

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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APPENDIX II

VOLUME I

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of the Conference on Disarmament in 1986

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PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u>			
336	Australia (the President) The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mexico USSR Sweden Cuba Canada	Algeria Argentina Australia Belgium Belgium (the President) Brazil (the President) Bulgaria Bulgaria (the President) Burma Burma (the President) Canada Canada (the President) China Cuba	342 358 381 337 340 355 369 381 336 337 343 343 368 346 353 355 359 337 378 360 363 365 358 366 375 336 355 367 376 381 384 339 357 381 336 343 359
337	Argentina Bulgaria Pakistan Australia (the President) Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States) United States	Australia (the President)	
338	United States German Democratic Republic The Secretary-General of the Conference		
339	Mongolia Japan France Romania China Egypt		
340	Germany, Federal Republic of Sri Lanka Argentina Nigeria Kenya		
341	USSR Hungary Poland		
342	United Kingdom Finland (non-member State) India Morocco Algeria		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u>			
343	Islamic Republic of Iran Norway (non-member State) Belgium The Secretary-General of the Conference Cuba Netherlands Australia (the President)	Czechoslovakia Egypt France	362 339 339 353 363
344	Germany, Federal Republic of	France (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	351
345	Poland (on behalf of a group of socialist States) Germany, Federal Republic of	German Democratic Republic	338 355 357
346	Belgium (the President)	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	362
347	Yugoslavia Romania Netherlands	Germany, Federal Republic of	340 344 345 360 382
348	Italy		
351	Zaire France (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	Hungary	341 363
353	Romania France USSR Brazil (the President)	India	342 358 378
355	The Secretary-General of the Conference USSR Brazil (the President) Australia Canada German Democratic Republic	Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran	376 343 379
357	Poland China German Democratic Republic	Italy Japan	348 339 381
358	India Burma Algeria	Japan (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	363
359	USSR Cuba Romania Yugoslavia Brazil (the President)	Kenya	340

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u>			
360	Bulgaria (the President) Germany, Federal Republic of Sweden USSR	Mexico	336 363
362	Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Mongolia	339 365
363	Hungary Mexico Bulgaria (the President) Japan (on behalf of a group of Western countries) France	Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	337
364	USSR Norway (non-member State)	Morocco	342 367
365	Mongolia Secretary-General of the Conference Bulgaria (the President)	Netherlands	343 347
366	Burma (the President) Romania	Nigeria	340
367	Morocco Canada	Nigeria (on behalf of Group of 21)	384
368	Belgium Sri Lanka	Pakistan	337
369	Australia	Peru	383
371	Austria (non-member State)	Poland	341 357
372	Norway (non-member State)	Poland (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	345
375	Yugoslavia Burma (the President)	Romania	339 347 353 359 366
376	Canada (the President) Indonesia	Sri Lanka	340 368
377	USSR Venezuela	Sweden	336 360

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u>			
378	Bulgaria India	USSR	336 341 353
379	Islamic Republic of Iran		355 359
380	New Zealand (non-member State) Yugoslavia		360 364 377 381 383
381	Japan Algeria China Canada (the President) Australia The Secretary-General of the Conference USSR	United Kingdom United Kingdom (on behalf of a group of Western countries) United States	342 384 337 338 382
382	United States Germany, Federal Republic of		
383	USSR Peru	Venezuela Yugoslavia	377 347 359 375 380
384	Canada (the President) Nigeria (on behalf of Group of 21) United Kingdom (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	Zaire <u>Non-member States</u> Austria Finland New Zealand Norway <u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u> <u>The Secretary-General of the Conference</u>	351 371 342 380 343 364 372 336 338 343 355 365 381

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
2. <u>Participation of Non-Member States</u>			
338	Australia (the President)	Australia (the President)	338
339	Australia (the President)		339
340	Australia (the President)		340
342	Australia (the President)	Belgium (the President)	342
346	Belgium (the President)		346
347	Romania		351
351	Belgium (the President)	Bulgaria (the President)	361
361	Bulgaria (the President)		363
363	Bulgaria (the President)	Romania	347

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
336	Australia (the President) The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	Algeria	342 358 381
	Mexico	Argentina	340
	USSR		344
	Sweden		
	Cuba	Australia	359
	Czechoslovakia		368
	Canada		372 379 381
337	Bulgaria Pakistan		
		Australia (the President)	336 343
338	United States German Democratic Republic Mexico		
		Australia (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	351 382
339	Mongolia Japan France Romania China Egypt	Belgium Belgium (the President)	343 351
		Brazil	383
340	Germany, Federal Republic of Sri Lanka Argentina Nigeria Kenya	Brazil (the President)	354 359
		Brazil (on behalf of Group of 21)	343 379
341	USSR Hungary Poland	Bulgaria	337 344 350 356 378 380
342	United Kingdom Finland (non-member State) India Morocco Algeria German Democratic Republic	Bulgaria (the President)	360 365
		Burma	358
343	Norway (non-member State) Belgium Sweden United States New Zealand (non-member State) Australia (the President) Brazil (on behalf of the Group of 21) German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Burma (the President) Canada	366 375 336 346 367 371 383

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
344	Argentina	Canada (the President)	376
	Bulgaria		381
	Germany, Federal Republic of		382
			384
346	Mexico		
	Canada	China	339
	German Democratic Republic		381
347	Yugoslavia	Cuba	336
	Romania		351
	Netherlands		
		Czechoslovakia	336
348	Peru		349
	USSR		362
	Mongolia		375
			381
349	Czechoslovakia		
		Egypt	339
350	Bulgaria		
	USSR	France	339
	United States		357
			383
351	German Democratic Republic		
	German Democratic Republic	German Democratic Republic	338
	(on behalf of a group of		342
	socialist States)		346
	Cuba		351
	Zaire		354
	Islamic Republic of Iran		373
	(on behalf of Group of 21)		380
	Belgium (the President)		381
	Australia (on behalf of a		382
	group of Western		
	countries)	German Democratic Republic	343
	Mexico	(on behalf of a group of	351
	USSR	Socialist States)	362
	Sweden (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u>		
	Group of Scientific Experts)	Germany, Federal Republic	340
		of	344
353	USSR		360
	Romania		378
			382
354	German Democratic Republic		
	Japan	Hungary	341
	USSR		363
	Brazil (the President)		
	United States	Hungary (on behalf of a	383
		group of socialist States)	
356	USSR		
	Bulgaria	India	342
	United States		358
			378

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
357	Poland France	Indonesia	376
358	India Burma Algeria Poland	Islamic Republic of Iran	379
359	USSR Italy (on behalf of a group of nine Western countries)	Islamic Republic of Iran (on behalf of Group of 21)	351
	Australia	Italy (on behalf of a group of nine Western countries)	359
	Romania	Japan	339
	Yugoslavia		354
	Brazil (the President)		362
			379
			381
360	Bulgaria (the President)	Kenya	340
	Germany, Federal Republic of		
	Sweden	Mexico	336
	USSR		338
			346
361	United States		351
	Venezuela		363
			375
362	Czechoslovakia		379
	Japan		381
	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)		382
		Mongolia	339
			348
363	Hungary		365
	Mexico		378
	United States		
364	USSR	Morocco	342
365	Mongolia	Netherlands	347
	Bulgaria (the President)		374
366	Burma (the President)	Nigeria	340
	Romania	Nigeria (on behalf of Group of 21)	384
367	USSR		
	Poland	Pakistan	337
	Canada		
368	Sri Lanka	Peru	348
	Australia		373
			383
371	Austria (non-member State)		
	Sweden		
	Canada		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
372	Norway (non-member State)	Poland	341
	Australia		357
	USSR		358
373	Peru		367
	German Democratic Republic		376
			381
374	Netherlands	Romania	339
	Viet Nam (non-member State)		347
			353
375	Czechoslovakia		359
	Yugoslavia		366
	Burma (the President)		384
	Mexico		
376	Canada (the President)	Sri Lanka	340
	United States		368
	Indonesia		
	Poland	Sweden	336
			343
			360
377	USSR		371
	Venezuela		383
378	Bulgaria	Sweden (Chairman, Ad Hoc	351
	India	group of Scientific Experts)	379
	Germany, Federal Republic of		
	Mongolia	USSR	336
			341
379	Islamic Republic of Iran		348
	Japan		350
	Mexico		351
	Brazil (on behalf of		353
	Group of 21)		354
	Australia		356
	Sweden (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group		359
	of Scientific Experts)		360
	United Kingdom		364
			367
380	German Democratic Republic		372
	Bulgaria		377
			381
381	Czechoslovakia		382
	USSR		383
	Japan		
	Algeria	United Kingdom	342
	Poland		379
	China		
	Australia		
	German Democratic Republic		
	Mexico		
	Canada (the President)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
382	Germany, Federal Republic of	United States	338
	United States		343
	USSR		350
	Australia (on behalf of a		354
	group of western countries)		356
	German Democratic Republic		361
	Mexico		363
	Canada (the President)		376
			382
383	France	Venezuela	361
	USSR		377
	Sweden		
	Peru		
	Brazil	Yugoslavia	347
	Canada		359
	Hungary (on behalf of a		375
	group of socialist States)		
		Zaire	351
384	Romania		
	Nigeria (on behalf of	<u>Non-Member States</u>	
	Group of 21)		
	Canada (the President)	Austria	371
		Finland	342
		New Zealand	343
		Norway	343
			372
		Viet Nam	374
		<u>The Secretary-General of</u>	336
		<u>the Conference on behalf of</u>	
		<u>the Secretary-General of</u>	
		<u>the United Nations</u>	

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>III. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u></p>		
336	<p>Australia (the President)</p> <p>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf on the Secretary-General of the United Nations</p> <p>Mexico</p> <p>USSR</p> <p>Sweden</p> <p>Cuba</p> <p>Czechoslovakia</p> <p>Canada</p>	<p>Algeria</p> <p>Argentina</p> <p></p> <p>Australia</p>	<p>342</p> <p>340</p> <p>359</p> <p></p> <p>336</p>
337	<p>Bulgaria</p> <p>Pakistan</p>	<p>Australia (the President)</p>	<p>343</p>
338	<p>United States</p> <p>German Democratic Republic</p>	<p>Belgium</p>	<p>384</p>
339	<p>Mongolia</p> <p>Japan</p> <p>France</p> <p>Romania</p> <p>China</p> <p>Egypt</p>	<p>Belgium (the President)</p> <p></p> <p>Brazil (the President)</p>	<p>351</p> <p></p> <p>357</p> <p>359</p>
340	<p>Sri Lanka</p> <p>Argentina</p> <p>Nigeria</p>	<p></p> <p>Bulgaria</p>	<p></p> <p>337</p> <p>378</p>
341	<p>USSR</p> <p>Poland</p>		
342	<p>United Kingdom</p> <p>India</p> <p>Morocco</p> <p>Algeria</p>	<p>Bulgaria (the President)</p>	<p>365</p>
343	<p>United States</p> <p>Australia (the President)</p>	<p>Burma</p>	<p>358</p>
344	<p>Argentina</p>		
347	<p>Yugoslavia</p> <p>Romania</p>	<p>Burma (the President)</p>	<p>366</p> <p>375</p>
348	<p>Mongolia</p>		
350	<p>China</p>	<p>Canada</p>	<p>336</p> <p>367</p> <p>371</p>
351	<p>Zaire</p> <p>Belgium (the President)</p>		
353	<p>Romania</p>		
355	<p>USSR</p>	<p>Canada (the President)</p>	<p>376</p>

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>III. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u></p>		
357	France German Democratic Republic German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States) Brazil (the President) Mexico USSR	China	339 350 365 381
358	India Burma	Cuba	336 359
359	USSR Germany, Federal Republic of Cuba Argentina Romania Yugoslavia Brazil (the President)	Czechoslovakia	336 362
360	Germany, Federal Republic of Sweden USSR	Egypt	339
361	United States Venezuela	France	339 357 383
362	Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	German Democratic Republic	338 357 367
363	United States		
364	USSR		
365	China Mongolia Bulgaria (the President)	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	357 362
366	Burma (the President) Romania		
367	Morocco German Democratic Republic USSR Poland Canada	Germany, Federal Republic of	359 360 382 383
371	Austria (non-member State) Canada	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist countries)	383

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	III. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u>		
375	Pakistan Yugoslavia Burma (the President)	India	342 358 378
376	Canada (the President) United States Indonesia Poland	Indonesia	376
378	Bulgaria India	Islamic Republic of Iran	379
379	Islamic Republic of Iran Mexico		
380	New Zealand (non-member State)	Japan	339 381
381	USSR Japan China	Mexico	336 357 379
382	Germany, Federal Republic of United States USSR	Mongolia	339 348 365
383	Germany, Federal Republic of France USSR Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist countries)	Morocco	342 367
		Nigeria	340
		Nigeria (on behalf of Group of 21)	384
		Pakistan	337 375
		Poland	341 367 376

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	III. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u>		
384	Belgium	Romania	339
	Romania		347
	Nigeria (on behalf of Group of 21)		353
			359
			366
			384
		Sri Lanka	340
		Sweden	336
			360
		USSR	336
			341
			355
			357
			359
			360
			364
			367
			381
			382
			383
		United Kingdom	342
		United States	338
			343
			361
			363
			376
			382
		Venezuela	361
		Yugoslavia	347
			359
			375
		Zaire	351
		<u>Non-Member States</u>	
		Austria	371
		New Zealand	380
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	336

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IV. <u>Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters</u>		
336	Australia (the President) The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mexico Czechoslovakia	Algeria	342
		Argentina	340 357
337	Bulgaria	Australia (the President)	336 343
338	United States German Democratic Republic	Belgium	343
339	Romania China Egypt	Belgium (the President)	351
340	Sri Lanka Argentina		
341	Poland	Brazil (the President)	357 358
342	India Algeria		
343	Belgium United States Australia (the President)	Bulgaria	337 369 378
350	China		
351	Belgium (the President)	Bulgaria (the President)	365
357	Argentina China Brazil (the President) India		
358	India Burma Yugoslavia Brazil (the President)	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	377 380
364	USSR	Burma	358
365	China Bulgaria (the President)	Burma (the President)	375
		Canada (the President)	376 377

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IV. <u>Prevention of nuclear war,</u> <u>including all related matters</u>		
366	Romania	China	339
369	Bulgaria		350
373	Germany, Federal Republic of		357
375	Yugoslavia		365
	Burma (the President)		377
376	Canada (the President)		381
	Indonesia		
377	Canada (the President)	Czechoslovakia	336
	United Kingdom (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	Egypt	339
	Nigeria (on behalf of Group of 21)		
	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	German Democratic Republic	338
	China		
	Romania		
378	Bulgaria	Germany, Federal Republic of	373
	India		382
			383
380	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	India	342
			357
			358
381	China		378
382	Germany, Federal Republic of	Indonesia	376
	United States		
		Mexico	336
383	Germany, Federal Republic of	Nigeria (on behalf of Group of 21)	377
			384
384	Romania	Poland	341
	Nigeria (on behalf of Group of 21)	Romania	339
			366
			377
			384

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IV. <u>Prevention of nuclear war,</u> <u>including all related matters</u>		
		Sri Lanka	340
		USSR	364
		United Kingdom (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	377
		United States	338 343 382
		Yugoslavia	358 375
		<u>The Secretary-General</u> <u>of the Conference on</u> <u>behalf of the</u> <u>Secretary-General of the</u> <u>United Nations</u>	336

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
V. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
336	Australia (the President) The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations USSR Sweden Cuba Czechoslovakia Canada	Algeria Argentina Australia Australia (the President)	342 381 354 349 357 369 336 337 338
337	Bulgaria Pakistan Poland (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons German Democratic Republic Australia (the President)	Belgium Belgium (the President) Brazil (the President)	343 368 351 359
338	United States Australia (the President)	Bulgaria	337 359 378
339	Mongolia Pakistan Japan France Romania China Egypt	Bulgaria (the President) Burma Burma (the President)	360 358 375
340	Germany, Federal Republic of Sri Lanka Nigeria Kenya Islamic Republic of Iran	Canada Canada (the President)	336 346 350 367 376 383 384
341	USSR Pakistan		
342	United Kingdom Finland (non-member State) India Algeria	China Cuba	339 350 381 336
343	Islamic Republic of Iran Norway (non-member State) Belgium United States France	Czechoslovakia	336 362 381

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
V. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
346	Canada	Egypt	339
347	Yugoslavia	France	339
	Netherlands		343
	Islamic Republic of Iran		351
			353
348	Peru		381
	Islamic Republic of Iran		
349	United States	German Democratic Republic	337
	Australia		351
350	China	Germany, Federal Republic of	340
	United Kingdom		351
	Canada		359
			360
			382
351	German Democratic Republic		
	Zaire	Hungary	355
	Germany, Federal Republic of		363
	Japan (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	383
	Netherlands		
	France	India	342
	Belgium (the President)		378
353	Japan		
	United States	Indonesia	376
	Romania		
	France	Islamic Republic of Iran	340
			343
354	Argentina		347
			348
355	Hungary		370
			379
357	Poland		
	United States	Japan	339
	Australia		353
			371
358	Burma		381
	USSR		
	Poland	Japan (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	351
359	Bulgaria		
	USSR	Kenya	340
	Germany, Federal Republic of		
	Romania	Mongolia	339
	Yugoslavia		
	Brazil (the President)	Morocco	367

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
V. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
360	Bulgaria (the President)	Netherlands	347
	Germany, Federal Republic of		351
	Sweden		374
	USSR		
361	United States	Nigeria	340
362	Czechoslovakia	Nigeria (on behalf of Group of 21)	384
363	Hungary	Pakistan	337
	United States		339
			341
364	USSR	Peru	348
	Norway (non-member State)		373
365	United States		383
	USSR	Poland	357
366	Romania		358
			381
367	Morocco	Poland (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)	337
	Canada		
368	Belgium	Romania	339
	Sri Lanka		353
369	United States		359
	Australia		366
			384
370	United Kingdom	Sri Lanka	340
	USSR		368
	Islamic Republic of Iran		377
371	Austria (non-member State)	Sweden	336
	Japan		360
373	Peru		383
374	Netherlands	Sweden (on behalf of Group of 21)	383
375	Yugoslavia	USSR	336
	Burma (the President)		341
376	Canada (the President)		358
	United States		359
	Indonesia		360
			364
377	Sri Lanka		365
	Venezuela		370
			383

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
V. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
378	Bulgaria	United Kingdom	342
	India		350
			370
379	Islamic Republic of Iran		
380	New Zealand (non-member State)	United Kingdom (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)	383
381	Czechoslovakia	United States	338
	Japan		343
	Algeria		349
	Poland		353
	China		357
	France		361
			363
382	Germany, Federal Republic of		365
	United States		369
			376
383	United Kingdom (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)		382
	USSR	Venezuela	377
	Sweden (on behalf of Group of 21)	Yugoslavia	347
	Sweden		359
	Peru		375
	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Zaire	351
	Canada (the President)	<u>Non-Member States</u>	
384	Romania	Austria	371
	Nigeria (on behalf of Group of 21)	Finland	342
	Canada (the President)	New Zealand	380
		Norway	343
			364
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	336

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PT	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PT
	VI. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>		
336	Australia (the President)	Algeria	342
	Mexico		358
	USSR		381
	Sweden		
	Czechoslovakia	Argentina	340
	Canada		348
337	Bulgaria	Australia	369
	Pakistan		374
338	United States	Australia (the President)	336
	German Democratic Republic		343
339	Mongolia	Belgium	343
	Japan		
	France	Belgium (the President)	351
	Romania		
	China	Brazil (the President)	357
	Egypt		359
340	Sri Lanka	Bulgaria	337
	Argentina		350
	Nigeria		378
	Kenya		
		Bulgaria (the President)	360
341	USSR		361
	Poland		
		Burma	358
342	United Kingdom		
	India	Canada	336
	Algeria		346
			367
343	Norway (non-member State)		371
	Belgium		
	United States	Canada (the President)	376
	Australia (the President)		383
			384
345	Germany, Federal Republic of		
346	Canada	China	339
			350
			365
347	Yugoslavia		372
	Romania		381
	USSR		
		Czechoslovakia	336
348	Argentina		362
	Italy		371
	Mongolia		
		Egypt	339
349	United States		
	USSR		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VI. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>		
350	China Hungary Bulgaria	Egypt (on behalf of Group of 21)	359
351	German Democratic Republic Belgium (the President)	France	339 383
354	Sri Lanka	German Democratic Republic	338 351 357 373
357	Poland German Democratic Republic Brazil (the President)	Germany, Federal Republic of	345 360 382
358	India Pakistan Burma Algeria Poland	Hungary	350
359	USSR Brazil (the President) Egypt (on behalf of Group of 21) Italy (on behalf of a group of Western countries) USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States) Romania Yugoslavia	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	383
		India	342 358 378
		Indonesia	376
		Islamic Republic of Iran	379
		Italy	348
360	Bulgaria (the President) Germany, Federal Republic of Sweden USSR	Italy (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	359 382
		Japan	339 381
361	United States Venezuela Bulgaria (the President)	Kenya	340
362	Czechoslovakia USSR	Mexico	336 379
364	USSR	Mongolia	339 348 378
365	China		
366	Romania Venezuela	Mongolia (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space)	383

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VI. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>		
367	Morocco Pakistan Canada	Morocco Nigeria	367 340
368	Sri Lanka	Pakistan	337 358
369	Venezuela Australia		367
371	Austria (non-member State) Czechoslovakia Canada	Peru Poland	373 383 341
372	China		357 358 376
373	Peru German Democratic Republic	Romania	339 347
374	Viet Nam (non-member State) Australia		359 366 377
375	Yugoslavia		
376	Canada (the President) United States Indonesia Poland	Sri Lanka Sweden	340 354 368 336 360
377	USSR Romania Venezuela	USSR	336 341 347
378	Bulgaria India Mongolia		349 359 360 362
379	Islamic Republic of Iran Mexico		364 377 381
380	New Zealand (non-member State)		382 383
381	USSR Japan Algeria China	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States) United Kingdom	359 342
382	Germany, Federal Republic of United States USSR Italy (on behalf of a group of Western countries)	United States	338 343 349 361 371 382

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VI. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>		
383	Mongolia (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space)	Venezuela	361 366 369 377
	France		
	USSR	Yugoslavia	347
	Peru		359
	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)		375
	Canada (the President)	<u>Non-Member States</u>	
384	Canada (the President)	Austria	371
		New Zealand	380
		Norway	343
		Viet Nam	374

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons</u>		
339	Egypt	Argentina	340
340	Sri Lanka Argentina Nigeria Kenya	Australia (the President)	343
		Brazil (the President)	359
343	Australia (the President)	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of Socialist States)	380
347	Romania	Burma	358
358	Burma	Burma (the President)	366 375
359	Romania Brazil (the President)	China	381
366	Burma (the President) Romania	Egypt	339
374	Viet Nam (non-member State)	Indonesia	376
375	Pakistan Burma (the President)	Kenya	340
376	Indonesia	Nigeria	340 381
377	Romania	Pakistan	375
380	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Romania	347 359 366 377 384
381	China Nigeria	Sri Lanka	340
384	Romania	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Viet Nam	374

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VIII. <u>New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons</u>		
339	Egypt	Argentina	340 366
340	Sri Lanka Argentina	Australia	369
341	USSR	Australia (the President)	343
342	United Kingdom	Belgium	343
343	Belgium Australia (the President) Morocco (on behalf of the Group of 21) Germany, Federal Republic of	Belgium (the President)	344 351
344	Belgium (the President)	Brazil (the President)	359
351	Belgium (the President)	Burma	358
353	Romania	Burma (the President)	366 375
358	Burma	Canada (the President)	376 383
359	Romania Brazil (the President)	Cuba	376 383
360	Sweden USSR	Cuba (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological Weapons)	382
366	Burma (the President) Romania Argentina	Egypt	339
367	USSR	Germany, Federal Republic of	343
368	Sri Lanka	Indonesia	376
369	Australia	Japan	381
375	Pakistan Burma (the President)	Morocco (on behalf of the Group of 21)	343
376	Canada (the President) Indonesia Cuba	Pakistan	375
377	Sri Lanka Romania	Peru	383
381	Japan	Romania	353 359 366 377
382	United States Cuba (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological Weapons)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VIII. <u>New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons</u>		
383	Sweden	Sri Lanka	340
	Peru		368
	Canada (the President)		377
	Cuba		
		Sweden	359
			383
		USSR	341
			360
			367
		United Kingdom	342
		United States	382

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. <u>Comprehensive programme of disarmament</u>		
336	Cuba	Australia (the President)	337
337	Australia (the President) Mexico	Belgium	343
339	Romania Egypt	Belgium (the President)	351
340	Sri Lanka Nigeria Kenya	Brazil (the President)	359
342	India	Burma	358
343	Belgium	Canada (the President)	376 383
351	Belgium (the President)	China	381
358	Burma	Cuba	336
359	USSR Romania Brazil (the President)	Czechoslovakia	362 375
362	Czechoslovakia	Egypt	339
364	USSR	Hungary (on behalf of a group of Socialist States)	383
366	Romania	India	342 377
374	Viet Nam (non-member State)	Indonesia	376
375	Czechoslovakia	Kenya	340
376	Canada (the President) Indonesia	Mexico	337
377	Romania	Mexico (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament)	383
378	India	Nigeria	340
381	China	Romania	339 359 366 377 384

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. <u>Comprehensive programme of disarmament</u>		
383	Mexico (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament)	Sri Lanka	340
	United Kingdom (on behalf of a group of western countries)	United Kingdom (on behalf of a group of western countries)	383
	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	USSR	359 364
	Canada (the President)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
384	Romania	Viet Nam	374

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
336	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>1. <u>Annual Report of the Secretary-General</u></p> <p>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</p>		336
		<p>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</p>	

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>2. <u>United Nations role in disarmament</u></p>		
336	Australia (the President) The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mexico Sweden	Australia (the President) Belgium China Islamic Republic of Iran	336 343 339 379
339	China	Mexico	336
343	Belgium	Peru	348
348	Peru	Sweden	336
368	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	368
379	Islamic Republic of Iran	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	336

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PT	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PT
378	India	India	378
X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>			
3. <u>Disarmament Commission</u>			

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PT	Country/speaker	Country/Speaker	PT
	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>4. <u>Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</u></p>		
336	Australia (the President)	Australia (the President)	336
	Mexico		
342	India	India	342
		Mexico	336

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PT
<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>5. <u>Nuclear-weapon-free zones</u></p>			
337	Bulgaria	Brazil (the President)	352
338	German Democratic Republic	Bulgaria	337 357
343	New Zealand (non-member State)	Bulgaria (the President)	360
351	Zaire	German Democratic Republic	338
352	Brazil (the President)	Islamic Republic of Iran	379
357	Bulgaria	Pakistan	375
360	Bulgaria (the President)	Romania	366
366	Romania	Zaire	351
374	Viet Nam (non-member State)	<u>Non-Member States</u>	
375	Pakistan	New Zealand	343 380
379	Islamic Republic of Iran	Viet Nam	374
380	New Zealand (non-member State)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>6. <u>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons</u></p>			
336	Sweden	Bulgaria	337
	Czechoslovakia	Czechoslovakia	336
337	Bulgaria	Germany, Federal Republic of	378
339	Japan	Japan	339
340	Kenya		381
342	Morocco	Kenya	340
347	Netherlands	Morocco	342
351	Zaire	Netherlands	347
374	Viet Nam (non-member State)	Nigeria	382
375	Pakistan	Pakistan	375
378	Germany, Federal Republic of	Sweden	336
381	Japan	Zaire	351
382	Nigeria	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Viet Nam	374

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>7. <u>Peaceful uses of nuclear energy</u></p>		
342	United Kingdom	Argentina	366
343	Belgium	Australia	369
353	Romania	Belgium	343
360	USSR	Canada	367
362	Czechoslovakia	Canada (the President)	376
366	Romania	Cuba	376
	Argentina	Cuba (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u>	382
	USSR	Committee on Radiological	
367	USSR	Weapons)	
	Canada	Czechoslovakia	362
368	Sri Lanka	Germany, Federal Republic of	382
369	Australia	Indonesia	376
375	Pakistan	Japan	381
376	Canada (the President)	Pakistan	375
	Indonesia	Peru	383
	Cuba	Romania	353
377	Sri Lanka		366
	Romania		377
381	USSR	Sri Lanka	368
	Japan		377
382	Germany, Federal Republic of	Sweden	383
	Cuba (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u>	United Kingdom	342
	Committee on Radiological		
	Weapons)	USSR	360
383	Sweden		366
	Peru		367
			381

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>		
	B. <u>Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons</u>		
342	United Kingdom	Peru	373
373	Peru	United Kingdom	342

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>9. <u>Conventional Weapons</u></p>			
336	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	Canada	367
		China	339
			350
			365
337	Pakistan	Czechoslovakia	362
338	United States	France	339
339	France		383
	Romania		
	China	Germany, Federal Republic of	360
			382
341	USSR		383
342	United Kingdom	Hungary	363
343	United States	India	378
347	Netherlands	Islamic Republic of Iran	379
350	China	Mongolia	365
359	USSR	Netherlands	347
360	Germany, Federal Republic of Sweden	Pakistan	337
			375
362	Czechoslovakia	Peru	383
363	Hungary	Romania	339
			366
364	USSR	Sweden	360
365	China	USSR	341
	Mongolia		359
366	Romania		364
			383
367	Canada	United Kingdom	342
371	Austria (non-member State)	United States	338
375	Pakistan		343
	Yugoslavia		376
376	United States	Venezuela	377
377	Venezuela	Yugoslavia	375

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>9. <u>Conventional Weapons</u></p>		
378	India	<u>Non-member States</u>	
379	Islamic Republic of Iran	Austria	371
382	Germany, Federal Republic of	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	336
383	Germany, Federal Republic of		
	France		
	USSR		
	Peru		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PT	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PT
	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>10. <u>Regional disarmament</u></p>		
337	Argentina Pakistan	Argentina	337
338	German Democratic Republic	Bulgaria	378
339	Mongolia Japan France	Bulgaria (the President)	360
		France	339 383
340	Nigeria Kenya	German Democratic Republic	338
347	Yugoslavia	Germany, Federal Republic of	382 383
348	Italy	Hungary	363
360	Bulgaria (the President) Sweden	India	378
363	Hungary	Italy	348
365	Mongolia	Japan	339
371	Austria (non-member State)	Kenya	340
374	Viet Nam (non-member State)	Mongolia	339 365 378
375	Pakistan	Nigeria	340
377	Venezuela	Pakistan	337 375
378	Bulgaria India Mongolia	Sweden	360
382	Germany, Federal Republic of	USSR	383
383	Germany, Federal Republic of France USSR	Venezuela	377
		Yugoslavia	347
		<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	371
		Viet Nam	374

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>11. <u>Zones of peace</u></p>		
340	Kenya	Indonesia	376
368	Sri Lanka	Kenya	340
374	Viet Nam (non-member State)	Sri Lanka	368
376	Indonesia	<u>Non-member State</u>	
		Viet Nam	374

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PT	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PT
<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>12. <u>Reduction of military budgets</u></p>			
339	Romania	Peru	348
348	Peru		373
360	Sweden		383
373	Peru	Romania	339
383	Peru	Sweden	360

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PT	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PT
	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>13. <u>Confidence-building measures</u></p>		
336	Sweden	France	383
337	Pakistan	Germany, Federal Republic of	360
341	Hungary		382
342	United Kingdom	Hungary	341
343	United States	Pakistan	337
348	Peru		375
360	Germany, Federal Republic of	Peru	348
	Sweden	Sweden	336
363	United States		360
371	Austria (non-member State)	USSR	377
375	Pakistan		383
	Yugoslavia	United Kingdom	342
337	USSR	United States	343
382	Germany, Federal Republic of		363
383	France	Yugoslavia	375
	USSR	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	371

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>14. <u>Disarmament and international security</u></p>			
337	Pakistan	China	339
339	China	Pakistan	337
348	Peru	Peru	348
383	Peru		383

Chronological		Alphabetical	
Pt	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	Pt
	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>15. <u>Economic and social consequences of the arms race</u></p>		
336	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	China	365
	Cuba	Cuba	336
		Islamic Republic of Iran	343
339	Romania	Kenya	340
340	Kenya	Mexico	379
343	Islamic Republic of Iran	Peru	373
351	Zaire	Romania	339
365	China	Zaire	351
373	Peru	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	336
379	Mexico		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>16. <u>Disarmament and development</u></p>			
336	Cuba	Algeria	342
339	France		381
340	Sri Lanka Kenya	China	365
342	United Kingdom Algeria	Cuba	336
347	Yugoslavia	France	339
348	Peru	India	358
358	India	Kenya	340
365	China	Peru	348
368	Sri Lanka		373
373	Peru		383
381	Algeria	Sri Lanka	340
383	Peru	United Kingdom	368
		Yugoslavia	342
			347

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<u>X. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>		
	<u>17. General and complete disarmament</u>		
336	USSR Cuba Czechoslovakia	Algeria	342 381
337	Argentina Bulgaria Pakistan	Argentina Australia	337 369
338	United States German Democratic Republic Mexico	Belgium Brazil (the President)	343 352
339	Mongolia France Romania China Egypt	Bulgaria Bulgaria (the President)	337 360
340	Sri Lanka	Burma	358
341	USSR Hungary Poland	Canada Canada (the President)	367 376
342	United Kingdom India Morocco Algeria	China Cuba	339 350 365 336 359
343	Islamic (Republic of Iran) Norway (non-member State) Belgium	Czechoslovakia	336 362
347	Yugoslavia USSR Netherlands	Egypt France	339 339 383
348	Peru Italy	German Democratic Republic	338 362 363
349	United Kingdom	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	362
350	China		
351	USSR Zaire	Germany, Federal Republic of	360 382 383

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<u>X. Consideration of other areas dealing with the</u> <u>cessation of the arms race and disarmament and</u> <u>other relevant measures</u>		
	<u>17. General and complete disarmament</u>		
352	Brazil (the President)	Hungary	341
353	Romania		361
			363
356	Romania	India	342
357	Poland		358
	United States		378
358	India	Islamic Republic of Iran	343
	Burma		379
	USSR	Italy	348
359	USSR	Japan	381
	Cuba		
	Romania	Mexico	338
			379
360	Bulgaria (the President)	Mongolia	339
	Germany, Federal Republic of		365
	Sweden		
	USSR	Morocco	342
361	Venezuela		367
	Hungary	Netherlands	347
362	Czechoslovakia	Pakistan	337
	German Democratic Republic		375
	German Democratic Republic	Peru	348
	(on behalf of a group of		373
	socialist States)		
363	Hungary	Poland	341
	United States		357
	German Democratic Republic	Romania	339
364	USSR		353
365	China		356
	Mongolia		359
			366
366	Romania	Sri Lanka	340
367	Morocco		368
	Canada	Sweden	360
368	Sri Lanka		
369	Australia		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>17. <u>General and complete disarmament</u></p>		
371	Austria (non-member State)	USSR	336
373	Peru		341
375	Pakistan		347
	Yugoslavia		351
376	Canada (the President)		358
	United States		359
377	Sri Lanka		360
	USSR	United Kingdom	364
378	India		377
379	Islamic Republic of Iran		383
	Mexico	United States	342
381	Japan		349
	Algeria		338
382	Germany, Federal Republic of		357
383	Germany, Federal Republic of		363
	France		376
	USSR	Venezuela	361
		Yugoslavia	347
			375
		Zaire	351
		<u>Non-Member States</u>	
		Austria	371
		Norway	343

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>18. <u>Public Information/World Public Opinion</u></p>			
336	Australia (the President)	Australia (the President)	336
351	Cuba	Cuba	351

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>X. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>19. <u>Naval arms race</u></p>		
360	Sweden	Sweden	360

ERRATUM TO CD/PV.332

Insert the following at the beginning of the statement of Mr. Issraelyan (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics):

Thank you, Mr. President.

Had I known earlier of the sad event of Ambassador Ali Skalli's departure from Geneva, I would of course have prepared my statement in verse form, but unfortunately I was not aware of it and therefore must confine myself to greeting Ambassador Skalli and wishing him all the best. He is not only one of the oldest of us, so to speak, but also a man who has always brought a spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding to the work of our Conference. We are deeply grateful to him for this, and wish him and his family good health and success in his future activities.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.336
4 February 1986

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 4 February 1986, at 10.30 a.m. and 3.30 p.m.

President:

Mr. Richard Butler

(Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. N. KERROUM
Mr. A. BENGUERINE
Mr. A. BELAID

Argentina:

Mr. M. CAMPORA
Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER
Mr. R.A. ROWE
Ms. M. LETTS

Belgium:

Mr. C. CLERCKX
Mr. P. NIEUWENHUYS

Brazil:

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. V. BOJLOV

Burma:

U. TIN TUN
U. MYA THAN
U. HLA MYINT
DAW AYE AYE MU

Canada:

Mr. J.A. BEESLEY
Mr. D. ROCHE
Mr. A. DESPRES

China

Mr. QIAN JIADONG
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. TAN HAN
Mr. HU XIAODI
Mr. SUO KAIMING
Mr. SHA ZUKANG
Ms. WANG WEI
Mr. LI DAOZHONG

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGY
Mr. S.A. ABOU ALI
Mr. M. BADR
Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia:

Ms. K. SINEGIORGIS
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. JESSEL
Mr. G. MONTASSIER
Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. W. KRUTZSCH
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. J. DEMBSKI
Mr. M. SCHNEIDER

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. W.-N. GERMANN
Mr. M. GERDTS
Mr. H. PETERS

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TÓTH

India:

Mr. A.S. GONSALVES
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI
Mr. A. EFFENDI
Mr. R.I. JENIE
Mr. A.M. FACHIR
Mr. A. MASBAR AKBAR
Mr. F. QASIM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB
Mr. M.D. KAMALIAN
Mr. S.D. KAZZAZI
Mr. V.A. ASTANEH

Italy:

Mr. R. FRANCESCHI
Mr. F. PIAGGESI
Mr. G.A. BRACCESI
Mr. M PAVESE
Mr. E. SIVIERO

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. K. KUDO
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mr. D. AFANDE
Mr. F. JOSIAH

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.-O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. E. BENHIMA
Mr. O. HILALE
Mr. S. BENRYANE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. van SCHAIK
Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R. MILDERS

Nigeria:

Mr. B.O. TONWE
Mr. B.A. ADEYEMI
Mr. A.A. ELLA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. J.C. MARIÁTEGUI
Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES
Mr. J.F. RUBIO CORREA

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. J. RYCHLAK
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. I. VOICU
Mr. G. CHIRILA
Mr. V. FAUR
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Ms. M.B. THEORIN
Mr. R. EKEUS
Ms. E. BONNIER
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Ms. A.M. LAU
Mr. J. PRAWITZ
Ms. E. WALDER BRUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
Mr. G.V. ANTSEFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS
Mr. I.P. CHALMERS
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY
Mr. L. BELGARD
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Ms. L. BRONSON
Mr. J. ENGLEHARDT
Mr. P. GARDNER
Mr. S. GARNETT
Mr. D. LAMBERT
Mr. C. GOBRECHT
Ms. S. MANNIX
Mr. A. LIEBOWITZ
Mr. J. GRANGER
Mr. R. GOUGH
Mr. R. NELSON
Mr. R. LEVINE
Mr. R. MIKULAK
Ms. M. WINSTON
Mr. G. LOVELACE
Mr. R.L. LUACES
Mr. B. TUA

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O. GARCÍA GARCÍA
Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B. ADEITO NZENGEYA
Mr. B. KAMA
Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Under Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of
the Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 1986 session and the 336th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I am sure that all members of the Conference have learned with sadness the news of the passing away of Mrs. Alva Myrdal. Mrs. Myrdal devoted a good deal of her life to the cause of disarmament, both as a private citizen and as a member of the Swedish Government. She was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1982, together with a distinguished member of this Conference, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles. She was Minister of State for Disarmament in Sweden and leader of the delegation to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. She played an outstanding role in the multilateral disarmament negotiating body and her contribution to various disarmament agreements was immensely significant. She also wrote and lectured widely on disarmament, becoming a pioneer of new approaches and ideas in this field. I feel certain that the Conference would wish me to convey on its behalf to the delegation of Sweden, and Mrs. Myrdal's family its deep-felt condolence and its expression of gratitude for the life's work of Alva Myrdal.

May I now express our appreciation to Ambassador Mario Cámpora of Argentina for his brilliant and effective Presidency of this Conference during the period of his office last year.

As President of the Conference, I should like to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to the new representatives who are joining us for the 1986 session. One of them is well-known to us, as he was President of the Conference in March 1985. I am referring of course to Ambassador Alfonso Taylhardat of Venezuela. I should also like to welcome on behalf of the Conference Ambassadors Nouridine Kerroum of Algeria, Constant Clerckx of Belgium, U Tin Tun of Burma, Alfred Gonsalves of India, Roberto Franceschi of Italy, Denis Afande of Kenya, El Ghali Benhima of Morocco and José Carlos Mariátegui of Peru. We are all looking forward to co-operating with you in the work of the Conference.

I wish also to extend a cordial welcome to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, Mr. Jan Martenson, who is present at this opening meeting. I should also like to note the presence in the Conference on Disarmament of our host, the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Eric Suy, and I would like to thank him for the services his office provides to our Conference.

I should also like to express on behalf of the Conference our sympathy to the United States delegation and to the people of the United States for the tragic loss they suffered over Cape Canaveral a week ago today.

Now, as President of the Conference, I have the honour to present to the Conference, a statement on the occasion of the beginning of our work in 1986 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, the Honourable Bill Hayden, MP. The following is Mr. Hayden's statement.

"1986 has been proclaimed by the United Nations as the International Year of Peace.

As the Conference on Disarmament begins its negotiations in Geneva this year, governments, organizations and individuals all over the world are preparing to mark this year with special programmes designed to strengthen the United Nations and to focus attention and encourage

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reflection on the many basic requirements of peace in our contemporary world. Perhaps more than at any time since its inception, therefore, the Conference on Disarmament will come under close scrutiny this year by the world community. People will be asking: what is the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, doing to promote world peace?

Australia strongly supports the United Nations decision to declare 1986 as the International Year of Peace. The extensive programme of activities my Government has planned to mark this year reflects our profound commitment to the goals of peace and disarmament. The Australian public, for its part has responded with proposals for hundreds of projects aimed at the fulfilment of the IYP objectives at the local, the national and the international levels. This response is a clear expression of a longing for peace in all sections of our community, who see the International Year of Peace as an opportunity for a new beginning. We as a Government are accountable to our people in their aspirations for a future free of war and conflict. In the same way, this Conference is accountable to all humanity and must meet the particular challenge of this International Year of Peace.

At this time last year, the Conference on Disarmament began the seventh year of its work in its contemporary form. That was just one month after the foreign ministers of the United States of America and the Soviet Union had met in Geneva and had issued the agreement of 8 January on the resumption of bilateral nuclear and space arms control negotiations between their two countries. Their joint statement and the agreements it embodied were universally welcomed. The issues on which they had agreed to resume their bilateral negotiations are widely recognized as amongst the most crucial issues of our time. Their decision to resume their negotiations was thus of immense significance.

Naturally, at this time last year, there was widespread hope that the resumption of negotiations between the two most militarily significant Powers would have a stimulating effect upon the work of this multilateral negotiating forum. Our work in this Conference last year made a greater degree of progress than had been the case in immediately preceding years but it fell short of the expectations of the members of the conference and certainly of the world community as a whole. That community met in a Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament for the first time, in May/July 1978.

That First Special Session constituted the largest and most representative meeting of independent nations ever held to consider disarmament issues. The Final Document, adopted unanimously by it, remains a document of irreducible significance. The Declaration which forms the first part of the Final Document is a brief one comprising only 31 paragraphs, but it sets forth the key goals and concerns of the international community with regard to disarmament, the maintenance of "enduring international peace and stability", and it incorporates a reaffirmation by all States Members of the United Nations of "their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security". Just as the Charter of

(The President)

the United Nations established a common responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and affirmed the signal importance of disarmament and arms control to that end, so the Final Document of the First Special Session emphasized both the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to ensure that progress is made in disarmament, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war, and the rights and duty of all States to participate on an equal footing in multilateral disarmament negotiations.

The present form of the Conference on Disarmament was brought into existence by that Final Document of the First Special Session. A fundamental concept involved in the stated role and purpose of the Conference on Disarmament is that of our common responsibility for ensuring that disarmament plays its required role in the maintenance of peace and security and in the fabric of international relations established under the Charter of the United Nations. But equally important is the universal recognition that success in our endeavours towards arms control and disarmament require participation by the wider international community and an active and successful process of multilateral negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements. There is a good reason for this. It would be ridiculous to fail to recognize, realistically, the crucial importance of success in the bilateral negotiations presently underway between the United States and the Soviet Union. But it would also be short-sighted to dismiss the role and importance of multilateral engagement in the vital issues of arms control and disarmament.

In the Australian view, what must be done between the two major Powers and what we must do in this multilateral context has a necessary and organic relationship. The one requires the other if we are to fulfil the urgent tasks we face.

The two major Powers have special responsibilities, which they acknowledge, for the prevention of war, for reducing tensions and for the reduction of nuclear and conventional arsenals but every country has a responsibility to contribute to these objectives within its means and its area of competence. Membership of this Conference itself confers added responsibilities on each of us.

The identity of the concerns shared by the United States and the Soviet Union in their bilateral negotiations and those which we have in this unique multilateral disarmament negotiating forum was illustrated by the joint statement issued on 21 November 1985 by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev following their summit meeting in Geneva. The President and the General Secretary recognized their special responsibility for maintaining peace and "agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". They further emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them and of eschewing military superiority. A number of the items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament address the same issues. There is clearly an area of common concern in which our actions in this conference and the actions taken in major bilateral negotiations can and should be able to be made complementary.

(The President)

We should all welcome the declaration by the President and the General Secretary that they will give new impetus to their bilateral negotiations, including on the basis of the principle of 50 per cent reduction in their nuclear arms, as well as the idea of an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The same is true of their pledge to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth.

Again, there are items on the agenda of this Conference directed to the same ends. This conference should, this year, establish the required mechanisms to conduct work on the relevant items on its agenda in order to play its part in complementing the important objectives that have been agreed to by the President and the General Secretary.

It was also of very great significance that the President and the General Secretary declared, on 21 November 1985, that they favour a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They stated that "they agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter". In this context, they stated that they had agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on such a chemical weapons ban, including discussions on the question of verification.

The only place within the world community in which a full-scale and serious effort is being made towards the negotiation of a universal chemical weapons convention is in this Conference. There is perhaps no more lively and positive instance of the relationship between what must be done bilaterally and what must be done multilaterally than the subject of chemical weapons. Simply, a bilateral agreement or some other form of agreement limited to a number of States or a region of the world on the issue of chemical weapons would be of very little value. What is required with regard to those abhorrent weapons is a universal convention. For this purpose all must participate and no one should look for a partial or limited solution.

It is appropriate at this point to note that during the past seven years, although substantial and significant political negotiations have taken place within this Conference, there have been few concrete results in terms of practical progress towards disarmament agreements. We all have a vital interest in changing this situation and there is no area more likely to fulfil that vital interest, in the short term, than the area of chemical weapons. It is the Australian Government's earnest hope that in this eighth year of the Conference, real progress on a universal chemical weapons convention will be made. Every passing day makes more urgent the need to conclude this convention.

In referring to the lack of concrete results during the last seven years I have in mind, in particular, the failure of the Conference to deal adequately with major issues involving nuclear weapons - a nuclear test ban, prevention of nuclear war, cessation of the nuclear arms race.

A nuclear test ban has been called for by the international community and indeed pledged in relevant international treaties and agreements for almost a quarter of a century. There should be no further delay. It would be foolish to fail to recognize that a nuclear test ban

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outlawing all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time is an issue on which there are varying opinions and approaches. These differences must be resolved and certainly should no longer be submerged or hidden from by reference to procedural or other disputes. I call upon this Conference to make practical progress this year towards the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

For that purpose we need to establish the means of verification of such a treaty. This includes seismological and other means. With regard to seismological verification we must build further on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. Some Member States declare that the means of verification of such a treaty are already available. We believe it is incumbent on them to join with the Conference on Disarmament in demonstrating the capabilities of the system. Those who are not convinced that the means of verification are adequate should explain their difficulties in detail and, together, we should seek solutions. A major aspect of the interrelationship between the multilateral and bilateral negotiation of disarmament agreements is the opportunity which this conference has to advance prospects for agreement between the nuclear Powers on a nuclear test ban. That objective would be advanced by the Conference on Disarmament undertaking substantive work on the practical matters which must be resolved before a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty could be concluded. Australia deplores this Conference's failure to date to avail itself of this opportunity.

It is surely also the case that this Conference can and must make a useful contribution towards the deeply serious and fundamental issue of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. Multilateral measures can supplement the measures already taken by the nuclear weapon powers. The Conference must establish, early in this session, an appropriate committee on this subject on which a start can be made towards identifying further means of ensuring that nuclear war never occurs.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another urgent and complex issue and one that is on the agenda both of this Conference and the United States-USSR negotiations on nuclear and space arms. There is a compelling need and ample scope for this area to be a fruitful example of complementary work in the two forums. This Conference should establish an appropriate committee to identify and address the dimensions of the outer space issue that will maximize its contribution to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space.

Reference to these issues which have been contentious in the past in the Conference on Disarmament, introduces some questions regarding the working methodologies of the Conference which, in many respects, have served us well but in some respects have come to hinder real progress towards the fulfilment of our responsibilities. Paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the First Special Session gave this Conference the clear responsibility and duty to negotiate disarmament and arms control agreements. It also allows the Conference to determine its own working methodologies. The rules of procedure of the conference give the Conference complete facility to take whatever decisions it deems appropriate for the effective discharge of its responsibilities. Under these circumstances, extended argument on form as against substance, on mandates for ad hoc committees as against their programme of work and,

(The President)

more importantly, arguments preventing decisions to establish the required committees and get work under way are sterile and unnecessary arguments. My Government is deeply concerned that, with respect to some items on the agenda of this Conference, those formal arguments have assumed an importance that contradicts the terms of paragraph 120 of the Final Document and the responsibilities of this Conference.

During the month in which Australia holds the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament we will seek, in consultation with others, to solve this problem. We will do so on the basis that we do not believe that any formal argument can be more important than this Conference conducting practical work on each of the items on its agenda. I ask for the co-operation of all Member States in this Conference in an attempt to find a way to sort out the relationship between form and substance, to find a way to bring to bear the flexibility that is available to us under our rules of procedure so as to ensure that no one will be able to say again that we preferred to argue about form rather than to get on with substantive work.

It is also important for the outcome of our work to be reported to other members of the world community not directly represented in this Conference. I have in mind our annual report on our work to the General Assembly. It has become of considerable concern to my Government that the process of constructing that annual report has become unnecessarily tortuous. Again, during the month of our Presidency we will enter into informal consultations on an approach to the construction of the annual report of the Conference which will seek to remove the adversarial procedures which have been followed in the past and put in their place an approach which is clear, constructive and factual. There is no need for our report to repeat statements which have already been made and are readily available in the verbatim records of the plenary.

All of us who sit in this Conference are privileged to do so. We have been asked to carry out work which is viewed as vital, around the world. All of us here are present at great cost and effort to our Governments and the peoples we represent. All of us here work hard in seeking to find solutions to the enormous problems which confront us. Thus it makes no sense that we should so often fail to get to the point of addressing these problems -- some of us preferring formal dispute to practical progress. None of us here, no matter the differences between us in terms of political perspective, economic development, or the length of time in which we have been self-respecting and independent members of the world community, have an interest in seeing the Conference on Disarmament continue to fail to produce the agreements for which it has been made uniquely responsible. None of us here ever state that we think this work, this responsibility, is too hard or not worth our efforts. Thus our commitment and our vision should impel us to work together in fulfilment of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the goals set forth in the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

There are great disparities of power and responsibility between those few States that have great military power, indeed great destructive capability, and those that share this earth with them. But the body of

(The President)

principles which brings us together in this Conference takes account both of this disparity and also of our inescapable interdependence. This relationship is an organic one: we need to work together because none of us can ultimately survive without a great co-operative effort.

