CD/787 Appendix II/Volume I 28 August 1987

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX II

VOLUME I

- Index by country and subject of the Verbatim Records
- Verbatim Records of the 1987 Session

INDEX OF THE VERBATIM RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN 1987

List of Subject Headings

- 0. Organizational Matters
 - 1. Organization of Work and Procedures
 - 2. Participation of Non-Member States
- I. Nuclear Test Ban
- II. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
- III. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
 - IV. Chemical Weapons
 - V. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
- VI. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
- VII. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
- VIII. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
 - IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures
 - 1. Annual Report of the Secretary-General
 - 2. Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament
 - 3. Verification
 - 4. Nuclear-weapon-free zones
 - 5. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
 - 6. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
 - 7. Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons
 - 8. Conventional Weapons
 - 9. Regional disarmament
 - 10. Zones of Peace
 - 11. Reduction of military budgets
 - 12. Confidence-building measures
 - 13. Disarmament and international security
 - 14. Disarmament and development
 - 15. General and complete disarmament
 - 16. Naval Arms Race

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
		Nork and Procedures	
385	China (the President) The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	Algeria Algeria (on behalf of Group of 21)	389 435
	Mexico USSR Sweden Australia The Secretary-General of the Conference	Argentina Australıa	387 410 385 394 408 426
386	Cuba China (the President)	Palana	431
387	China (the President) Argentina Japan	Belgium Brazil	404 424 432
	Bulgaria Peru	Bulgaria	387 413
388	Romania Hungary China (the President)	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	434
389	Sri Lanka German Democratic Republic Algeria	Canada China	433 431 435
391	Yugoslavıa Nıgerıa	China (the President)	385 386 387
392	India Poland China (the President)		388 392
393	Cuba (the President)	Cuba Cuba (the President)	386 393
394	Australia Cuba (the President)		394 396 398
396	Cuba (the President)		399 401

[Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
		tional Matters E Work and Procedures	
397	Norway (non-member State)	Czechoslovakia	406
398	Cuba (the President)	Czechoslovakia (the	402
399	Cuba (the President)	President) Egypt	432
401	Cuba (the President)	Egypt (the President)	411
402	Czechoslovakıa (the President)	_3154 (200 110010000)	417
403	Germany, Federal Republic	Ethiopia (the President)	426
	of	France (the President)	427 435
404	Islamic Republic of Iran Sri Lanka Belgium	German Democratic Republic	389 431
406	Czechoslovakıa Pakıstan	Germany, Federal Republic of	403
408	Yugoslavıa Australia	Germany, Federal Republic of (on behalf of group of Western countries)	435
409	Zaire	Hungary	388
410	Argentina	India	392
411	Egypt (the President)		431
413	Bulgaria	Indonesia	414
414	Indonesia	Islamic Republic of Iran	404 387
416	Morocco Norway (non-member State)	Japan Mexico	387
31/	United States Egypt (the President)	Morocco	416
418	Netherlands	Netherlands	418
421	United Kingdom Viet Nam (non-member State) Nigeria	Nigeria	391 421

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
		tional Matters f Work and Procedures	
422	Spain (non-member State)	Pakıstan	406
424	Belgium New Zealand (non-member State)	Peru	387 428
426	Yugoslavıa Australıa Ethiopia (the President)	Poland	392 432
427	France (the President) Romania	Romania	388 427
428	USSR Peru Venezuela	Srı Lanka	389 404 432
431	German Democratic Republic	Sweden	385 432
	Australia China	USSR	385 428
432	Sweden Brazil	United Kingdom	421
	Poland Egypt Srı Lanka	United States Venezuela	417
433	Pakıstan Canada	Yugoslavıa	391 408
434	Bulgaria (on behalf, of		426
	group of socialist States)	Zaire	409
435	France (the President) Germany, Federal Republic	Non-Member States New Zealand	424
	of (on behalf of group of Western countries) Algeria (on behalf of Group of 21)	Norway	397 417
4	China	Spain	422
		Viet Nam	421

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
		ional Matters Work and Procedures	
		The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	385
		The Secretary-General of the Conference	385

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
PV	Chronological Country/Speaker 0. Organizat	Alphabetical	PV 386 387 390 394 399 401 409 416 417 420 427 409
420 421 427	Ethiopia (the President) Viet Nam (non-member State) France (the President)		388 421

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	I. <u>Nucle</u> a	r Test Ban	
385	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	Algeria	389 402 433
	Mexico USSR	Argentina _	387
	Sweden Australia	Australıa	385 394 408
386	USSR Peru (on behalf of Group of 21) Cuba German Democratic Republic (on behalf of group of socialist States)		423 426 429 430 431 432
387	Argentina Japan Bulgaria	Belgium Brazil	404 424 432
388	Peru Finland (non-member State) Romania	Bulgaria	387 397 413
389	Hungary Srı Lanka	Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States)	434
	Germany, Federal Republic of German Democratic Republic Mongolia	Canada	410 433
	Algeria Mexico	China	400 416
390	France Czechoslovakıa	Cuba	386
391	Yugoslavia United States Kenya Nigeria	Czechoslovakia	390 402 406 418
392	India Poland USSR	Czechoslovakıa (the President)	402 405 410
	JOSE	Egypt	432

[Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	I. <u>Nucle</u> a	r Test Ban	
393	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of group of socialist States)	Egypt (the President)	411 417
394	Italy Australia	Ethiopia (the President)	418 426
396	Netherlands	France	390 411
397	Norway (non-member State) Bulgarıa	France (the President)	427 432
398	German Democratic Republic Venezuela	German Democratic Republic	389 397
400	China		403 409 411
402	Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia (the President) Algeria		416 429 431
	Nigeria Sweden (Chairman, Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts)	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of group of socialist countries)	386 393 432
403	German Democratic Republic Germany, Federal Republic of	Germany, Federal Republic of	389 403 411
404	Islamıc Republıc of Iran Belgıum	Hungary	388 413
405	United Kingdom Japan Romania Czechoslovakia (the	India	392 408 431
	President)	Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran	414
406	Czechoslovakia Pakıstan		425
408	India Australia United States USSR	Italy Japan	394 387 405 432

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	I. N <u>uclea</u>	r Test Ban	
409	German Democratic Republic Zaire	Japan (on behalf of group of Western countries)	410 429
410	Poland Canada	Kenya	391
	Czechoslovakia (the President) Japan (on behalf of group of Western countries) United States	Mexico	385 389 415 429 430
411	Egypt (the President) USSR (on behalf of group of socialist States) Sweden German Democratic Republic	Mexico (on behalf of Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia)	422
	Germany, Federal Republic of	Mongolia	389 416
	France	Morocco	416
413	Hungary Bulgarıa Pakıstan	Netherlands	396 418
414	Indonesia	Nigeria	391 402
415 416	Mexico Morocco	Pakıstan	406 413
410	Mongolia German Democratic Republic China	Peru	432 387
417	Norway (non-member State) United States USSR Egypt (the President)	Peru (on behalf of Group of 21)	428 386
418	Ethiopia (the President) Netherlands Czechoslovakia	Poland	392 410 419 432
419	Poland	Romanıa	388 405
421	United Kingdom Viet Nam (non-member State) USSR		427

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	I. <u>Nuclea</u>	r Test Ban	
422	Spain (non-member State) Mexico (on behalf of Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico,	Srı Lanka	389 432
	Peru, Srı Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavıa	Sweden	385 411 432
423	Australıa New Zealand (non-member State)	Sweden (Chairman, <u>Ad hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts)	402 430
424	Belgium	USSR	385
425	Islamıc Republıc of Iran	COOK	386 392
426	Australia		408
	Ethiopia (the President)		417 421
427	France (the President) Romania		428 430 431
428	USSR Peru	USSR (on behalf of group of socialist States)	411
429	Japan (on behalf of group of Western countries) Mexico	United Kingdom	405 421
	German Democratic Republic Australia	United States	391
430	USSR		408 410
	Mexico Australia		417 430
	Venezuela United States		431 432
	Sweden (Chairman, Ad hoc	Yan a mua la	
	Group of Scientific Experts)	Venezuela	398 430
431	German Democratic Republic India	Yugoslavıa	391
	Australia United States	Zaire	409
	USSR	Non-Member States	
		Finland	388

[Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	I. <u>Nuclea</u>	r Test Ban	
432	Sweden United States	New Zealand	423
	Brazıl Poland Egypt	Norway	397 417
	Sri Lanka Australia	Spain	422
	Japan	Viet Nam	421
	Pakistan German Democratic Republic (on behalf of group of socialist States) France (the President)	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	385
433	Canada Algeria		
434	Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States)		

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	II. Cessation of t and nuclear di	he nuclear arms race	
385	The Secretary-General of the Conference on	Algeria	402 433
,	behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	Argentina	~ 401 412
	Mexico USSR Sweden	Australia	426
		Belgium	404 424
386	United States Cuba	Brazil	432
387	Japan Bulgarıa Peru	Bulgarıa	387 397
388	Romanıa		409 413
389	Srı Lanka Mongolıa	Bulgarıa (on behalf of group of socıalist States)	434
390	France Czechoslovakıa	Canada	433
391	United States Kenya Nigeria	China	400 416
392	India Poland	Cuba Czechoslovakıa	386 390
. 393	German Democratic Republic USSR	•	394 402 406 418
394	United States Czechoslovakia Italy	Czechoslovakıa (the President)	402 405 410
397	Bulgaria	Egypt	432
. 398	Venezuela	Egypt (the President)	411
400	China Mongolia		415 417

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	II. <u>Cessation of the</u> and nuclear dis	e nuclear arms race sarmament	
401	Argentina	Ethiopia (the President)	418 426
402	Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia (the President) Algeria	France	390 411
	Nigeria United States	France (the President)	427 435
403	Germany, Federal Republic of USSR	France (on behalf of group of Western countries)	415
404	Islamic Republic of Iran Belgıum	German Democratic Republic	393 405 406
405	United Kingdom Romania USSR Czechoslovakia (the President)		411 425 431
406	German Democratic Republic Czechoslovakia	Germany, Federal Republic of	403 411 412
	German Democratic Republic		425 428
408	India Yugoslavia United States USSR	Hungary	413 424
100	Venezuela	India	392 408 431
409	Bulgaria Zaire	Indonesia	414
410	Poland Czechoslovakıa (the President)		
411	Egypt (the President) USSR	Islamıc Republic of Iran	404 425
	Sweden German Democratic Republic	Italy	394
	Germany, Federal Republic of France	Japan	387 412
		Kenya	391

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	1	he nuclear arms race	
412	Argentina USSR	Mexico	385 415
	Japan Germany, Federal Republic of	Mongolia	389 400
413	Hungary Bulgaria Pakıstan	Morocco	427
414	Indonesia	Netherlands	418
415	Mexico	Nigeria	391 402
	Egypt (the President) France (on behalf of group of Western	Pakistan	413
	countries)	Peru	387 428
416	Morocco China	Poland	392
417	United States USSR Egypt (the President)		410 419 432
418	Ethiopia (the President) Netherlands	Romania	388 405 427
	Czechoslovakia	Sri Lanka	389
419	Poland		432
421	United Kingdom Viet Nam (non-member State) USSR	Sweden	385 411 432
422	Spain (non-member State)	USSR	385 393 403
424	Belgium New Zealand (non-member State) Hungary		405 408 411 412 417
			421 428

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	II. <u>Cessation of t</u> and nuclear di	he nuclear arms race sarmament	
425	Islamıc Republıc of Iran	United Kingdom	405 421
	German Democratic Republic United States Germany, Federal	United States	386 391 393
426	Republic of Yugoslavia Australia		402 408 417 425
427	Ethiopia (the President)		427 428 431
42/	France (the President) Romania Mongolia United States		432
428	USSR	Venezuela	398 408
	Germany, Federal Republic of Peru	Yugoslavıa	408 426
431	United States German Democratic	Zaire	409
	Republic India United States	Non-member States New Zealand	424
432	Sweden United States	Spain	422
	Brazıl Poland	Viet Nam	421 385
	Egypt Srı Lanka	of the Conference on behalf of the	303
433	Canada Algeria	Secretary-General of the United Nations	
434	Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States)		
435	France (the President)		
L	1	1	

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	III. Prevention o	f nuclear war, including	
385	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	Algeria Belgium (on behalf of group of Western countries)	40 2 433 425
206	Mexico		
386	Cuba Bulgaria	Bulgaria	387 409
388	Finland (non-member State)	Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist countries)	425
389	Mongolia United States	China	400
391	Kenya	Cuba	425 386
392	India Poland	Czechoslovakia (the President)	402
393 400	USSR China	Egypt	432
402	Czechoslovakia	Egypt (the President)	411 417
	(the President) Algeria Nigeria	Ethiopia (the President)	425 426
405	Romania USSR	France (the President)	427
406	Pakistan	Germany, Federal Republic of	411
408	India Yugoslavia United States	India	392 408 431
409	Bulgaria	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	425
410	Poland	•	

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	III. Prevention of all related ma	nuclear war, including	
411	Egypt (the President) Germany, Federal Republic of	Kenya Mexico	391 385
413	Pakistan	Mongolia	389
416	Morocco	Morocco	416
417	Egypt (the President)	Nigerla	402
419	Poland	Pakistan	406 413
422	Spain (non-member State)	Poland	392 410 419
425	Ethiopia (the President) Belgium (on behalf of group of Western countries) China Bulgarıa (on behalf of group of socialist States) India (on behalf of Group of 21)	Romania Sri Lanka Sweden	419 413 405 427 432
426	Ethiopia (the President)	USSR	393 405
427	France (the President) Romania	United States	391 408
431	India	Yugoslavıa	408
432	Sweden Poland Egypt Sri Lanka	Non-member States Finland Spain	388 422
433	Algeria	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	385

	Chronological	Alphabetical		
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	
	IV. Chemical Weapons			
385	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of	Algeria	389 402 433	
	the United Nations USSR Sweden	Argentina	401 410 428	
	United Kingdom (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons) Australia	Australia	385 408 426	
		Belgium	404	
386	United States Germany, Federal Republic of	Brazil	424	
	Poland	Bulgaria	387	
387	Japan Bulgaria Peru		409 413	
388	Finland (non-member State) Romania	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	434	
	Hungary	Canada	410	
389	USSR Germany, Federal		420 433	
	Republic of German Democratic Republic	Czechoslovakia	390 406	
	Mongolia Algeria	Czechoslovakia (the President)	40 2 410	
390	France Czechoslovakia	Egypt	432	
391	Yugoslavia United States Kenya Nigeria	Egypt (the President) Ethiopia (the President)	411	

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IV. <u>C</u>	hemical Weapons	
392	India	France	390
			400
204	#4.a.l		409
394	Italy USSR		420
	ODDIX	-	435
396	Netherlands		
		France	427
397	Norway (non-member	(the President)	435
	State)		
		German Democratic	389 411
398	Venezuela	Republic	431
	Germany, Federal Republic of		451
	Republic of	Germany, Federal	386
400	China	Republic of	389
	France		398
	Mongolia		403
			411
401	Argentina	Hungary	388
	USSR	Hungary	300
402	Czechoslovakıa	India	392
	(the President)		408
	Algeria		431
	Nigeria		
	Netherlands	Indonesia	414
403	United States	Islamic Republic	404
403	Germany, Federal	of Iran	406
	Republic of		417
	USSR		425
404	Talama Banubla of	Italy	394
404	Islamic Republic of Iran	Italy	334
	Belgium	Japan	387
	1	-	424
405	United Kingdom		
	Romania	Kenya	39⊥
	USSR	Managa	403
100	Gasabaglavakaa	Mexico	421
406	Czechoslovakıa USSR	Mongolia	389
	China	Fioligotta	400
	Islamic Republic of		416
	Iran		427

	Alphabetical	Chronological			
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV		
	IV. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>				
416	Morocco	India	408		
396 402 418	Netherlands	Yugoslavıa Australıa United States USSR	i		
391 402	Nigeria	Bulgarıa Zaıre Pakıstan	409		
409 413	Pakıstan	France			
432		Argentina Poland	410		
387 428	Peru	Canada Sweden (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on			
386 410	Poland	Chemical Weapons) Czechoslovakia			
419 432		(the President)			
434	Poland (on behalf of group of socialist States)	Egypt (the President) USSR Sweden German Democratic Republic Germany, Federal	411		
405 427		Republic of			
432	Srı Lanka	Bulgarıa France Pakıstan	413		
385 411 432	Sweden	Indonesia	414		
410 434	Sweden (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee	Morocco Mongolia	416		
707	on Chemical Weapons)	Norway (non-member State) United States Islamic Republic of Iran USSR	417		
_		United States Islamic Republic of Iran			

	Chronological	Alphabetical			
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV		
	IV. Chemical Weapons				
418	Ethiopia (the President) Netherlands USSR	USSR	385 389 394 401 403		
419	Finland (non-member State) Norway (on behalf of Canada and Norway (non-member State)) Poland		405 409 411 417 418 428 429		
420	Canada France	United Kingdom	405		
421	United Kingdom Viet Nam (non-member State) Mexico	United Kingdom (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on	385		
422	Spain (non-member State)	Chemical Weapons)	296		
424	United States Japan Belgium New Zealand (non-member State)	United States	386 391 403 408 417 424 426		
425	Islamic Republic of Iran		428 431 432		
426	Australia United States	Venezuela	398		
427	France (the President) Romanıa Mongolia	Yugoslavia Zaire	391 409		
428	USSR Argentina Peru United States				
429	USSR				

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IV. C	Chemical Weapons	
431	German Democratic Republic	Non-member States	
	India United States	Finland	388 419
432	Sweden United States	New Zealand	424
	Brazil Poland Egypt	Norway	397 417
	Sri Lanka Pakistan	Norway (on behalf of Canada and Norway)	419
433	Canada Algeria	Spain	422
		Viet Nam	421
434	Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States) Sweden (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	385
434	Poland (on behalf of group of socialist States)		
435	France (the President) France		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	V. Prevention of an	arms race in outer space	
385	The Secretary-General	Algeria	389
303	of the Conference on	1.250000	402
	behalf of the		433
	Secretary-General of		
	the United Nations	Argentina	387
	Mexico		410
	USSR		423
	Sweden	Australia	385
	Australia	Australia	392
386	United States		408
500	On I cou based		426
387	Argentina		
	Bulgaria	Belgium	404
	Peru		424
388	Finland (non-member State)	Bulgarıa	387
300	Romania (non-member state)	Buigaria	402
	Hungary		413
			425
389	Srı Lanka		1
	German Democratic Republic	Bulgaria (on behalf of group	434
	Mongolia	of socialist States)	
	Algeria	Canada	402
390	France	Canada	410
330	Czechoslovakia		423
			433
391	Yugoslavia		
	Kenya	China	400
	Nigeria		423
392	India	China (the President)	392
	United States		
	China (the President)	Cuba (the President)	394
	Mexico		
	Australia	Czechoslovakıa	390
	Venezuela		394 402
	Mongolia		402
393	USSR		418
	United States		

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	V. Prevention of an arms race in outer space		
394	Italy Czechoslovakia Cuba (the President)	Czechoslovakıa (the President)	402 410
396	Netherlands	Egypt	432
397	Norway (non-member State) USSR	Egypt (the President)	411
398	Venezuela	Ethiopia (the President)	418
400	China Mongolia	France	390 416
402	Czechoslovakia	France (the President)	435
402	Czechoslovakia (the President) Poland Algeria	France (on behalf of group of Western countries)	405
	Bulgaria Canada United States	German Democratic Republic	389 425
403	Germany, Federal Republic of USSR United States	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of German Democratic Republic and Mongolia) Germany, Federal Republic of	427 403
404	Islamic Republic of Iran Sri Lanka	Hungary	388 424
405	Belgium United Kingdom Romania France (on behalf of group of Western countries)	India Islamic Republic of Iran	392 408 431 423
406	Czechoslovakia Srı Lanka		425
408	India Yugoslavia Australia USSR	Italy Italy (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space)	394 434
409	Zaire	Japan	419

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	V. Prevention of an arms race in outer space		
410	Argentina Poland	Kenya	391 385
	Canada Czechoslovakıa (the President)	Mexico	392 415
411	Egypt (the President) Sweden	Mongolia	392 389
413	Bulgarıa Pakıstan		400
415	Mexico	Mongolia (on behalf of group of socialist States)	427
416	Morocco France	Morocco	416
418	Ethiopia (the President) Netherlands	Netherlands	396 418
	Czechoslovakıa	Nigeria	391
419	Japan	Pakıstan	413 432
421	Viet Nam (non-member State)	Peru	387 428
422	Spain (non-member State) Argentina	Poland	402
423	India Canada China	FOTAIN	410 432
424	Belgium Hungary	Romania	388 405 427
425	Islamic Republic of Iran Bulgaria German Democratic Republic	Srı Lanka	389 404 406
426	Australia	Sweden	432 385
427	German Democratic Republic and Mongolia Romania Mongolia (on behalf of group of socialist States)	Sweden	411 430 432

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	V. Prevention of an arms race in outer space		
428	USSR Peru	USSR	385 393 397
430	Sweden USSR		403 408 428
431	India		430
432	Sweden United States Poland Egypt Sri Lanka Pakistan	United Kingdom United States	405 386 392 393 402 403
433	Canada Algeria		432
434	Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States) Italy (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space)	Venezuela Yugoslavia Zaire	392 398 391 408
435	France (the President)	Non-member States	
		Finland	388
		Norway	397
		Spain	422
		Viet Ņam	421
		The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	385

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VI. Effective international non-nuclear-weapon State threat of use of nuclear	es against the use or	
385	Sweden	Argentina	401
387	China (the President)	Bulgarıa	425
389	Egypt	China (the President)	387
391	Kenya	Czechoslovakıa (the President)	410
403	Nigeria	Egypt	389 432
401	Argentina	Fount (the Bornellant)	
403	Germany, Federal Republic of	Egypt (the President)	411
404	Islamıc Republıc of Iran	Ethiopia (the President)	418
405	United Kingdom	France (the President)	434
406	Pakistan	Germany, Federal Republic of	403
408 410	Yugoslavıa Poland	Germany, Federal Republic of (Chairman), Ad hoc Committee on Negative	433
410	Czechoslovakia (the President)	Security Assurances)	
411	Egypt (the President) Sweden	Hungary	413
413	Hungary	Islamıc Republıc of Iran	404 425
416	Morocco	Kenya	391
418	Ethiopia (the President)	Morocco	416
419	Finland (non-member State)	Nigeria	391
421	Nigeria	Delegator	421
422	Spain (non-member State)	Pakıstan	406 432
425	Islamıc Republıc of Iran Bulgarıa	Poland	410 432

1	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VI. Effective internationa non-nuclear-weapon Sta threat of use of nucle	tes against the use or	
432	United States Poland	Sri Lanka	432
	Egypt Sri Lanka	Sweden	385 411
433	Pakistan	United Kingdom	405
433	Germany, Federal Republic of (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Negative	United States	432
	Security Assurances)	Yugoslavia	408
434	France (the President)	Non-member States Finland	419
		Spain	422
			}

VII. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons 385 Sweden Algeria 38 387 China (the President) Argentina 40 388 Romania Belgium 40 389 Germany, Federal Republic of Algeria Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States) 396 Netherlands Canada 43 397 USSR China (the President) 38 398 Cuba (the President) Cuba (the President) 39 401 Argentina Czechoslovakia (the President) 41 402 Czechoslovakia (the President) 41 403 Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt 43 404 Islamic Republic of Iran Belgium 40 405 United Kingdom Bethiopia (the President) 41 406 Pakistan France 42 407 Yugoslavia 43 408 Yugoslavia 440 Czechoslovakia (the President) 411 409 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 412 410 Egypt (the President) 413 411 Egypt (the President) 414 412 Egypt (the President) 415 413 Bulgaria Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran 406 414 Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran 406		Chronological	Alphabetical	
Systems of such weapons: radiological weapons 385 Sweden Algeria Algeria 386 Algeria Argentina 40 42 42 389 Germany, Federal Republic of Algeria Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States) 43 397 USSR Canada Canada 43 398 Cuba (the President) Cuba (the President) 398 Cuba (the President) Cuba (the President) 401 Argentina Czechoslovakia (the President) 402 Czechoslovakia (the President) 403 Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt 43 404 Islamic Republic of Iran Belgium Ethiopia (the President) 410 406 Pakistan France 42 42 42 43 440 440 Foland Czechoslovakia (the President) 440 Foland Czechoslovakia (the President) 441 Egypt (the President) 442 444 Egypt (the President) 445 Germany, Federal Republic of 446 446 Foland Czechoslovakia (the President) 447 448 Foland 448 449	PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
387China (the President)Argentina40388RomaniaBelgium40389Germany, Federal Republic of AlgeriaBulgaria41391KenyaBulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States)43396NetherlandsCanada43397USSRChina (the President)38401ArgentinaCzechoslovakia (the President)39402Czechoslovakia (the President)41403Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt43404Islamic Republic of Iran BelgiumEgypt (the President)41405United KingdomEthiopia (the President)41406PakistanFrance42408YugoslaviaGermany, Federal Republic of 38410Poland Czechoslovakia (the President)Hungary (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons)Committee on Radiological Weapons)413BulgariaIndonesia41414IndonesiaIslamic Republic of Iran40				
388 Romania Belgium 40 42 42 43 44 44 44 Indonesia Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran Bulgaria 40 42 42 43 44 44 44 Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran Bulgaria 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 4	385	Sweden	Algeria	389
Germany, Federal Republic of Algeria 391 Kenya 396 Netherlands 397 USSR 398 Cuba (the President) 401 Argentina 402 Czechoslovakia (the President) 403 Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt 404 Islamic Republic of Iran Belgium 405 United Kingdom 406 Pakistan 407 Yugoslavia 408 Yugoslavia 408 Yugoslavia 409 Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt 400 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 401 Egypt (the President) 402 Bermany, Federal Republic of Egypt 403 Germany, Federal Republic of Iran Belgium 405 United Kingdom 406 Fakistan 407 France 408 Yugoslavia 408 Yugoslavia 409 Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt 410 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 411 Egypt (the President) 412 Egypt (the President) 413 Bulgaria 414 Indonesia 415 Indonesia 416 Islamic Republic of Iran 417 Islamic Republic of Iran 418 Islamic Republic of Iran 419 Islamic Republic of Iran 410 Islamic Republic of Iran 411 Indonesia 412 Islamic Republic of Iran 413 Islamic Republic of Iran 414 Islamic Republic of Iran	387	China (the President)	Argentina	401
389 Germany, Federal Republic of Algeria 391 Kenya 396 Netherlands 397 USSR 398 Cuba (the President) 401 Argentina 402 Czechoslovakia (the President) 403 Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt 404 Islamic Republic of Iran Belgium 405 United Kingdom 406 Pakistan 407 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 408 Yugoslavia 409 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 410 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 421 Hungary (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons) 422 Weapons) 433 Bulgaria 444 Indonesia 445 Islamic Republic of Iran 446 Islamic Republic of Iran 447 Islamic Republic of Iran 448 Yugoslavia 449 Islamic Republic of Iran 440 Islamic Republic of Iran 441 Islamic Republic of Iran 442 Indonesia 443 Islamic Republic of Iran 444 Indonesia 445 Islamic Republic of Iran 446 Islamic Republic of Iran 447 Islamic Republic of Iran 448 Islamic Republic of Iran 449 Islamic Republic of Iran 440 Islamic Republic of Iran 440 Islamic Republic of Iran 441 Indonesia 440 Islamic Republic of Iran 440 Islamic Republic of Iran 440 Islamic Republic of Iran	388	Romania	Belgium	404
396 Netherlands 397 USSR 398 Cuba (the President) 401 Argentina 402 Czechoslovakia (the President) 403 Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt 404 Islamic Republic of Iran Belgium 405 United Kingdom 406 Pakistan 407 Yugoslavia 410 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 410 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 411 Egypt (the President) 412 Egypt (the President) 413 Bulgaria 414 Indonesia 415 Indonesia 416 Islamic Republic of Iran 417 Islamic Republic of Iran 418 Islamic Republic of Iran 419 Islamic Republic of Iran 410 Islamic Republic of Iran 411 Egypt (the President) 412 Indonesia 413 Islamic Republic of Iran 414 Indonesia 415 Islamic Republic of Iran 416 Islamic Republic of Iran 417 Islamic Republic of Iran 418 Islamic Republic of Iran 419 Islamic Republic of Iran 410 Islamic Republic of Iran 411 Islamic Republic of Iran 412 Islamic Republic of Iran	389	-	Bulgaria	424
USSR Cuba (the President) Argentina Czechoslovakia (the President) Czechoslovakia Egypt Canada China (the President) Special (the President) Czechoslovakia Egypt Canada China (the President) Special (the President) Egypt Czechoslovakia Egypt Canada China (the President) Special (the President) Egypt Czechoslovakia Ethiopia (the President) France 42 43 43 44 45 Czechoslovakia Ethiopia (the President) France 42 Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Ethiopia (the President) France 43 Hungary (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons) France Committee on Radiological Weapons) Indonesia Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran 40	391	Kenya		434
Cuba (the President) Egypt Cuba (the President) Egypt Cuba (the President) Egypt Egypt Cuba (the President) France 42 43 44 44 45 46 Cuba (the President) Egypt Egypt Cuba (the President) France 42 43 44 44 45 46 46 47 47 48 49 40 Committee on Radiological Weapons) Fundonesia	396	Netherlands	Canada	433
Cuba (the President) Argentina Czechoslovakia (the President) Czechoslovakia Egypt Egypt Cuba (the President) Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Egypt Cuba (the President) Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Egypt Cuba (the President) Czechoslovakia Egypt Czechoslovakia Egypt Cuba (the President) Egypt Czechoslovakia Egypt Cthe President) France Czechoslovakia Ethiopia (the President) France 42 43 43 40 Czechoslovakia Egypt (the President) France 42 43 Germany, Federal Republic of Committee on Radiological Weapons) Indonesia Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran 40	397	USSR	China (the President)	387
401 Argentina 402 Czechoslovakia (the President) 403 Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt 404 Islamic Republic of Iran Belgium 405 United Kingdom 406 Pakistan 407 France 408 Yugoslavia 410 Poland 610 Czechoslovakia (the President) 411 Egypt (the President) 412 Egypt (the President) 413 Bulgaria 414 Indonesia 415 Islamic Republic of Iran 416 Islamic Republic of Iran 417 Islamic Republic of Iran 418 Islamic Republic of Iran 419 Islamic Republic of Iran 410 Islamic Republic of Iran 411 Islamic Republic of Iran 412 Islamic Republic of Iran 413 Islamic Republic of Iran 414 Islamic Republic of Iran 415 Islamic Republic of Iran 416 Islamic Republic of Iran 417 Islamic Republic of Iran 418 Islamic Republic of Iran 419 Islamic Republic of Iran 410 Islamic Republic of Iran	398	Cuba (the President)		398
402 Czechoslovakia (the President) 403 Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt 43 404 Islamic Republic of Iran Belgium 405 United Kingdom 406 Pakistan 408 Yugoslavia 410 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 411 Egypt (the President) 412 Egypt (the President) 413 Bulgaria 414 Indonesia 415 Islamic Republic of Iran 416 Islamic Republic of Iran 417 Islamic Republic of Iran 418 Islamic Republic of Iran 419 Islamic Republic of Iran 410 Islamic Republic of Iran 411 Islamic Republic of Iran 412 Islamic Republic of Iran 413 Islamic Republic of Iran 414 Islamic Republic of Iran	401	Argentina	·	402
Islamic Republic of Iran Belgium United Kingdom Ethiopia (the President) Pakistan Yugoslavia Poland Czechoslovakıa (the President) Egypt (the President) France Germany, Federal Republic of Hungary (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons) Hungary Committee on Radiological Weapons) Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran Islamic Republic of Iran	402	Czechoslovakia (the President)	CZECIIOSIOVAKIA	410
Belgium Belgium United Kingdom Ethiopia (the President) 41 406 Pakistan France 42 43 408 Yugoslavia Germany, Federal Republic of 40 Czechoslovakia (the President) Hungary (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons) 413 Bulgaria Indonesia Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran 40	403	Germany, Federal Republic of	Egypt	432
406 Pakistan 408 Yugoslavia 410 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 411 Egypt (the President) Sweden 413 Bulgaria 414 Indonesia France 42 43 Germany, Federal Republic of Hungary (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons) 413 Indonesia 414 Indonesia 42 43 445 446 France 42 43 Germany, Federal Republic of 440 Committee on Radiological Weapons) 441 442 443 444 444 444 444 445 446 446	404	-	Egypt (the President)	411 417
408 Yugoslavia 410 Poland Czechoslovakıa (the President) 411 Egypt (the President) Sweden 413 Bulgaria 414 Indonesia 415 Germany, Federal Republic of 416 Hungary (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons) 417 Indonesia 418 Indonesia 419 Indonesia 419 Indonesia 410 Committee on Radiological Weapons) 410 Indonesia 411 Indonesia 411 Indonesia 412 Indonesia 413 Indonesia	405	United Kingdom	Ethiopia (the President)	418
408 Yugoslavia 410 Poland Czechoslovakıa (the President) 411 Egypt (the President) Sweden 413 Bulgaria 414 Indonesia Germany, Federal Republic of Hungary (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons) Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran 40	406	Pakistan	France	427
410 Poland Czechoslovakia (the President) 411 Egypt (the President) Sweden 413 Bulgaria 414 Indonesia 415 Indonesia 416 Indonesia 417 Indonesia 418 Indonesia 419 Indonesia 410 Indonesia	408	Yugoslavia	Commun. Nodował nawyblie of	
411 Egypt (the President) Committee on Radiological Weapons) 413 Bulgaria Indonesia 41 414 Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran 40	410		- 1	403
414 Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran 40	411		Committee on Radiological	431
	413	Bulgaria	Indonesia	414
416 Morocco Kenya 39	414	Indonesia	Islamic Republic of Iran	404
	416	Morocco	Kenya	391
417 Egypt (the President) Morocco 41	417	Egypt (the President)	Morocco	416

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. New types of weapons of systems of such weapons	mass destruction and new radiological weapons	
418	Ethiopia (the President)	Netherlands	396
422	Spain (non-member State)	Pakıstan	406
424	Belgium		432
427	France (the President)	Peru	428
	Romania	Poland	410 432
428	Peru	Romania	388
430	Sweden		427
431	Hungary (Chairman, Ad hoc Committee on	Sweden	385 411
	Radiological Weapons)		430
432	United States Poland	USSR	397
	Egypt Pakistan	United Kingdom	405
433	Canada	United States	432
	France (the President)	Yugoslavia	408
434	Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States)	Non-member State	
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Spain	422

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VIII. Comprehensive programme of disarmament		
385	Mexico	Algeria	389 402
387	Argentina Japan		433
	Bulgaria Peru	Argentina	387
388	Romania	Australia	408 426
389	Germany, Federal Republic of Algeria	Australia (on behalf of group of Western countries and	434
390	Czechoslovakıa	Norway (non-member))	404
391	Yugoslavıa Kenya	Belgium Brazil	432
392	Nigeria India	Bulgarıa	387 413
396	Netherlands	Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States)	434
397	Norway (non-member State)	Canada	433
400	Mongolia	Czechoslovakıa	390
402	Czechoslovakia (the President) Algeria Nigeria		406 432
404	Islamıc Republıc of Iran Belgium	Czechoslovakıa (the President)	402 405 410
405	Czechoslovakia (the President) United Kingdom	Czechoslovakıa (on behalf of group of socialist States)	426
406	Czechoslovakıa	Egypt	432
408	Yugoslavıa Australıa	Egypt (the President)	411
409	Zaire	Ethiopia (the President) France (the President)	418
410	Poland Czechoslovakıa (the President)	Germany, Federal Republic of	435 389

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VIII. Comprehensive programme of disarmament		
411	Egypt (the President) Sweden	India	392 431
413	Bulgaria Pakistan	Islamıc Republic of Iran	404
416	Morocco	Japan Kenya	387 391
418	Ethiopia (the President)	Mexico	385
419	Poland Spain (non-member State)	Mexico (Chairman, <u>Ad hoc</u> Committee on Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament)	434
426	Australia Czechoslovakia (on behalf of group of socialist States)	Mongolia	400
427	France (the President) Romanıa	Morocco Netherlands	416 396
428	Peru	Nigeria	391 402
431	India		402
432	United States Brazil Poland	Pakıstan	413 432
	Egypt Sri Lanka	Peru	428
	Pakıstan Czechoslovakia	Poland	410 419 432
433	Canada Algeria	Romania	388 427
434	Bulgaria (on behalf of group of socialist States)	Srı Lanka	432
	Mexico (Chairman, <u>Ad hoc</u> Committee on Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament)	Sweden	411
	Australia (on behalf of group of Western countries and	United Kingdom	405
	Norway (non-member))	United States	432

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	3	PV
	VIII. Comprehensive programme of disarmament		
435	France (the President)	Yugoslavia	391 408
		Zaıre	409
		Non-Member States	
		Norway	397
		Spain	422
	•		
			1
}			
		<u> </u>	

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me	race and disarmament	
	1. Annual Report of	the Secretary-General	
385	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General	Brazil Bulgaria	392 387
387	of the United Nations Bulgaria	The Secretary-General of the Conference on	385
392	Brazil	Secretary-General of the United Nations	

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me 2. Special sessions of devoted to disarmatical devoted devoted to disarmatical devoted	race and disarmament asures f the General Assembly	
385	Sweden	Algeria	389 402
387	Peru	Australia	408
389	Algeria	Bulgarıa	413
391	Yugoslavia Kenya	Canada	433
400	Nigeria	France (the President)	435
402 405	Algeria United Kingdom	India	408
408	India	Indonesia	414
400	Yugoslavia Australia	Kenya	391
411	Sweden	Morocco	416
413	Bulgaria	Netherlands	418
414	Indonesia	Nigeria	391
416	Morocco	Peru Sri Lanka	432
418	Netherlands	Sweden	385
426	Yugoslavia		411
432	Sri Lanka	United Kingdom	405
433	Canada	Yugoslavia	391 408
435	France (the President)		426

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me	race and disarmament	
	3. <u>Veri</u>	fication	
386	United States	Australia	423 432
397	USSR	Canada	420
405	USSR	Canada	423 433
411	USSR German Democratic Republic	France (the President)	435
413	Hungary	German Democratic Republic	411 416
416	Mongolia German Democratic Republic	Hungary	413
417	United States	Mongolia	416
418	Netherlands	Netherlands	418
420	Canada	Poland	432
423	Australia Canada	Sweden	432
428	USSR	USSR	397 405
430	USSR		411 428
432	Sweden		430
	United States Poland Australia	United States	386 417 432
433	Canada		
435	France (the President)		

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
		mer areas dealing with the many many many many many many many many	
	4. Nuclear-w	eapon-free zones	
385	Australia Mexico	Australia	385 387
387	Peru Australia	China	400
388	Romania	German Democratic Republic	389
	New Zealand (non-member State)	Indonesia	414
389	Sri Lanka	Kenya	391
	German Democratic Republic Mongolia	Mexico	385
391	Kenya	Mongolia	389
396	Netherlands	Netherlands	396
400	China	Pakistan _	406
406	Pakistan	Peru	387 428
409	Zaire	Romania	388 427
414	Indonesia	Sri Lanka	389
421	Viet Nam (non-member State)	Sweden	432
424	New Zealand (non-member State)	Zaire	409
427	Romania	Non-member States	
428	Peru	New Zealand	388 424
432	Sweden	Viet Nam	421
,			

389 410
410
410
410
40.5
406
387
417
397
422

er PV
<u>he</u>
410
402
385
409
1 385 on
of

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me	race and disarmament	
389	Algeria	Algeria	389
405	United Kingdom	Indonesia	414
406	USSR	Mexico	421
408	United States	Poland	410
410	Poland	USSR	406
414	Indonesia	United Kingdom	405
421	Mexico	United States	408
L			

	Chronological .	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me	race and disarmament	
	8. Conventi	onal_weapons	
390	France	Australia	408
391	Yugoslavia	Belgium	424
396	Netherlands	China	400
397	Norway (non-member State)	Czechoslovakia	406
400	China	France	390
401	USSR	German Democratic Republic	411
403	Germany, Federal Republic of	Germany, Federal Republic of	403 411
405	Romania	Hungary	413
406	Czechoslovakia	Mongolia	416
408	Australia United States	Netherlands	396 418
411	German Democratic Republic Germany, Federal Republic of	Poland	419 432
412	USSR	Romania	405
413	Hungary	USSR	401 412
416	Mongolia		421
418	Netherlands	United Kingdom	421
419	Poland	United States	408
421	United Kingdom USSR	Yugoslavia	391 426

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	cessation of the arm and other relevant m	er areas dealing with the s race and disarmament easures ional weapons	
422	Spain (non-member State)	Non-member States	
424	Belgium	Norway	397
426	Yugoslavia	Spain	422
432	Poland		
			ļ
		1	L

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of other cessation of the arms and other relevant mea	race and disarmament	
387	Peru	Algeria	433
392	Poland	German Democratic Republic	411
401	USSR	Islamic Republic of Iran	404
404	Islamic Republic of Iran	Peru	387
408	USSR	Poland	392
411	German Democratic Republic	USSR	401 408
421	Viet Nam (non-member State)		421
404	USSR	Yugoslavia	426
424	New Zealand (non-member State)	Non-member States	
426	Yugoslavia	New Zealand	424
433	Algeria	Viet Nam	421
			:

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
PV 391 392 410 414 421 427 432	Country/Speaker IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me	Country/Speaker er areas dealing with the race and disarmament	PV 410 392 432 414 427 391
		1	

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	and other relevant me	r areas dealing with the race and disarmament	
386	United States	Kenya	391
388	Romania	Romania	388
391	Kenya	United States	386
1			1

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me	race and disarmament	
	12. Confidence-	building measures	
385	The Secretary-General of the Conference on	Czechoslovia	406
1	behalf of the Secretary-General of	France	390
	the United Nations Sweden	German Democratic Republic	389
387	Peru	Germany, Federal Republic of	411
388	Finland (non-member State)	Hungary	388
	Romania Hungary	Indonesia	414
389	USSR	Islamic Republic of Iran	404
303	German Democratic Republic	Netherlands	418
390	France	Peru	387
391	Yugoslavia	Poland	392 432
392	Poland	Romania	388
397	Norway (non-member State)	Nomenta	300
401	USSR	Sweden	385 432
404	Islamic Republic of Iran	USSR	389
405	USSR		401 405
406	Czechoslovakia		412 428
411	Germany, Federal Republic of	United Kingdom	421
412	USSR	United States	417
			432
414	Indonesia	Yugoslavia	391
417	United States		
418	Netherlands		

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me	race and disarmament	
	12. Confidence-b	ouilding measures	
421	United Kingdom	Non-member States	
428	USSR	Finland	388
432	Sweden United States Poland	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	397 385

Chronological		_	Alphabetical	
PV	Co	ountry/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	ıx.	IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures		
		13. Disarmament and	international security	
385	USSR		China	400
388	Hungary		Hungary	388
400	China		Sweden	432
432	Sweden		USSR	385
	:			
f 				

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
387 389	IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me	race and disarmament	402 390
390	France	France (the President)	427
391	Yugoslavia Kenya	India	392 408
392	India	Kenya	391
397	Norway (non-member State)	Netherlands	418
402	Algeria	Peru	387
405	United Kingdom	Sri Lanka	389
408	India Yugoslavia Zaire	United Kingdom Yugoslavia	405 391 408 426
418 426 427	Netherlands Yugoslavia France (the President)	Zaire Non-member State	409
		Norway	397

	Chronological	Alphabetical		
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	
	IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures 15. General and complete disarmament			
385	China (the President) The Secretary-General of	Argentina	387 401	
	the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations USSR	Belgium Bulgaria	424	
386	United States Cuba	Canada	423 433	
387	Argentina Japan Bulgaria	China China (the President)	400 385	
388	Peru Finland (non-member State)	Cuba	386	
300	Romania Hungary	Cuba (the President)	393	
389	USSR Sri Lanka	Czechoslovakia	390 402	
	German Democratic Republic Mongolia	France (the President)	390 435	
390	France Czechoslovakia	German Democratic Republic	389 411	
391	Yugoslavia Kenya Nigeria	Hungary	388	
392	India Poland United States	India Islamic Republic of Iran	392 404	
393	Cuba (the President)	Italy Japan	394 387	
394 396	Italy Netherlands	Kenya	391	
397	Norway (non-member State)	Mongolia	389 416	

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me	race and disarmament	
400	China	Netherlands	396
401	Argentina USSR	Nigerıa	418 391
402	Czechoslovakia	Peru	387
404	Islamic Republic of Iran	Poland	392 432
405	United Kingdom USSR	Romania	388 427
409	Zaire	Sri Lanka	389
411	Sweden German Democratic Republic	Sweden	411 432
412	USSR	USSR	385
416	Mongolia		389 401
418	Netherlands		405 412 428
421	United Kingdom Viet Nam (non-member State)	United Kingdom	405
423	Canada	, and the second	421
424	Belgium	United States	386 392
426	Yugoslavia	Yugoslavia	391
427	Romania		426
428	USSR	Zaire	409
L			1

		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of othe cessation of the arms and other relevant me	race and disarmament	
	15. General and co	omplete disarmament	
432	Sweden Poland	Non-member States	
433	Canada	Finland	388
435	France (the President)	Norway	397
		Viet Nam	421
		The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	385

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures 16. Naval arms race		
388	Finland (non-member State)	Sweden	432
432	Sweden	Non-member State	
		Finland	388
			İ
			!

