Parties in assistance of any endangered State Party;]***/

*/ Further material on the Consultative Committee can be found in Annex II, pp. 11-20 and in Annex III, CD/294, p. 7, and CD/500, pp. 7-8 and annex I.

**/ Concerning the participation in the Committee of States signatories to the Convention, it was suggested that an appropriate provision be included in the Convention. According to another view, this matter should be decided by the Committee itself.

***/ The proposals are not thought to affect in any way the rights of States to have recourse to the Security Council as provided in the UN Charter. According to another view, however, it would be appropriate to consider these proposals in close connection with a possible role of the UN Security Council in the compliance procedure, especially concerning assistance for a State Party which has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.

4. The Committee shall meet in regular sessions annually during the first ten years after the entry into force of the Convention. After that period, it may meet annually, unless States Parties decide otherwise.^{*/} The Committee shall review the operation of the Convention at its regular sessions every 5 years.^{**/}

An extraordinary session of the Committee may be convened at the request of any State Party or the Executive Council within 30 days after the receipt of such request.^{***/}

5. The Committee shall take its decisions by consensus^{***/} [whenever possible] [on matters of substance]. If a consensus cannot be reached [within 24 hours, a decision may be taken by a majority of those present and voting. The report on a fact-finding inquiry should not be put to a vote, nor should any decision be taken as to whether a Party is complying with the provisions of the Convention.] [during the session, each State Party may record its opinion in the final report of the session for subsequent study by the Governments of the other States Parties to the Convention. Decisions on procedural matters related to the organization of work shall be taken by consensus, whenever possible, and otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.]

6. The Committee shall elect its Chairman at the beginning of each regular session.

^{*/} It was suggested that the decision could be taken at the end of each session or the Chairman of the Committee could elicit the views of States Parties.

^{**/} It was suggested that in such a case the regular session may be divided into two parts: (a) normal regular session; (b) review session. According to another view, the possibility of holding regular review conferences should be considered in close connection with the procedure for amendments.

^{***/} It was suggested that the request forwarded by a State Party should be substantiated. According to another view, it should be supported by a certain number of States Parties (e.g. 5)

^{****/} It was suggested that decisions on all questions should be taken either by consensus or by a majority vote. It was furthermore suggested that there should be a clear understanding as to the difference between procedural and substantive matters.

7. The Committee shall, after each regular session, present to the States Parties a report on its activities.*/

8. The expenses for the activities of the Committee shall be borne by the States Parties to the Convention.**/

9. Legal Status***/

10. For the purpose of assisting the Committee in carrying out its functions, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat shall be established.

11. The Consultative Committee may set-up other [technical] subsidiary organs as may be necessary for its work.

12. The Executive Council shall have delegated authority to discharge the functions of the Consultative Committee set out in sub-paras. 3 [.....] as well as any other functions which the Committee may delegate to it. The Council shall report to the Committee at its regular sessions on its exercise of these functions. [In the intervals between the sessions, questions with regard to promoting the implementation of and compliance with the Convention shall be dealt with by the Executive Council acting on behalf of the Consultative Committee.]

13. The Council shall be composed of representatives of [15] States Parties and a non-voting Chairman.

[Ten members of the Council shall be elected by the Consultative Committee upon consultation with the States Parties, taking into account the principle of equitable political and geographic representation, for a term of 2 years with an annual replacement of five members. The remaining five seats shall be reserved for the permanent members of the Security Council participating in the Convention.]

[Based on the principle of the sovereign equality of States, members shall be elected by the Consultative Committee from among all States Parties. Elections could be made on the basis of a regional allocation of seats or on any other adequate basis that will be agreed upon, excluding the possibility of institutional permanent membership of any State Party.]

*/ It is understood that the report might consist of the proceedings of the regular session and the final document of the session. In case there is no annual regular session of the Consultative Committee, the Executive Council may present a technical report to States Parties.

**/ It is understood that the Preparatory Commission would make a recommendation concerning the financing of the activities of the Committee.

***/ It was suggested that the Technical Secretariat should be able to enter into the legal contracts necessary to fulfil its functions. This matter should be addressed in a comprehensive way after agreement is reached on the conduct of activities by the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs.

14. The Council shall take its decisions by consensus^{*/} [whenever possible] [on matters of substance]. If a consensus cannot be reached within [24 hours] [a decision may be taken by a majority of those present and voting. The report on a fact-finding inquiry should not be put to a vote, nor should any decision be taken as to whether a Party is complying with the provisions of the Convention.] [with regard to a request for on-site inspection, the State subject to the request shall be informed of the individual opinions expressed by all the Members of the Executive Council on the matter. The Council shall take its decisions on procedural matters related to the organization of its work by consensus whenever possible, and otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.]

[A fact-finding team shall be automatically sent out by the Executive Council in response to the request made by a State Party for inspection to be carried out in territories under its control.]

15. [The Council shall be able to be convened on short notice and to function continuously. Each member of the Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Consultative Committee.]

16. The Chairman of the previous regular session of the Consultative Committee shall serve as Chairman of the Council.

[17. The Executive Council may set-up such subsidiary organs as may be necessary for its work.]

[18. A Fact-Finding Panel subordinate to the Executive Council shall be established. The Panel shall be responsible for conducting fact-finding inquiries, including the oversight of challenge on-site inspection.]^{**/}

^{*/} It was suggested that decisions on all questions should be taken either by consensus or a majority vote.

^{**/} Different suggestions have been made with regard to such an organ:

a) It would not be necessary to provide for such a body, since the three bodies already envisaged would suffice;

b) Panel with political and technical functions as subsidiary organ to the Executive Council, composed of

- i) five members; or
- ii) technical experts belonging to the delegations to the Executive Council.

c) Staff of technical experts which would provide technical advice and carry out inspections. The following forms are envisaged:

- i) permanent unit in the Secretariat;
- ii) roster of quickly available experts.

19. The Technical Secretariat shall

- a) provide administrative support to the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council;
- b) render technical assistance to States Parties, the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council;
- c) carry out international on-site inspections as provided for in the Convention;
- d) assist the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council in tasks related to information and fact-finding as well as in other tasks provided to it by those organs.*/

20. [The staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed on the basis of the principle of just political and geographical representation of States Parties to the Convention. It shall be composed of inspectors and experts who shall be nationals of the States Parties.]

[The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff of the Secretariat and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible among States Parties to the Convention.]**/

21. ***/

*/ The functions of the Technical Secretariat might be specified further.

**/ It was suggested that other questions connected with the establishment of the Secretariat should be considered by the Preparatory Commission, which should make appropriate recommendations to the Consultative Committee.

***/ Material on cooperation between the Consultative Committee and the national verification bodies can be found in Annex II, p.18 and Annex III, CD/294, pp. 6 and 7.

IX. CONSULTATION, CO-OPERATION AND FACT-FINDING

Each State Party undertakes to consult and co-operate in any matter related to the implementation of the Convention, directly among themselves or through appropriate procedures, including the services or good offices of the Consultative Committee^{*/} (or its subsidiary organs) as well as of appropriate international organizations.

Each State Party shall endeavour to clarify and resolve, through bilateral consultation, any situation which may give cause to doubts about compliance with the Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related situation which may be considered ambiguous. A State Party seized with a request from another State Party for clarification of a particular situation shall [within 7 days] [as soon as possible] provide the requesting State Party with relevant information in order to dispel doubts and to clarify the situation [as a final, or, as an exception, a preliminary answer. A preliminary answer should give the reasons for the delay, and should be followed by a final answer within ...]

Systematic International Procedures

" 67 "

^{*/} Any mention of the Consultative Committee may also relate to its appropriate subsidiary organ, whichever may be decided.

Fact-Finding

General Provisions

1. [Each State Party undertakes to ensure non-routine verification of compliance with the Convention by the application of fact-finding procedures including on-site inspection on the basis of obligations as set forth in, arranged bilaterally, or by a request to the Consultative Committee as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article.]
2. Any State Party may at any time request the Consultative Committee (or its appropriate subsidiary organ) to carry out, in the exercise of its functions, appropriate procedures with regard to itself or another State Party to clarify and resolve any situation which may give cause to doubt about compliance with the Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related situation which may be considered ambiguous. Such a request may include a request for an on-site inspection.
3. Requests sent to the Consultative Committee (or its subsidiary organ) under Paragraph 2 of this Article should contain objective and concrete elements supporting doubts and concern of the compliance with the Convention and should be directly relevant to such doubts and concerns. (Requests should specify the action the Executive Council is requested to take).

4. Each State Party undertakes to co-operate [fully] with the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs and/or international organizations, which may, as appropriate, give scientific, technical and administrative assistance to the Consultative Committee in order to facilitate fact-finding activities so as to ensure the speedy clarification of the situation which gave rise to the original request.

5. The Consultative Committee shall notify all States Parties of the initiation of any fact-finding procedures as provided for in .. in which it will be involved and shall provide soon as possible [with the consent of the Parties concerned^{*/}] all available information related thereto to all State Parties.

6. Any State Party which has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may have recourse to appropriate procedures under the Charter of the United Nations [and that nothing in this Article should be interpreted as affecting the rights and duties of Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.]

^{*/} It should be observed that a request by one Party for information from another Party transmitted by the Technical Secretariat need not constitute initiation of a fact-finding process.

United Nations

"67"

Provisions for requests for fact-finding

Upon receipt of a request from a State Party for clarification and fact-finding the Technical Secretariat shall, on behalf of the Executive Council, transmit within [....] [2 days] the request to the State Party giving rise to the doubt or concern.

The Party which was asked for clarification shall within provide its information to the requesting Party, sending it directly to the requesting State Party or to it via the Technical Secretariat [within ... days].

The requesting State Party, upon receipt of the clarification, will decide if the doubts or concern have been resolved. If it finds that its doubts and concerns have not been resolved it can request the Executive Council to start a fact-finding procedure.

Upon receipt of such a request the Executive Council shall within... initiate the requested fact-finding procedure which will be conducted as specified in

A report on the requested fact-finding procedure, whether interim or final, shall be presented to the Executive Council within [2 months].

The report shall contain the information and the views presented during the requested fact-finding procedure.*/ |

On-site inspection by Challenge **/

Verification of the Prohibition of Use

"67"

X. ASSISTANCE ***/

Assistance

"67"

XI. ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

Promotion of Development Goals

"67"

XII. RELATION TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Preamble

"67"

XIII. AMENDMENTS

XIV. DURATION, WITHDRAWAL

Withdrawal

"67"

*/ Regarding possible further actions which could be taken by a State Party not satisfied with the outcome of the requested fact-finding report the State Party could ask for the convening of a special meeting of the Consultative Committee. A State Party would have such a right under the part of the Convention regulating the functions and procedures of the Consultative Committee. Whether a specific provision is needed in the section of fact-finding is still under discussion.

**/ Material on on-site inspection by challenge can be found in Annex II, pp. 21-23, which contains the relevant part of the Report of the Chairman of Working Group C, dated 16 April 1984, and in Annex III, pp. 7 and 8 (from CD/294 dated 21 July 1982) and pp. 10 and 11 and annex II, pp. 7 and 8 (from CD/500, dated 18 April 1984).

***/ See 3 c and d under Consultative Committee

XV. SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE

Depositary

"67"

XVI. LANGUAGES

ANNEXES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

Preparatory Commission^{*/}

1. For the purpose of carrying out the necessary administrative and technical preparations for the effective operation of the provisions of the Convention and for preparing for the first meeting of the Consultative Committee, the Depositary of the Convention shall convene a Preparatory Commission as soon as possible and in any case not later than 60 days after the Convention has been signed by ... States^{**/}.

2. The Commission shall consist of the representatives designated by the States which have signed the Convention. Any State which has not signed the Convention may apply to the Commission for observer status which will be accorded on the decision of the Commission. may designate an observer to the Commission.

Participation of intergovernmental organizations

3. The Commission shall be convened at Geneva Geneva, New York or Vienna and shall remain in existence until the Convention comes into force and thereafter until the Consultative Committee has convened.

4. All decisions of the Commission shall be made by consensus.

5. The Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedures and appoint an executive secretary and staff, as shall be necessary.

6. The expenses of the Commission shall be met from the regular budget of the United Nations, subject to the approval of the General Assembly of the United Nations. by a loan provided by the United Nations which shall be repaid by the Consultative Committee. by the States signatories to the

^{*/} There have been a number of suggestions on the format of the document on the Preparatory Commission which should be further explored. It was proposed that provisions on the Commission could be contained in

- a resolution of the UNGA commending the Convention;
- an Annex to the Convention which would enter into force before the Convention
- any other separate document (e.g. as part of the report of the CD to the UNGA containing the draft Convention)

^{**/} The figure should be identical with the number of States provided for in the Article of the Convention dealing with ratification and entry into force.

Convention, participating in the Commission, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, adjusted to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and the participation of States signatories in the Commission.]

7. The Commission shall have the following functions:

a) make arrangements for the first meeting of the Consultative Committee, including the preparation of a provisional agenda and draft rules of procedure [and choosing the site for the first meeting of the Consultative Committee];

b) make [studies, reports and] recommendations for the first meeting of the Consultative Committee on subjects of concern requiring immediate action, including

(i) the financing of the activities for which the Consultative Committee is responsible;

(ii) [the programme of work and] the budget for the first year of the activities of the Consultative Committee;

(iii) the establishment of the Technical Secretariat;

(iv) the location of the permanent offices of the Consultative Committee.

[8. In the exercise of its functions, the Commission may have recourse, as appropriate, to the services of appropriate international organizations [within the UN system.]

9. The Commission shall report on its activities to the first meeting of the Consultative Committee.

ANNEX II

Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Report of the Chairman of Working Group A	2 - 5
Report of the Chairman of Working Group B	6 - 10
Report of the Chairman of Working Group C	11 - 20
Report of the Chairman of Working Group C (pages 1, 5-6) dated 16 April 1984	21 - 23

Report of the Chairman of Working Group A

Working Group A held seven meetings between 18 June and 30 July. In the course of its work, and in accordance with its mandate, it had before it the questions of scope, definitions and non-production of chemical weapons, with a view to finding generally acceptable formulations for the articles in the Convention dealing with those subjects. Work was based on CD/CW/WP.67 as well as on proposals presented by delegations.

I. Scope:

There were still divergences of view on the way in which the matters which appear under the title "Purpose and Commitments" in WP.67 (page 4) should be finally drafted for inclusion in the Convention and whether they should be contained in a single article or in more than one article. This did not, however, prevent the Working Group from discussing possible formulations relating to such matters. Several proposals were made in this connection.