While the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons depends fundamentally on the actions of a few of us, the development of a climate of confidence within which such reductions will be able to be negotiated requires the contribution of all of us. The negotiation of effective measures of disarmament is one of the highest priorities of Australian policy. Thus the Australian delegation will again play a full and active part in the work of this Conference in 1986. The appeal of my Government to this Conference is this. We should seize the opportunities that are now before us, in the light of what has occurred during the last 12 months.

We should make 1986, the International Year of Peace, the year in which the modern Conference on Disarmament came into its own and made a direct and positive contribution to disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security."

I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Miljan Komatina who, in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, will read out a message addressed to us from Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar.

Mr. KOMATINA (Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The following is the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the 1986 Session of the Conference on Disarmament:

"Last year, on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the United Nations, there was a broad renewal by Member States of commitment to the purposes and principle of the Charter, with particular emphasis on those directly related to the maintenance of international peace and security. I believe that this commitment must, to be meaningful, necessarily entail concerted and sustained efforts toward disarmament. The intensification of such efforts during the past months is most welcome as essential to the achievement of the world of peace and well-being for which the United Nations was established.

The summit meeting in Geneva between leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States brought forth a number of important proposals which are presently under negotiation. The declaration made by them to the effect that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and that neither side will seek to achieve military superiority, has profound significance. Great importance must be attached, too, to the agreement of the two sides to accelerate their negotiations towards the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons as well as to recent proposals put forward separately on the subject. The constructive nature of the discussions in Geneva, have, moreover, resulted in an atmosphere more conducive to productive negotiations on many issues related to international security.

(Mr. Komatina, Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations)

I am confident that this will find reflection in the deliberations during the present session of the Conference on Disarmament. Some recent developments with regard to the verification aspects of specific arms limitation and disarmament measures may also facilitate productive negotiations. I believe that a prospect of significant progress has been opened.

The general improvement in the international climate, however, in no sense decreases the size of the task of reaching tangible agreements which still lies before us. The dangers stemming from the existence of large arsenals of nuclear weapons have not diminished and to these are added the ever-increasing stocks of conventional weapons. In many places, the use of force continues to bring destruction and death and to hold in jeopardy the needed increase in international confidence, the growth in global military expenditures has not yet been halted, while vast areas of the world suffer a serious lack of resources for development.

As the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body of the international community, the Conference on Disarmament, has a major role in the completion of the practical disarmament agreements which are so badly needed. It is the appropriate and competent forum where the positive developments which have recently emerged should also find expression in specific agreements. Numerous resolutions of the fortieth session of the General Assembly, in requesting you to endeavour to achieve concrete results on arms limitation and disarmament, give recognition to the unique potential of this Conference. Your agenda encompasses major areas of international concern which impinge on the future of humanity. No task can have greater importance than developing and reaching agreement on effective and practical measures to prevent nuclear war. In this context, the conclusion of a complete ban on nuclear testing should surely continue to have the highest priority. The urgency of this question is underlined by the evident dynamism of the technology of nuclear destruction. Just as the human mind is challenged by the seemingly limitless possibilities of technological advance, it must be challenged by the even more important possibility of ensuring that these advances serve only the well-being and peace that humanity needs. So, I believe, it should be with the Earth's resources and with the space that surrounds and shields our planet as a whole.

The complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons has been, for a number of years, the most productive area of negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament. Given the work already done in elaborating a Convention and the summit commitment of the two major Powers to accelerate agreement on a comprehensive ban on these weapons, it seems reasonable to expect that the remaining obstacles can be overcome during 1986. Indeed, I would hope that the multilateral negotiating process may regain a momentum which will lead to progress on many outstanding issues.

1986 is the International Year of Peace, the theme of which is the safeguarding of peace and humanity. It has begun under hopeful auspices of new opportunities to deal constructively with problems which threaten international security. Foremost among these is the problem of disarmament. The hope with which the Year begins can be fulfilled only

(Mr. Komatina, Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations)

if the foundations for significant measures of arms limitation and disarmament are speedily laid. All Governments know that, in this nuclear age, any major conflict carries with it the risk of world-wide disaster. All must recognize the common responsibility which this imposes for the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of international security. Your Conference has a major role to play in making it possible for this responsibility to be met.

I wish you every success in your negotiations."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for his statement. I would ask him to convey to Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar our appreciation for his message to the Conference and for the interest he shows in our work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sweden, Cuba, Czechoslovakia and Canada.

I now give the floor to the first speaker of the 1986 session, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, from a strictly chronological point of view you are not one who can boast of being among the longest standing members of the Conference on Disarmament. But while long standing membership is certainly valuable, it is not of course decisive, nor can it be compared to the possession of outstanding personal qualities such as those you have already displayed so often in your participation in the discussions of this multilateral negotiating body, in your brilliant chairmanship last year of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and in the effectiveness with which you have been able in the General Assembly to advance the projects initiated by your country on the subject of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, to which both Mexico and Australia attribute the utmost importance.

What I have just briefly said more than suffices to explain, I think, why my delegation is happy to see you directing our work in this first month of the session of the Conference for 1986, which the United Nations has designated as the "International Year of Peace".

I think it opportune to emphasize that we fully share the views stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia in the message just read out by our President regarding the need to observe the principles and to put into practice the purposes of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament, which my delegation, in order to highlight its significance to us, usually refers to as the Bible of Disarmament.

I should also like to reiterate my congratulations to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Mario Cárpora for the exemplary manner in which he chaired our Conference during what is the longest period of each year, from August to early February. I should also like to associate my delegation with your words of welcome to the distinguished representatives who are taking their place in the Conference for the first time, and once again express our

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

pleasure at the presence among us of the Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Martenson, and the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Komatina and Mr. Beresátegui, and the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Suy.

In a totally different frame of mind, I should like, in this place where her spirited eloquence in the cause of disarmament was so often to be heard, to voice my profound grief at the death of Alva Myrdal, with whom I had the privilege of sharing the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982 and whom I ventured at that time to refer to as my old friend and companion in numerous battles for the same cause in the forums of multilateral diplomacy. As the Nobel Committee rightly said when it gave the reasons for its choice of that year, she undoubtedly contributed through her outstanding activity in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the early years of the conference of the Committee on Disarmament to opening the world's eyes to the threat facing mankind as the nuclear arms race continued.

Lastly, I should also like to express the similar sentiments with which my delegation heard the news of the tragic accident which destroyed the space shuttle Challenger and annihilated its seven crew-members. Their names will certainly go to join those who have given their lives for the conquest of space, something which we trust can take place one day, bearing in mind that its exploration and use must, as the international instruments in force already envisage, be for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Today sees the start of the eighth session of this body which the General Assembly described in the 1978 Final Document as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum".

As was to be expected in a year like that which has just ended, one in which the United Nations celebrated its fortieth anniversary, the number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly based on recommendations by its First Committee exceeded the already high level of the previous year and reached the number of 67.

As is usual, these resolutions have been transmitted to us by the Secretary-General with indications as to which of them confer responsibilities on the Conference on Disarmament and which are also concerned with disarmament affairs but do not expressly require any intervention by the Conference.

It is not my intention in this first statement with which, in accordance with honoured tradition, it devolves on the delegation of Mexico to initiate our discussions for 1986, to endeavour to consider all these resolutions. I shall merely try to make a brief analysis of three out of the eight which the General Assembly devoted to the items which occupy the first three places on the agenda of the Conference, all concerning nuclear disarmament, for reasons which I shall explain in due course, I shall add to them a fourth resolution which deals with the fifth item of the agenda.

The item which from the start has headed the agenda of what we now call the Conference, and which in 1978 was called the Committee, is that entitled "Nuclear test ban", on which the Assembly this year adopted no less than four different resolutions. I am here only going to consider the first, which bears the number 40/80 A, since this was the resolution which received the largest number of votes in favour -- 124.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The resolution has many points in common with that adopted last year. For example, it stresses that the question has been examined for more than 25 years and is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which the General Assembly has repeatedly assigned the highest priority. It also stresses that on eight different occasions the General Assembly, the most representative body of the international community, has condemned nuclear tests in the strongest terms and has stated its conviction that the continuance of testing "will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war". It also reiterates the assertion made in several previous resolutions that, "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban".

The resolution also includes some new paragraphs in its preamble dealing with very recent events subsequent to the adoption of the latest resolution on the subject. One of these recalls that the Secretary-General, addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, after appealing for a renewed effort towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty, "emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament". Another of these new paragraphs is the penultimate paragraph of the preamble in which it is noted that "the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration approved in September 1985, called on the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament".

The innovations contained in the resolution are even more important in the operative section, in which two paragraphs, if strictly complied with, could have a decisive influence on achieving the aim which has been pursued for so long.

The first of these two paragraphs is paragraph 5, in which the General Assembly "appeals to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament", in particular to the three depositary Powers of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 "to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1986 session of an ad hoc committee to carry out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions".

The second of the two paragraphs to which I referred is paragraph 6, which follows on from the previous paragraph, because the General Assembly recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that it "instruct such ad hoc committee to establish two working groups which will deal, respectively, with the following interrelated questions:

Working Group I - Structure and scope of the Treaty

Working Group II - Compliance and verification".

The resolution concludes, in a form very similar to the five consecutive resolutions approved annually by the General Assembly since December 1980, by calling upon the depositary States of the Moscow Treaty and the

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Non-Proliferation Treaty to "bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria, for which they would then proceed to negotiate the establishment of appropriate means of verification", and by deciding to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session an item with the same title of "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions".

There are some pertinent new elements I shall now enumerate, which would tend to allow for a reasonable dose of optimism regarding the receptiveness of the Conference to the appeal by the General Assembly.

The six Heads of State or Government who issued a joint statement in May 1984 -- Argentina, Greece, India, Sweden, Tanzania and Mexico -- signed another declaration in New Delhi on 28 January 1985, urging nuclear-weapon States "to immediately halt the testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons, and to conclude, at an early date, a treaty on a nuclear weapon test ban", describing the latter as one of the two specific steps which "today require special attention". The value of this appeal is enhanced if it is borne in mind that the New Delhi Declaration led to the award to its authors of the "Beyond War" prize on 14 December.

It should also be borne in mind that the General Assembly adopted resolution 40/94 L on 12 December, by 131 votes in favour and none against. In this resolution, inter alia, it stresses the "fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them" and urged "all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions subscribed to". The significance of this resolution in the case with which I am concerned here is still greater when it is remembered that the draft on which it was based was submitted to the First Committee on 7 November by one of the States which had hitherto been opposing the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body to deal with the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. The substance of the resolution which I have just mentioned, which is adequately illustrated by the two paragraphs I have quoted, leads us to hope that this year that State will temper its opposition, since the cessation in question is expressly provided for in two treaties -- the Partial Test Ban of 1963 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 -- both of which are international instruments to which the State referred to is not only a State party but also one of the three depositaries.

It should also be mentioned that the recent conduct of another of the three depositary States in this regard is extremely encouraging, since in addition to having voted in favour of the resolution which I have been describing, its Government made a statement on 29 July 1985 to the effect that it had decided to halt unilaterally all nuclear explosions between 6 August and 31 December 1985, adding that this moratorium would "continue in effect beyond that date if the United States, for its part, refrains from carrying out nuclear explosions". As we know, the term fixed was subsequently extended by an additional three months as from the date mentioned in a further statement on 15 January of this year in which the new expiry date of 31 March 1986 is expressly left open to extension if the conditions mentioned in the previous statement are met, namely, the suspension of nuclear testing by the United States.

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Lastly, it should be borne in mind that inadequate means of verification, an argument adduced on previous occasions as an excuse for not accepting a comprehensive nuclear test ban, can no longer be considered an obstacle, since the Soviet Union has, for its part, in the statement of 15 January I have already quoted, expressed with the utmost clarity its acceptance that appropriate measures of verification should be ensured entirely by national technical means and by international procedures, including on-site inspections, should this be necessary. Again, the six authors of the New Delhi Declaration in the message addressed to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 24 October 1985, after proposing the suspension of all nuclear tests for a period of 12 months, stated that:

"The problems of verifying the suspension we propose are difficult, but not insurmountable ... Third-party verification could provide a high degree of certainty that testing programmes have ceased. We propose to establish verification mechanisms on our territories to achieve this objective."

With regard to the item which has invariably occupied the second place in the agenda of this multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, namely, the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", two resolutions were devoted wholly to this among those adopted by the General Assembly at its fortieth session; resolution 40/152 P, the title of which is identical to that of the agenda item, obtained the larger number of votes in favour: 131.

The resolution contains in its preamble a recapitulation of the background to this issue and particular mention may be made of the statement by the General Assembly in the 1978 Final Document that "the nuclear arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary weakens it and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war".

The preamble to the resolution also stresses what the General Assembly had said in paragraph 47 of the Final Document, namely, that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects and that the ultimate goal in this context is the "complete elimination of nuclear weapons".

The resolution also includes a paragraph intended to place special emphasis on the fact that "all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike".

In the operative part, the resolution notes -- and this is of particular interest to the members of the Conference -- that the initiation of bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms in no way diminishes "the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament". It therefore again requests the Conference to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1986 session to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document by means of the process indicated, which should culminate in "substantial reduction in the existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination".

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At its most recent session, the General Assembly also adopted two resolutions specifically devoted to the item occupying the third place on our Conference agenda, namely, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", of these the resolution which received the larger number of votes in favour -- 136 -- was resolution 40/152 Q. In this resolution the General Assembly reiterated, inter alia, that "it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war", and reaffirmed once more its conviction that "the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risk of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority and of vital interest to all peoples of the world". It is obvious from this that "the prevention of nuclear war is a problem too important to be left to the nuclear-weapon States alone".

On the basis of what was said in the preamble to the resolution, the General Assembly noted with regret that the Conference on Disarmament has been unable even to establish a subsidiary body on the question, and reiterates its conviction of the urgency of this matter. It again requested the Conference on Disarmament "to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1986 session".

As I announced at the beginning, in addition to the resolutions which I have just reviewed and all refer to questions of nuclear disarmament, I shall now consider another resolution that also falls in the category of those which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament and which, for reasons which to me seem obvious, should be given the same degree of priority as the others, both because of the importance of the topic and because of the impressive result of its adoption by 151 votes in favour and none against, thanks to the arduous negotiations co-ordinated by the distinguished representatives of Egypt and Sri Lanka in the First Committee.

The resolution in question, resolution 40/87, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" is, with reason, somewhat lengthy. In the preamble, it reaffirms the wish of all States that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, that they "shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries" and that they "shall be the province of all mankind". It also reaffirms the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, particularly those of articles III and IV, and those of paragraph 80 of the 1978 Final Document, in which it was stated that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit" of the Treaty I have just mentioned.

The General Assembly has also expressed its grave concern "at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and in particular by the impending threat of exacerbating the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security" and create obstacles to "the peaceful uses of outer space".

As to the operative part of the resolution, it would seem useful fundamentally to emphasize the following:

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The call to all States, in particular those with major space capabilities "to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding".

The exhortation, addressed to the United States and the Soviet Union, urging them "seriously to pursue their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching an early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament regularly of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work".

Thirdly, the call to all States, especially those with major space capabilities, "to refrain in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space".

Lastly, I have intentionally left the two quotations which I am now going to recall, from paragraphs 6 and 9 of the resolution, to conclude my series of quotations, since both refer expressly to the Conference on Disarmament.

In paragraph 6, the General Assembly reiterated "that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

In paragraph 9, the General Assembly unequivocally requested the Conference "to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its session of 1986, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

As this statement is becoming somewhat lengthy, I shall leave until later my concern, which I hope to be able to express, regarding a number of other items to which my delegation attributes particular significance, such as the prohibition of chemical weapons, on which the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has been so ably directed by the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski, and now has fairly encouraging prospects of achieving the desired conventions, the comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, on which we venture to hope that the Conference can give a positive response at the request of the General Assembly by submitting a complete draft for the Programme at its next session, the World Disarmament Campaign for which Mexico had the privilege of taking the initiative in 1980, the nuclear weapons freeze which the General Assembly has been recommending periodically so as to ensure that nuclear-weapon stockpiles do not continue to grow while disarmament negotiations are going ahead, and the nuclear winter, regarding which the General Assembly, rightly alarmed by the data contained in the report by the Secretary-General, has asked the latter to make a study on the climatic effects and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including its socio-economic consequences.

For the moment, I should simply like to emphasize that the number of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, a number which, as I have already said, is the highest ever recorded in the annals of the Organization, would be entirely worthless if

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Member States made no effort to implement them. Among them are several like the four I have considered here, whose implementation is anxiously awaited by all the peoples of the Earth and a start could at least be made on them, should it still be necessary to make distinctions in this respect, by applying what the six Heads of State or Government stressed most particularly in the New Delhi Declaration when they said that "two specific steps today require special attention: the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for this statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to congratulate you on your assumption of the responsible post of President of the Conference for the month of February. I wish to express the hope that it will be possible during this month to make progress in our work and to resolve the organizational questions which have frequently taken up so much of our time in the past. We also hope that during the session of the Conference on Disarmament which is opening today the positions of our delegations will be brought closer through further contacts; in our opinion, this will be in keeping with the spirit of the times.

We also express our gratitude to Ambassador M. Cámpora of Argentina, who presided over the Conference on Disarmament in August 1985 and represented it with such distinction during the intersessional period.

I should also like to welcome our new colleagues, the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Kerroum, the representative of Burma, Ambassador U Tin Tun, the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat, the representative of India, Ambassador Gonsalves, the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Afande, the representative of Morocco Ambassador Benhima, the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Clerckx, and the representative of Italy, Ambassador Franceschi. I express the hope that relations of mutual understanding and co-operation will develop between the delegations headed by them and the Soviet delegation. As far as we are concerned, we shall do everything in our power to that end.

It is with deep regret that we have learned of the death of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, the eminent Swedish diplomat, world-renowned disarmament specialist and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. We extend our condolences to the delegation of Sweden and request it to convey them to her family and friends.

We have already expressed our sympathy to the delegation of the United States of America in connection with the tragic loss of the crew of the space shuttle Challenger.

Mankind has entered the year of 1986, which was proclaimed the International Year of Peace by a decision of the United Nations. We see now favourable possibilities for overcoming the confrontational trends that have

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built up in world politics in recent years, for beginning to clear the ways to the curtailment of the arms race -- and first of all, the nuclear arms race -- on Earth and to the prevention of the appearance of weapons in outer space.

The results of the meeting between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, and the President of the United States of America, R. Reagan, that took place here in Geneva in November 1985 have already had a certain positive influence on the political and psychological climate in current international relations. The agreement reached between the leaders of the two Powers and expressed in the joint Soviet-American statement to the effect that nuclear war must never be fought and cannot be won has been welcomed with approval everywhere in the world. The recognition by both sides of the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional, and the statement that they will not seek to achieve military superiority are of fundamental significance.

It is particularly important to create conditions that would enable the good seeds of the Geneva meeting to produce good, sturdy offspring, since big differences on problems of principle, including the central issues of security, do remain between the USSR and the United States. The Geneva meeting created a real chance to reduce the military threat, to restore confidence as an element of international relations. Present-day world politics of today are not so rich in positive elements as to let slip that chance, to allow the gleam of nascent hope to die out. Practical deeds and new actions are needed to prevent that and to ensure a real change for the better, to move, finally, from the arms race to arms limitation, from confrontation and banking on force to co-operation and consideration for each other's legitimate interests.

The Soviet delegation has come to this session of the Conference on Disarmament with a firm resolve to achieve a change in the work of the Conference, to put an end to the period of stagnation which has been characteristic of its activity for many years now.

Life demands the putting into motion of the entire existing system of negotiations, the securing of the highest possible efficiency of the existing mechanisms of disarmament, including, naturally, the single global multilateral forum for negotiations on disarmament issues, the Conference on Disarmament, whose agenda includes all the central issues relating to the preservation of peace.

The most important event of the year that has just begun and one which has justly been evaluated all over the world as a courageous and constructive step towards the solution of the most vital problems of world development, has been the statement made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, on 15 January. (At the request of the Soviet delegation, this statement has been distributed as an official document of the Conference, CD/649).

The statement contains a concrete programme for complete nuclear disarmament within the next 15 years. The USSR proposes that agreement be reached without delay on entering the third millennium without nuclear arms, achieving the complete elimination of the chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction, and preventing the spread of the arms race into outer space.

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The acceptance of the programme of nuclear disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union would, undoubtedly, have a favourable influence on the talks that are held in bilateral and multilateral fora. Such a programme would fix precisely defined routes and targets, establish specific time-limits for reaching and implementing agreements and give the talks on the issues of nuclear disarmament direction and purpose.

The Soviet delegation is confident that the comprehensive programme of disarmament set forth in the statement by Mikhail S. Gorbachev will be of real help in the Conference's substantive work on all the items on its agenda. We express the hope that all States represented at the Conference will support the proposals contained in that statement. We urge particularly the United States delegation to confirm in deeds its country's declarations about its commitment to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, to translate into the language of practical actions the joint Soviet-American agreement to the effect that efforts in the area of the limitation and reduction of armaments should result in the liquidation of nuclear weapons completely and everywhere.

One of the most important elements of the Soviet programme is the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, which is justly considered everywhere as one of the most effective measures of nuclear disarmament.

As no other issue, the banning of nuclear weapon tests has been thoroughly studied from all aspects, it is the issue on which concrete results -- weighty and tangible ones -- are already within reach. The Soviet Union is resolutely in favour of starting the relevant negotiations without delay.

The Soviet Union has shown by deeds its readiness for practical steps leading to the immediate cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. As is known, on 6 August 1985 the Soviet Union introduced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. However, the United States did not follow that example, it responded to the demands of the overwhelming majority of States and world public opinion with new American nuclear blasts. Naturally, the Soviet Union had every right to resume nuclear testing after the moratorium expired on 31 December 1985. We nevertheless took a different decision, we extended our unilateral moratorium until next 31 March. That was not an easy decision, but we took it because we are guided by the supreme interests of international security.

As Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR pointed out, "If the American Administration avails itself of this new opportunity it has been given and stops nuclear-weapon tests, that would, naturally, create a more favourable background for the summit meeting of the leaders of the two countries. If it does not do that, the atmosphere in our relations would look utterly different, including the area that is relevant to the dialogue at the highest level".

It goes without saying that the reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons are possible only in the event of the solution of the question of the prevention of the arms race in outer space, which rightfully occupies one of the central places in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. As M.S. Gorbachev stressed the other day, "The Soviet Union has been and remains an irreconcilable opponent, as a matter of principle, of the 'star wars' project. And that is not because the project is American. We in Moscow

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regard this matter in the following way. It is impossible to create a universal space defence, it is, at best, an illusion and that from the technical, economic and political viewpoints. Any 'space shield' can, however, very easily be turned into a 'space sword'. And he who holds that sword may fail to resist the temptation to use it. That is the crux of the matter, that is the origin of our position, which is dictated by the interests of maintaining peace and by nothing else".

An important place in the statement of Mikhail S. Gorbachev was devoted to the problem of the prohibition and complete elimination of chemical weapons, including the elimination of the industrial base for their production. These provisions are directly relevant to the negotiations being conducted within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

Together with the withdrawal of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of States, the statement contains new proposals by the USSR regarding agreed reductions of conventional weapons and armed forces, confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe. It advances the idea of banning the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity is close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction.

As stated by the Soviet leadership, the Soviet Union is on the whole gratified by the way the new Soviet proposals have been received in the world -- by our friends and allies and by those who are responsible for the policy of the Western Powers. They have become the subject of attentive study, of analysis, of comments by politicians and by the press of every orientation, by a broad spectrum of the public in practically all countries. It is already evident that many have been able to see through to the heart, the very essence of the Soviet plan: a serious attempt to come to grips with the problems of international security, to concentrate attention on the pivotal task of finding ways of ensuring the survival of humanity.

Of course, we in the Soviet Union did not and do not expect that the implementation of the proposals advanced by the USSR to be simple and easy. Complex negotiations will be required. We are confident, however, that these difficulties can be overcome, given a mutual aspiration to agreement and the political will to rid mankind of the threat of nuclear war. It is important to take a fresh look at many issues, to approach their solution from unbiased positions, without prejudice and free from the burden of mutual mistrust that has been accumulating year after year. As the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, has observed, "Many habitual convictions and traditionally held views that were possibly correct 30, 20 or even 10 years ago are now hopelessly outdated. In this nuclear age, the world that is armed to the teeth and continues arming itself is fraught with the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war even assuming that nobody wants that". The Soviet proposals open up a practicable path to the exit from the nuclear deadlock, to the reliable securing of peace on the entire planet.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that 1986, which began under favourable omens, will occupy a befittingly important place in the history of the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that, by joint efforts of all the States represented at the Conference, it will at last be possible this year to achieve final agreement on certain items of the agenda and tangible progress in the negotiations on others. The Soviet delegation is prepared to make its contribution to this joint endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin.

Ms. THEORIN (Sweden): Mr. President, it is with a sense of great loss that the Swedish people has learned about the passing of Alva Myrdal.

For the Conference on Disarmament, the name of Alva Myrdal carries a special significance. She participated from the outset in 1962 as the Swedish delegate in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva and later in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament until she retired from public service in 1973. From 1967 she served as Minister for Disarmament in the Swedish Cabinet.

During this period, from 1962 to 1973, Alva Myrdal participated in shaping the role of the smaller States and in identifying the task of the neutral non-aligned States in the multilateral disarmament negotiations.

Based upon well-researched facts, she developed a critical attitude towards the major nuclear-weapon States. Alva Myrdal saw early the importance of factual competence in the multilateral disarmament negotiations. In Sweden she managed to turn some military resources into scientific research in support of the disarmament negotiations.

In her effort to build up a competence among the neutral and non-aligned States sufficient for a correct analysis of the many complex issues under negotiation, Alva Myrdal was instrumental in the establishment of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI. The activities of SIPRI should be well known to the Conference.

A complete record of Alva Myrdal's work for disarmament cannot be made within the time available at one meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I will just mention a few of her initiatives.

Alva Myrdal initiated several proposals that became fundamental in subsequent negotiations. In the early days of the ENDC she spent a great deal of effort on a ban on nuclear tests. In August 1962 (ENDC/PV.64), she suggested that verification of a test ban should be based on the findings of the scientific community of the world, and not on bilateral and mutual observations by the intelligence services of the super-Powers. Her model was the project of the International Geophysical Year of 1957.

This idea was later followed up by the proposal, in 1965 (ENDC/154), of the "detection club" and the setting-up of an advanced seismic observatory in Sweden the next year. The detection club constitutes the origin of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

In 1966 Alva Myrdal developed the "verification by challenge" concept in a comprehensive effort to solve the test-ban verification problems (ENDC/PV.247).

Generally speaking, Alva Myrdal by these concepts opened the test-ban issue to negotiation, co-operation and verification for all States, not only for the nuclear-weapon States. Her line of openness was continued in the

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proposal in 1972 for general access to satellite data for verification purposes, an idea that was rejected by the leading space Powers at the time, but has since been pursued by others.

Alva Myrdal generally stood for comprehensive solutions to issues under consideration. She favoured a ban on both biological and chemical weapons, not only the biological and toxin ones. She favoured a ban on all weapons on the sea-bed, not only those of mass destruction. She favoured the application of IAEA safeguards on the peaceful nuclear activities in all States, not only in the non-nuclear-weapon States. But, to her sincere regret, she and all others who worked for the same cause were overruled by co-chairmen compromises.

Alva Myrdal took a very active part in the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For her this work also included the final writing-off of nuclear weapons by Sweden, her own country.

In the summer of 1973 Alva Myrdal successfully took the lead in the international protest against the idea of developing mini-nuclear weapons.

In 1982, together with Ambassador García Robles, Alva Myrdal was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. She donated her prize to continued work for peace.

Finally, I would like to mention her work for denuclearization of the seas and oceans of the world. In 1984 she initiated an international symposium on the subject, contributing to the subsequent work in this field of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. She will not be able to learn about the result of this work.

Alva Myrdal insisted, particularly in moments of despair, that it is beyond human dignity to give up. The best way to pay tribute to the memory of Alva Myrdal is never to resign in front of the difficulties, but to meet the challenges with constructive action.

Mr. President, may I express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you in the Chair, Ambassador Butler, as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. On behalf of the Swedish delegation, I wish to express gratitude for your most kind and commemorative words about Alva Myrdal. You have expressed the sentiments of the Conference and your words will be conveyed to the family of Alva Myrdal. I will also express my deep appreciation of the words of sympathy regarding Alva Myrdal expressed to my delegation by the leader of the Mexican delegation, Ambassador García Robles, and by the leader of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Issraelyan. I would like to extend to your predecessor as President of the Conference, Ambassador Cámpora my sincere thanks for the skilful way in which he guided the Conference during the closing month of the previous session and up to the opening of this session. I would also like to direct a heartfelt welcome to nine other colleagues, Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, Ambassador Gonsalves of India, Ambassador Franceschi of Italy, Ambassador Afande of Kenya, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, Ambassador Mariátegui of Peru and Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela. I wish to pledge to our new colleagues the full co-operation of the delegation of Sweden.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

During the early years of this decade we witnessed a continued arms build-up in many parts of the world. Tensions between the main actors on the world stage increased. Their allies, as well as non-aligned nations, were also affected. The economic and social situation in many developing countries deteriorated.

Today's situation is, of course, far from satisfactory. But at least the two leading military Powers seem to realize that they have more to gain through co-operation than confrontation. A political foundation has been laid for progress in the field of disarmament as well as in other areas. It is now vital that efforts be pursued to achieve concrete results.

This Conference has an important role to play in this process.

Last year's session of the General Assembly coincided with the Fortieth Anniversary of the United Nations, which provided us with an occasion to assess what had been achieved so far by the Organization. It also gave us an opportunity to set our sights at the challenges of the future.

Although negotiations in the field of disarmament have produced some concrete results, which should not be underestimated, there was a general concern that the nuclear arms race continues unabated. During the Assembly, and especially in the work of the First Committee, it was made abundantly clear that the most urgent task is to reduce, and ultimately to eliminate, the risk of nuclear war.

The work in the First Committee took place in a constructive spirit. The sterile and unproductive polemics between the military alliances, which have so often infected the atmosphere of the Committee, were almost absent from the debate. The change in the political climate could also be noted in the approaches to certain resolutions. A feeling of guarded optimism regarding the future inspired the delegations.

The summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev and their joint statement, as well as the positive outcome of the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), were important factors in creating favourable conditions for the work in the First Committee.

It is to be hoped that the positive spirit of the First Committee will be strengthened in the Conference on Disarmament. The General Assembly urged the Conference to begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and to conclude the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament was also requested to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, and to accelerate its negotiations on a multilateral convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the Conference was requested to continue its negotiations on the subject of radiological weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament should now, without delay, agree on appropriate mandates so that the actual work can start. The Conference must live up to the expectations and demands of the international community.

During last year's session of the Conference no progress was made towards achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty. In spite of this discouraging fact, the question of such a ban did play an essential role at the Third NPT Review Conference and in the First Committee.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

Let us first look at the preliminary statistics on nuclear explosions according to the National Defence Research Institute in Sweden. A total of 1,567 nuclear explosions were registered between 1945 and 1985. The United States of America leads this gloomy competition with 801 explosions: 212 in the atmosphere and 589 underground, followed by the Soviet Union with 563 explosions: 161 in the atmosphere and 402 underground. France, the United Kingdom and China have conducted 135, 38 and 29 nuclear explosions respectively. And India has carried out one nuclear explosion.

A total of 30 presumed nuclear explosions were detected throughout the world in 1985. The corresponding number for 1984 was 55. The considerably lower figure for 1985 was mainly due to a halt in Soviet testing between 6 August and 31 December. Last year, France, in fact, overtook the Soviet Union in this morbid competition and carried out eight tests in the South Pacific. The Soviet Union carried out seven explosions and the United States 15. No tests were detected for either the United Kingdom or China.

Our analysis of the seismic data for the explosions of the United States and the Soviet Union in 1985 is consistent with the a priori assumption that the yields from the observed explosions were below the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit of 150 kilotons. One of the French explosions had an estimated yield in the order of 150 kilotons.

The fact that the total number of tests has declined could be greeted with satisfaction. And in this context a smaller figure is naturally better than a larger. But, in my view, this gives no real reason for satisfaction. A treaty prohibiting all tests in all environments for all time is still expressed as being only a long-term goal by one nuclear-weapon State. Another nuclear-weapon State continues testing in a distant region, where the nations in this region are strongly opposed to the tests.

In this connection, I would like to warn once again against some gradual or threshold approaches to a test ban. Such approaches will not stop the development of new nuclear weapons or over time render existing weapons obsolete. This can be achieved only by a comprehensive test ban treaty. A threshold approach is acceptable to Sweden only if it is directly linked to an effective comprehensive test ban from an agreed date, and if the phase-out period is kept short.

Let me refer to last year's Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference was successful to an extent that few had expected. Still, harsh criticism was raised against the nuclear-weapon States for not having fulfilled their obligations under article VI.

In the Final Declaration, regret was expressed that a multilateral treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far. A call was made on the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations already in 1985. In addition, all the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament.

The nuclear-weapon Powers parties to the NPT have always expressed a commitment to the authority, efficiency and survival of the Treaty. There

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

could, in my mind be no better way to demonstrate such a commitment than to heed the call for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Such a treaty is the key factor in any process of nuclear disarmament.

Just as Sweden welcomed the temporary unilateral moratorium on testing proclaimed by the Soviet Union last summer, we welcome its recent decision to prolong this moratorium. We still nourish the hope that the United States and other nuclear-weapon States will join the moratorium and that it will last until a comprehensive test ban treaty enters into force.

The adoption by the General Assembly last year of some important resolutions on the issue of a nuclear test ban, as well as other events, display clearly the strong demand of the international community for a halt in the nuclear testing.

This body can no longer, in the face of these developments, afford not to take action. Sweden is among those countries which have worked actively for a comprehensive nuclear test ban for many years. The draft treaty text (CD/381) submitted in 1983 is but one example. We have insisted on the start of negotiations. At the same time, differing views on how a mandate for an ad hoc committee should be formulated must not prevent the start of substantive work on this important question, which has the highest priority on our agenda.

Disarmament negotiations in other areas have taught us that, by creating a working process, many unsettled questions can be solved and a deadlock be broken, leading up to full negotiations. It is true that a body working according to the principle of consensus must take all views into account and, in the most constructive manner possible, resolve outstanding issues. At the same time, the Conference should not accept to be prevented from carrying out its task on the first item on its agenda by a small number of delegations, let alone only one.

I should like to take this opportunity to underline the importance my Government attributes to the Group of Scientific Experts. It is essential that it be able to continue its work on the verification issues related to a comprehensive test ban treaty. Once the political decision to stop nuclear testing is taken, the conclusion of a treaty must not be delayed because of outstanding technical matters. There is rapid technical development. It is important that it be taken fully into account in the verification systems, and that such systems not be permitted to lag behind.

The so-called Five-Continent Peace Initiative has underlined the importance of being able to monitor all nuclear explosions. Together with the other States behind this initiative, Sweden has announced its willingness to take part in the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban. The data centre that Sweden operated as part of an international experiment in the autumn of 1984, and which we have offered to run and finance as part of our commitment to a test ban, can be put to use at very short notice.

The question of verification has for decades been put forward as the main obstacle to a comprehensive test ban. The two major nuclear-weapon States have not been able to agree on what is needed in order to verify such a ban. That period now seems to be over. The Soviet Union has stated its willingness to accept international procedures including on-site inspections in order to verify compliance with a reciprocal moratorium. Both sides thus seem to agree on a basis for a verification system.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

Sweden therefore proposes that negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty start immediately. We feel that the establishment of an international verification system including on-site inspections should be initiated at an early stage in the negotiations. The co-operative measures worked out by the Group of Scientific Experts could serve as a basis for that, and monitoring be started by using existing facilities around the globe. These facilities could be rapidly improved using modern technology and methods. In this way, the entry into force of a future treaty will not be delayed for technical verification reasons.

Sweden was gratified that last year the Conference on Disarmament managed, although late in the session, to establish a Committee to deal with the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space." We expect the Committee to continue and intensify this important work and to seek concrete ways to prevent an arms race in outer space. We urge all members of the Conference to work together in a constructive manner to ensure that substantive work can take place at an early stage. The procrastination that left the Committee with only nine substantive sessions last year must be avoided.

At their meeting on 8 January 1985, Foreign Ministers Shultz and Gromyko agreed "to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth". This was confirmed by the leaders of the two main nuclear Powers in their Geneva meeting in November last year. We take this as a firm commitment by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to prevent an arms race in space.

It is, however, obvious that meaningful agreements on the prevention of an arms race in space cannot be reached only on a bilateral level. An ASAT ban not adhered to by all States with a future ASAT capacity would make many important satellites potential objects of attacks. It would also leave the satellites of the Soviet Union and the United States themselves vulnerable to attacks by ASAT weapons of a third State. A multilateral approach to ASAT weapons would thus be in the interest also of the two major space Powers.

It is important to elaborate a legally binding international instrument or instruments prohibiting ASAT weapons and ASAT warfare. Because all States are directly or indirectly involved, the Conference on Disarmament must immediately consider in what way it can take action to this effect.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States now in fact observe a moratorium on ASAT testing. This is a most welcome development, which should facilitate the negotiations of a multilateral comprehensive ban on ASAT systems.

Much attention has been given to the question of ballistic missile defences. The Swedish Government does not believe that security can be achieved through such defences. BMD systems in outer space -- if technically feasible -- might be vulnerable to attack and could be overcome by an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. It is difficult to see how destabilization and an increase in the risk of nuclear war could be avoided in the process to establish technically advanced BMD systems. The arguments that led to the conclusion of the ABM Treaty are still valid. This Treaty remains one of the most important achievements in the field of arms limitation. It is essential that the ABM Treaty be maintained, that its provisions be strictly observed and that measures be taken to prevent its erosion.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

The possible development of ballistic missile defence systems is a concern not only for the Soviet Union and the United States. Because of its implications we, the non-nuclear weapon States, like all other possible victims of nuclear war, have the right to expect from the bilateral negotiations concrete measures which will decrease the risk of nuclear war, enhance stability and, thus, the security of all of us.

Let me, in this context, underline that there are also multilateral treaties which contain obligations of relevance to the question of advanced BMD systems. Even if this insufficient, multilateral legal framework does not explicitly prohibit weapons in orbit around the Earth -- or on Earth, in the atmosphere, at sea or below -- Sweden thinks that their development, testing and deployment would run counter to the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty. Its article I states that the use of outer space "shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries". Article III states that the Parties to the Treaty shall use outer space "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding". It is indeed difficult to reconcile these intentions with activities aimed at developing weapons for use in space.

One of the technologies considered for space-based BMD systems is the X-ray laser. X-ray lasers require pumping by very intense radiation which, in practice, has to come from a nuclear explosion. The testing of X-ray lasers in outer space, if involving nuclear explosions, would be a breach of the prohibition of such explosions in article I of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Already the placing of such X-ray technology in orbit around the Earth would be a violation of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.

To spread the arms race into outer space is incompatible with the spirit of the treaties I just mentioned. Respect for international law must be upheld.

Last year the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons advanced in a slow but steady fashion. The 40 pages of CD/636, making up the present draft for a Convention, are no small achievement and speak for themselves.

The process of defining and listing relevant chemicals is now well under way, after having been dead-locked for some time. This work is fundamental to the continued elaboration of several other parts of the Convention. It should therefore be actively pursued during the 1986 session. The question of identifying chemical weapons production facilities as well as measures for their elimination is another area usefully dealt with during the last months. A substantial amount of work remains, however. There are certain prospects for further progress this year.

Other issues which necessitate major efforts during 1986 are the elaboration of principles for the elimination of existing stocks of chemical weapons, as well as régimes to ensure that new chemical weapons do not emerge within the framework of the chemical industry. Last, but not least agreements must be reached on the principles, procedures and organization for ensuring all States parties that the forthcoming Convention is being complied with in all aspects.

A certain momentum has been created in the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. This was confirmed when the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union met here in Geneva a few months ago. The role and the

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responsibility of the major Powers in the Conference on Disarmament are crucial to the successful conclusion of a Convention. Their concerns and approaches to the issues involved cannot be overlooked. Direct talks between the United States and the Soviet Union have proved useful in the past. Such contacts could and should reinforce and speed up the negotiating process.

Chemical weapons are, however, at least theoretically, accessible to all States, should they choose to acquire them. Furthermore, all States are potential victims of the use of such weapons. Consequently, the future Convention must be elaborated in such a way that the concerns and interests of States from all parts of the world are met. This can only be done in a multilateral context. All members of the Conference on Disarmament should therefore make full use of this multilateral negotiating forum.

There are other initiatives, outside the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, which are intended as steps towards ridding the world of chemical weapons. Certain statements indicate that efforts are under way to prevent the spread of chemical weapons. The proposal to create a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe is another initiative, which is important from a political point of view.

Sweden is strongly in favour of all efforts that can diminish the threat of chemical weapons in Europe as well as in other parts of the world. At the same time we remain convinced that the most effective way of achieving this is through a comprehensive convention like that being negotiated in this forum. Geographically or otherwise limited initiatives should not become alternative solutions, but should be pursued in such a manner that they support and strengthen the multilateral negotiations of a comprehensive convention. Enough substantial and preparatory work has already been done for such a convention to be feasible within a reasonably near future. No additional measures would then be needed.

In order to further the negotiations, all countries producing or considering producing chemical weapons -- binary or others -- should refrain from such production during the negotiations on a convention. Disarmament can never be furthered through increased armaments.

The meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva in November 1985 has given some hope about improvement of the climate for international negotiations in the field of disarmament. They stated that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They recognized that any conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States would have catastrophic consequences and emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They declared their intent not to seek to achieve military superiority.

Now their joint understanding should be transformed into concrete disarmament measures in the form of multilateral or bilateral agreements or conventions.

The comprehensive programme recently proposed by the Soviet Union, leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons and chemical weapons as well as to reductions of conventional forces, deserves serious consideration.

If we acknowledge the fact that mutual, deeply-rooted suspicions block the road to disarmament, then confidence-building is in many ways the heart of

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

the matter. In this context, the Stockholm Conference on Security- and Confidence-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe obviously has an important role to play.

As the host country and as a neutral State in Europe, Sweden naturally has a particular interest in the success of the Stockholm Conference. Recent statements by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev as well as by a number of recently high-level visitors to the Conference give reason for cautious optimism.

For the negotiators in Stockholm, less than eight months remain until the Conference will adjourn before the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna. It is our sincere hope that the Stockholm Conference will reach a substantial agreement this year, enabling the Vienna meeting to decide upon widening the mandate to include also genuine disarmament measures.

An agreement in Stockholm should reflect the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security. It should contain measures of openness enlarging the confidence-building measures agreed in Helsinki, that is to say, prior notification and exchange of observers in connection with military activities in Europe. It should also contain measures of military constraint and arrangements for communication and consultation. The obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force should also be duly reflected.

This year has been proclaimed as the International Year of Peace. This proclamation should be a serious challenge to peoples and Governments to make all possible efforts for peace and disarmament.

There could not be a better occasion than this International Year of Peace,

To start negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty,

To begin the reduction of nuclear arsenals,

To prevent an arms race in outer space,

To finalize the chemical weapons Convention,

To bring the Stockholm Conference to a successful conclusion.

The peoples of the world are eagerly waiting for concrete agreements on disarmament. Let us not leave them in disappointment as so often before. Let us work hard in order to avoid the darkness and the coldness of a nuclear winter. Let this International Year of Peace bring with it a spring of disarmament and a summer of peace!

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

We have now exhausted the time available to us this morning and we still have a number of members of the Conference listed to speak today. Consequently, I intend to suspend now the plenary meeting and resume it at 3.30 this afternoon in order to hear those statements.

(The President)

Before suspending the plenary meeting however, may I mention with regard to this afternoon's proceedings, that, as agreed during the informal consultations held last week, I intend, immediately after having heard the list of speakers this afternoon, to hold a brief informal meeting to consider the provisional agenda and programme of work of the Conference. If, in that informal meeting, we confirm the consensus which I believe does exist, and which emerged during the consultations last week, then we will be in a position this afternoon, to resume the plenary meeting in order to adopt the agenda and programme of work for 1986. If no other delegation wishes to take the floor I would suspend this meeting.

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m. and reconvened at 3.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 336th meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

On the speakers list for this afternoon are inscribed the names of the representatives of Cuba, Czechoslovakia and Canada. I would like to express my thanks to those delegations for agreeing to hold over their statements to this afternoon's meeting.

I would now propose to hear those statements and begin by calling upon the distinguished Ambassador of Cuba to address the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. LECHUGA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I extend a welcome to you from my delegation as you take the chair for this first month of our work. We pledge you the co-operation of the Cuban delegation in your undertakings, which will certainly be aimed at success in our endeavours.

We congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Mario C  mpora, on his able guidance of the Conference at the close of the session last year and he demonstrated to us once again, his diplomatic skill and his adherence to the cause of disarmament by his work in the First Committee of the General Assembly.

We join in the welcome you extended to our new colleagues in the Conference, to whom we convey our warmest greetings.

It is a pleasure to welcome among us again Under-Secretary-General Jan Martenson. We also wish to greet Ambassador Komatina, the Secretary-General of the Conference, and Ambassador Beras  tegui, the Deputy Secretary-General.

To the distinguished delegation of Sweden, we convey our deepest sympathy on the death of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, who fought ardently for the cause of disarmament. Her passing is a loss that affects us all.

To the delegation of the United States, we wish to say that the people of Cuba are not insensitive to the feeling of profound grief that afflicts the people of the United States as a result of the tragic space vehicle accident that caused the death of several persons, including a young schoolmistress. For this reason, we express our condolences.

(Mr. Lechuga, Cuba)

This year we are embarking on the session of the Conference with cautious expectations, despite the fact that multilateralism is coming under repeated attacks throughout the United Nations system. It is very difficult to venture beyond such a prudent attitude in view of the lengthy history of frustration in this body and the virtual absence of any results in the talks held outside this forum. But at the same time, we shall not allow ourselves to be disheartened by feelings that we are powerless. As the universal saying goes, one must make the best of a bad job, and we trust that the first thing we shall proceed to do in the Conference is negotiate. For this purpose, obviously, it is essential to demonstrate by deeds that the political will does exist to discuss in detail the problems on the agenda we now propose to adopt, so as to arrive at effective disarmament measures, and to refrain from using the discussions as a smoke screen to shirk the responsibility that has been entered into.

The context in which the Conference is starting out on its work is different from the programme last year. The proposals made by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are so momentous that they cannot be ignored and the apparent headway being made in the negotiations to ban chemical weapons fosters some hope of arriving at a satisfactory agreement. Unquestionably, the proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth within a period of 14 years under a logically structured plan is a challenge to all the major military Powers, but above all to the militarist sectors of those Powers in which the emblem of their foreign policy is military superiority and the maintenance of international tensions as tools to achieve their objectives.

The Soviet initiative opens up tempting prospects, a window through which the world can glimpse an end of the century that is more promising than the present years of anguish. For this reason, the initiative has generally been greeted with satisfaction and even those who display the greatest reluctance towards the idea of disarmament have had to admit that it is a plan which deserves serious consideration, but of course, we have to be realistic. It would be unwise to imagine that general disarmament within a space of 15 years will be accepted easily, for powerful interests benefit from the arms race. We know that the implementation of a programme of such magnitude calls for abundant doses of good will on the part of those whose view of the world is such that the use of force is the main ingredient to be used in the final analysis, when all the other means to secure their aims fail.

However, it would not be the objective truth to deny that, despite these patent facts, there is no real possibility of working effectively to achieve the aim of gradually reducing and then completely eliminating weapons of mass destruction. This, the aspiration of all peoples, is the Conference's great task: to contribute, by its endeavours, to the attainment of this goal.

We firmly believe that it is possible, for to think otherwise would be to resign oneself to the idea of collective suicide, which can in the present circumstances, only mean a nuclear conflagration, to accept as inevitable a steadily deteriorating situation in terms of world security and an end once and for all to any prospect of economic improvement for the overwhelming majority of mankind, now suffering from the burden of countless misfortunes for lack of the requisite resources to overcome them while astronomical sums are being spent on arms research, manufacture and emplacement. No people can accept this bleak future, or allow itself to be led into such a situation from which there is no way out.

(Mr. Lechuga, Cuba)

The Conference on Disarmament is under a special and specific obligation to do everything within its grasp to carry this undertaking through to a successful conclusion. In short, it is the only negotiating body freely established by the international community to carry out that task. It cannot constantly disappoint public opinion by failing to act on the topics of paramount importance for discussion in its programme of work.

If we look at the agenda, there is no valid reason or argument, for example, for not embarking promptly on negotiations for a nuclear weapon test ban. Neither inside nor outside this forum does anybody understand the logic of the countries which deny that nuclear weapon tests are harmful to the cause of security, when it is obvious, when it is plain and when it is an incontrovertible fact that continued tests spur on the demented arms race and build up further obstacles in the way of the negotiations on disarmament. Nuclear weapon tests are needed not to make the world safer but, on the contrary, to carry on perfecting current weapons and experimenting with other more destructive weapons so as to achieve military superiority over the opponents, something which in fact nobody can manage in the world of today. We are not living in the times of the colonialist share-out, when the imperialist Powers could, almost with impunity, line up their cannons against the inferior weapons of the peoples they went out to oppress and exploit. Those times have gone for ever.

Another question that is sufficiently ripe for the negotiations to be concluded successfully is the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiled in the various arsenals. Again, there is no reason to extend the negotiations beyond what is necessary, as has been happening. It would be unforgiveable to let slip the impetus that now seems to exist and fail to take advantage of this moment to meet yet another aspiration of mankind, which is the elimination of such horrifying weapons. In this connection, the recent Soviet initiative contains a positive factor which opens up the way for concluding the treaty, and it is the question of verification, namely, the proposal for strict control, including on-site inspections. There is no reason not to make rapid headway in the negotiations.

The arms race is not only a destabilizing factor and a source of latent dangers of a military confrontation but also a factor that greatly undermines the world economy, one of the main causes of the profound crisis that is being experienced on all continents, and particularly the continents with the developing countries. It is for this reason that the struggle for peace is now closely tied in with the efforts to solve the most pressing problems of those countries, with their hundreds of millions of human beings, and it is at the same time linked to the struggle for an international economic order that is more just and equitable than the order that now governs inter-State relations. Peace which, furthermore, must be beneficial to all regions and must be within the reach of all peoples. Peace by half-measures, peace with discrimination, are not possible.

As long as untold resources are being squandered on the arms race, there is little likelihood of international co-operation in the economic field. Development and disarmament go hand-in-hand and, fortunately, every day more sectors of public opinion in all countries are coming to realize this fact, and above all, what is more important, are deciding to wage the struggle for this cause.

(Mr. Lechuga, Cuba)

It is truly a crime against humanity to assign such hitherto inconceivable financial, scientific, technical and human resources to the manufacture of instruments of death and destruction at a time when millions of men and women, young people, old people and children are dying from lack of nourishment or medicines or medical treatment, when there are hundreds of millions of human beings with no schools or hospitals or when such facilities are not enough to meet the requisite needs.

There is blithe talk of fantastic investments to design space weapons when the world is deep in one of the most tragic economic crises for many a year, when the external debt of numerous countries is a noose that is strangling their opportunities to better themselves for many years to come, an external debt that even now cannot be paid off because, in the present situation, the economic capacity to do so is missing. And it is in precisely these circumstances that, with unparalleled wastefulness, funds are being allocated for such truly luxury projects, apart from what they signify in terms of aggravating international tensions, destabilizing the existing precarious balance and, consequently, making the achievement of peace more remote.

One of the Conference's tasks, in our opinion, is to dispel the scepticism surrounding it. We have to admit that it is virtually paralysed and this does not help its effectiveness and that its lack of efficiency is the reason for the distrust displayed towards it in broad sectors of public opinion. It is a vicious circle that can be broken only by the will to work in good faith. We hope that such good faith can be demonstrated by deeds at the session we are now embarking on.