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.385 3 February 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 3 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 1987 session and the 385th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Today we are all saddened by the sudden loss of a colleague and friend who devoted all his energies to the work of the Conference.

Ambassador Donald Lowitz will always be remembered by us as a man of integrity, competence and good will who not only represented his country with distinction, but also gained our friendship and respect. He was our President at the opening of the 1985 session, when he had just been appointed to lead his country's delegation, and he showed then those professional and personal qualities which we all came to admire so much. On behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and of the delegation of China, I extend to the delegation of the United States of America and to his family our deeply felt condolences and sympathy at such a tragic moment. Now may I suggest that we observe a minute's silence in memory of our esteemed colleague.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Morelli Pando.

Mr. MORELLI PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Speaking, on behalf of the Group of 21, I wish to say that we are deeply grieved by the death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz, the representative of the United States of America.

Ambassador Lowitz passed away at a time when he was dedicated heart and soul to his high office and when it was expected that he would continue to serve for a long time as the representative of a country that carries considerable weight in world affairs.

From his assumption of his post, together with the presidency of this body, at the beginning of the 1985 session, Ambassador Lowitz was held in high esteem by his colleagues for the way in which he performed his official duties, for his outstanding academic qualifications and for his personal qualities, which are now remembered with gratitude and respect.

The Group of 21 wishes on this occasion to express its condolences to the delegation of the United States of America, and, through it, to the United States Government, as well as to the wife and other members of the family of Ambassador Lowitz.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): We were profoundly shocked and grieved to learn of the sudden and totally unexpected passing away of the Head of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, His Excellency Ambassador Donald Lowitz. With this tragic event I would like to offer the heartfelt condolences of the Group of socialist countries. Together with the other delegations we mourn, in Ambassador Lowitz, a diplomat who served his country for several years in the Conference on Disarmament. We

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

have lost a colleague whose personal integrity, intellectual qualities and sincerity were valued by everyone. His abilities were particularly manifest two years ago when he chaired the Conference as a fair and even-handed President. May I ask the United States delegation to convey to the family of Ambassador Lowitz, as well as to his Government, my Group's deepest sympathy. Ambassador Lowitz will be long remembered as an outstanding person. We shall miss him here.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. Now I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Thank you, Mr. President. I have the honour to make the following statement on behalf of the Western Group of States members of the Conference on Disarmament.

Exactly two years ago, on 4 February 1985, Ambassador Donald Lowitz presented his letter of appointment by the President of the United States of America as United States Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. Just two days ago, this past weekend, Ambassador Lowitz died in Geneva. He was 57 years of age, he had shared 35 of those years with his wife, Shana, with whom he had children and then grandchildren. Ambassador Lowitz was at this Conference for a relatively short time but the mark he left here will endure for a very, very long time.

As Don Lowitz often said himself, he was not a professional diplomat, in the sense that he had not spent all of his professional life in the conduct of foreign relations. Indeed, he often described himself as simply a lawyer from Chicago. Yet Donald Lowitz showed us all the craft, the skill of diplomacy at its highest. He was scrupulously honest. He never sought to mislead anyone. He listened hard to all points of view and, I suspect, especially to those with which he thought he might conceivably have difficulty. Thus, his scrupulous personal honesty was also translated into fairness to others. He joined argument and negotiation vigorously, seeking to leave no one in any doubt or lack of clarity about the position of the Government that he was so proud to represent, and which he represented completely faithfully. And, when compromise could be reached, he would show generosity of spirit and join in that compromise.

The Western States members of this Conference mourn the loss of a valued colleague and friend. We know that the purposes of this Conference were greatly served by Donald Lowitz's presence at it. We feel great sympathy towards his wife, Shana, and the members of his family. Their loss is as grave as it was sudden and we collectively convey this expression of sympathy to the Lowitz family. We know, too, that the Government and people of the United States of America have lost an immensely skilled official and devoted public servant and we ask the Acting Head of the delegation of the United States of America to convey to the United States authorities our expression of sympathy for their loss of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. He combined qualities of personal integrity, patriotism and deep religious faith in a way that was rare and of inestimable value to all and we will all miss him.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Australia for his statment. The representative of the United States of America, Mr. Barthelemey, has asked for the floor, and I now give him the floor.

Mr. BARTHELEMEY (United States of America): The United States delegation acknowledges with gratitude the expressions of condolence that have just been offered by yourself, and by representatives of the Group of 21, the Group of socialist States and the Western Group on the sad occasion of the death of the leader of the United States delegation, Ambassador Donald Lowitz. We have also been moved by the generous words spoken to us by other colleagues here. The delegation will ensure that they are transmitted to Mrs. Lowitz and her family, as well as to Washington.

Ambassador Lowitz's death was, of course, a great shock to us. He had just returned to Geneva from the United States eager to renew the pursuit of the diverse goals of this Conference, in particular the chemical weapons negotiations. Ambassador Lowitz was immensely proud to have been chosen by President Reagan to represent the American people in this unique negotiating Conference and in the United Nations, for he believed profoundly that nations must be steadfast in the defence of their freedom and security but must also summon the will and wisdom to reduce weaponry and the danger of war.

In the two years that he served here, Donald Lowitz gained not only the respect, but also the affection of his delegation. The statements we have heard this morning are testimony to the esteem of his colleagues as well. It is a respect and affection that he earned by his integrity in representing the views of his Government; by his painstaking attention to all aspects of the issues and his quick grasp of their subtleties; by his willingness to listen carefully to the views of others; by his generosity of spirit and by his wit and good humour. We shall miss Don Lowitz very much.

Mrs. Lowitz has graciously consented to the request of the United States delegation that I share with you a message to her from the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan. I would like to read that message:

"February 2, 1987. Dear Mrs. Lowitz, I was saddened to learn of the death of your husband. Please accept my heartfelt condolences. Ambassador Lowitz will be remembered as a public servant of the highest distinction. As United States representative to the Conference on Disarmament and to the United Nations First Committee he pursued with imagination and energy the security of the United States. His negotiations toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons and other important United States arms control efforts promoted world peace and stability. In all of his efforts his deep humanity won him the affection and respect of his colleagues, both American and foreign. We shall all miss Ambassador Lowitz. Our best tribute to him will be to continue to pursue the goals to which he was dedicated and to pursue them in the same humane spirit he constantly exhibited. Signed, Ronald Reagan."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. I thank everyone. We shall now continue with our proceedings.

I am sure that all members join me in extending our thanks to Ambassador Alan Beesley, of Canada, for the brilliant manner in which he presided over the Conference during the month of August and the inter-sessional period. His rich diplomatic experience, tact and dedication to the work of the Conference were brought to bear in resolving a number of delicate questions facing the Conference at the time.

On behalf of the Conference, allow me to extend a warm welcome to the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Mr. Yuli Vorontsov, who will be addressing the Conference later today. I need hardly elaborate on Mr. Vorontsov's great knowledge in matters of disarmament, which makes him an eminent leader of the Soviet delegation in bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms. I am sure that members will be following his statement with particular interest.

I would like also to bid farewell to our colleagues who have left the Conference during the inter-sessional period to follow other pursuits: the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutowardoyo; the representative of Italy, Ambassador Franceschi; the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan; and the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas. Both Ambassador Issraelyan and Ambassador Vidas chaired this Conference during their tenure as representatives of their countries. The very effective manner in which they discharged their duties was appreciated by all of us. We wish all the above representatives every success in their future endeavours. I should like to recall that Ambassador Issraelyan was one of the deans among the representatives to the Conference on Disarmament, which he joined upon its constitution in its present form. He is also a veteran. He served his country with distinction and won the respect of all his colleagues.

As President of this Conference, I would also like, on behalf of you all, to extend a warm welcome to the new representatives who are joining us for the first time: Ambassador Hacene, of Algeria: Ambassador Barbosa, of Brazil: Ambassador Morel, of France; Ambassador Pugliese, of Italy; Ambassador Yamada, of Japan; Ambassador Dolgu, of Romania; Ambassador Nazarkine, of the USSR; and Ambassador Kosin, of Yugoslavia. We are sure all these new delegates and colleagues will support us in handling the difficult tasks confronting us in the coming weeks and I am sure that we are all looking forward to co-operating with them in our daily work.

I wish also to note the presence among us of the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Erik Suy, who has very kindly provided effective servicing for the Conference during his tenure in office in Geneva. I understand that he will be leaving us soon and I extend to him all our best wishes for his future personal and professional life. May I also extend a

(The President)

cordial welcome to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Jan Martenson, who is present at our proceedings today. In doing so, I should like to note that he will soon be leaving this important function and assuming others which will keep him also in close contact with the Conference. He has served as Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs for more than seven years and during that period his department has serviced this Conference with devotion and effectiveness. I am sure we all thank him for that and wish him every success in his new post.

Now, as President of the Conference, I have the honour to present to the Conference a message by the State Councillor and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, Wu Xuegian, which reads as follows:

"On the occasion of the commencement of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in 1987, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Chinese Government, our warm congratulations and cordial greetings to the distinguished representatives from various countries. Nineteen eighty-six was designated as the International Year of Peace. Over the year, the people of the world expressed their earnest desire for world peace in various ways, demonstrating their determination to strengthen unity, safeguard peace and oppose war. The continuous expansion of the forces for peace has become an irresistible historical trend.

However, the turbulent world situation shows that the danger of war is not yet past. Regional conflicts remain unsettled and the arms race continues unabated, posing a grave threat to world peace and security. The world's people strongly demand that the countries which bear a 'special responsibility' for putting an end to the arms race conduct serious negotiations in conformity with the trend of the times so as to reach an early agreement contributing to the maintenance of world peace without prejudice to the interests of other countries and that they fulfil in real earnest the obligations of 'taking the lead' in drastically reducing armaments.

The preservation of world peace and security and the realization of genuine disarmament are the common aspirations of the people of all countries and also the main task of the Conference on Disarmament. China has always held that the question of disarmament concerns the security interests of all countries and that all countries, big or small, strong or weak, should have equal rights to join in the discussion and settlement of the question. The institution of the Conference on Disarmament has changed the situation in which only a few countries monopolized disarmament negotiations and it has provided the small and medium-sized countries with an important forum for participation in the settlement of disarmament questions. As the sole international body for multilateral disarmament negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament has over the past few years done a great deal of useful work in pushing forward the international disarmament process. The non-aligned and neutral countries have played an important role in this respect. However, for reasons known to all, the Conference on Disarmament has made little progress on most of the major issues, much to the dissatisfaction of the people.

(The President)

China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It opposes the arms race and actively supports and advances proposals and propositions on disarmament which contribute to the maintenance of world peace and security. It has also taken serious major steps of practical significance concerning disarmament. This fully demonstrates the Chinese Government's sincerity in disarmament. Together with the people of other countries, the Chinese people will make unremitting efforts to build a world of lasting peace, prosperity and development, as well as equality and co-operation.

The Chinese Government attaches great importance to the role of the Conference on Disarmament and has taken an active part in its work. China is ready to work with the other member States participating in the Conference for progress in the negotiations on various disarmament issues and to make contributions to the early realization of genuine disarmament. I wish the Conference on Disarmament fresh progress in 1987."

This concludes the message by Minister Wu.

I should like now to give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Miljan Komatina. In his capacity as personal representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, he will read out a message addressed to the Conference by the Secretary-General.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message of the Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament reads as follows:

"Today, more than ever before, the tasks before the Conference on Disarmament engage the anxious interests of all, in East or West, North or South, who are cognizant of the deadly dangers created by an unrestrained arms race in this nuclear age. The whole community of nations will keenly watch the Conference's work and hope for auguries of success in the vast endeavour of lessening these dangers.

The past year has witnessed some remarkable developments. The meeting between the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America at Reykjavik was a most significant event: it showed what possibilities are open, in dialogue at the highest leadership level, for taking radical initiatives on crucial disarmanent issues which have been bogged down in indecisive negotiations for years. The proposals and ideas that were discussed were indicative of the positive evolution in the intentions and positions of the two most powerful States.

Nineteen eighty-six also recorded some progress in multilateral forums. The agreement in Stockholm, the two Conventions concluded in Vienna under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the successful conclusion of the Biological Weapons Review Conference and the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament in elaborating the chemical weapons ban are noteworthy examples of a constructive approach towards the issues of disarmament and international security.

8

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

The deliberations on these issues during the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly also contributed to the promotion of international dialogue. Furthermore, activities during the International Year of Peace put a focus on the elemental issue of human survival. The year ended with a wide international consensus for the strengthening of the role and efficacy of the United Nations without which the international order would be even more precarious.

These are all reassuring signs, but they have not yet changed the sombre realities facing us all. Concrete disarmament agreements still elude us and the gap between words and deeds has not narrowed. The same year that encouraged some hope also furnished vivid and alarming reminders of how even seemingly reliable technology can go wrong and of how war continues to take its high toll in human life and the assets of nations.

The responsibility resting on your Conference in matters of vital importance for the future of mankind can hardly be exaggerated. The goal of curbing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and moving towards substantial disarmament agreements leading to the final elimination of nuclear weapons needs to be vigorously pursued. Pending the realization of that goal, all practicable measures for the prevention of war, particularly nuclear war, need to be taken so as to bring about an immediate decrease in the risks stemming from the existence of today's enormous arsenals of weapons.

A most important and urgent matter of disarmament is the complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests and no efforts can be spared in the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. To that end, fresh and perhaps innovative proposals are needed which would lend a decisive impetus to your efforts and complement other endeavours in this field.

Your negotiations on a global chemical weapons ban have now reached a crucial stage and assumed a growing sense of urgency in the light of present realities. Elements for early success in your negotiations are not wanting. What is needed is the manifestation of a genuine willingness to make the necessary political compromises which would facilitate the conclusion of a convention even this year.

The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the prevention of the arms race in outer space needs to be translated into a co-operative undertaking by your Conference to create conditions for negotiating agreements on this vital matter. This is now one of the essential areas in which concerted action can be taken for strengthening international peace and security.

The tasks before your Conference as a unique representative negotiating forum are indeed difficult, but in no way unsurmountable, given the universal desire for a more secure world in which our scarce human and material resources could be utilized for the fullest, economic

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

and social development of all societies. In discharging its responsibilities, the Conference would certainly benefit from more high-level political attention by all its members.

I pledge my full support to the efforts of the Conference, which I consider essential not only for the completion of multilateral disarmament agreements, but also for the promotion of the general process of disarmament at all levels.".

This concludes the message of the Secretary-General, but I have been asked by the Secretary-General to convey on his behalf to the delegation of the United States and to the family of Ambassador Lowitz the expression of his heartfelt condolences and deepest sympathy.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for his statement. Allow me to invite him to convey to Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar our thanks for his message and for the interest he shows in our work.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has also addressed a letter to us transmitting the resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-first session. That letter has been circulated today by the secretariat as document CD/733.

I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of Mexico, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Sweden, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and the representative of Australia.

I now give the floor to the first speaker of the 1987 session, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Those of us who have had occasion to participate for some time in the work of this "single multilateral disarmament negotiating body" can, on the basis of our experience, say that the two months in which the task of guiding our deliberations presents the greatest difficulties are without doubt the first and last months of each session.

For this reason we are gratified that you are presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February which is now starting and which marks the beginning of its 1987 session. The skill which you displayed during previous consultations and your valuable participation as representative of China in the First Committee during the recent session of the General Assembly are guarantees of the efficiency with which we are sure you will discharge the important duties that are now entrusted to you, and in connection with which you may count on the wholehearted co-operation of the delegation of Mexico.

I should also like once again to extend to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley, the distinguished representative of Canada, our warmest congratulations on the outstanding way in which he performed his duties from 1 August 1986.

My delegation also associates itself with the tribute paid by the Conference on Disarmament to the memory of Ambassador Donald Lowitz as well as with the fully justified and well-deserved words of farewell you addressed to those who have left or are about to leave the Conference and your words of welcome to those who, in one way or another, are just beginning to participate in our work.

In embarking today on the ninth session of the Conference on Disarmament, it is most appropriate that we should bear in mind what the United Nations General Assembly stated emphatically at its last session, which happened to coincide with the so-called International Year of Peace, in its resolution 41/86 M, adopted on 4 December by the impressive majority of 133 votes in favour, on the item entitled "Report on the Conference on Disarmament".

In this resolution which, for a number of reasons, should serve as a guide in our work this year, the Assembly:

Expressed its conviction that this Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, "should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament".

It reaffirmed that the establishment of <u>ad hoc</u> committees "offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament".

It called upon the Conference on Disarmament "to further its mandate more earnestly through negotiations and to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament", and for that purpose established relevant committees with appropriate negotiating mandates.

At that forty-first session, the General Assembly adopted over 60 resolutions which, in one way or another, cover all the disarmament items on the agenda of the Conference. Of these various resolutions, I shall confine my present statement to an examination of the resolution which is the most important among those relating to the first of these items, namely, the prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing; of the resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; of the main resolutions dealing with the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters as well as, finally, of the decision on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which, this year, is of particular importance in the light of the action taken by the Assembly in the sense that, noting the recommendation contained in the report submitted by the Conference, it decided that work on the elaboration of the programme be resumed at the beginning of the Conference's 1987 session "for the purpose of completing that task during the first part of that session and submitting a complete draft of the programme to the General Assembly at that time", namely, during its forty-first session which, as we know, was not done.

The first of the resolutions to which I have just referred, namely, resolution 41/46 A, was adopted on Wednesday, 3 December 1986, by 135 votes in favour, and is entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". Although its text is more concise than in previous years, it contains all the essential and relevant elements. In its first preambular paragraph it is recalled that the item, which had been examined for more than 30 years and on which the General Assembly had adopted more than 50 resolutions, was a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it had repeatedly assigned the highest priority.

The resolution stresses that, on eight different occasions the General Assembly had condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it had stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing "will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war". Reference is also made to what was stated by the Secretary-General at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, at which the highest administrative official of the United Nations emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons, and that the desired comprehensive test-ban treaty was undoubtedly "the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament".

Another of the preambular paragraphs emphasizes that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook in article 1 of that Treaty to conclude a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear-test explosions, including all those explosions underground, and that such an undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the Preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

In the next paragraph, the Assembly recalls that the same three nuclear-weapon States, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, in the report they submitted on 30 July 1980 to the Committee on Disarmament after four years of trilateral negotiations, stated, <u>inter alia</u>, that they were "mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments will have" as well as "conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the remaining problems", adding furthermore that they were "determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion".

The preamble to the resolution I am referring to also contains a new element, since it refers to something that happened after the adoption of the 1985 resolution, namely, the so-called "Mexico Declaration" which was adopted at Ixtapa on 7 August 1986 and in which the leaders of the six countries associated under the five-continents peace and disarmament initiative affirmed

that they "remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests", adding that "Both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing".

In the operative part of its resolution, the Assembly began by reiterating once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, "against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States", reaffirming its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority and would constitute "a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race".

The Assembly once more urged the three depositary Powers of the Treaty of Moscow and the Non-Proliferation Treaty "to abide strictly by their undertakings" to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and to expedite negotiations to this end. It went on to appeal to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular to the three depositary Powers already mentioned "to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1987 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions".

The resolution ends with a recommendation to the Conference that this ad hoc committee should "comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification", and with an appeal to the States depositaries of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 "to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria".

As we all know, by virtue of the decision announced in July 1985, it will be one year and a half at the end of this week since the Soviet Union began to abide by a unilateral moratorium that took effect on 6 August of that year. It is for this reason that the Group of Six, consisting of the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the Prime Minister of Tanzania, issued a joint declaration at the end of last year in which, among other things, they stated:

"There is no justification for nuclear testing by any country. We appeal once again to the United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing so that a bilateral moratorium can be established. Our offer to help ensure adequate verification of such a moratorium remains valid. We are ready to start implementing it at any moment."

It will be recalled that the same Heads of State or Government who, in the Delhi Declaration of January 1985, had stated that "Two specific steps today require special attention: the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty", reverted to this question in the following terms in a new Declaration, adopted in Ixtapa on 7 August 1986:

"We reiterate our demand that an arms race in outer space be prevented. Space belongs to humanity, and as participants in this common heritage of mankind, we object to the outer space of our Earth being misused for destructive purposes".

Although, in addition to the resolution that was approved, three other draft resolutions were submitted in the First Committee on this item -- one sponsored by China, the second by a group of Western States and the third by a group of socialist States -- no decision was taken on them at the request of their respective sponsors. Then there was the draft resolution sponsored by many members of the so-called Group of 21 among whom, as in the previous year, the representatives of Sri Lanka and Egypt played a particularly important role in its elaboration and in the usual round of consultations; after the original text had been amended by its sponsors this draft resolution was adopted in plenary by the General Assembly on 3 December by a vote which can certainly be described as one of the most impressive of the session, namely, 154 votes in favour, none against and only 1 abstention -- that of the United States.

That resolution, namely, resolution 41/53, like that of the previous year, is very long and as usual consists of a preamble and an operative part. In the preamble, the General Assembly, after recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, reaffirms the commitments assumed by the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular their undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

In the preamble the General Assembly also reaffirmed paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and "appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty".

In the operative part of the resolution I am discussing, it is worthwhile highlighting the following two appeals: the first is contained in paragraph 4 and addressed to all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, "to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space" in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

The second appeal is contained in paragraph 9 and is addressed to the United States and the Soviet Union, which are urged to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work.

Finally -- just as I did a year ago -- I have intentionally kept until last the following three quotations from operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 8, since they all refer expressly to the Conference on Disarmament:

In paragraph 5, the Assembly reiterated that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, "has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

In paragraph 6 the Assembly expressly requested the Conference on Disarmament "to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space".

Lastly, in paragraph 8 of its resolution, it requested the Conference "to re-establish an <u>ad hoc</u> committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1987 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

As regards the item that has invariably been the second item on the agenda of this multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, namely, the one entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", resolution 41/86 F whose title is the same as the item and which was adopted on 4 December by 130 votes in favour, recalls, in its preamble, the danger posed by nuclear weapons to mankind and to the survival of civilization and, after a number of other equally pertinent considerations, goes on in its operative part to:

Affirm that the existence of bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms "in no way diminishes the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament".

In the same operative part the resolution goes on to request the Conference on Disarmament "to establish an <u>ad hoc</u> committee at the beginning of its 1987 session to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements" that would bring about a "substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination".

As regards the third item on our agenda, the main resolution adopted by the Assembly at its last session is, in my opinion, resolution 41/86 G entitled "Prevention of nuclear war" which, on 4 December, received 134 votes in favour in the plenary of the Assembly. This resolution, after stating that "it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war" and noting with "grave concern" that the Conference on Disarmament had once more been unable to start negotiations on the question

during its 1986 session, again requests this Conference "as a matter of the highest priority" to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject "at the beginning of its 1987 session".

Coming to the last point in my brief review, namely, the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, I shall today simply recall what has been on the agenda of the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum since 1980 and what the Conference recommended in its last report to the Assembly -- which endorsed that recommendation in its decision adopted unanimously on the subject on 4 December -- namely, that the elaboration of the draft programme should be concluded "during the first part" -- namely, the part that is beginning today -- of this year's session with a view to submitting "a complete draft of the programme to the General Assembly" at its forty-first session which, as we know, has not yet been concluded. At some later date I shall discuss the background of this question in greater detail and also examine with the attention it deserves another of the more important items on our agenda, namely, the elimination of chemical weapons.

In concluding this, my initial, statement, I should like to stress that what it suggests can be summarized as follows:

The need, this year, to establish without further delay an <u>ad hoc</u> committee "with the objective of -- and I emphasize these four words which represent a significant concession by the sponsors of the draft which constituted the basis of resolution 41/46 A -- with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions".

The need for the Conference "to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate ... with a view to undertaking negotiations" to prevent an arms race in outer space, in accordance with resolution 41/53 which, as I have already mentioned, was adopted by 154 votes in favour, none against and with only 1 abstention.

The need to establish forthwith an ad hoc committee for the purpose described in resolution 41/86 F, which was adopted by 130 votes in favour, on the second item on the Conference's agenda concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The need to establish without delay a subsidiary body which, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 41/86 G, adopted by 134 votes in favour, would deal with what the Assembly had every reason to describe as "the most acute and urgent task of the present day", namely, the prevention of nuclear war.

The need to concentrate efforts and display a real spirit of flexibility and mutual concession so that the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, on which we have been working since 1980, can be completed and submitted to the Assembly at its forty-first session, as we ourselves suggested last year and as the Assembly expressly requested in the decision it adopted unanimously on 4 December last.

The points I have summarized above are all the more urgent if they are viewed in the light of two factors. The first is that the year we are embarking upon will mark the first decade of this multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and that, during the nine years of its existence, contrary to what happened with its predecessors, it has been unable to approve a single treaty or convention on the subject. The second factor concerns what the Assembly stated at its last session and which I took the liberty of quoting at the beginning of my statement, namely, that it is vital that the Conference should "further its mandate more earnestly through negotiations ... in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament".

It must also be borne well in mind that, at their recent Reykjavık meeting, Secretary-General Gorbachev and President Reagan "came very close to reaching agreements which would have been historic in their sweep and significance ... could have paved the way for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons".

The authors of this sensible view that I have just quoted are the six leaders who, since 1984, have been submitting concrete proposals concerning disarmament and peace. They include Miguel de la Madrid, the President of Mexico who, in his statement at the United Nations on 24 September, expressed the following opinion that I feel constitutes an appropriate epilogue to my own statement with which, in accordance with our time-honoured tradition, initiates for us today the 1987 discussions of the Conference:

"In the Declarations that we have signed", said the President of Mexico, "first at New Delhi in 1985 and just last month in the Mexican city of Ixtapa, we have stated that it is incumbent upon all men and all peoples, and not just those Governments which possess the technical capacity to wreak total destruction, to make efforts to halt the arms race. ...

Our statements, whose legitimacy flows from the fact that they express the wishes of all mankind, are but the first in a series of efforts that the international community will have to undertake, in the hope of eradicating nuclear weapons.".

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency the First Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Yuli Vorontsov.

Mr. VORONTSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, thank you for the warm words of welcome addressed to me. It is pleasant to be here once again in the midst of large-scale disarmament. On behalf of the Soviet delegation, may I congratulate you on occupying the responsible post of President of the Conference on Disarmament and wish you success in the discharge of your

(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)

complicated duties. We express the hope that under your guidance the Conference will succeed in engaging in businesslike negotiations on a wide range of questions relating to arms limitation and disarmament. In your person, Comrade President, we also welcome the representative of the People's Republic of China, our great socialist neighbour whose Government has repeatedly stated its interest in solving questions of nuclear disarmament, of preventing an arms race in outer space, of banning nuclear-weapon tests and of prohibiting chemical weapons — in other words, of virtually all those issues which take pride of place in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

I also have pleasure in greeting the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, whom I met within these walls over 20 years ago. The tireless activity of the dean of the disarmament corps has earned wide recognition and has been marked by the award to him of the Nobel Peace Prize. All of us listened with great interest to his thoroughgoing statement concerning the tasks of the Conference on Disarmament. We should like to wish success to the distinguished representatives of Algeria, Brazil, Italy, Romania, France, Yugoslavia and Japan who have recently been appointed as heads of delegations, Ambassadors Hacene, Barboza, Pugliese, Dolgu, Kosin and Yamada. We should also like to thank Ambassador Beesley, who was in the Chair in August 1986 and represented the Conference on Disarmament with distinction during the intersessional period.

May I, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, express my most profound condolences to the delegation of the United States of America with regard to the sudden demise of their Head, Ambassador Lowitz. I should like to ask for our condolences to be conveyed to Mrs. Lowitz and to her family.

I should also like to introduce the new Head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Yuri Nazarkine, who is well known to many of you and who has the necessary experience in the field of disarmament negotiations, including at this Conference, and experience of work in preparing treaties and agreements. I should like to wish him and the Soviet delegation he heads successful and fruitful activity.

This session of the Conference on Disarmament is opening at a difficult, a crucial time. To prevent the world from moving towards the abyss of the nuclear self-annihilation of mankind to which we are all being criminally and irresponsibly pushed by the high priests of the arms race, by those enamoured of fabulous profits on armaments, by the fanatical advocates of the military orientation of each and every scientific discovery, it is now more urgently necessary than ever before to have new political thinking, new conduct by States. It is necessary, in sum, to break the sequence of years of senseless accumulation of the most sophisticated weapons of death, necessary resolutely to engage in creating a just, non-violent world, necessary to direct our efforts towards ensuring the survival of mankind and releasing its priceless intellectual and vast material potential for the purposes of development.

The Conference on Disarmament can make a concrete and invaluable contribution to this process. The Conference in essence embodies the idea of a world conference on disarmament. In its work there participate all the nuclear-weapon States, which have special responsibility for the elimination

of the nuclear threat. But not only they. In the efforts to ensure reliable security for all, the contribution of every State is weighty and important; this issue is the common responsibility of all the members of the world community.

The Soviet Union fully realizes its share of responsibility. A year has elapsed since, on 15 January 1986, the Soviet Union took an initiative unprecedented in its scope and purposes by putting forward a programme for the elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, before the end of this century. This programme has become the nucleus of the concept fixed by the twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of a comprehensive system of international security. As a result of a joint initiative by socialist countries in the United Nations, a wide-ranging, democratic international dialogue has begun on comprehensive security for all.

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held a few days ago demonstrated the resolve of the Soviet people in their desire to implement the decisions of the twenty-seventh Congress of the Party. We are openly talking about the need to think and act in a new way, as the realities in our country and in the world as a whole require. The plenary meeting noted that, under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, all sound forces in Soviet society are resolutely in favour of profound, revolutionary transformations in all spheres of our lives, the galvanization of socialist development and the practical implementation of the great humanitarian ideals associated with the theory of socialism.

We are now restructuring our national economic machinery in keeping with objective economic laws and freeing ourselves from the accumulation, as a result of the ignoring of scientific approaches to economic development, of serious defects in the operation of planning and management institutes and in management practice, style and methods. Priority is being given to the consistent introduction of self-management into the life of work collectives and to the creation of conditions that will enable every worker to feel himself truly the master of his enterprise. Elections are being introduced for senior managerial posts and the conditions for the operation of a competitive system for the selection and replacement of other supervisory staff are in the course of being defined. Simultaneously with this, methods are being introduced for managing economic activity by means of material and financial incentives rather than by directives.

Of course, economic and scientific progress is not an end in itself. Its fruits will be enjoyed fully by all Soviet people. Moreover, our basic premise is that, by increasing our economic potential, we shall be able to assist to a greater and qualitatively better degree in the development of the world economy and to make a weightier contribution towards helping the developing countries.

Restructuring is already more than merely an idea for our further advance; it is the reality in which the multi-million population of the Soviet Union lives, thinks and works. Its implementation and the introduction of new, transformative ideas are inconceivable without genuine democracy, which is why the plenary session put the serious, thorough democratization of Soviet society on a pinnacle as the lever whereby our main force, the people, can be fully involved in the solution of the problems confronting us.

We are convinced that democracy, openness, criticism and self-criticism are the guarantees for the sound development of Soviet society. Democracy and openness are inseparable from socialism, whose main principle is "everything on behalf of man, everything for the good of man". It is natural, therefore, that man, the means for the comprehensive development of his creative potential, and the satisfaction of his material and spiritual needs were at the centre of the plenary session's attention. "We want to turn our country into a model of a highly-developed State, into a society of the most advanced economy, the broadest democracy and the most humane and the highest moral standards, where the working man will feel himself a full and equal master". These words spoken at the plenary session by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, determine our thinking, our hopes and our practical actions.

The Soviet people associate with the restucturing, the speeding up of development and the democratization their vital interests, the fate of the country and its international prestige. It is clear to every unprejudiced person that the attainment of our creative goals is possible only in conditions of peace and security. We do not conceal the fact that the implementation of our plans as defined by the Party Congress and the January plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, plans for the most significant restructuring and the acceleration of the development of our entire country, would be furthered by the reduction of international tension and the cessation of the squandering of efforts and resources on the arms race, which is senseless and deadly dangerous to all mankind. We are in favour of the creation of a climate of trust conducive to the organization of a wide-ranging international distribution of labour and to the mutual enriching of the cultural lives of peoples.

We do not set concern for our own security against the interests of the security of other States and peoples. In the modern world -- a world that is interdependent, that is in many respects one and that is too fragile for military rivalry and wars -- political realism demands that the indivisibility of security be recognized. No country can achieve security for itself alone, by acting on its own or together with a narrow group of allies, by relying solely on military technology, whether on Earth or in space. In the Delhi declaration which was signed by the leaders of the Soviet Union and India and has enriched the world community with a concrete presentation of the principles of a non-violent world free from nuclear weapons, it is stressed, and I quote, "Instead of the 'balance of terror', there must be comprehensive international security ... East and West, North and South, regardless of social systems, ideologies, religions or races, must unite in a common devotion to disarmament and development".

Reykjavik has given us precise awareness of the fact that a nuclear-free world and the resolution of the crucial problems in the nuclear and outer space area is no Utopia but a real possibility. Although the hope that the meeting in Reykjavik would lead to early practical results has not been borne out, the negotitions in the capital of Iceland have taken the cause of nuclear disarmament to an unprecedentedly high frontier from which the outline of a nuclear-free, secure world is clearly visible. The Soviet Union is, through active and presistent practical actions at all the negotiations under way, reaffirming its desire to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

Here in Geneva, the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons are under way. We are not withdrawing a single one of the proposals aimed at the sharp reduction and subsequent elimination of all nuclear devices and the guaranteeing of a peaceful space that we put forward at Reykjavik. Moreover, we are crystallizing our proposals and manifesting in practice a readiness to find constructive outcomes by doing our utmost to impart dynamism to these negotiations. Hence, in the negotitations on nuclear space weapons, the Soviet side has put forward a proposal aimed at moving the discussions on at last from endless debate into the constructive channel of practical preparation of documents. Work on reaching agreement on the documents in question has already begun. We are counting on achieving success in this important task. People expect real results from us. We hope that they understand this in Washington too and that they will positively respond to our efforts there. However, one has the impression that in Washington they are for the present occupied with other business.

Upon the conclusion of the current round of negotiations, we intend, in keeping with the United Nations recommendations, to inform the Conference on Disarmament of the results. We are convinced that openness is bound to be one of the most powerful factors of movement towards a nuclear-free world too.

The results of Reykjavik have become the common heritage of all countries and peoples to whom it is of vital interest that nuclear weapons should be eliminated and that the arms race should not spread into outer space as well. The productive interaction of States both large and small is necessary as never before for the continued existence and progress of mankind.

In these circumstances, it is especially intolerable that the great negotiating potential of the Conference on Disarmament is being far from fully used. The reason for this is well-known: some people would not like businesslike negotiations to be conducted here on disarmament issues or real agreements to be achieved. Joint efforts are needed to wrench the Conference out of the "procedural quagmire" and to embark upon a search for constructive decisions and forward-leading compromises.

A priority measure on the way towards the curbing of the arms race and the subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons is, as the United Nations has recognized, the banning of nuclear-weapon tests. Hence, their attitude to the prohibition of nuclear explosions attests in the most eloquent fashion to States' attitude to the whole range of disarmament questions and is a test, a litmus test, of their good will and of the concordance of their words and deeds.

The most striking proof of our willingness to promote progress on the nuclear-test-ban que tion is our repeatedly extended unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. Today is the 547th day of silence on our nuclear test sites, silence that will continue until the first American test of this year. And even were we to be forced into resuming nuclear explosions — and, as a well-known Soviet scientist has so eloquently put it, "the button for the Soviet test sites is on the desk in the White House" — we would not cease even then our persistent efforts in favour of the commencement of full-scale negotiations on this problem, negotiations which we are prepared to conduct with a delegation of any composition and in any forum — with, of course, the participation of the United States. One such forum is undoubtedly the Conference on Disarmament.

It is incumbent on the Conference to begin, without a single day's postponement, the preparation of a treaty that would put an end to nuclear tests and, in particular, to resolve the issues pertaining to the structure and sphere of application of the treaty and to its observance and verification. And we urge you to move from discussions to actions. The time has come to create an ad hoc committee endowed with appropriate powers. It is time, finally, to get down to real business, to achieve tangible results. The Soviet side is prepared positively to consider all proposals furthering progress in this extremely important, this key area.

We are convinced that the focus of the Conference's attention should be the programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, which both sets concrete goals and fixes clear deadlines for their achievement. The Conference could consider such concrete questions of nuclear disarmament as the cessation of the production of fissionable and fusionable nuclear materials for the purposes of developing and creating weapons, the order of elimination of nuclear aramaments, and fundamental approaches to the monitoring of multilateral nuclear disarmament measures.

The solution to the question of nuclear disarmament is inseparably linked with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It would be unforgiveable if, after being wrested from the nuclear nightmare, mankind was thrust into a laser/space nightmare. The time has come for active negotiations and practical work, rather than abstract discussion, on finding effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The view is about here and there that the "serious" negotiations on this problem should be conducted, not in the meeting hall of this Conference, but rather on a bilateral basis, in the Soviet and American missions. We think otherwise. We are convinced that, in the matter of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, there is not and cannot be any division of the negotiations into "serious" and "unserious". We are in favour of being guided by the most serious approach to any negotiations on this crucial problem that has now arisen before mankind.

The Conference has good potential for businesslike and concrete discussion of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. This problem affects all States and is a case in which the Conference could not only become the generator of useful ideas, but also engage in concrete

negotiations on certain aspects of this problem. For instance, in our view, the Conference could engage in the businesslike consideration of the question of the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. After all, from outer space it is possible to select as a "laser target" not only Soviet cities, but any town in any "disobedient" country. The Conference could also consider the possibility of creating a system of international verification guaranteeing unswerving compliance with an agreement of the kind in question and, in particular, study the idea of an international inspectorate. Such an inspectorate, for instance, would have the right of access for the purpose of carrying out on-site inspections to all facilities designed for the launching and deployment in outer space of space devices and to the corresponding launch vehicles.

Bearing in mind as the ultimate goal the banning of the deployment of armaments in outer space, the Conference could begin the elaboration of partial, but important measures leading to this goal. In particular, the Conference could consider the possibility of drawing up an international agreement guaranteeing immunity for artificial Earth satellites which do not carry weapons of any sort on board. In this connection, it would also be desirable to study the possibilities of eliminating existing anti-satellite systems. For our part, we suggest banning weapon systems of the "space-to-space", "space-to-Earth" and "Earth-to-space" kinds. We should like to stress that the USSR, manifesting good will, continues to refrain from placing anti-satellite systems in outer space.

An area in which the most urgent action is today required from the Conference is indisputably that of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union considers it essential that every effort be made to complete the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons this year. Such a possibility does really exist, whatever those whom it does not suit may say. To drag out this work now, when most of the questions of principle have been solved, would be truly criminal. I have a suggestion to make to the participants in the Conference: let chemical disarmament become the first example of peaceful, rather than military progress in international politics.

The preparation of a convention on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons would mean a significant increase in trust, including in the military sphere, and would give the lead for the solution of complicated problems of disarmament. It would be a striking confirmation of the viability of the multilateral approach to disarmament and would greatly increase the prestige of the Conference, which bears full responsibility vis-à-vis the international community for negotiations on chemical weapons.

It is gratifying to note that progress achieved in many areas at the negotiations is the result of a series of Soviet proposals and steps made in the Conference on Disarmament last year, as well as of constructive initiatives by many other countries, including the United Kingdom, Sweden and Pakistan.

We are not closing our eyes to the difficulties. Nor do we consider that, having put forward our proposals, we can sleep on our laurels. I should like to inform the members of the Conference that our experts in Moscow are continuing their intensive work on the search for breakthrought on the questions outstanding.

At the same time, the efforts of a mere one country, and even the efforts of a mere majority of countries, are not enough for the drawing up of the convention. We hope that the United States will truly join the search for compromises. Now at the negotiations the time has come when what is needed is the ability to rise above "author's pride" in one's own approaches and to put to the forefront the task of finding a common approach. There is no other way to success. This applies both to the United States and to all other countries, including the Soviet Union.

And yet one further point. There remain in the negotiations few unagreed major questions that require a political solution. However, there are a lot of, as it were, minor technical issues, which as a whole make up a swamp that is difficult to cross. Let's not get bogged down in it, let's take a critical look at whether everything that is now being discussed at length in working groups and sub-groups is really necessary for an effective Convention.

I should like to wish every success to the Ambassador of Sweden, Rolf Ekéus, as the future Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the organization of the final stage of the agreeing of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. May Mr. Ekéus go down in diplomatic history as the last leader of negotiations on this issue.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that at this year's session progress will be made on the many procedural obstacles and the cause of real disarmament will move forward. And it is necessary to look purposefully ahead because, if we once again open the quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future, whereas what is at issue here is the future of mankind itself.

May I wish all the participants in the Conference success in the discharge of the responsible tasks before them.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank His Excellency the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, whom I welcome again amongst us.

