# United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY



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#### VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 16th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

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## Statements were made by:

Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)

Mr. Sheldov (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic)

Mr. Shah Nawaz (Pakistan)

PROGRAMME OF WORK

### The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

### AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 65 AND 142 (continued)

#### GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, the Sri Lanka delegation congratulates you warmly on your election to guide our Committee and pledges its co-operation to you in your tasks. Our association with you in Geneva has made us well aware of your deep commitment to the cause of disarmament, your sagacity and your ability. We also felicitate the other officers of the Committee.

The final document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament recognized that the United Nations General Assembly should continue to be the vortex of international disarmament deliberations and that this Committee should confine itself to questions of disarmament and related international security issues. The purpose of this was to fulfil the aspirations for disarmament of the Governments and peoples we represent and to translate the ideal expressed in the United Nations Charter of maintaining international peace and security into concrete reality.

Six years have elapsed since then. We cannot claim with any honesty that our deliberations have brought disarmament, arms control and even negotiations towards these objectives any closer. The debates and the resolutions leave no doubt about our joint commitment to the cause of general and complete disarmament although there may have been shifts of emphasis and differences in nuance. World public opinion has remained urgently articulate and insistent on the need for action towards disarmament. And yet the arms race has sped ahead as if motivated by an insane logic and a compulsive self-generating impulse of its own. This contradiction remains one that demands our serious attention.

How can the arms race intensify and proliferate into new areas of our universe when the overwhelming opinion of mankind is so set against it? Is there a schizophrenic streak in us that makes us plead for the survival of mankind and yet at the same time work towards its utter and total annihilation with weapons of mass murder the world has never known before? No answer that is totally satisfying has emerged from our debates to answer these questions. Perhaps we shall never find the answers to questions that are fundamental to the human condition. But we

cannot lose hope that the sum total of our reasoned pleas for disarmament will be heard and acted upon. It is this hope that sustains my delegation as we commence our work in this Committee.

To despair that our words will have no effect is fatally easy. Collectively it is that mood that is the surest way to self-destruction and the collapse of our international system. Hope, self-preservation and the instinct for survival are ultimately stronger impulses inherent in the human condition than fatalism, despair and lassitude. This is reflected in the religions, philosophies and cultures of all our nations as a primordial faith. The powerful groundswell of popular opinion against the arms race is also a demonstration of that fact. Its strength and vitality shines through the realpolitik of our statements. That in the final analysis is why we must go on bringing to this world forum the concerns of the citizens we represent. They will be heard some day; they must be.

Speaking in the general debate of the General Assembly last month, Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister referred to the central rationale underpinning the nuclear arms race when he said:

"The nuclear dimension of the armaments race bodes ill for all mankind. The nuclear deterrent theory, which is advanced as a means of securing peace is being perilously maintained at constantly rising levels of armaments, increasing rather than reducing, the threat of a global confrontation."

(A/39/PV.5, p. 92)

The fundamental premises of this deterrence theory have been disproved over and over again. Ironically the adherents of deterrence themselves envisage its failure and have plans for prevailing in a nuclear war. The quest for superiority in the arms race is demonstrably unwinnable. The nuclear Powers have shown that parity of strength will not satisfy them even if they can agree on what constitutes parity. The danger of nuclear war, by accident or design, increases more rapidly than the incremental rate of nuclear armaments. It is the most terrifying instance of exponential growth of insecurity and instability apart from the total misuse of human and material resources at great cost to mankind's moral dignity and its social and economic development. There can never be a perfect harmonization of

perceptions on a balance even if we accept the balance of terror thesis. Arguments and reasons will be found to reinforce the case for another spiral in the arms race, first on one side, then on the other, with no conception of where the spiral will end, let alone how and where it all began.

That is why my delegation favours the proposals for a freeze on the production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons. There will never be an optimum moment for the nuclear Powers to freeze for it will be argued by one or another that it will be to their strategic disadvantage. Against this it will always be an opportune and optimum moment for mankind that there be a freeze sooner rather than later. The ultimate weapon to which there can be no defence is an illusory ideal wasteful of time, money and effort. There are no medals to be won in the nuclear-arms race. More security for one super-Power means insecurity for the other with all the dangerous consequences that entails.

There is another theoretical postulate advanced by the advocates of nuclear weapons and that is that security is assured through strategic defence. In a nuclear age the global impact of a nuclear strike is a proven scientific fact in terms such as a nuclear winter. Strategic defence systems are also indistinguishable from offensive systems. While bilateral arms-control negotiations remain suspended and multilateral negotiations are frustrated, new weapon systems and arms are being manufactured to limits well beyond what is required for use in terms of military strategy. This breeds insecurity heightened by the lack of agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons. If weapons are developed and deployed well beyond the needs of mutually assured destruction, what is their political or military purpose except to satisfy a primitive desire to prove that one is greater than the other in the macabre game of one-upmanship.

The Final Communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly warned:

"Not only do these developments undermine international security, but in their total impact they are leading to the increasing 'conventionalization' and legitimization of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction."

(A/39/560, p. 8)

Our work this year takes place against the backdrop of a serious crisis in the international system that was structured after the Second World War. This structure was based on the need for multilateral co-operation in recognition of our fundamental interdependence. Despite ideological and other differences and transcending the varying levels of development, a global consensus on the need for international co-operation welded us together. Global crises evoked global responses, however inadequate they may have been as solutions to the problem. Today, however, that consensus lies broken.

Serious threats have been made to the world system which affect the field of disarmament negotiations as well. Going it alone for short-term political advantage may appear attractive but we have only to remind ourselves of the many historical antecedents of this dangerous course, and where it led. If Member nations of the United Nations system undermine international co-operation by their actions, the system is in peril and with it our chances for a better world based on peace, equality and justice. In no area is international co-operation more vital than in that of disarmament, because it impinges on the very existence of the human race on this planet. It is therefore vital that the multilateral organizations, both deliberative and negotiating, that have been established should work towards achieving their objectives. The danger of the present situation, with bilateral negotiations suspended and no visible progress in multilateral negotiations, is too great for the world to tolerate.

The report of the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, makes disappointing reading. My delegation was admitted to that body following the creation of the Conference on Disarmament through paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We have therefore a special interest in its success. An unpropitious international situation and lack of political will are frequently cited as causes of the limited progress of the Conference. That is no doubt the case. The report itself refers to proposals for the improved and effective functioning of the Conference and my delegation is glad to note that consideration of those proposals will continue in the 1985 session. The machinery set up by the Final Document of the first special session and its procedures were not intended to be immutable; nor was it intended that protracted debate on mandates should obstruct the substantive work of this negotiating body or that the rigid implementation of the rule of consensus should apply to procedural issues.

