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JOINT INSPECTION UNIT: REPORTS OF THE JOINT INSPECTION UNIT PERSONNEL QUESTIONS: OTHER PERSONNEL QUESTIONS Competitive examinations in the united Nations

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Competitive examinations in the United Nations" (JIU/REP/84/11).

# REPORT ON COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS <br> prepared by Maurice Bertrand Joint Inspection Unit 

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# REPORT ON COMPETITIYE EXAMINATIONS. IN THE UNITED NATIONS 

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## Geneva

1984

## INTRODUCTION

1. The competitive examination method for the recruitment of junior Professional staff in the United Nations has now gone beyond the experimental stage. Ten years have passed since the first competitive examination, held in Italy. But it is mainly since 1981 that they have been used systematically.
2. Recourse to competitive examinations for the recruitment of junior Professional staff was made compulsory by paragraph 10 of the annex to resolution 35/210, which decided that "at the P-1 and P-2 lavels, recruitment shall be made as a rule through competitive examinations", that the principle should be applied by reserving 30 per cent of the posts available for promotion by competitive examination from the General Service category to the Professional category, and that in the case of the remaining 70 per cent, recruitment for all posts should, as from 31 December 1982, be carried out by competitive examinations:

- Devised on a national basis, in consultation with the Governments concerned;
- Geared to candidates with at least a first-level university degree; and
- Based on written tests in one of the official languages of the United Nations, including a general test and specialized examination by occupational groups.

3. This decision supplemented and put more precisely the texts of the existing resolutions stipulating that recruitaent should be carried out on a competitive basia: regulation 4.3 of the Staff Regulations ("so far as practicable, selection shall be made on a competitive basis"); the decision of 18 December 1974; resolution $33 / 143$ of 1978 , which established the examination for movement of staff from the General Service category to the Professional category and had already recommended that "competitive methods of recruitment should be used in consultation with the Governments concerned".
4. It is hardly necessary to recall the importance of using objective recruitment methods. The quality of the "outputs" and services rendered by the Secretariat to the Member States will obviously depend on the quality of the staff, i.e., apart from its dedication, on its qualifications and training. It is no secret to anyone that endeavours to secure posts for candidates known in advance or strongly recommended are very difficult to resist when there are no precise rules, and such a procedure in most cases leads to mediocrity. A recruitment system without any objective
methods or competition cannot produce good results. 1/ In taking the decisions mentioned above, the Member States have thus demonstrated the importance they attach to the quality of the staff.
5. The competitive examination method has made it possible to recruit to date:

By the competitive examinations for movement from $G$ to $P$, held in 1979, 1981, 1982 and 1983; 134 Professional staff

By all the external national competitive examinations held from 1974 to 1983 inclusive: 118 Professional staff members.

The results are positive, but there is resistance to the proper application of the resolutions.

More detailed statistios concerning the dates and places of the examinations, the countries (or nationalities) concerned, the number of candidates, the number of posts, the number of recruited candidates by occupational groups (where this information was available) and the details of those who were placed on the reserve lists, are given in annex 1 (external examinations) and annex 2 ( $G$ to $P$ examinations).

1/ An analysis of the chief defects of recruitment systems without objective methods, such as was made by the Joint Inspection Unit in its report JIU/REP/81/11 of August 1981, reveals inter

That on the whole, recruitment is often limited to candidates who have made themselves known at the headquarters of the organizations;

That in most cases posts are sought for candidates known in advance;

That this system encourages political and personal pressure at all levels;

That the general basis for assessing the qualities of the candidates consists of university degrees whose value is of ten very difficult to assess, and interviews without any specific method (usually confined to not more than two or three candidates);

That recruitment is carried out for specific posts, while the persons recruited are likely to make a career in a series of posts;

That there is no test to check on the most important qualities that may be required of international civil servants such as, in the United Nations, their skill in drafting and analysis, their effective knowledge of the working languages, their motivation, and their understanding of the Organization's objectives.
6. The results achieved are thus both positive and capable of development, internally and externally, but the pursuit of these efforts is faced with serious obstacies. Bureaucratic difficulties and resistance have succeeded in preventing the regular application of the General Assembly resolutions. In particular, they reduce the number of posts offered for external examinations, in circumstances which it is difficult to accept. The Assembly must thus be informed of the reasons for this situation so that it can take the necessary steps to ensure that its decisions are complied with and so that a rational recruitment policy on which the efficiency of the Secretariat depends can be developed.
7. This report will examine separately the situation and problems of the external national competitive examinations and those of the internal examinations, before recomending any reforms that may appear necessary.

## THE EXTERNAL NATIONAL COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS

8. Annex 1 brings out the following:

The number of Member States in which competitive examinations were held has increased from five during the 1974-1981 experimental period to 15 in 1982-1983. While in the experimental period examinations were held only in major developed countries (Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and France), it became possible in 1982-1983 to organize examinations in developing and socialist countries and to reach all the continents. The competitive examinations scheduled for 1984 are to be held in the Federal Republic of Germany (7 posts), Japan (5), Italy (4), Papua New Guinea (2), Saint Lucia (2), Saint Christopher and Nevis (2).

The number of candidates at these examinations has on the Whole been high in relation to the number of posts offered, the ratio of candidates to posts sometimes reaching a figure of several dozen ( 58 in Italy in 1974 and in Brazil in 1982, 33 in Japan in 1975, etc.) and usually being higher than 4 or 5 in countries where the number of candidates is proportionately the lowest. Contrary to the pessimistic forecasts made, a large number of worthwhile candidates were forthcoming in all the developing countries (e.g. 236 in the Ivory Coast in 1982, 82 in Mauritania in 1983, etc.)

Reserve lists have been prepared for every examination, the total number of candidates included in these lists being 88 (as against 118 recruited for the posts officially offered for examination).

The distribution of the successful candidates by occupational groups (since 1981, when the distribution was first known) was more or less 60 per cent for the "economist" group, 21 per cent in the "general administration" group, 11 per cent for the "social and political sciences" group and 6 per cent for the "data-processing" group.
9. The establishment of a competitive examination system was not really a novelty in the United Nations, since such a system has been in use for a very long time for the recruitment of language staff, for whom there are three types of examinations: for translators, interpreters and editors; but the difficulties to be overcome for the recruitment of Professional staff in general were considerable. In particular, it was necessary to develop the examinations service, which found itself responsible for entirely new tasks; to work out specific tests and to select examination boards for each of the occupational groups; to negotiate the organization of the examinations on a case-by-case basis with the responsible authorities in each country; to ensure the confidentiality of the tests while arranging for their distribution to a great variety of places; to prevent possible cheating; to explain the new recruiting methods to the departments concerned and have them accepted; to make sure that the time needed for the organization of the examinations and the reservation of posts did

Most of the organizational difficulties have been overcome ...