The tentative heading for the first article ("Basic Undertakings") was found to be subject to widely different interpretations.^{*/} It was generally felt that an appropriate heading could best be chosen once the content of the article is agreed.

The Working Group agreed that the prohibitions to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile and retain chemical weapons, to transfer such weapons, and to assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in activities prohibited to parties, should be included in the first article. Views differed on the inclusion of other obligations.

The Working Group agreed that there should be a clear prohibition of use of chemical weapons, but decided not to discuss its formulation due to the fact that this particular question was being dealt with in another framework of the negotiations.

Regarding the proposals for a prohibition of "other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons", three main trends emerged: some of the proponents of the inclusion of such a provision stated their willingness to discuss the

^{*/} A delegation proposed the inclusion, as a "basic undertaking" of an additional provision stating the obligation of parties to "provide access to relevant facilities and locations for the purpose of international verification of compliance". Other delegations did not believe that such a provision should be included.

possibility of its incorporation elsewhere in the Convention; other proponents stated that they were prepared to present their position in further detail;*/ other delegations did not think that such a prohibition should be included in the Convention as they considered that the existing proposals were unclear and could be subject to different interpretations.

Views differed on the need to include a destruction obligation in the first article. Some considered this necessary, others questioned its need.

Taking into account the discussions held, as well as of the proposals made, the Chairman submits the following formulations for further elaboration.

Each State Party undertakes, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention, not to:

- develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
- assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to parties under this Convention;
- use chemical weapons (in any armed conflict);
- (conduct other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons);

and to:

- destroy (or divert for permitted purposes) chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control (alternative): under its control.

II. Definitions:

Working Group A devoted three meetings to the question of the definition of "chemical weapons production facility". At the close of the discussion, the Chairman presented an informal working paper, dated 29 June, which is attached to this report.

III. Non-production of chemical weapons:

Working Group A was unable to hold discussions on this question. The Chairman undertook to hold informal consultations, the results of which are not yet available at the time of this report.

*/ Documents CD/97; CD/142, CD/CW/CRP.29 and CD/426 were mentioned by those delegations as intended to clarify their views on this question.

Chairman's Paper of 29 June 1984 on

PRODUCTION FACILITIES

This paper is intended to summarize the discussions within Working Group A on 11, 25 and 27 June 1984 on the question of production facilities for chemical weapons. It does not engage any delegation and does not prejudice their positions. It represents the Chairman's understanding of the results of the discussion and its purpose is to provide a focus for further work on the matter. The paper draws both on the discussion and on proposals presented by individual delegations.

I. Definition.

Alternative A: a simple definition based on the definition of chemical weapons, e.g.,

Chemical weapons production facility means any building or equipment (any facility) designed and constructed, or used (exclusively) for the production of chemical weapons as defined in this Convention.

Alternative B: a definition based on the types of chemicals produced by the facility, and containing a cut-off date, e.g.: (CD/500)

Chemical weapons production facility means any building or any equipment which in any degree was designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946, for

- (a) the production for chemical weapons of any toxic chemical, except for those listed in Schedule B, or the production of any key precursor; or
- (b) the filling of chemical weapons.

II. Consequences.

1. Under the approach envisaged in Alternative A, measures to be taken regarding production facilities would be specified in the appropriate section of the Convention. Facilities would be categorized and measures would be specified accordingly. Categories would take into account factors such as the types of chemicals, munitions, etc., produced at the facility, the potential threat of chemical weapons produced, the purpose of the production, the practicability of verification, etc.

Production facilities would be subject to:

- (a) declaration, as provided for in the Convention;
- (b) total destruction;
- (c) partial destruction (or conversion);
- (d) verification, as provided for in the Convention.

2. Under the approach envisaged in Alternative B, all production facilities so defined would be completely destroyed.

3. Common features of both approaches:

Under both approaches, facilities to be destroyed would include:

- (i) facilities designed and built, or used, solely for production of chemicals defined in the Convention as chemical weapons, and which have no use for purposes not prohibited by the Convention;
- (ii) facilities designed and built, or used, for filling chemical weapons;
- (iii) facilities designed and built, or used, exclusively for the production of shell casings and similar metal components for chemical weapons.

III. Topics for further discussion and clarification: (in Working Group A or elsewhere)

1. Whether a definition such as Alternative A is needed, once facilities can be categorized and specific measures agreed for each category.
2. Types of specific measures; nature and scope of such measures.
3. Which types of facilities would fall under the scope of Alternative B.
4. Need for a cut-off date (as in Alternative B); consequences of its adoption.
5. Verification measures.
6. Types and categories of facilities (illustrative list):
 - (i) facilities designed and built solely for purposes not prohibited by the Convention but which have been used at least once for production of a chemical for chemical weapons (common commercial chemicals or chemicals that have little use except for chemical weapons);
 - (ii) facilities designed and built both for purposes not prohibited by the Convention and for production of chemicals that have little use except for chemical weapons;
 - (iii) facilities designed and built, or initially used, for production of a chemical that has little use except for chemical weapons, but later converted to purposes not prohibited by the Convention; possibility and speed of their reconversion to CW production;
 - (iv) facilities designed and built, or used, solely for production of chemicals that have little use except for chemical weapons;
 - (v) facilities designed and built, or used, for filling chemical weapons;
 - (vi) facilities designed and built, or used, for production of shells and casings for chemical weapons exclusively, or also for the production of other weapons;
 - (vii) facilities designed and built, or used, for the production of chemicals which may be used as precursors in binary or multi-component chemical weapons
 - (viii) facilities designed and built, or used, for the production of chemicals which may bring harm to the environment in case they are used as chemical weapons.

Report of the Chairman of Working Group B

Working Group B held seven meetings from 20 June to 3 August 1984. In the course of its work and in accordance with its mandate, it considered the issues of elimination of stocks of chemical weapons and elimination of production facilities, with a view to finding generally acceptable formulations for the articles in the Convention dealing with these issues. Work was based on CD/CW/WP.67 as well as on proposals presented by delegations and by the Chairman.

Stockpile Declarations

There remains a difference of views as regards declarations of locations of chemical weapons.

According to one view a State Party should declare the locations of all its chemical weapons to the Consultative Committee within 30 days after entry into force for it of the Convention. (International on-site verification should in the same view be enabled at the site of declaration immediately following declarations.)

According to another view a State Party would be under an obligation to submit to the Consultative Committee detailed declarations including their locations on each batch of chemical weapons that would be relocated for subsequent destruction. (Declarations and international on-site verification of the declarations would thus be implemented gradually over a period of up to approximately eight years.)

According to yet another view, a State Party would be under obligation to submit to the Consultative Committee within 30 days, a detailed declaration of all its stocks of chemical weapons as well as its destruction facilities and their storage areas where the chemical weapons will be progressively grouped in order to be destroyed. (An international on-site inspection should take place within three months after the declaration of stocks and the grouping sites.)

Those however who held different views on declarations of locations of chemical weapons agreed that, depending on the timeframe, States Parties may redeploy chemical weapons before declaration of their locations, so as to avoid compromising their security due to collocation of chemical weapons with other military objects to which the Convention bears no relation.

Another difference of views concerns the question of whether all precursors of toxic chemicals in chemical weapons stocks should be declared or key precursors only.

Further deliberations are necessary on whether there is a need to include in stockpile declarations "chemicals specifically designed for use directly in connection with munitions or other delivery devices".

Initial Plans

The differences of views on time limits within which a State Party should submit to the Consultative Committee its initial plans now ranges between one month and three months; related to this difference of views is the question whether a State Party should include in its initial plans the locations of the destruction plants to be used or (only) schedules for declarations, within two years after entry into force for it of the Convention, of such locations of destruction plants to be used.

Verification Measures

The differing positions with respect to declarations of locations of chemical weapons have their consequences on positions as regards (on-site) verification of stocks of chemical weapons. The differing positions are reflected hereunder, marked with 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 1 + 2 + 3 indicates where the positions are identical.

verification of initial declarations of stocks, their storage, destruction and diversion for permitted purposes

initial declaration

- 1 [to submit the initial declaration of stocks of chemical weapons to verification by means of systematic international on-site inspection on an immediate basis
- 3 to submit the initial declaration of stocks of chemical weapons to verification by means of systematic international on-site inspection within three months

storage

- 1 to monitor the stocks at their location upon entry into force of the Convention with monitoring instruments installed by international inspectors following verification of the initial declaration and systematic international on-site inspection on a periodic basis and to monitor, within three months after entry into force of the Convention, the stocks at their
- 3 relocation sites with monitoring instruments installed by international inspectors following verification of the initial declaration and systematic international on-site inspection on a periodic basis and]
to submit stocks to verification between the declarations and the commencement of destruction [or diversion for permitted purposes] by
- 1 + 2 + 3 continuous monitoring^{*/} with on-site instruments and by systematic international on-site inspection on a periodic basis as from the moment of their arrival at the storage site adjacent to the specialized facilities for the destruction.

^{*/} This concept needs further study and elaboration in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

destruction or diversion

'to submit the destruction [or the diversion for permitted purposes] of chemical weapons to systematic international verification by on-site
1 + 2 + 3 monitoring with instruments throughout the process and by systematic
. international on-site inspection throughout the time the facility is in
. operation
. [for the most dangerous chemical weapons, including supertoxic lethal
. chemical weapons; and for all other chemical weapons by combination of
. permanent on-site monitoring and systematic international on-site
2 + 3 inspection on a periodic basis or on a quota basis]

Production facilities

Attention was also devoted to the elimination of production facilities, notwithstanding the absence, for the time being, of agreement on a definition of production facilities.

For practical purposes the discussion focused on facilities dedicated to production for hostile purposes only.

Although the discussion helped clarify the methods to be used in eliminating chemical weapons production facilities, as reflected in the Chairman's proposal in this respect, it was not possible, within the time available, to narrow down the divergences with respect to: declarations, plans and notifications, and verification measures. The positions in this regard remain as reflected in CD/CW/WP.67.

* * *

On the basis of the discussions in the Working Group, the Chairman drafted proposals for articles of the Convention that are reflected hereunder. These proposals represent the Chairman's understanding of the results of the discussions and their purpose is to provide a focus for further work on these issues; they in no way commit delegations nor do they prejudice their positions.

Proposals by the Chairman of the Working Group

Stockpile Declarations

Each State Party undertakes to submit not later than 30 days after entry into force for it of the Convention declarations to the Consultative Committee, stating:

- whether it possesses or does not possess any chemical weapons^{*/}
- whether it has on its territory any chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else;

^{*/} (regardless of quantity or location)

- the composition of stocks of chemical weapons, i.e.:
 - toxic chemicals and their [key] precursors comprised in such stocks by their chemical names, structural chemical formulae, toxicities where applicable and weights in metric tons in bulk and filled munitions;
 - munitions by types, calibres, quantities and chemical fill;
 - other delivery devices by types, quantities, size and chemical fill;
 - equipment [or chemical] specifically designed for use directly in connection with munitions or other delivery devices;
- [the precise location of chemical weapons under its control and the detailed inventory of the chemical weapons at each location]

[Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee declarations stating the location of storage depots adjacent to destruction facilities when the first batch of chemical weapons to be destroyed has arrived there.

Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee declarations stating the location of storage depots adjacent to destruction facilities within three months after entry into force of the Convention.

Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee declarations on the detailed composition of each batch of chemical weapons to be destroyed upon arrival at the storage depot adjacent to the destruction facility.

Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee declarations on the detailed composition of each batch of chemical weapons to be diverted for permitted purposes before it is transported to the facility which will assure its diversion.]

Initial plans

Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee, not later than [30 days] [three months]^{*/} after entry into force for it of the Convention, initial plans for the destruction [or diversion for permitted purposes] of chemical weapons containing:

- types of operation;
- schedules with respect to quantities and types of chemical weapons to be destroyed [or diverted for permitted purposes] and end products
- [schedules for declaration within two years after entry into force for it of the] location of destruction plants to be used

^{*/} The [three months] timeframe is a working variant subject to further consideration taking into account the results of elaboration of specific contents of the initial plans.

Detailed Plans

Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee six months before the destruction or diversion operations are to begin detailed plans containing the information needed by the Consultative Committee for adequately preparing itself for its task.

Progress Reports

Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee annual reports of progress on implementation of plans for the destruction or diversion for permitted purposes of chemical weapons and a notification of the completion of destruction or diversion of chemical weapons within thirty days thereafter.

Verification Measures

In view of the fact that the consideration of the verification of stockpile declaration was not exhausted, no proposals for draft articles are at this stage included.

Elimination of production facilities

Each State Party undertakes to destroy production facilities.* /

In relation to production facilities destruction can mean any of the following methods:

1. dismantling and physical destruction of all components and structures (= razing to the ground);
2. dismantling and physical destruction of certain components, while reusing other components for permitted purposes;
3. dismantling and physical destruction (razing) of certain structures;
4. a combination of 2 and 3.

The specific method or combination of methods to be used in respect of each production facility shall be determined according to the nature of the facility concerned and in accordance with the principles laid down in

Each State Party shall indicate in its plan(s) for destruction of production facilities the specific methods of destruction envisaged.

* / to be defined elsewhere

Report of the Chairman of Working Group C

Working Group C held seven meetings between 22 June and 10 August 1984. It did not consider matters that had already been dealt with in the first part of the session.

In the course of its work and in accordance with its mandate, it considered mainly institutional issues concerning a Chemical Weapons Convention, including the Consultative Committee and the Preparatory Commission, with a view to finding generally acceptable formulations for relevant articles in the Convention and other documents connected with the Convention.

Work was based on CD/CW/WP.57 as well as on proposals presented by delegations and by the Chairman.

I. Consultative Committee

Appendix I to this report contains preliminary formulations of individual provisions on the Consultative Committee as well as indications of where differences lie, as a departure for further work.

Whereas the Working Group agreed on the general concept of the Consultative Committee and a number of detailed ideas, major differences prevailed especially with regard to the following questions:

- decision-making process in the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council;
- composition of the Executive Council;
- functions of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs.

These questions should receive attention in future work with a view to elaborating generally acceptable formulae. It was proposed to consider whether there is a need to setting-up a Fact-Finding Panel.^{*/} It was also proposed to consider procedures for the co-operation between the Committee and national authorities of States Parties assigned to implement the Convention^{**/} and to elaborate illustrative guidelines for the national authorities.

