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ЗАПИСКА ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЯ СОВЕТА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

Прилагаемое письмо Постоянного наблюдателя Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики при Организации Объединенных Наций от 17 сентября 1984 года было направлено на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности. В соответствии с содержащейся в нем просьбой натеящее письмо распространяется в качестве документа Совета Безопасности.

Приложение IПисьмо Постоянного наблюдателя Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики при Организации Объединенных Наций от 17 сентября 1984 года на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности

Имею честь сослаться на письмо заместителя Представителя Соединенных Штатов Америки при Организации Объединенных Наций на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности (S/16694) и приложенные к его письму так называемый "доклад командования Организации Объединенных Наций" в Южной Корее и добавление к нему.

Прежде всего я считаю необходимым обратить внимание Совета Безопасности и всех государств-членов Организации Объединенных Наций на тот факт, что Соединенные Штаты злоупотребляют именем Организации Объединенных Наций в пользу своей агрессивной политики.

На самом деле не существует каких-либо "вооруженных сил Организации Объединенных Наций" или "командования Организации Объединенных Наций" в Южной Корее. Организация Объединенных Наций не оплачивает расходы так называемых "вооруженных сил Организации Объединенных Наций" в Южной Корее, не назначала их командования и не давала ему никаких инструкций.

Короче говоря, Организация Объединенных Наций не имеет никакого отношения к "вооруженным силам Организации Объединенных Наций" в Южной Корее.

Кроме армии Соединенных Штатов, инструктируемой Пентагоном, нет в Южной Корее никаких других иностранных войск.

"Командование Организации Объединенных Наций" в Южной Корее - это не что иное, как командование Соединенных Штатов. Поэтому так называемые ежегодные "доклады командования Организации Объединенных Наций", представляемые Соединенными Штатами в Организации Объединенных Наций, являются пропагандистскими документами, которые изобилуют искажениями и выдумками в целях скрыть свою политику колониальной войны в Южной Корее.

Большая часть "доклада командования Организации Объединенных Наций" за этот год отведена искаженному и тенденциозному объяснению инцидента со взрывом бомбы, который произошел в Рангуне (Бирма) - за тысячи миль от Кореи - и который не имеет никакого отношения к "командованию Организации Объединенных Наций". Это означает, что "доклад" сам по себе красноречиво разоблачает, что "командование Организации Объединенных Наций" является не чем иным, кроме как пропагандистской уловкой Соединенных Штатов.

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Что касается инцидента со взрывом бомбы в Рангуне, то это драматическое событие было инсценировано южнокорейским правителем Чон Ду Хваном с целью найти выход из политического и экономического кризиса.

Что касается подлинной стороны инцидента со взрывом бомбы в Рангуне, то я прилагаю к моему письму меморандум министерства иностранных дел Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики от 12 декабря 1983 года.

Осквернение имени Организации Объединенных Наций Соединенными Штатами является вопиющим нарушением Устава Организации Объединенных Наций и запятнанием чести ее государств-членов.

Все так называемые "инциденты", перечисленные Соединенными Штатами в "докладе командования Организации Объединенных Наций", изобилуют искажениями и выдумками.

Не кто-то другой, а именно Соединенные Штаты и южнокорейские власти осложняют напряженность и усиливают опасность войны в Корее.

Соединенные Штаты разместили в Южной Корее различные виды оружия массового уничтожения, включая ядерное оружие и средства его доставки, в вопиющее нарушение Соглашения о военном перемирии в Корее.

Соединенные Штаты уже разместили в Южной Корее более 1 000 единиц ядерного оружия, взрывная сила которых достигает 13 000 килотонн. Южная Корея, в которой на 100 кв. км приходится более одной единицы ядерного оружия, вышла по ядерной плотности на одно из первых мест в мире.

Различные типы ядерных ракет размещены в районах Донгпучхона, Чхунчхона и Пхентхэка, ядерные истребители-бомбардировщики базируются в аэропортах Осан и Кунсан и ядерное оборудование всех видов хранится в Кванчжу, Южная Корея.

Соединенные Штаты постоянно держат свои атомные подводные лодки и атомные авианосцы в восточных и южных районах Корейского моря, а порт Чинхэ на юге Кореи превращается в базу атомных подлодок и авианосцев.

Соединенные Штаты пытаются также разместить в Южной Корее ракеты среднего радиуса действия "Першинг-2", крылатые ракеты и стратегические бомбардировщики В-52.

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Соединенные Штаты установили ядерные мины в демилитаризованной зоне (ДМЗ) к югу от военно-демаркационной линии (MDL) и доставили в Южную Корею 72 истребителя-бомбардировщика F-16, 24 самолета непосредственной воздушной поддержки A-10 и вертолета AH-1 "Кобра" и 100 вертолетов "Блэк Хок" и планируют дополнительно поставить более 180 разновидностей вооружений нового типа, включая усовершенствованную модель ракет "TOW", в течение двух или трех последующих лет.

Соединенные Штаты, действуя в соответствии с секретным планом размещения нейтронного оружия в Южной Корее, преобразовали батальон 105-мм гаубиц в батальон 155-мм гаубиц, способный использовать нейтронные снаряды.

Предполагалось, что нейтронные бомбы - самое жестокое смертоносное оружие - будут размещены в Южной Корее еще несколько лет назад, однако в настоящее время 56 нейтронных бомб уже доставлены в Южную Корею.