## geographical distribution has been improved.

not hinder the normal operation of the departments; to organize on a parallel basis the internal examination, which posed problems of the same kind but also had its own peculiar problems, particularly that of setting up throughout the world examination centres designed to function simultaneously.
10. Most of these difficulties have been overcome in a quite remarkable way: the examinations service has been able to hold external national competitive examinations in a larger and larger number of countries and at the same time to hold the internal examination on an annual basis; sufficient publicity has usually been made; boards have been set up consisting of competent, dedicated staff members who have carried out their work in an objective way; no cases of cheating have been found; serious difficulties have been encountered in only one country out of 15 ; and the quality of the successful candidates recruited has been outstanding, as has been acknowledged by nearly all the recipient departments.
11. Furthermore, the system of external national competitive examinations has greatly assisted the efforts of the Office of Personnel Services to apply the principle of equitable geographical distribution and improve the over-all statistics in that regard. of the 118 candidates recruited by external national competitive examinations, 111 - or 95 per cent - belonged to countries which were unrepresented or under-represented. As from 1982 this proportion reached 100 per cent, and the examinations scheduled for 1984 will be held solely in countries belonging to these categories. On the other hand, only 21 per cent of recruitments at the same grade levels, made without examination, came from unrepresented or under-represented countries. In this respect, therefore, the superiority of the national competitive examination method is unquestionable. Its more general use in accordance with the established rules would make it possible to improve fivefold the rate of progress towards the establishment of equitable geographical distribution.
12. The machinery for the fuil-scale operation of a system of external national competitions is thus in a sound condition. It may even be thought, in the circurstances, that once the system has been fully applied in the United Nations, it could be usefully extended not only to the major programmes affiliated to the United Nations, such as UNDP, UNICEF, WFP or HCR, but also to other organizations in the United Nations system. Unfortunately, very serious threats to the competitive examination method are still to be found inside the United Nations itself.
13. They stem from resistance to the application of re resolution 35/210, which finds expression in the fact that too small a proportion of the $\mathrm{P}-1$ and $\mathrm{P}-2$ posts have been filled by competitive examination. The figures are eloquent in this respect. Statistios supplied by the Office of Personnel Services on recruitment at the $\mathrm{P}-1$ and $\mathrm{P}-2$ Levels during 1982-1983
(1 January 1982 to 31 December 1983) show that, of a total of 271 staff members recruited:

66 persons, or 24.3 per cent, were recruited by competitive examination from $G$ to $P$ (promotion);

41 persons, or 15.1 per cent, were recruited by external national examinations; and
60.5 per cent, or 164 Professional staff, were recruited by the traditional methods, which are at variance with the resolution.

If these proportions are compared with those set out by resolution $35 / 210$, namely, 30 per cent for $G$ to $P$ examinations and 70 per cent for external examinations, we realize what a gulf there is between the actual situation and the directions given by the General Assembly: the proportion of recruitments by means of external examination is five times less than it should be according to the rules. Even admitting that this was the period during which the reform was under way, the situation seems difficult to accept, and in any case requires explanation.
14. Consequently, we asked the Office of Personnel Services to prepare a complete list of names of the persons recruited during the period in question and to indicate, against each name, the method of recruitment used and the reason why it was used. The following were the results;
(a) 35 persons were recruited at $P-2$ level for $P-3$ posts;
(b) 28 persons were recruited for posts that had been vacant before 1982, but with EOD dates in 1982 or 1983;
(c) 12 persons were recruited for posts in occupational groups which did not form the subject either of $G$ to $P$ examinations or external examinations;
(d) 19 persons were recruited for posts which had originally been reserved for the $G$ to $P$ examinations, but which were not used by the Central Examinations Board (CEB);
(e) 8 persons were recruited for periods exceeding 11 months but their submission to the APC-APS was delayed;
(f) 8 persons were recruited to replace professional staff members of the same nationality, in the case of Member States whose nationals serve essentially on fixed-term contracts;
(g) 7 recruitments were specially authorized by the Office of Personnel Services;
(h) 12 recruitments corresponded to professional staff members appointed to temporary posts who had left the Organization;
(i) 16 recruitments corresponded to "adjustments": changes in visa or post status for staff members already in employment, transfer from a post subject to geographical distribution to an unattached post, etc.; and

Unfortunately, the number of posts to be filled by external competitive examination was five times less than it should have been according to the rules.

A variety of reasons given for circumventing the examinations.
(j) lastly, there were 19 persons promoted from $G$ to $P$ without examination as a result of appeals to the Administrative Tribunal by $G$ staff members already occupying $P$ posts.
15. Among the cases thus listed, it is possible to distinguish:

Those which can be put down to a dubious interpretation of resolution $35 / 210$ - in the case in point, the 35 persons recruited at $\mathrm{P}-2$ level against $\mathrm{P}-3$ posts. The resolution refers to the $\mathrm{P}-1$ and $\mathrm{P}-2$ levels and not to posts, so that it should have been applied to these recruitments.

Those resulting from a previous situation, such as the 28 persons recruited "for posts that had been vacant before 1982", or the 19 persons promoted from $G$ to $P$ without examination as a result of appeals to the Administrative Tribunal. Some of these cases would appear to warrant a more detailed examination, but it is to be hoped that they will not recur in the future.

Those which can be explained by valid reasons during the period of introducing the reforms, e.g. the 12 persons recruited for posts in occupational groups which did not form the subject either of $G$ to $P$ examinations or of external examinations; or the 8 persons recruited as replacements in the case of countries whose nationals serve essentially on fixed-term contracts; or again the 7 recruitments specially authorized by the Office of Personnel Services.

Lastly, those which demonstrate a bureaucratic resistance to the application of the reforms not readily justifiable. This applies to the 55 cases in categories (d), (a), ( $h$ ) and (i), especially the cases of recruitment for periods of over 11 months without immediate submission of the appointments to APC-APB (in violation of the provisions of rule 104.14 of the Staff Rules).
16. With regard to the cases on decided bureaucratic resistance, the methods used have included:

Invoking every conceivable pretext for making exceptions; in addition to the recruitment of $\mathrm{P}-2$ level for $\mathrm{P}-3$ posts already mentioned (the effects of which are set out in detail in paragraph 14 (a)), candidates have been recruited without examination for overhead posts, "replacement" posts (posts lent by the Budget Division against posts made vacant by the dismissal or secondment of their holders), "non-geographical" posts, etc;

Making temporary appointments to vacant posts which are renewed over long periods by successive short-term contracts, or by alternating periods of recruitment against funds for consultants, expert posts, etc;

Manipulating post vacancies by the device of transferring a Professional staff member from one post to another: e.g. a vacant P-2 post which should have been submitted for competitive examination is filled by the transfer of a $\mathrm{P}-2$ staff member, who has
previousiy been recruited for a $\mathrm{P}-3$ vost, whereupon a new P-2 staff member is recruited for the $P-3$ post that has just become vacant;