II. Preparatory Commission

Appendix II contains preliminary formulations of individual provisions concerning the Preparatory Commission as well as indications as to where differences lie, as a departure for further work. This matter might be taken up at a later stage of negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention, especially after agreement has been reached on the provisions on the Consultative Committee.

^{*/} See document CD/500.

^{**/} See document CD/532.

III. National technical means of verification

Working Group C was unable to hold discussions on this matter. Positions of delegations remain the same and are reflected in CD/CW/WP.67, p.20.

IV. United Nations

Positions as reflected in CD/CW/WP.67, p.23, remained the same.

V. Other questions

Issues pertaining to:

- the Depositary of the Convention
- the procedure for amendments

should be taken up in the further work at the Ad Hoc Committee's level.

* * *

APPENDIX I

Chairman's Paper

Consultative Committee

1. For the purpose of facilitating the implementation of the Convention by assisting States Parties in consultations and co-operation, as well as by promoting verification of compliance with the Convention, a Consultative Committee shall be established. It shall consist of the representatives designated by the States Parties to the Convention.*/
2. The first session of the Committee shall be convened by the Depositary at [venue] not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention.
3. The Committee shall
 - (a) consider any matter raised, related to the objectives or the implementation of the Convention;
 - (b) review scientific and technical developments [which could affect the operation of the Convention and consider other technical matters] related to the implementation of the Convention;
 - [(c) consider measures to be taken by States Parties at the emergence of any situation which poses a threat to the Convention or impedes the achievement of its objectives;]**/
 - [(d) consider practical measures to be taken by States Parties in assistance of any endangered State Party;]**/

*/ Concerning the participation in the Committee of States signatories to the Convention, it was suggested that an appropriate provision be included in the Convention. According to another view, this matter should be decided by the Committee itself.

**/ The proposals are not thought to affect the rights the Security Council has under the United Nations Charter. According to another view, however, it would be appropriate to consider these proposals in close connection with a possible role of the United Nations Security Council in the compliance procedure, especially concerning assistance for a State Party which has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.

(e) obtain, keep and disseminate information presented by States Parties including ...*/

and revise the procedures for the exchange of such information, as necessary;

(f) co-ordinate all forms of verification and co-operate with the national authorities of States Parties assigned to implement the Convention; **/

(g) oversee and conduct international systematic on-site inspections, including:

(i) elaborate standard verification techniques;

(ii) adopt, at its first session, criteria it will subsequently use to determine the modalities and time frames for international systematic on-site inspections at*/

(iii) determine the modalities and time frames for international systematic on-site inspections at*/ proceeding from the agreed criteria;

(iv) carry out international systematic on-site inspections with regard to ...;*/

(h) receive and consider requests for fact-finding procedures, including requests for on-site inspections, and carry out the inspections, if they are agreed upon; ***/

(i) facilitate consultations and co-operation among States Parties at their request, by means of rendering services to them with regard to:

(i) holding consultations among them;

(ii) exchanging information;

(iii) obtaining services from appropriate international organizations;

(iv) participating in on-site inspections arranged among the States Parties;

(j) oversee the activities of its subsidiary organs;

(k) consider and approve the reports of the Executive Council;

+/ (l) consider and approve the budget.

*/ Should be further specified in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention.

**/ It was suggested to elaborate procedures for the co-operation between the Consultative Committee and national authorities in the conduct of verification activities.

***/ Should be regarded in close connection with the fact-finding procedures outlined in the Convention; includes verification of reports on use of chemical weapons.

+/ The material was put together by the Chairman of the Working Group on the basis of proposals made by delegations.

4. The Committee shall meet in regular sessions annually during the first ten years after the entry into force of the Convention. After that period, it may meet annually, unless States Parties decide otherwise.* The Committee shall review the operation of the Convention at its regular sessions every five years.**

An extraordinary session of the Committee may be convened at the request of any State Party or the Executive Council within 30 days after the receipt of such request.***

5. The Committee shall take its decisions by consensus**** [whenever possible] [on matters of substance]. If a consensus cannot be reached [within 24 hours, a decision may be taken by a majority of those present and voting. The report on a fact-finding inquiry should not be put to a vote, nor should any decision be taken as to whether a Party is complying with the provisions of the Convention]. [during the session, each State Party may record its opinion in the final report of the session for subsequent study by the Governments of the other States Parties to the Convention. Decisions on procedural matters related to the organization of work shall be taken by consensus, whenever possible, and otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.]

6. The Committee shall elect its Chairman at the beginning of each regular session.

* / It was suggested that the decision could be taken at the end of each session or the Chairman of the Committee could elicit the views of States Parties.

** / It was suggested that in such a case the regular session may be divided into two parts: (a) normal regular session; (b) review session. According to another view, the possibility of holding regular review conferences should be considered in close connection with the procedure for amendments.

*** / It was suggested that the request forwarded by a State Party should be substantiated. According to another view, it should be supported by a certain number of States Parties (e.g. 5).

**** / It was suggested that decisions on all questions should be taken either by consensus or by a majority vote. It was furthermore suggested that there should be a clear understanding as to the difference between procedural and substantive matters.

7. The Committee shall, after each regular session, present to the States Parties a report on its activities.*
8. The expenses for the activities of the Committee shall be borne by the States Parties to the Convention.**
9. Legal Status***
10. For the purpose of assisting the Committee in carrying out its functions, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat shall be established.
11. The Consultative Committee may set-up other [technical] subsidiary organs as may be necessary for its work.
12. The Executive Council shall have delegated authority to discharge the functions of the Consultative Committee set out in subparagraphs 3 [.....] as well as any other functions which the Committee may delegate to it. The Council shall report to the Committee at its regular sessions on its exercise of these functions. [In the intervals between the sessions, questions with regard to promoting the implementation of and compliance with the Convention shall be dealt with by the Executive Council acting on behalf of the Consultative Committee.]
13. The Council shall be composed of representatives of [15] States Parties and a non-voting Chairman.

[Ten members of the Council shall be elected by the Consultative Committee upon consultation with the States Parties, taking into account the principle of equitable political and geographic representation, for a term of two years with an annual replacement of five members. The remaining five seats shall be reserved for the permanent members of the Security Council participating in the Convention.]

[Based on the principle of the sovereign equality of States, members shall be elected by the Consultative Committee from among all States Parties. Elections could be made on the basis of a regional allocation of seats or on any other adequate basis that will be agreed upon, excluding the possibility of institutional permanent membership of any State Party.]

*/ It is understood that the report might consist of the proceedings of the regular session and the final document of the session. In case there is no annual regular session of the Consultative Committee, the Executive Council may present a technical report to States Parties.

**/ It is understood that the Preparatory Commission would make a recommendation concerning the financing of the activities of the Committee.

***/ It was suggested that the Technical Secretariat should be able to enter into the legal contracts necessary to fulfil its functions. This matter should be addressed in a comprehensive way after agreement is reached on the conduct of activities by the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs.

14. The Council shall take its decisions by consensus^{*/} [whenever possible] [on matters of substance]. If a consensus cannot be reached within [24 hours] [a decision may be taken by a majority of those present and voting. The report on a fact-finding inquiry should not be put to a vote, nor should any decision be taken as to whether a Party is complying with the provisions of the Convention.] [with regard to a request for on-site inspection, the State subject to the request shall be informed of the individual opinions expressed by all the Members of the Executive Council on the matter. The Council shall take its decisions on procedural matters related to the organization of its work by consensus whenever possible, and otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.]

[A fact-finding team shall be automatically sent out by the Executive Council in response to the request made by a State Party for inspection to be carried out in territories under its control.]

15. [The Council shall be able to be convened on short notice and to function continuously. Each member of the Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Consultative Committee.]

16. The Chairman of the previous regular session of the Consultative Committee shall serve as Chairman of the Council.

[17. The Executive Council may set-up such subsidiary organs as may be necessary for its work.]

[18. A Fact-Finding Panel subordinate to the Executive Council shall be established. The Panel shall be responsible for conducting fact-finding inquiries, including the oversight of challenge on-site inspection.]^{**/}

^{*/} It was suggested that decisions on all questions should be taken either by consensus or a majority vote.

^{**/} Different suggestions have been made with regard to such an organ:

(a) It would not be necessary to provide for such a body, since the three bodies already envisaged would suffice;

(b) Panel with political and technical functions as subsidiary organ to the Executive Council, composed of

(i) five members; or

(ii) technical experts belonging to the delegations to the Executive Council.

(c) Staff of technical experts which would provide technical advice and carry out inspections. The following forms are envisaged:

(i) permanent unit in the secretariat;

(ii) roster of quickly available experts.

19. The Technical Secretariat shall

(a) provide administrative support to the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council;

(b) render technical assistance to States Parties, the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council;

(c) carry out international on-site inspections as provided for in the Convention;

(d) assist the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council in tasks related to information and fact-finding as well as in other tasks provided to it by those organs.*/

20. [The staff of the secretariat shall be appointed on the basis of the principle of just political and geographical representation of States Parties to the Convention. It shall be composed of inspectors and experts who shall be nationals of the States Parties.]

[The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff of the secretariat and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible among States Parties to the Convention.]**/

[21. Co-operation between the Consultative Committee and the national verification bodies of the States Parties by, inter alia:

- holding regular meetings between the Consultative Committee and the national bodies;
- training of the personnel of the national bodies in standard verification techniques by the Consultative Committee;
- elaborating by the Consultative Committee of procedures for the sealing of the chemical weapons production facilities;
- assistance to be provided by national bodies to the international inspectors.]

*/ The functions of the Technical Secretariat might be specified further.

**/ It was suggested that other questions connected with the establishment of the secretariat should be considered by the Preparatory Commission, which should make appropriate recommendations to the Consultative Committee.

APPENDIX II

Chairman's Paper

Preparatory Commission*/

1. For the purpose of [carrying out the necessary administrative and technical preparations for the effective operation of the provisions of the Convention and for] preparing for the first meeting of the Consultative Committee, the Depositary of the Convention shall convene a Preparatory Commission as soon as possible and in any case not later than 60 days after the Convention has been signed by ... States.**/
2. The Commission shall consist of the representatives designated by the States which have signed the Convention. Any State which has not signed the Convention [may apply to the Commission for observer status which will be accorded on the decision of the Commission.][may designate an observer to the Commission.]
[Participation of intergovernmental organizations]
3. The Commission shall be convened at [Geneva][Geneva, New York or Vienna] and shall remain in existence until the Convention comes into force and thereafter until the Consultative Committee has convened.
4. All decisions of the Commission shall be made by consensus.
5. The Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedures and appoint an executive secretary and staff, as shall be necessary.
6. The expenses of the Commission shall be met [from the regular budget of the United Nations, subject to the approval of the General Assembly of the United Nations.][by a loan provided by the United Nations which shall be repaid by the Consultative Committee.][by the States signatories to the Convention, participating in the Commission, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, adjusted to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and the participation of States signatories in the Commission.]

*/ There have been a number of suggestions on the format of the document on the Preparatory Commission which should be further explored. It was proposed that provisions on the Commission could be contained in

- a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly commending the Convention;
- an Annex to the Convention which would enter into force before the Convention
- any other separate document (e.g. as part of the report of the CD to the United Nations General Assembly containing the draft Convention)

**/ The figure should be identical with the number of States provided for in the Article of the Convention dealing with ratification and entry into force.

7. The Commission shall have the following functions:

(a) make arrangements for the first meeting of the Consultative Committee, including the preparation of a provisional agenda and draft rules of procedure [and choosing the site for the first meeting of the Consultative Committee];

(b) make [studies, reports and] recommendations for the first meeting of the Consultative Committee on subjects of concern requiring immediate action, including

(i) the financing of the activities for which the Consultative Committee is responsible;

(ii) [the programme of work and] the budget for the first year of the activities of the Consultative Committee;

(iii) the establishment of the Technical Secretariat;

(iv). the location of the permanent offices of the Consultative Committee.

[8. In the exercise of its functions, the Commission may have recourse, as appropriate, to the services of appropriate international organizations [within the United Nations system].]

9. The Commission shall report on its activities to the first meeting of the Consultative Committee.

Report of the Chairman of Working Group C to
the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons
dated 16 April 1984

The Working Group held five meetings from 23 March to 16 April 1984.

The Chairman also conducted a number of consultations with delegations. Proceeding from the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (CD/440) and on the basis of existing material and new proposals made by delegations, the Working Group dealt with Elements concerning Compliance to be included in a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In particular the Working Group considered:

- I. National Implementation Measures
- II. Consultation and Co-operation
- III. Fact-finding
- IV. On-site Inspection by Challenge

The Annex to this report contains preliminary formulations of individual provisions for the above-mentioned Elements as well as indications of where differences lie, as a departure for further work.

IV. On-site inspection by challenge^{*/}

1. [Each State Party to the Convention] [An understanding that each State Party to the Convention] may at any time submit a [motivated/substantiated] request to the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary body to carry out an on-site inspection to clarify and resolve any situation which may give cause to doubt about compliance with the Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related situation which may be considered ambiguous.
2. Upon receipt of a request from a State Party for an on-site inspection, the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary organ shall as soon as possible and in any case within ... day(s) conduct a prima facie assessment of the request. If the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary organ concludes that the request contains objective and concrete elements supporting a suspicion of non-compliance with the Convention, it shall forward [the request] [its decision] to the State Party in question.
3. Such a [request] [mandatory decision] for an on-site inspection by the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary organ shall be treated favourably and in good faith by the State Party which receives it.
4. A report on the on-site inspection shall be transmitted to the Consultative Committee within ...
5. A refusal by a State Party to agree to an on-site inspection shall be [well-founded and] accompanied by the submission of a prompt, factual and exhaustive explanation of its reasons [and shall be made only for the most exceptional reasons].

The Consultative Committee or its subsidiary organ shall assess the explanation submitted and may [send another request] [cancel or confirm the decision], taking into account all relevant elements, including possible new elements received by the Consultative Committee after the original request.

[A refusal to accept a challenge on-site inspection would, as a first step, automatically require the challenged party to propose within ... days of such a refusal, some alternative on-site inspection measures which could establish beyond reasonable doubt whether or not a case of non-compliance had occurred.]

^{*/} The decision-making procedure of the Consultative Committee will be dealt with in the Element on the Consultative Committee.

6. [If a second request is refused, the State Party which originated the request may have recourse to appropriate procedures under the Charter of the United Nations.] [This provision is without prejudice of any other relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.*]

[If the decision is not complied with, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be requested to have recourse to appropriate procedures under the Charter of the United Nations, on behalf of all Parties to the Convention.]