Many delegations have commented favourably on the progress achieved in the Conference on Disarmament in the field of a chemical weapons ban. That is indeed an encouraging development and my delegation is hopeful that the excellent start made this year will be continued in the 1985 session, with a consensus being achieved on the full text of a treaty which will effectively banish this abhorrent form of warfare. Our satisfaction over progress on this aspect of disarmament is,

however, overshadowed by disappointment at the lack of progress on the priority nuclear issues. The inability to reach a consensus on mandates to set up <u>ad hoc</u> committees on a nuclear-test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and the prevention of an arms race in outer space was particularly regrettable considering the substantial agreement reached on those issues at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The statement of the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka in the Assembly's general debate referred to the arms race in outer space and the intention of my delegation to continue the initiative pursued at the last two sessions for the prevention of the extension of the arms race beyond man's last frontier. My delegation recalls with satisfaction the wide measure of support received for resolution 38/70, which emerged as the only resolution on the subject at the conclusion of the thirty-eight session of the United Nations General Assembly. Now, a year later, an arms race in outer space is an even more imminent danger.

The two super-Powers are on record as agreeing to bilateral negotiations, which have still to take place. In this context the need for a consensus resolution is self-evident in order that action may begin in this vitally important field. The military exploitation of space for offensive purposes is a new dimension of the arms race that is of awesome proportions, because of both its destructive potential and the colossal resources it will consume. It is easier to prevent an arms race in outer space than to arrest and reverse it once the super-Powers have embarked upon it. The technical complexity of the subject is no reason for postponing the issue, nor is it reasonable to postpone negotiations by arguing that existing agreements have to be examined first. Where no international law exists to cover the situations envisaged by space technology, we can collectively create that law. It is estimated that over \$4,000 is being spent every 10 seconds on military space programmes and their integration with existing strategic systems. The deterioration of the security atmosphere as a consequence is sharp and must be arrested now. Undoubtedly, an identification of the complex issues must be a preliminary stage in negotiations, but we cannot therefore postpone negotiations. It is the hope of my delegation that such negotiations will begin during the 1985 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

In 1985 many of us present here will participate in the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for which we have already had two successful Preparatory Committee meetings. As a signatory to the Treaty, Sri Lanka attaches great importance to that Conference as a means of strengthening the Treaty and encouraging wider accession to it. We remain convinced that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is an integral part of the process of nuclear disarmament. The world is, in the final analysis, safer with the Treaty than without it; but the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime lies not only in the verifiable cessation of horizontal proliferation among the non-nuclear-weapon States parties but also in the obligation imposed under article VI of the Treaty to "undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith" in order to end the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament. The initiation of the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty will have a reinforcing effect on the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime - if it is not to be considered another example of unequal exchange. Non-nuclear-weapon States must also receive guarantees that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons and an agreed international instrument must be negotiated to that end.

The Indian Ocean - the immediate security environment of Sri Lanka - is of special interest to my delegation. In 1971, on Sri Lanka's initiative, the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was adopted by the General Assembly. Since then Sri Lanka has worked steadfastly, together with the members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, to attain the objectives embodied in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, which were further considered at the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean held in July 1979.

Despite the consistent demands of the littoral and hinterland States, the convening of the Colombo Conference has been inordinately delayed. It is the hope of my delegation that the Conference on the Indian Ocean will be opened in the first half of 1985, in fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean.

As Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister, Mr. A. C. Shahul Hameed, stated in the General Assembly:

"The Conference itself will not establish a zone of peace overnight but will chalk out the essential principles and the appropriate modalities, mechanisms and machinery for the establishment of the zone of peace." (A/39/PV.5, p. 92)

In this context, my delegation is happy to note the increasingly wide acceptance of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones since the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whatever caveats may be added as transitional arrangements. The steady expansion of the area covered by such zones and their acceptance by all nuclear Powers is an important disarmament measure leading to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

We regret the apparent eclipse of the subject of disarmament and development in our discussions. The transfer of resources consumed by the arms race into social and economic development is no less urgent now than it was when the report of the Expert Group was first issued in 1981. We welcome the initiative of some delegations in pursuing the recommendations in that report and implementing it nationally. The report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development concludes that the phased establishment of a fund with an assured flow of resources would give tangible expression to the link between disarmament and development. This and other proposals should, in the view of my delegation, be considered at an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development.

While nuclear disarmament remains a priority issue, the subject of conventional disarmament is also of great importance. The conventional arms trade has many insidious effects, including the encouragement of any dissident, anarchist or nihilist group to acquire sophisticated weapons freely for the purposes of terrorist and destabilizing actions. This is especially so because we have today a buyer's market consequent upon the prevailing global over-capacity of arms production and the proliferation of arms-producing capabilities. The study of the Group of Experts established pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/97 A reveals that over 20 million people have lost their lives in some 150 armed conflicts since the Second Wrold War and that four fifths of the world's total expenditure for military purposes is spent on conventional arms and armed forces. Moreover, it points out that tensions and the arms race have a mutually reinforcing effect. In this context, my delegation places great importance on confidence-building measures.

My delegation supports the programme of activities under the World Disarmament Campaign launched by the second special session on disarmament. A greater concern among the world public over the nuclear-arms race is being increasingly reflected in public opinion polls in various countries, and the campaign will no doubt lead to an informed awareness of the issues involved. Sri Lanka was, therefore, happy to make a modest contribution to the Voluntary Trust Fund. Sri Lanka is also gratified to note the success of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament and the practical benefits accruing to Member States from this programme.

Our discussions in this Committee this year will lead to a series of resolutions aimed at achieving the objective of disarmament. My delegation hopes that our efforts can be directed at achieving consensus resolutions rather than having resolutions that compete with one another. If our resolutions are to be implemented and followed up and if our task is to narrow our differences rather than harden our positions, then clearly our work must be action-oriented and not solely resolution-oriented. This is all the more necessary when we have a situation where bilateral negotiations are suspended and multilateral negotiations are paralysed by a lack of political will. The impetus for a new beginning in disarmament negotiations can and must grow out of our discussions here. The Secretary-General's report has identified disarmament and arms limitation as being

among the main elements of a stable international order and referred to the need to utilize the full potential of multilateral and bilateral negotiations to achieve this.

The resumption of the dialogue, albeit tentative, between the super-Powers is one hopeful sign for the future. The multilateral institutions for negotiations are also there to be used. Our plea is that they should be.