Delaying recruitment for a post until a suitable moment for making an exception.
17. An analysis of the methods used to organize resistance to the competitive examinations reveals that the most effective has been the withholding of information about vacancies, which has made it impossible for the Office of Personnel Services to submit the posts in question for examination. The inadequacies of the central information system on posts and manning tables have long been criticized, but it has been stated on numerous occasions that headway was being made, and that in particular the integration of the data of the Staffing List, kept up to date by the Budget Division, and the data available to the Office of Personnel Services, was under way. In fact, if any progress at all has been made, it has been so slow that the information system as it exists at present does not make it possible for the Office of Personnel Seryices either to identify vacant posts (especially if they are awey from Headquarters in New York), or to have much of an idea what posts are going to become vacant in the next few months.
18. This situation, complicated by a systematic attempt to withhold information in a large number of departments, has resulted in the situation where, year after year, at the moment when the list is being made up of the posts to be filled by examination (internal and external) the Office of Personnel Services is able to identify only an extremely small number of vacant posts in comparison with the number of vacaricies that already exist or are likely to occur in the months to come. What is more, the internal examination has always been served first, and this means blocking some 30 posts out of a total of usually about 60 . On occasions, as we saw in paragraph 14 (d), more posts have been blocked than were needed for theinternal competition. In these circumstances, the number of posts which it has proved possible to reserve for external national competitive examinations has been extremely small: 35 in 1982 and 47 in 1983. Since, in addition, no rational use has been made of the reserve list method, it has not been possible to increase the number of posts offered for these examinations up to the level corresponding to the number of posts genuinely available each year, which is at least 90 . Information regarding vacancies becomes available when it is too late, at which point it is easy to find excellent pretexts such as urgent need, to recruit for the vacant posts without examination.
19. All this makes it clear that bureaucratic resistance to change in this area has been extremely strenuous. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that resolution $35 / 210$ has not met with full and complete approval. While competitive methods have their advocates and have been put into effect with courage and determination by the competent units of the Office of Personnel Serivces, they have also had their opponents. This organized resistance to decisions by the General Assembly is quite unacceptable, and steps must be taken to overcome it. However, before defining such steps, we feel it necessary to try first of all to understand the reasons behind this resistance.

Varied methods had been used, and the information on vacancies withheld.

The main explanation for the situation is the refusal to change ingrained habits.

More
satisfactory
explanation is necessary ...
... and certain operational shortcomings must be suppressed.

The tendency for the number of $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$
posts to fall
20. The main explanation of this situation is no doubt a refusal to change a routine that people have become accustomed to. The minor gratifications felt by such and such a staff member at being able to "secure recruitment" for such and such a candidete whom he knows (and who in fact seems to him to have more or less all the qualities needed); the feeling among most chiefs of services that 3 system which does not allow them to continue to choose their colleagues themselves from among people they know is at variance with their normal responsibilities; the refusal by various officials to accept the "imposition" by the General Assembly of recruitment methods which they had not themselves had any part in defining; and finally the annoyance at having to change one's ways, have certainly played a considerable role in the establishment of this negative outlook within the Secretariat.
21. The attempts that have been made to explain the importance of these new objective recruitment methods have no doubt been inadequate to convince most of the people concerned. There should have been more and better explanations, more demonstration of an active interest at the highest levels in the introduction of the reforms, and most of all perhaps, an endeavour to ensure that the competitive examination system did not from the outset have any disadvantage that could justify to some extent the irritation of the chiefs of service.
22. The preaent organization of the competitive examinations still has some defects which have not yet been overcome, the most important of them being the length of time required for recruitment. The user departments have found in this an argument - a perfectly valid one - against the methods currently in use. The problem is that the necessity to reserve posts in advance for examination purposes prevents any use of these posts for a period which lengthens the standard period needed for recruitment (already very long as a rule). This period consists of the length of time during which the post is blocked after it becomes vacant to the date of the examination plus the time taken for the examination itself. This defect should be corrected in the future, for example by a more systematic use of the "reserve list", as we shall explain below.
23. But instead of working to overcome this drawback while applying the new system, it has appeared much simpler to allege that the defects damn the reform. The same has been true of other minor drawbacks which could quite easily be removed. More generally speaking, the relationships between the Office of Personnel Services and the user departments - which have always been difficult, as indeed they usually are in any public office or company of any size - have not been improved by the problems that have had to be overcome to implement such a basic reform as the introduction of competitive examinations. Extra efforts should thus be made in the years to come to remove any drawbacks which still remain and to explain the essential interest and importance of the competitive examination system.
24. Eefore determining what methods of making the necessary corrections should be envisaged, however, we must analyse one final phenomenon which is helping to endanger the competitive examination system: the tendency for the number of $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ posts to fail. Between 1979 and 1985, the number of $\mathrm{P}-1$ and $\mathrm{P}-2$ posts evolved as follows:

| Budget cycle <br> Situation | At end of 1978-1979 cycle | At end of 1980-1981 cycle | At end of 1982-1983 cycle | ```Beginning of 1984-1985 budget``` |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Established posts | 613 | 632 | 603 | 615 |
| Temporary posts | 13 | 3 | 16 | 14 |
| Net results of reclassification | -4 | -29 | 6 | 0 |
| Posts resulting from the conversion of temporary assistance | 0 | 3 | 7 | 0 |
| Redeployment of existing posts | -2 | -6 | 0 | 0 |
| Suppression of posts | 2 | 0 | -1 | 0 |
| Transfer of extrabudgetary posts | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total of P-1/P-2 posts | 622 | 603 | 631 | 629 |

25. Thus, while the total number of Professional posts avallable at all grades increased from 4,232 to 4,586 between 1979 and 1984, or 8.4 per cent, the number of $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ posts remained almost unchanged. The pyramid of the Organization'a Professional grades has thus been proportionately narrowed at the base. The most critical trends are:

The fallure to create any new $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ posts (although the total number of posts is still increasing); and

The appearance of a significant phenomenon of reclassifying $\mathrm{P}-2$ posts to the $\mathrm{P}-3$ level.
26. The object of this report is not to make heavy weather out of the errors of the past, but rather to try to define how in the future, bearing in mind the experience acquired during this difficult period of introduction, it is possible to apply once and for all the reform of the recruitment methods defined in resolutions $33 / 143$ and $35 / 210$, and if possible to consolidate and strengthen it. Any corrective or complementary measures which the General Assembly might consider recommending, if it wishes to see its own resolutions implemented, seem to us to be concerned with:
(a) The over-all application of the rule of recruitment by competitive examination at levels $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$, with the exception of strictly delimited cases;
... also
has its
risks.

Corrective and supplementary measures which can be envisaged.

Exceptions to the wholesale application of the rule

## ... of

recruitment by competitive examination at P-1/P-2 levels for all types of posts should refer to specific cases, within a limit of 5 per cent for established posts and 30 per cent for temporary posts orposts financed out of extrabudgetary funds.
(b) The method of drawing up a list of successful candidates in the external national compatitions, and the planning of competitive examinations and their extension to cover wore countries;
(c) The broadening of the objective methods of recruitment by the gradual inclusion of $\mathrm{P}-3$ posts in a system of competitive examinations or written tests.
(a) Wholesale application of the rule of recruitment by competitive examination at levels $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$
27. The General Assembly wight indicate that it prohibits recruitment at $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ levels without competition against any post, whether established or temporary, financed out of extra-budgetary funds, and whatever their grade, apart from carefully spelt-out exceptions authorized personally by the Assistant Secretary-General; Office of Personnel Services, on behalf of the Secretary-General and within the limits of percentages to be specified. The examination we have carried out with the Office of Personnel Services of the difficulties which can arise has led us to propose the following limited exceptions:
28. For established posts, within a maximum limit of 5 per cent, both in the case of recmitments of nationals of countries not represented or under-represented, where the lower level of the desirable range is between two and four, and in the case where, for occupational groups with small numbers and few vacancies each year it would not be possible either to hold an examination or to use the reserve list from the competition of a previous year. The difficulties which these two types of circumscribed exceptions would make it possible to cope with are the following:

Experience has proved that the competitive examination syatem allows for application to all countries. However, it is quite obvious that the regular functioning of the system can only apply to countries where numbers are relatively high. The problem of representation of countries where the desirable range is very low can be solved in such cases more rapidly by direct recruitment. Furthermore, the countries under-represented or not represented in this category are no longer very numerous. Thus the exception provided for should not last more than three years.