Доставка большого количества таких самых современных вооружений, как средства ядерной атаки, в Южную Корею является не только вопиющим нарушением пункта 13 Соглашения о военном перемирии в Корее, которое предусматривает "прекращение ввоза в Корею подкреплений в виде боевых самолетов, бронированных автомашин, оружия и боеприпасов", но и актом, усиливающим опасность войны на Корейском полуострове.

Превратив Южную Корею в ядерный форпост, Соединенные Штаты и Южная Корея прибегают теперь к всяческим уловкам, с тем чтобы осуществить свой план ядерной войны.

Военные маневры "Тим спирт", которые проводятся ежегодно начиная с 1976 года, расширяются по масштабам полувоенных действий, способных привести к войне за рамками военных маневров.

В маневрах "Тим спирт-83" были задействованы атомные военные корабли, стратегические бомбардировщики с ядерным вооружением и истребители-бомбардировщики. В частности, в маневрах участвовало оперативное соединение VII флота Соединенных Штатов Америки, имевшее более 200 единиц ядерного оружия, включая атомные бомбы, атомные ракеты и глубинные атомные бомбы.

Совместные военные учения "Тим спирт-84", проходившие с 1 февраля до середины апреля текущего года, явились крупнейшими из всех ежегодных маневров, поскольку в них участвовали 60 000 военнослужащих Соединенных Штатов и более 147 500 южнокорейских военнослужащих и использовались новейшие боевые средства и техническое

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оборудование. В этих военных маневрах были задействованы штабы нескольких армейских корпусов и дивизий, мотострелковые и воздушно-десантные бригады, боевая группа транспортных самолетов, десантное механизированное подразделение, две боевых десантных группы, подразделение морской тактической группы, состоящее из боевых подразделений морской пехоты из состава VII флота Соединенных Штатов, и другие подразделения, находящиеся в подчинении генерального штаба вооруженных сил Соединенных Штатов и дислоцированные на континентальной части Соединенных Штатов, Гавайских островах и за рубежом. В маневрах были также задействованы многие боевые самолеты, способные нести на борту ядерное оружие, включая стратегические бомбардировщики B-52, истребители-бомбардировщики F-16 и F-15, а также ракеты и современное военное оборудование.

Совместные военные маневры "Тим спирит-84" целиком были маневрами ядерной войны, предназначенными для усовершенствования оперативной деятельности для "упреждающего ядерного удара" по Корейской Народно-Демократической Республике.

Соединенные Штаты и Южная Корея непрерывно осуществляют опасные вооруженные провокации против Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики на море, в воздухе и на суше.

За период с января по декабрь 1983 года Соединенные Штаты совершили 130 отдельных актов шпионажа, используя для вторжения в территориальное воздушное пространство Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики самолеты-разведчики SR-71, летающие на высокой скорости и большой высоте.

13 октября 1983 года вооруженная группа южнокорейских военнослужащих, оснащенная тяжелым оружием, проникла на нашу территорию возле отметки № 0880 к востоку от военно-демаркационной линии и произвела более 500 выстрелов через демаркационную линию в направлении пограничного поста на нашей стороне, а 22 октября 1983 года военнослужащие южнокорейской армии произвели более 400 выстрелов из автоматического оружия в направлении нашего поста возле отметки № 0352 военно-демаркационной линии.

В 17 ч. 00 м. 21 июля 1984 года южнокорейская армия осуществила вооруженную провокацию, обстреляв наш пограничный пост из точки, находящейся на расстоянии 550 метров к юго-востоку от отметки № 0403 военно-демаркационной линии.

Ранним утром 13 августа 1983 года южнокорейская армия потопила наше мирное рыболовецкое судно "Пунгсан", которое вело поиск рыбы в открытом море в 170 милях к востоку от острова Уллындо и

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110 милях к западу от префектуры Исикава (Япония). В результате обстрела и бомбардировки, в которых участвовали эскадренный миноносец и вертолет, пять членов экипажа были убиты.

За период с 1 января по 31 декабря 1983 года со стороны Соединенных Штатов Америки и Южной Кореи было совершено более 22 704 нарушений Соглашения о военном перемирии в Корее, а за период с 1 января по 30 июня 1984 года количество таких нарушений достигло 11 031.

10 января 1984 года правительство Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики предложило провести трехсторонние переговоры между Корейской Народно-Демократической Республикой, Соединенными Штатами и Южной Кореей, с тем чтобы ослабить напряженность и обеспечить прочный мир на Корейском полуострове.

Это предложение является крайне важной инициативой, открывающей путь к мирному решению корейского вопроса.

В настоящее время трехсторонние переговоры являются наиболее приемлемой формулой для переговоров по мирному решению корейской проблемы.

Правительство Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики предложило обсудить на трехсторонних переговорах такие проблемы, как заключение мирного договора, который заменил бы Соглашение о военном перемирии в Корее, заключенное между Корейской Народно-Демократической Республикой и Соединенными Штатами Америки, вывод вооруженных сил Соединенных Штатов из Южной Кореи и принятие декларации о ненападении между Севером и Югом.

Если Соединенные Штаты не имеют намерения оккупировать Корейскую Народно-Демократическую Республику и хотят мира в Корее, то у них нет причин не принять наше предложение о трехсторонних переговорах.