Mr. SHELDOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The statements of the vast majority of those who have taken part both in the general political discussion at the present session of the General Assembly and in the debate in this Committee have cogently indicated the growing alarm in connection with the continuing deterioration of an already dangerous and tense situation which has been brought about by adventuristic actions on the part of those who are dementedly pushing the world closer and closer to the edge of the precipice. The reasons for the tension that has arisen and the intensification of the arms race, as has been emphasized by us and by other delegations as well, can be seen to be rooted in the actions of the aggressive circles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and primarily the United States, aimed at undermining stability in the world, violating the military and strategic parity, acquiring military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries and, in the final analysis, attempting to be stronger than everyone, to determine the fate of peoples and impose their will on everyone in every part of the world.

The fact that Washington is actually pursuing such a course, which is sometimes camouflaged by rhetorical statements about peace, is attested to by a number of facts and data. In fact, in the United States there are large-scale physical preparations for nuclear warfare. The direct expenditure on strategic nuclear forces, in constant terms, rose by 96 per cent between 1980 and 1984 and became the most dynamic of the main programmes in the United States military budget. The budget itself for 1985 reached the record figure of approximately \$300 billion and is intended first and foremost to finance the most sophisticated systems, whose basic characteristics indicate that they are obviously conceived as first-strike weapons. I am referring to the intercontinental ballistic missiles, MX and Midgetman, atomic submarines with missiles belonging to the Trident system, strategic bombers of the B-IB and Stealth types and long-range cruise missiles. At the same time there is also tremendous expansion of the number of chemical and

conventional weapons, and a new type of weapon is being elaborated, that is, means of attack from outer space. A characteristic feature of the programmes being carried out at present is the very careful preparation of devices for the future, aimed at ensuring the qualitative and quantitative escalation of United States armaments to the end of the twentieth century and beyond into the twenty-first century.

The new fashion in Washington - and we are all quite aware who is the author of this initiative - is the programme for the development of anti-missile systems, which is closely related to plans for the militarization of outer space, frequently given the designation "star wars" in the United States. United States strategists are dreaming of subsequently using that as the basic means of securing a first strike. So the "star wars" system in actuality is intended to serve as a staging post for the unleashing of nuclear warfare on our planet.

I should like in this statement to refer to a number of topical and urgent problems relating to the prevention of the threat of war, particularly the nuclear threat. First I wish to point out, as was indicated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which, as members are aware, was adopted by consensus:

"Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth." (resolution S-10/2, part II, para. 11)

Naturally the senseless accumulation of mountains of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, necessarily undermines stability. It is dangerous in itself, but matters take on an even more threatening character because some arm themselves, as it were, with particularly dangerous doctrines.

At present the official doctrine of the United States is based on a concept which allows of the possibility of waging a nuclear war whose course could be controlled and which could be won. As members know, such doctrines have frequently in the past been condemned by the General Assembly. Fascinated by archaic concepts of crusades, those in certain circles in the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization do not wish to see the realities of the present day in their true light. However, it should be recalled that, at the dawn of the nuclear age, Albert Einstein expressed this thought: "If mankind is to survive, we must acquire a completely new way of thinking."

In the nuclear age we cannot look at the world simply from the viewpoint of our own selfish interests. Responsible statesmen have only one possible cause: to do everything possible to prevent a nuclear holocaust. Any other position would be more than short-sighted. It would be suicidal.

On this side of the Atlantic there is no limit to the material preparations for nuclear war, and concepts are advanced which are fraught with the possibility of the disappearance of mankind. Furthermore, propaganda is disseminated that is designed to present the idea of nuclear war as being, if not attractive, at least harmless. Sometimes it simply takes the form of a joke to the effect that there is going to be some nuclear bombing in five minutes' time.

Leading scientists in various countries are sounding the alarm. Thus, for example, at a meeting of Soviet and American scientists held in December last year it was stated that a massive exchange of nuclear strikes might mean the destruction of the human race. Furthermore, those who participated in the meeting agreed that a nuclear attack would be suicide for the country that initiated it, even if there were no reprisals. However, the voices of reason and moderation have not been heeded in Washington. The United States is resorting to a wide variety of methods in its attempts to gain a free hand in the unlimited escalation of stocks of nuclear and other weapons. It has refused to ratify the treaties it has signed. It disrupts talks on urgent matters relating to restrictions on nuclear weapons. It tries to sabotage agreements already in force. Camouflaging its own violations of existing treaties, it has not even balked at distorting the facts by attributing these actions to the other side.

The deployment of new United States first-strike nuclear missiles in a number of countries of Western Europe was a factor causing extreme instability and a very

dangerous step. When that was begun no one could have any doubt that Washington was trying to make use of the Geneva talks for the unsavoury purpose of misleading the peoples and camouflaging its own aspirations. All this led to the breakdown of the talks and to the Soviet Union's taking quite legitimate measures in response. Has anybody's security been enhanced by the deployment of United States missiles? The reply to this question is an unequivocal negative. As a result of this and other actions on the part of the United States the danger of a nuclear conflict has grown incalculably.

Everything I have said indicates that mankind has edged towards and reached an extremely dangerous point. Any step in the wrong direction might become a fatal one. In this tense situation what we need is a high sense of responsibility and an approach that is well thought out and strictly controlled. That is the kind of approach that has been proposed by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

We continue to advocate an optimistic view, and therefore are convinced that it is possible to secure a favourable reversal in international affairs and a return to tranquil and courteous relations among States. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. Konstantin Chernenko, recently emphasized that

"It is precisely the complexity of the situation which makes it encumbent upon us to double and even treble our efforts in pursuing a policy of peace and international co-operation."

Practical action constitutes the essence of the appeal made by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, which have constantly declared, in documents adopted at the highest level, that they are not advocates of any kind of bloc policy or rivalry among States; that they have never aspired and would ever aspire, to military superiority; that they do not have and would never have any other strategic doctrine than one of defence. The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community have proposed a set of practical measures to prevent nuclear war and to curb the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, both on earth and in outer space, which would help to correct the situation and get us out of this dangerous deadlock.

It would undoubtedly be a decisive turn for the better if all nuclear States undertook the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In this

connection, the Soviet Union set an important and excellent example when, in 1982, it unilaterally undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. As members are aware, the General Assembly in its resolutions has welcomed this step on the part of the Soviet Union. The ball is now in the court of those nuclear States that have not yet made such a commitment. If such a step were taken in reality, instead of being the subject of empty declarations, as some have made it, and if the provisions of the United Nations Charter concerning the non-use of force were strengthened and made more specific in this nuclear age, the threat of nuclear conflict would become considerably more remote.