[Nothing in the Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the rights and obligations assumed by any State under the Charter of the United Nations.]

-
- */ - Some delegations deemed that mention of the procedures under the United Nations Charter is not necessary.
- Other delegations proposed to include into the Convention special provisions concerning a complaints procedure with the United Nations Security Council.

ANNEX III

This Annex contains proposals introduced by delegations as formulated and presented in Conference documents. At appropriate places in Annex I reference is made to this Annex.

Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons
and on their destruction

Proposal of the USSR

Chemical weapons are a barbaric means of destruction. Such weapons have already taken tens of thousands of lives and have maimed millions of people. At present, the threat of massive use of much more horrible types of chemical weapons is looming over mankind.

The world's peoples are demanding that this should be prevented and that the very possibility of the use of chemical weapons should be ruled out by prohibiting their production and destroying accumulated stockpiles.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of this. True to the humane purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the USSR has never used chemical weapons anywhere and has never transferred them to anyone.

Motivated by the desire to achieve a comprehensive and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union is submitting to the States Members of the United Nations for their consideration the following basic provisions of a convention on the subject.

I. SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION

General provisions

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes never, under any circumstances, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons and undertakes to destroy or divert to permitted purposes the accumulated stocks of such weapons and to destroy or dismantle facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons.

Definition of chemical weapons

For the purposes of the Convention "chemical weapons" means:

(a) Super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal and harmful chemicals, and their precursors, except those intended for non-hostile purposes or for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons, in types and quantities consistent with such purposes;

(b) Munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of the chemicals released as a result of the

/...

employment of such munitions or devices, including those with binary or multicomponent charges;

(c) Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connexion with the employment of such munitions or devices.

Other definitions

For the purposes of the Convention:

1. The definitions of the terms "super-toxic lethal chemical", "other lethal chemical" and "harmful chemical" shall be based on specific criteria of toxicity (lethality and/or harmfulness) for each of these categories of chemicals (shall be specified in the Convention on the basis of the levels agreed upon in the Committee on Disarmament).

2. "Permitted purposes" means non-hostile purposes and military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.

3. "Non-hostile purposes" means industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes or purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons.

4. Such terms as "a chemical", "an incapacitant", "an irritant", "a precursor", "capacity" and "a facility" are also subject to definition in the Convention.

Prohibition of transfer

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes:

(a) Not to transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, any chemical weapons;

(b) Not to transfer any super-toxic lethal chemicals, incapacitants or irritants, or their precursors to anyone, directly or indirectly, even for permitted purposes, except to another State Party;

(c) Not to assist anyone, or to encourage or induce anyone, directly or indirectly, to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention.

Non-stationing

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not to station chemical weapons, including binary and multicomponent weapons, in the territories of other States and also undertakes to recall all its chemical weapons from the territories of foreign States if they were stationed there earlier (dates for the fulfilment of this obligation shall be specified in the Convention).

/...

Destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons

1. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to destroy its accumulated stocks of chemical weapons or divert them to non-hostile purposes in quantities consistent with such purposes.

2. The destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons shall be begun by each State Party not later than 2 years, and completed not later than 10 years, after the State has become a Party to the Convention.

The first operations for destruction may, as a display of goodwill be carried out by each State Party possessing chemical weapons as early as the initial stage of the functioning of the Convention.

Elimination or temporary conversion of facilities which
provide capacities for the production of chemical
weapons

1. Each State Party undertakes to eliminate or dismantle facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons.

2. Operations for eliminating or dismantling facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons shall be begun not later than 8 years, and completed not later than 10 years, after a State becomes a Party to the Convention.

3. Any State Party to the Convention shall have the right, for the purposes of destroying stocks of chemical weapons, to convert temporarily facilities previously used for the production of such weapons and also to carry out the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons at a specialized facility or facilities built for such purposes.

Permitted activities

1. Each State Party to the Convention shall have the right to retain, produce, acquire or use for permitted purposes any toxic chemicals and their precursors, in types and quantities consistent with such purposes.

2. The aggregate quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes which are produced, diverted from stocks or otherwise acquired annually or are available shall at any time be minimal and shall not, in any case, exceed one metric ton for any State Party to the Convention.

3. Each State Party which produces super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes shall concentrate such production at a single specialized facility, of appropriate capacity which shall be subject to special agreement.

/...

Protection of the population and the environment

In fulfilling its obligations connected with the destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons and the elimination of means of their production, each State Party shall take all necessary precautions for the protection of the population and the environment.

Promotion of development goals

The Convention shall facilitate the creation of favourable conditions for the economic and technical development of the Parties and for international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities. The possibility of interference with areas of activity unrelated to the purposes of the Convention shall be precluded.

II. DECLARATIONS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

1. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, to declare:

- Whether or not it possesses chemical weapons and capacities for their production;
- The magnitude of its accumulated stocks of chemical weapons and capacities for their production;
- The volume of transfers to anyone of chemical weapons, of technological equipment for their production, and of relevant technical documentation which took place after 1 January 1946;
- Whether or not there exist in its territory stocks of chemical weapons, and in what quantities, or facilities for the production of chemical weapons, and with what capacities, which are under the control of, or have been left by, any other State, group of States, organization or private person.

2. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, declare that it has ceased all activities relating to the production of chemical weapons or the transfer to anyone of such weapons, of technological equipment for their production and of relevant technical documentation.

3. Each State Party undertakes to declare, not later than 6 months after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, its plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons, and to declare, not later than one year before the commencement of the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for producing chemical weapons, its plans for their destruction and dismantling, stating the location of the facilities.

/...

4. Each State Party which carries out the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons at a facility (facilities) temporarily converted for such purposes or at a specialized facility shall declare the location of the said facility (facilities) within the time period provided for in the plan for the destruction of the said stocks.

5. Each State Party which carries out the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at a specialized facility shall declare its location before the date of the commencement of the facility's operation.

6. Each State Party shall undertake:

(a) To submit periodic notifications concerning the implementation of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of the available stocks of chemical weapons and of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons. Where such operations are carried out earlier than provided for in the plan, the State Party shall submit appropriate notification;

(b) To submit appropriate notifications three months before the initiation of the implementation of each stage of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons and of each stage of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons; the location of the facility to be destroyed or dismantled shall be stated in the appropriate notification;

(c) To submit, not later than 30 days after the destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons and after the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons, appropriate statements to that effect.

7. Each State Party shall undertake to submit annual declarations concerning the following substances produced, diverted from stocks acquired or used:

- Super-toxic lethal, other lethal and harmful chemicals for purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons;
- Super-toxic lethal chemicals for industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes and for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons;
- Other lethal and harmful chemicals for industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes and irritants for purposes of law enforcement.

8. States Parties shall proceed from the assumption that chemicals and precursors produced, acquired, retained and used for permitted purposes, when they represent a special danger from the viewpoint of their possible diversion to purposes connected with the use of chemical weapons, must be included in appropriate lists. Each State Party shall undertake to present annually information on the chemicals and precursors of chemicals included in those lists.

9. Each State Party shall undertake to submit notifications concerning each of its transfers to any other State Party, where not prohibited by the Convention, of super-toxic lethal chemicals, incapacitants and irritants and of other chemicals which could be used as components for chemical weapons with binary or multicomponent charges.

10. The above-mentioned declarations, plans, notifications and statements shall be submitted to the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention. Their contents and the procedure for drawing up the required lists are to be defined in the Convention.

III. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION

General provisions on verification

1. States Parties to the Convention shall base their activities relating to the verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention on a combination of national and international measures.

2. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take any internal measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity under its jurisdiction or control that is in violation of the provisions of the Convention.

3. To monitor the fulfilment of obligations provided for in the Convention, any State Party may establish a Committee of National Verification (a national verification organization) which is vested with the necessary juridical rights and whose composition, functions and methods of work shall be determined by the State Party to the Convention in accordance with its constitutional norms.

4. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Convention by other States Parties, any State Party shall have the right to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

Any State Party which possesses national technical means of verification may, where necessary, place at the disposal of other Parties information which it has obtained through those means and which is important for the purposes of the Convention.

5. Each State Party shall undertake not to impede, through the use of deliberate concealment measures or in any other manner, the national technical means of verification of other States Parties.

6. International measures of verification shall be carried out through international procedures within the framework of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, and through consultations and co-operation between States Parties, as well as through the services of the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention.

/...

Consultation and co-operation

1. The States Parties undertake to consult one another and co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of the Convention or in connexion with the application of its provisions.

2. The States Parties shall exchange, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, information which they consider necessary to provide assurance of fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Convention.

3. Consultation and co-operation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter. Such procedures may include the use of the services of appropriate international organizations in addition to those of the Consultative Committee.

4. In the interests of enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention, the States Parties shall agree in due form to prevent any actions aimed at deliberately falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with the Convention by other States Parties.

Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention

1. For the purpose of carrying out broader international consultation and co-operation, exchanging information and promoting verification in the interests of compliance with the provisions of the Convention, the States Parties shall establish a Consultative Committee within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force. Any State Party shall have the right to appoint its representative to the Committee.

2. The Consultative Committee shall be convened as necessary and also at the request of any State Party to the Convention within 30 days after the request is received.

3. Other questions relating to the organization and procedures of the Consultative Committee, its possible subsidiary bodies, their functions, rights, duties and methods of work, its role in on-site inspections, forms of co-operation with national verification organizations and other matters are to be elaborated.

Fact-finding procedure relating to compliance with the Convention. On-site inspections

1. Each State Party shall have the right to request, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, from another Party which is suspected of violating the Convention information on the actual state of affairs. The State to which the request is sent shall provide the requesting State Party with information in connexion with the request.

/...

2. Each State Party may, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, send to another State Party which is suspected of violating the Convention a request for an on-site inspection. Such request may be sent after the possibilities of fact-finding within the framework of paragraph 1 of this section have been exhausted and shall contain all relevant information and all possible evidence supporting the validity of the request.

Requests may, in particular, be sent in connexion with notifications concerning the destruction of accumulated stocks of chemical weapons and concerning the destruction and dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons. The State Party to which such a request is sent may treat the request favourably or decide otherwise. It shall inform the requesting State Party in good time about its decision, and if it is not prepared to agree to an inspection, it shall give appropriate and sufficiently convincing explanations.

3. Within the period of destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of the stocks of chemical weapons, a possibility of carrying out systematic international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota) of the destruction of stocks at a converted or specialized facility (facilities) shall be provided for.

4. The Convention shall provide for the possibility of carrying out international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota) of the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at a specified facility.

Procedure for lodging complaints with the United Nations
Security Council. Provision of assistance

1. Any State Party which has reason to believe that any other State Party has acted or may be acting in violation of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention shall have the right to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council. Such complaint shall include all relevant information and all possible evidence supporting the validity of the complaint.

2. Each State Party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the results of the investigation.

3. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to provide assistance or support assistance being provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which requests it if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed or is possibly being exposed to danger as a result of the violation by another State Party of obligations assumed under this Convention.

/...

Relationship with the Geneva Protocol of 1925

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting, or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, or under the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

IV. CONCLUDING PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION

Provision shall be made for a procedure for the signing of the Convention, its ratification and entry into force, arrangements relating to a depositary, as procedure for the accession of States to the Convention and withdrawal from it, machinery for amendments to the Convention, dates for holding conferences to review its implementation and the status of such conferences.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/500

18 April 1984

Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

GE.84-61689

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Preamble	1
I Basic Prohibition	1
II Definitions	2
III Permitted Activities	3
IV Declaration of Chemical Weapons, Chemical Weapons Production Facilities and Past Transfers	4
V Chemical Weapons	5
VI Chemical Weapons Production Facilities	6
VII Consultative Committee	7
VIII Non-Interference with Verification	8
IX Consultation and Co-operation; Resolving Compliance Issues . .	8
X Special On-Site Inspection	10
XI <u>Ad hoc</u> On-Site Inspection	11
XII Domestic Implementation Measures	11
XIII Assistance to Parties Endangered by Chemical Weapons	11
XIV Non-Interference with Other Agreements	12
XV Amendments	12
XVI Duration; Withdrawal	12
XVII Signature; Ratification; Entry into Force	12
XVIII Languages	13

Detailed United States Views on the Contents of the Annexes to the Convention

Annex I - Consultative Committee

- Section A. General Provisions
- Section B. Executive Council
- Section C. Fact-Finding Panel
- Section D. Technical Secretariat
- Section E. Special Meeting of the Consultative Committee

Annex II - Verification

- Section A. Declarations
- Section B. On-Site Verification

Annex III - Schedules: Chemicals Subject to Special Measures; Methods for Measuring Toxicity

- Schedule A
- Schedule B
- Schedule C
- Schedule D

Document Regarding the Preparatory Commission

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The States Parties to this Convention,

Reaffirming their adherence to the objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as set forth in its Charter,

Recalling the significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and also of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at Washington, London and Moscow on 10 April 1972, and calling upon all States to comply strictly with the said agreements,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of toxic chemicals being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Considering that achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind,

Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives,

Fulfilling the commitment under Article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction with regard to the effective prohibition of chemical weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Basic Prohibition

Each Party undertakes not to:

- (a) develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons, or transfer chemical weapons to anyone;
- (b) conduct other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons;
- (c) use chemical weapons in any armed conflict; or
- (d) assist, encourage, or induce, directly or indirectly, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to Parties under this Convention.

Article II

Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. "Chemical weapons" means,

(a) super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals, and their precursors, except for those chemicals intended solely for permitted purposes as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes and except for those chemicals which are not super-toxic lethal, or other lethal, chemicals and which are used by a Party for domestic law-enforcement and riot control purposes or used as a herbicide; or

(b) munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of any chemical which is defined as a chemical weapon under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph and which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; or

(c) any equipment or chemical specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

2. "Super-toxic lethal chemical" means any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to (0.5) mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or (2,000) mg-min/m³ (by inhalation), when measured by the standard methods specified in Schedule D.

3. "Other lethal chemical" means any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is greater than (0.5) mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or (2,000) mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) and which is less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation), when measured by the standard methods specified in Schedule D.

4. "Other harmful chemical" means any toxic chemical not covered under the terms "super-toxic lethal chemical" or "other lethal chemical", including chemicals which normally cause incapacitation rather than death.