Прошу распространить настоящее письмо и прилагаемый к нему меморандум министерства иностранных дел Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики в качестве документа Совета Безопасности.

ХАН Си Хе
Посол

Постоянный наблюдатель Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики при Организации Объединенных Наций

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Annex II

Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea dated 12 December 1983

The Burmese authorities staged from November 22 to December 9 a "trial" of the "suspects" of the case of Rangoon explosion which occurred on October 9.

The "trial" was held at the officers hall of the three services of the army on the outskirts of Rangoon under a strict guard, surrounded doubly and trebly by a large force of armed troops, Burmese fighter planes circling overhead.

At the "trial," according to a report, the Burmese police authorities, to begin with, read an "indictment" against the "suspects" and their "statements", which was followed by "questioning" of "witnesses" of the prosecution side.

Diplomats of some countries in Rangoon and home and foreign correspondents were reportedly present at the "court".

The Burmese authorities tried to give a semblance of legality to the "trial". But, it was clear from the beginning that it was a unilateral and unfair one.

The script of the trial had been prepared beforehand and the questions and answers were based on prearranged texts.

The whole course of the "trial", either by law or by fact, could never prove that the "suspects" were "operatives" sent by our Republic, as desired by the Burmese authorities.

The "trial" was a big burlesque crowded with doubts and riddles, shrouded in a fog and inconsistency.

Let us now dig up the shady background of the dubious "trial" of the case of Rangoon explosion on the basis of the objective facts available.

1. "Trial" Crowded with Doubts and Contradictions

The "trial" of the Rangoon explosion case staged by the Burmese authorities left behind a host of doubts from the first step.

The first point in question is what degree of impartiality and authenticity the "indictment" and "protocol of statements" published by the Burmese authorities could have.

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The Burmese authorities conducted jointly with the south Korean puppets the investigation to probe into the truth of the Rangoon explosion.

We may quote the following reports in this connection:

"No sooner had the incident broke out on October 9 than the authorities hurriedly dispatched to Burma a special investigation group headed by the Sports Minister".
(south Korean "Radio No. 1", October 9, 1983)

"Arriving in Burma, the Sports Minister demanded of the Burmese government through her Foreign Minister on October 10 a joint investigation by the investigation groups of the two countries to probe into the truth of the assassination explosion in Burma".
(south Korean "Radio Munhwa", October 11, 1983)

"The investigation group had a consultation with chiefs of competent organs of the Burmese side including the Intelligence Department Chief of the Burmese army in the office of the Aung San National Mausoleum and reached an agreement on the establishment of a joint investigation headquarters of the two countries for a quick and correct investigation" and "there the Burmese side promised active cooperation in the investigation activities."
(south Korean "Radio Munhwa", October 11, 1983)

Upon returning from Burma on October 13, the puppet Sports Minister said at a press conference held at Kimpo airport that "in investigating the bomb blast for assassination in Burma the Burmese government is active in close cooperation with our technical group for a probe into its truth" and declared that "in clarifying the incident it conducts wide-range and close cooperation not only in investigation but also in many other aspects".
(south Korean "Radio Munhwa", October 14, 1983)

The United States, too, under the cloak of "technical support to investigation in Rangoon" sent to the spot a "special team in charge of it" consisting of U.S. State Department officials with agents of U.S. CIA as its nucleus.
(south Korean "Radio No. 1", October 10, 1983)

The world knows that no sooner had the bomb blasted in Rangoon than the south Korean puppets advertised it as a "work of north Korea" without any ground and kicked up a frenzied row in an attempt to shift the responsibility for it on to us, and their American master zealously encouraged them.

Since the Burmese authorities started a "joint investigation" with them, it was as clear as noonday what results would be faked up.

The second point in question is on what ground the Burmese authorities concluded that the "suspects" were "terrorists sent by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".

It has been reported that the "suspects" were not in a condition to be interrogated and tried in a normal state.

According to Japanese "Asahi Shimbun", both of the "suspects" seemed to have difficulty in moving only a few days before the 'trial'. One could scarcely make voice and the other lay with his intestines exposed, awaiting medical treatment. A worsening symptom from the second infection was noticed". (Japanese "Asahi Shimbun", November 9, 1983)

When the "suspects" were brought to the "court", one was "minus his left hand" and the other "looked formidable, his right hand missing and eyes blinded, and he had difficulty in walking".
(south Korean "Radio No. 1", November 23, 1983)

Those who witnessed the "trials" said in unison that it was dubious if the "suspects" would clearly understand what was going on about them.

It is strange why the Burmese authorities brought the "suspects" so hurriedly to the court and staged the "trial" when they were in such a deplorable state. This is quite out of common sense.

It was disclosed in the course of the "trial" that one of the two "suspects" presented by the Burmese authorities had not made any "confession" to the last.

A foreign news agency reported as regards this:

"The leader of the commando team on trial for a terrorist bombing attack has made no confession after more than one month and a half in the custody of the Burmese authorities, said the court sources on November 28".
(AP, Rangoon November 28, 1983)

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According to a report, this "suspect" "refused to admit his being guilty" even at the last "hearing".
(Japanese Radio NHK, December 7, 1983)

It is also very questionable how the words of the "suspect" who allegedly "confessed" that he came "from north Korea" were cooked up.