Another important approach to stabilization of the situation and the establishment of the basis and the proper atmosphere for further steps is represented by the proposal of the Soviet Union for a quantitative and qualitative freeze, to begin on a date specified, of existing nuclear arsenals, on a global basis, but beginning with the Soviet Union and the United States. This would help to smooth the way to a genuine reduction of such weapons. That is the purpose underlying the well-known Joint Declaration of 22 May 1984 of the Heads of State or Government of six States representing various regions of the world, which won the support of the socialist countries and which was also approved in the Final Communiqué of the meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegation of Non-Aligned Countries during the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly. In order to freeze nuclear weapons, we do not need any complicated negotiations; what we need is the political will. The results of such a freeze would undoubtedly be significant in every respect, but, above all it would be a demonstration, not in words but in deeds, of a readiness to refrain from any attempt to gain military superiority over others.

Another important task is to achieve the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This was already within our reach, but the about-turn in the position of the United States, which undertook an extensive programme of escalating, improving and consequently testing its nuclear weapons, placed an obstacle in the way of the resolution of this question.

In this area, once again, the United States has a possibility of putting into practice the love of peace on which very frequently it lavishes so many words. A step which would require no talks whatsoever and which could be undertaken immediately, would be for them to ratify the Treaties which they have already signed in 1974 and 1976, on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapons tests and underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. All that is needed is the political will. The Soviet Union has frequently proposed that the United States should take this step, but up to now the Treaties remain unratified.

It is essential - and this is another thing that has been pointed out by many other delegations - that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should finally get down to talks on matters of substance in order to draw up a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests. The socialist and non-aligned countries have frequently put forward proposals on that score. In order to create more favourable conditions for such work, it would be important for States possessing nuclear weapons to state, as proposed by the Soviet Union, that they will impose a moratorium on any nuclear explosions, starting from a date mutually agreed between them, right up until the time when the treaty is concluded. It is generally acknowledged that States possessing nuclear weapons bear a particular responsibility. The language to this effect is included in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was subsequently confirmed at its second special session in 1982 and, moved by this feeling of responsibility, the Soviet Union, in March of this year, put forward an extremely important proposal on the joint recognition of nuclear-weapon States of certain norms governing their relations which would pursue the purpose of preventing nuclear warfare and strengthening peace. This has been mentioned in a number of statements made in the Committee.

The practical implementation of an agreed code of relations between nuclear States would serve the vital interests of all peoples and would be a step forward in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which recommended the adoption of a code of peaceful relations among States.

Broad circles of public opinion are particularly alarmed at the growing danger inherent in the state of affairs in Europe. There can be no doubt that the present course of events is by no means irreversible. The question of reducing medium-range and tactical weapons in Europe until they are completely eliminated

from that continent can be resolved on the basis of business-like and serious talks, on the basis of a principle of equality and equal security. As has already been emphasized in this Committee, the Soviet Union is not prepared to undertake negotiations while it is targeted by the missiles located in Western Europe. The United States must remove the obstacles which they have created to the holding of those negotiations.

In concentrating on one of the most important problems of the present time, the prevention of nuclear war, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would like to express its pleasure that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has included on its agenda an item to this effect, and to emphasize that the situation in the world makes it essential that we should immediately undertake specific and business-like talks in the auxiliary body specially set up by the Conference in order to elaborate the relevant steps. Also, the creation of a special auxiliary body for the Conference charged with drawing up a programme for staged nuclear disarmament is something which brooks no delay, and in this context agreement on the cessation of the production of new systems of nuclear weapons and the production of fissile material for creating new types of nuclear weapons and means of delivery of nuclear weapons, all these are necessary if progress is to be made towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

We entirely share the views of many States that in efforts to achieve international security, an important step is to establish nuclear-free zones. The States of the socialist community are working for the implementation of the well-known proposals to create zones which are free from nuclear weapons in the northern part of Europe, in the Balkans, in Africa and the Near East, and support the idea of creating in Europe a zone which would be exempt from nuclear weapons, the battle-zone along the lines of contact between the States of the Warsaw Treaty and those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

For well known reasons which I referred to previously in this statement, there is an urgently felt need for the adoption of effective measures, both to prohibit the elaboration, production and manufacture of new forms of weapons of mass destruction and systems of such weapons; as well as to attack this problem on a broader front, in order to achieve an effective ban on the utilization for military purposes of new discoveries and achievements in the scientific and technological fields. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, as in previous years, will make every effort to bring this about.

In the present circumstances, with the dangerous development of international affairs, it has become more and more urgent to consider the joint proposals of the socialist countries for the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force, and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the member States of the Warsaw Treaty and the countries belonging to NATO. This treaty, from the very outset, would be open for participation on the part of any other States who wish to do so. The commitment not to use any weapons, either nuclear or conventional, would surely help to dispel the threat of a conflict which would inevitably grow into a nuclear catastrophe.

This year the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty took another major initiative in the interests of European and general security. In their message, dated 7 May 1984, they called upon the member countries of NATO to take a further step in considering the proposals for a treaty and to proceed with consultations on a multilateral basis. That message and the proposals contained in it are to be regarded as an expression of the accumulated historic experience of peoples in defence of peace. What we need is active and concerted action. The conclusion of this kind of treaty would undoubtedly help to improve the situation on the European continent, certain aspects of whose development cannot at present but give us pause. In particular I am thinking of the fact that recently the Council of the West European Alliance has removed the ban on the Federal Republic of Germany producing bombers for strategic purposes, and also long-range missiles. In addition, to the territory of that country being converted into a launching pad for Pershing II and Cruise missiles, the green light has now been given, not for other, but for their own strategic weapons, and all that together with the fact that the West German armed forces already comprise one half of the land forces of NATO in Central Europe, 30 per cent of the aviation and one third of Western European naval forces. Such a doctrine is diametrically opposed to an important principle which is enshrined in international relations and which is frequently alluded to, to the effect that in no circumstances and at no time can the threat of a new war emerge from German soil.

Consistently striving to achieve the elimination of the danger of war, and primarily nuclear war, the States members of the Warsaw Treaty this year also put forward important initiatives in order to try to make some progress in the cessation and reduction of the arms race in other important areas. Thus, in January of this year, they put forward proposals to liberate Europe from chemical weapons, the intention being, inter alia, that the implementation of regional

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## (Mr. Sheldov, Byelorussian SSR)

measures in this particular area could serve as an incentive to the efforts which are being made on a world-wide basis in order to conclude a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, that is, to resolve an issue which for many years has been lying on the conference table in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The time has now come for the Conference to proceed immediately to work on the text of the convention, and the contribution of each and every member State participating in this enterprise should be genuinely constructive, and not mere speculation.

