

## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Foreword . . . . .	xi
Acknowledgements . . . . .	xv
Multilateral disarmament timeline: highlights, 2009 . . . . .	xvi
 <b>Chapter I. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation</b>	
Developments and trends, 2009 . . . . .	3
Issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . .	7
<i>Third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review     Conference . . . . .</i>	 7
General Assembly, 2009 . . . . .	13
Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty . . . . .	14
<i>Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty . . . . .</i>	14
<i>Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Ban-Treaty     Organization . . . . .</i>	 16
General Assembly, 2009 . . . . .	17
Conference on Disarmament, 2009 . . . . .	18
<i>Nuclear disarmament . . . . .</i>	18
<i>Fissile material for nuclear weapons     and other nuclear explosive devices . . . . .</i>	 19
<i>Negative security assurances . . . . .</i>	20
<i>Radiological weapons . . . . .</i>	21
Bilateral agreements and other issues . . . . .	21
<i>Negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States . .</i>	21
<i>Missile defence system in Europe . . . . .</i>	22
<i>Islamic Republic of Iran . . . . .</i>	24
International Atomic Energy Agency verification . . . . .	25
<i>Strengthened safeguards system . . . . .</i>	25
<i>Implementation of safeguards . . . . .</i>	28
<i>Peaceful uses of nuclear energy . . . . .</i>	29
Nuclear safety and security (IAEA) . . . . .	31
<i>Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013 . . . . .</i>	31

<i>International nuclear security framework</i> . . . . .	31
Export controls . . . . .	35
<i>Nuclear Suppliers Group</i> . . . . .	35
Missile-related issues . . . . .	36
<i>Missile Technology Control Regime</i> . . . . .	36
<i>The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation</i> . .	37
1540 Committee: implementation of Security Council resolutions	
1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008) . . . . .	38
<i>Outreach activities</i> . . . . .	39
<i>Cooperation with other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council</i> . . .	40
<i>Cooperation with international organizations</i> . . . . .	40
<i>Assistance</i> . . . . .	41
Political declarations and other initiatives . . . . .	41
General Assembly, 2009 . . . . .	46

## **Chapter II. Biological and chemical weapons**

Developments and trends, 2009 . . . . .	57
Biological weapons . . . . .	58
<i>Meeting of Experts</i> . . . . .	60
<i>Meeting of States Parties</i> . . . . .	62
<i>Work of the Implementation Support Unit</i> . . . . .	65
<i>Biological Incident Database</i> . . . . .	69
<i>Update of the roster of experts and laboratories</i> . . . . .	69
<i>General Assembly, 2009</i> . . . . .	71
Chemical weapons . . . . .	71
<i>Fourteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties</i> . . . . .	71
<i>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</i> . . . . .	75
<i>General Assembly, 2009</i> . . . . .	77
Export controls . . . . .	78
<i>Australia Group</i> . . . . .	78

### Chapter III. Conventional weapons issues

Developments and trends, 2009 .....	83
Small arms and light weapons .....	85
<i>Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission</i> .....	85
<i>Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons</i> .....	86
<i>The Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures</i> ..	87
<i>United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms</i> .....	88
<i>Reduction of armed violence and development</i> .....	88
<i>General Assembly, 2009.</i> .....	90
Conventional arms ammunition .....	91
<i>General Assembly, 2009.</i> .....	92
Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures . .	93
<i>Conference on Disarmament</i> .....	93
<i>United Nations Register of Conventional Arms</i> .....	93
<i>Objective information on military matters, including transparency of</i> <i>military expenditures</i> .....	98
<i>General Assembly, 2009</i> .....	99
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons .....	101
<i>Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the</i> <i>Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons</i> .....	101
<i>Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain</i> <i>Conventional Weapons.</i> .....	102
<i>Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.</i> .....	105
<i>Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of</i> <i>Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices.</i> .....	111
<i>General Assembly, 2009.</i> .....	115
Anti-personnel mines .....	116
<i>Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Convention</i> .....	116
<i>General Assembly, 2009.</i> .....	119
Cluster munitions .....	121
<i>Convention on Cluster Munitions</i> .....	121
<i>General Assembly, 2009.</i> .....	121
Towards an arms trade treaty .....	122

<i>Sessions of the Open-ended Working Group towards an Arms Trade Treaty</i> . . . . .	123
<i>Developments during the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly</i> . . . . .	123
<i>General Assembly, 2009</i> . . . . .	124
Export controls . . . . .	126
<i>Wassenaar Arrangement</i> . . . . .	126
<i>Annex I: Composite table of replies of Governments to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 2009</i> . . . . .	128
<i>Annex II: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Participation of Member States in reporting on transfers of small arms and light weapons, 2004-2009</i> . . . . .	131
<i>Annex III: Composite table of reports of Member States to the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures in 2009</i> . . . . .	134
 <b>Chapter IV. Regional disarmament</b>	
Developments and trends, 2009 . . . . .	139
Nuclear-weapon-free zones . . . . .	140
<i>General Assembly, 2009</i> . . . . .	143
Disarmament and arms regulation at regional levels . . . . .	147
<i>Africa</i> . . . . .	148
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa . . . . .	148
<i>General Assembly, 2009</i> . . . . .	150
African Union . . . . .	150
Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States . . . . .	151
General Assembly, 2009 . . . . .	153
<i>Americas</i> . . . . .	153
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . .	154
<i>General Assembly, 2009</i> . . . . .	156
Organization of American States . . . . .	156
<i>Asia and the Pacific</i> . . . . .	157

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific . . . . .	159
<i>General Assembly, 2009</i> . . . . .	160
Association of Southeast Asian Nations . . . . .	160
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat . . . . .	161
<i>Europe</i> . . . . .	163
European Union . . . . .	164
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe . . . . .	167
Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Center . . . . .	168
Regional Cooperation Council . . . . .	168
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons . . . . .	169
North Atlantic Treaty Organization . . . . .	170
<i>Middle East</i> . . . . .	172
League of Arab States . . . . .	172
<i>United Nations Development Programme</i> . . . . .	172
General Assembly, 2009 . . . . .	173
 <b>Chapter V. Related issues, including information and outreach</b>	
Developments and trends . . . . .	179
Disarmament machinery . . . . .	181
<i>Conference on Disarmament</i> . . . . .	181
General Assembly, 2009 . . . . .	182
<i>United Nations Disarmament Commission</i> . . . . .	183
General Assembly, 2009 . . . . .	187
Outer space . . . . .	187
<i>Conference on Disarmament, 2009</i> . . . . .	187
<i>General Assembly, 2009.</i> . . . .	188
Terrorism and disarmament . . . . .	189
<i>General Assembly, 2009.</i> . . . .	191
Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control . . .	192
<i>General Assembly, 2009.</i> . . . .	194

Developments in the field of information technology and security . . . . .	194
<i>Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security</i> . . . . .	196
General Assembly, 2009 . . . . .	197
Relationship between disarmament and development . . . . .	198
<i>General Assembly, 2009</i> . . . . .	200
Multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation . . . . .	201
<i>General Assembly, 2009</i> . . . . .	201
Gender and disarmament . . . . .	202
Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters . . . . .	203
Disarmament information and outreach . . . . .	205
<i>Disarmament studies</i> . . . . .	205
<i>Disarmament and non-proliferation education</i> . . . . .	205
<i>62nd Annual Conference for Non-Governmental Organizations: "For Peace and Development: Disarm Now"</i> . . . . .	215
Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services, 2009 . . . . .	216
United Nations Disarmament Information Programme . . . . .	217
<i>Print and e-publications</i> . . . . .	217
<i>Website</i> . . . . .	219
<i>Exhibitions</i> . . . . .	219
<i>Conferences, panel discussions and other information activities</i> . . . . .	220
<i>Secretary-General's Messenger of Peace</i> . . . . .	221
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research . . . . .	221
General Assembly, 2009 . . . . .	223
<i>Annex I: NGO Declaration: Disarming for Peace and Development</i> . . . . .	224
<i>Annex II: Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 2009</i> . . . . .	228
<i>Annex III: Publications and other materials on disarmament in 2009</i> . . . . .	229
<i>Annex IV: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research publications</i> . . . . .	231
<i>Annex V: First Committee 2009 Side Events</i> . . . . .	232

<b>Appendix I. Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements</b> .....	235
<b>Appendix II. Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Final Declaration</b> .....	247
<b>Appendix III. A shared commitment for a mine-free world: The 2009 Cartagena Declaration</b> .....	257
<b>Appendix IV. Security Council resolutions</b> .....	261
Resolution 1874 (2009) of 12 June 2009 .....	261
Resolution 1887 (2009) of 24 September 2009 .....	266
<b>Appendix V. Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter</b> .....	275
<b>Appendix VI. Abbreviations and acronyms</b> .....	281
<b>Selective index</b> .....	287



## Foreword

For the last 34 years, the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* has provided a chronicle of multilateral events relating both to disarmament and to the regulation of armaments.

The *Yearbook* focuses primarily on the United Nations disarmament machinery—consisting of deliberative institutions (the General Assembly’s First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission), a body to negotiate multilateral treaties (the Conference on Disarmament), and the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters—all assisted by the Secretariat. It also covers other activities pursuant to several multilateral disarmament and arms control treaties.

By many indications, 2009 was a positive one for both of these goals—mixed with some setbacks on some specific issues, and stalemates on others:

- The third Preparatory Committee session for the 2010 NPT Review Conference reached a consensus on procedural issues, but not substantive recommendations.
- The Conference on Disarmament was finally able to adopt a substantive programme of work, but was unable to implement it.
- The United Nations Disarmament Commission was able to agree on a substantive agenda, but not on recommendations for achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, nor on elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade.

Several significant disarmament-related events occurred in 2009. On 1 April, Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev jointly affirmed their commitment “to achieving a nuclear free world”, followed on 5 April by President Obama’s speech in Prague elaborating this theme. Japan and the United Kingdom launched their own initiatives. There was progress made in negotiating a new START treaty. The United Nations Security Council held its first summit on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Signatories to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)—including some 40 ministers—held their Article XIV conference.

In addition, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon continued to promote disarmament issues. In April, the Inter-Parliamentary Union endorsed his 2008 five-point nuclear disarmament proposal. In June, he launched a 100-day “WMD-We Must Disarm!” campaign, reaching out to young people using diverse electronic media. In September, he attended a DPI/NGO conference in Mexico City devoted to disarmament. And in December, he launched his Action Plan, following up on his nuclear disarmament proposal of 2008.

Civil society also had much to contribute, especially on nuclear disarmament. In June, Global Zero issued its Action Plan. In December, the

International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament—organized by Japan and Australia and consisting of independent experts—issued its comprehensive road map for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Non-governmental groups have actively promoted a nuclear weapons convention. They have also worked hard for an arms trade treaty and the convention to outlaw cluster munitions.

Yet much of the global disarmament agenda remains unfulfilled. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced its second nuclear test in May. States again encouraged the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with Security Council decisions. The International Atomic Energy Agency has been seeking to promote the Additional Protocol and to encourage more States to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements. Efforts continued to achieve a fissile material treaty, and to bring the CTBT into force, while the General Assembly adopted a resolution by Kazakhstan establishing an International Day against Nuclear Tests. There were no new constraints on missiles, missile defence and space weapons.

With respect to biological and chemical weapons, there has been slow but steady progress. Annual meetings of the States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) continued in 2009, which are helping to develop a world community united in its commitment to prevent the hostile use of life sciences for military purposes. These BWC meetings in 2009 covered both international cooperation and capacity-building. There was a Meeting of Experts in August and a Meeting of States Parties in December. Two key goals of these meetings are to improve national implementation of agreed global norms and to promote universal adherence.

These goals also apply to chemical weapons. The 14th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) took place late last year. These sessions enable States parties to discuss progress in achieving key treaty goals, to identify measures to strengthen implementation, and to expand CWC membership—which grew to 188 in 2009. The slow but deliberate destruction of vast quantities of chemical weapons, deadly agent materials and facilities testifies to the progress that is being made.

With respect to weapons of mass destruction terrorism, the 1540 Committee continued its outreach activities at regional, subregional and national levels to promote implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Working with the European Union and Member States, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) organized four workshops in 2009 focusing on border and export controls, which were held in Qatar, Vanuatu, Costa Rica and Egypt. The Security Council summit of 24 September adopted resolution 1887 (2009), which identified several actions to strengthen nuclear security worldwide.

As before, United Nations efforts in 2009 to regulate conventional arms encompassed several broad types of activities: curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation; establishing standards to prevent irresponsible transfers of conventional weapons; prohibiting certain types of conventional arms as inhumane and indiscriminate in their effects; and improving transparency over the production and transfer of arms.

After two sessions of an Open-ended Working Group on an arms trade treaty, the General Assembly adopted resolution 64/48, which contained a decision to convene a conference in 2012 to elaborate a robust legally binding instrument to regulate transfers of conventional arms. The General Assembly decided to consider the 2010-2011 sessions of Open-ended Working Group as a preparatory committee for a United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty.

On transparency—there was a decline in the number of States participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, yet also an increase in the percentage of reports that referred to small arms. A Group of Governmental Experts was unable to reach a consensus on the inclusion of small arms as a new item in the Register. With respect to the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, 2009 marked the lowest level of reporting since 2001. A Group of Governmental Experts will examine the instrument in 2010 and 2011.

The parties to the Mine Ban Convention held their second Review Conference in late 2009 in Colombia, yielding a Cartagena Declaration, which reaffirmed the goals of the treaty, appealed for universal membership and set the goal of achieving a world free of mines “in our lifetime”.

Universality and compliance were also key themes at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Among its results was a decision to establish a CCW “implementation support unit” within the Geneva Branch of UNODA. The *Yearbook* documents several other meetings of experts and States parties to Protocols to this Convention, focused on improving implementation and universality.

The United Nations also continued its efforts to promote ratifications of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, emphasizing the humanitarian dimension of the use of such weapons, and stressing victim assistance. By the end of 2009, the Convention had been signed by 104 States and ratified by 26, just four short of the number needed for entry into force.

On the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, UNODA—working with Member States and civil society—arranged meetings in Africa and the Pacific on implementing the Programme of Action. In cooperation with INTERPOL and the Economic Community of West African States, UNODA

organized a workshop on the International Tracing Instrument for small arms. Participation also expanded in the internal United Nations forum, Coordinating Action on Small Arms.

In August 2009, the Secretary-General submitted the first United Nations report to the General Assembly on the issue of armed violence and development, as requested by resolution 63/23 adopted in 2008. UNODA and other United Nations offices and departments have been seeking to promote effective international responses to this challenge, by measures that include the convening of workshops and the provision of substantive support.

Cooperation at the regional and subregional level advanced in 2009. Two treaties entered into force establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Asia and Africa. Other progress included efforts to prevent the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, capacity-building, promoting universality of multilateral disarmament treaties, and advancing disarmament and non-proliferation education. The three United Nations regional centres for peace and development—in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific—all promoted these goals, working jointly with Member States and other organizations.

The intent of the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* is to provide a single reference source that will be useful to Governments and civil society in monitoring multilateral efforts to promote disarmament and the regulation of armaments. I believe it has once again achieved this goal.



**Sergio Duarte**  
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs  
August 2010

## Acknowledgements

The production of Volume 34 (Part II) of the *Disarmament Yearbook*, like all previous productions, continued to be a team effort involving the time and energy of many members of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. The publication was produced under the overall direction of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Sergio Duarte, as well as the Director of the Office, Hannelore Hoppe.

Many thanks go to the following writers and contributors from the respective units of the Office: Junko Hirakawa, Karin Hjalmarsson, Franz Kolar, Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Thomas Markram, Myrna Peña, Curtis Raynold, Svetlana Utkina, Nils Schmieder, Nikita Smidovich and Michael Spies (Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch); Pericles Gasparini, Gillian Goh, Sara Greenblatt, Vera Hanus, Benoit Le Chartier, Tak Mashiko, Hideki Matsuno, Daniël Prins and Yuriy Kryvonos (Conventional Arms Branch); Shayla Brush, Ewen Buchanan and Soo-Hyun Kim (Information and Outreach Branch); Ngoc Phuong Huynh, Richard Lennane, Valère Mantels, Piers Millet, Bantan Nugroho, Peter Kolarov, Tsutomu Kono and Jarmo Sareva (Geneva Branch); Christian Boatswain, Katja Flueckiger, Agnès Marcaillou and Xiayou Wang (Regional Disarmament Branch); Amanda Cowl and Mélanie Régimbal (Lima Centre); David Brulotte, Roman Hunger, Tajiro Kimura and Huibert Oldenhuis (Kathmandu Centre); Nicolas Gérard and Thierry Zang-Azeme (Lomé Centre); and Randy Rydell (Office of the High Representative). Deep appreciations also go to the *Yearbook* consultant and former colleague, Nazir Kamal, for his work and support.

Special thanks go to the core team members: Cecile Dacudao for research assistance and language editing and Patricia Romualdez Lopez for desktop publishing, proofreading and web conversion.

**Tam Chung**  
Editor/Coordinator  
New York, August 2010

# Multilateral disarmament timeline Highlights, 2009



Secretary-General launches the start of the multiplatform "WMD-We Must Disarm" Campaign (13 June)



Mine Ban Convention entry into force 10th Anniversary (1 Mar.)

Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) adoption 5th Anniversary (28 Apr.)

Conference on Disarmament 2nd session (18 May-3 Jul.)



Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia entry into force (21 Mar.)

3rd session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (4-15 May)

Conference on Disarmament 1st session (19 Jan.-27 Mar.)


United Nations Disarmament Commission session (13 Apr.- 1 May)

President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at the SALT II treaty signing in Vienna



Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (Salt II) signing 30th Anniversary (18 Jun.)

Antarctic Treaty opening for signature  
50th Anniversary  
(1 Dec.)



Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms expiration  
(5 Dec.)

62nd Annual DPI/NGO  
Conference in Mexico City:  
"For Peace and  
Development: Disarm Now!"  
(9-11 Sept.)

Second Review  
Conference of the Mine  
Ban Convention  
(29 Nov.-4 Dec.)

The Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center



Source: www.ntnp.necsa.co.za

Pelindaba Treaty  
entry into force  
(15 Jul.)

Conference on  
Disarmament  
3rd session  
(3 Aug.-18 Sept.)

July

August

September

October

November

December

International Day of Peace  
2009: focus on "nuclear  
disarmament and non-  
proliferation"  
(21 Sept.)

Doves fly over UN Headquarters at the 2009  
International Day of Peace



Source: UN Photo

Agreement Governing the Activities of  
States on the Moon and Other Celestial  
Bodies opening for signature  
30th anniversary  
(18 Dec.)

Sixty-fourth session of the First Committee  
of the General Assembly (1 Oct.-2 Nov.)



Source: UN Photo

Agreement Governing the Activities  
of States on the Moon and Other  
Celestial Bodies entry into force  
25th Anniversary  
(11 Jul.)

High-level Security  
Council Summit on  
nuclear disarmament  
and non-proliferation  
(24 Sept.)

chapter I

**Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation**



## CHAPTER I

### Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

*My Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation is founded on a fundamental principle: nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and inseparable. They should be pursued in tandem.*<sup>1</sup>

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

#### Developments and trends, 2009

AN IMPROVED POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AND RENEWED MOMENTUM to achieve progress towards a nuclear-weapon free world prevailed in 2009, leading to important advances, though not without some setbacks, on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

The international community was able to make some progress towards breaking a decade of deadlock on key priority areas, including those identified by the Secretary-General in his 2008 five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, however, non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) continued to express concerns about the heavy emphasis on non-proliferation and the slow movement towards disarmament. Nevertheless, towards the end of the year, non-proliferation also benefited from the enhanced political climate, providing a number of opportunities to the international community for enhanced cooperation in addressing the areas of concern.

On 29 May, the Conference on Disarmament ended its decade-long stalemate by adopting a programme of work<sup>3</sup> that provided for negotiations on a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The agreed programme of work also allowed for substantive discussions on three other priority issues, namely, assurances to NNWS against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and nuclear disarmament. The Conference, however, failed

---

<sup>1</sup> Remarks at breakfast meeting on the Secretary-General's Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, New York, 8 November 2009. Available from [http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search\\_full.asp?statID=674](http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=674).

<sup>2</sup> "The United Nations and security in a nuclear-weapon-free world", address to the East-West Institute, New York, 24 October 2008. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SG/sgstatements.shtml>.

<sup>3</sup> Conference on Disarmament, "Decision for the establishment of a Programme of Work for the 2009 session", document CD/1864. Available from <http://ods.un.org/>.

to achieve consensus on modalities for implementing the work programme and was thus unable to progress further during the remainder of its 2009 session.

From 13 April to 1 May, the United Nations Disarmament Commission held its first substantive session in the new three-year cycle of work. It considered elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade and continued to consider recommendations for achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Commission was unable to achieve consensus on the draft declaration, despite consideration and revision of a non-paper that served as a working document.<sup>4</sup>

During the year, a number of nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and NNWS raised their voices in favour of disarmament by presenting concrete proposals and reiterating their commitment to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. In a landmark speech on 5 April in Prague, President Barack Obama expressed the commitment of the United States “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”.<sup>5</sup> In July, the United Kingdom released a major report, entitled “The Road to 2010”,<sup>6</sup> which proposed a three-stage process to achieve greater progress: transparency and control, arms reductions and steps to a world free of nuclear weapons. On 27 April, the Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone proposed 11 benchmarks<sup>7</sup> for achieving global nuclear disarmament, which included steps to be taken by the NWS and all other States, in addition to measures to support the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

On 8 December, building upon his 2008 five-point proposal, the Secretary-General presented an Action Plan<sup>1</sup> for Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in order to advance these issues.

In other related developments, on 13 June, the Secretary-General launched a multiplatform campaign under the slogan “WMD—We Must Disarm” to mark the 100-day countdown to the International Day of Peace on 21 September. He was joined in this campaign by United Nations Messenger of Peace Michael Douglas and American actor Rainn Wilson. In his message

---

<sup>4</sup> See “Report of the Disarmament Commission for 2009”, *Official Records of the General Assembly*, sixty-fourth session, Supplement No. 42 (A/64/42). Available from <http://ods.un.org/>.

<sup>5</sup> Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>6</sup> “The road to 2010: addressing the nuclear question in the twenty first century”, document Cm 7625, July 2009. Available from <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/224864/roadto2010.pdf> (accessed 7 June 2010).

<sup>7</sup> “Conditions towards zero: 11 benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament”, statement issued 27 April 2009. Available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/state0904.html> (accessed 14 June 2010).

on the International Day of Peace, the Secretary-General appealed to people throughout the world to join in the effort for peace and disarmament.<sup>8</sup>

Nuclear disarmament continued to receive considerable attention and heightened interest from both civil society at large and leading international figures, a trend that was initiated by the January 2007 *The Wall Street Journal* article calling for a world free of nuclear weapons, written jointly by former senior United States officials.<sup>9</sup> Likewise, in 2009, former high-ranking Government officials from a number of other countries, including France,<sup>10</sup> Germany,<sup>11</sup> the Netherlands,<sup>12</sup> Norway<sup>13</sup> and Poland, published similar articles<sup>14</sup> (see also pp. 44-45).

On 29 June, the Global Zero campaign, supported by 100 prominent global political, former military and civil society figures, released a draft action plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons by 2030. Also, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, co-chaired by former Foreign Ministers of Australia and Japan, released its final report on 15 December.<sup>15</sup>

On the bilateral side, the Russian Federation and the United States undertook progressive steps towards disarmament. In April, the two sides began negotiation on a new, legally binding and verifiable agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive

---

<sup>8</sup> Message to mark the 100-day countdown to the International Day of Peace, New York, 13 June 2009; Message on the International Day of Peace, New York, 21 September 2009. Available from <http://www.un.org/en/events/peaceday/2009/messages.shtml> (accessed 14 June 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William J. Perry and George P. Shultz, "A world free of nuclear weapons", *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 2007. Available from <http://www.henryakissinger.com/articles/wsj010407.html> (accessed 14 June 2010). For a brief discussion, see the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 32 (2007), pp. 39-40. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/index.shtml>.

<sup>10</sup> Alain Juppé, Bernard Norlain, Alain Richard and Michel Rocard, "For global nuclear disarmament, the only means to prevent anarchic proliferation", *Le Monde*, 14 October 2009.

<sup>11</sup> Egon Bahr, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Helmut Schmidt and Richard von Weizsäcker, "Toward a nuclear-free world: a German view", *International Herald Tribune* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 January 2009.

<sup>12</sup> Frits Korthals Altes, Ruud Lubbers, Max van der Stoep and Hans van Mierlo, "We must play an active role to establish a nuclear weapon free world", *NRC Handelsblad*, 2 December 2009. Available from [http://www.nrc.nl/international/opinion/article2427750.ece/We\\_must\\_play\\_an\\_active\\_role\\_to\\_establish\\_a\\_nuclear\\_weapon\\_free\\_world](http://www.nrc.nl/international/opinion/article2427750.ece/We_must_play_an_active_role_to_establish_a_nuclear_weapon_free_world) (accessed 14 June 2010).

<sup>13</sup> Kjell Magne Bondevik, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Odvar Nordli, Thorvald Stoltenberg and Kåre Willoch, "A nuclear weapon-free world", *Aftenposten*, 4 June 2009.

<sup>14</sup> Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Lech Wałęsa, "The unthinkable becomes thinkable: towards elimination of nuclear weapons", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 3 April 2009.

<sup>15</sup> International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, *Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers* (Canberra, 2009). Available from <http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/index.html> (accessed 14 June 2010).

Arms (START), which expired on 5 December. The two sides also made progress on narrowing their differences on the issue of missile defence, with the United States unilaterally refocusing its anti-missile development and deployment priorities and programmes.

States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) convened the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference in New York on 4 to 15 May.<sup>16</sup> Reflecting the changing political currents on nuclear disarmament, the Preparatory Committee was able to adopt expeditiously procedural arrangements for the 2010 Review Conference. Notwithstanding this achievement, however, delegations were unable to achieve consensus on substantive recommendations to the Review Conference, as deep differences persisted among States parties towards achieving nuclear disarmament, strengthening non-proliferation and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the NPT.

On 24 September, at the initiative of the President of the United States, the Security Council convened a historic high-level summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in which it adopted by consensus resolution 1887 (2009) (see appendix IV for text). The resolution referred to disarmament commitments and called for actions on non-proliferation and nuclear terrorism, building upon existing obligations and initiatives.

The ratifying States and signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty held the sixth Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty, which was convened under article XIV of the Treaty in New York from 24 to 25 September.<sup>17</sup> There was a marked level of participation at the ministerial level, including from the United States, which was represented by its Secretary of State.<sup>18</sup> The Conference adopted a Final Declaration (see appendix II for text) that included measures to promote the entry into force of the Treaty.

In other developments, the Six-Party Talks were unable to make progress on implementing the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement<sup>19</sup> on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In April, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) ceased its participation in the Six-Party Talks, following condemnation by the Security Council of the attempted space-launch by the DPRK. In May, it conducted its second nuclear test explosion,

---

<sup>16</sup> See "Final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", document NPT/CONF.2010/1. Available from <http://ods.un.org/>.

<sup>17</sup> See Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, "Report of the Conference", CTBT-Art.XIV/2009/6. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>18</sup> Hillary Clinton.

<sup>19</sup> China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and United States, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks", Beijing, 19 September 2005. Available from <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm> (accessed 12 June 2010).

prompting a resolute response from the Security Council, including the imposition of additional sanctions.<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, efforts to resume the Six-Party Talks continued throughout the year.

On 1 October, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3+3 negotiating partners<sup>21</sup> agreed in principle to a number of confidence-building measures, amid international concern over the revelation of the construction of a second uranium enrichment site at Qom, Islamic Republic of Iran. Despite some progress, the diplomatic process reached an impasse, as an agreement drafted by the IAEA for international cooperation on the provision of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor was not formally approved by the end of the year.

States continued to take steps to strengthen cooperation in the field of non-proliferation and to prevent non-State use or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their related materials. In 2009, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)<sup>22</sup> undertook a comprehensive review of the implementation of that resolution, as mandated by resolution 1810 (2008).<sup>23</sup> As part of this process, the Committee held an open meeting in New York from 30 September to 2 October, during which Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations, and other entities exchanged views on issues related to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

## **Issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

### **Third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference**

From 4 to 15 May, the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference<sup>24</sup> held its third session in New York, with Boniface Guwa Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe) serving as Chairman.<sup>17</sup> Representatives from 135

---

<sup>20</sup> See United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) of 12 June 2009 (see appendix IV for text).

<sup>21</sup> China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>22</sup> Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004. This and subsequent United Nations documents are available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>23</sup> Security Council resolution 1810 (2008) of 25 April 2008. See also the website of the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) at [http://www.un.org/sc/1540/comprehensive\\_review.shtml](http://www.un.org/sc/1540/comprehensive_review.shtml) (accessed 14 June 2010).

<sup>24</sup> For the Final Report, see NPT/CONF.2010/1.

States parties,<sup>25</sup> 1 observer,<sup>26</sup> 1 specialized agency,<sup>27</sup> 6 intergovernmental organizations<sup>28</sup> and 77 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participated in the session.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

<sup>26</sup> Palestine.

<sup>27</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency.

<sup>28</sup> Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, European Commission, League of Arab States, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

<sup>29</sup> Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, Archivio Disarmo, Arms Control Association, Ban All Nukes generation, Beati i Costruttori di Pace, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Canadian Peace Alliance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Center for War/Peace Studies, Centre d'Etudes pour la Sécurité Internationale et la Maîtrise des armements, Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament–Kenya, Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, Economists for Peace and Security, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Federation of American Scientists, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Global Security Institute, Greenpeace International, Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, Hudson Institute, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Institute for Security Studies, International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, International Association of Peace Messenger Cities, International Law Campaign, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, International Panel on Fissile Materials, International Peace Bureau, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, International Studies Association, Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, Kurtz Institute of Peacemaking, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, Le Mouvement de la Paix, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Program on Science, Technology and Society, Mayors for Peace, Monterey Institute of International Studies (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies), Mundo sin Guerras y Sin Violencia/World without Wars, New America Foundation, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, Nihon Hidankyo, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Nuclear Watch, Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation and International Safeguards System, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Pax Christi

The Committee held three meetings devoted to the general debate on all issues related to its work and one meeting devoted to statements by NGOs.

At its third meeting, the Committee unanimously endorsed Libran N. Cabactulan (Philippines) for the presidency of the Review Conference. It was also decided that the Review Conference would be held from 3 to 28 May 2010 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, taking into account the developments resulting from the Capital Master Plan<sup>30</sup> regarding the availability of conference services and facilities. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the draft rules of procedure and the provisional agenda of the Review Conference, and agreed on the allocation of items to the three Main Committees of the Conference.

Unable to reach consensus on recommendations to the Review Conference on principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, the Committee decided to defer consideration of the final document to the Review Conference.

### **Substantive work**

The Committee devoted 25 meetings to the discussion of substantive issues, which were organized into three clusters and three specific blocs. The clusters dealt with implementation of the Treaty relating to: (a) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security; (b) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and NWFZs; and (c) the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the NPT. The specific blocs of issues addressed: (a) nuclear disarmament and security assurances; (b) regional issues, including with regard to the Middle East and

---

International, Peace Action, Peace Boat, Peace Depot, People for Nuclear Disarmament (Nuclear Flashpoints Campaign), People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, Psychologists for Social Responsibility, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Réseau sortir du nucléaire, Rideau Institute on International Affairs, Rissho Kosei-Kai, Seriously Time to Stop, Soka Gakkai International, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stop Essais/Abolition des Armes Nucléaires, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, The Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance, The Royal Society, The Stanley Foundation, Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, Tri-Valley CAREs, United for Peace and Justice, United States Peace Council, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, Western States Legal Foundation, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, World Conference of Religions for Peace and World Council of Churches.

<sup>30</sup> The United Nations Capital Master Plan refers to the refurbishment of the United Nations complex to replace deteriorated systems, to meet current building codes and standards for safety, security and accessibility for persons with disabilities, and to improve its environmental performance. Completion is planned for 2013. More information available from <http://www.un.org/cmp/uncmp/english/index.asp>.

the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and (c) other provisions of the Treaty, including article X.

States parties<sup>31</sup> continued to regard the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament efforts. They supported the view that a balance should be maintained between the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty, namely, non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties maintained that the Review Conference should adopt forward-looking action plans covering each of the three pillars. The importance of implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was also stressed, while agreement on concrete measures in this regard was seen by a number of delegations as crucial to the success of the Review Conference.

On nuclear disarmament, the Preparatory Committee experienced a greater degree of convergence of views than it had in its first two sessions and in the previous NPT review cycle, though major differences persisted. States parties reaffirmed the commitments made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as well as at the 2000 Review Conference.

Some delegations expressed concern on a number of issues: the slow pace of progress on disarmament; programmes to modernize nuclear arsenals and qualitatively improve existing nuclear weapons; nuclear sharing arrangements; stationing of nuclear forces outside national territories; development of strategic conventional forces; deployment of national ballistic missile defences; and programmes to place weapons in space.

Delegations continued to call for the implementation of the 13 practical steps and for the 2010 Review Conference to build upon those steps. In particular, delegations emphasized the importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the production of nuclear fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Pending these steps, delegations stressed that current moratoriums on nuclear test explosions and the production of fissile materials for weapons should be maintained.

Many delegations also supported further reductions in the arsenals of the NWS, reductions in non-strategic nuclear forces, further reductions in the operational readiness of nuclear weapons and reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. Many others continued to express the view that the principles of verification, irreversibility and transparency should be applied to arms control and disarmament agreements.

Consistent with the commitments to engage NWS in a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, many delegations, particularly from the Non-Aligned Movement, called for the conclusion of an agreement

---

<sup>31</sup> References to "States parties" do not necessarily imply unanimity of all States parties.

on nuclear disarmament within a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention or analogous instruments.

States parties reaffirmed the positive role of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and achieving nuclear disarmament. Delegations also supported the further establishment of NWFZs, particularly in the region of the Middle East, and strengthening cooperation between existing zones.

The States parties continued to emphasize the importance of effective assurances from the NWS to the NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Many NNWS expressed the view that such assurances should be granted in a legally binding agreement. Some delegations believed that such an agreement could take the form of a Protocol to the NPT, while some NWS emphasized the role of protocols to treaties establishing NWFZs for providing such assurances.

On non-proliferation issues, support for the basic norms and obligations specified in the NPT remained strong, but differences continued to be evident, especially on matters perceived as affecting the right of States parties to peaceful use of nuclear energy. States parties continued to reaffirm that the proliferation of nuclear weapons posed a threat to international peace and security and required a global response. They also reaffirmed that IAEA safeguards were a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as they played an essential role in the implementation of the Treaty and contributed to an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some delegations discussed advancing additional measures related to combating proliferation, including resolute action to stem crises and financing.

Many delegations welcomed the work of the IAEA to strengthen its safeguards system and increase its ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials or activities. They also discussed the implementation of the IAEA additional protocol, though some continued to stress the voluntary nature of strengthened safeguards. Many States parties also affirmed that export controls were best implemented in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner that did not hamper the development of nuclear energy, in conformity with the Treaty. Delegations reaffirmed the need for multilateral cooperation in preventing the illicit trafficking in nuclear material, equipment or technology.

States parties emphasized the importance of verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and expressed support for diplomatic efforts to implement the 2005 Joint Statement towards this end. Some delegations called for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006)<sup>32</sup> and for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks.

---

<sup>32</sup> Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006.

Delegations also reaffirmed the need to resolve outstanding issues concerning the implementation of IAEA safeguards. In this context, some delegations continued to raise concerns related to the nuclear programme in the Islamic Republic of Iran and called upon it to implement resolutions 1737 (2006),<sup>33</sup> 1747 (2007)<sup>34</sup> and 1803 (2008),<sup>35</sup> as well as to suspend its nuclear programme. Delegations urged the parties concerned to seek a diplomatic and negotiated solution to the issue. They reaffirmed that the IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements undertaken pursuant to the NPT.

States parties acknowledged the right to withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with article X. They continued to consider proposals related to identifying procedures and modalities under which States parties could collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal, though delegations continued to disagree on the establishment of new mechanisms or procedures towards this end.

States parties reaffirmed their inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Many delegations stressed the important role of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and emphasized the need for such cooperation to be supported with adequate, assured and predictable financial and human resources.

Delegations, however, continued to express divergent views on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, with some delegations strongly backing initiatives tabled at the IAEA while others urging a more cautious approach to the issue that took into account its political, economic and technical aspects.

States parties reaffirmed their commitment to achieving the universality of the Treaty and renewed their calls on all remaining non-States parties to join the Treaty as NNWS without preconditions. They also discussed the modalities of implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which was reaffirmed as an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and served as part of a package of decisions taken that extended the Treaty indefinitely. Towards this end, they considered proposals to convene an international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the appointment of a special coordinator or the establishment of a standing committee to consult with the regional States and report on this issue during the review process.

---

<sup>33</sup> Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006.

<sup>34</sup> Security Council resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007.

<sup>35</sup> Security Council resolution 1803 (2008) of 3 March 2008.

States parties reaffirmed that the strengthened review process had become an indispensable and dynamic mechanism for evaluating the Treaty's implementation. Nonetheless, they continued to advance proposals for the further strengthening of the review process, including consideration of possible institutional measures, such as convening annual meetings of States parties and establishing a standing Secretariat for the NPT. In this context, delegations stressed the need to ensure adequate financial support and cost efficiency of the review process.

## **General Assembly, 2009**

### **64/31. Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

Introduced in 2005, the resolution once again called for practical steps to be taken by all NWS, which would lead to nuclear disarmament and promote international stability, based on the principle of undiminished security for all, including: (a) further efforts be made by NWS to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally; (b) increased transparency by NWS with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament; (c) the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process; (d) concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; (e) a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (f) the engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all NWS in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

**Introduced by:** Iran (Islamic Republic of) (15 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 109-56-10; 112-50-8, p.p. 6 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 105-56-12; 109-48-10, p.p. 6 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 35-39.

### **64/45. Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes**

First introduced in 1988, this biennial resolution called upon all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing the dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States, requested the Conference on Disarmament to take into

**Submitted by:** Nigeria (27 Oct.), on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 80-82.

account, in the negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, radioactive wastes as part of the scope of such a convention, and also requested the Conference to intensify efforts towards an early conclusion of such a convention and to include in its report to the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session the progress recorded in the negotiations on this subject. It also appealed to all Member States that had not yet done so, to take the necessary steps to become party to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management as soon as possible.

## **Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

### **Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty**

The sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)<sup>36</sup> took place in a climate of increased political support for the Treaty and attracted unprecedented international attention. The two-day Conference opened on 24 September in New York, the same day when the Security Council met at the Heads of State level for a special session on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

A total of 106 States<sup>37</sup> participated in the Conference, 40 of which were represented at the Ministerial level. Six States whose ratifications were needed

---

<sup>36</sup> Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT were also convened in Vienna in 1999, 2003 and 2007 and in New York in 2001 and 2005, in accordance with article XIV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. Background information, statements and documents related to the Conferences are available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/CTBT.shtml>. The Treaty text and status of adherence are available at <http://unhq-appspub-01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf>.

<sup>37</sup> Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Yemen.

for the Treaty's entry into force were in attendance.<sup>38</sup> Three non-signatory States also participated.<sup>39</sup> The Conference was also attended by a number of intergovernmental organizations,<sup>40</sup> specialized agencies and related organizations, as well as NGOs and the media.

The Conference was convened by the Secretary-General, in his capacity as the depository of the CTBT. Referring to the Treaty as a fundamental building block for a world free of nuclear weapons, he appealed especially to those States whose ratifications were needed for the Treaty's entry into force to sign and ratify it and emphasized that the new and rare momentum for a world free of nuclear weapons must be seized.<sup>41</sup>

The presidency of the Conference was shared by Foreign Ministers Bernard Kouchner (France) and Taïb Fassi-Fihri (Morocco). Calling on all States that had not yet signed or ratified the CTBT to do so, the French Foreign Minister stressed that the Treaty had never come so close to entry into force, while his Moroccan counterpart, supporting this appeal, emphasized that a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing could not be a substitute for ratification of the CTBT.

The United States participated in the Conference for the first time since 1999. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the gathering that "after a ten-year absence from this conference, America stands ready to renew its leadership role in the non-proliferation regime". Reiterating the United States commitment to achieving the Treaty's entry into force, she added that "we will work in the months ahead both to seek the advice and consent of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty, and to secure ratification by others so that the treaty can enter into force".

States participating in the Conference reviewed the overall progress made following the Treaty's adoption and opening for signature in 1996, with special emphasis on the two years since the fifth Conference in September 2007. Since then, five States had signed the Treaty and 11 had ratified it, including Colombia,<sup>42</sup> whose ratification was also required for the Treaty's entry into force.

---

<sup>38</sup> China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel and United States.

<sup>39</sup> Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Trinidad and Tobago. After the Conference, Trinidad and Tobago signed the Treaty on 8 October 2009.

<sup>40</sup> Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, European Commission, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Committee of the Red Cross, League of Arab States, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Pacific Islands Forum and World Meteorological Organization.

<sup>41</sup> Statement at the sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, New York, 24 September 2009. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SG/sgstatements.shtml>.

<sup>42</sup> Colombia ratified the Treaty on 29 January 2008.

States expressed their commitment to establishing a universal Treaty that was both internationally and effectively verifiable as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. They commended the progress made in setting up the CTBT verification regime that would monitor nuclear explosions around the world.

In their joint statement, NGOs urged States supporting the CTBT to make a joint endeavour to persuade the remaining States to join the Treaty. They also encouraged States that had not yet done so to provide their assessed contribution and to allow the transmittal of data from monitoring stations on their territory.

In a unanimously adopted Final Declaration (see appendix II for text), the participating States, including the non-ratifying States, called on all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty. The non-signatory States that participated in the Conference also associated themselves with the Final Declaration. Through the document, participating States expressed the shared concern about nuclear testing and the delay in the Treaty's entry into force. They also observed that international developments since the 2007 CTBT conference had made "entry into force of the Treaty more urgent than ever before".

### **Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Ban-Treaty Organization**

On 13 October, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) addressed the First Committee in which he reported on recent achievements<sup>43</sup> including the sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT and the status of the CTBT signatures and ratifications.

The Executive Secretary reported that the CTBTO PrepCom was nearing the fulfilment of its mandate and that almost 80 per cent of the International Monitoring System's stations were already sending data to its Headquarters in Vienna. He added that the volume of data transmitted from the stations to the data centre in Vienna had tripled in the last five years and that a new global communications infrastructure for relaying that data had been installed.

The year 2009 witnessed the second nuclear test explosion declared by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the signals of which were detected by International Monitoring System stations. The Executive Secretary said that the CTBT monitoring system had been tried and tested and that its reliability had thus been proven, adding that the system had gained the trust and approval of the scientific community. A conference with over 500 scientists took place

---

<sup>43</sup> The report on the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in 2008 was transmitted to the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee at its sixty-fourth session through a note by the Secretary-General (A/64/155).

in Vienna in June as part of the International Scientific Studies Project to assess the readiness and capabilities of the CTBT verification regime and to create synergies between the CTBTO PrepCom and the scientific community.

The Executive Secretary underlined that the verification regime had provided a host of opportunities for applications in scientific research and everyday life, including early tsunami warning, aviation safety, climate change and marine life research. He also reported that since its establishment, the CTBTO PrepCom had trained 1,700 technicians and professionals from 147 member States, thus contributing to capacity-building in member States.

As a result of financial contributions from donors and international development funds, the CTBTO PrepCom was able to implement a pilot project which enabled experts from developing countries to participate in technical meetings for a year. The CTBTO PrepCom also worked with the European Union (EU) to assist member States from Africa in establishing National Data Centres so that they would be able to use the data and analytical reports generated by the verification regime.

## **General Assembly, 2009**

### **64/69. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

Last introduced in 2008, the resolution called for the early implementation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and also called for early resumption of the Six-Party Talks and welcomed the ratification of the CTBT by Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as the signature by Trinidad and Tobago, as significant steps towards the early entry into force of the Treaty.

**Introduced by:** Australia (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 175-1-3; 169-1-6, o.p. 5 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 175-1-3; 166-1-5, o.p. 5 (30 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 183-187.

**First Committee.** Before the vote, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** (DPRK) recalled that since the first nuclear test in July 1945, over 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted. It explained that the second nuclear test of the DPRK was a self-defensive reaction, that it did not pursue a nuclear arms race, and that the DPRK believed in a denuclearized world. While possessing nuclear weapons, DPRK mentioned that it would act in a responsible manner in the management, use, non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons.

After abstaining, the **Syrian Arab Republic** explained that a treaty of such importance should in no way disregard the legitimate concerns of NNWS, which had neither received guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons, nor had been able to access nuclear energy. The text did not mention

elimination of nuclear arsenals of NWS within a reasonable period of time and the illegality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons. The draft also did not reaffirm the need for NPT universality. Furthermore, it stated that the text was limited to banning nuclear detonations, and not laboratory experiments or the production of new types of nuclear weapons. The Syrian Arab Republic also stated that the Treaty also made it possible for signatories to take measures against non-signatory States, which violated the sovereign rights of States to choose whether or not to become party to the CTBT.

After voting in favour, five States made statements. **Pakistan** said that it had taken measures to support the CTBT, including observing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and that acceptance of the Treaty obligations in South Asia would facilitate its entry into force. **Israel**, a CTBT signatory, stated that since the establishment of the CTBT Preparatory Commission in 1996 it had participated actively in the development of all elements of the CTBT verification regime. It said, however, that the Treaty's verification regime should be robust in order to detect non-compliance with its basic obligations, be immune to abuse and, at the same time, allow each State signatory to protect its national security interests. The **Islamic Republic of Iran** explained that it abstained in the separate vote on operative paragraph 5 because the language of the text did not reflect its concerns. **Cuba** said that it supported the resolution but believed that operative paragraph 5 did not address the complexity of the issues. It urged the sponsors of the resolution to focus on issues relevant to the CTBT in the future. The **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela** believed that efforts towards eliminating nuclear weapons should occur under the auspices of the United Nations.

## **Conference on Disarmament, 2009**

### **Nuclear disarmament**

Although the G-21<sup>44</sup> had repeatedly called for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty on nuclear disarmament, there were also strongly held views that nuclear disarmament could only be achieved through incremental, step-by-step approaches. Awaiting an agreement on a programme of work, the Conference continued to address the substantive items on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament.

In accordance with the Organizational Framework,<sup>45</sup> Carlos Portales (Chile), the Coordinator on agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on nuclear disarmament, held two rounds of informal meetings. Agenda item 1

---

<sup>44</sup> Also referred to as the Group of 21 or the group of non-aligned States members of the Conference on Disarmament.

<sup>45</sup> Conference on Disarmament, document CD/WP.553. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

was entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”, and item 2 “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”.<sup>46</sup>

This exercise provided Conference on Disarmament (CD) members<sup>47</sup> the opportunity to exchange views on the matter, validate previously identified questions and raise new elements that require particular attention. On the whole, the two meetings reflected the wide variety of positions and proposals that existed among delegations and groups of delegations with regard to nuclear disarmament, but the debates did not yield any substantially new items.

Some NWS informed the membership about their unilateral actions in favour of reducing nuclear arsenals, while others underscored the shared responsibility in the area of nuclear disarmament. Special reference was made to the importance of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

The consensus decision on the programme of work, adopted on 29 May, included, *inter alia*, the establishment of a subsidiary body with a deliberative mandate on nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the Conference was unsuccessful in reaching an agreement on the implementation of the agreed programme of work.

### **Fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices**

As provided in the Organizational Framework, Giovanni Manfredi (Italy), the Coordinator on agenda items 1 and 2 (see above for titles) with a general focus on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, held two rounds of informal consultations during the first part of the 2009 session.<sup>48</sup>

The discussions focused on four topics that were considered particularly important in a future treaty on fissile materials: the definition of fissile materials; the scope of the treaty; stockpiles and plants; and verification.

---

<sup>46</sup> For the report submitted by the Coordinator to the President of the CD on work done on agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on nuclear disarmament, see CD/1877, annex I. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>47</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

<sup>48</sup> For the report submitted by the Coordinator to the President of the CD on work done on agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, see CD/1877, annex II. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

A number of delegations stressed the importance of proceeding by consensus in negotiating a treaty and also the necessity of conducting such negotiations only within the framework of the CD, or in a subgroup thereof established in accordance with its Rules of Procedure.

Some delegations stressed that other issues should also be taken into consideration when dealing with a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), such as negative security assurances to NNWS and NWFZs, particularly in the Middle East.

The importance of the link between an FMCT and the implementation of article VI of the NPT was also highlighted and, given this link and the forthcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference, the urgency to commence negotiations promptly on an FMCT was further emphasized by a number of delegations.

### **Negative security assurances**

In accordance with the Organizational Framework, Babacar Carlos Mbaye (Senegal), the Coordinator on agenda item 4 (Effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons), held two rounds of informal meetings.<sup>49</sup>

Before the NPT was concluded in 1968, NNWS demanded assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them, which had been the subject of several Security Council resolutions thereafter. Moreover, the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice<sup>50</sup> reaffirmed the existence of an obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective control.

Many delegations made statements supporting the call for negative security assurances for NNWS and, in turn, NWS stated that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS. However, NNWS deemed these statements by NWS insufficient because they were unilateral, conditional and revocable.

Some delegations maintained that the assurances provided by NWFZs were insufficient, conditional and geographically limited. Nevertheless, they affirmed that the creation of such zones in Africa, Central Asia, South America, South-East Asia and South Pacific, as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, constituted a step forward.

In that spirit, some delegations called for the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the undertakings of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences to make the Middle East an NWFZ.

---

<sup>49</sup> For the report submitted by the Coordinator to the President of the CD on work done on agenda item 4, see CD/1877, annex IV. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>50</sup> A/51/218, annex; see also *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226.

Furthermore, some States stressed that granting negative security assurances would constitute a quid pro quo for States that renounced nuclear weapons and would help to combat proliferation. In that connection, they affirmed that granting legally binding assurances to NNWS would be a confidence-building measure and a step towards NWS implementation of article VI of the NPT concerning nuclear disarmament.

### **Radiological weapons**

As envisaged in the Organizational Framework, Petko Draganov (Bulgaria), the Coordinator on agenda item 5 (New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons), held two rounds of informal meetings during the first part of the session.<sup>51</sup>

Delegations used the opportunity to update and validate their positions, indicating continued interest in related topics such as definitions, a radiological weapons ban, the role of the IAEA and international assistance, the effectiveness of existing international instruments, and the threat of radiological terrorism.

Several additional comments of a specific nature were made during the year. One delegation raised the issue of state terrorism, while others pointed out that the focus of the discussions under agenda item 5 should be more on the nature of the weapon rather than the user of such a weapon. Emphasis was again placed on the prevention of the emergence of new WMD. In this regard, reference was made to General Assembly resolution 63/36 of 2 December 2008<sup>52</sup> on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new WMD and new systems of such weapons, together with an appeal to strengthen consensus around the issue.

## **Bilateral agreements and other issues**

### **Negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States**

On 1 April, in the wake of initial meetings held in the previous year, the Russian Federation and the United States issued a joint statement<sup>53</sup> regarding negotiations in which they, inter alia, agreed to pursue new and verifiable reductions in their strategic offensive arsenals, beginning with the replacement

---

<sup>51</sup> For the report submitted by the Coordinator to the President of the CD on work done on agenda item 5, see CD/1877, annex V. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>52</sup> A/63/49 (vol. I), p. 143.

<sup>53</sup> Joint Statement by the United States and the Russian Federation regarding negotiations on further reductions in strategic offensive arms, 1 April 2009. Available from [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-Barack-Obama/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-Barack-Obama/) (accessed 12 June 2010).

of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), which expired on 5 December. They directed their negotiators to begin work immediately and to report on their progress in July. The two sides also agreed to work together to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the NPT and to demonstrate leadership in reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles.

Between the months of April and July, negotiators from both sides held three rounds of negotiations and an interim meeting of experts in June. On 6 July, at a bilateral summit in Moscow, both countries agreed to a joint understanding on strategic offensive arms, which committed each side to reduce their strategic warheads to a range of 1,500 to 1,675 and their strategic delivery vehicles to a range of 500 to 1,100. Furthermore, they agreed that the new treaty would include effective verification measures drawn from the experience of START.<sup>54</sup>

On 4 December, the two States issued a joint statement<sup>55</sup> on the expiration of START, in which they recognized the contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the successful implementation of START and welcomed their commitment to their status as NNWS. The two parties affirmed that the security assurances set forth in the Budapest Memoranda of 5 December 1994 would remain in effect following the expiration of START.

With respect to the new treaty, they expressed their determination to support strategic stability between the two countries in a joint statement issued on 4 December. They also expressed their commitment as a matter of principle to continue working in the spirit of START following its expiration and reaffirmed their intention to ensure that a new treaty on strategic arms would enter into force at the earliest possible date.

Between July and December, the negotiators held five further rounds of negotiations. Although they were unable to conclude work on the new treaty before the end of the year, they had reported that they were close to an agreement.

### **Missile defence system in Europe**

In 2009, the Russian Federation and the United States made progress in their discussions on cooperative ways to deal with missile defence issues in the context of their strategic relationship, amid unilateral United States decisions to re-orient its missile defence plans. On 1 April, the two sides issued a joint

---

<sup>54</sup> See fact sheet, "The Joint Understanding for the START Follow-on Treaty", 6 July 2009. Available from [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/FACT-SHEET-The-Joint-Understanding-for-the-START-Follow-on-Treaty/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-The-Joint-Understanding-for-the-START-Follow-on-Treaty/) (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>55</sup> Joint Statement by the United States and the Russian Federation regarding the expiration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Washington, D.C., 4 December 2009. Available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/dec/133204.htm> (accessed 12 June 2010).

statement<sup>53</sup> in which they, *inter alia*, acknowledged their remaining differences over the deployment of missile defence systems in Europe and indicated that they would discuss the relationship between offensive and defensive systems.

On 6 April, the United States Department of Defense announced that it would refocus further development of the United States ballistic missile defence programme to countering short-range missiles and “rogue” States, and that its overall budget for the programme would be reduced.<sup>56</sup> As a result of this decision, the United States would cancel several research and development programmes and cease deployment of additional ground-based, midcourse interceptors in Alaska, while increasing its support for theatre-based capabilities.

After a bilateral summit in Moscow and in the wake of their 1 April joint statement, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States issued a joint statement<sup>57</sup> on 6 July on missile defence issues. In that statement they indicated that they had started jointly to assess ballistic missile challenges of the twenty-first century and to prepare recommendations, giving priority to diplomatic and political methods. In addition, they announced a joint review of the means at their disposal to monitor cooperatively the development of missile programmes around the world. To this end, they announced that work had intensified on establishing a Joint Data Exchange Centre, which was an initiative first agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in 1998. The Centre would provide the basis for a multilateral missile-launch notification regime.

On 17 September, the United States announced that it would not proceed with plans to deploy ballistic missile interceptors in Poland or with a radar installation in the Czech Republic.<sup>58</sup> Instead, it would focus over the next decade on deploying capabilities focused on the potential threat to Europe of short- and intermediate-range missiles. As part of a multiphased deployment programme, the United States would deploy sea-based interceptors to the region, starting in 2011, as well as land-based interceptors at two bases in Northern and Southern Europe, starting in 2015. Between 2018 and 2020, the ground-based systems would be upgraded to include the capability of targeting intercontinental-range ballistic missiles launched at the United States mainland.

---

<sup>56</sup> Robert Gates, United States Secretary of Defense, “Defense budget recommendation statement”, Arlington, Virginia, 6 April 2009. Available from <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>57</sup> Joint Statement by the United States and the Russian Federation on missile defense issues, 6 July 2009, available from [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitry-A-Medvedev-President-of-the-Russian-Federation-and-Barack-Obama-President-of-the-United-States-of-America-on-Missile-Defense-Issues/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitry-A-Medvedev-President-of-the-Russian-Federation-and-Barack-Obama-President-of-the-United-States-of-America-on-Missile-Defense-Issues/) (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>58</sup> See United States Department of Defense News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright, 17 September 2009. Available from <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4479> (accessed 12 June 2010).

## **Islamic Republic of Iran**

In March, the E3+3 reaffirmed their dual-track strategy,<sup>59</sup> which included seeking negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran to achieve a political solution while incrementally increasing international pressure on the country to suspend its “proliferation sensitive”<sup>60</sup> nuclear activities, in accordance with the decisions and resolutions of the Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors.

In April, the E3+3 invited the Islamic Republic of Iran to meet with the Group and welcomed the new approach to the issue, as proposed by the United States, including its decision to attend all future meetings with the Islamic Republic of Iran and to participate fully in the diplomatic process.<sup>61</sup> On 9 September, the Islamic Republic of Iran provided the E+3 with its own package of proposals for “comprehensive and constructive negotiations”, addressing a wide range of global issues.