Ms THEORIN (Sweden): It was with a deep sense of sadness and distress that the Swedish delegation learned about the death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. In Ambassador Lowitz, the delegates to the Conference had a trusted and always reliable friend. He served his Government with distinction and skill. In the small community of delegates dedicated to the great task of disarmament, his intelligent, articulate and steadfast

representation of his Government's position and interest was looked upon with respect and admiration. We deeply regret that the Conference can no longer benefit from the lucid and penetrating intellect of Donald Lowitz. We will badly miss his strong sense of humour and his warm personality. The memory of Donald Lowitz is inscribed in the annals of the Conference on Disarmament. We mourn with the delegation of the United States and we ask the leader of that delegation, Mr. Barthelemy, to convey to Mrs. Shana Lowitz and the children of Donald Lowitz and to the Government of the United States our heartfelt condolences and deep sympathy.

May I express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you, Ambassador Fan, in the Chair as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. My delegation is looking forward to working with you. I assure you of the full support and co-operation of my delegation in your important task to launch our work effectively. I wish also to extend to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley, of Canada, my sincere thanks for the skilful way in which he guided the Conference during the closing months of its previous session and up to the opening of this session.

And finally, I would like to extend a heartfelt welcome to those other colleagues who have joined us since August. Ambassador Hacene, of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa, of Brazil, Ambassador Morel, of France, Ambassador Pugliese, of Italy, Ambassador Yamada, of Japan, Ambassador Dolgu, of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkine, of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Kosin, of Yugoslavia. I wish to pledge to our new colleagues the full co-operation of the delegation of Sweden.

My delegation listened with the greatest attention to the important statement by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Yuli Vorontsov.

The Conference on Disarmament today reassembles at an important moment. Will disarmament be given a chance? Or will yet another lost opportunity be added to the list that is far too long? The next weeks and months may well determine whether progress can be made building on what was achieved in Reykjavik. The next weeks and months will determine whether the possibility now to advance towards a nuclear test ban will be wasted in Nevada and Kazakhstan. The United States has announced its intention to carry out a new test this very week. The Soviet Union has made it clear that it will, if that occurs, follow suit and abandon its unilateral testing moratorium. It would indeed be deplorable if such fireworks should mark the opening of this session. It would amount to nothing less than an affront to international efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban. Many far-reaching disarmament proposals have lately been made, with a culmination at the dramatic Reykjavik meeting. But developments since have been slow. Though all proposals are said to remain on the table, we have seen no reports of outstanding differences being narrowed or even jointly defined. To stall negotiations is to gamble, not only with high stakes, but against the odds.

The concerns of the non-nuclear States are legitimate and must be met. The world expects major steps because major steps are needed. The world expects bilateral and multilateral negotiations to reap the fruits of a new international climate. The world expects the nuclear Powers to show boldness and determination at the negotiating table and restraint on testing grounds and in weapons laboratories. Not the other way round, as is today the case. For the multilateral negotiations, a constructive dialogue between the major nuclear Powers is essential. Equally important: results in multilateral negotiations improve international political relations in general.

In Europe, the most over-armed of all continents, the Stockholm Conference achieved militarily and politically significant results. A breakthrough was made for the principle of on-site inspection of compliance with treaties on disarmament and confidence-building. Last September, a successful review Conference of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention was held in here in Geneva. Also at that Conference, progress was made regarding measures to strengthen and enhance the Convention. During the latest session of the General Assembly, the First Committee produced consensus resolutions on such traditionally controversial topics as verification and compliance. In addition to established priority issues in the nuclear field, increased and appropriate attention was paid to the conventional arms race. Several resolutions acknowledged progress made here in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons convention. On the main issue of a nuclear test ban, a development took place that should give the Conference a good opportunity finally to agree on a mandate to deal with all aspects of the matter.

The latest statistics of nuclear explosions published by the Swedish Defence Research Institute, although still preliminary for 1986, show that unilateral measures in the field of disarmament make a difference. Mainly as a result of the Soviet Union's moratorium, the total number of explosions has decreased: from 55 in 1984 to 30 in 1985 and 21 in 1986. The Soviet Union carried out 27 explosions in 1984, 7 in 1985 and none in 1986. The United States carried out 17 tests in 1984, 15 in 1985 and 12 in 1986. France continues to test on more or less the same level as before: 8 explosions were registered during 1986. One British test was registered in 1986, while no Chinese test was registered.

In 1986, the Conference on Disarmament was again unable to establish a committee with a view to negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty. However, while positions remained locked on the question of a mandate, one sensed a greater openness in the debate of the issue. And substantial progress was made by the Group of Scientific Experts, which agreed on an ambitious working plan for the future, including a second global data collection and analysis test in 1988.

Later on, the Reykjavik meeting was close to producing an agreed formula on how to deal with the matter between two major nuclear Powers. Seemingly this involved an approach in stages, which we regret, since the time is more than ripe to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive treaty. In the view of some, I may add, this goal is put off to a distant future. It is even said

that it should be preceded by the elimination of nuclear weapons. One may wonder what is the purpose of a test ban once nuclear weapons are abolished. Nuclear weapons development is taking place now and to halt it a test ban is a necessity now. This is the case with regard to both the present and the possible future nuclear-weapon States.

In the General Assembly, Sweden was pleased to note an improved political climate on the test ban issue. This improvement was translated into a certain convergence of views expressed in resolutions on the matter. The resolution on the urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty, introduced by Australia, attracted positive votes from an overwhelming majority of non-aligned States and for the first time from the group of socialist States, while this year the United States did not oppose it. The resolution on a cessation of all nuclear test explosions, introduced by Mexico, attracted a greater number of positive votes from the group of Western States than ever before. Sweden, as co-sponsor of both resolutions, appreciates the flexibility shown by various delegations.

Diplomacy is to accommodate without losing sight of the goal. For my country, the voting pattern by which these resolutions were adopted was a significant development. It makes the call for practical work on a comprehensive test ban treaty in this Conference still more authoritative. It is time for the convergence in the General Assembly to be translated by us into a mandate for an <u>ad hoc</u> committee on a nuclear test ban. This Conference cannot abdicate its responsibility for what has been our professed goal for 25 years — a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is time for the Conference on Disarmament to start practical work on its first agenda item. All relevant matters should be addressed: scope and content, as well as compliance and verification.

The informal meetings held during last year's session of the Conference on Disarmament on the substance of the agenda item, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", were both constructive and worthwhile. Continued efforts should lead to more structured and formalized deliberations under this item.

Although delegations from all groups have stated that they attach the utmost importance to the item "Prevention of nuclear war", unfortunately no agreement on how to deal with the issues involved has so far been reached. New efforts should be made to bring about progress on the matter.

It is unfortunate that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to make progress on the question of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The obstacles reflect basic differences of opinion on this issue. The most fundamental element of an effective negative assurance is legally binding undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. These non-nuclear-weapon States should not have to make any further commitments beyond that of staying nuclear-weapon free. This commitment should be formalized by adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by

participation in an established nuclear-weapon-free zone, or in other agreed ways, giving it international legal effect. The threat of an arms race in space has assumed an increasingly prominent place on the disarmament agenda. Possible future systems for defence against ballistic missiles have become a fundamental problem in bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Development and deployment of anti-satellite systems would be destabilizing and trigger an arms race in outer space. ASAT developments are a source of concern for the increasing number of countries having civilian space programmes.

Sweden is gratified that discussions have taken place in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during the past two years. That Committee's deliberations have, to a degree, been useful in sorting out issues in this field. The existing body of international law relating to an arms race in space is in many respects inadequate. We must negotiate additional measures, for example, a ban on space weapons, including development, testing and deployment of ASAT systems and their destruction. Existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral ones, must be strictly adhered to. The ABM Treaty is a case in point. The Ad Hoc Committee should continue its work during this year's session. Its considerations can be further broadened and deepened within the framework of its mandate. There are still a variety of legal aspects that should be further analysed. An overview of the technical aspect of space weapon development is called for. The setting up of an informal working group of technical experts could be considered.

The international context of the negotiations on chemical weapons gives cause for serious concern. Chemical weapons have been used by Iraq in the war with Iran, disregarding rules of international law. In Europe, very large chemical weapons stockpiles exist and further development, production and deployment of such weapons is under way. Major military Powers have prepared themselves to carry out chemical warfare. The worldwide spread of chemical weapons is a clear possibility, in some cases even a definite probability. There is no alternative to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning all chemical weapons.

After almost two decades of work and negotiation, it has been possible to address most of the elements which are necessary ingredients of a treaty. A structure and the early drafts of the treaty have been developed. We must not allow the steady pace of negotiations, and the smooth functioning of this multilateral negotiating body, to lull us into accepting slow progress and a long-term perspective. If that happens, weapons development will overtake us and ruin our efforts. In order to further the negotiations, all countries producing or considering the production of chemical weapons, unitary as well as binary, should refrain from it during the course of the negotiations. Disarmament can never be furthered through increased armaments. Against this background, any production of chemical weapons is regrettable. My Government attaches the utmost importance to this negotiation and will spare no effort to assure its urgent and successful conclusion.

A number of problems remain and must now be addressed vigorously. One is the régime for declaring and verifying existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. Another is the search for an effective, but not excessive system for international challenge inspections. The general narrowing of positions on verification that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate agreement on this issue. A third major problem is verification of future non-production of chemical weapons. Steps have been taken towards generally acceptable verification régimes applicable to different categories of chemicals. Such a verification system should, of course, not hamper legitimate activities of the chemical industry. Other important problems to be solved are questions related to the functioning of the Consultative Committee and its organs, including the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Committee Chairman during the past session, Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom, for his energetic and efficient performance of this function, characterized by his deep insight in the field. The continued work should be organized in a most effective way, corresponding to the requirements of this stage of the negotiating process. I rest assured that all members of the Conference will actively support efforts to speed up the negotiation to make possible an early conclusion of a convention.

Last year's summer session of the Conference took place in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. Many delegations pointed out the dangers connected with all nuclear activities, civilian or military, and the geographical dimensions of the risks involved. In Vienna, two international Conventions have been elaborated with efficiency and speed. They aim at improving arrangements for countries to alert and assist each other in the case of a nuclear accident. The Conventions have already entered into force. The IAEA General Conference has also adopted resolutions calling on competent fora to deal with the prohibition of military attacks against nuclear installations. Sweden regrets proposals by some countries to elaborate a convention on this matter in the framework of the IAEA. The prohibition of attacks against nuclear installations is indeed a disarmament issue, in view of the mass destruction which such attacks would cause. And, while not opposing any bilateral or regional arrangement on this matter, we prefer a global approach. The forum is here, in the Conference on Disarmament. In 1984, Sweden put forward a draft treaty on radiological weapons. The proposal aims at prohibiting radiological weapons, as well as attacks on nuclear facilities, causing mass destruction through radiation. Mass destruction -- the very title of the agenda item -- is the link which justifies this approach. Instead of suggesting the moving of the item from one international body to the other, delegations should this year try to address the substantive outstanding dispute.

Circumstances oblige me once again to draw the attention of the Conference to the somewhat perennial question of the expansion of its membership. It is far from reasonable that candidates are kept waiting year after year for a decision. I hope that a satisfactory solution of the matter will be arrived at during this session.

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is scheduled to take place in 1988. Sweden will take an active part in that special session, as well as in the important preparatory work preceding it. The special session should reconfirm the conviction of the international community that there is no task more urgent for mankind than to achieve nuclear disarmament. Bearing in mind the priority of the nuclear issue, the scope could be broadened. For our part, we would be pleased if the special session also addressed such crucial questions as conventional disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the naval arms race and the need for confidence-building measures on a global level.

Twenty-five years ago the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was established here in Geneva. Sweden joined it as one of eight members not belonging to any of the military alliances. The record of that Committee and that of its successors, the CCD and the CD, deserves close examination. The Geneva disarmament bodies have been instrumental in producing such agreements as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Bacteriological Weapons Convention, the Sea-Bed Treaty and the ENMOD Convention. It is a record that well stands comparison with what has been achieved in negotiations between the nuclear Powers. On several crucial disarmament issues, particularly when nuclear weapons are the subject, the functioning of these multilateral bodies has, however, been severely hampered. The comprehensive test ban is a case in point. This has not been due to lack of dedication, deftness or derring-do on the part of negotiators here in Geneva. It is because the conferences have been denied, by nuclear Powers, the leeway necessary to fulfil their role. They have even been denied the prerogative to negotiate on main items of their agenda.

Today we have an excellent opportunity to reinforce confidence in the ability of the Conference on Disarmament to perform its task. We must proceed with and conclude a treaty outlawing chemical weapons. We must get negotiations going on a comprehensive test treaty. We must, on all items on our agenda, demonstrate the potential and viability of multilateral disarmament negotiations. Political and military decision-makers, all over the world, are preparing plans for war and for new rounds of the ever accelerating arms race. If peace and disarmament is to become a reality, it must also be planned for and vigorously pursued. As the saying has it, "They sow the wind, they will reap the storm". If we sow weapons, we will reap war. But if we sow seeds of disarmament, we will reap peace. The work has been going on for 25 years here in Geneva. Time is running short. We will not have 25 more years to try it out.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. We have exhausted the time available to us this morning though we still have two members listed on our list of speakers. Furthermore, we also have some organizational matters to consider. Accordingly, I will suspend the plenary meeting and resume it at 3.30 p.m. sharp in order to

(The President)

continue our deliberations. As agreed by the Conference, after we have listened to the last speaker for today we shall hold an informal meeting to consider the provisional agenda and programme of work for the Conference. If we reach agreement at that informal meeting, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to adopt any decision resulting from the informal meeting. Also, at the request of the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, I wish to inform the members of that Group that they will meet here at 3 p.m. for a brief consultation and will be provided with interpretation service. The plenary meeting of the Conference is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and reconvened at 3.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare that the 385th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. First of all, I will give the floor to Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to introduce the report of the Committee. Now I give the floor to him.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I should like first to tell you of the profound shock with which I heard the news of the death of Ambassador Don Lowitz, whom we mourn both as a colleague and as a friend. He arrived in this Conference two years ago this week and we admired the courage and skill with which he stepped, at his first meeting, into the Chair which you now occupy to preside with success over the Conference for the month of February. Thereafter we were able to admire the ability and integrity with which he conducted his official function as leader of the United States delegation and we enjoyed friendship with him and with his family. He would have been sitting next to me today and it is with sorrow that I realize I shall see him no more. I should be grateful if the United States delegation would accept my deep condolences and convey them to his widow, Shana, whom we remember with affection and sympathy, and to their children.

I should now like to speak as outgoing Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to present the report which was adopted by the Committee on 29 January and which is now before you as document CD/734. This report covers the work carried out during the intersessional period on the basis recommended in the Committee's last report, CD/727, of 21 August, and approved by the Conference on 28 August.

The Conference requested that the Committee should resume its work under its existing mandate for a session of limited duration during the period 12-30 January 1987 on issues under Articles III, IV, V, VI and IX and the parts of Article II relevant to Articles V and VI, that consultations should be undertaken on those issues by the Chairman in the meantime in preparation for the resumed session; and that for that purpose open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee should be held between 24 November and 17 December 1986, including, where necessary, meetings with full services; and that the Committee should report to the Conference on Disarmament on its work during the intersessional period. It is this report that I am giving to you today.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The substantive results of the work in question are before you in document CD/734. The open-ended consultations were very well attended and took place in an atmosphere that demonstrated the keen interest of delegations in this work. Mr. Rowe, of Australia, and Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria, continued their work as Chairmen of Working Group A and Working Group B respectively with great dedication and enthusiasm. The Ad Hoc Committee owes a great debt of gratitude to them for the way in which they pursued during the intersessional period the work they had undertaken in the 1986 session, the results of which are contained in the Committee's previous report, CD/727, of 21 August 1986.

When the Committee met again in formal session, on 12 January, 1t decided that the progress achieved in informal consultations warranted an updating of the rolling text of the draft Convention to incorporate the addition of common ground identified during the intersessional period. This revised version is contained in appendix I to the document before you, CD/734, with the recommendation, in paragraph 9(a), that this appendix should be used for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention. Active work was still continuing until the last day. Two other papers of the Chairman of Working Group A were placed in appendix II so that they could be available for further work in the 1987 session.

As Mr. Wisnoemoerti, of Indonesia, who was Chairman of Working Group C in 1986 and who clarified the issues under Articles VIII and IX, left at the end of the most recent session of the Conference, in August 1986, I undertook, in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee, extensive consultations with many delegations on the subject of article IX and its relation to the Convention as a whole. I am most grateful to those of you who spent the time to give me the benefit of your perceptions both from your national and regional points of view and from the points of view of any Groups to which your countries belong. As a result of those consultations, I came to the conclusion that it would not at this stage help the Conference's work to attempt multilateral consideration of the text of Article IX. I was, however, agreeably surprised by the extent of common ground which I found. I therefore recorded in the Committee's report that I had detected a convergence of views on four points: firstly, that confidence in the Convention should be built up and maintained by routine inspection of declared facilities; secondly, that provisions under Article IX were needed for any party to give voice to its suspicions that another party was not complying with its obligations and to have confidence that these suspicions would be promptly allayed by agreed procedures; thirdly, that such procedures should be regarded as a fundamental source of confidence in the Convention and recourse to them should be a rare event; fourthly, that once these procedures had been invoked, a very short time for resolution of the issue was essential both for reasons inherent in the nature of chemical weapons as well as for wider political reasons. These points do not, of course, form part of the rolling text, which contains provisionally agreed treaty language subject to reservations expressed by square brackets or footnotes.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

As you will see from our latest version of the text, appendix 1 of the report before you represents a considerable advance on what was contained in the appendix to our previous report, CD/727. In the light of the agreement at the very end of the previous session on a new text for Article IV, Working Group B, under the chairmanship of Mr. Poptchev, has developed an improved and more comprehensive structure for Articles III, IV and V of the Convention, which deal with initial declarations of chemical weapons and production facilities for their elimination. This represents an important step forward and I hope that it will provide a good foundation for further work on this subject, where there are important points remaining to be resolved, including the questions of declaration of location of stocks and of the definition of production facilities. In the absence of a resolution of this last point, it seemed premature to tackle the questions remaining to be resolved under Article II on definitions.

In any case, Working Group A was very fully occupied with work which continued until the report before you went to press. The new text of Article VI developed during our previous session has been further developed under the able and energetic guidance of Mr. Rowe to comprise three schedules of chemical substances of concern under a chemical weapons convention, with corresponding annexes on régimes to deal with them. The Article now provides, for the first time, for an undertaking for each State Party to declare data on the relevant chemical substances and facilities which produced them and to subject the chemicals and facilities covered in Annex II and Schedule 2 to monitoring by data reporting and routine systematic international on-site inspection. This undertaking represents an important step forward. Taken together with the provisions of Annexes 1 and 3 of Article VI, it will make an important contribution to the confidence required for the Convention to be concluded.

This accords with the first of the four points of convergence that I mentioned earlier, namely that confidence in the Convention should be built up and maintained by routine inspection of declared facilities. During the transitional period in which stocks of chemical weapons and their production facilities are eliminated, further measures will be required, and remain to be elaborated, to give confidence that States Parties are complying with their obligations in this respect. As I told you earlier, I also detected a convergence of view that provisions under Article IX would be required to underpin confidence in the Convention we are negotiating. This crucial issue remains to be resolved. The execution of all these measures of verification will require the establishment of an effective organization under Article VIII of the treaty. This task may prove to be as complex as Article VI has proved this year. The development of Article VI so far establishes that this organization will have a long-term, detailed routine task to perform. Further work on this Article in conjunction with Article VIII will be required to ensure that the provisions of the draft convention together provide the necessary confidence in the draft Convention as a whole to enable it to be concluded.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

Finally, I should like to express my warm thanks to all delegations for the way in which they have, during my year as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contributed positively and constructively to the common task of negotiating in this Conference, the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, a draft Convention to ban chemical weapons altogether.

Our special joint thanks are due to the Chairmen of the three Working Groups, Mr. Rowe, of Australia, Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria and Mr. Wisnoemoerti, of Indonesia, for their tireless work and for the great contribution they have made to the fruitful result of our year's work. I am sure that I speak for all members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in expressing our deep gratitude to the United Nations Secretariat for the support and help that they have given to the Committee in its work, especially to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his staff, who have made a great contribution to the Committee's work, and to all the interpreters and translators, who have enabled us to operate in all the languages of the Conference.

I have now discharged the function with which the Conference entrusted me at the beginning of its last session. In doing so, I am delighted that, as a result of a decision of the Conference in August, I can hand over this task to Ambassador Ekéus, of Sweden. I know that the Chair of the Committee could not be in better hands. I offer my heartfelt best wishes for the forthcoming session and pledge to him as Chairman the co-operation and support of the delegation of the United Kingdom.

As I have the floor, let me say as the representative of the United Kingdom, that I congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the office of President. I know that you will discharge it with all the wisdom traditional in your country. And let me say finally a word of thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley, of Canada, for the great diplomatic skill with which he conducted the presidency in the month of August.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for his introduction to the report of the Committee contained in document CD/734 and I also thank him for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I wish to say to Ambassador Cromartie that we all admire his outstanding performance as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and also to thank him for his introduction to the fruitful results of one year's work. I would also like to say that, by his well-known diplomatic ability and his personal charm, he has been instrumental in securing substantial progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

During our informal consultations we agreed that, on 5 February, at our next plenary meeting, I will submit the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference for adoption. At the end of the morning session on 5 February, we will re-establish that Ad Hoc Committee and we will appoint Ambassador Ekéus, of Sweden, as Chairman.

I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list, the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Australia has great hopes at this 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. I believe, Mr. President, that there is a Chinese saying that says that "Even a journey of a thousand miles starts with its first steps"; our first steps this year are in your hands and this is one of the sources of our hope, or our optimism. It gives great satisfaction to my delegation to see you in the vital opening month of our 1987 session presiding over the Conference on Disarmament as head of the delegation of China. China's depth of culture and historical experience is well known and is deeply felt by the Australian Government and people. We have admired the determination and the resolve of the Chinese people in pursuing the goals of modernization and have been struck by the strides that China has made in multilateral work on disarmament. This was most recently reflected in the significant initiatives China took at the latest session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Australia also appreciated the very important declaration by China that it would no longer conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere. We look to the historic wisdom of China and to your obvious personal abilities to get us started on the right path, on the right journey in 1987. My delegation will give you full support in your efforts this month and not least because of the strong and ever-growing relationship that exists between our two countries as neighbours in the Asia and Pacific region.

I want to express, too, our thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley, for the efforts he made in August, a difficult month for the Conference on every occasion. I would like, too, to pause briefly to express congratulations to him for his election in the meantime as a member of the International Law Commission. I also want to join others who this morning have welcomed new heads of delegations who have joined us here at the Conference table.

I said that we have great hopes at this 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. There are a number of reasons why we hold this view and I will mention a few of them briefly.

First, last year at Reykjavik we saw the end of the first period of renewed vigour in United States/Soviet negotiations on major issues in arms control and disarmament. That period began in November 1985, at the Geneva summit meeting, and a year later, indeed a relatively short time later, there were exposed at Reykjavik the main elements of a truly significant agreement between the two major military Powers. Our understanding is that, while an agreement was not able to be sealed at Reykjavik, its elements remain substantially intact and work is proceeding on securing not only a far-reaching agreement, but an agreement which would be a beginning not an end, one which would lead naturally to even further measures of arms control and disarmament. This real possibility must and should have a positve influence on what we will seek to do and will be able to do in this Conference in 1987. It validates our confident expectations of momentum in this Conference this year.

Second, there was the progress we made in our own work last year. Two or three years ago, times were hard in this Conference. Debates were sharp and positions often very divergent. But last year a degree of convergence started to emerge. In several areas of our work there was a sense that the Conference was on the move, that differences were being narrowed and that progress was being sought with new determination.

Third, the same process of convergence and reconciliation of important differences was evident at the most recent session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. This was perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the resolutions adopted on nuclear testing and chemical weapons. Again, delegations set aside the narrow expression of differences of view and approach and strove instead to seek common ground. This spirit still exists. We detect a widespread willingness to continue this flow of events and to develop it.

We have heard a good deal of criticism of the multilateral disarmament system and machinery during the past few years. There is no doubt that some of that criticism has been valid, but surely it is wise, at least on some occasions, to put these things into an historical perspective.

It has always been the case, for example, certainly throughout this century, that there has been a multilateral conference on disarmament in Geneva and real disfunctionalities between what that conference could do and the realities of the military power held by certain States. Yet, in spite of that degree of disfunctionality, the various versions of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva have added incrementally to international law and practice in the field of arms control and disarmament. I think this was a point made this morning by Ms Theorin, the distinguished leader of the Swedish delegation. I think the point is this: if one looks at the corpus of such law and practice that has been agreed upon in Geneva this century, the value of historical perspective is revealed as in a flash. To put it simply the agreements and practices negotiated in Geneva have proven indispensable to the management of international relations and to attempts to maintain the peace in our difficult and increasingly complex age.

I would like now to address briefly three items on our Conference agenda which have definite priority for my Government. The first of them is a nuclear-test ban treaty.

Towards the end of our ser on last year, the gap between members of the Conference on this vital subject was closing. This process of convergence was further revealed at the General Assembly in the resolutions which were adopted on this subject, both in terms of the substance of the resolutions and in the voting patterns on them. There was also the resumption of discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on this subject.

Signific it developments took place too in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and in proposals for the establishment of an international seismic monitoring network for the verification of a test-ban treaty, one of which was made by my own Government. May I again at this moment urge the Conference to take a decision to establish that network, along the lines, for example, of our proposal.

On the central issue, that of a nuclear-test ban treaty, we see no reason why the last step cannot be taken very soon and an <u>ad hoc</u> committee of this Conference on a nuclear-test ban treaty established. We believe that this can be done and done quickly, and my delegation stands ready to participate in removing the last obstacles.

This is not to say that other work external to this Conference, either in bilateral discussions or by particular groups of States, should not continue. However, the missing piece is at hand and that piece is the resumption of work in this Conference on bringing into existence a verifiable treaty, preventing all nuclear test explosions by all States in all environments for all time.

I now turn to chemical weapons. We have stated repeatedly in this Conference that the Australian Government attaches high priority to the conclusion of a multilateral convention which would ban the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. We believe that such an objective is clearly in sight. There is a new spirit in the negotiations and this was evident throughout the 1986 session of the Chemical Weapons Committee. It was reflected in particular in the process which was recorded in the intersessional consultations during November, December and January. The advances made in the negotiations are reflected in the report containing the revised rolling text of the Convention which Ambassador Cromartie presented this afternoon. This momentum which was generated under the dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie must be sustained.

In fact we must increase the tempo of our negotiations during 1987 so that the opportunity which clearly exists of concluding a convention this year may be realized. This requires two things: concentration upon resolution of the main outstanding issues, and tailoring of the working arrangements of the Committee in the most effective way. The Committee has concentrated its work during the past year on matters relating to Articles III, IV, V, VI and IX. While all these Articles will continue to require further attention, we consider it is now imperative to focus in a concentrated way on other specific issues.

Four of these are of central importance: declaration and verification of chemical weapons stocks; chemical weapons production facilities; non-production of chemical weapons; and challenge inspection. There has already been a considerable amount of effort devoted to the discussion of these issues and to the formulation of appropriate provisions for inclusion in the Convention, but a solution to all aspects of these issues has remained elusive. They are difficult and complex, but it is not beyond our ability to solve them. Our ability to find solutions was demonstrated in the latter part of the 1986 session, which resulted in progress, good progress being made on Articles III, IV, V and VI.

The subject of challenge inspection is recognized as one of the most important issues needing solution. A range of proposals has been put forward in relation to it, but we believe that an appropriate provision can be arrived

at if the issue is taken up in a concentrated way. A solution to challenge inspection would give a significant impetus to the negotiations as a whole. Thus we think that the challenge inspection issue should be given prominence during the 1987 session.

We have mentioned the desirability of focusing our work on specific issues in a concentrated way. This would require an adjustment to the way in which we have organized the Committee's work in the past. We are very pleased that the incoming Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, is envisaging such an approach. We fully support the idea of focused consideration of clusters of issues, providing, of course, that there can be flexibility in relation to when particular issues might be taken up depending on the progress being made. It is through such an approach that we believe that the momentum that has been so much in evidence during 1986 will be sustained and that the objective to which we are all committed will be achieved.

As further evidence of Australia's commitment to this objective, we would like to record that since the last plenary meeting of the 1986 session of the Conference the Australian Government has taken further action in support of its view that chemical warfare is abhorrent. On 26 November 1986, Australia withdrew its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, although a valuable international agreement, is less than perfect. In view of the many reservations to the Protocol, it cannot be said categorically that it prohibits all use of chemical weapons. By withdrawing its own reservation and by its active pursuit of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention, Australia aims to strengthen the international norms against chemical warfare.

Australia has also been concerned about the proliferation of chemical weapons. To ensure that Australia does not inadvertently contribute to the problems of chemical weapon use through chemicals exported from Australia being secretly diverted to the manufacture of chemical weapons, eight chemicals which could be misused in this way were placed under strict export controls by us in 1985. The Australian Government has recently decided that an additional 22 chemicals which could be used in making chemical weapons will be placed under Australian export controls, bringing to 30 the number of such chemicals for which export permits will be required. Although Australian Ministers decided in December 1986 that an additional 22 chemicals would be controlled, I have to make clear that the full implementation of this decision, this firm decision, is still in train. The Australian export control list will, we hope, serve as a model for all chemical exporting nations. The measures we have implemented to control the export of these chemicals is intended to reduce the risk of chemical warfare. But export controls, while a valuable measure, are not a substitute for a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. So we will continue to give our full support to the maintenance of that important objective, an objective which is in sight and is one of our expectations for 1987.

I turn now to outer space. On the question of a convention of an arms race in outer space, the position of the Australian Government is clear: such an arms race should never take place. We accept that it is the basic commitment of the major Powers involved to prevent an arms race in outer space. That is what they have said, and we accept it and we want to see that commitment honoured. We believe that the multilateral community, whose interest in this issue is beyond question, can make an important contribution towards achieving this goal. We believe that the work of this Conference has a central place in this effort and should be resumed this year without delay. It would be distressing in the extreme if the resumption of that work were to be delayed by mere procedural arguments. The task is urgent and the job at hand is large. We hope, Mr. President, that the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space will be well into its working stride before you leave the Chair of this Conference.

At an earlier point in this statement I mentioned initiatives that have been taken by groups of States outside the strict confines of the Conference on Disarmament or the multilateral disarmament system. One such initiative which came to fruition in 1986 was the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga, the treaty establishing a South Pacific nuclear-free zone. On 8 August 1985, I informed the Conference of the decision taken on 6 August by the Heads of Government of the 13 member countries of the South Pacific Forum, at its meeting in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands, to endorse the draft South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and subsequently to open it for The text of the Treaty and its draft Protocols was transmitted to signature. the Conference on 16 August 1985 in document CD/633. Today I wish to inform the Conference that the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Rarotonga, entered into force, with the deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, on 11 December 1986. Just one and a half years after it was opened for signature, the Treaty of Rarotonga is in operation. There is now a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone stretching from the Equator in the north to the Antarctic in the south and from the west coast of Latin America to the west coast of Australia. The States which have ratified the Treaty are: Fiji, the Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Niue, Western Samoa, Kiribati, New Zealand and Australia. The South Pacific has therefore become the second populated region, that is, after Latin America, to establish a nuclear-free zone, one which covers a truly significant portion of the surface of this Earth. illustration of that significance, I have asked the secretariat now to distribute to the Conference a map of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

The Treaty of Rarotonga provides that: no South Pacific country which becomes a Party to the Treaty will develop, manufacture, acquire or receive from others any nuclear explosive devices; there should be no testing of nuclear explosive devices in the South Pacific; there will be no stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territories of participating States; nuclear activities in the region, including the export of nuclear material, are to be conducted under strict safeguards to ensure exclusively peaceful, non-explosive use; South Pacific countries shall retain their unqualified sovereign rights to decide for themselves such questions as access to their

ports and airfields by vessels or aircraft of other countries; international law with regard to freedom of the sea will be fully respected; and finally, performance of obligations by Parties will be subject to strict verification. The Treaty also bans the dumping of radioactive waste at sea in the region and in this it compliments the SPREP Convention concluded in 1986 for the environmental protection of the South Pacific region. The Treaty of Rarotonga reflects deeply-felt and longstanding concern in the South Pacific region about nuclear testing, the ocean dumping of nuclear wastes and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It expresses the strong community of interests which members of the South Pacific Forum share in environmental and security matters and, in the words of the Treaty's Preamble, the determination of the Parties to ensure "that the bounty and beauty of the land and the sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their people and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace".

There are three Protocols to the Treaty and they were opened for signature on 1 December 1986. The first of them invites France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom to apply key provisions of the Treaty to their South Pacific territories. The other two Protocols respectively invite the five nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Parties to the Treaty and not to test nuclear explosive devices within the Zone.

It is our firm view that the Treaty of Rarotonga constitutes an important contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the region it covers and is a significant nuclear arms control agreement. Its significance in this respect would be further enhanced if those nuclear-weapon States which have been invited to sign the Protocols to the Treaty relevant to them did so as expeditiously as possible. One State, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, did so on 15 December of last year, and Australia welcomed this.

A significant feature of the Treaty of Rarotonga is that the South Pacific Forum, which produced the Treaty, is an association of regional Governments which traditionally operates by consensus. Members of this Conference will be sensitive to the difficulties associated with the process of arriving at a consensus in producing arms control and disarmament agreements, and aware that, in coming to an agreement, the interests of all participants must be taken into account. The Treaty of Rarotonga is a document which is a product of just that process, a consensus document agreed to by a number of States, a number in fact numerically equivalent to a third of this Conference.

I have said that this Treaty is an important arms control measure. No nuclear weapons are stationed on the territory of the South Pacific States. This Treaty provides a strong guarantee that this will remain the case. The Treaty also creates verification mechanisms with respect to this undertaking. Other areas where a similar undertaking has been institutionalized, with the overwhelming support of the international community, are Antarctica, Latin America, outer space and the sea bed. The Treaty of Rarotonga marks an important additional contribution towards

preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, a contribution with significant consequences both for the South Pacific region and for neighbouring regions. It is a major contribution towards preventing a sizeable part of the globe becoming yet another location in which the geographical spread of nuclear weapons could The prohibition of the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of South Pacific countries is of particular importance in this regard. extends beyond the obligations that these countries have entered into under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As I mentioned earlier, the text of the Treaty of Rarotonga was circulated to this Conference in 1985 in document CD/633. Since then, following consultations by a South Pacific Forum delegation of officials with all the prospective Protocol States, the Protocols have been adopted in final form by the South Pacific Forum, meeting at Suva in August 1986. The final text of the Protocols has been circulated today jointly by the delegations of Australia and New Zealand as an annex to document CD/633. That has been placed on the table of The text of the Treaty proper, including all the annexes, delegations today. with the exception of the amended Protocols circulated today, remains identical to what is contained in CD/633.

I referred earlier to the history of multilateral disarmament efforts in Geneva. One thing that is clear about these efforts is that, in spite of occasional very difficult periods, they have never remained static. We believe the multilateral disarmament machinery is today undergoing a process of change. The reason for this is that States value the machinery and they want to see it made more effective. In New York, where this subject has been increasingly vigorously discussed, we have made clear that we welcome attempts being made to review and upgrade our machinery. We believe that this should include a reshaping of the agenda of multilateral negotiations to enable us to respond very directly to the central realities of armaments and their impact on the maintenance of peace and security. The multilateral disarmament process would be better served if this Conference, for example, could focus its attention on a number of priority agenda items. There is a strong case for streamlining the current agenda by setting aside items that are less urgent or relatively unsuited to consideration by the Conference at the present time. We particularly hope that we can conclude our work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament and, in conformity with the resolution of the General Assembly at its forty-first session, submit our conclusions to the General Assembly before the end of that session.

Australia believes in this Conference and in its role of ensuring that disarmament plays its proper part in the maintenance of peace and security. May I add that, in my firm view, this Conference is a better place for having had my friend, Donald Lowitz, sit at its table.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Conference and to the country that I represent. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Forgive me for having made so bold as to ask for the floor again after my lengthy statement this morning, but it will, I think, be understood that, as the representative of a country, Mexico, whose capital serves as the headquarters of the body set up under the first treaty to have established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an inhabited area, I should not wish to let pass the occasion on which Ambassador Butler has informed us of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga without extending to him, and asking him to convey to all the members of the new zone, the congratulations of the delegation of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament. I believe that the first special session of the General Assembly was very right when it said in its Final Document -- and I quote the words of paragraphs 60 and 61 -- that "the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure" and that, as it added in paragraph 61, "the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons". For that reason, I reiterate my congratulations to Ambassador Butler and to the State or States he represents.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none. I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, for a statement concerning the services allocated to the Conference.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): As you know, the United Nations continues to face a financial emergency necessitating reductions and the reprogramming of a number of its activities. As was the case during the second part of the 1986 session, the Conference needs to consider how to implement the target reduction of 30 per cent in services allocated to it. Intensive consultations were held at Headquarters, as well as in Geneva, in order to ensure the best prevailing conditions for the work of the Conference and for its servicing. The outcome of these consultations was that, in order that the work of the Conference would be the least impaired while bringing about the required rate of saving, it was better, on the basis of the experience of the second part of the 1986 session, to concentrate on reducing the number of weekly meetings rather than imposing a 30 per cent reduction in the duration of the annual session. As was the case for the second part of the 1986 session, those savings would mean in practice the allocation to the Conference of 10 meetings per week, with full servicing and 15 meetings per week also with full servicing, during the sessions of the Seismic Group. Therefore, the Conference will be afforded two daily meetings with full servicing throughout the whole of the 1987 session, plus one additional daily meeting when the Seismic Group is in session.

Furthermore, should the Conference establish a higher number of committees than in 1986, it should be envisaged to hold their meetings consecutively with other committees or working groups. This practice was put into effect in the past and prevented the wastage of allocated resources in

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

the event that the time allocated for each meeting had not been fully utilized. May I recall that predecessors of the CD developed a system of punctuality, whereby all meetings would start no later than five minutes after their scheduled time of commencement. Of course, the substantive secretariat will always be available to service informal consultations in case members wish to intensify their activities beyond the allocation of meetings with full services. As in the case of the 1986 session, it will not be possible to hold meetings in the evenings or during weekends with full servicing.

May I also recall the measures accepted by the Conference at the informal meeting held on 22 April 1986 concerning documentation. In order to implement these decisions and to bring about savings in the cost of documentation, we hope that documents will be presented in good time, since there is no overtime for the technical staff of Conference Services and therefore it will not be possible to meet last-minute deadlines.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference for his statement. During the informal consultations that we held before the opening of the session, I noted that there was general agreement among members on the services to be provided by us, as outlined by the Secretary-General. This being the case, we shall proceed accordingly.

In conformity with Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, the Secretariat has circulated working paper CD/WP.251, entitled "Provisional agenda for the 1987 session and programme of work on the Conference on Disarmament". I intend now to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider that working paper. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 4.35 p.m. and reconvened at 4.45 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 385th plenary meeting on Disarmament is resumed. I put before the Conference for decision the agenda for the 1987 session and the programme of work for the first part of the session, as contained in working paper CD/WP.251, dated 30 January 1987. In doing so, I wish to make the following statement on behalf of the Conference:

"The Conference will also intensify its consultations on the item dealing with the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, bearing in mind that the Conference recommended in its last report to the General Assembly, and the Assembly supported this recommendation in the decision it adopted on this matter, that the elaboration of the programme should be completed during the first part of the 1987 session for submission to the General Assembly before the closure of the latter's forty-first session.".

If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the working paper. 1/

It was so decided.

(The President)

I should like to express my appreciation to the members for their assistance in adopting quickly our agenda for 1987 and the programme of work for the first part of the session.

As agreed during our informal consultations, I intend to put before the Conference for adoption at the opening of our next plenary meeting, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/734, which was introduced today by its Chairman, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom. Also on that occasion, we shall re-establish, at the end of the morning meeting, that Ad Hoc Committee and appoint Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden as its Chairman. As you know, there is no need to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which can start its work immediately.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 5 February at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.

Note

1/ Later issued as document CD/735.

CD/PV.386 5 February 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 5 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m.

<u>President</u>: Mr. Fan Guoxiang

(China)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 386th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Conference, a warm welcome to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States of America, the Honourable Kenneth L. Adelman, who is to address the Conference today as first speaker. Mr. Adelman is well-known to us, as he has visited the Conference before. We also know of the important responsibilities which have been entrusted to him and, for that reason, I am sure that members will follow his statement with special interest. I should also like to welcome warmly the Deputy Foreign Minister of Cuba, His Excellency Mr. Raúl Roa Kouri, who will also speak today at the Conference. Mr. Roa Kouri is an experienced diplomat, who has served as Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations and, in that capacity, has been actively involved in disarmament matters. His statement will also be of particular interest to us.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend now to put before the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 12-30 January 1987, as contained in document CD/734. You will recall that the report was introduced by Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom at the same plenary meeting. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Cuba, Federal Republic of Germany and Poland.

I now give the floor to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States of America, the Honourable Kenneth L. Adelman.

Mr. ADELMAN (United States of America): Mr. President, before I make my statement today, I want to take this opportunity, on behalf of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, to extend our congratulations and best wishes to you as you guide the work of this Conference in the opening month of its 1987 session. On two occasions during the past three years I have had the privilege to lead an arms control delegation to your country, China, for discussions of arms control issues; it is a pleasure to be speaking under your presidency today.

The United States delegation also extends its congratulations to Ambassador Beesley of Canada, who so ably guided the work of the Conference in August and through the inter-sessional period. The United States delegation joins in the welcome that has been extended to the new heads of the delegations of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Two years ago, when I first addressed this Conference on Disarmament, I was sitting on the podium with Donald Lowitz at my side; he was serving as President for that month. Since then, you have had the good fortune to know Don as I've known him for all my adult life: as a warm and wonderful person, who served his country whenever called upon -- and I asked him to do so more than two years ago now -- and who believed in this Conference and its goals and who believed in all of you. You saw this side of Don. I had seen him as a marvellous husband to Shana -- herself such a perfect embodiment of what's fresh and caring about America -- and as a fabulous father to Amy, Teddy and Josh and a loving grandfather to David. How they will all miss him. How we will all miss him.

I understand that you have already heard from President Reagan on his tribute to Don. Let us, as the President said, pursue the goals Don pursued and, by so doing, give a living monument to his work here. I would now like to convey to you the President's greetings at the opening of this session; the President's words:

"As the Conference on Disarmament resumes its work in 1987, I would like to extend my wishes for a productive session. Although the opening of the Conference has been darkened by the sad and untimely loss of our Ambassador, Donald Lowitz, I am certain we can join together in making progress in this forum as a fitting testimonial to his memory.

Your work constitutes an important and integral part of efforts undertaken by the international community to make our world a more peaceful place. The issues with which you deal are complementary to those being addressed bilaterlly between the United States and the Soviet Union. The promise of Reykjavik, which has given us the vision of a world with significantly reduced levels of nuclear weapons, has become an indicator of what is possible. It inevitably draws attention to the issues on your agenda and should encourage you in your efforts to increase international stability and co-operation.