This "suspect" said he came "from Seoul, south Korea", on October 25 when he was interrogated in his hospital bed by the south Korean puppet special envoy to Burma in the presence of the ambassadors of third countries and officials concerned of the Burmese government.

Upset by this, the south Korean puppets declared that "the criminals talk nonsense" in "mental derangement" and "what he said is incredible".
(south Korean "Radio No. 1", October 25, 1983)

They said the "suspect" "had been repeating an unauthentic statement, talking jargon in the course of investigation till October 30".
(south Korean "Radio No. 1", October 30, 1983)

It was officially reported that on November 3, a few days after that, the "suspect" who had been "in mental derangement", "confessed" that he was an "operative" sent by our Republic.

We are, of course, in the dark as to what method of fabrication was applied to this "suspect" in the course of investigation, the man who had been reportedly "in mental derangement" with heavy wounds.

But, what is surprising and strange above all here is that, on the day following his "confession", the Burmese authorities held an "emergency Cabinet meeting", as if they had been waiting for it, and hastily took a step of severing diplomatic relations with our Republic and ordering our Embassy to leave Burma, without taking off time to make a scientific confirmation of the truth of his confession.

Why did the Burmese authorities not recognize the repeated and stubborn declaration of the "suspect" that he "came from Seoul, south Korea", but continued the coercive interrogation and why did they so hastily take the extreme step against our Republic as soon as they wrested from him the words he "came from north Korea"?

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Truth to tell, it is a common view in any country that the "confession" of a "suspect" alone without material evidence cannot be a ground for declaring anyone guilty.

The whole course of the "trial" vividly showed that there was no ground whatever to support the allegation of the Burmese side that the "suspects" are "operatives" sent by our Republic.

Not without reason, therefore, even the lawyers engaged by the Burmese side at the "court" declared that "the case must be dismissed because it has been faked up entirely on the basis of the confession of a 'suspect'" and "it is devoid of material evidence".

The third point in question is why are the "indictment", the "protocol of statements" of the "suspects" and the "testimonies" of the "witnesses" published by the Burmese authorities inconsistent and full of contradictions.

According to the so-called "protocol of statements" made public by the Burmese authorities on the second day of the "trial", the "suspects" "went aboard a north Korean boat in Ongjin on the west coast of north Korea on September 9 and arrived in Rangoon on September 22 or 23".
(AP, Rangoon, November 23, 1983)

But , on the third day of the "trial" on November 24, "the Director of the Burma State Harbour Corporation" who testified in defence of the Burmese authorities' "assertion" said that "the three suspects infiltrated into Rangoon port in the guise of crewmen of the ship 'Tonggon' which left Nampo port" and "the ship 'Tonggon' entered the Soledochi harbour No.6 of Rangoon port at 4 on the afternoon of September 17 and began unloading on September 18".
(south Korean "Radio No.1", November 24, 1983)

The "protocol of statements" says that the "suspects" left Ongjin on board an unidentified "north Korean boat" and "arrived in Rangoon on September 22 or 23", whereas the "testimony" of the Burmese side's "witness" claims that the ship in question is "Tonggon" which left Nampo port and entered Rangoon port on "September 17". Why?

This difference tells that the far-fetched fabrication cannot but be inconsistent from the beginning.

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Next, the "protocol of statements" says that "the 'suspects', after their arrival in Rangoon port were met by an official of the north Korean Embassy in Burma and had hid themselves in the house of a Counsellor of the Embassy".
(Japanese "Asahi Shimbun", November 24, 1983)

Giving a more detailed account of this question, a police officer of Rangoon harbour who appeared as a "witness" of the Burmese side said that "the 'suspects' in the guise of crewmen of the 'tonggon' anchored at Rangoon port got landing permit from the Burmese government and landed in Rangoon port with the confirmation of the harbour police."
(south Korean "Radio No. 2", November 24, 1983)

It follows from the words of the Burmese side that the "suspects" did not illegally infiltrate into Rangoon, but landed there lawfully. If it were true, there arises another big question.

How could the seamen who landed with a temporary permit stay in Rangoon, not returning until the ship left ?

And, if the crewmen who had made a temporary landing were not back, how could the ship "Tonggon" leave Rangoon port?

According to the "testimony" of the Director of the Burma State Harbour Corporation, "the master of the 'Tonggon' applied for the permit for departure after unloading was finished on September 21 and stayed three more days and got the permit on September 24 and left on schedule".
(south Korean "Radio No. 1", November 24, 1983)

That the Burmese authorities permitted the "Tonggon" to leave means that the ship had all legal conditions for departure. Had the seamen who had made a temporary landing did not return, why did the Burmese authorities issue the permit for departure to the ship?

Was it out of "kindness"? No!

A Japanese magazine wrote that "Burma pursues a stringent policy of seclusion and restricts the entry of foreign ships into Rangoon port and is so strict as to hardly allow temporary landing of seamen, to say nothing of transit".
(Japanese magazine "Mr. Dandy").

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We are told that the "Tonggon" left Rangoon port legally without any hindrance under such strict watch of the Burmese authorities. This means that it is a groundless lie to claim that it left Rangoon port, leaving in Rangoon the seamen who had made a temporary landing.

Even if we presume that it was true, the assertion of the Burmese authorities does not hold water.