International attention on the matter heightened considerably after 21 September, when the Islamic Republic of Iran declared to the IAEA that it was constructing a second uranium enrichment plant near the city of Qom. The announcement was followed by allegations from a number of member States that the Islamic Republic of Iran had started construction of the nuclear facility in 2006.

The E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran met in Geneva on 1 October, where they reached agreement in principle on three understandings related to confidence-building measures. These measures included an IAEA inspection of the new enrichment plant; negotiations for the shipment of 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium for processing in third-party countries, to be returned in the form of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, which produces radioisotopes for medical purposes; and convening a follow-up meeting by the end of October.

The implementation of the 1 October understandings initially proceeded quickly, then faltered, leaving unlikely prospects for an early diplomatic solution by the end of the year.

---

<sup>59</sup> See “Statement on behalf of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States,” 12 March 2009, INF/CIRC/749. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infciircs/2009/infcirc749.pdf> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>60</sup> In resolution 1737 (2006), the Security Council decided that Iran shall suspend specified “proliferation sensitive” nuclear activities, including enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water-related projects, including construction of a heavy water research reactor.

<sup>61</sup> See “Statement following the E3+3 political directors’ meeting”, London, 8 April. Available from [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/107191.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/107191.pdf) (accessed 12 June 2010).

From 25 to 27 October, the IAEA visited the new enrichment site.<sup>62</sup> In addition, at the end of a technical meeting between France, the Russian Federation, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran in October, the IAEA circulated a draft agreement<sup>63</sup> providing for the supply of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. France, the Russian Federation and the United States subsequently indicated their approval of the draft but the Islamic Republic of Iran did not provide a formal response by the end of the year.

## **International Atomic Energy Agency verification**

Since its founding, the IAEA continues to serve as the focal point for worldwide cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for promoting global nuclear security and safety and, through its verification activities, for providing assurances that international undertakings to use nuclear material and facilities for peaceful purposes are being honoured.

A major pillar of the Agency's programme involves activities that ultimately enable the IAEA to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities. Its verification programme thus remains at the core of multilateral efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>64</sup>

### **Strengthened safeguards system**

#### ***Safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols***

Safeguards agreements and additional protocols are the principal legal instruments that provide the basis for IAEA verification activities. The entry into force of such instruments therefore continues to be key to an effective and efficient IAEA safeguards system.

In 2009, comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) pursuant to the NPT entered into force for Bahrain, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Kenya, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Sierra Leone. CSAs were signed

---

<sup>62</sup> See the report by the IAEA Director General, document GOV/2009/74 (available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-74.pdf> (accessed 12 June 2010)). The Agency reported that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, but that no centrifuges or nuclear material had been introduced to the site. The Agency further verified that the design of the site was in accordance with the design information provided by Iran.

<sup>63</sup> Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Governments of the Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor.

<sup>64</sup> For a description, see "The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency", [http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg\\_system.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf) (accessed 12 June 2010).

with the Central African Republic, Chad, Kenya, Qatar, Rwanda and Timor-Leste, and were approved by the IAEA Board of Governors for Djibouti, the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda and Vanuatu. In addition, a safeguards agreement for India based on INFCIRC/66 entered into force. At the end of the year, 171 States had safeguards agreements in force with the IAEA. Twenty-two NNWS party to the NPT had yet to bring into force a CSA with the IAEA, as required under article III of the NPT.

Additional protocols (APs) to safeguards agreements entered into force for the Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Kenya, Mauritania and the United States. APs were signed with the Central African Republic, Chad, India, Kenya, Rwanda, Serbia, Timor-Leste, the United Arab Emirates and Zambia. The Board also approved APs for Bahrain, the Congo, Djibouti, India, Kenya, Rwanda, Serbia, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu. Overall, 128 States had signed APs and 94 had brought APs into force by the end of 2009.<sup>65</sup> The measures provided for under APs significantly increased IAEA ability to verify the correctness and completeness of a State's declarations under its CSA.

Small quantities protocols (SQPs) to CSAs were amended with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Lesotho, Nicaragua, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda. Such amendments were concluded in the context of the Board of Governors' September 2005 decisions on SQPs and allowed for the application of more safeguards measures in States with limited nuclear material and activities.

The conclusion of such legal instruments was the focus of safeguards outreach by the IAEA Secretariat throughout 2009.<sup>66</sup> Related events included a briefing on IAEA safeguards held in New York in May, on the margins of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. An interregional seminar on the Agency's safeguards system for States with limited nuclear material and activities was also conducted in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, in November. In addition, consultations on the amendment of SQPs and the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and APs were held throughout the year with representatives from member and non-member States in Berlin, New York and Vienna, as well as during training events organized in Vienna and elsewhere by the Office of Legal Affairs, the Department of Safeguards and the Office of Nuclear Security.

---

<sup>65</sup> For more information, see IAEA publication, *Safeguards Statement for 2009, Background to Safeguards Statement and Executive Summary of the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2009* (forthcoming). Available from <https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>66</sup> For additional information, see the IAEA document, "Plan of Action to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols". Available from [http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg\\_actionplan.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_actionplan.pdf) (accessed 12 June 2010).

### **Safeguards conclusions for 2009**

At the end of each year, the Agency draws a safeguards conclusion for each State with a safeguards agreement in force, based upon the evaluation of all information available to it for that year. For a broader conclusion to be drawn that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, both a CSA and an AP must be in force, and the Agency must be able to conduct all necessary verification and evaluation activities. For States that have CSAs in force but no APs, the Agency does not have sufficient tools to draw credible safeguards conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. For such States, the Agency draws a safeguards conclusion, for a given year, with respect to whether declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

With regard to those States for which the broader conclusion has been drawn and a State-level integrated safeguards approach has been approved, the Secretariat is able to implement integrated safeguards to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency's safeguards obligations.

In 2009, safeguards were applied for 171 States with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. Eighty-nine States had both CSAs and APs in force. For 52 of these States, the Agency concluded that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. For 37 of the States, the Agency had not yet completed the necessary evaluations under their APs, and concluded that the declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. For 73 States with CSAs in force but without APs, the Agency was able to conclude that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful nuclear activities.

For three States that had safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 in force in 2009, the Secretariat concluded that the nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied, remained in peaceful activities. Safeguards were also implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in four of the five nuclear weapon States, all of which have voluntary offer safeguards agreements in force. For these four States, the Agency concluded that nuclear material to which safeguards were applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or was withdrawn as provided for in the agreements.

For 2009, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions for 22 NPT NNWS without safeguards agreements in force.

Integrated safeguards were implemented during the year in 36 States, while implementation began in another eight States. In addition, integrated safeguards approaches<sup>67</sup> were developed and approved for three States.

---

<sup>67</sup> Integrated safeguards are the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA under CSAs and APs.

## **Implementation of safeguards**

Since December 2002, the Agency had not implemented safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and, therefore, could not draw any safeguards conclusions. In 2009, the Agency implemented ad hoc monitoring and verification measures related to the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and one facility at Taechon, as agreed between the Agency and the DPRK and envisaged in the Initial Actions agreed upon at the Six-Party Talks. In April, the DPRK informed the Agency inspectors at Yongbyon that it had decided to: (a) cease all cooperation immediately with the IAEA; (b) request Agency personnel to remove all Agency safeguards equipment; (c) not permit Agency inspectors access to the facilities after the removal of equipment; and (d) require the Agency inspectors to leave the country. The DPRK also stated that it would reactivate all facilities and reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

Until 14 April, the Agency found no indication of resumption of operation at these facilities or of any construction activities at the two installations under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon. On 15 April, the Agency inspectors removed their safeguards equipment, departing from the DPRK on the following day.<sup>68</sup> Since then, the Agency had not implemented the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement in the DPRK. The IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution<sup>69</sup> in September that, *inter alia*, supported the continuation of monitoring and verification activities by the Agency at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities as agreed upon in the Six-Party Talks, acknowledged the Agency's activities in relation to the disablement process, stressed the essential verification role of the Agency, and called upon the DPRK to come into full compliance with the NPT.

During the year, the IAEA Director General submitted four reports<sup>70</sup> to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the Islamic Republic of Iran's NPT safeguards agreement and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Agency was able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2009. However, it remained unable to conclude the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country without the required information and access to allow the Agency to make progress on outstanding issues related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's past nuclear activities. Moreover, the Agency could not draw a conclusion because the country had not implemented its AP. Contrary

---

<sup>68</sup> For more information, see <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/index.shtml> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>69</sup> IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", document GC(53)/RES/15. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/Resolutions/index.html> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>70</sup> Available from [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iaea\\_reports.shtml](http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iaea_reports.shtml) (accessed 12 June 2010).

to the decisions of the Security Council, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not suspend its uranium-enrichment-related activities and heavy-water-related projects. The Board of Governors adopted a resolution<sup>71</sup> on this matter in November 2009 and the Agency's verification work in the country continued through the end of the year.

In 2009, the Director General submitted four reports to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the Syrian Arab Republic's NPT safeguards agreement. In April 2008, the Agency was provided with information alleging that an installation destroyed by Israel at Dair Alzour in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2007 had been a nuclear reactor. The country had stated that the Dair Alzour site was a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activities. The destruction of the building and the subsequent removal of the debris made the Agency's verification work quite difficult and complex. The Agency had held discussions with the Syrian Arab Republic in Damascus and visited the Dair Alzour site in June 2008. Through the end of 2009, the Agency continued verification work in the country.<sup>72</sup>

## **Peaceful uses of nuclear energy**

### ***Assurances of nuclear fuel supply***

Proposals on assurance of nuclear fuel supply continued to be discussed in 2009.<sup>73</sup> In March, the Russian Federation circulated a concept paper on a guaranteed reserve of low-enriched uranium (LEU).<sup>74</sup> In June, the Director General issued reports entitled "Assurance of Supply: Proposal for the Establishment of an IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank" and "Assurance of Supply: Russian Federation Initiative to Establish a Reserve of Low Enriched Uranium for the Supply of LEU to the IAEA for its Member States".<sup>75</sup>

By the end of 2009, 31 IAEA member States as well as the Nuclear Threat Initiative had pledged or contributed more than \$150 million to

---

<sup>71</sup> IAEA, resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 27 November 2009, document GOV/2009/82. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-82.pdf> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>72</sup> For 2009, the Agency concluded that declared nuclear material in the Syrian Arab Republic remained in peaceful activities.

<sup>73</sup> An update is available from <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2009/fbankmilestone.html> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>74</sup> See IAEA information circular, "Communication dated 13 March 2009 received from the Resident Representative of the Russian Federation to the IAEA on the Russian initiative to establish a guaranteed reserve of low enriched uranium", INFCIRC/748. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infocircs/2009/infocirc748.pdf> (accessed 14 June 2010).

<sup>75</sup> See <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull492/49204845963.html> and <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull511/51104871013.html> (accessed 12 June 2010).

enable the IAEA to set up its own LEU bank of 60 to 80 tonnes of LEU.<sup>76</sup> Additionally, earlier in May, Kazakhstan announced its intention to host the IAEA LEU Bank on its territory.<sup>77</sup>

The IAEA LEU Bank under IAEA auspices could be based on three principles: (a) it should be non-political, non-discriminatory and available to all States in compliance with their safeguards obligations; (b) any release of material should be determined by non-political criteria established in advance by the IAEA Board of Governors and applied objectively and consistently; and (c) no State should be required to give up its rights under the NPT regarding any parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Germany also submitted its proposal in June entitled “Establishing an Independent Access to Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services: The Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project”,<sup>78</sup> in which it presented the text of the two draft model agreements. One model agreement would be concluded between the Agency and a Group of Interested States to provide for the establishment by these States of a market-based Enrichment Company. The other model agreement would be concluded between the Agency and a Host State to provide for the establishment of a Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary on territory offered by a Host State and administered by the Agency.

Also in June, Austria circulated a working paper entitled “Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Increasing Transparency and Sustainable Security”.<sup>79</sup>

In November, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution, concerning the request of the Russian Federation to establish a guaranteed reserve supply of LEU for IAEA member States. The resolution authorized the Director General to conclude and subsequently implement the Agreement with the Russian Federation to establish such a reserve,<sup>80</sup> which would consist of 120 metric tons of LEU, sufficient for two full cores of fuel for a 1,000 MWe power reactor.

---

<sup>76</sup> See <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2009/fbankmilestone.html> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>77</sup> See IAEA information circular on a position paper of Kazakhstan regarding the establishment of IAEA nuclear fuel banks, INFCIRC/753. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc753.pdf> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>78</sup> See IAEA information circular, “Communication dated 9 July 2009 received from the Permanent Mission of Germany regarding the German proposal on a Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project”, document INFCIRC/765. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc765.pdf> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>79</sup> IAEA, “Communication dated 26 May 2009 received from the Permanent Mission of Austria to the Agency enclosing a working paper regarding “Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle”, document INFCIRC/755. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc755.pdf> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>80</sup> For an update, see <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2010/uraniumfuelbank.html> (accessed 12 June 2010).

Once the reserve is established by the Russian Federation, IAEA member States would be eligible to receive LEU from the Agency in instances of disruption of their supplies, in accordance with the mechanism already approved by the Board. The material in the reserve would be placed under IAEA safeguards, and would be provided to IAEA member States upon the request of the Director General at the prevailing spot market price.

In addition, the United Kingdom submitted in September a proposal on assurance of supply entitled “Progress on the UK-led Proposal for a Nuclear Fuel Assurance”.<sup>81</sup> Its proposal would be a model for an agreement between the Governments of supplier and consumer States, co-signed by the IAEA, to back up existing or imminent fuel supply contracts for peaceful nuclear energy programmes.

## **Nuclear safety and security (IAEA)**

### **Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013**

In September 2009, the Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013<sup>82</sup> was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference. The new Plan was built on lessons learned from implementation of previous Plans and designed to respond to priorities identified by the Secretariat and member States, particularly with regard to changes in the nuclear security situation since the initiation of the first Plan and the recommendations from external evaluations. The new Plan sought to move from ad hoc interventions to providing long-term sustained improvements in nuclear security. It envisaged a budget of approximately €23 million per year, the majority of which would come from the extrabudgetary contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund.

In 2009, the Board approved a significant increase in regular budget funding for the Agency’s nuclear security programme. This funding will enhance the Secretariat’s platform for establishing and providing long-term, sustained improvements to nuclear security.

### **International nuclear security framework**

As referred to in prior IAEA reports on nuclear security,<sup>83</sup> the nuclear security framework is recognized as the combination of international binding and non-binding legal instruments together with IAEA nuclear security guidance. This legal framework, together with measures to facilitate its

---

<sup>81</sup> For more information, see <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/weapons/nuclear-weapons/peaceful-uses/010-nuclear-fuel-assurance/> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>82</sup> IAEA, document GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18. Available from [http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Documents/English/gc53-18\\_en.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Documents/English/gc53-18_en.pdf) (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>83</sup> See IAEA document, “Nuclear Security Report 2009”, GOV/2009/53-GC(53)/16. Available from [http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Documents/English/gc53-16\\_en.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Documents/English/gc53-16_en.pdf) (accessed 12 June 2010).

implementation such as training, information exchange, legislative assistance and capacity-building, constitute the nuclear security regime.

The binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security include: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols; and United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001),<sup>84</sup> 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006).<sup>85</sup> The non-binding international instruments are the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. In addition, the document entitled “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” published as INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 contains recommendations for physical protection that States implement on a voluntary basis. It provides a comprehensive basis for guiding States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.

### **Status of international instruments related to nuclear security (31 December 2009)**

<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Binding</i>	<i>States in-force</i>
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	Yes	141
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	Yes	33
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources	No	95
Code of Conduct Supplementary Guidance	No	53
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	Yes	63

### **International symposium on nuclear security**

The Agency convened a major symposium to consider advancements and achievements in global efforts to enhance nuclear security and to provide projections for the future. From 30 March to 3 April, more than 500 people from 76 countries participated in the event. The symposium noted the importance of continuing existing efforts, including strengthening legal elements of the international nuclear security framework, harmonizing efforts in the areas of security, safeguards and safety, and promoting participation in initiatives for the exchange of nuclear security information, particularly with

<sup>84</sup> S/RES/1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001.

<sup>85</sup> S/RES/1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006.

regard to lessons learned. It encouraged the strengthening of both national and global efforts to secure nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and transports.

### **IAEA Nuclear Security Series**

During the year, the tenth and eleventh documents in the Nuclear Security Series were published. The former, entitled *Implementing Guide on Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat*, was intended for decision makers from organizations involved in establishing measures for protecting nuclear material against potential insider and/or external adversaries. The latter, entitled *Implementing Guide on Security of Radioactive Sources*, included recommended measures for the prevention and detection of, and response to, malicious acts involving radioactive sources. It also aimed to help prevent losing control of sources.

### **Nuclear security human resource development**

The Agency continued to assist States in the area of nuclear security human resource development. In 2009, it conducted 51 training events on all aspects of nuclear security, reaching 1,275 people from 120 countries. Furthermore, the third and fourth Agency-assisted Master's degree programmes on nuclear security commenced. These programmes were designed to underpin sustainable nuclear security improvements through the development of core skills. Supported by the Nuclear Security Fund, Tomsk Polytechnic University launched a Master of Science course in nuclear security, the curriculum of which was based on the Agency's draft guidance document, *Educational Programme in Nuclear Security*.<sup>86</sup> Also during the year, Saudi Arabia's Naif Arab University for Security Sciences offered a course entitled "Introduction of Nuclear Security" as a component of its existing Master of Science Programme in Security. The University had requested the Agency's support in developing teaching material and providing guest lecturers to implement the course.

### **Capacity-building: Interdepartmental Special Training Centre**

In cooperation with the Russian Federation, the Agency completed in 2009 its largest project since its inception that aimed to build capacity for physical protection, involving the upgrading of the nuclear security training facilities at the Interdepartmental Special Training Centre in Obninsk to enable field-based training for international audiences.

The first phase of the project, completed in 2006, involved upgrades to the Centre's technical infrastructure to support indoor nuclear security training,

---

<sup>86</sup> IAEA, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 12, Technical Guidance (Vienna, 2010). Available from [http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1439\\_web.pdf](http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1439_web.pdf) (accessed 12 June 2010).

which included the equipping of an international training auditorium. Under the second phase, two training laboratories were furnished, respectively, with equipment for a central alarm station and a local alarm station. Three outdoor training areas were also constructed, featuring, respectively, a full-scale model of a nuclear power plant perimeter fencing area, a range of variants of fences used at nuclear power plants and training stands for studying separate models of detection sensors based on various physical principles of operation. The new nuclear security training facilities of the Centre were inaugurated in May and the first international training course using these facilities took place in October to November 2009.

### ***Nuclear security peer reviews***

Nuclear security advisory missions continued to be key tools for the assessment of needs by the Agency, which conducted 14 such missions in 2009. More than half of these missions dealt with physical protection and with legal, regulatory and practical measures for controlling nuclear and other radioactive material. Several additional missions reviewed measures for the detection of illicit nuclear trafficking and response to nuclear security incidents. The Agency also conducted a number of technical visits, which addressed security needs at locations, including border crossings, medical facilities, scientific institutes and industrial sites.

### ***Combating illicit nuclear trafficking***

An essential element of the Agency's nuclear security assistance to States continued to be the provision of equipment for detecting and responding to unauthorized movement of nuclear and other radioactive material, including illicit trafficking. The Nuclear Security Equipment Laboratory coordinated the provision to States of 471 instruments for radiation detection, including remote monitoring systems and radiation portal monitors. The laboratory's technical staff became increasingly integrated in the conduct of missions and training courses on detection and response, participating in 35 such events during the year.

### ***Risk reduction***

The Agency continued to assist States in establishing systems and technical measures for protecting nuclear material, associated facilities and transports, and radiation sources and radioactive waste against malicious, criminal or terrorist access. During the year, the Agency completed, in over 12 countries, upgrades to facilities housing nuclear material or radioactive sources. Several additional arrangements were also concluded from the technical side and were in final administrative stages by the end of the year. Furthermore, the Agency was an implementing partner in operations to repatriate to the Russian Federation more than 225 kg of spent high-enriched uranium fuel from Kazakhstan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Poland and Romania, as well

as 18.9 kg of fresh high-enriched uranium fuel from Hungary. In addition, 597 vulnerable radioactive sources, of which 53 were Category 1 or 2 sources, were recovered from seven countries, including four African States.

### **Illicit Trafficking Database**

The Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database contains data on illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events from 1993 onwards. The membership of the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database programme continued to expand, numbering 108 member States and 1 non-member State. As of 31 December, States had reported or otherwise confirmed 1,801 incidents to the database. In 2009, 239 incidents were reported, 124 of which had occurred during the year (others occurred earlier). Of the 124 incidents, 9 involved illegal possession and attempts to sell nuclear materials or radioactive sources. In 26 cases, thefts or losses of radioactive sources were reported. The remaining 89 incidents involved discoveries of uncontrolled material, unauthorized disposals, and inadvertent unauthorized shipments and storage of nuclear materials, radioactive sources and radioactively contaminated materials.

Information provided to the database continued to indicate risks of illicit trafficking and pointed to vulnerabilities in protection, accounting and detections systems, as well as in regulatory infrastructures. It provided evidence that supported the need for further improvement of measures to control and secure nuclear and other radioactive material, wherever used or located, and of capabilities to detect illicit trafficking and other unauthorized acts involving such material.

## **Export controls**

### **Nuclear Suppliers Group**

The aim of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation, on a national basis, of export controls of nuclear and nuclear-related materials, equipment, software and technology, without hindering international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The 19th Plenary Meeting of the NSG took place in Budapest on 11 to 12 June and was chaired by Györgyi Martin Zanathy (Hungary). The NSG had 46 Participating Governments,<sup>87</sup> including Iceland whose membership

---

<sup>87</sup> Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

was approved by the plenary. The European Commission participated as a permanent observer, while the Chairman of the Zangger Committee participated in the plenary as an observer.

The NSG also organized a seminar in New York on 15 October on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation. Participants of the seminar acknowledged the importance of strengthened international solidarity and enhanced transparency in the field of transfers of nuclear material. It was also stressed during the seminar that recent developments, particularly the adoption by consensus of United Nations Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) (see appendix IV for text), could give further impetus to the ongoing work of the NSG in addressing nuclear non-proliferation challenges while ensuring that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field were not unduly hindered in the process.

## **Missile-related issues**

### **Missile Technology Control Regime**

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 24th Plenary Meeting in Rio de Janeiro from 11 to 13 November to evaluate its activities and further intensify its efforts to prevent missile proliferation. The plenary was inaugurated by Vera Barrouin Machado, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs of Brazil's Ministry of External Relations, and chaired by Georges Lamazière (Brazil).

MTCR Partners,<sup>88</sup> agreeing that the Regime had a key role to play in preventing missile proliferation, discussed the rapid changes in relevant technology and the need for reinvigorated efforts to continually adjust the MTCR technology control list to remain ahead of developments in missile proliferation. In this regard, they agreed on a number of proposals to update the Technical Annex.

The Partners exchanged information and discussed global trends in missile developments related to the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. They focused in particular on challenges posed by missile proliferation in North-East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, where missile programmes of increasing range are being developed and where the capability to export missile technology is growing. In this regard, the Partners renewed their determination to discourage missile programmes and activities of proliferation concern, in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law.

---

<sup>88</sup> The 34 Partners of the MTCR are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

MTCR Partners, recalling the Security Council's reaffirmation that proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery constituted a threat to international peace and security, noted the direct relevance of important Security Council resolutions to MTCR export controls and expressed their strong support for these resolutions. They renewed their determination to implement fully those resolutions and exercise vigilance to prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to WMD delivery systems, including through strict implementation and, where necessary, further strengthening of their national export controls.

Individually and through the outreach activities of the Chair, the Partners confirmed their intention to continue cooperating with non-members to promote effective export controls over missiles and missile technology. To that end, they intended, *inter alia*, to provide a better understanding of the types of equipment and technology being sought by proliferators and the methods they were using to acquire such items. They welcomed the successful outcome of the technical outreach meeting for non-member countries in Paris in April 2009. The Chair was mandated to carry out outreach activities with a wide range of non-member States.

Consistent with their support for Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008), which urged all States to establish effective national export controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials, MTCR Partners called on all States to take action to discourage missile proliferation, including by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines. The Partners, which were in a position to do so, reaffirmed their willingness to assist non-member States, as stipulated in resolution 1540 (2004).

### **The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation**

The Subscribing States<sup>89</sup> of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOG) held their Eighth Regular Meeting from 28 to

---

<sup>89</sup> Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-

29 May in Vienna. The Conference discussed, inter alia, the strengthening of confidence-building measures, such as pre-launch notifications and annual declarations of ballistic missiles, space-launch vehicles and the importance of outreach activities to foster the universalization of the HCOC and thereby increase the number of Subscribing States.

The Chairperson of the Conference, Ana Teresa Dengo (Costa Rica), expressed her commitment to uphold the principles of the HCOC and promote its universalization, as well as enhance its full implementation by all Subscribing States. She reiterated the need to strengthen relations with the United Nations and pledged to continue outreach activities to advance the objectives of the Code.

In the general debate, Subscribing States welcomed the reaffirmation of the Code's importance and relevance by the United Nations General Assembly at its sixty-third session on 17 October 2008, in a resolution<sup>90</sup> supported by 159 Member States. The EU presented a proposal for the creation of an Internet-based information and communication system. Other Subscribing States<sup>91</sup> also presented proposals during the Regular Meeting.

It was decided that the next Regular Meeting of Subscribing States would be held in Vienna from 31 May and 1 June 2010 under the chairmanship of France.

### **1540 Committee: implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008)**

On 4 March, the 1540 Committee<sup>92</sup> submitted its eighth Programme of Work<sup>93</sup> for the period 1 February 2009 to 31 January 2010, focusing on five main areas of its work, including:

(a) Organizing a comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and reporting to the Security Council on its outcome;

(b) Increasing its knowledge by examining the information on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

---

Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zambia.

<sup>90</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Resolutions and Decisions of the Sixty-third Session of the General Assembly*, vol. 33 (Part I): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), pp. 102-104.

<sup>91</sup> Germany, Russian Federation and Ukraine.

<sup>92</sup> Security Council Committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004.

<sup>93</sup> S/2009/124.

(c) Engaging in outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation to promote implementation of all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004);

(d) Enhancing ongoing cooperation between the Committee and other international organizations, including the Security Council Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999)<sup>94</sup> and 1373 (2001); and

(e) Encouraging and fully availing voluntary financial contributions to assist States in identifying and addressing their needs for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

From 30 September to 2 October, the Committee conducted an open meeting<sup>95</sup> with broad participation. Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations as well as other entities were invited to participate both in the open meeting and in the comprehensive review process. Member States were encouraged to share their views to assess the evolution of risks and threats, address specific critical issues that had not been resolved and identify possible new approaches for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).<sup>96</sup> The final outcome of the review was not envisaged as an update of the report of the Committee on compliance that was presented in July 2008,<sup>97</sup> but rather as a complimentary exercise to be presented in January 2010.

### **Outreach activities**

As requested in Security Council resolution 1810 (2008), the 1540 Committee continued to organize and participate in outreach activities at regional, subregional and national levels to promote the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

In 2009, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs organized the following four workshops aimed at enhancing national capacities for the management of border and export controls and promoting information and experience-sharing among relevant enforcement authorities:

- In Doha, Qatar, from 8 to 11 March for the Arab States,<sup>98</sup> funded by the EU, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States.
- In Port Vila, Vanuatu, from 29 April to 1 May for the Pacific Islands States,<sup>99</sup> funded by the EU, Norway and New Zealand.

---

<sup>94</sup> Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999.

<sup>95</sup> See S/2009/432.

<sup>96</sup> See S/2009/170.

<sup>97</sup> S/2008/493.

<sup>98</sup> Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Representatives from international and regional organizations: IAEA, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), League of Arab States and Middle East and North African Financial Action Task Force.

<sup>99</sup> Cook Islands, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Representatives from international

- In San José, Costa Rica, from 8 to 10 September for the Central American States,<sup>100</sup> funded by the EU, Norway and the United States.
- In Cairo, Egypt, from 7 to 10 December for the African States,<sup>101</sup> funded by the EU, Norway and the United States.

In addition, the Chair, as well as members and experts, of the 1540 Committee participated in a number of international, regional and national events throughout the year to promote and advance the full implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008).

### **Cooperation with other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council**

The 1540 Committee continued cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee<sup>102</sup> and the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee.<sup>103</sup> The Chairs of the three Committees conducted a joint briefing of the Security Council on 26 May<sup>104</sup> and 13 November,<sup>105</sup> elaborating on the cooperation with respect to resolution 1810 (2008) and reiterating the need to enhance ongoing collaborative efforts among the three Committees, including through enhanced information-sharing, coordination on visits to countries, technical assistance and other issues of relevance.

### **Cooperation with international organizations**

Aware of their special role and ability to assist Member States, the Committee continued its cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations, as well as NGOs, to promote and advance the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In this connection, the Chair, members and experts of the 1540 Committee participated in a number of events organized by international and regional organizations.

---

and regional organizations: IAEA, OPCW, International Maritime Organization, Oceania Customs Organization and Secretariat of the Pacific Community.

<sup>100</sup> Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama. Representatives from international and regional organizations: IAEA, OPCW, World Customs Organization (WCO), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Organization of American States and Central American Integration System.

<sup>101</sup> Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda. Representatives of international and regional organizations: IAEA, OPCW, WCO, INTERPOL, UNODC, African Union, African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism and CARICOM.

<sup>102</sup> Security Council Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001.

<sup>103</sup> Security Council Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999.

<sup>104</sup> See S/PV.6128.

<sup>105</sup> See S/PV.6217.

## **Assistance**

The 1540 Committee continued to act as a clearing house for assistance requests by facilitating contacts and information exchange, including through its website,<sup>106</sup> which contained numerous offers for assistance. The Committee facilitated this process by matching assistance requests and offers through its assistance template.

## **Political declarations and other initiatives**

In 2009, the international community generated considerable momentum for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world, with a number of notable proposals and initiatives being advanced by political leaders, Governments, parliamentarians and civil society. The Secretary-General also continued to remain personally engaged in advancing disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Some nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States raised their rhetoric in favour of nuclear disarmament, presented concrete proposals and reiterated their commitments to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.

On 5 April in Prague, President Barack Obama expressed the commitment of the United States “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”,<sup>107</sup> outlining a number of intermediate objectives for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the United States’ national security strategy and reaffirming his commitment to negotiate a new treaty with the Russian Federation to reduce their nuclear warheads and stockpiles. He also said he would “immediately and aggressively pursue” United States ratification of the CTBT as well as a new treaty that would verifiably end the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. Furthermore, he called for the NPT to be strengthened and for a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank. Finally, to guard against nuclear terrorism, President Obama announced a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.

On 27 April, the Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone proposed 11 benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament.<sup>108</sup> The benchmarks included steps to be taken by the NWS, including further reductions in the arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States, disarmament by other NWS, transparency of nuclear arsenals, irreversible nuclear disarmament and study of future verification measures. The benchmarks that applied to all States included regimes to ban nuclear-weapon test explosions and prohibit

---

<sup>106</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/sc/1540/> (accessed 14 June 2010).

<sup>107</sup> Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered> (accessed 12 June 2010).

<sup>108</sup> “Conditions towards zero: 11 benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament”, statement issued 27 April 2009. Available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/state0904.html> (accessed 14 June 2010).

the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, as well as restrictions on missiles. With regard to civil nuclear energy, the benchmarks provided for increased international cooperation on safeguards, and nuclear safety and security. The document also provided for strengthening safeguards and additional measures to prevent nuclear terrorism.

In July, the United Kingdom released a major report, entitled “The road to 2010”,<sup>109</sup> which addressed the strategic context and opportunities for the 2010 NPT Review Conference and also discussed the issues of nuclear security, civil nuclear energy and global governance. The United Kingdom proposed a three-stage process for further progress towards achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation beyond 2010, which included transparency and control measures such as legally binding and verifiable controls on nuclear technologies and materials, as well as limits on activities related to nuclear weapons development and production. On arms reductions measures, the report placed the onus for achieving further reductions on the Russian Federation and the United States. On steps leading to a world free of nuclear weapons, the report discussed the need to address regional security issues, including those related to the Middle East and South Asia, as well as political, technical and financial issues relevant to verifying disarmament.

On 24 September, President Obama chaired the Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The meeting marked the fifth summit at the Head-of-State level in the history of the Security Council. With 14 Heads of State participating,<sup>110</sup> the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1887 (2009) (see appendix IV for text), which called for NWS, and those who have not yet done so, to ratify a ban on nuclear testing and negotiate a new treaty to stop the production of fissile material. It also called for them to join the disarmament process being led by the United States and the Russian Federation. The document also endorsed measures intended to strengthen the NPT and the IAEA role in addressing nuclear threats and non-compliance with nuclear treaties.

In calling for a world free of nuclear weapons, the Secretary-General welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009). He stated that the summit was a historic event that had opened a new chapter in the Council’s efforts to address nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

---

<sup>109</sup> “The road to 2010: addressing the nuclear question in the twenty first century”, document Cm 7625, July 2009. Available from <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/224864/roadto2010.pdf> (accessed 7 June 2010).

<sup>110</sup> Heinz Fischer of Austria, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, Hu Jintao of China, Óscar Arias Sánchez of Costa Rica, Stjepan Mesić of Croatia, Nicolas Sarkozy of France, Yukio Hatoyama of Japan, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa of Mexico, Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda, Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom, Barack Obama of the United States and Nguyen Minh Triet of Viet Nam.

He also expressed hope that the international community would seize and build on this momentum towards advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

On his part, the Secretary-General presented on 8 December his Action Plan for Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation,<sup>111</sup> which elaborated upon his 2008 five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament.<sup>112</sup>

The action plan consisted of the following proposals, where the Secretary-General:

(a) Pledged to work to facilitate success at the 2010 NPT Review Conference through statements, advocacy and attendance at events, urged like-minded States to facilitate agreement on measures related to disarmament and non-proliferation, and encouraged Member States to consider seriously the proposal for a nuclear-weapon convention;

(b) Encouraged the Security Council to meet annually to discuss nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to consider the adoption of a joint declaration for the 2010 NPT Review Conference addressing nuclear disarmament issues;

(c) Pledged to promote the universality of multilateral treaties dealing with all WMD, the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons, and the entry into force of the CTBT;

(d) Called upon States parties at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to consider adopting a United Nations registry on measures taken by States to implement article VI of the Treaty, and pledged to explore ways to encourage greater involvement by civil society and parliamentarians; and

(e) Called upon States to pursue eliminating other WMD, combating WMD terrorism, and banning missiles and space weapons, while not losing sight of conventional disarmament.

On 10 April, the Inter-Parliamentary Union adopted a resolution entitled “Advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and securing the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: the role of parliaments”. The resolution encouraged parliamentarians to take a number of actions in support of disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, and for parliaments to instruct their Governments to support the Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament. In addition, the resolution called for efforts to bring the CTBT into force. It also called for States to take additional nuclear disarmament measures, including prohibiting short- and intermediate-range land-based missiles that carry nuclear warheads,

---

<sup>111</sup> Available from [http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search\\_full.asp?statID=674](http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=674).

<sup>112</sup> “The United Nations and security in a nuclear-weapon-free world”, address to the East-West Institute, New York, 24 October 2008. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SG/sgstatements.shtml>.

de-alerting and de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in security doctrines, and taking necessary steps to declare the Middle East an NWFZ.

Throughout the year, nuclear disarmament continued to receive considerable attention and heightened interest from both civil society and leading international figures. Building upon the trend that followed from the January 2007 *The Wall Street Journal* article<sup>113</sup> by former senior United States officials calling for a world free of nuclear weapons, former Government officials in several countries also published similar articles.

On 9 January, former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, former President Richard von Weizsäcker, former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and former Government Minister Egon Bahr published an article in the *International Herald Tribune* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* entitled “Toward a nuclear-free world: a German view”. The authors expressed unreserved support for “a turnaround in nuclear policy” as advocated earlier by the American statesmen. The German authors made a number of proposals, including, inter alia, rekindling the vision of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev for a nuclear-weapon-free world, drastic reductions in the Russian and United States arsenals, eliminating short-range nuclear weapons and restoring the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

On 3 April, former Polish Presidents Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Lech Wałęsa, and former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki published an article in *Gazeta Wyborcza* entitled “The unthinkable becomes thinkable: towards elimination of nuclear weapons”. They noted that the end of the cold war had not changed the international order which was still based on the dangerous doctrine of mutual deterrence, and called for a system based on cooperation and interdependence. They believed that effective nuclear non-proliferation would not be possible unless the Russian Federation and the United States took urgent steps towards nuclear disarmament. They shared the expectation of others that achieving zero nuclear weapons should be the basis for a future multilateral nuclear disarmament agreement.

On 4 June, former Norwegian Prime Ministers Odvar Nordli, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Kåre Willoch and Kjell Magne Bondevik and former Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg published an article on the front page of *Aftenposten* entitled “A nuclear weapon-free world”. Their article stressed the necessity of eliminating nuclear weapons and the facilities that produce them, as well as all fissile material for military use. In this regard, they called upon the Russian Federation and the United States to take the first steps and also to include sub-strategic nuclear weapons in future disarmament negotiations.

---

<sup>113</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William J. Perry and George P. Shultz, “A world free of nuclear weapons”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 2007. Available from <http://www.henryakissinger.com/articles/wsj010407.html> (accessed 14 June 2010). For a brief discussion, see the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 32 (2007), pp. 39-40, available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/index.shtml>.

In addition, they argued that the development of any missile defences should be subordinated to disarmament considerations. They also advocated retaining existing instruments and initiatives, including the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the United States–Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1990-1991 and the NPT. Pending further progress in nuclear disarmament, they urged that the existing security doctrines should reflect the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons should be to ensure that such weapons were not used.

On 14 October, former French Prime Ministers Alain Juppé and Michel Rocard, former Defence Minister Alain Richard and Retired General Bernard Norlain published an article in *Le Monde* entitled “For global nuclear disarmament, the only means to prevent anarchic proliferation”. They argued that in light of the reduced utility of nuclear deterrence and the need to strengthen non-proliferation, the NWS, together with other States possessing nuclear weapons, must cease the development of new types of nuclear weapons and engage in a process leading to the structured elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

On 2 December, former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, former Foreign Minister Max van der Stoep, former Defence and Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo and former Justice Minister Frits Korthals Altes published an article in *NRC Handelsblad* entitled “We must play an active role to establish a nuclear weapon free world”. They argued that, since the end of the cold war, the existence of nuclear weapons had become far more dangerous and that the primary responsibility for disarmament lay with the two States with the largest arsenals. They further argued that the Netherlands, which hosts the International Court of Justice, should do more to make its views on disarmament heard, especially in the context of the review of the NATO Strategic Concept.

On 29 June, the Global Zero campaign, sponsored by 100 prominent political, former military and civil society figures, released a draft action plan, which outlined a four-phase road map to eliminate all nuclear warheads by 2030, with a global accord to be signed and ratified by all NWS after 2020. The Global Zero campaign had been launched in December 2008 to promote the phased and verified elimination of nuclear weapons, starting with deep reductions in the United States and Russian arsenals.

The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, co-chaired by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, released its final report on 15 December.<sup>114</sup> The report contained 76 recommendations

---

<sup>114</sup> International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, *Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers* (Canberra, 2009). Available

for Governments, international organizations and civil society for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, strengthening nuclear non-proliferation, mitigating the threat of nuclear terrorism and addressing risks associated with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To this end, the report proposed a two-phase approach, including the reduction in nuclear arsenals by 2025 to be followed by preparations for their elimination.

During the First Committee, Kazakhstan introduced a new draft resolution which was originally entitled “International Day for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, proposing 29 August (date of the closing of the Semipalatinsk nuclear-weapon testing site) as such a day. However, as a result of differing views over the appropriate date for such a day on the part of many delegations, the title of the draft resolution was revised to an “International Day against Nuclear Tests”. The General Assembly adopted the resolution by consensus.

### General Assembly, 2009

#### **64/27. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons**

Introduced annually, with only minor changes from the previous year, the resolution recommended that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character, and that the various alternative approaches, particularly those considered in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), be explored further. It also recommended that the Conference actively continue intensive negotiations to reach agreement and conclude effective international agreements on security assurances, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

**Introduced by:** Pakistan (27 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 118-0-58 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 119-0-58 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 19-23.

**First Committee.** After abstaining on the draft resolution, the **United States** explained that it had objections to certain provisions in the draft resolution and that the text did not accurately reflect the situation in the CD.

---

from <http://www.icndd.org/reference/reports/ent/index.html> (accessed 14 June 2010).

### 64/29. Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

This new resolution decided to include in the provisional agenda of the sixty-fifth session an item entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” and urged the CD to agree early in 2010 on a programme of work that included the immediate commencement of negotiations on the proposed treaty.

**Introduced by:** Canada (29 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (29 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 29-30.

**First Committee.** After joining the consensus, four States made statements. **France** explained that for almost 15 years it had been strongly committed to the negotiation of a cut-off treaty. It reiterated that it was also the first country to decide to close and dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and, currently, it no longer had any installations for such purposes. France called on all States concerned to do the same. **Pakistan** said that it joined the consensus, without prejudice to the need for the CD to adopt a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. The Conference members should commence substantive negotiations on that issue. Pakistan opposed a nuclear arms race in the South Asian region, especially against the backdrop of recent developments, and believed that the goal of regional peace could only be achieved by addressing issues on regional and international levels. It could not accept any position that would put itself at a strategic disadvantage. **Israel** stated that recent developments had highlighted the dangers of non-compliance and the uncontrolled dissemination of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, especially in the Middle East. It explained that certain States could masquerade their illegal activities, that compliance should be ensured for existing agreements and that multilateral arrangements should be entered into for nuclear fuel supply and storage options, among other things. The **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that it had joined the consensus on the understanding that negotiations on nuclear disarmament were of utmost importance and that the CD programme of work should be balanced and comprehensive. It added that a treaty banning fissile material should cover the past and future production of fissile material.

### 64/35. International Day against Nuclear Tests

Introduced for the first time, the resolution declared 29 August as the International Day against Nuclear Tests, devoted to enhancing public awareness and education about the effects of nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and the need for their cessation as one of the

**Introduced by:** Kazakhstan (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (30 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 50-51.

means of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. It also invited Member States, the United Nations system, civil society, academia, the mass media and individuals to commemorate the International Day in an appropriate manner, including through educational and public awareness-raising activities.

**First Committee.** Speaking before the vote, **Sweden**, on behalf of the EU, which was ready to join consensus on the draft resolution, clarified that the EU understood “nuclear test” in the more precise terminology of the CTBT, which referred to “any nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions”. The EU continued to appeal to the States that had not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so without further delay, and in particular, the nine States listed in annex II to the CTBT, whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force. Although hesitant regarding the creation of international days, it hoped that the creation of an international day against nuclear tests would increase attention on the CTBT and speed up its entry into force.

After the action, **Switzerland** said that it had joined the consensus, despite its scepticism about its usefulness and value. It believed that the project was limited in scope, with provisions not applicable to other areas such as peaceful use of nuclear energy. It also called on all countries to sign and ratify the CTBT.

#### 64/37. Reducing nuclear danger

The resolution continued to call for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in that context, for immediate and urgent steps by the five NWS to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It also requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters,<sup>115</sup> and to continue to encourage Member States to consider the convening of an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration,<sup>116</sup> and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

**Introduced by:** India (15 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 115-50-14 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 113-50-15 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 53-56.

**First Committee.** After voting in favour, **Brazil** explained that it was convinced that the review of nuclear doctrines was crucial to reducing the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It believed that reducing nuclear danger could not substitute for multilateral disarmament efforts and that mere existence of those weapons constituted a grave global

<sup>115</sup> See A/56/400, para. 3.

<sup>116</sup> See resolution 55/2.

risk. It would have preferred that the thrust of the draft to have been the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

#### **64/47. Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons**

This year, the annual resolution encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the obligations under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions<sup>117</sup> and to undertake further steps in nuclear disarmament with greater transparency, including the conclusion

**Introduced by:** Japan (29 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 171-2-8 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 161-2-8 (29 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 86-91.

of a legally binding successor to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which was due to expire in December 2009, while welcoming the progress that had been made recently. It also called upon the NWS to take measures to reduce the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons and to consider further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security. Furthermore, it welcomed the adoption by the CD of a programme of work for its 2009 session,<sup>118</sup> and called upon the Conference to start its substantive work when it convened in January 2010, with due consideration to the increasing global momentum in favour of nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution also stressed the importance of preventing nuclear terrorism, encouraged every effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear and radiological material, and commended and further encouraged the constructive role played by civil society, including the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

*First Committee.* Making a general statement before the vote, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** strongly objected to Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), which were referred to in the draft resolution. It stressed that its second nuclear test was a self-defence measure to counter the action of the Security Council, which had made an issue of its peaceful satellite launch. It stated its willingness to participate in multiparty talks, including the Six-Party Talks, but would vote against the draft resolution.

After the voting in favour of the draft resolution, three States took the floor. The representative of the **Syrian Arab Republic** wished to express a reservation to the reference in the text to the CTBT because it detracted from the draft resolution's main thrust of nuclear disarmament. **Brazil** pointed out that the call in operative paragraph 15 for the universalization of the Model

<sup>117</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2350, No. 42195.

<sup>118</sup> See CD/1864.

Protocol Additional to the Agreements between States and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards referred to an instrument of a voluntary nature. The **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela** explained that it was fully committed to disarmament and non-proliferation and recognized multilateral efforts to achieve these goals. It pointed out, however, that the limited composition of the Security Council did not allow the rest of the United Nations delegations to participate in the Summit on nuclear issues held in September.

After voting against the draft resolution, **India** stated that it continued to support time-bound global disarmament, but that nuclear weapons were an integral part of its security. It clarified that it remained willing to work towards global disarmament and non-proliferation.

After abstaining in the vote, three States spoke in explanation. **France** said that with the upcoming Review Conference of the NPT, the draft resolution could have been clearer and included progress made and the problems still ahead. It fully supported a new agreement on reducing strategic arsenals by the Russian Federation and the United States, however, it regretted that reference was not made on measures taken by other NWS, including France and the United Kingdom. France supported operative paragraph 5 of the draft text, concerning transparency on the part of some NWS regarding their nuclear arsenals. **Pakistan** stated that while it supported the objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons, some provisions of the resolution were unrealistic. **China** explained that it endorsed the thrust of disarmament efforts in the resolution, however, the relevant measures described were not practical under current circumstances.

### **64/53. Nuclear disarmament**

Introduced annually, the resolution urged the CD to commence as early as possible its substantive work during its 2010 session, on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that took into consideration all the real and existing priorities in the field of disarmament and arms control.

**Introduced by:** Myanmar (23 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 111-45-19 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 112-43-21 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 115-122.

*First Committee.* Before the vote, in a general statement, **Cuba** said that it believed that the draft resolution fully addressed the issue of nuclear disarmament, which should continue to be the highest priority in the area of disarmament.

After the vote, **India** stated that it abstained owing to certain references to the NPT. It did, however, support the draft resolution's main objective, including provisions referring to the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), the Non-Aligned Movement summit statements, the advisory opinion of

the International Court of Justice, the time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons, the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD, and the call for convening an international conference on nuclear disarmament. **Pakistan**, which also abstained, explained that it agreed with a number of elements in the draft resolution, including, inter alia, on negative security assurances. However, it remained convinced that the references to the NPT Review Conferences were unwarranted.

### **64/55. Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons***

The annual resolution again called upon all States to fulfil immediately the obligation under the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice<sup>119</sup> by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. It also requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have taken to implement the present resolution and nuclear disarmament and requested the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its sixty-fifth session.

**Introduced by:** Malaysia (23 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 124-31-21 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 126-29-22 (30 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 134-137.

**First Committee.** After abstaining in the vote, **Japan** said that it supported the opinion of the Court's judges and the need to conclude the matter in good faith. It explained that, prior to embarking on negotiations that paragraph 2 of the draft resolution calls upon all States to commence, concrete measures must be taken to achieve steady, incremental progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. **Norway** maintained its vote against the draft resolution but was committed to the NPT goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. It stated that for the time being, the focus should be on achieving a positive outcome of the upcoming NPT Review Conference. It also questioned the functionality and universality of the CD, which represented a limited number of countries, and regretted that the text did not reflect the progress in the strategic talks between the United States and the Russian Federation and the Security Council summit that led to the adoption of resolution 1887 (2009).

### **64/57. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments**

Introduced annually, this year, the resolution urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rescind its announced withdrawal from the

<sup>119</sup> A/51/218, annex; see also *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996*, p. 226.

NPT, to re-establish cooperation with the IAEA and to rejoin the Six-Party Talks, with a view to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. It also called upon all parties to the NPT to spare no effort to ensure a successful and constructive outcome of the 2010 Review Conference and stressed that the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference should build upon the positive results reached at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences, contribute significantly to the concrete implementation of the outcomes of both Conferences, advance the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world, strengthen the NPT in all its aspects and contribute to achieving its full implementation and universality. Furthermore, it called upon all NPT States parties to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference and also called upon the CD States members to pursue continued positive developments in that forum, in order to maintain the momentum that led to the adoption of a programme of work on 29 May, and spare no efforts to ensure an early start to the substantive work of the Conference at the beginning of its 2010 session.

**Introduced by:** Brazil (27 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 169-5-5; 162-4-2, o.p. 4 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 165-5-4; 159-4-2, o.p. 4 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 142-147.

**First Committee.** Before the vote, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** stated that it was in favour of the main thrust of the text, however, could not support its reference to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It also believed that the NPT was discriminatory in content and unfair in implementation, with NWS imposing non-proliferation obligations on developing countries, while evading their obligations under the NPT. It signed the Treaty in 1985, with a hope of peaceful nuclear-energy development, but its expectations had not been met. It would therefore vote against the draft.

After voting against the draft resolution, two States took the floor. **India** stated that it remained committed to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It believed in disarmament and non-proliferation, and in a credible time-bound programme for nuclear disarmament. Its negative vote was because it could not agree to accede to the NPT as a NNWS. The **United States** said that it had engaged in intense consultations with the sponsors, but that the two sides had been unable to reach agreement on changes that would have made the draft resolution acceptable to the United States. It looked forward to continuing discussions on the subject.

**Pakistan**, which abstained in the vote, explained that it could not accept the NPT-related references in the text, owing to its known position on that subject.

### 64/59. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Unchanged from previous years, this annual resolution reiterated its request to the CD to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

**Introduced by:** India (15 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 116-50-12 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 116-50-11 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 150-152.

### 64/66. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

This annual resolution again called upon Israel to accede to the NPT, and not to develop, produce, test or acquire nuclear weapons, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all of its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly's sixty-fifth session on the implementation of the resolution.

**Introduced by:** Egypt (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 167-6-6; 164-5-5, p.p. 6 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 164-5-6; 163-4-6, p.p. 6 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 170-174.

**First Committee.** In general statements before the vote, five States took the floor. The **Syrian Arab Republic** said that the activities of Israel, which possessed nuclear weapons outside the non-proliferation regime, were being overlooked. It stressed that it had been among the first States to call for the region to become free of WMD under international supervision, however, Israel had still not subjected its nuclear programme to IAEA safeguards. **Sweden**, speaking on behalf of the EU, said that the EU intended to vote in favour of the text, but that it did not support the preambular reference to IAEA resolution GC(53)/RES/17. Also, the draft resolution did not mention the serious proliferation risks related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme. **Israel** stated that the current situation on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East warranted the question of whether the draft text was realistic. It mentioned that cases of non-compliance with the NPT in the region demonstrated the alarming attitude of certain Middle Eastern States towards their international commitments in the nuclear sphere. The **Islamic Republic of Iran** explained that it remained committed to establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East, but regretted that Israel remained an impediment to that goal. **Norway** clarified that, while it would support the text, it shared the EU concerns about it. It was in favour of the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.

After abstaining in the vote, two States addressed the Committee. **India** said that the focus should be limited to the region the draft intended to address.

It also stated that the call to States outside the NPT to accede to it and to IAEA safeguards was at variance with the principle of free consent and contrary to current realities. Canada explained that the text unfairly singled out Israel. If the draft's goal was to stem proliferation, then it should require that all States adhered to and complied fully with their obligations.

After voting against the draft resolution, the **United States** explained that the text was neither fair nor balanced and did not mention the failure of some NPT States parties in the region to comply with their IAEA obligations.

#### **64/516. Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources**

A resolution was introduced in 2007 on the subject. By the terms of the decision, the General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth session the item entitled "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources".

**Submitted by:** France (27 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 195.

**First Committee.** After joining consensus on the draft decision, the **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela** said that it hoped that when the next resolution on the subject was considered it would include, inter alia, the idea that preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD was through the elimination of those weapons and that States possessing WMDs had the primary responsibility to suppress such weapons.

chapter II

**Biological and chemical weapons**



## CHAPTER II

### Biological and chemical weapons

#### Developments and trends, 2009

DURING THE YEAR, States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)<sup>1</sup> continued to develop national capacities to deal with the threat posed by the possible use of the life sciences as a weapon. The annual meetings of the BWC helped to identify common ground around the world, provided a key forum for expert exchange, fostered a community dedicated to preventing the hostile use of the life sciences and carried out work in many areas to ensure that biology is used solely for peaceful purposes.

The BWC was also three quarters of the way into its intersessional process that began after the Sixth Review Conference held in 2006<sup>2</sup> and will end before the Seventh Review Conference scheduled for 2011. This ongoing process has built upon the work of an earlier series of meetings that ran from 2003 to 2005.<sup>3</sup> The process aims to obtain a common understanding on ways of strengthening the implementation of the Convention and improving its effectiveness as a practical barrier against the development of biological weapons.

In 2009, progress continued to be made in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).<sup>1</sup> On 16 March, India became the third possessor State party, after Albania and another State party, which had requested anonymity, to have completely destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile within the framework of the CWC.

Inspectors of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verified the destruction of approximately 55 per cent of Category 1 chemical weapons and more than 52 per cent of Category 2 chemical weapons, which had been officially declared to OPCW. The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and Iraq joined the Convention in 2009, bringing the total number of States parties to 188. Iraq was the latest State party to declare the presence of chemical weapons that had been rendered unusable under the activities authorized by the United Nations Security Council. It also declared its former chemical weapons production facilities.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament>.

<sup>2</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 31 (2006) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.07.IX.1), pp. 73-77. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament>.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 28 (2003) (Sales No. E.04.IX.1), pp. 86-90; vol. 29 (2004) (E.05.IX.1), pp. 76-81; and vol. 30 (2005) (E.06.IX.1), pp. 78-83.

Significant advances were also made under the OPCW Action Plan on the national implementation of the CWC. By the end of 2009, 184 States parties had established or designated their National Authorities, which is a crucial step to ensure the Convention's implementation. In addition, 46 per cent of the States parties instituted the necessary domestic legal framework to ensure the effective implementation of the Convention, including measures to prosecute and punish those who violate its provisions.

## **Biological weapons**

The format of the annual meetings of the BWC consists of sessions at the expert and State party levels and provides space for States to interact and to share expertise, experience and best practices among themselves as well as engage with the stakeholder communities. The perceived value of these meetings could be seen from increasing levels of participation in the BWC process (see figure I).

The intersessional BWC process succeeded in bridging gaps between different viewpoints. By bringing States parties closer together and fostering a positive working environment, this process yielded practical improvements in national capacity to deal with biological weapon threats. The BWC States parties also started to look towards the next review conference in 2011, using the current momentum to consolidate gains and translate national efforts into collective international results.

The topic of the BWC meetings in 2009, as mandated by the Sixth Review Conference, covered both international cooperation and capacity-building.<sup>4</sup> This meant identifying the requirements of States parties in need of assistance and making such assistance available from States parties and international organizations in a position to do so.


The BWC Meeting of Experts, held in August, provided an opportunity for a thorough investigation of these issues by experts from around the world with different backgrounds. The information generated was processed by the Chairman and the Implementation Support Unit (ISU)<sup>5</sup> into a more usable format prior to the December Meeting of States Parties, which was tasked to

---

<sup>4</sup> The Sixth Review Conference's mandate for 2009 meetings was, "with a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases: (1) for States Parties in need of assistance, identifying requirements and requests for capacity enhancement; and (2) from States Parties in a position to do so, and international organizations, opportunities for providing assistance related to these fields".

<sup>5</sup> The Sixth Review Conference decided to establish the ISU for the Convention within the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. It provides support and assistance in administrative matters, national implementation, confidence-building measures and obtaining universality.

Figure I. Participation in BWC meetings<sup>a</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Abbreviations are as follows: RC = Review Conference (with (O) = original session, (R) = resumed session); RCPC = Review Conference prepcom; AHG = Ad Hoc Group; MSP = Meeting of States Parties; MX = Meeting of Experts; CBM = Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts to Finalise the Modalities for the Exchange of Information and Data; VEREX = Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint; FCM = Formal Consultative Meeting; SPEC = Special Conference; SPECPC = Special Conference prepcom.

develop common understandings on how the mandated issues could be moved forward to pave the way for effective action.