One of the most important tasks facing you is the working out of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. This task is made even more difficult by the fact that capabilities for chemical warfare are increasing and that, contrary to international agreement, chemical weapons are being used in various parts of the world. You have a heavy responsibility. For, as you consider the provisions of a convention, you must make sure that a global ban will, in fact, eliminate the capability for chemical weapons to be used against future generations. An effective convention will require an unprecedented degree of openness on the part of all States.

I reaffirm the commitment made by the United States in 1984 when we tabled our draft convention banning chemical weapons worldwide. The United States delegation will make every effort to work for the total elimination of these terrible weapons and for the verification provisions necessary to ensure that they never again enter the arsenals of the world's armies.

Your efforts in this and in other fields are to be commended. We are committed to working with you in the Herculean task of bringing stability to a still insecure world and in achieving responsible solutions to the problem of reducing the world's arms."

In the two years since I last spoke to this forum, the world has witnessed some dramatic developments in arms control. I would like to single out especially the remarkable meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik last October, in which I had the privilege of participating. From the United States perspective, Reykjavik marked an historic turning-point in our arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union. Why is that? Because for the first time, we engaged the Soviet Union in serious negotiations — not just public initiatives, but serious, hands—on negotiations during those dramatic two days — on the subject of deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms.

This was the goal that President Reagan has been striving for ever since he entered office, ever since he first proposed the "zero-zero" option for intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and deep strategic arms reductions (START) in 1981 and 1982. At that time, you may remember, there were many people in our own country and elsewhere who argued that such ambitious arms reduction proposals had no real place in the arms control dialogue. Many, if not most, claimed that these deep-cuts proposals were too far-reaching and could never be the basis for productive negotiations with the Soviet Union: the Soviet Union would just never entertain such deep cuts as we envisioned. But, when the Soviet Union walked out of the arms talks at the end of 1983 —a walk-out that was totally unjustifiable, I might add, due to the INF situation — many of these same critics reiterated their arguments, believing that events had vindicated their views.

But President Reagan persisted. And his persistence has paid off in a real shift in the arms control agenda. Now at last — at long last, if you ask me — the two sides are talking in nuclear arms control about agreements that, if signed — and if fully complied with, which is another thing altogether — would effect real and deep reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals, particularly those systems that are most destabilizing, that are most threatening in the world. No more are we looking at arrangements like the SALT accords of the 1970s, which permitted vast growth in the arsenals of both sides — a fourfold increase in the number of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons since SALT I was signed in 1972 and an increase in our own arsenal in response to that fourfold increase on the Soviet side. Thanks to President Reagan's persistence, the agenda in nuclear arms control is now, I believe, irreversibly, deep offensive weapons cuts.

There is another development to which I would call your attention, a development that has occurred outside the field of arms control proper, but which, if it were to come to pass, could have potentially broad ramifications for arms control and surely for the deliberations of this forum, for the future of the Conference on Disarmament. That is the increasing discussion of

"openness", or glasnost, in the Soviet Union itself. Indeed, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov addressed it here two days ago and we talked about it last night during our long evening together. It is not clear where this focus might lead, it is not clear what glasnost is to mean and how it is to unfold, or if the openness that the Soviet Union talks about now will be genuine openness by the standards of a truly open society. We can speak conditionally and we can express hope, a deep hope; we can say that, if this interest in openness on the part of the Soviet Union were indeed to prove real, if it were indeed to prove enduring, we could very much find ourselves standing on the threshold of a new era for the cause of arms control and disarmament.

For openness and arms control go together, hand in hand, they go together on at least two levels. First, there is a clear connection between openness and international trust, between peace and the open society. Andrei Sakharov, that great world hero and a Soviet hero, has spoken of "the indissoluble bond between international security and trust on the one hand, and respect for human rights and an open society on the other". Societies that respect the rights of their citizens, that respect freedom of speech, that respect freedom of religion, that respect freedom of the press, that respect freedom of assembly, these kinds of societies that defend the rights of individuals to criticize their leaders, to vote for their leaders in office and out of office -- such societies also keep their international treaty commitments. Such societies can be expected to behave in a fashion that promotes world peace. Such societies do not crave new territory. Such societies do not menace their neighbours. Looking at the history of the United States, it is impossible to find any time in our history when we went to war, engaged in war, against another open society, another democratic society. In fact, I don't believe that history shows one example of two free countries ever going to war with one another, because free peoples just don't choose to go to war. Conversely, as President Reagan said not long ago, "a Government that breaks faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign Powers".

Second, there is a direct, practical link between openness and progress in arms control. That link lies in the problem of verification, in which I know this Conference is so interested and on which you have heard so much over the years. Verification has always defined the outer frontier of what we can achieve in arms control. We can control effectively only what we can verify effectively. But verification is often directly limited in turn by the degree of openness permitted by the States that subscribe to an arms control agreement.

In an open society like the United States, relevant information on defence programmes is readily available. That is why, when dealing with open, democratic societies, one does not have to rely exclusively on what we call "national technical means" or elaborate verification mechanisms to verify arms agreements. Often in the past I have been asked about the Soviet ability to verify our arms control agreements and I say basically that all the

Soviet Union needs to verify our compliance with arms control is a subscription to various open publications in the United States -
The New York Times, The Washington Post, Aviation Week, and publications like that -- because, if there were ever a case where the United States violated an arms control agreement, it would be readily available in the open press.

That is one reason why the United States has called for greater openness in all nations. Since 1982, when I worked with many of you here in this room there in the First Committee at the United Nations, the United States has consistently pressed for resolutions on disarmament and openness in the United Nations General Assembly and I am sure Jan Martenson will remember that, in 1982, we introduced a resolution on disarmament and openness and it was adopted by the General Assembly as I remember, by consensus. This resolution explicitly stated the connection between advancing disarmament and advancing openness and free discussion and free dissemination of information in all nations. It encouraged all nations to advance the cause of openness as a way of advancing the cause of disarmament as a way of advancing the cause of arms control.

And basically this is my message to you today: the path to more ambitious arms control, in all areas, lies through the gateway of greater openness. To quote Dr. Sakharov, once again, the issue here "is not simply a moral one, but also a paramount, practical ingredient of international trust and security".

The world is still very far from achieving this kind of openness, which is one reason why arms control remains a very painstaking, very difficult, very timely business. Take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defence spending. You all know just as well as I do how slow and careful we must be in terms of arms control and how frustrating is a lot of the pace of the arms control talks, because all of us in this room grapple with the issue on a daily basis. But take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defence spending, something that the United Nations has also been discussing for a good number of years.

In 1985, according to our best estimates, the United States and the Soviet Union each devoted around \$250 billion to defence. Figures on United States defence spending are, of course, widely available in open sources. They are broken down by category. They are extensively discussed. They are scrutinized in the United States Congress -- probably scrutinized a little too much, if you ask me -- but they are scrutinized in the United States Congress and elsewhere in our society. Figures for Soviet defence spending, on the other hand, must be derived from careful analysis. Why? Because published Soviet figures bear absolutely no relationship to the reality of the Soviet defence effort.

In 1985, for example, the Soviet Union claims to have spent 20.3 billion roubles on defence. Assuming the official exchange rate of approximately \$1.50 per rouble, that comes to less than \$35 billion. Now,

that is a ridiculously small sum — some 15 per cent of what they really spend — for the declared defence budget of a State regarded as a military super-Power. It bears no relationship at all to the \$250 billion figure I mentioned a moment ago, which suggests what it would cost the United States to mount an effort equivalent to the present Soviet defence effort. There is no way in the world that the Soviet Union could be mounting its current defence effort on a declared budget of 20.3 billion roubles. It is spending many, many, many times that, and we all know that.

Or again, take the public statements of the two sides on the issue of strategic defences. The United States Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), of which you have heard some, I am sure, in this room, is an openly declared programme. Its budget is published and voted on by the United States Congress. Its activities are reported to the Congress, where it is widely discussed and debated. The President of the United States often discusses the programme in his speeches. In fact I have personally found it hard to stop him from discussing the subject of SDI at any time, in his speeches or otherwise.

Yet to this day, even as we negotiate on defence and space issues with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union continues to deny that it has the equivalent of an SDI programme of its own. We know this denial to be false. I believe everybody in this room knows the denial to be false. We know that the Soviet Union began investigating several advanced strategic defence technologies before we did, years before. We know it is extensively engaged in exploration and development of these technologies. We know, for example, that the Soviet Union has an extensive laser research programme which involves about 10,000 scientists and expenditure of resources worth approximately \$1 billion a year just on that kind of laser research programme. And we know it is researching a host of other technologies, advanced technologies, as well.

Can it surprise anyone that our progress in arms control if often slow and halting when there is such a lack of openness and honesty between Governments about even such an elementary fact as this one?

There is, in short, almost no area of arms control in which greater openness would not lead to greater openness on the way to greater progress. In some of these areas, lack of openness is among the most crucial barriers to a meaningful agreement. Thus, my message to you today can be summed up as this: unless the Soviet Union moves to the openness it now talks about, accomplishments in arms control are just going to be limited, if not thwarted altogether. That movement towards greater openness is necessary for progress on an issue like the one this Conference has before it.

Of the tasks before you, my Government, as you know, considers the negotiations on achieving a comprehensive and effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons to have the highest priority. International negotiators have been striving to remove the chemical weapons threat since the late nineteenth century. Here it is 198/. Nearly a century has passed since the Hague Conference prohibited use of chemical projectiles, in 1899.

Yet the world finds that the problem of chemical weapons remains; indeed, as the world edges toward the twenty-first century, the chemical weapons danger continues to grow. Shockingly, we have witnessed use of chemical weapons by some nations in this decade and even during the past year.

It is high time that chemical weapons use was rendered a thing of the past. It is high time that these barbaric weapons were banished from the face of the earth. But it is obvious that, if these weapons are to be banned, a thorough and effective mechanism of verification is necessary. My country will just not accept, and no free nations should accept, a ban on chemical weapons without sound machinery of verification.

A chemical weapons ban without confidence of compliance will be no more effective than the Hague Conference's 1899 prohibition on use of artillery containing poison gas, which did nothing to prevent extensive use of chemical weapons in the First World War. The use of chemical weapons, as I remember, produced some 1 million casualties. It will be no better than so many of the misguided disarmament measures of the 1920s and 1930s, which, the great Americal commentator, Walter Lippmann, said, were "tragically successful in disarming the nations that believed in disarmament" while permitting aggressor nations to maintain and expand their own arsenals. Until an effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban is in place, the American people will insist, and rightly so, that the United States maintain adequate chemical forces to deter use of these heinous weapons by an aggressor.

While the establishment of procedures for the effective verification of arms control agreements is often extremely demanding both technologically and politically, in the case of chemical weapons, the challenges are especially great. The toxic chemicals which are or could be used as agents of warfare are in general not very different from a variety of substances having legitimate civilian use. Clearly, the chemical process equipment used in their production can be found in the legitimate manufacture of pesticides or corrosives. Chemical agents can be stored in bulk, facilitating transportation as well as concealment. Chemical munitions have no particular characteristics which distinguish them from other types of munitions. They are too small and easily transported and concealed.

Thus, as I mentioned before, the issue of openness goes to the heart of achieving a chemical weapons ban. Article III of the rolling text of the draft Convention on chemical weapons (CD/734) requires each State Party to declare whether it possesses chemical weapons. And yet today the United States is the only country in this room, the United States is the only country in the world, that publicly admits to having chemical weapons and has made public its stockpile locations. That, to me, is astonishing — especially when so many countries are pressing the urgency of a chemical weapons ban. Some are even criticizing the United States for holding up progress and for developing chemical weapons.

The production of chemical weapons is not illegal. The use of chemical weapons is illegal. Since it signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the United States has never used chemical wweapons; others have — others, who do not even publicly admit to possessing chemical weapons, they have used them; others, with representatives in this very room, they have used chemical weapons. The world expects better than this.

The United States openly declares its possession and development of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union, along with other nations, does not. The world expects better than this.

The United States has presented publicly an extraordinary amount of information concerning its binary weapons programme. The details are known to everyone. The Soviet Union has told us nothing about its chemical weapons programme. The world expects better than this.

The United States has invited all members of this Conference to examine procedures for the destruction of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has yet to accept this invitation, which is still outstanding. The world expects better than this.

The United States will devote some \$500 million under the fiscal 1987 defence budget to the elimination of its current chemical munitions stocks. The Soviet Union, apparently, has no similar chemical weapons elimination or demilitarization programme. The world expects better than this.

The United States has maintained a unilateral moratorium on the development of chemical weapons for 17 years. The Soviet Union has never stopped producing chemical weapons and it continues today to expand its facilities and to expand its capabilities. The world expects better than this.

It is because of this sad state of affairs, because of this glaring lack of openness in the realm of chemical weapons, that we are more than ever convinced that confidence in compliance is essential to a chemical weapons ban. We are more than ever convinced that nothing less than an inspection régime institutionalizing the right of short-notice access upon demand to any location or facility suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons will effectively deter non-compliance — that is, of course, the challenge-inspection provision of Article X of the United States draft convention, CD/500.

But every article of the convention must be designed to contribute to this overall objective of confidence in compliance. And, to be effective, each provision must be clearly and unambiguously defined, written, and understood. It will do little good to have broad agreement on the basic provisions concerning permitted and prohibited activities if inspection procedures are inadequate or if they are imprecise.

At present, it is a point of consensus among all our Governments that each State Party will provide international access to its destruction sites, its production facilities to be eliminated, and its facilities for producing permitted chemicals. But the working out of precise procedures for all these tasks had only just been begun by Ambassador Lowitz and his fine delegation. And the vital question of how to ensure confidence in compliance with regard to undeclared sites still remains at issue.

But, again and again, wherever we turn in this negotiation, we run up against the same problem: it is precisely the absence of openness, the absence of glasnost, that is standing in the way, blocking further progress. In the draft Convention, I count no less than 13 different types of declarations that each State Party must be expected to make about its stockpiles and about their destruction, about its chemical weapons production facilities and about their elimination, and about its chemical industry.

Article IV is a key element in this series of declarations — calling for the declaration of all stockpiles. Everyone agrees that each State Party should declare the amount and composition of its stockpile. Everyone agrees with the basic objective that the complete stockpile should be destroyed. And yet the Soviet Union continues to reject two particular "openness" provisions; each is necessary if we are to have confidence that this objective is fulfilled. One is the early and complete declaration of the stockpile locations and on-site verification to ensure that the declaration reflects reality. The second is on-site monitoring of the stocks until destruction to ensure that some weapons are not clandestinely diverted to undeclared sites before destruction. And it is obvious that we face the serious risk that a State will not declare all its stockpile locations or the entire amount of its stockpile.

The consequences of lack of openness in this realm are unfortunate, and they are not lost on world opinion. I think the 1983 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) identified the problem — and identified the solution — as well as anyone did:

"Faced with a high degree of uncertainty about Soviet CW intentions, Western defence authorities have no prudent option but to assume that they pose a threat. If it decided to do so, the Soviet Government could probably find a way for reducing the ambiguities attaching to its CW stance in Western (and non-aligned country) eyes without at the same time jeopardizing Soviet security to the point of net detriment. Yet even though the need for such mistrust-reducing measures is so evidently growing, it seems that Moscow has not chosen to act in such a manner, a failure which is becoming more and more conspicuous and damaging".

And that is from the Stockholm Institute (SIPRI).

Clearly, there is a gap between the way certain States conduct business today and the way they promise they will behave under a convention banning chemical weapons. And it is simply not possible for a nation to yield

(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

national control over its own defence to an international agreement -- as we will be asked to do when we have a convention ready for signature -- on the basis of a mere promise of a new and better pattern of behaviour by other States like the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union says it is interested in real openness. Good. But will its deeds in this forum match its words? We hope so. We hope to see signs of real glasnost, here in the CD, in the coming weeks and months, otherwise I fear our work will be even slower and more difficult.

I believe that a turn by the Soviet Union to real glasnost would transform our discussion and sweep away a host of difficulties that have been blocking your progress here. I believe it could remove the barriers that some have attempted to erect to the inspection procedures absolutely essential to make a chemical weapons ban worth the paper it is printed on. Genuine openness, real glasnost, were it to emerge in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet Union's dealings with the rest of the world — nothing could be more welcome to the United States of America. Nothing could do more to make possible progress in the relationship between our two Governments. Nothing would so improve the prospects, not only for real advances in arms control, but for the entire cause of world peace. Nothing would be a better tribute to your dedicated and important work. Nothing could be a better monument to Donald Lowitz's work and to his life.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair personally and to the country the Chair represents. I wish also to thank him for conveying the message of the President of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkine.

Mr. NAZARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, I endorse your greetings in connection with the presence at today's meeting of the distinguished Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Comrade Raúl Rao, and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Adelman. Allow me also to thank you and those distinguished delegates who expressed words of welcome to me on my appointment as representative of the Soviet Union to the Conference on Disarmament. It is also a pleasure for me to transmit to my predecessor, Ambassador Issraelyan, the warm wishes expressed by yourself and by distinguished representatives.

The opening day of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament, 3 February this year, was "celebrated" by an event that constituted an open challenge to the entire world community which is seeking to remove the threat of nuclear war and to strengthen the foundations of peace. On the day when there were heard in this room the statements of Alfonso García Robles, the distinguished representative of Mexico and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, and other distinguished representatives in favour of the cessation of nuclear

(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)

testing, the United States carried out another in the series of nuclear explosions at the test site in Nevada, an explosion as it were deliberately, maliciously timed to coincide with the opening of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament.

One cannot but agree with the opinion voiced by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Maj Britt Theorin, literally a few hours before the receipt of the news of the explosion, that such fireworks to mark the opening of this session "would amount to nothing less than an affront to international efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban". This affront shows Washington's real attitude towards the opinion of the world community, which has called upon the United States time and again to reconsider its negative stance on nuclear testing and to join the Soviet moratorium.

By conducting another nuclear explosion, the United States has demonstrated flagrant disregard for the calls of the non-aligned movement, for the constructive proposals by the leaders of the "Delhi Six", for the views of parliaments and for the apirations of all people on Earth demanding the cessation and banning of all nuclear tests.

The United States Administration carried out a nuclear explosion -- and I wish particularly to emphasize this -- in a situation in which the Soviet Union had been strictly observing for a year and a half and had extended five times the moratorium on all nuclear explosions that it had declared in August 1985. It is deplorable that the present United States Administration has not responded positively to the call from the USSR to join its peace initiative and has carried out another nuclear explosion, the twenty-fifth since the Soviet Union declared its unilateral moratorium. the United States has ignored the numerous decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, including the resolutions of the forty-first session calling for the cessation of nuclear testing once and for all. For example, resolution 41/46A, as you know, explicitly calls upon the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain to bring to a halt, without delay, all nuclear test explosions. It also indicates the ways to achieve such a halt: through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria, which should include appropriate means of verification", that is, exactly what the Soviet side has done in practice.

By carrying out the first nuclear explosion of 1987 in Nevada, the United States has also put an end to the silence at Soviet test sites. As the Soviet Government has repeatedly warned, the Soviet Union will be compelled to resume nuclear testing after the first nuclear explosion by the United States in 1987. In connection with what happened in Nevada on 3 February, the Soviet Union no longer considers itself bound by its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and will resume at the appropriate time the execution of its own programme of nuclear testing. We will not let the United States achieve military advantages. At the same time, the Soviet delegation is authorized to declare that the Soviet Union will be prepared, on the basis of reciprocity, to stop the implementation of its test programme if the United States halts its nuclear testing.

(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)

The purpose of American nuclear tests is well known. It is to test fundamentally new types and classes of nuclear arms intended above all for the implementation of the notorious "Star Wars" programme. The United States stubbornly refuses to cease nuclear testing for it cherishes an unrealizable dream: to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, primarily through the development of third-generation nuclear weapons, including fundamentally new means of laser-beam warfare.

Even today we do not think that the door leading to a solution to the question of halting nuclear testing has been definitively slammed shut. It is not our intention to cease our persistent efforts in favour of the commencement of negotiations on a nuclear-test ban, negotiations which we are prepared to conduct in any framework and in any forum — with, of course, the participation of the United States. As you may recall, in his statement at the plenary meeting on 3 February, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, pointed out that the Conference on Disarmament is undoubtedly one such forum.

The Soviet Union is in favour of the participants in the Conference engaging without delay -- I repeat, without delay -- in the elaboration of a treaty on a complete and general nuclear-test ban by the members of the Conference. We are in favour of establishing an <u>ad hoc</u> committee on this subject in the framework of the Conference and of endowing it with appropriate powers. In short, we are in favour of moving at last from words to practical work.

There are no reasons, except false and fictitious ones, preventing agreement on a nuclear-test ban. There was a time when the United States argued that it would be impossible to verify such an agreement, but now, thanks to Soviet initiatives, these so-called arguments have been dispelled once and for all. The Soviet Union is willing — and this has repeatedly been affirmed at the highest level — to see any measures of verification in this field. It has been clearly stated by the Soviet side that such verification could be implemented both by national technical means and on the basis of international procedures, including on-site inspections.

When the United States was no longer in a position to use the verification issue for delaying a solution to the question of the cessation of nuclear testing, it advanced new arguments. It now argues that nuclear tests can only be ceased in the event of complete nuclear disarmament and that, so long as nuclear arsenals exist, there is need for nuclear testing. However, to put the question in that way is to do nothing more than to deny the existence of the problem of a nuclear-test ban as an issue in its own right in the field of disarmament. After all, since 1954, when this question first appeared on the agenda of international disarmament negotiations, it has been understood that the cessation of nuclear testing is a significant measure in the limiting of the nuclear arms race and a step towards nuclear disarmament, and that its implementation will in fact put an end to qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, lead to their elimination and promote the conclusion of radical agreements on the reduction and elimination of these weapons. The new

(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)

American logic puts the cart before the horse. After all, nobody would take it into their head to argue that nuclear tests will be needed even when all nuclear arsenals have been destroyed. That line of argument, too, is nothing more than yet another unsuccessful attempt to justify the unjustifiable, that is, the unwillingness of the United States Administration to start curbing the nuclear arms race.

Mr. Adelman, who has, unfortunately, already left the room, today put forward the usual collection of well-worn conjectures against the Soviet Union, the aim of which is to cover up the United States Administration's unwillingness to move towards arms-reduction and disarmament measures. But there is a reliable sign, a litmus test of States' attitude to disarmament and that is their attitude to the cessation of nuclear tests. We are in favour of such a ban. The United States, and this they confirmed on 3 February, is against it. In this way, they have shown their true attitude to the problem of disarmament. It is significant that Mr. Adelman did not feel it possible even to mention the question of a nuclear-test ban, which, as you know, is item number 1 on our agenda.

As to the specific questions which are the subject of negotiations and which Mr. Adelman touched upon in his statement in a polemical tone, we prefer, not polemics, but businesslike negotiations. We have been and will continue showing our attitude to these questions at the negotiating table, in the form of constructive proposals and not by declarations. Unfortunately, the United States prefers declarations, polemics. Behind this lies their aspiration to continue and strengthen the arms race.

Once again we appeal to the United States to stop and heed the voice of dozens upon dozens of States, the voice of hundreds of millions of people on our planet. At stake is the survival of mankind, the salvation of human civilization.

The Soviet delegation has explicit instructions from its Government to do everything necessary to reach a solution on the question of the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests as a priority measure towards the attainment of the principal objective of containing the nuclear arms race and subsequently eliminating nuclear arms. I would like to express the hope that we shall be supported in this undertaking by all members of the Conference who hold dear the cause of preserving peace on Earth.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I would now inform the Conference of a change in the order of the list of speakers, the speakers next in line having agreed to a request put forward by the Co-ordinator for the Group of 21, who would like to make a statement at present. For this reason, I now give the floor to the Co-ordinator for the Group of 21, Ambassador Morelli-Pando.

Mr. MORELLI-PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): I have requested the floor at this time with the permission of distinguished delegates, who had requested their inclusion on the list of speakers, the distinguished delegates of Cuba, the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, in order to make, as you have just explained, the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21 (continued in English):

"The Group of 21 expresses its deepest regret and disappointment at the announcement of the new nuclear-weapon test by one of the super-Powers on 3 February, the opening day of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The international community has been discussing for 30 years the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The General Assembly in that period of time has adopted more than 50 resolutions on this matter, to which the United Nations has assigned the highest priority.

As stated in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This action ignores the insistent appeals made recently by the international community for the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. In Harare last year, the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries state in their Political Declaration, inter alia, that 'the continuance of the nuclear-weapon testing fuels the nuclear arms race and increases the danger of nuclear war'. In January 1985, in New Delhi, the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, India, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania called for an immediate halt to nuclear-weapon testing preparatory to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The same appeal was reiterated by the Group of Six in the Mexico Declaration and in the Joint Declaration of December 1986, in which it was stated that 'There is no justification for nuclear testing by any country. We appeal once again to the United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing so that a bilateral moratorium can be established'. Thus, this new nuclear-weapon test also frustrates the hopes of the international community for a joint moratorium.

In light of the above, and bearing in mind that the aforesaid super-Power's decision not only greatly increases the risk involved in its bilateral nuclear-arms race with the other super-Power, but also affects the interest of the international community as a whole, in which the neutral and non-aligned countries play a significant role, the Group of 21: reaffirms its call for the multilateral negotiation of an agreement on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, and demands that this objective be fulfilled in the Conference on Disarmament.".

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, the Ambassador of Peru, for his statement. The next speaker on my list is the representtive of Cuba, His Excellency the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Raúl Roa Kouri. I now give the him the floor.

Mr. RAUL ROA KOURI (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): First of all, I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation for the work done in the past few months by the distinguished Ambassador of Canada in fulfillment of his duties as President and to welcome the distinguished representative of the People's Republic of China, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, to whom has fallen the difficult task of presiding over this Conference during the month of February, a time of particular significance since it is the occasion for establishing the guidelines for our work for the entire session. Knowing your diplomatic skill, we are sure, Sir, that under your presidency the deliberations of this disarmament negotiating body will gain momentum. It goes without saying that the Cuban delegation, which represents a country struggling for peace, will contribute to that effort to the full extent of its abilities.

The delegation of Cuba wishes also to extend its condolences to the delegation of the United States of America on the demise of Ambassador Donald Lowitz.

In beginning the work of the new session, the Conference must redouble its efforts to reach the objectives that were at the origin of forum. The danger of a conflagration persists and, rather than diminishing, is growing daily.

The intensification of the arms race, the enormous quantity of weapons already accumulated, the advances of technology in the perfecting of means of destruction, particularly in the nuclear sphere, constitute the greatest threat there has ever been to the survival of mankind. It is for that reason that all peoples urgently demand the adoption of measures to prevent nuclear war and promote disarmament.

The declaration adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Movement meeting at Harare is a genuine expression of that demand for peace. The hundred or so countries that comprise the Movement proclaimed themselves in favour of the banning of the use of nuclear weapons, the freezing of their development, production, stockpiling and deployment and the cessation of all new production of fissionable material for military purposes. This stand in favour of disarmament and peace, which has been restated throughout the 25 years of the Movement's existence, was renewed on this occasion, with the greatest priority being given to the issues of nuclear armament.

At their meeting in Zimbabwe, the Heads of State or Government therefore generally welcomed the broad programme for nuclear disarmament according to a schedule and with fixed deadlines submitted by the Soviet Union, whose objectives and priorities are aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Being convinced likewise of the enormous

(Mr. Raúl Roa Kouri, Cuba)

importance of the suspension of nuclear-weapon tests for the halting of the arms race, our countries also expressed themselves on the need to establish a moratorium on all tests.

Accordingly, they not only took note of the initiatives of the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and of the first President of the United Republic of Tanzania, but also expressed their satisfaction at the unilateral moratorium declared by the Soviet Union in August 1985 and extended several times and appealed to the United States to join the Soviet Union in that action, while urging the Soviet Union to maintain its moratorium. It is appropriate, in this context, to draw attention to the latest statement made by the Soviet Government extending the moratorium on testing so long as the United States did not stage any further nuclear tests — which, it has been announced, it unfortunately did some hours ago, thus going against the interests of peace and disregarding the clamour of international public opinion. This and no other has been the United States Government's portentous greeting to the present session of this Conference on Disarmament.

The resumption of nuclear testing is a serious matter that will poison both the environment and the international political climate still further and will complicate negotiations between the two great nuclear Powers while raising new obstacles to the work of this Conference. But this challenge to the international community is not the only thing contributing to the heightening of tension. We would also mention the decision of the United States Government to cease respecting the SALT II Agreement by adding to its arsenal, without dismantling another aircraft as the Agreement provides to remain within the established limit, its 131st heavy bomber capable of transporting long-range cruise missiles.

In the present situation, that is a new factor of disturbance that increases distrust, particularly as the decision was premeditated and a further expression of the militaristic policy that it is desired to continue developing.

Another question that deserves our attention and that was also examined by the summit Conference of the non-aligned is the extension of the arms race into outer space. The Heads of State or Government meeting at Harare expressed their deep concern at the preparations under way to extend the arms race into outer space and vigorously reaffirmed the principle that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes to the benefit of all countries, whatever their level of economic or scientific development, and be open to all States.

Consequently, they urged this Conference urgently to begin negotiations with a view to arriving at agreements to prevent the extension of the arms race, in all its aspects into outer space and to promote the possibility of co-operation in the sphere of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, while emphasizing the imperative need to halt the development of anti-satellite weapons, to dismantle existing arsenals, to prohibit the introduction of new weapons systems and to ensure that the treaties in force preserve outer space for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Raúl Roa Kouri, Cuba)

In taking stock of what happened last year in the sphere of disarmament, special mention must be made of the meeting that took place at Reykjavik on 11 and 12 October between the highest-ranking leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States, a meeting which came very close to achieving significant progress in arms reduction that, if they could continue going forward along those lines in bilateral or multilateral negotiations, would obviously have great importance for all mankind. The persistence of one of the parties, the United States, in continuing to develop what is termed the Strategic Defence Initiative to its ultimate consequences has prevented the realization of the agreements that had in principle been reached. That negative policy has earned the opprobrium of public opinion, which contrasts it with the willingness of the other party to give up nuclear weapons, to agree on a plan for their total elimination within a fixed time-frame, to propose guarantees for all as regards verification and, finally, to adopt effective measures to ensure the peaceful use and prevent the militarization of outer space before it is too late and the situation becomes irreversible.

The Conference on Disarmament has a great responsibility in the efforts being exerted to eliminate the dangers of war by altering the course of that negative policy for world peace. It is, therefore, imperative to get the Conference out of the deadlock it now finds itself and to attempt by every means to attain a convergence of views that will make possible progress in the negotiations on all the items on the agenda. If the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons are crowned with success this year, there is no doubt that a great step will have been taken. Still fresh in our memory are the scourges affecting the Vietnamese people as a result of the criminal use of defoliant chemicals by the United States army.

We must not lose sight of the fact that whatever arrangement that may be made as regards disarmament measures will have a beneficial influence on the budgets of the immense majority of international community by releasing, for their devotion to disarmament, the resources that are today being criminally squandered upon arms production and that this would alleviate in great measure the present economic crisis, by which all are affected in one way or another.

Furthermore, the Conference is, in our view, duty-bound to pay attention to the resolutions of the General Assembly. It is inadmissible that, year after year, the agreements reached in the Assembly, which reflect the attitudes and aspirations of the immense majority of the international community, should be cast aside. The Conference cannot operate in a vacuum. It must link its work with what is being demanded by that public opinion that is, in turn, an echo of the aspirations of peoples and of their need to live in a climate of peace and trust in order fully to develop their capabilities. This negotiating body has a key role to play in the sphere of disarmament and a major responsibility of contributing by its efforts to rendering international relations more healthy.

Given the <u>fait accompli</u> of a resumption of nuclear testing by the United States which is, objectively, the serious event with which we are confronted today, we believe it is timely for the Conference to pay urgent heed to the opinion of the Assembly, which gives the greatest priority to this matter, since as the resolution that gained overwhelming support during the

(Mr. Raúl Roa Kouri, Cuba)

Assembly's forty-first session puts it, the permanent prohibition of all explosions would constitute "a contribution of the greatest importance for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race". In conformity with the provisions of that resolution, our Conference should create an ad hoc committee to draft a treaty on the banning of nuclear tests. My delegation trusts that the Conference will not fail to do this. We hope that, in this 1987 session, the Conference on Disarmament will shoulder its great responsibilities and take steps seriously and definitively to resolve the grave problems before it. Cuba, of course, will lend its resolute support to that end.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Deputy Foreign Minister of Cuba for his statement and the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Wilfried Bolewski.

Mr. BOLEWSKI (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, it gives great satisfaction to my delegation to see you, as the representative of the People's Republic of China, presiding over the Conference on Disarmament during this opening month.

My delegation would like to stress the usefulness of our inter-sessional consultations and regular sessions in November, December and January which have provided us with a number of clarifications and useful discussions. There has been continuous general recognition of the urgent need for a ban on chemical weapons and speakers have expressed their desire for further constructive deliberations.

My Government has emphasized on many occasions that it attributes the highest priority to the negotiations of a worldwide ban on CW. In this context, permit me also to quote from the North Atlantic Council Communiqué of 12 December 1986: "At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, we seek a convention which meets our objective, the general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all existing stockpiles".

The North Atlantic Council further states: "If the Soviet Union is prepared to take a constructive attitude on all aspects of an effective verification régime, such an agreement is within reach. We appeal to the USSR to join us in overcoming the outstanding obstacles".

At this point, my delegation would like to reaffirm the position of my Government on the need for effective verification. Our wish is that agreement be reached as soon as possible on a system of verification which effectively prevents the production of chemical weapons. It must be impossible for any contracting party to evade the inspections required for the attainment of this goal. Of decisive importance is verification expecially in areas where there is a danger of chemical weapons production. The inspections must therefore be tailored to the very purpose of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

(Mr. Bolewski. Federal Republic of Germany)

Our object is and remains, for example, to control super-toxic lethal chemicals which are suitable for CW, not dangerous substances of the chemical industry in general. But even if a total control of the chemical industry were feasible or acceptable — not only of the commercial industry, but of any chemical industry — this would not render superfluous challenge inspections, because even such a total control would not mean that there could not be undeclared or unknown facilities and stocks which might present a risk. That is why my delegation insists on the necessity for any challenge inspection not to be limited to declared facilities, but to cover all possible installations and all locations. This, then, in turn will be a factor reacting upon the regular controls.

The pre-condition to make challenge inspection a really satisfying operation is the acceptance of such a demand for control as a rule. But there are other elements on which consensus does not seem to be achieved yet. This concerns, for example, a further pre-condition, namely that the demand of a challenging State should prevail and not be made dependent upon a plebisciterian machinery of any sort. In our view, majority results or minority failures are hardly apt procedures, even if they are called democratic, to solve international security problems -- and this is what we are dealing with here. If a State perceives an imminent danger to its security, then that State -- no State -- will want to rely on a multilateral process to accept or discard its perception. In addition to that, we might run the risk of establishing the right of veto for one or even more groups in the international supervising body, depending upon the qualifications chosen for representation in that body. A right of veto or a blocking minority would be a completely new element in an international convention, the central logic of which is to guarantee all States equal rights to security and equal duties to contribute towards its realization.

As for on-challenge inspections, we continue to regard the British proposal as the basis of a solution that answers the need for stringent verification while taking account of the legitimate interests of the participating countries in terms of protection.

My delegation stands ready to help in any way to ensure that decisive steps towards a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons are taken in 1987.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. I also thank him for his kind words addressed to the President and to the country which the President represents. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Stanislav Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANKSI (Poland): Permit me to begin by expressing to the delegation of the United States, my delegation's and my own profound condolences on the sudden, unexpected and untimely death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz, whose funeral will take place today in Chicago. It is still difficult to believe that he will no longer be with us. His exceptional personal qualities which so many representatives have pointed out in this hall and his contribution to the work of the CD will be long remembered by us.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Comrade President, as it is for the first time that I take the floor under your presidency, allow me to congratulate you wholeheartedly on assuming this important and, especially at the beginning of the session, undoubtedly difficult function. My delegation is very pleased to see you, Ambassador Fara representative of the People's Republic of China, a great socialist State with which my country, Poland, enjoys traditionally friendly relations in all spheres, presiding over the first month of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. We are convinced that your diplomatic skill and personal qualities will make this month to be remembered as an example of good work and efficiency. We wish you a successful presidency and pledge full co-operation and support in your efforts. May I also take this opportunity to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley of Canada, who presided in the last month of the 1986 session of the Conference and in the inter-sessional period.

It is also a pleasure for me to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors and heads of delegation of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the USSR and Yugoslavia, and to wish them a most successful stay in Geneva. And last, but not least, I welcome the presence at our today's meeting of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Cuba, Comrade Raúl Roa Kouri, and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Kenneth Adelman. I have listened with interest to their statements, so different in their tune and the messages they contained.

Speaking as co-ordinator of the Group of socialist States for item 4, chemical weapons, I wish to express our satisfaction over the Conference's adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, together with the substantial annexes reflecting, as they do, the state of affairs in our work on a CW convention. The results achieved are a convincing demonstration of the usefulness and fruitfulness of the work during the inter-sessional period, i.e. of both the informal consultations and the resumed session of the Ad Hoc Committee.

In this connection, I would like to express our thanks to Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom for his skillful chairing over the Committee's work, his personal devotion and contribution to the achieved results. May I also extend our gratitude to Mr. Rowe, of Australia, and Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria, who, also during the January session, chaired Working Groups A and B respectively, as well as to Mr. Bensmail and other staff of the Secretariat and technical services.

The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on which we shall decide later today already in the first week of the session has, in our view, more than just procedural meaning. It points to the willingness of the Conference's members to restart without any unnecessary delay further work on a convention banning chemical weapons. We believe that is also an indication of the feeling that 1987 should bring us to the completion of this task. Indeed, an early finalization of the draft Convention is within our reach, and 1987 is most propitious for concluding the negotiations.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

This no doubt optimistic event at the outset is a good omen for our further work. We are deeply convinced that similar efficiency will be a guiding principle in the Ad Hoc Committee's work throughout the session of 1987.

On the part of the socialist States, I assure you, no effort will be spared in the search for mutually acceptable solutions, as was stressed recently at the Berlin meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of socialist States. We do have our own position, but we also do realize that at the outcome of these negotiations there has to be only one common position based on a compromise.

We expect that the same approach will be taken by others and we appeal to all delegations to contribute their share to the compromise solutions which are sought for. In this connection, let me draw your attention to the statement of the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Yuli Vorontsov, who said:

"What is now required at the negotiations, is to be able to shed 'parental feelings' toward the approaches one proposes and to concentrate on finding a common approach.".

The rolling working text of the future Convention represents quite an extensive area of agreements, including most of the fundamental issues.

The time has come to make necessary political decisions which would open the way to a successful solution of some of the outstanding issues. There is no need to repeat what we all know, i.e. what the areas of agreement are, or to point out issues where political solutions are needed. It seems, however, that both last year's session and the inter-sessionsal period have demonstrated clearly the growing significance of the overall problem of verification, both verification of non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry and challenge verification. We are of the opinion that verification measures should be in the centre of our work. The verification system should provide confidence for all States parties that the provisions of the convention are observed. We should be careful to close all loopholes which may either open the way to re-emergence of chemical weapons or become a constant source of misunderstandings.

The socialist countries will continue their activity and flexibility in search for possible solutions to these important issues, as well as to all other still unresolved questions.

We call on all States participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemial Weapons to join in a common effort toward an early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It would contribute to the strengthening of international security and confidence and would enhance the credibility of this body.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Our Group is very pleased that at this very decisive stage of our negotiations the work of the Ad Hoc Committee will be chaired by Ambassador Ekéus, of Sweden, whose contribution to the progress achieved so far is considerable. We support Ambassador Ekéus' intention of giving a strong boost to the Committee's work. We are certain that both the method and the programme of work he is to put forward will serve this goal. His personal experience as previous Chairman of the Committee, and as long-time co-ordinator in the Group of 21 is a good guarantee that the 1987 session will close with a result which would enable the Conference to finalize its work on agenda item 4.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. Now I give the floor to the Co-ordinator of a group of socialist countries, Ambassador Rose, of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): I have asked for the floor in order to make a statement on behalf of a group of socialist countries, but, before coming to that, I would like cordially to congratulate you, Comrade President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We are pleased to see in the Chair a very experienced and outstanding representative of socialist China, a country with which the German Democratic Republic enjoys friendly relations. These ties received fresh impetus through last year's visit to China by Erich Honecker, Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic. I wish to assure you, Mr. President, of my delegation's unqualified support in the discharge of your responsible duties.

Also, I should like to thank Ambassador Beesley, of Canada, once more for the job well done as Conference President at the end of last year's session. My delegation is pleased to see in our midst the Deputy Foreign Minister of Cuba, Mr. Raúl Roa, and I listened with great interest and attention to his important speech.

Now I will read the joint statement of a group of socialist countries:

"We deplore and condemn the nuclear-weapon test which the United States conducted on 3 February 1987, the very day the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament opened and 547 days after the Soviet Union's testing sites fell silent. With this move, militarist circles have tried in their specific way to counteract the efforts of States and peoples to ward off the danger of nuclear disaster and have shown their indiferrence to the demands of the international community, as expressed in numerous United Nations resolutions, in the declarations of the 'Delhi Six' and in strong appeals launched by peace forces all over the world.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The USSR has stated that it cannot put up <u>ad infinitum</u> with the disadvantages resulting for its security and that of its allies from extending its unilateral moratorium to almost one and a half years and that it would have to resume nuclear testing after the first United States nuclear explosion in 1987. Thus, the Soviet Union has made it clear that the button for touching off nuclear-weaspon tests at Semipalatinsk is located right in Washington. Regrettably, this has fallen on deaf ears.

Even so, we still possess the means to agree on immediate measures to end all nuclear-weapon testing. The lasting impact of the unilateral moratorium will reside in the fact that the feasibility of such a step has been demonstrated to everyone. Fatalism and resignation are out of place. They would only aid the plans to carry the nuclear-arms race into outer space through a third generation of nuclear weapons and to destroy targets on Earth from outer space.

With this in mind, we appeal to all those willing to avert the nuclear threat from mankind to start working, without any further delay, on dependable agreements aimed at halting all nuclear-weapon tests. The Conference on Disarmament is certainly the proper forum for that. It should at once set up a committee to begin drafting a nuclear-test ban treaty, including provisions for strict international verification. We are prepared to consider seriously all proposals to this effect, from whatever side they may come."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none. Then we take up the following items.

As agreed at our last plenary meeting, I shall now proceed to put before the Conference for adoption the draft decision on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the appointment of its Chairman, as contained in document CD/WP.252 which has just been circulated. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision. 1/2

It was so decided.

May I, on behalf of the Conference, extend to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, our warm congratulations on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I am sure that all members join me in wishing him a successful tenure in that important office, which he has already held with the utmost competence and person commitment, advancing substantially the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, I would like to thank you and, through you, the members of the Conference for the confidence the Conference has placed in me and, through its decision, in my delegation. On this occasion, I would only state one thing and that is that results can only be achieved if all members of the Conference work together in the same direction and that progress can only be achieved through joint efforts.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Ambassador of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, for his statement.