How could those men who made a temporary landing after legal registration by the Burmese authorities remain two weeks there, not returning to the ship, and commit such terrible bomb blast in broad daylight?

This means that the crime was committed with the clue disclosed beforehand. No one but fool would conceive such a thing even in fantasy.

The fourth point in question is that the Burmese authorities, though there were ample opportunities of identifying the "criminals" impartially, gave them up of their own accord.

According to the "protocol of statements", the "suspects" who had intruded into Rangoon "were in hiding at the house of a Councillor of the north Korean Embassy in Tangu Street, Rangoon, till October 6".

But this either is utterly impossible.

The Japanese "Tokyo Shimbun" reported that "from about two months before Chon Du Hwan came, north Koreans were closely shadowed by Burmese secret police" and, accordingly, "it was impossible for the north Korean embassy to plot such incident". (Japanese "Tokyo Shimbun", November 5, 1983)

The south Korean puppets themselves confessed:

"The north Korean Embassy does not seem to have been involved in this incident. Because the Burmese government sharply watched the moves of its staffers from one month before Chon Du Hwan's Burma visit and so the operatives could not act freely". (south Korean "Radio No. 1", October 12, 1983)

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If it were true that the "suspects" were in hiding at the house of a counsellor of our Embassy, as the Burmese authorities claimed, they had an ample opportunity of squarely and lawfully confirming this fact vis-a-vis our Embassy.

But the Burmese authorities began with expelling our Embassy, without the slightest intention to do that.

Since the Burmese authorities took issue with us, it should have given us an opportunity of clarifying our stand, in view of international law and international usage.

According to a report, the Burmese judicial authorities on November 25, prior to the fourth trial, took the "suspect" who had "confessed" to the "house of the Councillor of the north Korean Embassy, the local spot of operation, for a spot inspection" and the "suspect" "made a detailed statement about the food they had been served in the house".
(south Korean "Radio No. 1", November 28, 1983)

Of course, we do not know if the Burmese authorities really took the "suspect" to the Counsellor's for "a spot inspection".

But, even if that were true, we wonder why they had not made that "inspection" when our Embassy officials were on the spot, but raised a row of "inspection" and "confirmation" in the empty house after they were expelled.

Only if they had taken the "suspect" there when our Embassy staffers were assembled and let him point at the "Councillor" in question, everything would have been made clear then and there.

It is a very elementary procedure in the investigation into a criminal case to arrange such tripartite meeting.

But the Burmese authorities expelled our diplomats first of all without so much as such elementary procedure.

This arouses our deep doubt as to their real intention.

Perhaps, they did not venture this, because they feared that if they made the three meet, the "suspect" would be unable to recognize the "Councillor" in question and then it would seriously damage their fabrication of the incident.

The fifth point in question is their declaration that the National Mausoleum, the spot of explosion, had been left unguarded till the eve of the function.

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According to the "protocol of statements", the "suspects" "climbed the roof of the Aung San Mausoleum and planted the bomb on its ceiling at ten on the night of October 7". And, in the meantime, the mausoleum was left unguarded and the only guardsman was asleep in the sentry box".
(Japanese "Yomiuri Shimbun", November 24, 1983)

"Asahi Shimbun" reported that "Rangoon which had been always on a strict alert was put under an uncommon guard" on the threshold of Chon Du Hwan's trip.
(Japanese "Asahi Shimbun", October 10, 1983)

According to another Japanese magazine, nearly 200 south Korean puppet guardsmen had been posted, in fact, at the Burmese National Mausoleum from about 10 days before the function.
(Japanese magazine "Tsukuru")

The claim that the National Mausoleum "was in a defenceless state without any guard" on the eve of the function is a lie that can convince no one.

If it were "in a defenceless state", what were the hundreds of south Korean puppet guardsmen doing in Rangoon?

If it were true that the Burmese authorities themselves left the place where the function was to be held "in a defenceless state", not organizing any guard till the eve of the function, Burma would be a country which is ignorant of the elementary national security step and international usage of etiquette.

All facts show that the National Mausoleum where Chon Du Hwan was to go was strictly guarded airtight.

Had the "suspects" been dispatched by our Republic as the Burmese authorities allege, how could they break into the National Mausoleum and install a bomb there, those strangers who do not know Burma's geography and her language.

The DPA News Agency of West Germany said in a report from Rangoon that "it was impossible for north Koreans to plant a bomb there, since it was guarded day and night".
(DPA, West Germany, October 10, 1983)

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The English-language paper of Thailand "The National Review" said that "since entry into Burma is controlled very strictly, it is extremely difficult for a foreign group to infiltrate into the country and carry out such operation". (AP, Bangkok, October 11, 1983)

It goes without saying that no one can approach there without secret communication with the guardsmen of the Chon Du Hwan puppet clique who had been posted there beforehand or with Burmese guard authorities.

A Japanese magazine wrote:

"In Burma foreigners who walk along the road are sure to be shadowed by intelligence agents and if they take a step into a back lane, they are suspected. It is difficult even to go shopping because of information by citizens. If one slipped off under such circumstances and succeeded in carrying the bomb, explosive devices and so on to the Aung San Mausoleum, he must have many helpers close to the Burmese government". (Japanese magazine "Mr. Dandy")

What is meaningful in this connection is the following report of the Japanese Jiji press November 9:

"The criminals visited the house of a custodian of the Aung San Mausoleum under cover of darkness and told him that they were guardsmen of Chon Du Hwan.