### **Meeting of Experts**

A total of 103 States participated in the Meeting of Experts held from 24 to 28 August in Geneva. This total included 96 States parties,<sup>6</sup> 4 signatory States<sup>7</sup> and 3 States<sup>8</sup> from outside the regime, which were granted observer status. The national delegations were joined by three United Nations entities<sup>9</sup> and six specialized agencies or other international organizations,<sup>10</sup> including those dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation, crime and justice, international humanitarian law and technology, as well as public, animal and plant health. At the invitation of the Chairman, and in recognition of the special nature of the topic under consideration, 10 scientific, professional, academic and industry bodies also participated as guests of the Meeting of Experts.<sup>11</sup> Sixteen non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research institutes attended the Meeting.<sup>12</sup> A total of nearly 500 individuals, including some 190

---

<sup>6</sup> Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zambia.

<sup>7</sup> Haiti, Myanmar, Syrian Arab Republic and United Republic of Tanzania.

<sup>8</sup> Angola, Cameroon and Israel.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

<sup>10</sup> European Commission, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Science and Technology Center, World Health Organization and the World Organisation for Animal Health.

<sup>11</sup> Amyris Biotechnologies, Biosafety and Biosecurity International Conference Series, European Biosafety Association, HealthMap, International Council for Life Sciences, International Security and Biopolicy Institute, International Vaccine Institute, National Center for Security and Crisis Management (Jordan), NTI Global Health Security Initiative and ProMED-mail.

<sup>12</sup> Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Bavarian Nordic, Biological Weapons Prevention Project, Center of Halabja against the Anfalization and Genocide of the Kurds, Center for Biosecurity University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Institute for National Security Studies, International Peace Bureau (Italy), Pax Christi International (Ireland), Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Texas Tech

technical experts, gathered to consider the mandated topic. The large number and diverse range of participants allowed the Meeting of Experts to draw upon expertise from both the public and private sectors, as well as to benefit from independent, national, regional and international perspectives.

Under the chairmanship of Marius Grinius (Canada), the substantive work of the Meeting began with a formal session offering opportunities to States to make general observations and introductory comments.<sup>13</sup>

Seven working sessions were held, covering all aspects of the topic. For the first time at a BWC meeting, all working sessions were held in public and were broadcast live over the Internet, with 51 States parties, 5 international organizations and 9 guests of the Meeting making presentations or statements. The topic was divided into five subtopics.<sup>14</sup>

In addition to the statements and presentations, the Meeting of Experts also held a poster session on 27 August, with 27 posters presented by several States, international organizations, guests of the Meeting and NGOs. The posters visually provided additional technical information, enabled participants to process data at their own pace and facilitated improved interaction among the experts.

Furthermore, during the Meeting, numerous side events were organized by States, academia and industry representatives, the ISU and NGOs.<sup>15</sup>

---

University School of Law, Geneva Forum, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of Bradford and Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.

<sup>13</sup> Twenty-five States, some on behalf of broader groups, made statements (Algeria, Bangladesh, Chile, China, Cuba (on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States), India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sweden (on behalf of the European Union), Turkey, Ukraine, United States of America and Yemen). Among NGOs, research institutes and the private sector, nine organizations addressed delegations on the opening day. Statements and presentations during the Meeting of Experts are available from <http://www.unog.ch/bwc>.

<sup>14</sup> Subtopics with corresponding statements and presentations made at the 2009 BWC Meeting of Experts: national arrangements (19 States, 1 international organization); international arrangements (3 international organizations); opportunities for international cooperation (19 States); specific needs and challenges (12 States); and role of international, regional and non-governmental organizations (1 State, 1 international organization, 9 guests of the Meeting).

<sup>15</sup> Side events (sponsors in parentheses): 24 August—launching of the second Joint Action in support of the BWC (European Union); speed-networking session to help experts get acquainted (ISU); 25 August—session to introduce a separate Joint Action in support of the biosafety and biosecurity work of the World Health Organization; event on regional disease surveillance networks (International Council for the Life Sciences); 26 August—panel discussion on national experiences and responses to H1N1 influenza (several States parties); 27 August—session on implementing ecohealth surveillance (independent expert Anupa Gupte); event on stockpiling and delivery of medical countermeasures (International Security and Biopolicy Institute); 28 August—event focusing on the

Delegations were also able to draw upon a variety of other resources: 28 working papers were circulated during the Meeting.<sup>16</sup> During the course of the Meeting of Experts, the Chairman compiled a list of considerations, lessons learned, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the discussions and available resources. As in previous years, this document was annexed to the report of the Meeting.<sup>17</sup>

The final session of the Meeting was devoted to summarizing its work in a factual report.<sup>18</sup> Delegations also heard remarks by the Chairman on universalization activities. The report was adopted by consensus and the Meeting closed as scheduled on 28 August. In his concluding remarks, the Chairman highlighted that the Meeting had covered considerable ground, laying a firm foundation for reaching common understandings on dealing with disease and also for building national capacity and resources.

### **Meeting of States Parties**

From 7 to 11 December, the 2009 Meeting of States Parties was held in Geneva. Pursuant to the conclusions of the Meeting of Experts in August and in an attempt to build on the momentum from the Meeting, the Chairman structured his consultations around four themes: sustainability; integrating approaches to humans, animals and plants; improving coordination; and addressing specific needs and requirements. He encouraged States parties to pursue an action-oriented product for the 2009 Meeting that would be of practical assistance to all States parties, enabling them to take effective action in building capacity to deal with diseases.

With that in mind, the Meeting of States Parties was held under the theme “Information for Action”. This approach clearly struck a chord as the Meeting enjoyed the highest level of participation of any intersessional meeting to date, and the second highest turnout of any BWC meeting. Participating in the December Meeting were representatives from 100 States parties,<sup>19</sup>

---

political implications of the possible de novo synthesis of smallpox (International Security and Biopolicy Institute).

<sup>16</sup> All the documents from the Meeting of Experts are available from <http://www.unog.ch/bwc>.

<sup>17</sup> “Report of the Meeting of Experts”, BWC/MSP/2009/MX/3, annex I. This and subsequent BWC documents are available from <http://www.unog.ch/bwc>.

<sup>18</sup> “Report of the Meeting of Experts”, BWC/MSP/2009/MX/3.

<sup>19</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania,

6 signatory States,<sup>20</sup> 2 non-States parties,<sup>21</sup> 3 United Nations entities,<sup>22</sup> 4 international organizations<sup>23</sup> and 14 NGOs, research institutes and industry representatives.<sup>24</sup>

The Meeting of States Parties began with a substantive general debate.<sup>25</sup> States parties structured their discussion on the subject of capacity-building to deal with disease by holding sessions for each specific aspect: aims; addressing problems, challenges, needs and restrictions; developing mechanisms for building capacity; developing necessary infrastructure; developing human resources; and developing standard operating procedures. Among the speakers was Ellen Tauscher, United States Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, who highlighted the United States Government's new national strategy for addressing biological threats. The Meeting also held a working session on the report of the Chairman on universalization activities (see pp. 64-65) and the report of the ISU (see pp. 65-68).

As reflected in the report of the Meeting,<sup>26</sup> the States parties appreciated the value of working together to promote capacity-building to deal with disease and agreed that such efforts would directly support the objectives of the Convention. This strengthened the concept of health security under

---

Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Yemen.

<sup>20</sup> Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Haiti, Myanmar, Syrian Arab Republic and United Republic of Tanzania.

<sup>21</sup> Israel and Angola.

<sup>22</sup> UNODA, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

<sup>23</sup> European Union, International Committee of the Red Cross, OPCW and the World Health Organization.

<sup>24</sup> Biological Weapons Convention Verification Inspection Partnerships, Bio Weapons Prevention Project, European Biosafety Association, International Council for the Life Sciences, International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, London School of Economics and Political Science, Morocco Biosafety Association, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, University of Bradford, University of Hamburg, United States National Academy of Sciences, and Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.

<sup>25</sup> Twenty-nine States, some on behalf of larger groups, made opening remarks (Algeria, Argentina, Australia (on behalf of Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand), Australia (in national capacity), Bangladesh, Chile, China, Cuba (on behalf of the Group of the Non-aligned Movement and Other States), Germany, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden (on behalf of the European Union), Switzerland, Turkey and the United States). Statements and presentations during the Meeting of States Parties are available from: <http://www.unog.ch/bwc>.

<sup>26</sup> "Report of the 2009 Meeting of States Parties", BWC/MSP/2009/5.

the BWC and reinforced the link between measures to deal with biological weapons on the one hand and natural and accidental disease on the other. This approach is based on the understanding that biological risks and threats are interlinked (see figure II).

**Figure II. Spectrum of biological risk**



The Meeting succeeded in delivering a comprehensive range of common understandings, which can be divided into two areas: pillars for building capacity (see table 1); and cross-cutting themes (see table 2).

### **Obtaining universality for the Convention**

The Meeting of States Parties reviewed a report by the Chairman (BWC/MSP/2009/4) on efforts to expand the membership of the Convention. The report contained relevant information made available to the Chairman and the ISU by States parties, non-States parties, NGOs and others during the course of the year. It covered the current status of States outside the BWC, indicating their intentions with regard to the Treaty, which included progress made with respect to adherence, problems or obstacles in their path, and measures that might facilitate their accession or ratification. It detailed the various activities undertaken by the Chairman and the ISU to encourage States to join the Treaty.

Furthermore, the Meeting reviewed the progress made during the year, noting that although no new States had joined the Treaty, four States<sup>27</sup> which previously had not joined the universalization efforts had now provided information.

The Chairman called upon States parties to redouble their efforts to expand the membership of the Treaty and outlined what he saw as the next critical steps. He stressed the need to better coordinate actions and activities and also highlighted the importance of demonstrating to non-States parties that joining the Convention would help to contribute to their overall security and public health goals. He also called upon States parties to identify a target level of membership that they should aim towards achieving prior to the next Review Conference in 2011, suggesting that a difficult but attainable target of 175 States parties could be a realistic goal. To this end, the Chairman

<sup>27</sup> Chad, Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Nauru.

**Table 1. Common understandings on pillars for building capacity to deal with disease, as reached at the 2009 BWC Meeting of States Parties<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Infrastructure components</i>	<i>Developing human resources</i>	<i>Implementing shared practices</i>
Disease surveillance systems, which continuously collect and analyse data from multiple sources	Make use of national, regional and international workshops	Use standard operating procedures to enhance sustainability, improve trust, build confidence, contribute to quality control and foster the highest standards of professional performance
Capacity for rapid detection and identification of pathogens	Ensure training materials are available in local languages	
Primary health care, veterinary and phytosanitary services	Take advantage of both computer-based and hands-on training	Develop and use best practice for surveillance, management, laboratory practice, manufacturing, safety, security, diagnostics and trade
Emergency and epidemiological response capabilities	Foster a more interdisciplinary approach to dealing with disease	
Communications capabilities	Engage all relevant sectors	Work with all relevant ministries to develop legislation, standards and guidelines
Appropriate national regulatory framework to provide command structure and necessary resources	Identify ways to reduce brain drain	Strengthen international protocols for the rapid sharing of information
Treatment capabilities, including diagnostics, vaccines and medicines	Need for political leadership	Take use of existing case studies to improve existing practices and procedures
	Provide sponsorship for training, exchange visits and travel to Meetings of Experts	

<sup>a</sup> Summarized from the report of the 2009 Meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2009/5, paras. 23-25.

stressed that there was no substitute to working in the regions with the greatest concentration of States outside the regime.

### **Work of the Implementation Support Unit**

The ISU presented its third annual report to the Meeting of States Parties,<sup>28</sup> which included a summary of its efforts to provide support for the Convention’s administration, national implementation, confidence-building measures (CBMs) and universalization.

<sup>28</sup> “Report of the Implementation Support Unit”, BWC/MSP/2009/2.

**Table 2. Common understandings on cross-cutting themes for building capacity to deal with disease, as reached at the 2009 BWC Meeting of States Parties<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Sustainability</i>	<i>Improving integration</i>	<i>Enhancing coordination</i>	<i>Overcoming challenges</i>
Pool resources	Ensure effective communication and coordination among human, animal and plant health sectors	Take advantage of all appropriate routes for assistance—bilateral, regional, international and multilateral	Mobilize resources, including financial resources, to facilitate the widest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information
Make funding processes longer-term and more predictable	Use an interdisciplinary, all-hazards approach	Forge North-South, South-South and North-North partnerships	States parties seeking to build capacity should identify specific needs and requirements and seek partnership
Ensure ownership by the receiving country	Improve how government departments and agencies work with the private sector, academia and non-governmental experts	Improve coordination and information-sharing among:	States parties in a position to do so should provide assistance and support
Address needs for day-to-day maintenance	Make use of public-private partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assistance providers</li> <li>• States parties and international efforts to tackle disease</li> <li>• National institutions, departments, agencies and other stakeholders</li> </ul>	Make use of the ISU to facilitate communication and partnerships, act as a clearing house for information and sources of cooperation
Tailor activities to meet differing circumstances of each recipient State			
Take full advantage of existing resources			
Utilize twinning programmes			
Use collaborative projects			

<sup>a</sup> Summarized from the report of the 2009 Meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2009/5, paras. 26-29.

The ISU administrative support activities included the following: acting as the substantive Secretariat for its meetings; facilitating attendance of meetings of the Convention; reorganizing and expanding its website, including its online tools, as well as updating the restricted access section to support implementation assistance; following up and reporting to States parties on scientific and technological developments; keeping in regular contact with relevant international organizations, as well as professional, commercial and academic institutions and associations; and organizing and participating in relevant workshops, seminars and meetings.

As part of its efforts to support national implementation, the ISU continued to act as a clearing house for implementation assistance. It also maintained and updated databases and compendiums of national approaches, interacted with providers of


relevant assistance and continued to collect and distribute details of national contact points.

On CBMs, the ISU maintained its electronic reporting platform, compiled and distributed submissions, provided basic statistics on the 2009 CBM returns submitted in 2009, assisted in the drafting of guidelines for completing CBM forms, and communicated with States parties to promote meeting the deadline for their submissions.

The ISU supported the Chairman’s activities to promote universalization, assisting him with correspondence with non-States parties to the Convention, and in providing support for meetings between the Chairman and representatives of non-States parties. It promoted universalization at many seminars and events in which it participated, provided information and advice to several signatories and non-States parties, and consolidated and published information in the restricted section of the ISU website on the progress being made the towards universality of the Convention.

Additionally, the report also provided details submitted under the CBM process. In recent years, this transparency exercise has seen an increase in submission levels (see figure III). Participation in the 2009 returns registered a slight increase over 2008, which is consistent with the general trend of greater participation.

**Figure III. CBMs participation since 1987 inception**



The ISU concluded its report by highlighting the following areas for future attention: the Unit has reached the limit of its capacity for involvement in events given its current mandate, staffing and resources; there were shortcomings in the current mechanisms for assistance to attend meetings; there were continuing concerns regarding information relevant to


universalization efforts; and there was inadequate availability of informal translation services to improve access to information. In this regard, the ISU made concrete recommendations for improvement in each of these areas.

In addition to its report, the ISU released a background document on relevant scientific and technological developments. This document summarized information that had been brought to the attention of the ISU in the course of its mandated activities as described in its report. The background document included information on continued progress in gene synthesis, automated research and security-related initiatives by scientific communities.

In discussions during the Meeting of States Parties, as well as after the presentation of the report of the ISU, States parties acknowledged the important role played by the ISU in supporting their efforts in all areas identified in the Unit’s mandate, and encouraged it to continue enhancing its efforts under the existing mandate. A number of States parties offered additional support and assistance to improve the Unit’s capacity to perform its assigned tasks.

In 2009, 64 States, representing 39 per cent of the membership of the Convention, reported through this mechanism. Figure IV provides a summary of the type of declaration made for each of the CBM reporting forms.

**Figure IV. 2009 CBMs summary**



## Biological Incident Database

In the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy's Plan of Action,<sup>29</sup> the section entitled "Measures to prevent and combat terrorism" invited the United Nations system to develop, together with Member States, a single comprehensive database on biological incidents, ensuring that it is complementary to the biocrimes database contemplated by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Such a database would be a platform for the exchange of technical information on biological incidents and it would promote coordination, outreach and capacity-building measures of Member States in support of preventing and combating terrorist threats.

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) continued its work on the database, initially developed and launched on a trial basis in July 2008<sup>30</sup> to promote and facilitate its use by Member States. In response to concerns about the security of data to be reported, a website for secure data entry was made available. UNODA provided briefings to Member States on the status of the Biological Incident Database during a number of information meetings offered by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. UNODA also published *Occasional Paper No. 15: Developing a Biological Incident Database*,<sup>31</sup> which provided information on the background, development and current status of the database.

## Update of the roster of experts and laboratories

In order to carry out objective and thorough investigations of alleged use, the Secretary-General should have at his disposal experts and laboratories with a wide scope of expertise, skills and technical capabilities. To achieve this objective, Member States have nominated experts and laboratories to be placed on the Secretary-General's roster.

The Secretary-General's mechanism to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons was developed in the late 1980s. Triggered by a report from any Member State, the Secretary-General is authorized to launch an investigation including dispatching a fact-finding team to the site of the alleged incident(s) and to report to all United Nations Member States. This is to ascertain in an objective manner facts of alleged violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons.

<sup>29</sup> "The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy", A/RES/60/288, annex. This and subsequent United Nations documents are available in the six official languages at <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>30</sup> See the report of the Secretary-General entitled "United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: activities of the United Nations system in implementing the Strategy" of 7 July 2008, A/62/898.

<sup>31</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.3. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/index.shtml>.

UNODA has developed and continues to maintain a database containing details on the technical expertise and analytical capabilities of the experts and laboratories on its roster. The database allows for rapid identification of knowledge and expertise required for fact-finding missions.

The experts designated by the Secretary-General to carry out an investigation of alleged use of biological weapons should be well prepared in order to form a coherent United Nations team that can work effectively under challenging field conditions. Specialized training for this purpose was developed to enhance skills and increase understanding of such field investigations. The first training course was held in Sweden from 25 May to 5 June 2009, which was supported by funds from Sweden and organized by the European CBRNE Centre,<sup>32</sup> based in Umeå (Sweden), in collaboration with UNODA. Fourteen experts from several Member States completed this course, with officials from INTERPOL, OPCW and WHO attending as lecturers and participants. The exercise established a core team of experts trained to conduct investigations of alleged use of biological weapons, significantly enhancing the operational capabilities of the Secretary-General's mechanism.

In order to increase the operational preparedness of this mechanism, including ongoing tracking and assessment of trends in the area of weapons of mass destruction, UNODA studied scenarios that may trigger an investigation of alleged use as well as technological developments in relevant areas in order to identify methods, equipment and materials that could prove useful for future investigations of alleged use.

In order to carry out comprehensive investigations of alleged use, the Secretary-General's mechanism requires support from international organizations, in particular the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, WHO and the World Organisation for Animal Health, which have internationally recognized expertise in specialized areas concerning plant, human and animal diseases.

A work plan for collaboration was agreed between UNODA and WHO in January, covering activities in such areas as education and training, the expertise for missions and interactions during actual investigations. The other organizations have also agreed to cooperate with UNODA on issues requiring their respective expertise.

---

<sup>32</sup> The European CBRNE Center at Umeå University in Sweden is a centre for research within the areas of security and vulnerability, in particular incidents with chemical (C), biological (B), radiological/nuclear (RN) and explosive (E) substances. See also <http://www.cbrne.umu.se/english/> (accessed 12 May 2010).

## General Assembly, 2009

### 64/70. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

As in the previous year, the annually introduced resolution welcomed the successful holding of meetings as part of the 2007-2010 intersessional process between the Sixth and Seventh BWC Review Conferences. It acknowledged the efforts, which were aimed at promoting common understanding and effective action on agreed upon topics at the Sixth Review Conference, and urged States parties to continue to participate actively in the intersessional process. It also urged States parties to continue to work closely with the Implementation Support Unit of UNODA in fulfilling its mandate.

**Introduced by:** Hungary (16 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 188-190.

## Chemical weapons

*As the only instrument that bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under strict international verification, the [Chemical Weapons] Convention is a major accomplishment.*<sup>33</sup>

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

### Fourteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties

The Fourteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC was held in The Hague, Netherlands, from 30 November to 4 December.

---

<sup>33</sup> The Secretary-General's message delivered at the Fourteenth Session of the Conference of States Parties in The Hague on 30 November is available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SG/sgstatements.shtml>.

A total of 122 States parties<sup>34</sup> and 2 signatory States<sup>35</sup> of the CWC attended the Conference. Other participants included eight international organizations, specialized agencies and other international bodies,<sup>36</sup> as well as 30 NGOs.<sup>37</sup>

In his message to the Conference, the Secretary-General highlighted that in 2009 OPCW had achieved a landmark by verifying the destruction of more than 50 per cent of the declared chemical weapons stockpiles. He reiterated the importance of promoting universality and full implementation of the Convention.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen and Zambia.

<sup>35</sup> Israel and Myanmar.

<sup>36</sup> Council of the European Union, International Committee of the Red Cross, League of Arab States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization of the American States, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and the World Customs Organization.

<sup>37</sup> Academia Della Science–Academy of the Sciences of Bologna, American University in Cairo, Amman Centre for Peace and Development, Arms Control Association, Bilking University–International Relation Department, Brookings Doha Center, Centre for Policy Research, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, Danish Institute of International Studies, Global Green USA–Security and Sustainability Program, Green Cross Netherlands, Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland, Harvard Sussex Program, Indian Chemical Council, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Institute for Security Studies, International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, Kathak Academy Bangladesh, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Organisation for Defending the Sardasht Victims of Chemical Weapons, Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Society for Chemical Victims Support, South Asia Strategic Stability Institute, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, University of Bradford–Disarmament Research Centre, Verification Research–Training and Information Centre, and World Federal of Scientific Workers.

In his opening statement,<sup>38</sup> the Director-General of OPCW provided an overview of the progress in implementing the Convention and of OPCW activities in 2009. He noted that the Organisation had emerged as an effective, strong and credible body due to the commitment of States parties to implementing their obligations and promoting its work through consensus. He further expressed confidence that the prevailing spirit of constructive engagement would help deal with future challenges like destruction deadlines and keeping the Convention's verification regime relevant to future needs.

During the general debate, participating member States expressed strong support for the CWC, noted with satisfaction the progress achieved towards its universality and welcomed the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and Iraq for joining the Convention in 2009, thus bringing the total number of States parties to 188.

The Conference reaffirmed the priority to attain the Convention's universality, which is fundamental to achieving its objective and purpose, and noted that 33 States had become party to the Convention as a result of the progress achieved since the adoption in 2003 of the action plan on universality. The Conference decided to continue with the implementation of the action plan.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, it decided, *inter alia*, to amend its earlier decision<sup>40</sup> and extended the deadline to 15 May 2011, by which time the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya must destroy all of its Category 1 chemical weapons stockpiles and keep the Council informed, at each alternate regular session and with supporting documentation, of the status of its plans to implement its destruction obligations.<sup>41</sup> The Conference also decided to request the Executive Council to intensify consultations to develop concrete measures and recommendations for ensuring the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article XI, which deals with international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry. In this regard, it requested the Technical Secretariat to organize a workshop in 2010 for the exchange of ideas among States parties and relevant stakeholders able to assist, as appropriate, the policymaking organs of OPCW in developing concrete measures and recommendations.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> OPCW, "Opening statement by the Director-General to the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourteenth Session", document C-14/DG.13. This and subsequent OPCW documents are available from <http://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/conference-states-parties/>.

<sup>39</sup> OPCW, "Decision: Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the further implementation of the universality action plan", document C-14/DEC.7.

<sup>40</sup> OPCW, "Proposal by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the establishment of specific dates for intermediate destruction deadlines, and its request for an extension of the final deadline for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapons", document C-11/DEC.15.

<sup>41</sup> OPCW, "Report of the OPCW on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction in 2008", document C-14/DEC.3.

<sup>42</sup> OPCW, "Decision on the full implementation of Article XI", document C-14/DEC.11.

In the area of national implementation, the Conference urged States parties that had not done so to notify OPCW of the designation or establishment of their National Authority and to inform the Organisation of the steps taken to enact legislation and to adopt administrative measures to implement the Convention. The Conference also urged States parties to review existing regulations related to trade in chemicals in order to render them consistent with the Convention and encouraged the Secretariat to continue to provide, upon request, customized and systematic technical assistance to address effectively the needs of States parties. It encouraged States parties to continue to offer assistance in implementing article VII, through the provision of expertise to States parties, and to foster cooperation within and among regional groups, as well as through voluntary contributions to OPCW and by making any other offers.<sup>43</sup>

The Conference adopted a comprehensive annual report on the implementation of the Convention in 2008 and approved the OPCW Programme and Budget for 2010<sup>44</sup> amounting to €74,505,400, making it the Organisation's fifth consecutive year of zero nominal budget growth. It also elected 20 new members<sup>45</sup> of the 41-member OPCW Executive Council for a two-year term that would start on 12 May 2010.

The Conference, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, appointed Ahmet Üzümcü (Turkey) as the next Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat for a four-year term beginning on 25 July 2010 to succeed Rogelio Pflinter whose mandate was to end on 24 July 2010. States parties expressed their gratitude to the Director-General for his leadership and commitment during his tenure as well as their support to the incoming Director-General in the fulfilment of his responsibilities.<sup>46</sup>

On the sidelines of the Conference, Global Green USA convened a special two-day meeting of more than 30 NGOs, which culminated with the establishment of a new Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition to supplement the efforts of States parties towards ensuring the full and effective implementation of the CWC. Participants agreed on a charter for the coalition, stipulating its main goals, objectives, activities, structure and operational modalities. Global Green USA was to serve as the coalition's

---

<sup>43</sup> OPCW, "Decision on national implementation measures of Article VII obligations", document C-14/DEC.12.

<sup>44</sup> OPCW, "Decision: Programme and budget of the OPCW for 2010", document C-14/Dec.8.

<sup>45</sup> Africa: Algeria, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, South Africa; Asia: Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; Eastern Europe: Albania, Romania, Russian Federation; Latin America and the Caribbean: Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador; Western Europe and Other States: Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey.

<sup>46</sup> For details on the outcome of the Conference, see the report of the fourteenth session of the Conference of the States parties (OPCW, document C-14/5).

initial coordination hub and six NGO representatives, selected on a regional basis, were to comprise its Advisory Committee.<sup>47</sup>

### **Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons**

With 188 States parties, the CWC covers 98 per cent of the world's population. By 2010, over 56 per cent of the world's declared chemical weapon stockpiles would be verifiably destroyed and by April 2012, all stockpiles would be required to be destroyed. Meanwhile, all declared chemical weapons production facilities would have been de-activated.

The Executive Council of OPCW held four regular sessions, in February, April, July and October. During its sessions, the Council considered reports by the Secretariat on the status of implementation of the Convention, including verification activities and implementation of articles X and XI. The Council also: (a) reviewed progress in, and adopted decisions on, the destruction of chemical weapons and the destruction or conversion of other chemical production facilities; (b) monitored the progress made in implementing the plan of action on the implementation of article VII obligations and submitted a report on the matter to the Conference; (c) took decisions on matters related to the chemical industry; (d) monitored the implementation of the action plan for the universality of the Convention; and (e) approved facility agreements between OPCW and a number of States parties.

The Eleventh Annual Meeting of OPCW National Authorities was held at OPCW headquarters in The Hague from 27 to 29 November. A total of 172 participants from 117 States parties representing all regional groups were in attendance.<sup>48</sup> The thematic focus of the meeting was the sharing of experiences on the Convention's national implementation. National Authorities made presentations on lessons learned while round-table discussions focused on organizing National Authorities and sensitizing domestic constituencies. The regional groups explored regional perspectives on the national implementation and discussed ways to foster subregional and regional cooperation.

The meeting of National Authorities was preceded by a workshop on matters related to other chemical production facilities (OCPFs) held on 25 to 26 November at OPCW headquarters. A total of 107 participants from 72 States parties and a non-State party, including representatives of National Authorities, OPCW delegations and industry experts, attended the workshop. It served as a platform for dialogue to promote a better understanding of verification of

---

<sup>47</sup> Mansour Abu Rashed, Amman Center for Peace and Development (Jordan); Cindy Vestergaard, Danish Institute of International Studies (Denmark); Noel Stott, Institute for Security Studies (South Africa); Maria Sultan, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (Pakistan); and Scott Spence and Angela Woodward, Verification Research, Training and Information Center (Netherlands).

<sup>48</sup> Africa, 33; Asia, 31; Eastern Europe, 17; Latin America and the Caribbean, 17; Western and other States, 19.

OCPFs. In his opening remarks to the workshop, the Director-General stressed that OCPF were a crucial part of the non-proliferation regime established by the Convention. Participants visited two OCPF plant sites—namely, Shell Nederland Chemie in Rotterdam, Chemtura in Amsterdam and the OPCW laboratory in Rijswijk.

On 22 June, the Director-General addressed the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, highlighting OPCW cooperation with the United Nations and relevant regional and international organizations. He noted that contemporary security threats had created increased interest among Member States in the ability of OPCW to coordinate the delivery of emergency assistance in case of an attack, or threat of an attack, with chemical weapons. He further stated that these activities had contributed to international efforts against terrorism within the framework of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004), as well as the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2006.

OPCW took part in the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which was carried out by the 1540 Committee in 2009. In his opening statement at the review meeting held on 1 October, the OPCW representative reaffirmed the readiness of OPCW to continue cooperating with the United Nations and with the 1540 Committee. He stressed that the work of OPCW in implementing the disarmament and non-proliferation provisions of the CWC is consistent both with the larger objectives of promoting international peace and security as well as with the specific goals of resolution 1540 (2004). He also underlined that in the area of legislative and other regulatory measures the work that OPCW had been doing with States parties complemented directly the efforts of the United Nations to promote the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with regard to toxic chemicals. He mentioned that OPCW had participated in all outreach activities organized by the United Nations and in workshops on specific themes relevant to the implementation of the resolution.

In addition, the OPCW Technical Secretariat co-organized and supported three workshops to discuss how implementing the CWC contributes to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the area of chemical weapons.

The Chairman of the 1540 Committee, Jorge Urbina (Costa Rica), visited OPCW headquarters on 12 October and met with the Director-General who gave an overview of OPCW activities, highlighting the technical assistance being offered to States parties in drafting national legislation implementing the CWC and to national customs authorities to improve their capacity for monitoring transfers of scheduled chemicals. The Chairman suggested that his Committee establish closer cooperation with OPCW through an exchange of experience at the expert level. The suggestion was welcomed by the Director-General who expressed the willingness of OPCW to expand its cooperation with the 1540 Committee in this regard.

On 16 October, the Director-General, in his statement to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, reported progress covering all aspects of the implementation of the CWC. He noted that 188 States were now parties to the Convention and called upon States that had not yet joined to do so without further delay. He also highlighted OPCW cooperation with the 1540 Committee and other United Nations bodies, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate.

Observed annually, OPCW held a day of remembrance for all victims of chemical warfare to mark the anniversary of the CWC entry into force in 1997. The ceremony took place on 29 April at OPCW headquarters. In his message, the Secretary-General encouraged those present to honour the victims of chemical warfare by reaffirming commitment to build a world where achievements in the field of chemistry were used exclusively for the benefits of mankind.

### **General Assembly, 2009**

#### **64/46. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction**

Introduced annually, this year's resolution noted the General Assembly's satisfaction that three additional States had acceded to the Convention, bringing the total number of States parties to 188. As in the previous year, it emphasized that the Second Review Conference welcomed

that the Convention remained a unique multilateral agreement banning an entire category of WMD in a non-discriminatory and verifiable manner under strict and effective international control. It underlined that implementation of the Convention made a major contribution to international peace and security through the elimination of existing chemical weapons stockpiles and the prohibition of the acquisition or use of chemical weapons, and provided for assistance and protection in the event of use, or threat of use, of chemical weapons and for international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities.

The resolution welcomed OPCW activities in relation to assistance and protection against chemical weapons and emphasized the continuing relevance and importance of the provisions of article X of the Convention, the importance of article XI provisions relating to the economic and technological development of States parties, while recalling that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of those provisions contributed to universality and reaffirming the undertaking of the States parties to foster international cooperation for

**Introduced by:** Poland (16 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 83-85.

peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities of the States parties and the importance and contribution of that cooperation to the promotion of the Convention as a whole. Finally, it reaffirmed that the provisions of the Convention be implemented without hampering the economic or technological development of States parties and international cooperation in chemical activities not prohibited under the Convention.

**First Committee.** After the action, the Islamic Republic of **Iran** said that it had joined the consensus on the draft resolution, but that all State parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should fully comply with their obligations under that Convention, in order to uphold its credibility.

## **Export controls**

### **Australia Group**

The Australia Group<sup>49</sup> held its annual plenary meeting in Paris, co-hosted by Australia and France, from 21 to 25 September.<sup>50</sup> At the 2009 plenary, participants shared information on best practices and measures to detect and prevent proliferation attempts, and also discussed the enhancement and continued refinement of the Group's licensing and customs controls. The Group reiterated its commitment to ensuring that non-proliferation export controls should not hinder legitimate trade and technical cooperation in the chemical and biological sectors.

Several changes to the Group's chemical and biological control lists were adopted or referred for further consideration. The updated lists in 2009 included biological agents for export control (October 2009), dual-use biological equipment and related technology and software (January and September 2009), chemical weapons precursors (September 2009), and dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technology and software (September 2009).

The Australia Group maintained its particular focus on international developments in the field of synthetic biology and considered a report from its specialist technical advisory group in this area. Participants agreed to broaden the scope of the advisory group to include evolving technologies and to enhance cooperative measures to deal with intangible transfers of technology, including preparation of a new outreach publication for this purpose. The

---

<sup>49</sup> More information on the Australia Group is available from <http://www.australiagroup.net>.

<sup>50</sup> Participants in the Australia Group include the European Commission and 40 States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

Group also noted the ongoing mutual benefit of close cooperation with the United Nations Security Council and its relevant committees.

chapter III

**Conventional weapons issues**



## CHAPTER III

### Conventional weapons issues

*The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons can also help us to respond to the humanitarian challenges posed by advancements in weapons technology. This is particularly relevant with regard to cluster munitions. I urge you to remain focused on strengthening the protection of civilians from the inhumane and indiscriminate impact of these weapons, and to be guided in your efforts by the high standards embodied in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.<sup>1</sup>*

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

### Developments and trends, 2009

MEMBER STATES CONTINUED TO VOICE THEIR CONCERNS over the devastating effects of the illicit trade in and the excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), irresponsible arms transfers, and the use of weapons that are inherently inaccurate and indiscriminate.

The issue of elaborating an arms trade treaty attracted particular attention in the international community in 2009. In the United Nations, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/240 of 24 December 2008 entitled “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”,<sup>2</sup> two sessions of an Open-ended Working Group were held in New York from 2 to 6 March and from 13 to 17 July. The Group considered the goals and objectives, scope, principles and draft parameters of a feasible arms trade treaty and reported the results of those discussions.<sup>3</sup>

An exchange of views on an arms trade treaty during the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly led to the adoption of resolution 64/48 on 2 December,<sup>4</sup> which sought the convening of a United Nations conference on an arms trade treaty in 2012 to elaborate a legally binding instrument to

---

<sup>1</sup> Secretary-General’s message to the Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 12 November 2009. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SG/docs/2009/2009Nov12CCW.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part I): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), pp. 196-202. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament>.

<sup>3</sup> A/AC.277/2009/1. This and subsequent United Nations documents are available in all official languages from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>4</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 34 (Part I): 2009 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.IX.1), pp. 97-98. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament>.

regulate international transfers of conventional arms. The resolution also transformed the remaining sessions of the Open-ended Working Group, scheduled for 2010 to 2012, into sessions of a preparatory committee leading up to the conference.

With regard to transparency in armaments, participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms continued to decline. This downward trend and other issues were discussed by a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which reviewed the operation and further development of the Register in 2009. The GGE concluded that the Register's focus on the seven major categories<sup>5</sup> of conventional arms made it less relevant to some regions, where the main security concern was the uncontrolled spread of illicit SALW.

Despite this decrease in the number of States reporting to the Register, the percentage of reports including information on international transfers of small arms continued to increase. Nevertheless, the GGE failed to reach consensus on inclusion of small arms as a new category of weapons in the Register. This prompted statements from a number of Member States during the General Assembly session advocating more vigorous steps to ensure the Register's relevance for all regions. In addition to the Register, Member States participated in other confidence-building measures related to military matters, notably the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, and the reporting of information concerning their participation in regional transparency measures.

The Second Review Conference of the States parties to the Mine Ban Convention took place in Cartagena, Colombia, from 30 November to 4 December. The Conference reviewed the implementation of the Convention, considered requests from States Parties to extend the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel landmines and adopted the 2009 Cartagena Declaration (see text in appendix III). In the Declaration, States parties reaffirmed their adherence to the Convention's goals and appealed to those countries which had yet to ratify the Convention to do so.

The Tenth Annual Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, held in Geneva from 12 to 13 November, focused, as in previous years, on the implementation of the Plan of Action to promote the universality of the Convention, as well as compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols.

With regard to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the United Nations continued to encourage States to ratify the Convention, bearing in mind the devastating effects of such weapons.

---

<sup>5</sup> The categories are: (a) battle tanks; (b) armoured combat vehicles; (c) large-calibre artillery systems; (d) combat aircraft; (e) attack helicopters; (f) warships; and (g) missiles and missile launchers.

Throughout 2009, the United Nations continued its work with Member States towards promoting the implementation of the Programme of Action on curbing the illicit trade in SALW, particularly against the background of the Third Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) on the Programme of Action, which was held in New York in 2008. In this regard, the United Nations organized a series of regional meetings in Africa and the Pacific, with more meetings to be held in other regions in 2010.

## **Small arms and light weapons**

The misuse of small arms causes large-scale killing in many conflict situations and has been linked to a wide spectrum of human rights violations. Their excessive accumulation and easy availability around the world aggravates conflicts and hinders finding peaceful resolutions. At the same time, a number of countries plagued by armed violence often perform poorly in terms of the Millennium Development Goals because a climate of armed insecurity impedes investments that are needed to generate sustained economic growth.

### **Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission**

The Security Council has been seized with the issue of small arms for over a decade, especially from the standpoint of its implications for peace and security, the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, as well as women and children in armed conflict. Arms embargoes form the principal instrument by which the Council has sought to curb the illicit trade in SALW. Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council continued to maintain a number of Sanctions Committees to enforce its arms embargoes.

In 2009, expert groups mandated by the Security Council continued to carry out on-site visits, inspections and investigations, as well as reported on the trafficking of arms, including SALW. They highlighted that non-State groups had obtained arms and ammunition from the following sources: leakage of Government stocks from both the targeted and neighbouring States; sale of arms by corrupt Government officials; battlefield acquisition of arms and ammunition; and attacks by non-State groups on military and police personnel, as well as on their convoys and static positions.

The expert groups made a number of recommendations to improve the respective sanctions regimes. These included the improved marking on imported arms in Liberia; enhanced, preferably computerized, record-keeping in Liberia; the destruction of surplus weapons, effective tracing of weapons and sharing of information in Somalia; and enhanced stockpile management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In 2009, the Peacebuilding Commission continued to focus on mobilizing resources as well as advising on and proposing integrated strategies for

post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. In its country-specific efforts, the Commission also continued to include small arms-related measures in its work. For example, the Commission's mission to Burundi recommended the adoption of legislation pertaining to SALW, and the regulation of arms during the election period.

### **Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons**

Enhanced international efforts to combat the threat posed by illicit SALW have been ongoing for almost a decade, starting with the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), which was opened for signature in May 2001 and had 79 States parties at the end of 2009.<sup>6</sup> The Firearms Protocol is a legally binding document that deals with the illegal manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms. In July 2001, the United Nations Member States also adopted a Programme of Action,<sup>7</sup> which sought to address all aspects of the illicit trade in SALW.

In the Outcome Document of the Third BMS on the Programme of Action, States stressed the importance of regional approaches to the implementation of the Programme of Action and the usefulness of convening regional meetings sponsored by interested States and international, regional and subregional organizations in a position to do so, in particular in the years between biennial meetings. States also welcomed a coordinating role by the United Nations, where needed, in setting up such regional meetings.<sup>8</sup> In this connection, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), in collaboration with donor countries as well as regional and subregional organizations, organized a series of regional meetings on the implementation of the Programme of Action in 2009.

The first such meeting was held for the States of the Pacific region, which took place in Sydney from 22 to 23 June. This was followed by a meeting for the States of the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region and Southern Africa, which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, from 8 to 9 July. The meetings adopted forward-looking documents<sup>9</sup> that sought concrete, region-specific and time-bound implementation of goals and underscored the importance of aligning regional and global implementation activities. Progress was also

---

<sup>6</sup> The Firearms Protocol was adopted in 2001 by the General Assembly through resolution 55/255 and entered into force on 3 July 2005.

<sup>7</sup> "Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects", A/CONF.192/15. See also <http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poa.aspx>.

<sup>8</sup> A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3, para. 6, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> The outcome document at the regional meeting in Sydney is available from <http://www.poa-iss.org/PoA/PoA.aspx> (accessed 13 July 2010). The outcome document at the regional meeting in Kigali is available from [http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/Documents/Kigali\\_Meeting\\_outcome.pdf](http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/Documents/Kigali_Meeting_outcome.pdf) (accessed 13 July 2010).

made to elaborate the assistance needs of requesting States with a view to matching needs with resources as mandated in the Outcome Document of the Third BMS.<sup>10</sup> This series of regional meetings was expected to continue until the Fourth BMS, scheduled to be held from 14 to 18 June 2010.

UNODA continued in 2009 to give attention to implementation of the International Tracing Instrument.<sup>11</sup> In collaboration with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the Economic Community of West African States, UNODA organized in Prague from 14 to 19 September a capacity-building workshop on this instrument, which included discussions on the technical aspects of marking and tracing of small arms. The workshop also engaged in exchanges of national experiences on the implementation of measures to curb illicit flows of small arms, and field visits to weapons and ammunition factories.

The Prague workshop was a follow-up to earlier regional meetings organized in previous years in Nairobi, Lomé, Seoul and Rio de Janeiro.

### **The Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures**

Following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 51/45N of 1996 entitled “Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures”, which focused on measures to deal with conflict and post-conflict situations through the control of SALW, demining, as well as demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures (GIS) was established by Member States for finding ways to provide concrete assistance to States for post-conflict rebuilding and to prevent a recurrence of crisis situations through the creation of durable peace. Meetings of the Group are open to all States, interested United Nations partners and relevant non-governmental organizations.

The GIS met three times in 2009 and its agenda items included: the preparation of the Fourth BMS; discussions on an arms trade treaty; briefings on the First Committee of the General Assembly; and a presentation on the International Small Arms Control Standards. In addition, on 21 October, the GIS and the Geneva Process on Small Arms co-organized a joint meeting in New York to discuss the preparations for the Fourth BMS.

During the preparatory process for the Fourth BMS, the GIS was frequently mentioned as a possible informal mechanism for facilitation of matching needs with resources in international cooperation and assistance

---

<sup>10</sup> A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3, para. 3, p. 8.

<sup>11</sup> The International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted in 2005 under the Programme of Action, requires that implementation meetings be preferably integrated in meetings under the Programme of Action and national reports on the instrument be part of national reports on the implementation of the Programme of Action.

under the United Nations Programme of Action on small arms. The discussion of this matter was expected to continue in 2010.

### **United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms**

The United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) now brings together 22 United Nations system partners that deal with preventing violence and mitigating the impact of SALW on societies, communities and individuals from their particular angle. United Nations system partners assist Member States and regional organizations with their implementation of the Programme of Action.

In addition to the Programme of Action and its International Tracing Instrument, CASA also covers other global small arms-related agreements, including the United Nations Firearms Protocol. It is also the coordinating body within the United Nations on the arms trade treaty and on ammunition stockpile management.

In 2009, the CASA mechanism achieved both broader participation within the United Nations system and further strengthening of its coordination role in the area of small arms, as reflected in the endorsement of its Strategic Framework for 2009-2013.

The flagship initiative of CASA at present is the development of International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). The aim is to develop a set of internationally accepted and validated technical standards that provide comprehensive guidance to practitioners and policymakers on legal, policy and operational issues surrounding small arms control. Twenty-six ISACS modules have been drafted and have been opened as public consultation drafts available online at [www.un-casa-isacs.org](http://www.un-casa-isacs.org). The ISACS project will continue into 2011.

In the Outcome Document of the Third BMS, States underlined that the value of assistance proposals would be enhanced if formulated as concrete projects with measurable goals and posted on the Implementation Support System.<sup>12</sup> As a follow-up, an online tool developed by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to assist States in identifying their assistance needs was integrated into the Implementation Support System. Meanwhile, the United Nations is working with States to further improve the matching of needs and resources for international cooperation, assistance and national capacity-building in the area of SALW.

### **Reduction of armed violence and development**

Growing recognition that armed violence represents a fundamental challenge to many developmental and humanitarian goals, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, has brought about recent

---

<sup>12</sup> A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3, para. 6, p. 9.

States-led initiatives such as the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, which was adopted in June 2006,<sup>13</sup> and the preparation for the “Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence” to be adopted in 2010.<sup>14</sup>

The General Assembly, by its resolution 63/23<sup>15</sup> of 17 November 2008, requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the interrelationship between armed violence and development and to submit a report to the General Assembly on the matter. Accordingly, the Secretary-General prepared the first United Nations report<sup>16</sup> on this issue, in consultation with relevant partners and agencies, and taking into account views voluntarily submitted by Member States.

The report examined different aspects of the relationship between armed violence and development, as well as identified such factors as weak institutions, systemic economic and horizontal inequalities, exclusion of minority groups, persistent unemployment, organized crime and illicit markets, and the easy availability of firearms as contributing to the occurrence of armed violence. The report placed particular emphasis on tackling the risks and effects of armed violence in relation to underdevelopment, including: investment in the production, analysis and use of evidence; strengthening capacities to diagnose, articulating strategies and implementing programmes; and developing measurable goals, targets and indicators for armed violence prevention and reduction.

The preparations for the High-Level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals, scheduled to be held from 20 to 22 September 2010, included efforts by States and the United Nations to emphasize how a consistent engagement by States in the prevention and reduction of armed violence can be an effective component in efforts to alleviate poverty and to achieve these goals.

A number of entities of the United Nations system continued to collaborate within the inter-agency Armed Violence Prevention Programme. The Programme is coordinated in CASA and seeks to promote effective responses to armed violence through substantive support to the development of international policies and nationally led comprehensive armed violence prevention programmes.

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UNODA and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme co-organized a regional workshop on “Youth and Armed Violence in Africa” in Nairobi, Kenya, from 15 to 17 December. The purpose of the workshop was to engage youth leaders and promote actions to reduce youth involvement in armed

---

<sup>13</sup> For more information, see <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/>.

<sup>14</sup> A/64/665, para. 45.

<sup>15</sup> A/63/49 (Vol. 1), p. 37.

<sup>16</sup> A/64/228.

violence in Africa. Leaders and activists of youth organizations, as well as Government officials working on youth issues from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania, participated in the workshop.

### General Assembly, 2009

#### **64/30. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them**

Substantively unchanged from the previous session, this annual resolution once again encouraged the international community to support the Economic Community of West African States Convention, and also encouraged the States in the region to facilitate the functioning of national commissions to combat illicit proliferation of SALW and to collaborate with civil society organizations in these efforts.

**Introduced by:** Mali, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Economic Community of West African States (28 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 31-34.

#### **64/50. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects**

Building on past resolutions, several revisions were introduced this year. Inter alia, the resolution recalled that the meeting of States to consider the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument<sup>17</sup> would be held within the framework of the BMS. It encouraged States to promote substantive discussions at the Fourth BMS on possible practical measures, and to develop common positions on issues relevant to the implementation of the Programme of Action and to present such positions to the Fourth BMS. It also encouraged States to submit their national reports, to use the reporting template prepared by the United Nations Development Programme and to include information on progress made in the implementation of the measures highlighted in the report of the Third BMS. It further encouraged the early submission of States' national reports on the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, and to make use of the Programme of Action Implementation Support System and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research clearing house for matching assistance needs with potential donors as additional tools to facilitate global action on SALW.

**Introduced by:** South Africa (19 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 180-0-0; 177-0-1, o.p. 4; 176-0-1, o.p. 15 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 179-0-0; 177-0-1, o.p. 4; 177-0-1, o.p. 15 (29 Oct.)

For text, sponsors, and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 99-107.

<sup>17</sup> A/60/88 and Corr.2, annex; see also decision 60/519.

**First Committee.** Before the vote, **Mexico** said that it would support the draft resolution, but that it believed that it was only through an open and inclusive process that the international community could respond effectively to the threat of the illegal traffic in arms. In the future, it wanted more substantive elements and the legitimate concerns of all to be reflected in the draft resolution.

After abstaining in the separate votes on operative paragraphs 4 and 15, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** explained that the outcome of the Third BMS had fallen short of the General Assembly's standards and principles, and that the selective approach in dealing with the Programme of Action had not been acceptable. It also emphasized that it had participated in meetings on the Programme of Action and would continue to do so, hoping for transparency in the method of work.

## **Conventional arms ammunition**

Ammunition stockpiles are a recurring source for diversion to illicit channels. Also, their unsafe stockpiling may lead to grave unintended explosions, sometimes in civilian areas and with disastrous consequences. By its resolution 64/51<sup>18</sup> entitled "Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus", which was adopted without a vote on 2 December, the General Assembly encouraged Member States to eliminate their surplus ammunition stockpiles and to improve management and control in order to reduce the risk of possible leakage into illicit channels.

In the 2008 report of the GGE to consider further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus,<sup>19</sup> the GGE recommended that technical guidelines for the management of stockpiles of conventional ammunition be developed within the United Nations, which would be made available for States to use on a voluntary basis, in order to assist States in improving their national stockpile management capacity. This issue was one of the four main themes of the Third BMS in 2008.

Acting on the recommendations of the GGE, UNODA embarked on a project for the development of such technical guidelines, which envisaged not only their development but also their validation in selected countries. Furthermore, the project planned to deliver training courses and on-the-job mentoring on the implementation of the guidelines.

Towards the end of 2009, the technical guidelines were being drafted under the auspices of UNODA in collaboration with the United Nations

---

<sup>18</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 34 (Part I): 2009 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.IX.1), pp. 108-110. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament>.

<sup>19</sup> A/63/182.

Mine Action Service with further assistance provided by a Technical Review Panel made up of experts from countries selected on the basis of equitable geographic representation. Seven out of the 11 projected volumes of the technical guidelines were completed, reviewed and commented on by Panel members by the end of 2009. These guidelines were expected to be completed at the end of 2010 and were to be periodically reviewed and, if required, updated every five years.

### **General Assembly, 2009**

#### **64/51. Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus**

Last introduced in 2008, the resolution again took note of the Member States' views on the risks regarding the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus and on national ways of strengthening controls on conventional ammunition. It strongly encouraged States to implement the recommendations of the report of the GGE established pursuant to resolution 61/72<sup>20</sup> to consider further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue. The resolution also continued to encourage States in a position to do so to contribute, on a voluntary and transparent basis, to the development within the United Nations of technical guidelines for the stockpile management of conventional ammunition to assist States in improving their national stockpile management capacity, preventing the growth of conventional ammunition surpluses and addressing wider risk mitigation.

**Introduced by:** Germany (20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 108-110.

**First Committee.** After the action, the **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela** said that it had joined the consensus on the draft resolution, but nevertheless felt that it was up to each State to determine when its accumulation of stockpiles was in surplus. It believed that States where arms were produced had a responsibility to ensure that the marking of ammunition was done prior to their export.

---

<sup>20</sup> Text of the resolution is available in the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 31 (2006), pp. 390-391. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament>.

## Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures

### Conference on Disarmament

Agenda item 6 was entitled “Comprehensive programme of disarmament” and agenda item 7 was entitled “Transparency in armaments”. In accordance with the Organizational Framework,<sup>21</sup> Dayan Jayatilaka (Sri Lanka) and I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja (Indonesia), the Coordinators for agenda items 6 and 7, respectively, held two informal meetings for each of item.<sup>22</sup>

On agenda item 6, as in the previous year, several delegations emphasized the importance of conventional arms control, particularly in relation to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its GGE, and they also referred to illicit SALW. As pointed out by a delegation, nuclear disarmament would remain elusive if asymmetries in conventional arms continued to grow. It was mentioned that increased efforts should, therefore, be made to curb the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons and their uncontrolled transfers. Delegations also maintained that a stable balance of conventional forces was essential to ensure strategic stability.

On agenda item 7, delegations reaffirmed their views and concerns on some of the issues that had been discussed previously, including the effectiveness of existing transparency measures, increasing military expenditures, the inclusiveness of transparency in armaments, the possibility of appointing a special coordinator, and preventing the transfer of arms to non-State actors.

### United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

In 2009, the GGE to review the continuing operation of the Register of Conventional Arms and its further development performed the sixth triennial review of the Register, as mandated by the General Assembly pursuant to resolution 61/77 of 6 December 2006.<sup>23</sup> With a view to facilitating discussions within the GGE, UNODA published an Occasional Paper entitled *Assessing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms*.<sup>24</sup> The Group’s report to the Secretary-General was issued on 14 August.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Conference on Disarmament (CD), document CD/WP.553. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>22</sup> For the report submitted by the Coordinators to the President of the CD on work done on agenda items 6 and 7, see CD/1877, annex VI and VII, respectively. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>23</sup> A/61/49 (Vol. 1), pp. 157-158.

<sup>24</sup> UNODA Occasional Papers No. 16, April 2009 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.4). Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/OccasionalPapers/PDF/OP16.pdf>.

<sup>25</sup> A/64/296.

The Group consisted of representatives from 18 Member States<sup>26</sup> and was chaired by Roberto García Moritán (Argentina). The review was carried out over three sessions. The first session was held in Geneva from 16 to 20 February, while the second and third sessions were held in New York from 27 April to 1 May and from 6 to 10 July.

The Group analysed data and information provided by participating States in their national reports to the Register, assessed the participation patterns and the reporting methods, as well as considered ways to improve the relevance of the Register and to promote its progress towards the goal of universality. It also examined the future operation of the Register, with respect to regional priorities and relevance. In connection with the Register's further development, it considered the issues of technical adjustments and expansion of the existing scope of the Register, taking into account advanced technology in armaments and military equipment, current security and capacity concerns and emerging tactical methods.

The long-standing issue of raising the status of reporting on procurement through national production and military holdings, which have been treated as optional parts of the Register belonging to "additional background information", were also considered by the GGE, as in all previous reviews.

The Group considered a number of proposals aimed at expanding the current reporting categories of armaments covered by the Register. It also considered proposals for adding the following new categories to the Register: an emerging class of equipment employed in combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles; and SALW. The main focus of attention in the 2009 review was on the issue of incorporating SALW as an additional category. Due to budgetary constraints, this review was carried out over a shorter period than in previous reviews. The Group was unable to reach consensus on any of the proposals to expand the Register's scope and adapt it to the changing political and military circumstances. It did agree, however, on the need to effecting some changes to the standardized reporting forms to improve the quality of submissions to the Register by participating States.

In its report, the GGE reconfirmed the recommendations made during the 2006 review. In view of the serious security concerns of many States related to the illicit trafficking and excessive accumulation of small arms, the Group recommended that the Secretary-General seek the views of Member States to determine whether the continuing absence of SALW as a main category in the Register has limited its relevance and, as a result, influenced the decisions of Member States on participation in this instrument.

---

<sup>26</sup> Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Jamaica, Japan, India, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

UNODA, with the support of the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and in cooperation with its Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, organized a regional workshop for the Western African States in Dakar, Senegal, from 9 to 10 June. The purpose of this workshop was to enhance familiarity with and promote participation in the Register. This workshop was a continuation of a series of workshops held in other regions in past years, especially in areas where participation levels and familiarity with the Register were considered relatively low.

In order to facilitate discussion in the General Assembly on the agenda item on transparency in armaments, UNODA prepared and distributed to Member States a fact sheet entitled “Objective information on military matters and transparency in armaments”.<sup>27</sup> During the year, UNODA continued work on overhauling the United Nations Register database, based on the outcomes of a pilot project on “Electronic Filing of National Reports in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms”. The project was related to the task assigned by the 2006 GGE, which was endorsed by the General Assembly.

### **Annual report on the Register**

The seventeenth consolidated annual report and its three addenda issued by the Secretary-General in 2009<sup>28</sup> contained data and information provided by 80 Governments on transfers of conventional arms covered by the Register during the calendar year 2008.<sup>29</sup> The report indicated that only 80 national reports, including 30 “nil” reports, were received in 2009, with 30 States meeting the deadline for submission.<sup>30</sup> This was the lowest number of reports submitted by Member States since the inception of the Register. Thirty countries provided information on arms exports and 44 reports contained information on imports. Additional background information was included in 53 submissions, 24 of which contained data on national military holdings, and 21 on procurement through national production.