Good faith is needed to complete the comprehensive programme of disarmament and overcome the stagnation into which it has sunk, so as to work with an effective mandate on this very important subject, namely the prevention of nuclear war. Good faith to advance the work on the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, which is the responsibility of everyone and the privilege of no one.

Without losing sight of the modest character of our contribution to the business of the Conference, the delegation of Cuba stands ready to commit itself with others to fulfilling the responsibility that has been laid upon us by the international community.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, it is, at the same time, a privilege and a commitment for you to chair our work in the opening month of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament. Guiding the work of this body is always a privilege, and it becomes more of a commitment today, when the Conference is undoubtedly going to try to translate into concrete deeds certain positive developments in the international situation. I pledge you the full support of my delegation in your effort to launch our work effectively and in the right direction.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Let me welcome among us our new colleagues, Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Gonsalves of India, Ambassador Franceschi of Italy, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, Ambassador Afande of Kenya, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, Ambassador Mariátegui of Peru and Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, with whom we have already had a chance to work together. I am looking forward to the same fruitful co-operation I enjoyed in working with their predecessors.

Let me not forget to thank Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina for the efficient guidance of our work at the end of last year's session. We were also very happy to see the Under Secretary-General Martenson here, and of course we are happy to see Ambassador Komatina in the seat of the Secretary-General of our Conference, with Ambassador Berasátegui at his side.

It is with a deep sense of sadness that I express condolences to the delegation of Sweden in connection with the passing away of Alva Myrdal, the distinguished Swedish diplomat and Nobel Peace Prize Winner. I knew well her dedication to peace and disarmament, since I had an opportunity to co-operate with her closely here in Geneva and at the sessions of the General Assembly. I would ask the Swedish delegation to transmit our condolences to the relatives of Alva Myrdal and to the Swedish Government.

Only a couple of months separate us from the end of last year's session. We ended it on the already usual, rather sombre mood, with no special reason for optimism. It is therefore encouraging to note that during our break, important, positive developments took place. Immediately after the Conference recessed the Third NPT Review Conference took place. In spite of a number of difficulties, it ended positively, reaffirming the validity of the non-proliferation régime and calling for its further strengthening. Certainly, much still has to be done in order to close definitely all avenues for possible nuclear weapons proliferation and my country is ready to join in this common effort. In this respect, the Third Review Conference was, in spite of all forecasts about its failure, a step in the right direction.

Needless to say, the best guarantee against the proliferation risks would be the achievement of specific measures ensuring the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The readiness of the WTO member States to achieve such measures was again unequivocally confirmed at the meeting of the political consultative committee of the WTO in October of last year in Sofia. The participants at the meeting stressed that "urgent measures are necessary which would make it possible to stop the arms race, prevent its extension into outer space and achieve drastic cuts in armaments, nuclear ones in particular".

Later, in November, we witnessed here in Geneva an event of extreme political significance. The Soviet-American summit meeting, the first since 1979, was generally regarded as a positive turn in the development of relations between the USSR and the United States. It quite naturally aroused expectations about the possibility of the adoption of specific steps aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the elimination of nuclear weapons. People in Czechoslovakia followed the summit meeting closely, maintaining as well that concrete measures to stop the arms race should be undertaken, the sooner the better. The joint communiqué of the meeting, indicating areas of discussion, common understanding on various matters and further tasks to be solved was welcomed.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Right after the summit meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev met with the highest representatives of the WTO member States in Prague and informed them of the results. They fully supported the constructive approach of M. Gorbachev during the negotiations with President Reagan and welcomed the fact that the two sides reaffirmed their commitment of January 1985 to look for ways and means to prevent an arms race in outer space and to end it on Earth.

The great significance of the Geneva meeting stems from the fact that it represents the beginning of a dialogue aimed at positive changes in Soviet-American relations and in the world in general. It creates favourable conditions for improvement of the international situation and for a return to détente. It was quite natural that, after the summit meeting, we were waiting for further action to be taken, especially in connection with the approaching resumption of the bilateral Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons last month.

On the eve of the opening of the fourth round of these talks, on 15 January, the Soviet Union advanced a far-reaching programme aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. This proposal met with keen interest in my country. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Government welcomed that initiative and declared, inter alia, that it represents "a complex of new proposals expressing the constant peaceful nature of the internal and foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which corresponds also to the vital interests of the Czechoslovak people. These balanced, realistic, clear and deeply human proposals reflect the highest responsibility for the future of human civilization and meet the interests of all countries without distinction. Their aim is to stop the arms race on Earth, to avert the militarization of outer space, to improve the overall international situation and to ensure the development of peaceful, mutually advantageous co-operation".

The Soviet disarmament programme is indeed unprecedented in its bold approach, ambitious goals and detailed, specific nature. Thus, right at the beginning of the International Year of Peace, the world was offered a chance for peace and for a radical solution to the problem of a continuous arms race which more and more threatens the existence of human civilization and squanders immense material and human resources. We note with satisfaction that the generally positive reaction throughout the world shows that peoples identify themselves with the goals of the programme and political leaders understand its historic significance. It is not the kind of initiative which could be ignored or downplayed. The questions it raises are primarily aimed at how best to implement it.

A number of issues addressed in the recent Soviet initiative will also be inscribed in our agenda. It would therefore seem only natural for us to look at these issues again, trying to find new, more efficient ways of dealing with them.

Let us look in the first place at the problem of the nuclear test ban. We consider it unquestionable that either we did not deal with it at all, or when we did, the method we chose was inappropriate. We do not share the view that the Working Group's activity in 1982 and 1983 demonstrated that a number of verification problems still needed to be solved. What it really indicated was that some remaining verification problems cannot be settled if treated separately from other basic provisions of the test ban. The same applies to the activity of the Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events. In a

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couple of weeks this Group is going to finalize its third report. With the evaluation of the results of the first two practical experiments of the transmission of seismic data the third report could indeed represent a positive contribution. But a contribution to what? If the negotiations on the NTB are going to be blocked again, then the valuable work of the Group of Scientific Experts will be bound to remain just an exercise in modern seismology, an opportunity for experts to exchange information and experience and a check of the communication channels of the World Meteorological Organization. On the other hand, if negotiations on all aspects of the NTB were to start, the third report of the Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events could become a real contribution to the future establishment of a system for the transmission of seismic data, which would constitute an important part of the NTB verification procedures.

In addressing the NTB problem the Conference on Disarmament has to take into account new, important developments related to this question. During the second half of last year, one of the two major military Powers was left alone on the road of active nuclear testing. The Soviet leadership in an effort to break the usual "logic" of the arms race, introduced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests. Regrettably, the other side ignored the invitation to reciprocate and to render the nuclear testing moratorium a lasting measure until a general and complete ban is negotiated. Thus, this major country remained in this respect a lonely zealous competitor in an awkward arms race with just one participant. And even after the expiry of the six months originally proposed, the "solo race" continues, since the Soviet Union prolonged its unilateral moratorium for the next three months. We consider this additional measure an extraordinary example of the only approach that could break the vicious circle of the arms race.

Nor can the problems of verification serve any longer as an excuse for not joining the moratorium and for the deadlock in the NTB negotiations. The Soviet Union stated unequivocally that verification is no problem so far as it is concerned. Appropriate verification of compliance with the moratorium -- should the United States join it -- would be fully ensured by national technical means as well as through international procedures, including on-site inspections whenever necessary.

Mr. President, we are aware that the delegation of your country pays due attention both here and at the United Nations General Assembly to the necessity to stop nuclear testing. In fact, one of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly last year on this question was sponsored by your country. The three resolutions addressing the problem of nuclear weapon testing, resolutions 40/80 A, 40/80 B, 40/81 and 40/88 indicate, that there are certain differences on how to deal most effectively with this question. But basically they agree on the importance and urgency of the cessation of nuclear testing. We are confident that you will use the term of your Presidency to search for a most appropriate framework for the Conference to deal with what is again going to be its top agenda item. In this respect I pledge to you the full support and co-operation of my delegation. We shall be flexible, but we shall continue to proceed from the basic criterion -- our activity here must be directed towards the early conclusion of a treaty on general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

We are also in favour of establishing working bodies for proposed items 2 and 3 of our agenda. There is an urgent need to adopt measures aimed at decreasing the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, to stop further senseless stockpiling of nuclear weapons and gradually reduce them until they

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are completely eliminated. An argument was advanced previously that it was not clear what the Conference should negotiate on within these items. We maintain that this argument can no longer be put forward seriously. A number of specific proposals were submitted on the question of prevention of nuclear war. The group of socialist countries submitted the proposal for a stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament as far back as 1979. In the new Soviet proposal, the three-stage programme for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons is very detailed and specific. It is realistic, since in designing the stages and participation in them it takes fully into account the unequal potentials of individual nuclear-weapon States. Here, in this body, we have all five nuclear-weapon States represented and we are supposed to discuss disarmament. Would it be appropriate if we did not touch on the subject of nuclear disarmament at all? To say the least, it would be total disregard of the almost unanimous opinion of the international community as expressed in General Assembly resolution 40/151 F on the convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, resolution 40/152 A on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, resolution 40/152 Q on the prevention of nuclear war and resolutions 40/152 C and 40/152 P calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Outer space still might seem to some of us a distant and remote sphere. But it becomes more and more obvious that what happens there, especially from the military point of view, is going to concern all of us very closely, and probably very soon. In a couple of weeks it will be already three years since the day when one major country proclaimed one form of the militarization of outer space as its official doctrine. From then on, year by year, huge financial resources and the skill of thousands of technicians were dedicated to that programme. As the years go by, more and more will be poured into this enterprise until one day it may become an unstoppable self-supporting machinery. Let us hope that this day will not come sooner than the negotiations on the non-militarization of outer space are given a fair chance. Otherwise it is inconceivable that, with the progressive militarization of outer space, any significant results in the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament can be achieved.

My country has sent a cosmonaut into outer space and in close co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries participates actively in the peaceful exploration of outer space. We, certainly, do not consider ourselves a space power, but even as a small earthly country we would feel directly threatened by the eventual introduction into orbit of attack space weapons. Already now we have to face an immense threat to our territory from a multitude of sources, including modern missiles with nuclear warheads stationed just a couple of kilometres from our border. If an additional source of threat were to be introduced, this time from space, with practically no chances for defence, an explanation that these weapons should allegedly play a defensive role would hardly dispel our worries. And this potential threat is steadily gaining more and more specific shape. Nuclear-weapon testing in Nevada continues intensively, aimed at the perfectioning of X-ray lasers to be placed in outer space. Declarations on the non-nuclear nature of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative thus seem rather misplaced and one should not be surprised if they are soon forgotten completely. At the same time, militarized space is not going to replace the old dangers but merely add to them. Just last week, Defense Secretary Weinberger stated that the SDI now shares the "highest priority" among Pentagon programmes, equal in status to the five-year campaign to modernize nuclear missiles.

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In view of these developments, Czechoslovakia welcomes what the recent Soviet proposal has to say on outer space. It is suggesting a completely different approach which would not bring a threat to all countries, and in the long run also to the initiator of the arms race in space, but on the contrary it would definitely close outer space for military confrontation and would also create favourable conditions for nuclear disarmament. In the statement by M. Gorbachev, introducing the new Soviet initiative, the following question is put: "Instead of wasting next 10-15 years by developing new extremely dangerous weapons in space, allegedly designed to make nuclear arms useless would it not be more sensible to start eliminating those arms and finally bring them down to zero?". Apparently, no political leader would openly question this simple truth. Nor, let us hope, will it finally be denied through the actions of any country.

The Conference on Disarmament should contribute to multilateral efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. We therefore support early resumption of the activity of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space. As to its mandate, we made it clear last year that we want a committee empowered to negotiate specific measures ensuring prevention of an arms race in outer space. After last year's useful exploratory work we are even more convinced that time has come to move forward and to speak specifically on what new measures could ensure that outer space remains free of the arms race. General Assembly resolution 40/87 calls for nothing less than that.

We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will continue its work without undue delay. It should build further on what was achieved last year and in January of this year under the chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland. We note with satisfaction that the atmosphere in the Committee recently improved substantially. This, together with the opening of the bilateral Soviet-American consultations last week, gives us a good negotiating pattern wherein multilateral and bilateral efforts could mutually complement each other. Thus, all constructive proposals could be made use of and lead towards the solution of the remaining problems outstanding.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is, in fact, the only working body of the Conference negotiating on a specific problem of disarmament. It has been working hard during the recent years on the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention and we may say that all delegations are paying special attention to its work. Let us hope that the activity of this Committee would serve us as an example of how we should organize our work also on other priority items. Otherwise, the Conference on Disarmament could soon be associated merely with the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. And we would like to believe that this organ of multilateral negotiations on disarmament would eventually be in a position, and why not this year already, to address other urgent problems too.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada). On this opening day of the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament, may I begin by welcoming our nine colleagues who have recently joined us, the distinguished Ambassadors of Algeria, Belgium, Burma, India, Italy, Kenya, Morocco and Peru and welcome back with pleasure the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela. May I also express my personal and official congratulations to you, Ambassador Butler, as our President during the month of February. It is already evident that under your very able guidance, the Conference has got off to a good start. I should also, of course, like to join other delegations in expressing our appreciation to Ambassador Cámpora for his skilful diplomacy during the difficult month of August and since, indeed, I may have to look to him for technical assistance, since I am destined to be the President for the month of August which is usually a difficult one. Before commenting on our agenda, I would like to express the deep sense of loss we all feel at the death of the distinguished former Swedish disarmament minister and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Mrs Alva Myrdal, who made a unique and lasting contribution to our work. I join others also in extending to the United States delegation our sincere condolences at the tragic loss of the shuttle Challenger and its young crew of seven.

As we began our deliberations here a year ago, there was a note of cautious expectation in the air. The Governments of the USSR and the United States of America had only recently agreed to resume negotiations on the central arms control and disarmament issues of our time. Moreover, in taking this step, which entailed considerable statemanship on each side, the two Governments set themselves agreed negotiating objectives which are impressive in their scope and comprehensiveness, namely: "The prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on Earth, the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, and the strengthening of strategic stability." They stated as an ultimate goal "the complete elimination of nuclear weapons." We, and the watching world, saw a glimmer of hope.

Now, little more than a year later, that flame of hope not only remains alive, but burns a little brighter. Negotiators for the two Governments completed three rounds of negotiations in Geneva during 1985. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Geneva in November and issued an important Joint Statement, affirming inter alia the intent to accelerate the work of their negotiations. The fourth round of negotiations is already underway.

Happily, this process has produced more than rhetoric. Detailed and substantive proposals and counter-proposals have been made, reflecting a readiness on both sides to agree to major reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals as a first step toward implementing the agreed negotiating objectives in their entirety. Thus, in the Canadian view, the good faith and serious intent of each of the parties to these negotiations have been persuasively demonstrated. We applaud the constructive beginning which has been made in this all-important negotiation. We recognize that the negotiation is likely to be long and arduous and that to expect quick, comprehensive solutions on the many outstanding issues would be unrealistic. We urge the two parties to continue their negotiating efforts with all the determination, skill and patience that the importance of the subject matter demands, as they have pledged to do. Canada, for its part, pledges that in the Conference on Disarmament and all other relevant international fora, we will support, facilitate and attempt to reinforce these crucial bilateral negotiations.

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It is a reality of our time that the United States and the USSR, by their separate and joint decisions, will determine central aspects of any international framework for preserving global security. But of course, the establishment of a stable basis for enduring international peace and security must not and cannot be a proprietary monopoly of the two super-Powers. Their negotiations are of vital concern to all peoples, as Canada's Prime Minister has recently affirmed, peace and security is everybody's business. It is for every responsible Government, through its national policies and by constructive participation in international fora such as the Conference on Disarmament where such issues are addressed, to make its own contribution to the collective international effort to come to grips with the complex and seemingly intractable issues involved in creating conditions for stable, enduring international peace and security. The Canadian Government reaffirms its determination to do just that.

In this forum, the seriousness of Canada's commitment to the pursuit of realizable arms control and disarmament measures is well known. Canada's long-standing approach to arms control and disarmament, sometimes criticized as idealistic, is not starry-eyed but directed to the pursuit of practical and achievable goals. We see arms control not as separate from, but intimately bound up with, the legitimate concern of all States for their national security. The essence of our approach has been expressed succinctly by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney: "The world at large should recognize that arms control is a component of, not a substitute for, a healthy national security policy. A wise and correct approach to security cannot ignore the virtues of arms control, just as arms control cannot ignore the requirements of national security. The search for either at the expense of the other is fruitless. And the search for both is imperative."

The Canadian Government has set for itself six arms control priority objectives. These have been publicly stated by Canada's Prime Minister and were spelled out by Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Joe Clark, in the Canadian Parliament on 23 January. These six priority objectives are: (1) negotiated radical reductions in nuclear forces and the enhancement of strategic stability, (2) maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime, (3) negotiation of a global chemical weapons ban, (4) support for a comprehensive test ban treaty, (5) prevention of an arms race in outer space, and (6) the building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

We intend to pursue these objectives actively and by all means at our disposal. We will be pressing our views and policy objectives in bilateral talks with our allies, with Governments of the socialist bloc and with the People's Republic of China and with the Governments of neutral and non-aligned countries. We will play an active and constructive role in various multilateral fora, here in the Conference on Disarmament, in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna and at the Stockholm Conference and other CSCE meetings which address broad security-related issues.

We see this Conference however, the Conference on Disarmament, as pre-eminent among the multilateral fora dealing with arms control and disarmament. A heavy responsibility weights on its 40 members. We are, in a very real sense, negotiating on behalf of the international community as a

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whole. It therefore behoves us to approach our tasks with as much energy, patience, skill and wisdom as are at our command. Our Governments must be prepared to seek out common ground which can become a basis for practical, operable measures.

Our collective record in recent years is not something about which we can boast. In the decade since the conclusion of the ENMOD treaty, we have failed to reach agreement on a single arms control measure. The reasons for this are multiple. It cannot be attributed entirely to the parlous state of East-West relations, though this has at times been an important factor. On occasion, agreements which have seemed within reach have eluded our grasp sometimes because some of us have pressed to expand the scope of an agreement beyond what has been effectively negotiable in this forum. The objectives sought were legitimate, but there may have been too much readiness to pursue the ideal at the expense of the achievable.

However, not all of our difficulties are due to divergent purposes or failures of political will. There is an increasingly pressing need to re-examine our procedures and processes with a view to ensuring the optimal use of the limited time, resources and energy at our disposal. I shall not dwell on the matter at this time, having intervened more than once during our 1985 session to make this very point. Suffice it to say that there are several procedural habits and routines which have evolved in this forum which could usefully be reassessed in order to make our work more efficient and, just as important, less contentious.

I would urge again that you as our Conference President, as you have already pledged to do with the support and co-operation of all delegations, give priority attention during this session to exploring and examining ways by which we might, by agreement, improve and streamline our processes and procedures so that we might better serve our Governments and the peoples whom they represent.

Whatever our concerns about procedural matters, however, it is our primary task to deal with the substantive items on our agenda. I have alluded already to the Canadian Government's generally positive appreciation of the course of the negotiations thus far between the United States and the USSR. While this should be a source of encouragement to us here, it should not prompt us to slacken our efforts but rather to intensify them. It should entitle us to a heightened expectation that in this forum, where our first obligation is to seek out common ground and expand areas of agreement, we will be able to avoid political polemics, invective and recriminatory exchanges, which are out of place in any serious negotiating forum.

As in recent years, the negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is a priority item on our agenda. Modest but detectable progress was made on this item during the 1985 session but there is still cause for disappointment in spite of the strenuous efforts of our friend and colleague, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Known instances of recent chemical weapons use should add to our collective sense of urgency to attain the earliest possible conclusion of such a ban. We note with particular attention the affirmation by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their Joint Statement of their intent to "accelerate their efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention" as well as their intention to "initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons."

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As others have pointed out, and indeed my delegation has in the past, it will be of limited utility if we get an effective bilateral convention which is not a comprehensive convention in both senses in extending to all the main issues under negotiation and comprising a genuine non-proliferation convention. It is our understanding that this latter initiative is not intended in any way to divert efforts from the priority need to conclude a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, so too with respect to the statement contained in the proposals most recently made by General Secretary Gorbachev raising the possibility of "certain interim steps," possibly involving multilateral agreement on matters relating to the non-transfer of chemical weapons.

Despite the considerable progress which has been made, there remain several difficult issues to be resolved if a chemical weapons ban is to be concluded. Among these, the verification provisions of the treaty will require especially serious and dispassionate effort if agreement is to be achieved. It will be recalled that in April 1984, almost two years ago, the Vice-President of the United States of America tabled in this forum a draft treaty text which is the most comprehensive proposal yet before us, setting out in detail the kind of verification régime his Government prefers and would regard as adequate. Canada has indicated its readiness in principle to accept and apply the kinds of verification provisions contained in the United States text. However, while there has been much criticism of these proposals, no delegation has thus far come forward with concrete, substantive alternative proposals which would delineate with clarity the area of common ground and the areas of disagreement, thus providing a basis for serious negotiation with a view to arriving at verification provisions which would be acceptable to all.

The Canadian Government noted, and welcomed, the reaffirmation by the United States spokesman in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 31 October 1985 that "No imbalance in inspection obligations is either desired, intended or contained in any provisions of the United States draft convention banning chemical weapons." The Canadian Government has also noted with particular care and interest the recent statement by General Secretary Gorbachev that, with reference to declarations of the location of chemical weapons production facilities, the cessation of production, the destruction of production facilities and the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, "All these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections." We are greatly encouraged by this statement. We hope that during the present session of this Conference the delegation of the USSR will be in a position to further elaborate on its particular meaning. The task of seriously negotiating effective, operable and politically acceptable verification provisions for a chemical weapons treaty will be difficult and time-consuming. However, it should not be postponed any longer.

During the session, the Canadian delegation intends to continue to make substantive inputs to the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban. We will be submitting a HANDBOOK FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. The Handbook identifies procedures, equipment and standard formats which could go a long way toward ensuring that the findings of an investigation of alleged chemical weapons use would be as conclusive, convincing and impartial as possible. It reflects Canadian experience and expertise and our longstanding interest in various aspects of verification.

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It should be of particular value in relation to the provisions of a chemical weapons treaty dealing with a verifiable ban on chemical weapons use, as is being negotiated in this forum. We will also be submitting a technical working paper dealing with identification of chemical substances. We will also be making available to all delegations through the Secretariat a compendium of all chemical weapons documentation of this Conference during the period 1983-1985.

Another important item on our agenda is the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a subject on which there is widespread and legitimate public anxiety. Last year, an important step forward was taken when we were able to agree on a mandate for an Ad hoc Committee on this item. I pointed out at the time that it was a realistic mandate which takes into account and both complements and accurately reflects the realities concerning the bilateral negotiations already then under way between the United States and the USSR, but does not undermine or undercut or prejudge or in any way interfere with those negotiations. At the same time, I expressed the hope that the mandate would not expire at the end of 1985 bearing in mind the wishes of some delegations who would like something more and something better. The view I then expressed continues to be the view of the Canadian Government. The mandate has enabled us to make a beginning, but it has no means been exhausted. It was attained only with great difficulty, skill and perseverance. Any attempt to negotiate it or renegotiate it could almost certainly involve further lengthy discussion at the expense of substantive deliberation, with little prospect of agreement on a new mandate. Moreover, the political and negotiating context in which the mandate was agreed has not appreciably changed. Indeed, to the extent that the United States and the USSR are seriously coming to grips with the negotiating objectives they have set for themselves, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space, our need to ensure that our deliberations are complementary to, and not disruptive of, those negotiations is enhanced. Finally, I would note that, due to regrettable procedural delays, our substantive discussions on this item last year were seriously curtailed and as some delegations have pointed out, we were able to have only nine meetings. Nevertheless, those discussions, in the Canadian judgement, got off to a reasonably good start. They were substantive. They were for the most part objective. They went some way toward elucidating the complexities and intricacies -- technical, legal and political and we have heard of some of them today -- involved in this process. However, they remain incomplete. The importance and difficulty of the subject demand that we discharge our last year's mandate with determination and dispatch before we embark on a new one. The reputation of this Conference would not be enhanced by procedural wrangles on this item. As was the case last year when we submitted a broad survey on the existing international legal régime in outer space, the Canadian delegation intends to make concrete contributions to substantive discussions. In the process, we will be making available to all delegations, through the Secretariat, a compendium of the 1985 Conference on Disarmament documentation on the subject.

The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains an especially important item on our agenda. It has, unfortunately, become one of the more contentious issues. The intensity of feeling it generates reflects both the inherent importance of nuclear weaponry as a core element of the strategic policies of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the profound public anxieties arising from an awareness of the massive and relatively indiscriminate destructive power of such weapons. Because the use of such weapons on any significant scale would have serious repercussions not only for combatant

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States but, almost certainly, for all others as well, the active interest in this item shown by all delegations of this Conference is legitimate and understandable. In these circumstances, there may also be a consequential need to take care that the strength of our views and concerns, and the vehemence with which they may be expressed, do not become a hindrance to rational discussion of the central issues involved. Here or elsewhere, polemics will not lead the way to better understanding.

I wish to emphasize that a negotiated, verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a fundamental objective of the Canadian Government. Canada continues to favour a careful, step-by-step approach to a nuclear test ban, both on procedure and substance although we respect the views of those who differ. The Canadian Government is clearly on record as favouring the re-establishment in the Conference of a subsidiary body to address this subject, and I now reiterate that position. Such a body must have a concrete and realistic mandate which would enable the immediate resumption of substantive work, with a view to negotiation of a treaty. We suggest that priority attention be given to reaching agreement on a programme of work, which might address the issues of scope, as well as verification and compliance, with appropriately structured working groups. We sense among the countries represented in this room a growing recognition of the potential value of a focused approach along these lines. The Canadian delegation would be ready to take an active and constructive part in implementing an agreed work programme. We hope too that, in support of such efforts, there could be general agreement to press ahead with our important work on seismic exchanges.

Finally, although it is not a separate agenda item here, I would like to speak briefly on the broad issue of verification. As is well known here, this is a subject of longstanding priority for Canada, going well beyond mere rhetoric. Significant amounts of the scarce financial and personnel resources available to the Canadian Government are being devoted to a serious and methodical examination of the problems and issues connected with verification. Within Canada's Department of External Affairs, for example, a special verification research unit has been established, with an annual budget of a million dollars. As one concrete step, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs announced at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly that the Canadian Government has decided to upgrade in a substantial way its seismic facility in our Northwest Territories. By this and other means, we intend to accumulate a store of experience and add to our expertise which can increase Canada's ability to contribute in practical and constructive ways to the international negotiation of effective, verifiable arms control measures.

This Canadian approach reflects our firm belief that the verification aspects of arms control and disarmament agreements are in no way subsidiary or secondary elements but are integral and essential parts of such agreements, in some cases amounting to pre-conditions to final agreement, but not obstacles to be utilized to obfuscate or postpone serious negotiations. This approach reflects our view that questions of confidence are central to all arms control negotiations. The reconfigurations of national arsenals which arise from arms control agreements both reflect and reinforce a certain level of reciprocal confidence in the intentions and capabilities of the parties. When it is appreciated that States are being asked to give up security based on weaponry in return for security based on arms control agreements, the importance of this element of trust and confidence is readily apparent. If the necessary levels of confidence are to be sustained and increased, all parties to such

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agreements must be able to assure effective compliance through adequate verification. Conversely, the inability adequately to assure compliance can lead to reduced levels of confidence, an increase of mistrust and, through a vicious spiral, could bring the whole arms control and disarmament process to a halt. We, of course, recognize that the legitimate need for adequate verification can be abused. For our part, we are convinced that a rational and imaginative approach to verification, far from being a smoke-screen, is a prerequisite in every serious arms control negotiation. In circumstances when all parties are negotiating in good faith, meticulous attention to verification provisions will not be a hindrance to the negotiatin progress. On the contrary, it should facilitate such negotiations.

From this perspective, the Canadian Government was especially gratified at the adoption by consensus at the fortieth session of the General Assembly of a resolution reaffirming resoundingly the importance of verification as an essential element of the arms control negotiating process. This confirms to us the high importance of effective verification in disarmament and arms control agreements -- not as a partisan issue but as a matter on which there is international consensus. This consensus may be fragile, yet it is a foundation on which we can build. It is in this context that the Canadian delegation will shortly be making available to all delegations a comprehensive, cross-indexed compendium of verbatim statements on verification which have been made in this Conference and its predecessors during the period 1962-1983. These records, the sheer size of which some of you may find intimidating, are in fact instructive in indicating the extent to which there is common ground on which we can expand. I trust that this compendium will prove to be a valuable tool for our collective work. The compendium has already been referred to variously in the Canadian delegation. The polite ones call it "heavy stuff". Others say it has a very weighty tone. But these adjectives mean these are the three volumes that were prepared to be made available to the delegations that are interested in it.

Mr. President, may I conclude with the hope that 1986, the International Year of Peace, will prove to be a year of concrete achievement by this Conference, a year which we will one day look back upon as a turning point in the history of arms control and disarmament.

THE PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage?

In accordance with rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, I have requested the Secretariat to circulate a Working Paper under the symbol CD/WP.198, entitled "Provisional agenda for the 1986 session and Programme of Work of the Conference on Disarmament". As announced this morning and as agreed, I intend now to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider that Working Paper. If there is no objection, we shall proceed accordingly.

The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 5 p.m. and reconvened at 5.15 p.m.

THE PRESIDENT: The 336th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now resumed.

I wish to put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.198, dated 30 January 1986, containing the provisional agenda for the 1986 session and Programme of Work of the Conference on Disarmament. In submitting that Working Paper for adoption by the Conference, I wish to make the following statement:

"With respect to the adoption of the agenda for the year 1986, it is understood that the question of the nuclear neutron weapon is covered by item 2 of the agenda and can be considered under that agenda item."

If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts its agenda for the 1986 session and the Programme of Work for the first part of its annual session.

It is so decided.

I am grateful to the members of the Conference for their co-operation in adopting, at this first plenary meeting, the agenda and programme of work. I believe this augurs well for our consideration of other organizational matters and for the substantive work of the Conference in 1986.

As agreed at our informal meeting earlier today, I intend to convene an informal meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on Thursday, 6 February, immediately following our completion of the list of speakers, in order to consider the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies, as well as requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. I see no objection.

It is so decided.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 February at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.337
6 February 1986

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 6 February 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Richard Butler (Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria

Mr. N. KERROUM
Mr. A. BELAID

Argentina:

Mr. D. CAPUTO
Mr. M. CAMPORA
Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER
Mr. R.A. ROWE
Ms. M. LETTS

Belgium:

Mr. C. CLERCKX
Mr. P. NIEUWENHUYS

Brazil:

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. V. BOJILOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma:

U TIN TUN
U MYA THAN
U HLA MYINT
DAW AYE AYE MU

Canada:

Mr. J.A. BEESLEY
Mr. R.J. ROCHON

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIU ZHONGREN
Mr. TAN HAN
Mr. YU ZHONGZHOU
Mr. HU XIAODI
Mr. SUO KAIMING
Mr. SHA ZUKANG
Ms. WANG WEI
Mr. LI DAOZHONG

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. M. BADR
Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. JESSEL
Mr. G. MONTASSIER
Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. W. KRUTZSCH
Mr. F. SAYATZ

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. W.-N. GERMANN
Mr. M. GERDTS
Mr. H. PETERS

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. A.S. GONSALVES
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI
Mr. A. EFFENDI
Mr. R.I. JENIE
Mr. A.M. FACHIR
Mr. A. MASBAR AKBAR
Mr. F. QASIM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. A. SHAFII

Italy:

Mr. R. FRANCESCHI
Mr. F. PIAGGESI
Mr. G. ADORNI-BRACCESI
Mr. M. PAVESE
Mr. E. SIVIERO

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. K. KUDO
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mr. D. AFANDE
Mr. F. JOSIAH
Mr. P. MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. B. ELGHALI BENHIMA
Mr. O. HILALE
Mr. S. BENRYANE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Nigeria:

Mr. B.O. TONWE
Mr. B.A. ADEYEMI
Mr. A.A. ELLA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. J. RYCHLAK
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. I. VOICU
Mr. G. CHIRILA

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mrs. M.B. THEORIN
Mr. R. EKEUS
Ms. E. BONNIER
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Ms. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
Mr. G.V. ANTISIFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS
Mr. J.F. GORDON
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY
Mr. L. BELGARD
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Ms. L. BRONSON
Mr. P. GARDNER
Mr. S. GARNETT
Mr. J. GRANGER
Mr. R. GOUGH
Mr. R. NELSON
Mr. R. LEVINE
Ms. M. WINSTON
Mr. B. TUA

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA
Ms. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Under-Secretary-General
for Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 337th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me to extend a warm welcome to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Mr. Dante Caputo, who is addressing the Conference today as first speaker. Minister Caputo is no stranger to our Conference. He addressed us at the beginning of our 1984 session, shortly after he assumed his present office. His presence among us today is yet further evidence of the importance Argentina attaches to the Conference and of his country's continuing commitment to the cause of disarmament.

May I also welcome in our midst the new representative of Zaire, Ambassador Kama Budiaki, who has recently been appointed leader of the delegation of his country to the Conference on Disarmament. We are all looking forward to co-operating with Ambassador Budiaki.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will continue with statements in plenary meetings. As agreed at our last plenary meeting, an informal meeting will be held today to consider the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the Conference agenda and other organizational matters.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina, Bulgaria, Pakistan, Poland and the German Democratic Republic.

I now have great pleasure in giving the floor to the first speaker on our list, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Mr. Dante Caputo.

Mr. CAPUTO (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I wish to begin this statement by extending to you my best wishes for success in the exercise of the presidency during this opening month of the 1986 session.

On 28 February 1984, less than three months after democratic government was restored in my country and I began my term as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, I had the honour to address this Conference in this very room.

In February 1985, it was the Secretary of State of Argentina for International Relations who was here, and today I once again have the privilege of speaking before this Conference.

I believe that this presence of members of the democratic Government of Argentina bears witness to the importance my country attaches to the topic of disarmament and to this Conference as the multilateral forum par excellence for dealing with it.

However many vicissitudes and problems of its own a country may have -- and Argentina's are unquestionably serious and difficult to solve -- no one doubts that international peace and disarmament are today vital issues in the face of which it would be senseless to disagree. The lives of our inhabitants and the very existence of our nations currently hang on those issues, and if we are incapable of strengthening peace and promoting disarmament, the efforts, however great, and the sacrifices, however heroic, we may make to overcome the difficulties besetting every country will be of little value.

(Mr. Caputo, Argentina)

Although we have no part in the major causes of international tensions, we know that their effects will not pass us by. We must therefore play an active part in the search for peace so as not to suffer as victims of war. We cannot evade the issue under the pretext that our influence is small, just as it would be unacceptable for us to be excluded on that ground. No Government can shun its responsibility to face up to questions in which the lives of its people and the destiny of its nation are at stake, and no one can deny it the right to act on those issues.

Furthermore, no efforts or influence can be termed small when it is a question of defending peace or the freedom and prosperity of men and nations. History and experience have shown us that, in each of these fields, victory is possible only when the effort is permanent and the will unswayable. And if peace proves difficult to consolidate and disarmament difficult to promote because the powerful countries do not wish or do not know how to achieve them, then we who are not powerful must play an even greater role, since changing the intentions of the powerful and smoothing the way to peace will depend on us, on our working together. We do not lack the means to take up this formidable challenge, for reason and life are on our side.

Two years ago, when I spoke before this Conference for the first time, I described what were the aspirations and proposals of a Government that had recently begun its term in Argentina in an international situation marked by an escalation of menacing tensions. During the past two years, the Argentine Government has been translating its hopes and aims into deeds and actions. At the same time, a series of events has partially changed the international setting as regards peace and disarmament. From the experience we have gained and the changes which have occurred throughout the world there has emerged a set of lessons and approaches which I believe it is relevant to point out in this forum.

In February 1984, quoting the words of Raúl Alfonsín on his assumption of the presidency of the Republic, I said that Argentina would not have two policies or two faces, one for the nation and the other for the world outside, that it was the will of the democratic Argentine Government to seek peace and justice within my country and within the international community, since both states were, de facto and de jure, closely connected.

In accordance with those ideas, we began active international efforts to put them into practice.

Thus we were able to bring to an end our centuries-old dispute with Chile in the Beagle Canal zone, with the inestimable mediation of His Holiness Pope John Paul II, which made it possible to reach an honourable and reasonable solution, in conformity with the decision of both Governments to foster peace between the two countries.

In the same spirit, the Argentine Government has repeatedly stated its will to seek a peaceful solution to the ongoing controversy between my country and the United Kingdom over the Malvinas, as once again recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 40/21 of November 1985. During the discussion preceding that resolution, I said that, when there is good will, imagination and the political decision to arrive at a solution, problems which are seemingly the most complicated can be solved. The vast

(Mr. Caputo, Argentina)

majority of the countries comprising the international community also see things this way. We hope and trust that, in the very near future, the aspiration to resolve this controversy peacefully will become a reality.

The conflict in Central America has also been a source of concern to the Argentine Government. Like the other Latin American countries, Argentina feels deeply affected by what is happening in Central America. That is not only because we share the anguish and suffering of peoples with whom we feel a bond of brotherhood. It is also because our own peace of mind and security will be at risk if that conflict is not resolved. That explains the constant support we have given to the steps taken by the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group, support that -- together with Brazil, Peru and Uruguay -- we explicitly and formally confirmed in Lima in July 1985. We are aware that a peaceful, diplomatic solution must be found to the problems in Central America. We are convinced that, with realism, flexibility and imagination, this can be achieved. We note that all the Latin American countries share this view. We know that to achieve the objective, we must work constantly and hard, without giving way to discouragement or disillusionment.

That is why, when possibilities of finding a solution seemed blocked, the countries of the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group met at the beginning of this year in Venezuela. There we recapitulated the basic areas of agreement uniting Latin Americans and the fundamental, realistic and reasonable conditions for a peaceful feasible solution. This was the origin of the Caraballeda proposal, which was to be signed a few days later by all the Central American countries and which has received the approval of many nations in the international community, including -- it should be mentioned -- practically all the nations of Europe.

If I have taken the liberty of stressing this theme, it is to show to what extent a problem which affects the countries of a region can and must be dealt with by the countries of that region, to what extent formulas for a solution can be explored and found if common sense, realism and imagination prevail, to what extent these potential solutions may be frustrated or blocked if extraregional factors attempt to place on them conditions going beyond what the nations of a region can accept or permit. And I believe it is relevant to mention this issue in the Conference on Disarmament because we are all aware that disarmament is not possible if peace is not possible, that the search for peace is a necessary pre-requisite for disarmament, and that, unfortunately, today's world shows us that the expansion of regional conflicts threatens peace throughout the world and that regional conflicts can evade both control and solution when world tensions are introduced into them.

As with other conflicts, those affecting a region, like those affecting two nations or the world as a whole, cannot be dealt with when there is mistrust, intolerance and rigidity of viewpoint from each of the parties involved. Neither the international community nor the individual nations comprising it can remain indifferent when this occurs and, in particular, when the dimension of the problem affects them.

For this reason, the Argentine Government, in a personal commitment by President Raúl Alfonsín, participated actively with the Heads of State and Government of Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden in the "Five-Continent Initiative" with which you are familiar.

(Mr. Caputo, Argentina)

The question of disarmament, and especially that of nuclear disarmament, is something which concerns us all, since it involves our lives, the future of each of our countries and that of humanity as a whole.

When the six countries launched their initiative on 22 May 1984, the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union were at a complete standstill, and, distressingly, the deployment of nuclear weapons was expanding rapidly and new and dangerous forms of the arms race between the super-Powers were multiplying. Irrationality prevailed, and the world was at the edge of the abyss.

In their first declaration, the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania called for the adoption of urgent measures to prevent a nuclear holocaust, including the complete banning of all types of nuclear-weapon test and of all extension of arms systems into outer space.

Towards the end of 1984, a first, albeit slight hope emerged that common sense would begin to prevail when the discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union began again in this very city of Geneva.

In January 1985, the six Heads of State or Government met personally for the first time at the city of Delhi and drew up a second declaration which bears the name of that city. In that declaration they repeated the basic proposals they had formulated in May 1984 and spoke of the legitimacy of the claiming by every human being and every nation of the most fundamental right there is on this Earth, a right which the nuclear arms race has jeopardized: the right to life.

Both the first declaration of May 1984 and the Delhi Declaration received enormous support from world public opinion, eminent persons and the international community. We believe that it was in some way a positive contribution to the favourable development of the world situation and testimony to the fact that the efforts being made in the world in favour of peace and disarmament are not in vain.

During 1985, a number of encouraging developments occurred in humanity's struggle to prevent its own destruction. Outstanding among them was the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Six years had elapsed without the highest officials of the United States and the Soviet Union having been able to meet in person and establish a dialogue that is essential for their own countries and for the entire world.

In our opinion, the essence of this meeting is reflected in a sentence of the joint communiqué of 21 November 1985 which states, "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". These few words summarize what we all know and need and represent a commitment to the world that we must all support and demand be met.

Admittedly that is but a fresh start, and virtually the entire task remains to be done. Admittedly, too, some disturbing ideas were put forward during those conversations, such as the talk of the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, which constitutes a discriminatory approach since the

(Mr. Caputo, Argentina)

priority objective of the Conference on Disarmament in this regard is to obtain a complete ban on those weapons. Piling-up discriminatory agreements will certainly not be the most appropriate and effective way of ensuring world peace.

But beyond these and other facts that worry us, it is obvious that the meeting of President Reagan with General Secretary Gorbachev was an extremely positive event, and one that was preceded and followed by others which we also find favourable. I am referring, for example, to the unilateral suspension of nuclear tests adopted by the Soviet Union and extended until April 1986, to the proposal made last January by General Secretary Gorbachev -- a proposal which has some new and stimulating aspects -- and President Reagan's promise to give it serious and careful study. It is also encouraging that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have agreed to meet again in the second half of this year.

When we examine the problems of disarmament, beginning with those of nuclear disarmament, so many complex questions arise that the task appears huge and interminable. Buried in the accumulation of problems and complications, the starting points are sometimes lost from sight. It is not, I think, superfluous to remind ourselves of them from time to time, if only so that we can see the wood again and find out where we are.

Weeks before the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, India, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania sent them a letter, which actually represents the third joint declaration of this group of leaders. In it, in addition to stressing certain concrete steps which could be taken immediately to promote disarmament and offering their co-operation in the areas of verification of the suspension of tests, they raised one aspect which appears to me to be essential: the necessity and obligation to build mutual trust.

As a result of many centuries' experience, the presumption of good faith in the execution and interpretation of contracts between individuals is an established principle of private law. No one is so ingenious or foolish as not to know that it is often not good faith, but malice and deceit that motivate the contracting parties. But history has shown the impossibility of building a legal system in which presumption of deceit prevails. Indeed it is impossible not only to construct a legal system but simply to get a society to function without calling on the presumption of good faith in the behaviour of its members and the maintenance of its institutions. Without this presumption, there would be neither currency nor justice, neither authorities, nor law, nor what is even more essential, civilized co-existence between men.

The same principle applies in relations between countries. Well known and oft-repeated as it is, we ourselves have reconfirmed it throughout our administration and in the cases I mentioned earlier. Whenever there has been mutual trust, it has been possible to resolve the questions in which we have been involved. Whenever there has been mistrust, there have immediately arisen refusal to understand the other party's arguments and rigid and blind cleavage to one's own positions. Certainly mistrust is often encouraged by very precise and obvious interests and pressures. But what is surprising is that this interplay of interests and pressures which feeds mistrust is often contrary to the greatest and most enduring interests that a country can have. And that is more than obvious when what is at stake is nothing less than the danger of a nuclear holocaust which no specific interest will survive.

(Mr. Caputo, Argentina)

It is also surprising that, in today's world, the incorporation in international relations of such an elementary and well-known principle as the need for mutual trust does not appear to be a fundamental task. We are unfortunately well aware how far the experience of the pre-Second World War years had a negative influence in that respect.

The counter-productive effects of what is termed the "policy of appeasement" towards Hitler marked an entire generation of leaders and created an environment of hostility towards those who advocated and advocate the need for flexibility, understanding and trust in order to promote peace in the world.

It may be wondered whether this lesson is not only fruitless but also incorrect. Among other reasons, because immediately after the First World War, when there was a need for understanding, the recourse was to rigidity and later, when there was a need for firmness in the face of intolerance and threats, weakness prevailed. And, as we have had occasion to confirm, rigidity and firmness are not the same thing.

But perhaps the greatest error that can be made when recalling our experience prior to the Second World War is to forget that the main cause of that war was the First World War. And that, in its turn, that First World War was basically caused by the concept of "armed peace" which preceded it.

During the 44 years that elapsed between 1870 and 1914, a period longer than that separating us from the end of the Second World War, there was no war among the great European Powers. During that unprecedented period of peace and prosperity in Europe, the great Powers of the time began an extraordinary arms race and were guided by a policy of force between nations. For several decades it was emphatically maintained that the arms race was the best guarantee of peace, since the dread of a tremendously destructive war would ward off the danger that one would occur. What is certain is that, in 1914, Europe found itself, within the space of a few weeks, involved in a war against its leaders' will and, what is worse, without their being able to prevent it. The war organization that had been created, driven on by interests of all kinds, had its own logic and ended up imposing itself on the Governments' intentions.

It is tragic to think that, at this moment, guided by our fear of repeating the errors that preceded the Second World War, we are repeating the behaviour patterns that led to the First World War and are, basically, those which ultimately produced the Second World War.

Hence, though we can understand why there are those who posit mistrust as the starting point of relations among the great Powers, we cannot, nor must we, accept it as a legitimate approach. Certainly we cannot prevent its being put forward. But nothing compels us to accept it, since we know that, if this type of attitude prevails, the nuclear holocaust will occur sooner or later, not to mention the proliferation of lesser conflicts it is creating throughout the world and of which we who have the least and need the most are victims.

(Mr. Caputo, Argentina)

In point of fact, the vast majority of the inhabitants of this planet, like the vast majority of the nations of the international community, favour the creation of a climate of growing trust that would strengthen the possibilities of a lasting peace. If we are true to this desire, if we believe that it is reasonable and feasible, we must consider the creation of mutual trust to be not only a need for the great Powers and the world as a whole, but also a commitment which the great Powers must assume towards humanity. And that, therefore, it is for us all to play an active role to ensure that this mutual trust is created. And if the great Powers cannot achieve this, we have the right and the obligation to work so that they do so. In this respect, we can make a contribution if we refuse to accept as legitimate any approach which is generally and a priori based on a theory of mistrust. Each time this type of argument is made, we should reply that, far from defending the preservation of the inhabitants and of the nation that entertains it, it attacks peace, the survival of those it aims to protect and the security of the entire human race.

During the past year, some rays of hope have appeared in the midst of all the misfortunes by which humanity is afflicted. The arms race continues to be the central issue threatening the survival of the human species on earth and is increasingly affecting the prosperity of a world which needs to work in peace. Disarmament is therefore the common cause of us all, it is the cause for which we must struggle without respite or flagging. If we do so, we will not merely be fulfilling our duty; we will, above all, be giving humanity and our children a world to live in.

I have concluded my statement to the Conference and must now leave this forum because, owing to important obligations attaching to my post, I have to travel to New York this afternoon for consultations with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

One effect of this will be to deprive me of the possibility of staying on here and getting together with you at the end of this meeting as I would have liked.

Permit me, Mr. President, to express through you to the distinguished delegates to the Conference on Disarmament a cordial farewell until we meet again.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dante Caputo, for his important statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the President and to the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the first month of the 1986 session. Your diplomatic skill demonstrated during the Third NPT Conference is reassurance to all of us that you will do your utmost quickly to resolve the organizational problems and proceed with the substantive work of the Conference. We are honoured today to have with us

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, who just left, Mr. Caputo. I have listened with great interest to the important statements he has made in our Conference and my delegation is going to study them carefully. I should also like to express the gratitude of my delegation to the Ambassador of Argentina who presided over the CD in August of last year and represented the Conference during the inter-sessional period. I should like to welcome my new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Algeria, Belgium, Burma, India, Italy, Kenya, Morocco, Peru and Venezuela and assure them of the readiness of my delegation to co-operate with their delegations in the best interests of the work of our Conference. We are pleased to note the presence among us of Mr. Martenson, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate our appreciation of the work done by the efficient team headed by the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina.

The delegation of Bulgaria shares the deep grief expressed by many delegations on the passing away of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, Nobel Peace Prize winner and distinguished Swedish diplomat, whose lifelong dedication and contribution to the cause of peace and disarmament is universally known and recognized. We express also our condolences to the United States delegation on the tragic death of the crew of the space shuttle Challenger.

The Conference on Disarmament opens its session in an atmosphere of rising hopes and expectations. Hopes born out of an event of prime political importance which took place in November 1985 -- the summit meeting in Geneva between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev, and the President of the United States of America, R. Reagan. Expectations stemming from the desire to see the good intentions become translated into meaningful deeds. These hopes and expectations are shared by all nations. The safest way to make them come true goes through reaching agreements, bilateral and multilateral, to reduce the danger of a nuclear catastrophe, to limit and terminate the arms race on Earth and prevent it in space.

The determination of the Warsaw Treaty States to engage on this road found a renewed expression in their Declaration adopted at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia on 24 October 1985 and circulated as an official document (CD/645) of the Conference on Disarmament. The States Members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization stated in this Declaration that "the principal objective of their foreign policy has been, and still is, the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, the lowering of the level of military confrontation and the evolution of international relations in the spirit of peaceful co-existence and détente". They pointed to the urgent need for the adoption of practical measures to halt the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and to proceed to disarmament. The States participating in the Meeting further reiterated that "there is no type of weapon that they are unwilling to limit, reduce or withdraw from their arsenals and destroy forever under an agreement with the other States, while abiding by the principle of equality and equal security". Without entering into details, my delegation wishes to point out that the Sofia Declaration reflects also the position of principle of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on matters that are the subject of work by the CD.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

This Declaration reaffirmed the commitment of the member States to a complete and general ban on nuclear-weapon tests, as well as their support for the USSR unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, and called upon the United States to join it; expressed their determination to remove the danger of nuclear war, to put an end to the arms race on Earth, and prevent it in space by reaching agreement to ban all space strike weapons; pointed out that "in present-day conditions, the objective of a total ban on and elimination of chemical weapons, including their particularly dangerous binary version, acquires ever greater importance and urgency"; and further reaffirmed their conviction that "the States which do not possess or have nuclear arms on their territory are fully entitled to solid international legal guarantees that such weapons will not be used against them".

The Warsaw Treaty States declared themselves in favour of enhancing the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament and emphasized the need of initiating constructive discussion on those items of the agenda which are not currently the subject of negotiations.

The Geneva summit meeting between General Secretary M. Gorbachev and President R. Reagan demonstrated that it is possible to halt the world sliding down to the abyss of nuclear catastrophe, to initiate a joint venture aimed at improving Soviet-American relations. This meeting set the beginning of new efforts to heal the climate of international relations. The Joint Statement by the leaders of the USSR and the United States that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", that any war between them "whether nuclear or conventional", has to be prevented, and that "they will not seek to achieve military superiority", can and should -- as many previous speakers the day before yesterday pointed out -- become the basis for accomplishing the tasks set down in the Joint Soviet-United States Agreement of 8 January 1985, namely "to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability."

The most difficult task today is to find forms and means to translate generally recognized truths into generally acceptable agreements, general principles into legal norms, and words into deeds. That is why the statement of 15 January 1986 by General Secretary M. Gorbachev was met with such great interest and triggered the broadest approval in all parts of the world. The Government of the people's Republic of Bulgaria has expressed its full support for this statement as a large-scale, concrete and genuine nuclear disarmament programme, one that strives to eliminate weapons of mass destruction by the end of the twentieth century, to create a qualitatively new atmosphere of confidence in relations among States.

With reference to the new Soviet initiative, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and President of the Bulgarian Council of State, Todor Zhivkov, stated at a recent session of the Bulgarian National Assembly: "The Statement sets timeframes as to the road which mankind has to cover in order to meet the third millenium under clear and peaceful skies, without wars, with no weapons. This goal is attainable because it reflects the fundamental interests of all peoples, regardless of class, race, naton or religious or ideological differences".