"Then they gave him 10,000 Kyat in Burmese currency corresponding to one million Won and got from him a ladder and thus succeeded in laying a bomb on the roof of the mausoleum." (Japanese Jiji press, November 9, 1983)

The south Korean paper "Choson Ilbo" November 10 carried this report of the Japanese Juji press.

This bespeaks that the planting of a bomb in the Rangoon National Mausoleum could be done only by the Chon Du Hwan clique themselves.

The "protocol of statements" published by the Burmese Authorities and the "testimonies" of the Burmese "witnesses" to confirm it give rise to many doubts.

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In a nutshell, the biggest point in question is why the Burmese authorities failed to produce at the "trial" a single legal and material evidence enough to prove the basic question that the "suspects" were "operatives" sent by our Republic.

The "material evidences" produced by the Burmese authorities are "unexploded incendiary" left on the spot, "Japan-made electric torch", "Belgium-made browning" and "man-killing fountainpen" which were allegedly carried by the "suspects" when they were arrested.

How could such things which are found in any part of the world "prove" that the "suspects" were sent by our Republic?

Even the U.S. paper "The New York Times" wrote that it has not been made clear why these articles are certainly connected with north Korea".

(the U.S. paper "The New York Times", October 14, 1983)

The Japanese paper "Tokyo Times" in an article titled "Rangoon bomb blast. Three unaccountable enigmas" said:

"This incident leaves a number of riddles such as 'how did the criminals sneak into the spot of crime under the martial law state', beside the simple question: 'did north Korea really commit such crime which would make the whole world its enemy?' How could the criminal infiltrate into the spot of crime and install a bomb under the martial law system enforced by the Burmese and south Korean sides? This is the biggest puzzle, because the south Korean guardsmen alone numbered 300 and a strict alert was ordered beforehand and the north Korean Embassy was under the watch of Burma from two months before the incident."

According to this paper, a Japanese commentator said:

"I had been paying attention to the indictment of the Rangoon explosion case. But its content was so poor that it does not hold water. Such materials give no answer to the questions."

(Japanese "Tokyo Times", November 25, 1983)

The unbiased public opinion of the world is now casting in unison deep suspicion on the "trial" farce of the Burmese authorities and throwing mockery and disdain at the poorly staged burlesque.

But one thing was made clear through the "trial" -- the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has nothing to do with the Rangoon explosion.

2. Who is The Real Criminal?

Then, who is the real criminal in the Rangoon Bomb blast? He is none other than the traitor Chon Du Hwan himself.

We can bring this to light by our logical inference and judgement of facts.

Shortly after the Rangoon bomb blast, foreign publications said that it might be a drama of Chon Du Hwan's own making.

Tanjug said that "it is considered in Tokyo that it was not accidental for Chon Du Hwan to have been 'fortunately late' in going to the scene of the tragic incident and the possibility of him, the dictator of south Korea, being involved in the bomb blast which claimed the lives of south Korean cabinet ministers is not excluded".

(Tanjug News Agency of Yugoslavia, Tokyo, October 14, 1983)

The Japanese "Shakai Shimpo" in an article titled "terrorism and assassination caused by military regime" said:

"The reaction of Chon Du Hwan who promptly linked the terrorist incident with north Korea is aimed at using the incident as a lever for preventing the vacillation in south Korea."

(Japanese "Shakai Shimpo", October 14, 1983)

The question here is, first of all, how the traitor Chon Du Hwan alone survived the Rangoon bomb blast while his suite members were all killed.

In this regard Chon Du Hwan himself said when he incited anti-communist fever among representatives of government-controlled political parties including "Democratic Justice Party" on October 14:

"My original plan was to visit the Aung San Mausoleum with my entourage straightly from Rangoon airport on October 8. But I instructed the date to be put off to the following day.

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"This seems to be a decisive factor of evading the misfortune".
(south Korean "Radio Seoul", October 14, 1983)

Then why did Chon Du Hwan change at will the date of his visit to the mausoleum he had agreed upon with the Burmese authorities and postpone it till the following day?

The bomb blasted on the Morning of October 9. Had Chon Du Hwan gone to the mausoleum on October 8 as planned, not changing the date, all would have been safe. But he stubbornly changed the date and didn't go to the spot at the moment when the explosion broke out. What does this mean?

This tells that he brought death to his underlings and he himself escaped it.

"Radio Seoul" reported about the situation at that time:

"Before Chon Du Hwan arrived, official and unofficial suite members were lined up at the Aung San Mausoleum, assembled individually.

"At 10:25, just before the bomb blast, our ambassador to Burma arrived on the scene in his car carrying the flag, guided by motorcycles, to join the suite members who had already been present there. About one minute later, the bugle for the repose of the deceased was sounded and the bomb blasted."
(south Korean "Radio Seoul", October 10, 1983)

It was made clear later that the traitor Chon Du Hwan was reaching a spot 1.5 kilometres off after leaving in a car the guest house 4.8 kilometres from the spot of explosion. This was not because he had a good luck.

The point is why he sent his suite members there in advance in violation of diplomatic usage and left lately alone.

Herein lies the biggest riddle.