Table 1 reflects regional participation. A composite table, listing all the replies received by the Secretary-General and indicating which reply contained data on imports and exports of conventional arms, as well as what kind of

---

<sup>27</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/DOCS/MILEX&RegisterFactsheetFINAL.pdf>.

<sup>28</sup> A/64/135 and Add.1, 2 and 3. Available from [www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/HTML/RegisterIndex.shtml](http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/HTML/RegisterIndex.shtml).

<sup>29</sup> Calendar year refers to the year in which the transfer occurred or did not occur (“nil” report) as reported by the participating Member States. The year in which the report is submitted normally refers to transfers in the previous calendar year, covering the period from 1 January to 31 December. The register also permits retroactive reporting, which means that Member States could submit a delayed report covering an earlier year, e.g., reporting in 2009 regarding transfers that took place in 2006.

<sup>30</sup> A/64/135 and Add.1, 2 and 3. Available from [www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/HTML/RegisterIndex.shtml](http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/HTML/RegisterIndex.shtml).

background information was included, is annexed to this chapter (see annex I).


**Table 1. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 2001-2009**

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
African States (total: 53)	11	17	17	10	16	16	15	8	4
Asian States (total: 53)	31	30	29	32	31	27	26	21	18
Eastern European States (total: 23)	21	21	22	20	21	21	22	22	19
Latin American and Caribbean States (total: 33)	23	26	24	21	18	21	20	11	13
Western European and Other States	30	30	29	30	29	30	30	29	26
<b>Total</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>80</b>


Note: The table shows participation in the Register based on the years in which the national report was submitted. As reports from non-Member States of the United Nations are not counted, the figures for Asian States in the table differ from those in vol. 33 (Part II): 2008 of the *Disarmament Yearbook*.

Despite the lower number of reports submitted to the Register in 2009, the percentage of those containing additional background information on SALW transfers continued to rise (see figure I), reaching almost 60 per cent of submissions, with the number of these submissions totalling 47 (see figure II). This trend reflected the relevance for Member States of transparency as a means of controlling transfers of SALW, as well as the increased recognition of the Register as a reliable tool for that purpose. The information provided by States on international transfers of SALW is presented in annex II to this chapter.

**Figure I. Small arms and light weapons transfers in submitted reports**



**Figure II. Reporting on transfers of small arms and light weapons by regional groups**



### Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures

The United Nations continued to receive national submissions to its Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures and the data submitted were reflected in the Secretary-General's annual report on the subject.<sup>31</sup> In 2009, UNODA received 58 national reports on military expenditures for the latest fiscal year, including 5 "nil" reports. These figures represented the lowest number of reports received since 2001. Information on States that provided data on their military spending in 2009 is presented in annex III to this chapter. Regional participation in the instrument is reflected in table 2.

**Table 2. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures: 2001-2009**

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
African States (total: 53)	1	6	4	4	1	4	2	5	2
Asian States (total: 53)	11	15	16	16	16	17	15	13	9
Eastern European States (total: 22)	17	18	16	20	19	19	19	21	19
Latin American and Caribbean States (total: 33)	8	15	13	9	11	14	14	11	7
Western European and Other States (total: 30)	24	26	26	29	28	26	26	27	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>58</b>

Note: The reports on military expenditures submitted by Member States normally contain data and information on the latest available fiscal year, as requested by UNODA in its annual note verbale, which is based on the relevant General Assembly resolution.

In order to raise awareness and promote transparency on military expenditures, UNODA included this issue in the agenda of its regional workshop entitled "Transparency in Armaments" held in Dakar, Senegal, from 9 to 10 June. Similarly, it prepared a fact sheet entitled "Objective information on military matters and transparency in armaments",<sup>32</sup> which was distributed to Member States during the sixty-fourth session of the First Committee.

<sup>31</sup> A/63/97 and Add.1 and 2. Available from [http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Milex/html/Milex\\_SGReports.shtml](http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Milex/html/Milex_SGReports.shtml).

<sup>32</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/DOCS/MILEX&RegisterFactsheetFINAL.pdf>.

In light of the forthcoming 2010 review by a GGE of the operation and further development of this instrument, as mandated by General Assembly resolution 62/13 of 5 December 2007,<sup>33</sup> UNODA requested regional organizations to help raise awareness and encourage Member States to submit their views for consideration by the GGE. It also encouraged them to submit their national reports to the instrument. In cooperation with interested States, representatives from UNODA, regional organizations and research institutes participated in a brainstorming seminar on this instrument, which was held in Berlin on 4 to 5 May. The aim of this seminar was to identify key issues for inclusion in the agenda of the forthcoming work of the Group.

### General Assembly, 2009

#### **64/22. Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures**

Presented on a biennial basis, this year, the resolution requested the Secretary-General to circulate annually the reports on military expenditures received from Member States and encouraged Member States to continue to provide the Secretary-General with their views and suggestions on ways and means to improve the future functioning of and broaden participation in the standardized reporting system, including necessary changes to its content and structure.

**Introduced by:** Germany (20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 1-4.

#### **64/40. National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology**

Last presented in 2007, the resolution reiterated all the main elements of the previous resolution. It invited Member States that were in a position to do so, without prejudice to the provisions in Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent relevant Council resolutions, to enact or improve national legislation, regulations and procedures to exercise effective control over the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, and encouraged Member States to provide information to the Secretary-General on the above matters, as well as the changes therein. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to continue making that information accessible to all Member States.

**Introduced by:** Netherlands (21 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 64-65.

---

<sup>33</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 32 (Part I): 2007 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.08.IX.1), pp. 1-4. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament>.

#### 64/54. Transparency in armaments

Last introduced in 2008, the resolution endorsed the report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development<sup>34</sup> and the recommendations contained in the consensus report of the 2009 GGE. It also requested the Secretary-General to: (a) seek the views of Member States, including whether the absence of SALW as a main category in the Register had limited its relevance and directly affected decisions on participation; (b) continue to assist Member States to build capacity to submit meaningful reports, including capacity to report on SALW; and, (c) with a view to the three-year review cycle of the Register, ensure that sufficient resources were made available for a GGE to be convened in 2012 to review the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the views expressed by Member States and the reports of the Secretary-General on the Register.

**Introduced by:** Netherlands  
(21 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 153-0-23; 149-0-24, o.p. 3; 152-0-22, o.p. 4; 151-0-22, o.p. 5; 151-0-22, o.p. 6 (d); 149-0-24, o.p. 6; 152-0-22, o.p. 8 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 150-0-22; 147-0-24, o.p. 3; 147-0-24, o.p. 4; 149-0-22, o.p. 5; 147-0-23, o.p. 6 (d); 148-0-22, o.p. 6; 146-0-23, o.p. 8 (29 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 123-133.

**First Committee.** After abstaining in the vote, the **Sudan** spoke on behalf of the League of Arab States. It said that the members of the League wished to stress again their position on transparency in armaments, especially the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons. Their position on the Register was based on the specific situation in the Middle East as regards disarmament. It explained that the Register was a valuable tool for promoting confidence, but problems arose because many Member States of the United Nations did not provide data for it. It stressed that there was a need to widen the scope of the Register to contain additional data on advanced conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. It also stated that transparency should be dealt with in a global and balanced way. The **Syrian Arab Republic**, which also abstained in the vote, aligned itself with the Arab League's position on the draft resolution. It fully supported the universal desire for an international community free of threats or use of force and was ready to participate in efforts in good faith to achieve that goal. It believed that the draft resolution did not take into account the particular situation in the Middle East.

<sup>34</sup> A/64/296.

## **Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons**

### **Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons**

In Geneva from 13 to 14 November 2008, the States parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) had decided that the GGE would continue its negotiations on a new CCW Protocol that addressed the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, taking into account document CCW/GGE/2008-V/WP.1 and other present and future proposals by delegations while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations. The States parties had further tasked the Group to make every effort to conclude its negotiations as rapidly as possible and report to the next Meeting of the High Contracting Parties. Furthermore, the work of the GGE would be supported by military and technical experts, and the Group would meet for up to two weeks in 2009, from 16 to 20 February, and subsequently, if required, from 14 to 17 April.<sup>35</sup>

Accordingly, the GGE met in February and April. In addition to these meetings, the Chairperson of the Group, Gustavo Ainchil (Argentina), believed that additional informal consultations<sup>36</sup> were necessary to seek ways of bridging the wide divergence of views. Although it was expected to present an instrument for adoption by the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties in November, and despite the Chair's efforts to create a cooperative atmosphere throughout the process, the Group was unable to resolve existing differences.

During the first session of the GGE, the Chair successfully built momentum that allowed him to table his text of a draft Protocol<sup>37</sup> at the end of the session. The Chair's text constituted the basis for negotiations at the second session and during the informal consultations conducted in August. Based on the work of the two sessions and the informal consultations held in August, a new version of the draft<sup>38</sup> was submitted to the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties by the Group's Chairperson, in his own personal capacity.

Mindful of persisting wide differences throughout the negotiations, the Chairperson organized various meetings, including small working groups and over a dozen informal consultations with all States parties, observers and organizations, which focused on the general prohibitions, storage and transfers (draft articles 4, 5 and 6). Due to time constraints, additional informal meetings

---

<sup>35</sup> Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, "Report", document CCW/MSP/2008/4, para. 34. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>36</sup> Geneva, 17-21 August 2009.

<sup>37</sup> GGE of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, document CCW/GGE/2009-I/2, annex II. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>38</sup> Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, "Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions", document CCW/MSP/2009/WP.1.

were held by the Friends of the Chair<sup>39</sup> on the issue of definitions (draft article 2). These four articles were considered the most difficult to agree upon.

Despite these efforts, a wide divergence of views remained, including “ambiguous” terms and concepts that still appeared among the definitions (draft article 2) and the absence of noteworthy progress on the general prohibitions and restrictions (draft article 4). Moreover, many States parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions who were also parties to CCW argued that the current text was too weak and would hardly reduce the harm that cluster munitions caused to civilians. Those States also reiterated that the text would legalize the use of cluster munitions, which would contradict the letter and spirit of the Convention. The issue of transition periods, including periods in transfer of cluster munitions, still remained a highly contested part of the draft text. However, the new text on international humanitarian law (draft article 3) and on victim assistance (draft article 10) were gradually becoming acceptable to most delegations.

The Chair’s efforts, backed by the Friends of the Chair, resulted in incremental changes in the national positions of some key delegations. Despite their cooperation and flexibility, and despite some concessions by some key players, the text still remained unacceptable to many delegations. Throughout the two sessions, the Group’s Chair was assisted by the Chairperson of the Meeting of Military and Technical Experts<sup>40</sup> and four Friends of the Chair.<sup>41</sup>

### **Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons**

Upon conclusion of the two GGE sessions, the Chairperson of the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Babacar Carlos Mbaye (Senegal), in coordination with the GGE Chairperson, embarked on informal consultations ahead of the Meeting to seek common ground for adopting a new instrument on cluster munitions. These consultations were not only aimed at fostering consensus on cluster munitions, but also at preparing delegations for the following substantive issues: (a) review of the Plan of Action to Promote the Universality of the Convention and its annexed Protocols, including the implementation of the CCW Sponsorship Programme; (b) compliance; (c) mines other than anti-personnel mines; and (d) consideration of a proposal to establish an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) for the Convention.

---

<sup>39</sup> Angela Robinson (Australia) on cooperation and assistance; Anesa Kundurovic (Bosnia and Herzegovina) on victim assistance; Julio Fontes Laranjeira (Brazil) on storage and destruction and on transfers; Jim Burke (Ireland) on definitions.

<sup>40</sup> Roberto C. Juárez (Argentina).

<sup>41</sup> Angela Robinson (Australia) on cooperation and assistance; Anesa Kundurovic (Bosnia and Herzegovina) on victim assistance; Julio Fontes Laranjeira (Brazil) on storage and destruction and on transfers; and Jim Burke (Ireland) on definitions.

The Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, held in Geneva on 12 to 13 November, welcomed three new parties,<sup>42</sup> which brought the total number of States parties to 111 at the end of 2009. Despite the outcome of the Group's work on cluster munitions, the Meeting concluded on a positive note. Due to the conciliatory efforts of the Chair, the Meeting decided on continuing the Group's work on cluster munitions in 2010. As in the previous two years, the mandate did not specify a CCW Protocol as the final objective of the negotiations, but referred to the related consolidated text by the Chairperson.<sup>38</sup>

In his message to the Meeting, the Secretary-General urged States parties to strengthen the protection of civilians from the inhumane and indiscriminate impact of cluster munitions and to be guided by the high standards embodied in the new Convention on Cluster Munitions.<sup>43</sup> He also reminded States to ratify the other relevant treaties in this field including the Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The final report<sup>44</sup> adopted by the Meeting included all the decisions for the 2010 series of activities. The renewed mandate for the GGE contained the following elements:

(a) The GGE will continue its negotiations, informed by the Chairperson's consolidated text of 26 August 2009,<sup>38</sup> taking into account document CCW/GGE/2009-II/2, annex I,<sup>45</sup> as well as other past, present and future proposals by delegations; and in addressing urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, it will strike a balance between military and humanitarian considerations;

(b) The GGE will conclude its negotiations as soon as possible and report to the next Meeting of the High Contracting Parties;

(c) The work of the GGE will be supported by experts on issues relevant to the negotiations;

(d) The GGE will meet in 2010 from 12 to 16 April and 30 August to 3 September.<sup>46</sup>

The States parties agreed to hold the Fourth Review Conference in 2011 and to start the preparatory work in 2010 under the overall responsibility of Gancho Ganev (Bulgaria) who was designated to chair the 2010 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties.

---

<sup>42</sup> Kazakhstan (8 July), Qatar (16 November) and the United Arab Emirates (26 February).

<sup>43</sup> The message was delivered by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Sergio Duarte.

<sup>44</sup> Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, document CCW/MSP/2009/5. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>45</sup> GGE of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, "Cluster Munitions", document CCW/GGE/2009-II/2.

<sup>46</sup> Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, "Final report", document CCW/MSP/2009/5, para. 40. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

States parties noted that in view of the increasing work related to CCW and its Protocols, the Convention could benefit from the service of a strengthened UNODA. Consequently, a landmark decision was made to establish the CCW ISU within the Geneva Branch of UNODA.<sup>47</sup>

The proposed unit will perform, *inter alia*, the following tasks:

(a) Provide administrative support to and prepare documentation for meetings agreed by the meetings of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, Amended Protocol II and Protocol V;

(b) Facilitate communications among High Contracting Parties and, upon request, with international organizations;

(c) Serve as a focal point for submission of information by and to the High Contracting Parties related to the Convention and its annexed Protocols;

(d) Develop and maintain the CCW website and the CCW databases;

(e) Support the High Contracting Parties, upon request, in the implementation of the CCW and its Protocols, as well as assist the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the discharge of his/her responsibilities pursuant to article 11 (2) of Protocol V, article 14 (4) of Amended Protocol II and the CCW Compliance mechanism;

(f) Contribute to the promotion of the universalization of the CCW and its annexed Protocols, as well as support the High Contracting Parties in the implementation of the CCW Plan of Action for the Universalization of the CCW and its Protocols and the CCW Sponsorship Programme; and

(g) Perform any other duty as mandated by the High Contracting Parties of the CCW or its Protocols.

The proposed ISU would consist of two full-time staff members within the Geneva Branch of the UNODA and would be funded by the States parties through their assessed contributions in supporting the CCW meetings. It would work under the authority of the annual Meetings of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention. It was also decided that the number of staff employed and the functions of the ISU could be reviewed in the future, while its performance would be evaluated by the annual Meetings of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention.

The Meeting expressed satisfaction at the steps taken to implement the Plan of Action to Promote the Universality of the Convention and its annexed Protocols, and called upon non-States parties to join. In this context, the Meeting took note of the report of the CCW Sponsorship Programme and recognized its importance in the framework of strengthening treaty implementation, while calling upon those States in a position to do so to contribute to the Programme.

---

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 34-37.

The Meeting reiterated the importance of States parties' compliance with the Convention and the Protocols they adhere to. The States parties expressed satisfaction at the steps taken to implement the relevant decisions on compliance, including the establishment of the compliance database and the roster of experts. The Meeting continued to encourage the States parties to nominate national experts for inclusion in the pool of experts, and it decided to continue consideration of mines other than anti-personnel mines under the overall responsibility of the Chairperson-designate.

The Meeting decided to designate Gancho Ganev (Bulgaria) as Chairperson of the 2010 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties and appointed Jesus S. Domingo (Philippines) as the GGE Chairperson. The dates and duration of 2010 CCW activities were also determined.<sup>48</sup>

### **Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War**

During the year, States parties to Protocol V continued their efforts to enhance the implementation mechanism for cooperation, consultation and assistance among the States parties, as established by the First Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V. Particularly, the annual Meeting of Experts considered several substantive aspects of implementing the Protocol provisions and further developed the compliance and implementation tools. The Third Conference considered the work of the experts and subsequently approved the recommendations submitted by the Meeting of Experts on all substantive issues, which were dealt with under separate Coordinators.<sup>49</sup>

### **Protocol V Meeting of Experts**

The Meeting of Experts, held in Geneva on 22 to 24 April, was the second session since this informal mechanism for information exchange and cooperation among the States parties was established in 2007 by the First Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). The experts continued to focus on the five major topics identified by the First Conference on the implementation of Protocol provisions, and the discussions were chaired by Coordinators responsible for each of the topics.

---

<sup>48</sup> Schedule for 2010: (a) first 2010 GGE session: 12-16 April; (b) second GGE session: 30 August-3 September; (c) Group of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II: 19-20 April; (d) Meeting of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V: 21-23 April; (e) Fourth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V: 22-23 November; (f) Twelfth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II: 24 November; and (g) Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention: 25-26 November 2010.

<sup>49</sup> Renata Alisauskiene (Lithuania) on clearance, removal or destruction of explosive remnants of war; Angela Robinson (Australia), assisted by Danijela Žunec Brandt (Croatia) on victim assistance; Gyula Somogyi (Hungary) on cooperation and assistance, and requests for assistance; Henrik Markuš (Slovakia) on national reporting, and article 4 generic electronic template; Jean-Christophe Le Roux (France) on generic preventive measures.

*Clearance, removal or destruction of ERW.* The experts further discussed efforts to mitigate the challenges confronted by the States parties in implementing the clearance obligations pursuant to article 3 of the Protocol. The main aims of the discussion were: (a) to share national experience in dealing with present or past ERW contamination, particularly focusing on the challenges associated with the clearance, removal or destruction of ERW with specific types of munitions or submunitions; (b) to provide a forum for those States in need of assistance to submit requests in the ERW database and update their ERW status; and (c) to encourage the donor States to use the ERW database to identify States in need of assistance and to advise on their own activities in support of ERW-related activities.

The main topics discussed were: (a) exchange of national information and experience;<sup>50</sup> (b) responsibilities of the users of explosive ordnance;<sup>51</sup> and (c) the environmental impact of ERW and clearance activities.

*Victim assistance.* Following the adoption of the Plan of Action on victim assistance under article 8 (2) of the Protocol in 2008, the experts advanced their work by focusing on three main topics: (a) encouraging the collection and sharing of data with respect to victim assistance (i.e., the number and type of ERW victims for which States have responsibility) in order to gain a better understanding of the situation on the ground;<sup>52</sup> (b) examining practical ways to implement the Plan of Action; and (c) broader considerations on victim assistance.

Discussions on the first two topics were guided by a panel of experts.<sup>53</sup> It was also a key opportunity to share experiences in implementing the Plan of Action and to identify obstacles preventing effective support to ERW survivors. In this regard, several States made national presentations.<sup>54</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> The following presentations were made by: Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Georgia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia and Tajikistan.

<sup>51</sup> The following presentations were delivered: "ERW: the need for clearance" by Chris Clark (United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)); "Information management" by Daniel Eriksson (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)); "Priority-setting for ERW programmes" by Ted Paterson (GICHD); "Lao PDR risk management and mitigation model" by Åsa Wessel (GICHD); "ERW and environmental consequences" by Mario Burger (United Nations Environment Programme).

<sup>52</sup> In accordance with Action 2: "Each High Contracting Party should make every effort to collect reliable relevant data with respect to victims."

<sup>53</sup> The panel of experts made the following presentations: "General overview: Evolution of victim assistance and current needs" by Sheree Bailey (Victim Assistance Specialist, Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit); "Assisting ERW victims in Uganda" by Herbert Baryayebwa (Commissioner for Disability, Uganda); "Assisting ERW victims in El Salvador" by Lourdes Barrera de Morales (Executive Director, National Council for Persons with Disabilities, El Salvador); "Assisting ERW victims in Afghanistan" by Najmuddin Helal (Head, International Committee of the Red Cross Orthopaedic Centre, Kabul).

<sup>54</sup> Presentations were made by: Reykhan Muminova (Tajikistan Mine Action Centre); Veri Dogjani (Albania Mine Action Centre); Kommasith Saleumxay (Director-General of

The experts focused on gaining a better understanding of how the various actions under the Plan of Action were being put into practice, including exchanging information on best practices, challenges ahead and lessons learned. The States parties were also encouraged to respond to the questionnaire on victim assistance<sup>55</sup> in order to further improve the knowledge base on how best to address the problems of ERW survivors. The sharing of experiences of service providers, policymakers and survivors provided the group with practical information for its future work. The third topic, unfortunately, could not be addressed as planned due to time constraint.<sup>56</sup>

*Cooperation and assistance and requests for assistance.* The Coordinator gave an update on the work in progress on the Web-based Information System on Protocol V (WISP.V), focusing on practical ways of using the Internet to enhance the implementation of articles 7 and 8 of the Protocol. The Coordinator reported that the modules of the WISP.V had been reviewed and simplified in close collaboration with the information technology section of the United Nations Office at Geneva. The experts also reviewed the existing ERW database, which was accessible through the CCW website. They were reminded of the importance of updating their requests for assistance online to provide up-to-date information to potential donors. Although no deadline existed, timely submission was strongly encouraged so that such information could be made more visible to potential donors. Finally, the Coordinator invited all States parties and non-States parties to participate in the Budapest Workshop on ERW Clearance, Removal and Destruction.<sup>57</sup>

*National reporting.* The experts focused on formulating a guide, which could help States parties to better fulfill their reporting obligations, and on using the article 4 generic electronic template. On the guide to national reporting, the experts worked on a helpful tool to improve the quality of national reports to be submitted by States parties. Through the tool, reports could serve as a useful source of information for purposes of international cooperation and assistance under the Protocol. On the generic electronic template, the work focused on finding ways to deal with the States parties'

---

International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lao People's Democratic Republic); Zoran Grujic (Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre); Danijela Žunec Brandt (Permanent Mission of Croatia, Geneva); Vasyl Pokotylo (Deputy Head of Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine).

<sup>55</sup> Second Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V on ERW to the CCW, "Report on victim assistance", document CCW/P.V/CONF/2008/2, annex I.

<sup>56</sup> Only one speaker shared his experience on the subject: "Civil society and victim assistance—a survivor's perspective" by Firoz Alizada (International Campaign to Ban Landmines).

<sup>57</sup> The event was held in Budapest on 29-30 June 2009 and was organized by Hungary. It was one of the first open-ended international workshops in the framework of Protocol V implementation, focusing on practical information on using a wide range of ERW clearance, removal and destruction techniques and equipment. The organizers planned visits to military barracks, the Danube River military harbour and a demolition site.

obligations to record and retain information on the use of explosive ordnance or the abandonment thereof. The work also sought to encourage States parties to establish a functional link with the Meetings of Experts at the national level, with a particular focus on procedures of national agencies responsible for recording and retaining information.

*Generic preventive measures.* In preparation for the Meeting, the Coordinator undertook open-ended consultations to identify how to make the best use of the existing theory and practice, and to develop possible recommendations for further progress in the field of preventive technical measures. The experts focused in particular on the proposal of France entitled “Generic Preventive Measures”,<sup>58</sup> which contained a checklist of best practices and preventive measures that could be a useful guide throughout the life cycle of munitions, from design to destruction. Presentations by States and international organizations<sup>59</sup> highlighted preventive measures applied to munitions manufacturing and management at national level, respectively. The experts, subsequently, drew up a list of recommendations for further work.

The five Coordinators subsequently reported to the Third Conference on the work of the Meeting of Experts and introduced the recommendations on all aspects that were under consideration. Due to the informal nature of the meeting, no report was adopted.

### ***Third Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War***

The States parties to Protocol V continued to consider ways to further improve the Protocol’s implementation mechanism. The Third Conference, which met on 9 to 10 November, noted that since the Second Conference held in 2008, an additional 13 States parties<sup>60</sup> had notified their consent to be bound by Protocol V, bringing the total to 61 States parties. Two additional States<sup>61</sup> announced their ratification to Protocol V during the Conference, raising hope for further progress towards universality. The President of the Conference<sup>62</sup> assisted by two Vice-Presidents<sup>63</sup> received reports submitted by the five Coordinators who conveyed the results of the discussions held during the Meeting of Experts. The implementation process, in its third consecutive year, was acquiring momentum as a forum for matching needs with resources.

---

<sup>58</sup> Second Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V on ERW to the CCW, “Report on victim assistance”, document CCW/P.V/CONF/2008/7.

<sup>59</sup> “Ammunition storage” by Vera Bohle (GICHD); “Stockpile management” by Larry D. Schultz (United States); Chris Clark (UNMAS).

<sup>60</sup> Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Latvia, Mali, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, United Arab Emirates and United States.

<sup>61</sup> Qatar and Italy.

<sup>62</sup> Hamid Ali Rao (India).

<sup>63</sup> Caroline Millar (Australia) and Boštjan Jerman (Slovenia).

In his message to the Conference, the Secretary-General<sup>64</sup> encouraged States parties to make full use of the implementation mechanism as it could facilitate assistance and both improve knowledge on the scope of the ERW problem and promote measures to deal with it. He also urged States to further employ the Plan of Action on Victim Assistance through, inter alia, stronger measures to help victims.

The Conference had before it 31 national annual reports from States parties,<sup>65</sup> which are accessible through the Protocol V Internet database. The Conference also heard presentations by national delegations and international organizations focusing on ERW clearance and victim assistance.<sup>66</sup>

Based on the Coordinators' reports and the recommendations contained therein, the Third Conference decided to:

- Continue consideration of clearance, removal or destruction of ERW in the context of the Meetings of Experts and the Conferences of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V. In this regard, the Conference decided to reiterate its invitation to all States in need of assistance to bring their case to the attention of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V and make full use of the Protocol V implementation mechanism as a tool to connect needs with resources and to foster cooperation and assistance between those requesting assistance and potential donors;
- Reiterate its invitation to donor States to make use of the ERW database to identify all possible sources of support for ERW-related activities and to share information on their efforts in support of ERW-related activities;
- Keep under review the implementation of article 4, its impact on the implementation of the obligations on clearance, removal or destruction of ERW under article 3, and the potential environmental impact of ERW clearance;

---

<sup>64</sup> Delivered by Sergio Duarte, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

<sup>65</sup> Australia, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Holy See, India, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine.

<sup>66</sup> "Implementation of CCW Protocol V by the Finish Defence Forces" (Finland); "The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and Victim Assistance under CCW Protocol V" (Adriana Zarraluqui, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights); "Provision of Victim Assistance in conflict and post-conflict environment" (Theo Verhoeff, International Committee of the Red Cross Special Fund for the Disabled); and "Disability and Rehabilitation" (Alana Officer, World Health Organization).

- Continue consideration of victim assistance in the context of the Meetings of Experts and the Conferences of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V, and request the Coordinator to report to the Fourth Conference of the High Contracting Parties on the state of implementation of article 8, paragraph 2, in particular, and the Plan of Action on Victim Assistance, in general;
- Request that the Meeting of Experts further discuss the issue of reporting under article 8, paragraph 2, keeping in mind also the Plan of Action, and request the Coordinator to make suggestions to the Fourth Conference of the High Contracting Parties based on this discussion;
- Encourage High Contracting Parties and observers to identify themselves as requiring assistance or in the position to provide assistance for the purpose of matching needs and resources;
- Request that the Meeting of Experts consider the benefits of the Plan of Action for the wider CCW community;
- Take note of the concept for WISP.V and to launch its development;
- Continue consideration of the implementation of article 4, which would include, inter alia: (a) action taken by the High Contracting Parties that have not yet established relevant national systems, regulations and procedures for recording and retaining information pursuant to article 4 of the Protocol (Discussion Paper 2 may continue to serve as a basis for sharing information on the actions taken in respect of the article 4 generic electronic template, as well as for providing their views, comments, suggestions, etc., on this issue); (b) exchange of information on the national procedures and experience in the implementation by the High Contracting Parties of their obligations under article 4; (c) identification of the relevant United Nations structure that could serve as the focal point for collecting and transmitting information pursuant to article 4 (2);
- Approve the draft “Guide to National Reporting under CCW Protocol V” and recommend it as a document representing a checklist of questions to be used as a tool at the discretion of the High Contracting Parties to facilitate the filling-out of the National Reporting forms;
- Continue to evaluate the reporting mechanism, including the Reporting Formats and the “Guide to National Reporting under CCW Protocol V”;
- Complete the elaboration of the “Guide for the implementation of Part 3 of the Technical Annex”, as contained in CCW/P.V/CONF/2009/2/Add.1, with a view to its adoption at the Fourth Conference of the

High Contracting Parties to Protocol V as a best practice for the implementation of Part 3 of the Technical Annex;

- Pursue the practice of addressing one specific technical issue directly related to the implementation of article 9 and Part 3 of the Technical Annex of Protocol V;
- Invite all States parties to share, during the 2010 Meeting of Experts, their national technical approaches and experiences in implementing article 9 and Part 3 of the Technical Annex of Protocol V.

The Third Conference adopted its report,<sup>67</sup> which contained the mandate for 2010 activities, including the designation of the President of the Fourth Conference in 2010,<sup>68</sup> the two Vice-Presidents,<sup>69</sup> the appointment of the Coordinators responsible for each substantive issue<sup>70</sup> and the decision on the dates and duration of the 2010 Meeting of Experts.<sup>71</sup>

### **Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices**

In 2009, the Amended Protocol II experienced a revitalization of activities to strengthen its implementation with the re-establishment of an open-ended Group of Experts to add more substance to the Amended Protocol II implementation mechanism, and to further promote the achievement of the goals of the Protocol. The Group was organized on the model of, and in conjunction with, the annual meetings of experts of the States parties to Protocol V. The Group, whose work was overseen by the President of the annual conferences, reported its findings to the annual conferences of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II.<sup>72</sup> Pursuant to the relevant decision of the Tenth Annual Conference, the proceedings of the 2009 session of the Group were presided over by the President-designate of the Eleventh Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, Jānis Mažeiks (Latvia).

---

<sup>67</sup> Third Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V on ERW to the CCW, "Final document", document CCW/P.V/CONF/2009/9. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>68</sup> A representative of Australia.

<sup>69</sup> Representatives of Pakistan and Slovakia.

<sup>70</sup> Coordinators: Renata Alisauskiene (Lithuania) on clearance, removal or destruction of ERW; Stephanie Karner (Austria), assisted by Danijela Žunec Brandt (Croatia) on victim assistance; James C. O'Shea (Ireland) on cooperation and assistance and requests for assistance; Gyula Somogyi (Hungary) on the WISP.V; Henrik Markuš (Slovakia) on national reporting, and the article 4 generic electronic template; Eric Steinmyller (France) on generic preventive measures.

<sup>71</sup> Geneva, 21-23 April 2010.

<sup>72</sup> In discharging his duties, the President appointed Friends of the President to assist him in his work and lead the discussions.

### **Amended Protocol II Group of Experts**

The Group met in Geneva on 20 to 21 April to: (a) review the operation and status of the Protocol; (b) consider matters arising from States parties' reports and the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines; and (c) address the issue of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Two Friends of the President were appointed to assist in the work of the Group.

The Friend of the President responsible for the consideration of IEDs, Reto Wollenmann (Switzerland), guided the discussion based on well-researched material and a well-structured scenario composed of basic presentations and a rich exchange of national experience in addressing IEDs from different perspectives, including the technical, military, legal and humanitarian problems associated with its use.

The presentations by leading experts on the issue provided a wide range of possibilities for the Group to consider.<sup>73</sup> Presentations, case studies and interventions by States parties and observers<sup>74</sup> also provided positive contribution to the Group's work. Delegations expressed particular interest in the topic and recognized that IEDs posed a significant threat to civilian populations, military forces and infrastructure, and hampered socio-economic development. There was a common understanding of the need to deal with IEDs within the CCW due to the gravity of the problem; however, negotiating a new legally binding instrument on IEDs would not be perceived as an outcome of this exercise. The Group focused, *inter alia*, on the definitions of IED, the technical details related to its key components, the humanitarian impact, and the measures to prevent, detect and protect against IEDs. A number of references were made to ongoing work elsewhere in the United Nations. The supply of explosives was frequently referred to as a potential entry point for the CCW to address the issue on IEDs, which was treated as part of a broader subject in the past.

Abderrazzak Laassel (Morocco) was the Friend of the President responsible for reviewing the operation and status of the Protocol, the consideration of matters arising from the annual national reporting by States parties, and the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines. He guided the experts to discuss a wide range of matters under this broad responsibility. The discussion brought to light an issue relating to the termination of the original Protocol II, which is still

---

<sup>73</sup> "Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)" by Chris Clark (UNMAS); "IEDs and explosive violence: Framing the humanitarian problem" by Richard Moyes (Landmine Action); "IEDs: A problem for humanitarian aid operations" by Erik Tollefsen (GICHD); and "Technical trends: The unconventional use of conventional ammunition" by Colin King.

<sup>74</sup> "IED Fact Sheet" (Australia); "IEDs" (Colombia); "IED Network" (Germany); "Detection and Destruction of IEDs" (Russian Federation); "IEDs" (Ukraine); and "Best practices for secure storage and transport of munitions" (United States).

in force even though it is no longer perceived to be of any practical value and only creates confusion.<sup>75</sup> Another issue was the idea of harmonizing the submission deadlines and the duration of reporting for all three CCW reports, i.e., under Amended Protocol II, Protocol V and Compliance, respectively.

The two Friends of the President subsequently reported to the Eleventh Annual Conference on the work of the Group of Experts and introduced recommendations on the aspects they had covered.<sup>76</sup>

### ***Eleventh Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II***

The Eleventh Annual Conference, held in Geneva on 11 November, reviewed and considered the work of the Group of Experts and reiterated the importance of universal adherence, adopting an appeal to promote wider adherence to the Protocol.<sup>77</sup> The Conference also recommended that the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the Conference exercise their authority to achieve universality of Amended Protocol II. The latest country to join Amended Protocol II brought the number of adherents to 93 States parties.<sup>78</sup> Of this total, 45 States parties submitted national annual reports containing information on the implementation of the Protocol, all of which were posted on the official CCW website.<sup>79</sup>

In his message, the Secretary-General underscored the importance of the Protocol's universal adherence, acknowledged the latest status of accessions and encouraged the States parties to continue efforts to expand

---

<sup>75</sup> It is widely recognized today that the original CCW Protocol II has serious shortcomings and had failed to prevent the disastrous humanitarian crisis of the early 1990s provoked by the worldwide use of landmines. Based on the assessment that much firmer measures were needed in order to find an effective way of improving the situation, negotiations took place from 1995 to 1996 and culminated in the adoption of CCW Amended Protocol II and the Mine Ban Convention.

Today, CCW Protocol II has little, if any, humanitarian, legal, military, or political logic and is superseded by the higher international standards contained in Amended Protocol II and the Mine Ban Convention. However, it is still in force and creates confusion, in particular, among the States not parties to the Convention that are often perplexed by the complicated structure of the CCW with its amended article 1, five annexed protocols, one of which was also amended.

<sup>76</sup> The Group of Experts did not adopt a report at the end of its session due to the informal nature of its activities.

<sup>77</sup> Eleventh Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to the CCW (hereinafter, Eleventh Annual Conference), "Final Document", document CCW/AP.II/CONF.11/4, annex II.

<sup>78</sup> Georgia acceded to Amended Protocol II and the amendment to article 1 on 8 June 2009.

<sup>79</sup> Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

the membership, especially among developing countries, States affected by landmines and States in conflict.<sup>80</sup> He also urged wider adherence to other humanitarian conventions in the field of mine action, such as CCW Protocol V on ERW, the Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities and the new Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Conference took note of the report by Abderrazzak Laassel, matters arising from reports by High Contracting Parties according to article 13, paragraph 4, of Amended Protocol II, and the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines.<sup>81</sup> It was also decided at the Conference that the Plan of Action to Promote the Universality of CCW and its annexed Protocols were the relevant mechanisms to enhance universal adherence. Furthermore, the Conference encouraged the States parties and the CCW Secretariat to intensify their efforts to implement the Plan of Action, in particular through organizing more national and regional seminars aimed at promoting and explaining the CCW and its Protocols.

The Conference decided that the Group of Experts would meet from 19 to 20 April 2010, and that it should analyse the implementation of the reporting obligations by the States parties and the content of their national annual reports. In particular, the Group should consider, and make a recommendation on, the proposal on the possible synchronization of the submission of the national annual reports under article 13, paragraph 4, of Amended Protocol II with national reports submitted under other legal regimes, such as the CCW Protocol V on ERW. The Group of Experts should also consider the legal possibility and the practical feasibility of terminating the original CCW Protocol II.

The Conference took note of the report by Reto Wollenmann<sup>82</sup> and decided that the Group of Experts should continue to explore the issue of IEDs in the context of the Amended Protocol II, in particular focusing on the strict and effective implementation of all relevant provisions of the Protocol and, when appropriate, in synergy with the related activities under CCW Protocol V. The Group of Experts was also mandated to explore possible practical steps to address the challenges posed by IEDs, including the possibility of discussing best practices in addressing these challenges. Furthermore, the Conference decided that the Group of Experts should continue to review the operation and status of the Protocol, consider matters arising from reports by High Contracting Parties according to article 13, paragraph 4, of Amended Protocol II, as well as the development of technologies to protect civilians

---

<sup>80</sup> The message was delivered by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Sergio Duarte.

<sup>81</sup> Eleventh Annual Conference, document CCW/AP.II/CONF.11/3. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>82</sup> Eleventh Annual Conference, document CCW/AP.II/CONF.11/2. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

against indiscriminate effects of mines.<sup>83</sup> It was also decided that the Group of Experts continue to explore the issue of IEDs.<sup>84</sup> The work of the Group would be considered by the Twelfth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II.<sup>85</sup>

## General Assembly, 2009

### 64/67. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Introduced annually, this year's resolution introduced several new elements. Among other things, it recalled the decision by the Third Review Conference to establish a Sponsorship Programme within the framework of the Convention, and, with recognition of the value and importance of the programme, encouraged States to contribute to the Sponsorship Programme. It also expressed support for the work conducted in 2009 by the GGE of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention to continue its negotiations to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations, in accordance with the mandate given to it by the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties in November 2008. Furthermore, it welcomed the commitment of States parties to the Protocol on ERW (Protocol V) to the effective and efficient implementation of the Protocol, as well as the implementation of the decisions of the First and Second Conferences of the High Contracting Parties to the Protocol establishing a comprehensive framework for the exchange of information and cooperation. It also welcomed the holding of the second Meeting of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Protocol, from 22 to 24 April 2009 in Geneva, as a mechanism for consultation and cooperation among the States parties. The resolution also noted the decision of the Tenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to establish an informal open-ended Group of Experts, and welcomed the holding of the first session of the Group of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, on 20 and 21 April 2009 in Geneva, to exchange national practices and experiences and to assess the implementation of the Protocol.

**Introduced by:** Sweden (19 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (29 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 175-178.

**First Committee.** After joining consensus, two States took the floor. **Norway** questioned the rationale for the CCW dealing with issues already

<sup>83</sup> Under the overall responsibility of the Coordinator, Abderrazzak Laassel (Morocco).

<sup>84</sup> Under the overall responsibility of the Coordinator, Reto Wollenmann (Switzerland).

<sup>85</sup> The Conference agreed on the provisional agenda for the Twelfth Annual Conference in 2010 and its presiding officers: Germán Mundaraín Hernández (Venezuela), to be assisted by three Vice-Presidents representing China, Germany and Romania.

covered in other forums, such as cluster munitions. It believed that the continued process of expert meetings on cluster munitions was no longer useful. However, it welcomed open and frank discussions on the future work of the CCW and a determination of the Convention's possible concrete contributions. It stated that the Treaty's value should be measured on the basis of its positive humanitarian effect on the ground. The **Libyan Arab Jamahiriya** said that its acceptance of the consensus did not mean full agreement with the provisions of the CCW, to which it was not a party. It believed that the CCW and its Protocols did not address certain issues in sufficient depth, such as landmines laid in formerly warring States. It hoped that discussions that took into account the concerns of all parties would soon occur.

## **Anti-personnel mines**

### **Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Convention**

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Convention) states in article 12, paragraph 1, that "a Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of the Convention" and that "further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years". Furthermore, the First Review Conference in 2004 had decided that the Second Review Conference would take place in the second half of 2009.

Against this background and pursuant to the relevant decision of the Ninth Meeting of the States Parties,<sup>86</sup> the Second Review Conference was held in Cartagena, Colombia, from 29 November to 4 December. The preparations for the Cartagena Summit were publicly launched on 2 March at a ceremony in Geneva and which were advanced by five regional events organized in Albania, Nicaragua, South Africa, Tajikistan and Thailand. The Conference, also known as the Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World, was organized by two sessions of a Preparatory Committee on 29 May and from 3 to 4 September in Geneva. Susan Eckey (Norway) presided over the Second Review Conference.

The first preparatory meeting focused on the procedural issues and approved the draft rules of procedure, agenda, provisional programme of work and the cost estimates of the first and the second preparatory meetings. The meeting also decided that, in keeping with the established practice, the

---

<sup>86</sup> Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention, "Final report", document APLC/MSP.9/2008/4, para. 33.

Co-Chairs of the four Standing Committees should serve as Vice-Presidents of the Second Review Conference.<sup>87</sup>

The second preparatory meeting focused on all substantive issues that would constitute the final outcome of the Second Review Conference. In particular, the meeting considered the following draft documents: the review of the operation and status of the Mine Ban Convention: 2005-2009;<sup>88</sup> Cartagena Action Plan 2009-2014;<sup>89</sup> Cartagena Declaration;<sup>90</sup> and decisions on future meetings.<sup>91</sup> Additional comments and amendments to some of these drafts were also provided in the intersessional period preceding the Review Conference, as well as during the Conference itself.

Subsequently, the Second Review Conference was opened on 29 November by the Vice-President of Colombia, Francisco Santos Calderón. On 30 November, the Conference heard a message from the United Nations Secretary-General in which he praised the extraordinary results achieved by the Mine Ban Convention, positively impacting the lives of villagers, schoolchildren, peacekeepers and traders, and contributing to helping achieve the Millennium Development Goals. He also stressed the ultimate goal of realizing a mine-free world as a realistic possibility. He appealed for the universalization of the Convention and offered United Nations support.

A total of 108 States parties, 20 observer States, United Nations officials and a number of international, regional and non-governmental organizations participated in the work of the Cartagena Summit, which reiterated the success and importance of the Ottawa process. The Conference engaged in a detailed review of the Convention, successfully adopting the Cartagena Declaration (see appendix III for text) and a robust Cartagena Action Plan<sup>92</sup> with a special emphasis on victim assistance. The Conference culminated in a high-level segment, held from 3 to 4 December, during which some 70 representatives

---

<sup>87</sup> Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, Italy, Japan, Thailand and Zambia.

<sup>88</sup> Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention (hereinafter, Second Review Conference), document APLC/CONF/2009/PM.2/WP.1. Available from <http://www.cartagenasummit.org/fileadmin/pdf/review-conference-2nd/prep-mtgs/2nd-prep-mtg/2RC-Draft-Review-17July2009.pdf> (accessed 7 July 2010).

<sup>89</sup> Second Review Conference, document APLC/CONF/2009/PM.2/3. Available from <http://www.cartagenasummit.org/fileadmin/pdf/review-conference-2nd/prep-mtgs/2nd-prep-mtg/2RC-Draft-ActionPlan-e.pdf> (accessed 7 July 2010).

<sup>90</sup> Second Review Conference, document APLC/CONF/2009/PM.2/4. Available from <http://www.cartagenasummit.org/fileadmin/pdf/review-conference-2nd/prep-mtgs/2nd-prep-mtg/2RC-Draft-ActionPlan-e.pdf> (accessed 7 July 2010).

<sup>91</sup> Second Review Conference, document APLC/CONF/2009/PM.2/2. Available from <http://www.cartagenasummit.org/fileadmin/pdf/review-conference-2nd/prep-mtgs/2nd-prep-mtg/2RC-Draft-FutureMtgs-17July2009.pdf> (accessed 7 July 2009).

<sup>92</sup> Second Review Conference, "Cartagena action plan 2010-2014: Ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines". Available from <http://www.cartagenasummit.org/fileadmin/pdf/review-conference-2nd/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFICIAL-11Dec2009.pdf> (accessed 7 July 2010).

of States parties, observer States and observer organizations addressed the Conference and signed the Cartagena Declaration.

A few key issues concerning implementation were also considered during the three days preceding the high-level segment, in particular the universalization of the Convention, which presented a challenge. In this regard, many participants expressed disappointment over the lack of any new accessions to the treaty for more than two years.

Pursuant to the established procedure, the Conference assessed the requests submitted by Argentina, Cambodia, Tajikistan and Uganda for an extension of the respective deadlines for anti-personnel mine destruction in mined areas in accordance with article 5.1, and agreed to grant the requested extensions. Four States parties,<sup>93</sup> submitted declarations on the completion of their article 5 obligations.

A special open-ended task force was established to develop terms of reference for an evaluation of the Convention's Implementation Support Unit, which would present its report and recommendations for adoption at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties.

The Second Review Conference also decided, *inter alia*, to hold annually, until the Third Review Conference, a Meeting of States Parties and informal intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees, as well as the Third Review Conference at the end of 2014.

The Tenth Meeting of States Parties is scheduled to take place in Geneva from 29 November to 3 December 2010 and will be chaired by Gazmend Turdiu (Albania), the President-designate of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties. The meetings of the Standing Committees will be held in Geneva from 21 to 25 June 2010. The Conference also elected the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs of the Standing Committees who will serve until the Tenth Meeting of States Parties.<sup>94</sup> Also, the Conference accepted the offer made by Cambodia to host and preside over the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in 2011.

---

<sup>93</sup> Albania, Greece, Rwanda and Zambia.

<sup>94</sup> Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies: Greece and Nigeria (Co-Chairs), Colombia and Switzerland (Co-Rapporteurs); Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration: Peru and Turkey (Co-Chairs), Australia and Uganda (Co-Rapporteurs); Stockpile Destruction: Bulgaria and Indonesia (Co-Chairs), Lithuania and Philippines (Co-Rapporteurs); General Status and Operation of the Convention: Ecuador and Slovenia (Co-Chairs), Canada and Thailand (Co-Rapporteurs).

## General Assembly, 2009

### 64/56. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

The annual resolution reiterated the General Assembly's invitation and encouragement to all interested States, the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to attend the Second Review

Conference of the States parties to the Convention, entitled "The Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World", at the highest possible level and, pending a decision to be taken at the Second Review Conference, to participate in future meetings. It also requested the Secretary-General, in accordance with article 11, paragraph 2, of the Convention, to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the next meeting of the States parties, pending a decision to be taken at the Second Review Conference, and on behalf of the States parties and in accordance with article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention, to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations, to attend the Second Review Conference and future meetings as observers.

**Introduced by:** Switzerland  
(20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 160-0-18 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 158-0-18 (29 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 138-141.

**First Committee.** Before the vote, two States, which intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution, made statements. **Azerbaijan** said that it fully supported the comprehensive ban and destruction of anti-personnel mines. However, it explained that the country had not acceded to the Mine Ban Convention because it was forced to use landmines as a means of protection from a resumption of possible hostilities. It also stated that Azerbaijan's adherence to the Convention would be possible only after the settlement of the conflict with Armenia. Despite the difficulties, Azerbaijan said that it followed most of the provisions of the Convention. **Morocco** reiterated its support for the humanitarian objectives of the Mine Ban Convention. It reaffirmed its endorsement of the universal momentum in favour of eliminating anti-personnel mines by ratifying Amended Protocol II of the CCW. In the same spirit, it implemented the provisions of the Mine Ban Convention and carried out remarkable demining efforts. Adherence to the Convention was a strategic objective of Morocco with regard to the maintenance of its territorial integrity.

Also speaking before the vote, two States, which intended to abstain, took the floor. As a State party to the CCW, including its Protocol II, **Cuba**

fully complied with the provisions of the Convention on the use of mines. It explained that it was unable to renounce the use of mines in order to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It would continue to support all efforts to maintain the necessary balance between humanitarian and national security concerns, and to minimize the effect of anti-personnel mines on civilian populations. The **Libyan Arab Jamahiriya** said that it believed that the existing international mechanisms neither objectively addressed the problem of landmines nor took into account affected Member States' concerns. It stated that the Convention had prohibited the use of mines by the most impoverished countries that used them to defend their borders. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya urged a review of the Convention and called for the implementation of its provisions in a more practical way, which would be acceptable to all.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, **Singapore** said that in 1996 it had declared a moratorium on landmines, and later expanded it to include other types of mines. However, it believed that a State's right to self-defence could not be disregarded and that a total ban might be counterproductive.

After abstaining in the vote, five States spoke in explanation. **Egypt** said that the instrument had been developed and concluded outside the United Nations context. It also lacked balance between humanitarian considerations and legitimate military use for border protection. It had imposed a moratorium on landmines long before the conclusion of the Mine Ban Convention. It also stressed that the treaty did not acknowledge the responsibilities of States that had laid mines on other territories. The **Russian Federation** said it was against the creation of processes in parallel to existing disarmament forums. It stated that all matters regarding mines should be resolved within the framework of the CCW. The Russian Federation intended for the first time to take part as an observer at the Cartagena Conference. **Pakistan** said that landmines played a significant role in the defence requirements of many States, especially those in regions of conflicts. It stated that the use of landmines formed an important part of Pakistan's defence strategy and it could not agree to complete prohibition of landmines until viable alternatives were available. Pakistan was a party to the Amended Protocol II of the CCW, which concerned rules on landmine use. It remained committed to ensuring that its mines would not cause civilian casualties in its country or elsewhere. **India** said that it supported the view of a world without anti-personnel landmines. It believed that the availability of alternatives to anti-personnel mines would facilitate the achievement of the goal of the complete elimination of landmines. India had participated and would participate as an observer at all of the meetings of States parties, including the Cartagena Summit. The **Republic of Korea** explained that due to the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula, it could not accede to the Mine Ban Convention at that point. Nonetheless, it was concerned about and committed to mitigating human suffering, and was enforcing a moratorium

on mine exports. It also contributed to various initiatives and trust funds on mine clearing and related humanitarian activities.

## Cluster munitions

### Convention on Cluster Munitions

During the year, the efforts of the international community were mostly focused on promoting adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its early entry into force.<sup>95</sup> Specific aspects of its future implementation, such as destruction of cluster munitions, were also given attention. Preliminary informal consultations were also held in advance of its entry into force to look at the Convention's potential implementation mechanism and its First Meeting of States Parties to be held in 2010.

By the end of 2009, the Convention was signed by 104 States and ratified by 26 countries. Thirty ratifications were needed for its entry into force, pursuant to article 17 of the Convention.

### General Assembly, 2009

#### 64/36. Convention on Cluster Munitions

First introduced in 2008, the resolution welcomed the offer of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to host the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions following its entry into force and requested the Secretary-General, in accordance with article 11, paragraph 2, of the Convention, to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention following its entry into force.

**Introduced by:** Ireland (19 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, p. 52.

**First Committee.** Six States took the floor after joining consensus. **Egypt** said that, while it understood the humanitarian concerns and the positive motivations leading to the Convention, it believed that the precedents set by the Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions should not be encouraged nor promoted in the interest of the United Nations. It continued to view the draft resolution as a procedural one, despite some political references in it. **India** clarified that it was not a signatory to, and did not endorse, the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Therefore, its consideration of the draft resolution should not be construed as endorsement. The **Russian Federation** expressed support for the draft resolution, but said it did not agree with a number of approaches contained in the Convention. It opposed the creation of

<sup>95</sup> The Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008 in Dublin, Ireland, and it was opened for signature on 3 December 2008.

parallel processes to existing disarmament forums and believed that the CCW was a good platform to address issues relating to cluster munitions.

**Israel** stated that the CCW remained the most relevant forum for addressing cluster munitions, continued to strike the balance between military and humanitarian considerations, and encompassed many weapons, including cluster munitions. Following the CCW negotiations in 2009, it believed that more work needed to be done to finalize a protocol addressing humanitarian concerns regarding cluster munitions. It also stressed that Member States must enable the CCW GGE on cluster munitions to reach a successful outcome. Israel had joined consensus on the draft resolution, but that should not be construed as support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions. **Singapore** said that it consistently supported initiatives against the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions, especially when directed at civilians. However, it believed that humanitarian concerns should also be balanced with each State's right to self-defence. The **Republic of Korea** said it had joined the consensus in support for humanitarian concerns, but, owing to the security situation in the Korean peninsula, was unable to take an active stand on the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It also stated that it was fully committed to reducing the humanitarian concerns of those weapons and would continue to participate constructively in discussions within the CCW framework.

## **Towards an arms trade treaty**

The Secretary-General underscored in his report to the Security Council on small arms<sup>96</sup> the importance of having a normative framework for all States in order to help guide their decisions regarding arms transfers. Furthermore, he emphasized that agreed international standards would help prevent irresponsible transfers, as well as diversion of arms into illicit channels.

The idea of an arms trade treaty (ATT) to regulate international arms transfers on the basis of agreed standards has been strongly supported by civil society groups and has been under discussion in the United Nations since 2006. In that year, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a GGE to look into "the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms". The 2008 report of the GGE<sup>97</sup> prompted the Assembly to mandate deliberations on a possible ATT, open to all Member States.

---

<sup>96</sup> S/2008/258.

<sup>97</sup> A/63/334.

## **Sessions of the Open-ended Working Group towards an Arms Trade Treaty**

The Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) towards an ATT received its mandate from the 2008 report of the GGE, which recommended the General Assembly to further consider the elements contained in the report, where consensus could be developed for their inclusion into what could eventually become a legally binding treaty on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.

Consequently, the first session of the OEWG took place from 2 to 6 March in New York. It was to hold six substantive sessions from 2009 to 2011. The OEWG elected Roberto Garcia Moritán (Argentina) as the Chairperson and its agenda included: (a) goals and objectives of a feasible ATT; (b) scope of a potential ATT; (c) principles and draft parameters of a potential ATT; and (d) other aspects that could be addressed by a potential ATT. The mandate required the Chair to report to the General Assembly.

Some States considered that such a treaty might not be necessary, if the existing instruments, notably regional and global political agreements (such as the United Nations Programme of Action on the illicit trade in SALW), were improved. Other States spoke out strongly in favour of a global normative framework that would guide the decisions by Governments on arms transfers.

At the second session of the OEWG, held from 13 to 17 July in New York, Member States agreed to a report on the need to address the problems associated with the international trade in conventional arms.<sup>98</sup> Reflecting this consensus, which had not existed hitherto, the OEWG considered possible elements of a legally binding treaty that would establish common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms. According to the Group's mandate, the common standards would "provide a balance giving benefit to all, with the principles of the United Nations Charter and other existing international obligations at the centre of such considerations".

The two substantive sessions of the OEWG were conducted in a deliberative and inclusive manner, with States agreeing on the need for a step-by-step, consensual approach. Proponents of an ATT introduced elements relating to objectives, goals, scope and parameters for inclusion in a possible treaty.

### **Developments during the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly**

On 21 October, during the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and the United Kingdom introduced a draft resolution entitled "The arms trade treaty", which

---

<sup>98</sup> A/AC.277/2009/1.

after several revisions was adopted on 2 December (see further discussion on resolution 64/48 below).

During the Assembly session, a number of non-governmental organizations advocated for an ATT through various speeches by relevant experts, the showing of topical film(s) and media presentations, as well as through exhibits and publications. Throughout 2009, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research hosted a series of regional seminars in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Europe to inform, elicit discussion and garner support for an ATT in a build-up to the Preparatory Committee sessions that will be under way in July 2010.

## **General Assembly, 2009**

### **64/48. The arms trade treaty**

Last tabled in 2008, this year the resolution underwent several substantive changes. It decided, *inter alia*, to convene a United Nations Conference on the ATT to meet for four consecutive weeks in 2012 to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms, and to consider the remaining sessions of the OEWG in 2010 and 2011 as a preparatory committee for the Conference. It requested the Preparatory Committee, at its four sessions in 2010 and 2011, to make recommendations to the Conference on the elements that would be needed to attain an effective and balanced legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms. It also decided to establish a fifth session of the Preparatory Committee in 2012 of up to three days' duration to decide on all relevant procedural matters, including the composition of the Bureau, the draft agenda and the submission of documents, for the United Nations Conference on the ATT. It stressed the need to ensure the widest possible and effective participation in the Conference in 2012 and also requested the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee and the United Nations Conference on the ATT all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information and relevant documents.