5. "Toxic chemical" means any chemical substance, regardless of its origin or method of production, which through its chemical action can interfere directly with normal functioning of man or animals so as to cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent damage.

6. "Precursor" means any chemical which may be used in production of a super-toxic lethal chemical, other lethal chemical, or other harmful chemical.

7. "Key precursor" means any precursor that is listed in Schedule C.

8. "Permitted purposes" means industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes; protective purposes; and military purposes that do not make use of the chemical action of a toxic chemical to interfere directly with normal functioning of man and animals so as to cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent damage.

9. "Protective purposes" means purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons, but does not mean purposes directly related to the development, production, other acquisition, stockpiling, retention or transfer of chemical weapons.

10. "Chemical weapons production facility" means any building or any equipment which in any degree was designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946, for:

(a) the production for chemical weapons of any toxic chemical, except for those listed in Schedule B, or the production for chemical weapons of any key precursor; or

(b) the filling of chemical weapons.

11. "Other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons" means (to be elaborated), but does not mean activities directly related to protective purposes.

Article III

Permitted Activities

1. Subject to the limitations contained in this Convention, each Party may retain, produce, acquire, transfer or use toxic chemicals, and their precursors, for permitted purposes, of types and in quantities consistent with such purposes.

2. The following measures shall apply to toxic chemicals for protective purposes:

(a) The retention, production, acquisition, and use of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective purposes shall be strictly limited to those amounts which can be justified for such purposes. At no time shall the aggregate amount possessed by a Party exceed one metric ton, nor shall the aggregate amount acquired by a Party in any calendar year through production, withdrawal from chemical weapons stocks, and transfer exceed one metric ton. Once a Party has reached the aggregate one metric ton permitted per year, it must not acquire any further such super-toxic lethal chemicals until the next year, at which time it may then acquire only those amounts of such chemicals to replace amounts used or transferred to another Party for protective purposes.

(b) Each Party which produces super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors for protective purposes shall carry out the production at a single specialized facility, the capacity of which shall not exceed (an agreed limit). Information on the facility and its operations shall be provided in accordance with Annex II. The facility shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Annex II.

(c) Each Party shall, in accordance with Annex II, make an annual declaration regarding all key precursors devoted to protective purposes and all toxic chemicals that can be used as chemical weapons but are devoted to protective purposes, as well as provide other specified information on its protective activities.

(d) The provisions of the Convention do not preclude transfer for protective purposes of super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors produced or otherwise acquired for such purposes. Such transfers may be made only to another Party. The maximum quantity transferred to any Party shall not exceed (quantity) in any 12-month period, nor shall it cause the receiving Party to exceed the aggregate limit specified in subparagraph 2 (a) of this Article. Prior to any transfer of such a super-toxic lethal chemical or key precursor, the transferring Party shall provide the information specified in Annex II. Items transferred may not be retransferred to another State.

3. In view of the particular risk they pose to achieving the objectives of the Convention, the chemicals listed in Schedules A, B and C shall be subject to the special measures specified in Annex III.

(a) In respect of chemicals in Schedule A, each Party shall prohibit all production and use except for production and use of laboratory quantities for research, medical, or protective purposes at establishments approved by the Party; and

(b) Facilities producing chemicals listed in Schedule C for permitted purposes shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, as specified in Annex II.

4. A Party in a position to do so may assist another Party in destruction of chemical weapons, including shipment of chemical weapons to its territory for the purpose of destroying them, or in destruction of chemical weapons production facilities.

5. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed in so far as possible to avoid hampering the economic or technological activities of Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities including the international exchange of toxic chemicals and equipment for the production, processing, or use of toxic chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Article IV

Declaration of Chemical Weapons, Chemical Weapons Production Facilities and Past Transfers

1. Each Party shall file a declaration, within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, stating whether it has under its control anywhere, any chemical weapons, any chemical weapons production facility, any super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors for protective purposes, or any production facility for super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective purposes. The declaration shall also state whether the Party has on its territory, under the control of others, including a State not party to this Convention, any of the foregoing and their locations.

2. The declaration filed by each Party shall comply with the requirements of Annex II and shall state:

(a) the precise location of any chemical weapons under its control and the detailed inventory of the chemical weapons at each location;

(b) its general plans for destruction of any chemical weapons under its control;

(c) the precise location, nature, and capacity of any chemical weapons production facility under its control at any time since 1 January 1946;

(d) its plans for closing and eventually destroying any chemical weapons production facilities under its control;

(e) the precise location and capacity of the single specialized production facility, if any, for super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors permitted by subparagraph 2 (b) of Article III;

(f) the precise location and nature of any other facility under its control designed, constructed or used, since (date) for the production of chemicals listed in Schedules B and C;

(g) the precise location and nature of any facility under its control designed, constructed, or used since (date), for development of chemical weapons, including test and evaluation sites; and

(h) whether the Party has transferred control of chemical weapons or equipment for their production since (date) or has received such weapons or equipment since that date. If so, specific information shall be provided in accordance with Annex II.

Article V

Chemical Weapons

1. Each Party shall, in accordance with Annex II:

(a) provide information on the location and composition of any chemical weapons, pursuant to Article IV;

(b) provide a general plan for destroying its chemical weapons, pursuant to Article IV and, subsequently, provide more detailed plans;

(c) ensure access to its chemical weapons immediately after the declaration is filed, for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration, through on-site inspection;

(d) ensure, through access to its chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification, and through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, that the chemical weapons are not removed except to a destruction facility;

(e) destroy its chemical weapons, pursuant to the time-table specified in Annex II, beginning not later than 12 months, and finishing not later than 10 years, after the Convention enters into force for it;

(f) provide access to the destruction process for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of destruction, through the continuous presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments;

(g) provide information annually during the destruction process regarding implementation of its plan for destruction of chemical weapons; and

(h) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that its chemical weapons have been destroyed.

2. All locations where chemical weapons are stored or destroyed shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Annex II.

3. Old chemical weapons found after the declarations required by Article IV and this Article have been filed shall be subject to the provisions of Annex II regarding notification, interim storage, and destruction, as well as systematic international on-site verification of these actions. These provisions shall also apply to chemical weapons which were inadequately disposed of in the past and are subsequently retrieved. A detailed explanation shall be given as to why these chemical weapons were not declared in the declarations filed pursuant to Article IV and this Article.

4. Any Party which has on its territory chemical weapons which are under the control of a State which is not a Party to this Convention shall ensure that such weapons are removed from its territory not later than () months after the date on which the Convention entered into force for it.

Article VI

Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

1. Each Party shall, in accordance with Annex II,

(a) cease immediately all activity at each of its chemical weapons production facilities, except that required for closure;

(b) close each of its chemical weapons production facilities within three months after the Convention enters into force for it in a manner that will render those facilities inoperable;

(c) provide information on the location, nature and capacity of any chemical weapons production facility, pursuant to Article IV;

(d) provide a general plan for destroying its chemical weapons production facilities, pursuant to Article IV and, subsequently, provide more detailed plans;

(e) provide access to each chemical weapons production facility immediately after the declaration is filed, for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection;

(f) provide access to each chemical weapons production facility for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification to ensure that the facility remains closed and is eventually destroyed, through periodic on-site inspection and continuous monitoring by on-site instruments;

(g) destroy its chemical weapons production facilities, pursuant to the time-table specified in Annex II, beginning not later than 12 months, and finishing not later than 10 years, after the Convention enters into force for it;

(h) provide information annually during the destruction period regarding the implementation of its plan for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities; and

(i) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that its chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed.

2. All chemical weapons production facilities shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Annex II.

3. No Party shall construct any new chemical weapons production facilities, or modify any existing facilities, for purposes prohibited by the Convention.

4. A chemical weapons production facility may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons. Such a converted facility must be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons and, in any case, not later than the deadline for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities set forth in subparagraph 1 (g) of this Article.

Article VII

Consultative Committee

1. A Consultative Committee shall be established upon entry into force of this Convention. Each Party shall be entitled to designate a representative to the Consultative Committee.

2. The Consultative Committee shall oversee the implementation of the Convention, promote the verification of compliance with the Convention, and carry out international consultations and co-operation among Parties to the Convention. For these purposes it shall:

(a) carry out systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, of:

- (i) chemical weapons,
- (ii) destruction of chemical weapons,
- (iii) closure and destruction of chemical weapons production facilities,
- (iv) permitted single specialized facilities for production of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective purposes, and
- (v) production for permitted purposes of the chemicals specified in Schedule C;

(b) provide a forum for discussion of any questions raised relating to the objectives, or the implementation, of the Convention;

(c) conduct special on-site inspections under Article X and ad hoc on-site inspections under Article XI;

(d) participate in any inspections agreed among two or more Parties as referred to in paragraph 2 of Article IX, if requested to do so by one of the Parties involved;

(e) develop, and revise as necessary, detailed procedures for exchange of information, for declarations and for technical matters related to the implementation of the Convention;

(f) review scientific and technical developments which could affect the operation of the Convention;

(g) meet in regular session annually; and

(h) review the operation of the Convention at five-year intervals unless otherwise agreed by a majority of the Parties.

3. The Consultative Committee shall establish an Executive Council which shall have delegated authority to discharge the functions of the Committee set out in subparagraphs 2 (a), 2 (c), 2 (d) and 2 (e) of this Article, and any other functions which the Committee may from time to time delegate to it. The Council shall report to the Committee at its regular sessions on its exercise of these functions.

4. Each Party shall co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee in the exercise of its verification responsibilities.

5. Further functions and the organization of the Consultative Committee, the Executive Council, the Fact-Finding Panel, the Technical Secretariat and other subsidiary organs are specified in Annex I.

Article VIII

Non-Interference with Verification

A Party shall not interfere with the conduct of verification activities. This shall apply to verification activities conducted in accordance with the Convention by the designated representatives of the Consultative Committee or by Parties, and shall include verification activities conducted by national technical means in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

Article IX

Consultation and Co-operation; Resolving Compliance Issues

1. Parties shall consult and co-operate, directly among themselves, or through the Consultative Committee or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the objectives or the implementation of the provisions of this Convention.

2. Parties shall make every possible effort to clarify and resolve, through bilateral consultation, any matter which may cause doubts about compliance with this Convention or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. A Party which receives a request from another Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting Party believes causes such doubts or concerns shall provide the requesting Party, within seven days of the request, with information sufficient to answer the doubts or concerns raised along with an explanation of how the information provided resolves the matter. Nothing in this Convention affects the right of any two or more Parties to arrange by mutual consent for inspections among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not effect the rights and obligations of any Party under other provisions of this Convention.

3. In order to facilitate satisfactory resolution of matters raised, the Parties concerned may request the assistance of the Consultative Committee or its subsidiary organs. Any Party may request the Executive Council to conduct fact-finding procedures with regard to the Party's own activities or the activities of another Party in order to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance with the Convention or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous.

(a) Requests sent to the Executive Council under this Article shall state the doubts or concerns, the specific reasons for the doubts or concerns, and the action that the Council is being requested to undertake.

(b) Within two days of receipt of such a request, the Technical Secretariat shall, on behalf of the Council, request the Party whose activities create the doubts or concerns to clarify the state of affairs.

(c) If the doubts or concerns which gave rise to the request have not been resolved within 10 days of the receipt of the request by the Council, its Fact-Finding Panel shall immediately initiate a fact-finding inquiry, and transmit to the Chairman of the Council a report on its work, whether interim or final, within two months of the date of the request. Reports of the Panel shall include all views and information presented during its proceedings.

(d) All requests for special on-site inspections shall be governed by Article X and all requests for ad hoc on-site inspections by Article XI.

4. Any Party whose doubts or concerns about compliance have not been resolved within two months or any Party which has doubts or concerns it believes warrant urgent consideration by all Parties regarding compliance or regarding other matters directly related to the objectives of the Convention may request the Chairman of the Consultative Committee to convene a special meeting of the Committee. The Chairman of the Committee shall convene such a meeting as soon as possible and in any case within one month of the receipt of the request. Each Party may participate in such a meeting, whose functions and rules of procedures are established in Annex I.

5. All Parties shall co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs, as well as with international organizations, which may, as appropriate, give scientific, technical and administrative support in order to facilitate fact-finding activities and thereby help to ensure the speedy resolution of the matter which gave rise to the original request.

6. The Executive Council shall promptly notify all Parties of the initiation of any fact-finding procedures and shall provide all available information related thereto to any Party upon request. All Parties shall also be promptly notified of the refusal by a Party of any request made by the Committee or its subsidiary organs as part of a fact-finding inquiry. All reports regarding the fact-finding activities conducted under this Article, as well as on-site inspections under Articles X and XI shall be distributed promptly to all Parties.

7. The provisions of this Article shall not be interpreted as affecting the rights and duties of Parties under Articles X and XI or under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

Special On-Site Inspection

1. In accordance with the provisions of this Article and Annex II, each member of the Fact-Finding Panel shall have the right to request at any time a special on-site inspection of any other Party, through the Technical Secretariat, to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous, of:

(a) any location or facility subject to systematic international on-site inspection pursuant to Articles III, V and VI; or

(b) any military location or facility, any other location or facility owned by the Government of a Party, and as set forth in Annex II, locations or facilities controlled by the Government of a Party.

2. A request shall be handled in the following manner:

(a) Within 24 hours of the request, the Technical Secretariat shall notify the Party to be inspected and designate an inspection team in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article; and

(b) Within 24 hours after the receipt of such notification, the Party to be inspected shall provide the inspection team unimpeded access to the location or facility.

3. Each Party may solicit from any member of the Fact-Finding Panel a request for an inspection of any other Party under this Article.

4. Any special on-site inspection requested through the Technical Secretariat shall be carried out by inspectors designated from among the full-time inspectors of the Secretariat. Each inspection team shall consist of one inspector from each member State of the Fact-Finding Panel, except that if the Party to be inspected is a member State of the Panel, the team shall not include any inspector from that State. The team shall promptly provide a written report to the requesting Party, the inspected Party, and the Fact-Finding Panel. Each inspector shall have the right to have his individual views included in the report.

Article XI

Ad Hoc On-Site Inspection

1. In accordance with the provisions of this Article and Annex II, each Party shall have the right to request, at any time, the Consultative Committee to conduct an ad hoc on-site inspection, to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous, of any location or facility not subject to Article X.

2. A request shall be handled in the following manner:

(a) The Fact-Finding Panel shall meet within 24 hours to determine whether to request such an ad hoc on-site inspection using the guidelines in Section H of Annex II.