In March this year the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty proposed that the countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should proceed with preparatory consultations, with the participation of all States belonging to both alliances, with a view to agreeing to initiate talks on a mutual non-increase in military expenditure and, subsequently, the reduction of such expenditure. In addition to what had been put forward previously, a whole set of concrete proposals was submitted the implementation of which would indeed effectively promote the curbing of the arms race and finally achieve disarmament. The funds liberated in that way could be used to serve the social and economic development needs of many countries, including the developing ones.

Equally topical is the problem of reducing conventional weapons and armed forces. The socialist countries are taking effective steps on a regional basis, as well as other bases, to try and unsnarl the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. In this connection, they are calling for the adoption of the necessary global steps. They have frequently put forward specific proposals and have expressed their readiness to engage in very thorough consultations taking into account every realistic proposal made at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in order to ensure the adoption of large-scale military and political measures to effect a general reduction in the level of tension and create political, legal and material safequards for peace and security.

Other constructive proposals relating to the curbing of the naval arms race and to the problem of the relationship between disarmament and development are contained, in particular, in the replies sent by the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to a questionnaire sent out by the Secretary-General. The main purpose of these proposals is, by concerted efforts, to remove the threat of war that hangs over mankind, to improve the international atmosphere and to promote the social and economic development of peoples.

That is where we also stand in regard to our participation in the activities of the Disarmament Commission, in which, as can be seen from the report to the present session of the General Assembly, the delegations of the socialist countries have put forward a number of important proposals, inter alia on the prevention of

nuclear war. It is not their fault that the work of that Commission, within the framework of the mandate set by the special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, seems to be constantly encountering immovable obstacles.

Naturally, it has not been our endeavour in this statement to refer to all the proposals made and the initiatives taken by the countries of the socialist community this year with a view to removing the danger of war, first and foremost nuclear war, and to strengthen peace and international co-operation. But I think that what I have already said indicates that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have made considerable efforts and taken specific steps and measures that would make it possible for every State that wished to do so to help in practical ways, to reduce international tension and create an atmosphere of trust in the world. It is no accident but, rather, a very significant fact that the proposals of the socialist States are consonant with the demands of the anti-war and anti-missile movements in public opinion. This is precisely because the countries of the socialist community are, in their foreign policies, mindful of the vital interests both of their peoples and of other peoples of the world.

Unfortunately, the imperialist circles and those who follow in their wake and who become their allies are feverishly pursuing a policy of force in politics and force in general. They are thereby undermining the foundations of international security. Peace has become more fragile. I am not referring to any kind of mutual recriminations, as some speakers sometimes try to suggest. Rather, I am trying to identify the real threat to international peace and security that is inherent in such positions and such acts.

We are profoundly convinced that it is possible to correct the present alarming trend in the development of international events. It is our belief that there are real possibilities for an effective and serious approach to discussing those problems whose solution could help to avert nuclear warfare and to achieve disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, to reduce and then finally eliminate the threat of war, and to turn world affairs into the channel of normal development. For this to happen, all we have to do is demonstrate a readiness to make use of, and indeed to make use of, all available possibilities. That is the constant appeal of the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Mr. SHAH NAWAZ (Pakistan): While joining other delegations in extending felicitations to you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee, I should like to express the particular pleasure of my delegation in seeing you presiding over this body. Your long association with disarmament affairs, your perceptive analyses of disarmament concepts and issues and your bold and unequivocal articulation of third-world concerns in the international disarmament debate qualify you eminently to guide the work of the First Committee in a constructive fashion. May I assure you, on behalf of my delegation, of our full co-operation as you discharge your important duties. May I also take this opportunity to congratulate the other officers of the Committee on their well-deserved election.

The sombre and dangerous background against which the First Committee is meeting again this year is characterized by a continuing deadlock in the field of disarmament negotiations. The talks between the two super-Powers on the reduction of their nuclear arsenals remain suspended. Despite some guarded optimism generated by the recent high-level contacts between these two Powers, prospects for an early resumption of the negotiations between them on control and limitation of nuclear weapons are still far from encouraging.

The report of the Conference on Disarmament provides a dismal picture of its work during the current year. The Conference did not find it possible to reach an agreement even on the establishment of <a href="mailto:ad-hoc">ad-hoc</a> committees to deal with several of its agenda items, including such priority areas as a nuclear-test ban; cessation of the nuclear-arms race, and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war; and prevention of an arms race in outer space. Where <a href="mailto:ad-hoc">ad-hoc</a> committees were established, such as on negative security assurances, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament, they failed to register any progress.

This stalemate in disarmament negotiations is due, in large measure, to the climate of distrust and suspicion which currently prevails between the two super-Powers and their alliance systems. Such distrust and suspicion are, in turn, the product of a deteriorating climate of international security. Progress in disarmament and a tension-free international environment are interlinked.

Disarmament efforts cannot remain immune to adverse developments in international security. The foreign military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 brutally brought home to the small-and medium-sized States their vital stake in the preservation of a safe international security environment in which their freedom and independence can be assured.

A renewed commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly those enjoining respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of States, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, the renunciation of the use or threat of the use of force in the conduct of inter-State relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes is thus the essential prerequisite not only for an improvement in the climate of international security but also for progress in the field of disarmament. My Government is fully convinced that resolute efforts need to be made to get out of a vicious circle of international tensions fuelling an arms race which in turn aggravates the tense international situation.

The stalemate in disarmament negotiations, to which I have just referred, is particularly grave in so far as its nuclear aspect is concerned. The existing nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers are capable of destroying the world many times over. In these circumstances, further additions to stockpiles by either side and a continuous and feverish investment in their qualitative improvement cannot be justified on any ground whatsoever. Mankind's survival has come to depend upon a fragile balance of terror which can be rudely disturbed at any moment by a human or mechanical error which would unleash a nuclear holocaust. It is therefore imperative that the two super-Powers immediately resume negotiations for the gradual reduction of their nuclear arsenals, leading ultimately to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

In the broad context of nuclear disarmament a comprehensive test ban occupies the central position. It is equally a litmus test for the intentions of the nuclear-weapon States. If one looks back at the history of nuclear disarmament negotiations, one sees that the partial test ban and threshold Treaties constitute its most important and encouraging landmarks. A comprehensive test ban now would in one stroke bring to an end the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, render existing stockpiles unreliable and act to reduce the number of weapons in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States. The technical and scientific aspects of verification have already been fully explored. Eminent seismologists assert that nuclear explosions of a yield even less than 1 kiloton can be detected, located and identified. They cite cases where explosions below 1 kiloton have been identified from distances of more than 3,000 kilometres. It is clear that what stands in the way of a comprehensive test ban is the absence of political will.