**Introduced by:** United Kingdom (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 151-1-20 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 153-1-19 (30 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 92-96.

**First Committee.** Before the vote, five States made general statements. **Sweden**, speaking on behalf of the EU, attached great importance to an ATT and would vote in favour of the draft resolution. The EU firmly believed that a comprehensive treaty could prevent the global problem of unregulated transfer of conventional arms, and it was committed to its elaboration. It said that the draft resolution paved the way for the launch of the negotiating process with a clear timeline, and that it was crucial that the preparatory process leading to the 2012 Conference on the ATT would be inclusive and able to make

strong recommendations on the elements of a future treaty. **Indonesia** said that it had decided to support the draft resolution because it believed that its future negotiations would provide flexibility and consider all Member States' views. However, it stressed that the draft clearly reaffirmed the right of all States to maintain their territorial integrity and political independence. In the future negotiations for an ATT, Indonesia would continue to pursue a clear and unequivocal reference to that position. **Nigeria**, speaking on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), appealed to all Member States to adopt a strong, effective and legally binding ATT capable of regulating trade in conventional weapons and combating illicit circulation of those weapons, especially SALW. A strong ATT would be in consonance with the spirit of the ECOWAS convention, which the 15 ECOWAS Heads of State had adopted in 2006.

The **Sudan**, speaking also on behalf of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Egypt, Yemen, Kuwait and itself, said that those countries would abstain from the vote on the draft resolution because it intentionally disregarded the lack of consensus within the OEWG, which the current resolution would turn into a preparatory committee on the ATT. They welcomed the fact that operative paragraph 5 called for decisions at the 2012 conference to be adopted by consensus, but the draft lacked a clear reference that the preparatory committee would adopt decisions by consensus. Moreover, they also expressed reservations about the unjustified linkage between the right to import, export and manufacture arms and the right to sustainable development and human rights. The countries also stressed that hurrying the work to achieve the treaty would only weaken its strength and universality, create an imbalance in its commitments, and harm developing countries. The **Russian Federation**, which also intended to abstain in the vote, said that it agreed that it was time to bring order to the international arms trade to prevent arms from being acquired by terrorists, extremists, illegal armed groups, organized crime and States that were under Security Council embargo. It stated, however, that it was counterproductive to discard the conclusions and recommendations of the OEWG towards an ATT, as well as the provisions of the Secretary-General's report and General Assembly resolution 63/240. It could not support the draft resolution in its present form and called for continuation of the gradual, step-by-step work on the document. The Russian Federation proposed that in 2010 the Working Group focus on determining and agreeing on the goals, scope and parameters of the possible document, bearing in mind that those goals should be concrete, clear, feasible and based on the key problems of international arms trade.

After voting in favour, five States took the floor. **Germany** said that, along with the EU, it supported the negotiation of a strong, robust and legally binding treaty, which would make a real difference on the ground. The draft

resolution's adoption reflected a strong interest in such a treaty. As to operative paragraph 5, it would have preferred to leave that issue to the work on the rules of procedure of the Conference, but it understood that the topic was important for some delegates. **Switzerland, Mexico and Ireland** had similar statements, reiterating their support for an ATT that was effective, inclusive and legally binding. However, they were concerned that the precondition in operative paragraph 5 for decisions to be made on the basis of consensus would lead to an unsatisfactory result and force States to settle for the lowest common denominator. They believed that the paragraph should not be interpreted as imposing a requirement to take decisions only by consensus. Mexico also stated that it was unfortunate that the paralysis in other bodies had been caused by the abuse of the consensus rules and was convinced that work towards an ATT would be successful if negotiations were conducted in good faith. Mexico and Ireland also pointed out that major treaties, such as the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, had been adopted by a vote. Furthermore, Switzerland and Ireland preferred the established practice of allowing the preparatory process, not a General Assembly resolution, to determine the functioning of a conference that was aimed at negotiating a treaty. The three States said that while an agreement by consensus was beneficial, it should not be an obstacle to a strong, effective and legally binding treaty. **Portugal** aligned itself with the statement of the EU. However, regarding operative paragraph 5, it stated that there should be more exhaustive discussions and a collective analysis of how to achieve a strong and robust legally binding treaty.

The **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela** said it had abstained because the draft resolution undermined the atmosphere of trust that the General Assembly had decided to create by establishing an OEWG on the issue. It expressed disappointment that constructive proposals on assurances and guarantees, such as incorporating States' right to self-defence, were not taken into consideration. It believed that it was important to take into account the interests of all States, and that the 2012 Conference might even undermine the progress achieved under the Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit SALW.

## **Export controls**

### **Wassenaar Arrangement**

In 2009, the Wassenaar Arrangement<sup>99</sup> continued to focus its efforts on its overall functioning and its contribution to regional and international

---

<sup>99</sup> The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established on the basis of the Initial Elements adopted in July 1996 (see [www.wassenaar.org/](http://www.wassenaar.org/)). Currently the Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,

security and stability. Discussions took place in the 15th Plenary Meeting<sup>100</sup> on the current and future challenges posed by the destabilizing accumulation of conventional arms and it was decided to continue such discussions as well as the ongoing work on developing Best Practices Guidelines.

The Arrangement continued to keep pace with advances in technology, market trends and international security developments involving the spread of military and dual-use goods and technologies. The Plenary agreed to a significant number of amendments to the control lists, including some in technically complex and challenging areas, such as security of information (encryption) and reception equipment for the Global Navigation Satellite Systems. Participating States also worked actively to make the existing control text more user-friendly for exporters and licensing authorities.

The Wassenaar Arrangement continued its outreach dialogue with non-Participating States and international organizations with a view to promoting and sharing the Arrangement's best practices on export controls and to raising awareness of its work. Outreach activities included post-plenary briefings, interaction with industry and bilateral outreach with a number of non-Participating States. It was also decided that technical briefings on changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement's Control Lists would be undertaken for several non-Participating States in 2010.

The Plenary reiterated that the Wassenaar Arrangement was open to membership by all States that complied with the agreed criteria.

---

Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>100</sup> See the public statement of the 2009 Plenary Meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, 3 December 2009. Available from <http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2009/WA%20PUBLIC%20STATEMENT%202009.pdf>.

## Annex I

### Composite table of replies of Governments to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 2009

State	Report received on (2009)	Data on exports	Data on imports	Background information		
				Military holdings	Procurement through national production	International transfers of SALW
1. Andorra	27 Apr.	nil	nil			
2. Antigua and Barbuda	28 Sept.	nil	nil			
3. Argentina	20 Jun.	nil	yes	yes	nil	nil
4. Armenia	1 Jun.	nil	nil	yes		yes
5. Australia	29 Jun.	nil	yes	yes	yes	yes
6. Austria	10 Aug.	yes	yes	yes	nil	
7. Azerbaijan	1 Oct.	nil	yes			
8. Bangladesh	29 Jul.	nil	yes			yes
9. Belarus	3 Jun.	yes	nil			
10. Belgium	25 Jun.	yes	yes	yes		yes
11. Belize	2 Jul.	nil	nil			
12. Bhutan	4 Aug.	nil	nil			
13. Bolivia	10 Sept.	nil	nil			yes
14. Bosnia and Herzegovina	23 Jun.	nil	nil			
15. Brazil	29 May	nil	yes			
16. Bulgaria	22 Jun.	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
17. Burundi	31 Aug.	nil	nil			
18. Canada	25 Jun.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
19. Chile	4 Aug.	nil	yes			yes
20. China	9 Jun.	yes	nil			
21. Costa Rica	7 Jul.	nil	nil			
22. Croatia	22 May	nil	yes			yes

State	Report received on (2009)	Data on exports	Data on imports	Background information		
				Military holdings	Procurement through national production	International transfers of SALW
23. Cyprus	21 May	nil	nil			nil
24. Czech Republic	28 May	yes	yes			yes
25. Denmark	19 Oct.	nil	yes	yes	nil	yes
26. Estonia	20 May	yes	yes	yes		
27. Finland	29 May	yes	yes	yes	yes	
28. France	7 Jul.	yes	nil	yes	yes	yes
29. Germany	24 Jun.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
30. Grenada	8 May	nil	nil			
31. Hungary	12 Jun.	yes	yes			yes
32. India	22 Jun.	nil	yes			
33. Indonesia	5 Jan. 2010	nil	yes			yes
34. Ireland	27 May	nil	yes			yes
35. Israel	22 Dec.	yes	yes			
36. Italy	2 Jul.	nil	yes	yes	yes	yes
37. Japan <sup>a</sup>	31 May	nil	nil	yes	yes	
38. Kazakhstan	20 Aug.	nil	yes			yes
39. Latvia	8 Jun.	nil	yes			yes
40. Lebanon	2 Jun.	nil	nil		nil	nil
41. Liechtenstein	25 May	nil	nil			yes
42. Lithuania	20 May	nil	nil	yes		yes
43. Malaysia	2 Jul.	nil	yes			
44. Malta	24 Sept.	nil	nil			nil
45. Mexico	27 May	nil	nil			yes
46. Moldova	27 May	nil	nil			yes
47. Monaco	27 Feb.	nil	nil			
48. Nauru	16 Mar.	nil	nil			
49. Netherlands	1 Jul.	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes

State	Report received on (2009)	Data on exports	Data on imports	Background information		
				Military holdings	Procurement through national production	International transfers of SALW
50. New Zealand	29 May	yes	nil	yes		yes
51. Norway	9 Jun.	yes	yes		yes	yes
52. Pakistan	23 Jul.	nil	yes			
53. Panama	11 Jun.	nil	nil			yes
54. Peru	29 May	nil	yes			yes
55. Philippines	27 Aug.	nil	nil			yes
56. Poland	25 Jun.	yes	yes			yes
57. Portugal	11 Jun.	yes	yes			yes
58. Republic of Korea	10 Jul.	nil	yes			yes
59. Romania	16 Jun.	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
60. Russian Federation	29 May	yes	yes			
61. Samoa	5 Jun.	nil	nil			
62. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	14 Aug.	nil	nil			yes
63. Seychelles	1 Apr.	nil	nil			
64. Singapore	26 May	nil	yes			
65. Slovakia	20 Jul.	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
66. Slovenia	9 Jun.	nil	yes			yes
67. Solomon Islands	13 Apr.	nil	nil			
68. South Africa	20 Oct.	yes	yes			
69. Spain	20 May	yes	yes	yes	yes	
70. Suriname	15 Jul.	nil	nil			
71. Swaziland	24 Jun.	nil	nil			nil
72. Sweden	6 Aug.	yes	nil	yes	nil	yes
73. Switzerland	28 May	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes

State	Report received on (2009)	Data on exports	Data on imports	Background information		
				Military holdings	Procurement through national production	International transfers of SALW
74. Tajikistan	20 May	nil	nil			
75. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	18 Mar.	nil	nil			
76. Turkey	22 Jun.	yes	yes			yes
77. Ukraine	1 Jun.	yes	yes			yes
78. United Kingdom	8 Jul.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
79. United States	14 Aug.	yes	yes	yes	yes	
80. Viet Nam	30 May	nil	nil			

<sup>a</sup> Japan provided a paper on “Policies on the control of arms export”.

## Annex II

### United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Participation of Member States in reporting on transfers of small arms and light weapons, 2004-2009

Year of submission	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Total no. of reports to the Register	115	117	117	113	91	80
No. of States reporting SALW transfers	5	5	4	37	48	47
1. Albania				yes	yes	
2. Antigua and Barbuda				yes	nil	nil
3. Argentina <sup>a</sup>					nil	nil
4. Armenia					yes	yes
5. Australia					yes	yes
6. Bangladesh				yes	yes	yes
7. Belgium						yes
8. Bolivia						yes

<i>Year of submission</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>
<i>Total no. of reports to the Register</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>113</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>80</i>
<i>No. of States reporting SALW transfers</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>47</i>
9. Bosnia and Herzegovina				yes	yes	
10. Brunei Darussalam					yes	
11. Bulgaria						yes
12. Canada				yes	yes	yes
13. Chile					yes	yes
14. Colombia					yes	
15. Croatia					yes	yes
16. Cyprus				yes	nil	nil
17. Czech Republic				yes	yes	yes
18. Denmark				yes	yes	yes
19. El Salvador					nil	
20. Fiji					nil	
21. Finland		yes				
22. France		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
23. Georgia				yes	yes	
24. Germany				yes	yes	yes
25. Ghana					nil	
26. Greece				yes	yes	
27. Haiti				yes		
28. Hungary				yes	yes	yes
29. Indonesia					yes	yes
30. Ireland						yes
31. Italy					yes	yes
32. Jamaica				yes		
33. Japan <sup>p</sup>		PNP	PNP	PNP	PNP	PNP
34. Kazakhstan						yes
35. Latvia	yes			yes	yes	yes
36. Lebanon						nil
37. Liechtenstein				yes	yes	yes

<i>Year of submission</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>
<i>Total no. of reports to the Register</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>113</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>80</i>
<i>No. of States reporting SALW transfers</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>47</i>
38. Lithuania				yes	yes	yes
39. Luxembourg					yes	
40. Mali				nil		
41. Malta					nil	nil
42. Mexico				yes	yes	yes
43. Moldova				nil	nil	yes
44. Montenegro					yes	
45. Netherlands	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
46. New Zealand				yes	yes	yes
47. Norway					yes	yes
48. Panama				yes		yes
49. Peru						yes
50. Philippines				nil		yes
51. Poland	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
52. Portugal				yes	yes	yes
53. Republic of Korea				yes	yes	yes
54. Romania					yes	yes
55. Saint Lucia				nil		
56. St. Vincent and the Grenadines						yes
57. Senegal				yes		
58. Slovakia				yes	yes	yes
59. Slovenia					yes	yes
60. Swaziland				nil	nil	nil
61. Sweden	yes			yes	yes	yes
62. Switzerland						yes
63. Togo				nil	nil	
64. Trinidad and Tobago				yes		
65. Turkey				yes	yes	yes

<i>Year of submission</i>	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<i>Total no. of reports to the Register</i>	115	117	117	113	91	80
<i>No. of States reporting SALW transfers</i>	5	5	4	37	48	47
66. Ukraine					yes	yes
67. United Kingdom <sup>c</sup>	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

<sup>a</sup> In 2008-2009, Argentina also reported military holdings of SALW.

<sup>b</sup> Japan reported procurement of SALW through national production (PNP) in 2004-2008.

<sup>c</sup> The United Kingdom also provided information on SALW destroyed between 1 January and 31 December 2007.

### Annex III

#### Composite table of reports of Member States to the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures in 2009

<i>Reporting States</i>	<i>Submission received on</i>	<i>Form of submission</i>		
		<i>Standardized</i>	<i>Simplified</i>	<i>"Nil" report</i>
1. Andorra	27 Apr.			yes
2. Argentina	10 Jun.	yes		
3. Armenia	24 Apr.		yes	
4. Australia	6 May	yes		
5. Austria	30 Apr.	yes		
6. Belarus	23 Apr.	yes		
7. Belgium	8 May	yes		
8. Bosnia and Herzegovina	15 Apr.	yes	yes	
9. Brazil	27 May	yes		
10. Bulgaria	30 Mar.	yes		
11. Burkina Faso	22 Jul.		yes	
12. China	16 Jul.		yes	
13. Colombia	15 Oct.	yes		
14. Costa Rica	1 Jul.			yes
15. Croatia	11 May	yes	yes	
16. Cyprus	30 Mar.	yes	yes	

	<i>Reporting States</i>	<i>Submission received on</i>	<i>Form of submission</i>		
			<i>Standardized</i>	<i>Simplified</i>	<i>"Nil" report</i>
17.	Czech Republic	28 May	yes		
18.	Estonia	30 Mar.	yes		
19.	Finland	21 Apr.	yes		
20.	France	22 Jul.	yes		
21.	Germany	21 Apr.	yes		
22.	Ireland	21 Jul.	yes		
23.	Israel	5 May		yes	
24.	Italy	30 Apr.	yes		
25.	Japan	24 Apr.	yes		
26.	Latvia	8 May	yes		
27.	Lebanon	15 Apr.		yes	
28.	Lithuania	4 May	yes		
29.	Malta	9 Apr.	yes		
30.	Mexico	30 Apr.	yes	yes	
31.	Moldova	29 Apr.	yes		
32.	Monaco	11 Mar.			yes
33.	Montenegro	9 Jun.	yes	yes	
34.	Nauru	16 Mar.			yes
35.	Nepal	21 Aug.	yes	yes	
36.	New Zealand	30 Apr.	yes		
37.	Norway	17 Apr.	yes		
38.	Peru	29 May	yes		
39.	Philippines	3 Jun.		yes	
40.	Poland	30 Apr.	yes		
41.	Portugal	28 Apr. 2008	yes		
42.	Republic of Korea	11 May		yes	
43.	Romania	28 May	yes	yes	
44.	Russian Federation	15 May	yes		
45.	Samoa	5 Jun.			yes

	<i>Reporting States</i>	<i>Submission received on</i>	<i>Form of submission</i>		
			<i>Standardized</i>	<i>Simplified</i>	<i>"Nil" report</i>
46.	Serbia	13 May	yes		
47.	Slovakia	14 Jul.	yes		
48.	Slovenia	29 Apr.		yes	
49.	Spain	21 Apr.	yes	yes	
50.	Suriname	28 May		yes	
51.	Sweden	25 Sept.	yes		
52.	Switzerland	8 Apr.	yes		
53.	Thailand	19 Aug.		yes	
54.	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	9 Apr.	yes		
55.	Tunisia	11 Sept.			yes
56.	Turkey	22 Jun.	yes	yes	
57.	Ukraine	29 Apr.	yes		
58.	United States	26 Aug.	yes		

<sup>a</sup> Germany submitted its views on the United Nations reporting system for military expenditures.

chapter IV

**Regional disarmament**



## CHAPTER IV

### Regional disarmament

*Not so long ago, many Member States questioned whether internal armed conflict posed a threat to international peace and security. Today, the regional dimensions and destabilizing effects of internal conflicts have been firmly recognized.<sup>1</sup>*

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

### Developments and trends, 2009

THROUGHOUT 2009, REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS remained actively engaged with disarmament and non-proliferation issues and continued to consolidate their partnership with the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations. Regional and subregional initiatives as well as follow-up activities were pursued across a broad range of issues, including notably those aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW), promoting confidence- and security-building measures and advancing the prospects of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ).

The year was also characterized by two major developments in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. On 21 March, the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ) came into force following its ratification by all five signatories—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The CANWFZ, the first NWFZ in the Northern Hemisphere, encompasses an area where nuclear weapons previously existed. The Treaty also requires the parties to comply fully with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Another major development was the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone established under the Treaty of Pelindaba, after the required number of ratifications was achieved in July 2009. The parties to the Treaty also agreed to establish an African Commission on Nuclear Energy as well as convene the First Conference of States Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty in April 2010.

---

<sup>1</sup> Remarks at the open debate of the United Nations Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, New York, 11 November 2009. Available from <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=4222>.

Consequently, five NWFZs now exist, extending to six land areas, covering 56 per cent of the Earth's surface and totalling nearly 150 million square kilometres.

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) continued to sustain and strengthen its cooperation with regional organizations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa was granted observer status on the African Union Steering Committee on SALW, bringing together the African Union, the eight Regional Economic Communities of Africa and other regional bodies with a mandate on SALW. The Regional Centre also briefed the African Union's Peace and Security Council on its activities in the area of disarmament, including SALW, and explored possibilities for greater cooperation within the framework of the United Nations–African Union Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme.<sup>2</sup>

UNODA also assisted the European Union (EU) in implementing the Joint Action<sup>3</sup> in support of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons by organizing six regional seminars<sup>4</sup> that were completed in 2008, the results of which were presented by the EU on the margins of the sixty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee.

## **Nuclear-weapon-free zones**

Several positive developments occurred in 2009 with regard to progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Sustained efforts in the previous years culminated in the coming into force of NWFZs in Central Asia and in Africa. These developments greatly extended the geographical reach of NWFZs in the world. Meanwhile, sustained diplomatic efforts were made to further strengthen Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

Twelve years after the Central Asian States formally endorsed the idea of an NWFZ and two and a half years after the Treaty was signed, the CANWFZ formally entered into force on 21 March, following ratification by Kazakhstan in December 2008. The other four signatory States, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, had already ratified the Treaty.<sup>5</sup> Covering an

---

<sup>2</sup> "Declaration: Enhancing UN–AU Cooperation—Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union", A/61/630, annex.

<sup>3</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2007/528/CFSP of 23 July 2007, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 194 (26 July 2007), pp. 11–17. Available from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=718&lang=en> (accessed 28 May 2010).

<sup>4</sup> See *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part II): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), p. 188.

<sup>5</sup> Kazakhstan's ratification closely followed similar approval by the Tajik Parliament on 12 November 2008. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan had ratified the Treaty earlier on 22 March 2007, 2 April 2007 and 19 April 2008, respectively. The Treaty was signed

area of roughly 4 million square kilometres, the CANWFZ is the smallest of the NWFZs, but is the only one where nuclear weapons previously existed. The CANWFZ Treaty contains a Protocol on negative security assurances where each party to the Protocol undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any party to the Treaty.<sup>6</sup>

In another significant development, 13 years after its opening for signature, the African NWFZ established under the Treaty of Pelindaba entered into force on 15 July. The ratification of Burundi completed the requirement of 28 ratifications for the Treaty to take effect. This followed ratification by Malawi on 6 March. By the end of 2009, 24 of 52 signatory States had yet to ratify the Treaty. The fifth NWFZ in the world,<sup>7</sup> the African NWFZ encompasses an area of over 30 million square kilometres, making it the largest NWFZ.

At the 42nd Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Phuket, Thailand, on 20 July, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member States agreed to exert greater efforts to carry out the various programmes and activities indicated in the Plan of Action of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty and to continue their engagement with nuclear-weapon States to encourage them to accede to the SEANWFZ Protocol as soon as possible.<sup>8</sup>

The 14th Summit of ASEAN, held in Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, from 23 to 25 October, adopted the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint which included the implementation of the SEANWFZ Treaty and its Plan of Action as one of its priorities. The ASEAN Political-Security Community is part of the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community (2009-2015).<sup>9</sup> By the end

---

by the five Central Asian States on 8 September 2006, approximately eight and a half years after the Presidents of Central Asia first issued their joint declaration calling for the zone.

<sup>6</sup> Protocol to the CANWFZ Treaty, article 1. For the text, see *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 31 (2006) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.07.IX.1), appendix II, available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament>. On 15 October 2009, the States parties to the CANWFZ Treaty held their first consultative meeting in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, in which the need for progress in narrowing the gap between the positions of the Central Asian States and the nuclear-weapon States on the issue of negative security assurances was noted.

<sup>7</sup> The other NWFZs are located in Central Asia (under the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk), South-East Asia (under the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok), the South Pacific (under the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga) and Latin America and the Caribbean (under the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco).

<sup>8</sup> "Acting together to cope with global challenges", joint communiqué of the 42nd ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. Available from <http://www.aseansec.org/24238.htm> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>9</sup> ASEAN, *Roadmap for an ASEAN Community, 2009-2015* (Jakarta, 2009). Available from <http://www.aseansec.org/publications/RoadmapASEANCommunity.pdf>.

of the year, seven<sup>10</sup> out of the ten SEANWFZ Treaty parties acceded to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, as envisaged in article 6 of the Treaty of Bangkok.

Efforts to define and institutionalize Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, which it had been seeking since September 2001, continued to be made through consultations for negotiating a draft trilateral treaty with the Russian Federation and China. In March and September, the three sides held preliminary meetings in Geneva to exchange views on a draft treaty. At the end of the second meeting, the Russia Federation and China presented a joint paper containing questions and comments on some provisions of the draft presented by Mongolia.<sup>11</sup>

At the above Geneva meetings, both the Russian Federation and China expressed desire to see the other three nuclear-weapon States join the talks at some stage since the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council needed to extend security assurances to Mongolia. The date for the next meeting had not yet been decided.

In his report,<sup>12</sup> pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/38 of 2 December 2008,<sup>13</sup> the Secretary-General emphasized the importance of establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East. The report recalled that, at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held in New York from 4 to 15 May, States parties had reiterated their support for the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. They had also reaffirmed the importance of implementing the resolution on the Middle East<sup>14</sup> adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, recognizing that the resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives were achieved. In addition, the Arab Summit held in Doha from 30 to 31 March, issued a resolution emphasizing that the success of the 2010 NPT Review Conference required the adoption of practical and well-defined steps towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the 1995 resolution and agreement.

---

<sup>10</sup> Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.

<sup>11</sup> The joint paper was to be studied by Mongolia in 2010. See "Memorandum of the Government of Mongolia regarding the consolidation of its international security and nuclear-weapon-free status", NPT/CONF.2010/12, 22 March 2010. Available from <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/docs.shtml>.

<sup>12</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, A/64/124, part I. This and subsequent documents of the United Nations are available in all official languages from <http://ods.un.org/>.

<sup>13</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part I): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), pp. 8-11. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/>.

<sup>14</sup> See NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex.

## General Assembly, 2009

### 64/24. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

Introduced on a biennial basis, the resolution noted with satisfaction the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty and called upon African States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify it as soon as possible.

**First Committee.** On behalf of the EU, **Sweden** spoke before joining consensus, stating that NWFZs enhanced global peace and promoted stability and confidence, and that the EU welcomed the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty and congratulated all African States on that achievement.

After the vote, two States spoke. **Spain**, which joined the consensus, said that the Treaty's entry into force was a major step for all African countries and that it had always supported the Treaty and related activities. However, having carefully studied the invitation to join Protocol III of the Treaty, the Spanish Government had decided not to sign it. Underlining two issues, Spain said that the Pelindaba Treaty did not contain any safeguards in terms of nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation that the country had not already adopted, and that, in addition, Spain had been denuclearized since 1976. As for the draft resolution, Spain had opted not to break consensus, but it did not consider itself bound by the consensus as far as operative paragraph 4 was concerned and appealed to the sponsors to find a more balanced wording acceptable to all parties. **France**, which spoke also on behalf of the United Kingdom, aligned both States with the statement of the EU. It recalled that the protocols to the Pelindaba Treaty stipulated that nuclear-weapon States commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any African State party to the Treaty. It underlined that France and the United Kingdom had already complied with Treaty obligations by signing and ratifying all the relevant Protocols attached to the Treaty.

**Introduced by:** Nigeria (27 Oct.), on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 8-9.

### 64/26. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

Introduced on an annual basis, the resolution, inter alia, called upon all countries of the region that had not yet done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It also requested the

**Introduced by:** Egypt (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote; 169-0-3, o.p. 3 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote; 166-0-3, o.p. 3 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 14-18.

Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the

region and other concerned States, and to seek their views on the measures outlined in the study annexed to his report of 10 October 1990 or other relevant measures, and to submit to the General Assembly's sixty-fifth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.

**First Committee.** Before adoption of the resolution, two States made general statements. **Egypt** said that the international consensus on the resolution adopted annually was a manifestation of the importance given to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime in the Middle East region and globally. In view of the current positive atmosphere, Egypt was determined to move forward on nuclear challenges in the region, particularly those emanating from unsafeguarded nuclear activities. The draft had been technically updated to include factual references to resolutions adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Agency safeguards in the region. Egypt looked forward to continued and consensual adoption of the resolution, as well as collective action towards its implementation. The **Islamic Republic of Iran** stated that the General Assembly had recognized that an NWFZ in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. It also stressed that Iran remained committed to realizing the goal of an NWFZ in the Middle East.

After the draft's adoption, **Israel** said that establishing the Middle East as a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone was a vision to which Israel aspired. However, grave cases of non-compliance to NPT obligations had not been included in the draft. Moreover, continuing threats were directed against Israel by certain States in the region. It stressed that essential progress must be made through mutual recognition before such a zone could be attained and that the creation of such a zone should emanate from within the region. It also stated that it was unable to accept the reference made in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution to the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. Therefore, it had asked for a separate vote with regard to that paragraph. Israel emphasized that it had not abandoned a vision where negotiations were possible over a nuclear-weapon-free zone, but only when all States took part in discussions could its realization be possible.

#### **64/39. Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)**

Last introduced in 2007, the resolution welcomed the efforts of the Commission for the Bangkok Treaty to improve the implementation of the Bangkok Treaty through the 2007-2012 Plan of Action, and also welcomed the decision of the ASEAN Political Security Community Council, established under the Charter of ASEAN, to give priority to the Plan of Action implementation.

**First Committee.** Two States spoke after voting in favour. The **Russian Federation** said that it voted on the basis of its fundamental support for

NWFZs created under agreements reached freely by States of the region concerned.<sup>15</sup> It mentioned its readiness to continue consultations with other nuclear-weapon States in accordance with operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. The **United Kingdom** welcomed the draft resolution's support for the establishment of NWFZs and its encouragement of the five nuclear-weapon States and the States parties of the Bangkok Treaty to resume consultations on the outstanding issues. It emphasized the importance of the development of internationally recognized NWFZs, which could make an important contribution to regional and global security, provided they were established as set out in the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines.<sup>15</sup> It regretted that the ASEAN States parties had not conducted consultations in accordance with the Disarmament Commission's guidelines before signing the Bangkok Treaty. The United Kingdom was still awaiting a formal response to the non-paper issued by France, the Russian Federation, the United States and the United Kingdom to the ASEAN States on 4 September 2002. The United Kingdom continued to stand ready to resume consultations with the concerned States parties to NWFZ Treaties to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome regarding outstanding issues.

After abstaining in the vote on the draft, **France** stated that a regional approach was needed for disarmament and non-proliferation to allow for progress in the areas of security. It supported the establishment of NWFZs and had given security guarantees to more than 100 States. It believed that the draft reflected positive improvements, compared with the resolution adopted in 2007 and France was ready to participate in a constructive dialogue.

#### **64/44. Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas**

Introduced on an annual basis, the resolution noted with satisfaction that all NWFZs in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas were currently in force, welcomed the entry into force, on 15 July 2009, of the Treaty

**Introduced by:** Thailand, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the States parties to the Bangkok Treaty (15 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 174-0-6 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 172-0-5 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 60-63.

**Introduced by:** New Zealand (14 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 170-3-6; 167-2-7, o.p. 7 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 168-3-5; 165-2-6, o.p. 7 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 74-79.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Disarmament Commission, "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned" (document A/54/42), annex I. Also available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NWFZ2.shtml>.

of Pelindaba that established an NWFZ in Africa, and urged relevant States to resolve outstanding issues with a view to the full implementation of the CANWFZ, which entered into force on 21 March 2009.

**First Committee.** After voting in favour, the **Russian Federation** said that it fundamentally supported NWFZs created under agreements arrived at freely by the countries concerned.<sup>15</sup> It welcomed the entry into force of the CANWFZ and Pelindaba Treaties, however, it believed that the adoption of the draft should not mean the expansion of the areas covered by NWFZs beyond legally established borders.

After abstaining from the vote, both **India** and **Pakistan** disagreed with the call in operative paragraph 7 for an NWFZ in South Asia as it contravened the well-established principle that NWFZs must be established freely among the States of the region concerned<sup>15</sup> and also failed to acknowledge the reality on the ground.

After voting against the draft resolution along with France and the United States, the **United Kingdom**, speaking on behalf those three States, emphasized the importance they attached to the development of internationally recognized NWFZs, which could make an important contribution to regional and global security, provided they were established as set out in the Disarmament Commission's 1999 guidelines.<sup>15</sup> The three countries appreciated the willingness of the sponsors of the draft resolution to engage in constructive discussions of their concerns and welcomed the changes to the text compared to resolution 63/65. They still believed, however, that the text was contradictory to propose simultaneously the establishment of an NWFZ that would be composed largely of the high seas and yet say that it would be fully consistent with applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the right of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The three States continued to question whether the real goal of the draft text was, in fact, the establishment of an NWFZ covering the high seas. They did not believe that that ambiguity had been sufficiently clarified.

#### **64/52. Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia**

This new resolution was introduced to garner support for the holding at the United Nations of the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia on 30 April 2010. The resolution urged regions that have not yet established NWFZ treaties to accelerate efforts in that

**Introduced by:** Chile (2 Nov.)

**GA vote:** 166-3-6 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 159-0-6 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 111-114.

Middle East, and decided to convene the Conference. The draft also urged the States parties and signatories to NWFZ treaties to develop activities of cooperation and coordination in order to promote their common objectives in the framework of the Conference.

**First Committee.** Before the vote, four States spoke. The **Syrian Arab Republic**, which had proposed an amendment to remove the reference to the Middle East in preambular paragraph 4, said that it stood for the lofty principles of the draft resolution. **Egypt**, a sponsor of the draft, strongly supported the existing preambular paragraph 4 as it stood, as it accurately reflected the Committee's priorities in agreed language and in the most appropriate manner. The **Islamic Republic of Iran** and the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** both supported the Syrian proposal to amend the draft resolution.

After the vote on the draft resolution, four States spoke in explanation. The **Russian Federation**, which had abstained from voting, stated that it supported the full cooperation between States parties who had signed onto those NWFZs and it recognized Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. However, several sentences in the draft were contentious, prompting the abstention. The **United Kingdom**, also speaking on behalf of the United States and France, explained that the Security Council had noted its support for convening this Conference in its resolution 1887 (2009) (see appendix IV for text). It was confident that the Conference would make a useful contribution to the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The policy of the three States towards NWFZs had been set out in an explanation of vote on the draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere. In that context, the three countries clarified that they did not endorse all the Treaties listed in the second preambular paragraph, nor were they able to give an unqualified endorsement of paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the fifteenth summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/63/965, annex) in July 2009. The **Syrian Arab Republic** reiterated that it supported the establishment of NWFZs and that its abstention had been due to the addition to preambular paragraph four. **Belarus** said that it had voted in favour because the document was comprehensive and universal in nature, covering all regions of the world, including the Middle East, and that it supported the convening of the proposed Conference. It also believed that the elements in question in the draft should have been removed to achieve consensus.

## **Disarmament and arms regulation at regional levels**

Though most of the work in disarmament remains in pursuing multilateral objectives, individual States still had to adopt policies and laws that were focused on achieving such goals. This was a challenge not only for individual States but also for regions.

## **Africa**

In addition to the entry into force of the African NWFZ under the Treaty of Pelindaba, the year saw a further strengthening of cooperation between the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) in the area of small arms as well as on activities related to the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty. Reflecting this progress, UNREC became an observer member of the AU–Regions Steering Committee<sup>16</sup> responsible for drafting the Organization’s strategy on small arms.

Another legal instrument took effect at the subregional level in 2009 when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials entered into force on 20 November, after ratification by Benin.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, two subregional bodies, the Southern African Development Community and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization, continued their collaboration by developing an action plan to implement the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community Region for 2010-2012.

In Central Africa, the 11 States of the subregion maintained confidence-building efforts by holding annual meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (UNSAC). In East Africa, the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) maintained the momentum of its activities, especially through its cooperation with UNREC and the EU.

### ***United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa***

UNREC further developed its partnership with subregional organizations by signing memoranda of understanding with ECOWAS and RECSA to jointly decide on areas of cooperation. The Centre also cooperated with RECSA for the implementation of a project to identify brokers that are active in the six countries of the subregion, and to develop a database of brokers and of

---

<sup>16</sup> The AU–Regions Steering Committee on SALW is an ad hoc body which brings together the AU, the eight Regional Economic Communities of Africa, and other regional bodies with a mandate on SALW, namely the Regional Centre for Small Arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The EU and the United Nations, through the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, are observers on the Steering Committee.

<sup>17</sup> The Convention was signed on 14 June 2006. In addition to Benin, the following States have deposited their instruments of ratification: Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

brokering licences. The ongoing project had already enabled some countries to register brokers active in their territories and to restructure the administration responsible for brokering licences. UNREC also assisted a State with the development of national legislation on brokering.

UNREC worked with ECOWAS to assist its member States in translating the provisions of the ECOWAS Small Arms Convention into national legislation. Furthermore, they helped civil society and parliamentarians in building their capacities to participate and oversee national programmes related to SALW. UNREC also worked with civil society groups on the proposed arms trade treaty.

In Central Africa, UNREC, in its capacity as Secretariat to UNSAC, continued to provide substantive and logistical assistance to the Committee, as well as helped in drafting a legal instrument to control small arms in the subregion. Member States of the Committee<sup>18</sup> requested the document, including a plan of action, to be submitted for approval in 2010.

In Togo, the Centre implemented a programme to train armed and security forces on human rights, humanitarian law, peaceful law enforcement and civilian-military relations, especially during election periods. Since the launch of the African Security Sector Reform Programme in 2007, more than 200 Togolese personnel were trained, including future trainers.

In cooperation with the Institute for Security Studies-Pretoria, UNREC initiated a series of meetings to assist African countries in their preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference and also to discuss the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty.

On gender-related activities, UNREC included a module on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)<sup>19</sup> on women and peace and security in its training course for armed and security forces in Togo. The Centre also participated in the launching of the ECOWAS Women in Peace and Security Network and assisted the Togolese Government and civil society to organize a national network for this subregional initiative. In addition, UNREC engaged in further awareness-raising activities on gender and violence for female officials of the Togolese armed and security forces.

---

<sup>18</sup> Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe.

<sup>19</sup> S/RES/1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000.

## General Assembly, 2009

### 64/62. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

Introduced on an annual basis, this year the resolution took note of the Secretary-General's report,<sup>20</sup> noted the successful revitalization of UNREC through the strengthening of its financial and human capacities, and welcomed UNREC efforts to revitalize activities and extend operations to cover all of Africa.

#### **African Union**

In 2009, a major focus of the AU was on promoting the ratification and entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba.<sup>21</sup> This was an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, promoting cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and enhancing regional peace and security. With the entry into force of the Treaty on 15 July, the parties to the Treaty agreed to establish an African Commission on Nuclear Energy and the AU Commission began preparations for convening the First Conference of States Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty which was to be held in Addis Ababa from 21 to 23 April 2010.

During the year, the AU also continued its cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, adopting a number of decisions and declarations that called for the effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Africa by States parties.

Regarding SALW, the AU focused its work on three main areas: consolidation of the AU–Regions Steering Committee on SALW;<sup>16</sup> development of an AU SALW strategy; and reinforcing relations with partners.

In this regard, the AU convened the 2nd meeting of the AU–Regions Steering Committee on SALW<sup>16</sup> in Bamako, Mali, from 2 to 4 December, which was hosted by ECOWAS. The objectives of the Steering Committee were to share experiences and best practices related to SALW activities among all the Regional Economic Communities and regional bodies and also to promote cross-regional activities. The Steering Committee oversaw the development of an AU SALW strategy, which would become part of a comprehensive framework of human security, thereby bringing SALW activity in Africa

**Introduced by:** Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (30 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 159-161.

<sup>20</sup> A/64/112.

<sup>21</sup> The Treaty was adopted by the 31st ordinary session of the Organization of African Unity Summit, held in Addis Ababa on 26 to 28 June 1995, and signed in Cairo on 11 April 1996.

within the African Peace and Security Architecture of the AU. With financial assistance from the EU, a draft strategy was presented for consideration by the Steering Committee at its meeting in Bamako in December. It was to be submitted to a meeting of experts in May 2010 before being presented for adoption to the AU Executive Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

With regard to consolidation of relations with partners, the AU invited UNREC to brief the Peace and Security Council on its activities in the area of disarmament, including SALW, and to explore possibilities for greater cooperation within the framework of the United Nations–AU Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme.<sup>22</sup>

The AU further strengthened its ties with the EU. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy signed in Lisbon in December 2007 had eight partnerships, including one on Peace and Security, which, in turn, included SALW and antipersonnel landmines as a major area of activity. Within the framework of this partnership, the AU and EU convened a meeting on “Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa-EU Partnership and Developing Cooperation in De-mining and Disarmament”, held in Rome from 7 to 9 October, as part of the AU-EU dialogue on conventional disarmament cooperation.

The issue of landmines had remained high on the AU agenda since the First Continental Conference of African Experts with the theme “Towards a Landmine-Free Africa” and the Plan of Action endorsed by the Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers in Harare, Zimbabwe, in May 1997. The AU Commission, together with the South African Government and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, convened the Third Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines in Pretoria from 9 to 11 September. The Conference re-examined the 1997 Kempton Park Plan of Action and the 2004 African Common Position on Anti-Personnel Mines and also discussed other challenges. The AU Commission was in the process of finalizing the Plan of Action to assist member States to coordinate mine action across the continent.

### ***Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States***

Congo became the thirteenth member State of RECSA following its admission by the fifth RECSA Council of Ministers meeting in April 2009. During the year, RECSA developed a five-year strategy to enhance the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol. To this end, the Centre developed a two-year work plan, a monitoring and evaluation strategy and a regional implementation strategy, as well as a policy to mainstream the gender issue

---

<sup>22</sup> “Declaration: enhancing UN–AU cooperation—framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union”, A/61/630, annex.

in the RECSA processes and to ensure gender responsiveness at all stages of SALW programmes.

RECSA signed memorandums of understanding, notably with UNREC in July and with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa in August, to enhance cooperation in areas of information-sharing and disarmament, respectively. It also supported the strengthening of National Focal Points through capacity-building, which included administrative and technical support. The Centre offered specific support for the development of National Action Plans (NAPs) in Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea and Rwanda, bringing the number of NAPs in the region to seven. NAPs provided member States with a clear road map to effectively control illicit SALW trafficking within their borders. Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania are in the process of reviewing their NAPs after the initial five-year period of implementation.

The RECSA secretariat continued with its distribution of marking machines to member States, as well as to the Central African Republic and Zambia, which are non-member States. The Secretariat facilitated the training of law enforcement officers and military officials in Burundi, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Seychelles and the Sudan. RECSA also supported the Commission for Civilian Disarmament and Control of the Proliferation of SALW in implementing the Burundi national awareness campaign for the voluntary surrender of illegally held weapons, which collected 15,985 arms and explosives and 191,866 ammunitions. During the year, 30,266 firearms were destroyed in Rwanda, 4,700 pieces of assorted SALW in Uganda, and 100,425 firearms and 479 tons of ammunition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In July, RECSA member States and other relevant stakeholders participated in an SALW brokering seminar to share best practices, initiate a regional dialogue and open channels of cooperation between member States in enhancing SALW brokering control measures. In August, RECSA also organized the third Regional Harmonization of Legislation Meeting, which aimed to share the progress made and the status of review of SALW legislation in member States.

RECSA also supported the development of a research manual on SALW in order to promote accurate and comprehensive information on the SALW problem, given that research in the RECSA region was currently inadequate, posing a potential obstacle in the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol.

With regard to advocacy, RECSA supported awareness campaigns on the dangers of small arms proliferation. Among the various campaigns, the commemoration of the signing of the Nairobi Declaration was organized this year in Kenya and Djibouti.

In 2009, RECSA received funds from the European Commission to implement a three-year project on SALW, which was due to commence in early 2010. Japan, through the United Nations Development Programme, also provided funding to implement a project on practical disarmament in 2010, which would lead to the development of best practices guidelines and the establishment of regional databases on SALW for the RECSA region.

## General Assembly, 2009

### 64/61. Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

Among other things, this year, the annual resolution reaffirmed the importance of disarmament and arms limitation programmes in Central Africa carried out by the States of the subregion with the support of the United Nations, the AU and other international partners. It welcomed the adoption by the member States of UNSAC on 8 May of the Code of Conduct for the Defence and Security Forces in Central Africa and the major strides made by States in the drafting of a legal instrument on the control of SALW in Central Africa, and encouraged interested countries to provide their financial support to the implementation of the “Sao Tome Initiative”. It also encouraged the member States of UNSAC to carry out the programmes of activities adopted at their ministerial meetings, and welcomed the adoption on 8 May of the Libreville Declaration calling upon States members of UNSAC to contribute to the Trust Fund for UNSAC. The resolution expressed satisfaction in the Secretary-General for his support for the revitalization of UNSAC activities, and requested him to continue to provide assistance to ensure the success of regular biannual meetings.

**Introduced by:** Gabon (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (29 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 156-158.

**First Committee.** Before the vote, **Gabon**, speaking on behalf of the 11 States of Central Africa, reaffirmed the States’ commitment to the activities of UNSAC.

## Americas

Security and disarmament continued to garner significant interest in Latin America and the Caribbean throughout 2009. While regional leaders were able to find common ground when addressing issues related to increasing levels of armed violence and crime afflicting the region, they were unable to achieve consensus on a collective security regime for the regional States.

The Fifth Summit of the Americas, held in Trinidad and Tobago from 17 to 19 April, set the tone for regional exchanges on public security matters, with the regional leaders recognizing their shared responsibility for addressing

public security threats, in particular those related to illicit firearms trafficking, which accounted for much of the armed violence. Commitments to address this threat included a pledge from the region's main exporter of firearms, the United States, to ratify the Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA).

Similarly, at the Second Meeting of Ministers responsible for Public Security in the Americas, held in the Dominican Republic on 5 November, regional leaders agreed to the Consensus of Santo Domingo on Public Security. The Ministers took note of statistics of armed violence and homicide caused by firearms, which place Latin America and the Caribbean as one of the most violent regions of the world.<sup>23</sup> They reaffirmed their commitment to modernize public security management and strengthen national and regional responses to crime, violence, and insecurity, including diagnosing the problem at the local level and incorporating other data on insecurity and violence. They also acknowledged the need for integrated policy proposals to address the problem of insecurity and violence affecting citizens.

In September, Peru proposed that members of the Union of South American Nations reach agreement on a military non-aggression pact to halt the arms race through a mechanism for transparency and confidence-building. The proposal, however, further exposed the existing dichotomy among States on the relationship between military spending and transparency measures, which proved to be an impediment to reaching common ground. Although the year-old South American Defence Council was unable to agree on a non-aggression pact, it raised awareness on military spending and promoted cooperation to strengthen South America as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

At the XXI Regular Session of the General Conference, held in Mexico City on 26 November, member States of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean elected by acclamation Gioconda Ubeda Rivera (Costa Rica) as the new Secretary General for the period 2010-2013.<sup>24</sup>

### ***United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean***

Control over the trade in legal firearms and prevention of their illicit trafficking were the main focus of the activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the

---

<sup>23</sup> United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2009* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

<sup>24</sup> See resolution CG/Res.524 of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean available from <http://www.opanal.org> (accessed 29 May 2010).

Caribbean (UN-LiREC) activities during the year, principally throughout the Central American and Andean regions.

Both Colombia and Peru strengthened their capacities and networks in the field of disarmament, benefiting from the UN-LiREC trademark Inter-institutional Training Course on Combating Illicit Firearms Trafficking. Participants of the course were able to share experiences and good practices, with a view to increasing the impact and effectiveness of their actions. Over 300 law enforcement community members benefited from these training initiatives during the year.

The capacity of various States to implement disarmament and non-proliferation instruments was increased in relation to UN-LiREC-supported awareness-raising forums. These platforms focused on strengthening national and regional controls to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and provided States with an in-depth and first-hand perspective on existing national and subregional WMD positions throughout the region.

These subregional platforms also provided States with the opportunity to measure their internal capacity to implement other international instruments, such as the International Tracing Instrument, and to carry out debate on surplus weapons. In Colombia and Peru, for example, UN-LiREC provided technical assistance for harmonizing their national legislation with international firearms instruments and succeeded in promoting the implementation of these instruments within the legal and judicial community of these States.

In Central America, these forums allowed for the collective revision of the regional work being done to better understand how disarmament and arms control measures can positively contribute to the reduction and prevention of armed violence. These platforms also facilitated the elaboration of regional workplans, including prevention programmes and intervention strategies, thus enabling the Geneva<sup>25</sup> and Guatemala<sup>26</sup> Declarations to be translated into practical actions in the field.

With regard to institutional matters, UN-LiREC received approval from the United Nations General Assembly for the creation of two positions funded from the regular budget of the United Nations and the provision of annual operational costs. The Centre formalized donor agreements with the United States and Spain while working with Canada as a donor to develop a new long-term partnership, consequently strengthening the ability of UN-LiREC to effectively carry out its mandate.

---

<sup>25</sup> For more information about the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, see <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/>.

<sup>26</sup> For the Regional Declaration of Guatemala on Armed Violence and Development, see the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 32 (Part II): 2007 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.08.IX.1), appendix III. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament>.

## **General Assembly, 2009**

### **64/60. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean**

Introduced on an annual basis, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, invited all States of the region to continue to take part in UN-LiREC activities, proposing items for inclusion in its programme and making greater and better use of the Centre's potential to meet the current challenges facing the international community to fulfil the aims of the United Nations Charter in the areas of peace, disarmament and development.

**Introduced by:** Peru, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (23 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 153-155.

### **Organization of American States**

The Organization of American States (OAS) Group of Experts held their fourth meeting on 23 April at OAS Headquarters in Washington, D.C., to consider draft model legislation on confiscation or forfeiture of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials that have been illicitly manufactured or trafficked, pursuant to article VII of the CIFTA. Member States considered the model legislation, which was to be further discussed at the next meeting of the Expert Group. Of the 34 OAS member States, 30 had ratified CIFTA, including the Dominican Republic, which submitted its instrument of ratification on 24 April.

As part of ongoing efforts to strengthen cooperation with other regional and international organizations, the OAS Secretariat for Multidimensional Security (OAS/SMS) participated in the preparation of a training course offered by UN-LiREC aimed at strengthening the capacity of law enforcement officials to prevent the illicit trafficking of firearms, ammunition and explosives. OAS representatives participated in the development of the training manual as well as in the course held in Lima in November.

The OAS/SMS organized a seminar entitled "Practical Approaches to Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials Across Borders: Meeting of Law Enforcement Authorities and Customs Officials"<sup>27</sup> to strengthen the enforcement of international regulations on the movement of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials. The event also served to encourage the exchange of information regarding best practices in this field.

---

<sup>27</sup> The seminar was held in Vancouver, Canada, in March 2009.

Activities were also initiated in September to launch the OAS/SMS programme on stockpile management and destruction in Central America, which will strengthen national capacities to prevent and eliminate illicit firearms trafficking and ensure the safety and security of legally held stocks. The programme will also provide legislative assistance to Central American countries to ensure that national laws are in compliance with the provisions of CIFTA and other international agreements on firearms trafficking. Also, in September, the OAS/SMS programme on promoting firearms marking in Latin America and the Caribbean provided marking equipment and training to national authorities of 30 countries in the region.

The First Conference of States Parties to the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition was held on 3 December in Washington, D.C.<sup>28</sup> The Convention is legally binding and has strong links with the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

Out of a total of 34 signatories to the Convention, 13 States had ratified or acceded to the Convention.<sup>29</sup> The number of States parties submitting their reports in compliance with articles III and IV of the Convention increased from three in 2007 to eight in 2009.<sup>30</sup> The OAS/SMS worked with other countries to sign or deposit their instruments of ratification or accession as well as urged permanent observers and non-member States of the OAS to provide information on their exports of conventional weapons to the States parties to the Convention.

### **Asia and the Pacific**

In 2009, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula remained the most pressing issue on the nuclear agenda of the region. The nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 25 May was a direct challenge to global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. The Security Council, through resolution 1874 (2009) (see appendix IV for text),<sup>31</sup> unanimously condemned the nuclear test conducted in violation and flagrant disregard of relevant Council resolutions.

---

<sup>28</sup> The participating State parties were: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, , Uruguay and Venezuela. The participating signatory States were: Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti, Mexico and the United States. The Bahamas, a non-State party, and six observer countries also participated.

<sup>29</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Dominican Republic was the most recent State to deposit its instrument of ratification on 17 July 2009.

<sup>30</sup> The Convention requires each State party to provide annual reports to the OAS on its imports and exports of conventional weapons and to notify the depositary of its acquisition on conventional weapons covered by the Convention within 90 days of acquisition, whether through import or national productions.

<sup>31</sup> S/RES/1874 (2009) of 12 June 2009.

On the positive side, the region witnessed two significant developments in the nuclear field. The Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty entered into force on 21 March. Also, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, a global initiative sponsored by Australia and Japan, finalized its deliberation and published in December its report entitled “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers”.<sup>32</sup>

Regarding activities of regional organizations, they increased efforts to address challenges in the field of peace and disarmament. On 28 February, the member States of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation adopted the Ministerial Declaration on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism,<sup>33</sup> which included the promotion of cooperation and information exchange in preventing the international movement of terrorists and trafficking of materials, including arms.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), on its fifteenth anniversary in July 2009, adopted the Vision Statement for 2020,<sup>34</sup> which sought to make ARF an action-oriented mechanism that could develop concrete and effective responses to the common challenges confronting the region, including non-proliferation and disarmament. It also organized the first ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-proliferation and Disarmament in early July.<sup>35</sup>

In the Pacific region, the fortieth Pacific Island Forum, held in Cairns, Australia, from 5 to 6 August, adopted a Forum Communiqué,<sup>36</sup> which noted with extreme concern the availability throughout the Pacific of guns and other SALW, and the need to implement the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, 15 December 2009. Available from <http://www.icndd.org/reference/reports/ent/index.html>.

<sup>33</sup> Adopted 28 February 2009. Available from <http://www.saarc-sec.org/Ministerial-Declarations/68/> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>34</sup> ARF, “ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement”, 23 July 2009. Available from <http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/tabid/66/ItemId/3268/Default.aspx> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the First ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ISM-NPD)”, 3 July 2009.

<sup>36</sup> Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “Fortieth Pacific Islands Forum, Cairns, Australia, 5-6 August 2009, Forum Communiqué”, document PIFS(09)12. Available from <http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/documents/forum-communiques/> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>37</sup> “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects”, A/CONF.192/15. See also <http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poa.aspx>.

**United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament  
in Asia and the Pacific**

Since its relocation to Kathmandu in August 2008, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (RCPD) had been carrying out substantive disarmament-related activities to fulfil its mandate. Those implemented throughout 2009 were wide in range and scope.

Recognizing the importance of addressing the problem of the illicit regional trade in SALW, the Centre prioritized strengthening the implementation of the Programme of Action, consistent with the needs of the region.

Pursuant to the outcome of the Third Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action held in July 2008, the Centre focused on the illicit brokering in SALW by launching a new project entitled “Combating and Eradicating the Illicit Brokering of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Asia and the Pacific”. Under this project, the first regional seminar for Central and South Asia was held in Kathmandu in June. Representatives of Governments, regional organizations and civil society discussed challenging issues regarding illicit brokering in SALW in national and regional contexts and identified follow-up actions. In addition, the Centre assisted States in adopting a draft regional plan during a regional meeting of the Pacific Island States, held in Sydney (Australia) on 22 to 23 June—a substantial contribution to the implementation of the Programme of Action in the Pacific region.

Due to growing interest in the region to promote dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues in order to have a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010, the Centre organized two conferences with a particular focus on seeking a successful outcome for the Review Conference. The first initiative, entitled “21st United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues”, was held in Japan in August, while the other, entitled “8th United Nations-Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues”, took place in the Republic of Korea in November. With the participation of the President-elect for the 2010 Review Conference and the representatives of Governments and academia, the two conferences addressed the strengthening of the NPT and discussed ways to translate the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world into concrete actions. The conferences also provided a unique opportunity to address non-proliferation challenges in North-East Asia (see also. p. 220).

Benefiting from its location, the Centre increased efforts to enhance interactive partnerships with regional stakeholders, including Member States, regional organizations and civil society organizations. It conducted joint activities with the International Action Network on Small Arms, Safer World and the Small Arms Survey and explored possibilities for collaboration with regional organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation and the Pacific Island Forum on issues related to SALW. RCPD also enhanced its partnerships with the host Government of Nepal, United Nations agencies and relevant non-governmental organizations by organizing events such as the one on the International Day of Peace, and the first discussion forum on SALW in Kathmandu.

With regard to institutional matters, RCPD received approval from the United Nations General Assembly for the creation of two positions funded from the regular budget of the United Nations and the provision of annual operational costs.

### **General Assembly, 2009**

#### **64/63. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific**

Last introduced the previous year, the resolution welcomed the physical operation of RCPD from Kathmandu in close cooperation with Member States, and expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General and UNODA for providing the necessary support to ensure the Centre's smooth and effective operation.

**Introduced by:** Nepal (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 162-163.

#### **Association of Southeast Asian Nations**

ASEAN members increased their efforts in 2009 to gain international support and recognition for the Protocol to the SEANWFZ. In this regard, China expressed its readiness to sign the Protocol, while the other four nuclear-weapon States still maintained some reservations, notably on the geographical coverage of SEANWFZ which included continental shelves and the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone of the 10 States parties. Since ASEAN wished to have all the five NWS sign the Protocol together, it continued consultations with all of them.