(b) If the Fact-Finding Panel decides to request an ad hoc inspection, the Party to be inspected shall, except for the most exceptional reasons, provide access within 24 hours of the Panel's request.

(c) If the Party to be inspected refuses such a request it shall provide a full explanation of the reasons for the refusal and a detailed, concrete proposal for an alternative means of resolving the concerns which gave rise to the request. The Fact-Finding Panel shall assess the explanation and alternative submitted, and may send another request, taking into account all relevant elements, including possible new elements received by the Panel after the original request.

(d) If the request is again rejected, the Chairman shall immediately inform the Security Council of the United Nations.

Article XII

Domestic Implementation Measures

Each Party shall:

(a) take any measures necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to implement this Convention and, in particular, to prohibit and prevent any activity that a Party is prohibited from conducting by this Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control, and

(b) inform the Consultative Committee of the measures it has taken to implement the Convention.

Article XIII

Assistance to Parties Endangered by Chemical Weapons

Each Party undertakes, to the extent it deems appropriate, to render assistance to any Party to this Convention that the Security Council of the United Nations decides has been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention.

Article XIV

Non-Interference with Other Agreements

1. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, or under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at Washington, London and Moscow on 10 April 1972.

2. Each Party to this Convention that is also a Party to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, affirms that the obligation set forth in subparagraph (c) of Article I supplements its obligations under the Protocol.

Article XV

Amendments

Any Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for Parties ratifying or acceding to them on the thirtieth day following the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession by a majority of the Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining Party on the thirtieth day following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Article XVI

Duration; Withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Every Party to this Convention shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Convention, to the Depositary and to the Security Council of the United Nations three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVII

Signature; Ratification; Entry into Force

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature.

2. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

3. This Convention and its Annexes, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, hereby designated as the Depositary.

4. This Convention shall enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the (fortieth) instrument of ratification.

5. For each State ratifying or acceding after the deposit of the (fortieth) instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.

6. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. The Depositary shall immediately upon receipt transmit any notices required by this Convention to every Party.

7. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XVIII

Languages

This Convention, the English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

DETAILED UNITED STATES VIEWS ON THE CONTENTS
OF THE ANNEXES TO THE CONVENTION */

Annex I

CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

Provisions should be included along the following lines:

Section A. General Provisions

1. The Consultative Committee established pursuant to Article VII should convene in (venue) not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force.
2. The Consultative Committee should subsequently meet in regular sessions annually for the first 10 years after the Convention enters into force, and annually thereafter unless a majority of Parties agrees that a meeting is unnecessary. A special meeting may be convened at the request of any Party or of the Executive Council.
3. In order to assist it in carrying out its functions, the Consultative Committee should establish an Executive Council, as provided in Section B of this Annex, as well as a Fact-Finding Panel, a Technical Secretariat and such other subsidiary bodies as may be necessary for its work.
4. The Executive Council should be responsible for carrying out the functions of the Consultative Committee specified in paragraph 2 of Article VII during the period when the latter is not in session. In particular, it shall be responsible for the activities in paragraph 1 of Section B of this Annex.
5. Except as specified elsewhere, the Committee and its subordinate bodies should take decisions where possible by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached within 24 hours, a decision may be taken by a majority of those present and voting. The report on a fact-finding inquiry should not be put to a vote, nor should any decision be taken as to whether a Party is complying with the provisions of the Convention.
6. The chairman of the Committee should be chosen by the Committee itself.
7. The Committee should present an annual report on its activities to the Parties.
8. The expenses of the Committee should be met by (_____).
9. The question of international legal personality of the Committee and its subsidiary organs should be addressed.

Section B. Executive Council

1. In carrying out its responsibilities, the Executive Council should, in particular, be responsible for:

*/ This paper presents current United States views on the contents of the annexes of a chemical weapons convention. It is subject to further modification, elaboration and refinement.

- (a) carrying out systematic international on-site verification;
- (b) ensuring the implementation of, and compliance with, the Convention;
- (c) obtaining, keeping and disseminating information submitted by Parties regarding matters pertaining to the Convention;
- (d) rendering services to Parties and facilitating consultations among them;
- (e) receiving requests from Parties, including requests for fact-finding;
- (f) deciding and overseeing specific action to be taken regarding such requests;
- (g) overseeing the activities of the other subordinate bodies of the Consultative Committee, including ensuring the proper execution of the functions of the Technical Secretariat, including the carrying out of systematic international on-site verification pursuant to Articles III, V, VI; the carrying out of special on-site inspections pursuant to Article X; and the carrying out of ad hoc on-site inspections pursuant to Article XI;
- (h) reporting to the Consultative Committee; and
- (i) requesting, when it deems necessary, a special meeting of the Consultative Committee.

2. (a) The Executive Council should be established within 45 days after entry into force of the Convention and should be composed of one representative from each of not more than 15 Parties, plus a non-voting chairman.

(b) Ten members should be elected by the Consultative Committee after nominations by the chairman based on consultation with the Parties. In selecting these members, due regard should be given to ensuring an appropriate geographic balance. These members should serve for a two-year period, with five of these members replaced each year.

(c) In addition, those permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations who are Parties to the Convention should be represented.

(d) Each member may be assisted at meetings by one or more technical or other advisers.

(e) The chairman of the Consultative Committee should serve as chairman of the Executive Council.

Section C. Fact-Finding Panel

1. Within 45 days after entry into force of the Convention, the Consultative Committee should establish a Fact-Finding Panel subordinate to the Executive Council, which should be responsible for conducting fact-finding inquiries pursuant to Article IX, considering reports on special on-site inspections pursuant to Article X, and overseeing ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article XI.

2. (a) The Fact-Finding Panel should consist of diplomatic representatives of five Parties, plus a non-voting chairman.

(b) Three Parties should be selected by the Consultative Committee by a four-fifths vote after nominations by the chairman based on consultations with Parties. These member States should serve for a six-year period, with one Party being replaced every other year. Of these three Parties, one should represent the (Western group), one the (Eastern group), and one the (neutral/non-aligned group).

(c) In addition there should be one diplomatic representative each from the United States and the Soviet Union.

(d) The chairman of the Executive Council should serve as chairman of the Fact-Finding Panel.

3. (a) The Panel should convene within 10 days after receipt of a request from a Party for a fact-finding inquiry, within 24 hours after a request for an ad hoc on-site inspection pursuant to Article XI, or immediately on completion of a special on-site inspection by inspectors from the Technical Secretariat pursuant to Article X, to review the information available, conduct necessary inquiries, and make appropriate findings of fact.

(b) The work of the Fact-Finding Panel should be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform its functions.

(c) The Panel should transmit to the chairman of the Executive Council its findings of fact, whether interim or final, within two months of the date of the convening of the Panel. Reports of the Panel's findings should include all views and information presented during the Panel's proceedings.

(d) Each member should have the right, through the chairman, to request from Parties and from international organizations such information and assistance as the member considers desirable for the accomplishment of the work of the Panel.

(e) The first meeting of the Panel should be held not later than 60 days after entry into force of the Convention to agree on its organization and rules of procedure. At this meeting the chairman should submit recommendations, based on consultations with Parties and signatories.

Section D. Technical Secretariat

1. The Technical Secretariat should:

(a) conduct on-site inspections pursuant to Articles III, V, VI, X, and XI;

(b) provide the necessary administrative support to the Consultative Committee, the Executive Council, the Fact-Finding Panel and such other subsidiary bodies as may be established;

(c) render appropriate technical assistance to Parties and to the Executive Council in implementing the provisions of the Convention, such as reviewing Schedules A, B, C, and D, developing technical procedures, and improving the effectiveness of verification methods;

(d) receive from Parties and distribute to them data relevant to the implementation of the Convention;

(e) negotiate the subsidiary arrangements for systematic international on-site inspections provided for in Annex II, section B, subsection A, paragraph 3; and

(f) assist the Executive Council on such other tasks as may be agreed.

2. The composition of the Technical Secretariat should be elaborated by the Preparatory Commission.

3 All inspectors should be technically qualified and acceptable to their governments.

Section E. Special Meeting of the Consultative Committee

1. The special meeting of the Consultative Committee provided for in Article IX should undertake to solve any problem which may be raised by the Party requesting the meeting. For this purpose, the assembled Parties should be entitled to request and receive any information which a Party is in a position to communicate.

2. The work of the special meeting should be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform its functions

3. Any Party should be able to participate in the meeting. The meeting should be chaired by the chairman of the Committee.

4. Each Party should have the right, through the chairman, to request from States and from international organizations such information and assistance as the Party considers desirable for the accomplishment of the work of the meeting.

5. A summary of the meeting, incorporating all views and information presented during the meeting, should be prepared promptly and distributed to all Parties.

Annex II

VERIFICATION

Provisions along the following lines should be included:

Section A. Declarations

A. General Provisions

1. Unless otherwise stipulated, information required to be provided should be submitted to the Depositary until the Consultative Committee is established and thereafter to the Committee. The information should be provided according to a standard format, which should be specified by the Depositary, after consultation with signatories, for information submitted before establishment of the Committee, or specified by the Committee for information submitted after its establishment. The information should be made available to Parties.

2. Locations should be specified with sufficient precision to permit unambiguous identification of sites and facilities. For this reason all locations should be specified by geographical place name and co-ordinates, as well as by any other official or commonly used designation, and should be clearly marked on maps of a suitable scale. For facilities within complexes, the exact position within the complex should be specified.

3. The accuracy and completeness of all declarations should be subject to the procedures specified in Articles IX, X and XI. As specified in subsections B and C, declarations should also be subject to systematic international on-site verification.

B. Contents of the declarations required by Articles IV, V and VI

1. Chemicals should be declared by scientific chemical name, chemical structural formula, toxicity and weight. The fraction in munitions and devices should be given. Munitions and devices should be declared by type and quantity. "Specifically-designed" equipment and chemicals, referred to in Article II, subparagraph 1(c), should be declared by type and quantity.

2. The exact location of chemical weapons within a site and form of storage (bulk, cylinder, etc.) should be declared, and storage standards should be provided.

3. The general plan for destruction of chemical weapons should include the type of operation, schedules of quantities and types of chemical weapons to be destroyed, and products.

4. Chemical weapons production facilities should be declared even if they have been destroyed; are now being used for other purposes; or were or are dual-purpose facilities designed or used in any degree for civilian production. The declaration should specify the chemical name of any chemicals, including civilian products, if any, ever produced at the facility, whether the facility still exists; and, if not, its disposition.

5. The information regarding existing chemical weapons production facilities should include information about the chemical process used, precisely what equipment and structures are at the facility, including any old or replacement equipment not in use, as well as equipment and spare parts stored at the facility; the methods that

will be used to close and eventually to destroy the equipment and structures; the general methods that will be used to dispose of the debris left from the destruction process; and the time periods (i.e., the months or years) when specific production facilities will be destroyed, respectively.

6. The declaration regarding a single specialized production facility for super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective purposes should include a detailed description of the equipment at the facility.

7. The capacity of a chemical weapons production facility, or of a single specialized facility for production of super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors for protective purposes, should be expressed in terms of the quantity of end product that can be produced in (period), assuming that the facility operates (schedule). The capacity of a chemical weapons production facility used for filling chemical weapons should be expressed as the quantity of chemical that can be filled into munitions or other chemical weapons in (period), assuming that the facility operates (schedule).

8. With respect to past transfers, Parties should be required to make a declaration covering activities since (date). The declaration should specify the supplier and recipient countries, the timing and nature of the transfer and the current location of the transferred items, if known. The following should be declared:

(a) transfer of any militarily significant quantities (e.g., one ton) of toxic chemicals, munitions, devices or equipment for chemical weapons purposes; and

(b) transfers of equipment specifically designed or constructed for production of chemicals, munitions, devices or equipment for chemical weapons purposes.

C. Contents of Other Declarations

1. A declaration should be made annually regarding activities for protective purposes. It should cover activities actually conducted in the past year and those planned for the coming year. Information should be provided on:

(a) operations of any single specialized facility for production of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors, including the schedule and names and quantities of chemicals involved;

(b) the scientific chemical name, chemical structural formula, quantity and use of each key precursor devoted to protective purposes and each toxic chemical that can be used as a chemical weapon but is devoted to protective purposes;

(c) (other protective activities to be agreed).

2. As specified in Article III and Annex III, a declaration should be made annually regarding the chemicals listed in Schedules A, B, and C.

3. Thirty days prior to the transfer to another Party of any super-toxic lethal chemical or key precursor for protective purposes, information should be provided on the recipient, and on the scientific chemical name, chemical structural formula, quantity, and end use, of the chemical transferred.

4. The detailed plan for destruction of chemical weapons, to be provided pursuant to Article V, should be submitted six months before destruction operations are to begin and should contain agreed information necessary for the planning and carrying out of systematic international on-site verification.

5. The detailed plan for destruction of any chemical weapons production facility, to be provided pursuant to Article VI, should be submitted six months before destruction operations are to begin and should contain agreed information necessary for the planning and carrying out of systematic international on-site verification.

6. As specified in Articles V and VI, notifications should be provided annually regarding the implementation of plans for destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, respectively. These notifications should contain agreed information on activities actually conducted in the past year and those planned for the coming year. Information should also be provided on any changes in the detailed plans for destruction.

7. Should any Party discover or retrieve any old chemical weapons (e.g., weapons found on World War I battlefields or dumped at sea after World War II) anywhere under its jurisdiction or control after the declarations required by Articles IV and V have been filed it should:

(a) notify the Consultative Committee promptly of the approximate quantity and type of the chemical weapons found. The notification should also specify how, where, and when the chemical weapons were found, why they were previously undeclared, and where they are located. The notification should be filed within 45 days of the discovery. In the case of multiple and frequent discoveries of small quantities, a notification may cover a one-month period; such a notification should be made within 30 days of the end of the reporting month; and

(b) notify the Consultative Committee, within five months of the first notification, regarding the exact quantity and type of chemical weapon found, including the scientific chemical name and chemical structural formula of any toxic chemical found and its quantity. The notification should specify plans for the destruction of the chemical weapons.

(c) In the event that some of the information stipulated under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph cannot be provided within the periods specified, submit as much information as possible, specify the reasons the remainder is unavailable, and give an estimate of when such information might be provided.

Section B. On-Site Verification

A. General Provisions

1. All on-site verification, whether systematic international verification, special on-site inspection or ad hoc on-site inspection, under the auspices of the Consultative Committee should be carried out according to procedures which are agreed in advance and based on this Annex.