The Soviet initiative opens up a real opportunity to break once and for all the Damocles sword of the threat of nuclear annihilation hanging over mankind, to cut the vicious circle of the arms race and to achieve

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

disarmament. This is an historic chance that should not be missed. It is an opportunity also for a fresh start in the work of the CD, which has important and responsible tasks as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament.

Bulgaria has always held the view that all States, be they nuclear or non-nuclear, big or small, aligned or non-aligned, developed or developing, can and should make their contribution to the efforts to reduce the military threat and strengthen international peace and security. We attach great importance to the initiatives aimed at fostering a climate of mutual understanding and confidence in the Balkans, at consolidating good-neighbourly relations in our region. For some years now, Bulgaria, together with other Balkan countries, has been working to turn the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Most recently, on 23 December 1985, the Heads of State of Bulgaria and Romania -- Todor Zhivkov and Nicolae Ceauşescu -- came out, in a Joint Declaration, with a new initiative: to transform the Balkans into a zone free of chemical weapons. In this Declaration-Appeal to the leaders of the Balkan countries, circulated as document CD/648, they proposed to start without delay negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement among the Balkan countries to prohibit testing, production, acquisition and storage of any type of chemical weapons on their respective territories. We believe that the implementation of this proposal, as an interim measure, would provide an impetus to freeing the whole of Europe of a category of extremely dangerous weapons, and would contribute to the successful conclusion of a convention to prohibit and eliminate chemical weapons -- an important task of a global nature.

The same is valid also for the initiative of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia aimed at the establishment of a CW-free zone in Central Europe, which the Bulgarian Government wholeheartedly supports.

My delegation would like to regard as a good omen the fact that the Conference adopted its agenda and programme of work on the very first day of its 1986 session. We hope that the task of setting up subsidiary bodies will not prove to be as difficult as it used to be in the past. My delegation pledges to give its full support to any efforts aimed at proceeding to meaningful negotiations on all items of the agenda.

The Bulgarian delegation believes that it is high time for the CD to undertake a serious and substantive consideration of the priority items on our agenda, i.e. the issues related to nuclear disarmament.

The question of nuclear test-ban is now more than ripe for solution. The unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions, declared on 6 August last year, has been universally welcomed. The extension of this moratorium for three additional months is fresh evidence that the Soviet leadership means deeds, and only deeds. These steps are, in the words of Madame Margarita Papandreou at the opening of the NGO Conference in Geneva on 20 January this year, a "disarmament by challenge", a challenge which, if met by the United States, would create a most favourable atmosphere for negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban. References to the problem of control cannot continue to serve as an excuse for not accepting the offer for a joint Soviet-United States moratorium. Such a problem does not exist

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

any longer. General Secretary M. Gorbachev clearly stated that the Soviet Union is willing to apply any forms of control by national technical means, international verification mechanisms, on-site inspections.

A joint Soviet-American nuclear test moratorium would, indeed, be of great help to the constructive and goal-oriented work of the CD on the first item of its agenda. As we see it, the basic provisions of the four resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the question of nuclear weapon test ban are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, given the existence of good political will, they could become the building stones of a mutually acceptable procedural agreement. My delegation holds the view that there are no legal and technical impediments to set up an ad hoc committee on item 1 with a mandate to start negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The new Soviet Programme for nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 provides a real basis to proceed with a tangible concrete discussion in an ad hoc committee on the contents, stages, specific measures and timeframes of such a programme. The consensus reached in the Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review-Conference on the subject dealt with under item 2 of our agenda is a valuable prerequisite for arriving at an agreement on appropriate means and forms meaningfully to supplement bilateral negotiations by multilateral efforts on nuclear disarmament.

In his message to the CD, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that "no task can have greater importance than developing and reaching agreement on effective and practical measures to prevent nuclear war". The CD session this year could prove, by proceeding to negotiations on item 3, that to agree on efficient measures to prevent a nuclear war is an endeavour that is neither so dangerous, nor so impossible, as some delegations tend to make us believe. In this connection we would like to recall that document CD/515 tabled by the Group of 21 provides a good basis for search for a compromise solution. The statement from the Chair last Tuesday that "the Conference must establish, early this session, an appropriate committee on this subject on which a start can be made towards identifying further means of ensuring that nuclear war never occurs" also seems to us encouraging.

The Bulgarian delegation favours a prompt resumption of the substantive work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In 1985, the CD's work made significant progress, which should be carried over this year. We assess positively the results of the extended January session of the Ad Hoc Committee, more specifically the agreement reached on the Integrated Approach for Listing Relevant Chemicals.

The Bulgarian delegation considers that there is already a good basis for a gradual solution of the problem of chemical weapons production facilities. We would also like to believe that there will be an intensification of the search for realistic solutions on Article IX of the draft Convention (Consultation, co-operation and fact-finding).

My delegation welcomes the resumption of the Soviet-United States consultations on the banning of chemical weapons, which will undoubtedly be beneficial to the negotiations in the Conference.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The headway made at the CW negotiations in this Conference so far is a common achievement. We would not be fair, however, if we do not single out the contribution of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski of Poland, who has energetically and skilfully steered its work.

To prevent an arms race in outer space today means to overcome the largest and most dangerous obstacle in the way of a radical reduction of the nuclear arsenals, to achieving real nuclear disarmament. The proposals contained in the new Soviet programme for nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 have made the idea behind the plans to build anti-missile defence systems not only obsolete, but also completely useless. It is our considered view that the position of each State on the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space constitutes, at this stage, a litmus test for the sincerity of its yearning to achieve nuclear disarmament.

The Bulgarian delegation believes that the Conference should, without delay, set up an ad hoc committee on item 5 of its agenda. The mandate of that committee should be based on the provisions of United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/87, which was adopted as a whole with no dissenting vote.

To conclude, I should like to wind up where I began. The session of our Conference this year has an important and responsible task, i.e. to respond to the hopes and expectations for a significant breakthrough in our work. We should like to believe that the year 1986 will mark the end of the fruitless period in the work of the CD and will witness the beginning of serious and constructive negotiations aimed at reaching agreements in the interests of peace and security of all peoples.

We fully subscribe to the view of Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar that the hope with which the International Year of Peace begins "can be fulfilled only if the foundations for significant measures of arms limitation and disarmament are speedily laid".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): It gives me great pleasure, Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf, to join all those who have congratulated you on your assumption of the office of the President of the Conference on Disarmament for the first month of the 1986 session. You have had a long and distinguished association with disarmament efforts. Your many contributions in this field are known to everyone. Your Government's commitment to disarmament and its forthright position on the issues which are of interest to us is one from which we derive great satisfaction and support. May I pledge to you, Mr. President, the fullest co-operation of my delegation in the fulfilment of your responsibilities. I would like also to place on record my delegation's appreciation for the laudable manner in which

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Ambassador Mario Campora of Argentina guided us during the period when he was President. May I extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues in the Conference, the distinguished representatives of Algeria, Belgium, Burma, India, Italy, Kenya, Morocco, Peru, Venezuela and Zaire. Their presence will enrich our work and I look forward to close and fruitful collaboration with them.

Mr. President, my delegation shares fully the sentiments of sorrow and sympathy that have been expressed at the tragic accident met by the United States space shuttle a few days ago, as also the expressions of grief at the passing away of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, whose contributions in the field of disarmament will remain a beacon light for us for a long time to come.

We have heard this morning the important statement made by His Excellency, Mr. Dante Caputo, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Argentina. We are appreciative of the fact that he has been able to find time to address the Conference on Disarmament again, which reflects Argentina's close interest in our work. I am sure that his statement will receive the close attention that it richly deserves.

Since we concluded our 1985 session, the two most significant developments from our point of view have been the super-Power summit meeting in Geneva in November last year and the statement on 15 January by General Secretary Gorbachev, which covered a wide range of disarmament and arms control issues.

The November summit, the first such meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union in six years, did not achieve any breakthroughs. In all fairness, it was not expected to. However, the summit did confirm the importance that the two super-Powers attach to arms control and their determination to make all efforts towards the realization of this goal. We would like to nourish the hope that the expression of positive intentions made at the Geneva summit will be the harbinger of concrete and far-reaching agreements at future meetings between the Soviet and American leaders.

My delegation has studied with keen interest the statement made by General Secretary Gorbachev on 15 January this year, which contains the outlines of a three-phase programme for disarmament to be implemented by the turn of the century. The proposals that have been made are comprehensive. They are also significant. It is, therefore, our hope that they will be examined with care and seriousness and generate constructive responses. May I put forward in my intervention this morning some preliminary comments on the programme envisaged in the General Secretary's statement.

We welcome the specific timeframe for denuclearization offered in the programme. The objective of abolishing nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is a goal sought and supported by all neutral and non-aligned countries. The non-aligned nations believe that specific time frames for achieving agreements and implementing them would make our efforts in this direction purposeful and goal oriented. Given vision and political will, a period of 15 years should not be too short to achieve most, if not all our disarmament objectives.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The principal responsibility for progress in nuclear disarmament rests on the United States and the Soviet Union. It is, therefore, logical that a phased programme for nuclear disarmament should call upon the two super-Powers to begin the process, which should then be joined at an appropriate stage by the other nuclear-weapon States and that, during the first stage of the programme, while the two super-Powers start reducing their nuclear arsenals, the other nuclear-weapon States should impose a qualitative and quantitative freeze on their nuclear weapons.

In proposing the removal of Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe and by leaving out in the first instance the French and British nuclear forces from the overall equation now prevailing in Europe, the Soviet proposals definitely offer a way forward. It is our hope that this will facilitate early agreement now on the INF question. The removal of intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe would raise the nuclear threshold and thus serve as an important confidence-building measure that would act also, we would hope, as a catalyst for progress on other issues.

My delegation appreciates fully the priority which the programme accords to a ban on nuclear testing as the key to halting the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is imperative that, in the first stage of the programme, the two super-Powers at least accept a ban on nuclear testing and invite other States to join in such a moratorium. This would pave the way for a comprehensive test ban treaty by the beginning of the second stage, which, according to the programme, should commence around 1990. By placing the primary responsibility for a nuclear test ban on the United States and the USSR, the Soviet proposals meet the argument raised by some that the super-Powers, which are far ahead of the other nuclear-weapon States, must first set an example to enable the other nuclear-weapon States to contemplate a similar move. We welcome in this regard the three-month extension of the unilateral moratorium imposed by the Soviet Union on its nuclear explosions.

We have repeatedly stated in this Conference that we attach the utmost importance to a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions, which we believe can serve to check both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our assertion that verification could not be the insurmountable barrier that it might have been at some earlier stage and that what was required to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty was, in fact, a political decision has been vindicated by a number of recent statements. We, of course, recognize that, in a world characterized by mistrust, it is difficult to conceive of disarmament or arms-control agreements which do not provide for adequate verification arrangements to ensure compliance. We, therefore, welcome the acceptance in the Soviet proposals of the concept of on-site inspection and the expression of a willingness to reach agreement on any other additional verification measures.

We also welcome the indication given in the Soviet proposals of a positive approach to talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. The expression of a desire for an acceptable accommodation at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and the reaffirmation of the goal of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons both deserve to be acknowledged with appreciation. My delegation hopes that these expressions of flexibility, good will and an overall constructive approach will facilitate forward movement on these and other issues.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

My delegation sees merit in the link which the Soviet disarmament programme establishes between substantial reductions of offensive nuclear weapons and a commitment not to develop, test or deploy space-based weapons. The traditional strategic doctrine of nuclear deterrence is based on offence. If it is now going to be based on defence or on a mix of offence and defence, the results will be highly destabilizing. An operational and effective ballistic-missile defence system could make possible a nuclear first strike by a side possessing a defensive screen which could then be used to protect the attacker from the feeble retaliation of its adversary. The super-Power confronted with a comprehensive ballistic-missile defence would, in all likelihood, be driven into multiplying its own strategic offensive weapons with a view to acquiring the capacity to overwhelm the defences of its opponent and thereby ensure the credibility of its strategic deterrence. A concurrent option for it would be to erect a similar defensive screen. It is, in the circumstances, not difficult to conclude that an offence-defence mix would in fact take the arms race, in both offensive and defensive weapons, to higher and more dangerous levels, thus further jeopardizing the chances of arriving at arms limitation agreements. Comprehensive ballistic-missile defences, whether ground- or space-based, would equally undercut the basic rationale of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which places reliance for strategic stability on offensive weapons and discards the defence option as destabilizing.

My country is no admirer of the concept of strategic deterrence. We are, however, gravely concerned at the attempts to replace this concept with an even more dangerous one. In our view, the objective of making nuclear weapons obsolete cannot be achieved through a ruinously expensive and highly destabilizing arms race, but very simply by measures aimed at eliminating them.

While my delegation is generally appreciative of the contents of the Soviet disarmament proposals and endorses their basic thrust, we find that attention needs to be given to some other issues such as the link between disarmament and security. Paragraph 93 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament states, inter alia: "in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States". The theme of security also figures at a number of other places in the Final Document.

States acquire arms either to threaten the security of other nations or to safeguard their own security. Consequently, it would not be reasonable to expect them to relinquish their armaments if they feel insecure or threatened. Disarmament and international security are not only closely interlinked, but also operate in a mutually reinforcing manner. An improvement in the international security climate would help promote disarmament measures that would, in their turn, strengthen international security. It logically follows that it would not be realistic to expect the super-Powers to agree to significant disarmament measures while their political and military rivalry continues unabated. The grave consequences which the military intervention in our neighbourhood in 1979 had on the arms-control process are too well known to be repeated here. The adverse repercussions which regional conflicts can have on the disarmament process should, therefore, not be ignored. In fact, solution of regional conflicts is necessary to create an appropriate international climate for global disarmament.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The disarmament programme outlined by General Secretary Gorbachev is essentially, and understandably so, addressed to the nations in the Atlantic Alliance. It is perhaps because of its Euro-centricity that the programme proposes to eliminate during its first phase the intermediate-range missiles stationed in Europe only. This leads one to conclude that similar missiles in Asia would be retained till the second or perhaps the third stage of the programme. It also leaves open the possibility of transferring the Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe to the Asian theatre, thereby intensifying nuclear-weapon concentration in Asia, at least during the early stages of the programme. Pakistan, as an Asian State, views this with concern. We hope that this matter will be addressed by the Soviet Union in a satisfactory manner.

The Soviet programme contains encouraging references to conventional disarmament in Europe. However, we feel that the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament, both in the European context and in terms of other parts of the world, requires further recognition and elaboration. The concern aroused among the NATO countries at the Warsaw Treaty Organization's conventional military preponderance is well known. Any serious nuclear disarmament endeavour in the East-West context would therefore have to address this question in a mutually satisfactory manner. Since security is not exclusively indigenous to the two alliances, a global approach would have to recognize and develop appropriate solutions for other parts of the world. Such a comprehensive approach would be essential to make nuclear and conventional disarmament agreements a realistic possibility.

Finally, in our view, a comprehensive programme of the type envisaged by the Soviet Union should, as its integral part, recognize the importance of measures to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons. In this regard I would refer to the suggestions already made by the non-aligned countries. The programme could also make provisions for interim and collateral measures for disarmament, such as extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

My delegation agrees with the Soviet assessment that negotiations for a convention banning chemical weapons have been unreasonably protracted and need to be intensified. My Government continues to adhere to the objective of a convention comprehensively prohibiting chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of their stockpiles, production facilities and delivery systems. We fear that bringing partial measures for discussion in the Conference on Disarmament will divert attention away from the main goal. Moreover, such measures may erode the political will to attain the agreed objective of total elimination of chemical weapons. An arrangement for non-transfer of chemical weapons and their non-deployment in other States or any other similar interim measure should best be negotiated and concluded among the chemical-weapon States themselves without involving the Conference on Disarmament or non-chemical-weapon States. This would allow the Conference to continue to concentrate its efforts on the objective of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

Despite some differences on specifics briefly mentioned by me, my delegation is in considerable agreement with the proposals outlined in General Secretary Gorbachev's disarmament programme. We will, of course, offer further detailed comments if and when specific elements of the proposed programme come under discussion.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski, who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, will introduce the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which is contained in document CD/651.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Mr. President, permit me to start by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of February. I am sure that you will again demonstrate your known diplomatic skill and resourcefulness by directing our work in the most efficient way. I want to assure you, Mr. President, of the full support and co-operation of my delegation. At the same time, I should like to express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Campora of Argentina, for the excellent performance of his duties. The Polish delegation appreciates and welcomes the personal appearance at today's meeting of His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Mr. Dante Caputo. We have listened with great interest to his important statement. Let me also welcome our new colleagues: Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, whom it is good to see back with us, and Ambassadors Kerroum of Algeria, Clerckx of Belgium, U Tin Tun of Burma, Gonsalves of India, Franceschi of Italy, Afande of Kenya, Benhima of Morocco, and Mariátegui of Peru. I look forward to co-operating closely with them and their respective delegations. May I also welcome Mr. Jan Martenson, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs. We are always pleased with his presence at our deliberations.

The Polish delegation shares the feeling of sadness expressed already in this hall in connection with the passing away of Alva Myrdal, the distinguished Swedish diplomat and Nobel prize winner and devoted champion for peace and disarmament. I extend our most sincere condolences to the delegation of Sweden and through it to the Swedish people and Government.

I have the pleasure to submit today to the Conference the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 13-31 January 1986, contained in document CD/651, which was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee at its meeting on 31 January.

During this period, the Ad Hoc Committee, in accordance with its mandate and the decision on a resumed session taken by the Conference on Disarmament at its 333rd plenary meeting, held on 27 August 1985, continued to work on further elaboration of the Convention.

Without going into details and repeating the content of the report, I would like to characterize briefly its main features and to shed some light on the work preceding its preparation and adoption by the Committee.

As is known, in preparation for a resumed session I held informal consultations here in Geneva in October 1985 and prior to resuming the Committee's session in January. These consultations were carried out on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis; they had a somewhat structured form but retained a necessary degree of flexibility. It has to be said with all frankness that without these consultations it would have been hardly possible to present to the Conference the report in its present form.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Hard and devoted work by delegations taking part in all stages of consultations, but especially the extremely important contribution of technical experts, produced a solid backbone for our work in January.

I would like to take this opportunity to express before the Conference my deepest gratitude to all those who took part in the preparatory work of the resumed session.

At the beginning of the session, the Committee accepted the Chairman's proposal, based on the work done during the consultations, to consider the following three issues:

(a) Article II (Definitions and Criteria), point 4, in the context of Article VI (Permitted Activities),

(b) Article II (Definitions and Criteria), point 5, in the context of Article V (Measures on Chemical Weapons Production Facilities),

(c) Article IX (Consultation, Co-operation and Fact-Finding).

The report duly reflects the Committee's work, which resulted in further clarification or development of the issues involved..

With regard to the first issue, work was undertaken on further refining the three criteria characterizing key precursors, on defining especially dangerous key precursors or key components for chemical weapons systems and on identifying chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical-weapons purposes.

An endeavour was made to compile lists of these groups of chemicals. The progress achieved in this area is a result of lasting, patient efforts and a compromise approach by all the delegations involved. It is reflected in the annex to this report, entitled "Integrated Approach for Listing Relevant Chemicals", which is, of course, at its preliminary stage, and hence subject to development and revision.

The work on the issue of chemical weapons production facilities was more of an exploratory nature. Its purpose was a gradual identification of kinds of production facilities or parts of facilities, which should, for the purposes of the Convention, be included in the definition of a "chemical weapons production facility". Both the method which was applied and the level of clarification and identification achieved are extensively described in the report.

Still another method of work was used with regard to Article IX. A broad discussion took place, allowing delegations to explain their approaches and relevant aspects of their positions on fact-finding and a system of on-challenge verification.

In the course of discussions, a number of approaches, as well as a number of areas deserving more thorough consideration in the future, were identified, as reflected in the report.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

In the final paragraph of the report, the Committee emphasizes that the report should be considered together with the Committee's report on its 1985 session and should equally be utilized in further elaboration of the Convention. In other words, the Committee should make good use of the results achieved and continue its work toward setting up régimes with regard to the listed chemicals and defining chemical weapons production facilities -- thus enabling more concrete work to be done on their elimination -- and, finally, working out mutually acceptable and efficient fact-finding and on-challenge verification procedures.

These three areas are of basic importance for the overall possibilities of further progress in our work on the Convention.

The negotiations on the chemical-weapons ban have reached a very important stage, I would say -- a kind of turning point and, at the same time, a point of dilemma. Turning point because we will have to rely more and more on precise and thorough technical expertise. We are all striving to speed up the process of drafting the Convention but, at the same time, we do not always have the manpower resources, especially on the technical level, necessary to sustain, when needed, simultaneous work on different issues. We will have to resolve this dilemma.

At the outset of the 1986 session I cannot but make another remark. The Ad Hoc Committee worked in January in an atmosphere which was more conducive to progress than that during the session of 1985. I think everybody can identify the background of this improvement.

The first and most important one is the Soviet-American agreement on the need to activate efforts towards achieving an effective and verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Another factor undoubtedly favourable to our work was the statement made on 15 January by the General Secretary of the CPSU containing new ideas with regard to chemical weapons. Moreover, the intensification of the efforts of the USSR and the United States is being matched by a similar attitude on the part of other members of the CD. Such harmonized action by all members of the CD could soon bring even more tangible results. It is a specific characteristic of this important multilateral forum that to achieve common goals we have to work together.

There is also another factor, maybe not a quite new one, but certainly more visible. That is the continuity of the negotiating process in the intersessional period. We had a period of very intensive consultations and an intensive and productive January session. This should encourage us to use more fully and effectively the intersessional period for negotiating and drafting.

I do strongly believe that this year's session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will bring more good will, more understanding for each other's positions, and more readiness to compromise which all together will add to a new spirit around the chemical-weapons negotiating table, thus leading to considerable progress in the preparation of the Convention banning chemical weapons.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

As this is my last statement in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I would like once again to express my deepest thanks, as I did in August, to all the delegates and experts, as well as the employees of the Secretariat, with whom I have had the pleasure to work. Mr P. Poptchev of Bulgaria, Mrs. E. Bonnier of Sweden and Mr. F. Elbe of the Federal Republic of Germany, who assisted me also during the resumed session deserve my special gratitude. They were tireless, skilfull and efficient in their efforts while guiding the work in the areas assigned to them.

I wish to thank personally Mr. A. Bensmail, the Secretary of the Committee, as well as his collaborators from the Secretariat. I was always able to count on their advice, assistance and support. And finally, let me thank those who work invisibly, but efficiently, and without whom our work would have been much more difficult, not to say impossible, the interpreters and translators.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Poland and Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I am certain that I would be correctly interpreting the feelings of the Conference in extending to you, Ambassador Turbanski, our deep appreciation for your outstanding chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee, which clearly contributed significantly to the advancement of our work on the item of chemical weapons. In accordance with the practice of the Conference, I believe we shall move to adopt the report of the Ad Hoc Committee and if there is no objection, I would intend to put it before the Conference for adoption at our plenary meeting to be held next Tuesday, 11 February.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, at the outset of my statement, I would like to join the previous speakers in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency. I am convinced that, guided by your diplomatic skills and experience, we shall be able, in the month of February, to lay the foundations for intensive and meaningful work to be conducted during this year's session of the CD. I wish you every success and pledge my delegation's full support and co-operation. At the same time, I would like to pay particular tribute to the outgoing President of the Conference, Ambassador Campora of Argentina, and commend him on the excellent job he did.

We join also the warm welcome expressed to His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Mr. Caputo. My delegation listened to his important statement with great attention. We appreciate the presence of the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Martenson, at our Conference. On behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, I wish to associate myself with the greetings of welcome to the new colleagues at this table, the distinguished Ambassadors of Algeria, Belgium, Burma, India, Italy, Kenya, Morocco and Peru.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Permit me to offer sincere condolences to the delegation of Sweden on the passing away of Alva Myrdal. Together with the Swedish delegation, we mourn a personality who was revered far beyond her country's borders for her untiring commitment to the cause of peace and disarmament and who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of her outstanding services. My delegation also wishes to convey its deep sympathy to the United States delegation on the tragic death of seven American citizens during the recent space-shuttle launch.

My delegation will soon present its position on the fundamental issues on our agenda. Today I would like to make a few observations with reference to the report (contained in document CD/651) describing the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons between the 1985 summer session and the 1986 spring session.

First of all, I should like to express my special thanks to Ambassador Turbanski, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, for the excellent job he has done. His comments and the report show itself how much has been achieved under his guidance in the way of speeding up negotiations on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and on the liquidation of the stockpiles of these dangerous arms. To continue the examination of unresolved problems and to start drafting has proved the right thing to do. If we can speak of a businesslike and constructive atmosphere today, we must attribute it first and foremost to the tolerant and human style the Committee's Chairman has cultivated in the performance of his duties.

Also, I wish to congratulate Mrs. Bonnier from the Swedish delegation, Comrade Poptchev from the Bulgarian delegation, Mr. Elbe from the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Mr. Wisnomoerti from the Indonesian delegation on the circumspection they displayed in their offices as co-ordinators of the working groups. I would also like to express my appreciation to Mr. Bensmail and his assistant, Mr. Cassandra, who performed their functions with great devotion and outstanding ability. Last but not least, our grateful thanks are due to Mrs. Johnston.

Through the concerted effort of many delegations, it was possible to add new elements to the positive results obtained back in the summer. We have managed to make headway on the road to the wording of a future Convention. What is more, it is obvious now in what direction we should be heading if we are to achieve further progress in drafting the convention.

I understand all delegations consider the integrated approach as the basis on which to determine key precursors of toxic chemicals, key components of chemical-weapon systems and chemicals that are produced in large commercial quantities and can be used for CW purposes. The approach allows the simultaneous identification of criteria governing the selection of chemicals and the listing of relevant substances. It will be important, however, to discuss these two elements in a balanced way.

In the past few weeks, the chances of arriving at a definition of production facilities have increased. Most delegations recognize that, due to the great variety of chemicals of relevance to chemical weapons, a discriminative approach to the different stages of production is needed. The last manufacturing stage plays a particularly important role. If we continue working along these lines, I see no reason why progress should not be possible in respect to production facilities.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

As far as measures of compliance are concerned, my delegation expects the Conference to carry on the discussion of problems. With regard to the crucial on-site inspection issue, we are witnessing an honest desire on the part of numerous delegations to find a practicable and generally acceptable solution. The present situation, Mr. President, is undoubtedly propitious for expeditious work on a CW ban. I am convinced that the proposals which the Soviet Union made on 15 January will have a positive impact on what we are doing here. The statement of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, exemplifies how serious his country is about translating the joint declaration issued at the Geneva summit into concrete action.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

Distinguished delegates that concludes our list of speakers for today. Does any other delegate wish to take the floor?

As that appears not to be the case and as agreed at our last plenary session, I would now propose to move towards an informal meeting of the plenary and for that purpose I will now suspend this formal meeting for five minutes, after which we will resume in informal session.

The meeting was suspended at 12.30 p.m. and
reconvened at 1.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 337th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. In connection with the establishment of subsidiary bodies, delegations will recall that during our consultations we recognized that, simply with a view to facilitating our consultations, we could view the required subsidiary bodies as falling into two groups.

The first would be in relation to the agenda items on which proposals had been made but on which further consultations would be required. The second would relate to agenda items on which the Conference had taken decisions or made recommendations with regard to the conduct of its work in subsidiary bodies in 1986. I would now propose to discuss with the Conference this first group of agenda items and then, thereafter, to seek decisions from the Conference on the second group of items. This procedure reflects the consultations which have been held and our assessment of how we can best achieve progress in our work.

First, the agenda items on which further intensive consultations are required: item 1, Nuclear test ban; item 2, Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. item 3, Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; item 5, Prevention of an arms race in outer space; item 6, Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and item 7, New types of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons. In respect to each of those agenda items, the Conference has been

(The President)

acquainted in informal session, with the relevant documentation which remains before it and with the terms of relevant decisions or conclusions by the Conference as contained in the report of the Conference to the General Assembly in 1985. These are the agenda items on which further intensive consultations are clearly indicated and required so that we will be in a position to establish appropriate subsidiary bodies on them, as allowed for in the rules of procedure of the Conference. I believe it is the wish of the Conference that the President should proceed immediately to conduct such intensive consultations and I would propose to do so, beginning tomorrow. Is there any comment on this proposal?

I see none. It is so decided.

It was so decided.

I now turn to the second group of agenda items, that is, those on which the Conference has taken decisions or made recommendations and which, according to our consultations, are now ready for decision. With regard to the establishment of subsidiary bodies, I would now propose that we turn first to the establishment of a subsidiary body under item 4 of our agenda, Chemical weapons.

In that context, the Conference has before it document CD/WP.207, which is a draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Do I hear any objections or any statements before the adoption of this draft decision? I hear none. So the Conference has adopted the draft decision provided in CD/WP.207. 1/

It was so decided.

1/ (Also issued as CD/654). "The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind that the negotiation of a Convention should proceed with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest possible date, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions 39/65 C and 40/92 B, and in discharging its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention, decides to re-establish, in accordance with its rules of procedure, for the duration of its 1986 session, the Ad Hoc Committee to continue the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. This agreement, if possible, or a Report on the progress of the negotiations, should be recorded in the report which this Ad Hoc Committee will submit to the Conference at the end of the second part of its 1986 session.

"The Conference also decides to appoint Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Chairman of this Ad-Hoc Committee."

(The President)

I now turn to agenda item 8, Comprehensive programme of disarmament, in respect to which, by virtue of a decision in 1984, the ad hoc subsidiary body does not need to be re-established, I understand that Ambassador Alfonso García Robles will continue to chair the Ad Hoc Committee under this agenda item. Do I hear any comments on this decision? There being none, I take it that the Conference accepts the situation.

It was so decided.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mongolia.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia): I have asked for the floor in my capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of socialist countries and I hope that, in my capacity as representative of Mongolia, during my next statement, I shall have the occasion to congratulate you, as President of our Conference.

In connection with the adoption of the decision on the re-establishment of subsidiary bodies on agenda items 4 and 8, the Group of socialist countries has entrusted me on their behalf to make the following statement:

"The Group of socialist countries expresses its satisfaction at the early decision reached this year to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committees on Chemical Weapons and on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under the chairmanship of Ambassadors Cromartie and García Robles respectively, representing the Western Group and the Group of 21. Considering the question of the establishment of further subsidiary bodies on other agenda items, the Group of socialist countries wishes to record that it is seeking the chairmanship of the ad hoc committee which is expected to be established under item 5. In this connection, the Group wishes to state that it would be interested in chairing, in keeping with the principle of equitable distribution, ad hoc committees under items 1, 2, 3 and 5, while not seeking, this year, chairmanship of subsidiary bodies under items 6 and 7".

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, I, too, share the view that we have made very good progress under your leadership today in the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the acknowledgement of the continuation of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under the leadership of Ambassador García Robles, and I am sure that we all look forward to continued progress on both of these issues. As I understand from the earlier portion of this meeting, you will be continuing negotiations and consultations on the other open issues. It is also my understanding that these consultations also leave open the question of chairmanships of all remaining committees that we might seek to establish at this point.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States and can confirm that, as was agreed by the Conference, we will enter into intensive consultations on those remaining agenda items and in that context, of course, it is the case that views of the kind that have just been reiterated will form a part of those consultations.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I should simply like to express my gratitude to all the distinguished members of the Conference on Disarmament for the confidence they have once again demonstrated in me by agreeing that I should continue to serve as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee that will be dealing with the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

I would just like to add that I hope all the members will bear in mind that this is the last chance the Assembly has given us. The Assembly said that the time-limit for submitting the complete programme will be the forty-first session. So I hope that everyone will contribute towards enabling us to discharge that task as I indicated in my statement on the first day of our discussions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement.

If no other delegation wishes to comment or take the floor, I would propose now to adjourn this plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 11 February, at 10.30 a.m. This plenary session is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.338
11 February 1986

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,

on Tuesday 11 February 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Richard Butler (Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria</u>	Mr. A. BELAID
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. M. CAMPORA Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. BUTLER Mr. R.A. ROWE Ms. M. LETTS Mr. J. OKELY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. C. CLERCKX Mr. P. NIEUWENHUYSEN
<u>Brazil</u>	
<u>Bulgaria</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. V. BOJILOV Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. R. DEYANOV
<u>Burma</u>	U TIN TUN U MYA THAN U HLA MYINT
<u>Canada</u>	Mr. R.J. ROCHON
<u>China</u>	Mr. QIAN JIADONG Ms. WANG ZHIYUN Mr. YU ZHONGZHOU Mr. HU XIAODI Mr. SUO KAIMING. Mr. SHA ZUKANG Mr. YANG MINGLIANG Ms. WANG WEI Mr. LI DAOZHONG
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. M. BADR Mr. F. MONIB
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Ms. K. SINEGIORGIS Mr. F. YOHANNES
<u>France:</u>	Mr. J. JESSEL Mr. H. RENIE
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. H. ROSE Mr. W. KRUTZSCH Mr. F. SAYATZ

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGNER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. H. PETERS

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. A.S. GONSALVES
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI
Mr. R.I. JENIE
Mr. A.M. FACHIR
Mr. A. MASBAR AKBAR
Mr. F. QASIM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. A. SHAFII

Italy:

Mr. F. PIAGGESI
Mr. M. PAVESE
Mr. E. SIVIERO

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. K. KUDO
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mr. F. JOSIAH

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE
Mr. S. BENRYANE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. van SCHAIK
Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R. MILDERS

Nigeria:

Mr. B.A. ADEYEMI
Mr. A.A. ELLA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. I. VOICU
Mr. G. CHIRILA

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mrs. M.B. THEORIN
Mr. R. EKEUS
Ms. E. BONNIER
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Ms. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS
Mr. J.F. GORDON
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY
Mr. L. BELGARD
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Ms. L. BRONSON
Mr. A. LIEBOWITZ
Mr. J. GRANGER
Mr. R. GOUGH
Mr. R. NELSON
Mr. R. LEVINE
Ms. M. WINSTON
Mr. B. TUA

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA
Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 338th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today with statements in plenary meetings, as well as its consideration of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items on the agenda and other organizational questions.

In this connection, the Conference will suspend the plenary at the end of the list of speakers and hold an informal meeting to consider the question of participation of States not members in its work, as well as other organizational questions. We shall then take up the draft decisions on non-members participation which were circulated at our informal meeting last Thursday and which have been circulated again today. If there is consensus on those draft decisions, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize them.

May I also recall that, as agreed at our plenary meeting last Thursday, we shall today adopt the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in document CD/651, which was introduced by its Chairman at that plenary meeting. We shall proceed accordingly at the end of the plenary meeting today.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America and the German Democratic Republic.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on that list, the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Donald Lowitz.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Thank you Mr. President: At the beginning of our work in the Conference on Disarmament for 1986, the United States delegation is pleased to see in the chair our friends from "down under", the delegation of Australia. We congratulate you, Ambassador Butler, on getting our work off to a swift start, and pledge you our co-operation during the remainder of your tenure. Our congratulations also go to Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina for skilfully guiding us through the arduous conclusion of the 1985 session. My delegation extends a warm welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassadors Kerroum of Algeria, Clerckx of Belgium, Tin Tun of Burma, Gonsalves of India, Franceschi of Italy, Afande of Kenya, Benhima of Morocco, Mariategui of Peru, Taylhardat of Venezuela, and Kama of Zaire. We look forward to working closely with each of you.

My delegation extends its condolences to the delegation of Sweden on the death of Alva Myrdal, who laboured so long and so diligently in the cause of disarmament. And we deeply appreciate the expressions of condolence that we have received on the tragic destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger and the death of its crew.

We begin our work against the background of a number of encouraging developments in the arms control and disarmament field that have taken place since we adjourned last August:

In the Fall, in the bilateral nuclear and space talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, the USSR introduced a number of counter-proposals to United States proposals which the United States found of

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interest. These proposals were followed in turn by major new and responsive proposals from the United States side, tabled in the negotiations on 1 November. The United States continues to await a response to these latest proposals.

The meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev that followed later in November was of great importance. The joint statement of 21 November at the conclusion of that meeting contained elements of immediate concern to this Conference. The statement called for an intensification of the bilateral negotiations, and the two sides also agreed that they would intensify their efforts to conclude a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and would accelerate their bilateral discussions to this end. My delegation has returned to this Conference with instructions to press for the implementation of that joint commitment regarding the chemical weapons negotiations.

The United States delegation, in parallel with the delegation of the Soviet Union, will be introducing the joint statement of 21 November as a Conference document for the information of all delegations.

The United States has also been carefully studying the 15 January statement by General Secretary Gorbachev, which contains a number of interesting ideas and proposals and to which we will respond in due course. Mr. Gorbachev's proposal for a three-stage approach, leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, appears to recognize that progress toward this goal -- one which the United States has long supported -- first requires the USSR and the United States to reduce radically their nuclear arsenals. We should, therefore, bear in mind the criterion of whether this proposal will advance the nuclear and space negotiations towards an agreement on substantial reductions which is equitable and verifiable. The new proposal must thus be assessed to determine whether it does in fact give substance to the commitment contained in the joint statement of 21 November. That commitment is for early progress, particularly in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 per cent reductions in nuclear arms appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim agreement affecting intermediate-range nuclear forces. The United States awaits the elaboration of this and the other proposals in Mr. Gorbachev's statement.

In taking into account General Secretary Gorbachev's proposals, as with all proposals, the crucial element of compliance with agreements must be emphasized. The pattern of violations of existing obligations and commitments makes it difficult for the United States to enter into new agreements on offensive nuclear arms reductions. Nevertheless, as the United States has many times made clear, it will continue to pursue the resolution of these difficulties, and the search for truly effective agreements reducing the numbers of weapons.

Our own objective in seeking solutions to the control of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is summarized in the joint statement: "The sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the US for maintaining peace, have agreed that nuclear war can never be won, and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the US could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority."

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I should note that this passage also refers to conventional conflict. In our determination to deal with the nuclear threat, we should not lose sight of the serious problems posed by the continued build-up of conventional weapons and forces around the world and the threat they pose to international stability.

As I noted, the joint statement of 21 November also addressed the issue that clearly is of most urgency for the Conference on Disarmament at this time: a comprehensive and verifiable global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January also addressed the chemical weapons negotiations, and we look forward to the elaboration of his remarks by the delegation of the Soviet Union in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It is important at this stage that the possibilities suggested by Mr. Gorbachev be translated into a clearer picture of Soviet views. We also seek a clear response to the detailed proposals contained in the United States draft convention CD/500, which has been on the table in this Conference for almost two years. With such responses from the Soviet Union, we hope it will be possible to speed up our work. Thus far the situation has been one in which, on many issues, but in particular on verification, it has appeared that the United States was being invited to negotiate with itself. This is clearly not a productive path.

My delegation very much hopes that it will be possible to advance our work on the chemical weapons convention swiftly during this session. Ambassador Turbanski of Poland is to be commended for patiently guiding the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in its 1985 session. We pledge our full support to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom as he assumes his duties as Chairman of this Committee during 1986.

We look for progress on the numerous issues which await resolution in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We attach particular importance to the following issues: the important problem of ensuring that chemical weapons will not be produced in the civilian industry; the elimination of chemical weapons facilities; and the matter of resolving questions about compliance, including by challenge inspection. Progress in the Committee is needed on all these issues in parallel. It might seem easier to postpone resolution of the difficult issues, including verification, to a later time, and to make progress on the less difficult matters. But such an approach would be misleading. It would create a false impression that sufficient momentum had been generated to sweep all obstacles aside in the interests of concluding an agreement. The shortest path to our agreed objective lies rather in a candid recognition from the outset that verification issues, and in particular the matter of challenge inspection, need to be settled sooner rather than later. There should be no mistake about the views of the United States on challenge inspection. They remain as I described them in my statement of 22 August last: a fundamental need for an effective convention is mandatory, short-notice challenge inspection provisions to complement its routine verification provisions. The issue is the effectiveness of the provisions in satisfying security concerns, not specific language.

Within the structure of the common outline of a chemical weapons convention as contained in the 1985 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, CD/636, it should be possible to narrow differences of view on many

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of the areas in which blanks, or bracketed text, are present. Again, I believe that this should apply at least as much to the crucial issue of verification of compliance with the convention as to other issues.

I want to make one additional point about the chemical weapons agenda item. The United States maintains the view it has held from the outset, that the conclusion and implementation of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention is our primary objective in the field of chemical weapons. We see our bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union on all aspects of a chemical weapons ban as complementary to the multilateral negotiations and in no way intended to supplant them. It is our intention to use these discussions as a means of providing assistance to the task of reaching agreement on a multilateral convention. All of us in this Conference should join together to accelerate our work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We should review the efforts we made last year, follow up on areas where progress was made, and do what we can to eliminate obstructions to further progress.

The problem of the use and dangerous spread of chemical weapons is an item of continuing concern to us and recently has been the subject of considerable press reporting, some of it confused and confusing as concerns the United States view. Achievement of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban is our first priority and the focus of my delegation's efforts in Geneva. Until that agreement becomes a reality, other measures, such as the control of the export of chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons, may be useful. Indeed, a number of States have enacted such measures. However, the United States is opposed to a formal treaty -- as some have suggested -- such as one that would mirror the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We are also opposed to any attempts to hinder legitimate, peaceful, trade and development. Let me repeat: the focus of our efforts is and must remain a comprehensive agreement that eliminates forever the scourge of these terrible weapons.

A number of speakers during this session already have addressed the first item on our agenda, that of a nuclear-test ban. Some have called for the prompt initiation of negotiations on a treaty that would prohibit underground nuclear explosions as well as those already off limits as a result of the 1963 Limited Test-Ban Treaty. A number of speakers have also expressed a willingness to show flexibility so as to renew practical work on issues related to a nuclear-test ban, or, in the case of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, to continue the outstanding work that that Group has performed. My delegation stands prepared to participate in both of these efforts. The United States view on the appropriate role that a comprehensive test ban can play in reducing and eventually eliminating the threat to security posed by nuclear weapons has not altered. For the United States, a nuclear-test ban remains an objective to be achieved in due course, in the context of significant reductions in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons and the development of substantially improved verification measures. We have also made it clear that, at the present levels of nuclear weapons, testing plays a role in ensuring the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent which remains a key element in the security of the Western Alliance.

My delegation realizes that the importance of verification for a future comprehensive test ban is universally recognized, but that there is a division of opinion as to whether effective means of verification exist. In our view, more work is necessary in the field of seismic verification, and in other

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areas such as on-site inspection. We believe the present status of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts reflects this reality. Let the Conference, then, agree to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban that last met in 1983, under the mandate and with the programme of work proposed by Western delegations in CD/521 and CD/621, and carry forward the practical work which would establish the facts in this regard.

The questions of verification and compliance, both in the chemical weapons area and in the area of nuclear testing, point to the broader issue of compliance with existing agreements and undertakings in the entire field of arms control and disarmament. This issue is one to which my delegation devoted considerable attention last year, in the opening statement made by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, in my closing remarks in August, and in our other interventions and activities during the session.

During the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the United States, together with eight other States, was pleased to introduce a resolution, 40/94 L, concerning compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements. With the indulgence of my colleagues around this table, I would like to consider this resolution, which passed in the General Assembly by a vote of 131 to 0 with 16 abstentions, in some detail. The General Assembly expressed its awareness of "the abiding concern of all Member States for preserving respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law," and agreed that it was essential for the strengthening of international security to observe "the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law." It took note of "the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them."

The resolution stressed that "any violation" of arms control agreements "not only adversely affects the security of the States Parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements," and "that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system". Members of the General Assembly supporting this resolution further stated their belief that "compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States Parties is, therefore, a matter of interest and concern to the international community."

Resolution 40/94 L "Urges all States Parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions subscribed to", "Calls on all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications of non-compliance with those obligations for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament", and appeals for support for "efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements."

I think it is obvious that the matters with which this resolution was concerned, and which attracted such a large degree of support from the world

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community, should be matters that we in this Conference keep firmly in view in our own work. The resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly do not exert a binding force on the Conference on Disarmament, which operates on the basis of mutual consent among its members. But clearly the principles embodied in this resolution are essential for the conclusion of new agreements, specifically, at this juncture, on chemical weapons.

My delegation will return to the issues of verification and compliance in a future plenary statement.

With regard to agenda item 5, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, my delegation has returned to the Conference prepared to continue the detailed examination of the issues as provided for in the mandate upon which we reached agreement last March. We are convinced that a great deal of work remains to be accomplished under this mandate, and that it would be helpful to reach early agreement to resume the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. It was unfortunate that last year, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, work began too late to accomplish more than a fraction of the tasks established for the Ad Hoc Committee. The United States delegation intends to play a very active role in the continuation of this work. At the appropriate time, we plan again to have a legal specialist available to provide expert views on the coverage and appropriateness of existing agreements. We are aware of the interest among many delegations in carrying forward the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space and we see no reason for delay.

It is perhaps appropriate at this point to take note of recent plenary statements that have expressed concern over new developments in the area of strategic defences. It is argued that strategic defences would destabilize the strategic balance. But the objective of the United States research programme, designated the strategic defence initiative, is in fact the opposite: it is to determine whether a defence against ballistic missile attack is feasible and would lead to an increase in stability. Moreover, the United States cannot ignore the relentless development and deployment of both offensive and defensive strategic forces by the Soviet Union, at levels that greatly exceed those of the United States. Indeed, it is precisely those Soviet activities that today are jeopardizing strategic stability. By investigating the potential for effective defence against ballistic missiles, the United States has therefore also undertaken a prudent and necessary response to these activities of the Soviet Union.

But the United States has gone further. We have proposed in the bilateral defence and space negotiations a reciprocal programme of open laboratories in strategic defence research. Under that programme, experts of the Soviet Union would be permitted to see firsthand that the strategic defence initiative does not involve offensive weapons. American experts would visit comparable Soviet facilities in their programme for strategic defence. And if research indicates the feasibility of defence against nuclear missiles, the United States would sit down together with its allies and the Soviet Union to see how we could replace all strategic ballistic missiles with such a defence, which threatens no one.

Finally, I want to touch on one aspect of the improved and effective functioning of our Conference. In this connection, the statement of the distinguished Foreign Minister of Australia, Bill Hayden, as read out in the Conference on 4 February, correctly put the finger on a major source of

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difficulty, and one that is clearly both unproductive and unnecessary. That problem is the preparation of our annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. I raised the matter in my concluding statement on 22 August last and promised to return to it. In brief, there is simply no reason why the preparation of our report should develop into an annual source of controversy and difficulty. It is my impression that most representatives here consider the way in which the report has been drafted, and the product which results, as unnecessarily lengthy, tedious, and even confrontational. The secretariat does a skilful job in preparing an appropriate and balanced summary of the Conference's activities, but unfortunately their draft in many ways becomes less and less useful as the Conference works its will in reaching a final version. Most of us, I am certain, would agree that the report should rather be a concise, factual and dispassionate summary of the Conference's activities for the year.

It is the considered view of my delegation that the report this year should be substantially different from those of the last several years. It should be shorter. It should be free of immoderate rhetoric so that delegations will not be prompted to respond to intemperate criticisms. We are confident that this is the predominant view in the Conference. But in any event, we fully expect that the drafting process, and the final product will this year be different, and better.

In conclusion, I emphasize what I said at the outset: the events of the past several months have given new impetus and new promise to our work in the Conference on Disarmament. We need to redouble our efforts to build on what has been accomplished and to take advantage of all available avenues to strengthen international security and stability.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, all signs are that the international political climate is changing. So it will be the prime task of the Conference now to take advantage of this trend and produce concrete results. The Ice Age has lasted much too long. With the acute danger of a nuclear war persisting and the situation in the world at large remaining extremely volatile, arms limitation and disarmament agreements are more imperative than ever.

We know from experience how fragile a more favourable climate can be, if it is not stabilized and cemented by practical measures. This is true for international relations as a whole, but even more so for co-operation aimed at halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament.

The summit meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, has set the stage for a turn for the better. The two leaders agreed to accelerate the bilateral negotiations on the basis established in January 1985, and they made declarations of intent to which we all subscribe.

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The joint statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought is, with good reason, one of the most frequently quoted political phrases today. In addition, there is the important mutual promise not to seek military superiority. The message has been heard and welcomed everywhere. What is required at this stage are practical conclusions.

The Soviet Union acted promptly. On 15 January, General Secretary Gorbachev presented a programme, which shows how serious his country is about translating the results of the Geneva summit into concrete action and which is fully endorsed by the German Democratic Republic. On 31 January, Erich Honecker, Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, said in an interview granted to Die Zeit, a weekly published in the Federal Republic of Germany: "We look upon this programme as a historic chance. What strikes us in particular is not only the boldness of the vision conjured up but also the fact that it is practicable if the two sides use the proper approach."

Any unbiased examination of the proposals will reveal to what lengths the Soviet Union is going to take into account other countries' ideas. This attitude deserves a constructive reply.

To implement this plan means to help common sense carry the day. Then there would be no more room for cataclysmic accidents triggered by high-tech weaponry, let alone for the intentional use of those arms. People could breathe more freely.

What we would have then would not only be the safest but also the cheapest system of international security. Important resources would be released and could be used to meet man's peaceful needs. The programme represents a tool capable of moving forward the entire disarmament process, without compromising the security of any State.

The document issued at the latest session in Sofia of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which is before the Conference, contains further significant ideas to the same end.

With its precise proposals and its time frame, the Soviet initiative literally calls for action. A rethinking of policy approaches is required. Old clichés and hollow slogans must be discarded.

I share the view that the USSR move will provide a fresh impetus to our work, including its conceptional aspect. Let me briefly explain what I mean.

At least since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it has generally been accepted that the biggest nuclear-weapon Powers have a particular responsibility to bear. The Soviet initiative is a very powerful manifestation of that responsibility, making it easier for the other nuclear-weapon States to join in the overall process, while looking after their specific legitimate interests.

The programme reflects the objective relationship between nuclear disarmament and the necessity to keep space clear of weapons. This is the convincing and only acceptable alternative to a spread of the arms race to

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

outer space. How can the champions of the Strategic Defence Initiative still uphold their claim that space must be crammed with arms in order that nuclear weapons may be eliminated, and how do they justify the concomitant pressure on international treaties?

Based on the position that the implementation of disarmament accords needs to be reliably verified, the programme contains new aspects, on the understanding, of course, that all sides involved have equal obligations. Verification should become what it actually has to be, namely, an instrument to promote disarmament and not to impede it. I am sure, discussions and negotiations at our Conference would gain from that approach.

It goes without saying that the rethinking I have just referred to will also be necessary with respect to the stupid assertion that now that nuclear weapons are invented, they can never be eliminated. If this were true, we would mutatis mutandis, have to give up work on a chemical weapons convention. The truth is, scientific discoveries are turned into weapons by political decisions, and it takes political decisions to get rid of them again. If we are to judge nuclear-weapon States by their public pronouncements, then it is precisely what all of them believe.

The Governments concerned are again called upon to reconsider the so-called doctrine of deterrence, whose principal elements are the possession and the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, this concept is not what is required to eliminate all nuclear weapons and considerably reduce conventional arms.

The new USSR initiative is addressed to all the bodies engaged in disarmament negotiations. In his statement last Tuesday, Ambassador Issraelyan was absolutely right in pointing out how relevant his country's move is to this Conference. Together with United Nations resolutions and other documents submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, the initiative is an excellent basis on which we can tackle our job head on, with fresh momentum.

In other statements to be made during this session, my delegation will deal in greater detail with the various items on our agenda. Today, I want only to comment on a number of issues of particular interest to my country. Before I do this, let me tell you that the German Democratic Republic believes that negotiations on every agenda item should be conducted in appropriate subsidiary bodies.

My delegation proposes that we should focus on the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the elimination of the risk of a nuclear war, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the expeditious drafting of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The most pressing and urgent measure to halt the arms spiral is a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests. Support for it comes from everywhere in the world and from most delegations at this Conference. There is a steadily growing demand for such a ban, as can be seen from United Nations resolutions, the final document of the NPT Review Conference and important proposals put forward by non-aligned countries. The Soviet disarmament programme accords a very high priority to a nuclear-test ban as well.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium has met with a broad positive response. It is now up to the United States to take up the challenge. Time is pressing. A moratorium to be agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States would be interpreted by everyone as a clear indication of the two nations' firm resolve to implement the document signed at the Geneva summit.