The manning figures for the 14 occupational groups into which the Professional staff of the United Nations are divided are unequal. Some groups, such as language staff, general administration and economists, have a size which allows the recruitment of several dozen Professional officers at P-1/P-2 level each year. Others only offer three to elght posts at $P-1 / P-2$ level regularly each year (social development, statistics, information, political affairs, legal matters, library, electronic dataprocessing, finance, etc.). Others again are too small to offer with any degree of certainty more than three $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ posts each year. In this group (engineers and architects, publishing and printing, science and technology) it can happen that it is impossible to organize external competitive examinations or even to offer a post for internal competition in the course of a givenyear.

In such instances, it may be necessary to authorize recruitment, exceptionally, without a competitive examination. For other groups, it is for the Office of Personnel Services to ensure that there are always, at least onse every two years, posts available for external national competitive examinations in sufficient number to enable recruitment to be made on the basis of a list thus established until a new competition can be organized for that group.
29. With regard to temporary posts, or posts financed out of extrabudgetary funds or from support funds, exceptions could be authorized within a maximum limit of 30 per cent whenever the Secretary-Gereral or the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Personnel Services, feels that it is not possible to offer recruited candidates a two-year contract. The difficulties to be overcome here are the following: temporary posts or posts financed from extra-budgetary funds do not, in principle, make it possible to offer candidates recruited for these posts a two-year contract. Actually, a large proportion of temporary posts or posts financed out of extra-budgetary funds are held by personnel on the reguiar Professional manning table. It is therefore possible, in a large number of these cases, to offer two-year contracts at the time of recruitment to P-1/P-2 levels. All that is necessary here is for the Organization to undertake to replace the Professional officer thus recruited in the event of the disappearance of the post before that date. We feel that such an undertaking could be given in at least 70 per cent of cases. Under these circumstances, it is proposed that the number of possible exceptions to recruitment by competitive examination at $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ levels for these posts should be limited to the figure of 30 per cent already mentioned.
30. The General Assembly might finally decide:
(a) That for all recruitment at P-1/P-2 levels involving exceptions to the competitive examination rule, written tests would be organized enabling the candidates chosen from the short lists for recruitment to the corresponding posts to be tested. The examination service would be responsible for preparing tests for such occasions in advance and arranging for the practical organization of the examinations.
(b) That the Secretary-General would each year report to the Assembly, in the report on the staff situation, concerning the circumstances in which exceptions to the recruitment by competitive examination to levels $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ had been authorized.
(b) Method of drawing up lists of successful candidates in the external national competitive examinations, and planning of the examinations
31. Annex 1 indicates that the examination boards have taken care, whenever they deemed it possible, to place on a list the names of a number of candidates not immediately assigned to reserved posts but recommended for subsequent recruitment. The number of these candidates varies with each competitive examination between one and eight, and the total number amounts to approximately 75 per cent of the total number of reserved posts. This inclusion in reserve lists

The other cases of recruitment would involve written tests and anaccount of exceptions would begiven to the
General
Assembly.

Use of the reserve list system ...
... would make it possible to cope with the difficulties arising from delays in recruitment.
has been done since 1981 by occupational groups. The use made of the lists for the recrustment of candidates has on the other hand been extremely disappointing. In all, only eight candidatas were recruited in 1981 and 1982 from the reserve lists (two in 1981, one for France and one for Japan, and six in 1982; two for Brazil, two for Italy, one for the Federal Republic of Germany and one for the Ivory Coast). Nor were we able to ascertain whether these candidates had been recruited to replace other successful candidates who had decided not to take up their posts or whether they had been recruited in addition to successful candidates already assigned posts. These figures show that the reserve list system needs to be completely re-organized.
32. The so-called "reserve 11st" problem, which might be better described as the problem of the list of successful candidates in examinations, arises as follows: since the competitive examinations are organized only once a year, it is necessary to resolve the question of the coincidence in the number of available posts in the course of a given year at $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ levels in each of the existing occupational groups and the number of candidates passing the examination in each of these groups. To ensure this coincidence, the following may be envisaged:

- Advance reservation of available posts as and when they become vacant. This reservation has two practical difficulties - that of unduly prolonging vacancies arising at the beginning of the year preceding the examination, and that of identifying the vacancies, since information on this subject is "withheld", as indicated in paragraphs 17 and 18 above.
- Forecasts, made by calculating the figures for the previous years and correcting them on the basis of the most recent information, of the number of posts which will become available during the current year. If such forecasts could be made, it would no longer be necessary to reserve posts in advance, and in these circumstances, successful candidates would immediately be assigned posts as and when vacancies arose. Unfortunately, such forecasts for each professional group cannot be made in a very precise manmer, so that it is impossible to give successful candidates admitted on the basis of such forecasts a guarantee of assignment to specific posts. The risk of making successful candidates wait too long is also considerable.

33. In view of the difficulties arising in respect of both these methods (wholesale reservation of pasts offered for competition or advanced forecasts of posts to be filled), only a combination of the two methods could make it possible to obtain acceptable results, in other words to achieve a reasonable degree of accuracy without making either the departments or the successful candidates wait too long. A sound system might therefore consist of the follawing:

- Reserving approximately half the posts which have become vacant during the course of the year (all posts becoming vacant six months prior to the date of the competition);
* Offering for competitive examination a number approximetely twice that of the posts reserved, so as to fill the vacancies arising within a period of six months following the date of the competition, in addition to those representing the reserved posts. $2 /$

34. If such a system were applied in its entirety, the drawback pointed out in paragraph 22 - the protraction of recruitment delays because of the additional time needed for reserving posts and

Planning of the competitive examinations should be part of recruítment plan.
35. This system of forecasts should alsc make it possible to set up a competition programme over several years withtn the framework of the long-term recruitment plan by the establishment at least three years in advance of lists of countries in winich the competitive examingtions will be held. These countries would be provided with an approximate idea of the number of places which could be offered to ther, by occupational groups, and this advance indication would enable them to make better publicity and to train candidates better. At, the same time it should be possible:

Gradually to increase the number of countries in which the competitive exaninations are held each year;

To offer more posts at each examination (in proportion to the quotas of the countries in question);

Gradually to extend the examinations to countries whose representation is within their desirable range. While appreciating the reason why the Office of Personnel Services has since 1982 confined the examination to countries not represented or underrepresented, namely as providing an excellent apportunity to meet the wishes of the General Assembly as to the application of a fairer geographical distribution, an effort should now be made to extend the competitive examinations to all ecuntries.

This last suggestion seems to us to be justified by the fact that the increase in the number of posts offered for competitive examination each year as a result of the application of the measures
2) An estimate of the number of recruitments to be envisaged each year is furnished in table I of the recruitment plan for 2983-1985. It proves that such calculation is possible. However, it must be kept constantly up to date. Indeed such a forecast will only be seriously possible ence the breakdown of all existing posts by occupational gronps is made. In this respect, it may be hoped that the Career Development and Placsment Unit which was recently reorganized within the Office of Personnel Services will carry out this indispendable task as rapidly as possible (it should in fact have been completed several months ago).

Observance of four conditions would make it possible to extend the competition to cover P-3 level.