The "spokesman" of Chon Du Hwan had reportedly claimed that he was "delayed by traffic jam".

Even if he is a puppet president not worth a penny, he was invited by the Burmese authorities as a "state guest".

It is impossible, indeed, therefore that he could not arrive in time at the function spot because he alone was caught in traffic jumble in the city.

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Does it mean that even a police car with a mission to control traffic was not attached to Chon Du Hwan himself, while the puppet ambassador to Burma who left just before him went with an escort car? It is foolish to explain his being late by "traffic jam".

As to the cause of Chon Du Hwan's delay the Burmese government corrected its announcements twice or thrice, saying that he was "late because he was met by the Burmese Foreign Minister late" and then stating that it followed "the customs of the south Korean side". This shows that their words are in a mess of confusion.

Chon Du Hwan did not go to the scene of explosion because he knew that there would be a bomb blast.

The "bugle for the repose of the deceased" which had been expected to be sounded at the function after the arrival of Chon Du Hwan at the cemetery rang out before his arrival and the bomb blasted with the bugle call. This fact, too, clearly proves that the incident was a drama stage-managed by Chon Du Hwan.

According to a report of the south Korean paper "Chungang Ilbo", the "bugle for the repose of the deceased" was sounded before Chon Du Hwan's arrival because "a south Korean guardsman requested the Burmese side to blow it once".

Thus the "bugle" which had been to be sounded after the arrival of Chon Du Hwan was sounded in advance at the "request of the south Korean guardsman" and the bomb exploded at that moment and Chon Du Hwan alone survived it. Isn't it a homicidal drama staged on the order of the traitor Chon Du Hwan himself?

Foreign publications also pay attention to the following points:

"No explanation is given yet why the south Korean ambassador to Burma who was playing the role of the local guide arrived after the Deputy Prime Minister and all other suite members, his superiors, were lined up. Didn't the south Korean ambassador first play the role of the 'scapegoat' to prevent a possible bomb attack on Chon Du Hwan?"
(Japanese magazine "Mr. Dandy")

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This is a very correct judgement, we may say.

That Chon Du Hwan knew in advance of the explosion is well illustrated by the fact that the moment the explosion sounded he gave up going to the scene and drove back.

In this regard AP said that there was no trace of Chon Du Hwan going on to the scene after the bomb explosion. He immediately changed the course and went off. How could Chon Du Hwan know that the explosion sounded from the National Mausoleum and turn round instantly?

Even if he heard a bomb exploded, it would have been normal for him to go to National Mausoleum as arranged, since he didn't know what explosion it was.

But he turned round as soon as the explosion sounded, as if he had been waiting for that explosion, because he knew what it meant.

That the Rangoon bomb blast was a drama of the Chon Du Hwan clique's own making was fully disclosed in the large-scale "cabinet reshuffle" carried out on October 14 to call it to account for the incident.

In this "cabinet shakeup" Chon Du Hwan dismissed many vassals including the puppet Prime Minister. But he left the "director of the security planning board" and the "chief guard secretary of Chongwadae", who should have been held more responsible for the incident than anyone else, at their posts, saying that "they were not to blame".

As noted in the above, according to the "protocol of statements" of the Burmese authorities, the "Aung San Mausoleum was in a defenceless state" when the "suspects" planted a bomb there. Then, what does he mean by claiming that the "director of the security planning board" and the "chief guard secretary of Chongwadae" were not to blame for this?

This suggests that the traitor Chon Du Hwan needed not to call them to task, as he had plotted the Rangoon explosion in conspiracy with them.

All the facts eloquently prove that the Rangoon explosion was a drama of dastardly and vicious murder plotted and committed by the traitor Chon Du Hwan himself.

It shows more clearly that the traitor Chon Du Hwan, the very one who massacred thousands of defenceless people in Kwangju, is a truculent murderer and human-butcher who made no scruples of killing his "cabinet Ministers" in groups for his insidious political purpose.

The Swedish paper "Gnistan" in an article titled "south Korea kills 'cabinet Ministers' by explosion" said:

"It is said that hundreds of troops stood guard around the mausoleum. Even the date of visit was changed for security reasons.

"But how could Chon Du Hwan alone was delayed by traffic jam?

"It is becoming clear that the Rangoon incident was a drama of Chon Du Hwan's own making".

("Gnistan" of Sweden, November 10, 1983)

The Bangladesh paper "Naya Jug" in an article headlined "smokescreen of Rangoon bomb blast" wrote that the "Rangoon explosion was a drama stage-managed by the south Korean dictator himself to divert elsewhere the world's attention".
(Bangladesh "Naya Jug", October 23, 1983)

The DPRK Foreign Ministry already declared in its statement dated November 5:

"It is not without reason that the traitor Chon Du Hwan faked up this burlesque.

"Now the anti-U.S. struggle for independence and anti-fascist struggle for democracy of the patriotic people and students is daily gaining momentum in south Korea and the traitor Chon Du Hwan, a filthy dual stooge of the United States and Japan, is being driven into a serious fix within and without.

"To extricate himself out of the blind alley, it was necessary for the traitor Chon Du Hwan to produce a shocking drama."

No sooner had the bomb exploded than the traitor Chon Du Hwan, kicking up a frenzied anti-communist, anti-DPRK racket groundlessly, issued an "emergency alert order" throughout south Korea and placed it on a full combat alert, intensified fascist suppression of the south Korean people as never before and pushed the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war.