At our Conference, work should start without delay so that a global treaty may be achieved as quickly as possible. To this end, a committee, operating on the basis of the guidelines set out in United Nations resolutions, will have to be established. The term "flexibility" is used quite often in this context. Right now, flexibility means above all that delegations should put on record their willingness to take part in the process of working out an agreement. Lack of such willingness cannot, with the best will in the world, be compensated by procedural compromises. On the other hand, if that readiness is there, understanding on adequate procedures could easily be reached.

At no time was the verification issue a genuine obstacle to the negotiations on a multilateral treaty. This, I am sure, will become even more apparent during this session.

I am convinced that the drafting of an agreement offers ample room for taking into consideration specific interests of individual States, provided everyone strives for the same ultimate goal.

As far as agenda item 2 is concerned, a little more flexibility could help get activities under way which have for so many years been stymied. Nobody will contest the immense importance of the bilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. Citing them, however, as a reason why the Conference must not pursue specific activities is in no way justified. If discussions on that particular item were started, it would very soon be evident that bilateral and multilateral negotiations can very well complement each other. My delegation, therefore, advocates setting up a committee which allows a businesslike exchange of views and a rapprochement.

Measures, effective immediately, to prevent a nuclear war, such as a freeze of nuclear arsenals and the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, are more urgent than ever. That is why my delegation would like to suggest that a committee on item 3 be established and the problems be at last debated in a very concrete fashion. What was still unattainable a year ago should be feasible at this session.

There is no doubt about the overriding importance of steps to prevent an arms race in outer space. Should the United States space programme come to fruition, prospects for the elimination of nuclear weapons would be more than bleak. Fortunately, an increasing number of people are awakening to this fact.

The debate we had last year was useful but showed at the same time that a more systematic approach is required. We need to agree on the objective to be achieved and on the framework enabling us to conduct orderly discussions and eventually negotiations geared to a concrete task. This is what should be borne in mind in creating an appropriate committee.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

As for the prohibition of chemical weapons, my delegation already presented its views when the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was discussed. It intends, however, to address this very significant subject again, in more detail, in one of its coming statements.

Our Conference is not only linked with international affairs in general but also affected by other disarmament fora and activities undertaken by individual States.

In my view, it is of considerable interest that progress is being made at the Stockholm Conference and that prospects for accommodation are looking up at the Vienna Talks. These developments are truly encouraging. They demonstrate that we are right in saying that no chance must be passed up, if we are to arrive at global accords capable of making the world a safer place.

My delegation has noted with satisfaction that regional arms limitation and disarmament steps are gaining in importance. As you know, my country and Czechoslovakia have jointly suggested to the Federal Republic of Germany that a zone free of chemical weapons should be created. Although limited in scope, such a step would effectively help remove those weapons of mass destruction from the face of the globe and undoubtedly further the preparation and implementation of a multilateral convention. I am pleased to see this idea winning increasing international support. My delegation welcomes a similar initiative which Bulgaria and Romania have launched for the Balkans.

Only recently talks have been agreed between representatives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which will hopefully yield tangible results quite soon.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me give you the assurance that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic will do everything in its power to enable our Conference to present a better report to the United Nations in this International Year of Peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement.

That concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In his statement today, the distinguished representative of the United States emphasized, quite rightly in my opinion, the importance we should attach to General Assembly resolution 40/94 L on compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

My delegation was one of the 131 delegations which voted in favour of this resolution on 12 December last. Previously, my delegation had also found itself obliged to abstain when the draft which preceded this resolution was put to the vote in the First Committee on Tuesday, 19 November. In the plenary meeting I made a statement in explanation of vote which I think it is

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

worth reading out here so as to include it in the records of the Conference on Disarmament, because it explains very well Mexico's position on this issue. I shall therefore read out in full the explanation of vote which I gave on 12 December 1985 in the plenary of the General Assembly.

"When a vote was taken at the 40th meeting of the First Committee on Tuesday, 19 November last, on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.66/Rev.1, entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements", the Mexican delegation abstained. I should like now briefly to explain what prompted that abstention and why in voting here in the plenary Assembly just now we deemed it not only appropriate but indeed necessary to vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted to the Assembly by the First Committee.

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.66/Rev.1, which is now a General Assembly resolution, embodies a series of provisions the validity and pertinence of which no one who takes his duties as a representative to the United Nations seriously can call into question. It is enough to examine any of its paragraphs to realize that is so. To illustrate my point, by way of example I shall take the liberty of reading out the following three paragraphs.

In the third preambular paragraph, the Assembly emphasizes 'the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them'. A little later, in the fifth preambular paragraph, the Assembly stresses 'that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system'. And in operative paragraph 1, the Assembly 'urges all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions subscribed to'.

Precisely because that is the content of the various paragraphs of the draft, it proved to be the height of irony that it had been prepared and introduced before the First Committee by the very country which for a number of years now has been voting, alone or almost alone, against General Assembly resolutions on disarmament agreements such as, for example, those dealing with halting all nuclear-weapon tests, explicitly envisaged in two Treaties -- the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty both being international instruments to which the country in question is not only a party but of which, indeed, it is a one of the three depositaries.

It seemed to us, therefore, imperative to state for the record, via our abstention in the Committee, the well-known position Mexico takes with regard to the absolute need for agreement between words and deeds. The situation that has confronted us here today is essentially different, given that the draft was forwarded to us with the explicit favourable recommendation of the First Committee, without any indication in that document as to its source, as against what happened in the case of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.66/Rev.1. Therefore we have found reasons for satisfaction in casting a positive vote on it, on behalf of our

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

delegation. Let us hope that the wise exhortations it contains may be heeded by all and that when, in the future, draft resolutions on a total halt of nuclear-weapon tests are put to a vote -- draft resolutions enjoying the support of the vast majority of the Members of the United Nations -- we shall not see a repetition of the lamentable spectacle that it has been our lot to witness here yet again, of the distance which sometimes separates preaching from behaviour."

That is the end of my explanation of vote of 12 December.

To conclude, I should merely like to reiterate that wish. Of course, now it is not a case of a draft resolution. But when the time comes there will be a proposed decision or a proposal for a decision on this item, a total nuclear-weapon-test ban, and I reiterate here my hope that on that occasion preaching and behaviour will coincide.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

I now intend to suspend this plenary meeting and convene, in five minutes' time, the informal meeting of the Conference scheduled for today. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.45 a.m. and reconvened at 12.10 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 338th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of our exchange of views at the informal meeting, we need to take up for decision requests by States not members of the Conference to participate in our work. Requests had been received, at the end of last week, from Norway, Finland, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, New Zealand, Viet Nam, Denmark and Switzerland. In accordance with established practice, we shall take up those requests one by one in the order in which they were received by the Secretariat. I now put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.199 1/ dealing with the request received from Norway. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

1/ "In response to the request of Norway (CD/655) in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1986 at plenary meetings of the Conference".

(The President)

I now put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.200 2/ dealing with the request received from Finland. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

I now put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.201 3/ dealing with the request received from Portugal. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

I now put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.202 4/ dealing with the request received from Greece. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

I now put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.203 5/ dealing with the request received from Turkey. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

2/ "In response to the request of Finland (CD/656) in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1986 at plenary meetings of the Conference".

3/ "In response to the request of Portugal (CD/657) in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Portugal to participate during 1986 at plenary meetings of the Conference".

4/ "In response to the request of Greece (CD/658) in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1986 at plenary meetings of the Conference".

5/ "In response to the request of Turkey (CD/659) in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1986 at plenary meetings of the Conference".

(The President)

I now put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.204 6/ dealing with the request received from New Zealand. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

I now put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.205 7/ dealing with the request received from Viet Nam. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

I now put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.206 8/ dealing with the request received from Denmark. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

I now put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.208 9/ dealing with the request received from Switzerland. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

6/ "In response to the request of New Zealand (CD/660) in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of New Zealand to participate during 1986 at plenary meetings of the Conference".

7/ "In response to the request of Viet Nam (CD/661) in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Viet Nam to address during 1986 the plenary of the Conference on item 8 of its agenda".

8/ "In response to the request of Denmark (CD/662) in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1986 at plenary meetings of the Conference".

9/ "In response to the request of Switzerland (CD/663) in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Switzerland to participate during 1986 at plenary meetings of the Conference".

(The President)

We have concluded our consideration of requests by non-members to participate at plenary meetings of the Conference. We shall consider the question of participation by non-members in subsidiary bodies at an informal meeting next Thursday. We shall then take up the relevant draft decisions at a resumed plenary of the Conference.

If there is no objection, we shall proceed accordingly.

It was so decided.

As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, we shall now proceed to adopt the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/651, which has been circulated to the members today. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

May I once more extend my congratulations to Ambassador Turbanski of Poland who provided the Ad Hoc Committee with very able guidance during difficult negotiations held in 1985, as well as at the resumed session in January of this year. I think we are all indebted to Ambassador Turbanski for his work.

I have been asked by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to make the following announcement: the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet on Thursday, 20 February, in Conference Room III, at 3 p.m.

I now give the floor to the Secretary General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ambassador Komatina, who wishes to make a statement in connection with recent measures taken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): I have sought the floor today to share with you some considerations resulting from the serious financial situation of the United Nations which may have repercussions on the Conference's work. As you are undoubtedly aware, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has informed all the Members of the Organization of his on-going efforts to effect economies in the expenditure of the United Nations without detriment to its programmes and activities.

Among those efforts are the following: a 20 per cent reduction in costs relating to the hiring of consultants, temporary assistance and overtime; and strict and rigorous application of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on the control and limitation of documentation.

To meet all the requirements in the present financial situation, the support and understanding of Member States is essential. In this connection, the co-operation of Member States is also sought regarding requests for the circulation of individual communications as official documents. It is strongly suggested that such requests should be made only when the communications are directly relevant to the current consideration of an

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament and
Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations)

agenda item. Wherever possible, as required by the General Assembly, circulation should be requested under the cover of a note verbale in the official language in which the communication is submitted.

At the same time the need arises to ensure optimum use of allocated conference resources. As the Secretary-General has stated repeatedly, time and facilities are too often wasted by meetings which start late, end early, or which are cancelled at the last minute. As a result hours of meeting time are lost and conference servicing expenditures are unnecessarily increased, particularly by the need that then arises to schedule meetings outside normal working hours or on weekends.

In order to prevent this situation from emerging, every effort has been made by the secretariat to ensure that the Conference will have an appropriate allocation of meetings. In this connection, I wish to inform all members that a maximum of 15 weekly meetings with full services have been allocated to the Conference, on the understanding that not more than 3 will be held on any particular day. During the session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, the number of meetings per week will be increased to 20, with full services, with no more than 4 daily meetings.

Given the present limitations on overtime services, one can expect some delays in the processing and publishing of the Conference documentation, such as the one experienced in the circulation of document CD/650, containing the letter of the Secretary-General transmitting the resolutions of the General Assembly relating to disarmament. In this connection, I wish to apologize to the members of the Conference for the delay of one week in circulating this document, which has always been made available to the Conference on its opening day. This is due to the situation arising from the reductions effected in overtime.

I would like to assure the members of the Conference that the Secretariat will do its utmost to rationalize and streamline its procedures so that the Conference will continue to function without undue inconvenience.

I hope that I have been able to convey to you the sense of urgency that we in the secretariat feel about the financial situation and the need for making a joint effort to overcome the existing difficulties. Faced with the situation which I have just described, I am confident that all members of the Conference will co-operate with each other, and with the secretariat, in ensuring an efficient and well-run session.

The PRESIDENT: I think we are all grateful to the Secretary-General of the Conference and the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for his statement and for the information he provided in it. In this connection, I wish to inform the Conference that I have received a letter addressed to me by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, by which he informs me of the measures that he has put into effect in connection with the financial situation of the Organization and has transmitted to me a copy of communications addressed to all Permanent Missions in New York on the question of control and limitation of documentation and meeting costs. In view of the

(The President)

importance of this matter, and my belief that delegations would wish to see these materials, I have requested the secretariat to circulate copies of the Secretary-General's communication to all delegations.

As there is no other business, I now intend to adjourn the plenary meeting of the Conference, unless any other delegation wishes to take the floor or has any comment to make. I see none.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 13 February, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting of the Conference is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.339
13 February 1986

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on 13 February 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. Butler

(Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BELAID
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. M. CAMPORA Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. BUTLER Mr. R.A. ROWE Ms. M. LETTS Mr. J. OKELY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. C. CLERCKX
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. V. BOJILOV Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. R. DEYANOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U TIN TUN U MYA THAN U HLA MYINT AYE AYE MU
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. R. J. ROCHON
<u>China:</u>	Mr. QIAN Jiadong Ms. WANG Zhiyun Mr. YU Zhongzhou Mr. HU Xiaodi Mr. SUO Kaiming Mr. SHA Zukang Mr. YANG Mingliang Ms. WANG Wei Mr. LI Daozhong
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. S. ALFARAGY Mr. M. BADR Mr. F. MONIB
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. F. YOHANNES
<u>France:</u>	Mr. J. JESSEL Mr. H. RENIE Mr. G. MONTASSIER
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. H. ROSE Mr. W. KRUTZSCH Mr. F. SAYATZ

<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. H. WEGENER Mr. F. ELBE Mr. H. PETERS
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. D. MEISZTER Mr. T. TOTH
<u>India:</u>	Mr. A.S. GONSALVES Mr. S. KANT SHARMA
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI Mr. A.M. FACHIR Mr. A. MASBAR AKBAR Mr. F. QASIM
<u>Islamic Republic of Iran:</u>	Mr. A. SHAFII
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. R. FRANCESCHI Mr. F. PIAGGESI Mr. M. PAVESE Mr. E. SIVIERO
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. R. IMAI Mr. M. KONISHI Mr. K. KUDO Mr. T. ISHIGURI
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. D.D. AFANDE Mr. F. JOSIAH
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. L. BAYART Mr. S.O. BOLD Mr. G. GONGOR
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. O. HILALE Mr. S. BENRYANE
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. R.J. van SCHAIK Mr. J. RAMAKER Mr. R. MILDERS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. B.A. ADEYEMI Mr. A.A. ELLA
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. AHMAD Mr. K. NIAZ Mr. Z. AKRAM
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. S. TURBANSKI Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. I. VOICU
Mr. G. CHIRILA
Mr. V. FAUR

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS
Ms. E. BONNIER
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Ms. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY
Ms. L. BRONSON
Mr. R. GOUGH
Mr. R. LEVINE
Mr. B. TUA
Ms. S. MANNIX

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA
Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament,
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of
the Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERSATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 339th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today with statements in plenary meetings as well as its consideration of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items on the agenda and other organizational questions.

In accordance with the decision taken at our last plenary meeting, I intend to suspend this plenary meeting at the end of the list of speakers and hold an informal meeting to consider requests by States not members to participate in the work of the Conference. The relevant draft decisions have been prepared by the secretariat and have been circulated today. The draft decisions deal with requests for participation at plenary meetings, as well as at meetings of subsidiary bodies. If there is consensus on those draft decisions at the informal meeting, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize the relevant agreements.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mongolia, Pakistan, Japan, France, Romania, China and Egypt.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all I should like to convey to you the Mongolian delegation's sincere congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February, and assure you of our support and co-operation in the performance of your duties. We note with satisfaction that this year the Conference has managed to adopt its agenda and programme of work as well as reach a decision for the re-establishment of some subsidiary bodies already in the first week of its session. It is to be hoped that the coming weeks will be as productive as regards the solution of organizational and substantive issues.

My delegation expresses its appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Mario Cámpora, for the vigorous and energetic efforts he made as President last August and in the intervening months prior to the opening of this session.

I should like to take this opportunity to associate myself with the words of welcome addressed to our new colleagues, the distinguished representatives of Morocco, Burma, Algeria, India, Venezuela, Kenya, Peru, Italy, Belgium and Zaire.

We would request the delegations of Sweden and the United States to accept our sincere condolences in connection with the death of the well-known Swedish diplomat and eminent specialist in disarmament affairs, Nobel Peace Prize winner Alva Myrdal, and on the tragic death of the crew of the Space Shuttle Challenger.

The 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament has begun its work in a reassuring atmosphere of opposition to any further exacerbation of international tension. Nineteen eighty-six is the International Year of Peace, and it has also ushered in the second half of the 1980s, which the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the Second Disarmament Decade.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The peoples of the world hope that this year will mark a decisive start to the successful implementation and completion of the process of nuclear disarmament in the very near future, and the securing of durable peace and security.

The results of the Soviet-United States Geneva Summit Meeting gave the peoples of the world hope for an upturn in the political climate in the world. In Mongolia this meeting was viewed as a very important political event in international life. As the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and President of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, Comrade Zh. Batmunkh, recently pointed out, its results struck a blow against the designs of those forces interested in the further exacerbation of Soviet-United States relations and of the international situation as a whole.

As has been rightly recognized throughout the world, particularly important in the Soviet-United States joint declaration is the statement to the effect that nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought, that everything must be done to prevent war between the USSR and the United States, whether nuclear or conventional, and that the sides will not strive to achieve military superiority.

We are convinced that the practical observance and implementation of these major agreements is one of the important ways of improving the international situation, and of limiting and reducing arms and achieving disarmament. In this connection, as in the past we attach great significance to the Soviet-United States talks on nuclear and space weapons, the third round of which is currently taking place in Geneva. Needless to say, the continuation of the talks and the recognition by the United States together with the Soviet Union of the unacceptability of nuclear war and of military superiority must not be used as a screen for the arms race.

The "Geneva spirit" and the realization of the goals of the agreements reached are fully embodied in the statement by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, of 15 January 1986.

The Mongolian People's Republic warmly welcomes and supports the set of new proposals made in that statement: for the step-by-step total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 under an agreement for the prohibition of the development, testing and deployment of space offensive weapons, on the extension of the moratorium to all nuclear explosions, on the elimination this century of chemical weapons, on the setting into motion of all the existing system of negotiations and ensuring results from the entire disarmament machinery. Reliable verification during all stages of implementation of the programme is envisaged. The implementation of these large-scale initiatives and other disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries would save mankind from the threat of war for all time.

The statement of the Central Committee of the Mongolian National Revolutionary Party and of the Government of Mongolia stresses in particular that the large-scale proposals and initiatives by the Soviet Union open up a new opportunity for the achievement of mutually acceptable and strictly controlled disarmament measures. The programme of disarmament contains three historic landmarks in mankind's steep advance to universal peace. The carefully considered and genuinely practical nature of the Soviet proposals

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also lies in the fact that they are based on the underlying principle of equality and equal security at constantly lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of existing arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. They provide a powerful stimulus and lend clarity of purpose to the international community's struggle against the threat of nuclear war, and are fully in keeping with the spirit and letter of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The new Soviet nuclear disarmament programme as a whole responds to the vital interest of the peoples of Asia, where explosively dangerous hotbeds of tension persist to this day.

We note with satisfaction that the Soviet Union recently once again stressed at the highest level that the number of its missiles in the eastern part of the country would be frozen and was directly conditioned by the military strategic situation in the region. The Soviet Union thus made it quite clear that if the United States would not increase its potential in the region but rather reduce it, then the USSR would do the same.

We consider it important for the achievement and strengthening of security in the Asian Continent that the USSR and the United States should assume an undertaking for a mutual freeze on levels of intermediate-range missiles in Asia in parallel with the elimination of such missiles in Europe.

The fact that the two nuclear Powers of the Asian continent -- the USSR and the People's Republic of China -- have assumed an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is particularly significant for the security of all Asia.

It is quite natural for Mongolia, as a socialist State situated in Asia, to wish to make its contribution to improving the situation in this vast continent.

As is well known, it has proposed that a convention be concluded on mutual non-aggression and mutual non-use of force in relations between the States of Asia and the Pacific. This proposal is an integral part of the broad view of general Asian security, which could include the five principles of peaceful coexistence worked out by the Asian States ("Pancha Shila"), the Bandung ten principles, as well as the various proposals made by Asian countries.

The formula for general Asian security could, it would seem, include the following specific steps and measures: in particular, the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon Powers, following the example of the USSR and the People's Republic of China, of the first use of nuclear weapons; the non-use of nuclear weapons against countries and areas of this part of the world which observe non-nuclear status; the adoption by non-nuclear-weapon States of the three non-nuclear principles -- not to possess, not to manufacture, and not to introduce any such weapons on their territory; that those States of Asia which have not yet done so should become Parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, including in Asia and the Pacific region; a freeze on the level of military activity in the Asian and Pacific regions; the refusal of States of Asia and the Pacific to take part in plans for the militarization of space; the

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refusal to create new blocs in the region or to expand the existing one, and the elimination of foreign military bases in the territories of countries of Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The task of halting and reversing the arms race, which is the main source of the threat of nuclear war, and the working out of effective disarmament agreements requires both increased efforts on the part of all States and ensuring that the entire disarmament machinery produces results. This applies in full to the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, in which all the nuclear Powers are represented.

It is no secret that the solution of the urgent problems concerning the prevention of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, depends primarily on the efforts and political will of the nuclear States. A crucial issue, which can only be resolved by political determination, is a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban.

In this connection it is hard to overestimate the importance of the Soviet Union's extension for another three months of its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, which it announced in early August last year. This act of great political wisdom offers a unique chance which must not be lost. It is absolutely clear that if all nuclear States, and above all the United States, followed the example of the USSR, that moratorium would become indefinite and thus a qualitatively new situation would have arisen on the road towards the prohibition of nuclear tests by all States in all environments, which is viewed everywhere as an extremely important measure in efforts to end the nuclear arms race. In this connection it is hardly necessary to demonstrate, how unfounded it is, to say the least, to assert that nuclear tests play a role in ensuring the effectiveness of so-called nuclear deterrence.

At its fortieth session, the General Assembly clearly declared that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it should not become an arena for an arms race. In resolution 40/87 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was adopted by an absolute majority of United Nations Member States, it once again requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Unfortunately, so far the Conference has not managed to comply with this instruction from the General Assembly. There is a major obstacle to the solution of the issue of the non-militarization of space, namely, the United States' Star Wars programme. The supporters of the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative persist in trying to convince people that it will render nuclear weapons "unnecessary and obsolete". But common sense suggests that if the goal is really the elimination of nuclear weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, then what is required is to engage seriously and thoroughly in disarmament and not to embark on the creation and deployment of expensive strike systems in space. We consider that currently in the light of the Soviet Union's new historic initiative aimed at the step-by-step reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century, this opportunity should not be neglected for the sake of dubious ideas concerning the supplanting of nuclear weapons by so-called space defence systems.

Consequently Mongolia, like the majority of other States in the world, considers it important and essential for the USSR and the United States to agree, as the Soviet Union proposes, on a mutual renunciation of the

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development, testing and deployment of space offensive weapons. This would be a major step towards carrying into practice the well-known agreements reached in the Soviet Union-United States joint declarations of 8 January and 21 November 1985.

The problem of a chemical-weapon ban and the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles has today become something which could be achieved relatively rapidly. This is all the more true in the light of the Soviet-United States agreement reached at the Geneva Summit Meeting and in the context of the new far-reaching proposals of the Soviet Union contained in the statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev.

In our view, the Conference on Disarmament should step up its efforts and make a practical contribution to saving mankind from this barbarous type of weapon of mass destruction by means of more intensive negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee, aimed at drawing up as rapidly as possible an international convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. In this connection the Mongolian delegation wishes to draw attention to the great contribution made by the Ambassador of Poland, Comrade Stanislaw Turbanski, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, in making headway in the negotiations on key parts of the Convention under preparation.

Together with the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, in our opinion, intermediate partial measures serving to achieve the general goals are of great significance. In this context Mongolia supports the proposal by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia for ridding central Europe of chemical weapons and the joint proposal by Bulgaria and Romania for the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans.

These, Mr. President, are some remarks that my delegation wish to make at this stage in the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, in my statement today I wish to touch upon some aspects of a future convention prohibiting chemical weapons. This is not only a subject to which we have devoted the greatest amount of time and effort over the last few years but one which continues to hold the maximum degree of promise among the various items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Let me state at the outset that Pakistan neither possesses chemical weapons nor desires to acquire them. Consequently we have a deep and abiding interest in the earliest possible conclusion of an international convention on a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons.

The present international consensus on the need to ban chemical weapons has its roots in efforts that began over a hundred years ago with the Brussels Declaration which prohibited the use of poisons and poisoned bullets in warfare. I do not intend to trace developments since then; suffice it to say that we have now reached a point where an international convention banning chemical weapons appears feasible. Given a sufficient degree of accommodation on the part of the leading chemical-weapon Powers, it can become a reality in

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a matter of two to three years. There is, however, no room for complacency since according to a publication of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, there have been reports of the use of chemical and biological weapons in at least 16 different conflicts over the last 10 years. Further potentially dangerous structural changes are taking place in the chemical and allied manufacturing industries, especially in the field of biotechnology, which by facilitating the induction of new chemical and biological weapon concepts might open up the possibility of another destabilizing arms race. The existing international régime against the use of chemical weapons is thus under a mounting threat and it should, therefore, be in the best interest of everyone to strengthen that régime.

While expressing the hope that a chemical-weapons convention could be achieved in two to three years, I am fully aware that the present endeavour began almost 20 years ago. One reason for the slow rate at which the effort has moved forward is to be found in the implications that chemical weapons disarmament has for the industrial, scientific and military interests of States.

Pakistan supports a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty which should prohibit the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons and provide for the total destruction of existing stockpiles, delivery systems and production facilities of chemical weapons. My delegation is particularly gratified that at its 1985 session the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was able to reach agreement on a simple and straightforward clause on prohibition of use. We have always held that such a clause would in no way erode the effectiveness or the legal status of the 1925 Geneva Protocol which the future Chemical Weapons Convention would indeed serve to complement and strengthen.

The issue of definitions and criteria in the context of a chemical weapons convention is an intricate subject which has been further complicated by the existence of competing national and commercial interests. Because of this we view with hopeful anticipation the possibility of an agreement that seems to be emerging as a result of the discussions held in the framework of Working Group A of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. An agreed set of criteria from which various definitions flow and on the basis of which lethal chemicals are categorized would constitute a foundation-stone for the convention. The integrated approach to the categorization of chemicals relevant to the chemical-weapons convention initiated last year and further developed during the January mini-session of the Ad Hoc Committee deserves to be earnestly pursued.

Ideally, declarations regarding chemical weapon stockpiles and their production facilities should be made before the convention is opened for signature. An agreement on these lines would, besides enhancing the value of the convention, also serve as a confidence-building measure. If this is not possible, a consensus on the time frame within which declarations are to be made should not be too difficult to reach. The declarations should not only be comprehensive but also verifiable. My delegation finds it difficult to sympathize with the position that detailed declarations would compromise the security interests of the possessor States. Such arguments appear to ignore the concerns of those who have not exercised the option to acquire chemical weapons.

Complete elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles, their production facilities and means of delivery should be a central feature of the convention. We hope the chemical-weapon States will eschew viewing the

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destruction process exclusively from their own military perspective. The process should begin very soon after the convention enters into force, if not before it, and should be completed at the quickest possible pace under international supervision. It is absolutely essential, in this regard, to define chemical-weapon production facilities in a manner that does not impinge upon or interfere with the peaceful chemical industry in any country. As a non-aligned and non-chemical-weapon State, we find it difficult to appreciate the spending of valuable time over working out agreed destruction schedules whose central objective appears to be to ensure that the security of the two alliance systems is not put in jeopardy during the elimination process. When viewed in the light of the fact that the security of the two is not based on chemical weapons but on nuclear arsenals, this debate appears somewhat unnecessary. In our view the destruction process should provide for the elimination of chemical-weapon production facilities ahead of chemical weapon stockpiles. Similarly newer stocks should be destroyed before the older ones. Further, a 10-year period should not necessarily be required to complete the elimination process. It should be possible for States possessing chemical weapons to eliminate their stockpiles and production facilities in a period considerably less than 10 years.

The issue of establishing confidence in compliance with the future chemical weapons convention lies at the heart of our negotiations. Consequently provisions relating to verification and compliance, which would in any case constitute the backbone of the convention, would have to construct a régime which ensures that undertakings relating to destruction, non-production and non-acquisition were complied with. Given the limitations of the existing capabilities as well as the misgivings attached with too intrusive a verification régime, 100 per cent effective compliance machinery does not appear within the realm of possibility. This, however, does not mean that a verification régime containing a mix of national and international means of an intrusive nature cannot be arrived at. It is clear to us that the type and intrusiveness of verification to which an activity is subjected should be determined by the element of risk which that particular activity posed for the convention.

It would perhaps be too simplistic to base a vitally important international convention only on the premise that States would adhere to it in good faith and with the intention of abiding by its provisions. Trust blended with mutual self-interest, therefore, seems a better basis for an agreement. In our view it would be in the general interest to ensure compliance through an effective and equitable verification system and an efficacious and non-discriminatory complaints procedure duly supported by a viable organizational structure.

A general understanding appears to exist that the future chemical weapons convention should provide for the establishment of a consultative committee -- a body composed of all the States parties -- as the principal organ responsible for overseeing the implementation of the convention. A consensus also seems to prevail that the Consultative Committee should have as its main subsidiary organ an executive council, a body composed of a fixed number of States which remains permanently in session and exercises authority delegated to it by the Consultative Committee. My delegation believes that the organization and functioning of these bodies should be arranged in a manner that ensures their effectiveness without compromising the principle of sovereign equality, which is an essential basis on which States adhere to international agreements. We disagree in this regard with arguments calling

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for the establishment of an organizational set-up which would give a privileged position to the developed nations at the expense of the developing countries. We realize the existing inequalities in the present-day world but cannot support their being institutionalized through international agreements.

In case the States with highly developed chemical industries find it difficult to accept the notion of an executive council in which some of them might not be represented, the solution could perhaps lie in starting with an executive council which is larger than the 15 member body that has often been mentioned. Simultaneously the convention could provide for an increase in the membership of the Executive Council once the total number of States parties goes beyond a certain figure. Another solution could be to fix the membership of the executive council at a certain percentage of the total number of States parties to the convention. A figure between 30 and 40 per cent should be considered as adequate. This would allow for automatic expansion in the executive council membership as the convention is acceded to by more and more States. Such solutions would be equitable and allow for a sufficient number of developed countries to be always represented in the executive council in order to protect their special interests.

The question of decision-taking is an important element in determining the effectiveness of the bodies set up under the convention. The consensus principle, by giving everyone virtually the right to veto, would be a prescription for paralysis, especially in situations where a decision or action is most required. On the other hand a significant number of States may be highly reluctant to accept decisions by a simple majority, especially in so far as substantive matters are concerned. There is also the additional question of determining as to what is substantive and what is procedural. The dilemma could be resolved by basing all decisions, procedural and substantive, on a qualified majority. Such a solution would not only be unambiguous but also have the merit of being simple and efficient. My delegation has explained this approach in a working paper submitted last year. We realize that the suggestion may be considered unconventional but we should not be afraid of breaking new ground if it signals improvement over past practice and contributes towards our goal of achieving an effective and efficient convention.

The future chemical weapons convention must also lay down procedures for resolving doubts, apprehensions and complaints about non-compliance. These would, however, have to be carefully balanced. While on the one hand they impinge on the sensitive issue of national sovereignty, they are essential, on the other hand, to ensure a healthy respect for the convention. The fact-finding procedures should thus be devised in a manner which operates as a safety net around the convention. The convention while acknowledging the value of clarifying suspicions and ambiguities through bilateral means should provide for a graduated, though not necessarily rigid, framework for resolving doubts through the machinery to be established under it.

While any breach would be a grave development, use of chemical weapons should be treated as the most serious violation of the convention. It is essential that a separate procedure is provided in the convention for expeditiously dealing with allegations of use of chemical weapons.

In the less than perfect world in which we live, inter-State relations often tend to be characterized by mistrust, mutual rivalries and competing interests. So long as the current situation obtains, efforts at having a

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watertight convention do not come as a surprise to us. Comprehensive, unambiguous and stringent procedures would greatly help in promoting international confidence in any agreement. Provisions aimed at ensuring compliance with the convention should, therefore, not be seen as directed against this or that State or group of States, but rather at enhancing the credibility of the convention. The relationship between sovereign rights of States and international obligations freely entered into has been and will remain a sensitive issue as well as an interesting debating point. However, sovereignty voluntarily conceded for the greater good of all is altruism at its best.

The Conference on Disarmament must capitalize on the existing international consensus on the urgent need for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. We must not expend our energies and time in the pursuit of a less than comprehensive ban or on half-way measures. Also, inordinate delay or too laboured a rate of progress towards a comprehensive ban can lead to an erosion of world-wide interest in the subject. Equally, the danger that a momentum can also develop for the acquisition of these weapons of mass destruction which can be easily produced, disguised and employed can only be ignored at our peril. Such a disastrous development would irreparably destroy the international disarmament process itself.

I cannot allow this opportunity to pass without placing on record my delegation's gratitude to Ambassador Turbanski, the distinguished representative of Poland, for the very competent manner in which he fulfilled his responsibilities as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during our 1985 session. Our thanks also go to Mr. Petar Poptchev, Mrs. Elisabet Bonnier and Mr. Frank Elbe who chaired the three Working Groups established under the Ad Hoc Committee. We are also deeply appreciative of the efforts made by Mr. Wisnoemoerti in his consultations on the question of herbicides.

The Conference has taken a wise decision in appointing someone as eminently qualified as Ambassador Cromartie to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the 1986 session. My delegation looks forward to working under his guidance and pledges to him its fullest co-operation.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, we are already in the second week of the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament and it is indeed a pleasure to see you, Ambassador Butler, the distinguished representative of an important country of the Asia-Pacific region, as the President of this forum for the month of February. As I offer my congratulations to you on this occasion, I am confident that under your able guidance the Conference will move very quickly into the substantive phase of our deliberations, and I pledge my delegation's full co-operation to you. I would like to add here the special appreciation of my delegation of the outgoing President, Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, who not only led the Conference during the difficult final month of August last year, but also bore the burden of the Presidency till early this year.

May I also take this opportunity to welcome new colleagues who have recently joined us, Ambassadors Kerroum of Algeria, Clerckx of Belgium, U Tin Tun of Burma, Gonsalves of India, my distinguished neighbours Ambassadors Franceschi of Italy and Afande of Kenya, Ambassadors Benhima of Morocco, Mariategui of Peru and Taylhardat of Venezuela, whom of course we had known as the President of the Conference in March last year, and I extend our

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welcome to Ambassador Kama Budiaki of Zaire look forward to maintaining and enhancing the good and close co-operation and friendship I enjoyed with their predecessors.

I should like first to observe that we have been able to start this year's session in a somewhat favourable climate. At the Third NPT Review Conference held in September last year, we saw the adoption by consensus of a final document calling for further efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. In November, the leaders of the United States and of the Soviet Union met here in Geneva and confirmed the need to improve their bilateral relations and agreed to continue their dialogue. Compared to the emphasis on pessimism which was so prevalent with regard to disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular, it is very important that we are now at least witnessing new momentum to carry the discussions forward.

We hope that the dialogue between the two Powers will not only create a positive psychological atmosphere but will lead to concrete results, enhancing as well the deliberations and negotiations at the multilateral negotiating forum which is the Conference on Disarmament. We ourselves intend to make best efforts to this end.

In my statement at the opening of the 1985 session, I referred to the United States-Soviet Union joint statement of 8 January of that year and, while welcoming the resumption of negotiations on space and nuclear arms, called for both States to take concrete and firm steps towards the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Reviewing the course of the bilateral Geneva negotiations over the past year, we have so far failed to see any immediate breakthroughs toward the reduction in size, capabilities or expanse of the highly complex and sophisticated systems of the nuclear forces of the two countries; nor have we seen any immediate likelihood of achievement of strategic stability. At the same time, we sense that serious efforts are exerted to maintain dialogue and in seeking a path of reconciliation.

We highly value the fact that President Reagan of the United States and General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union met here in Geneva for three days, the first such meeting between the leaders of the two States in over six-and-a-half years, and the fact that following the meeting, they agreed to announce the framework and issues of future United States-Soviet Union relations as a joint statement. We very much hope that the fresh start, which both sides stressed, will lead to an early attainment of specific agreements and lead towards the realization of global arms control and disarmament.

It is in this sense that we specifically welcome the agreement on the continuation and strengthening of dialogue at various levels and, especially, the agreement on mutual visits by the two leaders to take place in the near future. These measures will make an important contribution to the stabilization of the international situation.

It is our common goal to achieve drastic reductions in the level of nuclear warheads and means of their delivery, which have clearly passed the level of simple overkill. These reductions should ultimately lead to a complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.

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From this perspective, we note with particular interest the fact that in the joint statement issued after the meeting, the two leaders noted "proposals recently tabled by the United States and the Soviet Union" and "called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 per cent reductions in the nuclear arms of the United States and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement". "During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon."

It is our understanding that the two sides have clarified their positions regarding defence and space arms and have put forward concrete and detailed proposals for limiting and reducing both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Further, we note that at the beginning of this year, General Secretary Gorbachev issued a statement on disarmament as a further reply to a United States proposal. We realize that the proposals by the two sides contain some basic differences and thus do not warrant undue optimism regarding the future of the negotiations. However, we do hope that the two countries will give full consideration in a constructive spirit to the proposals of the other side and strive through such efforts for solutions which will contribute to the international peace and stability.

With regard to the problem of intermediate nuclear forces in particular, we cannot support an approach as was set out in the statement by General Secretary Gorbachev in which the stress was on a solution in a European context alone, without any reference to the situation in Asia. I wish to take this opportunity to emphasize again our grave concern on the question of INF deployment in Asia.

I would like now to turn to nuclear non-proliferation, which is as important a subject as the reduction of nuclear arms.

The Third NPT Review Conference held in September last year adopted by consensus a final document declaring continued support for the three objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: namely, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also declared the determination of the States Parties to enhance the implementation of the Treaty and to further strengthen its authority.

This outcome was of particular importance. At the same time, we hold in common many of the views expressed by States Parties concerning the Treaty and on disarmament, and share much of their concern. We also believe that the agreement which was reached after negotiations extending until early in the morning of the last scheduled day of the Review Conference was a reflection of the clear and common recognition among the States Parties that there was no alternative to maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation régime set forth in this Treaty.

It goes without saying that the successful conclusion of this Review Conference presupposes the faithful observance by the nuclear-weapon States of the obligations undertaken in accordance with the Treaty, including the commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI. It is therefore significant that the United States-Soviet Union joint statement of November 1985 reiterated clear recognition of this point. We sincerely hope

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that States not Parties will now give serious attention to the fact that this Treaty has so far achieved its objective in preventing nuclear proliferation among the non-nuclear-weapon States over the past 16 years and realize the significance of the fact that some 130 States have elected to become Parties to this Treaty.

I should next like to state our views with regard to multilateral disarmament efforts at the Conference on Disarmament.

The developments in the bilateral area as I have so far touched upon are extremely important and have a favourable influence on the general atmosphere of disarmament. It is opportune, therefore, to recall at this time the interrelationship between such a bilateral approach and that of a multilateral nature, and consider means to make best use of our forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations, namely the Conference on Disarmament. The successful outcome of the NPT review as well as the developments of the bilateral United States-USSR negotiations are providing a favourable atmosphere for the continuation of efforts at this Conference. Additional efforts and renewed approaches are called of us in dealing with the questions of the nuclear test ban, a ban on chemical weapons, prevention of an arms race in outer space and other items on our agenda.

First, I would like to take up item 1 of our agenda, the nuclear-test ban.

Although this item has been on the disarmament agenda since the 1950s, there has been no substantial development in a multilateral context since the Limited Test-Ban Treaty of 1963. In recent years the Conference has been unable even to agree on the mandate for an ad hoc committee to deal with this subject. The situation is deplorable not only because the consideration of one of the Conference's agenda items has been at a standstill, but also as it speaks for the credibility, or the lack of it of our own forum itself. It is also true that it generates a profound feeling of futility and frustration concerning disarmament in general. We very much hope that the States concerned will be able to rise above the differences of views regarding the mandate and agree to work together in developing a formula whereby practical work can immediately commence.

One major issue with regard to the nuclear-test ban is the question of verification and its limitations, which is obviously linked to the question of compliance. We regret the fact that this Conference has not been able to consider these aspects because we do not have an ad hoc committee on this subject. Had we been broadminded enough to provide a working forum in the name of an ad hoc committee, we certainly would have had ample opportunities to undertake in-depth consideration of this matter.

The issue seems to be one of the technology required to detect, identify and evaluate very small-scale nuclear explosions which take place in differing geographic conditions and locations under the Earth's surface, together with the problem of an international data link to provide for common and well-organized determinations. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has been working on such problems for quite some time, and we hope that their mandate will be enlarged so as to enable further in-depth study on detection, identification and evaluation. For our part, we are considering to take further steps as a contribution toward such a goal in the near future and we expect to be in consultation with like-minded countries regarding the means of conducting further seismic data exchange.

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When we turn our attention to the fortieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, we were again unable to obtain a single unified resolution on a comprehensive test ban and three differing approaches were presented. However, we should like to note that one of them showed a more practical approach than had been the case previously and laid out the questions to be considered as those concerning "structure", "scope", "compliance" and "verification" of a NTB treaty. Though we take the view that the Conference on Disarmament need not be directly bound by United Nations resolutions, none the less we welcome such a development as above as an indication of widening common understanding regarding the substantive matters to be taken up by the Ad Hoc Committee.

Furthermore, concerning the technology of verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban, it is clear that the nuclear-weapon States, and especially the United States and the Soviet Union, who together possess a wealth of relevant information accumulated throughout the years, should take the lead and show a practical and forward-looking posture in developing an agreement on effective and reliable verification measures.

With regard to verification, I should like to point out the following developments which have come to our attention.

The United States has, since 1984, proposed mutual visits by experts between the United States and USSR to the other's nuclear test sites in order to assure precise calibration of measurements. Further, it has recently made a unilateral invitation for Soviet experts to visit United States sites.

In response to these initiatives, the Soviet Union has shown that it too emphasizes the importance of verification and, though with the precondition of a moratorium on nuclear testing, has supported the idea of an international verification system, including agreement to on-site inspection. We are aware that the efficacy of on-site inspection is very much governed by the conditions under which it is conducted. Given the common understanding on the importance of verification as was declared by the joint statement following the November Summit, we would like to think that common ground concerning verification in general, including the questions of on-site inspection and calibration of the yield of actual nuclear explosions is slowly emerging. We look forward to early consultations and a solution to this matter between the two States.

It is against such broadening of common understanding that my country strongly hopes for a recommencement of substantial considerations for a nuclear-test-ban at the Conference on Disarmament this year.

In 1984, we made a proposal for a step-by-step approach to a nuclear-test ban and in 1985 presented a working paper on concrete measures for the realization of the International Seismic Data Exchange System. There are important contributions made by various States which still await the Conference's consideration in detail. We remain fully prepared to co-operate with other States so that these worthy ideas and proposals may not be brushed aside with some general statement of principle, but will be fully considered according to their respective merits and exploited for the realization of a nuclear-test ban.

I wish next to state our views on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

We are appreciative of the fact that substantive and extensive negotiations for a convention prohibiting chemical weapons were conducted in the Ad Hoc Committee during 1985, through which the structure of the future convention and its major elements were developed in treaty language, with, however, many reservations. The deliberations were reinforced through inter-sessional meetings. I would like to congratulate the outgoing Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Turbanski, for his achievements as well as to welcome the incoming Chairman, Ambassador Cromartie.

At this point, I should like to recall that the objective of our negotiations is a "comprehensive ban on chemical weapons". Therefore, a partial or regional approach cannot be accepted as an alternative to our negotiations.

Additionally the "comprehensive ban" is of course not the same thing as a complete prohibition of all related substances and activities. Existing chemical weapons should be destroyed at an early stage, with due consideration being given to the need for undiminished security for all States. There should be no question about that, and similarly, particularly serious and careful attention should be paid to the questions concerning some other issues.

For example, if we look at the world, there are those countries which have a very extensively developed and comprehensive system of material chemical industries; there are those where only limited kinds and volume of chemicals are produced, those which engage extensive export-import of chemicals, and finally purely consumer nations. Since in talking about a chemical-weapon convention, we are in fact touching upon the extensive outer reaches of the modern, complex and ever-advancing chemical industries, it is useful and indeed very important to give due consideration to different concerns arising out of different conditions in different countries.

We should also keep in mind that the negotiations have become, in a certain respect, so complicated that it is rapidly becoming an issue surpassing the comprehension of the average bystander. In order for the future convention to receive the necessary wide support, we should always keep in mind that its basic logic should be straightforward and readily understandable. In our future negotiations, it is imperative that we should take the positions of various countries well into consideration so as to develop a convention which will be convincing and realistic.

This year's negotiations will be conducted on the basis of the results of last year's work, and we consider that the work conducted in January, where attention was concentrated on specific substances was useful in pointing the way towards a realistic approach to the issues of definition and permitted activities. At the same time, we feel it necessary to point out that future discussions should consider specific substances and the regulatory régimes concerned so as to keep an overall picture clearly in our mind.

In this connection, I should like to mention some of the obvious problems in the wish to find just solutions.

First, if we were to list those substances to be prohibited from among those now identified, we shall wind up leaving new technological developments unregulated.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Second, if we were to try to circumvent the above situation by laying down a comprehensive ban, we might rule out existing or future peaceful use which could be made possible through technological development.

Third, it would be just as inappropriate to provide for an unduly strict ban on those substances which have peaceful uses as it would be to provide for a loose regulatory régime on account of the peaceful uses.

Fourth, if the regulatory régime were to be extended to cover too wide an area of the chemical industry, its implementation could become impractical, thus creating disenchantment with such a régime.

Fifth, we should not forget that the problems related to the day-to-day management of the convention (namely, the composition of the secretariat, procedures for decision-making, etc.) are matters of delicate political balance.

These and other questions should be taken fully into account and considered together with the varied situations States find themselves in, so that a solution acceptable to all may be developed. I might add that the five points enumerated above are not necessarily unique to the case of chemical weapons. They are common to wide ranges of modern technology for which the distinction between military and peaceful uses is often found in the domain of subjective judgement.

With regard to our work for the present year, I submit for consideration the possibility of holding separate expert group meetings to draw up a list of chemicals and precursors in accordance with guidelines to be developed. I realize that for the past three years or so, the experts have not held that kind of a meeting but have basically participated in the general considerations directly, providing inputs from the expert's point of view. I would be the first to acknowledge that the utility of this approach has been well proven. At the same time, I feel that it may also be useful to reconvene an experts' meeting to deal with matters of a purely technical nature.

When discussing questions of verification in relation to chemical weapons, I believe that we are assuming an integrated system of routine verification as a basis for the structure of operations, which seems from time to time to have taken secondary place in the considerations due to very active discussions concerning challenge inspections. The working paper my country submitted last year dealt with a part of the problems regarding routine verification activities by showing how it could be possible to utilize various sensors and equipment, and we hope that this and other relevant proposals would be discussed further.

Though all States seem to be in agreement concerning the need for challenge inspection, differing views have been expressed as to the concrete formulation for such verification. We feel that the significance of challenge verification lies in ensuring compliance with the future convention and thus assuring security for all States, in other words, in its deterrence role. With such a perspective in mind, we should undertake a full examination of the question in search of a feasible solution.

In such work, much consideration should be given to the various reasons concerning which one among the possible different modes of challenge inspection might have to be invoked, together with the time frame and scenario

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

for an actual inspection. Further, full consideration should be given to the various procedures by which a request for on-site inspection may arise, whether they emerge from routine inspection or from some other procedure, taking into account such views as may be expressed by the experts.

At the recent meeting between the leaders of the United States and the USSR, the two sides "agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons". My country welcomes this agreement to intensify consultations on chemical weapons and to try to overcome their differences. However, we should like to state that the commencement of bilateral negotiations should not imply stagnation with the work of our Conference until such time as some progress has been made at these bilateral talks. We believe that these talks should be of a complementary nature to the work of this Conference.

Last year, the Conference on Disarmament established an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space for the first time, and considerations of a general and substantive nature were made on the question. We feel that much useful work in identifying problems related to present activities in outer space was accomplished. However, the discussions were far from conclusive, and we consider it important that they should be further developed.

Outer space is also an important topic at the United States-Soviet Union bilateral talks, and it would be unrealistic to proceed with multilateral discussions without paying due attention to the developments at the bilateral level. Further, we need to define more clearly what we mean when we talk of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. For one thing, definitions and roles of various space objects have become very complicated. This fact, taken together with the reality that the information available for our work is extremely limited, requires us to ask the United States and the Soviet Union to keep the Conference on Disarmament appropriately informed as to the state of the bilateral negotiations and the problems that they are facing, so that we shall be able to give full consideration to those areas which could be suitable for a multilateral approach and take action early in this session to agree on specific questions to be discussed. In drawing up a programme of work for this year, we believe it necessary to reflect on the discussions which took place last year. Further, we think that the documents and papers presented by the representatives of Canada and the United Kingdom and by the secretariat all provide useful material for advancing our work.

As a result of efforts by many countries, we were able to reach agreement on a single resolution on outer space at the General Assembly last year. My country strongly hopes that the spirit of co-operation shown there will make possible the early establishment of an ad hoc committee on this subject and that we will be able to commence substantive work on questions to be taken up at our multilateral forum.

I have tried to outline our thinking regarding two or three major issues facing us here at the Conference on Disarmament at the start of our 1986 session. Besides these subjects, we hope to see progress on radiological weapons and on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, but I wish to state my country's views with regard to these items as well as additional thoughts

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

on the subjects which I have just touched upon in this statement on another occasion at the Conference, in the Ad Hoc Committees or some other suitable forums.

The work of the Conference on Disarmament has a long history, and though we may not see any sudden breakthroughs, we should not allow ourselves to become overly pessimistic. Neither should we become unduly optimistic, but exercise restraint and work patiently and steadfastly for realistic solutions to the problems facing us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (France) (translated from French): The Conference on Disarmament has just resumed its work and begun its 1986 session. It has done so in its usual atmosphere of calm and moderation, as becomes a body devoted to negotiation.

We are beginning our work under your direction, Mr. President. A few weeks ago, one of your country's weekly newspapers reported that you intended to begin this session of our Conference with "renewed vigour" following the Reagan/Gorbachev summit. I have no doubt that the vigour, combined with a blend of carefulness, balance and flexibility, such essential qualities in a president, will enable you to get our Conference off to a good start. I hope in particular that you will be able to guide the Conference with a steady hand through the difficult reefs of procedural decisions which surround the opening of each session, and save it from running aground on the countless sandbanks in that channel. I therefore wish you and the other officers of the Conference all the best, and assure you of my delegation's concern and co-operation.

I should also like to convey my congratulations and thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Cámpora, who arrived last August and immediately had to preside over our work, thus remaining our President until the beginning of this month: in that office he displayed talent, skill and a sense of moderation and realism with which he enabled us to conclude our work last summer without undue delay. We remain most grateful to him for the great contribution he thus made to our Conference.

I should like to address the Swedish delegation and add my voice to the many speakers who have expressed their condolences on the death of Mrs. Myrdal, whose tireless activity on behalf of disarmament was known worldwide.

I should also like to convey to the United States delegation my delegation's distress and grief at the sudden disaster which overtook the Space Shuttle Challenger: we bow our heads before these victims, whose names will be added to the long list of those who have died so that science can advance, as an essential element in mankind's progress. Their example will be there to remind us that progress in both these realms demands a high degree of intelligence, but also of courage.

Finally, I should like to welcome all the representatives who have joined our ranks since last August: Mr. Roberto Franceschi of Italy,

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Mr. Alfred Silvester Gonsalves of India, Mr. C. Clerckx of Belgium, Mr. Nouridine Kerroum of Algeria, Mr. Dennis Daudi Atande of Kenya, Mr. Tin Tun of Burma, Mr. Paul Adolfo Taylhardat of Venezuela, Mr. José Carlos Mariategui of Peru, Mr. El Ghali Benhima of Morocco and Mr. Kama Budiaki of Zaire. Since the resumption of our work we have already had many opportunities to get to know one another better, and in pursuing our work we shall have many more, I am sure that they will bring to our activities a new vigour which can only redound to the benefit of our Conference.