But a period of gradual adaptation is necessary.
recommended above should make it possible to reduce very rapldiy the number of countries under-represented or not represented. These measures seem to us all the more urgent in that they could be a means of correcting one of the defects in the present methods, which in some snall and highly-specialized occupational groups such as data processing leads to the recruitment of nationals of one or two countries only, thus running the risk of giving a monopoly among the professional groups to these countries - which is clearly not desirable.
(c) Broadening of the competitive examination and objective methods of recruitment to the $P-3$ level
36. In paragraphs 14 and 16 above we saw the abuse that had led to recruitment at $\mathrm{P}-2$ level for $\mathrm{P}-3$ posts and the manipulations encouraged by this operation (transfers, etc.). It seems to us highly desirable, for a variety of concordant reasons, to develop objective methods of recruitment at all levels; to take a decisive step in the direction of organization of professional careers; to put an end to the abuse described above; to increase considerably the number of posts offered for competition, and to embark resolutely on the extension of the examinations to the $P-3$ level.
37. The simplest and most comprehensive solution might be to set up for all outside recruitment at $\mathrm{P}-3$ level, i.e. for all nominations at this level made outside the scope of internal promotion from $\mathrm{P}-2$ to $\mathrm{P}-3, \frac{3}{2}$ a system of recruitment using external national examinations at $\mathrm{P}-\frac{1}{2}$ level, though with the following differences:
(a) Candidates would be required to produce evidence of five years professional experience in the occupational group for which they were applying.
(b) The university qualifications required would be raised to the minimum level of master's degree (M.A.) instead of the firstlevel degree (licence or B.A.)
(c) Consequentially, the age-limit for the competition would be raised from 32 to 36 years, e.g. for candidates meeting the first two conditions.
(d) Candidates for recruitment at $P-3$ level would sit the same examinations as candidates for the P-2 level, but would also have to pass a special additional test relating to the occupational group concerned and designed to provide evidence of a level of professional competence higher than that for candidates at P-2 level.

3/ For which no new procedure differing from the present one would be introduced.
38. Such a system, which in particular could be adapted to the level of the suboccupational groups by providing for the special selective test covering various specialities within the occupational group concerned, would make it possible to recruit objectively, with a greater guarantee of level of qualifications than the direct recruitment system, candidates meeting the requiraments for $\mathrm{P}-3$ level.
39. It seems to us nevertheless that a system of this kind cannot be organized without a period of preparation and adaptation. Unexpected difficulties can arise which only experience will reveal. This is why it seems to us possible to envisage a progressive plan which would cover:

The estabiishment on an experimental basis of the system proposed in paragraph 37 for one large occupational group only, for example the numerically most important group - General Administration;

The parallel establishment of written teats for recruitment at $\mathrm{P}-3$ level of all butside candidates in another large occupational group such as the economists group;

The gradual extension, after two years of experiment, of one or other of the above systeas to cover all the occupational groups.
40. The measures just advocated would help to increase the nurber of posts available for competitive examination. The number of outside recruitments at $\mathrm{P}-3$ level varies between 70 and 90 each year; the number of recruitments in the general administration occupational group alone is approximately 15 and in the economist group, 30 to 35 . In all, therefore, it may be said that the imnediate application of proposed measures would make it possible:

To offer about 100 places at the external examinations ( 85 to 100 at $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ level, because of the extension of the competition to posts financed out of extra-budgetary funds, and 15 at P-3 level);

Gradually to prepare the extension of objective recruitment measures in the form of written tests to supplement the oral tests or interviews, by applying them to the exceptional cases where the competitive examination is not used at $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ level and to the occupational group of economists at $\mathrm{P}-3$ level.

This would mean a resolute movement towards an extension of objective recruitment methods to a greater and greater proportion of the total recruitments of professional staff, with a view to preparing for their subsequent wholesale adoption for the whole of the Secretariat.

Various methods could be tested for the two largest professional groups, before their application becamegeneral.

The situation in regard to the examination for $G$ to $P$ promotion ...

## Results to be expected from the whole boay of decisions advocated

41. The measures just advocated are complementary. They would make it possible, among other things:

To ensure henceforth the observance of the resolutions already voted by the General Assembly, and in particular resolution 35/210;

To transform radically the conditions governing the recruitment of Professional staff, and consequentiy to improve decisively the quality of the Secretariat;

To interest all the Member States in the functioning of the competitive examination system;

To prepare for the extension of the competitive examination machinery to the United Nations system as a whole, with a view to a decided modernization of this group of institutions.

## CHAPTER II

## THE COMPFYIMIVE EXAMINATION FOR MOVENENP FRCM G TO P CATEGORY

42. The situation in regard to the competitive examination for $G$ to $P$ promotion is different from that just iescribed in relation to the external national competitive examinations, aince in this case the number of pogts offered for recrijtmenthas giweys been at the level required by resolution $35 / 210$. The question asked in regard to this system of promotion are quite different from those we have just dealt with in the limst chapter.
43. It should be noted first of all that as in the case of the extemal competitions, the examination arrangements have proceeded satisfactorily, Here the examinations were at world-wide level, and could be said to represent a phenomenon which has appeared for the first time ever. The testr have had to be held at the same time in a large number of centres. Jhis dirficulty has been satisfactorily overcome, the number of centres varying between eight and twelve $4 /$ over the years, and corresponding respectively to between 25 and 31 duby stations. For the four competitive examinations held in 1979, 1981, 1982 and 1983, the number of candidates was approximately 400 in each instance (there was a slight decline from 434 in 1979 to 382 in 1983). The number of posts offered varied between 48 and 25 , or about one post per 10 to 15 candidates (see annex 2).
44. The allocation of posts set aside for successrul sandidates by occupational groups was different fron that of national competitive examinations: 40 per cent in the case of the general Administration group (as compared witin 21 per cert for the national competitive exeminations), 12 per cent for the economist group (as against 60 per cent for the national examinations, 8 per cent for the librarian group, recruitment here being for practical purposes limited to tris internal examination. This tendency to reserve the posts in certain groups by preference for promotion from inside is explained by the qualifications possessed by personnel in categoxy $G$. But $i t$ has soye disadvantages, which could only be removed by extending the outside competitive examinations to ail posts at the $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ level.
45. The academic level of candidates was higher than first-level degree "licence" or B.A. in 24.6 per cent of cases, equal to that level in 38.8 per cent, and lower in 36.5 per cert of cases. This last situation is explained by the provisions of resolution $33 / 143$, which merely requires post-secondary educational qualifications (plus five years' experience).
... is
different frou
that of the external national competitive examinations.

4/ In 1983: Adais Ababa, Baghdad, Barıgkok, Nev York, Jerusalem, Santiago, Vienna, Geneva. In other years, centres were set up also at Mexico City, Ismailia, Nairobi, Nicosia and Beirut.

The question can be asked whe ther it is a system of recruitment or a system of promotion
46. Annex 2 shows the main nationalities to which the candiatates and the successful candidates belong. In practically all cases they are from countries which are well-represented or overrepresented. In certain cases it is precisely because of the existence of this internal examination that the countries remain regularly in the well or over-represented category, which has the effect of making it virtually impossible to organize outside competitive examinations in those countries. This is one of the drawbacks of the system of intermal promotion. It should be noted, however:

That $G$ to $P$ promotion as it took place before the institution of the promotion examination had exactly the same consequences as far as nationality was concerned;

That the nationality of candidates and of successful candidates reflects proportionally the present nationality distribution of the whole of the General. Service category.