We are convinced that a move has to be made to unfreeze the existing situation. If the nuclear-weapon States are not yet ready to conclude a comprehensive test ban, a less ambitious beginning can be made by adopting a step-by-step approach. Such an approach can be pursued simultaneously at two levels, namely, a gradual reduction in the yield range of tests and a progressive reduction in the number of such tests each year. However, in order to ensure that a step-by-step approach is meaningful and acceptable, each limitation must automatically be followed, within agreed time frames, by movement to still lower levels of permitted yields and number of test explosions, leading eventually to a comprehensive test ban. My delegation would be happy to explore further in the Conference on Disarmament the concepts and modalities of such an approach.

The adoption of concrete measures for the prevention of nuclear war demands our immediate attention. We must negotiate measures which would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. We can in no way sympathize with those strategic doctrines which are predicated on their use. We find dangerous the argument that nuclear weapons have kept the peace in one part of the world. Pressed to its logical conclusion, such an argument can only be a prescription for nuclear proliferation.

Pakistan is fully committed to the objective of non-proliferation. This commitment has been demonstrated practically in the initiatives which it has taken at the global as well as the regional levels aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Our strong support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world is well known. We are distressed to note that for a handful of countries this concept is losing its value as an effective instrument of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and even confidence-building.

In 1974 Pakistan took the initiative in the General Assembly for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Since then the General Assembly has year after year called upon the regional States to enter into negotiations for the establishment of such a zone. This year again Pakistan will submit a draft resolution on the subject along the lines of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. We hope that this draft resolution will receive widespread support from Member States and that its adoption will provide the necessary encouragement to the regional States to enter into mutual consultations for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

At the global level, Pakistan has proposed that effective and credible assurances should be extended to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We feel, like many other delegations, that in order to be credible such assurances must be free from conditions and legally binding in character. We will again submit a draft resolution on this subject at this session. We hope that it will receive unanimous support in this Committee and in the General Assembly.

My delegation attaches the highest importance to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space. We fully share the belief that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of the whole of mankind. We therefore view with concern, and strongly oppose, any proposals or attempts to carry the arms race to outer space. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament will be enabled at its next session to undertake negotiations on this important item.

Banning of chemical weapons is one area in a wide range of disarmament efforts where one can discern some forward movement during the past year. At its 1984 session the Conference on Disarmament devoted by far the greatest amount of time to this subject. There have been some positive developments as regards the issues of definitions, the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the verification of the destruction process. The fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament has started drafting treaty language is a welcome development. My delegation remains of the view that a future chemical weapons convention must effectively prohibit any use of such weapons, and should be so formulated as to inspire the confidence of all States in its observance.

Pakistan believes in a comprehensive approach to the goal of general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, to which it is fully committed. We feel that initiatives, whether relating to nuclear weapons or to conventional arms, whether at the global or regional level, and whether long-range or interim, deserve full support and encouragement from the international community. It is also our view that confidence-building measures at the global as well as regional levels can play an important role in the creation of a climate of mutual trust and confidence, which is an important prerequisite for progress towards disarmament.

We have taken note of the study on conventional disarmament prepared by the group of experts, which is contained in document A/39/348. We hope that the conclusions and recommendations of this study will provide the necessary encouragement to the international community to take steps towards conventional disarmament.

Within its own region, Pakistan remains ready to enter into negotiations to reach agreements on mutually acceptable and balanced ratios of forces, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

Pakistan has extended its full support to the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. In our view, the establishment of such a zone has regional as well as extre-regional dimensions.

On the one hand, such a zone would require the elimination of the military presence of non-regional States from the Indian Ocean region, including its littoral and hinterland States; on the other, it would be necessary for the regional States to enter into arrangements for the total renunciation of the development, production and acquisition of nuclear weapons, for ensuring mutual security through, inter alia the maintenance of reasonable ratios between their armed forces, particularly the naval forces, and for the peaceful settlement of disputes. We hope that the Indian Ocean Conference for the realization of these objectives would be convened at an early date in Colombo.

According to the latest estimate, total global military expenditures amounted to about \$800 billion during 1983. In view of the trends of recent years it would not be too daring to assume that the corresponding figure for the current year would be even higher. The allocation of precious human and material resources, on such a gigantic scale, to military purposes cannot but have an adverse effect on international peace and security. This colossal wastage of scarce resources is even more reprehensible in a world where there is widespread poverty and hunger and where no solution is in sight for the serious economic difficulties being faced by a large number of countries, particularly the developing countries. We support the proposal made by France for convening an international conference on disarmament and development to be preceded by a preparatory meeting. My delegation also supports the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development. We hope that this Committee and the General Assembly will be able to encourage progress in these directions.

There is nothing more urgent on the agenda of this Committee than the task of preventing nuclear war and that of nuclear disarmament. Obviously, the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two super-Powers. This Committee and the General Assembly must call upon those States to shoulder their responsibilities and to make determined efforts for the reduction and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. It is the firm belief of my delegation that a comprehensive test-ban treaty occupies a position of first importance in any scheme of nuclear disarmament. It is also important that an agreement be arrived at most urgently for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. While nuclear disarmament must receive the first priority, the international community must also continue with its efforts, at the global and regional levels, towards conventional disarmament, especially those pertaining to

weapons of mass destruction. The importance of a comprehensive prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons in this context can hardly be over-emphasized.

It is our hope, Mr. Chairman, that under your leadership the First Committee, during its deliberations this year, will be able to provide the impetus for rapid progress towards the achievement of these and other important goals in the field of disarmament. My delegation would like to assure you of its full and unreserved co-operation in these endeavours.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no further speakers for this afternoon's meeting.

However, several representatives have asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Before calling on them, I should like to remind members of the Committee that the number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply should be limited to two per speaker. The first intervention should be limited to 10 minutes and the second to five minutes.

I shall now call on those members who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. SHAHABI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Sir, appropriate expressions of congratulations to you as a wise Chairman and to the Secretary of the Committee will be made in due time. But since this is the first time I have spoken here I should like to express the warm support of the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran to you and to the other officers of the Committee.