2. On-site verification should make use of both on-site inspectors and on-site instruments.

3. The Executive Council and the host Party should promptly agree upon subsidiary arrangements which specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Committee to fulfill its verification responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner, how the on-site verification provisions will be implemented at each of the locations subject to systematic international on-site verification.

4. The privileges and immunities which should be granted to inspectors to ensure that they can discharge their functions effectively should be specified. The steps that a Party should take to ensure that inspectors can effectively discharge their functions in its territory should also be specified.

5. Certain rights of a Party with respect to the conduct of verification in its territory should be specified. For example, although it should not be required, host Party representatives should be allowed to accompany international inspectors during on-site inspections.

6. Pursuant to the obligation in Article VIII not to interfere in any manner with the conduct of verification activities:

(a) entry visas for inspectors should be issued promptly;

(b) host Party representatives should be ready to accompany the inspectors immediately. No delays in carrying out the inspections should be allowed to occur under the guise of the unavailability of appropriate host Party representation;

(c) no bureaucratic constraints (e.g., governmental travel approval) should be imposed which would interfere with the inspection or provide the host Party with sufficient advance notification of the site to be inspected that the host Party could cover up possible prohibited activities prior to the inspection.

7. The Consultative Committee and the Party concerned should be required to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the verification measures specified by the Convention.

8. Verification measures should be implemented in a manner designed:

(a) to avoid hampering the economic and technological activities of Parties; and

(b) to be consistent with management practices required for the safe conduct of the activities subject to verification.

9. On-site instruments should incorporate a capability for remote monitoring. They should also incorporate data protection and tamper-detecting devices and be serviced only by international inspectors.

10. Full account should be taken of technological developments in order to ensure optimum effectiveness of verification.

11. An agreed timetable for destruction activities should be included to facilitate verification and to ensure that no Party gains military advantage during the destruction period.

B. Inspection and Interim Monitoring of Stocks

1. After a Party has filed its declarations pursuant to Articles IV and V, chemical weapons should be subject to inspection immediately, under agreed procedures, to confirm the accuracy of the declarations. These inspections should be completed within (number) days after the filing of the declarations.

2. To ensure that a Party does not move chemical weapons to a deployment site or to a clandestine site prior to destruction, the storage facilities should be equipped with monitoring instruments by international inspectors immediately following the confirmatory inspection.

3. During confirmatory inspection of chemical weapons, an on-site survey of each location should be made to determine what preagreed types of instruments would be emplaced to monitor the chemical weapons there prior to removal for destruction. The instruments should be installed and tested by the inspecting team, in the presence of host Party personnel, before the site and facility are declared secure. After emplacement of instruments is complete, on-site inspection should be repeated to confirm that no chemical weapons had been removed from that location since the initial confirmatory inspection. An additional set of agreed procedures should be developed for the removal of chemical weapons from each storage site for transfer to a destruction facility. Until all chemical weapons have been removed for destruction, the storage site should be visited periodically by an international inspection team for routine monitoring and maintenance purposes, e.g., testing the system of instruments.

C. Verification of the Destruction of Chemical Weapons

1. The verification procedures should be designed to confirm that chemical weapons are not diverted during transport or any phase of the destruction process and to confirm that the type and quantity of materials destroyed correspond to the declarations and that all materials are actually destroyed.
2. Transport of chemical weapons from storage sites and their destruction should be verified by systematic, international on-site procedures. International inspectors should be present at the storage facility when chemical weapons are removed for shipment to declared destruction facilities. The inspectors should verify the chemical weapons being moved and resecure the storage facility once they have been loaded on transports. (However, inspectors would not need to accompany the shipments.) Inspectors should verify that the chemical weapons are received at the destruction facility and placed in interim storage there. On-site instruments as well as inspectors, should be utilized for verification of destruction. Inspectors should be present in the destruction facility continuously when the facility is operating.
3. The destruction procedures should permit systematic international on-site verification. The following procedures should not be used for the destruction of chemical weapons: dumping in any body of water, land burial, or open-air burning. The destruction process should, for practical purposes, be irreversible.

D. Closure, Inspection, and Interim Monitoring of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

1. After a Party has filed its declarations pursuant to Articles IV and VI, chemical weapons production facilities should be immediately subject to inspection to confirm the accuracy of the declaration, and to confirm the implementation of agreed procedures for closure. These inspections should be completed within (number) days after the filing of the declaration. Subsequent verification procedures should be implemented to confirm that Parties have not resumed production or filling at the facility and to confirm that equipment has not been removed.
2. An inventory of key equipment should be prepared, and its accuracy verified by international inspectors during confirmatory inspection. At the same time, the inspector should survey the facility to determine which of the pre-agreed types of instruments should be emplaced to monitor the facility until it is destroyed. The instruments should be installed and tested by the inspecting team, in the presence of host Party personnel, before the facility is declared secure. During the interim between securing the facility and actually destroying it, the facility should be visited periodically by an international inspection team for routine monitoring and maintenance purposes, e.g., testing the system of instruments.

E. Verification of the Destruction of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

1. The verification procedures should be designed to confirm that chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed.
2. International inspectors should be present at the facility to be destroyed prior to beginning destruction to verify that the inventory of structures, equipment, parts, etc., at the facility is consistent with the inventory prepared when the facility was secured. During destruction, inspectors need not be present continuously, provided agreed procedures, including the use of on-site instruments, are implemented to ensure that the facility remains inoperative during the destruction phases. On-site inspections would be conducted periodically throughout the destruction process.
3. Equipment specifically designed for chemical weapons production should be destroyed. All items to be destroyed should be destroyed according to agreed procedures which permit systematic international on-site verification. No equipment may be removed from the site prior to check-off from the original inventory by the inspectors. Structures should be destroyed completely, by razing, and a final international inspection performed.

F. Inspection and Monitoring of the Permitted Single Specialized Production Facility

1. The verification procedures should be designed to confirm that the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors in quantities significantly in excess of one ton does not occur at the single specialized production facility.
2. The precise location of the facility should be declared and the facility should be inspected by international inspectors before it is used to ensure that its capacity will not permit the production, on an annual basis, of quantities significantly in excess of one ton. On-site instruments should be installed which will signal whether the facility is active or inactive. An annual declaration should be made about planned production activities. International inspectors should have the right to visit the facility periodically to enable them to monitor production activities, as well as inactive periods, through on-site inspection.

G. Verification Measures Applicable to Production for Permitted Purposes of Chemicals Listed in Schedule C

1. The verification procedures should be designed to confirm that these facilities are not used to produce chemical weapons.
2. Inspections should occur periodically on a random basis. Such inspections should be conducted under agreed procedures which provide protection for proprietary information.
3. During an inspection, international inspectors should have the right to review certain agreed plant records and interview personnel under agreed procedures. Inspectors should be allowed to view agreed areas; take samples from agreed points, such as finished product storage containers and waste treatment areas; and analyse them using agreed methods. Inspectors would not have the right to interfere with plant operations more than necessary to carry out their agreed functions.
4. Use of special instruments (e.g., end product samplers) between inspections should be permitted when deemed necessary by the inspectors.

5. Plans to change the end product of the facility or substantially change its capacity should be reported in advance to international authorities. Details of process modification need not be disclosed; however, final products and estimated time for completing the work should be provided. International inspectors should be permitted to view agreed areas soon after completion of the modifications. At that time, new or altered instruments should be installed, as required.

H. On-site Inspections under Articles X and XI

1. Agreed procedures for conducting on-site inspections under Articles X and XI should be specified in this Annex, including:

- (a) a requirement for definition of the area to be inspected;
- (b) time limits for providing access to the area to be inspected;
- (c) the maximum number of personnel on an inspection team;
- (d) length of service requirements for designation of inspectors;
- (e) routes of access and means of transportation;
- (f) types of experimental and support equipment which may be employed and who shall furnish specific types of equipment;
- (g) procedures for making observations and measurements, including collecting samples and taking photographs;
- (h) protection of proprietary and confidential information including liability for unauthorized disclosure of such information;
- (i) services to be furnished by the host Party;
- (j) rights of inspection personnel, including privileges and immunities;
- (k) certain rights of the host Party;
- (l) allocation of expenses;
- (m) preparation of reports;
- (n) dissemination of findings;
- (o) additional rights to be exercised in specific situations; and
- (p) duration of an inspection.

2. With regard to "locations or facilities controlled by the Government of a Party," referred to in Article X, subparagraph 1(b), this Annex should provide the means of specifying those categories of locations or facilities which shall be subject to special on-site inspections, including the relevant facilities used for the provision of goods and services to the Government of a Party. It is intended that this provision reach any location or facility that in the future might be suspected of being used for activities in violation of this Convention. The specification of such locations and facilities should be a reasonable one.

3. The Committee should use the following guidelines in determining whether to request a Party to permit an ad hoc inspection pursuant to Article XI:

(a) whether the information available to it causes any doubts about compliance with the Convention or gives rise to any concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) whether the proposed inspection would assist in determining the facts;

(c) whether the locations to be inspected are clearly defined and limited to places relevant to determination of the facts; and

(d) whether the proposed arrangements will limit intrusion to the level necessary to determine the facts.

4. The Technical Secretariat should ensure that sufficient inspectors will always be readily available to carry out special on-site inspections pursuant to Article X and ad hoc on-site inspections pursuant to Article XI.

Annex III

SCHEDULES: CHEMICALS SUBJECT TO SPECIAL MEASURES;
METHODS FOR MEASURING TOXICITY

Provisions along the following lines should be included:

1. Schedule A should contain super-toxic lethal chemicals, key precursors, and other particularly dangerous chemicals, which have been stockpiled as chemical weapons or which pose particular risk of such stockpiling. Information on the persons authorized to possess such chemicals, the quantity produced and used at each location and the end uses should be reported annually.
2. Schedule B should contain chemicals which are produced in large quantities for permitted purposes but which pose a particular risk of diversion to chemical weapons purposes. In respect of each chemical in Schedule B, every Party should report annually the location of each production facility and statistical data on the aggregate quantities produced, imported, and exported, and on the end uses of the chemical.
3. Schedule C should contain chemicals whose production for permitted purposes should be subject to systematic international on-site verification, including key precursors. In respect of each chemical listed in Schedule C, every Party should report annually, for each chemical which is produced, imported or exported in an aggregate amount greater than (quantity), the location of each production facility and statistical data on the aggregate quantities produced, imported, and exported, and on the end uses of the chemical. Plans to establish a new production facility or to change substantially the capacity of an existing production facility should be reported ninety days in advance. Production facilities should be subject to systematic international on-site inspection, pursuant to Article III.
4. Schedule D should contain agreed methods for measuring lethal toxicity.
5. If a Party has information which in its opinion may require a revision of Schedules A, B, C, or D, it should provide the information to the Chairman of the Consultative Committee who should transmit the information to all Parties. The Technical Secretariat should also submit any such information to the Committee.
6. The Executive Council should promptly examine, in the light of all information available to it, whether the Schedule in question should be revised. The Council may recommend that the Schedule be revised or it may recommend that no revision be made. Any recommendation should be communicated promptly to all Parties.
7. Any recommendation by the Executive Council should be reviewed by the Consultative Committee at its next regularly scheduled meeting. The Committee may decide to accept the recommendation as stated, or in revised form, or it may decide to reject the recommendation. If requested by five or more Parties, a special meeting of the Committee should be held to review the recommendation. A two-thirds vote of the Committee should be required to revise a Schedule.

SCHEDULE A

1. Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl
methylphosphonothioate (VX)
2. Ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate (Tabun)
3. iso-Propyl methylphosphonofluoridate (Sarin)
4. 1,2,2-Trimethylpropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (Soman)
5. Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulphide (Mustard gas)
6. 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ)
7. Saxitoxin
8. 3,3-Dimethylbutanol-2 (Pinacolyl alcohol)
9. Methylphosphonyl difluoride

SCHEDULE B

1. Carbonyl chloride (phosgene)
2. Cyanogen chloride
3. Hydrogen cyanide
4. Phosphorus oxychloride
5. Phosphorus trichloride
6. Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin)
7. Thiodiglycol

SCHEDULE C

Key precursors for super-toxic lethal chemicals

1. Chemicals containing the P-methyl, P-ethyl or P-propyl bond
2. Methyl and/or ethyl esters of phosphorous acid
3. 3,3-dimethyl butanol-2 (pinacolyl alcohol)
4. N,N disubstituted-B-amino ethanols
5. N,N disubstituted-B-amino ethane thiols
6. N,N disubstituted-B-aminoethyl halides
(halide = Cl, Br or I)

Key Precursors for other toxic chemicals

1. Phenyl-, alkyl- or cycloalkyl-substituted glycolic acids
2. 3- or 4-hydroxypiperidine and their derivatives

Toxic chemicals

(To be discussed)

SCHEDULE D

Lethal toxicity should be measured by the procedures specified below:

(text of procedures contained in document CD/CW/WP.30, Annexes III and IV;
22 March 1982)

ANNEX III

RECOMMENDED STANDARDIZED OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR ACUTE SUBCUTANEOUS TOXICITY DETERMINATIONS

1. Introduction

Three categories of agents were defined on the basis of their toxicity:

- (i) super-toxic lethal chemicals;
- (ii) other lethal chemicals;
- (iii) other harmful chemicals.

Lethality limits in terms of LD₅₀ for subcutaneous administration were established to separate three toxic categories at 0.5 mg/kg and 10 mg/kg.

2. Principles of the test method

The test substance is administered to a group of animals in doses corresponding exactly to the category limits (0.5 or 10 mg/kg respectively). If in an actual test the death rate was greater than 50 per cent, then the material would fall into the higher toxicity category; if it was lower than 50 per cent the material would fall into the lower toxicity category.

3. Description of the test procedure

3.1 Experimental animal Healthy young adult male albino rats of Wistar strain weighing 200 ± 20 g should be used. The animals should be acclimatized to the laboratory conditions for at least five days prior to the test. The temperature of the animal room before and during the test should be 22 ± 3 °C and the relative humidity should be 50-70 per cent. With artificial lighting, the sequence should be 12 hours light, 12 hours dark. Conventional laboratory diets may be used for feeding with an unlimited supply of drinking water. The animals should be group-caged but the number of animals per cage should not interfere with proper observation of each animal. Prior to the test, the animals are randomized and divided into two groups; twenty animals in each group.