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A Japanese magazine said in this connection:

"Why did the south Korean regime hastily conclude that it was a 'work of north Korea' in the stage where a decisive evidence or ground had not yet been clarified? This caused the people at home and abroad to suspect it to be an internal offspring of south Korea, saying, 'why they insist on its being a work of north when there is no evidence ?'"
(Japanese magazine "Mr. Dandy")

The traitor Chon Du Hwan stage-managed the Rangoon explosion also to present a high-priced "present" to Reagan in his south Korean tour.

3. "Political Settlement"

Although the truth of the Rangoon bomb blast was thus clear, the Burmese authorities took a rash and unilateral step of hurriedly declaring the severance of diplomatic relations with our country, without any legal and material evidence, before a probe was made into the concrete background of the incident. This time again they staged a burlesque of "trial" of the "suspects" and made an unnecessary fuss which cannot be regarded as normal by anyone.

The point is why they did so.

When the Rangoon bomb blast occurred, broad public of the world threw many doubts on the possibility of its being a work of our Republic, saying that it might be a drama of the traitor Chon Du Hwan's own making, it might be done by south Korean dissidents and that it might be carried out by a Burmese dissident force.

When the Burmese authorities announced that they arrested two "Koreans" regarded as "suspects" on October 10 and 12, the world public paid deep attention to it.

On October 25, one "suspect" said he "came from Seoul, south Korea". This completely upset the intrigues of the south Korean puppets to announce that the "suspects" came from the north.

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Thrown into an utter confusion, the south Korean puppets got more feverish and put pressure upon the Burmese authorities to impute the blame for the Rangoon bomb blast to our Republic and, at the same time, openly begged the U.S. imperialist and Japanese masters to increase pressure upon them.

A Japanese commentator said in this regard:

"The announcement of the Burmese government came on November 4 and, earlier, on November 3, 'Tonga Ilbo' carried a Rangoon report of Yonhap Tongsin, the only news agency of south Korea.

"I read this article, thinking that it may be a key to the incident.

"This article reads in part:

"1, The Burmese government is not in possession of a definite datum to draw a conclusive conclusion:

"2, But the case cannot be dragged on for an indefinite period.

"It is said that if Burma refused to sever diplomatic relations with the north, south Korea would put pressure upon her, threatening that it would break off relations with her.

"So Burma was forced to choose one of the two.

"In other words, the announcement of the Burmese government is a product of a political settlement destitute of materials."

Asking why Burma came to this political settlement, the article continues to say:

"Burma which is troubled with the economic problem chose south Korea backed by the United States and Japan after comparing the north and the south.

"Burma is tilting its neutral policy to the west with her economy plunged into the worst situation of international payments from 1975."

(Japanese "Tokyo Times", November 25, 1983)

The U.S. paper "The Washington Post" in an article titled "Seoul puts pressure upon Rangoon" after the Rangoon explosion, said that "the impatient south Korean officials in Burma continue to force their assertion against north Korea in an attempt to put pressure upon the Burmese government".
(U.S. The Washington Post", October 16, 1983)

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On the very day of Rangoon explosion Reagan stated that the "United States would do everything possible," contending that "there is an ample opportunity of the north being involved in the explosion in Burma".

Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone blared that he would "render any cooperation necessary to south Korea," saying "this incident was plotted or instigated by the north".
(south Korean "Radio No. 1", October 10, 1983)

When Burma took the unwarrantable step of breaking off diplomatic relations with our Republic, the Japanese government promised her food and free loans in the form of emergency economic aid, in addition to a loan of 187 million dollars.
(Japanese Radio NHK, November 1, 1983)

A south Korean radio reported as regards this:

"The Japanese government decided to give an emergency economic aid to the Burmese government. The economic aid of Japan to Burma is known to be food and free loans.

"This plan of the Japanese government is construed as one aimed to help Burma in her difficult economy, caused, for example, by the suspension of the construction of a cement factory in Burma assisted by north Korea, and to bring Japan closer to Burma from the diplomatic point of view.

"Japan's loans to Burma so far are known to be about 1,000 million dollars."
(south Korean "Radio No. 1", November 6, 1983)

On December 6 the Japanese government, to begin with, exchanged notes on granting "free loans" amounting to 3,354 million Yen (14.34 million dollars) to Burma with the Burmese government in Rangoon.
(Japanese Jiji press, Tokyo, December 6, 1983)

The Burmese authorities, to make a long story short, fabricated in accordance with the prearranged script the preposterous "results of investigation" claiming that the Rangoon explosion was "a work of north Korea" through their "political settlement" with the United States, Japan and the south Korean puppets and staged the fraudulent "trial" farce to "justify" them.

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But truth cannot be concealed.

As time flows, the dark intention of the organisers of the Rangoon explosion will be dragged into the light of day.

Even the materials of the "trial" made public by the Burmese authorities, independent of their subjective desire, proved more clearly to the whole world that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is innocent and upright.

On the contrary, the Burmese authorities besmirched their faces by their own hands by dancing to the drum-beating of the south Korean puppet clique, the dual stooge of the U.S. imperialists and the Japanese reactionaries, and they will suffer from its evil consequences for long.