ASEAN members also focused their attention on issues relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as on the peaceful use of nuclear technologies. While the 10 ASEAN member States had ratified the NPT, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand had not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Indonesia was among the 44 countries in Annex 2 of the CTBT, whose ratification was needed for the Treaty to enter into force.

External cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation had been part of the ARF<sup>38</sup> agenda since the early 1990s. This issue received significant attention at the 16th ARF meeting, held in July. The ARF Ministers expressed support for concerted measures to prevent non-State actors from acquiring WMD, related materials and technology, while recognizing the right of States to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their non-proliferation obligations and international law.

Another important development was the convening of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in Beijing from 1 to 3 July. The Meeting, which addressed disarmament and non-proliferation issues, agreed at its first meeting to develop a work plan immediately on non-proliferation and disarmament to ensure the continued progress and tangible achievements of ARF activities in this area. Singapore plans to host the Meeting in July 2010.

The ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2010-2015<sup>39</sup> included a provision for the development of civilian nuclear energy. In a joint statement<sup>40</sup> on 29 July, the Energy Ministers of ASEAN, together with those of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, agreed to advance efforts towards developing civilian nuclear energy as an option to meet the future energy demand in the region while ensuring that nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards, safety and security are in accordance with their respective international obligations.

### ***Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat***

During the year, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) assisted the Forum Island Countries (FIC) in curbing the illicit traffic in SALW and in implementing the 2001 Programme of Action.

Representatives at a regional meeting of the FIC, held in Sydney in April and hosted jointly by Australia and UNODA, discussed strengthening the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action. PIFS provided technical assistance at this meeting in which officials from the FIC agreed to consider draft regional implementation guidelines for the Programme of Action. The FIC representatives also agreed to consult with national stakeholders on the draft implementation guidelines with the option for

---

<sup>38</sup> ARF participants: the 10 ASEAN member States (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam), Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, EU, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, DPRK, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste and United States.

<sup>39</sup> ASEAN, "ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2010-2015". Available from <http://www.aseansec.org/22675.pdf> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>40</sup> ASEAN, "Joint Ministerial Statement, 6th ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and Korea) Ministers on Energy Meeting, Mandalay, Myanmar, 29 July 2009". Available from <http://www.aseansec.org/JMS-6ASEAN+3-AMEM.pdf> (accessed 29 May 2010).

seeking its future adoption in the annual Forum Regional Security Committee Meeting or the Forum Officials Committee Meeting.

Through the draft implementation guidelines, regional States would be able to take concerted action and decide which activities to pursue, taking into consideration their existing activities, priorities and resources. The draft guidelines would allow for technical assistance from UNODA, RCPD and PIFS.

At their 40th meeting in August, the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum endorsed activities aimed at controlling SALW and implementing the Programme of Action. They also supported the proposed Control of Ammunition Project of the Forum Secretariat Law Enforcement Unit and encouraged efforts to build national and regional capacity for the successful implementation of the Programme of Action.

Other SALW-related activities included the Control of Ammunitions Project, an FIC secondment programme<sup>41</sup> to the Secretariat, the formation and coordination of Working Groups to enhance regional law enforcement activities and the review of a current regional model for a Weapons Control Bill to ensure compliance with Programme of Action guidelines. The Control of Ammunitions Project was an initiative of PIFS to create a toolkit containing model provisions for regulating ammunition, which would contain literature on firearms, training modules on recognizing SALW, introduction to ammunition, storage of SALW and associated ammunition, and would also be used as a training tool for firearm usage and handling.

The review of the current regional model for a Weapons Control Bill involved the evaluation of provisions to regulate the procurement, sale, import, export, possession, transfer, registration and licensing of weapons and firearms. Most importantly, the review of the model Bill would make provisions for the regulation of arms brokering, which was an area for improvement in the region.

In addition to SALW-related work, the PIFS supported international efforts by lobbying member States to ratify pertinent disarmament conventions and by providing relevant technical assistance to them as required. Following the sixth Conference to accelerate the entry into force of the CTBT held in September in New York, the Secretariat discussed with member States how it could assist in ratifying the Treaty or in aligning their legislations with the CTBT. The PIFS also offered assistance to its members in efforts to increase ratification or implementation of other disarmament treaties, including the NPT

---

<sup>41</sup> The secondment programme involves seconding a Customs Officer from one of the Forum Island Countries to assist with the Control of Ammunition Project. The programme was introduced to develop regional policy and leadership skills to build the capacity of law enforcement organizations of participating members.

and the Rarotonga Treaty. The Secretariat also participated as an observer at the 11th Annual Meeting of National Authorities under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November.

## **Europe**

Throughout the year, European intergovernmental organizations, led by the EU, made intensive efforts to advance the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda across a wide range of issues, notably those related to WMD and SALW.

Efforts by the EU in the WMD area included providing strong and sustained support for the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004),<sup>42</sup> capacity-building at the global and regional levels to prevent trafficking in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, strengthening implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct, promoting universal adherence to the CWC and Biological Weapons Convention as well as seeking the early entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

In the area of SALW, the EU provided significant support and assistance for capacity-building for the sustained implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action in various regions, notably including Africa. The EU was also actively involved on issues related to mine-action and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons as well as the universalization of the Mine Ban Convention. Besides strengthening its own legislation on the regulation of the export, transfer, brokering and transit of arms, the EU supported and promoted a universal arms trade regime through the proposed arms trade treaty.

Significant WMD and SALW-related activities, which included training and capacity-building, were also carried out in South-East Europe by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Center (RACVIAC), the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) and the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). Some of these activities also received EU and United Nations Development Programme support and assistance.

---

<sup>42</sup> S/RES/1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004.

### **European Union**

Following the decisions reached in December 2008, the EU started to incorporate WMD and SALW clauses in relevant agreements with countries.<sup>43</sup> On WMD, the EU also supported the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004),<sup>42</sup> 1673 (2006)<sup>44</sup> and 1810 (2008),<sup>45</sup> which were being implemented by UNODA.<sup>46</sup> Six workshops were conducted, of which the last two were held in Costa Rica in September and in Cairo in November. The workshops enabled the EU to identify the specific needs and gaps in the area of export controls, as well as assess assistance requests and the tools available for cooperation with donors and 1540 Committee experts.

With regard to its dual-track approach, the EU resumed discussions on possible sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran while also seeking to build a long-term relationship with that country based on confidence and cooperation, encompassing progress on all issues of concern, starting with the nuclear issue but also including terrorism, Iran's approach to the Middle East peace process, regional issues and human rights. Besides formalizing United Nations Security Council resolution embargoes and restrictions, the EU adopted a list of dual-use items requiring authorization for export to Iran.<sup>47</sup>

Following the nuclear test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in May, the EU reiterated its strong support for the Six-Party Talks and full implementation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006)<sup>48</sup> and 1874 (2009) (see appendix IV for text).<sup>49</sup> Concerned about external proliferation activities by the DPRK, the EU imposed embargoes on dual-use goods.<sup>50</sup>

The EU also continued to promote actively the early entry into force of the CTBT as well as negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, including verification provisions.

In July, the European Council adopted a decision for the universalization and full implementation of the CWC as well as enhancing international cooperation in the field of chemical activities. The EU also launched two Joint

---

<sup>43</sup> See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/wmd>.

<sup>44</sup> S/RES/1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006.

<sup>45</sup> S/RES/1810 (2008) of 25 April 2008.

<sup>46</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2008/368/CFSP of 14 May 2008, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 127 (15 May 2008), pp. 78-83. Available from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=718&lang=en> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>47</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) N°1228/2009 of 15 December 2009, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 330 (16 December 2009), pp. 49-60. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>48</sup> S/RES/1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006.

<sup>49</sup> S/RES/1874 (2009) of 12 June 2009.

<sup>50</sup> Council Regulation (EU) N°1283/2009 of 22 December 2009, amends Regulation (EC) N° 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against DPRK (OJ L346, 23 December 2009 pp. 1-25). Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en> (accessed 29 May 2010).

Actions in support of the Biological Weapons Convention<sup>51</sup> and the World Health Organization's biosafety and biosecurity activities,<sup>52</sup> besides supporting concrete projects in these fields in third countries (non-EU States).

To mitigate the risk of WMD proliferation in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the EU continued to support the International Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine through the provision of peaceful employment opportunities for former weapons programme scientists and technicians. It also supported the reallocation through capacity-building of former Iraqi scientists with WMD-related skills and dual-use knowledge for decommissioning nuclear facilities.

On 5 May, the EU adopted an enhanced regulation for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, which entered into force on 27 August.<sup>53</sup> In addition to exports and transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items were also controlled at Union level by this new regulation.

The EU continued to support the Knowledge Management System on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear trafficking in North Africa and the Middle East in order to enhance a sense of ownership among participating countries on efforts to reduce trafficking in such materials. In addition, it supported two projects to reduce the threat of nuclear and radiation terrorism by improving detection of nuclear and radioactive materials at the borders. The first project focused on the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Belarus and on some selected countries of the Mediterranean Basin and ASEAN region, while the second focused on Georgia, Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The EU launched the implementation of a Council decision<sup>54</sup> in support of the Hague Code of Conduct to strengthen its functioning and to make it universal. Efforts also continued within the EU to implement the recommendations of the 2008 action plan called "New lines for action by the

---

<sup>51</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2008/858/CFSP of 10 November 2008, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 302 (13 November 2008), pp. 29-36. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>52</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2008/307/CFSP of 14 April 2008, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 106 (16 April 2008), pp. 17-23. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>53</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 of 5 May 2009, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 134 (29 May 2009), pp. 1-269. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en> (accessed 29 May 2010). This Council Regulation sets up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (recast).

<sup>54</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2008/974/CFSP of 18 December 2008, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 345 (23 December 2008), pp. 91-95. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en> (accessed 29 May 2010).

European Union in combating the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems".<sup>55</sup>

The Union pursued work on its proposed draft international Code of Conduct to enhance confidence-building and openness in outer space activities and continued to discuss the text with a number of countries to identify their concerns and suggestions. EU experts also focused their work on Part III of the Code. The draft Code was welcomed by the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee.<sup>56</sup>

Throughout 2009, while promoting the issue of SALW in multilateral forums and with third countries within the framework of its SALW Strategy, the EU pursued its project on SALW and surplus ammunition destruction in Ukraine and prepared a new Council Decision in support of SEESAC arms control activities in the Western Balkans. Preparation also started for a new Council Decision to support the implementation of the Programme of Action on SALW, in view of the upcoming Fourth Biennial Meeting of States in June 2010.

In addition to ongoing projects on SALW, the EU launched a project to support the fight against the illicit accumulation and trafficking of firearms in Africa through the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The project will raise awareness and knowledge of relevant institutional and civil society actors, as well as strengthen the African Regional Police Chiefs Organizations and boost cooperation between national, regional and continental law enforcement agencies.

On arms exports, EU member States continued to strive for convergence of their control policies to prevent the export of military technology and equipment which might be used for undesirable purposes. The EU also continued to support the negotiation of an arms trade treaty as well as adopted and began implementing Council Decisions to promote the Treaty process.

The implementation of the Joint Action<sup>57</sup> in support of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons was completed in 2009 and the publication of the results of the six regional seminars<sup>58</sup> organized by UNODA during the previous year was presented on the margins of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly's First Committee. In parallel, the EU

---

<sup>55</sup> Available from <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17172.en08.pdf> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>56</sup> Eighth preambular paragraph of resolution 64/49 of 2 December 2009. See *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 34 (Part II): 2009 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.IX.1), p. 97. Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament>.

<sup>57</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2007/528/CFSP of 23 July 2007, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 194 (26 July 2007), pp. 11-17. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en> (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>58</sup> See *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part II): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), p. 188.

contributed to the Convention's Sponsorship Programme, managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

The EU continued to promote integration of mine action through its development and external assistance programmes in line with the "Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013". In 2009, the European Commission committed approximately €55 million to support mine action projects. It also implemented the Council Joint Action<sup>59</sup> in support of the universalization of the Mine Ban Convention and contributed to organizing five regional meetings in advance of the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Convention held in Cartagena, Colombia, where the EU participated and provided an update of its activities (for the Cartagena Declaration, see appendix III).

### ***Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe***

Throughout the year, OSCE participating States remained engaged on the issue of WMD proliferation, a topic they further discussed in the regular meetings of the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). In December, they adopted the Ministerial Declaration on Non-Proliferation at the Athens Ministerial Council Meeting, which reaffirmed their adherence to the international treaties and conventions that sought to prevent and prohibit WMD proliferation. In that meeting, participating States also reiterated their readiness to further enhance and strengthen existing international legal instruments.

Through another Ministerial Council Decision adopted in December, participating States tasked OSCE to facilitate the fulfilment by the participating States of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008). Based on OSCE regional experiences, the participating States continued developing a Handbook of Best Practice Guides for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and, in September, adopted the first of five guides dealing with export control and transshipment. In its final form, the Handbook would constitute a compendium of suggested implementation practices, which could assist in the development of national action plans and in fostering better coordination of regional assistance activities.

With regard to SALW, OSCE continued its efforts to eliminate or reduce threats posed by the trafficking of SALW as well as by surplus conventional ammunition. Following the adoption of OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 11/08, the FSC organized a meeting in September to review the OSCE Document on SALW and its supplementary decisions. The meeting called for

---

<sup>59</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2008/487/CFSP of 23 June 2008, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 165 (26 June 2008), pp. 41-44. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en> (accessed 29 May 2010).

enhanced implementation of existing commitments as well as a review and update of some of the existing norms. As a result, the participating States adopted a Ministerial Council Decision in December that called for the adoption of the OSCE Plan of Action on SALW by May 2010 and concrete steps to further the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument.

The OSCE participating States destroyed 898,153 pieces of SALW in 2008 and to further improve the implementation of OSCE Documents on SALW and stockpiles of conventional ammunition, the Organization organized a regional workshop in Kazakhstan on the Handbook of Best Practices on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition.

### ***Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Center***

In 2009, RACVIAC used its experience to provide for stronger dialogue and cooperation on a wide range of issues related to cooperative security, with particular focus on arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in South-East Europe. It planned and conducted seminars, courses, workshops and training programmes related to currently implemented arms control treaties and agreements.

RACVIAC also emphasized the continuing importance of arms control by providing updated information and practical experiences to course participants who came from different military, political and diplomatic backgrounds. Considerable progress was also achieved in implementing guidelines from the RACVIAC governing body—the Multinational Advisory Group—regarding courses on arms control issues. During the reporting period, special emphasis was placed on close cooperation with other related organizations, including the OSCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), non-governmental organizations and military units.

Under its annual programme for 2009, RACVIAC carried out nine activities related to arms control, bringing together experts from the political, diplomatic, military and academic fields to discuss arms control-oriented topics relevant to the security and political environment. Altogether, over 180 participants and 42 lecturers/instructors from South-East European countries and other countries and organizations participated in arms control activities organized by RACVIAC.

### ***Regional Cooperation Council***

Since its inception in 2008, RCC, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme, had been actively involved in issues related to the control of SALW in South-East Europe. Primarily, this meant supporting the activities of SEESAC, which complemented the work of the RCC Secretariat in 2009 and contributed to developing a coordinated regional approach to combat the excessive and uncontrolled circulation of SALW in

South-East Europe. The main focus of its work was on: (a) assisting Western Balkan countries to increase harmonization of their SALW legislation with the laws and practices of the EU; and (b) improving the operational capacity of Governments to integrate SALW control in their policies and to increase compliance with their international SALW obligations.

A wide range of responses was developed through SEESAC, which included the following activities:

- Development of national legislation on marking and tracing of weapons in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
- Research on convertible weapons in the Western Balkans;
- Securing political support for destruction of surplus weapons in the Republic of Moldova (2,300 SALW) and Serbia (27,000 SALW);
- Development and publication of the First Regional Report on Arms Exports;
- Establishment of the Regional Information Exchange on Arms Exports;
- Capacity-building of the newly established Albanian State Export Control Authority, which resulted in the publication of the first Albanian annual report on arms exports; and
- Design, development and implementation of a sophisticated export controls software.

The RCC Secretariat also continuously supported resource mobilization for SEESAC activities, which resulted in securing funds for their operations for 2010-2011. Furthermore, the RCC Secretariat initiated a process of establishing a funding mechanism for regional initiatives that would further contribute to enhancing the regional ownership of SEESAC.

### ***South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons***

During the year, SEESAC concentrated on improving the control and transparency of arms transfers to and from the Western Balkans, reducing the surplus stockpiles of SALW and developing the framework for increased transparency of arms transfers within and from the region.

The continuous support provided to authorities in the Western Balkans resulted in the publication of the first annual arms export report in Albania, while Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia reported on their arms transfers according to the already established practice. SEESAC initiated the process of producing the first regional report on arms exports, resulting in its publication in November. The annual report aimed to help consolidate the gains in transparency achieved in the region, while demonstrating the ability

and willingness to uphold commitments associated with the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing export control of military technology and equipment.

The SEESAC efforts to increase transparency of arms transfers led to an informal information exchange on arms exports among Western Balkan Government officials. The first output from this process was the agreement by the national licensing authorities to develop a regional database of arms brokers.

SEESAC also produced a report reviewing the conformity of Montenegro's weapons legislation with EU standards and recommending necessary actions to ensure compliance. It further reported on international standards on SALW marking and tracing and SALW brokering to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations Firearms Protocol and the observance of United Nations, OSCE and EU norms on brokering.

### ***North Atlantic Treaty Organization***

At the NATO Summit held in Strasbourg, France, and Kehl, Germany, in April, Alliance leaders reiterated their 2008 Bucharest Summit pledge that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation would continue to make an important contribution to regional peace, security and stability. They also noted the increased role of NATO over a broad range of activities, including continuous efforts to prevent the spread of WMD and the destruction of excess SALW as well as surplus munitions.<sup>60</sup>

The Alliance leaders also endorsed the latest policy on non-proliferation of WMD entitled "NATO's Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending against Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats".<sup>61</sup> For the first time, this new policy introduced a comprehensive approach that sought to integrate the three major elements of NATO response to the WMD threat—that is, preventing WMD proliferation and also protecting against, and recovering from, a WMD attack or a CBRN event. The new policy also emphasized the role of intelligence and information-sharing, international outreach and partnership activities, as well as public diplomacy and strategic communications.

On WMD-related commitments, the Alliance leaders reaffirmed the importance of the NPT and their constructive contribution to achieve a successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They also called for universal adherence to the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic

---

<sup>60</sup> NATO, "Strasbourg/ Kehl Summit Declaration", para. 55. Available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease) (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>61</sup> Available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_57218.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_57218.htm) (accessed 29 May 2010).

Energy Agency Safeguards Agreements and full compliance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

In their new Declaration on Alliance Security,<sup>62</sup> the Alliance leaders noted that their nations and the world as a whole faced increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and cyberattacks, and that those threats and other challenges may have a negative impact on Allied and international security. Besides improving the Alliance's own capabilities to meet such threats and challenges, they affirmed a comprehensive approach that would include increased cooperation with other international actors, including the United Nations, the EU, OSCE and the AU.

The main non-proliferation activity of NATO in 2009 was the Annual Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation held in Warsaw from 10 to 11 December. Senior non-proliferation officials attended representing countries from the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, nations from Asia and the Pacific,<sup>63</sup> international organizations<sup>64</sup> and select academic institutions and think tanks.

In connection with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Alliance considered the Treaty to be a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security as reflected in the Ministerial Communiqué of December 2009,<sup>65</sup> which contained the latest statement of the Alliance on Conventional Forces in Europe.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action met six times in 2009. The Group sponsored a workshop on combating illicit brokering with experts invited from Alliance nations as well as other international and non-governmental organizations. The Working Group also continued to advocate full implementation of the Programme of Action, especially through supporting NATO/PfP Trust Fund projects.<sup>66</sup>

The Alliance also continued to train national experts on arms control issues through the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. The School conducted 11 courses in 2009 on arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and confidence- and security-building measures with a total of 306 participants. The NATO School also divided its SALW courses into a course for implementers from the informal Multinational Small Arms and

---

<sup>62</sup> Available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_52838.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm) (accessed 29 May 2010).

<sup>63</sup> Australia, China, India, Iraq, Japan and Republic of Korea.

<sup>64</sup> Preparatory Commission for CTBTO, EU, OPCW and OSCE.

<sup>65</sup> NATO, "Final Statement, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels", 4 December 2009. Available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_59699.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59699.htm) (accessed 29 May 2010). This Ministerial Communiqué builds upon the NAC Statement on the CFE of March 2008.

<sup>66</sup> Current details on NATO/PfP Trust Fund projects are available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50082.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50082.htm) (accessed 29 May 2010).

Ammunition Group and a separate course focusing on political and military policy issues. This new SALW Policy Course was open to NATO partners.

## **Middle East**

### ***League of Arab States***

In 2009, the League of Arab States<sup>67</sup> actively engaged in coordinating a collective position, both regionally and internationally, on disarmament and arms control issues, especially those related to the International Atomic Energy Agency and NPT. Notably, the League's Summit Council adopted resolution 470<sup>68</sup> on 30 March requesting the League of Arab States to hold an Arab conference of senior officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs to prepare common positions on the agenda issues of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The first meeting was held in December, while two other meetings were scheduled to take place in February and March 2010. The Summit Council also adopted resolutions 471<sup>69</sup> and 472<sup>70</sup> to promote the joint development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, the League dealt with issues related to illicit SALW and, in May, organized the third annual meeting of Arab national points of contact on the Programme of Action to combat the illicit trade in SALW.

### **United Nations Development Programme**

Throughout the year, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supported national and regional initiatives aimed at assisting Governments to address SALW proliferation, armed violence and contamination related to landmines or ERW. UNDP advocated for the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and, with a view to promoting the Convention's early entry into force, it organized two events in New York, in March and October, in cooperation with the affected states, civil society and its United Nations partners. UNDP also supported substantive planning and sponsorship programmes for about 150 delegates from 80 countries for the Global Meeting on Stockpile Destruction held in Germany in June, the Latin America Regional Conference on the CCM held in Chile in September and the Regional Conference on the Promotion and Universalization of the CCM held in Indonesia in November.

---

<sup>67</sup> The 22 members of the League of Arab States are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

<sup>68</sup> See letter dated 16 April 2009 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2009/212, annex, pp. 43-44.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

UNDP also introduced innovative and cost-effective ways of accelerating the release of land for civilian use, including by providing inputs into the International Mine Action Standard on Land Release issued in June and by participating in panel discussions at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Convention in Colombia from 30 November to 4 December.

In connection with SALW and armed violence, UNDP focused on addressing both the supply and demand side problems in the context of tackling SALW proliferation as a key development issue.

## General Assembly, 2009

### 64/23. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The resolution, which was substantively unchanged since it was last introduced in 2007, requested the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to continue his informal consultations with Committee members and to report through the Committee to the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session.

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (28 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 128-3-45 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 128-3-44 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 5-7.

### 64/41. Regional disarmament

Unchanged in substance from the previous year, the resolution, inter alia, called upon States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures (CBMs) at the regional and subregional levels, and welcomed the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken at those levels. It also supported and encouraged efforts aimed at promoting CBMs, easing regional tensions and furthering disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation at the regional and subregional levels.

**Introduced by:** Pakistan (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 66-67.

### 64/42. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

Introduced on an annual basis, by this resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, again requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles to serve as a framework for

**Introduced by:** Pakistan (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 174-1-2 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 173-1-2 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 68-70.

regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looked forward to the subsequent report on the subject. It also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States for submission to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

**First Committee.** After voting against the draft, **India** explained that its vote was because the United Nations Disarmament Commission had adopted similar principles; there was no need for the Conference on Disarmament to do the same. Moreover, with security concerns extending beyond narrowly defined regions, the notion of a preservation of balance in the regional and subregional context was unrealistic and unacceptable to India. After the **Russian Federation** abstained in the vote on the draft, it stated that regional control measures must ensure equal security for all participants, and such measures should be appropriate to the situation in each region. Preambular paragraph 6 noted the relevance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which it believed was out of date. The draft also did not indicate that a new agreement for Europe was needed.

#### **64/43. Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context**

By this resolution, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, once again called upon Member States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to pursue confidence- and security-building measures through sustained consultations and dialogue. It also urged States to comply with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements, to which they are party, and encouraged the promotion of bilateral and regional CBMs.

**Introduced by:** Pakistan (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 71-73.

#### **64/58. United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament**

As in previous years, by this resolution, the Assembly appealed to Member States in each region and those that were able to do so, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the United Nations regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (28 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 148-149.

initiatives. It also requested the Secretary-General to provide all necessary support, within existing resources, to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities.

### **64/68. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region**

Unchanged substantively from the previous year, the resolution reaffirmed that security in the Mediterranean was closely linked to that of Europe, as well as to international peace and security. It called upon all States of the Mediterranean region that have not yet done so to adhere to all the

multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. It encouraged all States of the region to strengthen CBMs by promoting openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter alia, in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

*First Committee.* Before the vote, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that the text had given a rosy picture of the situation on the Middle East, which did not reflect the realistic situation. As a result, it would not participate in the voting.

**Introduced by:** Algeria (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 179-182.

chapter V

**Related issues, including information  
and outreach**



## CHAPTER V

### Related issues, including information and outreach

*The world should pursue several related measures, including: eliminating other weapons of mass destruction; combating [weapons of mass destruction] terrorism; and bans on missiles and space weapons.<sup>1</sup>*

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

### Developments and trends

ISSUES RELATED TO DISARMAMENT RECEIVED SUSTAINED ATTENTION in 2009 and the prolonged deadlock in the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery showed signs of abatement as a result of the positive momentum in the relations between the United States and the Russian Federation on bilateral strategic issues.

The challenging issue of information security continued to receive close attention, with 2009 culminating in the establishment by the Secretary-General of the Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. Similarly, on the equally challenging issue of verification, in-depth discussion reinforced by the work done in the preceding years continued to characterize the deliberations in the United Nations, leading to a better understanding of the subject.

At a time of increased economic and social challenges confronting the international community, the importance of the relationship between disarmament and development also gained further recognition in the United Nations, including the Security Council. The renewed focus on the issue was particularly in the context of rising global military expenditures and that of Article 26 of the United Nations Charter, which calls for “the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resource”.

Notwithstanding the absence of substantive negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, the long-standing stalemate in the CD showed signs of easing, which encouraged expectations of substantive progress in 2010. The lack of progress witnessed in the United Nations

---

<sup>1</sup> Secretary-General’s remarks at the breakfast meeting on the Secretary-General’s Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, New York, 8 December 2009. Available from [http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search\\_full.asp?statID=674](http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=674).

Disarmament Commission in the previous years also abated. Both these developments raised hope of an incipient revival of multilateralism in the field of disarmament.

This chapter contains issues that do not fall into the general division of the previous chapters devoted to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conventional weapons or regional approaches. It covers a wide array of issues and approaches relating to security, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

The following issues are addressed in this chapter:

- Disarmament machinery: the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission;
- Outer space;
- Terrorism and disarmament;
- Environmental norms in drafting and implementing disarmament agreements;
- Developments in the field of information technology and security;
- Relationship between disarmament and development;
- Multilateralism and disarmament;
- Gender and disarmament;
- Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters;
- Disarmament information and outreach;
- Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services;
- United Nations Disarmament Information Programme; and
- United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

## **Disarmament machinery**

*The immediate task before the Conference is to convert your discussions on procedure into practical negotiations that will lead to real disarmament. At a time of global economic and financial crisis, advancing the disarmament agenda could produce a tangible peace dividend when the world needs it most.<sup>2</sup>*

**BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL**

### **Conference on Disarmament**

In accordance with its traditional practice, the 2009 session of the CD was organized in three parts—from 19 January to 27 March, 18 May to 3 July and 3 August to 18 September—and concluded with the adoption of the Annual Report to the General Assembly.<sup>3</sup> In addition to the 65 members,<sup>4</sup> 44 non-members<sup>5</sup> were invited to participate in the work of the Conference under its rules of procedure.

During the first part, the 2009 Presidents of the Conference<sup>6</sup> appointed seven coordinators to organize and chair two rounds of debates on the agenda items.<sup>7</sup> After the conclusion of their work, a report was submitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference under the Presidency of Austria.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Secretary-General's message to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 20 January 2009. Available from <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=3664#>.

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/64/27)*.

<sup>4</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

<sup>5</sup> Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Holy See, Honduras, Iceland, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Montenegro, Nepal, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay.

<sup>6</sup> The 2009 Presidents were: Idriss Jazairy (Algeria), Roberto García Moritán (Argentina), Caroline Millar (Australia), Christian Strohal (Austria), Le Hoai Trung (Viet Nam) and Chitsaka Chipaziwa (Zimbabwe).

<sup>7</sup> The Coordinators were: Petko Draganov (Bulgaria), Marius Grinius (Canada), Carlos Portales (Chile), I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja (Indonesia), Giovanni Manfredi (Italy), Babacar Carlos Mbaye (Senegal) and Dayan Jayatilaka (Sri Lanka).

<sup>8</sup> CD, document CD/1877. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

Following broad and intensive consultations, on 19 May, Idriss Jazairy (Algeria), who was the incumbent President, submitted a draft decision for the establishment of a programme of work for the 2009 session. The document was adopted on 29 May and included the establishment of subsidiary bodies with a negotiating mandate for a fissile material cut-off treaty and deliberative mandates for nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. In addition, Special Coordinators were to be appointed to deal with the remaining issues on the agenda, namely, new types of WMD, a comprehensive programme of disarmament and transparency in armaments.<sup>9</sup>

The Conference was, however, unable to overcome the procedural issues related to the implementation of its adopted programme of work, in particular those concerning the schedule of activities and the appointment of office bearers.<sup>10</sup>

Nevertheless, heightened interest in the work of the CD continued to be reflected in the addresses delivered by a large number of dignitaries throughout the year, most notably the speech on 7 March by Sergey Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. On that occasion, he called for a successor agreement for the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) and also listed a number of steps to reinvigorate the disarmament process.

In its annual report,<sup>11</sup> the Conference requested the current and incoming Presidents to conduct consultations during the intersessional period. Not only would this allow for the early commencement of substantive work during the 2010 session, but also take advantage of the adoption of the 2009 programme of work and the momentum provided by other initiatives of States relevant to the work of the CD.

## **General Assembly, 2009**

### **64/64. Report of the Conference on Disarmament**

This year, this annual resolution welcomed the consensus adoption of a programme of work for the 2009 session of the CD,<sup>12</sup> including the establishment of four working groups and the appointment of three special coordinators. It also took

**Introduced by:** Austria (23 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (30 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 164-166.

<sup>9</sup> CD, document CD/1864. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>10</sup> CD, documents CD/1866 and Rev.1, CD/1867, and CD/1870 and Rev.1 and Rev.2. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>11</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/64/27)*. This and all subsequent United Nations documents are available in all official languages from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. II.D; see also CD/1864.

note of the active discussions held on the implementation of the programme of work at the 2009 session of the CD, as duly reflected in the report<sup>13</sup> and the records of the plenary meetings.

**First Committee.** After joining the consensus, two States spoke. **Bangladesh** said that it was committed to general and complete disarmament and was party to all major disarmament conventions. It strongly believed in the multilateral approach to disarmament under the auspices of the United Nations. It also stressed that the CD should play its mandated role as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. As the next President of the Conference, it was taking all preparations to conduct consultations during the intersessional period and to gather recommendations, taking into account all relevant proposals. Bangladesh would try its best to reach consensus on the work programme during the first few weeks of the 2010 session. **Turkey** said that it attached great importance to the work of the CD and hoped that the CD would be able to resume its negotiating role as the primary multilateral disarmament forum. It expected that the remaining obstacles to the implementation of its programme of work would be removed so that it could embark on substantive work on the fissile material cut-off treaty, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. On expanding the CD membership, Turkey was convinced that such expansion was not a current priority and should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

### **United Nations Disarmament Commission**

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) held the first session of its new three-year cycle of deliberations from 13 April to 1 May in New York. Prior to the substantive session, it held an organizational session on 15 January in which it considered the provisional agenda for the 2009 substantive session and decided to take up the issue of the establishment of working groups after the substantive items on the agenda were agreed upon. Subsequently, at its substantive meetings held on 15 April, the Commission adopted the provisional agenda and approved its general programme of work.<sup>14</sup>

The main agenda items under consideration were recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade; and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. The last item was to be taken up upon the conclusion of the elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade, preferably by 2010 and in any case, no later than 2011.

---

<sup>13</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/64/27).*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid., Supplement No. 42 (A/64/42), sect. II.*

The Commission held 12 plenary meetings<sup>15</sup> and 4 informal meetings under the chairmanship of Andrzej Towpik (Poland). Along with the Chair, six Vice-Chairpersons and a Rapporteur constituted the Bureau of the Commission.<sup>16</sup> As in the previous years, two working groups were established to deal with the substantive agenda items.

Working Group I, tasked with discussing recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, held six meetings between 22 and 29 April, under the chairmanship of Paolo Cuculi (Italy). Working Group II, entrusted with the task of recommending elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade, held nine meetings between 20 and 30 April, under the chairmanship of Johann Paschalis (South Africa).

During the general debate, many delegates discussed their vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world, stressing strict verification, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and agreements on the “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons and non-use against non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS).<sup>17</sup>

The United States asserted that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world required assurances that the security of countries possessing nuclear weapons and of their allies would not be impaired as they reduced the role of those weapons. The Russian Federation maintained that reaching “nuclear zero” would be possible only through a step-by-step process involving all nuclear-weapon States (NWS). Such a goal should be considered alongside other international issues, including offensive and defensive strategic weapons.

Indonesia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), reiterated the call for an international conference to achieve a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame and that global non-proliferation efforts should parallel those aimed at nuclear disarmament.

Nigeria, on behalf of the African Group, stressed due diligence by NWS in implementing all their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and called on them to desist from developing new types of nuclear weapons. The African Group also sought unconditional security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

---

<sup>15</sup> See A/CN.10/PV.290-301.

<sup>16</sup> The Vice-Chairpersons were from: Azerbaijan, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), South Africa, Switzerland and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). The Rapporteur was from the Netherlands.

<sup>17</sup> A/CN.10/PV.295-297. See also press release DC/3164, 15 April 2009 (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/dc3164.doc.htm>), and press release DC/3165, 16 April 2009 (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/dc3165.doc.htm>).

The Czech Republic, on behalf of the European Union (EU), emphasized the potential for clandestine military nuclear activities, which it considered to be particularly worrying in light of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and their increasing range.

Jordan, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, called for translating words into actions for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world and expressed concern that some States were in violation of their non-proliferation commitments.

India urged NWS to adopt measures to reduce nuclear dangers and to negotiate a global agreement for a “no-first-use” among NWS, as well as a legally binding pact on non-use of nuclear weapons against NNWS. Pakistan called for an international conference to develop a new consensus for nuclear disarmament, to make non-proliferation norms non-discriminatory, and to normalize the relationship of the NPT with NWS that are not parties to the NPT.

Cuba asserted that NWS were legally obligated to conclude negotiations to achieve complete nuclear disarmament under strict and effective verification. Australia urged NWS to show leadership at the upcoming third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The Islamic Republic of Iran maintained that even limited efforts to pursue the total elimination of nuclear arsenals faced serious setbacks arising from the anti-disarmament policies of some NWS.

While statements related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues were predominant, many delegations expressed support for enhanced mechanisms and measures to prevent the destabilizing effects of the international transfer of conventional weapons, particularly the diversion of small arms and light weapons (SALW) to illicit channels. In this regard, the concept of legally binding commitments under a proposed arms trade treaty received significant support, as reflected notably in the statements of Australia, Brazil, the EU countries, Japan, Nigeria and Panama.

A number of references were made during the general debate with regard to the elements for a draft declaration of the fourth disarmament decade, notably by Member States belonging to the NAM. Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the NAM, wanted the draft declaration to give priority to nuclear disarmament while also reflecting other relevant issues, including SALW.

Algeria considered it desirable for the draft declaration to draw from the experiences of the past three disarmament decades, including the importance of revitalizing multilateral disarmament forums. Indonesia envisaged a wide range of disarmament issues for inclusion in the declaration. Cuba asserted that the declaration should appropriately reflect the priorities already established.

Brazil proposed that nuclear disarmament be reflected as a priority issue in the proposed declaration and other issues to be included, notably those related to SALW and an arms trade treaty. It also wanted a reaffirmation of the

indispensable role of the United Nations in dealing with peace and security issues in accordance with the Charter. India believed that the proposed declaration should provide a broad agenda to help determine the work of the UNDC for the next 10 years.

The United States wanted the declaration to contain a small number of key principles of disarmament and non-proliferation, encompassing nuclear weapons, other WMD and conventional weapons. It believed that in order to be meaningful, the declaration must take into account the need to establish a new security paradigm to replace nuclear deterrence as an essential step in creating the conditions for achieving “nuclear zero”.

### **Report of the Commission**

The Commission concluded its 2009 session by adopting its report to the General Assembly, as well as the reports of its two Working Groups.<sup>18</sup>

Working Group I on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation engaged in substantive, extensive and inclusive discussions on issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In line with its deliberative mandate, the Group considered both practical and action-oriented aspects, as well as broad philosophical and conceptual approaches to the issue. The debate, held in a constructive atmosphere, was marked by the interactive participation of a large number of delegations. Based on the views expressed by delegations, the current Chair of the Working Group was to present a paper at the next session of the UNDC to identify possible areas of consensus for further deliberations during the remainder of the Commission’s current cycle.<sup>19</sup>

Working Group II did a considerable amount of work on a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade in both formal meetings and informal consultations. For its discussions, the Group used a non-paper prepared by the Chair, which he further revised based on the views and proposals of delegations. The Working Group was able to conduct a reading of the second revised non-paper and agreed to continue its consideration of the text at the next session of the Commission in 2010. The degree of convergence of different positions and approaches and the flexibility shown by delegations raised the hope that agreement could be achieved next year.<sup>20</sup>

Although agreement could not be reached in Working Group II on elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade, which was the Commission’s main task in 2009, the Chairman of the Commission said in his concluding statement that he believed the session had

---

<sup>18</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/64/42).*

<sup>19</sup> A/CN.10/PV.301.

<sup>20</sup> A/CN.10/PV.300-301.

laid a good basis for next year's deliberations. Similarly, he remarked that the dialogue in Working Group I on the complex issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation also represented a good start.<sup>21</sup>

## **General Assembly, 2009**

### **64/65. Report of the Disarmament Commission**

This procedural resolution recommended that the UNDC continue the consideration of the following items at its substantive session of 2010: (a) recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; (b) elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade; and (c) practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. The last item would be taken up upon the conclusion of the preparation of the elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade, preferably by 2010 and in any case no later than 2011.

**Introduced by:** Poland, on behalf of the members of the extended Bureau of the Disarmament Commission (Azerbaijan, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Italy, Netherlands, Poland, South Africa, Switzerland and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)) (19 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 167-169.

**First Committee.** In a general statement, **Cuba** expressed support for the draft resolution and reaffirmed the importance of the Commission as the only specialized deliberative body within the multilateral disarmament mechanism of the United Nations. It also welcomed the items to be considered at the 2010 session of the Commission, as listed in operative paragraph 7. Before the action, the **United States** said it would not participate in the action on the draft resolution.

## **Outer space**

### **Conference on Disarmament, 2009**

There was general consensus that space activities played a pervasive role in all aspects of the daily lives of individuals and that the benefits of such activities should remain accessible to all while being confined to peaceful uses only. Informal discussions in the CD in the previous years suggested that many countries considered the existing legal architecture governing space activities to be inadequate to address current and future security challenges in outer space. Most delegations also agreed that the CD had a role in addressing the gaps in outer space security.

---

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. See also press release, DC/3172, 1 May 2009 (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/dc3172.doc.htm>).

In accordance with the Organizational Framework,<sup>22</sup> the Conference held two rounds of informal sessions on agenda item 3 on “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (PAROS), led by Marius Grinius (Canada), the Coordinator for the agenda item.<sup>23</sup>

The objectives of these informal sessions were to: (a) validate the positions of delegations on PAROS that have been identified over the last several years; (b) provide opportunities for delegations to indicate any changes or to present new positions and/or ideas; and (c) advance the discussions on specific issues in order to prepare the ground for possible future work on PAROS.

On legally binding instruments, the informal discussions focused primarily on the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space.<sup>24</sup> Many delegations supported continued discussions on the draft treaty and welcomed the contributions that the Russian Federation and China had made to the PAROS debate.

On transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in outer space activities, most delegations supported the view that TCBMs could foster greater trust and serve as an important complementary measure or even as a stand-alone instrument. The draft EU Code of Conduct,<sup>25</sup> an initiative that was being pursued outside the CD, was cited as one example of a TCBM. Some delegations, however, opposed the idea of TCBMs serving as a substitute for a legally binding instrument as they did not believe those measures could fill the gaps in the existing legal regime.

A large number of delegations expressed interest in starting substantive discussions on outer space within the framework of an agreed programme of work in the CD. Some delegations expressed optimism that a possible shift in the position of the new United States Administration could add a new element to the discussions on PAROS.

## **General Assembly, 2009**

### **64/28. Prevention of an arms race in outer space**

Last tabled the previous year, the resolution, *inter alia*, invited the CD to establish a working group under its

**Introduced by:** Sri Lanka (19 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 176-0-2 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 176-0-2 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 24-28.

<sup>22</sup> CD, “Organizational Framework for the 2009 session”, document CD/WP.553. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>23</sup> For the report submitted by the Coordinator to the President of the CD on work done on agenda item 3, see CD/1877, annex III. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>24</sup> CD, document CD/1839. Available from <http://ods.un.org>.

<sup>25</sup> Council of the European Union, document 17175/08. Available from <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17175.en08.pdf> (accessed 15 July 2010).

agenda item entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” as early as possible during its 2010 session.

### **64/49. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities**

Similar to the 2008 resolution on this subject, the resolution took note of the report of the Secretary-General containing concrete proposals from Member States on international outer space TCBMs.<sup>26</sup> It also requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session a final report with an annex containing concrete proposals from Member States on international outer space and confidence-building measures.

**Introduced by:** Russian Federation (19 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (29 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 97-98.

**First Committee.** Before the action on the draft resolution, two States took the floor. **Cuba** stated that an arms race in outer space would entail a serious threat to peace. It welcomed the draft resolution, which included concrete measures to bring about greater transparency in space activities. It believed that the CD must lead the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on the PAROS in all its aspects. The **United States** said that it would not participate in the vote on the draft resolution. Nonetheless, it would continue to undertake voluntary TCBMs on space-related activities. Earlier in the year, it had exchanged information with the Russian Federation regarding the collision of satellites in space. It had also worked with the EU on a proposed code of conduct for outer space activities. It was currently undergoing a presidential review of its space cooperation options and would discuss insights from the review next year at the First Committee session.

## **Terrorism and disarmament**

In resolution 64/235 of 24 December entitled “Institutionalization of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force”,<sup>27</sup> the General Assembly recalled the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy<sup>28</sup> and requested the Secretary-General to provide the resources necessary to finalize the institutionalization of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force without delay in order to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system.

<sup>26</sup> A/62/114 and Add.1, A/63/136 and Add.1 and A/64/138 and Add.1.

<sup>27</sup> A/RES/64/235.

<sup>28</sup> See A/RES/60/288 of 8 September 2006.

In resolution 11 of 18 September entitled “Nuclear Security, including measures to protect against nuclear and radiological terrorism”,<sup>29</sup> the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), taking into account the growing number of tragic terrorist attacks worldwide, considered the continuing need to devote specific attention to the potential implications of terrorist acts for the security of nuclear materials, other radioactive materials in production, use, storage and transport, including associated facilities. It emphasized the importance of physical protection and other measures to prevent illicit trafficking, as well as national control systems for ensuring protection against nuclear terrorism and other malicious acts, including the use of radioactive material in a radiological dispersion device or a radiation exposure device.

The General Conference also took note of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001),<sup>30</sup> 1540 (2004),<sup>31</sup> 1673 (2006)<sup>32</sup> and 1810 (2008)<sup>33</sup>, as well as General Assembly resolution 63/60 of 2 December 2008,<sup>34</sup> the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism and other international efforts aimed at preventing access by non-State actors to WMD and related materials. In this connection, it recalled General Assembly resolution 60/78 of 8 December 2005,<sup>35</sup> which underscored the urgency of making progress in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to help maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism.

The Conference also recalled the functions assigned to the IAEA by the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism<sup>36</sup> and urged States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention as soon as possible. It further recalled the resolution on the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,<sup>37</sup> which encouraged the IAEA to continue helping States to build capacity to prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear materials, ensure security at related facilities and respond effectively in the event of an attack using such materials. In this regard, the Conference invited the IAEA Secretariat to provide assistance to Member States, upon their request, for the fulfilment of their responsibilities under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and their obligations to the 1540 Committee.

---

<sup>29</sup> General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, “Nuclear security, including measures to protect against nuclear and radiological terrorism”, document GC(53)/RES/11. Available from [http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Resolutions/English/gc53res-11\\_en.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Resolutions/English/gc53res-11_en.pdf) (accessed 15 July 2010).

<sup>30</sup> S/INF/57, pp. 291-294.

<sup>31</sup> S/INF/59, pp. 214-227.

<sup>32</sup> S/INF/61, pp. 250-251.

<sup>33</sup> S/INF/63, pp. 190-193.

<sup>34</sup> A/63/49 (Vol. 1), pp. 174-175

<sup>35</sup> A/60/49 (Vol. 1), pp. 155-156.

<sup>36</sup> A/59/49 (Vol. III), pp. 4-11. The Convention entered into force on 7 July 2007.

<sup>37</sup> A/60/49 (Vol. III), pp. 31-39.

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism held a meeting on 25 March. In his opening statement, the Director-General recalled the response of the Organisation to terrorism as reflected in the recommendations of its Second Review Conference.<sup>38</sup> He also stressed the Group's established practice of sharing regional experiences in the field of counter-terrorism that may potentially involve WMD, especially chemical weapons.

In his address to the Organisation's Executive Council at its fifty-sixth session, the Director-General further stated that "the OPCW's contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts and effective multilateralism continues apace" and that the Secretariat would "continue to support the United Nations in this area".<sup>39</sup>

The Executive Council's medium-term plan for the period 2010-2012 issued on 10 July, stated: "The OPCW will continue to support the Council's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, maintain contacts and exchanges with relevant international, regional, and subregional organisations in the field of counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, and support the United Nations counter-terrorism strategy by participating in the work of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force."<sup>40</sup>

## **General Assembly, 2009**

### **64/38. Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction**

Substantially unchanged from the previous year, this annual resolution called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD and urged them to strengthen national measures in this regard. It also appealed to all Member States to consider early accession to and ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by

**Introduced by:** India (15 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 57-59.

<sup>38</sup> The Review Conference, taking cognizance of the resolutions of the United Nations on combating terrorism, invited States parties to consult and cooperate both bilaterally and regionally on ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring and/or using chemical weapons. It also took note of the work of the OPCW Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism. See also the report of the Second Review Conference (OPCW, document RC-2/4, available from [http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam\\_frontend\\_push&docID=1837](http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=1837) (accessed 20 July 2010)).

<sup>39</sup> OPCW, document EC-56/DG.10. Available from [http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam\\_frontend\\_push&docID=12961](http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=12961) (accessed 20 July 2010).

<sup>40</sup> OPCW, document EC-57/S/8 C-14/S/1. Available from [http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam\\_frontend\\_push&docID=13262](http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=13262) (accessed 20 July 2010).

international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by terrorists acquiring WMD and to report to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

**First Committee.** After supporting the consensus, **Pakistan** said that the draft resolution's language could have been improved to convey a more objective reflection of reality. It believed that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-State actors was less likely than other types of WMD and that the resolution should not be used as an excuse for discrimination against selected countries. It agreed that it was necessary to enhance measures to prevent WMD from being acquired by terrorists and stated that faithful implementation of treaties could effectively address those threats. However, Pakistan believed that as long as huge quantities of chemical weapons existed, the risk remained that terrorists could acquire those weapons. Furthermore, it stressed the importance of controlling biological weapons through the strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention. It was convinced that a comprehensive strategy should be developed to prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring WMD, which included addressing the causes of terrorism.

### **Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control**

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/51 of 2 December 2008,<sup>41</sup> Member States communicated to the Secretary-General the measures they had adopted to promote the application of scientific and technological progress within the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to the attainment of sustainable development.<sup>42</sup>

Cuba reiterated its belief in the complete elimination of WMD, asserting that such weapons posed one of the gravest threats to international peace and security, to the fragile environmental balance of our planet and to sustainable development. It attached great importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention,<sup>43</sup> which contained measures for the protection of people and the environment, and also to strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention,<sup>44</sup> which it considered to be critical for protecting the environment

---

<sup>41</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part I): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), pp. 60-61. Available from <http://un.org/disarmament>.

<sup>42</sup> See A/64/118 and Add.1.

<sup>43</sup> The Treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/treaty/treaties.shtml>.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

and preserving biodiversity on our planet. In addition, Cuba stressed the importance of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.<sup>45</sup> It further stated that it possessed extensive experience in the implementation of various international instruments on disarmament and arms control and highlighted a number of domestic legal provisions to protect the environment.

The Czech Republic stated that it was implementing disarmament and arms control agreements strictly in accordance with the provisions of those agreements and it was dedicated to the protection of the environment.

El Salvador stated that it was in compliance with environmental standards established by the relevant United Nations bodies dealing with disarmament and arms limitation. It referred to its national legislation and executive action, which gave effect to international environmental norms.

Lebanon stated that it did not possess any arms that could affect the environment and that it respected international environmental standards, as well as all disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.

Mexico expressed its support for observing international environmental norms. It was also concerned that pollution from indiscriminate use of various types of weapons and the lack of effective national legislation concerning their destruction were threatening large areas of land and other ecosystems. It further stated that it did not possess WMD and had adopted legislation to prevent the diversion of material for the fabrication of chemical weapons. Mexico also reported that it used mechanical means for destroying conventional arms and ammunition.

Spain, expressing its sensitivity to the environmental impact of any activity, stated that the environmental norms of the EU were part of its domestic law. It listed a number of activities it had conducted to implement various agreements related to the destruction of anti-personnel mines, conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, and fragmentation weapons.

The United Arab Emirates provided a list of measures it had taken towards observing environmental norms in implementing disarmament and arms control agreements. It also expressed its belief in the peaceful settlement of differences and conflicts between States through dialogue, negotiation and mediation, and called for a zone free of all WMD in the Middle East.

---

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

## General Assembly, 2009

### 64/33. Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

Mostly unchanged from the previous year, the annual resolution once again called upon States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress within the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development. It also invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General the measures they had adopted, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing that information to the Assembly's sixty-fifth session.

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (28 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 43-44.

### Developments in the field of information technology and security

Since 1998, the General Assembly had annually adopted a resolution entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security". Pursuant to these resolutions, the Secretary-General had submitted a yearly report containing the views and assessments of Member States on the following questions: (a) general appreciation of the issues of information security; (b) efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation in this field; (c) relevant international concepts to strengthen the security of global information and telecommunications systems; and (d) possible measures to strengthen information security at the global level.

The Secretary-General's report of 8 July and 9 September<sup>46</sup> contained replies from Brazil, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Lithuania, Mali, Mexico, Serbia, Spain, Tajikistan, Thailand and Ukraine.

Brazil suggested complementary approaches by the international community: one aimed at dealing with criminal and terrorist activities involving information technology and the other at considering the impact of the emergence of cyberwarfare. It underscored a leading role by the United Nations in discussions on the use of information and telecommunications as

<sup>46</sup> A/64/129 and Add.1

cyberwarfare in interstate conflict situations. It also recognized a relevant role for the United Nations in assisting Member States on issues related to criminal and terrorist activities.

Cuba emphasized the need to prevent the use of information resources and technologies for criminal, terrorist or State terrorism purposes and offered its support for the peaceful global development and use of information and telecommunications technologies for the good of all humanity.

Kazakhstan proposed an international convention that should, *inter alia*, focus on combating Internet-based crime and stated that it was engaged in regional efforts to safeguard information security within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These efforts were aimed at agreeing on, *inter alia*, mutual non-use of information as a weapon, as well as mechanisms to minimize the negative consequences of injurious acts and to rehabilitate national information infrastructures.

Lebanon stated that it was in the process of enacting a law to regulate the information and telecommunications sector, including security and crime. Lithuania attached great importance to international cooperation to enhance the protection of communication and information systems and planned to prepare a draft law to further improve State capabilities in the field of information security, including defence against cyberattacks.

Mexico believed that the main threat was the risk that information technology and telecommunications could be used by terrorists for violent or dissuasive purposes. Internally, it had taken a number of measures to strengthen security in the field of information and communications, including maintaining a cyberpolice unit for preventive actions related to crimes committed via the Internet and other information technology tools.

Serbia believed that States needed to consolidate their legal norms as cyberspace was not limited to the territory of one country. It supported the consolidation of legislation at the international level to strengthen international security and ensure a free flow of information.

Tajikistan supported initiatives for increasing the level of protection of corporate informative systems, and through such initiatives, counteract the ideology of terrorism, extremism and violence.

Thailand highlighted the steps it had taken at the national level to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation. It suggested measures to strengthen information security at the global level, including coordination by appropriate international agencies, notably the International Telecommunication Union, as well as awareness-raising by the United Nations.

Ukraine stated that cybercrime and cyberthreats were not limited to national borders, calling for expanded international cooperation as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements. It enumerated the measures it had taken to create a legal and regulatory framework to improve the effectiveness of response to unauthorized acts.

Mali called for increased involvement of the international community to raise awareness of and responsibility for information security and to strengthen States' capacities to manage their information and communications technology infrastructure more effectively. One of its main priorities in the national strategic plan was to establish a legal and regulatory framework on information and communications technology.

Spain specified the various measures it had adopted to combat Internet use by terrorist organizations and highlighted some measures for strengthening information security at the global level, notably by adopting a convention similar to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, in which the States would undertake to harmonize their legislation to enable the prosecution of Internet crimes. It also emphasized expeditious international legal and police cooperation to prosecute criminal offences rapidly and efficiently.

### **Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security**

By its resolution 63/37 of 2 December 2008,<sup>47</sup> the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts to continue studying existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them, as well as examine relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems.

Accordingly, the Group of Governmental Experts<sup>48</sup> commenced its work by holding its organizational session from 24 to 26 November in Geneva under the chairmanship of Andrey Krutskikh (Russian Federation). During the session, the Group discussed its method of work and the outline of its final report. As mandated, the Group was scheduled to meet for three sessions in 2010 and report the results of its work to the General Assembly at the sixty-fifth session.

---

<sup>47</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part I): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), pp. 4-7. Available from <http://un.org/disarmament>.

<sup>48</sup> The Group consisted of members from Belarus, Brazil, China, Estonia, Germany, France, Israel, India, Italy, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.

## General Assembly, 2009

### 64/25. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

The annual resolution noted with satisfaction the holding in Geneva in November 2009 of the first session of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established by the Secretary-General to study existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security, and the intention of the Group to convene three more sessions in 2010 in order to fulfil its mandate as specified in resolution 63/37 of 2 December 2008.

**Introduced by:** Russian Federation (21 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (29 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 10-13.

**First Committee.** In a general statement, **Cuba** commented that the draft resolution appropriately stressed the need to prevent the use of information technology resources, including radio and television, for criminal or terrorist purposes.

After the action, **Sweden**, speaking on behalf of the EU, expressed support for the resolution. The EU took note of the GGE that would study threats to information security. It was concerned that information technologies could be misused to adversely affect international security and the integrity of States' information-related infrastructure, in both civil and military fields. It also discussed the threat of cybersecurity, which could originate from coordinated attacks by organized criminals, non-State actors and politically motivated hackers. It emphasized the need to ensure a balance between law enforcement and fundamental human rights. It proposed that States criminalize the misuse of information technology and implement measures designed to prevent damage to critical information infrastructure, regardless of the source of the threat. In that regard, it called on all States to accede to the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe, which was open for accession to non-members of the Council.

## Relationship between disarmament and development

*A renewed focus on disarmament and non-proliferation will benefit international security and stability. It can also produce considerable dividends for peace and development. The world is enduring a deep economic and financial crisis. By accelerating disarmament, we can liberate resources that we need to combat climate change, address food insecurity and achieve the Millennium Development Goals.*<sup>49</sup>

**BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL**

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/52 of 2 December 2008,<sup>50</sup> the Secretary-General submitted a report on the relationship between disarmament and development.<sup>51</sup> The report summarized the United Nations activities related to this issue conducted in recent years. It also contained information provided by Member States to the Secretary-General on efforts to devote part of the resources made available by disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the gap between developed and developing countries.

Over the past several years, and as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council,<sup>52</sup> the United Nations has increasingly focused on the relationship between disarmament and development in the context of its broad-based approach to addressing issues related to SALW. This is similarly reflected in the Organization's emphasis on a comprehensive approach to mine action<sup>53</sup> and in the support it is providing to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.<sup>54</sup>

Member States also gave increased attention to the subject within the United Nations framework, as seen during the sessions of the Open-ended Working Group towards an Arms Trade Treaty<sup>55</sup> in which issues pertaining to development were frequently raised. Likewise, the presidential statement

---

<sup>49</sup> Secretary-General's statement to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 19 May 2009. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/sgsm12255.doc.htm>.