I should like now to refer to other questions. The secretariat has circulated all requests received from non-members concerning their participation in the work of the Conference. They are as follows: Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Viet Nam, Austria, Denmark and Greece. I have requested the secretariat to prepare the relevant draft decisions, which I intend to put before the Conference at our next plenary meeting, on Tuesday, 10 February. As usual, we shall first have a brief informal meeting to consider those requests and later, at a resumed plenary, we will formalize the agreements reached at the informal meeting. We shall also take up then the question of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committees under item 6 on the agenda, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States sgainst the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and item 7, "Radiological Weapons".

I have requested the secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. You will notice there that the Ad Hoc Committees on Chemical Weapons and on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will start their work immediately. Of course, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On that understanding, and if there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 10 February, at 10.30 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

Note

1/ Later issed as CD/736.

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 10 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 387th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will listen to statements in plenary meetings and consider the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions. In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As agreed at our last plenary meeting, I intend to convene an informal meeting, immediately after we listen to those members listed to speak today, in order to consider the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committees on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and on "Radiological weapons". We shall also then examine requests by non-members to participate in the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina, Japan, Bulgaria and Peru. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset I wish to say that the Argentine delegation places the greatest confidence in your ability to exercise the very responsible duties of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in the first month of its annual session. Under its rules of procedure the Conference on Disarmament each year is obliged to engage in a process of setting up subsidiary bodies and establishing mandates for them that requires, from the person occupying the Presidency, great diplomatic ability, which fortunately for us you possess in a most noteworthy degree, so as to give the Conference the initial impetus that will set in motion the negotiations on disarmament and these are its very raison d'être. We therefore have no doubt that at the end of your term as President you will have made to the Conference on Disarmament a positive contribution, for which in advance we extend our heartiest congratulations and offer you our closest co-operation. Through you, Sir, I should also like to extend to Ambassador Beesley of Canada the appreciation of the Argentine delegation for the diplomatic tact and keen political insight with which, as President, he carried to fruition the work of the Conference on Disarmament in August of last year. It is a sad duty indeed to extend to the delegation of the United States of America the most heartfelt condolences of the Argentine delegation on the untimely demise of Ambassador Lowitz, a man esteemed by us all for his moral and political qualities in the service of his country. My delegation extends a warm welcome to the new members of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Kemal Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Rubens Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Chusei Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Gheorghe Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Marko Kosin of Yuqoslavia, and Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin of the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, we can never dwell sufficiently upon the first session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament where agreement was reached on an international strategy to take decisive action on the problems before us in this field. In particular, it was then agreed to establish a strategy for

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

nuclear disarmament and the growing risks of nuclear war, and machinery was set up in the disarmament field by the establishment of a deliberative body, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and a negotiating body, the Conference on Disarmament.

The Final Document adopted by consensus on that occasion provided the appropriate framework for initiating the disarmament process. What had to be done from that moment on was to translate into practical terms the provisions of the Final Document and continue along the avenue that was to lead us to the conclusion of binding and effective international disarmament agreements.

Regrettably, in the intervening four years between the first and second special sessions no tangible result was reached. In addition, if we had to take stock of the second special session of the General Assembly itself, the salient feature would be the inability to agree on a single measure, however modest, to limit the risks of nuclear war. And yet on that occasion it was very clear that mankind's primary concern was the threat of nuclear annihilation.

As we begin, this month, the ninth session of the Conference on Disarmament, we should ask ourselves what has been achieved to date. Looking back we can reach one unquestionable conclusion, which is that the initiatives undertaken do not offer any solution to the priority problems of disarmament nor to the increasingly urgent requirements generated by the nuclear and space arms races. It is clear also that for the two military alliances the quest for military pre-eminence that goes hand in hand with the accumulation of weapons has been more important than the search for international security through the disarmament process.

The situation faced by the sole multilateral negotiating body on Disarmament derives chiefly from the fact that certain Powers and their allies take the view that negotiations on disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, should be confined exclusively to a bilateral framework. This is only one symptom of a totalitarian attitude that seems to be based on the utterly unacceptable idea that the force of nuclear weapons grants them the omnipotent and exclusive right to decide how, when, where and to what extent this question is to be negotiated. It should be emphasized once again in this forum that no country is prepared to surrender its right to participate in a negotiating process that affects its very survival.

It would seem that in setting aside the urgent priority questions in this field of disarmament that have been defined and agreed in the Final Document, the Conference on Disarmament has gradually been losing sight of the gravity and urgency of the situation it faces. Were this tendency to continue, there is a danger that the credibility of the multilateral process could be completely lost. This state of affairs, certainly not created by the Group of 21, indicates the need to endow the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum with a new resolve and a new sense of urgency in its work. This requires, among other things, that we should be carefully selective in our efforts and concentrate our attention upon those items which, by their effects, have the greatest importance and priority.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

On the eve of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference still has a chance to give its work the impetus that will yield the concrete results which the international community has been demanding. It would suffice, as a first step, for us to fulfil the mandate entrusted to us in paragraph 120 of the Final Document and to leave to the appropriate body the deliberative work which, important though it may be, is stripped of any great efficiency in a forum such as this. At the same time we should establish a preliminary method that will ensure appropriate complementarity between bilateral and multilateral disarmament endeavours.

The situation we face today, as has repeatedly been said by other distinguished colleagues in this Chamber, is extremely critical for the multilateral negotiating body if it does not begin negotiations on the chief items upon its agenda. Questions such as the negotiation of a treaty that will prohibit nuclear-weapon tests, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, measures to prevent nuclear war, the necessity to avoid an arms race in outer space and the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament cannot be delayed any further. Nor can we accept that progress on these items should depend upon something so haphazard as the relations between the two principal nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The Conference on Disarmament should not confine its work to the negotiation of questions which, in our judgement, lack the necessary priority, as is the case, among other things, of what are generally referred to as radiological weapons.

We recognize that the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests will not in and of itself bring about the reduction of existing nuclear-weapon arsenals, nor will it imply a limitation of the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout all regions, particularly in the seas and oceans. However, we do believe that this measure would contribute to halting the qualitative development of these weapons and would make it possible simultaneously to tackle the question of the cessation of their production and deployment throughout the world.

The commencement of those negotiations would serve to strengthen confidence, thus tending to reduce risks of nuclear weapons, and would contribute also to the adoption of additional measures preventing the outbreak of nuclear war and permit the appropriate functioning of multilateral crisis management centres which, in our opinion, it is urgent to establish.

Similarly, the various aspects and problems involved in the broad subject of outer space should be the object of our consideration. If this Conference does not respond with the necessary firmness and determination in dealing with this question, both from the standpoint of the interests of the space Powers and from the standpoint of the non-aligned countries, developments in this sphere will continue to accelerate until they lead to another ruinous arms race that will increase the risks of nuclear war.

This rationale, which compels us to take a consistent approach to disarmament, leads me back to my point of departure, namely the Final Document. This is so because the strategy set forth in that Magna Carta of disarmament, has as its ultimate aim general and complete disarmament, and it therefore requests, in paragraph 109, that the then Committee on Disarmament should "undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated.

It clearly emerges from this that there is an essential prerequisite of agreeing on calendars for the fulfilment of the Programme and for each stage of its implementation. Along this same line of thinking, as regards nuclear and space weapons, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament cannot mean or imply any backward movement, however small, with respect to the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, in particular as regards paragraph 51.

For my country, disarmament is not just one subject among many; rather it is one which is given the most serious attention at the highest level of Government. The active presence of the President of Argentina in the context of the initiative of the Group of 6 and his participation in the eighth Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement serve to illustrate the degree of our concern and our resolve to take up this challenge with the urgency and earnestness that it requires.

Let me conclude my statement today by repeating some of the ideas expressed by President Alfonsín in his message to the Conference on Disarmament in 1985.

President Alfonsín said:

"The aim of my Government is to give expression to its policy through deeds which confirm our intentions rather than through words alone. This applies to our conduct both in internal affairs and in the field of foreign policy. In simple terms, we propose to preach by example rather than with words.

"Our actions in government contribute to peace and international co-operation because we neither believe nor accept that the threat or use of force should be an instrument of policy. This attitude does not imply the renunciation of principles or any lessening of our determination to protect legitimate national interests. Above all, our position is the expression of a stubborn faith in the capacity of man to settle disputes by peaceful means, through dialogue and negotiation, because nothing is lost from peace while everything can be forfeited as a result of war and violence."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President personally. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, I would like to express my sincere congratulations to you on your assumption of the Presidency in this important opening month of the Conference; under your pre-eminent leadership we will no doubt embark on a fruitful undertaking. May I also express my gratitude to

you, Mr. President, and other representatives, for the kind words of welcome extended to me. It is a sad duty for me to offer my heartfelt condolences to Mrs. Shana Lowitz and the United States delegation on the untimely demise of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. May his soul rest in peace, for we will carry on his work for the cause of peace.

At the beginning of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament for 1987, I wish first of all to state that this is a year of critical importance in determining the future of disarmament negotiations, and those of us who are engaged in disarmament tasks have a joint responsibility to the international community to make further intensive efforts. The adoption last year by the General Assembly of resolution 41/60 G, calling for the convening of the third special session on disarmament in 1988, sets a date towards which we must carry forward our substantial work. It is with this perception that I wish to enunciate the views of my delegation on the arms control negotiations between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, and on the major agenda items of our Conference, especially those of a nuclear-test ban and chemical weapons.

With regard to the United States-Soviet arms control negotiations, we wish to witness that in year 1987 they will succeed in giving effect to the progress thus far achieved.

Speaking at the University of Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on 15 January, my Prime Minister, Mr. Nakasone, renewed his calls on the two Powers to work for early agreement at the nuclear and space talks, keeping in mind the following five points.

First, the United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be such as to enhance the sense of strategic stability between the East and the West, and to contribute to the strengthening of the peace and security of the world.

Second, in the negotiations for reductions of nuclear weapons, "globalism" should be fully adhered to, and, in the case of the long-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF), they should ultimately be completely removed from Europe and Asia alike.

Third, in the negotiations, whatever is practicable should be undertaken and realized steadily on a step-by-step basis. In order to realistically move the negotiations even a step forward, it may have to be considered to separate the INF negotiations from others and to reach early agreement thereupon.

Fourth, the security of the world should be safeguarded with consideration for the overall balance of all systems of weaponry. We must pay attention to the international efforts now being exerted in this direction for arms control and disarmament, including chemical and other conventional weapons.

Fifth, East-West dialogue should be expanded and deepened.

The United States-Soviet exchanges following the Reykjavik meeting do not, I regret to say, warrant optimism. We hope, however, that during the seventh round of the nuclear and space talks now taking place here in Geneva, the negotiators of the two Powers will continue to search for common ground for agreement in a business-like atmosphere.

I now wish to take up the work of the Conference which is entrusted with the task of multilateral disarmament negotiations by the international community.

The fact that this Conference, since its establishment by the first special session on disarmament to this day, has produced no disarmament convention, should be a source of serious concern to us. I am not overly pessimistic, but I would rather like to focus our attention on the Conference's potentiality. The five nuclear—weapon States and States representing the various economic and social systems as well as regions of the world are gathered here to work seriously for disarmament. The Conference has at its disposal many interesting ideas put forward by various States, as well as accumulated expert knowledge and experience in the field of disarmament. It is my belief that if we skillfully draw upon the potentiality of the Conference with our wisdom and determination, there is a real possibility for the Conference to move substantially forward this year.

Allow me to begin with the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests.

As is well known, Japan has consistently considered the realization of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban as being the priority item in the field of disarmament, and strongly wishes to see a resumption of substantial work by the Conference on the issue. We believe that the following circumstances hold out prospects for recommencement in 1987 of this long-suspended work.

First, there now seems to be a genuine desire on the part of a number of member States that substantial work be resumed. In the General Assembly last year, a great majority of non-aligned countries and socialist States, in contrast to their previous abstentions, voted in favour of the resolution 41/47 which Japan co-sponsored, calling for various actions to be taken in order that a CTB treaty may be concluded at an early date. We are encouraged by the wide support shown for the resolution, in particular, the call on the Conference on Disarmament, in its operative paragraph 2(a), to "commence practical work on a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of the 1987 session."

Secondly, there is now a widening common perception as to the subject matter of the work. Resolution 41/46 A lists "contents and scope" of a treaty and "compliance and verification" as the subject matter of the work which, in comparison to the similar resolution of the previous year, shows a more realistic approach, an approach which we view favourably.

Thirdly, all groups now seem to share a more or less common perception of the importance of verification in developing a CTB régime.

A comprehensive nuclear-test ban has serious implications for the security concerns of all States. Verification measures to ensure compliance are therefore essential. It is from such a perspective that my Government has, in a number of ways, contributed to the work on verification, including, in particular, the proposal in June 1984 for a step-by-step approach, whereby those nuclear tests which are at present verifiable would be prohibited, and as progress is made in verification technologies, the scope of prohibition would be expanded, finally arriving at a comprehensive prohibition. It is also well known that other Western States such as Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom have made concrete proposals which stress the need for adequate verification measures.

We welcome the fact that the socialist States, at the 1986 session of the Conference, began to attach importance to verification measures with regard to a CTB. As Mr. Petrovsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, stated in his intervention on 24 June, "the Soviet Union favours the strictest possible verification of the ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspection and making use of all achievements in seismology". He went on to state that the Soviet Union does not favour any loopholes in the régime for an on-site inspection and that "Should any ambiguous situation arise when, for example, an exchange of seismic data would make it difficult to determine whether or not there had been a nuclear explosion or an underground tremor due to some other reason, that would in fact be just the case when an on-site inspection would be required". I do hope that such positive statement by the socialist States with regard to the problem of verification, will be translated into concrete proposals in the course of substantial work on a CTB.

The non-aligned and neutral States have also stressed the need for specific measures of verification with regard to a CTB, and have made clear their willingness to co-operate actively. For example, the "Document issued at the Mexico Summit on Verification Measures" by the Leaders of the Six Nations, in August 1986 in Ixtapa, Mexico, recognizes the importance of verification and expresses the preparedness of the six countries to participate in on-site inspections at the nuclear-test sites of the United States and the Soviet Union, and in monitoring of the territories of the two States outside of the test sites.

As I have discussed, there exists now, in the Conference, a general expectation for the commencement of substantial work on a CTB. There is common perception of the subject matter of the work. There are recognition of the importance of verification and willingness to participate in its implementation. Now is the chance to resume substantial work on a CTB.

Lastly, the Conference has, in the past three years, failed to establish an <u>ad hoc</u> committee on agenda item 1 because of the mandate issue. What a great loss this has been to all members of the Conference! Given the emerging common perception of the subject matter of the work, we may well wonder whether the so-called negotiating mandate is absolutely necessary at this present time. The draft mandate of a group of Western countries (CD/521) provides that the <u>ad hoc</u> committee is to resume its work "with a view to negotiation of a treaty", while the non-aligned sponsored resolution 41/46 A of the General Assembly lays down that the <u>ad hoc</u> committee is to be

established "with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty". We cannot but note that there could be much in common between the two.

Since July 1986, talks have been under way between United States and Soviet experts on the entire scope of issues related to nuclear testing. They can also have a positive impact on the work in the Conference.

It must be possible for us to proceed in a spirit of co-operation to establish an <u>ad hoc</u> committee with an appropriate mandate to commence substantial work on a CTB at the beginning of this session. Indeed, it would be our collective responsibility to do so. Mr. President, may I call upon you to make the best use of your eminent leadership for the establishment of the <u>ad hoc</u> committee. As far as my delegation is concerned, I pledge our full co-operation.

The conclusion of a CTB treaty will necessitate the establishment of an international seismic monitoring network as an indispensable international mechanism to ensure compliance. In this connection, we highly value the Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test (GSETT) 1984, presented last year, concerning an exchange and analysis of Level I data, as well as the agreement by the experts to begin work directed towards the design of a modern international system based on the expeditious exchange of wave-form (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and on the processing of such data at International Data Centres. We had, in April 1986, presented our ideas on an exchange of Level II data with like-minded countries, and, following up the results of the Canadian Workshop in October 1986 for data communication experts, we began an experimental exchange of Level II data in December 1986 with several interested countries. We will report on the results of this experiment to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts this year. May I take this opportunity to thank the Canadian Government for its sponsorship of this useful workshop.

Useful ideas on the organization of an international seismic monitoring network indispensable for verifying compliance with a CTB treaty have been presented by Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Sweden and others. Discussions on this important question of organization would require much work. From this point of view also, I earnestly hope for an early establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> committee on CTB.

A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, in the form of a convention widely acceptable the world over, is another item on which we hope to see further progress during the course of this year.

The Ad hoc Committee, in 1986 and January 1987, has identified those substances to be controlled under a future convention and has begun the drafting of the régimes to which these substances would be subject, as well as streamlining the provisions concerning the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities. I would like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation of these results and to extend our sincere gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom, and the Chairmen of the Working Groups, Mr. Richard Rowe, Mr. Petar Poptchev and Mr. Noegroho Wisnoemoerti. Many countries called for

the convention to be concluded in the course of this year, and my delegation for one is certainly prepared to do its share to enhance the work under the new Chairman, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden.

Much time and effort have already been spent on the chemical weapons negotiations, and they are now at an advanced stage. They are very complicated and extensive in detail. As such, they do not lend themselves easily to immediate and simultaneous solutions. I should therefore like to propose that we concentrate our energies on those problems which will require agreements on principles: namely, articles of the convention and some of its annexes, leaving those other problems of a technical and procedural nature for extended consideration by experts.

In the view of my delegation, the priority questions are as follows:

First, the definition of chemical weapons is one of the basic issues of the convention. It is a most complicated and difficult problem. But the definition should, in principle, be understood to be "substances of particular relevance to chemical weapons" and related munitions. In drafting, the focus up to now has been placed on the prohibited substances under Article VI. Would that be sufficient? We should probably also take into consideration those substances as will be declared under Article IV.

In this connection, my delegation thinks that the convention should not create impediments for the legitimate activities of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, and thus feels that due significance should be given to the general purpose criterion. It is therefore imperative that the concept of "permitted purposes" be given careful attention in drafting the definition.

Second, with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons, the declaration of location of stocks, together with the declarations on the entirety of the stockpile and on its composition, should be made at an early point in time following the entry into force of the convention. These declarations should be verified by on-site inspection.

In this connection, my Government welcomed the presentation in July 1986 by the United States delegation of a document in which detailed information on United States stockpiles and plans for their destruction were given. It was a courageous step helpful to the negotiations. If the other countries possessing chemical weapons were to follow suit, during the course of the negotiations, it would greatly contribute to the solution of the problems we now face, in particular, with regard to Articles IV and V.

Third, in Article VI, which deals with the question of permitted activities, we should strive to develop common language on the verification measures to be applied to each of the categories of substances.

There is much work to be done, also, on the issues of thresholds for the control of various chemical substances, the concept of militarily significant quantities, the mechanism for revising lists of chemicals, the cost factor, and so on. We feel however that these problems might be better assigned to the experts for their consideration and advice. It would be more productive

.

for the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee to agree on the basic utility of these concepts in implementing Article VI, and then proceed to work out the body of Article VI and its annexes.

With regard to the substances on which there is no agreement as to whether they should be included in a particular list or régime, we suggest that it would do no harm to put them aside temporarily by putting them on a preliminary list, returning to settle the question of the outstanding substances once the régimes to which they would be subject are more developed.

Fourth, as regards the organizational questions in Article VIII, we feel it appropriate to maintain the present draft text for the time being. When the various substantive provisions on the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, régimes for permitted activities, challenge verification, and so forth are developed, there will be a need for a thorough review. The organs of the convention will need to be fully worked out and be in existence by the time of the entry into force of the convention. As they require extensive work, my delegation thinks that these, including the financial clauses, would be another set of problems which we could delegate for expert consideration at an appropriate time.

Fifth, there seems to be common understanding on a challenge inspection régime under Article IX, that this inspection is to be of an exceptional nature to be conducted within a short time scale. However, when we get down to working out the details of its implementation, the divergences seem to be as wide as ever. In order to overcome this impasse, we must develop our thoughts as to whether we are pursuing a rectifying effect as regards possible contraventions of the convention or the restoration of confidence among the parties to the convention, whether our aim is to drive the offending party out of the convention régime, or whether bilateral solutions may possibly be contemplated. We should review existing proposals and engage in quiet and informal discussions to seek a solution to the problem.

I have already said that the chemical weapons negotiations are at an advanced stage. We must organize ourselves to deal with this new stage in a most effective way.

My delegation has advocated a work process where we concentrate on one item for a given week and move on to another, rather than deal with several questions in three separate working groups at the same time. I am pleased to note that the organization of work suggested by Ambassador Ekéus is along the lines of our thinking. We might meet as the Ad Hoc Committee for several days each month so as to assess the situation in the Working Groups, to consolidate areas where there has been progress and give directives where there has been little progress.

Rather than spending day after day in various meetings, we need also to bear in mind the utility of "breathing spaces", so as to allow delegations to develop their thoughts and to consult with capitals. To this end, we may need to reduce the frequency of meetings within the framework of carefully formulated schedules.

To sum up, we should aim to build substantive agreements one by one at this advanced stage.

Besides the CTB and chemical weapons, we are also expected to make substantial progress, during this spring session, on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The position of my delegation with regard to the various subjects on this item were stated in the Ad Hoc Committee. To recapitulate, we feel that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should by its nature be adopted by consensus, both here in the Conference and at the General Assembly; that the various measures it envisages and their means of implementation should be of a realistic character, accurately reflecting the present international situation; and that the review of the Comprehensive Programme should be an entirely different thing from the special sessions on disarmament which would have political significance in the light of the international situation prevailing at the time. My delegation stands ready to make its contribution, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, in furthering our work to develop the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

There are other agenda items such as outer space which are equally important, but I shall defer them to another opportunity.

In beginning my statement, I stated my belief that this is an important year to work for disarmament, in view of the third special session scheduled for 1988. I also touched upon the potentiality of this Conference.

We should not become overly pessimistic or blame others for lack of progress. Let us reaffirm our joint responsibility and focus our efforts on those areas where progress seems possible. And we can, through dialogue and co-operation, fulfil our joint responsibility to the international community and share in the fruits of such progress.

Allow me to conclude my first intervention in the Conference with a personal note. In 1945 I was a boy of 14 years old attending a school in the beautiful city on the river Delta facing the inland sea. There was an old castle, temples, schools, inns, shops and houses. Almost in an instant they were all gone and people were suffering beyond description. There now stands a monument on which it is inscribed "Let it never happen again". I would like to pass on to all of you what a nuclear catastrophe really is, for I witnessed myself what it was like. I pledge to you, Sir, that I will work with you for a world where we can live together free from the fear of nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Thank you, Comrade President. It is a great pleasure for me to see you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament during the opening month of its 1987 session, representing a great country which bears special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. You are willing, I am sure, to perform your duties in a most efficient manner. Your high professional and diplomatic skills have already

brought about some concrete results. In the spirit of the existing friendly relations between our two countries, you may rely, Comrade President, on the co-operation of the Bulgarian delegation. I wish to pay tribute to the successful work done by Ambassador Beesley of Canada who presided in August and during the intersessional period. It is a pleasure for me to welcome in our midst our new colleagues, Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkin of the USSR, and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. My delegation looks forward to co-operating with them. On a sad note, I wish to extend our heartfelt condolences to the delegation of the United States of America in connection with the passing away of Ambassador Donald Lowitz.

The year 1986 will remain memorable as "the International Year of Peace". The President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, sent a message on 29 January last to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which contains the assessment of my Government on a period that was difficult and complex, but rich in important international events. In his message, President Zhivkov informed the Secretary-General of the efforts that my country has been deploying for the implementation of the lofty ideals of the International Year of Peace, including the establishment, in the Balkans, of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a chemical-weapon-free zone.

There is no doubt that the year 1986 will remain, in the annals of disarmament, intricately linked with the Statement of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of 15 January. In that Statement the Soviet Union put forward a large-scale programme to eliminate by the year 2000 all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and to build a world without nuclear weapons. This programme has been largely recognized as an example of new, dynamic political thinking, as an expression of determination to undertake radical steps called for by the nuclear-space age.

In 1986 silence continued to reign at the Soviet nuclear-test sites. The Soviet unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions was an important gesture of political goodwill. It had no other aim than to create the most propitious conditions for solving one of the most urgent tasks of our time: the achievement of an agreement on a comprehensive ban of nuclear-weapon tests.

An event of great political importance was the Summit Meeting in Reykjavik. It demonstrated once again the necessity of bold, non-traditional approaches to the solution of the most acute problems of today. What is more, it proved that it was possible to cut, in a not-so-distant future, through the Gordian knot of the nuclear-arms race; and to reduce and do away with the danger of nuclear catastrophe.

In Reykjavik, the Soviet Union made sweeping proposals for a balanced reduction of nuclear arsenals, to be followed by their complete elimination. Regrettably, the United States was unable to negotiate its own half of the way. It remained prisoner to its illusions of reaching military superiority through the deployment of its Star Wars weapons.

In his message to the United Nations Secretary-General, President Todor Zhivkov stated, inter alia:

"We all have been deeply impressed by the Reykjavik Meeting between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan. This Meeting has given rise to great expectations in world public opinion and among the nations of the world. Notwithstanding the fact that the American side could not muster enough determination to accept the historic proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Reykjavik Meeting will, undoubtedly, remain as one of the most significant events during the International Year of Peace. We hope that sound reason will prevail and that the dialogue will continue on from where it was interrupted."

The International Year of Peace was also remarkable for a number of important political initiatives: the Budapest proposal by the Warsaw Treaty Member States on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe; the Harare Declaration of Non-Aligned leaders; the "Six States" initiatives; and the proposals of the socialist countries in the United Nations for the setting up of a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Xavier Pérez de Cuéllar, rightly pointed out in his message of 3 February to the Conference that the agreement in Stockholm, the two IAEA conventions concluded in Vienna, the results of the Biological Weapons Review Conference and the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament in its negotiations on the chemical weapons ban, "are noteworthy examples of a constructive approach towards the issues of disarmament and international security". The recent entry into force of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty was also an encouraging event.

Speaking in terms of disarmament, may I emphasize that 1986 would have been a better year had the United States Administration joined the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Nineteen eighty-six would have been a better year if the United States of America had not rejected all proposals to start negotiations on a comprehensive treaty to ban all nuclear-weapon tests. Nineteen eighty-six would have been a better year if the United States of America had not continued its preparations for waging Star Wars. Nineteen eighty-six would have been a better year if the United States Administration had not decided to violate the SALT-2 Treaty.

On 3 February 1987, the very day the Conference on Disarmament began its annual session, the United States Administration offered an affront to the international community by conducting its twenty-fifth test since the beginning of the Soviet moratorium. Thus, the United States Administration did everything possible to force the USSR to take a decision for resuming its nuclear testing.

My delegation could not agree more with the phrase that Mr. Adelman considered it appropriate to repeat so many times in his statement here on 5 February last, namely that "The world expects better than this!".

The year 1986 confirmed that a new kind of political thinking is necessary, one that is in line with the new realities of our times. It is imperative to break with the century-old pattern of thinking and behaviour, resting on the acceptability and admissibility of war as a means of solving international disputes. For today, it is widely recognized that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The world situation must not be allowed to become such that peace and security no longer depend on the common sense or will of governments and peoples, that they become hostage of military and technological logic. This is the reason why we welcomed the Delhi Declaration, signed by the leaders of the USSR and India, in which it is stated that "the building of a world free of nuclear weapons and violence requires a revolutionary restructuring in the minds of men and bringing up nations in a spirit of peace, mutual respect and tolerance".

The Bulgarian delegation cannot help repeating that, in its view, the establishment of ad-hoc committees offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Conference. In this vein my delegation believes that it is high time for the Conference on Disarmament to undertake concrete and substantive work on the items related to nuclear disarmament.

My delegation attaches highest priority to item 1 of our agenda: "Nuclear Test Ban". In our submission, the results of the forty-first regular session of the United Nations General Assembly have created favourable prerequisites to overcome the stalemate in our work. Any unbiased analysis of resolution 41/64 A and resulction 41/47 cannot but lead to the conclusion that there is a convergence and reconciliation of differences in them. The Bulgarian delegation considers that on the basis of these resolutions a compromise solution can and must be found, that a consensus can and must be reached to set up an ad hoc committee with a mandate which would allow the Conference to proceed to substantive work. The existing convergence of views must be translated into an agreement, words must be matched by deeds.

The Soviet Union and the United States bear a particular responsibility for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In Reykjavik, the framework for agreements relating to the first stage of nuclear disarmament was clearly defined. It is quite natural that so many hopes are pinned, now, on the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva. This, however, does not mean and cannot mean that the Conference on Disarmament ought to sit idle on its agenda item 2. My delegation believes that the Conference has to proceed with an in-depth and structured discussion on all aspects of that issue, including the conditions for adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the efforts aimed at ending the nuclear-arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament.

In its resolution 41/86 G, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Conference to undertake negotiations "with a view to achieving agreements on appropriate and practical measures which could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war". It requested also the Conference to establish, for that purpose, an <u>ad hoc</u> committee on the subject. This resolution perfectly reflects the considered view of my delegation on item 3 of our agenda. At the same time it is appropriate to

note that my delegation's flexibility is well known, both officially and unofficially. We would like to reiterate our readiness to co-operate in order to break away with the deadlock on item 3.

As to item 4, my delegation would like to express its satisfaction with the results achieved by the Conference at its 1986 session and during the inter-sessional period. Under the able guidance of Ambassador Cromartie of Great Britain, the Ad Hoc Committee succeeded in resolving a number of important issues related to the chemical weapons stocks, the chemical weapons production facilities and the activities not prohibited by the convention.

It is gratifying to note that the progress achieved at informal consultations warranted an updating of the rolling text of the draft convention to incorporate the addition of common ground identified during the inter-sessional period.

We share the view that momentum has been generated, and it must be sustained. In fact, it is necessary for the Conference to intensify its efforts by increasing the tempo of its negotiations. We believe that in 1987 our objective should be to finalize the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. While we do not tend to underestimate the remaining difficulties, we think that this objective is not beyond the reach of the Conference. There is no doubt in our mind that the Conference made a very wise decision in giving, at this crucial stage of the negotiations, the steering wheel of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons into the hands of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus.

My delegation holds the view that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should resume its activities as soon as possible.

There is no lack of valuable ideas and specific proposals in the Conference. We believe it is important now to focus the Committee's attention on the elaboration of significant measures conducive to guaranteeing the peaceful uses of outer space and preventing an arms race in it. This Conference should concentrate on the elaboration of an agreement or agreements, for instance on ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites. In this context, it is warranted to explore the possibility of elimination of existing anti-satellite systems. In other words, what my delegation would like to see on item 5 is deeds.

With respect to item 8, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by consensus, a decision for the Conference to conclude the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the first part of its 1987 session, and to submit a complete draft of the Programme before the end of its forty-first regular session.

Having co-sponsored this decision, my delegation would like to assure the distinguished Chairman of our Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador García Robles, that he can rely on our full support and co-operation in the work on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The United Nations General Assembly has already taken a decision to convene its third special session devoted to disarmament. At the first plenary meeting of the Conference, the distinguished representative of Mexico rightly recalled that for nine years now the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to adopt even a single treaty, even a single convention.

We are afraid that it might be a fatal blow to the credibility of this Conference, if it presents to the third special session devoted to disarmament a report along the lines of the reports it has been submitting to the regular sessions of the General Assembly during the past nine years. It is high time for the Conference to make a breakthrough. We must find a way out of the vicious circle with respect to nuclear disarmament and proceed to business-like negotiations on a nuclear-test ban. We must have no less an objective than to agree upon a convention which would ban the chemical weapons. We must adopt a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. To put it in a nutshell, we all must move forward at the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President, and to the country the President represents. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Morelli Pando.

Mr. MORELLI-PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, at the outset I wish to congratulate you and express my delegation's pleasure at the fact that a person of such great eminence should be presiding over this session, representing a country of such great world influence as China. It gives me particular pleasure to express my delegation's satisfaction at the work done by the distinguished representative of Canada as President of this Conference. I wish to extend to the delegation of the United States the condolences of my delegation at the premature and highly regrettable loss occasioned by the decease of Ambassador Lowitz for his country and for all of us who knew him. I extend a welcome to the distinguished delegates of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

Year after year, ever since it received its mandate from the Final Document of 1978, this Conference has been going through a ritual of good intentions every February and a great chorus of frustration every August, and it is well known that, as in other disarmament forums, that ritual tends to follow the mercurial changes in relations between the major Powers, particularly the super-Powers. As we begin the 1987 session, the question arises this year, as in so many other years: is February going to be a season of good intentions? That question is especially relevant today in the light of the Reykjavik Summit. The meagre results of bilateral summits in recent years have become habitual, indeed predictable. This time it is understood that Reykjavik will go down in history as significantly different from previous summits, but it is not yet known whether that difference will in the final analysis have a positive sense and, if so, what its scope will be.

(Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru)

Another question therefore arises, as to whether this Conference, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum, is going to receive the same information as was received by the General Assembly concerning what occurred at Reykjavik. If that is the case, if we are going to receive partial and mutually divergent reports about the achievements of the latest summit, then the proposal of the Group of 21 at our previous session that the Conference should be informed in February 1987 of the results of the bilateral negotiations that have taken place and any others that may be under way will not have been heeded. Obviously that proposal provided and continues to provide coherent, reliable and realistic foundations for multilateral negotiations which cannot be avoided and which we must not continue to postpone. Some statements in the plenary meeting last Thursday illustrate the difficulties faced by the Conference on Disarmament with respect to what I have said and with respect to other disturbing developments. And it was no coincidence that the Group of 21 at that same meeting expressed its view on the sensitive and urgent item of nuclear-weapon tests.

That statement of the Group of 21 significantly took into account the resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the Non-Aligned Statement of Harare and the more recent statement of the six Heads of State or Government, and concluded, in conformity with those documents, by voicing an explicit and significant demand that the Conference on Disarmament should negotiate and conclude a treaty on this issue which is of the highest priority. requested in General Assembly resolution 41/46 A, opportunely commented on and highlighted at our inaugural meeting by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, the creation of an ad hoc committee to address the question of a nuclear-weapon-test ban would be a major step forward and in the present circumstances would allow some hope of a convergence in the determination of the super-Powers to seriously negotiate a process which, in the final analysis, is a multilateral concern. Needless to say, other multilateral efforts should take place side by side with the Conference on Disarmament, in the context both of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 and of the Non-Proliferation Treaty whose preamble contains an undertaking to put an end to vertical proliferation, an issue profoundly and naturally linked, with horizontal non-proliferation. The delegation of Peru hereby reiterates its support for the principles and standards of that Treaty, whose continuity must be assured and whose acceptance should be extended so that the credibility of its fulfilment will be enhanced.

Other types of convergent co-operation deserve attention. The six Heads of State or Government have offered their co-operation for the fulfilment and verification of general agreements in that area. Peru believes that other countries should rally to this suggestion, and therefore, within the bounds of its possibilities and bearing in mind the appropriate training of its experts in seismology we offer our co-operation as and when it may be required.

In our plenary we have heard the views expressed by the distinguished representatives of Australia and Mexico with respect to the implementation of the Treaty of Rarotonga. As the representative of a country which is a full member of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the only country of the south-east Pacific area belonging to this forum I also wish to welcome the fact, that despite the nuclear threat hanging over mankind, it has proved possible, following in the wake of the Tlatelolco Treaty, to establish a second nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated geographical area.

(Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru)

The link between the two treaties is clear and therefore if they are fully implemented this will mean, having in mind Ambassador Butler's fine turn of phrase, a zone of application extending from the west coast of Australia to the west coast of the corresponding part of Latin America and from the Equator down to the Antarctic, which in turn is governed by an appropriate international status.

It is worth emphasizing a process that was begun by Latin America and is now being continued by the countries of the South West Pacific through the Treaty which has just entered into force and which fully marks the progress that was to be expected of non-nuclear-weapon countries 20 years after the adoption of the Tlatelolco Treaty. I refer to the definition of nuclear devices and their comprehensive prohibition, and in particular to the inclusion of a third protocol, relating to nuclear tests vis-à-vis the five Great Powers.

Peru, whose legitimate interest coincides with that of other countries of the Permanent Commission of the South Pacific has a clear position on nuclear tests in that area, specifically with a view to the preservation of vital marine resources. But Peru also believes that these problems cannot be conceptually divorced from the highly qualitative competition in testing which has existed and may continue to exist between the super-Powers. Likewise we must bear in mind that what occurred, vis-à-vis the nuclear Powers, with the two additional protocols of the Tlatelolco Treaty may now begin to happen with the additional protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty: I refer to the highly qualified statements made by those Powers when they subscribe or ratify these additional instruments. The Tlatelolco Treaty expressly affirmed in its preamble that it did not constitute an end in itself. It could not, since to a great extent it depends for its refinement and full application upon the respect and support of the nuclear Powers. We may assume that this will also be the case as regards the Rarotonga Treaty.

The delegation of Peru hopes that, in line with the possible advances in the prohibition of nuclear tests, we may also make progress on the items concerning the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the prevention of nuclear war, as the Group of 21 has tirelessly been proposing. We hope for a positive increase in the exchange of views which is already being reflected in our report to the General Assembly, with a view to reaching tangible results at this Conference.

With respect to the established continuity of the <u>ad hoc</u> committees on items 4 and 8 of our agenda, my delegation wishes to state the following. With regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, we once again express our hope that the efforts currently under way to achieve a comprehensive and global treaty in this field may be completed this year, as has continually been requested by the competent international forums and also significantly and recently, by the Second Review Conference of the Treaty prohibiting biological weapons. Recognition should be given to the work done recently by the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee under the expert guidance of the distinguished representative of Great Britain, and now entrusted to the distinguished representative of Sweden, from whose guidance we may hope for very good results.

(Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru)

With respect to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, we again express our hope that under the prestigious leadership of Ambassador García Robles it may fulfil its mandate to submit the draft programme, as desired and expected, to the forty-first session of the General Assembly.

The delegation of Peru will adhere to the position formulated by the Group of 21 with regard to the re-establishment of the committees on items 5, 6 and 7 of the agenda.

With respect to the first, item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space, we are prepared to participate actively in discussing and considering this increasingly urgent priority item of the Conference on Disarmament, chiefly in the light of the concept of the peaceful uses of space and the possible analogies between such uses of outer space and the uses contemplated in the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The delegation of Peru firmly believes that this year the Ad Hoc Committee should be given a broader mandate than last year's which was its first, and an appropriate programme of work.

The prospects that lie before the Conference on Disarmament this year are uncertain because of the state of world affairs and because of the record of its own activities in recent years, with such scant results. But even though there are some auspicious signs, in this forum, will it be enough to achieve some additional partial results for us to be able to say that our annual work has been done? In my delegation's judgement, the time has come for some far-reaching thinking about the purposes of this Conference, thinking that will lead to conclusions worthy of being included in our report to the General Assembly.

For example our work, as is natural, is governed by our agenda, but the latter does not take into account the interrelationship that exists between those items, as if they existed in their own airtight compartments. It does not seem acceptable that the obvious need to have <u>ad hoc</u> committees should rule out a comprehensive yearly deliberation.

As I ventured to point out in August last year, we have systematically been excluding from our agenda certain items which the General Assembly entrusted to us. It is true that these items do not yet deserve the establishment of ad-hoc committees, but nothing would prevent us from being truly comprehensive in our yearly deliberations, and not excluding those items that have so far been postponed.

Along the same line of thinking, and bearing in mind the request made in this Conference that it should be informed about the bilateral negotiations, we should establish whether we are talking only about bilateral negotiations and only with respect to the items specifically included in the present agenda. My delegation believes that this Conference should also be informed about regional negotiations on the reduction of military forces and the implementation of confidence-building measures, that is, items which, like the question of conventional weapons, are specifically included among those entrusted to us by the General Assembly.

(Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru)

The distinguished representative of Argentina has very rightly pointed out that this year the Conference on Disarmament should give due attention to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled for 1988. My delegation believes that this is exactly what is needed with a view to this very important event, as well as in relation to other related ones. We regret that in 1986 our Conference did not show interest in another item that has been postponed, the issue of disarmament and development, which should be dealt with this year at the conference referred to by several General Assembly resolutions.

Mr. President, the delegation of Peru once again expresses its best wishes for your success in the important tasks entrusted to you in this initial period, in the belief that they will lead to tangible and auspicious progress in this eminent negotiating forum.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and I thank him for the kind words addressed to the President himself and to the country which the President represents. I now give the floor to Ambassador Butler, the Ambassador of Australia.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): At our first plenary meeting this year, on 3 February, I had the honour of joining with the representative of the delegation of New Zealand in circulating to the Conference the final text of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, a Treaty which had then entered into force. May I say just quickly that I am very grateful to the distinguished Ambassador of Peru for the references that he has just made to the Treaty of Rarotonga and for the analysis of its importance which he shared with us. When we circulated those Protocols, we were able to announce that Protocols 2 and 3 had been signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I thought it would be interesting if I reported briefly to the Conference this morning that at 10 o'clock Suva time today, 10 February 1987, Protocols 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Rarotonga were signed by your country, Mr. President, by the People's Republic of China. The Protocols were signed by Ambassador Ji Chaozhu in Suva, that being the place where the Treaty of Rarotonga is deposited. May I take this opportunity, Mr. President, of saying to you personally that Australia, and I am sure I can speak for New Zealand in this context, very much welcomes the action that your Government has taken. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none.

As announced earlier and agreed at our last plenary meeting, I intend now to postpone the plenary meeting and convene, in five minutes' time, an informal meeting of the Conference to consider the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committees on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and on "Radiological weapons", as well as requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference.

The plenary meeting was suspended at 12.15 p.m. and resumed at 12.25 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 387th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of our discussions at the informal meeting, I wish first to put before the Conference for decision document CD/WP.253, dealing with the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". If I hear no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. 1/

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): May I now turn to document CD/WP.245, relating to a draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision. 2/

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I suggest now that we take up those requests contained in documents CD/WP.255 to 266, containing draft decisions on the participation of Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, Zimbabawe, Viet Nam, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Bangladesh. Since consensus was noted at the informal meeting on each of the requests received from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, we agreed to take up at the resumed plenary all draft decisions together. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decisions. 3/

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): As there is no other business to consider, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 February 1987 at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at at 12.50 p.m.

Notes

- 1/ Later issued as CD/737.
- 2/ Later issued as CD/738.
- 3/ CD/WP.255:

"In response to the request of Norway and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."

CD/WP.256:

"In response to the request of Finland and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."

CD/WP.257:

"In response to the request of New Zealand and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of New Zealand to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

CD/WP.258:

"In response to the request of Portugal and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Portugal to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."

CD/WP.259:

"In response to the request of Turkey and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 7 and 8 of its agenda."

CD/WP.260:

"In response to the request of Zimbabwe and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Zimbabwe to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."

CD/WP.261:

"In response to the request of Viet Nam and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Viet Nam to address during 1987 the plenary meetings of the Conference on item 8 of its agenda."

CD/WP.262:

"In response to the request of Austria and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."

CD/WP.263:

"In response to the request of Denmark and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

CD/WP.264:

"In response to the request of Greece and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."

CD/WP.265:

"In response to the request of Spain and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."