As many speakers have stated before me, we can approach this session with measured but genuine optimism based, as I see it, on several elements. Although during the past year some important and distressing conflicts have unfortunately continued, no major new clashes have broken out. There have been improvements in some aspects of international relations (in particular in East-West relations). Finally, last November's Geneva summit between the two super-Powers, although it has not yet brought about any solutions, raised serious hopes that the bilateral negotiations in several essential areas of arms control and disarmament will be pursued with determination.

These various elements have already had a beneficial effect on the climate of our Conference. Let us hope that this improvement in the atmosphere will continue throughout this session and help make our work effective. But, of course, atmosphere is not everything.

Indeed, it is not simply a question of going back to the "détente" era of the 1970s, as a sort of golden age of arms control. For the disenchantment which later appeared around that subject, and which continues, can of course be explained by the crises which have occurred, but also to the disillusionment created by the considerable gap between the hopes placed in the benefits that were to stem from détente in the field of disarmament, and the tenuousness of the results. Let us therefore hope that the errors of the recent past will not recur.

Our Conference's business is multilateral negotiation in the area of disarmament. Strictly speaking, the only negotiations with which we are dealing for the time being concern chemical weapons.

In this area, we note that since the start of this session our work has been virtually free of polemics. We are pleased at this, and we are convinced that this moderation, from which we must not depart in future, will help make our work more effective.

We support the recent start of a dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States in an effort to speed up our negotiations. However, an agreement between those two Powers will only be completely beneficial if it is extended and reflected in our multilateral framework.

Thus we are fervently hoping for a general convention, open to all, stipulating the banning and elimination of chemical weapons.

We welcome Ambassador Issraelyan's recent statement before the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in which he described the measures taken by the Soviet authorities to regulate exports of toxic products.

I would like to point out that France, for its part, and in association with its European Community partners, has taken national control measures.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Clearly, steps of this kind should open prospects for the establishment of a list of substances used in civil industry that should be under regular control in the framework of the future Convention. Of course, measures for control of exports of sensitive substances of this nature must necessarily be applied "across the board", and not only with respect to certain destinations, in order to avoid the risk of diversion.

But unilateral measures alone cannot solve the problem. Neither does it appear to us to be possible to conclude a chemical "non-proliferation treaty", for, besides the fact that such an agreement would leave stocks and production facilities intact, it might well increase the imbalances between the States which continued to possess such weapons and the others.

On the other hand, it would probably be wise to begin consultations among the concerned countries, and in particular those having a large chemical industry, with a view to adopting national measures that would make it possible to avoid compounding the difficulties involved in the negotiations on a total ban and on the destruction of stocks by problems concerning proliferation.

Among the many problems which should be examined by our Conference, France considers that priority attention should be given to the following:

- (i) The procedures for verification of civilian factories producing substances which might be diverted for the purpose of manufacturing chemical warfare agents.
- (ii) The elimination of stocks and of production facilities, concerning which last year the French delegation submitted a text that is contained in document CD/630. We have also observed that, in the area of verification, the language of the Soviet proposals of 15 January prompts us to ask for additional information which will, we hope help further the discussion in this area.
- (iii) The composition and modus operandi of the bodies to be set up under the Convention.

But our work is not confined to chemical disarmament, as is clearly indicated by our agenda. Without wishing to review all the items appearing on our agenda, I would like to refer to two other major areas, to which we will certainly devote a significant proportion of our meetings: space and nuclear weapons.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space is an item to which France attaches particular importance. The 1985 session was the occasion of the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee which, unfortunately, was able to conduct substantive work for only a few weeks. However, thanks to the skilful chairmanship of the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Al-Faragy, the Committee was able in that brief period of time to hold a highly interesting preliminary debate, which should lead us to re-establish this ad hoc committee this year as soon as possible.

The mandate adopted last year is far from exhausted. In my opinion a similar mandate should be adopted immediately, so that the Committee can continue the exchanges of viewpoint begun last year, on the legal régime of space and its omissions, the technical aspects of the question, and various

(Mr. Jessel, France)

specific proposals. In this way, by the end of this session, we should have a clear idea of what can be undertaken and accomplished by our Conference.

The French delegation, for its part, is prepared to participate fully in the Ad Hoc Committee's discussions. My country's interest in space is not recent. It has expressed this interest on numerous occasions, and made various proposals all aimed at achieving a use of space consistent with the general interest, security and peace. As far back as 1978, we had suggested the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, which could provide the international community with an essential element for verification of disarmament agreements and for crisis management.

In June 1984, in this very forum, we formulated a set of proposals and presented a memorandum, based on the following considerations. Because of their long-standing military presence in outer space, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics obviously have a particular responsibility with regard to seeking verifiable agreements for the limitation of military uses of space. However, this does not mean that the international space régime should be the result of bilateral negotiations alone. The Conference on Disarmament must therefore consider the different problems which arise, in particular, because of their possible implications for other countries.

It was in this spirit that France proposed, in 1984, that the international community should set itself a twofold objective, in addition to any possible results in the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations. This twofold objective should be the following:

- (1) To limit what can still be limited, and in particular to guarantee the safety of high orbits.
- (2) To consolidate and complete the existing legal régime, in particular with regard to immunity of satellites of other States and the confidence-building measures which could be implemented for space objects in general.

We have been discussing nuclear weapons for a long time and under different guises.

The cessation of nuclear tests has always been an important concern in our discussions, and will no doubt also be during this session. At this stage, I will simply recall my Government's unvarying position, which is that the proposed nuclear-test ban can only be considered in the framework of a long-term process of arms reductions leading to a balance of forces at a level considerably lower than the current one. For France, the halting of tests cannot be a condition or a prerequisite for the reduction of nuclear arsenals.

Before going any further, I would like to recall a few general points, while apologizing for the fact that they are commonplace. Firstly, Europe has just experienced a 40-year period free, not of tensions, but of war, and few other regions have been so fortunate. Secondly, there are huge areas and extensive frontiers in the world where no existing concentration of forces exists. Thirdly, a build-up of troops and weapons never occurs spontaneously: it occurs where there are problems, disputes, difficulties, concern.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

The following conclusions can be drawn from these facts:

1. Attempting to reduce such a build-up, without seeking also to settle the underlying political problems, would be either a fruitless exercise doomed to failure, or a dangerous undertaking which would result in situations of precariously-balanced armed peace being replaced by still more dangerous situations of imbalance.
2. It would be just as wrong to believe that technical decisions can replace political solutions, in order to achieve progress in disarmament. Thus, to believe that the elimination of nuclear weapons could result from technical innovations -- in space or otherwise -- or the ending of tests, may appeal to our imaginations, but would only lead us to sham solutions, like the false windows which architects used to put into their buildings.
3. In the current situation, disarmament cannot be an end in itself for any responsible Government. As the French Minister of Foreign Affairs recently stated at the Stockholm Conference, "the heart of the problem is still security". The purpose of disarmament is to increase or in any case maintain security, not reduce it. This shows us how narrow is the path along which we must carefully progress if we wish the cause of disarmament to make realistic progress: the aim must be to maintain the balance of all the forces involved, but gradually bring them down to the lowest possible level.
4. In this respect let us also take care not to rank the different categories of armaments in a way that would make some inherently bad, and the others somehow good in themselves. In a given situation all the components of security must be taken into consideration, or else security will be jeopardized. As the President of the French Republic stressed in a recent statement, "since the imbalance in Europe is basically conventional and chemical, it would be logical to start there".

This is the crux of the debate. And this is where I would like to say a few words about the recent Soviet proposals. The plan, whose "intellectual boldness" President Mitterrand praised, is an ambitious one. It requires thorough analysis and attentive consideration, which, on our side, are currently under way. But at this stage, a few remarks can already be made.

This plan proposes large cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers, and this is obviously a step in the right direction.

However, these proposals would from the outset require my country to freeze its nuclear forces, and therefore prohibit modernizing them. This would amount to forthwith jeopardizing the credibility of our deterrence, deterrence of the strong by the weak, according to which the weaker party does not seek in any way to attain parity of means with the stronger but simply to remain in a position to persuade the stronger party not to attack it, out of fear of an "unacceptable punishment". This is still one of the main obstacles to war, as Mr. Gorbachev stated during his visit to Paris last October.

The threat we are facing is not only a nuclear one: it is also conventional and chemical. In view of this situation, I should simply like to recall that since long ago France has, on various occasions, and especially in 1983 through its President, proclaimed its determination to participate actively in effective and verifiable nuclear disarmament but that in order for it to do so certain conditions had to be met. Those conditions are the following. Firstly, the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals should be reduced to the point where the gap between them and the other nuclear Powers

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has essentially changed. Secondly, defence systems should not be strengthened. It was in this spirit that, before this very Conference on Disarmament, we made the proposals concerning space to which I referred earlier. Finally, the imbalance in classical forces should have disappeared and the chemical threat should truly have been eliminated.

In its current role of medium-sized Power, with the wealth of long experience and with no claims towards anyone, France is aware of being among the main architects of disarmament in the world; it can refer to the role it played in the Helsinki Conference and the CSCE process, and more recently it was at the origin of the Conference currently taking place at Stockholm. Finally, it launched the proposal which was welcomed by the last United Nations General Assembly and which will bring the international community together in Paris next July to discuss the topic "Disarmament-Development".

It is in this spirit that, perhaps at a more modest or perhaps more technical level, my delegation will continue, together with all those present, the important but difficult task entrusted to our Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Mr. Voicu.

Mr. VOICU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, as this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor in the Conference on Disarmament this session, I should like to congratulate you most warmly on your election to the Presidency of the Conference for the month of February. It is our hope that, thanks to your many qualities, under your Presidency the Conference will make tangible progress in carrying out its mandate. The Romanian delegation wishes to assure you of its whole-hearted co-operation in the work of our Conference.

The Romanian delegation associates itself entirely with the delegations which have expressed their condolences to the delegation of Sweden following the tragic and premature disappearance of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, an outstanding scholar and diplomat whose name will for ever be engraved in the history of the humanistic enterprise of peace and disarmament. We also wish to reiterate to the United States delegation our sympathy at the disaster which befell the crew of Challenger. The Romanian people's sympathy was conveyed to the people of the United States at the highest level immediately after the tragedy.

The work of the Conference on Disarmament this year is taking place under special conditions. Despite encouraging developments at the end of last year, the international situation remains extremely serious and complicated. The arms race, above all the nuclear-arms race, continues unabated, increasing still further the real danger of a nuclear catastrophe and profoundly affecting -- by the vast human and material resources squandered for military purposes -- the global economic and social situation. At the same time, the use of force and threat of force in inter-State relations persists.

The situations of conflict in different regions of the world is aggravating -- and in a disturbing manner -- the threats to the cause of international peace and security, and to the freedom and independence of peoples.

(Mr. Voicu, Romania)

The debate on disarmament problems at the fortieth session of the General Assembly and the resolutions adopted on that occasion, to which several speakers have already rightly referred, reflect the deep concern and preoccupation of all States in the face of the extremely dangerous situation which has been reached. The debate and the resolutions reflect the general conviction that if the present arms race is not halted, if the negotiations on disarmament continue to remain in the impasse which has persisted for several years, then mankind will be confronted -- and increasingly so -- with the sombre perspective of a major conflict which, in a nuclear-weapon situation, will inexorably turn into a nuclear holocaust.

The current situation places a major and very heavy responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference is required to make an effective contribution to the halting of the particularly dangerous course of events and to the conclusion of agreements that will pave the way to disarmament. It is a responsibility that rests not only with the Conference, as the single forum for multilateral negotiations in the field of disarmament, but also with Member States and particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other heavily armed countries.

At the summit meeting in Geneva last November, an event which was welcomed by all, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States of America decided to step up negotiations with a view to arriving at agreements on the vital problems of nuclear-weapon reductions and on other issues that are the subject of the Soviet-American negotiations but also appear on this Conference's agenda. Consequently, this year, International Year of Peace, unlike recent years, political conditions are better for the negotiations within the framework of the Conference to lead to tangible results that will help to end the arms race and further negotiations in other forums on the aspects of confidence, security and disarmament.

Furthermore, the Declaration of 15 January of this year by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. S. Gorbachev, highlights the exceptionally broad-ranging issue of the elaboration of a programme of nuclear and conventional disarmament.

The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Mr. Ceausescu, said the following about this initiative: "We regard this programme as being very important. Its implementation will, without any doubt, be of major importance for international life as a whole and will remove the greatest danger that threatens life itself on our planet. We must therefore lend firm support to this programme and take determined action for its implementation".

While supporting this programme, we also express the hope that everything necessary will be done -- on both sides -- to arrive as soon as possible at specific, mutually acceptable agreements that pave the way for genuine progress in the disarmament field.

At the same time it is necessary to intensify activities to achieve general disarmament and reduce conventional weapons and troop strength because only thus will it be possible to guarantee the overall elimination of tension and the danger of new wars. It is also urgently necessary to reduce military budgets, as a tangible expression of the desire to achieve nuclear and general disarmament and thereby create the conditions necessary to eradicate war from human lives.

(Mr. Voicu, Romania)

It cannot be denied that peace and disarmament directly and vitally concern all the peoples and States of the world irrespective of size, social system or geographical location. All States therefore have not only the right but also the duty to contribute towards efforts to end the arms race, eliminate the nuclear threat and defend peace.

Considering that the elimination of the threat of nuclear war is disarmament's foremost priority, Romania resolutely supports the engagement of effective negotiations to end the nuclear-arms race and the implementation of specific disarmament measures designed to halt the development of nuclear weapons and to gradually reduce and ultimately eliminate them. This goal implies a particularly urgent need to ban all tests of nuclear weapons as an effective means of preventing their modernization. At least during the Soviet-American negotiations, a ban on the testing, production and deployment of new nuclear weapons and on the militarization of outer space would be particularly beneficial. At the same time, since both parties have agreed on the principle of a substantial reduction, of about 50 per cent in nuclear arms, the freezing and reduction of military budgets should already begin this year.

The particularly heavy burden placed on peoples and humanity in general by the continuous increase in weapon capability renders most imperative the legitimate demand that the enormous resources currently wasted on non-productive, destructive goals be rechannelled towards solving the critical economic and social problems facing humanity today, with particular emphasis on the elimination of underdevelopment and the strengthening of efforts for the advancement of developing countries. Any unilateral initiative, based on reciprocal example, undertaken for the reduction of military budgets and armed forces by the States of the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would be beneficial as well as politically important and significant.

An overall decrease in tension and in the threat of new wars as well as the establishment of international peace and security require a strengthening of efforts towards general disarmament entailing the reduction and elimination of other types of weapons. Thus, an agreement must be reached on measures for the substantial reduction of conventional weapons in the interest of reducing the balance of military power to the lowest level possible. In that respect, any agreement between the two military blocs and the two parties in general to establish a ceiling for major arms -- aircraft, tanks, warships, missiles, heavy guns, etc. -- would be of significant practical value. The dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other States would constitute important specific contributions in that respect.

Concerning the specific agenda items of the current session of the Conference, the Romanian delegation favours a constructive approach stressing the essential questions. Thus, in the area of nuclear disarmament, the start of effective negotiations is crucial. To that end, certain working bodies should be established, in particular negotiating committees on nuclear disarmament and on measures for the prevention of nuclear war. An important step towards increasing the effectiveness of the Conference work would be the resumption of negotiations on the establishment of an international nuclear-test ban treaty which would contribute to halting the development of nuclear weapons and pave the way for the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures. The swift establishment of an ad hoc negotiating committee on a nuclear test ban is also imperative. Romania suggests that a moratorium

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should be adopted on nuclear testing until the establishment of such a treaty. At the same time it would be useful to examine the possibility for the Conference to adopt a declaration or other legally binding document concerning the implementation of a moratorium on the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space also constitutes a priority aim of the Conference negotiations. In that respect, it is imperative to swiftly re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and to begin specific negotiations on that question with a view to ending all militarization of space and ensuring the use of space for exclusively peaceful ends in the interest of all nations. One specific measure which should be adopted in this respect is the establishment within the United Nations of a special body to monitor the use for peaceful ends of outer space, which belongs to all mankind, as well as to promote widespread international co-operation in this field.

In view of the progress made to date by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we consider it necessary during this session to stress the advance of negotiations on the draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of all chemical weapons. The convention should be an international legal instrument designed as a step in the direction of prohibiting and eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. We welcome the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and hope that it will work fruitfully throughout this session of the Conference.

The adoption of preventive measures for the non-proliferation of chemical weapons in chemical-weapon-free zones, in order to strengthen efforts to swiftly establish a universal convention on the prohibition and destruction of all chemical weapons, would be particularly useful in promoting confidence in the reduction and elimination of those weapons. The Declaration-Appeal of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, and of the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Jivkov, concerning the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans is particularly relevant here. It proposes that negotiations be undertaken without delay to establish an agreement among the Balkan States banning the testing, production, acquisition and stockpiling on their territory of all chemical weapons, as an effective contribution to confining the proliferation of chemical weapons on our planet. That Declaration-Appeal has been circulated for the Conference as document CD/648.

Mr. President, the recent Soviet proposals for stage-by-stage disarmament highlight, as we mentioned earlier, the need for careful planning in an area which has been neglected in recent years. This calls for the acceleration of negotiations to provide a coherent framework for efforts undertaken to achieve nuclear and conventional disarmament and military budget reductions, and for related activities engaged on bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Of course, this co-ordination of efforts should take place within the comprehensive programme of disarmament which the Conference is called upon to draw up. We express the hope that under the Chairmanship of the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, His Excellency Alfonso García Robles, the Ad Hoc Committee established to that end will fulfil its mandate with considerable success. Romania favours the acceleration of negotiations in 1986 to elaborate the comprehensive programme of disarmament for submission and adoption at the next special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1988 or 1989.

(Mr. Voicu, Romania)

As to the organization of this session's work, a particular effort should be made swiftly and immediately to establish all the negotiating committees at the outset, thereby enabling the Conference to concentrate on the discussion and settlement of the substantive items on the agenda.

The Romanian delegation would like to stress in conclusion that it has come to this session of the Conference on Disarmament with the firm intention of making sustained efforts, jointly with all participating delegations, to enhance the Conference's activity and effectiveness. The essential goal of the Conference should be the adoption of specific measures to end the arms race, above all the nuclear-arms race, and to achieve disarmament. In so doing, the Conference will respond to the legitimate hopes of all States and peoples concerning the maintenance of world peace, the achievement of disarmament and the defence of the supreme right of mankind and all nations to life, liberty and peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Qian Jiadong.

Mr. QIAN Jiadong (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, with the resumption of bilateral negotiations, particularly the holding of a summit meeting between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, the past year witnessed some improvement in the relations between the two big Powers and certain signs of relaxation in the general atmosphere of the world situation. In the field of disarmament, the two sides have put forward their respective proposals. In spite of the fact that their positions remain far apart, we have noticed that the two sides have both expressed their willingness to assume their special responsibilities for disarmament and have agreed to take the lead in reducing arms. They have both stated as an ultimate goal to completely eliminate nuclear arms everywhere and set a 50 per cent reduction as their first target. This accords with the spirit of the Final Document adopted by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and is precisely the long-standing proposal of many countries, including China. Compared with the past, we regard it as a step forward and express our welcome for it.

However, we must not fail to see that the improvement of the situation is still limited and falls far short of the aspiration and desire for peace and security of the people of the world. The conflicts in some "hot spots" of the world have not been resolved. The arms race is continuing. The root cause of tension remains. The danger of war has not been removed. In order to achieve a genuine relaxation of the world situation and provide an effective guarantee for world peace and security of all countries, the United States and the Soviet Union should not stop at issuing statements or putting forward proposals, but should take concrete actions, halt their rivalries in the "hot spots", conduct disarmament negotiations in real earnest and reach agreements on the drastic reduction of nuclear armaments and the cessation of an arms race in outer space, so as to create conditions for the realization of a world without nuclear arms. At present, United States-Soviet Union negotiations on disarmament are under way. The leaders of the two countries will have their second summit meeting this year. We hope that they will live up to the keen expectations of the world's people.

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The resumption of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union is a positive development, but it can by no means replace multilateral negotiations. Many representatives have voiced their opinions in this regard and we fully share their views. The issue of disarmament has a vital bearing on the interests of the people of all countries and we cannot afford to sit back and wait for the outcome of the United States-Soviet Union negotiations. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, nuclear or non-nuclear, have the right to participate in the discussions and express their views on an equal footing. It can be said without exaggeration that years of multilateral negotiations constitute one of the various factors which helped bring about the bilateral negotiations of today. Of course, the resumption of bilateral negotiations has, in turn, created a favourable atmosphere for multilateral negotiations. The two are not mutually exclusive but complementary to each other. The international community has entrusted our conference with an important task and placed great hopes on it. In his message to the current session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, once again emphasized: "As the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body of the international community, the Conference on Disarmament has a major role in the completion of the practical disarmament agreements which are so badly needed. It is the appropriate and competent forum where the positive developments which have recently emerged should also find expression in specific agreements. Numerous resolutions of the fortieth session of the General Assembly, in requesting you to endeavour to achieve concrete results on arms limitation and disarmament, give recognition to the unique potential of this Conference." For many years, owing to reasons known to all, the Conference has not been able to play its due role. It is high time now to bring an end to this unsatisfactory state of affairs. We are pleased to note that soon after the opening of this session, the Conference had been able to adopt its agenda smoothly and establish subsidiary bodies on two items. It is our hope that on other matters of the Conference, either procedural or substantive, solutions can also be found in the same manner, so that a breakthrough can be achieved in our work.

Now I wish to address some priority items on our agenda: first, the nuclear issues. For several years, resolutions on nuclear issues have always topped the dozens of disarmament resolutions adopted at each session of the United Nations General Assembly. This fully testifies to the great concern of the international community for, and the importance it attaches to, the prevention of nuclear war, reduction of nuclear weapons and elimination of nuclear threat. China has always held that the fundamental approach to the prevention of nuclear war lies in the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. Obviously, only by eliminating the material basis of nuclear war, can the danger of nuclear war be removed once and for all. In order to achieve this goal step by step, China put forward a concrete proposal at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

The Soviet Union and the United States should stop testing, improving and manufacturing nuclear weapons, and should reduce by 50 per cent all types of their respective nuclear weapons and means of delivery. After that, all other nuclear States should also stop testing, improving or manufacturing nuclear weapons and should reduce their respective nuclear arsenals according to an agreed proportion and procedure.

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This is a proposal based upon the present state of nuclear armaments. It features not only the special responsibilities which the two super-Powers are obliged to assume in the first place, but also the responsibilities borne by the other nuclear States subsequently. It covers not only a nuclear-test ban, but also a ban on the improvement and production of nuclear weapons. What is more, the reductions envisaged in this proposal involve nuclear weapons and means of delivery of all types, which also include nuclear weapons deployed at different areas. Only in this way can the qualitative improvement and quantitative increment of nuclear weapons both be prevented and the sense of security of all countries in the world be enhanced. This proposal of ours does no harm to any country's interest; on the contrary, it is conducive to universal peace in the world. It is both fair and feasible.

Of course, we are also aware that since the nuclear capabilities of both the United States and the USSR have long since exceeded the level of "overkill", there will still be enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world more than once even if their arsenals are cut by half. It is for this reason that, in addition to the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons, China has proposed the following: all nuclear States, the two big nuclear Powers, the United States and the USSR, in particular, should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances and should unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States or nuclear-free zones. Proceeding on such a basis, an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons should be concluded, with the participation of all nuclear States. In this regard, it must be emphasized that no reservations or conditions whatsoever should be attached either to non-first-use of nuclear weapons or to non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. Otherwise, the significance and effectiveness of such guarantees will be impaired. We believe this is the easiest and most practical measure to help reduce the nuclear threat. If the two major nuclear Powers are really sincere in proclaiming that "nuclear war must never be fought", there should be no difficulty for them to undertake not to use nuclear weapons.

It is not fortuitous that nuclear issues take up the top three items on our agenda. To our regret, no subsidiary bodies on nuclear issues have been established so far, let alone conducting any negotiations. My delegation has all along favoured the setting up of ad hoc committees on the items of "cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In the past we did not participate in the subsidiary body on a nuclear-test ban, though we were not opposed to its establishment. I would like to announce here that if an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban is established this year, the Chinese delegation will participate in its work. Last year already saw China taking part in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to detect seismic events relating to nuclear-test-ban verification measures. This year a deputy director of our National Seismic Bureau will participate in the work of this Group.

The second issue I wish to speak on is the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is also a priority item on our agenda. Since the importance and urgency of the issue have already been addressed on many occasions both inside and outside the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament forums, I do not intend to go over them again. As a reflection of our historical experience, there is a saying in China -- and it is said that a similar saying is also popular in Japan -- which goes: "There is a

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shield for every sword, and a sword for every shield.". What has happened in the past year further proves that it is impossible to eliminate weapons by developing a new type of weaponry, or to terminate the arms race by starting a new one. Development of space weapons can only further aggravate and escalate the arms race, bringing greater instability to our world. The efforts to stop an arms race in outer space have reached a crucial juncture when something must be done. Otherwise there will be no end of trouble for the future.

China has always held that outer space ought to be exclusively used for peaceful purposes, and the development of space technology should serve the benefit of all mankind. At the spring part of the last session the Chinese delegation submitted a working paper (CD/579) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We proposed that at the present stage the "de-weaponization of outer space" be made the primary objective in our efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. At the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Wu Xueqian, further proposed: "The United States and the Soviet Union should immediately stop the arms race in all its forms in the outer space. All countries with a space capability should refrain from developing, testing or deploying outer space weaponry. An international agreement on the complete prohibition and destruction of outer space weaponry should be concluded as soon as possible.". We are prepared to work together with other delegations to look into all other relevant proposals.

We are pleased to see that after several years' efforts an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space was finally established last summer and did some initial work. With an overwhelming majority in favour, and none against, the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (40/87). Proceeding on the basis that has been laid down, we ought to establish an ad hoc committee this year at the earliest date to conduct substantive negotiations. In our view, an agreement on the mandate could be reached given a spirit of compromise and co-operation by all sides.

The prohibition of chemical weapons has long been considered as the most promising item on the agenda, and the reality fully bears this out. We have already entered the stage of developing and working out a draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and we have been rid of the trouble of redrafting a mandate for the relevant subsidiary body every year. Like many other delegations, we are pleased to see that, thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Turbanski, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and all the co-ordinators, further progress was made during the January resumed session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We have also taken note that the two countries with the largest chemical-weapon arsenals have both expressed their willingness to speed up the negotiations to conclude a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Their representatives have made it clear that their bilateral talks are only aimed at facilitating the multilateral negotiations and they have no intention to supplant them. All this, we believe, is conducive to our work.

However, blind optimism will do us no good. We have to keep a sober mind on the fact that tremendous work has yet to be done, and divergences on some key issues still remain. The question of verification, especially challenge verification, is one of the thorny problems calling for greater

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efforts. At the initiative of the Canadian delegation, the United Nations General Assembly last year adopted by consensus a resolution on the question of verification. Although this resolution only deals with the question of verification in general, we hope it will bear a positive impact on our negotiations. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has started its work. We wish it renewed success.

Though the issue of conventional disarmament is not on the agenda of our conference, still I wish to touch on it. An increasing number of countries attach attention to conventional disarmament. In their statements at the First Committee meetings of the fortieth session of the General Assembly, representatives from many countries referred to conventional war as the most real threat. With the rapid development of military technology and the increasing lethality of modern conventional weapons, a conventional war can also result in an enormous disaster to the world. What is more, in the nuclear age, there is no insuperable chasm between nuclear and conventional wars. There exists the danger of a conventional war escalating into a nuclear war. China has always held that the efforts for nuclear disarmament should be combined with those for conventional disarmament. We hope that with the amelioration of East-West relations, the long stagnant Vienna disarmament negotiations will produce positive results at the earliest possible date, for any progress in the field of conventional disarmament will serve as a boost to the solution of nuclear problems.

Finally, I would like to make some observations on the relationship between disarmament and international security. These two issues are dealt with in New York in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. This shows that the two issues are closely related. Disarmament furthers the maintenance of world peace and security, while the latter will in turn accelerate the pace of the former. The fact that for a long time disarmament has made no progress is not due to inadequate efforts or lack of appropriate proposals and measures on the part of various countries, but due to the tense and turbulent international situation caused by super-Power confrontation and rivalry and to the absence of guarantees for peace and security. Facts have shown that only by strict observance of the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter and by mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference in each other's internal affairs without resort to the use or threat of force in State-to-State relations, can the international situation be genuinely eased and a favourable atmosphere and conditions created for disarmament. Therefore, while seeking disarmament we must endeavour to maintain world peace and security.

China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and opposes power politics and any acts of aggression and expansion. We support all constructive initiatives conducive to world peace and are willing to establish friendly relations with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Chinese Government and people are exerting every endeavour in their socialist modernization. In recent years, we have been reducing, on our own initiative, the size of our military forces, cutting down military expenditures and shifting a great part of military industry to civilian production. We warmly support the United Nations decision declaring 1986 as the International Year of Peace. Reflecting the eager desire of the people of all countries for world peace, this decision has won universal support and response. The danger of war still exists, but the forces

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detering war are growing. We are confident that so long as the people of all countries unite, co-operate and make joint efforts, world peace can be preserved.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President and to my country.

We have exhausted the time available to us this morning. I would now propose suspending the plenary meeting, and resuming again this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. in order to hear the speaker who is inscribed on the list of speakers, and then holding an informal meeting of the plenary as indicated earlier. This plenary meeting is suspended and will resume at 3.30 p.m. this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 1.10 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 339th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. I have on the list of speakers for this afternoon the representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargy.

Mr. ALFARARGY (Egypt): Mr. President, since your appointment as Australia's first Ambassador for Disarmament and its representative to the Conference on Disarmament, you have shown deep knowledge of disarmament issues and made a remarkable contribution to the work of the Conference. That is why we are happy to see you presiding over the Conference at the start of its 1986 session. We are confident that your efficiency and experience will help to push the work of the Conference forward, not only during this month of February but also throughout the entire session.

You are a most fitting successor to your worthy predecessor, Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, who presided over the Conference during the month of August 1985 and throughout the inter-sessional period with competence and brilliance, for which he deserves our gratitude and appreciation.

I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to welcome our distinguished new colleagues who participate for the first time in the work of the Conference, Ambassadors Franceschi of Italy, Tin Tun of Burma, Mariategui of Peru, Kerroum of Algeria, Afande of Kenya, Benhima of Morocco and Gonsalves of India. We are fully confident that their extensive and wide diplomatic experience will enrich our work. I would also like to welcome the return of Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela to the Conference: his period as President of the Conference in March 1985 will always be linked with our success in establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space for the first time.

The circumstances under which the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament is held give us reason to feel optimistic about the possible results of its work within, of course, the framework of the Conference's role as the sole international multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. Our optimism is based on the results of the summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan of the United States of America and Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the

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Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in Geneva in November 1985. Both leaders acknowledged that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. It was also decided that neither side will seek military superiority. They agreed to accelerate their bilateral negotiations to accomplish the objectives of the January 1985 Joint Agreement concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its termination on Earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms, and with a view that such negotiations would ultimately lead to the elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

Such affirmations by the two super-Powers are important and a cause for satisfaction, since the two bear a particular responsibility in reversing the rush towards the nuclear-arms race, and in taking serious and concrete measures for nuclear disarmament. The proposals for arms control that followed came as a step in the right direction.

As for the note of caution, I must say it stems from the fact that deeds are not in harmony with words. They are even contradictory. Instead of serious striving to halt the nuclear-arms race, both quantitatively and qualitatively, what we see is its disastrous continuation and escalation. We observe the ever-increasing possibilities of its expansion from land, sea and air into outer space. Such actions are based on theories of achieving international peace and security through the accumulation of armaments, balance of deterrence, limited nuclear war and strategic stability. All such theories have been proved invalid and unacceptable. In fact, they increase the risks of nuclear war, lead to instability in international relations and the squandering of material and human resources at a time when millions of human beings are suffering from backwardness, hunger, poverty and disease.

Although the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the NPT and the resolutions of the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly reflected once again international quasi-unanimity on the necessity to reach a treaty on a nuclear-test ban, to halt the nuclear-arms race, to achieve nuclear disarmament, to prevent nuclear war, and to prevent an arms race in outer space, and although those instruments urged the Conference on Disarmament to carry out its negotiating task in these fields, we still see a few States refusing this course of action adamantly. These States try to invoke irrelevant arguments and justifications to delay the implementation of such recommendations and resolutions by the Conference on Disarmament. We must face such a trend with determination. We must demonstrate the required political will to advance the work in the Conference.

It was no coincidence that the item "Nuclear Test Ban" was placed at the top of the Conference's agenda. Such a ban is the necessary first step towards vertical and horizontal non-proliferation. It is also a demonstration of the nuclear-weapon States' credibility as regards their commitment to halt the nuclear-arms race. We hold the view that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, after having concluded its introductory work according to its specific mandate, i.e. to review the subject in all its aspects, must proceed now to negotiate a treaty on a nuclear test ban with all its elements, including verification, which should be considered on an equal footing with the other elements and together with one another.

This concept was confirmed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/80 A. The resolution referred to the fact that the negotiations must cover the various interrelated problems to enable the preparation of the draft treaty. It called upon the States members of the Conference,

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particularly the three depositary Powers of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and of the NPT to promote the establishment of the ad hoc committee so as to start negotiations; it also recommended that the Conference should establish two sub-committees, the first to consider the structure and scope of the treaty, the second to study compliance and verification.

We welcome the declaration by the Soviet Union on its readiness to initiate negotiations on a nuclear-test ban treaty, whether on a bilateral basis with the United States, or by the resumption of the tripartite negotiations with the participation of the United Kingdom, or in the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, we express our regret at the declaration by the United States on the continuation of its nuclear tests, and its position that attaining a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is a long-term objective.

If verification is considered to be the main obstacle which delays the endeavours to reach a comprehensive test-ban treaty, then it behoves us to refer and pay tribute to the declaration by the Soviet Union on its readiness to accept on-site inspection, whenever necessary, and to the initiative by the six States signatories of the Delhi Declaration on their readiness to participate in the verification efforts of a nuclear-test ban. Doubtless, any step that brings us closer to the objective of a comprehensive test ban is worthy of appreciation and support. When all cannot be achieved, all need not be abandoned. That is why we welcome the Soviet Union's decision to freeze its nuclear tests as of 6 August 1985 until the beginning of 1986, and also its subsequent decision to extend the moratorium for another three months and its readiness to extend such a freeze further if it is reciprocated by the United States, which is what we all hope will happen.

The non-nuclear-weapon States endeavoured to have the Conference on Disarmament negotiate a halt to the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. This was due to the fact that, notwithstanding their recognition of the unique responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two super-Powers, in this area they still deem, and rightly so, that such negotiations are so vital and important that the nuclear-weapon States should not be singled out to monopolize them under any circumstances. The negotiations have an impact that transcends the super-Powers to encompass the entire international community. It follows that participation by the non-nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations on halting the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, through expressing their views, giving their counsel and sharing in the decision-making process in the Conference on Disarmament, is deemed necessary and essential.

We had expected, when the two super-Powers resumed their negotiations on arms control, that it would also help the Conference on Disarmament to deal with this item. We now find the objecting States invoke the same grounds to confirm their objection: namely, their apprehension, if the Conference considers this item, that it would interfere with and impede the bilateral negotiations, thus limiting their chances of success. We hold the contrary view. The experience gained in disarmament negotiations clearly show that bilateral and multilateral negotiations are not alternatives or a cause of mutual obstruction. They rather complement and sustain each other. That is why we call for the implementation of the successive General Assembly resolutions on this item, the last of which is resolution 40/152P, which calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to submit recommendations

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to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for nuclear-arms control and the reduction of nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination.

Our failure to achieve any real progress to halt the nuclear-arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament strengthens the fears of all the non-nuclear-weapon States and their feeling of unease: they would find their security permanently and increasingly threatened, for reasons not of their own doing and not of their own choice. Thus it is only natural that such States are the most keen to prevent a nuclear war. They know they would be the victims of such a war, without possessing the means to avert its consequences. Despite all the efforts deployed by those States to consider the possibility of reaching practical measures to prevent such a war, they have so far met with refusal. Else, how can we interpret the fact that a few States are impeding the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a non-negotiating mandate, according to the proposal by the group of non-aligned and neutral States, that would permit a thorough consideration of all the proposals before the Conference in all their aspects. It would make it possible to study all the potential approaches to the problem without any given priority. It would pave the way for initiating negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement on appropriate and practical measures to prevent nuclear war, as has been reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 40/152A. We have to rise to our responsibilities. Our action must be commensurate with the importance and priority of preventing a nuclear war.

The non-nuclear-weapon States, in their endeavours to prevent nuclear war, called for guarantees of non use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. Regrettably, the only response came in the transient and incomplete form of Security Council resolution 255 of 1968. The nuclear-weapon States tried to deal with this deficiency by their unilateral declarations issued on the occasion of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, but with the exception of the declaration by China it would be difficult to claim that the guarantees are unconditional or unqualified. That is why the non-nuclear-weapon States affirmed, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982, that the issue of their security must be solved in a way that they deem satisfactory.

As for the guarantees that would lead the non-nuclear-weapon States to feel confident of their security and stability, they were described by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt in his statement before the Third Review Conference of the NPT. He said that they are those "based on binding commitments. Comprehensive guarantees that are unconditional, unrestricted and immune to threat. These must be explicitly stipulated in a credible and applicable international instrument".

That is why we feel disappointed that the Conference does not give the item the importance it deserves, an importance that dwindles gradually at each session. We call upon both the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to determine their positions so as to help establish the ad hoc committee early in the session. The committee should undertake serious and constructive work to agree on international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

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The speakers who preceded me agreed that the opportunity we now have is more favourable than ever before for achieving real progress in formulating a treaty banning chemical weapons. This comes as an aftermath of the affirmation by President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, in their Geneva Summit, of their determination to intensify their efforts to reach such an agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, during its resumed session last month, did show a new spirit in the negotiations. If the short time allotted to the resumed session prevented the Committee from considering all the existing problems and finding appropriate solutions, we still hope the spirit shown will continue to prevail so as to support the Committee in its work during its ordinary session. We are confident that Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, will continue the valuable efforts previously deployed by Ambassador Turbanski of Poland during his tenure as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee during the last session.

In this regard, it is of importance to me to indicate that while we share the concern at the increasing trend to possess and use chemical weapons, and while we support every effort to control such a trend, we still deem it necessary that this should not be considered as an alternative to or at the expense of our basic objective, which remains a convention for the comprehensive ban of chemical weapons.

Our delegation still attaches great importance to reaching an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons, including the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. Our interest is shared by other non-aligned and neutral States, whether members of the Conference or not represented here. This has been clearly demonstrated by the discussions which took place in the Third Review Conference of the NPT on this item. To any State which has nuclear energy, or which has a programme for generating nuclear energy -- such as Egypt for example -- the prohibition of releasing and disseminating radioactive material through attacks on nuclear facilities is a vital question of security and of development. Attacks against nuclear facilities are no longer a matter of mere speculation. They are a concrete fact in the light of what happened to nuclear facilities in our region: they were attacked in the past and remain under threat of renewed attack in the future. And while we welcome the constructive and excellent work done by the Ad Hoc Committee during the last session under your chairmanship, we would like to express the hope that it will complete the task entrusted to it.

Although the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament achieved much, it still has a lot to do if it is to finalize the draft Programme in time to submit it to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-first session, which is in only a few months' time. If we were slow in our work in the previous sessions, wrongly believing we had ample time, we now have to hasten the process. We are still confident that under the able chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles and with the adoption of constructive and flexible positions by the various delegations, we will achieve our task in the specified time.

Since mankind succeeded in reaching outer space, international efforts have tried to establish appropriate international treaties and measures to secure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes and to keep it aloof from militarization and the arms race. Although it was possible to achieve a number of treaties for that purpose -- such as the Partial Test Ban of 1963, and the Treaty on Outer Space of 1967 -- these remained, as a whole, insufficient to establish the integrated international legal system we are

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striving to achieve. The Final Document drew attention to such gaps when it called for taking further measures and for appropriate international negotiations to be held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Outer Space, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space. The successive resolutions of the General Assembly, the last of which was 40/87, reaffirmed this notion when they stressed the primary role the Conference on Disarmament should play in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

This subject has acquired increasing importance with the declaration by the United States of its Strategic Defence Initiative, which is based on establishing a defensive anti-ballistic missiles system in outer space.

It is an initiative considered by the majority of States as a serious escalation of the arms race, and an introduction of completely new dimensions to such a race, with all the ominous political, economic and military implications.

At its last session, the Conference succeeded in establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space. It is true that only a limited number of meetings was held to consider substantive aspects, but it was sufficient to show the gaps in the existing conventions and the necessity of remedial action. That is why we hope the Ad Hoc Committee will start its work at the beginning of the current session to fill those gaps through the objective consideration of the subject in a way commensurate with the seriousness of the situation we are facing and the dangers surrounding all of us, whether we are space or non-space States.

If the improvement in the relations between the two super-Powers provides today a precious opportunity that is not often repeated to achieve progress in disarmament, let us exploit it. Let us enable the Conference to carry out its task in response to the will of the international community and its aspiration that we agree on effective measures for disarmament to ensure for the world a more secure present and a brighter future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If that is not the case, I would now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and convene, in five minutes' time, the informal meeting of the Conference scheduled for today to deal with requests for participation by non-member States and some other organizational matters. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 4.10 p.m. and reconvened at 4.20 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 339th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of our deliberations at the informal meeting, we shall now take up for decision requests by States not members of the Conference to participate in its work. In accordance with existing practice, we shall take up those requests one by one, in the order in which they were received by the Secretariat.

(The President)

I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.209 1/ dealing with the request received from Norway. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see none.

It was so decided.

I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.210 2/ dealing with the request received from Finland. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see none.

It was so decided.

I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.211 3/ dealing with the request received from Portugal. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see none.

It was so decided.

I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.212 4/ dealing with the request received from Greece. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see none.

It was so decided.

I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.213 5/ dealing with the request received from Turkey. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see none.

It was so decided.

1/ "In response to the request of Norway (CD/655) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4 and 8 of its agenda."

2/ "In response to the request of Finland (CD/656) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4 and 8 of its agenda."

3/ "In response to the request of Portugal (CD/657) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Portugal to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4 and 8 of its agenda."

4/ "In response to the request of Greece (CD/658) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4 and 8 of its agenda."

5/ "In response to the request of Turkey (CD/659) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4 and 8 of its agenda."

(The President)

I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.214 6/ dealing with the request received from New Zealand. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see none.

It was so decided.

I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.215 7/ dealing with the request received from Denmark. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see none.

It was so decided.

I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.216 8/ dealing with the request received from Switzerland. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see none.

It was so decided.

I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.217 9/ dealing with the request received from Spain. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see none.

It was so decided.

6/ "In response to the request of New Zealand (CD/660) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of New Zealand to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

7/ "In response to the request of Denmark (CD/662) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

8/ "In response to the request of Switzerland (CD/663) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Switzerland to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

9/ "In response to the request of Spain (CD/665) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1986 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4 and 8 of its agenda."

(The President)

I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.218 10/ dealing with the request received from Bangladesh. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see none.

It was so decided.

This concludes our consideration of requests from States not members of the Conference to participate in its work. I now propose to turn to another subject.

As indicated at our plenary meeting a week ago. I have requested the Secretariat to circulate an informal paper containing a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. I would now draw attention to a change which has been indicated to me. The document to which I am referring is the informal paper of 13 February 1986 giving the indicative timetable of meetings. That document shows that the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was to be scheduled for Monday, 17 February. I have been advised that that meeting will not now take place at that time, and that the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will now occur, as indicated in the timetable, on Wednesday, 19 February, in Room III at 3 p.m.

May I note that we are not including in this timetable the informal consultations that the President is conducting under a number of items on the agenda and which are indicated in the informal paper that I circulated on Tuesday. As you will recall, the specific form and subject matter of those consultations have yet to be decided, depending on how we proceed with our exchanges of views in the coming days. In the same context I should mention that an informal consultation was scheduled for this afternoon immediately following the conclusion of this plenary session of the Conference. The progress of work in informal consultations and indications given to me today suggest that it would be appropriate not to hold an informal consultation as planned immediately following the conclusion of this plenary session. If that is agreeable, I would propose to delete that consultation from today's schedule but continue to adhere to all other informal consultations indicated in the schedule that was distributed by me on Tuesday.

Is there any comment on the informal paper of today's date with regard to meetings of the Conference on Disarmament to be held during the forthcoming week, having noted the change with regard to the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons? If there is no comment or objection, I will consider that the Conference has adopted this informal timetable for its meetings next week.

10/ "In response to the request of Bangladesh (CD/666) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Bangladesh to participate during 1986 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 8 of its agenda."

(The President)

With regard to the other issue that I mentioned, that is the cancellation of a planned informal consultation this afternoon. I gather that is the wish of the Conference and unless there is any objection I propose to proceed in that way. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 18 February at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.340
18 February 1986

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 18 February 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. R. Butler (Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. BELAID

Argentina:

Mr. M. CAMPORA

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R.A. ROWE

Ms. M. LETTS

Mr. J. OKELY

Belgium:

Mr. C. CLERCKX

Brazil:

Mr. QUIEROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. V. BOJILOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma:

U TIN TUN

U MYA THAN

U HLA MYINT

AYE AYE MU

Canada:

Mr. J.A. BEESLEY

Mr. R.J. ROCHON

China:

Mr. QIAN Jiadong

Ms. WANG Zhiyun

Mr. HU Xiaodi

Mr. SUO Kaiming

Mr. SHA Zukang

Mr. YANG Mingliang

Mr. LI Daozhong

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA

Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGY

Mr. M. BADR

Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. JESSEL

Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. W. KRUTZSCH

Mr. F. SAYATZ

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. H. PETERS

Mr. W.-N. GERMANN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER

Mr. T. TOTH

Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. A.S. GONSALVES

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI

Mr. A.M. FACHIR

Mr. A. MASBAR AKBAR

Mr. F. QASIM

Mr. R.I. JENIE

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB

Mr. A. SHAFII

Italy:

Mr. R. FRANCESCHI

Mr. F. PIAGGESI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Mr. E. SIVIERO

Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. KONISHI

Mr. K. KUDO

Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mr. D. AFANDE

Mr. F. JOSIAH

Mexico:

Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. G. GONGOR

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE
Mr. S. BENRYANE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. van SCHAIK
Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R. MILDERS

Nigeria:

Mr. B.O. TONWE
Mr. B.A. ADEYEMI
Mr. A.A. ELLA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. J. RYCHLAK

Romania:

Mr. I. VOICU
Mr. G. CHIRILA
Mr. V. FAUR

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. L.-E. WINGREN
Ms. E. BONNIER
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Ms. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY
Ms. L. BRONSON
Mr. R. GOUGH
Mr. R. LEVINE
Mr. B. TUA
Mr. J. GRANGER
Mr. R. NELSON
Mr. R. LUACES

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 340th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of items 1, "Nuclear Test Ban" and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In accordance with the timetable of meetings for the present week, after we have exhausted the list of speakers, I intend to convene an informal meeting of the Conference to deal with a request from a non-member State to participate in our work, as well as to consider some organizational questions.

The list of speakers for today includes the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Sri Lanka, Argentina, Nigeria and Kenya.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Henning Wegener.

MR. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, as is our pattern, many delegations have again devoted the opening period of the annual session of the Conference to a general assessment of the overall political situation in which we have resumed our work. This stocktaking has proved very useful. My delegation notes with satisfaction that it has generated a certain amount of common views. All delegations agree that the new year has started under favourable new circumstances for the arms control process and that progress towards a more stable and co-operative relationship between the two important military systems, but also, generally, progress towards a more peaceful world less dependent on the massive accumulation of armament appears now possible. Delegations have also agreed that these opportunities must be actively seized, and that a particular and considerable task awaits the Conference on Disarmament. We are called upon to do substantive work in appropriate organizational formats on as many of our agreed agenda items as is feasible.

As last year, many delegations have dwelt upon the role of the multilateral arms-control process at a time when much immediate attention is focused upon the on-going bilateral negotiation process. Indeed, my delegation agrees that our assignment in this initial phase of our annual work should be to define more clearly and more actively the relationship between bilateral arms control and multilateral disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. Foreign Minister Genscher, when he spoke at this Conference last year, called for a constructive parallelism of both, recognizing the necessary juxtaposition and mutual reinforcing role of both aspects of disarmament. It is not difficult to find rational objective criteria by which the multilateral domain can be defined and delineated from its bilateral complement. Global security issues need global solutions. There are domains where, by the very nature of the subject matter, it is clear that only global regulation can provide durable solutions. The negotiations on the global and effective elimination of chemical weapons are, as we all agree, very much a case in point.

There are other global arms-control concerns to which the members of the Conference on Disarmament must make a significant contribution in 1986. Among these the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban looms particularly

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large, -- because of its real significance in military terms, but also because of the symbolic significance for the disarmament process which is often attached to it. Since this is the first plenary session in 1986, according to our programme of work, on the question of a nuclear-test ban, I would like to devote my statement to this topic, thus testifying to the importance which the Federal Government attaches to it, and clarifying again our overall approach to the issue.

In essence, the position of the Federal Government has remained unchanged over the years. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban is and remains an objective to which we attribute major significance in the framework of our arms control negotiations. The commitment to this objective is unequivocal and has been so formulated in many statements in the United Nations General Assembly and in this Conference. It has been confirmed as recently as 9 January, 1986 by Chancellor Kohl. The Chancellor stated that the Federal Government "had for a long time documented its fundamental interest in a comprehensive test ban". The Chancellor then, in the same statement, gave his view that there are now improved opportunities for coming to terms with this problem.

In advocating a solution to nuclear testing, we have always stressed that a nuclear test stop must be seen in connection with Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which commits the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate in good faith on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and general and complete disarmament, under strict and effective international control. In its arms-control perspective, the obvious purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is not only a test ban, but the reduction of nuclear armaments. The link between the cessation of tests and the elimination of nuclear weapons has also clearly -- and jointly -- been recognized by the States participating in the recent Third Review Conference. It is important to keep these complex and interdependent processes clearly in mind. Chancellor Kohl, in the statement from which I have cited, explicitly affirmed "that a test-ban treaty could not be a substitute for a substantial reduction of existing arsenals of weapons".

Nor are the two equivalent. The conclusion and implementation of a comprehensive test ban, highly desirable and indeed vital as it is, is not the same as the reduction of nuclear weapons, or as the desired degree of strategic stability and balance.

There is now a good prospect that all these objectives can be promoted in unison. My Government hopes that the bilateral nuclear negotiations in Geneva which aim at the reduction of nuclear arsenals can also enable a comprehensive test ban treaty to play, in the near future, a stabilizing role such as we all expect from it. One can infer from General Secretary Gorbachev's proposals of 15 January -- proposals which we deem significant and which contain important elements of substance -- that the Soviet side also recognizes this relationship. The General Secretary speaks of the connection between reduction of nuclear weapons and a test ban. We must expect from the two major Powers that in the course of their arms-control dialogue they also address with appropriate attention the question in which phase of the envisaged reductions a comprehensive test-ban treaty can unfold its stabilizing effects.

A second criterion for a meaningful comprehensive test-ban treaty is, as we all know, effective international control. My Government has noted in this

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connection that the recent proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev indicate some possible movement in the field of verification and indicate, in particular, that verification would not be allowed to be an obstacle to the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. It should be noted specifically that the Soviet Union would now also appear to accept on-site inspections for the monitoring of tests or for the verification of their absence. We hope that these new openings will develop further momentum. It is equally encouraging that the Six Heads of State and Government from four continents, in their recent declaration, have also offered seismic control measures, thereby underlining their positive disposition towards the necessity of making a reliable international control mechanism an integral part of a future test-ban agreement.