At today's morning meeting one of the respectable Government representatives here referred to the Persian Gulf by using a term which has no meaning from the cultural and historical point of view and is unknown in the context of United Nations terminology and world atlases and maps. By coining fictitious terms do representatives intend to drive all of us onto a side issue having no relevance to the substance of our debate in this Committee? By replacing the term "Persian Gulf" with an unknown name, are they suggesting that geographical names, such as the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, the Sea of Oman or the Indian Ocean may also be replaced by some other names? What good can this do for the international community, not to speak of other hazardous long-term effects regarding science, culture and history?

## (Mr. Shahabi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The practice of changing historically and culturally credible names into forged names has been a normal practice pursued by racist and/or expansionist régimes, against which the international community has protested with disapproval and a show of anger.

Therefore, I ask why, from time to time we witness direct or indirect efforts to coin new names for historically well-known areas of the world? We in this Committee have the pleasure of having amongst us persons with high levels of cultural values, intelligence and nobility. Thus it is hardly expected from us that we should sacrifice values of historic credibility and principles before short-sighted or cross-sectional interests or opportunities. Trusting in his nobility, I believe the mistake made by the representative of one delegation who spoke this morning was in fact due to negligence and not intent.

The name Quds will always be Quds; the Indian Ocean will always be the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf will forever remain the Persian Gulf.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation decided to avail itself of its right of reply in connection with the statement made in our Committee by the representative of the United States.

In that statement yesterday, he attempted to distort the state of affairs in a number of key areas relating to arms limitation and disarmament and to distort matters in such a way that the innocent party was charged with the guilt - not presenting the United States but rather the Soviet Union as the party responsible for the present intolerable situation, on the one hand, and, at the same time, depicting the United States as an advocate of the solution of the problems.

In this connection, we have to refer only to a few facts. Let us take, for example, a question which is quite legitimately one of concern to many of us here. Why are there no negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms in Europe - and strategic ones? The reply is unequivocal - because the United States disrupted these negotiations by proceeding to locate in Western Europe its own nuclear first-strike missiles, which created a new military and strategic situation. The United States in this way has attempted to violate or to disturb the strategic balance in its own favour - I should like to remind the United States delegation about this - which it agreed to observe when it signed the Second Round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II).

We have heard here appeals for talks on the reduction of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union does not need to be convinced of this. There is absolutely no need for that to be done. This is precisely our policy. The Soviet Union has favoured and continues to favour talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons, on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. But these should be business-like, serious negotiations. We have already said in this Committee, and we would repeat here and now, that as the target of the new missiles which have been located in Europe, that is, under ultimatum conditions, the Soviet Union is not prepared to conduct negotiations. The United States has to remove the obstacles which it has created to the holding of such negotiations.

I shall now refer to outer space. In June of this year we proposed to the American side that we undertake negotiations on the prevention of the militarization of outer space. Yesterday it was suggested that the United States is in favour of these space talks - and even without any pre-conditions, if you please. But the actual state of affairs is that when this was proposed the United States tried to replace the very subject of the negotiations. It proposed discussing questions relating to nuclear weapons, that is, matters on which negotiations have been going on in Geneva, but which were broken off by the United States itself.

As far as outer space is concerned, instead of not allowing the arms race to proceed there, it was proposed that we elaborate certain rules to govern such an arms race, that is, essentially to legalize such an arms race in outer space. This

is what is to be seen under the vague phraseology about discussing the interdependence of defensive and offensive systems. It is precisely the United States which made it impossible for negotiations to be held in September of this year, as was proposed by the Soviet Union.

The same is true of the ban on nuclear-weapon tests. It is not the Soviet Union but the United States which has in fact blocked practical work at the Conference on Disarmament by failing to ratify the Soviet-American treaties on underground explosions in 1974 and 1976.

The statements made by American representatives have also distorted the state of affairs in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the last year alone the Soviet Union has taken a number of major steps which make it possible to reduce the list of disputed matters on this important subject. In reply, the United States has taken one step, and such a step indeed, that the number of disputed areas has increased. I am talking about the draft Convention which was put forward by the United States in April of this year. I should like to refer, for example, only to article 10 thereof, which states that inspection on constant invitation would cover any military object, any military site, which is the property of the Government party and which is indicated in annex II, which is controlled by a Government of a State party. So whatever we are told about this by the American representatives, the fact remains a fact. The United States proposals put forward at the Geneva negotiations would exclude from special inspection a considerable portion of what is being done at the present time. I now ask the American representative, is this not a discriminatory approach? These are the facts in so far as they relate only to a few issues. They are essentially different from the picture which was painted for us by the American delegation.

In his statement yesterday, the representative of the United States referred to President Reagan's statement that the American side was prepared to resume a dialogue with the Soviet Union on a broad range of issues, including arms control. In this connection, I should like once again to quote the words of the Soviet leader, Mr. Chernenko:

"If what the President has said about readiness to negotiate is not merely a tactical move, I wish to state that the Soviet Union will not be found wanting. We have always been prepared for serious and businesslike negotiations and have repeatedly said so."

## (Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

We are prepared to undertake negotiations in order to elaborate and conclude an agreement to prohibit the militarization of outer space, including completely refraining from anti-missile systems, first starting by establishing a mutual moratorium on the elaboration of space weapons. This is precisely the formulation of the proposal we made from the very outset. But we have not received a reply from Washington. We are anxious to bring this matter up before the Disarmament Conference as well. Once again, the ball is in the court of the United States.

We still have before us the Soviet proposals that the nuclear Powers, firstly the Soviet Union and the United States, should freeze their nuclear armaments, which would certainly help in reaching agreements on the reduction of such armaments. Once again we are awaiting a reply from Washington: Is it really possible to reach an agreement on general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests? The United States could quite easily demonstrate its readiness to take action if it were to agree to start negotiations on this question both at the Disarmament Conference and on a trilateral basis, or if it were to ratify the Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976. Once again, we await a reply from Washington.

The United States might also help to create an atmosphere of trust if it were to follow our example and agree not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. But words of readiness for negotiations, which are not borne out by practical actions, remain simply words - and nothing more.

Since we were quoting from the classics of ancient Greece today, I should like to refer to a classic of German literature, Goethe, who said that: "Conduct is the mirror in which the personality of all of us is reflected." It is through practical actions - deeds - that peoples will judge the political face of the United States.

Mr. IOWITZ, (United States of America): My delegation is disturbed by statements delivered yesterday and today by representatives of Syria, Democratic Yemen and the Byelorussian SSR which distorted the policies of my Government. My Government is fully committed to the attainment of peace, security, stability and development. We seek no superiority but, rather, the security which will allow our people and all the peoples of the world, regardless of their nationality, to exercise their individual rights and achieve their potential.