In any event, here again, an increase in the number of posts offered for competition outside could overcome this drawback to a great extent.
47. Like any change in settled habits, the institution of this internal examination has created psychojogical difficulities. It is often forgotten that the General Asseubly set up this system to get rid of manifest abuses and serious showtorings. 5/ On the other hand, it has seemed regrettable, for example, that the new system makes it less easy than did the previous system to reward staff members who have spent a long career in the service but have neither the qualifications nor the desire to sit the examination. In other words, the question raised has been whether the system of internal examinations was a method of recmuitment or a system of promotion.
48. A paper dated 12 August 1983 (SMCC/VII/9) prepared by the Joint Advisory Cormittee (JAC) at Headquarter's, New York for the Staff Management Comordination Comnittee (SMCC) at its seventh session in New York in Septemker 1983 and entitled "Altematives to the Competitive Examination for Movement from the General Service and Related Categonies to the Professional Category" sumarizes the problem in this respect very neatly. It points out that any promotion system should:

Be part and parcel of a career development plan based on clearly defined professional groups and a job classification system;

Apply on a Secretariat-wide basis;
Be as objective as possible.

[^0]It also points out that the crucial question is whether the movement from one category to the other should be regarded as a system of recruitment or of promotion. After looking at various options, it recommends the examination of a dual system which would address two groups among the General Service staff:

Those who have reached the highest levels within their category (or alternatively have at least 15 years' service to their credit);

Those who have academic qualifications corresponding to an occupational group ( $P$ category) and five years' experience (this group is the same as under the present systen, but witin the academic level requirement raised).

For each of the groups, different systems of tests would be considered, in the first case mainly to test the experience acquired on the job, and in the second to test the candidate's technical and general qualifications. The paper explains in conclusion that this dral option in any case requires further study and that essential information is lacking.
49. The ideas expressed in this paper seem to us to be of interest and deserve serious study. However, the problem which arises in this connection appears to 23 to be wider still. The questions which the institution of the competitive examination has thus brought to light are concerned not merely with the specific matter of how to move from $G$ to $P$ category, but actually with the entire concept of a staff policy for General Service staff. They also indicate that the present policy is undoubtedly ill-defined.
50. This question, particularly the part concemed with career development in the General Service category, has been under consideration for many years; but progress has been extremely slow. It would be tiresome to list all the documents which have dealt with this problem and all the wo king groups which have studied it without reaching either conclusions that can be applied, or decisions. For more than 12 years, the Joint Inspection Trit has in report after report been recomnending the restructuring of the General Service category (e.g. recomendation No. 1.4 of report JIJ/REP/71/7 of July 1971), and has time after time called for the adoption of an occupational groups list of career planning, of a system of training, and of better recruitment methods. Some progress appears to have been made in the understanding of the problem, in the formal adoption of the above concepts and in the study of certain aspects of the question. Recent proposals for setting up two complementary G-6 and G-7 grades in New York are certainly a step in the right direction; but no overmall policy has been either formulated or put into practice.
... but nothing can be resolved finally until a system of career development for General Service staff has been established.
51. The General Service category in the United Nations comprises about 10,000 staff members. 6/ These are broken down as foliows: approximately 31.7 per cent in New York ( 3,116 ); 15.23 per cent at Geneva ( 1,496 ) ; 10.47 per cent at Vienna ( 1,029 ); 6.50 per cent at Bangkok (638); 5.32 per vent at Addis Ababa (523); 4.17 per cent at Santiago (410); in other words, nearly 74 per cent at six duty stations, the rest being spread over a very large number of countries throughout the world. The nationalities represented are those of practically all the countries, but in the case of more then 65 per cent they are essentially those of a. dozen countries. 7/ The only policy which appears to exist as regards recruitnent is that of recruiting locally, in other words in the zones surrounding the duty stations. On the other hand, apar't from a few tests in shorthand and typing for secretaries (tests varying according to the duty stations), there is no objective method of recruitment and there are no principles which apply to the proportions to be recruited at the beginners' grades, nor rules concerning age, work experience or qualifications required. While the odd document may give reason to hope that some progress has been made in defining occupational groups, it does not appear that the existing posts have been classified into

## A report by the

SecretaryGeneral on these problems
would make it possible to clarify the situation and to look into possible solutions. for each of the groups. Nor does there appear to be any outside system of training, either prior to recruitment or of an in-service kind.
52. This means that there is a long way to go to provide a suitable status for this category of staff, which is of great importance as regards the number of its members and the functions it serves. As everyone knows, one of the fundamental bases for good management in any administration and in any large undertaking is the existence of a body of subordinate persomnel fully trained and adequately motivated by its career prospects. In spite of the devotion of a large part of this personnel, and the often heavy responsibilities entrusted to it, the United Nations leaves much to be desired in this direction.

6/ The statistics concerning General Service staff would appear to suffer from the same shortcomings as the staff statistics in general. For example, the report on the Composition of the Secretariat ( $A / 38 / 347$ of 14 September 1983) inaicates for 30 June 1983 a figure of 8,218 staff members in the General Services and 1,153 in other related categories, making a total of 9,371 (table 20), and another figure of 9,980 for staff belonging neither to the professional category nor to that of experta (table A); whereas for 31 December 1982, report ACC/1983/PER/32 of 30 June 1983 published by the secretariat of the Consultative Comittee on Administrative Questions (CCAQ) indicates for the United Nations a figure of 9,821 staff members in the General Service category (tables 1, 2 and 17), and then, in tables 11A and 11B, figures of 7,707 General Service staff members paid out of budgetary funds and 5,329 paid out of non-budgetary funds, or a total of 13,036 .

7/ Jnited States, Thailand, Philippines, Ethiopia, Uinited Kingdom, France, Austria, Chile, India, Bangladesh, Switzerland, Kenya.
53. For this reason it seems to us essential, before making any proposal to the General Assembly for possible amendment of the present system of competitive examinations for $G$ to $P$ promotion, that the Secretary-General should let the Assembly look closely into the present situation of the General Service staff as a whole. A study such as the Assembly might see fit to ask for on this question should comprise at least the following information:
(a) A serious statistical basis including (for a recent date but the same for all data):

The number of budget and non-budget posts covering General Service and other related staff, with a breakdown by duty station and by grade;

A list of recognized occupational groups and the number of posts, with grades, assigned to each of them;

The number of staff by grade (with an indication of the equivalences making it possible to add together the results for the various duty stations), by length of service, age group, nationality, occupational group, sex, level of academic qualifications anã job experience;

The combinations of these various characteristics:
Occupational group, grade and length of service;
Occupational group, age and length of service;
Occupational group, age and grade; etc.
Comparative data on the systems of $G$ to $P$ promotion prior to and following the institution of the competitive examinations (same indications as above for the staff members promoted).
(b) Proposals concerning:

Improvements in the methods of recruiting General Service staff to achieve greatea objectivity for each occupational group;

The determination of age standards, qualifications, recruitment procedures, etc. in eack grade, incluaing beginner grades, for each occupational group. (This is particularly important. It is not possible to organize the careers of a category of staff unless the recruitment proportions at the beginners' grades and higher grades are clearly established. In general, it is desirable that the bulk of recruitments axe effected at beginners' grades);

Training methods applicable prior to secruitment, in the course of recruitment and for the preparation of the promotion examination, at least at the ei.ght most important duty stations;

Career organization, including career procedures in each occupational group; examination of the possibility of harmonizing grades at the various duty stations; and conditions for promotion to the highest grades;

Possible modifications of the system of $G$ to $P$ promotion, including a thorough study of a dual system of internal recruitment (at a level equal to that of the extemal competitive examinations, especially in regard to academic qualifications) and of promotion in the case of staff members who have reached the highest grades.