3.2 Test substance Each test substance should be appropriately identified (chemical composition, origin, batch number, purity, solubility, stability etc.) and stored under conditions ensuring its stability. The stability of the substance under the test conditions should also be known. A solution of the test substance should be prepared just before the test. Solutions with concentrations of 0.5 mg/ml and 10 mg/ml should be prepared. The preferable solvent is 0.85 per cent saline. Where the solubility of the test substance is a problem, a minimum amount of an organic solvent such as ethanol, propylene glycol or polyethylene glycol may be used to achieve solution.

3.3 Test method Twenty animals receive in the back region 1 ml/kg of the solution containing 0.5 mg/ml of the test substance. The number of dead animals is determined within 48 hours and again after seven days. If the death rate is lower than ten animals, another group of twenty animals should be injected by the same way with 1 ml/kg of the solution containing 10 mg/ml of the test substance. The number of dead animals should be determined within 48 hours and again after seven days. If the result is doubtful (e.g. death rate = 10), the test should be repeated.

3.4 Evaluation of the results If the death rate in the first group of animals (receiving a solution containing 0.5 mg/ml) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "super-toxic lethal chemical" category. If the death rate in the second group (receiving a solution containing 10 mg/ml) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other lethal chemical" category; if lower than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other harmful chemical".

4. Data reporting

A test report should include the following information:

- (i) test conditions: date and hour of the test, air temperature and humidity;
- (ii) animal data: strain, weight and origin of the animals;
- (iii) test substance characterization: chemical composition, origin, batch number and purity (or impurities) of the substance; date of receipt, quantities received and used in the test; conditions of storage, solvent used in the test;
- (iv) results: the number of dead animals in each group, evaluation of results.

ANNEX IV

RECOMMENDED STANDARDIZED OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR ACUTE INHALATION TOXICITY CRITERIA

1. In the assessment and evaluation of the toxic characteristics of chemicals in a vapour state determination of acute inhalation toxicity is necessary. In every case, when it is possible, this test should be preceded by subcutaneous toxicity determination. Data from these studies constitute the initial steps in the establishing of a dosage regimen in subchronic and other studies and may provide additional information on the mode of toxic action of a substance.

Three categories of agents were defined on the basis of their toxicity:

- (i) super-toxic lethal chemicals;
- (ii) other lethal chemicals;
- (iii) other harmful chemical.

Lethality limits in terms of LCT_{50} for inhalatory application were established to separate three toxic categories at 2,000 mg min/m³ and 20,000 mg min/m³.

2. Principles of the test method

A group of animals is exposed for a defined period to the test substance in concentration corresponding exactly to the category limits (2,000 mg min/m³ or 20,000 mg min/m³ respectively). If in an actual test the death rate was greater than 50 per cent, then the material would fall into the higher toxicity category; if it was lower than 50 per cent, the material would fall into the lower toxicity category.

3. Description of the test procedure

3.1 Experimental animal. Healthy young adult male albino rats of Wistar strain weighing 200 ± 20 g should be used. The animals should be acclimatized to the laboratory conditions for at least five days prior to the test. The temperature of the animal room before and during the test should be $22 \pm 3^{\circ}\text{C}$ and the relative humidity should be 50-70 per cent. With artificial lighting, the sequence should be 12 hours light, 12 hours dark. Conventional laboratory diets may be used for feeding with an unlimited supply of drinking water. The animals should be group-caged but the number of animals per cage should not interfere with proper observation of each animal. Prior to the test the animals are randomized and divided into two groups, twenty animals in each group.

3.2 Test substance. Each test substance should be appropriately identified (chemical composition, origin, batch number, purity, solubility, stability, boiling point, flash point, vapour pressure etc) and stored under conditions ensuring its stability. The stability of the substance under the test conditions should also be known.

3.3 Equipment. A constant vapour concentration may be produced by one of several methods.

- (i) by means of an automatic syringe which drops the material onto a suitable heating system (e.g. hot plate),
- (ii) by sending airsteam through a solution containing the material (e.g. bubbling chamber),
- (iii) by diffusion of the agent through a suitable material (e.g. diffusion chamber).

A dynamic inhalation system with a suitable analytical concentration control system should be used. The rate of air flow should be adjusted to ensure that conditions throughout the equipment are essentially the same. Both a whole body individual chamber exposure or head only exposure may be used.

3.4 Physical measurements. Measurements or monitoring should be conducted of the following parameters:

- (i) the rate of air flow (preferably continuously),
- (ii) the actual concentration of the test substance during the exposed period,
- (iii) temperature and humidity.

3.5 Test method. Twenty animals are exposed for 10 minutes to the concentration of 200 mg/m^3 and then removed from the chamber. The number of dead animals is determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the death rate is lower than 10 animals, another group of twenty animals should be exposed for 10 minutes to the concentration of $2,000 \text{ mg/m}^3$. The number of dead animals should be determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the result is doubtful (e.g. death rate = 10), the test should be repeated.

3.6 Evaluation of results. If the death rate in the first group of animals (exposed to the concentration of 200 mg/m^3) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "super-toxic lethal chemical" category. If the death rate in the second group (exposed to the concentration of $2,000 \text{ mg/m}^3$) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other legal chemical" category; if it is lower than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other harmful chemical".

4. Data reporting

A test report should include the following information:

- (i) **Test conditions.** date and hour of the test, description of exposure chamber (type, dimensions, source of air, system for generating the test substance, method of conditioning air, treatment of exhaust air etc) and equipment for measuring temperature, humidity, air flow and concentration of the test substance.

- (ii) Exposure data: air flow rate, temperature and humidity of air, nominal concentration (total amount of test substance fed into the equipment divided by volume of air), actual concentration in test breathing zone.
- (iii) Animal data: strain, weight and origin of animals.
- (iv) Test substance characterization: chemical composition, origin, batch number and purity (or impurities) of the substance; boiling point, flash point, vapour pressure; date of receipt, quantities received and used in the test; condition of storage, solvent used in the test.
- (v) Results: number of dead animals in each group, evaluation of results.

Document Regarding Action Prior to Entry into Force of the
Convention: Detailed Views

A document containing the following should be associated with the Convention:

1. When signing the Convention, every State should declare whether chemical weapons stocks or chemical weapons production facilities are under its control anywhere or located within its territory.
2. Not less than 90 days after the Convention is opened for signature a Preparatory Commission, composed of representatives of all signatory States, should be convened for the purpose of carrying out necessary preparations for the coming into force of the Convention's provisions, including preparing the first session of the Consultative Committee.
3. The Commission should include one representative from each signatory. All decisions should be made by consensus. The Preparatory Commission should remain in existence until the Convention comes into force and thereafter until the first meeting of the Consultative Committee. Its actions must be consistent with the provisions of the Convention.
4. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission should be met as follows (details).
5. The Preparatory Commission should:
 - (a) elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary, determine its own place of meeting and establish such committees as it deems necessary;
 - (b) appoint an executive secretary and staff, who shall exercise powers and perform such duties as the Commission determines;
 - (c) make arrangements for the first session of the Consultative Committee, including preparing a provisional agenda, drafting rules of procedure, and choosing the site; and
 - (d) make studies, reports, and recommendations for the consideration of the Consultative Committee at its first meeting on procedural matters of concern to the Committee which would require immediate attention, including:
 - (1) financing of the activities for which the Committee is responsible;
 - (2) the programs and budget for the first year of the Committee's activities;
 - (3) staffing of the Secretariat; and
 - (4) the location of the permanent offices of the Committee.
6. The Preparatory Commission should submit a comprehensive report on its activities to the Consultative Committee at the Committee's first session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/539/Corr.1
31 August 1984
Original: ENGLISH

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament

Corrigendum

On page 6, paragraph 8, penultimate line:

After the words "United Kingdom", add "of Great Britain and Northern Ireland".

On page 6, paragraph 10, last sentence:

Replace the words, "... during the 1984 session", by the word, "in".

Annex I, page 5, foot-note 1:

Replace the page number to read "12".

Annex I, page 5, foot-note 2:

Replace the page number to read "14".

Annex I, page 10, foot-note 2:

The word "Annex" should be in lower case.

Annex I, page 19, foot-note 1:

1st line: page numbers should read "13-18".

2nd line: delete the word "and" before "CD/500", and replace the "full stop" by a "comma" and add the following words "and in CD/532.".

Annex I, page 23, foot-note 3:

Last line: Replace the "full stop" by a "comma" and add the following words "and in CD/532, pp.3 and 4.".

Annex I, page 28, foot-note 2:

4th line: replace the word "and" by a "comma" before "pp.10 and 11".

5th line: replace the "full stop" by a "comma" and add the following words "and p.3 (from CD/532, dated 8 August 1984).".

Annex III

Document CD/532 of 8 August 1984 should also be attached so that Annex III contains the following documents: CD/294, CD/500 and CD/532.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/532
CD/CW/WP.84
8 August 1984

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Working Paper

submitted by a group of socialist States

The organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee

I. General provisions and structure

1. With a view to ensuring broader international consultations and co-operation, exchanging information and promoting verification in order to obtain compliance with the provisions of the Convention, a Consultative Committee shall be established by the States Parties to the Convention within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force.
2. Each State Party shall be entitled to designate a representative to the Consultative Committee who may be accompanied at the meetings by one or more advisers. The Chairman of the sessions of the Consultative Committee shall be elected by the Consultative Committee itself.
3. The Consultative Committee shall meet in regular sessions annually unless it decides otherwise. Every five years the Committee shall review the implementation of the Convention to ensure that its objectives and provisions are being fulfilled. An extraordinary (special) session of the Consultative Committee may be convened to consider matters of urgency at the substantiated request of any of the States Parties within 30 days of the receipt of such a request.
4. The Consultative Committee shall take its decisions on matters of substance by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached during the session, each State Party may record its opinion in the final report of the session for subsequent study by the Governments of the other States Parties to the Convention. Decisions on procedural matters related to the organization of work of the Committee shall be taken by consensus where possible, and otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.
5. The results of the sessions of the Consultative Committee shall be reflected in the records of its meetings and in the final report which shall be circulated to all the States Parties.

GE.84-64647

6. In the intervals between sessions, questions relating to promoting the implementation of and compliance with the Convention shall be dealt with by the Executive Council acting on behalf of the Consultative Committee.

The Executive Council shall be composed of 15 members representatives of the States Parties and a Chairman, who shall be the Chairman of the last session of the Consultative Committee. Ten members of the Council shall be elected by the Consultative Committee after consultation with the States Parties, taking into account the principle of equitable political and geographical representation, for a term of two years, five members being replaced each year. The remaining five seats shall be reserved for the permanent members of the Security Council parties to the Convention.

7. The Executive Council shall take its decisions on matters of substance by consensus. If consensus with regard to a request for on-site inspection cannot be reached within 24 hours, the State subject to the request shall be informed of the individual opinions expressed by all the members of the Executive Council on the matter. The Executive Council shall take its decisions on procedural matters related to the organization of its work by consensus where possible, and otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.

8. The Technical Secretariat shall be staffed proceeding from the principle of equitable political and geographical representation of States Parties. It shall be composed of inspectors and experts who shall be nationals of the States Parties.

9. The Consultative Committee may establish such subsidiary technical bodies as may be necessary.

II. Functions

The Consultative Committee shall:

1. Provide a forum for discussion by all the States Parties concerned of all issues related to implementation of and compliance with the Convention;
2. Co-ordinate all forms of verification and provide for communication between national and international verification bodies;
3. Elaborate, in agreement with all Parties, standard verification techniques;
4. Receive, store and disseminate information presented by the States Parties in accordance with the Convention, including declarations, notifications and statements on chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities, plans for the destruction or diversion of such stockpiles and for the elimination (destruction, dismantling or diversion) of the facilities, and annual declarations concerning chemicals for permitted purposes that are produced, diverted from stockpiles, used, acquired or transferred;

5. Provide the States Parties, at their request, with services in respect of holding consultations among themselves on questions with regard to implementation of and compliance with the Convention, as well as in respect of exchanging information on a bilateral or multilateral basis or obtaining services from relevant international organizations;

6. Adopt, at its first session, the criteria that it will subsequently use to determine the modalities and time frames for on-site inspections at each facility for the destruction of stockpiles or for the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes;

7. Verify, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, reports on the use of chemical weapons;

8. Determine, on the basis of the information presented by the States Parties on chemical weapon stockpiles and the technical characteristics of the facilities for their destruction, as well as on the technical characteristics of the facilities for the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes, the modalities and time frames for the implementation of international on-site inspections at each individual facility, proceeding from the agreed criteria;

9. Consider requests for on-site inspections filed by States Parties and, in the event of a positive decision, carry out the inspection, subject to the consent of the host State;

10. Assign, in cases of on-site inspections by challenge, conducted by agreement directly between the States Parties concerned, inspectors from its Technical Secretariat to participate in such inspections, if this is requested by one or several States Parties;

11. Approve the reports of the Executive Council containing information on implementation of and compliance with the Convention, recommendations on particular technical matters and the factual report on the work done by the Executive Council between the sessions of the Consultative Committee;

12. Consider and decide upon administrative and financial questions and approve the budget on the basis of an agreed scale of financial contributions.

III. Co-operation with the national verification bodies of the States Parties

The Consultative Committee shall:

1. Hold regular meetings on a bilateral or multilateral basis, with the national bodies of the States Parties in order to enhance the effectiveness of co-operation in ensuring compliance with the Convention;

2. Provide, within a specially established technical body, training for the personnel of the national verification bodies in standard international verification techniques and the use of the relevant equipment;

3. Elaborate, in agreement with the States Parties, procedures for sealing chemical weapon production facilities (or their key points), design the sealing devices and formulate recommendations for their possible use by the national verification bodies of the States Parties;

4. In the course of inspections the inspecting personnel shall have the right to request assistance from the officials of the national bodies in charge of the implementation of the Convention on any matters related to such inspections;

5. A State Party which has received a notification of a regular international systematic on-site inspection or of a challenge on-site inspection specifying the concrete purpose of such an inspection, the approximate time of the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry into the territory of the State Party concerned and the qualifications and names of the inspectors and their nationalities, shall acknowledge receipt of the notification within two days and shall provide in its turn (in the case of a challenge inspection — subject to its agreement thereto) a list of officials representing the national body in charge of the implementation of the Convention who could, for their part, facilitate and provide support for the conduct of the inspection.

DOCUMENT IDENTIQUE A L'ORIGINAL

DOCUMENT IDENTICAL TO THE ORIGINAL