CD/WP.266:

"In response to the request of Bangladesh and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Bangladesh to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 6 and 8 of its agenda."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.388 12 February 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 12 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. Fan Guoxiang

(China)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 388th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to cordially welcome in our midst the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, His Excellency Dr. Klaus Törnudd, who is addressing the Conference today as our first speaker. In doing so, I also wish to thank him for his interest in our work, as he has visited the Conference before. In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will listen to statements in plenary meetings and consider the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of Finland, Romania, New Zealand and Hungary.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, His Excellency Dr. Klaus Törnudd.

Mr. TORNUDD (Finland): Mr. President, I wish to begin by expressing my thanks for the warm words of welcome you addressed to me. May I, for my part, congratulate you upon your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. I am sure that your well-known experience and skill will guide the work of the Conference in the most efficacious way. May I also offer our heartfelt condolences to the United States delegation, and through it, to the family of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. The sudden passing away of Ambassador Lowitz, whom I had the honour to meet on several occasions, has deprived the United States of an educated public servant, and the Conference of an able negotiator.

The Conference on Disarmament is resuming its work at a time of uncommon flux in international disarmament efforts. Much has happened since the Conference last assembled in this Chamber less than six months ago.

The Reykjavic summit meeting showed that there is indeed a real possibility of radical reduction of nuclear weapons. After so many years of fruitless effort, bilaterally and by this Conference, Reykjavik is a harbinger of hope despite its immediate outcome.

The Stockholm Conference showed that patient and painstaking multilateral negotiation of complex and militarily significant issues can pay off. The achievement of a new régime of confidence— and security-building measures in Europe has already inspired initiatives designed to move Europe towards lower levels of conventional forces and armaments on a regional scale.

Finland welcomes the fact that, after Reykjavık, both the Soviet Union and the United States have reaffirmed their commitment to a continued search for agreement on the outstanding issues dividing them. Effective and

(Mr. Törnudd, Finland)

verifiable agreements on reducing nuclear weapons and preventing an arms race in outer space between the two Powers with the largest arsenals would truly enhance their security and that of everyone else.

We note with satisfaction the extension of the United States-Soviet arms control dialogue to new areas. The formal negotiations that began last month on establishing nuclear risk reduction centres in Moscow and Washington deal with an aspect of the nuclear equation that is often overlooked in discussion of the ways and means to prevent nuclear war. In the final analysis, preventing nuclear war from arising by miscalculation or misunderstanding is no less important than preventing it from arising by calculation or design.

In our view, efforts to reduce nuclear weapons and prevent their accidental or deliberate use would be greatly assisted by an equal effort to end their testing. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty would do much to retard and eventually end the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would put pressure on those who might still harbour nuclear ambitions to desist from their folly, thus strengthening one of the key instruments of international security, the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

We regret the fact that the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing did not lead to the start of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, bilaterally or by this Conference.

We continue to believe that a comprehensive test-ban treaty with adequate verification provisions is achievable right now. However, we also recognize that, even on this important question, the best should not be the enemy of the good. At the present juncture, step-by-step negotiations, firmly geared to the generally accepted goal of ending all nuclear tests in all environments for all time, would seem to offer the best available means out of the deadlock. We welcome the willingness of both sides to explore a gradual approach to this important issue.

The Conference on Disarmament has already done a considerable amount of useful work on the subject of a test ban. That work needs to be continued bearing in mind the possibility of interim steps. One such step might well be the establishment by the Conference of an international seismic monitoring network based on existing facilities around the world, as recently recommended in General Assembly resolution 41/47.

Clearly, confidence in a comprehensive test ban requires that it be verifiable. Mandated by this Conference, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has done valuable work in laying the necessary technical groundwork for reliable monitoring of seismic events for verification of a test ban. We welcome the steps toward developing an international data exchange system now underway. This work would be further assisted if all States conducting nuclear explosions were to provide the Secretary-General of the United Nations with information concerning these explosions as requested by General Assembly resolution 41/59 N.

(Mr. Törnudd, Finland)

Finland participates actively in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. With government funding, the University of Helsinki has for some years conducted a special seismological project for this purpose. In view of the new and demanding tasks the GSE set for itself at its last meeting, the Government of Finland has recently decided to allocate considerable additional resources to the project as of this year.

Since 1980, Finland has co-operated with Zambia in establishing a seismic network there and training Zambian personnel to operate it. Zambia participated with success in the Level I data exchange experiment organized by the GSE in 1984. We look forward to Zambian participation in the even more complex Level II data exchange experiment scheduled for 1988.

Since I last spoke from this rostrum one year ago, considerable progress has been achieved with regard to another priority item on the agenda of this Conference, the elaboration of a convention to ban chemical weapons. Although a number of critically important issues remain to be settled, the pace of progress over the past year gives rise to the hope that the remaining problems, too, can be solved in the not too distant future. We wish the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, every success in his important task.

Challenge inspection is undoubtedly the major unresolved issue at this point. We are glad to note that, as last year's Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, noted in his report to the Committee, a convergence of views now exists on at least four points. Enlarging this common ground to the point of consensus — by working out the appropriate detailed procedures to everyone's satisfaction — poses a challenge of its own. Perhaps differentiation by types of challenge inspection objects and accumulating experience from on-site inspections might help to solve this problem.

We are heartened by the progress made in developing régimes for the verification of various categories of chemicals relevant to the convention. For the first time, there is now a provisional list of at least nine known chemical warfare agents which will be banned, except for small-scale production for research, medical or protective purposes. Important work has also been done in developing detailed verification measures for such production. We believe that in perfecting these measures care should be taken not to hamper basic research routinely undertaken in university laboratories or elsewhere.

It is clear that effective verification of the chemical weapons convention requires, in addition to data reporting, both on-site inspections and the use of modern monitoring equipment.

Monitoring equipment for verification purposes has been studied and tested by the Finnish chemical weapons verification project since 1972. As part of our continuing effort to help to provide the necessary technical means for assuring confidence in the convention, the Finnish project is hosting, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, a special workshop in Helsinki. The

(Mr. Törnudd, Finland)

workshop, convened at expert level, will address questions of automatic monitoring in terms of detection of alleged use, verification of destruction and verification of non-production. The results of the workshop will be communicated to all members of the Conference on Disarmament in written form as soon as they are available.

We welcome the fact that the Conference on Disarmament will continue to deal with the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. Substantive, although rather preliminary, discussions have already been held in the past. Bearing in mind the fact that the extensive use of outer space for some military purposes, such as early warning and verification, clearly contributes to international security, continued discussion should, in our view, focus on preventing the weaponization of outer space. A ban on anti-satellite weapons should be a priority objective in this context. Multilateral efforts at this Conference would thereby complement, for the common good of all, the bilateral effort of those two who bear the primary responsibility for preventing an arms race in outer space.

The Conference on Disarmament could also play an important role in furthering naval disarmament. This aspect of disarmament has for too long been overlooked. We are encouraged by the fact that the idea of bringing the burgeoning naval arms race under closer scrutiny, and eventually control, is gaining momentum. The United Nations Disarmament Commission will deal with this question again at its next annual session in May. As the single multilateral negotiating body for disarmament, this Conference could complement the work of the UNDC by taking up, in an appropriate manner, some aspects of this problem for more concrete action. Finland has recently drawn attention to the importance of naval confidence-building measures in her own region, Northern Europe, where the adjacent sea areas are the scene of growing military activity.

Finally, as a representative of a non-member State I wish to take this opportunity to re-emphasize the continuing active interest of my country in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that our contributions have been useful and we look forward to all new opportunities to participate in disarmament efforts in the future as well. We remain ready to assume membership in the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.

Ambassador DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): Comrade President, it is with great pleasure that I associate myself with previous speakers in extending to you my warmest congratulations on your accession to the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in this month that begins our session, a month that is so important for the subsequent pursuit of our work. Our satisfaction is all the greater in that you are the representative of the

People's Republic of China, a great socialist State with which the Socialist Republic of Romania has close and exemplary relations of friendship and co-operation in every field. We are confident that given your abilities in the conduct of our work, the Conference will have the most auspicious conditions for accomplishing its duties. Mr. President, through you I should also like to pay tribute to the outgoing President, Ambassador Alan Beesley of Canada, for the excellent work that he did and express to him my delegation's gratitude. I thank you, Comrade President, for your words of welcome for those of us who are taking our seats at the heads of our delegations for the first time here and through you I also thank the other colleagues who extended their welcome to me. It is a painful duty for me to convey my very sad condolences to the delegation of the United States on the untimely death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz.

I wish to take this opportunity to share some thoughts reflecting the position of Romania, the view of President Nicolae Ceauşescu, on the problems of halting the arms race and of disarmament, problems which are included in the agenda of this forum.

The effort and concern to participate in the solution of these problems are an essential component of my country's foreign policy. An essential component because the problem of halting the arms race and moving on to disarmament is, as we see it, in itself the fundamental problem of the contemporary world.

Because of the events which marked it, last year was not the year of peace as our peoples had proclaimed through the United Nations. International relations continued to be characterized by particularly serious tensions, because all the negative processes and phenomena that feed these tensions persisted. But last year did not elapse without leaving some lessons behind. It led us to reconsider some of the basic ideas that have underpinned military and political thinking in the post-war period. It has become clear, for example, that a nuclear war cannot be waged without ending in the annihilation of civilization and of the very conditions for life on our planet. Last year also led us to a better understanding of the disastrous impact of the arms race on the state of health of the world economy. again, last year, developments led us to realize ever more forcefully that in the suspicion-arms race spiral each of the two terms is both a cause and an effect and that the vicious circle they constitute can be broken, as the outcome of the Stockholm Conference showed, when all States display political will. All States, be they large and powerful and endowed with nuclear weapons or small or medium-sized and with limited military potential, all States, I say, have the right to be involved and to become involved in efforts to build a world without nuclear weapons.

If we wish to survive, it is essential to give up the time-worn idea that nuclear arms strengthen defence capacity and thereby contribute to maintaining peace, and we must move on to the adoption and application of real nuclear disarmament measures. The most fruitful approach — the one that we support — is the comprehensive approach to disarmament problems: nuclear disarmament measures should be accompanied by a substantial reduction of

conventional arms, troops and military expenditure. The latter, in Romania's view, should be reduced by at least 50 per cent by the year 2000. An initial step in that direction could be the implementation of the proposal contained in the Appeal and programme of the States members of the Warsaw Treaty for a 25 per cent reduction in arms, troops and expenditure by the end of the next decade. By simultaneously tackling nuclear and conventional disarmament in the framework of a comprehensive programme, this approach covers the complex realities of our world and the security perceptions of different States.

As regards arms control and disarmament, there is no lack of ideas and proposals for action. What is lacking is action. More than ever, what is needed is to move from words to deeds. Having this in mind, and prompted by a desire to make at least a modest and symbolic contribution to this difficult transition, my country has set itself the task of unilaterally carrying out a 5 per cent reduction of its arms, troops and military expenditure. This measure was adopted by a popular referendum last November. It would have been desirable for such a reduction to take place on a multilateral basis, but given the enormous scale of destructive potentialities, such unilateral actions seem possible to undertake without hurting the security interests of the States concerned. Measures of this kind may contribute to building confidence and to establishing the right climate for halting the arms race and moving on to real disarmament measures.

This decisive moment in the evolution of international life requires that all States step up their efforts and give new dynamism to the activities of organs and conferences in the field of disarmament and the activity of the entire system established for negotiations on disarmament. It goes without saying that by the military potential they possess the United States, the Soviet Union and the other nuclear Powers have a special responsibility in beginning and fostering the disarmament process. It is therefore natural to expect negotiations and meetings between the Soviet Union and the United States to lead to substantial and rapid results. But other States whose existence is also threatened and which are also directly affected by the political, economic and social consequences of the arms race cannot confine themselves to the role of spectators. With regard to the foremost problem of our day halting the arms race and moving on to disarmament, they should be able to express their views and they should be able to make their contribution.

The Conference on Disarmament has a unique, leading role in the negotiating system on disarmament. It is the only multilateral negotiating organ of which all the nuclear-weapon States, as well as the principal States having considerable military potential, are members.

Unfortunately we must observe, as other speakers before me have done, that in the period since its creation the results achieved by the Conference have been minimal. It is imperative that the potential of the Conference be more effectively used and that it apply itself to the drawing up of concrete agreements in the field of disarmament so that it can truly become a negotiating forum. In this regard we share the view that negotiating

structures, i.e. ad hoc committees should be set up for each priority disarmament issue. Finally, what is of the essence is to begin a concrete dialogue on all the questions on the Conference's agenda.

In view of the importance of disarmament problems in the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, in view of the great number of resolutions adopted on these issues, many of them touching directly upon the activity of this Conference, we feel that the Conference's work should be based to a greater extent on the relevant United Nations resolutions which are the embodiment of the will of the overwhelming majority of the States of the world.

As regards the specific items on the Conference's agenda, the Romanian delegation wishes to make the following comments and proposals at this stage:

As regards nuclear disarmament, these issues are at the forefront, quite rightly, of the Conference's agenda. As I have already stressed, due to its view of disarmament, Romania places nuclear disarmament at the forefront of its concerns. On the basis of this absolute priority, my country has always favoured effective negotiations aimed at ending the nuclear arms race and for the conclusion of agreements on the halting of production and development, on the reduction and finally on the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this spirit Romania welcomed and supported the proposals of the Soviet Union regarding the stage-by-stage elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. We feel that new efforts should be undertaken on the basis of the proposals submitted at the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik in order to achieve as soon as possible appropriate agreements for a halt to the arms race on Earth and in space.

As a European country, Romania attaches special importance to the need to achieve this year an agreement, even one that is separate from the overall "package", for the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, with a view ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the European continent.

Similarly, as a country situated in the Balkan region, Romania favours and is working for the transformation of that part of the continent into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons and of foreign military bases. At the same time we support the creation of such zones in the north and centre of Europe as well as in other continents. In that spirit we welcome the recent entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific.

As regards the work of the Conference, we believe it is high time for us to cease dealing with nuclear questions in very general terms, and for these issues to become the specific subject of negotiations. Romania attaches a particular importance and high priority to the cessation of all nuclear testing which could and should constitute a first step in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Public opinion in my country learned with legitimate and deep concern of the new underground nuclear tests conducted by the United States and expressed its firm disapproval of this event. Romania,

which welcomed the Soviet Union's decision to institute a unilateral moratorium on its nuclear tests, considers it of the greatest importance that the United States should join in that measure. Such an act would be an important step towards creating the necessary conditions to move on to negotiations designed to conclude an agreement capable of ending nuclear tests. The establishment of such a moratorium by both parties as well as by the other nuclear Powers would constitute evidence of their willingness effectively to embark upon the path towards the cessation of the arms race and progress towards disarmament. In the present international circumstances, where there is a real risk of the annihilation of our civilization and of life itself on our planet it is more necessary than ever to refrain from any action which could increase tension and unleash a further arms build-up.

The Romanian delegation firmly advocates that the problem of prohibition of nuclear testing should occupy a central place in the work of this session. We therefore favour the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> committee on this item. In view of the importance and gravity of this problem of nuclear tests, Romania proposes the convening of an international conference on a nuclear-test ban. Such a conference could be entrusted with debating all aspects involved in this problem, including the role of non-nuclear-weapon countries in the negotiation of an international nuclear-test-ban treaty and the application of a reliable and effective system of monitoring the provisions of such a treaty. The Conference on Disarmament could be the appropriate setting for the preparation of such a conference. As an interim step the Conference could also call for the establishment of a moratorium on all nuclear tests.

Romania welcomes the idea of the creation of a network of seismic stations in different countries which, through the exchange of data and information, could contribute to monitoring the implementation of a future treaty banning all nuclear tests. We are prepared to participate in this with the technical means available to us.

In the view of the Romanian delegation, the prevention of an arms race in outer space should also constitute a priority objective of negotiations in the Conference. Of considerable practical importance would be the prompt re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with dealing with all aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the beginning of negotiations on this issue. In our conception it is necessary that priority be given to the cessation of all actions militarizing space, the convening of an international conference and the conclusion of a general treaty on the use of space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Romania attaches great importance to the total prohibition and final elimination of chemical weapons, and thus to the preparation by the Conference of a draft convention. The results achieved to date by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Cromartie to whom we wish to express the Romanian delegation's gratitude, represent remarkable steps towards the elaboration of the text of the convention. Several delegations that have already spoken have stressed the importance and urgency of developing a text of this convention as well as their willingness to exert the necessary efforts for resolving the problems or issues that remain

pending: notably verification of non-production of chemical weapons by civilian industry, challenge inspection, declaration and verification of stocks of chemical weapons and other problems. In all these areas, verification remains the key problem. The agreed measures should be such as to inspire confidence that the provisions of the convention will be respected by all States parties. It is on that aspect in particular that we shall have to focus our attention during the process of searching for generally acceptable solutions. As regards the verification provisions, especially on-site inspection, we suggest using the formulas contained in the document of the Stockholm Conference. In our view, the monitoring system agreed upon should not in any way affect the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, or the enhancement of the technical and scientific potential of each country.

Like other delegations, we hope that under the skilful chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will this year be able to carry to its conclusion the task entrusted to it.

Romania favours the stepping up of negotiations aimed at the drafting of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons as part of the efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Such a convention could at the same time facilitate co-operation between States in the peaceful use of radiation and radiation sources while providing a suitable verification system with the participation of all States. We favour the achievement of an agreement containing a commitment by States not to resort to attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities likely to produce radiation and endanger the areas concerned. A subject that also deserves attention in our view is the need to ensure the safe operation of all peaceful nuclear facilities. Likewise, our delegation is in favour of the Conference addressing all aspects of the production of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and concrete measures for prohibiting them.

I shall not dwell on the importance of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I have already stressed that in Romania's view true movement towards disarmament can emerge only from an integrated approach to all its aspects. I will therefore confine myself to expressing the hope that under the chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be able to fulfil its tasks during this year. The drafting of the text of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will constitute a concrete contribution by the Conference on Disarmament to preparations for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

To conclude I wish to quote some words recently pronounced by President Nicolae Ceauşescu. They seem to me particularly significant in this forum.

"Present international circumstances are such that nothing can be more important today than moving on to concrete disarmament measures, to the adoption of measures capable of freeing mankind from the danger of a world war of annihilation. It is essential that we should do everything possible to halt the arms race, and above all the nuclear arms race, in order to ensure peace, the vital right of all peoples to existence, to freedom, to life and to peace."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to the country that the Chair represents.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Mr. Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand): Mr. President, my delegation extends its congratulations to you on your election to the Presidency of this important body. We hope that under your early guidance, the Conference will realize its potential this year in contributing to a saner and more stable security order.

New Zealand has jointly submitted with Australia the final text of the Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The Protocols were finalized over the past year following consultations with each of the nuclear-weapon States. They were adopted in final form by the South Pacific Forum last August and opened for signature on 1 December.

It is gratifying to see that, with Australia's ratification, the Treaty of Rarotonga has now entered into force. A majority of South Pacific Forum countries now constitute the Zone.

The adherence of China and the Soviet Union to Protocols 2 and 3 is also welcomed. The Treaty and its Protocols meet the basic criteria for nuclear-free zones stipulated by the major nuclear Powers. New Zealand trusts that the sincerity with which the zone States have undertaken their obligations will be acknowledged by all nuclear Powers. We believe they will do so, and we look forward to their eventual adherence to the Protocols.

The South Pacific region, which covers one sixth of the surface of the planet, is now nuclear-free in the accepted United Nations definition of the term. Together with the contiguous zones of Latin America to the east and the Antarctic to the south, a very sizeable part of the Earth's surface -- 40 per cent -- is free from the permanent deployment of nuclear weapons. The zones established by the Antarctic and Tlatelolco Treaties served as admirable precedents for our work, and we pay tribute to those who had the wisdom and foresight to conceive and negotiate those treaties.

The South Pacific is relatively free from strategic rivalry and confrontation. It is this situation which we seek to preserve as a strong and vital endowment to future generations. The Treaty is an arms control agreement not only of regional but also of global importance. The world has

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

changed dramatically in recent decades, and global security has become an interwoven tapestry of security commitments and relationships that form an indivisible whole. All countries of our world community, whether related in adversarial terms or not, are now mutually dependant upon one another for their common security and survival. In the South Pacific we have made a solemn security commitment by renouncing the possession and testing of nuclear weapons and their deployment in our territories. Nuclear weapons have no part to play in the security of the South Pacific. They offer no defence and their presence itself is destabilizing. We have made a common recognition that nuclear weapons provide an illusory protection, and that the survival and well being of our planet depends upon a lesser reliance on such weapons than that which prevails today.

We in New Zealand seek an alternative to the system of nuclear deterrence at some future stage as the basis of international security. A global security system can only rest on something other than the threat of planetary degradation and our collective self-extinction. The risk of nuclear deterrence failing gives us all limited time in which to work. For our part, we will see to it that nuclear weapons stay out of New Zealand. We have declared that we do not wish to be defended by nuclear weapons. We see the Rarotonga Treaty as a small but significant step towards greater global security. It is New Zealand's hope that the Conference on Disarmament this year will reflect the same sense of urgency that galvanized our work in the South Pacific and that we shall see substantive progress during the session this year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Meiszter.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Mr. President, please allow me to express to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the responsible office of the President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am especially honoured to welcome in the Chair the representative of a State with which my country has increasingly good relations in all fields of social activity, the representative of a State which displays profound interest in an ongoing contribution to the cause of making disarmament efforts more efficient. I am confident that your patient guidance and diplomatic skills will help our Conference to break the vicious circle of feverish activities on one hand and fruitlessness on the other prevailing in this body during the past years. words of appreciation go also to Ambassador Beesley of Canada who presided over our proceedings in an exemplary way during the closing month last year. The composition of this body has considerably changed since we closed our session last August. Some colleagues have left us to take up other responsibilities somewhere else, or departed under tragic circumstances like Ambassador Donald Lowitz, a man whose personal integrity, correctness and human warmth will leave a feeling of emptiness in us. May I express my profound condolences and sympathy over the sudden demise of our respected colleague, and request the delegation of the United States to transmit the

same to the Government of the United States, to Shana Lowitz and to her mourning family. I would like to join other representatives speaking before me and welcome our newly arrived colleagues, the representatives of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, offering to them friendship and co-operation as we had with their respective predecessors. I feel privileged to welcome again in our midst the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Klaus Törnudd of Finland, and to welcome as well Mr. Graham of New Zealand, and express my appreciation over their interest displayed and contribution made to the work of this Conference which will certainly be carefully studied by my delegation.

Mr. President, at the beginning of this session I feel it appropriate to have a glance at the international situation. Our work is conducted under its conditions and is expected in its turn to produce a favourable feed-back effect on it.

Approximately a year ago, when making my statement before this body on the same occasion, I characterized the international conditions prevailing at that time as "a shade clearer" than it had been in the preceding years. I attributed this to the fact that the results of the Summit Meeting in November 1985 between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan were significant and had some favourable influence on the general atmosphere of international relations. Now, a year later, one can see — fortunately — the continuation of that promising tendency. Significant events have taken place in the international arena, which have contributed to improving the situation, even if not to the extent hoped or desirable. Elements of detente and confrontation continue to co-exist, and our task is consequently to decrease the confrontational element.

An outstanding event of high-level diplomacy was the Reykjavik meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. The understanding in Reykjavik proved that courageous initiatives pursued with vigour and fresh thinking may produce results which had seemed unrealistic before. There are results from Reykjavik, even if not in the form of international written instruments. The understanding on the 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear arms and the accord reached on the elimination of United States and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and on a radical cut in missiles of this type in Asia are all elements of such importance that they can hardly be overestimated. The proposal of the Soviet side to consolidate the régime of the ABM Treaty and the initiation of full-scale talks on a total nuclear-test ban added special significance to the above-mentioned meeting.

The greatest importance of the accords reached in Reykjavık is that they proved that nuclear disarmament is a real possibility. Mutually agreed elements of the Reykjavik accords are being followed up here in Geneva at the bilateral talks, hopefully with concrete results.

Another instance of the favourable trend is the successful completion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The document concluded there carries a reaffirmation of the commitment by the participating States to refrain from any use of armed

forces inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, and contains far-reaching measures on confidence-building coupled with real provisions for verification, including inspections carried out on site.

One can say even more. Despite its evident shortcomings we consider that the communiqué issued at the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council of 12 December 1986 carries a possibility of negotiating on the proposals put forward in the Budapest Declaration of June 1986. Let me remind the distinguished colleagues that the text of the Budapest declaration was submitted to the attention of this body last June by my delegation.

These are but a few positive aspects of the present situation. They do not imply in any way that we forget that the controversial international situation is fraught with grave tensions. They only mean that the world is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that contradictions and problems cannot be solved by the policy of force, but rather through co-operative efforts and readiness for mutual accommodation.

It means further that the awareness of the mutual interdependence of States has deepened to an extent never seen before. A number of problems have emerged — partly as a consequence of the continuing arms race — the solution of which is unimaginable in the framework of national policies alone. Problems and dangers threatening mankind have a global dimension, and consequently they lend themselves only to a treatment that is global in character.

It is also becoming evident that security cannot be ensured by military means only. Even the most powerful States, those possessing the most destructive weapons, cannot feel secure if they represent a menace to any other State's national security. National security cannot be ensured unilaterally, it is more and more interrelated with international security. To put it shortly: security has become indivisible, it can only be universal and equal for all. That necessarily implies that the security of no State can be ensured to the detriment of that of others. Security policies should be pursued on the basis of co-operation, keeping in mind the security interests of others also.

Another relevant and important recognition of our times is the broadening of the concept of security. Security is not just a question of military balance, but the elimination of imbalances in the world economy and joint solutions for the problems of mankind: economic co-operation, opportunities for contacts among peoples, respect for human rights and for the basic rules of civilized conduct of States in international relations.

On the basis of such considerations, the delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic proposed in the name of its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organization the idea of the "Establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security" at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The aim of launching this idea has been to initiate a process of collective thinking, to hear the views and ideas of our partners. We started with the understanding that such a system could only be the product of collective thinking. Proceeding on this basis we hopefully can arrive at collective actions on this crucial issue too.

In our view, the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security calls for an ever deepening international co-operation in all fields of international relations. The immediate aim of such co-operation is to prevent the danger of nuclear catastrophe threatening the very existence of mankind, and to promote arms control and disarmament. It is indispensable in this context to establish an appropriate system for harmonizing different interests, to adjust the character, aim and level of military forces to the criterion of adequate security, and to effect a radical reduction in the accumulated arsenals of military hardware.

This line of thinking leads me to the actual tasks of the Conference on Disarmament, which has a role to play in one of the vital aspects of the aim I mentioned a minute ago. The priorities in our work here are apparently agreed to by almost all: nuclear test ban, prohibition of chemical weapons, prevention of an arms race in outer space.

There is a growing international consensus that nuclear-weapon testing should be banned once and for all. My delegation is certainly of this view. Nuclear testing is the engine of the arms race in the so-called "conventional nuclear field" as well as in the development of the new "exotic types" of third-generation categories. With nuclear testing going on, any effort in the field of nuclear disarmament may well prove a futile exercise.

The proceedings of the First Committee and the resolutions adopted there indicate a certain convergence of views which calls for an appropriate follow-up here in the Conference also. In our view it is imperative for the Conference to set up an ad hoc committee and to proceed to practical work without delay, with the aim of preparing a treaty that would effectively ban all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States everywhere and would contain provisions, acceptable to all, preventing the circumvention of this ban by means of nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. The negotiations should comprise all relevant aspects of the future treaty including scope and verification.

The 18-month unilaterial moratorium by the USSR laid the groundwork for the successful achievement of the aim of a CTB. It is unfortunate and deplorable -- to say the least -- that the United States responded with a nuclear-weapon test to the calls of the international community on the very opening day of this Conference.

The prohibition of chemical weapons figures high among the priorities of our agenda. It is a subject where the Conference could produce a tangible result this year, restoring its worn prestige.

Last year's work in the Ad Hoc Committee, and complemented by the two rounds of intersessional work, yielded a reliable basis which offers a real possibility for a breakthrough. In saying that, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom for the able guidance he rendered to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Major issues related to verification in the field of CW stocks and their destruction, CW production facilities and the non-production of chemical weapons are generally agreed upon, and the main lines of methods of verification have been drawn up.

On-challenge inspection has been generally accepted as part of the international verification system. Realistic guidelines have been spelled out for conducting such an inspection. Many delegations, including those most concerned, accepted the British proposal as a basis for work.

In our view all the necessary prerequisites are at hand now to accomplish the work on the convention this year. What is needed is a firm determination, and a good deal of efficient diplomatic professional work. It is encouraging to know that Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden has already made the first steps to gear the work of the Ad Hoc Committee to a higher level of efficiency.

The degree of priority of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space has greatly increased in the face of the events taking place in the development of new weapons systems designed for operation in outer space. The work done last year by the Ad Hoc Committee has produced fairly good results. The exchange of views proved that there is a need and room for developing further the international legal régime for keeping the arms race out of this area. The present system of international legal instruments is evidently not sufficient to prevent the technological arms race from moving into the outer space. It needs to be complemented. We are of the opinion that the Conference is an appropriate place to do this work, parallel with efforts made at other forums. The Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space should be re-established without wasting time on procedural aspects, and should start working with a view to concrete measures. It should concentrate on such particular issues as banning the use of force in outer space, space weapons, prohibiton of ASAT weapons systems and the protection of satellites.

Dwelling only on the three priority issues before our Conference does not in any way mean that we disregard other subjects on our agenda. I will return to them later at the appropriate time as our work moves on.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to the country that the President represents.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none. Now we will proceed to other proceedings.

(The President)

Before we adjourn, I should like to turn to another subject. As you are aware, at its 9th plenary meeting on 8 February 1979, the then Committee on Disarmament decided to hold its plenary meetings on Tuesdays and Thursdays, beginning at 10.30 a.m. The Secretary-General of the Conference held consulatations with the co-ordinators of the various groups and reported to them on certain additional measures that could be taken to make maximum use of the resources allocated to the Conference. As a result of his consultations, a consensus has emerged on two questions which may lead to additional economies by the Conference.

The first aspect requires a decision by the Conference in order to ensure that there is agreement in changing the times established by the 1979 decision. In this connection, I should like to propose that we begin the plenaries and other meetings of the Conference at 10.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m., so that we could use the maximum three hours which are normally allocated for meetings wth full services. In doing so, I wish to note that we will be receiving a high-level visitor on Thursday, 19 February, and that arrangements have already been made in connection with that visit. On that particular occasion, we shall start the plenary meeting at 10.30 a.m., in order to avoid any disruption in the programme of activities of such a distinguished visitor. With that exception, I believe that we could now agree that all meetings of the Conference, be they plenaries or meetings of subsidiary bodies, should start at 10.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The second aspect relates to the need to start punctually each plenary meeting. You will recall that, already at the Group consultations, I noted that in previous years it was the practice of the negotiating body to open its plenary meetings not later than five minutes after the scheduled time. I do hope that we can reach an understanding to the effect that this practice is adhered to.

The Secretariat is circulating, at my request, an informal paper containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On that understanding, if there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Does any member wish to take the floor? I see none.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 17 February, at 10.00 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.389/Corr.1 13 May 1987

Original: ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 17 February 1987, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Fan GUOXIANG

(China)

Corrigendum

Page 17, paragraph 5

The first sentence should read We noted with interest the reference the Romanian delegation made to the Document of the Stockholm Conference.

Delete the fifth and sixth sentence

Page 18, line 14

For at all events read at all even

Page 18, line 18

Before In accordance with insert And these will be my last words:

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.389 17 February 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 17 February 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Fan GUOXIANG (China)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 389th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda items 1, entitled "Nuclear Test Ban" and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

In conformity with Rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sri Lanka, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and Egypt.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkine.

Mr. NAZARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Comrade President. As you know, yesterday, 16 February, Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed the participants in the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World for the Survival of Humanity, in Moscow. The text of this statement has been distributed in a press release and any delegation that so wishes has the opportunity of reading it.

Speaking on the reorganization of society which is under way in my country, Gorbachev emphasized that for the Soviet Union, in order to concentrate on the constructive endeavours to improve the situation in our country, peace is necessary. Our desire to make our country better will hurt no one, with the world only gaining from this. Reorganization, to stress its international aspect, is an invitation to any social system to compete with socialism peacefully for the benefit of general progress and world peace. But for such competition to take place and unfold in civilized forms worthy of mankind in the 21st century, we must have a new outlook and overcome mentalities, stereotypes and dogmas inherited from a past which is gone, never to return.

We have come to the conclusion, said the Soviet leader, that in today's complex and contradictory world, new approaches and methods are required for solving international problems. These conclusions make us reconsider something which once seemed axiomatic, and fully realize that with the advent and improvement of nuclear arms the human race has lost its immortality. It can only be regained by destroying nuclear weapons. The nuclear Powers must go beyond their nuclear shadow and enter a nuclear-free world, thus ending the alienation of politics from the general human ethical norms. A nuclear tornado, said General Secretary Gorbachev, will sweep away both socialists and capitalists alike, the just and the unjust alike.

Referring to the Soviet disarmament initiatives, the Soviet leader noted that none of our proposals attempts to leave out any of our weapons from the negotiations. Our principle is simple: all weapons must be limited and

reduced, and those of wholesale annihilation eventually scrapped. He stressed, in particular, that the Soviet Union had expressed its readiness to have chemical weapons totally abolished.

Comrade President, negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban have a long history, but only recently did the prospect of a successful conclusion already in the very near future become evident. This is an important result of constructive initiatives and efforts made by many countries including Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Sweden, Pakistan, Indonesia, Great Britain, Australia and other countries, and by the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee and its Working Groups. A breakthrough in the negotiations became apparent last year, when the Soviet Union, building upon the fundamental provisions of the statement of 15 January 1986, put forward several series of proposals which contributed to accelerating the negotiations and reaching agreement on guite a number of sections of the future convention.

I believe there is every reason to regard the current session of negotiations as a decisive one. What we have now is not just the framework for a future convention but also solutions to most of the fundamental issues and, moreover, agreed texts of many provisions of a future convention.

At the same time, a number of questions are yet to be resolved. Among them I would mention declaration and verification of chemical-weapon stocks and challenge inspections. Further work is required on provisions relating to non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry, the definition of a chemical-weapons production facility and elimination measures, the scope of the prohibition and various others. The "procedural" articles of the convention too, are not to be forgotten — the procedure for the signing of the convention and its entry into force, its depositary, etc. We are therefore required to act most promptly and comprehensively so as to reach agreement on all outstanding issues and finalize the text of the convention and open it for signature.

We agree with Ambassador Butler, the head of the Australian delegation, who said on 3 February 1987, referring to the objectives currently facing the participants of the negotiations, that "we must increase the tempo of our negotiations during 1987 so that the opportunity which clearly exists of concluding a convention this year may be realized".

The only way to succeed is to seek mutually acceptable solutions and to negotiate, taking into account each other's legitimate concerns.

The Soviet delegation commends the energetic efforts of Ambassador Ekéus, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, aimed at a successful conclusion of the negotiations.

In the inter-sessional period of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet Union explored in depth all aspects of the state of affairs of the negotiations; its own position on the outstanding questions and the way other countries approach them. In doing so we looked above all for possible solutions to these questions and instructed our experts to act accordingly.

In today's statement the USSR delegation wishes to present its proposals and ideas on the solution to a number of questions concerning the future convention with a view to facilitating more intensive negotiations and further progress therein.

I have already referred to chemical-weapon stocks. They are the subject matter of Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the draft convention which is now under discussion and negotiation. Agreement has already been reached on a number of important provisions of that article, including those relating to declarations of volumes of stocks, their methods of destruction, and verification of operations of chemical-weapon destruction facilities. So far, however, it has not been possible to come to an agreement on the provisions in the convention relating to declarations of locations of chemical-weapons stocks and to international verification of such locations. Agreement has been hampered by a number of perfectly legitimate national security concerns expressed, for example, by the delegation of France and my delegation. We, for our part, have once again weighed up all the factors, viewed them in the context of the need for speedy progress at the negotiations and the concerns expressed by a number of countries, including the United States, which attach particular importance to finding a solution to this very question as rapidly as possible.

As a result, we have come to the conclusion that with a view to finding a speedy solution to this question it would be advisable to agree to the proposal to provide, immediately after the convention enters into force, access to chemical weapons for the purposes of systematic international on-site verification of declarations of chemical-weapon stocks.

In our view each State party to the convention should, not later than 30 days after its entry into force, make a declaration containing detailed information on the locations of chemical-weapon stocks (storage facilities) at the time of the convention's entry into force, both in its national territory and elsewhere under its jurisdiction or control. Such a declaration, inter alia, would specify the precise location of each storage facility, the quantity and composition of the chemical weapons in each location, methods of storage indicating the name of each chemical, munition types and calibres, etc. A State party should, within 30 days after the convention enters into force, take measures to ensure a closure of chemical-weapon storage facilities and prevent movement of stocks other than movement for their elimination.

For the purposes of effective verification of closed chemical-weapon storage facilities, it is necessary to provide for systematic international verification with permanent use of instruments, including verification of the correctness of declarations, closure of storage facilities, installation by inspectors of devices for this purpose and periodic checks on such devices, presence of inspectors at the time when chemical weapons are moved out of the facility for elimination, sealing of the means of transport, etc. Upon complete removal of all chemical weapons from the facility, an international inspection team would draw up a statement certifying this fact.

We expect that the proposals we have presented will enable us to agree promptly and without delay on the provisions relating to declarations of chemical weapons.

A number of other issues relating to Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the convention, are to be considered in the near future. We express our willingness to reach agreement on all outstanding issues in that article, including those related to the time-frame, order and methods of elimination. Bearing in mind that the proposal that a State party should have the right to divert chemical weapons has caused difficulties, we have carefully weighed up all the pros and cons of the proposal: we now proceed on the assumption that all chemical weapons are to be destroyed.

The Soviet delegation hopes that our flexible approach will make it possible to find solutions to the above-mentioned issue and will help accelerate the negotiations. We also call upon other delegations to join in these efforts and to present concrete proposals for mutually acceptable solutions.

In his statement yesterday, General Secretary Gorbachev, referring to problems of verification, said <u>inter alia</u>: "Now that we are coming to consider major measures for actual disarmament affecting the most sensitive area of national security, the Soviet Union will be pressing for the most stringent system of supervision and verification, including international verification. There must be complete certainty that the commitments are honoured by all."

That is precisely why the Soviet Union gives priority to negotiating an agreement on effective international verification of compliance by all States parties with their obligations under the convention. Such verification should not only effectively ensure confidence in the destruction of chemical weapons and facilities for their production but also effectively preclude any rebirth of chemical weapons anywhere and in any country.

The negotiations on verification machinery are based on a general understanding that the basis will be a system of "routine" international inspections. On the other hand, it has also been recognized that such international inspection should be complemented by on-site challenge inspections so that the whole verification mechanism of the Convention may be particularly reliable. Thus challenge inspections would serve above all the purpose of preventing breaches of the convention. Ultimately they would ensure the possibility of implementing international verification with regard to any activities relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. These principles should be taken fully into account in elaborating specific procedures for such challenge inspection.

We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the participants in the negotiations, despite agreement on a number of important aspects, still encounter great difficulty in finalizing agreements on challenge inspection. We believe that basically these difficulties have a perfectly objective and real basis: States may indeed have certain locations and facilities which are not relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Access to such locations and facilities, due to their particularly sensitive nature, is normally prohibited or restricted. One cannot therefore exclude the possibility of a State having the right to refuse a challenge inspection in exceptional cases when its supreme interests are jeopardized. The existence of such areas and sensitive points have by the way been recognized in the

document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. In this context we consider that the view expressed by Ambassador Dolgu, Head of the delegation of Romania, was quite justified, namely that it would be advisable to use the provisions of that document at the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The participants in the negotiations have different views on solutions to the issue of challenge inspections at the present time. Some propose that the Executive Council be involved. Others, while in favour of providing access to a number of sensitive locations and facilities automatically, immediately upon request, make exemptions for private premises. Moreover the procedure for implementing challenge inspections envisaged under these proposals while securing the interest of the major Powers and members of military alliances, gives a small number of States certain rights of which practically all the other parties to the convention are deprived of. There is also a proposal to the effect that in the event of a challenge, the challenged State should have the right to propose alternative measures which should satisfy the challenging State.

In view of these various proposals and approaches, movement towards agreement apparently might be initiated by defining a number of cases where refusal of an inspection on the requested scale would not be allowed: for example, in the event of suspected use of chemical weapons, or inspection of locations and facilities declared under the convention. It appears this idea enjoys wide support at the negotations, and understandably so, for we are dealing with the cases and facilities which are most directly relevant to a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and consequently there should be no reason for refusing an inspection.

As for other cases and other locations and facilities, in elaborating agreement on challenge inspections the idea of using alternative measures, up to viewing the facility from without and collecting chemical samples near the facility, might be helpful. Such a differentiation would, in our view, ensure progress towards agreement on this issue which, while unresolved, hampers agreement on other issues of the convention.

Of course, there remains the difficult problem of what should be done if the alternative measures still do not satisfy the challenging State.

We share the hope expressed by the head of the Swedish delegation, Ambassador Theorin, that the "general narrowing of positions on verification that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate agreement on this issue" — i.e. international challenge inspection. The Soviet delegation declares itself ready to seek actively for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of any positive ideas and suggestions which are on the negotiating table.

We have been asked by a number of delegations to explain what is meant by permanent international verification which the Soviet Union proposes applying to chemical-weapon destruction facilities, specialized facilities for the production of category I chemicals for permitted purposes and to a certain number of facilities producing key precursors. I would like to explain our

understanding of permanent verification. In our view, such verification can be implemented either through the permanent presence of international inspectors at facilities or through visits to facilities by international inspectors in combination with permanent use of control and measuring instruments at facilities, including remote monitoring. As for the order and modalities for the use of such instruments, helpful solutions in our view might be prompted by the experience in the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Identification of "important" (in terms of verification) points at the facilities, sealing of certain units, installation of photo and video equipment, measuring devices in agreed sections of the technological process, maintenance of international verification instruments by international inspectors, etc.

As for systematic international inspection, we propose that their frequency and timing be determined by the Consultative Committee on the basis of the risk posed to the convention by a given chemical or facility. In working out the details of systematic international inspections, we could also draw on the experience and practices of the IAEA, in particular with regard to providing the different types of systematic inspections, (routine and special), the frequency and time-frame of inspections, and the right of the IAEA to determine the facilities to be inspected at a given time. We believe that the experience and practices of the IAEA might also prompt us to the right solutions on other questions of verifying compliance with the chemical weapons convention. They might be drawn upon in working out an agreement on the activities of the inspectorate too, that is the appointment of inspectors, their privileges, inspection procedures, etc.

On the basis of the provisions included in the convention, it would be advisable to elaborate subsequently, along the lines of the IAEA, a model agreement between a State Party and an appropriate body of the Convention which would govern the practical aspects of implementing international verification at facilities (the verification procedure, specific measures for the closure of facilities, etc.)

When the convention is in effect, specific measures of verification with regard to chemical-weapon production facilities and chemical-weapon destruction facilities would be agreed upon by a State Party and the Consultative Committee and included in the relevant plans for the elimination of stocks and facilities.