## CHAPTMR III

54. The establishment of a staff policy calculated to provide the United Nations with the high quality staff it needs is a long-texm undertaking. The staff policy reforms recommended by the Joint Inspection Unit since 1971 have been implemented in part, sometimes cautiously, more of ten with a slowness which serves no purpose and can hardly be justified. The balance-sheet to be drawn up today is still oniy relatively in the black, so that it would seem necessary to take one or two more steps in the right direction and to speed up the tempo somewhat.

## 55. This balance-sheet has on the credit side:

The institution and systematic implementation of competitive examinations for recruitment at levels $P-1 / P-2$;

The definition of 14 occupational groups for the professional staff category;

The development and modermization of the recruitment rostexs for professional staff and project staff;

The establishment of a long-term recruitment plan;
The work done on preparing a career development plan for professional staff;

A number of studies on the occupational groups for General Service staff.

This report has described one or two of the phenomena which must be placed on the debit side:

Resistance to the wholesale application of external competitive examinations and the continuation at $P-1$ and $P-2$ levels of recruitment practices which are not objective and are at variance with resolution 35/210;

Difficulties in the implementation of a career development system for professional staff;

The inadequacy of studies concerning General Service staff, the lack of a definition for this category of a career development plan and an over-all policy.
56. The purpose of this report is to suggest to the

General Assembly that it give the necessary stimulus to get rid of these shortcomings. The main recommendations in this respect are the following:

Recruitment at P-1/P-2 ievel, against any post (whether established, temporary or financed out of exira-budgetary funds, and whatever the grade) should be by competitive examination, apart from very specific exceptions authorized by the Assistant SecretaryGeneral, Office of Personnel Services, on behalf of the Secretary-General subject to the limits and conditions laid down in paragraphs 28 and 29 and to the provisions defined in paragraph 30.

Recommendation No. 2
The preparation of a list of successful candidates at the external national competitive examinations should be carried out in accordance with the procedures described in paragraphs 31-34.

## Recomendation No. 3

A plan for external national competitive examinations should be established for a minimu period of three years within the framework of the long-term recruitment plan in accordsnce with the procedures described in paragraph 35.

## Recommendation NO. 4

The General Assembly might consider seeing to it that the creation of new posts in budgets include a substantial proportion of $\mathrm{P}-1 / \mathrm{P}-2$ posts, so as to re-establish the normal pyramid of Professional grades. It might also consider limiting or prohibiting the reclassification of $P-2$ posts at higher levels.

Recommendation NO. 5
As of 1 January 1985, recruitments at $P-3$ level should follow the methods defined in paragraphs 37-39, and these methods should be fully applied from I January 1987 onwards.

Recommendation No. 6
The General Assembly might consider the possibility of recommending the extension of the rules applicable to competitive examinations to UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and HCR.

## Recommendation No. 7

The General Assembly might consider the possibility of requesting the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation of General Service staff in the United Nations, in accordance with the procedures defined in paragraph 53.

Annex 1, External National Examination

| Date. | Cowntry | Place | No. of candidates | No. of candidates admitted | No. vf posts by occupational groups | No. oi candidates recruited by occupational groups | No. of candidates on reserve list |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1974 | Italy Fed. Fep. of Germany | Rone | $\begin{array}{r} 580 \\ 404 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 283 <br> 183 | 10 15 | 18 10 | 6 |
| 1975 | Japan <br> Ini ted Kingdom |  | $\begin{array}{r}338 \\ - \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 322 \\ 47 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 10 \\ -2 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 5 \\ & 2 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6 \\ & 2 \end{aligned}$ |
| 1979 | France |  | 1.40 | 94 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| 1981 | France Japan | New Yorik | $\begin{aligned} & 53 \\ & 83 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 47 \\ & 51 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Econ. } & 2 \\ \text { Econ. } & 7 \\ \text { EDF } & \frac{2}{9} \\ \text { Totai } & \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Econ. 6 <br> Feon. 6 <br> EDP $\frac{2}{8}$ | Euon. 4 <br> E.on. 2 <br> EDP $\frac{0}{2}$ |
|  | TOMAL |  |  |  | 51 | 48 | 32 |
| 1982 | $\left\lvert\, \begin{aligned} & \text { Brasil } \\ & \text { Fed.Rep, or }\end{aligned}\right.$ | Rio de Janeiro | 350 | 195 | $\begin{array}{ll}\text { Scon. } & 4 \\ \text { Aumin. } & 4 \\ \text { Soo. Pol } & 1 \\ & \\ & \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Econ. } & 4 \\ \text { Aainin. } & 1 \\ \text { Soc.Pol. } & \frac{1}{6} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Econ. } & \frac{1}{3} \\ \text { Admin. } & 3 \\ \text { Soc.Pol. } & \frac{3}{7} \end{array}$ |
|  | Germany | vologne | 182 | 147 | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Econ. } & 6 \\ \text { FDP } & \frac{2}{7} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Eicon. } & 6 \\ \text { EDP } & \frac{2}{\tilde{E}} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll}\text { Econ. } & 3 \\ \text { EDP } & \frac{6}{9}\end{array}$ |
|  | Italy | Rome | 104 | 57 | Econ. EDP | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Econ: } & 6 \\ \text { EEDP } & \frac{1}{7} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Econ. } & 2 \\ \text { EDP } & \frac{2}{4} \end{array}$ |
|  | Ivory woast | Abidjan | 236 | 159 | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Admin. } & \frac{1}{2} \\ \text { Econ. } & \\ \text { Soc. Pol. } & \frac{2}{5} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Admin. } & 1 \\ \text { Econ. } & 2 \\ \text { Soc.Pol. } & \frac{0}{3} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Admin. } & 4 \\ \text { Econ. } & \frac{1}{2} \\ \text { Soc.Pol. } & \frac{0}{5} \end{array}$ |
|  | Mauri tania | Nouakchott | 82 | 59 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Admin. } \frac{1}{2} \\ & \text { Econ. } \\ & \text { Soc.Po1. } \\ & \frac{2}{5} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Admin. } & 1 \\ \text { Econ. } & 2 \\ \text { Soc.PoI. } & \frac{0}{3} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Admin. } & 4 \\ \text { Econ. } & \frac{1}{2} \\ \text { Soc.Pol. } & \frac{0}{5} \end{array}$ |
|  | Suriname | Paramaribo | 31 | 7 | Econ. 4 <br> Soc. $\frac{1}{5}$ | Econ. 0 <br> Soc. 0 | No |
| 1983 | Czechoslovakia <br> Ped. Ref. of Gesmany | Prague <br> Cologne | 20 175 | 16 112 | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Admin. } & 4 \\ \text { Admin. } & 4 \\ \text { Libr. } & \frac{4}{8} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Admin. } & 4 \\ \text { Admin. } & 4 \\ \text { Sac.Sc. } & \frac{4}{8} \end{array}$ | No $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Admin. } & 4 \\ \text { Soc.Sc. } & \frac{4}{8} \end{array}$ |
|  | Okrainian SSR | Kiev | 22 | 19 | Admin. 5 | Admin. 5 | Admin. 2 |
|  | Libya | Tripoli | 20 | 12 | Admin. 3 | Admin. 1 | No |
|  | German Dem.Rep. | Berlin | 37 | 32 | Buon. 5 | Econ. 5 | Econ: 2 |
|  | Japan | Tokyo | 215 | 152 | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Econ: } & 4 \\ \text { Fin. } & \frac{4}{\varepsilon} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Econ. } & 4 \\ \text { Fin. } & \frac{2}{6} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Econ. } & 2 \\ \text { Fin. } & \frac{3}{5} \end{array}$ |
|  | Norway | Osla | 52 | 32 | Econ. 4 | Econ. 4 | Ewon. 3 |
|  | USSR | Moscou | 44 | 41 | Evon. 6 | Econ. 6 | Econ. 2 <br> Soc.Pol? |
|  | Venezuela | caracas | 135 | 22 | SOC, PCI. 4 | Sno. | Soc.Pol |
| Total 1982-1933 |  |  |  |  | Evon. 43 <br> Admin. 19 <br> Eiler 2 <br> Libr. 4 <br> Fin. 4 <br> Soc. Poll $\frac{10}{82}$ | 70 | Econ. 17 <br> Adnin. 17 <br> FDP 3 <br> Soc. Pol 8 <br> Firi. 3 <br>  5 |
| GRAND TOTAL |  |  |  |  | 133 | 118 | 88 |