<sup>50</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part I): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), pp. 62-64. Available from <http://un.org/disarmament>.

<sup>51</sup> A/64/153.

<sup>52</sup> S/2008/258.

<sup>53</sup> See, for example, A/RES/62/307.

<sup>54</sup> See General Assembly resolution 63/71 (*United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part I): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), p. 134. Available from <http://un.org/disarmament>).

<sup>55</sup> The Group's mandate is derived from General Assembly resolution 63/240 (*United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part I): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), pp. 196-202. Available from <http://un.org/disarmament>).

issued after the Security Council debate on military expenditure stressed the Council's concern over rising global military expenditures.<sup>56</sup>

Similarly, in resolution 63/23 of 17 November 2008 entitled "Promoting development through the reduction and prevention of armed violence",<sup>57</sup> the General Assembly stressed the need for a coherent and integrated approach for the prevention of armed violence, with a view to achieving sustainable peace and development.

The main existing mechanisms for coordination on disarmament and development issues within the United Nations are the Mine Action Team; the Coordinating Action on Small Arms Mechanism; and the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. These mechanisms seek to ensure that the relationship between disarmament and development is covered in their respective areas through the involvement of all relevant actors from within the United Nations system.

Pursuant to resolution 63/52, the following Governments provided information to the Secretary-General in 2009: Cuba, Lebanon, Panama, Philippines and Qatar.

Cuba asserted that the global economic, social, food, energy and environmental crises underscored the increasing relevance of the relationship between general and complete disarmament and development and it reiterated its support for the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held in September 1987.

Lebanon maintained that the expenditure on armaments, particularly WMD, absorbed resources that could instead be allocated to development in its various forms.

Panama stated that under its constitution, it could not maintain an army and the Government was required to seek the permission of the executive branch to possess arms. It has also established regulations to restrict the import of arms.

The Philippines provided information on the implementation of its programme for rebel returnees in support of disarmament and arms limitation from 1987 to 1992, which was called the Social Integration Programme for Former Rebels (the Philippine version of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants).

Qatar stated that its arms expenditures represented only a small fraction of the national budget and its efforts were focused on various aspects of social advancement.

---

<sup>56</sup> S/PRST/2008/43.

<sup>57</sup> A/63/49 (Vol. 1), p. 37.

## General Assembly, 2009

### 64/32. Relationship between disarmament and development

Substantially unchanged from the previous year, the annual resolution reiterated its invitation to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (28 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 40-42.

**First Committee.** Before the action on the draft resolution, three States spoke. **Cuba** reaffirmed the importance of the draft resolution, not only to the NAM, but also to the international community as a whole. It said that it had proposed the creation of a United Nations–managed fund, in which at least half of the current military expenditures would be allocated to development assistance for countries in need. The **United States** and **France** stated that they would not participate in the action on the draft resolution.

After the action on the draft resolution, two States took the floor. The **United Kingdom** welcomed the mainstreaming of disarmament issues in development policy. It did not believe, however, that there was an automatic link between disarmament and development. The United Kingdom noted that, while it was desirable to share information about resources made available for development through the implementation of disarmament and arms control agreements, in practice, it was not possible to identify a direct relationship between different sources of funding. However, it would continue to make available information on its increasing levels of development assistance through relevant forums. **France** questioned the idea of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development, as noted in the seventh preambular paragraph. It agreed that disarmament had an impact on the conditions for development, but the converse was less certain. In that regard, France believed that it seemed reductive to have resources devoted to military spending diverted to financing development needs. It also stated that disarmament had a cost that could not be overlooked. It pointed out that defence spending could also contribute to a country's development.

## Multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/50 of 2 December 2008,<sup>58</sup> the Secretary-General invited Member States to provide information on the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. He received replies from Lebanon, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>59</sup>

Lebanon stressed the importance of increased multilateralism for advancing negotiations on disarmament and devising more comprehensive global measures. Qatar emphasized multilateralism and believed that multilateral agreements on disarmament should be concluded under the aegis of the United Nations or its specialized agencies. The United Arab Emirates enumerated the treaties and international agreements it had acceded to in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and expressed its belief in the peaceful settlement of differences between States through dialogue, negotiation and mediation and called for a zone free of WMD in the Middle East.

### General Assembly, 2009

#### 64/34. Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

Beginning in 2002, this resolution has been introduced on an annual basis. This year it again reaffirmed multilateralism as the core principle in disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations and once again called upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. It also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

**First Committee.** In a general statement, **Cuba** reaffirmed the relevance of the draft resolution, not only to the NAM, but also to the international community as a whole. The complex international situation and the need to jointly address the pressing problems affecting humankind confirm the

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (28 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 122-5-49 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 126-5-49 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see *Yearbook*, Part I, pp. 45-49.

<sup>58</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part I): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), pp. 55-59. Available from <http://un.org/disarmament>.

<sup>59</sup> See A/64/117 and Add.1.

importance of the draft resolution. It urged all delegations to support the draft resolution.

After abstaining in the vote, **Australia**, on behalf of Canada, New Zealand and itself, said that they could not agree that multilateralism was the only way to address disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations. The eighth preambular paragraph recognized the complementarity of regional, bilateral, multilateral, unilateral and other approaches, which they fully supported.

## **Gender and disarmament**

The United Nations system is taking actions across its main areas of work on peace and security, human rights, humanitarian affairs and development to assist States to prevent sexual violence, protect individuals from such violence, punish perpetrators and provide remedy to victims. Actions are diverse and include, inter alia, planning support and strategic advice, awareness-raising and advocacy, capacity development and training, legal and judicial reforms, institutional reforms, provision of services to victims, establishment of victim support centres, legal assistance, monitoring and protection, and support to regional peacekeeping forces.

In a significant development and building on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000),<sup>60</sup> the Security Council adopted resolution 1820 (2008) on 19 June 2008<sup>61</sup> in which it expressed deep concern that violence, including sexual violence against women and children in situations of armed conflict, continued to occur, and in some situations such acts had reached appalling levels of brutality. The Council expressed its readiness to adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence while calling for immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians. It also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of its resolution.

Pursuant to resolution 1820 (2008), the Secretary-General submitted a report<sup>62</sup> on 20 August, which provided information on, inter alia: situations of armed conflict in which sexual violence had been widely or systematically employed against civilians; analysis of the prevalence and trends of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict; proposals for strategies to minimize the susceptibility of women and girls to such violence; benchmarks for measuring progress in preventing and addressing sexual violence; information on the Secretary-General's plans to facilitate the collection of timely, objective, accurate and reliable information on the use of sexual violence in

---

<sup>60</sup> S/INF/56 , pp. 177-180.

<sup>61</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part II): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), pp. 289-293. Available from <http://un.org/disarmament>.

<sup>62</sup> S/2009/362.

situations of armed conflict; and information on actions taken by parties to armed conflict to implement their obligations as described in Security Council resolution 1820 (2008).

### **Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters**

The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its fifty-first session in New York from 18 to 20 February and its fifty-second session in Geneva from 1 to 3 July. Both sessions of the Board were chaired by Carolina Hernandez (Philippines) (for the list of Board members, see annex I to this chapter). On 12 August, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly summarizing the Advisory Board's deliberations and recommendations.<sup>63</sup>

As part of the improvements made to its method of work since 2008, the Board focused its deliberations during both sessions on two substantive agenda items: (a) cyberwarfare and its impact on international security; and (b) ways to strengthen the field of verification, including the role of the United Nations.

On the first agenda item, views were expressed on how the issue could be addressed effectively through preventive and possible regulatory measures at the national, regional and international levels. Preventive measures were emphasized against the use of information technology for hostile purposes. At the same time, questions were raised as to whether cyberwarfare was a disarmament, an arms control issue or a law enforcement matter. Difficulties were expressed in establishing a clear delineation between cyberwarfare and cyberattacks and between hostile and non-hostile actors in cyberspace. The question of infringement of civil liberties in efforts to prevent cyberattacks was also raised.

Recognizing the complex nature of cyberwarfare, the Board agreed that more detailed work and studies were required before the issue could be considered in the context of arms control and disarmament. In this regard, suggestions were made for a comprehensive study on the subject under the aegis of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Strong support was also expressed for the Group of Governmental Experts established by the Secretary-General which commenced its work on information security in the latter part of 2009.

The Board concluded its deliberations on cyberwarfare by recommending that the Secretary-General raise the awareness of Governments and the general public on the emerging risks and threats related to cyberwarfare, whenever possible.

---

<sup>63</sup> A/64/286.

On the second agenda item, there was in-depth exchange of views with particular emphasis on nuclear verification issues. Members stressed that multilateral verification processes should be undertaken by independent experts in accordance with internationally accepted global norms on verification. Many members concurred that multilateral verification was complex, costly and challenging to enforce while some members emphasized that verification mechanisms were worthless unless effective action could be taken against potential violators.

Several members maintained that verification mechanisms should be launched within the framework of multilateral agreements, while others stressed the relevance of bilateral agreements and the important role of regional organizations. Also noteworthy were opinions stating that, notwithstanding the difficulties of achieving a universal and absolute verification system, it would still be necessary to develop internationally accepted global norms on verification.

The Board agreed that Governments should pay more attention to the results of independent inspections and engage in a periodic review of the work done by various inspection agencies and multilateral institutions in order to chart avenues to improve the work done at that level.

The Board concluded its deliberations on strengthening the field of verification, including the role of the United Nations, by recommending that the Secretary-General encourage Member States to provide feedback on all the studies undertaken so far in the field of verification for purposes of gathering lessons learned and for a better appreciation of the limits and counterproductive nature of a “one-size-fits-all” approach in this field. The Board also concluded that, while the United Nations had a primary responsibility in the field of international peace and security, it could consider a role for regional organizations on verification matters.

With regard to the Board’s consideration at its July session of an additional item on conceptual issues leading up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the members welcomed recent developments that might impact positively on the NPT review process, including the positive outcome of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, the ongoing nuclear negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation, the call by United States President Obama for a nuclear-weapon-free world and his commitment to seek the United States Senate’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The Board identified other important elements that could help to strengthen the positive political momentum achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, such as, encouraging States to ratify the IAEA additional protocols, preferably before the 2010 Review Conference; urging NWS to adhere to the Protocols of all existing nuclear-weapon-

free-zone treaties; and paying equal attention to the three pillars of the NPT. Some members, however, expressed caution, stressing that expectations about the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference should be both realistic and practical.

The Board concluded its deliberations on conceptual issues leading up to the 2010 Review Conference by recommending that the Secretary-General continue to provide his strong support for the positive political momentum in the field of bilateral and multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through effective diplomatic channels, as well as through public statements.

It also proposed that the Secretary-General encourage States to sign the IAEA additional protocols and to adopt as many confidence-building measures as possible. In addition, the Board expressed support for the five-point plan of the Secretary-General to revitalize nuclear disarmament efforts and suggested that the Secretary-General might consider advancing an updated version of his proposals in view of new developments that had occurred since October 2008.

## **Disarmament information and outreach**

### **Disarmament studies**

The Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation and further development of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms concluded a report contained in A/64/296. The report was mandated by resolution 63/69 of 2 December 2008 and noted by resolution 64/54 of 2 December 2009. For an overview of the report, see chapter III.

Future studies include:

- Group of Governmental Experts on the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures (mandated by resolution 62/13 of 5 December 2007). For more details, see chapter III.
- Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (mandated by resolution 63/37 of 2 December 2008). For more details, see p. 196 in this chapter.

### **Disarmament and non-proliferation education**

Pursuant to resolution 63/70 of 2 December 2008, entitled “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education”,<sup>64</sup> the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report reviewing the results of the implementation of the recommendations and possible new

---

<sup>64</sup> *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Part I): 2008 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IX.1), pp. 132-133. Available from <http://un.org/disarmament>.

opportunities for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

Responses received from Member States, the United Nations and other international, regional and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are summarized below. The following cases, selected by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, are not exhaustive but are meant to serve as examples of initiatives. The relevant recommendations of the report being carried out are highlighted as side-boxes below.

### **Implementation of the recommendations by Member States**

#### *Burkina Faso*

In Burkina Faso, the introduction of civics and ethics in the education system allows for instilling in the youth the ideals of peace, with a view to building a secure world free from arms. (Recommendation 1)

#### *Japan*

Japan continued to host participants in the United Nations disarmament fellowship programme each year. Since 1983, it has invited more than 700 fellows to visit Japan, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan published material, as well as organized and sponsored exhibitions, on disarmament and non-proliferation education and the effects of atomic bombings. Japan also engaged in various activities during the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. (Recommendations 1 and 13)

#### *Mexico*

Institutions like the Secretariats of National Defense and the Navy have included issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation in their programmes of studies for chiefs and officials. That decision is a consequence of the principles of the military doctrine of Mexico of non-intervention and non-use of force, two essential bases to implement Mexico's plans of defence that do not anticipate the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as a necessary element to ensure the defence of the country. (Recommendation 1 and 13)

#### **Promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training: practical recommendations**

(excerpted selectively from A/57/124)

1. Member States are encouraged to accord importance to disarmament and non-proliferation education and training in their programmes and policies, consistent with their national legislation and practices, taking into account present and future trends. They are also encouraged to use, designate or establish public advisory bodies, where appropriate, whose responsibilities include advising on disarmament and non-proliferation education and training practices. Member States are encouraged to share their experience in disarmament and non-proliferation education and training with other Member States, international organizations, civil society and the Department for Disarmament Affairs.
2. Relevant United Nations offices and other international organizations and agencies should prepare, adapt

In civil society, the education system of Mexico has permanently included in its curriculums the position of Mexico in favour of disarmament. A few academic institutions have even participated in events to make high school and university students more conscious of the importance of promoting disarmament and non-proliferation as a valuable tool to ensure international peace and security. (Recommendation 1)

**Implementation of the recommendations by the United Nations and other international and regional organizations**

*United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)*

In September 2009, UNODA published a user-friendly educational booklet on disarmament and non-proliferation, *Disarmament: A Basic Guide*, in collaboration with the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security.<sup>65</sup> (Recommendations 2, 3 and 4)

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa continued its series of seminars on the principles of disarmament and security sector reform for parliamentarians, as well as members of military and security forces from Benin, Togo and other francophone countries in Africa. (Recommendation 7)

Additional information on other activities undertaken by UNODA in the areas of SALW and WMD, including those related to capacity-building, and by the Committee established by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), are available in separate reports that will be submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.<sup>66</sup> (Recommendation 14)

and disseminate a wider range of user-friendly educational material on disarmament and non-proliferation. The current experience in this field should be tapped and existing educational material, including educational modules, resource books, guides and online programmes, should be tailored to the needs of individual countries, specific audiences or the international community at large.

3. The United Nations and other international organizations should translate its disarmament and non-proliferation educational material and publications into all United Nations official languages and, when possible, into other languages for additional dissemination. Upon request by the United Nations or relevant international organizations, Member States, academic and research institutions and NGOs are encouraged to support or assist in translating relevant materials.

4. The United Nations and other international organizations should increase their capacities to disseminate disarmament and non-proliferation education-related materials (print and audio-visual) more widely to all regions of the world. While strengthening existing distribution channels, they should explore new ones, such as cooperation with educational networks, teachers unions and curriculum committees as well as electronic access. Member States, local academic

<sup>65</sup> It is available in both English and Spanish and electronic versions are available online at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/education/index.html>.

<sup>66</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean; report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; report of the Secretary-General on small arms; and the report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

UNODA continued to organize the United Nations disarmament fellowship programme. Both in New York and Geneva, the Office trained more than 65 graduate and undergraduate students through the United Nations internship programme. (Recommendations 19 and 24)

UNODA continued to maintain and update the “Disarmament Education, Resources for Learning” website (<http://www.un.org/disarmament/education/index.html>) featuring disarmament education materials from the United Nations, other international organizations and NGOs, including a section for use in the classroom by teachers and students. (Recommendation 25)

On 4 May, UNODA, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and the National Film Board of Canada sponsored a screening of *The Strangest Dream*, depicting the story of Joseph Rotblat and the efforts of the Pugwash Conferences, which he founded, to curb nuclear proliferation. On 20 October, UNODA, together with the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands, sponsored a screening of *The Silent Army*, a film about the hardships of child soldiers in Africa (see also p. 220). On 26 October, UNODA and Peace Boat US jointly sponsored a screening of the documentary film *Flashes of Hope: Hibakusha Travelling the World*, which featured the journey of 100 atomic bomb survivors around the world. (Recommendation 26)

#### United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI)

DPI continued its long-term collaboration with UNODA, which included a joint project on the United Nations Cyberschoolbus website (<http://cyberschoolbus.un.org/dnp>) to provide teachers and students from late middle school to early college with lesson plans and activities for the classroom.

A new book was under preparation, entitled *Action for Disarmament: 10 Things You Can Do*, which seeks to provide the youth with concrete ideas on how they can help raise awareness about

institutions, research centres and NGOs are also encouraged to assist in dissemination efforts. As it is essential to reach the local community level, channels of dissemination such as school libraries, gathering places, radio and television are highly recommended.

5. The Department of Disarmament Affairs should gather information about the involvement of regional and intergovernmental organizations in disarmament and non-proliferation education, training and data collection activities. The Department should examine ways to foster an exchange of experiences and regional perspectives to facilitate the development of disarmament and non-proliferation education programmes.

6. The Department of Disarmament Affairs should examine, accumulate and make public and easily accessible the different disarmament and non-proliferation curricula and programmes that States have developed for their formal school systems and university courses as well as for informal training.

7. UNU and UPEACE are encouraged to develop intensive postgraduate and other courses on disarmament and non-proliferation for representatives of all regions of the world, including government officials, legislators, military officers, NGOs, the media and students, working in cooperation with academic and non-governmental institutions that have expertise in designing and implementing such courses. UPEACE, in coordination with the Department of Disarmament Affairs,

disarmament and non-proliferation issues relating to nuclear weapons and small arms. The book is forthcoming in the second half of 2010.

The visual content for a new website, “Nobel Voices for Disarmament”, which will feature interviews with Nobel Laureates recognized for their work in support of disarmament, was close to completion. Website construction is due to begin in 2010. (Recommendations 2, 18 and 25)

#### *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)*

*Disarmament Forum*, the quarterly journal of UNIDIR that is considered to be its flagship publication, celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2009. The journal provides timely expert analysis on key disarmament and security topics in a manner that is widely accessible to specialists and non-specialists alike.

UNIDIR assisted the University for Peace with the development of disarmament education courses in Geneva and signed a memorandum of understanding to consolidate this cooperation. In addition, the Institute regularly briefed visiting student groups and fellowship programmes on disarmament and security themes. For example, a teaching module on disarmament law was presented in 2009 to graduate students of international humanitarian law and human rights. UNIDIR also continued to maintain the momentum of its education-related activities that were described in previous reports of the Secretary-General (A/59/178, A/61/169 and A/63/158). More detailed information about specific aspects of its educational activities can be accessed at [www.unidir.org](http://www.unidir.org). (Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 7, 19, 21 and 24)

#### *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*

IAEA publications include a quarterly journal, informative brochures, thematic reports, articles and opinion pieces written by the Director General and other IAEA staff. Overall, a large number of publications and newsletters were issued in print and electronic formats in 2009, several of which

may wish to host seminars and workshops as well as to develop model university and school material.

8. Member States are encouraged to include parliamentarians and/or non-governmental advisers in delegations to United Nations disarmament-related meetings, taking into account national legislation and practices.

9. The Department of Disarmament Affairs and its regional centres, in cooperation with UNIDIR, UNU and UPEACE, are encouraged to establish a virtual library of reports of “lessons learned” on disarmament-related aspects of peace operations and make it available to both Governments and NGOs on a disarmament and non-proliferation online education resource site (see recommendation 25).

12. Religious leaders and institutions are encouraged to develop educational material promoting a culture of peace and disarmament.

13. Member States, in cooperation with the United Nations and relevant international organizations, are encouraged to sponsor training, fellowships, and awareness programmes, on as wide a geographical basis as possible, for researchers, engineers, scientists and other academics in areas of particular relevance, but not limited to treaties and agreements on weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. They are also encouraged to give special emphasis to training customs, licensing and law enforcement officers for the purpose of fulfilling international obligations of Member States in the disarmament and non-proliferation fields.

relate to nuclear non-proliferation and verification. More information is available from [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org). (Recommendation 4)

*Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)*

In 2009, the annual global meeting of OPCW National Authorities focused its theme on sharing experiences in the national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention by National Authorities. As part of its outreach programme, the Technical Secretariat of OPCW regularly hosted group visits to its headquarters by university students, diplomats and officials. In 2009, OPCW received nearly 50 such visitations totalling more than 1,000 visitors. (Recommendations 8 and 13)

*Organization of American States (OAS)*

OAS invited the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), through the Inter-American Defense College, to organize a seminar on disarmament and non-proliferation for its students and also for the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the Permanent Council of OAS. Its purpose was to examine, collect, and make publicly available the curricula and programmes on disarmament and non-proliferation that States or international organizations have prepared for school systems and university courses. (Recommendations 2 and 4)

*Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)*

The CTBTO Preparatory Commission focused on its website, as well as new media and social networking tools, such as Facebook, Twitter, Flickr and YouTube. It also continued its active outreach work with the media. An increasing emphasis was also placed on capacity-building efforts through restructured and consolidated training activities, as well as distance and Web-based learning opportunities. (Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 17 and 24)

14. The Department of Disarmament Affairs, in cooperation with UNU and UPEACE, should be encouraged to organize a programme of training for educators and trainers in disarmament and non-proliferation. These programmes may be implemented cooperatively with international organizations such as IAEA, OPCW and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

17. The United Nations, relevant international organizations, Member States, NGOs and research institutes should develop and strengthen programmes, workshops, fellowships and materials on disarmament and non-proliferation topics for journalists and media representatives in order to enhance their knowledge of these issues. Special attention should be paid to the development of programmes and materials designed for local media in post-conflict situations, as essential partners in the disarmament and non-proliferation education process.

18. Disarmament and non-proliferation educational materials developed by the United Nations, such as the Cyberschoolbus web site, should include complementary material on how parents can encourage attitudes of peace and non-violence. Efforts should also be made by educators, parents and the business community to devise and produce toys, computer games and videos that engender such attitudes.

19. Additional fellowships and scholarships should be provided for various target audiences by or through the Department of Disarmament Affairs (di-

### *United Nations University (UNU)*

In 2009, the UNU published two books: *The United Nations and Nuclear Orders* and *Sexed Pistols: The Gendered Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons*. From 3 to 10 August, UNU participated in the International Network of Universities (INU) Master's Summer School on Global Citizenship and in the INU Student Seminar entitled "Migration, Refugees, and Peace" held in Hiroshima. It also presented papers at the 21st United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, which was held in Saitama, Japan, from 26 to 28 August. The theme of the Conference was "From Niigata to the World: Renewed Determination and Action toward a Nuclear Weapon-Free World". (Recommendations 2, 3, 5 and 22)

### **Implementation of the recommendations by civil society and non-governmental organizations**

#### *Ban All Nukes Generation (BANg)*

In May, BANg organized an event during the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference in which 30 university students from Germany simulated negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention. BANg also collected and disseminated educational materials and methods to promote disarmament and non-proliferation (available from <http://bang-europe.org/resources.html#education>). (Recommendations 4 and 23)

#### *Campaign on Nuclear Disarmament (CND)*

CND developed disarmament-related cross-curricula materials for use in science, English, humanities, citizenship, religious education, math and art classes (available from [www.cnduk.org/education](http://www.cnduk.org/education)). (Recommendations 2 and 23)

#### *Daisy Alliance*

Daisy Alliance sponsored an annual student scholarship and essay contest on relevant non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control topics. Participants were from high schools, colleges and graduate schools from across the globe. It also

rectly or through its regional centres), UPEACE, UNIDIR and the NGO Committee on Disarmament, among others. An important educational supplement to disarmament and non-proliferation classroom training should be on-the-job training, which may be conducted at the sites of international organizations, national governmental agencies, NGOs and research centres. Opportunities for such on-the-job training should be expanded.

21. Organizations of the United Nations system and other relevant international organizations are encouraged to promote and provide financial support for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training using such techniques as distance learning, the Internet, and videoconferencing as well as cost-efficient and cost-effective media such as CD-ROMs.

22. Regional organizations, academic institutions and NGOs are encouraged to develop and disseminate material online in languages other than English.

23. Educators should consider a full range of pedagogical methods for inclusion in any educational material. In addition to computer-based learning, model United Nations programmes, other role-playing and simulation games, videos, film, dance, song, theatre, puppetry, poetry, photography, origami, visual art and creative writing, to name a few, are all useful methods. Special emphasis should be given to participatory learning approaches that can be applied to a wide variety of disarmament and non-proliferation problems and audiences.

published a monthly online newsletter to provide timely coverage on disarmament-related issues. (Recommendations 4 and 19)

#### *Ehime University*

Ehime University continued its programme for fieldwork on peace and nuclear disarmament for second-year students. It also organized a Hiroshima fieldwork tour to enhance the interest of its students in disarmament affairs. (Recommendations 4 and 23)

#### *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)*

IPPNW leaders visited the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to conduct seminars on the nuclear threat and to have informal discussions with physicians in those countries (disarmament and non-proliferation education-related materials available from [www.ippnw.org](http://www.ippnw.org)). (Recommendations 2, 4 and 23)

#### *James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies*

Students earned their certificate in non-proliferation studies from the James Martin Center and visiting fellows received instruction through a fellowship programme designed to assist young and mid-career professionals on non-proliferation issues. The Center also organized workshops to provide an informal forum for national delegations to discuss proliferation issues and promote a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010.<sup>67</sup> During the fall semester, over 20 graduate students negotiated their own follow-on Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, in tandem with the actual negotiations on a new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, which were taking place in Geneva.<sup>68</sup> (Recommendations 6, 7 and 23)

24. Internships in United Nations organizations with special competence in disarmament and non-proliferation are a valuable tool for educating graduate and undergraduate students and should be continued and expanded.

25. The Department for Disarmament Affairs should develop a disarmament and non-proliferation online education resource site in the six official United Nations languages. This site should be based on:

(a) Links to existing resources of United Nations and other relevant international organizations, Member States, universities, research institutes and NGOs having web sites on disarmament and non-proliferation and with education-oriented online programmes;

(b) Existing web pages of the Department for Disarmament Affairs on the United Nations web site;

(c) Recommendations by the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters;

(d) Recommendations of the inter-agency group on disarmament and non-proliferation education and training.

The Department for Disarmament Affairs should develop the online educational resource site in cooperation with interested research institutes, IT companies, NGOs and/or regional centres for information technology. It should

<sup>67</sup> For more information, see [http://cns.miis.edu/treaty\\_npt/workshop\\_100312\\_pr.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/treaty_npt/workshop_100312_pr.htm) and [http://cns.miis.edu/treaty\\_npt/pdfs/090414\\_final\\_annex\\_2009\\_report.pdf](http://cns.miis.edu/treaty_npt/pdfs/090414_final_annex_2009_report.pdf).

<sup>68</sup> For more information, see [http://cns.miis.edu/activities/091208\\_smart\\_treaty/index.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/activities/091208_smart_treaty/index.htm).

### *Nuclear Age Peace Foundation*

A strong message with 220,000 signatures was submitted to President Obama to encourage his leadership for a nuclear-weapon-free world and over 53,000 messages advocating nuclear disarmament were sent to key decision makers. The Foundation also held video and poetry contests on nuclear disarmament and peace.<sup>69</sup> (Recommendations 4, 19 and 23)

have chat rooms and testing tools and be user-friendly.

26. The Department of Public Information and relevant international organizations, in coordination with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and, when appropriate, NGOs, are encouraged to produce video programmes to promote disarmament and non-proliferation to the widest possible audience.

### *Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND)*

PNND members participated in and organized a number of educational forums at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They were also active in initiatives to support and strengthen existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and explore possibilities for establishing additional NWFZs. (Recommendations 4 and 8)

### *Peace Boat*

Peace Boat co-organized two events in Latin America: “Article 9 and Article 12 Conference: Peace Constitutions for Global Disarmament”<sup>70</sup> held in Costa Rica in July; and “International Peace Constitutions Conference for Nuclear and Foreign Military Base Abolition” held in Ecuador in November. Both events focused on Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution and its importance for disarmament, as well as the peace constitutions of several Latin American countries, notably those of Costa Rica and Ecuador. (Recommendations 2, 4, 8 and 23)

### *Peace Foundation*

In October 2009, the Peace Foundation helped organize a global competition for students and a two-day global youth videoconference on nuclear disarmament. It also launched “Peace Heritage Walks” in Auckland and Wellington, New Zealand, for schoolchildren, tourists and residents. (Recommendations 2, 19 and 23)

---

<sup>69</sup> For more information, see [www.wagingpeace.org](http://www.wagingpeace.org).

<sup>70</sup> Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits an act of war by the State. Article 12 of the Costa Rican Constitution abolished its military.

*Physicians for Global Survival*

Physicians for Global Survival co-sponsored a public forum, “Zero Nuclear Weapons”, from 13 to 14 November (video recording available from <http://www.zeronuclearweapons.com/>). (Recommendation 4)

*Project Ploughshares*

Project Ploughshares Calgary held a number of events covering a broad range of disarmament issues, including a book launch and film showings, in order to promote disarmament. (Recommendations 4, 12 and 23)

*Religions for Peace*

In November, the Religions for Peace Global Youth Network launched a year-long disarmament campaign called “Arms Down!” in Costa Rica, attended by over 120 young religious leaders. The event emphasized skill-building and learning opportunities with the assistance of experts. (Recommendations 3, 4 and 12)

*Russian Center for Policy Studies (PIR Center)*

The PIR Center organized an International Summer School on Global Security on non-proliferation and disarmament issues, attended by participants from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine, as well as other governmental organizations of the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan. (Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 22 and 23)

*Saskatoon Peace Coalition*

Saskatoon Peace Coalition of Canada sponsored “Musicians for Peace” to commemorate the International Peace Day in which local musicians staged concerts to promote world peace (see also [www.saskatoonpeace.wordpress.com](http://www.saskatoonpeace.wordpress.com)). (Recommendations 4 and 23)

*Soka Gakkai International (SGI)*

The People’s Decade, a grassroots educational initiative supported by the SGI, engaged in various education-related projects to promote nuclear disarmament (see also [www.peoplesdecade.org](http://www.peoplesdecade.org)). (Recommendations 2, 4, 12 and 23)

*Toronto Hiroshima Day Coalition*

The Toronto Hiroshima Day Coalition held its annual commemoration of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in front of the Peace Garden at Toronto City Hall in August 2009 (see also [www.hiroshimadaycoalition.ca](http://www.hiroshimadaycoalition.ca)). (Recommendations 4 and 23)

*Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)*

WILPF, through its project Reaching Critical Will, published a number of disarmament resources, guides and fact sheets online and in print, and helped facilitate youth conferences on disarmament in the United States. (Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 22 and 26)

**62nd Annual Conference for Non-Governmental Organizations:  
"For Peace and Development: Disarm Now"**

The United Nations held its 62nd Annual Conference for Non-Governmental Organizations entitled "For Peace and Development: Disarm Now" from 9 to 11 September in Mexico City. This was the second time in its 62-year history that the Conference was held outside the United Nations Headquarters.

Jointly organized by the Executive Committee of Non-Governmental Organizations Associated with the United Nations Department of Public Information (NGO/DPI Executive Committee), the Government of Mexico, and UNODA, the Conference focused on effective ways by which civil society could contribute to the advancement of disarmament, peace and development at the international, regional, national and local levels. It also aimed to generate greater global awareness of disarmament issues and stronger commitments to address those issues among diverse stakeholders worldwide. A host of activities and events involving the youth on contemporary issues in the interrelated fields of disarmament, development and peace were an integral part of the Conference.

Attended by over 1,300 representatives from NGOs and experts from 55 countries, the three-day Conference was opened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In his opening address,<sup>71</sup> the Secretary-General asserted that "there can be no development without peace and no peace without development". He welcomed the positive developments that had taken place between the United States and the Russian Federation on strategic arms issues, which had helped to bring disarmament back on the global agenda. He believed that ridding the world of nuclear weapons was not an unrealistic goal and exhorted civil society groups in particular to continue to speak out against these WMD. The Secretary-General applauded civil society groups for their passionate grassroots campaigns, which had infused the nuclear disarmament movement with the "power of the people" that he believed offered the prospect for real change.

He also drew attention to the emerging dangers from other weapons, such as missiles, space weapons and conventional arms, emphasizing that progress was needed in these areas in support of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

---

<sup>71</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm12445.doc.htm>.

The Conference concluded by adopting a declaration entitled “Disarming for Peace and Development” (see annex I for text), which called for strict government regulations over the sale, trade, possession and use of small arms, and also for an effective arms trade treaty covering all types of conventional weapons. According to civil society groups, the declaration had a simple purpose: to save lives and reduce injuries, and in the case of nuclear weapons, to prevent the destruction of civilization.

### **Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services, 2009**

During the year, UNODA continued to provide training for young diplomats, especially those from developing countries, through the United Nations fellowship, training and advisory services programme,<sup>72</sup> with fellowships awarded to diplomats from 24 Member States.<sup>73</sup>

The Programme was structured in three segments: a study session in Geneva; study visits to both intergovernmental organizations working in the field of disarmament and to certain Member States; and a study session at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

The Programme commenced on 24 August in Geneva and concluded on 22 October in New York. Lectures were given by heads of delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and to the General Assembly First Committee, heads of various arms control and disarmament conferences and meetings, and United Nations officials, including senior UNODA officials. The fellows also attended meetings of the Conference on Disarmament and the First Committee.

During the first phase of the programme, the Government of Switzerland invited the fellows to visit Bern for a briefing by the Swiss authorities on various disarmament and security-related issues. The fellows also conducted research projects and prepared papers on disarmament-related topics of their own choice, as well as on disarmament issues on the agenda of the General Assembly.

The fellows visited disarmament-related agencies in Vienna, including the IAEA and the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO as well as the OPCW in The Hague. The Government of Germany hosted the fellows in Berlin, where they attended briefings and round-table discussions with senior

---

<sup>72</sup> The Programme started in 1979 as a follow-up to a decision of the General Assembly adopted at its tenth special session in 1978 (see S-10/2, para. 108).

<sup>73</sup> Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Chile, Egypt, Honduras, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Sudan, Switzerland, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

officials and experts of the Department of Disarmament and Arms Control of the Federal Foreign Office. The fellows also visited the Nammo Buck GmbH conversion plant.<sup>74</sup>

At the invitation of the Government of China, the fellows visited Beijing, where they attended briefings and round-table discussions with senior officials and experts of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, as well as scholars of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association. The fellows also visited the facilities of the China Institute of Atomic Energy.

The Government of Japan also invited them to visit Tokyo, Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In Tokyo, the fellows were briefed by senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Japan's arms control and disarmament policies. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they visited memorial museums at the atomic bomb ground zeroes, met with survivors and heard lectures on social and medical legacies of atomic bombing.

At the conclusion of the Programme on 22 October, the First Committee's Chairperson and the Secretary-General's High Representative for Disarmament Affairs awarded the fellows certificates at a ceremony held in New York at the United Nations Headquarters.

## **United Nations Disarmament Information Programme**

The objectives of the Disarmament Information Programme reflect the overall orientation of UNODA, guided by the priorities of Member States as enunciated in the resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly.

The Programme is administered by UNODA, in close collaboration with the Department of Public Information for information campaigns of major disarmament-related events and conferences.

### **Print and e-publications**

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* remains the flagship publication of UNODA. Over 4,000 copies of the English version of the *Yearbook* are printed and distributed worldwide to United Nations libraries, including its depositary library system, United Nations information centres, permanent missions in New York and Geneva, the offices of the regional commissions and parliamentary libraries. It is sold in United Nations bookshops to subscribers and non-subscribers. Additional copies are distributed to all delegations participating in the work of the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament. The *Yearbook* is also distributed to

---

<sup>74</sup> The plant is the site for ammunition disposal run by the Nammo Group. Since 1991, a large amount of missiles, rockets ammunition, mines, hand grenades, detonators and pyrotechnical material have been dismantled, detoxified, demilitarized, disposed of or recycled on the premises.

approximately 1,300 research institutes, organizations and individuals, mainly in the developing world.

In addition, the *Yearbook* is produced in electronic format, which is easily accessible at the UNODA website. The *e-Yearbook* is in a PDF format and features full-text search, index search and a bookmark navigation panel.

The UNODA Occasional Papers series was developed to give wider dissemination to the expert inputs from panels and seminars sponsored by UNODA. The publication is disseminated free of charge and posted on the UNODA website. The following Occasional Papers were issued in 2009:

- UNODA Occasional Paper No. 14, entitled *Conflict of Interests: Children and Guns in Zones of Instability*, was based on a 15 July 2008 panel discussion organized by UNODA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, in collaboration with the International Action Network on Small Arms and the Government of Belgium.
- UNODA Occasional Paper No. 15, entitled *Developing a Biological Incident Database*, was based on a 23 October 2008 panel discussion organized by UNODA in cooperation with the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security.
- UNODA Occasional Paper No. 16, entitled *Assessing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms*, was an exception to the normal UNODA Occasional Papers series. It was a specific contribution prepared by UNODA for the 2009 Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and was also intended for those concerned with these matters in Government, civil society and academia.
- UNODA Occasional Paper No. 17, entitled *Promoting the Universality of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons* was a product of a joint UNODA/EU project related to the holding of six regional seminars during 2008.

In 2009, UNODA also published a booklet entitled *Disarmament: A Basic Guide* in collaboration with the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. Pursuant to the purposes of the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, this guide seeks to inform, educate and generate public understanding of the importance of multilateral action in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, as well as encourage support for such action. While intended for the general reader, it may also be useful for the disarmament educator or trainer. It is available in both English and Spanish, and electronic versions are available online.

Meanwhile, UNODA continued the production of its quarterly e-publication, *UNODA Update*, which is aimed at the interested public and

highlights recent events and activities of UNODA and other disarmament forums, linking the reader to fuller material and documents available online.

See also annex III to this chapter for a list of publications of UNODA and its regional centres.

## **Website**

UNODA continued to maintain and improve both the substantive content and technical delivery of its website ([www.un.org/disarmament](http://www.un.org/disarmament)). The overall design of the website remains oriented towards specific issues, with the priorities of the Office determining its core content. Its front page provides the latest disarmament-related press releases, statements of the Secretary-General and other senior United Nations officials, as well as publications, information on current and upcoming events, relevant background documentation and links to significant United Nations partners. Its substantive pages provide background information on the topic being explored and contain a wealth of information on recent and past major disarmament-related conferences. Documentation relating to these conferences that exists in all official United Nations languages is posted on the website.

The top users of the website, in terms of the time spent on the site, were Government agencies (mainly Ministries of Foreign Affairs), educational institutions and NGOs. The two most visited sections of the site were: (a) the database of General Assembly resolutions and decisions; and (b) the database of the status and texts of disarmament-related treaties.

## **Exhibitions**

Public exhibitions play an important role in promoting advocacy and providing information on United Nations priority issues, reaching a large number of visitors to United Nations Headquarters. In 2009, an exhibition entitled “Against Nuclear Arms”, jointly sponsored by Japan and Kazakhstan, was organized in the public area of the United Nations complex.

In addition, the permanent disarmament exhibition on the United Nations guided tour route in the General Assembly building continued to attract scores of visitors. The Secretary-General’s “WMD-We Must Disarm” campaign was incorporated in the exhibition gallery in 2009, and visitors were encouraged to participate by writing statements on “Why we must disarm” on a huge paper scroll in the gallery (for more information, see pp. 4-5 in chap. I and <http://www.un.org/en/events/peaceday/2009/>). A new exhibit showing child victims of anti-personnel landmines was added to the public gallery.

### **Conferences, panel discussions and other information activities**

UNODA was involved in a number of activities in 2009 pursuant to the purposes of the Disarmament Information Programme through conferences, panel discussions and other information activities.

The 21st United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues took place in Niigata, Japan, in August. The Conference covered topics ranging from the Korean Peninsula denuclearization, the outlook for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and the role of media and civil society in the field of disarmament. The gathering urged all nations to take major steps towards creating a world without nuclear weapons and to identify ways to translate the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world into concrete actions (see also p. 159).

The 8th United Nations–Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues took place in Jeju Island, Republic of Korea, in November. With the overall theme of “Prospects for a New Era of Progress on Disarmament and Non-proliferation”, the conference addressed several critical issues, such as actions towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, challenges and possible solutions to nuclear non-proliferation, promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and non-proliferation challenges in North-East Asia (see also p. 159).

The 2009 session of the United Nations First Committee witnessed a large number of side events organized separately and jointly by Permanent Missions to the United Nations, NGOs, think tanks, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and UNODA. The side events included the launch of the UNODA Occasional Paper No. 17 entitled *Promoting the Universality of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons*, which was a joint UNODA-EU project. Other events included a movie screening of *The Silent Army*, followed by a panel discussion on child soldiers and small arms. The event was organized by UNODA and the United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict. (See also p. 208 and annex V to this chapter.)

Youth have been a focus of outreach activities by UNODA. On 9 June, an event was held at the United Nations Headquarters entitled “Disarm the World with Knowledge”, which was organized by the Co-chair of the DPI/NGO Youth Subcommittee, Mary E. Norton. The co-sponsors of the event included the NGO/DPI Executive Committee, the United Nations University and UNODA. Young professionals, students and faculty members from fourteen academic institutions attended, while other students from around the world were able to participate through a live webcast.

A similar seminar for the youth in Latin America and the Caribbean was held in Mexico City on 23 June. It was organized by the United Nations Information Centre at Mexico City with the DPI/NGO Youth Subcommittee. More than 100 students from various universities from Mexico City

participated, as well as officials from the Mexican Foreign Ministry. Students from different cities of Mexico and other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean were also able to take part through a webcast of the seminar.

### **Secretary-General's Messenger of Peace**

In 2009, the Messengers of Peace Michael Douglas and Jane Goodall made a number of contributions on disarmament-related issues through their participation in panel discussions and public information campaigns, including the use of social networking. Michael Douglas joined the Secretary-General in promoting the “WMD-We Must Disarm” campaign and in posting 100 reasons to disarm nuclear weapons on the microblogging site, Twitter (for more information, see p. 4 in chap. I and <http://www.un.org/en/events/peaceday/2009/>). In addition, he was a panellist at the “Voices of Experience” event,<sup>75</sup> held in New York on 7 May, conducted on the margins of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. He also made a presentation at the meeting, held at the United Nations Headquarters on 24 September, to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Jane Goodall participated in the observance of the 2009 International Day of Peace at the United Nations Headquarters, attending the traditional Peace Bell ceremony and taking part in the student observance on disarmament.

### **United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research**

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is an autonomous body within the framework of the United Nations that promotes the peacebuilding process by contributing its forward-looking analyses of disarmament and security issues. Through its research projects, publications, conferences and networks of experts, the Institute encourages creative thinking and promotes dialogue between decision makers, researchers, practitioners, Member States and United Nations agencies on current and emerging security challenges.

The Institute's key activities in 2009 included: continued work on outer space security; outreach on entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; analysis of the effectiveness of aid and assistance in the area of small arms; and examination of United Nations–EU cooperation in

---

<sup>75</sup> A panel event on the United Nations and nuclear disarmament, co-sponsored by UNODA and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Other speakers were Sergio Duarte (United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs), as well as former Under-Secretary-Generals for Disarmament Affairs Nobuyasu Abe and Jayantha Dhanapala.

peacebuilding.<sup>76</sup> A selection of three projects that contributed to ongoing discussions and processes on disarmament and security issues are briefly described here.<sup>77</sup>

First, between February 2009 and May 2010, UNIDIR commenced implementation of an EU-sponsored project on an arms trade treaty (ATT). Based on an EU Council decision entitled “On support for EU activities in order to promote among third countries the process leading towards an Arms Trade Treaty, in the framework of the European Security Strategy” (2009/42/CFSP), the project consisted of six regional seminars, together with other activities, to promote discussions on the proposed ATT. At the seminars, participants discussed the nature of the proposed ATT, its possible scope, content and implications, the ongoing United Nations process on the subject, and region-specific themes.

Second, UNIDIR engaged in a detailed study on the political and legal aspects of various proposals for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. The main goals of the three-year project are to: (a) clarify the different implications of the existing proposals on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle; (b) ensure awareness, particularly among policymakers and the diplomatic community, and consideration by the international community of the proposals developed; and (c) stimulate discussion in the wider international community, including governmental experts, NGOs and academia. Activities related to the project, which was in its second year in 2009, focused on the need to build trust between potential supplier and client States.

Third, the Institute pursued a project entitled “The Road from Oslo: Analysis of Negotiations to Address the Humanitarian Effects of Cluster Munitions”, which was launched in March 2008. The 18-month project examined the emergence and conduct of international efforts to address the humanitarian impacts of cluster munitions. It documented the Oslo Process and other related work, including the relevant CCW process, and developed lessons learned that were relevant to multilateral practitioners. The main project output was the publication of an analytical history of the Oslo Process entitled “Unacceptable Harm: A History of How the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions was Won”. The completion of this project, which followed in part from an earlier one on “Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: Making Multilateral Negotiations Work”, has led in part to a new UNIDIR project, “Discourse on Explosive Weapons”. The new project will address the stigmatization of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

---

<sup>76</sup> A full account of UNIDIR activities and its proposed programme of work can be found in the annual report of the Director. See A/64/261 of 6 August 2009 for activities from August 2008 to July 2009 and the 2009-2010 programme of work.

<sup>77</sup> Visit [www.unidir.org](http://www.unidir.org) for full access to books and reports, project descriptions and materials, as well as the quarterly journal *Disarmament Forum*, audio files of UNIDIR events and other resources.

During the year, the Institute also adopted a new structure for its programme of work. The activities of the Institute are now categorized into the following themes: (a) weapons of mass destruction; (b) weapons of societal disruption; (c) security and society; (d) emerging threats; and (e) improving processes and creating synergies.

As part of its institution-building work, UNIDIR also developed a resource mobilization strategy that takes into account the challenging realities facing organizations that are dependent on voluntary funding in a prevailing uncertain financial climate. The purpose of this strategy is to broaden and deepen the Institute's financial support base.

For a list of UNIDIR publications, please see annex IV.

### **General Assembly, 2009**

#### **64/512. Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification**

Last introduced in 2007 as a resolution, this procedural decision includes in the provisional agenda of its sixty-sixth session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification".

**Submitted by:** Canada (1 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, p. 191.

#### **64/513. Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security**

By the terms of the decision, the General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-sixth session the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security".

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (28 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, p. 192.

### **64/514. Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament**

By the terms of this decision, which was last introduced in 2008, the General Assembly decided again to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth session the item entitled “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament”.

**Introduced by:** India (21 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, p. 193.

### **64/515. Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament**

Last introduced in 2008, by the terms of this procedural decision, the General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth session the item entitled “Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament”.

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (28 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see *Yearbook*, Part I, p. 194.

*First Committee.* In a general statement, **Cuba** said that it fully supported the draft decision and emphasized the need for the Assembly to review the matter and to establish a preparatory commission. It hoped the draft would be adopted by consensus.

## **Annex I**

### **NGO Declaration: Disarming for Peace and Development<sup>a</sup>**

#### **Sixty-second Annual United Nations DPI/NGO Conference**

We, the 1,300 participants representing over 340 Non-Governmental Organizations from more than 55 countries,

#### **Introduction**

*Determined*, as eloquently expressed in the Charter of the United Nations, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to promote social progress and better standards of life;

*Alarmed* that 1,000 people per day are killed by small arms and 3,000 more are seriously injured;

---

<sup>a</sup> S/2009/477, annex.

*Inspired* by the Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for the twenty-first Century (see A/54/98, annex), a 50-point proposal for getting from a culture of violence to a culture of peace, and committed to the abolition of war;

*Guided* by the Secretary-General's five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament of 24 October 2008;

*Committed* to promoting respect for cultural, religious and ethnic diversity as key to reaching peace and security;

*Recognizing* that security, peace, disarmament, human rights, gender equality and development are closely interconnected at the local national, regional and global levels;

*Recognizing* that progress in all these fields is essential for attaining the Millennium Development Goals, which also links this year's meeting to recent DPI/NGO meetings on climate change and human rights;

*Having met* at the sixty-second Annual United Nations DPI/NGO Conference in Mexico City from 9 to 11 September 2009;

*Urge* the following actions:

**To Governments and international organizations:**

***Nuclear disarmament***

1. At the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, reaffirm and strengthen commitments to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and concurrently to prevent their spread.
2. Promptly commence negotiations on a convention prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons globally within an agreed, time-bound framework.
3. Obtain the necessary signatures and ratifications to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force without further delay and without conditions.
4. Complete negotiations on a treaty that bans production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, brings all weapons-usable materials under safeguards, and fosters reduction of existing stocks.
5. Consolidate existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, promote cooperation between members of such zones, and create new zones, with the goal of achieving, in the near future, a global nuclear-weapon-free zone.
6. At the Security Council Summit on 24 September 2009, decide to propose plans for disarmament as provided by the Charter of the United Nations, and to reform the Council to make it more representative and accountable and therefore more capable of responding to violations of disarmament and non proliferation obligations.

7. Declare October 27 as the annual International Day for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons.
8. Request the International Court of Justice to issue a new Advisory Opinion on the requirements for action following from the NPT Article VI obligation of “good faith” negotiation of nuclear disarmament.
9. Join and support the new International Renewable Energy Agency and make energy investment choices that phase out nuclear power and fossil fuels in favour of environmentally sustainable energy sources.

***Small arms and other conventional disarmament***

10. Regulate and restrict the military and law enforcement use and trade in arms, especially small arms.
11. Prevent the proliferation of small arms in the civilian population through strict government licensing, registration and regulation of the sale, possession and use of such arms.
12. Support a strong and effective arms trade treaty to regulate the global international trade in conventional arms. This treaty must apply to all types of conventional arms and all types of international transfers. An effective treaty must also prohibit international arms transfers where there is a significant risk that the transfer would violate international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
13. Implement the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community Region and the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and strengthen the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.
14. Harmonize laws on domestic violence with laws for the prevention of violence committed with small arms.
15. Achieve universal adherence to and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
16. Establish a ban on the use of explosive force in populated areas.
17. Undertake disarmament of major conventional arms (tanks, artillery, aircraft, etc.) in accordance with the longstanding United Nations objective of general and complete disarmament.

***General***

18. Redirect arms expenditure towards more productive and socially responsible alternatives that could help to diminish the world’s rich-poor divide and in turn increase security.
19. Convene a fourth Special Session on Disarmament.

20. Declare the International Decade for Disarmament, 2010-2020.
21. Commence negotiations on a treaty to prevent the deployment or use of any weapon in space.
22. Establish a world space launch organization, which makes launch capabilities available to all States.
23. Commence negotiations on a global treaty on missiles and anti-missile systems.
24. Establish a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and achieve universal adherence to and implementation of the BWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
25. Establish a world agency for technology assessment relating to disarmament and development.
26. Responding to the global economic crisis, give special consideration to increasing employment, and to vulnerable groups, such as youth, women, children and indigenous people.
27. Promote the development of a high-level goal on preventing and reducing armed violence towards 2015, which will offer the opportunity to integrate security-related themes into the possible follow-up of the Millennium Development Goals.
28. Fully implement Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and in particular ensure representation of women at all levels of decision-making on conflict prevention, management and resolution.
29. Fully implement Security Council resolution 1820 (2008) to prevent sexual violence in armed conflict.

**To the United Nations system, via the Secretary-General:**

1. Transform the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms into a true global observatory linking civil society organizations and United Nations agencies, to monitor and report all trade and use of weapons.
2. Encourage greater participation of civil society from developing and least developed countries in United Nations peace and disarmament forums, so that their local and regional perspectives are included within the discussions.
3. Involve new partners from strategic global networks as key elements to promote peace education, violence prevention, conflict resolution and development.

**To NGOs and civil society:**

1. Join and develop international NGO networks to promote peace, security, disarmament and development and support cross-sectoral forums building on this conference.
2. Strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations in the global South, through partnerships, information exchange and fund-raising.
3. Focus research on the impacts on development of armed insecurity, and develop best practices in disarmament.
4. Promote education for peace, conflict resolution, human rights (civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental) and gender equality as essential to a just peace and improved human security.

**In conclusion:**

The purpose of this declaration is simple. Its aim is to save lives and to reduce injuries, and in the case of nuclear weapons, to prevent the destruction of civilization. The benefits of peace and security far outweigh whatever short-term economic benefits the trade in arms may promise.

We request all peoples, organizations and Governments to recognize and promote the efforts of the many thousands of NGOs and civil society organizations around the world which promote peace and disarmament at the community level and are the roots of our international movements.

We thank the people and the Government of Mexico for their warm and friendly welcome at this, our first such meeting in Latin America.

**Annex II**  
**Members of the Advisory Board**  
**on Disarmament Matters, 2009**

Carolina Hernandez (Chair), Founding President and Chair, Board of Directors, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Manila

Nobuyasu Abe, Director, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo

Anatoly I. Antonov, Director, Department for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Director for Programme Research, Habibie Centre, Research Professor and Deputy Chairperson for Social Sciences and Humanities of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta

Desmond Bowen, Former Director of Policy in the Ministry of Defence, London

Philippe Carré, Ambassador of France to Austria, French Embassy in Vienna

- Jingye Cheng, Director-General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Beijing
- Kate Dewes, Co-Coordinator of the Disarmament and Security Centre of the New Zealand Peace Foundation, Christchurch, New Zealand
- Monica Herz, President, Brazilian Association of International Relations, Professor, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
- Donald A. Mahley, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls, and Negotiations, Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C.
- H.M.G.S. Palihakkara, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, New York
- Olga Pellicer, Department of International Studies, Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico, Mexico City
- François Rivasseau, Deputy Chief of Mission of France in the United States, French Embassy, Washington, D.C.
- Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Special Envoy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw
- Cheikh Sylla, Ambassador of Senegal to Germany, Embassy of Senegal, Berlin
- Carlo Trezza, Special Envoy of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, General Directorate for Multilateral Political Affairs and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
- Theresa Hitchens (ex-officio member), Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva

### **Annex III**

#### **Publications and other materials on disarmament in 2009**

##### **United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs<sup>b</sup>**

- United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 33 (Parts I and II): 2008. New York: United Nations, 2009 (Sales No. E.09.IX.1).
- Conflict of Interests: Children and Guns in Zones of Instability*. UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 14. New York: United Nations, 2009 (Sales No. E.09.IX.2).

---

<sup>b</sup> For a full list of publications and to access online versions, see <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/index.shtml>.

*Developing a Biological Incident Database.* UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 15. New York: United Nations, 2009 (Sales No. E.09.IX.3).

*Assessing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.* UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 16. New York: United Nations, 2009 (Sales No. E.09.IX.4).

*Promoting the Universality of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.* UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 17. New York: United Nations, 2009 (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish).

*Disarmament: A Basic Guide.* New York: United Nations, 2009 (English and Spanish).

*UNODA Update* (Quarterly e-Newsletter)

- No. 1 February
- No. 2 June
- No. 3 August
- No. 4 November

### **Forthcoming**

*United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 34 (Parts I and II): 2009. New York: United Nations, 2010 (Sales No. E.10.IX.1).

*Ways to Strengthen the Field of Verification.* UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 18. New York: United Nations, 2010 (Sales No. E.10.IX.2).

*Cyberwarfare and its Impact on International Security.* UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 19. New York: United Nations, 2010 (Sales No. E.10.IX.4).

### **Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa**

“Rapport sur les activités de réforme du secteur de la sécurité au Togo/Report on Security Sector Reform Activities in Togo”, Lomé, Togo, 2009.

“UNREC Leaflet” and “Dépliant UNREC”, November 2009. Available from <http://www.unrec.org/focus/leafletfrench.pdf> and <http://www.unrec.org/focus/leafletenglish.pdf>.

*UNREC Focus* (a bilingual newsletter; available from [www.unrec.org](http://www.unrec.org))

- No. 1 August 2009
- No. 2 September 2009
- No. 3 November 2009

Redesigned UNREC website in French and English ([www.unrec.org](http://www.unrec.org))

### **Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific**

“United Nations Regional Seminar on Enhancing International and Regional Cooperation to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons in South and Central Asia: Summary Report”. Kathmandu, Nepal, June 2009. Available from <http://www.unrcpd.org.np/uploads/conferences/file/Summary%20Report%20Brokering%20Seminar%20Kathmandu%20June%202009.pdf>.

“Brochure on the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific”. Kathmandu, Nepal, February 2009.