We are willing, indeed eager, to resume nuclear negotiations immediately and have neither stated nor accepted the notion that current conditions are not proper for their resumption. Until such time as reductions in the nuclear arsenals have been achieved, we remain committed to defending the international agreements which have been fashioned in the interest of at least stemming the deterioration of international security, such agreements as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

We deeply respect the Brazilian delegation and Brazil's efforts to support disarmament. We are also aware that Brazil did not identify us by name in its statement. We must, however, also take exception to Brazil's statement of earlier today. Can anyone really believe that international stability and the security of every nation has not been enhanced by the NPT, and, although important articles remain to be fully implemented, does it not still deserve our respect?

Finally, American nuclear co-operation with other nations is fully consistent with our NPT obligations and is monitored closely to ensure that all such co-operation is purely for peaceful purposes.

Mr. MASTAMAND (Afghanistan): First, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, and the other officers of the Committee on your election to your important posts.

Today the Committee is discussing items relating to disarmament, which is an issue of great importance to this Committee and to the international community. If we could achieve this goal we should be able to maintain peace and security all over the world.

The baseless and slanderous allegations of the representative of Pakistan, regarding the invasion of my country by the USSR is a pretext designed to destroy the peaceful atmosphere in this Committee. It is not relevant to the items before the Committee. Every unbiased person knows the real cause of the temporary presence of the Soviet military contingents in my country.

## (Mr. Mastamand, Afghanistan)

In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 1978 Treaty between my country and the USSR, we requested the USSR to help us maintain our independence and territorial integrity, which were in grave danger from foreign intervention, mainly from Pakistan and China, which are close allies of United States imperialism.

We have suffered a great deal from the aggressive forces armed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and based in Pakistan. Because of their aggressive policy against us, we requested, - I repeat, we requested - the USSR to help us, and as long as the threat from aggressive imperialism and its regional reactionaries exists the military contingents of the USSR will remain.

We strongly support the policy of peaceful coexistence and we are ready to solve our problems with the neighboring country through political negotiations, because we need peace to rebuild our society. On the other side, however, the illegal military régime is happy to be at war. That is the only way it can live long; that is the only reason why the military régime is not willing to negotiate directly to solve the so-called issue around Afghanistan. We are not the main cause of the destabilization of peace in the region. We are not sending terrorists and militia to other countries; they are sending terrorist groups and militia to my country to destroy schools and hospitals and kill women, children and the elderly.

My Government has repeatedly declared, and still insists, that all those Afghans who fled to neighboring countries can return to their homeland and live in peace with their families. But, unfortunately, the terrorist bands and the military régime will not allow them to return to their home country, because that régime is gaining a lot of foreign currency by preventing their return. At the same time, the military régime will not allow the people to talk about elections because of the war with Afghanistan and preparations for another shameless war with India. That is the main reason why the military régime, at the behest of the United States, is not ready to solve the problem.

I should like to reiterate that the Soviet military contingents will remain as long as the threat from neighbouring countries exists. When the main cause of the temporary presence of contingents of the Soviet Union no longer exists, those contingents will return to their own peaceful country.

#### (Mr. Mastamand, Afghanistan)

I should like to ask the representatives of Pakistan to study the Charter of the United Nations and to refresh their memories of the definition of intervention, invasion, and aggression, instead of wasting the time of the Committee. We are ready to discuss this matter with them as long as they want when the relevant item is debated in the Committee.

Mr. AL-ALFI (Democratic Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): I was completely stunned when I heard the representative of the United States Administration say that the statement my delegation made in this Committee distorted the facts. We realize the purpose of that representative in selecting certain statements of certain States, my own among them. If he had listened carefully to the statements of all delegations, whether in this Committee, during the general debate in the General Assembly or at the Conference on Disarmament, he would know that we spoke nothing but the truth. The truth is that most of the States of the world have condemned United States policy, not just those countries that he picked out as having done so.

We have listened to eloquent statements concerning the commitment of the United States to peace, but we have not learned what kind of peace is meant. We are aware, however, that the peace that the American Administration seeks is a peace that it imposes on the world.

## (Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

Unfortunately it calls that version peace - the kind of peace it tries to impose on the world, based on nuclear deterrence and the achievement of military and strategic superiority as well as on hostile actions to peoples, their freedom and their progress.

Genuine peace is to be achieved through the implementation and crystallization of the common will, expressed by the international community in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which clearly indicates that the main country placing barriers in its path is the United States.

I hope that the delegation of the United States will peruse once more the verbatim records of the meetings of this Committee and of other similar forums, as well as those of the General Assembly, to reach a different conclusion.

Mr. DUARTE (Brazil): The representative of the United States acknowledged that in my intervention this morning I did not refer to his country by name. Since, however, he referred specifically to the intervention that I made this morning, I should like to say that his words just now brought to my mind the comments made by several analysts, which I also mentioned in my statement this morning, to the effect that of all the issues in the field of disarmament the only one that is in the common interests of the super-Powers is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and that such a single-minded and overriding preoccupation on their part reflects their interest in maintaining and supporting the discriminatory régime instituted by that instrument as long as it serves and perpetuates their privileged position as the sole possessors of nuclear weapons.

My delegation stands by its view of the real significance of that instrument and would hope that at least as much attention and devotion is given to stopping the quantitative, qualitative and geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons as is given to the support for that régime.

#### PROGRAMME OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with our programme of work and timetable contained in document A/C.1/39/2, the Committee has today reached the end of its initial phase of the general debate on all disarmament items.

# (The Chairman)

Beginning on Monday, 29 October, the Committee will proceed to the next phase of its work, namely, statements on specific disarmament items and continuation of the general debate, as necessary. As representatives are aware, this flexible approach was adopted in order to afford the Committee an appropriate structure for its deliberations, while at the same time not curtailing the right of delegations to make statements of a general nature if they did not have that opportunity during the first phase. Accordingly the period from 29 October to 12 November is to be devoted mainly to statements on specific items. However, as I have already pointed out, these do not preclude the right of any delegation to make statements of a general character during that same period.

A number of delegations have already inscribed their names on the list of speakers for next week to make statements of a general character. In order fully to utilize the time allocated for this phase of the Committee's work I urge those members of the Committee who wish to make statements on specific agenda items to inscribe their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible.

If I may refer to another matter, at this stage I would again urge those delegations who intend to submit draft resolutions to do so at the earliest possible date and to proceed to introduce them, if possible, during the next phase of our work starting on Monday, 29 October, as I have stated.

Finally, delegations are also invited in their statements to address the draft resolutions already introduced when they deem fit to do so.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.