Competitive examination for $G$ to $P$ promotion

| Date | Number of candidates | Main nationalities of candidates |  | Number of posts by occupational group |  | Number of candidates recruited by occupational group |  | Main nationalities of successful candidateb | Academic level |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1979 | 434 | Philippines <br> USA <br> France <br> Thailand <br> United Kingdom <br> Ethiopia <br> Austria <br> India <br> Chile | $\begin{aligned} & 11 \\ & 65 \\ & 31 \\ & 29 \\ & 21 \\ & 17 \\ & 14 \\ & 16 \\ & 10 \end{aligned}$ | Admin. <br> Jibr. <br> Econ. <br> Soc. <br> Statist. <br> Fin. <br> EDP <br> Total | 18 4 7 7 1 6 4 $\overline{47}$ | Admin. <br> Libr. <br> Econ. <br> Soc. <br> Statist. <br> Fin。 <br> EDP | $\begin{array}{r} 21 \\ 4 \\ 6 \\ 5 \\ 0 \\ 6 \\ 4 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | USA 16 <br> Fhilippines 6 <br> India 4 <br> United Kingrion 4 <br> France 2 <br> Thailand 2 <br> Australia 2 <br> Austria 2 <br> Miscell. $\frac{10}{4 B}$ | $\begin{array}{cc} >M A & 13 \\ \mathrm{RA} & 14 \\ \angle \mathrm{BA} & 21 \end{array}$ |
| 1981 | 459 | IISA <br> Philippines <br> France <br> Thailand <br> United Kingdom <br> Ethiopia <br> Chile | $\begin{aligned} & 79 \\ & 62 \\ & 30 \\ & 26 \\ & 28 \\ & 21 \\ & 12 \end{aligned}$ | Admin. <br> bubr. <br> Econ. <br> Soc. <br> Statist. <br> Inform. <br> Soc. <br> Total | $\begin{array}{r} 13 \\ 2 \\ 0 \\ 5 \\ 4 \\ 6 \\ 17 \\ \hline 31 \end{array}$ | Admin. <br> Libr. <br> Econ, Soc. Statist. Inform. | $\begin{array}{r} 13 \\ 2 \\ 0 \\ 5 \\ 4 \\ 6 \\ \hline \overline{30} \end{array}$ | USA 6 <br> France 3 <br> United Kingdom 2 <br> India 4 <br> Philippines 2 <br> Miscell. 10 <br>  $\overline{30}$ <br>   | $\begin{array}{rr} >M A & 6 \\ \mathrm{BA} & 10 \\ <\mathrm{BA} & 14 \end{array}$ |
| 1922 | 408 | USA <br> Philippines <br> Thailand <br> France <br> United Kingiom <br> India <br> Ethiopia | $\begin{aligned} & 62 \\ & 50 \\ & 30 \\ & 22 \\ & 20 \\ & 19 \\ & 14 \\ & 20 \end{aligned}$ | Admin. <br> Econ. <br> Soc. <br> Fin. <br> $-$ <br> Total | $\begin{array}{r} 12 \\ 8 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 1 \end{array}$ $\overline{34}$ | Admin. <br> Eron. <br> Soc. <br> Fin. <br> $=$ | 12 6 6 7 0 <br> 31 | USA 5 <br> Philippines 3 <br> Austria 5 <br> Argentina 3 <br> Ethiopia 2 <br> Miscell. 2 <br>  11 <br>  $\overline{31}$ | $\begin{array}{lr} >\mathrm{MA} & 8 \\ \mathrm{RA} & 1.5 \\ \angle \mathrm{BA} & 8 \end{array}$ |
| 1983 | 382 | USA <br> Philippines <br> Uni.ted Kingdom <br> Ethiopia. <br> France | $\begin{aligned} & 71 \\ & 49 \\ & 27 \\ & 16 \\ & 1.5 \end{aligned}$ | Admin. <br> Libr. <br> Statist. <br> EDP <br> Inform. <br> Total | $\begin{array}{r} 8 \\ 5 \\ 4 \\ 2 \\ 9 \\ \hline 28 \end{array}$ | Admin. <br> Libr. <br> Statist. <br> EDP <br> Inform. | $\begin{array}{r} 6 \\ 5 \\ 3 \\ 2 \\ 9 \\ \hline 25 \end{array}$ | USA 11 <br> United Kingdom 3 <br> Miscell. 2 <br>  $\frac{9}{25}$ | $\begin{array}{rr} >M A & 6 \\ B A & -3 \\ <B A & 6 \end{array}$ |
|  | TAI, | USA <br> Fhilippines <br> United Kingdom <br> France <br> Thailand | $\begin{array}{r} 278 \\ 232 \\ 96 \\ 98 \\ 87 \end{array}$ | Admin. 51 <br> Libr. 11 <br> Econ. 15 <br> Soc. 18 <br> Stat. 9 | $\begin{array}{lr} \text { Fin. } & 13 \\ \text { EDP } & 6 \\ \text { Inf. } & 25 \\ \text { Soc. } & 1 \\ \text { N. } & \frac{1}{140} \end{array}$ | Admin. 52 <br> Iibr. 11 <br> Econ. 12 <br> Soc. 18 <br> Stat. 7 | Fin. 13 <br> EDP 6 <br> Inf. 15 <br> $\overline{134}$ | USA 40 <br> Philippines 15 <br> India 10 <br> United Kingdon 10 <br> France 8 | $\begin{array}{rr} M A & 33 \\ B A & 52 \\ \angle B K & 49 \end{array}$ |


[^0]:    5/ In that connection, see for example the reports JIU/REP/71/7, $76 / 8,77 / 4,78 / 4$.