### **Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean**

“Chairperson’s Summary”, summary presented at the Second Armed Violence and Development Seminar, Cartagena, Colombia, April 2009. Available from <http://www.unlirec.org/Upload/EventsFiles/1379II%20Seminario%20sobre%20Violencia%20Armada%20y%20Desarrollo%20-%20Resumen%20de%20la%20Presidencia.pdf> (Spanish) and <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/focus-countries/Colombia-Chairpersons-Summary.pdf> (English) (accessed 4 August 2010).

## **Annex IV United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research publications<sup>c</sup>**

Borrie, John. *Unacceptable Harm: A History of How the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions was Won*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2009.

*Comparative Analysis of Post-Manufacture Marking Instruments and Practices for Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Prepared by Giacomo Persi Paoli. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2009.

Gourlay, Catriona. *EU-UN Cooperation in Peacebuilding: Partners in Practice?* Geneva: UNIDIR, 2009.

Johnson, Rebecca. *Unfinished Business: the Negotiation of the CTBT and the End of Nuclear Testing*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2009.

Maze, Kerry and Y. Issar. *International Assistance for Implementing the UN PoA on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Case Study of the South Pacific*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2009.

---

<sup>c</sup> For a full list of publications and to access online versions, see <http://www.unidir.ch/html/en/publications.php>.

Maze, Kerry. *Implementing the UN Programme of Action: A Checklist for Matching Needs and Resources*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2009.

Yudin, Yury. *Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Assessing the Existing Proposals*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2009.

### **Report**

*Space Security 2009: Moving towards a Safer Space Environment, Conference Report 15-16 June 2009*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2009.

### **Disarmament Forum (a quarterly publication)**

- No. 1 Ideas for Peace and Security
- No. 2 Ideas for Peace and Security
- No. 3 Tackling Illicit Brokering
- No. 4 A Safer Space Environment?

## **Annex V**

### **First Committee 2009 Side Events**

- 20 October Promoting Discussion on an Arms Trade Treaty: Results of EU-UNIDIR Regional Seminars (sponsored by UNIDIR)  
*The Silent Army*—movie screening and panel discussion on child soldiers and small arms (sponsored by UNODA and the United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict)
- 21 October Towards BMS4: Issues and Approaches (sponsored by UNIDIR)
- 22 October UNODA-EU Joint Project to Promote Universal Adherence to CCW and its Protocols (sponsored by UNODA and EU)

appendix I

---

**Status of multilateral arms regulation  
and disarmament agreements**



## APPENDIX I

### Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The data contained in this appendix has been provided by the depositaries of the following treaties or agreements.

The most up-to-date information on Disarmament Treaties and their status of adherences is available on the UNODA website at

<http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/treaty/treaties.shtml>.

#### Secretary-General of the United Nations

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Convention on Cluster Munitions

#### Canada and Hungary

Treaty on Open Skies

#### France

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

#### Mexico

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

#### Netherlands

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

### **Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity**

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

### **Organization of American States**

Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

### **Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States of America**

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor in the Subsoil Thereof

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction

### **Thailand**

Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)

### **United States of America**

Antarctic Treaty

### **Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat**

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).

Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported.

The total number of parties has been calculated on the basis of information received from the depositaries.

### **Kyrgyzstan**

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

## **Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 2009**

The following list shows actions reported, if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 2009 with regard to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements.<sup>a</sup>

Accession is a one-step process for becoming bound by a treaty after it has entered into force. In this appendix, when a State agrees to be bound by a treaty it will be noted as (r) ratified, which would include (a) accession, (A) acceptance, (AA) approval and (s) succession.

In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The letters “K”, “O”, “B”, “M”, “L”, and “W” indicate where the reported action was completed: “K” for Kyrgyzstan, “O” for Ottawa, “B” for Budapest, “M” for Moscow, “L” for London, and “W” for Washington.

### **Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare**

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 8 February 1928

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France

NEW PARTIES:	Costa Rica	—13 February (a)
	El Salvador	—26 February 2008 (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 137

### **Antarctic Treaty**

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 47

### **Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty)**

SIGNED BY THE ORIGINAL PARTIES<sup>b</sup> IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

---

<sup>a</sup> The texts of treaties concluded up to 1992 are contained in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992, vols. 1 and 2 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11), in *Status*, 5th edition: 1996 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.97.IX.3), and thereafter in the relevant volumes of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*. The texts and status data are also posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/treaty/treaties.shtml>.

<sup>b</sup> The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L), and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 125

**Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L), and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 105

**Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 39<sup>c</sup>

**Amendment to article 7<sup>d</sup>**

NEW RATIFICATIONS: None

**Amendment to article 25<sup>e</sup>**

NEW RATIFICATIONS: None

**Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20<sup>f</sup>**

NEW RATIFICATIONS: None

**Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L), and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 190

---

<sup>c</sup> Total includes the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands, which have ratified one or both of the Additional Protocols. The Treaty is fully in force for all the regional States that ratify it and waive the requirements under article 28.

<sup>d</sup> Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990.

<sup>e</sup> Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991.

<sup>f</sup> Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992.

**Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-Bed Treaty)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L), and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 97

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 163

**Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 73

**Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:<sup>g</sup> None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 13

**Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

---

<sup>g</sup> Article 19, paragraph 4, states:

“For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of any such instrument.”

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:<sup>h</sup> Kazakhstan —8 July (a)  
Qatar —16 November (a)  
United Arab Emirates —26 February (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 111

**Amended Protocol II (entered into force on 3 December 1998)**

Georgia —8 June

TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCEPTANCES: 93

**Protocol IV (entered into force on 30 July 1998)**

Kazakhstan —8 July  
Qatar —16 November  
United States —21 January

TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCEPTANCES: 96

**Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (entered into force on 18 May 2004)**

PARTIES: Colombia —20 May (a)  
Costa Rica —3 June  
Ecuador —10 March (A)  
Georgia —8 June (a)  
Guatemala —13 February (a)  
Tunisia —11 March (a)  
United States —21 January

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 73

**Protocol V (entered into force on 12 November 2006)**

Canada —19 May  
Chile —18 August  
Costa Rica —27 April  
Ecuador —10 March  
Latvia —16 September  
Mali —24 April  
Pakistan —3 February  
Peru —29 May  
Qatar —16 November  
United Arab Emirates —26 February  
United States —21 January

TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCEPTANCES: 62

---

<sup>h</sup> Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention state:

“2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of Article 4 of this Convention.”

### **South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the Forum Secretariat

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 17<sup>i</sup>

### **Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)**

SIGNED AT PARIS: 19 November 1990

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 9 November 1992

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Netherlands

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 30

#### **Agreement on Adaptation**

ADOPTED AND SIGNED AT ISTANBUL: 19 November 1999

NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>j</sup>

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

NEW RATIFICATIONS: None

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 4

### **Treaty on Open Skies**

SIGNED AT HELSINKI: 24 March 1992

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 January 2002

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Canada and Hungary

NEW RATIFICATIONS: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 34

### **Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC)**

SIGNED AT PARIS: 13 January 1993

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 29 April 1997

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Bahamas —21 April

Dominican Republic —27 March

Iraq —13 January (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 188

---

<sup>i</sup> Total includes nuclear-weapon States China and the Russian Federation, which have ratified Protocols 2 and 3, and France and the United Kingdom, which have ratified Protocols 1-3.

<sup>j</sup> Article 31, paragraph 3, states:

“This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form.”

**Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone  
(Bangkok Treaty)**

SIGNED AT BANGKOK: 15 December 1995

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 27 March 1997

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Thailand

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 10

**African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)**

SIGNED AT CAIRO: 11 April 1996

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 15 July 2009

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 56 (includes NWS)

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Burundi —15 July  
Malawi —23 April  
Tunisia —7 October

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 29<sup>k</sup>

**Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 24 September 1996

NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>l</sup>

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW SIGNATORIES: St. Vincent and the Grenadines —2 July  
Trinidad and Tobago —8 October

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 181

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Liberia —17 August  
Marshall Islands —28 October  
St. Vincent and the Grenadines —23 September

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 151

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,  
Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their  
Destruction (Mine Ban Convention)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT OTTAWA: 3 December 1997

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 March 1999

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:<sup>m</sup>

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 156

---

<sup>k</sup> Total includes France, which has ratified Protocols I, II and III and China and the United Kingdom, which have ratified Protocols I and II.

<sup>l</sup> Article XIV, paragraph 1, states:

“This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex II to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.”

<sup>m</sup> Article 17, paragraph 2, states:

“For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification,

### **Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT WASHINGTON, D.C.: 14 November 1997

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 July 1998

DEPOSITARY: Organization of American States

NEW PARTIES:<sup>n</sup> Dominican Republic —24 April

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 30

### **Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GUATEMALA CITY: 7 June 1999

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 21 November 2002

DEPOSITARY: Organization of American States

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Dominican Republic —17 July (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 13

### **Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT SEMIPALATINSK: 8 September 2006

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 21 March 2009

DEPOSITARY: Kyrgyzstan

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Kazakhstan —19 February

Tajikistan —13 January

Turkmenistan —17 January

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 5

### **Convention on Cluster Munitions**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT OSLO: 3 December 2008

NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>o</sup>

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW SIGNATORIES: Cameroon —15 December

Cyprus —23 September

Democratic Republic  
of the Congo —18 March

Dominican Republic —10 November

Haiti —28 October

---

acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

<sup>n</sup> Article XXV, states:

“This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification.”

<sup>o</sup> Agreement on Adaptation.

	Iraq	—12 November
	Jamaica	—12 June
	Nigeria	—12 June
	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	—23 September
	Tunisia	—12 January
TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 104		
NEW RATIFICATIONS:		
	Albania	—16 June
	Austria	—2 April
	Belgium	—22 December
	Burundi	—25 September
	Croatia	—17 August
	France	—25 September
	Germany	—8 July
	Japan	—3 December (A)
	Lao People's Democratic Republic	—18 March
	Luxembourg	—10 July
	Malawi	—7 October
	Malta	—24 September
	Mexico	—6 May
	New Zealand	—22 December
	Nicaragua	—2 November
	Niger	—2 June
	San Marino	—10 July
	Slovenia	—19 August
	Spain	—17 June
	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	—8 October
	Uruguay	—24 September
	Zambia	—12 August
TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 26		

appendix II

---

**Conference on Facilitating the Entry into  
Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-  
Ban Treaty: Final Declaration**



## **APPENDIX II**

### **Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

#### **Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

**New York, 24 September 2009**

##### **Final Declaration**

1. We the ratifiers, together with the States Signatories, met in New York on 24 and 25 September 2009 to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date. In accordance with the mandate given to us in Article XIV of the Treaty, we decided by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty, thus ridding the world of nuclear weapon test explosions.

2. We reaffirm that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We reiterate that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. The end to all nuclear weapons testing is, thus, a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament.

3. The international community is committed to establishing a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The overwhelming support for the Treaty and its early entry into force has been expressed by the United Nations General Assembly and other multilateral and regional organs and initiatives, which have called for signature and ratification of the Treaty as soon as possible, and have urged all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level. We affirmed the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications without delay to achieve early entry into force of the Treaty as one of the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, which were agreed to by the participating States at international forums dealing with nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

4. We note that significant progress has been made in signing and ratifying the CTBT, which has achieved near universal adherence with signature by 181 States and ratification by 150 States as of today, of which four have signed and ten, including one listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, whose ratification is required for its entry into

force, have ratified since the 2007 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT. This progress demonstrates the strong determination of the vast majority of States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under their jurisdiction or control. Of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, 41 have signed and of these, 35 have also ratified the Treaty. A list of those States is provided in the Appendix.

5. Despite the progress made and the near universal international support that exists for the Treaty, we note with concern that it has not entered into force thirteen years after its opening for signature on 24 September 1996. Relevant international developments since the 2007 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT make entry into force of the Treaty more urgent today than ever before, within the broader framework of multilateral disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts. Noting the improved prospects for ratification in several Annex 2 countries, we renew our strong conviction that entry into force of the CTBT will enhance international peace and security.

6. We call upon all States which have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular, those States whose ratification is needed for entry into force. We strongly encourage such Annex 2 States to take individual initiatives to ratify the Treaty. We also commend efforts to create conditions facilitating ratification by such Annex 2 States, including confidence building measures through which such States could be encouraged to consider, as an option, ratifying the Treaty in a coordinated manner. At the same time, we renew our commitment to work for universal ratification of the Treaty and its early entry into force.

7. We recognize the extensive range of bilateral and joint outreach efforts by signatories and ratifiers to encourage and assist States that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so, and agreed to intensify our efforts to encourage ratification. Such efforts should pay special attention to States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty. We expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Special Representative in promoting entry into force of the Treaty.

8. In accordance with the letter and spirit of the Treaty, we reaffirm our firm determination to end nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions. We call upon all States not to carry out such explosions. Continuing and sustained voluntary adherence to a moratorium is of the highest importance, but does not have the same effect as the entry into force of the Treaty, which offers the global community the prospect of a permanent and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty's basic obligations and call on all States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. With respect to the nuclear tests announced by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006 and 25 May 2009, bearing in mind the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions (A/RES/61/104 and A/RES/63/87) and other relevant United Nations resolutions including the latest (S/RES/1874 (2009)), we underline the need for a peaceful solution of the nuclear issues through successful implementation of the Joint Statement agreed upon in the framework of the Six-Party Talks. We also believe that the aforementioned events, internationally condemned, highlighted the urgent need for the early entry into force of the Treaty and hence the completion of

the CTBT verification regime at its entry into force, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the mandate of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

9. We reaffirmed our strong belief that it is essential to maintain momentum in building all elements of the verification regime, which will be capable of verifying compliance with the Treaty at its entry into force. The verification regime will be unprecedented in its global reach after entry into force of the Treaty and will thereby ensure confidence that States are maintaining their Treaty commitments. In this context, we will continue to provide the tangible support required to enable the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to complete all its tasks in the most efficient and cost-effective way, including the On-Site Inspection programme and the progressive development and coverage of the International Monitoring System, which will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at its entry into force. In this regard we note the progress achieved in the establishment of the International Monitoring System, which has currently 249 certified facilities, and the satisfactory functioning of the International Data Centre.

10. We agree that in addition to its essential function, the CTBT verification system currently being built up would be capable of bringing scientific and civil benefits, including for tsunami warning systems and possibly other disaster alert systems. We will continue to consider ways to ensure that these benefits can be broadly shared by the international community in conformity with the Treaty.

11. We reaffirm our determination to continue to work towards early entry into force of the Treaty and to this end adopt the following measures.

### **Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

Convinced of the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty, we:

- (a) Will spare no efforts and use all avenues open to us in conformity with international law to encourage further signature and ratification of the Treaty, and urge all States to sustain the momentum generated by this Conference to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level;
- (b) Support and encourage bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives by interested countries and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to promote the entry into force of the Treaty;
- (c) Agree that ratifying States will continue the practice of selecting coordinators to promote cooperation, through informal consultations with all interested countries, aimed at promoting further signatures and ratifications;
- (d) Will maintain a contact list of countries among ratifiers which volunteer to assist the coordinators in various regions in promoting activities enhancing the entry into force of the Treaty;
- (e) Encourage the organization of regional seminars in conjunction with other regional meetings in order to increase the awareness of the important role that the Treaty plays;

- (f) Call upon the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to continue its international cooperation activities and organizing workshops, seminars and training programmes in the legal and technical fields;
- (g) Call upon the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to continue promoting understanding of the Treaty and demonstrating, on a provisional basis, the benefits of the civil and scientific applications of the verification technologies, inter alia, in such areas as environment, earth science and technology, tsunami warning systems and possibly other disaster alert systems;
- (h) Recommend that the Provisional Technical Secretariat continue to provide States with legal assistance with respect to the ratification process and implementation measures and, in order to enhance these activities and their visibility, maintain a contact point for the exchange and dissemination of relevant information and documentation;
- (i) Request the Provisional Technical Secretariat to continue to act as a ‘focal point’ for collecting information on outreach activities undertaken by ratifiers and signatories, and to maintain an updated overview of the information based on inputs provided by States Signatories for this purpose on the public web site of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, thereby assisting in promoting the entry into force of the Treaty;
- (j) Encourage cooperation with inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and other elements of civil society to raise awareness of and support for the Treaty and its objectives, as well as the need for its early entry into force.

## **Appendix to the Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

### ***List of States***

#### ***A. States that have ratified the Treaty***

Afghanistan	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Cyprus
Albania	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Czech Republic
Algeria	Botswana	Democratic Republic of the Congo
Andorra	Brazil	Denmark
Antigua and Barbuda	Bulgaria	Djibouti
Argentina	Burkina Faso	Dominican Republic
Armenia	Burundi	Ecuador
Australia	Cambodia	El Salvador
Austria	Cameroon	Eritrea
Azerbaijan	Canada	Estonia
Bahamas	Cape Verde	Ethiopia
Bahrain	Chile	Fiji
Bangladesh	Colombia	Finland
Barbados	Cook Islands	Estonia
Belarus	Costa Rica	Ethiopia
Belgium	Côte d’Ivoire	Fiji
Belize	Croatia	
Benin		

*Conference in Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT: Final Declaration*

Finland	Namibia	United Arab Emirates
France	Nauru	United Kingdom of Great
Gabon	Netherlands	Britain and Northern
Georgia	New Zealand	Ireland
Germany	Nicaragua	United Republic of
Greece	Niger	Tanzania
Grenada	Nigeria	Uruguay
Guyana	Norway	Uzbekistan
Haiti	Oman	Vanuatu
Holy See	Palau	Venezuela (Bolivarian
Honduras	Panama	Republic of)
Hungary	Paraguay	Viet Nam
Iceland	Peru	Zambia
Ireland	Philippines	
Italy	Poland	
Jamaica	Portugal	
Japan	Qatar	
Jordan	Republic of Korea	
Kazakhstan	Romania	
Kenya	Russian Federation	
Kiribati	Rwanda	
Kuwait	Saint Kitts and Nevis	
Kyrgyzstan	Saint Lucia	
Lao People's Democratic Republic	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	
Latvia	Samoa	
Lebanon	San Marino	
Lesotho	Senegal	
Liberia	Serbia	
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Seychelles	
Liechtenstein	Sierra Leone	
Lithuania	Singapore	
Luxembourg	Slovakia	
Madagascar	Slovenia	
Malawi	South Africa	
Malaysia	Spain	
Maldives	Sudan	
Mali	Suriname	
Malta	Sweden	
Mauritania	Switzerland	
Mexico	Tajikistan	
Micronesia (Federated States of)	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	
Moldova	Togo	
Monaco	Tunisia	
Mongolia	Turkey	
Montenegro	Turkmenistan	
Morocco	Uganda	
Mozambique	Ukraine	

**B. The following 44 States, whose ratification is required for the entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with Article XIV, are listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty**

Algeria	Egypt	Poland
Argentina	Finland	Republic of Korea
Australia	France	Romania
Austria	Germany	Russian Federation
Bangladesh	Hungary	Slovakia
Belgium	India	South Africa
Brazil	Indonesia	Spain
Bulgaria	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Sweden
Canada	Israel	Switzerland
Chile	Italy	Turkey
China	Japan	Ukraine
Colombia	Mexico	United Kingdom of
Democratic People's	Netherlands	Great Britain and
Republic of Korea	Norway	Northern Ireland
Democratic Republic of	Pakistan	United States of America
the Congo	Peru	Viet Nam

**1. States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty that have signed and ratified the Treaty**

Algeria	Poland
Argentina	Republic of Korea
Australia	Romania
Austria	Russian Federation
Bangladesh	Slovakia
Belgium	South Africa
Brazil	Spain
Bulgaria	Sweden
Canada	Switzerland
Chile	Turkey
Colombia	Ukraine
Democratic Republic of	United Kingdom of Great
the Congo	Britain and Northern
Finland	Ireland
France	Viet Nam
Germany	
Hungary	
Italy	
Japan	
Mexico	
Netherlands	
Norway	
Peru	

2. *States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty that have signed but not ratified the Treaty*

China	Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Egypt	Israel
Indonesia	United States of America

3. *States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty that have not signed the Treaty*

Democratic People's Republic of Korea	India	Pakistan
--	-------	----------

appendix III

---

**A shared commitment for a mine-free  
world: The 2009 Cartagena Declaration**



## APPENDIX III

### **A shared commitment for a mine-free world: The 2009 Cartagena Declaration\***

#### **Cartagena de Indias, 30 November-4 December 2009**

1. We, the high representatives of the States Parties to the Convention banning anti-personnel mines, gathered here at the Cartagena Summit, reaffirm our commitment to ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines and to achieving a world free of mines. We are convinced that we will reach this goal in our lifetime.

2. Inspired by our collective achievements, we will strengthen our efforts to overcome the remaining challenges.

#### **A decade of saving lives**

3. The number of persons killed or injured by anti-personnel mines has fallen considerably since the Convention entered into force in 1999.

4. Survivors are receiving better care and their human rights have been enhanced. We are inspired by the survivors who participate actively in their communities and in the work of the Convention.

5. Countless lives and limbs have been saved through the destruction of more than 42 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines and the clearance of vast mined areas. We are proud of this humanitarian accomplishment, and of our contribution to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

6. Our aim is universal adherence to the Convention. One-hundred-fifty-six States have already joined the Convention and will never again use anti-personnel mines and nearly all other States observe the global norm it has established. Endeavours to convince other actors not to use anti-personnel mines are bearing fruit.

7. We are proud that the Convention has strengthened international humanitarian law and inspired the development of other instruments for the protection of civilians.

8. These achievements are the result of the partnership we have built between affected and other States, international organisations and civil society.

#### **People remain at risk**

9. Despite great efforts and much progress, we have still not been able to fulfil all the promises we as States Parties to the Convention have made to mine victims and to people living with the daily threat caused by anti-personnel mines.

10. Thousands of people – women, girls, boys and men – are injured or killed by anti-personnel mines every year. People living in affected areas remain at risk and

---

\* APLC/CONF/2009/9, part IV.

the development of their communities is hindered by the presence of anti-personnel mines.

11. A small number of States not parties to the Convention and several armed non-state actors still use anti-personnel mines, causing new humanitarian challenges and continued suffering.

12. As long as people remain at risk, we are compelled to do more to achieve our goal. Compliance makes a difference.

### **A mine free world is possible**

13. We continue to be guided by the humanitarian imperative that led to the Convention.

14. We will ensure the full and effective participation and inclusion of mine victims in the social, cultural, economic and political life of their communities. Our victim assistance efforts will meet the highest international standards in order to fulfill the rights and fundamental freedoms of survivors and other persons with disabilities.

15. We will ensure that all efforts to implement the Convention will involve young and old, women and men, girls and boys, and reflect their views. The dignity and well-being of survivors, their families and communities will be at the core of our efforts.

16. We reaffirm our aim of zero new victims through clearing all mined areas and destroying all anti-personnel mines still in stock as soon as possible. We condemn the use of anti-personnel mines by any actor, including armed non-state actors.

17. We call on all States not yet party to the Convention to join the vast majority of States in our struggle against this weapon.

18. We will make use of synergies with other instruments of international humanitarian and human rights law.

19. We will continue and enhance our cooperation with international organisations and civil society to improve implementation of the Convention.

20. We will commit the necessary national and international resources and work together to pursue our common goal.

21. We appeal to the world to join us in our shared commitment for a mine-free world.

appendix IV

**Security Council resolutions**



## APPENDIX IV

### Security Council resolutions

#### Resolution 1874 (2009) of 12 June 2009

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its previous relevant resolutions, including resolutions 825 (1993) of 11 May 1993, 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, 1695 (2006) of 15 July 2006 and, in particular, resolution 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006, as well as the statements by its President of 6 October 2006<sup>a</sup> and 13 April 2009,<sup>b</sup>

*Reaffirming* that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

*Expressing* the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation of resolution 1718 (2006), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons<sup>c</sup> and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non proliferation of nuclear weapons towards the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

*Stressing* its collective support for the Treaty and commitment to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects, and global efforts towards nuclear non proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and recalling that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the Treaty in any case,

*Deploring* the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of withdrawal from the Treaty and its pursuit of nuclear weapons,

*Underlining* once again the importance that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

*Underlining* that measures imposed by the present resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

*Expressing the gravest concern* that the nuclear test and missile activities carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

---

<sup>a</sup> S/PRST/2006/41.

<sup>b</sup> S/PRST/2009/7.

<sup>c</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

*Reaffirming* the importance that all Member States uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter, and taking measures under Article 41 thereof,

1. *Condemns in the strongest terms* the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006), and the statement by its President of 13 April 2009,<sup>b</sup>

2. *Demands* that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology;

3. *Decides* that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re establish its pre existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;

4. *Demands* that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006);

5. *Demands* also that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;<sup>c</sup>

6. *Demands* further that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea return at an early date to the Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the Treaty, and underlines the need for all States parties to the Treaty to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

7. *Calls upon* all Member States to implement their obligations pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), including with respect to designations made by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) ("the Committee") pursuant to the statement by its President of 13 April 2009;

8. *Decides* that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty and the terms and conditions of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement<sup>d</sup> and shall provide the Agency transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the Agency;

9. *Decides also* that the measures in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel;

10. *Decides further* that the measures in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial

---

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 1677, No. 28986.

transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms, except for small arms and light weapons and their related materiel, and calls upon States to exercise vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of small arms or light weapons, and further decides that States shall notify the Committee at least five days prior to selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

11. *Calls upon* all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items, the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of the present resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

12. *Calls upon* all Member States to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items, the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of the present resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

13. *Calls upon* all States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 12 above, and, if the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, decides that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities pursuant to paragraph 11 above;

14. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose of items, the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of the present resolution, that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraph 11, 12 or 13 above in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 13 January 1993<sup>e</sup> and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972,<sup>f</sup> and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;

15. *Requires* any Member State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11, 12 or 13 above, or seizes and disposes of cargo pursuant to paragraph 14 above, to submit promptly reports containing relevant details to the Committee on the inspection, seizure and disposal;

---

<sup>e</sup> Ibid., vol. 1974, No. 33757.

<sup>f</sup> Ibid., vol. 1015, No. 14860.

16. *Also requires* any Member State, when it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State pursuant to paragraph 12 or 13 above, to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details;

17. *Decides* that Member States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as the provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items, the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of the present resolution, unless the provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and underlines that the present paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;

18. *Calls upon* Member States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear related, ballistic missile related or other weapons of mass destruction related programmes or activities, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

19. *Calls upon* all Member States and international financial and credit institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance or concessional loans to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, except for humanitarian and development purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population or the promotion of denuclearization, and also calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments;

20. *Calls upon* all Member States not to provide public financial support for trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear related, ballistic missile related or other weapons of mass destruction related programmes or activities;

21. *Emphasizes* that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;<sup>8</sup>

22. *Calls upon* all Member States to report to the Council within forty five days of the adoption of the present resolution and thereafter upon request by the Committee on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the

---

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 500, No. 7310.

provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) as well as paragraphs 9 and 10 of the present resolution, as well as financial measures set out in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of the present resolution;

23. *Decides* that the measures set out in paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2;

24. *Decides also* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and the present resolution, including through the designation of entities, goods and individuals, and directs the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Council within thirty days of the adoption of the present resolution, and further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report;

25. *Decides further* that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolution 1718 (2006), the statement by its President of 13 April 2009 and the present resolution, through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council by 15 July 2009, and that it shall also receive and consider reports from Member States pursuant to paragraphs 10, 15, 16 and 22 of the present resolution;

26. *Requests* the Secretary General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to seven experts (“the Panel of Experts”), acting under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in resolution 1718 (2006) and the functions specified in paragraph 25 of the present resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in the present resolution, in particular incidents of non compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or Member States, may consider to improve the implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in the present resolution; and (d) provide an interim report on its work to the Council no later than ninety days after the adoption of the present resolution, and a final report to the Council no later than thirty days prior to the termination of its mandate, with its findings and recommendations;

27. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006) and the present resolution;

28. *Calls upon* all Member States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea within their territories or by their nationals, in disciplines which could contribute to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

29. *Calls upon* the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty<sup>h</sup> at the earliest date;

---

<sup>h</sup> See General Assembly resolution 50/245.

30. *Supports* peaceful dialogue, calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return immediately to the Six Party Talks without precondition, and urges all the participants to intensify their efforts for the full and expeditious implementation of the joint statement issued on 19 September 2005 and the joint documents issued on 13 February and 3 October 2007 by China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in north east Asia;

31. *Expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation, and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;

32. *Affirms* that it shall keep the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and relevant paragraphs of the present resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at that time in the light of compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with relevant provisions of resolution 1718 (2006) and the present resolution;

33. *Underlines* that further decisions will be required, should additional measures be necessary;

34. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

*Adopted unanimously at the 6141st meeting.*

## **Resolution 1887 (2009) of 24 September 2009**

### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 6191st meeting, on 24 September 2009**

*The Security Council,*

*Resolving* to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

*Reaffirming* the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

*Recalling* also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

*Reaffirming* that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

*Bearing* in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations and relevant international organizations in the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, as well as the Conference on Disarmament, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,

*Underlining* that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

*Reaffirming* its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation, and recalling in this regard the outcomes of past NPT Review Conferences, including the 1995 and 2000 final documents,

*Calling* for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,

*Recalling* the Statement by its President adopted at the Council's meeting held on 19 November 2008 (S/PRST/2008/43),

*Welcoming* the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,

*Welcoming* the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,

*Welcoming* in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,

*Welcoming and supporting* the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and *reaffirming* the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,

*Noting* its support, in this context, for the convening of the Second Conference of States Parties and signatories of the Treaties that establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones to be held in New York on 30 April 2010,

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), and 1874 (2009),

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008),

*Reaffirming* all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,

*Gravely concerned* about the threat of nuclear terrorism, and *recognizing* the need for all States to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists,

*Noting* with interest the initiative to convene, in coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

*Expressing* its support for the convening of the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,

*Affirming* its support for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,

*Recognizing* the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,

*Noting* the contribution of civil society in promoting all the objectives of the NPT,

*Reaffirming* its resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and *calling upon* all Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),

1. *Emphasizes* that a situation of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council's primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

2. *Calls upon* States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty,

3. *Notes* that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

4. *Calls upon* all States that are not Parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms;

5. *Calls upon* the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and *calls on* all other States to join in this endeavour;

6. *Calls upon* all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty's three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament;

7. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force at an early date;

8. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, *welcomes* the Conference on Disarmament's adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009, and *requests* all Member States to cooperate in guiding the Conference to an early commencement of substantive work;

9. *Recalls* the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and *affirms* that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

10. *Expresses* particular concern at the current major challenges to the non-proliferation regime that the Security Council has acted upon, *demands* that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, and *reaffirms* its call upon them to find an early negotiated solution to these issues;

11. *Encourages* efforts to ensure development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries seeking to maintain or develop their capacities in this field in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

12. *Underlines* that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the inalienable right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II, and *recalls* in this context Article III of the NPT and Article II of the IAEA Statute;

13. *Calls upon* States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

14. *Encourages* the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and *urges* the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

15. *Affirms* that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

a. *Calls upon* all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

b. *Calls upon* all States to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

c. *Stresses* the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

16. *Encourages* States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and *affirms*

the Security Council's resolve to support the IAEA's efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

17. *Undertakes* to address without delay any State's notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while noting ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and *affirms* that a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

18. *Encourages* States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, non-compliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

19. *Encourages* States to consider whether a recipient State has signed and ratified an additional protocol based on the model additional protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

20. *Urges* States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

21. *Calls for* universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;

22. *Welcomes* the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and *affirms* its commitment to promote full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

23. *Reaffirms* the need for full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, *calls upon* Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) provisions, and in this context *welcomes* the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and *calls upon* all States to participate actively in this review;

24. *Calls upon* Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

25. *Calls upon* all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

26. *Calls upon* all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and *calls upon* those States in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

27. *Urges* all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing and shipments, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

28. *Declares* its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

29. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

appendix V

**Disarmament resolutions and  
decisions listed by chapter**



## APPENDIX V

### Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter

Reference in text  
(page)

#### Chapter I. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

##### Nuclear disarmament

64/27	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	46
64/29	Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	47
64/35	International Day against Nuclear Tests	47
64/37	Reducing nuclear danger	48
64/47	Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	49
64/53	Nuclear disarmament	50
64/55	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the <i>Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons</i>	51
64/57	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	51
64/59	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	53
64/66	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	53
64/516	Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources	54

##### Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

64/69	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	17
-------	---------------------------------------	----

##### Issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

64/31	Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	13
64/45	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	13

## **Chapter II. Biological and chemical weapons**

64/46	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	77
64/70	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction	71

## **Chapter III. Conventional weapons issues**

### **Small arms and light weapons**

64/30	Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them	90
64/50	The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects	90

### **Conventional arms ammunition**

64/51	Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus	92
-------	---	----

### **Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures**

64/22	Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures	99
64/40	National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology	99
64/54	Transparency in armaments	100

### **Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons**

64/67	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	115
-------	---	-----

### **Anti-personnel mines**

64/56	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction	119
-------	---	-----

### **Cluster munitions**

64/36	Convention on Cluster Munitions	121
-------	---------------------------------	-----

### **Towards an arms trade treaty**

64/48	The arms trade treaty	124
-------	-----------------------	-----

## **Chapter IV. Regional disarmament**

### **Nuclear-weapon-free zones**

64/24	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	143
64/26	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	143
64/39	Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)	144
64/44	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	145
64/52	Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia	146

### **Disarmament and arms regulation at regional levels**

64/23	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	173
64/41	Regional disarmament	173
64/42	Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels	173
64/43	Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context	174
64/58	United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament	174
64/60	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	156
64/61	Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa	153
64/62	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	150
64/63	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific	160
64/68	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	175

## **Chapter V. Related issues and approaches, including disarmament machinery**

### **Disarmament machinery**

64/64	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	182
64/65	Report of the Disarmament Commission	187

### **Outer Space**

64/28	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	188
64/49	Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities	189

**Terrorism and disarmament**

- 64/38 Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction 191

**Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control**

- 64/33 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control 194

**Developments in the field of information technology and security**

- 64/25 Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security 197

**Relationship between disarmament and development**

- 64/32 Relationship between disarmament and development 200

**Multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation**

- 64/34 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation 201

**United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research**

- 63/512 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification 223
- 64/513 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security 223
- 64/514 Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament 224
- 64/515 Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament 224

appendix VI

**Abbreviations and acronyms**



## APPENDIX VI

### Abbreviations and acronyms

AHG	Ad Hoc Group
AP	additional protocol
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATT	arms trade treaty
AU	African Union
BANg	Ban All Nukes Generation
BMS	Biennial Meeting of States
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CANWFZ	Central Asian Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
CBM	confidence-building measure
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CIFTA	Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials
CND	Campaign on Nuclear Disarmament
CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Ban-Treaty Organization
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
EU	European Union
FCM	Formal Consultative Meeting
FIC	Forum Island Countries

Firearms Protocol	Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
FMCT	fissile material cut-off treaty
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation
GGE	Group of Governmental Experts
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HCOC	The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IED	improvised explosive device
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
INU	International Network of Universities
IPPNW	International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
ISACS	international standards for small arms control
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
LEU	low-enriched uranium
Mine Ban Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
MSP	Meeting of States Parties
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
MX	Meeting of Experts
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAPs	National Action Plans
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
NNWS	non-nuclear-weapon States
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
NWS	nuclear-weapon States
OAS	Organization of American States
OAS/SMS	OAS Secretariat for Multidimensional Security
OCPFs	other chemical production facilities
OEWG	Open-ended Working Group

OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAROS	prevention of an arms race in outer space
PIFS	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
PIR Center	Russian Center for Policy Studies
PNND	Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
PNP	procurement of SALW through national production
RC	Review Conference
RCPC	Review Conference prepcom
RCPD	Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SEANWFZ	South-East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
SIGI	Soka Gakkai International
SPEC	Special Conference
SPECPC	Special Conference prepcom
SQP	small quantities protocol
START	Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
TCBM	transparency and confidence-building measure
UNDC	United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UN-LiREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
UNSAC	United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa
UNU	United Nations University
VEREX	Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint
WISP.V	Web-based Information System on Protocol V

WILPF

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

**Selective index**

---



## SELECTIVE INDEX

A reference to a chapter indicates the main place in the *Disarmament Yearbook* where a subject is discussed. For information concerning the titles and sponsorship of resolutions, refer to *Yearbook*, Part I. For the status of treaties, see appendix I.

### Symbols

- 1540 Committee, 7, 38–41, 76–77, 190
  - assistance, 41
  - workshops, 39–40

### A

- Action Plan for Nuclear Disarmament, 43
- Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 203–205
  - cyberwarfare, 203–204
  - members, 228–229
  - verification, 204
- Africa, 148–153
  - African Union, 150–151
  - ECOWAS, 148–149
  - Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials, 148
  - RECSA, 148, 151–152
  - UNREC, 148
  - UNSAC, 148
    - resolution on*, 153
- African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, 139, 141
- African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
  - resolution*, 143
- African Union, 148, 150–151
  - European Union, 151
  - Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 151
- Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, 40
- Americas, 153–157
  - OAS, 156–157
  - UN-LiREC, 155–156
- Antarctic Treaty
  - adherence status, 237

- anti-personnel landmines, 116–121
- armed violence and development, 88–90
- arms trade treaty, 83, 122–126, 166
  - resolution on*, 124–126
  - OEWG, 123, 198
  - regional seminars, 222

### ASEAN

- See* Asia and the Pacific
- ASEAN Regional Forum, 158
- Asia and the Pacific, 157–162
  - ARF, 158, 161–162
  - ASEAN, 160–161
  - PIFS, 161–163

### Australia

- explanation of vote
  - 64/34, 202

### Azerbaijan

- resolution on*
  - 64/56, 119

### B

#### Bangkok Treaty

- adherence status, 242

#### Bangladesh

- explanation of vote
  - 64/64, 183

#### Belarus

- explanation of vote
  - 64/52, 147

#### Biennial Meeting of States

- See* small arms and light weapons

#### Biological Incident Database, 69

- UNODA, 69

#### biological weapons, 58–71

- See also* chapter II
- Biological Incident Database, 69

roster of experts and laboratories, 69–71  
Biological Weapons Convention, 57, 58–68  
    *resolution on*, 71  
    adherence status, 239  
    capacity-building, 58  
    confidence-building measures, 67  
    cross-cutting themes, 66  
    EU, 165  
    international cooperation, 58  
    ISU, 58, 65–68  
    Meeting of Experts, 58, 60–62  
    Meeting of States Parties, 58, 62–65, 68  
    pillars for building capacity, 65  
    universalization, 64–65, 67, 68

Brazil  
    explanation of vote  
        64/37, 48  
        64/47, 49

Burkina Faso  
    disarmament education, 206

BWC  
    *See* Biological Weapons Convention

## C

CASA mechanism  
    *See* small arms and light weapons

CBMs  
    *See* confidence-building measures

Celestial Bodies Treaty  
    adherence status, 239

Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,  
    139, 140

Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone  
    Treaty  
        adherence status, 243

Certain Conventional Weapons Treaty  
    adherence status, 239–240

CFE Treaty  
    adherence status, 241

chemical weapons, 71–78  
    *See also* chapter II

Chemical Weapons Convention, 57, 71–78  
    *resolution on*, 77  
    Action Plan, 58  
    adherence status, 241  
    Conference of the States Parties, 71–75

EU, 164  
India, 57  
OPCW, 57, 73, 74, 75–77

China  
    explanation of vote  
        64/47, 50

CIFTA, 156

cluster munitions, 101, 121

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 6,  
    14–18

*resolution on*, 17

    adherence status, 242

ASEAN, 160

CTBTO PrepCom, 16–17

    disarmament education, 210

PIFS, 162

sixth Conference, 14–16

Conference on Disarmament, 3, 18–21, 179,  
    181–183

*resolution on*, 182

    fissile material, 19–20

    NSAs, 20–21

    nuclear disarmament, 18–19

    outer space, 187–189

    radiological weapons, 21

    transparency in armaments, 93

conventional arms ammunition, 91–92  
    *resolution on*, 92

GGE, 91

    technical guidelines, 91

Convention on Certain Conventional  
    Weapons, 84, 101–116  
    *resolution on*, 115

    Amended Protocol II, 111–115

        Conference of the High Contracting  
        Parties, 113–115

        Group of Experts, 112–113

GGE, 101–102

ISU, 102, 104

Meeting of the High Contracting Parties,  
    102–105

Protocol V, 105–111

    Conference of the High Contracting  
    Parties, 108–111

    Meeting of Experts, 105–108

Convention on Cluster Munitions, 84, 102,  
121–122  
*resolution on*, 121  
adherence status, 243  
UNDP, 172

Counter-Terrorism Committee, 40  
Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task  
Force, 189, 191

Cuba  
explanation of vote  
64/25, 197  
64/32, 200  
64/34, 201  
64/49, 189  
64/53, 50  
64/56, 119  
64/65, 187  
64/515, 224

CWC  
*See* Chemical Weapons Convention  
cyberwarfare, 203–204  
*See also* information technology and  
security

## D

Democratic People's Republic of Korea  
explanation of vote  
64/47, 49  
64/57, 52  
64/69, 17  
nuclear test, 16  
Six-Party Talks, 6, 11, 28

Democratic People's Republic of Korea  
explanation of vote  
64/52, 147  
IAEA, 28

Department of Public Information  
disarmament education, 208–209  
NGO Conference, 215–216  
declaration, 224–228

disarmament and development, 88–90, 179,  
198–200  
*resolution on*, 200

disarmament and non-proliferation education,  
205–215  
BANg, 211

CND, 211  
CTBTO PrepCom, 210  
Daisy Alliance, 211  
DPI, 208–209  
Ehime University, 212  
IAEA, 209  
IPPNW, 212  
James Martin Center, 212  
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 213  
OAS, 210  
OPCW, 210  
Peace Boat, 213  
Peace Foundation, 213  
Physicians for Global Survival, 214  
PIR Center, 214  
PNND, 213  
practical recommendations, 206–212  
Project Ploughshares, 214  
Religions for Peace, 214  
Saskatoon Peace Coalition, 214  
SGI, 214  
Toronto Hiroshima Day Coalition, 214  
UNIDIR, 209  
UNODA, 207–208  
UNU, 211  
WILPF, 215

Disarmament Commission  
*See* United Nations Disarmament  
Commission  
disarmament education  
recommendation implementation,  
206–213  
disarmament fellowship programme, 216–217  
Disarmament Information Programme,  
217–221  
events, 220–221, 232  
exhibitions, 219  
Messenger of Peace, 221  
publications, 217–219, 229–231  
website, 219  
disarmament machinery, 181–187  
CD, 181–183  
UNDC, 183–187

- Douglas, Michael, 4  
    *See also* Disarmament Information Programme: Messenger of Peace  
        64/29, 47  
        64/32, 200  
        64/39, 145  
        64/47, 50
- E**
- ECOWAS  
    *See* Africa
- Egypt  
    explanation of vote  
        64/26, 144  
        64/36, 121  
        64/52, 147  
        64/56, 120
- environmental norms, 192–194  
    *resolution on*, 194
- Europe, 163–172  
    FSC, 167  
    NATO, 170–171  
    OSCE, 167–168  
    RACVIAC, 168  
    RCC, 168–169  
    SEESAC, 169–170
- European Union, 164–167  
    African Union, 151  
    ATT, 166  
    SALW, 166–167  
    WMD, 164–165
- explosive remnants of war, 105–106
- export controls  
    Australia Group, 78  
    Nuclear Suppliers Group, 35–36  
    Wassenaar Arrangement, 126–127
- F**
- fissile material, 19–20
- Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty  
    *resolution on*, 47
- five-point proposal, 3, 43
- FMCT  
    *See* Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
- fourth disarmament decade, 186–187
- fourth special session on disarmament  
    *decision on*, 224
- France  
    explanation of vote  
        64/24, 143
- FSC  
    *See* Europe
- G**
- gender and disarmament, 202–203
- Geneva Declaration, 89
- Geneva Protocol  
    adherence status, 237
- Germany  
    explanation of vote, 125
- Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 189  
    Biological Incident Database, 69
- Group of Governmental Experts  
    CCW, 93, 101–102, 103  
    information and technology security, 196–197  
    military expenditures reporting instrument, 99
- Register for Conventional Arms, 84, 93–95
- studies, 205
- H**
- Hague Code of Conduct, 37–38
- I**
- India  
    explanation of vote  
        64/36, 121  
        64/42, 174  
        64/44, 146  
        64/47, 50  
        64/53, 50  
        64/56, 120  
        64/66, 53
- Indonesia  
    explanation of vote  
        64/48, 125
- information and outreach, 205–216  
    NGO conference, 215–216  
    declaration, 224–228

- information technology and security, 194–197
    - resolution on*, 197
    - ABDM, 203–204
    - GGE, 196–197
  - Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials
    - adherence status, 243
  - Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions
    - adherence status, 243
  - International Atomic Energy Agency, 25–35
    - additional protocols, 25–26
    - Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 28
    - disarmament education, 209
    - human resource, 33
    - illicit nuclear trafficking, 34
    - Illicit Trafficking Database, 35
    - Interdepartmental Special Training Centre, 33–34
    - Iran (Islamic Republic of), 28–29
      - nuclear fuel supply, 29–31
      - nuclear safety and security, 31–35
      - nuclear security framework, 31–32
      - Nuclear Security Plan, 31
      - Nuclear Security Series, 33
      - peer reviews, 34
      - risk reduction, 34
      - safeguards, 11, 25–29, 27, 28–29
      - small quantities protocols, 26
      - symposium, 32
      - Syrian Arab Republic, 29
      - terrorism and disarmament, 190
  - International Day against Nuclear Tests, 46
    - resolution on*, 47
  - International Day of Peace, 4
  - international security
    - decision on*, 223
  - International Small Arms Control Standards, 88
  - Iran (Islamic Republic of)
    - E3+3 talks, 7, 24–25
    - explanation of vote
      - 64/26, 144
      - 64/29, 47
      - 64/46, 78
      - 64/50, 91
      - 64/52, 147
      - 64/66, 53
      - 64/68, 175
      - 64/69, 18
      - IAEA, 28–29
  - Ireland
    - explanation of vote
      - 64/48, 126
  - Israel
    - explanation of vote
      - 64/26, 144
      - 64/29, 47
      - 64/36, 122
      - 64/66, 53
      - 64/69, 18
- J**
- Japan
    - disarmament education, 206
    - explanation of vote
      - 64/55, 51
- L**
- League of Arab States, 172
  - Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
    - explanation of vote
      - 64/56, 120
      - 64/67, 116
- M**
- Messenger of Peace, 4
    - See also* Disarmament Information Programme: Messenger of Peace
  - Mexico
    - disarmament education, 206
    - explanation of vote
      - 64/48, 126
      - 64/50, 91
  - Middle East, 172–173
    - League of Arab States, 172
    - military expenditures
      - Reporting Instrument, 98–100

Government replies, 134–136  
Millennium Development Goals, 85, 88  
Mine Ban Convention, 84  
    *resolution on*, 119  
    adherence status, 242  
    Cartagena Summit, 84, 116–118  
    Second Review Conference, 116–118  
missiles, 36–38  
    Code of Conduct, 37–38  
    defence system, 22–23  
    Missile Technology Control Regime,  
    36–37  
Morocco  
    explanation of vote  
    64/56, 119  
multilateralism and disarmament, 201–202  
    *resolution on*, 201

## N

NATO, 170–172  
    WMD, 170  
negative security assurances, 20–21  
Nigeria  
    explanation of vote  
    64/48, 125  
Norway  
    explanation of vote  
    64/55, 51  
    64/66, 53  
    64/67, 115  
NPT  
    *See* Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
nuclear disarmament  
    *resolution on*, 50  
    CD, 18–19  
    convention on prohibition of use  
    *resolution on*, 53  
    Global Zero campaign, 5, 45  
    legality of nuclear weapons  
    *resolution on*, 51  
    nuclear-weapon-free world  
    *resolution on*, 51  
    reducing danger  
    *resolution on*, 48  
    statements on, 4, 5, 41–45  
    total elimination of nuclear weapons

*resolution on*, 49  
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation  
    *See* chapter I  
    Action Plan, 43  
    high-level summit, 6  
    Middle East  
    *resolution on*, 53  
    UNDC, 186  
nuclear energy, 29–31  
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 6, 7–14,  
    142  
    *resolution on*, 13  
    2010 Review Conference, 159  
    adherence status, 238  
    Preparatory Committee, 7–14  
nuclear safety and security, 31–35  
nuclear-weapon-free zones, 20, 140–147  
    Africa, 139, 141  
    *resolution on*, 143  
    CANWFZ, 139  
    Middle East, 20, 142  
    *resolution on*, 143  
    SEANWFZ, 141–142, 160–161  
    *resolution on*, 144  
    southern hemisphere and adjacent areas  
    *resolution on*, 145  
NWFZ  
    *See* nuclear-weapon-free zones

## O

OPCW  
    *See* Organisation for the Prohibition of  
    Chemical Weapons  
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical  
Weapons, 57, 73, 74, 75–77, 76  
    1540 Committee, 76  
    disarmament education, 210  
    terrorism and disarmament, 191  
Organization of American States, 156–157  
    disarmament education, 210  
    OAS Secretariat for Multidimensional  
    Security, 156  
OSCE  
    *See* Europe  
outer space, 187–189  
    *resolution on*, 188

CBMs  
*resolution on*, 189  
Outer Space Treaty  
adherence status, 238  
PAROS, 188  
TCBMs, 188

## P

Pakistan  
explanation of vote  
64/29, 47  
64/38, 192  
64/44, 146  
64/47, 50  
64/53, 51  
64/56, 120  
64/57, 52  
64/69, 18  
Partial Test Ban Treaty  
adherence status, 237  
Peacebuilding Commission  
small arms and light weapons, 85–86  
Portugal  
explanation of vote  
64/48, 126  
Programme of Action  
*See* small arms and light weapons  
Protocol on the Control of Firearms,  
Ammunition and Other Related Materials,  
148

## R

RACVIAC  
*See* Europe  
radioactive wastes  
*resolution on*, 13  
radiological weapons, 21  
RCC  
*See* Europe  
RECSA  
*See* Africa  
regional disarmament  
*See* chapter IV  
*resolution on*, 173  
Africa, 148–153  
Americas, 153–157

Asia and the Pacific, 157–162  
confidence-building measures  
*resolution on*, 174  
conventional arms control  
*resolution on*, 173  
Europe, 163–172  
Indian Ocean  
*resolution on*, 173  
Mediterranean  
*resolution on*, 175  
Middle East, 172–173  
RCPD, 159–160  
*resolution on*, 160  
United Nations Development Programme,  
172  
United Nations regional centres  
*resolution on*, 174  
UN-LiREC  
*resolution on*, 156  
UNREC  
*resolution on*, 150  
Register of Conventional Arms, 84, 93–97  
annual report, 95  
Government replies, 128–131  
SALW, 131–134  
Republic of Korea  
explanation of vote  
64/36, 122  
64/56, 120  
Russian Federation  
explanation of vote  
64/36, 121  
64/39, 144  
64/42, 174  
64/44, 146  
64/48, 125  
64/52, 147  
64/56, 120  
Russian Federation–United States  
negotiations  
missile defence system, 22–23  
START, 5, 21–22

## S

science and technology  
*decision on*, 224

- security assurances
  - resolution on*, 46
- Security Council
  - high-level summit, 6
  - resolution
    - 1267 (1999), 39
    - 1325 (2000), 202
    - 1373 (2001), 39, 76, 190
    - 1540 (2004), 37, 164, 167, 190
      - See also* 1540 Committee
    - 1673 (2006), 37, 38, 40, 164, 167, 190
    - 1718 (2006), 11, 164
    - 1737 (2006), 12
    - 1747 (2007), 12
    - 1803 (2008), 12
    - 1810 (2008), 7, 37, 38, 39, 40, 164, 167, 190
    - 1820 (2008), 202
    - 1874 (2009), 164, 261-267
    - 1887 (2009), 6, 36, 42, 267-271
  - small arms and light weapons, 85
- SEESAC
  - See* Europe
- Singapore
  - explanation of vote
    - 64/36, 122
    - 64/56, 120
- Six-Party Talks, 6, 11, 28, 164
- small arms and light weapons, 85–91
  - resolution on*, 90
  - African Union, 150–151
  - armed violence and development, 88–90
  - Armed Violence Prevention Programme, 89
  - assistance to States
    - resolution on*, 90
  - Biennial Meeting of States, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90
  - CASA mechanism, 88
  - CD, 93
  - EU, 166–167
  - GIS, 87–88
  - International Tracing Instrument, 87
  - ISACS, 88
  - League of Arab States, 172
  - military expenditures, 98–100
  - NAPs, 152
  - OSCE
    - PoA, 167
  - Peacebuilding Commission, 85–86
  - PIFS, 161–163
  - Programme of Action, 85, 86–87, 123, 166
  - RCC, 168–169
  - RCPD, 159–160
  - RECSA, 152–153
  - Register of Conventional Arms, 93–97
  - Security Council, 85
  - SEESAC, 168–169, 169–170
  - UNDP, 172
  - Weapons Control Bill, 162
- Spain
  - explanation of vote
    - 64/24, 143
- SSOD IV
  - See* fourth special session on disarmament
- START
  - See* Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 5, 21–22
- Sudan
  - explanation of vote
    - 64/48, 125
    - 64/54, 100
- Sweden
  - explanation of vote
    - 64/24, 143
    - 64/25, 197
    - 64/35, 48
    - 64/48, 124
    - 64/66, 53
- Switzerland
  - explanation of vote
    - 64/35, 48
    - 64/48, 126
- Syrian Arab Republic
  - explanation of vote
    - 64/47, 49
    - 64/52, 147
    - 64/54, 100
    - 64/66, 53
    - 64/69, 17
- IAEA, 29

## T

- terrorism and disarmament, 189–192
  - resolution on*, 191
  - IAEA, 190
  - OPCW, 191
  - radioactive materials
    - resolution on*, 54
- transparency in armaments, 84, 93–100
  - resolutions on*, 99–100
  - CD, 93
  - military expenditures, 98–100
  - Register on Conventional Arms, 84, 93–95
- Treaty of Rarotonga
  - adherence status, 241
- Treaty of Tlatelolco
  - adherence status, 238
- Treaty on Open Skies
  - adherence status, 241
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
  - See* Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
- Turkey
  - explanation of vote
    - 64/64, 183

## U

- United Kingdom
  - explanation of vote
    - 64/32, 200
    - 64/39, 145
    - 64/44, 146
    - 64/52, 147
- United Nations–AU
  - Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme, 151
- United Nations Development Programme, 172
- United Nations Disarmament Commission, 4, 179, 183–187
  - resolution on*, 187
  - fourth disarmament decade, 186–187
  - general debate, 184–186
  - nuclear disarmament, 186
- United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 221–223
  - arms trade treaty, 222
  - disarmament education, 209
  - publications, 231–232
- United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 140
  - See also* UNODA
  - 1540 Committee, 39–40
  - Biological Incident Database, 69
  - disarmament education, 207–208
  - Disarmament Information Programme, 217–221
  - events, 220–221, 232
  - exhibitions, 219
  - Inter-institutional Training Course on Combating Illicit Firearms Trafficking, 155
  - publications, 217–219, 229–230
  - RCPD, 159–160, 231
    - resolution on*, 160
  - Register of Conventional Arms, 93–97
  - UN-LiREC, 155–156, 231
    - resolution on*, 156
  - UNREC, 148–149, 231
    - resolution on*, 150
  - website, 219
- United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, 149
  - resolution on*, 153
- United States
  - explanation of vote
    - 64/27, 46
    - 64/32, 200
    - 64/49, 189
    - 64/65, 187
    - 64/66, 54
- United States–Russian Federation
  - negotiations
  - missile defence system, 22–23
  - START, 5

UN-LiREC

*See* United Nations Office for  
Disarmament Affairs

UNRCPD

*See* United Nations Office for  
Disarmament Affairs

UNREC

*See* United Nations Office for  
Disarmament Affairs

**V**

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

explanation of vote

64/47, 50

64/48, 126

64/51, 92

64/69, 18

64/516, 54

verification, 204

*decision on*, 223

**W**



weapons of mass destruction

EU, 164–165

FSC, 167

NATO, 170–171

UNSCR 1540 (2004), 170



## **UNODA Occasional Papers**

### **No. 18, January 2010— Ways to Strengthen the Field of Verification**

- Features presentations made at the fifty-first session of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held from 18 to 20 February 2009 in New York.
- James Acton, Associate in the Non-Proliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, made a presentation entitled “Verifying zero: long-term aims, short-term steps”.
- Andreas Persbo, Acting Executive Director of the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre, spoke of “Nuclear arms control in the 2010s—verification challenges”.

Sales No. E.10.IX.2 • ISBN 978-92-1-142272-6

### **No. 19, June 2010—Cyberwarfare and its Impact on International Security**

- Features presentations made at the fifty-first session of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held from 18 to 20 February 2009 in New York.
- James Andrew Lewis, Senior Fellow and Program Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provided the Board members with a presentation on the issue of cyberwarfare and international security.

Sales No. E.10.IX.4 • ISBN 978-92-1-142275-7