The importance of adequate verification, tailored to the purposes, scope and nature of disarmament agreements, is now universally recognized. United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/152 0 testifies to this welcome evolution and to the increasing conceptual clarity with which verification matters are viewed. It now hardly needs argument anymore that disarmament agreements that dodge the verification issue and do not contain appropriate provisions for the monitoring of compliance are incomplete and may, in case of controversy, tend to wreck the mutual confidence of States rather than enhance it. This issue will be placed squarely before many delegations when the Bacteriological Weapon Treaty will come up for its next review later this year. Resolution 40/152 0, however, also makes it quite clear that verification is not an abstract purpose by itself, but subservient to specific arms control purposes. Excessive demands on verification are therefore self-destructive and may generate the suspicion that the proponents are less interested in the conclusion of a disarmament agreement than its avoidance. The important and responsible task for negotiators is to define precisely the levels of confidence that are needed for the effective monitoring of compliance of a given agreement and to determine, on the basis of full knowledge of the state of art of verification techniques, how these can be achieved and maintained.

Verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is not an easy task and nobody should proclaim that the inherent technical issues are reliably resolved. Those who tend to quote statements to this effect from earlier periods are oblivious to the rapidly changing technological environment in which both nuclear testing and verification can be operated, not to speak of the evolution, potentially equally rapid, of various evasion techniques.

It is in the spirit of such a responsible search for an adequate negotiated verification system for a future test ban that my delegation last year introduced two Working Papers, CD/612 and CD/624. Both -- one illuminating the political aspects, the other more oriented towards technical solutions -- proposed the gradual establishment of a permanent global seismic monitoring network. The intention of this initiative is to contribute in a concrete and practical manner to the work on a comprehensive test ban. This initiative has been based on the recognition of the fact that verification models are complex and need a period of elaboration and further evolution. It is therefore necessary that the work, with a clear finality link to the future treaty, be taken in hand at an early juncture so that no time be lost and all scientific methods be used in a purposeful manner to achieve the desired result at the appropriate time.

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Significant progress in the application of seismic technology has been made, in particular in recent years. Four areas, however, can be identified which require further practical work and refinement before a global network can perform in a reliable manner.

The establishment of a comprehensive test ban régime necessitates the installation of a global seismic network in order to ensure worldwide compliance with a treaty which for obvious reasons should have universal adherence. The physical establishment of an effective global network will, however, take time somewhere in the order of several years depending on the intensity of efforts and the amount of financial resources applied. If a comprehensive test-ban treaty were concluded tomorrow, the necessary seismic installations to guarantee reliable verification of compliance on a worldwide scale at an appropriate level of confidence would be lacking.

A second consideration relates to the level of development, the state of the art of seismic technology. Although a wide range of questions concerning the detection and identification of nuclear explosions have been theoretically solved and some of the individual components and systems of seismic installations have been tested and operated, a number of open questions remain, in particular with a view to possible evasion scenarios such as, for instance, the muffling or even decoupling of seismic signals generated by a nuclear explosion tested in a large underground cavity. The search for practical and reliable solutions to these crucial issues is still underway in the scientific community.

Thirdly, the question of operationability of a complex worldwide system of seismic data collection, communication, and processing has to be addressed. Although individual seismographic stations might work effectively, the task of operating smoothly and reliably an interlinked system of 50 to 100 seismic stations based in different countries and parts of the world and operated by many nations and the communication of data to and from international data centres has not yet been satisfactorily resolved as the upcoming report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) on the technical test run in 1984 will demonstrate.

Finally, available seismic technology has heretofore only been applied and tested on a worldwide scale during the past test runs executed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and these test runs were limited in scope. Advanced technology such as, for instance, high-performance data acquisition systems, Level II-data, fast real-time data communication, and automated seismic installations have not yet been installed and tested within the setting of a global network.

It is on the basis of these considerations that the Federal Government introduced the proposal to gradually establish a global seismic monitoring and verification system already before the conclusion of a CTBT in order to make use, in a most effective manner, of the available time span prior to the functioning of the treaty. In order to set such a process in motion the international seismic data exchange system, as tested in the 1984 GSE test run, should be put into a continuous operating mode. While in operation the system would be geographically expanded and technically upgraded with the objective of implementing a global seismic network which would meet the degree of sophistication desired for monitoring and verifying a CTB on a global level. The proposed project would give scientists the opportunity to resolve,

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in a learning-by-doing process, remaining problems of monitoring and verification and to increase, progressively, the system's capability to detect, locate, and identify explosions. In a dynamic process of scientific research and practical application the global seismic network would mature over time and would be available and operational whenever needed.

The establishment and continuous operation of such a network needs to be embedded in an institutional framework. It is, therefore, suggested that during the transitional period, i.e. during the pre-treaty phase, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be assigned the task of supervising the establishment and continuous operation of a global network and to make recommendations for its further improvement. Seismological facilities and data centres would be operated, as during the 1984 experiment, by participating states. The GSE would, as in the past, submit its recommendations and reports to the Conference on Disarmament as the political decision-making body. Upon conclusion of a test-ban treaty the global network and its terms of operation would immediately become part of the treaty provisions.

The proposal that I have outlined is geared exclusively to the establishment of a multilateral and worldwide seismic network. As the technical study which my delegation introduced in document CD/624 concludes, a global seismic network utilizing the most advanced technology could be brought to a standard of performance which would allow for detection and identification of explosions down to a bodywave magnitude of 4.0. This measurement is approximately equivalent to an explosion yield of 5 to 10 kt in dry unconsolidated rock or to a yield of about 1 kt for explosions in wet hard rock. An appropriate number of additional in-country networks would be required which would significantly improve the capability to detect and identify explosions and which would make the testing of low yield explosions and successful evasion by cavity-decoupling a rather difficult and risky undertaking.

I would like to emphasize that the intention of this initiative is in no way to detract from the importance of other work that needs to be done in connection with the resolution of outstanding issues related to a CTB. As stated before, my Government attaches great importance to the continuation of the work on a CTB in the Conference on Disarmament. The proposed project offers an opportunity to the Conference to engage in practical and concrete work on the central issue of verifying a nuclear test ban which needs to be done in any event. The establishment of a global seismic monitoring network will contribute significantly to this task. My delegation stands ready to resume the work in an Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Test Ban and hopes that this concrete and practical proposal will find a positive and supportive and detailed reaction from delegations in this Conference.

This task could not be performed in our previous session, which was reaching its completion when the two aforementioned documents came before delegations. I am confident that they have in the meantime found the necessary attention on the cost of experts and administrations. I would therefore appeal to colleagues to focus on this proposal and to provide the opportunity, during our current session, for it to be discussed in depth, both in its political and technical aspects, both in the appropriate working body of this Conference and within the GSE.

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This leads me on to the difficult organizational choices which appear to be before us at this time. My delegation is avid to see the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban re-established at the earliest possible point. On the basis of our policy on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which I have once more clarified in this statement, we wish to embark on the necessary practical work as soon as possible without, to be sure, losing sight of the negotiating perspective without which such work could not fully unfold its usefulness. It appears imperative to my delegation that the technical and institutional prerequisites for a future Test Ban Treaty be fully discussed and solved, on the shortest possible time-scale. The position of my delegation on the mandate necessary for initiating the work of an appropriate ad hoc committee is clear and has been expressed on several occasions, in unison with the views of other members of the Western group of delegations. The early and pragmatic initiation of the necessary work process would best be undertaken on the basis of draft mandate CD/521, in conjunction with the elaborate work programme contained in CD/621, documents that have been before the Conference for some time. However, my delegation is also prepared to examine closely any other documents that would seem to serve the same purpose and to have the potential of meeting with approval by all interested delegations. Differences in specific language cannot be an unsurmountable problem, as long as the effectiveness of a text in satisfying security concerns remains the same. I would wish you, Mr. President, early success in the ongoing process of consultations on this organizational issue. My delegation wishes to be as helpful as possible with a view to swift establishment of the required working organ. You will find us open for proposals from other delegations who share our fundamental interest in a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Referring to your own active role in consultations on this subject, let me take this opportunity Mr. President, to express the warm gratification of my delegation at seeing you preside over the Conference this month. The dynamic, competent representative of a country that makes a dynamic and important contribution to disarmament at the present time serves the Conference well in this beginning phase of our annual work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, an Australian Presidency of our Conference is a matter of particular satisfaction to the Sri Lanka Delegation which shares so many links with you, including our membership of the Commonwealth. Your own presence in the Chair gives me a personal satisfaction because of our association that goes back two decades and your strong commitment to the cause of disarmament. Among the auspicious portents for disarmament in 1986 is the fact that you preside over our Conference this month. After the unprecedented adoption of our agenda and work programme and the establishment of two Ad Hoc Committees in the very first week of our deliberations, we look forward to similar despatch in the establishment of the other Ad Hoc Committees with appropriate mandates, especially on the nuclear items of our agenda, so that the Conference will negotiate on disarmament instead of negotiating on negotiations.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Our thanks are due to Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina for his Presidency in the month of August 1985 and for the skilful manner in which he guided the Conference. My delegation would also like to welcome the distinguished Ambassadors of Algeria, Belgium, Burma, India, Italy, Kenya, Morocco, Peru, Venezuela and Zaire to the Conference.

Many distinguished speakers before me have referred to the hopeful climate ushered in by the November 1985 Summit between President Reagan of the United States and General Secretary Gorbachev of the USSR -- the leaders of the two countries which possess 95 per cent of the world's total nuclear arsenals. This climate has been enhanced by the far-reaching proposals made in January this year by General Secretary Gorbachev. We share these hopes and expectations. However, as we did last year we must again sound a note of caution that so much hope is pinned on so tenuous a basis. In doing so my delegation does not belittle the enormous significance of the declaratory principles and good intentions contained in the Joint Statement of the Geneva Summit or the proposals of General Secretary Gorbachev. They remain general principles and proposals with the promise, and not the certainty, of concrete results. The perspective of my delegation is that of a developing, non-aligned nation which remains bewildered by and fearful of the arms race and the threat of a nuclear war which continues unabated after the Summit meeting of November 1985. The Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned countries held in Luanda in September last year concluded in its Final Document, "For almost 40 years the survival of mankind has been hostage to the perceived security of a few nuclear-weapon States and their allies and most notably of the two major nuclear-weapon States ... The Ministers therefore find it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests and State relations among a handful of nuclear-weapon States. Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of nuclear disarmament must take into account the security interests of nuclear weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike and ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered."

On the eve of the Geneva Summit last year and in pursuance of a proposal made to the 40th anniversary session of the United Nations General Assembly by Prime Minister Premadasa of Sri Lanka my delegation together with Yugoslavia co-sponsored a resolution on bilateral negotiations which was adopted without any votes being cast against it. The resolution -- No. 40/18 -- expressed the hope that the Geneva Summit "will give a decisive impetus to their current bilateral negotiations so that these negotiations produce early and effective agreements on the halting of the nuclear arms race with its negative effects on international security as well as on social and economic development, reduction of their nuclear arsenals, prevention of an arms race in outer space and the use of outer space for peaceful purposes". The resolution also reaffirmed that the vital interests of all peoples, including those of the two negotiating parties, were at stake in the negotiations. Important principles on the need for a linkage between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations are asserted in the resolution. The series of bilateral negotiations set in motion by the Shultz-Gromyko Joint Statement of 8 January 1985, which aimed at "preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth" with the ultimate goal of achieving the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere yielded no concrete results in 1985. Despite the decision at Summit level to accelerate and intensify these negotiations we have no information to believe that the round of negotiations which began in Geneva on 16 January this year is proceeding any better than

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

last year. Instead we hear from both sides that proposals have been presented and that responses are awaited. A world in which the two nuclear super-Powers are talking to each other is undoubtedly better than a world situation where there is no dialogue between them. But are we so skewed in our scale of values, where "in the land of the blind the one-eyed man is King", that we must rest content and even acclaim a set of declaratory principles and proposals as having ushered in a new era in disarmament?

My delegation does applaud the agreement on principles that is reflected in the United States-USSR Joint Statement of 21 November 1985, and especially the agreement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought -- that any war between them whether nuclear or conventional should be prevented and that neither will seek to achieve military superiority. To my delegation, perhaps in the naive innocence of a small non-nuclear non-aligned nation, we see as a logical corollary to these statements immediate and practical steps to dismantle the weapon systems of the two military alliances. The agenda on the disarmament Conference table -- both bilateral and multilateral -- has never been bare. Today, basing ourselves on publicly-available information, it has a greater specificity with the proposal for a 50 per cent reduction in nuclear arms, an interim INF agreement and the range of proposals contained in General Secretary Gorbachev's proposals of 15 January which seek to implement paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We hope that before the next summit, scheduled for this year, concrete progress will have been made on the implementation of these proposals. The majority of States of the world and the survival of humankind can no longer be held hostage to the security interests of the major Powers. The Secretary-General of the United Nations in his recent message to us in the Conference recognized that the task before us remains undiminished.

"The general improvement in the international climate, however, in no sense decreases the size of the task of reaching tangible agreements which still lies before us. The dangers stemming from the existence of large arsenals of nuclear weapons have not diminished and to these are added the ever-increasing stocks of conventional weapons. In many places, the use of force continues to bring destruction and death and to hold in jeopardy the needed increase in international confidence, the growth in global military expenditures has not yet been halted, while vast areas of the world suffer a serious lack of resources for development."

While these bilateral negotiations go on the urgent need for us is to proceed with multilateral negotiations. Outside the Conference on Disarmament we look forward with great hope to the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, to be held, appropriately, in Paris in July this year, bringing to fruition the proposal of the distinguished President of France. The preparations for this Conference are going forward in a purposeful and business-like manner. We earnestly hope there will be universal participation and that after the plethora of statements upholding the United Nations system in its 40th anniversary last year the principle of multilateral co-operation for peace and development will be strengthened by concrete action taken at this Conference. A recent study on the United Nations system reveals that expenditure in favour of peace, political problems and security was less than one tenth of a day's expenditure on armaments. As we approach the twenty-first century many crises afflict the

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

world but the security crisis which affects the survival of humankind involves the militarization of economies and societies and the diversion of scarce resources from the satisfaction of basic needs to military purposes. We have an opportunity to retard, if not halt that diversion now.

Prime Minister Premadasa addressing the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly said:

"Beyond the elemental wrongness of these outlays are three derivative concerns. They are the fatality of weapons accumulation, the concentration of destructive power in the hands of a few nations and the diversion of scarce resources and talents into the industry of death. All these could result in the extinction of human life and add to human deprivation. Mahatma Gandhi expressed this in the following words: 'Bombs will not be destroyed by counter-bombs, even as violence cannot be destroyed by counter-violence'."

The ordering of priorities in the field of disarmament is not a subjective matter if we are guided by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. And yet we hear frequently the voices of those who urge us to be practical and realistic. What is practical and realistic to some is the acceptance of the status quo. To others it means acquiescing in a situation where one or two delegations adopt fixed positions on issues refusing to follow the path of discussion and compromise which is the only way to multilateral co-operation and agreement. My delegation will oppose this advocacy of unequal exchange in whatever forum it is advanced.

In South Asia, a developing region with one-fifth of humanity, the Summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation [SAARC] held in Dhaka on 7 and 8 December last year declared that the Heads of State or Government of the seven countries were "alarmed at the unprecedented escalation of the arms race particularly in its nuclear aspect. They recognized that mankind today was confronted with the threat of self-extinction arising from a massive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. The arms race intensified international tension and violated the principles of the United Nations Charter. The leaders called upon the nuclear-weapon States for urgent negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty leading to the complete cessation of testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons".

We are deeply conscious of a fresh and irresistible surge of world opinion on this important question of nuclear testing. A major impetus was provided by the Final Document of the Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which recorded the view of the overwhelming majority that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty should resume trilateral negotiations and that all the nuclear-weapon States should "participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion" of a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament. Alternative approaches towards the same goal are being pursued with the support of non-government organizations and international groups.

Statements have already been made since we opened the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament on the need to make progress on Item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear Test Ban". The unilateral extension of the USSR moratorium

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

on nuclear testing up to 31 March lends an urgency and demands that we act speedily. The two resolutions adopted in the last session of the United Nations General Assembly appealed to us here in the Conference on Disarmament to carry out negotiations on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions and recommended flexible approaches to this. The absence of any mention in the Joint Statement of the Geneva Summit of this crucial item on the global agenda for disarmament is regrettable. We in the Conference on Disarmament cannot betray the hopes of the people of the world. Nor can we undermine our role as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament by failing to act on an important issue in which we have had a group of scientific experts working so successfully on the related issue of verification. We are alarmed at the shifting arguments of those opposed to a nuclear-test ban. When the argument on verification proved to be unconvincing because of scientific developments in verification techniques and the political decision of some countries to permit on-site inspection if necessary, fresh reasons were advanced to resist the demand for a comprehensive test ban. These include the importance of testing in the development of new weapons and the need to test and modernize existing arsenals. If deep and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals are considered the higher priority surely testing to develop new weapons and maintain existing weapons is a non-sequitur. Logic and reason have seldom characterized the arguments of those who want bigger and better bombs. A test ban is a beginning. It is not an end in itself. We are gratified that the impact of world public opinion in favour of a nuclear-test ban has resulted in a decrease in the number of tests detected in 1985. The Conference must commence work on negotiating a nuclear-test ban and there would be nothing more appropriate than if we did so under the Presidency of one whose country has been at the vanguard in seeking such a ban.

By common consent the prevention of an arms race in outer space has become an urgent issue so as to ensure that another part of our Universe is not embroiled in the arms race we have been witnessing and is instead used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Sri Lanka delegation has been actively associated in the discussion of this item and we were glad once again to be associated with the delegation of Egypt in co-sponsoring resolution 40/87 which received an overwhelming vote of 151 votes for with none opposing as the only resolution on the subject in the General Assembly. Last year despite similar success at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly we delayed action here in the Conference until March when through the commendable efforts of Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela as President, we achieved agreement on a mandate in order to establish an Ad Hoc Committee. The Report of the Conference for 1986 concluded that our work had contributed to clarifying the complexity of a number of problems leading to a better understanding of positions. It also urged that substantive work on the agenda item should be continued in the 1986 session. "Substantive work" implies progress and not repetition. Resolution 40/87 in operative paragraph 9 contains clear and unambiguous guidance for our work in an Ad Hoc committee this year and the fact that 151 nations supported this must weigh with those who plead for realism. My delegation will speak at greater length on this item later in our session. At this point our main focus of attention is the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee with an adequate mandate for substantive work to be concluded.

My delegation is conscious that the area in which some progress has been registered is in the field of a chemical-weapons ban. We would like to congratulate Ambassador Turbanski of Poland of having chaired the

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Ad Hoc Committee so successfully and for the useful inter-sessional work he conducted. We now have a basis for further progress in ridding the world of this repulsive form of weaponry effectively and finally. We were glad therefore that in the very first week of our 1986 session this Ad Hoc Committee has been re-established with Ambassador Cromartie, whom we wish well, as Chairman. We are negotiating an all-encompassing and comprehensive chemical-weapons ban to prohibit the development, manufacture and use of all forms of chemical weapons that could be employed in hostilities including those intended to strike at the sources of mankind's sustenance and the ecological system that nourishes the human environment. The speedy conclusion of this work will be a credit to the Conference on Disarmament but it cannot be the only area in which we must show results.

The Group of 21 has repeatedly proposed mandates for items 2 and 3 out of a conviction that these nuclear issues must be acted upon in the Conference. The recently concluded Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, in which three nuclear-weapon States participated as depositaries to the Treaty, in its consensus Final Document urged the Conference on Disarmament to proceed to early multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in pursuance of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, that undertaking has yet to be implemented. It is important to note that continued non-compliance with Treaty obligations erodes confidence and jeopardizes the effective operation of Treaty régimes. My delegation calls upon this Conference to set up a subsidiary body on Item 2 with an appropriate mandate. We were close to agreement on Item 3 -- Prevention of a Nuclear War during the 1984 session and what we have witnessed since then is a sad regression from that situation. A redoubled effort can and must bridge the gap.

We look forward to continued work being done in an Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and we are sure that under the wise and experienced leadership of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico the work in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament will be brought to a successful conclusion. My delegation pledges its fullest co-operation to achieve this end. We hope that consideration will be given to re-establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances.

Our tasks are by no means simple or easy but our responsibility to proceed with our work is an awesome one. In its seventh year of existence as the 40-nation body for negotiations on disarmament we have to measure up to what is expected of us. In doing so practical expediency must be sacrificed for the greatest good of the greatest number. The security of nations is of serious importance but more so is the collective survival and security of the world. In the International Year of Peace, the Conference on Disarmament must lead the way. If we are, around this table, merely the sum of governmental postures then the result is zero because some postures cancel each other out. If on the other hand we genuinely seek compromise to achieve agreements in the pursuit of general and complete disarmament the result must be a positive one.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Mario Cámpora.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): The Argentine delegation, through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, has expressed to you its best wishes for success in the important task you are performing as President of the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of the 1986 session.

I should therefore like to repeat those wishes and also offer you my personal co-operation, in the certainty that your political and diplomatic firmness and intelligence will make a very positive contribution to vitalizing the action of this single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.

The Argentine delegation welcomes the new delegates who have joined the Conference, Ambassador Franceschi of Italy, Ambassador Gonsalves of India, Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Afande of Kenya, Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma, Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, Ambassador Mariátegui of Peru, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco and Ambassador Kama Budiaki of Zaire. We offer them all our close co-operation and wish them every success in this delicate task.

We would like particularly to address ourselves to the Swedish delegation to express to Ambassador Ekéus our sorrow at the passing away of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, whose contribution to the cause of peace will remain engraved in the history of international relations of our time.

We would also like to express our sympathy to Ambassador Lowitz over the accident to the space shuttle Challenger and the sacrifice of its crew in an enterprise which propels man towards new frontiers of space.

The Conference on Disarmament begins its work every year in the month of February. In other words, this is sowing time, just as the month of August is harvest time, when the Conference, in its annual report, gives an account of the results of its negotiations, and of what has been agreed upon in the area of disarmament. The importance of this issue exceeds that of any other in contemporary international relations, since the existing nuclear arsenals have the capacity to make the human race extinct. In these first weeks, we devote ourselves chiefly to organizational matters; that is, we are concentrating on establishing the way in which we will treat each of the nine items appearing on the Conference's agenda. We have already taken an important step in adopting, at the first meeting, both the agenda and programme of work; this represents an encouraging determination in our opinion. We have also constituted the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and elected as its Chairman the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie, whom we wish the greatest success in his functions. Furthermore, in accordance with the spirit prevailing in the Conference, we have entrusted the eminent representative of Mexico, Mr. Alfonso García Robles, with the leadership of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as we have from the outset.

Today we are holding the 5th plenary meeting of 1986, and the above-mentioned objectives have been met. You should be satisfied, Mr. President with all these results.

In addition, you are carrying out an intensive schedule of consultations to advance in the treatment of the remaining items on our agenda. These consultations, which you are undertaking with so much commitment and dedication, have our complete support and will enjoy our entire co-operation. The Argentine delegation will do its utmost to keep the work of the Conference

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

moving onwards, since this forum offers the sole institutional framework for negotiations in which the question of disarmament emerges from the closed and exclusive circle of the nuclear Powers. Here, in this Conference, the organized international community composed of the member countries of the United Nations defends and reaffirms its competence to conduct multilateral negotiations on disarmament.

At this stage of the organization of work, we would like to refer to the other items of the agenda, taking into consideration each one's possibility of being suitably considered by an ad hoc committee with the appropriate mandate and programme of work.

We believe item 1 on the nuclear test ban to be of the utmost urgency and priority. In addition, international circumstances are favourable for beginning serious and final multilateral negotiations which will lead to the conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Most particularly, consideration of this very important item is facilitated by the moratorium which the Soviet Union has imposed since 6 August and which will last until 31 March according to the statement by the Soviet Government.

We have not lost the hope that the United States will join in that moratorium, so that it can be extended until a treaty is concluded permanently banning nuclear tests for all States. Furthermore, we believe that elaboration of a mandate on that question is within the current possibilities of the Conference if there is the corresponding political will. This mandate should say that an ad hoc committee is being established to hold multilateral negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

It is also our opinion that item 5, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, is at an extremely interesting stage. We believe that the ad hoc committee on this item can be re-established at an early date to continue analysing a vital field in relations between States. Drawing up the rules to prevent the militarization of outer space represents a new task which should necessarily begin with a description of the military activities which should be prohibited in order for outer space to be used for exclusively peaceful purposes.

We welcome the beginning of bilateral negotiations on this subject. but from our point of view a restricted circle cannot be a substitute for the multilateral treatment of an item which affects the security interests of all States.

If, as I deeply hope, at the end of your Presidency the subsidiary organs which I have mentioned have been established, I believe that this month of February will be remembered as an extremely fruitful moment in the work of the Conference.

Item 2 and item 3, although they are different, are linked by a common and negative fate, i.e. the lack of consensus to begin to deal with them in the proper manner.

Item 2, which concerns cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, was given superficial consideration last year as in previous years.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

For one group of delegations, this is a question that can only be treated appropriately in bilateral negotiations. Those delegations are currently using the argument that while the United States and the Soviet Union are carrying out bilateral negotiations to reduce their nuclear weapons, it is not suitable to treat this item in the Conference on Disarmament.

The holding of bilateral negotiations is not a valid argument for not dealing with item 2 in this Conference, since there are not only two nuclear-weapon States, but five, and they are all represented in this Conference. In other words, as we have heard in statements by other representatives of nuclear-weapon Powers, the bilateral discussions will later have to take into account the points of view of the other three Powers represented here.

Our objective observation of the international situation has led us to acknowledge that nuclear disarmament depends on the will of the nuclear-weapon countries. From this point of view, only those countries with nuclear weapons can make the elimination of nuclear weapons a reality.

The Republic of Argentina, which, like the vast majority of the countries comprising the international community, does not possess nuclear weapons, and whose nuclear policy is directed exclusively towards the peaceful use of nuclear energy, cannot actually destroy nuclear weapons it does not possess. Obviously, nuclear weapons can only be destroyed by the States having the dubious privilege of possessing nuclear weapons.

However, Mr. President, my country, like the vast majority of countries, can carry into effect its declared abhorrence of nuclear weapons, demand their elimination and claim the right to participate in that process.

We therefore find ourselves unable to deal with this highly important item. On the one hand, there is no consensus to set up the ad hoc committee whose establishment and mandate were once again requested by the General Assembly in resolution 40/152 P adopted by 131 votes in favour. Neither is item 2 being given a thorough consideration in the plenary meetings. In situations such as this one, the consensus rule inevitably prompts one to wonder about whether it would be desirable for it to be applied flexibly in procedural aspects.

Under these circumstances, it would appear to be time for the Conference on Disarmament to consider the possibility of inviting the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union to present a report to this multilateral body on the progress of the bilateral negotiations. We would venture to suggest that both delegations will experience a feeling of relief when they share with the rest of the international community the tribulations that I do not doubt are felt in countries burdened with nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. We believe that this is indeed the psychological mainspring of the famous statement made by their two highest leaders, that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

This expression contains an explicit recognition of the fruitlessness of nuclear weapons. If it means to its authors what it actually says, we have no doubt that the bilateral negotiations on disarmament will make progress. The opposite would mean that they consciously accept the rule of injustice.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

Fortunately, the international community possesses this single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum which operates within the United Nations system, in which countries not belonging to the two major military alliances can make proposals designed to further negotiations on disarmament. We believe that this special point in time, characterized by the resumption of the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, should be accompanied by a stepping-up of the multilateral negotiations. It is necessary and fitting to give a political boost to the discussions and negotiations on disarmament in this Conference.

The President of my country, Mr. Raul Alfonsín, and the heads of State or Government of Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania put forward proposals on the need to suspend nuclear tests and prevent the arms race in outer space which have met with wide acceptance at the highest level in government levels and international public opinion.

It is obvious that the proposals of the six countries I have mentioned, are a result of deep concern in view of the growing risk of nuclear war. This concern was also clearly reflected at the most recent session of the General Assembly, when resolution 40/152 "Q", on the prevention of war which is item 3 of the Conference agenda, was adopted by 136 votes in favour.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Mr. Dante Caputo, in his statement on 6 February, spoke of those who posit mistrust as the point of departure of relations among the great powers, and he added that "the vast majority of the nations of the international community favour the creation of a growing climate of trust which will strengthen possibilities for a durable peace".

Progress could be made on item 3 with the adoption of concrete measures, as long as there is a climate of trust among the nuclear-weapon Powers.

We hope that the consultations being carried out by the Chairman will yield concrete results in the near future.

With regard to item 6 on negative safeguards, we continue to hope that four nuclear-weapon States will revise their position. Until this occurs, the Conference on Disarmament will be nothing more than a platform for those States and their allies to highlight the supposed virtues of unilateral declarations which, as the Argentine Foreign Minister said in 1984, are "permissible scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons".

With regard to the item "New types of mass destruction weapons and new systems for such weapons", we believe it is time for the Conference on Disarmament to treat that item by identifying such weapons and weapons systems. In the area of radiological weapons, we hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on that item will be re-established quickly.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Tonwe.

Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): Permit me, Mr. President, to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you, the distinguished representative of Australia, a country with which Nigeria has historical ties and most cordial relations, presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1986 session. The experience and wisdom you bring to this office are guarantees that you will conduct us successfully through this usually crucial month of February. I wish to assure you of the Nigerian delegation's full support and co-operation during your Presidency.

I would also like to express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Mario Cámpora, the distinguished representative of Argentina, for the very skilful manner in which he guided the work of this Conference during the closing month of the 1985 session.

May I also extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma, Ambassador Gonsalves of India, Ambassador Franceschi of Italy, Ambassador Afande of Kenya, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, Ambassador Mariategui of Peru, Ambassador Budiaki of Zaire, and last, but not least, our colleague and friend, Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, with whom we already had fruitful co-operation last year. I sincerely look forward to working closely with everyone in the pursuit of the noble objective of this Conference.

It is with a heavy heart that I learnt of the death of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, Minister of State for Disarmament of Sweden and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate. Some 18 years ago, I had the fortune of working in these chambers with this great lady of Sweden, and I was greatly impressed by her indefatigable dedication and her unswerving commitment to international peace and disarmament. I was even more struck by her patience and tolerance. Her death constitutes a major loss, not only to the people of Sweden, but also to the entire international community. I would request the delegation of Sweden kindly to transmit the condolences of the Nigerian delegation to the family of Mrs. Alva Myrdal and to the Swedish Government.

May I also take the opportunity to express my delegation's condolences to the delegation of the United States of America on the tragic loss of seven heroes and heroines of our time who perished when the space shuttle "Challenger" exploded in flight last January. The Nigerian people shared the shock and sorrow of the American people in that tragic hour. We would request the delegation of the United States kindly to convey the Nigerian delegation's condolences to the families of the heroes and heroines.

This session of the Conference on Disarmament begins at a time when major developments in the relations of the great military Powers would appear to leave room for cautious optimism regarding the future of our work.

In November last year, we witnessed here in Geneva, the historic meeting between the leaders of the World's principal nuclear-weapon States, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. In their joint statement issued after that meeting, the two leaders lent their collective weight to that now famous and irrefutable statement that "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". Although from the point of view of our work, not much was achieved in concrete terms during that meeting, an important step was taken by the two Powers, towards the relaxation of international tension, which deserves our encouragement.

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

My delegation welcomes the declared intentions of the leaders of the two great countries to break with the past, which was characterized by fear, suspicion and mistrust. The lack of mutual confidence between the two great military Powers over the years had unnecessarily fuelled the nuclear arms race, with its attendant consequences for world peace, including stagnation in the work of this Conference.

As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in his address to the Stockholm Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures "a lack of mutual confidence among States, ... like a nervous finger on a trigger, increases the danger of explosion". The Nigerian delegation would therefore like to see a consolidation of the gains of the recent top-level contacts between the major Powers and would hope that these will be quickly translated into genuine disarmament measures designed or endorsed by this Conference.

While acknowledging the importance of the developments in the bilateral front between the major military Powers, my delegation believes that the question of disarmament must remain the concern of all countries. Bilateral efforts should therefore be seen only as complementary to the efforts of this body, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum representing the will of mankind. The major military Powers, therefore, owe it as a duty to the international community to ensure that the intrinsic qualities of this body are fully utilized for the purpose of securing concrete disarmament measures.

Last year, at the fortieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, virtually all delegations expressed their deep concern at the continued threat to the survival of humanity by the massive build-up of nuclear weapons by the major military Powers and other nuclear-weapon States. Everyone spoke of the urgent need to prevent a nuclear war, reduce international tension and promote international peace and security. This common desire for peace and harmony led to the adoption by the General Assembly of a number of resolutions which should serve as the basis of the work of this Conference. Furthermore, by proclaiming 1986 the "International Year of Peace", the General Assembly was, in a way, stressing the need to produce some major disarmament agreements during this session. My delegation believes that the mandates of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the reduction of the tension among the major military Powers should spur this Conference to respond positively to the plea of mankind.

My delegation's position on the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is very well known to this Conference. We firmly believe that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is the first and most urgent step towards a cessation of the nuclear-arms race. The impact which such a ban would have on the nuclear-arms race is clearly underlined in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which says, inter alia, that "It would make a significant contribution to ending qualitative improvement of new types of such weapons and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons".

A comprehensive ban would consequently lead to a reduced reliability of nuclear-weapon stocks and make sure that nuclear weapons actually become obsolete. Over 50 resolutions have been passed by the United Nations General Assembly urging action in this domain. The nuclear-weapon States

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

undertook to act under the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970 imposed a concrete obligation on them.

The argument, or perhaps excuses, which were advanced for delaying a comprehensive test ban, verification and mutual confidence are now unconvincing. Authoritative scientific reports have confirmed for some time that national technical resources are adequate. Secondly, reliable neutral and non-aligned States have assured us that they can organize a satisfactory verification system for an agreement. And with regard to mutual confidence, the major military Powers are concluding agreements in other areas which are as sensitive and require a comparable level of mutual confidence. So what we need is the political will, that very common factor which is so rarely demonstrated in international relations without ulterior motives.

How long should the world wait for what the vast majority recognize as the first genuine step to nuclear disarmament? The Nigerian delegation believes that this Conference can move ahead, by setting up an ad hoc committee in the next few weeks, with a mandate to commence negotiation on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test-ban Treaty. In this connection, we would like, once again, to express our appreciation of the moratorium on tests which the Government of the USSR has unilaterally observed for some months. The Nigerian delegation would appeal to other nuclear-weapon States to emulate this significant example.

The logical collateral measure to a comprehensive test ban is a freeze in the development, manufacture, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons. If we are to believe the opponents of this policy, the balance of terror is today the guarantee against nuclear war. So there is some balance, and it is precisely that balance that the Nigerian delegation would like to see preserved at the stage preceding negotiated reductions in nuclear arms.

We can all see that walking the nuclear-weapon tightrope, and nuclear-weapon brinkmanship, is as unnerving for the major military Powers as they are ominous for the survival of non-nuclear-weapon States. The consequent frantic efforts of nuclear-weapon Powers to match one another in newer, bigger and more efficient weapons and systems, have themselves become the main driving force behind the nuclear-arms race. This has made the quest for superiority a disastrous illusion. There is no doubt that we need to exercise some control over the development and deployment of new weapons, and that a freeze is a natural step forward. It is not enough, as some seem to think, to jettison obsolete weapons, or substitute quality for quantity.

While this Conference focuses on the paramount question of nuclear disarmament, it should also seek to elaborate a binding international instrument which will prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This assurance, which is for us the least nuclear-weapon States can expect to give in exchange for the commitment by the other States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Nigerian delegation cannot, therefore, understand the vacillations that have surrounded proposals to concretize this assurance in a manner that will render irrelevant the diverse reservations that are now placed on it. The Nigerian delegation sincerely hopes that an ad hoc committee, duly mandated, will be set up early in this session to elaborate the desired legally binding international instrument.

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

In dealing with the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, it is important for my delegation that this Conference fully realize that it is not merely trying to stop vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nuclear-weapon States, nor horizontal proliferation among the normal run of States, which respect a minimum standard of international behaviour, but that it is, above all, concerned with keeping the bomb from the hands of the fringe States, such as the desperate racist régime in South Africa, which practise State terrorism inside and across their borders, and use any means to achieve their diabolical ends. It is not only South Africa's neighbours but the entire Conference which should be anxious to stop the racist régime from further developing its nuclear-weapon capability.

The horrendous dangers which the accumulation and refinement of nuclear weapons pose to human survival are now well known to everyone. Reputable scientists from both sides of the ideological divide have given us vivid descriptions of the intensity of destruction and human suffering which a major nuclear war would entail for the entire planet. The most favourable post-nuclear-war sceanario is too disastrous to contemplate! And yet the view that nuclear weapons guarantee peace is still strongly held in some quarters. Those who hold this view also claim that the major military Powers are not likely to use the weapon against each other. The Nigerian delegation finds these arguments totally contradictory and unconvincing. In fact, we believe that it is because the major military Powers can conceive the use of nuclear weapons to gain national advantage, that they strive ever so hard to achieve military superiority over their rivals.

This research for superiority has taken the nuclear arms race to outer space and has further complicated disarmament negotiations and reduced the chances of significant nuclear disarmament measures. During the last few years, we have all heard the arguments for and against the deployment of weapons in outer space. The Nigerian delegation remains unconvinced that the decisive weapons superiority over rivals which some States have sought unsuccessfully on Earth for centuries will now be permanently had in outer space. There is every reason to believe that the vision of any such superiority in a high-tech age can only be illusive. If the protagonists of nuclear deterrence and the theories justifying the unbridled arms race are right, why, one might ask, would any State with the necessary resources deny itself that security guarantee?

Extending the nuclear-arms race to outer space is, in our view, too dangerous and too costly to be condoned. The several hundred billion dollars which the world spends on arms at present will be further increased as more and more countries intensify their development of space weapons or defensive systems. This will only lead to greater insecurity and misery for mankind and should therefore be stopped through negotiations. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space will be set up early to seriously consider this matter.

Nothing we have said in this statement is intended to diminish the importance of space technology. Indeed, while the Nigerian delegation deplores any attempt to use outer space for military purposes, we warmly congratulate all States which have advanced and are continuing to advance the frontiers of human knowledge through space probes.

The question of elaborating a multilateral convention for the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

chemical weapons is one to which my delegation attaches great importance. Next only to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons constitute the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

The General Assembly in its resolution on the issue last fall "Urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to intensify the drafting process of such a Convention for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-first session". My delegation welcomes the early re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and is pleased to note that the body has already begun work, under the Chairmanship of one of our most competent colleagues in the field, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Ian Cromartie. We are impressed by the considerable progress so far made in the negotiations and would appeal to all members of this Conference to do their utmost to ensure the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. Such a breakthrough will certainly have a positive influence on negotiations in other areas, and to achieve that breakthrough, the draft convention must recognize the sovereign equality of all States, and the similarities in their security requirements. The convention must not seek to create categories of "have and have-not" States which characterized the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.

General Assembly resolution 40/152 D urged the Conference on Disarmament to resume work at the beginning of the 1986 session, on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme on disarmament, with the firm intention of concluding that task and submitting a complete draft of the programme to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

My delegation notes with pleasure the decision of the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, to continue to serve as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. It is our belief that for negotiations on partial measures of disarmament to be effective and complementary, the path of the Conference on Disarmament must be charted and its pace ahead of new weapons technology. My delegation therefore pledges its full support for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Mr. President, it is a heavy schedule for the Conference on Disarmament in 1986. We do not expect miracles. It will be a long haul, and nothing will be achieved unless all members demonstrate the political will and the courage to make concessions. It is not impossible to extricate the world from the vicious circle of mistrust and an arms race. The billions of dollars which are today spent on arms, especially nuclear arms, if diverted to productive ends, would greatly reduce international greed and release funds to finance trade and development and social justice in every country, poor or rich alike. Only then would we have directed our attention to the real causes of the arms race: poverty of the mind and of the body, greed and megalomania.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kenya, Ambassador Afande.

Mr. AFANDE (Kenya): Mr. President, It is with great pleasure that I address, for the first time, a session of the Conference on Disarmament during your Presidency. I warmly congratulate you for presiding over the Conference at the start of its 1986 session. You represent a Commonwealth country with which my country, Kenya, a member of the Commonwealth, enjoys close and friendly co-operation in many fields. Australia's outstanding contribution in the Conference on Disarmament is well recorded. I take this opportunity to thank you for your warm welcome extended to me. In pledging my co-operation, and that of my delegation, with you, I am confident that with your skill, experience and devotion, you will ably advance the work of this Conference. You have succeeded another able and experienced personality -- Ambassador Campora, the distinguished representative of Argentina, who guided the Conference during the month of August 1985, and with the same devotion continued with his presidency until the beginning of February 1986.

I also wish to thank my other distinguished colleagues for their warm welcome extended to me. I look forward to their guidance and close co-operation in our deliberations. I will, undoubtedly, benefit from their knowledge and long experience in the disarmament work. Similarly, I look forward to establishing close links and fruitful co-operation with my distinguished colleagues who are also participating for the first time in the Conference on Disarmament, namely, Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, Ambassador Gonsalves of India, Ambassador Franceschi of Italy, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, Ambassador Mariátegui of Peru, Ambassador Kama Budiaki of Zaire and Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela -- who is, however, not new to the Conference's work.

Allow me to thank the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament for the general services and assistance its staff offered to the Kenya delegation before a permanent mission of Kenya was established in Geneva.

I convey to the delegation of Sweden my delegation's condolences for the passing away of Madame Alva Myrdal, a distinguished Swedish diplomat and Nobel peace-prize winner whose dedication to disarmament has left a lasting mark. I also convey my delegation's deep condolences to the delegation of the United States of America for the tragic loss of its distinguished citizens in the space shuttle Challenger.

Nineteen hundred and eighty six is the International Year of Peace whose theme is to safeguard peace and humanity. The year has begun with hopes of new opportunities to deal constructively with problems which threaten international peace. We are, therefore, happy to participate in this very important negotiating body with a renewed sense of urgency in dealing with the difficult work of disarmament. We are profoundly but sadly aware of the reality of the extremely limited progress that has been achieved despite the fact that disarmament has been a subject of international deliberations and negotiations since 1932. It is, in my Government's view, a matter of urgency for this Conference to pursue concrete negotiations aimed at yielding the results that would enable all States, big or small, developed or developing, to live in peace and not under threat or fear.

This year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is starting in an atmosphere of expectations and hopes aroused by the results of the summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva in November 1985. Happily this meeting, as my other colleagues have indicated, produced more than rhetoric. Detailed and substantive proposals and counter-proposals were made, reflecting, a desire of both sides to agree on

(Mr. Afande, Kenya)

major reductions in the respective nuclear arsenals as a first step toward implementing the agreed negotiated objectives. My delegation recognizes that the negotiations are likely to be long and time-consuming and that to expect prompt, comprehensive results on the many outstanding issues would be unrealistic. We, however, urge the two parties to continue their negotiating efforts with all the determination, skill and patience that the importance of the subject matter demands. In our opinion, the essence and seriousness of the ongoing negotiations is summed up in the following sentence of the Joint Communiqué of 21 November 1985. "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". Much as we appreciate the resumption of the United States/USSR arms-control talks, it is the view of my delegation that the talks are only complementary to the multilateral negotiations conducted in the Conference on Disarmament and should, therefore, supplement them in order to facilitate the work of the Conference.

Kenya and other peace-loving African countries follow with keen interest the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament and hope that this multilateral negotiating body will achieve meaningful results soon. We are concerned over the lack of political will by some governments to be party to the treaties or régimes which can facilitate disarmament. The delay in making substantive progress in disarmament creates opportunity for South Africa, whose policies of apartheid do not promote peace, acquiring devastating arms including nuclear-weapon capability. It is towards this end that Kenya fully supports the objectives of the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa as was envisaged in July 1964 in Cairo by the summit meeting of the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity. South Africa's nuclear capability frustrates the declaration and poses a direct threat to regional and international security. It is regrettable that some countries continue to collaborate with South Africa in the nuclear field.

We continue to experience mounting tensions in several parts of the world. The socio-economic problems currently afflicting the world cannot be viewed in isolation from the escalating military build-up supported by record-breaking military budgets. It is, indeed, sad that even the third-world countries, buffeted by lagging economic development, are allocating over 12 per cent of their declining national products to the purchase of arms. This unfortunate military build-up is occurring at a time when the necessary adequate resources are not being made available for social welfare and economic development of the poverty-stricken majority of the world's population.

In the interest of promotion of peace, stability and co-operation in the Indian Ocean region, Kenya fully shares the view that the first step towards the establishment of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region is the convening of the much-awaited international conference. Kenya believes that the conference would harmonize the viewpoints of the littoral States of the region, the Major Powers and maritime users. The success of the conference would largely depend on a firm and resolute commitment by the countries of the region, the Major Powers and maritime users of the ocean to the principles of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

The agenda before us this year contains a host of critical important issues vital to the future of humanity and linked to the overall objective of disarmament and security. The question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty, to which my Government attaches great importance, has always been

(Mr. Afande, Kenya)

inscribed on the Conference's agenda as an item of highest priority. It has, however, unfortunately become one of the more contentious items. The intensity generated by this item shows the inherent acquisition of more nuclear weapons as a strategic policy of major world Powers, particularly the super-Powers, and the profound public anxieties arising from an awareness of the massive destructive power of such weapons. While recognizing that real and potential difficulties stand in the way of the conclusion of acceptable treaties to reduce the danger of vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, I wish to reaffirm my Government's strong belief that a negotiated verifiable comprehensive agreement limiting nuclear tests would be a logical step in that direction. Since the partial test-ban Treaty came into force some 20 years ago, there have been no meaningful results achieved towards reaching agreement on a comprehensive test-ban which would be an effective barrier against the development of a new generation of nuclear systems, and thereby strengthen efforts to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Although initially believed to be of historic significance, the emergence of the partial test-ban treaty has not slowed down the nuclear-arms race among the major nuclear Powers. On the contrary and tragically, the Treaty seems to have served as a licence for accelerating nuclear testing despite the existence of numerous General Assembly resolutions against such testing. We share the view that verification arrangements can be adequately negotiated and accommodated in a final treaty. The cessation of testing could significantly reduce the qualitative aspects of the nuclear-arms race and encourage an end to the development of nuclear weapons and the reduction of existing stockpiles. My delegation welcomes the decision announced by China to participate in the NTBT negotiations this year. I wish to reaffirm Kenya's position that it attaches great importance to the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament on the question of effective international arrangements to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons constitute the greatest and the gravest threat to humanity, and as in the case of nuclear-test ban, the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States has been the subject of various resolutions and discussions by the General Assembly and this Conference. I therefore reiterate the call of my Government to the nuclear powers to re-examine their unilaterally declared policies and positions relating to arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We consider it an obligation on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to provide such unqualified concrete and legally binding assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States. However, my country believes that under the present circumstances, until nuclear weapons are totally eliminated, the only real political and morally justifiable security arrangement is the prohibition of nuclear weapons as a step parallel to the joint or unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States. My delegation also calls for full adherence by all non-nuclear States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In this connection, my delegation acknowledges the deliberations of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty confirming that the non-proliferation régime is of special importance to international peace and security. For the first time in 10 years, the Conference achieved a consensus agreement on certain vital issues. Such an agreement would have been impossible without the political will and co-operation needed to reach it. My delegation hopes that the States concerned will view the successful outcome as an example to be followed and a precedent for agreements on vital disarmament issues. We hope that the

(Mr. Afande, Kenya)

resolution of the Conference will give momentum to the efforts being made to formulate measures that would halt stockpiling of nuclear weapons and initiate a genuine process of nuclear disarmament.

The effective prohibition of chemical weapons has been on the agenda of the Conference for a number of years now, and although considerable progress has already been achieved on the technical issues relating to a ban on chemical weapons, there are some areas that need to be resolved. My delegation shares the optimism that a comprehensive convention which would outlaw the development, production, stockpiling, storage and use of those weapons and provide for destruction of existing stocks can be effectively concluded. It is our earnest hope that the Conference will overcome the major political difficulties and resolve the divergent views that have emerged in the crucial area of verification. We thank Ambassador Turbanski, the distinguished representative of Poland, for his skill and ability in guiding the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the Conference's 1985 session and welcome the decision to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee during the 1986 session under Ambassador Cromartie, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. Being aware that even developing countries can manufacture chemical weapons on a large scale, Kenya supports measures which can bring about the earliest conclusion of a convention to prohibit them and will, in this regard give Ambassador Cromartie our maximum co-operation in his challenging task. My delegation also notes, with satisfaction, the continuation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under Ambassador García Robles, the distinguished representative of Mexico. My delegation pledges to give him the necessary co-operation and urges others to do the same in order to enable the Ad Hoc Committee to complete its work this year, as scheduled, with a view to leading to a general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The realm of outer space and the rules to apply to its peaceful uses is another important item on our agenda in which there is a widespread legitimate public anxiety. In the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty, the international community has proclaimed mankind's common interest in the progressive research and uses of space for peaceful purposes. Today, however, it has become apparent that there is an overriding necessity to arrest the process of militarization of outer space from assuming irreversible proportions. The adoption of steps effectively to block all possible channels for the militarization of outer space and progress towards the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons would serve as the starting point for solving the task of preventing nuclear war. It is, therefore, regrettable that the consideration of this matter by the Conference has met with apparently insurmountable difficulties, especially in reaching an understanding over the framework of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on the item. This impasse only postpones any chance of reaching acceptable and binding legal instruments that would ensure that outer space is preserved as the common heritage of mankind and not another arena of military competition. The international community is legitimately interested in preserving outer space for peaceful purposes. Consequently, I trust that the Conference will be able, in its deliberations, to contribute to the achievement of mutual understanding and agreement. My delegation is of the view that consideration of this subject, like that of nuclear war and nuclear testing, illustrates very clearly the close linkage between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations at the present time. Everything should be done to ensure that the approaches in one, strengthens the prospects of progress in the other. The statement which

(Mr. Afande, Kenya)

has been made so often in the Conference that an arms race in outer space will end on Earth is not a hypothetical phenomenon but a statement of fact. No country, organization or individual is competent to announce the winner of the race -- in a game which has neither rules nor a designated point as its end.

In conclusion, I cannot conclude my statement without referring to the question of the relationship between development and disarmament. I am aware that the subject is not on the agenda of this session of the Conference on Disarmament. As a developing country, Kenya desires to take every opportunity available in its general development of the country as well as the social and economic development of its people. We cannot realize this if, as I stated earlier in my statement, both developed and developing countries are spending a substantial part of their resources on the manufacture and purchase of arms. The effects of military expenditures on national and international economies are of great concern to developing countries. The world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously and with deliberate speed toward a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both. In many resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the world body has often expressed its concern for reducing and restraining military expenditures and for creating increased possibilities for re-allocating released resources towards those of socio-economic development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. It is in this context that Kenya attaches great importance to the international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development which is due to be held in Paris this year. My delegation hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will offer the necessary support in facilitating a meaningful achievement and success of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

Distinguished delegates, that concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, as this is the first occasion that my delegation has taken the floor in the course of the present session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference for the month of February. I wish you every success. I also take this opportunity to express my appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina, and to offer my words of welcome to our new colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament.

It was not my intention to take the floor at our meeting today, but unfortunately some extremely sad developments concerning the use of chemical weapons prompted me to seek the floor in order to inform the Conference as a matter of urgency of these developments. According to information that I have received from my capital, the Iraqi Régime, once again, has engaged in a massive use of chemical weapons against the civilian and military sectors of the population of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The scale and frequency of this use of chemical weapons are both large and numerous. Most recently, on

(Mr. Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

12 and 15 February, during the course of the present military operation (which has been named VALFAJR-8) Iraq resorted to repeated massive employment of chemical weapons which resulted in many new victims. On one day alone, 12 February, the use of chemical weapons led to 1,700 persons being killed or wounded. On 13 February, chemical weapons were used by Iraq against the civilian population of Abadan City, which resulted in the death of 20 civilians and injury to more than 100 persons.