The emerging prospect of the conclusion of a convention puts on the negotiating agenda the question of interaction of States under the new conditions where chemical weapons have been banned. The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of implementing wide international co-operation on an equal and mutually beneficial basis in the developments of peaceful chemical industry as an alternative to the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. One cannot but agree with the view that without provisions to this effect a future convention would be weakened. A convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons can, in our opinion, become an example of practical implementation of the agreed principles of "disarmament for development".

The negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have gained momentum and it is our hope that the proposals we have presented today will contribute towards speedy agreement on the convention. However, we cannot remain impassive in the face of certain statements which are in fact aimed at creating difficulties in the negotiations.

The British magazine, Jane's Defence Weekly, recently published an article on chemical-weapon issues by K. Adelman, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency — incidentally, this article has been reprinted in our newspaper, Pravda. In that article, Mr. Adelman writes: "To have a chance of achieving that (a chemical-weapons ban), we need to ensure that our negotiators' hands are not empty. Congress, therefore, should fund the Administration's request for binary chemical weapons production". In our view this logic is strange, to say the least. It reminds me of a satirical story by the well-known Czech writer, Janislav Hašek, about the Conference on Disarmament at the time of the League of Nations. That Conference literally blew up as a result of careless handling of a new explosive, "Washingtonite", by a representative of the military business who stood waiting at the entrance to the conference room with samples of his product to offer the participants of the Conference.

It is simply regrettable that the negotiating portfolio of the United States delegation is still being replenished not with compromise proposals but with new types of chemical weapons, which can only poison the atmosphere at the negotiations.

The Soviet delegation has today expressed certain views on ways of reaching agreement at the next stage of negotiations. We intend to continue to work actively for the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons this year. The positive effects of the conclusion of such convention would be of great significance, and not only in the military field. Its conclusion would demonstrate that it is practically possible to find solutions to the complex problems of disarmament through the joint efforts of States, and would contribute to creating a more positive political climate. This is the aim of the new Soviet proposals, and we expect similar steps on the outstanding issues from other participants in the negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, the friendship between our two countries extending over so many centuries has resulted in a unique relationship as equal sovereign States despite vast disparities in size, population and power. In the field of disarmament we have respected your principled approach and your many initiatives including the declaration of non-first use of nuclear weapons, the unilateral reduction of your army by 1 million, your decision not to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere and your consistent policy that disarmament is the concern of all nations irrespective of size and might, as mentioned in your distinguished Foreign Minister's message to our Conference on 3 February. As an outstanding representative of your country we are confident that you will conduct our work in the first month of the 1987 session so as to create the necessary impetus to carry us forward in our task of negotiating for disarmament.

We would like to take this opportunity of thanking Ambassador Alan Beesley of Canada for having presided so competently over our work in August 1986 and in the inter-sessional period.

My delegation extends its sincere condolences to the delegation of the United States of America and to the family of the late Ambassador Donald Lowitz. We have lost a friend and a colleage whose outstanding personal qualities will long be remembered. As we begin a new session in our Conference my delegation would like to acknowledge the contribution made to our forum by Ambassador Sutowardoyo of Indonesia, Ambassador Franceschi of Italy, Ambassador Issraelyan of the USSR and Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia, who have left us. At the same time we welcome Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Dolqu of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkine of USSR and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. My delegation was especially touched by the poignant statement last week of Ambassador Yamada speaking as a survivor of the Hiroshima holocaust. The words on that monument in Hiroshima "Let it never happen again" should indeed be in our minds at all times during our important work in this Conference to ensure their realization in our time. Nuclear deterrence theory based on the continuity of adversarial relationships and the credibility of the threat that it will happen again has only led to greater arsenals of nuclear weapons with an explosive power of over 1 million Hiroshima bombs, and greater insecurity.

Despite its being the International Year of Peace, the events of the last year did not fulfil the deeply-held aspirations of the people of the world in terms of concrete agreements on disarmament. We recognize, however, that a significant improvement in the international climate for disarmament negotiations has continued since 1985. Reykjavik was a missed opportunity where this improvement could have culminated in a radical change for the better. To the extent that the participants at Reykjavik are ready to carry forward its lessons will depend the real historical significance of that weekend's discussions. The reports we have had so far are not encouraging. The leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation who held a Summit Meeting in Bangalore on 16 and 17 November 1986, stated their view on Reykjavik in the following terms:

"The Heads of State and Government noted with deep disappointment that the promise held out by the Reykjavık Summit could not be realized. They, however, noted with satisfaction that the proposals made at the Summit were still on the table. They expressed the earnest hope that the negotiations would be resumed without delay so that a decisive step could be taken towards realizing the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether."

For Sri Lanka as a founder-member of the Non-aligned Movement and one of its former Chairmen, the Harare Summit of non-aligned leaders represented an important event in the International Year of Peace. The Declaration issued at Harare contained the main principles and policies of 101 non-aligned countries in the field of disarmament and international security. Basic to these is the non-aligned concept of global security which the Harare Declaration expressed in the following words:

"Historically, States have considered that they could achieve security through the possession of arms. The advent of nuclear weapons, has however, radically changed this situation. Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war; they are instruments of mass annihilation. The accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, constitutes a threat to the continued survival of mankind. It has therefore become imperative that States abandon the dangerous goal of unilateral security through armament and embrace the objective of common security through disarmament."

Many speakers in our current session have noted the achievements registered in the First Committee of the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. The distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has set out in detail the resolutions adopted in respect of some of the more important issues including the priority nuclear subjects. My delegation was also encouraged by the atmosphere that prevailed and the voting patterns which implied a broader area of agreement on the substantive disarmament issues. We now face a crucial test as we attempt to transfer those resolutions into the negotiating context of our Conference. Convergence in the deliberative United Nations bodies devoted to disarmament cannot cohere with divergence in this sole negotiating body. The hopes that have been expressed for positive developments in our 1987 session are therefore justified and the Sri Lanka delegation will strive together with others to ensure their realization. A related development which we welcome is the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga and the signature of the relevant Protocols by two of the five nuclear Powers.

With 1987, the Year of Peace has yielded to the Year of Shelter for the Homeless designated as such by the United Nations on a proposal made in 1980 by Prime Minister Premadasa of Sri Lanka. This focus on a core issue of development as an investment in mankind is also a reminder to all of us of the relationship between disarmament and development. The global expenditure of almost a trillion dollars a year on armaments, both nuclear and conventional, is by all empirical standards inconsistent with stable and balanced social and economic development and contributes to distortions and imbalances in the world economy. The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development rescheduled for this year and to be held in New York can, with universal participation and intensive preparation, result in an agreed programme of disarmament measures releasing resources for development purposes.

Another forthcoming event which impinges on the work of our Conference is the convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1988 and its preparatory process beginning this year. The approach of the third special session devoted to disarmament must necessarily lend a sense of urgency to our work. We have within our grasp the completion of a convention on chemical weapons and the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament before the third special session. In addition we can and must show progress in the nuclear issues and especially on item 1 of our agenda, Nuclear-Test Ban.

We have entered the ninth year of our existence as the single multilateral negotiating body. The agenda before us is dictated by the needs of our common security and not by the national interest of individual nations alone. Our failure to act on this agenda is a common failure but the responsibility for that failure cannot be shared knowing as we do the relative capacity of the members of this body to contribute to disarmament. We have begun this year with the re-establishment of two Ad Hoc Committees which have begun functioning without delay and the setting up of two further ad hoc committees which we hope will commence work soon. There are two agenda items in which my delegation has a particular interest in seeing some forward movement while emphasizing the need to make progress on all agenda items.

We have in this Conference remained far too long in a stalemated position on item 1 — Nuclear-Test Ban. The need for the Conference to work on this important agenda item is self-evident. Self-evident too is the impact of external developments. The rejection of the offer of converting a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing into a bilateral moratorium; the dilatory linkage being established between bilateral negotiations for a reduction in the yields and the numbers of nuclear tests with bilateral negotiations for reductions in nuclear weapons; the Six-Nation Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1986, with its practical proposals on the verification of a test ban; and the overlap in content and similarity of voting patterns on General Assembly resolutions 41/46 A, which Sri Lanka co-sponsored, and 41/47, on which we voted affirmatively, are some of these developments. The impact of some of them is clearly negative and while we cannot ignore their reality we can seek to build on the positive developments for our work here.

The distinguished Ambassador for Mexico has indicated a possible way to further our work by setting up an ad hoc committee with a mandate acceptable to all. The distinguished Ambassador of Japan also made an important contribution by noting that the gap we have to bridge is indeed not so wide as to daunt us in our diplomatic efforts. Our purpose in wanting to see an ad hoc committee set up on item 1 is not a window-dressing effort to make the Conference appear to be working towards a nuclear-test ban so as to placate international public opinion, mollify domestic lobbies or stall other moves to achieve a comprehensive test ban. We want to see real work begin on practical steps or interim steps including on an international seismic monitoring network with the active participation of all delegations. But the steps must lead to the objective clearly set out in both General Assembly resolutions 41/46 A and 41/47 -- a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty. We recognize and indeed respect the differences that exist among us for the moment about the pace at which we should progress towards a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. The objective however remains a common one and our differences should not be an impediment towards practical work in an ad hoc committee in this Conference. Statements made here on verification clearly indicate that there is a common approach. Work in an ad hoc committee can demonstrate the reality of this. We shall soon be observing the first death anniversary of the late Olof Palme who campaigned so long and so hard for an end to nuclear testing. The Palme Commission pamphlet on a comprehensive test ban published recently in pursuance of his wishes and dedicated to his memory "Together with measures to reduce significantly the size of existing nuclear arsenals and to limit the characteristics of new nuclear

weapon systems, a comprehensive test ban could constrain nuclear capabilities and help to create a new political atmosphere in which the danger of nuclear war would be greatly reduced.

Over recent years there has been a steady swell of support for the non-aligned resolution in the General Assembly initiated by Egypt and Sri Lanka on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which has emerged as the only resolution on this crucial issue. Last year, resolution 41/53 was adopted by a record vote of 154 for, with one sole abstention, and no votes against the resolution. Once again it seems to be a situation where there is a common objective shared by us all -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- which, as the province of all mankind, cannot be an arena for the threat or use of force and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. While the resolution acknowledges the primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on this issue differences exist on what steps are necessary now for this body to achieve these objectives. Since 1985 we have had an Ad Hoc Committee mandated with the deliberately circumscribed task of exploring relevant issues. Last year my delegation was encouraged by the efforts of some delegations to advance the work of the Ad Hoc Committee by attempting to agree on definitions of important concepts and terms relevant to this agenda item. We regret that the participation in this important aspect of work was limited. We would like to see the Ad Hoc Committee re-established with the minimum delay possible and as an earnest of its sincerity the Group of 21 has made a very modest proposal for a mandate which we trust will be accepted. one can be so wedded to the status quo as to object to the addition that has been proposed, bearing in mind paragraph 80 of the Final Document as reiterated in General Assembly resolution 41/53. The message of the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations to this Conference enjoined us "to create conditions for negotiating agreements on this vital matter". That is our modest goal for this session.

We hear, meanwhile, disturbing calls for an early deployment of space-based ballistic missile defence systems which were until recently described to us as research programmes. They will, if heeded, inevitably involve non-compliance with existing treaties which even the most elastic interpretation will not conceal. Whether ballistic missile defence systems are being researched and developed in the full glare of media attention or in clandestine, they represent generically a dangerous new phase in the arms race. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that our discussions here are taking place while irreversible steps are being planned to place weapons in space. A balanced and even-handed non-aligned attempt in pursuance of the Harare Declaration to ban such obviously offensive weapons in space as dedicated anti-satellite weapons met with the strongest opposition from those who have crafted the most elaborate arguments to justify defensive systems. As the Harare Declaration noted "Measures aimed at developing, testing or deploying weapons and weapons systems in outer space could, through a constant chain of action and reaction, lead to an escalation of the arms race in both 'offensive' and 'defensive' weapons thus making the outbreak of nuclear conflict more likely". There is an obvious inconsistency in seeking a world free of ballıstıc missiles and proceeding to erect shields against them which the overwhelming body of scientific opinion assesses as being vulnerable and therefore only functional as part of a first-strike capability. The

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

deployment of weapons in space must be prevented in our common interest. The attractions of hi-tech warfare and an interlocking programme of lucrative research contracts should not divert us from the dangers of an arms race in space and the need to prevent it going beyond the research stage. This task cannot be left exclusively to bilateral negotiations. It also requires the establishment of a group of scientific experts within this Conference so that multilateral expertise can be pooled on the technical issues relevant to preventing an arms race in outer space. My delegation therefore supports the proposal made by the Swedish delegation and calls for an early agreement on the mandate and composition of such a group.

The discussions at Reykjavik gave us all a glimpse of a nuclear-free world as a realistic possibility seriously contemplated by the leaders of the two nations accounting for 95 per cent of nuclear weapons in the world. Non-aligned countries like Sri Lanka would like to encourage these nations to pursue this goal in their bilateral negotiations. We are disturbed however by those who seek to obstruct this, arguing the need for nuclear weapons on the basis of an alleged inferiority in conventional arms. The goal of nuclear disarmament must be pursued if the spirit of Reykjavik is to inform the bilateral discussions taking place and lead to agreements in all disarmament forums including the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, as well as the MBFR and CSCE. That goal is a priority issue in this multilateral negotiating body.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President himself and the country that the President represents. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, speaking for the first time in this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament, it is a particular pleasure for me to congratulate you to the assumption of your office. At this point in time we can already note how brilliantly you discharge your duties, doing it with diplomatic skill, friendliness and resolution.

In this family of nations which constitute the Conference on Disarmament, we all feel deep sorrow for the loss of an eminent colleague who had been with us for two years. With Don Lowitz my delegation has lost a friend, the Conference has a lost a warm hearted, politically engaged and professional dynamic personality. We are grateful to have known him.

We have new colleagues among us. I welcome Ambassadors Pierre Morel of France, Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Chusei Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. My delegation looks forward to working closely with all of them.

Any observer with sufficient interest in our proceedings would, from a most perfunctory study of statements during the first two weeks of our work this year, certainly recognize the importance and prominence of emphasis that item 1 of our agenda, nuclear test ban, has been given in many interventions. Some of the speeches did not fail to paint a very sombre picture of the

situation the Conference finds itself in with regard to the work on a CTB; neither was there a lack of pre-emptive accusations, which were visibly aimed at one group.

I cannot share the speculative pessimism of some of our colleagues; quite the contrary: an impartial and detached analysis both of the work the Conference achieved last year on the subject and of the developments that took place since it adjourned at the end of August lead me to believe that the circumstances are most propitious for the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> committee and for positive and meaningful results to be achieved by it.

The controversy concerning the formulation of those parts in last year's report of the Conference on item no. 1 tends still to obscure the view of what has already been achieved in terms of a considerable narrowing of differences in an important field of the CTB discussion, i.e. the question of verification. In our view the Conference has reached a remarkable momentum towards general acceptance of an effective international monitoring and verification system. This promising development, as we see it, is due to the efforts of many delegations who have contributed important elements to a new and more refined view of test-ban safeguards. Needless to say, the conceptual accomplishments that have enlarged the common ground on which to build could only be achieved on the basis of the purposeful contribution by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts over the last 10 years, and especially by its last progress report, CD/721, which has opened remarkable new perspectives towards the realization of an international seismic monitoring system by detailing plans to integrate the exchange of level II (waveform) data into the next international seismic data exchange experiment.

We consider hallmarks some of the contributions of individual delegations during last year's session of the Conference. There is, for one, the Swedish Working Paper CD/712, representing an admirable and knowledgeable compilation of present insights into the requirements of a global seismic network; calling for the definition and development of prototype monitoring stations, this paper further develops a proposal my delegation had already advanced in Working Papers CD/612 and CD/624.

Norway's contribution, in this Working Paper CD/714, was particularly significant in that it explores the interaction of regional small-aperture seismic arrays with a global network incorporating a number of such arrays. The practical experiences with the Norwegian regional seismic array system NORESS provide an indispensable input for the operationality and the continuous improvement of an effective global system.

The most unambiguous demand for an early installation of a world-wide seismic monitoring network along the lines of the working papers of my delegation I already mentioned is contained in the Australian Working Paper, CD/717, which clearly points out the advantage to be harvested by swift enactment of the proposals contained in it: by establishing a permanent global seismic monitoring network based initially on the existing facilities.

In keeping with the advances of seismic technology, experience could be gained with long-term operations and the system could be perfected in such a way that, on the very entry into force of a CTBT, the comprehensive monitoring devices could at once become a truly safeguarding system.

Among other valuable contributions of individual delegations one has certainly to count Working Paper CD/724 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which it formalized a change of position concerning the inclusion of the level II data exchange in further discussions.

This brief review of some of the proceedings of our Conference during its 1986 session amply substantiates my initial claim that substantial progress towards common concepts, common methodology, has been achieved during last year's session in spite of some attempts to the contrary. In the view of my delegation the time has come to discuss inter alia those common concepts within an ad hoc committee on a CTB, to be established at the earliest possible juncture. The work of the Committee should help us to reach practical and universally acceptable solutions in our quest for a comprehensive, fully verifiable test ban; it is our firm belief that this should be possible on the basis of the working programme proposed in CD/621 and within the confines of a mandate as contained, for instance, in CD/521.

Certainly, if an <u>ad hoc</u> committee were instituted, its discussions would not be exhausted in merely technical deliberations; a comprehensive and fully verifiable test ban would, if agreed upon, be of eminent importance for the security policies of States world wide. It is exactly for this reason that the topic of a CTB cannot be discussed by the Conference without paying due attention to its general implications in the nuclear age. The Federal Government believes that the goal of agreement on a reliably verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban at the earliest possible juncture can be realized gradually. This should be achieved by reducing allowed testing to agreed and defined intervals of time and by consecutively refraining from testing altogether in the framework of agreed reductions of nuclear weapons.

While my delegation wishes for timely results from the bilateral talks which the United States of America and the Soviet Union are holding here at Geneva about questions relevant to test limitation in all its aspects and which are scheduled to enter into a new round in the middle of March, my Government has never hesitated to express its view that there are more than bilateral aspects to the problem of a CTBT. The community of States can indeed contribute substantially to the solution of those problems which still stand in the way of an agreement.

We do not agree, though, with some delegations which content themselves with dwelling lengthily on their finding that the verification problems still facing us can be solved — and indeed some went as far as to imply that they were already solved. In our view attention should be drawn to the numerous prerequisites listed in the Swedish Working Paper CD/712 to ensure the incorporation of state-of-the-art technology into a global monitoring network that does not yet exist and has only once been tested in a most elementary form. A great number of stations that participated in the 1984 GSETT, though already representing a high level of technological achievement in themselves, would not match the definitions given in the last chapter of CD/712 for the

prototype of a CD monitoring station. Although individual seismographic stations, even if they fell short of the aforementioned demands concerning their equipment, might work effectively, the task of operating in a reliable manner an interlinked system of as much as 50 to 100 seismic stations based in different countries and run by many nations, as well as the task of communicating the data derived from these stations to and from international data centres -- possibly in real time -- has not yet been satisfactorily resolved, as the report of the GSE on the technical test run in 1984 has demonstrated. Furthermore, CD/712 proposes as an additional measure for the analysis of doubtful seismic events to combine the findings of the international seismic monitoring network with data derived from satellite inspection. The realization of this proposal would indeed greatly enhance verification capabilities and most probably resolve most of the outstanding verification problems; but no multilaterally accessible satellite system for verification purposes exists as of today or of tomorrow. And we do not know that even the most ardent NTB proponent has volunteered with a corresponding offer. The conclusion we draw from this is that we should do everything possible to improve the global seismic monitoring system until the possibility depicted in the Swedish Working Paper may come true.

My Government has noted with great pleasure that the six Heads of State or Government, of the New Dehli initiative, at the meeting in Mexico on 7 August 1986, have expressed their readiness to actively participate in surmounting the outstanding verification problems of a future CTBT. We would welcome it if, besides Sweden, also other States participating in the initiative would see fit to send their experts to the GSE, especially with regard to the new test run of the global monitoring system envisaged for 1988.

My Government has repeatedly declared that it considers a CTB as one of the main goals of its disarmament and arms control policy. And if we think that we still see some difficulties in the field of verification, we do not want to give room to any doubt that we will actively pursue a course aimed at clearing away these obstacles, which in any case we do not find insurmountable.

As a step towards substantiating its own commitment to this global system, the Federal Government decided to intensify its co-operative efforts in the field of fast and reliable data exchange and storage of acquired seismic data. It therefore finances the continuous operation of a seismic data anlysis centre installed at the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources in Hannover. The Institute, by way of direct computer-to-computer links with other countries, is in a position to store and to exchange all relevant seismic data including level II (waveform) data. We have concentrated our research in the field of designing the hardware and software necessary to acquire, analyse and transmit seismic data including waveform data on direct computer-to-computer links. Our seismic data centres, specifically and from the outset, are designed for open access and remote data treatment via telecommunication links so as to freely share our specific knowledge in this field with interested seismic scientists. We explicitly request all members of the Conference to make use of this hitherto singular service, two demonstrations of which will be given to interested heads of delegations and to the experts of the GSE on 5 and 6 March 1987 here in Geneva. The data centre described above in our view constitutes an important step forward on the way to the creation and reliable operation of an international seismic monitoring network.

Mr. President, let me now turn shortly to other subjects on our agenda. In our view the negotiations on a world-wide ban of chemical weapons command high priority. In document CD/734 we have the outlines of a treaty which, in important parts, is already well developed. The Conference on Disarmament has before it the task of solving the questions still open, especially in the field of verification, as rapidly as possible.

Concerning the verification of non-production, it is in our view important that the selection of substances which are to be forbidden or controlled should satisfy the criteria of possible use, or better misuse, for military purposes. It would not be a sensible contribution to the solution of that problem if we included in that selection substances which are militarily irrelevant.

As to challenge inspection, we still see in CD/715 the model which could finally satisfy all interests. We appeal to our partners in this negotiation to co-operate in the search of a solution because it is this co-operation which is the true expression of credibility of negotiating partners. Readiness to adopt CD/715, as expressed in principle by formerly hesitant delegations, is welcome as long as the conceptual approach of this proposal is not diluted. We will, in this context, screen carefully what the Soviet delegation has said this morning, which lends itself to the interpretation that the Soviet delegation now accepts the principle of mandatory or obligatory challenge inspections; but as I say, we will have to look at the text very closely and see what the other conditions which go along with it will mean. A procedural arrangement for example prior to an on-challenge-inspection that would put into question the inspection itself, or in any case delay it, is not acceptable to us. We are convinced that an effective verification of a chemical-weapon ban is attainable if the controls on non-production and challenge inspections are adequately formed. What has to be secured is that the Convention can reliably prevent that militarily significant amounts of chemical weapons or their precursors from being produced or stocked secretly. The methods and volume of the controls must be realistic, credible and effective. These are the essentials and we think that within the near future we could make decisive progress in this field. We are ready to co-operate.

My delegation welcomes the long-established Finnish initiative to provide advice for the necessary monitoring equipment and technical means for verification purposes. I understand that the recent special workshop on automatic monitoring in terms of detection of alleged used, verification of destruction and non-production in Helsinki is another step towards the common goal of effective verification. My Government looks forward to the communication of the results of this workshop.

We noted with interest the reference which the Romanian delegation made in our CW negotiations to the Document of the Stockholm Conference which was taken up today. Indeed, the most important aspect of the Stockholm Conference is the agreement on on-site inspections without refusal. Thereby, obligatory on-site inspection has been recognized as an essential element of effective verification for any arms control and disarmament agreement. We think this is an essential breakthrough to which we attach great importance in light of the whole arms control process. But then, Stockholm is not part of the true arms

control process. It is a measure of confidence-building measures, and not what we are doing here in the realm of chemical weapons, disarmament measures. As my delegation pointed out in our Plenary Statement of 5 February of this year already challenge inspections should cover all possible installations and all locations — they all must be "challenge inspection objects", and there we differ from what we have heard this morning.

My delegation hopes that it will be possible to agree on a mandate for our discussions about space and the possible arms race in space. We think it useful to screen all aspects even more profoundly than we did last year.

Concerning radiological weapons, we think that after the reinstitution of our Ad Hoc Committee what is needed now is informal consultations, to enable us to find out how our work in both tracks, A and B, could possibly proceed. If it proves that the forced merger of the two tracks renders us unable to speak at all about those aspects of the problem which might otherwise be solvable, then we should find a way to address the unitarian approach. The public in all our countries justifiably awaits answers from the Conference on Disarmament on this issue.

In accordance with the unanimously adopted resolution 41/421 of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly all delegations should now endeavour to contribute in a realistic way to the finalization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, if possible in the given time-frame.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, I have already had an opportunity to congratulate you, on behalf of my delegation, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Allow me to extend a warm welcome to the newly arrived Ambassadors of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. I wish them all the best in their office as Heads of their countries' delegations to the Conference on Disarmament. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to express our deepest sympathy to the United States delegation on the unexpected passing away of its chief delegate, Ambassador Donald Lowitz.

A comparison of the initial situation at this session with that of last year reveals new elements propitious to our work. At the same time, we are compelled to note that the arms race has not slowed down and that arsenals have not become smaller. The entire international situation remains exceedingly complex and tense. In order for it to be markedly improved, much greater efforts are needed. With this aim in mind, socialist countries proposed at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly that all nations should jointly commence work on a comprehensive system of peace and international security. The system should embrace the most important areas of Government-to-Government relations and their interaction and bring about a world in which peoples can look to the future without having to worry about their existence and without the tremendous burden of armaments on their shoulders.

The main thrust of this great project is to free mankind, even during this century, from nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, as suggested by the Soviet Union at the outset of the Year of Peace. This initiative goes hand-in-hand with the Budapest Appeal, which calls for a dramatic cut in conventional forces and armaments in Europe.

In this context, we attach great importance to the decisions taken by the non-aligned movement and the signatories of the Delhi Declaration, which aim in the same direction.

Behind all these endeavours, there is the recognition that a joint political effort will be required and that national interests must honestly and reciprocally be respected if the security of peoples and countries is to be guaranteed in the nuclear and space age. As far as we are concerned, this is what the call for a fresh approach to international relations is all about.

We know full well how far some circles are from this mode of thinking. Yet in the final analysis, they will have to meet this historic challenge, since there is no other alternative in the face of the threatened annihilation of the human race. In yesterday's address to the International Forum for A Nuclear-Free World, General Secretary Gorbachev put it in this way: "The question is like this: either the political mentality is geared to the requirements of the times, or civilization and life itself on Earth may perish".

Naturally, the socialist countries' initiatives do not only seek to brighten the horizons for future development. They must also be considered as offers of practical measures to be tackled right now.

Seen in this light, the Reykjavik meeting was an especially outstanding event. It is among the first things to be mentioned whenever reference is made to new elements. The emerging possibility of radical disarmament measures is an encouraging sign and fosters determination to labour still more committedly for the cessation of the insane arms race. However, irritation on the part of certain quarters has not escaped our attention either. Those concerned regard Reyjavik as an accident and long to return to the status quo ante. What we, in turn, urge countries to do is to build on the results achieved in Reyjavik and translate them into concrete agreements. In particular, the aim must be to reduce strategic weapons by 50 per cent within the next five years, to eliminate medium-range weapons in Europe and to strengthen the ABM régime. The German Democratic Republic has declared on this score that the countermeasures taken on its territory could be reversed once medium-range missiles are removed.

The results attained in Stockholm and at the Conference that reviewed the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons are unanimously judged as an indication of broader readiness for constructive dialogue. May these examples, showing that problems can be resolved if reason and goodwill prevail, have a favourable impact on our forum. The same is to be hoped for the relevant resolutions adopted at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly.

We are watching with keen interest and with particular satisfaction the growing efforts aimed at curbing the arms race regionally. One such instance is the ratification of the treaty on the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Inspired by the same principal objective, the German Democratic Republic has proposed regional arms limitation measures in Europe, notably a nuclear-weapon-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe. As for the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe, it is our hope that the current talks between the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO may very soon lead to successful negotiations by the parties concerned.

We would end up with a one-sided picture, if we left out of consideration the developments running in the very opposite direction. They are alarming indeed. The deviation from the Salt II Agreement, the mounting intensity of attacks on the ABM Treaty and the refusal to give a positive response to the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests are a clear indication of the intention to continue and fuel the arms race in all fields and to extend it to outer space.

The bilateral negotiations and talks between the USSR and the United States appear to be making no progress on matters of substance, either on nuclear and space arms or on the cessation of nuclear weapons testing.

These are, in brief, the conflicting circumstances under which the Conference has begun its 1987 term. We believe whatever positive element there is should be used to bring differing positions closer together and to seek progress with even greater tenacity in all the fields of interest to the Conference. This is precisely what the Deputy Foreign Ministers of socialist countries were guided by when they met in Berlin a few weeks ago to deliberate issues of relevance to the Conference on Disarmament. In this context, I wish to point out that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic considers as priority items a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Certainly, we are also aware of the importance of the other subjects on the agenda, including the call for a comprehensive disarmament programme to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its resumed forty-first session.

Of special urgency now is that a fresh start be made on the drafting of a treaty that provides for the complete cessation of all nuclear weapons testing. Both the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and the statements we have heard so far during the plenary debate give evidence of broad readiness to move ahead. No doubt, the fastest way to arrive at a treaty would be through regular negotiations. For this reason, my delegation would prefer an appropriate mandate for a committee. In order to help prepare the ground for an accord, it would be equally ready, however, to take part in goal-oriented discussions about problems to be resolved. Without going into details, I would like to point out some of the aspects which, in our judgement, will have a major bearing on the practical approach to be chosen.

Firstly, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests will remain an international task of utmost urgency. Achieving it would impact very favourably on the entire disarmament process, and appropriate disarmament forums should be used to pursue this goal. This Conference, however, seems to us particularly capable of working out a universal treaty.

Secondly, we believe in the possibility of intermediate measures in the event that a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests is recognized and formulated as an explicit commitment.

This idea is not new to socialist countries. Just take the Threshold Treaties of 1974 and 1976, the Soviet programme of 15 January 1986 and the proposals put forward by the USSR in Reyjavik. Clearly, a moratorium by the Soviet Union and the United States, to which the USSR has not slammed the door after all, would be particularly effective. It will be of crucial importance in this regard that any partial step be geared to a comprehensive, legally binding ban.

Thirdly, it appears indispensable to us to discuss all the elements of a future treaty in their complexity. Any selective approach is liable to leave out of consideration the interrelated nature of the subjects involved and would thus not yield the desired result.

Fourthly, it will be necessary to rid the verification issue of all political encumbrances and to resolve it in a constructive manner, in line with the requirements of the treaty. Whatever it may take to do that is there. We need parallelism beween the Committee's activities and the Group of Scientific Experts, which should expeditiously prepare the level-2 data experiment to be carried out in 1988.

My delegation takes the view that a committee should be set up as quickly as possible. We second the proposal that two working groups should be created -- one on matters of contents and scope of the treaty, and the other on compliance and verification.

If we manage to establish a committee in which business-like discussions are conducted, we must make clear their pertinence to future negotiations and that we expect all the sides concerned to strive for real results. There must not be repetition of some of the practices in which the 1983 working groups indulged.

Considerable headway has been made in drawing up a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, not least thanks to the laudable efforts of the Committee's former chairmen, Ambassadors Turbanski and Cromartie. The goal of finalizing the convention this year — something that presents itself as the logical consequence of this development — is very exacting but realistic. We fully concur with Ambassador Ekéus, Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, that there is a positive chance right now for eliminating chemical weapons from the globe once and for all. It must not be passed up. A new round in the chemical arms race would all of a sudden move to a distant future the attainment of results which we are so close to now. In fact, this is what bad experience has taught us.

Given strong commitment to accommodation and dedicated work, we could well rise to the occasion. The far-reaching proposals which the Soviet delegation has just tabled are of special significance in this context and we welcome them as yet another exemplary contribution to our work. Solving the remaining issues of substance would speed up the negotiating process. This is particularly true of challenge inspection, the locations of stocks and their verification, and matters relating to the non-production of chemical weapons in civil industry. Results are possible on the basis of existing proposals.

Once this and other blanks in the text of the convention are filled, it will be a lot easier to work out details. We are convinced of the possibility of an understanding on what is needed now and what could be completed at a later stage.

We support the Chairman's desire to streamline operations of the committee so that it is able to perform its current duties. Apart from the efforts undertaken at the Conference proper, everything should be done to maintain and improve the atmosphere needed for constructive work. The USSR has suggested an agreement under which chemical weapons would be neither produced nor deployed. Such a step would give a fresh impetus to the present negotiations.

My delegation is gratified to note the interests evoked by the seminar on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be organized by the German Democratic Republic's National Pugwash Group next month. The event will focus on the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic is doing its utmost to make that seminar a success.

During the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, 154 countries reiterated their opposition to an arms race in outer space and called for relevant agreements. The Conference on Disarmament has the duty to answer this call. Reason and realism are utterly incompatible with the strange logic that wants to eliminate weapons on Earth and, at the same time, put most modern means of destruction in space. Hence the world-wide resistance to the Star Wars plans. Time is pressing, as the champions of SDI are doing everything to get weapons deployed in outer space and to create faits accomplis. Attacks on the ABM Treaty are increasing in number. It is thus no longer sufficient for the Conference simply to continue last year's exchange of views. Rather, it must start direct work on practical measures designed to head off the spread of the arms race to outer space and ensure that space is used peacefully, for the good of all mankind. My delegation advocates the early establishment of a committee with a relevant mandate.

In view of the fact that bilateral and multilateral negotiations complement and stimulate each other, the following projects could, in our opinion, be envisaged: prohibition of the use of force in outer space, as well as from space against the Earth and <u>vice versa</u>; protection of satellites and prohibition of anti-satellite weapons; and verification measures.

In conclusion, let me give you, Comrade President, the assurance that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic is prepared and willing to do its very best in order that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament may conclude this year's sessions with tangible results.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. President. Since this is the first time I am taking the floor allow me to congratulate you sincerely on your assumption of the post of the President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. I wish you success in fulfilling the important functions incumbent upon you, and I can assure you of our aspiration to give you every help in this task. Allow me also to express our gratitude to the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley, for his able and competent leadership of the work of the Conference last August and during the inter-sessional period. I am taking advantage of this opportunity to associate myself with the words of welcome to our new colleagues, the heads of the delegations of France, Romania, Japan, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Italy and the Soviet Union, and we wish them all every success. We ask the delegation of the United States of America to accept the deep condolences of the Mongolian delegation on the untimely death of Ambassador Lowitz and to pass on to his family and friends our sincere sympathy.

We are satisfied to note that the Conference has succeeded, as it did last year, in adopting the agenda and programme of work and also a decision on the creation of certain subsidiary bodies right at the start of the session. It is to be hoped that the coming weeks will be just as productive from the point of view of dealing with organizational questions and questions of substance.

Since the beginning of the activities of the multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, today known as the Conference on Disarmament, practically a quarter of a century has passed. Possibly this date does not have any particular meaning for the activities of the Conference on Disarmament but, nonetheless, it is worth mentioning, not only as a reason for reviewing the results already achieved, but rather and mainly as an encouragement for further efforts which must be made in negotiations on disarmament. respect we must admit that, with regard to the main aims of disarmament, we have still been unable to justify the hopes of the peoples of the world and, particularly in recent years, solutions to many vitally important and pressing problems facing this negotiating body have been bogged down without justification. It is high time, as stated in the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/86 M, adopting the report of the Conference on Disarmament, "to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament". Appeals to the Conference to fulfil its mandate in holding negotiations in the field of disarmament are contained in many other resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly too. To ignore these resolutions reflecting the demands of the world's community is inadmissible, and we are of the view that this year it is necessary to take decisive action to speed up the work of the Conference, to achieve solutions, based on new political thinking, which would direct its efforts towards the elaboration of concrete agreements on problems which are ripe for such agreement.

The Reykjavik meeting of the heads of the world's two leading Powers and the virtual agreements reached there, thanks to the constructive efforts by the Soviet Union in its position on the most important questions of limiting and eliminating nuclear arsenals in a short period, have confirmed the truth that there are no issues in world affairs on which it is impossible to achieve mutually acceptable agreement if there is common sense, political realism and a feeling of responsibility for the peaceful future of mankind. This meeting opened up a qualitatively new stage in the fight for nuclear disarmament and has given it powerful impetus. Now the main thing we have to do is to go forward in strengthening and developing the new situation that has come about following the meeting in Iceland so that the spirit of Reykjavik is fully reflected in disarmament negotiations in various forums.

The continuation of the arms race is showing itself more and more to be a dead-end leading only to a destabilization of the situation, a pointless waste of resources, and an increased military danger for everybody, including its proponents. In order to stop and reverse around, practical measures are urgent. One such measure, and one of the most important and most urgent in our conviction, is the prohibition of nuclear tests. This question, as it certainly deserves, has been right from the beginning of the session in the centre of the attention of the Conference. In this connection we would like here and now to express the hope that the new efforts being made will make it possible finally to get this question out of its deadlock and create a subsidiary body with a proper mandate intended to start practical work on an agreement on a nuclear-test ban. In an atmosphere of growing general concern about nuclear explosions, it is unacceptable that the Conference on Disarmament should fail to deal seriously with this problem.

A few days ago we witnessed two nuclear tests carried out by the United States. Thus, the United States has taken the step that brings about the ending of the unprecedented USSR moratorium on all nuclear explosions. That moratorium has quite clearly confirmed that it is possible to take measures that can set up a firm barrier against the nuclear arms race. The Soviet moratorium made a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and was a sign of new political thinking and responsibility. The moratorium has in a sense overturned the old thesis that both the super-Powers were equally responsible for the arms race.

Speaking at the plenary meeting of the Conference on 5 February, the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Nazarkıne, stated that as a result of events in Nevada, the Soviet Union no longer feels bound by its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and will, in due course, begin carrying out its own programme of nuclear tests. As you know, the Soviet Government has repeatedly stated, including in its statement on 18 February last year, that the Soviet Union will be obliged to renew its nuclear test after the very first nuclear explosion by the United States in 1987. Mongolia understands this position on the part of the Soviet Union, a position dictated exclusively by the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies. In this connection one cannot but stress the obvious fact that the gap between the number of nuclear explosions carried out by the United States and the USSR has increased in the favour of the United States by 26 since the Soviet moratorium. Moreover, it is no secret that the continuation of nuclear tests in the United States of America is not aimed at keeping the nuclear

arsenal in a state of readiness for war or at carrying out the doctrine of "deterrence", but rather primarily at developing completely new forms and types of nuclear weapons, at creating the third-generation nuclear weapons. Mongolia is happy to note the readiness of the Soviet Union, on a basis of mutuality, to stop carrying out its nuclear test programme at any time, and expresses the hope that the leadership of the United States will see the need to respond positively to the Soviet Union's goodwill.

Questions of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war continue for us to be extremely important and have high priority. A resolution adopted at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly on these issues once again emphasized the urgent need for the Conference to begin multilateral negotiations on them. The programme put forward by the Soviet Union more than a year ago for the stage-by-stage complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, with an agreement on the prohibition of the development, testing and use of space strike weapons, is just as relevant today and could be the basis for consideration of nuclear disarmament issues by the Conference on Disarmament. One of the most important measures intended to prevent nuclear war, as we see it, remains the adoption by all nuclear States of an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It should be emphasized in this connection that the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 41/86 B asked the Conference on Disarmament to examine the question of the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character which would contain a formulation of such an obligation.

Mongolia is happy to note that the Soviet Union and your country, Mr. President, the People's Republic of China, have assumed the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. We can only welcome the fact too that both these Powers recently signed Protocols II and III of the Rarotonga Treaty on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, which deserves general approval. We think that the aim of this Treaty is in keeping with our proposal for the creation of a mechanism for excluding the use of force among States of Asia and the Pacific. If these examples were to be followed by the other nuclear States, it would really be a concrete contribution to the strengthening of confidence among States and a reduction of the threat of nuclear war. Confidence needs to be strengthened by deeds and not by words. One cannot demand confidence from others if one reserves for oneself the freedom to continue nuclear tests and to torpedo the most important agreements.

The Reykjavik meeting has confirmed that unless the threat of the arms race spreading to space is removed, it is impossible to agree on a reduction and elimination of strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, the meeting has once again cast light upon the key significance of the solution to this problem for preserving and strengthening peace and stability on Earth.

Today, the need to set up a firm barrier against the proliferation of the arms race into space is stronger than it ever has been. The proponents of the Strategic Defence Initiative are setting about speeding up the deployment of the individual elements in space and are trying in this way to shift to a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In General Assembly resolution 41/53 the international community once again unambiguously expressed itself in favour of preventing the arms race in space and the holding of negotiations on

the conclusion of an agreement or agreements on this question. It is essential now to start negotiations urgently on specific aspects of this problem, bearing in mind the final aim of the non-admissibility of arms in space. The proposal concerning the elaboration of an international agreement on ensuring immunity for artificial Earth satellites and the prohibition of the development, testing or use of anti-satellite systems, and the elimination of existing systems of that kind, seems in our opinion to be extremely realistic and fully in accordance with the general aspiration to keep space free from weaponry and to use it for peaceful and creative purposes.

We must as soon as possible re-establish the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Outer Space this year, and avoid creating a situation like the one which arose in the past, where the whole of the first part of the session was wasted on agreeing on the mandate and the programme of work of the Committee.

We are inspired by the general aim to complete this year the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The course of the negotiations warrants our judgement that this optimism is not built on sand. The inter-sessional consultations last year and the session of the Ad Hoc Committee in January this year have been very productive from the point of view of dealing with several complicated technical questions. Taking this into consideration, and taking into account the recommendation of the consensus resolution 41/58 D of the United Nations General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee could work without interruption to achieve the conclusion of the convention.

And now, in order to turn the possible into the real, and hopes into practical deeds, what is needed, as was very accurately and rightly stated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, in his message to the Conference, are political compromises. An example of this kind of political compromise, of a constructive search for mutually acceptable solutions, is the new and important proposals by the Soviet Union, described by Ambassador Nazarkine in his statement today, to deal with various important questions of the future convention concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons. These proposals, in our opinion, will no doubt encourage further progress at the negotiations to find a way to deal with the outstanding issues. They go a long way to taking account of the positions and the interests of the various partners and reflect the responsible approach of the Soviet Union in expressing new political thinking with regard to the cause of peace and disarmament. We hope that other participants in the negotiations will show the same readiness for compromise, so that, as far as possible, in the very near future the drafting of the convention will be completed.

In our opinion, the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee can achieve success in the outstanding issues of principle such as non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry, procedures for the destruction of the CW production base and the question of challenge inspection, if it avoids wasting valuable time in discussing technical details of a secondary nature. After the questions of principle have been resolved, such technical details could be relatively easily settled.

We, like other delegations, highly appreciate the contribution made by Ambassador Turbanski and Ambassador Cromartie in achieving the successes which have been obtained thus far, and we are convinced that under the guidance of the new Chairman, Ambassador Ekéus, the Ad Hoc Committee will achieve further decisive progress.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now come to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi.

Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt): Mr. President, allow me first to express to you our happiness to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament at the start of its 1987 session. I would like also to voice my appreciation for the way you are directing its work. This comes as no surprise from an able diplomat like yourself, and from a State like China, which you represent, and because of the special responsibility it carries as one of the Great Powers and because of its unique status within the Conference. I am confident that this status will enable you to present many initiatives to allay the difficulties slowing the pace of the work of the Conference.

Permit me also to avail myself of this opportunity to express our gratitude to Ambassador Alan Beesley, the representative of Canada, for his efforts during August 1986, and throughout the inter-sessional period.

I am saddened today by the absence from our midst of Ambassador Donald Lowitz, the representative of the United States of America, whose untimely death is a loss for his country, the Conference and his friends who worked with him and came to be closely acquainted with his noble qualities. I kindly ask the United States delegation to convey my heartfelt condolences to his widow and to the other members of his family.

It gives me pleasure to welcome the new representatives who joined the Conference, Ambassadors Youri Nazarkine of the Soviet Union, Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Rubens Antonio Barbosa of Brazil, Jorge Morelli of Peru, Kamel Hacene of Algeria, Gheorge Dolgu of Romania, Pierre Morel of France, Chusei Yamada of Japan and Marko Kosin of Yugoslavia. I am confident that each one of them will bring his own positive contribution to the work of the Conference.

Normally, a new session of the Conference on Disarmament is opened against a background of optimism, of looking forward with hope to the possibility of achieving progress in the work of the Conference. But how can this be the case today when we see the start of this session coinciding with the continuation and escalation of both the nuclear and the conventional arms race; when we see the persistence of the trend to extend it from land, sea and air into outer space and a continuation of the attempts to achieve military superiority and nuclear deterrence. All this goes on without regard to the existing arms limitation and disarmament treaties, whether they be bilateral or multilateral; without feeling bound by the pledges already made in the Geneva Joint Statement of January 1985, or those made at the Geneva Summit November 1985, where it was pledged to prevent an arms race in outer space and to terminate it on Earth, not to seek military superiority, and acknowledged that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. All

this is happening without any consideration to the security of the great majority of States or their interests, a great majority of States that find themselves drawn forcibly into untold dangers and threatened with annihilation.

The situation we face today must give rise to pessimism and generate a feeling of frustration. There is simply no other way out of this sad state of affairs but to comply with existing treaties on arms limitation and disarmament, both in letter and spirit. We have to strengthen such treaties through the conclusion of yet more treaties. This necessitates generating momentum in the bilateral negotiations in response to the high hopes pinned on them. The spirit of Reykjavık must be maintained. This also requires enabling the Conference on Disarmament to break out of the state of paralysis it has reached, by making it possible for the Conference to undertake the tasks entrusted to it instead of persisting to raise doubts about the scope of its mandate or continuing to obstruct its work. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations are not alternatives to one another but rather complement and sustain each other. Such efforts must be guided by the world conscience and the international will as reflected in the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. They must respond to the appeals contained in the declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement and the six countries representing the five continents.

Like the majority of States we are of the view that a nuclear-test ban is a necessary first step if we are really serious in our attempt to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament, thus protecting the world from the scourge of a nuclear war. Hence our increasing concern about the insistence of some nuclear-weapon States to persevere in their nuclear tests using, as a pretext, the arguments of maintaining their capacity of nuclear deterrence, to ensure the worthiness of their nuclear weapon stocks, and their doubts about the effectiveness of verification procedures under the technology presently available. All these arguments are not valid. They are merely used to justify the continuation of nuclear tests. They were refuted by many previous speakers in this same room. It is regrettable that some of these States are parties to, even depositaries of, both the treaties on the partial ban of nuclear testing and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These States have pledged to work towards a comprehensive test ban, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. They were expected to lead the way towards a consolidated non-proliferation régime and thus encourage the States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede to it. But the same States, by their present conduct, can lose their credibility as an ideal to be followed. In fact they are encouraging the States not parties to remain outside the Treaty, and worse, to develop further their own nuclear capabilities. And this is another cause for our concern, particularly when we know that among such States some are situated in the Middle East, and the racist régime in South Africa. By remaining outside the NPT and developing their nuclear capabilities they threaten to engulf the two regions in a nuclear conflict. This would have grave consequences not only for the two regions, but for the world at large.

In this context, we welcome every step which would help to achieve the objective of a nuclear-test ban. We object to every action that diverts us from this goal. Once more we welcome the decision by the Soviet Union to

impose a unilateral moratorium on its nuclear tests as of 6 August 1985. We welcome their decision to renew this moratorium repeatedly. We regret that the other nuclear States, particularly the United States, did not respond in kind, and all the more so in view of the fact that nobody raised doubts about the sincerity of the Soviet Union in honouring its decision. We understand the Soviet Union's decision not to be bound by the unilateral moratorium any longer. We still deem it necessary for the nuclear States to declare a moratorium on their nuclear tests, thus creating the required climate to negotiate a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

We also welcome the decision by the United States Administration to transmit to the Congress, for ratification, the two draft treaties on threshold and peaceful nuclear explosions. This came after a long wait. But we hope that they will be ratified at the earliest possible opportunity. We feel satisfied at the news that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev touched upon the issue of a nuclear-test ban during their last meeting in Reykjavik, considering the possibility of an agreement on the reduction of the number and yield of nuclear tests and appropriate verification procedures.

But while welcoming all these steps our objective will remain that of concluding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Conference on Disarmament will remain the optimum framework to conclude such a treaty, giving it the universality we all hope for. That is why we regret the failure of the Conference on Disarmament, during its last three sessions, to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban, in spite of the many attempts made to reach a compromise. We hope that the Conference will succeed in its present session in re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee and in ending the deadlock on this issue. Undoubtedly General Assembly resolution 41/46 A provides a good basis for such an action. It contains many concessions that were described to us in the past stages of the work of the Conference as conducive to a softening in the position of the objecting States. The resolution also reflects the extent of flexibility of the States that sponsored and voted in favour of it. This is a positive development that should not be underestimated and should meet with a positive response.

Egypt was one of the first States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Egypt was at the forefront of the States that signed the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and on their destruction, although the circumstances prevailing in our region prevented us from speeding up its ratification. From this background and in the framework of the continuity of Egyptian policy, we fully support the current efforts to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Egypt will not hesitate to exert every effort to achieve this objective. We look forward to a treaty that fully and effectively bans the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction; a treaty that does not, however, impede the peaceful chemical activities. We aspire to a treaty which includes effective verification provisions without such procedures that would exceed the actual requirements of the treaty, or be

used as an indirect means to threaten the national security of the States parties. We believe that acceding to the treaty will depend to a large extent on the provisions it contains providing for international co-operation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries. In this context we welcome the decision by the Ad Hoc Committee to consider this aspect of the treaty during its current session. Lastly, I would like to mention the fact that concluding a treaty which is acceptable to all parties and to which all would accede is one of the prerequisites for its acquiring universality.

Allow me on this occasion to express my thanks to Ambassador Cromartie, the representative of the United Kingdom, for his efforts during his chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in the previous session. May I also congratulate Ambassador Ekéus, the representative of Sweden, on his assumption of the Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in the present session. We all know the role played, and being played, by the delegation of Sweden, particularly by Ambassador Ekéus personally, in the ongoing negotiations to conclude a treaty banning chemical weapons. We wish him all success in his task. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will conclude the draft treaty in time to present it to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-second session in accordance with its resolution 41/58 B.

The progress we have achieved in the realms of science and technology is an indisputable fact. What is more, it is an ongoing phenomenon, day after day. Space technology available today represents the new link in the chain of evolution and advancement with both its useful and harmful facets affecting humanity. It has useful aspects, because each addition to the technological discoveries and inventions represents a new victory, increasing the welfare of the human being by what it provides to fulfil his aspirations to prosperity and the raising of his living standards. It has also harmful facets, by what is achieved by its military facet, the destructive power in the service of the selfish tendencies of the States able to exploit this technology militarly to impose their hegemony and to introduce it in the arms race, thus escalating the race to extremely dangerous heights, where security and serenity are neutralized, even for the States that do not take part in the race.

This explains why the prevention of an arms race in outer space is imposing itself as a priority item on the agenda of all international forums and meetings dealing with arms limitations and disarmament. This is particularly true since the United States declared its Strategic Defence Initiative. Today there is quasi international consensus that the extension of the arms race to outer space and the implementation of the SDI are a serious escalation of the arms race that will have grave consequences in all fields, political, military and economic.

If we spoke a few years ago about the possible availability of the necessary technology for the development and production of space weapon systems, and if we had tried then to imagine the dangers that would attend such a development, it therefore becomes a source of deep concern when we hear today that it has proved possible to achieve such progress in acquiring the necessary technology for the production of such weapon systems. We are worried to hear those who call for hastening the production and deployment of the said systems, in such a way that the danger becomes an actual reality, where it was but a mere possibility in the past.

What complicates the issue even more is the seeking of some States to participate in the SDI. If the avowed objective of their action is to extract purely commercial profits, we are sure that the participation of other States in this programme will provide them with advanced technology which will help, sooner or later, to proliferate space weapons and will contribute, directly or indirectly, to improving the performance level of a conventional weapon system. The matter becomes more serious when, among such States, we find some that are situated in areas where tension prevails already, particularly when previous efforts to bind such States to one or more of the treaties on arms limitations and disarmament have already failed.

How we wish that the mastering of space technology and the new horizons it conquered will remain confined to serving humanity and increasing its welfare! How we wish that outer space, as a common heritage of humanity, may be explored and exploited exclusively for peaceful purposes!

If in the past we called for the possibility to conclude an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, this call becomes more urgent in the light of the current developments. Undoubtedly, the prevention of an arms race in outer space is easier at present, before the space Powers multiply and militarize outer space in such a way as to impede the efforts in the field of arms limitations and disarmament, if it does not destroy the whole fabric. Here, we are at a loss as to how to perceive the fact that the declared objective of the bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers is to prevent an arms race in outer space, while at the same time the United States is developing, with the purpose of their deployment, space weapon systems about which negotiations are going on for their prohibition and the destruction of existing systems.

Here again, if there are priorities to be set, in the light of the present developments, we deem it necessary to take action to achieve: first, the halting of the development of anti-satellite weapons and the dismantling of the existing systems; second, the prohibition of the introduction of new weapons systems into outer space; and third, ensuring that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems are fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances.

In the face of the present situation with all its ramifications, we cannot but express our dissatisfaction with the attempts to raise obstacles to prevent the Conference on Disarmament being entrusted with carrying out the required negotiations to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space, particularly bearing in mind that the record of the bilateral negotiations gives no cause for optimism, since they have failed to achieve any progress until the present. What is more, this failure in the item on outer space resulted in impeding the possibilities of agreement in other areas. General Assembly resolution 41/53 reaffirms the primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Notwithstanding the important work done by the Ad Hoc Committee during the last two sessions, there must be a more specific link between the Committee's work, in any particular stage, and the

final objective unanimously endorsed by the international community, namely to conclude an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will speedily overcome the procedural difficulties concerning the agreement on an appropriate mandate and a programme of work that ensures that its work will take the right direction towards the final objective of its activities.

It was not by coincidence that the issue of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, within the framework of the item on the prohibition of radiological weapons, received such attention by the great majority of States members in the Conference. This is an expression by these States of the interests of the greater part of the world community. This fact has been reflected by many United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the last of which is resolution 41/59 I, and by resolutions of other international groupings. This concern arises from the desire of many States to build nuclear reactors in order to benefit from nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. At the same time, the same States are keen that such an action on their part will not make them hostages to the dangers of nuclear radiation resulting from any attack on their facilities.

The Israelı aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor was a living example of what nuclear facilities could be subjected to. The Chernobyl accident was another case in point of the dangerous effects of nuclear radiation on environment and population. We thought that the two incidents were ample evidence to validate our view about the importance and the need for the Conference on Disarmament to deal with the issue of prohibition of attack on nuclear facilities, particularly since many other international forums have transmitted the subject to the Conference for consideration. That is why we are concerned about the persistence of some members in voicing doubts about the competence of the Conference to consider this issue. We regret to have to note a clear regression in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during its past session. If we are keen about the consideration of this issue by the Conference, at the same time we do not underestimate the difficulties and varying security considerations of the member States, nor the necessity of reaching solutions that are satisfactory and acceptable to all. We are of the view that the right way is through further negotiations. We have to explore new approaches and proposals to deal with this issue. But the way does not lie in some members deliberately raising obstacles to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, even going so far as preventing its re-establishment.

The importance we attach to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should not be interpreted as an attempt to diminish the importance of the issue of prohibition of radiological weapons. We believe that if it is unacceptable to some to concentrate on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, then, and regardless of the fact that we do believe that prohibition of an actual threat has priority over the prohibition of a potential threat, let us at least consider both issues simultaneously.

Needless to say, my referring to a limited number of the items on the agenda of our Conference in my statement, and my having specified Egypt's position regarding them, does not in any way diminish the importance we attach to the other items. We hope that the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under its able Chairman, Ambassador García Robles,

the representative of Mexico, will succeed in preparing the draft before the end of the first part of the present session so as to present it to the forty-first session of the General Assembly. We are confident that this is possible provided there is the political will and if the positions of the different States are adequately flexible, particularly concerning the nuclear paragraphs of the programme, the stages of implementation and the time-frame.

We agree with the view of the members who called for the necessity that the item on negative security assurances be given the importance it deserves by the Conference. We believe that the provision of such guarantees in a legally binding international document, with no conditions attached, is a legitimate and just demand on the part of the non-nuclear States. We are confident that the Ad Hoc Committee, if reactivated, will be able to reach the appropriate formula to satisfy this demand.

We also think that the establishment of <u>ad hoc</u> committees, with appropriate mandates, is the best framework to consider both the items on the cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

We do not deny that the international climate and the relations between the two super-Powers in general, and the stages reached in their bilateral negotiations in particular, have their impact, whether positive or negative, on our Conference. But regardless of our apprehension of the effect of these factors, we deem it necessary for the Conference to succeed in generating its own momentum for its work. This must be done in such a way that the Conference is able to carry out the tasks specified to it by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is our view that the holding of the third special session in 1988 is an opportunity for the Conference to confirm its credibility by presenting to that session specific draft treaties on arms limitations and disarmament, treaties that would provide the peoples of the world with peace and security through which they can achieve progress and enjoy prosperity.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President and for the country that the President represents. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The distinguished representatives will have received today the document that has been circulated under number CD/739. This contains a letter signed by four permanent representatives, those of Argentina, India, Sweden and Mexico, containing a request that the Conference publish and distribute as a document of the Conference the joint statement that the leaders of six countries, the authors of the Initiative for Peace and Disarmament, issued on the eve of the New Year. In this joint statement, there is one paragraph — that is, paragraph 6 — which refers specifically to the question of a moratorium that might serve as a first step towards achieving a treaty putting an end to nuclear tests. I felt that since that subject is specifically on the agenda of this Conference it was relevant for me to read out the part that seemed

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

most relevant. It reads as follows: "There is no justification for nuclear testing by any country. We appeal once again to the United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing so that a bilateral moratorium can be established. Our offer to help ensure adequate verification of such a moratorium remains valid. We are ready to start implementing it at any moment."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? And I see none. You will recall that as an exception to the agreement reached at our last plenary meeting, the Conference will hold its next plenary meeting on Thursday, 19 February, at 10.30 a.m. On that occasion we might need to have a brief informal meeting once the list of speakers is exhausted, to consider a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. As there is no other business to consider, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.390 19 February 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 19 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m.

<u>President:</u> Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I call to order the 390th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, I wish to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, who will be the first to address this plenary today. The Minister is a distinguished career diplomat who has served his country in several important diplomatic posts in Member States of this Conference. It may be fitting to recall that His Excellency is no stranger to Geneva and the Palais des Nations, as he was a member of the French Delegation to the Conference of Experts on the Prevention of Surprise Attack, held here in 1958. I am sure that all members join me in expressing our appreciation to him for finding the time to come here to convey the views of his Government on the issues of disarmament, in spite of a very heavy schedule. His very presence here is a clear indication of the importance the Government of France attaches to matters concerning disarmament. In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 1, "Nuclear-Test Ban" and 2, "Cessation of the Nuclear-Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of France and Czechoslovakia. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond.

Mr. RAIMOND (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to tell you how happy I am to be taking the floor today before the Conference on Disarmament. I would like to take this opportunity to associate myself with the tribute paid by all delegations to the memory of the representative of the United States to the Conference, Mr. Lowitz. I am happy that as chance would have it, China is presiding over our work today. This circumstance gives me the opportunity to greet the representative of a great country which is the friend of France. Its foreign policy is based, like ours, on independence of action. Its security policy, like that of France, rests on exclusive control over its forces. China is, like my country, a nuclear and space Power. I do not hesitate to say here that in this capacity too she, for her part, is contributing to the balance of force, and therefore to peace. Like France, China decided eight years ago to participate in the new Committee on Disarmament which has since become the Conference.

The last address delivered by a member of the French Government before your Conference dates back to 1979. At the time we were marking the transformation of a <u>sui generis</u> institution organized around the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States into a multilateral negotiating body. This change, and in particular the abolition of the co-chairmanship, was something which in 1978 France had made the condition for its participation in the new institution.

The question facing us at the time was whether there was room for multilateral negotiations in parallel with the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations. There were some who invoked the so-called law attributed to George Kennan according to which the chances of negotiations achieving anything are in inverse proportion to the number of participants involved, and

argued that any multilateral forum dealing with disarmament would be inefficient or indeed useless. I would like to recall here that this is not France's position.

The work being done by your Conference in the field of chemical weapons is second to that of no other forum as regards the seriousness of its approach.

On the question of conventional weapons, last September's success at the Stockholm Conference, in another framework, that of the CSCE, showed that there is no need to be only two parties in order to complete and conclude the first agreement between East and West for a decade. Certainly, confidence-building measures are a limited sphere; however, nobody would underestimate their implications for Europe, nor their significance for arms control, inasmuch as they have endorsed the principle of on-site inspection.

The day before yesterday, in Vienna, there was a meeting in the French Embassy — the first in a series of informal consultations — to find out whether it is possible to build on the achievements of Stockholm in the field of conventional disarmament at the same time as in that of confidence-building measures. Here again my country insists that each participant in the CSCE should speak on its own behalf and that negotiations should not turn into a bloc-to-bloc confrontation.

France is in favour of disarmament agreements which are verifiable and part of a progressive process. The maintenance of the right to security of each State throughout this process is in our view its necessary corollary. France will therefore never accept that its forces or its territory should be affected by any negotiations to which France is not a party or in which she has not spoken on her own behalf. This right which she claims for herself she naturally recognizes for other countries.

At the opening of this new session of the Conference there is a prevailing feeling that negotiations on arms control and disarmament are at a turning point. The resumption of the Soviet-American dialogue in 1985 led, four months ago, to the Reykjavik meeting. That meeting left many observers bewildered.

As I had occasion to say in December, from the Reykjavik talks public opinion noted, rightly or wrongly, that the United States could, if necessary, change its strategy, give up its ballistic missiles in Europe and, more particularly, bring about an evolution in its contribution towards deterrence in which recourse to conventional means would play a greater part. It also noted from this meeting that the USSR stated that it was prepared to rid itself within 10 years of the strategic investment which it has been making continuously for a quarter of a century. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with conjuring up new worlds, which one would naturally hope would be better ones. It can be intellectually stimulating to imagine the adoption of new strategies for tomorrow or the day after.

In Reykjavik the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged proposals and counter-proposals concerning remote, probably utopian, horizons; but we should be careful not to endanger the foundations of our security today.

As many European leaders emphasized, in the disarmament field, we must now concentrate on what is realistic, possible and desirable.

For us, specifically, this can be summarized in three points.

First, we hope that the objectives agreed upon by the Soviet Union and the United States in Reykjavik can be achieved, that is, the reduction of 50 per cent of their strategic arsenals over five years. It goes without saying that this would be a considerable result, without equivalent in the history of arms control negotiations, and obviously we would be extremely happy about it. In that case why, paradoxically, detract in advance from this five-year objective by setting up against it much more doubtful 10-year objectives?

Secondly, we should ensure the maintenance of the ABM Treaty for a mutually agreed period, followed by a period in which, if appropriate, it would be changed by negotiation, as was sought in Reykjavik.

At present, as everybody knows, a debate is underway on the problem of interpreting the ABM Treaty in relation to the research programmes being carried out in the United States as well as in the Soviet Union. This is not a new argument, and should be carefully distinguished from the question of the early deployment of defensive systems. That would go beyond what was authorized in 1972, that is, the possibility of deploying a hundred antiballistic interceptors around a single site, as had been done in Moscow.

My country's position with respect to the interpretation of the ABM Treaty clauses starts from an obvious point: the ABM Treaty is essentially bilateral and there has never been any question of considering its extension to other countries. So, it is up to the two signatory countries to determine for themselves what today is in keeping with the provisions laid down in 1972, taking account of new technological developments; what goes beyond the agreed provisions of the Treaty; and what modalities can or cannot be used to make changes in the Treaty. Whatever solution may be found, I add that it would have to be agreed upon bilaterally.

We are attached to maintaining the ABM Treaty, as our representative had occasion to recall in 1984 before your Conference. We therefore hope to see it respected by both parties, including with respect to research activities. These are clearly permitted by the Treaty. To avoid any technological surprises is an element of the Treaty's stability and thus of its durability.

Finally, a third objective should be the reduction of American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe over the same period of five years. The zero option was implicitly accepted in 1979 by our partners in the Alliance and explicitly proposed by them in 1981. The political reasons for this are well known. However, the situation in 1987 is different. In 1981 our partners in the Alliance had proposed renouncing the deployment announced, but not yet been carried out, in exchange for a reduction in the number of missiles existing on the Soviet side. In 1987 there are intermediate-range missiles on both sides, but not in the same quantities. Therefore, the

implementation tomorrow of such a formula, which in any case would have to be accompanied by a very detailed timetable and verification measures, must not lead to a situation of diminished security for Europe.

The implementation of a possible zero option agreement between the United States and the USSR therefore supposes that the security of Europe should be perserved. This means, firstly, that the possibility of getting round the agreement (over or under it) must be avoided. I am thinking more particularly of the question of shorter-range missiles, a matter of concern, quite rightly, not only to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany but also to the governments of other European countries. And secondly, it means that the consequences of the present conventional imbalances must not be further aggravated. This last point is rather a statement of the obvious, but we must still not lose sight of it: we do not recall that it was raised at Reykyavik.

These prospects are of direct concern to Europe and its security. Europe, as the President of the French Republic observed, "remains divided between the security it has and the security it hopes for". In his memoirs of Europe before the First World War, written at a time when a conventional war was ravaging our continent for the second time, the Austrian writer, Stephan Zweig, noted that "now that the great storm has long since shattered it, we know that this world of security was only a dream. And yet our parents inhabited it as a house of peace."

Today, Europe sees its security assured in a very real way by nuclear deterrence. It cannot, therefore, consider any evolution in the opposite direction, which would make conventional and chemical war once again possible and no doubt probable one day, taking into account the assymetry in the forces involved, as well as geography. There is, then, no purely conventional deterrence which could ensure the security of our continent.

France is in favour of a return to a balance of conventional forces in Europe, if possible at a lower level. We also hope that the Soviet-American negotiations on strategic arms and intermediate-range missiles will reach a successful conclusion.

None the less we consider that, as the Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac, recalled, as long as we are confronted with the overarmament of the two super-Powers at the same time as the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe, our security will lie in nuclear deterrence. My country will therefore never accept that its nuclear forces should be included, directly or indirectly, in negotitions in which it does not intend to participate as long as the conditions it has set have not been met. France, through the voice of the President of the Republic, made known in September 1983 and June 1984 the conditions which would enable it to make its contribution to an effective and verifiable process of nuclear disarmament:

First, that the gap between the nuclear arsenals of the two Great Powers, on the one hand, and that of France, on the other, shall have changed in nature. Second, that the great imbalances existing in conventional arms shall have been corrected and the elimination of the chemical threat become a

reality. And third, that no new defensive system leading to a destabilization of the present foundations of deterrence and therefore of peace, shall have been brought into use.

The problem of third forces in the process of nuclear disarmament should be brought into proportion. The French strategic nuclear forces today represent less than 2 per cent of the comparable potential of the United States or the Soviet Union.

What then, finally, is the situation four months after the Reykjavik meeting? I would say that today there is a possibility and even a hope of managing to rebuild a disarmament and arms control policy on more realistic bases. To swap the aspiration of a denuclearized world for that of a world without ballistic weapons leads to a dead end.

The way, therefore, in which both Washington and Moscow return to a more accurate assessment of what is really possible and desirable in negotiations will determine what real progress can be made in the limitation of nuclear arms. This is true not only for 1987 but also for coming years.

The reason why I have talked at length about the "post-Reykjavik" prospects and nuclear disarmament negotiations is that I know how much attention is being given to these issues by delegations at the Conference. But the Conference equally has its own concerns and tasks, I mean nuclear testing, chemical weapons and space.

We are aware of the importance attached by most members of this Conference to a total nuclear-test ban. The later is in part the continuation of a concern which, in the 1960s, was more a matter of the environment than of disarmament. It also results from commitments made within the framework of disarmament agreements in which France did not wish to participate: on the one hand, the 1963 atmospheric test-ban Treaty, and on the other, what a French expert described as a "disarmament agreement of the unarmed countries", that is, the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

France does not consider today, any more than yesterday, that stopping tests is a pre-condition for progress towards nuclear disarmament. It maintains that, on the contrary, the stopping of tests could become significant at the end of a long-term process resulting in real and effective nuclear disarmament.

There is, therefore, an important difference with a number of countries represented here concerning the desirable sequence of disarmament measures. I think it is honest to recognize it, and that clarity in these matters is more useful than ambiguity.

Over and above these considerations of principle, there is the fact that France has not carried out one tenth of the nuclear explosions conducted by the two Big Powers. It does not carry out tests over the 150 kilotonne threshold, so often and so long discussed and today apparently so difficult to verify accurately. Finally, it sees no reason to agree to the planned obsolescence of its deterrent.

For all these reasons, we informed the Soviet Union that we had no objection to the moratorium it proposed and introduced, nor, however, did we see any advantage in it. We may note in any case that through Marshall Akhromeev on 25 August last, the Soviet Union recognized that nuclear tests did not have only negative effects. The Army Chief of Staff and Deputy Minister of Defence admitted that a high percentage of them served to test the reliability of existing arms. This observation has also been made by the American side. Now, in a world in which the number of nuclear warheads were reduced by half, the reliability of the existing weapons could only be yet more important. This is a problem that cannot be indefinitely ignored.

The work of this Conference with a view to elaborating an international convention on the prohibition of the manufacture of chemical weapons and the elimination of stocks is certainly one of the most delicate tasks to which it has addressed itself.

The effort made has enabled us to find some significant points of convergence on the shape and a number of important elements of the future convention. It remains true that as the work progresses the real difficulties come to light. This stems from the natural course of negotiations in such a complex field, but it also means that a number of choices have to be made.

First, do we want a convention which, like the one on biological weapons, simply postulates that chemical weapons should be banned, without really doing anything about the effectiveness of such a prohibition and its verification?

Or do we consider that these are weapons whose military effectiveness unfortunately has less and less to be demonstrated and which therefore are likely to become commonplace? Results achieved step by step, and limited not geographically (because the ease with which such arms can be transported would make such an approach utterly meaningless) but in terms of stockpiles, would surely already be a considerable achievement.

Secondly, do we want verification measures to be aimed at putting permanent pressure on any possible cheating, or are we prepared to settle for imperfect verification because nobody will ever know whether clandestine stocks have been reconstituted or hidden?

Third, what links should be established between the future convention and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning the use of chemical weapons?

Fourth, should we concentrate our efforts mainly on conventional chemical weapons, those which could be described as "bottom of the range" and accessible to most countries with industrial facilities? Or on the contrary, do we mean to give priority to the most modern chemical warfare agents or even prevent the appearances of future technologies in these areas? Is such an ambition even realistic?

These discussions underly the work of your Conference. They explain their complexity and therefore their inevitable slowness.

My country wishes to achieve results, even if they prove to be limited, in an initial stage, for example, to the progressive destruction of stocks and production facilities during a period to be determined.

This same stage-by-stage approach could be used with respect to the solution to be found for the problem of the lists of supertoxic agents. We know that it is difficult at this stage to identify the possibilities of military use of some of them which are already being used in civilian industry, for example in pharmaceutical products. It should be possible to ask the Consultative Committee envisaged by the convention to determine the régime during a later stage of the negotiations, or during the implementation of the convention. The French delegation will put forward proposals along these lines. Generally speaking, quite obviously, it will spare no effort to ensure that concrete results are achieved, including during this session.

Nevertheless, it is in the light of these uncertainties in the negotiations that France does not rule out the possibility of acquiring a limited and purely deterrent capability in this area. In accordance with the commitments assumed by France when signing the Geneva Protocol of 1925, this would only be used for retaliation and not for a first attack. In any case, the current negotiations, to which we continue to attach very high priority, could not constitute a moratorium for France, nor for that matter for any other country.

Everybody here knows that side by side with the discussions which this Conference is to pursue concerning measures to contribute to the prevention of the arms race in outer space, negotiations are going on on a bilateral basis in this same city between the Soviet Union and the United States. Our objective cannot be to give preference to one or other of these approaches, or to cause them to hinder one another.

It remains true that in the mid-1980s the international community included among its concerns the problems of the military use of space in the same way as in the mid-1950s it recognized that the problems of the nuclear age could not be a matter of indifference to it, even though the possession of nuclear weapons was at the time limited to two countries. In 1978, when proposing the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, and then in 1984, through the proposals it put before this Conference, France emphasized that these problems could not be excluded from the multilateral debate.

We naturally attach the greatest importance to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It remains true, as your work has clearly shown, that the present régime seems inadequate, particularly with respect to the immunity of satellites of third parties. France will submit, within the framework of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, proposals which take account of the difficulty of formulating a régime based solely on the definition of an anti-satellite weapon.

In fact there is no single way of destroying satellites, and it would therefore not be realistic to found an international régime on the prohibition of ASAT systems, which could only be incomplete. What does seem to be a matter of priority is to implement the fundamental principles of the present

space régime, that is, its utilization under conditions of equality, non-discrimination among States, and non-appropriation of space. If such an approach is adopted, a number of specific measures can be considered concerning the registration and notification of space objects, as well as the multilateral code of conduct applicable to space activities.

At the institutional level, the idea of entrusting responsibility for seeing to the application of transparency measures and the code of conduct for space activities to the International Satellite Monitoring Agency might be considered.

All too often in the field of disarmament we have to admit, at the risk of causing disappointment or being misunderstood, that nothing will ever be as easy, completely satisfactory or rapid as we might hope. In the complicated and changing world which we have irreversibly entered for more than half a century, the threat has become more diverse. Paradoxically, the most modern weapons are also those which will apparently be the least used. How then can we be suprised when reason falters in the face of suspicion?

France wishes to contribute to disarmament, but like any other State it considers that the negotiations should first serve the security of each and every one. If, furthermore, disarmament can contribute to the enterprise of development, France would naturally be the first to be delighted. It is from this point of view that we consider that the United Nations meeting on the relationship between disarmament and development, which it proposed in 1983 and which is to take place in New York this summer, is extremely important.

We all know how far arms control represents a necessary effort to ensure foreseeability and stability in an international environment whose technological evolution constantly challenges its structures.

The nightmare of seeing progress in arms overtaking negotiations, which sums up the arms control dilemma, is nothing new. In the field of nuclear weapons in particular, for almost 20 years the negotiators, like the young Tancredo in "The Leopard", would like to agree "that everything should change only if, afterwards, everything remains the same as before". It is inevitable, in this context, that public opinion should be concerned more with wars that are going to change, rather than the wars which are going on. And yet we know very well that if it is weapons that kill, it is men that start the conflicts. Modern arms are not the first cause of tensions; they are the result of older antagonisms, of longstanding conflicts of interests, which patient diplomacy must reconcile.

A disarmament and arms control policy that only deals with the consequences and not the causes of tension and the absence of confidence among nations cannot lead to lasting results, that is, to the security to which each of our nations aspires. Nothing is more difficult, we know full well; and therefore nothing is more worthy of our efforts.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade President, we welcome you wholeheartedly to the chair of the Conference on Disarmament during this opening month of our present session. Your great socialist country has contributed a lot to the work of this Conference since it joined it in 1978. Your wise presidency is another specific contribution of China to the Conference on Disarmament at a time when we are all trying to invigorate its work, to effectively meet the requirements addressed to this multilateral negotiating body. My delegation pledges you full support in the remaining part of your presidency. Let me also thank Ambassador Beesley of Canada for the able guidance he offered to us in the concluding part of last year's session. It is with pleasure that I welcome the new representatives to this Conference — Ambassador Nazarkine of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Yamada of Japan and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia.

Let me also express once again the deepest sympathy of my delegation to the delegation of the United States and to the family of Ambassador Lowitz with whom we had excellent working and social relations. At the same time I would like to welcome in our midst the Deputy Head of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Hansen, as Acting Head of the United States delegation.

(spoke in French)

We listened most attentively to the statement of the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Raimond. His presence here at our session is evidence that his country considers the work of the Conference to be highly important. We were also able to note France's keen interest in the problems of international security during the recent visit to Paris of our Foreign Minister, Bohuslav Chhoupek. That visit was considered most useful by the authorities in Prague, as it contributed not only to Franco-Czech relations but also to highlighting the need for greater European co-operation as launched 12 years ago in Helsinki.

(continued in English)

Throughout the history of mankind, nations and groups of nations have always had to fight for their security. Peace, when it came here and there, was usually at the price of a hard and bloody struggle. This is true not only of distant but also of quite recent history of Europe, and it is not yet past history in many regions of the world today. In the process, means of war improved constantly until personal arms were replaced by automatic machines for annihilation and the present weapons of mass destruction. Peace and security cannot be won by these weapons, since their destructive nature prevents them from being used rationally, even from a purely military and technical viewpoint. Peace and security today have to be built otherwise.

It is one of the far-reaching political conclusions of our times that international peace and security have to be put on a wider and more stable basis than in the past. This basis cannot be established other than by all States which want to build their relations with neighbours and other countries not on force but through peaceful co-operation in conditions of firm

international security. That is what the sponsors of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/92 on the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security had in mind in advancing their initiative.

The cessation of the nuclear-arms race and measures of real disarmament will have to constitute the backbone of such a comprehensive system.

Nuclear disarmament is of highest priority in this regard. The treatment nuclear weapons deserve was very accurately described by Mikhail Gorbachev when he spoke on Monday to the participants in the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World and for the Survival of Humanity in Moscow. I quote from his statement: "We rejected any right for the leaders of a country, be it the USSR, the United States or any other, to pass a death sentence on mankind. We are not judges, and the billions of people are not criminals to be punished. So the nuclear guillotine must be broken."

We followed with great attention the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik last October. Even if some political "experts" subsequently described the meeting as a failure, we did not share that view. On the contrary, we witnessed, for the first time, a direct attempt to break the "nuclear guillotine". Even if that was not possible on that occasion, and I will not discuss the reasons for it, the meeting in that calm, northern island has left a permanent mark and the nuclear arsenals will never again seem as untouchable as they still seemed to be in the recent past.

Our Conference is a highly representative body, with all nuclear countries taking part in its work. It should therefore, also contribute to the solving of a number of issues related to nuclear disarmament which are very clearly inscribed on its agenda. We reject the notion that the Conference should address only some of its agenda items while others should be left to bilateral or some other limited fora. This applies especially to the first three items, which deserve our permanent attention.

Whether some like it or not, the NTB has been not only at the top of our agenda but also at the centre of international attention for quite some time.

One of the two major nuclear Powers gave us, during the previous almost 19 months, convincing proof of its readiness to stop nuclear testing. The Soviet Union did all in its power to continue its moratorium, and if it was interrupted that was done by the United States, by carrying out its nuclear explosion on 3 February.

In our understanding, its willingness to refrain from nuclear testing shows not only that the Soviet Union is ready to achieve a nuclear-test ban but also that it is prepared effectively to address nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Such a concrete step as the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing is much more convincing proof of good political will than loud peaceful rhetoric and declarations of good intentions.

We fully associate ourselves with those who call for the establishment of a working body for the NTB. There is a lot to be done in this area, including on verification. In our opinion, active and purpose-oriented work of such an organ could clearly demonstrate the following.

First, the achievement of the NTB is an urgent measure which could substantially contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and create an atmosphere conductive to successful negotiations on measures of nuclear disarmament.

Second, the overwhelming majority of States are in favour of the cessation of nuclear testing and realize that the universal test ban would correspond to their vital security interests.

Third, there are all necessary ingredients for an effective NTB to be negotiated, including its verification machinery.

Fourth, there is a need to consider, in a businesslike manner and in one forum, numerous proposals concerning the scope and nature of the NTB, possible partial measures, various approaches towards verification, including individual offers of States or groups of States, so as to combine them into one system, ensuring, in the most effective way, full compliance with the test ban.

Fifth, the Ad Hoc Committee on the NTB could also constitute a necessary bridge between the useful work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts and the actual state of efforts aimed at the achievement of the NTB. That link would be useful, inter alia, for putting the results of the planned test of level II seismic data transmission next year into a proper perspective.

Fruitful work by the NTB Ad Hoc Committee can also give us the necessary specific criteria for consideration of the utility of establishing a permanent international system for the exchange of seismic data.

Thus, we see a number of valid arguments in favour of the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the NTB. My delegation would be ready to participate in its proceedings actively and to display the necessary flexibility so that the Conference can, finally, undertake some specific steps towards the nuclear-test ban.

It is our hope that the Ad Hoc Committee for the prevention of an arms race in outer space is going to be re-established shortly. The Conference should not close its eyes to the danger of outer space being completely militarized. The Committee's mandate should reflect the objective necessity to establish quite clearly, and in a more conclusive form, the impact of the present legal régime for outer space and to define what additional measures are needed. At the same time we do not consider that a mandate, thus conceived, should prevent us from an exchange of views on specific proposals which already have been, or might be proposed in the coming months. In this respect we were attracted by the statement of the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, containing, inter alia, the proposal to establish an international inspectorate to verify that arms are not being

placed on objects launched into outer space. This is a new, far-reaching and radical measure which could, in our opinion, represent a solid barrier against the direct militarization of outer space.

There is no need to stress further the urgency of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space since it is sufficiently displayed in the course of the present debate in the United States on the deployment of a first phase of the SDI. It seems that supporters of this allegedly defensive programme are becoming somewhat impatient. They see important changes in the world and finally realize that even the nuclear threat, on which they calculated heavily in their "mission to save the world", as they say might not be here indefinitely. For this reason it is necessary to launch the practical implementation of the SDI, to invest huge financial resources as soon as possible, to make the SDI irreversible. If they succeed, they will assure huge profits for the American military-industrial complex for many years to come. But what is more important, the SDI will become a limitless laboratory for the transition from "dirty" and indiscriminate nuclear weapons to equally efficient, but more "handy" and "practical" weapons based on directed energy. Space is considered wide enough to absorb the effects of nuclear explosions, which are difficult to control on Earth. Certainly, the chosen objects on Earth will be spared the long agony of nuclear destruction. Instead, they will be blown away in a clean, fast and "civilized" manner.

Anyone who is sufficiently acquainted with the provisions of the ABM Treaty and its spirit cannot take seriously any talk of its "broad interpretation". The only real meaning of such an interpretation is that the ABM Treaty is an obstacle to the SDI and will have to be forgotten. And that will be the first real step opening the way to complete militarization of outer space.

Our delegation welcomes the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has promptly been re-established under the able guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. This early commencement, as well as a new, purpose-oriented approach, gives us a guarantee that the Conference will try to use its potential fully and that everything will be done so that the CW convention is finalized already this year. Nothing can prevent us from solving the remaining political and technical aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons providing there is the political will to do so. Just two days ago the Conference witnessed another good example of the required constructive approach when the Head of the USSR delegation, Ambassador Nazarkine, spoke on the problem of location of chemical weapons stocks, on the question of destruction versus diversion, and some aspects of verification on challenge. We consider that all the proposals advanced reveal genuine interest in speeding up our work on the CW convention and should be approached seriously. Any hasty conclusions, especially if they are rather beside the point, are somewhat out of place. We would like to hope that the suggestions made by Ambassador Nazarkine will be discussed thoroughly on an appropriate working level.

We follow attentively the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the problem of non-production of chemical weapons and on challenge verification. During the brief sessions in autumn of last year and in January we noticed that divergencies in the positions of various countries were being gradually

reduced. It is a delicate process which should be further pursued in a calm, businesslike manner. We are confident that by the end of this year's session the remaining differences will have been narrowed down sufficiently in order to permit us to formulate what, for the purposes of the convention, could be considered as essentially common positions also on articles VI and IX.

The CW convention is, unfortunately, not yet definitely agreed upon. But it is clear that its basic outline has already evolved and one may already have quite an accurate idea of the basic provisions of its individual articles. Verification will be extensive, covering a large number of activities right from the entry into force of the convention, through the destruction of CW stocks and facilities for their production, as well as with a view to permanent assurance that the convention is fully complied with in the future. Such a wide verification system is a sort of acknowledgement that the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons is an ambitious and difficult task. We consider that it would be fully in compliance with this ambition to try to cover the whole road which substances have to travel before they become chemical weapons. Everyone would apparently agree that the first step to create a toxic substance is a synthesis. The only places where this may happen are laboratories. Let us recall that such first category substances as tabun, sarin or soman were also the results of laboratory research. We therefore support the idea that this first step in the creation of chemical weapons should be recognized and dealt with by the convention. It would be futile to try to control regularly all existing laboratories, but it would be a grave mistake to ignore that new supertoxic lethal chemicals of category I may permanently be synthesized in the laboratories, whether deliberately or by coincidence. The number of relevant laboratories is relatively limited in each country and their declaration, with a possibility of inspection on challenge, should not represent an extraordinarily heavy burden. Smooth application of such procedures could create the necessary confidence and would represent a kind of introduction to the effective verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical industry.

The comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been on our agenda since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. During the period of almost 10 years a lot of provisions for the Programme have been agreed upon. There are now just a couple of items that remain open but they, somehow, seem beyond our reach.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the CPD has already resumed its work under the continued, dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. We are confident that he will do all in his power to finalize the draft Programme soon, in accordance with the decision of the United Nations General Assembly and we will offer him our most active co-operation. But the key to the CPD is in the hands of those who fail to display a minimum of flexibility with respect to a number of priority items, among which the NTB is an outstanding issue.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to the country that the President represents.

(The President)

That completes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? That does not appear to be the case.

I now intend to suspend briefly the plenary meeting and to convene, as announced last Tuesday, an informal meeting of the Conference to deal with a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. Once we have considered that request, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize any decision reached at the informal meeting, as well as to adopt the timetable for the activities of the Conference during the coming week. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.35 a.m. and resumed at 11.36 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 390th plenary of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I wish to put before the Conference for decision document CD/WP.267, dealing with a request from Senegal to participate in the work of the Conference. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I should like now to make an announcement: The Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will hold open-ended consultations on the next session of the Commission in Conference Room III on Friday, 27 February, at 3 p.m. Those consultations will be held with full services. As there is no other business to consider, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 24 February, at 10 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