Of course, these recent incidents were not isolated. On 25 and 26 January 1986, Iraq several times used chemical weapons in Yibis area. On 27 January Iraq twice launched attacks using chemical weapons in the Aine Khosh area. On 30 January in two different places, Iraq more than eight times resorted to the use of chemical weapons. We are getting more information concerning the kinds of gas which have been used and other details with regard to recent incidents. As soon as this information is available we will make it known to interested delegations in the Conference on Disarmament. Of course I am referring here to the most recent occasions on which chemical weapons have been used by the Iraqi Régime. As the distinguished members of the Conference are well aware, during the course of the past two years, Iraq has employed chemical weapons on numerous occasions, some of which were brought to the attention of the Conference.

Some of the persons who have been wounded in the recent series of attacks employing chemical weapons have arrived in Europe for medical treatment and some others will arrive shortly. While sincerely thanking the countries which have received these wounded persons and have provided medical assistance for them I would like to request any other countries which find themselves in a position to provide medical care in such cases to let it be known.

I may bring to the attention of the Conference that on 12 February 1986, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran sent a note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which, while raising the alarm with regard to the serious danger in the use of chemical weapons for the international community, it was requested that a mission be sent to Teheran immediately to carry out an on-the-site inspection and verification of the facts regarding this employment of chemical weapons. This request of the Islamic Republic of Iran still stands and it is a cause for regret that such a mission has not been despatched to the area to date.

We feel that these repeated violations of principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by Iraq should meet with the strong condemnation of the international community. We also hope that these unfortunate developments will prompt the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate its negotiations on the convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

If that is not the case, I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and convene, in five minutes' time, in accordance with the timetable for the present week, an informal meeting of the Conference. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.50 p.m. and reconvened at 1.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 340th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I now put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.219, 1/ dated 12 February 1986, dealing with a request received from Austria to participate during 1986 in plenary meetings of the Conference and in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

If I hear no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 20 February, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

1/ "In response to the request of Austria (CD/669) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1986 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.341
20 February 1986

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday 20 February 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. R. Butler

(Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria

Mr. A. BELAID

Argentina:

Mr. M. CAMPORA

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R.A. ROWE

Ms. M. LETTS

Mr. J. OKELY

Belgium:

Mr. P. NIEUWENHUYS

Brazil:

Mr. QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. V. BOJILOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma:

U TIN TUN

U MYA THAN

U HLA MYINT

AYE AYE MU

Canada:

Mr. J.A. BEESLEY

Mr. R.J. ROCHON

Mr. A. DESPRES

China:

Mr. QIAN Jiadong

Mr. HU Xiaodi

Mr. SUO Kaiming

Mr. SHA Zukang

Mr. YANG Mingliang

Mr. LI Daozhong

Mr. LIU Zhongren

Mr. TAN Han

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. B. BEDNAR

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARSY
Mr. M. BADR
Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. JESSEL
Mr. H. RENIE
Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. W. KRUTZSCH
Mr. F. SAYATZ

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. H. PETERS
Mr. W.-N. GERMANN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. T. TOTH
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. A.S. GONSALVES
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI
Mr. A.M. FACHIR
Mr. A. MASBAR AKBAR

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB
Mr. A. SHAFII

Italy:

Mr. R. FRANCESCHI
Mr. F. PIAGGESI
Mr. M. PAVESE
Mr. E. SIVIERO
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. K. KUDO
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. AFANDE
Mr. F. JOSIAH

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. G. GONGOR
Mr. S.-O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. van SCHAIK
Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R. MILDERS

Nigeria:

Mr. B.O. TONWE
Mr. A.A. ELLA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. J. RYCHLAK

Romania:

Mr. I. VOICU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. L.-E. WINGREN

Ms. E. BONNIER

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Ms. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. G.M. KORNIENKO

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. M.D. SYTENKO

Mr. E.N. ZVEREV

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

Mr. A.N. KASHIRIN

Mr. A.P. KOUTEPOV

Mr. O.V. KUZMIN

Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN

Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

Mr. A.A. TITARENKO

Mr. N.P. SMIDOVICH

Mr. G.V. ANTSEFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

Mr. R.J.S. EDIS

Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ

Ms. L. BRONSON

Mr. R. GOUGH

Mr. R. LEVINE

Mr. B. TUA

Mr. J. GRANGER

Mr. R. NELSON

Mr. R. LUACES

Mr. P. CORDEN

Ms. M. WINSTON

Ms. S. MANNIX

Mr. L. BELGARD

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 341st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to His Excellency the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Georgy Markovich Kornienko, who is addressing the Conference today. His presence in the Conference today shows the importance that his country attaches to our work and to all disarmament activities.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of items 1, "Nuclear test ban" and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Hungary, Pakistan and Poland.

I now give the floor to the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Mr. Georgy Kornienko.

Mr. KORNIENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, may I, on behalf of the Soviet delegation convey to you my greetings in connection with your performance of your responsible duties as President of the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that under your guidance the Conference will succeed in starting negotiations on the vital issues of arms limitation and disarmament.

We greet you also as the representative of Australia, the Government of which has declared its interest in the banning of nuclear tests, in nuclear disarmament and in the prevention of the arms race in outer space, i.e. on the issues which rightfully occupy a position of priority on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. President, may I, at the outset, carry out the instructions of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, and read his message addressed to the Conference.

"Message from the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, to the Conference on Disarmament

I extend greetings to the representatives of States who have gathered for a regular session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Soviet Union takes a most responsible approach to its participation in the Conference on Disarmament, because it understands that disarmament is the main avenue towards establishing new and equitable international arrangements and building a safe world. It is precisely disarmament which, by releasing enormous material and intellectual resources, would permit their use for constructive purposes, for achieving economic development and prosperity.

(Mr. Kornienko, USSR)

Mankind has come to a watershed in its history, when it has to choose which road to follow: either it will overcome the inertia of the past, when security was regarded above all in terms of a position of strength and of military and technological solutions, or it will remain hostage to a race in nuclear, chemical and, in future, other equally awesome weapons.

This choice between what is prompted by reason and what would lead to catastrophe can only be made by all States together, regardless of their social system or their level of economic development.

This should be a courageous and responsible choice, and it depends to no small degree upon the States represented at the Conference on Disarmament if it is to be so. Now it is no longer enough to devise palliative solutions that would slow down the arms race in some areas only to allow it to surge ahead at double speed in others.

In other words, the time has come for us jointly to take major strides towards ridding our planet of nuclear and other weapons so that security for each of us will also mean security for all.

Guided by these considerations, at the start of this year the Soviet Union has put forward a comprehensive plan whose central element is a step-by-step programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons. We propose that the sword of Damocles which has been hanging over the peoples since the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be definitively and irrevocably removed by the end of this century.

It is only fair that the first crucial step should be made by the Soviet Union and the United States, which possess the largest nuclear capabilities, with the other nuclear Powers following suit.

We are deeply convinced that there is only one direct way of ridding mankind of the nuclear threat -- to eliminate nuclear weapons themselves. Objectively, it is a fact that the development and deployment of 'Star Wars' weaponry would inevitably spur on the arms race in every area. This is why it is necessary that from the very outset an effective international ban should be imposed on space strike arms.

The Soviet Union is also proposing that chemical weapons be completely eliminated by the end of this century. The unduly protracted negotiations to conclude a convention on this matter should be vigorously accelerated.

While advocating a world without nuclear or chemical weapons, we are also prepared to go as far as other States would be prepared to go in reducing conventional arms and armed forces.

I should like to emphasize strongly that we propose that all practical measures of arms limitation and disarmament should be buttressed by measures of effective control and verification. No less than other States, the USSR is interested in having assurance of strict compliance with agreements reached.

(Mr. Kornienko, USSR)

A number of points in our plan have a direct bearing on the Conference on Disarmament.

Suffice it to say that at the top of its agenda is the test-ban issue, whose radical solution could, in our opinion, become a turning point in the efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat.

The Soviet Union, for its part, has been doing all it can to help achieve this goal. In particular, it is agreeable to the strictest control over a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspections and the use of all the latest developments in seismology.

As is known, last year the USSR, wishing to set a good example, unilaterally ceased all nuclear explosions; it has subsequently extended its moratorium until 31 March 1986. It now depends above all on the United States whether the moratorium will continue in effect, and whether it will become bilateral and then multilateral.

I would like to express the hope that the States participating in the Conference will speak out strongly in support of such a course and that the Conference itself will be able to proceed to businesslike negotiations which would lead to the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by everyone, everywhere and for all time.

I wish the participants in the Conference success in resolving the important issues facing them."

As is clear from the message of M.S. Gorbachev that I have just conveyed to you, the Soviet leadership, without needlessly dramatizing the situation, at the same time soberly considers that the period which we, all of us, are living through is extremely important; it is a turning point. Mankind has to make a choice right now, on the threshold of the third millennium, which will determine its fate.

If we simplify the terms of the choice to the extreme and ask each of us what he prefers -- the survival of human civilization or its destruction -- it is not difficult to foresee what answer would be given by any and every sensible person. However, in reality rather than in the abstract matters are considerably more complex. Powerful forces are at work in the world, and they are pushing it further along the road of a constantly accelerating and expanding arms race in an effort to achieve military superiority for themselves so as to impose their will on others.

And if we fail in our joint efforts to put an end to that insane "race to non-existence", to break the momentum of the obsolete and vicious thinking, the course of events may become irreversible and then a grim future is in store for mankind: to be more precise, the absence of any future.

Back in 1915, 30 years prior to the explosion of the first atomic bomb, V.I. Lenin cautioned that because of the use of the most modern powerful achievements of science and technology a war "may result and that it will inevitably result in undermining the very conditions of the existence of human society".

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That prediction of the genius who founded the Soviet State has been fully confirmed, in this case regrettably, we should say. Today mankind already has the means of its own self-destruction.

We in the Soviet Union, however, by no means consider that the situation is irreparable and that nuclear war is fatally inevitable. Through the dense screen of mistrust and through the huge stockpiles of weapons can be seen -- and we are sure of that -- the real possibility of making a radical turn for the better in international trends and of preventing the outbreak of the arms race with its easily predictable consequences. Naturally, that is not easy to do but we are confident that it is within the power of world public opinion. The ground for this confidence is that with every passing day people are increasingly realizing the scale and nature of the imminent threat. Millions and millions of people on Earth are coming to realize that any delay is a crime, that it is necessary to act, and to act immediately. We shall never be won over by the arguments of those who consider that the arms race is inevitable and who claim that appeals to heed wisdom for the sake of the survival of mankind are "idle talk".

There are States and politicians in the world who not only do not share such ideas but consistently translate their awareness of the danger threatening humanity into their practical policies and into weighty, tangible acts. They have sufficient good will and statesmanship to overcome the established cliches and prejudices of the period of confrontation and to be the first to embark on the road leading away from the brink of the nuclear precipice.

The new formula of an advance towards lasting peace should be based on the unconditional recognition of the necessity of ensuring equal security for all States and peoples. The facts of the nuclear and space age, which has infinitely expanded man's possibilities and at the same time has narrowed down to the minimum and condensed the space and time in which we live, have made it axiomatic -- and that axiom is not yet understood by all -- that it is impossible to strengthen one's own security at the expense and to the detriment of others.

The Soviet State in its policies always -- both in the pre-war and post-war years -- gave preference to the ideas of collective security based on the carefully verified balance of interests of all countries. However, in the past we dealt with the idea that ensuring collective security was the preferable way while today it is, we profoundly believe, the only possible way. In the nuclear age, security of States, as M.S. Gorbachev pointed out, "is possible only as security for all". From that viewpoint, a lower degree of security of, for instance, the United States in comparison with the Soviet Union would be even disadvantageous for us since that would create strategic instability and, as a result, would spur on the arms race. As you see, we do not have a double standard -- one for the security of the USSR and another for other countries.

Another basic element of the new approach to ensuring international security should be the understanding and the recognition by all that this task can only be resolved by political and not by military and technological means. A search -- even a sincere one -- for military and technological means of ensuring security can bring about only the same endless escalation of the arms race with its fully predictable consequences. One day, in the conditions of a political crisis or simply as a result of technical faults in

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a computer, the entire "escalator", each stair of which is "the balance of fear", would collapse, dragging down all mankind into the nuclear abyss.

No solutions of a military and technological nature can make up for the deficiency of political will, the lack of which prevents some of our counterparts from escaping from the vicious circle: arms race -- tension -- arms race. However, we are not fatalists on that subject either, we hope that common sense and human wisdom will nevertheless triumph over ideological intolerance and the temptation of rivalry in strength. The revolution in thinking must prove -- it cannot but prove -- to be stronger than the revolution in military technology.

Such is our philosophy of moving towards a safe world which underlies the practical policies of the USSR as regards stopping the arms race and achieving real disarmament. The Soviet Union's expanded proposals on a broad range of those issues have been set forth in the Statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, dated 15 January of this year, the main integral part of which is the programme for a stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

The great interest that the Conference has shown to that proposal by the Soviet Union is a source of satisfaction to us. Essentially, this forum has already begun the extensive and comprehensive discussion of the programme for the destruction of nuclear weapons. The ideas expressed by many delegations indicate that the Soviet initiative is timely and that a great number of States are interested in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

We hope that this programme will in future too be the focus of attention in the deliberations of the Conference.

The prohibition and the eventual complete elimination of nuclear weapons have always been the objective of Soviet foreign policy. Now the Soviet Union has proposed a concrete programme for attaining that goal, and not in some distant future but within a historically short period of just 15 years.

In determining the content of the practical measures envisaged by the programme, in arranging them by stages and in establishing the interrelationship between them the Soviet Union was, above all, guided by the understanding that no one's security should be prejudiced at any time in carrying that programme into effect.

This is the reason why the process of nuclear disarmament would first affect the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States, only after those arsenals have been reduced, and reduced substantially, would other nuclear Powers join in this process.

In the interests of undiminished security for all and, moreover, of the inadmissibility of military superiority of one side, our proposed programme also includes, as an integral component a ban on the development, testing and deployment of space strike arms. Without such a ban it would be absolutely pointless to hope for a possibility of eliminating nuclear arms.

This is not at all the kind of artificial "linkage" that arbitrarily makes the solution of an issue depend on the solution of a second issue that

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has nothing to do with the first. No, in this case there is an intrinsic interrelationship between the two questions which, objectively speaking, cannot be uncoupled.

Assertions about the defensive and hence allegedly innocuous nature of the space weapon system now being developed can deceive only those who are either ignorant or eager to be deceived.

First, the weapon systems now being developed under the United States SDI programme undoubtedly also possess an offensive potential. For instance, a weapon capable of destroying from outer space a missile in the boost stage is certainly capable of destroying any other target on Earth.

Second, even if one disregards for a moment -- which one should not -- the potential capabilities of those systems in clearly offensive operations, still the construction of a so-called space shield is only meaningful as part of an aggressive design. While not being capable of neutralizing a first nuclear-missile strike, in other words, being unable to perform a truly defensive mission, such a shield would at the same time afford protection from a retaliatory strike after the side that had built the shield had dealt a first nuclear-missile strike -- in other words, committed aggression.

Indeed, it was not by chance that the USSR and the United States concluded in 1972 the Treaty prohibiting the deployment of a large-scale ABM system, despite the fact that the Treaty deals with genuinely defensive weapon systems, which cannot be used for striking the territory of the other side. By doing that, the leaders of the two countries showed that they were wise enough to abandon the simplistic notion that defensive weapons are always a blessing. Nowadays, the notion of "defensive weapons" is not at all synonymous with the notion of "defensive doctrine".

Nor is it by chance that under the 1972 Treaty the two sides undertook "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based".

It is sometimes argued that the SDI programme does not yet involve the development of space weapons but includes only scientific research intended to find out whether such weapon systems can be developed.

But, in the first place, this again is not true. Whereas, at the outset, in 1983 when the SDI programme was proclaimed, its objective was indeed so formulated for the sake of camouflage, later, in an official publication issued by the White House on 3 January 1985, with reference to the work already done, the aim of the programme was stated as being not to find out whether it was possible to develop a space-based ABM system but to determine how this could be accomplished. The Pentagon's documents submitted to the Congress qualify the SDI efforts as belonging to the category of "advanced development". So much for the stage of "finding out"!

Secondly, even to formulate the objective of developing a space-based ABM system, regardless of the stage of its practical implementation, is in direct contradiction with the spirit and letter of the 1972 ABM Treaty. That this is so can be seen from the following hypothetical situation. Suppose a State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition and Destruction of Bacteriological Weapons, which, by the way, was also signed in 1972, suddenly

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announced a national programme to develop such weapons: would anyone dare to say that was a legitimate step and that it was not contrary to the Convention? And yet this is in fact what is happening in the case of the SDI in relation to the ABM Treaty.

In an attempt to create confusion in this perfectly clear matter, references are sometimes made to one of the agreed statements annexed to the ABM Treaty which, allegedly, allows the development of ABM systems based on physical principles other than those limited by the Treaty. Now, since the SDI programme involves the development of such basically new ABM systems as lasers, directed energy beams and so on, it is argued that this would not be contrary to the Treaty.

It is time that one of the statements annexed to the Treaty indeed does not rule out the possibility of the emergence of "ABM systems based on other physical principles". The point is, however, that such a possibility is permitted only in regard to the limited ABM areas authorized by the Treaty and only to fixed land-based systems. The text of the statement does not allow for any other interpretation. We are not alone in saying this. It is also the view of prominent American lawyers, including those who were directly involved in the preparation of the ABM Treaty.

Furthermore, a report submitted to the United States Congress by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency already under the present Administration, I repeat, already under the present Administration, states in no uncertain terms that "the ABM Treaty prohibition on development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems, or components for such systems, applies to directed-energy technology (or any other technology) used for this purpose".

I repeat, all this is stated in an official document of a United States Government agency. What is going on, then? The answer is quite simple: the report in question was sent to the United States Congress six weeks before President Reagan announced the SDI programme in March 1983. It was after that that Washington began its strenuous efforts to pass a pig for a carp.

Finally, when all conceivable and inconceivable arguments would seem to have been exhausted, the question of verification is dragged out by the opponents of disarmament, as always happens in such cases. It is alleged, that, anyway, scientific research cannot be banned because it does not lend itself to verification, and, generally, human thought cannot be stopped.

Indeed, human thought cannot be stopped. But no one is proposing that, ourselves least of all. Of course, basic scientific research can and should be conducted: not for the purposes of destruction, however, but in pursuit of constructive goals.

Without basic research in the nuclear field, carried out by many scientists in many countries over many years, there would be no nuclear weapons, but neither would there be nuclear power plants, nor the numerous other benefits that the peaceful atom has given mankind.

The same is true of basic space research: its results can be used either to develop weapons for waging "Star Wars", or else they can and should be used to benefit mankind, to achieve what we call "Star Peace", or in other words wide-ranging international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

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Banning research deliberately aimed at the development of space strike arms and effectively verifying such a ban is quite possible. A common will is all that would be required. Opening the laboratories concerned for verification would be enough, and the Soviet Union is ready for that. For instance, if someone ventured to violate the ban on the development of space strike arms the fact would inevitably become known, since to prevent such research from reaching a dead end, tests outside the laboratory would be needed, which cannot be carried out in secret.

While on the question of the objective interrelationship between the questions of strategic nuclear arms and space strike weapons, I wish to stress, at the same time, that the Soviet nuclear disarmament programme is structured in such a way -- and this is yet another of its distinctive features -- that the nature of the interrelationship between its various components is different; with regard to some of them no solutions are possible without simultaneously resolving other issues, but in other cases certain measures can also be implemented independently.

In other words, our programme does not in any way rule out the possibility of discussing and finding generally acceptable solutions to a number of important problems outside its framework as well.

For instance, the Soviet Union's previously expressed readiness to reach agreement, without a direct linkage to space and strategic arms, on reducing Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in the European zone also remains valid today as far as the option to cut down these missiles to zero is concerned, which is also included in our programme.

In this context it is envisaged that both the United States and the Soviet Union would actually destroy those missiles rather than redeploy them in other areas, or transfer them to any other country, just as they cannot transfer their strategic missiles. We have not heard any reasonable arguments against this. The same is true of the proposal that along with the destruction of all Soviet and American medium-range missiles in the European zone, any further build-up of the relevant British and French nuclear arms should be stopped.

The problem of preventing an arms race in outer space, which is on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, certainly remains important in its own right. It is our firm belief that the Conference should continue to work on that problem, and the more active and effective that work is the better. It will facilitate rather than impede the solution in the Soviet-American negotiations of the problem of banning space strike arms in its interrelationship with the question of reducing and eliminating strategic nuclear arms.

A major step in that direction could be taken, in our view, by working out at the Conference an international agreement on ensuring the immunity of artificial earth satellites and on banning the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite systems as well as eliminating those systems that already exist.

The independent significance of the problem of preventing the arms race in outer space to which we referred above, is fully applicable to the extremely urgent question of stopping nuclear-weapons tests. Naturally, that

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issue was bound to be included in the overall programme of nuclear disarmament proposed by us. But we are certainly far from thinking that this should result in removing that issue from the agenda of the Conference of Disarmament where it rightfully figures most prominently as a separate item. The Soviet people as well as, we are convinced, all people of goodwill will be most grateful to all those who are working at the Conference if and when it produces such a treaty. It is the result that matters. On the whole, we continue to consider the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests as a task of the highest priority, and one which can be pursued in any forum.

In the absence of a total ban on nuclear tests the Soviet Union's appeal to the other nuclear Powers, and above all to the United States, to join the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, which was announced by the USSR in August 1985 and the extended term of which expires on 31 March, retains all its significance.

There is, and can be, no justification for the United States' refusal to follow the example of the USSR. It is argued in the United States that nuclear tests are needed for perfecting new types of nuclear weapons and for developing certain types of space arms, as well as for maintaining confidence that the nuclear arsenals already stockpiled remain effective. But that is precisely the reason why it would be important to stop nuclear tests: as a result, no side would gain the advantage, since all nuclear arsenals would be affected equally.

Those who oppose the cessation of nuclear tests have made a habit of referring to the difficulties of verifying their cessation. That, however, is refuted by facts. The following example, in particular, provides an indication of the capabilities of national technical means. Soon after the moratorium was introduced by the Soviet Union, a test explosion was set off at the Nevada test range which has to date not been reported in the United States. They must have expected that due to its low yield the explosion would not be detected and that therefore if the need arose, it could be claimed that it is impossible to verify such explosions. But despite its low yield the explosion was registered in the Soviet Union and the United States Government is well aware of that.

The Soviet Union does not, however, suggest that verification should be confined to national technical means. It is agreeable to supplementing it with international procedures, including on-site inspections if necessary.

All verification measures, including on-site inspections, that the Soviet Union considers possible for ensuring strict compliance with the moratorium on nuclear explosions would be also applicable, naturally, to an agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, in case the agreement in question is achieved.

It is known that extensive work has already been done within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament to work out an international seismic data exchange system for the verification of a nuclear-weapon-test ban. The USSR favours the continuation of that work as well.

One thing, however, must be absolutely clear -- in any case what can be dealt with is, specifically, the verification of compliance with an agreement

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to stop nuclear tests, and by no means with the supervision of nuclear explosions. Proposals to do the latter are nothing but a mockery of common sense.

Now let me address chemical weapons -- that formidable instrument of mass destruction which actually exists. The Soviet Union has always been an ardent proponent of the idea that chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of people and never to their detriment. We believe that the most dependable way to achieve that goal is, as before, a total ban on chemical weapons as such and not merely on their use.

The USSR, both on its own and together with other socialist countries, has repeatedly made specific proposals on this subject. It is not through the fault of the Soviet Union that the solution of the problem has been unacceptably delayed.

As was pointed out in M.S. Gorbachev's Statement of 15 January, the Soviet Union regards as entirely feasible the task of completely eliminating chemical as well as nuclear weapons even in this century. He has proposed to intensify the talks within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament to work out and conclude an effective and verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of the existing stockpiles of those weapons.

It should be said that the Soviet Union favours the earliest possible elimination of the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons as well as of the industrial base for their production.

Accordingly, our position envisages the timely declaration of the locations of enterprises producing chemical weapons and the timely cessation of their production. We are in favour of starting to work out procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and for proceeding to eliminate stockpiles of chemical weapons soon after the convention enters into force.

Again, it should be emphasized that all these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections. Here, as in other cases, the Soviet Union is no less interested in such control than other States.

While proposing that weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and chemical, should be removed from the arsenals of States and that the emergence of space arms should be prevented, the Soviet Union considers that measures to limit and reduce conventional armed forces and armaments should be carried out in parallel to this process.

Let me name only some of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union in this area:

- reduction of the armed forces of States, above all of the permanent members of the Security Council, and of States, that are connected with them by military alliances;

- freezing, for a start, of the numerical level of the armed forces of the USSR and the United States, including those stationed outside their national borders;

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- reduction on a mutual basis of the armed forces and armaments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Treaty Organisation in Central Europe,

- limitation of sales and transfers of conventional weapons.

These, I repeat, are just some of the possible initial measures. In reducing conventional armaments and armed forces the Soviet Union is prepared to go as far as its counterparts would be ready to do. Here, as in other areas, the Soviet Union is ready for action.

Of course, in the area of reducing conventional armaments and armed forces the Conference on Disarmament can and must make its own contribution.

The Soviet Union also proposes to ban the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles whose destructive capacity is close to that of nuclear arms and other means of mass destruction. Recently the Conference on Disarmament has made some progress in this direction and it should be continued.

Speaking about the Conference on Disarmament in general, we would like to state very clearly that the Soviet leadership, as is confirmed by the message of M.S. Gorbachev to the Conference, views it as an important and, in a way, unique forum where representatives of 40 nations -- large and small, socialist and capitalist, belonging to military alliances and non-aligned -- located in various geographic regions of the world participate in the consideration and elaboration of decisions on disarmament issues.

The Committee on Disarmament, which preceded the Conference, bequeathed it quite an impressive record. It produced such international legal instruments of paramount importance as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Without those agreements the situation in the world today would definitely have been much more dangerous than it is now.

However, it is only right to recall that the last of the aforementioned agreements was signed in 1977, or almost 10 years ago.

Therefore, while acknowledging what has been achieved, the peoples of the world have every right to expect the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts and work more productively, and to make an effective contribution to the prevention of nuclear war and to the strengthening of world peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I should also like to thank him for delivering to the Conference General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's personal message to the Conference on Disarmament.

(The President)

I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary,
Ambassador Meiszter.

Mr. MEISZTER: (Hungary) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, with your permission I should like warmly to welcome the presence here today of the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Georgy Markovich Kornienko, the representative of a country with which we maintain the friendliest and most fraternal of relations. I think that the First Deputy Minister's second appearance after so short a time in Geneva is symbolic of the indissoluble link existing between the efforts made in the lateral and the multilateral spheres in the field of disarmament. Further evidence of this has just been given by the message of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In all modesty I should like to draw my distinguished colleagues' attention to two passages in the message to which we have just listened. The first is the appeal and warning concerning the fact that at the present turning-point which mankind is facing "it is no longer enough to devise palliative solutions". The second passage is the unequivocal statement to the effect that the Soviet Union "while advocating a world without nuclear or chemical weapons, is prepared to go as far as other States would be prepared to go". In my opinion, we should study the Soviet Union's proposal, work in the light of this philosophy, and respond "in kind" so to speak, and then we may be able to look towards mankind's future with greater hope than we have been able to do hitherto.

(Continued in English)

Please allow me at the outset to associate myself with the warm felicitations and good wishes that have been extended to you by the previous speakers on your assumption of the responsible duty of President of the Conference for the opening phase of the 1986 session.

I would also like to express my thanks and appreciation to Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, who presided over the work of this body during the unusually difficult month of August last year, as well as during the recess, in a very efficient and skilful manner.

And finally, instead of a roll-call of one fourth of the membership, may I be permitted simply to welcome all the 10 new heads of delegation and wish them success in the exercise of their responsible functions. The Hungarian delegation is glad to offer them all goodwill and co-operation.

It has become a tradition at this Conference to start the annual session with a series of statements, wherein the delegations give a "tour d'horizon" of the previous year, and present their forecasts or expectations. That, in fact, is a good tradition. What in previous years turned it into a gloomy exercise was the negative record of this forum, and it is by no means any consolation that our Conference is only a reflection of the general state of international relations. After a long period of mounting tension and confrontation, we could only last year register certain promising signs, and note with some relief and welcome with expectation the resumption of negotiations between the two leading Powers. Fully aware, as we were, of the enormous differences and distrust between them, as well as the complexity of the problems, we could not hope for quick results. But we were also aware of the great interdependence between them, and with faith in the wisdom of their

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leaders, we continued to maintain the hope for a step-by-step development of a realistic, constructive and responsible relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Today, a year later, the sky is a shade clearer, though it is still far from sunny. No doubt, the results of the summit meeting in November 1985 between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan are significant and already have had some favourable influence on the general atmosphere of international relations. The most outstanding result of the meeting is that the two leaders, fully conscious of the special responsibility of their countries, could come to three fundamentally important common understandings, which are embodied in their Joint Statement. The first is the realization that a nuclear war is unwinnable and inadmissible. The second is the realization that war, whether nuclear or conventional, must be prevented between the two countries. And finally, as a logical consequence of the previous, the commitment that they would not seek to achieve military superiority. The three understandings, which are meant to become a solid basis of their foreign policy, form an organic unity, which means that none of them must be disregarded.

The Joint Statement was received all over the world with relief and expectation. The political foundation was laid for progress both in bilateral relations and also in the field of arms limitation, reduction and disarmament. It was certainly a great step in the right direction. A step that must now be followed with a series of concrete, practical measures with a view to restoring confidence, reducing tension and relaunching co-operation.

Less than two months after the summit meeting, the Soviet Union was again, without any delay, in the field of action. The comprehensive programme of disarmament presented by General Secretary Gorbachev is serious and convincing proof of his will and determination to translate the joint understanding reached at his meeting with President Reagan into concrete measures.

The Soviet proposals were welcomed everywhere by Governments, leading politicians and, most of all, by the peoples, which consider them as a heartening overture to 1986 -- proclaimed by the United Nations the International Year of Peace. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly, in a statement adopted at a special meeting devoted to the new Soviet proposals, emphasized the outstanding significance of that concrete plan of action, which is aimed at relieving the world of nuclear weapons, preventing the militarization of outer space, and bringing about the complete and general elimination of chemical weapons. The Foreign Affairs Committee underscored the importance of the fact that the Soviet initiative proposes also a reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, first of all in the European region, and insists on the utilization of the resources thus liberated, for goals of social and economic development and the solution of other burning problems of mankind. The Foreign Affairs Committee pointed out that the Soviet proposals take into account the legitimate security requirements of all parties involved, and the interests of every nation. They offer a reasonable, step-by-step solution, and a chance to seek constructive compromises at every disarmament forum. In its statement, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly fully endorsed the Soviet Union's disarmament programme.

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Analyses and detailed evaluations of the results of the summit meeting and of the new Soviet proposals will continue to be forthcoming, I am sure, for a long time. The statements that we have heard here since the opening of the session also prove this point. We welcome that phenomenon. The process of fresh thinking and the re-thinking of old ideas, a new look at old issues and a reconsideration of old positions, in a word, a new approach -- that is what is really required today in the light of the important developments of the last few months. With your permission, Mr. President, I would leave that task to those who are better qualified and better placed. At this point I only wish to share with you some of my "ruminations" over a particular subject which, at least I have the impression, has been always present, whether expressly stated or just lurking in the back of minds, at the summit meeting, in the Joint Statement, in the Soviet proposals, and in our own deliberations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, in his important statement here two weeks ago, pointed out that the six Heads of State or Government, in the letter which they had sent to General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan a few weeks before the summit meeting, raised an essential subject, namely "the need and obligation to build mutual confidence".

The Joint Statement is not really specific in this context, but coming, as it does, after such a long period that was characterized by anything but mutual trust and confidence, world public opinion was appreciative of what could be included in it on the subject.

The document, in its introductory part, had first to recall the differences of approach which the two leaders have to international issues. Aware of that, one can better evaluate the next phrase stating that "some greater understanding of each side's view was achieved", and the fact that "they agreed about the need to improve US-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole". This applies equally to the fact that the General Secretary and the President expressed "their strong desire to seek common ground on existing problems".

Later on, both leaders were more specific about what they think of the subject. President Reagan in his statement spoke about the need to create confidence, and expressed his belief that his partner agreed with him that genuine confidence should be built on deeds and not only in words. General Secretary Gorbachev most probably nodded to him in the affirmative, the official documents are not quite clear on such details, but in his report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR six days later, we find the following: "In order not to make it more difficult to achieve new agreements, both sides, we are convinced, should first of all refrain from actions subverting what was achieved in Geneva, refrain from actions which would block talks and erode the existing constraints on the arms race."

Confidence-building, therefore, consists of a great number of components -- actions that need to be taken, as well as actions that need to be avoided. Confidence-building is an important task not only of the Great Powers, but also of all nations and Governments, as well as their representatives, in particular those taking part in bilateral or multilateral negotiations. "The development of a climate of confidence ... requires the contribution of all of us" -- to use the words of the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, which you, Mr. President, read out at the opening meeting of this session. Confidence-building must become "an

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integral part of relations among States" -- that is what the Soviet proposals express not only in words but also in deeds and action, which they are really aimed at.

The role of the Conference on Disarmament, and its possibilities vis-à-vis bilateral negotiations, were a subject of discussion already at the opening phase of the 1985 session. In the fire of arguments and reservations, the view emerged that bilateral negotiations do not in any way diminish the urgent need for determined and substantial negotiations at the multilateral level. One is not, and cannot be, a substitute for the other.

The Hungarian delegation noted already last year the great importance which the Soviet Union always attached -- not only in words but also in specific initiatives and proposals -- to the work of the Conference. Now we can note once again with great satisfaction that their new initiative of 15 January places appropriate emphasis on negotiations to be undertaken or to be continued at this multilateral forum.

We do not close our eyes to realities. Nobody here denies that there are a number of fundamental problems which must be tackled bilaterally. Some of them should be settled by the two Great Powers, but most of the problems have a strong bearing on other countries, or rather on the whole of mankind. Such problems cannot and should not be settled without the active participation of the delegations around this table, delegations which in fact represent also the interests of those that are not actively engaged in our work. There are, of course, questions on which a preliminary accord of the two Great Powers and their actions are required before the others can join in really concerted action for arms reduction or disarmament. As we have to take into account the hard realities of our time, the major military Powers also have to remember that the tragic consequences of those realities would be suffered by all.

Negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral, should not be regarded as a sort of "one-way" process. There is, or rather, there could be a mutually beneficial effect between them, a kind of useful "fall-out" or "retombé" coming from both of them. If one of the fora can manage to solve a problem, even if only partially, the other would certainly benefit from that solution.

The history of arms limitation and disarmament negotiations bears testimony to the fact that bilateral and multilateral negotiations are not exclusive alternatives. On the contrary, they have mutually positive and constructive effects on each other, consequently, they should run parallel, complementing and reinforcing each other.

The Hungarian delegation, therefore, cannot accept the strange role which certain delegations try to impose on this Conference. We are fully conscious of the importance and urgency of the complete and general prohibition of chemical weapons, and try to contribute as best as we can to negotiations to that end. But we are in no way willing to consider this question as the only item for the Conference to deal with. Like most of the other delegations, we urge that the Conference start without any further delay substantive negotiations also on the other questions of high priority, and in particular on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

We welcomed, as we all did, the Joint Statement of last November, but were, nevertheless, disappointed by the total absence of any mention of the urgent need of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Knowing very well the Soviet Union's steadfast position on this question, we were sure that no omission was committed. The whole document was drafted with meticulous care, the specific issues listed in a logical sequence, in appropriate detail. We, of course, welcomed the attention devoted to questions such as nuclear non-proliferation, and most of all, the commitment of the parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty" on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

But I must state squarely that my delegation found the Joint Statement grossly wanting. And we all know that our disappointment, which is fully shared by the overwhelming majority of nations, is due to the well-known lack of political will of the other party. It is really anachronistic to speak about being committed to the implementation of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty without a single sentence on a comprehensive test-ban, which has for long been qualified as the necessary first step towards vertical and horizontal non-proliferation. After all, the comprehensive test-ban is not only one of the most urgent problems of contemporary international politics but also considered an elementary test of the nuclear-weapon Powers' credibility concerning their commitment to halt the nuclear-arms race. Credibility and confidence are but two faces of the very same coin. The credibility of the nuclear-weapon States is directly dependent on the non-nuclear-weapon States' confidence in them.

As I have already had occasion to point out earlier in my statement, confidence-building requires actions or the avoidance of certain actions. In this particular case it requires the renunciation of an action -- the testing of nuclear explosive devices. That is a real non-action in the best sense of the word. No verification, not even the unattainable 100 per cent perfect verification system, could be a substitute for the necessary action. Without the required action, without the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, verification cannot in itself create confidence. But on the basis of a certain level of confidence the necessary verification system could be elaborated gradually. We are convinced that a moratorium on all nuclear explosions is the best way to achieve the level of confidence, on the basis of which all the required verification measures could be safely developed, tested and introduced. We are also convinced that such an interaction of processes -- not endless talks on verification in abstract -- is the only feasible way to arrive at the results so badly needed for so long a time.

We must all acknowledge that now almost all the necessary components are at hand. The unilateral moratorium, introduced by the Soviet Union last August, and extended by an additional three months in January, is still in effect. The necessary verification means are available, and the Soviet Union has declared its readiness to reach agreement with the United States on further measures deemed necessary to verify compliance with the moratorium. There exists already an elaborate international system that has worked for years with sufficient accuracy and could be upgraded in a reasonably short time. There is only one more thing required: a responsible political decision by the United States to reciprocate the Soviet Union's gesture.

I dare to hope that the emphasis was properly placed and also properly understood when I attempted to prove that the time to act is now, to make the

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

best of the situation that cannot be expected to last indefinitely. It would be alien to me to toll the alarm bell, especially if it is unwarranted; but we must all face the realities with a sober mind. The effect of the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium will expire by the end of March, and the turn of events largely depends on the attitude of the United States. The statement of General Secretary Gorbachev on 15 January contained an unambiguous message: "The Soviet Union cannot indefinitely display unilateral restraint in nuclear testing. But the stakes are too high and the responsibility too great for us not to try every possibility of influencing the position of others through the force of example.". This is the opportunity that must not be missed. We hope that everyone, in particular those most directly concerned, will really "take advantage of all available avenues to strengthen international security and stability" -- as Ambassador Lowitz suggested at the end of his first statement some 10 days ago.

In conclusion, let me underscore the following: the fact that in this opening statement I have singled out the issue of the comprehensive test-ban should not in any way be construed as a sign of neglect or disregard for other pressing problems on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. I do intend to take up other questions in earnest and in due time. With this heavy accent on item 1, and the detailed presentation of our views and concerns, the Hungarian delegation wanted to underline the utmost urgency that the Hungarian people and Government attach to the complex problem of nuclear disarmament. We wanted to emphasize once again our preoccupation with the complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, which we regard, in all seriousness and sincerity, as the key to any solution of the cluster of questions comprising the prevention of nuclear war, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Besides, we consider this item also as a crucial test of sincerity, honesty and resolve of the leading politicians and Governments of all States, and in particular, the nuclear-weapon States.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): We listened with very great attention to the message addressed by General Secretary Gorbachev to the Conference on Disarmament and to the statement by His Excellency Mr. Kornienko, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. My delegation is thankful for General Secretary Gorbachev's message. We are also appreciative of the fact that Mr. Kornienko found time to address the Conference. We are confident that the Conference will give the close and careful consideration that the message and the statement merit. We see these as indicative of the importance that the Soviet Union attaches to the multilateral disarmament negotiating process.

I have sought the floor this morning to introduce a document that my delegation has submitted on the subject of "Fact-Finding under the future Chemical Weapons Convention". This document, which carries the number CD/664 has, I understand, been circulated in all working languages today.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

In my statement last Thursday I had in very broad terms described my delegation's views on the question of fact-finding. In doing so I had made the point that the fact-finding procedures should be devised in such a manner that they operate as a safety net around the Convention. I had also stated that the Convention should provide for a graduated, though not necessarily rigid, framework for resolving doubts through the machinery to be established under it. The Working Paper that we have submitted elaborates our views on this subject.

The overall approach spelt out in document CD/664 aims at handling the question of fact-finding at four different levels, which though separately identifiable, cannot be deemed to impose a strict discipline whereunder one level has necessarily to be traversed in order to reach the next one.

In our opinion most of the doubts and ambiguous situations emerging in the implementation or observance of the chemical weapons convention should be resolved through clarifications sought and obtained within the framework of bilateral consultations in a co-operative mood. This could be described as the first or the least acrimonious level at which suspicions could be allayed.

In case a State party having some doubts about the observance of the convention by some other State party does not wish to directly approach the latter it should have the right to seek clarification through the organization set up under the chemical weapons convention. This could be described as clarification through the multilateral process and referred to as the second tier for resolving doubts.

The third tier would come into operation when a State party failing to satisfy its concerns through either of the approaches already mentioned by me, or without resorting to them, submits a request for the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to another State party in order to clarify a situation that gives rise to doubts about compliance with the convention. Fact-finding at this level acquires a more serious nature and needs to be carefully elaborated since it implies, inter alia, direct interference in the affairs of another State.

The fourth level of the fact-finding procedure involves a complaint regarding the use of chemical weapons. Since such a complaint would denote a violation of the gravest nature it would need to be handled in the most expeditious manner. It should be obvious that delayed action could lead to the removal or diffusion of the evidence of the use of chemical weapons.

I have broadly outlined the thinking behind the Working Paper submitted by my delegation. In our document we have tried to foresee different contingencies that may arise in the implementation of the fact-finding procedure. The treatment may, however, still be far from exhaustive. We have also put various steps in different time-frames keeping in view their relative importance as well as the overriding necessity of allaying suspicions as expeditiously as possible. We are conscious of the fact that the issues addressed in our document may not be readily amenable to solutions acceptable to everyone. However, we have presented our ideas with the conviction that the objective of resolving contentious issues cannot be served by taking extreme positions, but by seeking reasonable and practical solutions which lie somewhere between the extremes.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

I also wish to clarify that the document has been submitted in a constructive spirit not only with a view to presenting our preferences on the various issues involved in fact-finding but also to stimulating discussion on this important question.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Mr. President, the Polish delegation warmly welcomes the presence at our meeting today of the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the fraternal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrade Georgy Markovich Kornienko. We have listened with great attention and interest to his very important statement and particularly to the message of the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Comrade Gorbachev, which we whole-heartedly welcome and which we consider as a most valuable contribution to our deliberations. We see it as another expression of the significance the Soviet Union attaches to the work of our multilateral forum.

At the outset of the spring session of the Conference a year ago there was a common feeling of a new favourable development. The agreement reached by the ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR and the United States to start negotiations on nuclear and space arms in their interrelationship, which was generally viewed as a harbinger of improvement of the international political climate, thus creating hopes for more fruitful work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Since then a further improvement of the international atmosphere took place. The bilateral talks in Geneva became reality. The Third Review Conference of the NPT brought about an encouraging result and the auspicious Soviet-American summit meeting was held in Geneva. Our hopes were growing. Unfortunately, only hopes since, in principle, no real progress in disarmament was achieved, especially in areas of highest priority i.e. nuclear and space weapons. With regard to the Conference on Disarmament it would have been understandable to some extent if we were negotiating, but failed in reaching results. But this was not the case. We all know the deplorable truth -- we were not negotiating on these very issues because some delegations were not ready for it and made impossible the establishment of appropriate working bodies.

My delegation expects that such a situation will not be repeated this year and that we shall be able to start business-like dialogue and negotiations on various aspects of nuclear disarmament and on preventing an arms race in outer space as well as on other issues on our agenda. We base this expectation on a generally expressed opinion, including in this chamber, which we fully share, that the present political climate is more beneficial to disarmament efforts. More specifically I would point out new significant prerequisites which should be helpful and stimulating to the Conference's work. I have in mind the Soviet-American Joint Statement that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", that the Soviet Union and the United States "will not seek to achieve military superiority" and other commitments which came out from the summit and which so often have been quoted in this hall. The Soviet-American Joint Statement has to be viewed as a political decision of highest importance, but it will bring the desired effects only if followed by practical steps.

A comprehensive and concrete programme of how they could be taken was proposed by the Soviet Union in the statement of 15 January 1986 by General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev. It

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

is a proposal without precedent in the history of disarmament negotiations. It is, to use the words of the Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski, "a wise, courageous and honest proposal". These three attributes: wisdom, courage and honesty, are indispensable in all endeavours for disarmament, peace and common security.

Poland fully supports the Soviet proposals. Speaking in the Sejm -- the Polish Parliament -- on 29 January this year, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marian Orzechowski said:

"The Soviet initiative expresses our own hopes and aspirations, our national interest in its deepest essence. In this initiative we see a common programme and a goal of aspirations of the socialist community. It synthesizes all considerations resulting from hitherto existing disarmament negotiations, including those in which Poland has taken or takes part. We shall be giving our support to this initiative by contributing to it with our own considerations and suggestions."

It is especially here, at the Conference on Disarmament, that a broad use of the ideas included in the Soviet programme should be made. We do have on our agenda issues concerning the whole complex of nuclear disarmament issues as well as prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are negotiating with some success on a ban on chemical weapons. All these issues constitute the very essence of the Soviet proposal to get rid of weapons of mass destruction by the end of the century.

The Soviet proposal has some features which I consider to be of particular importance. It is complex, it embraces all key areas of disarmament, suggesting that they be negotiated separately or together in a parallel process. It is designed so as to strengthen mutual confidence and not to diminish the security of any party at any stage.

The initiative is not a detailed blueprint offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, but a flexible, open programme which has to be discussed, developed and negotiated in different forums in order to produce final results. And finally, it is clear even at first sight that the content of the programme is well grounded in the experience of various disarmament negotiations and takes due account of the proposals and ideas of other countries.

The words of appreciation coming from many countries and expressed repeatedly also in this very hall are encouraging. The programme deserves, however, more than mere appreciation. It deserves first to be constructively responded and then to be negotiated with a view to giving the world the safest, the cheapest and the most credible system of international security.

No special knowledge or expertise, but only pure logic, is necessary to see that no system of defence against nuclear or any other weapon could be more reliable than total elimination of the weapon itself. Such a system of international security, based on the annihilation of existing weapons of mass destruction, on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and at the same time on appropriate confidence-building measures has been proposed by the Soviet Union. But to achieve this goal by the year 2000, which is certainly feasible, we must not lose time.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The alternative concept of international security for the twenty-first century is the idea of SDI, which offers: "if research indicates the feasibility of defence against nuclear missiles, the United States would sit down together with its allies and the Soviet Union to see how we could replace all strategic ballistic missiles with such a defence, which threatens no one". In other words, that would mean the continuation of the nuclear-arms race and starting one in space. After all, nobody knows how long it would take for research to bring about reliable results, what kind of new weapon ideas would be the by-products of such a research, how long it would be necessary to wait to see how strategic ballistic missiles could be replaced by what is called "defence which threatens no one", and so on. Similar questions could easily be multiplied, and in fact they have been asked here many times.

I do not intend to discuss at this juncture the logic of replacing ballistic missiles with a space defence system, instead of simply eliminating the missiles, or a concept of a space defence which "threatens no one".

The position of principle of the Polish delegation with respect to issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament has not changed, it continues to be constructive and progress-oriented. We would like to see serious, business-like work being carried out on all items, in which we are prepared to take active part. However, a common effort is needed towards eliminating unnecessary constraints, one of them being long-lasting discussions, sometimes even of a semantic nature, on the wording of mandates for relevant subsidiary bodies. The Conference on Disarmament is a negotiating forum, to which we all assent but do not always carry into effect. It is quite clear that some issues are more mature than others. But we should keep negotiating possibilities open on all of them. It is only through negotiations that problems can be identified, difficulties resolved and mutually acceptable solutions worked out. The Conference on Disarmament should without further delay establish ad hoc committees on priority items concerning nuclear and space weapons. While dealing with these and other issues we can, and in fact we should, give close consideration to the relevant ideas of the Soviet proposal with a view to finding new tools for making progress.

A nuclear-test ban is of crucial importance for stopping the nuclear-arms race. Everything that is said to the contrary is untrue. It would certainly preclude both the development of new weapons and to a great extent the modernization of the existing arsenals. But this is exactly what is feared by those who may be ready for nuclear-arms control but certainly not for their elimination. That is why I fully agree with Ambassador Dhanapala when he said that "Logic and reason have seldom characterized the arguments of those who want bigger and better bombs".

The problem has to be addressed comprehensively, not just from the point of view of verification, which obviously is a very important question and has to be resolved with respect to every disarmament agreement at the appropriate stage of negotiations. We are, for instance, negotiating a chemical-weapons ban, although we are aware that verification problems have not yet been resolved. We still do not know what the whole verification procedure would look like, though we have various, sometimes very detailed, proposals.

The Soviet proposals with respect to a NTB open various possibilities for starting practical work. They offer a three-month extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions introduced in August 1985, they appeal to the

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

United States to join this moratorium which could be appropriately verified by national technical means as well as through international procedures -- including on-site inspections whenever necessary. Such a reciprocal, agreed and verified moratorium, which could be joined by other nuclear Powers, would certainly bring about practical experience which might be useful in the Conference's work on a test-ban treaty.

Also other parallel measures, such as resuming the trilateral negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom on a complete and general ban of nuclear-weapon tests, as well as consultations with a view to making the 1963 Moscow Test Ban Treaty apply also to underground tests, are proposed.

We welcome also the readiness of the Chinese delegation to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a NTB. All these factors convincingly demonstrate that the substantive work on this issue of highest priority could start and be continued in favourable conditions. In addition, a commencement of work on a NTB Treaty would be, in my opinion, tantamount to beginning work on one of the significant measures of preventing nuclear war.

Mr. President, we appreciate very much your personal efforts aimed at diminishing differences of view which prevent the Conference from establishing an appropriate subsidiary body on a NTB. My delegation pledges to do its best in supporting these efforts. We shall be responsive to all constructive proposals: but the same is needed on the part of all delegations. That is why we appeal especially strongly to the three nuclear Powers which during last year's United Nations General Assembly were not able to support any of the four resolutions dealing with a nuclear-test ban to reconsider their position.

As I have already indicated, my delegation strongly favours the long-overdue establishing of subsidiary bodies on items 2 and 3, that is, cessation of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war. There is no justification for any further delay. We may not be able to produce international agreements from the very outset, but we can have a useful try at narrowing differences and setting up a better basis for further work. The complexity and abundance of problems involved enables both bilateral and multilateral talks not only to coexist but to be complementary to one another.

Arguments can be heard that if the phased programme of denuclearization is to be gradually implemented no substantive work at an early stage would be left for the relevant ad hoc committee. We consider that the contrary is true. Let me again use the example of a chemical-weapon convention. It has already taken 15 years of discussions and negotiations, and we still have a great deal of work to do.

The goal of eliminating nuclear weapons in a comparable period means not only gradual reductions, but also a universal treaty totally and for ever prohibiting nuclear weapons.

To work out such a treaty would be neither an easy task nor feasible in bilateral negotiations only. Thus the Conference on Disarmament has an important role to play and all of us have the obligation to make a contribution.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

In this context and in concluding I would like to quote from General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's statement: "Our new proposals are addressed to the whole world". And further: "In the question of preserving peace and saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war, no one should remain indifferent or stand aloof. This concerns all and every one. Each State, large or small, socialist or capitalist, has an important contribution to make".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement. Distinguished delegates, that concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? As that appears not to be the case, may I turn to another subject.

I have requested the secretariat to circulate an informal paper containing a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. May I note, once again, that we are not including in this timetable the informal consultations that the President is conducting under a number of items on the agenda. They are covered by the informal paper that I circulated on Tuesday. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the informal paper containing the timetable for next week.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: At the request of the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, I wish to inform the Conference that he is convening informal consultations, open to all members of the Commission, in connection with its forthcoming session. Those consultations will be held on Tuesday, 25 February, at 9.30 a.m. in Conference Room III, with interpretation services. The Chairman of the Commission, Ambassador Wegener, expects that the informal consultations will be concluded in less than an hour's time.

With regard to the informal consultations being conducted by the President, may I remind delegations that the meeting which was scheduled for this evening has been cancelled and there will be no such meeting this evening. The next informal presidential consultation will take place tomorrow morning, as indicated on the circulated list of informal consultations.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 25 February, at 10.30 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

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