
2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

8 June 2010

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Summary record of the 7th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 6 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Organization of work

Requests from intergovernmental organizations to make a statement

1. **The President** said that he had received an additional request to make a statement during the general debate from the representative of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. He took it that the Conference, in accordance with the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee, wished to accede to that request.

2. *It was so decided.*

General debate (continued)

3. **Mr. Labbe** (Chile) said that the current Review Conference was opening in a much more propitious climate than the preceding one, thanks in particular to the proactive leadership role assumed by the countries with major responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Important recent developments had been the conclusion by the United States and the Russian Federation of a new arms reduction treaty and the latest United States Nuclear Posture Review; they had also included the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., whose results would promote more flexible exercise of the inalienable right of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. Considering that international security was indivisible, Chile held that all States were responsible for its preservation, irrespective of their size and power. All States parties to the Treaty, which remained the cornerstone of the system of collective security, likewise had a share of responsibility for the success of the Conference.

5. To that end, Chile proposed that the States parties should respect all prior agreements and decisions relating to the Treaty review process and, rather than renegotiate such earlier agreements as the 13 practical steps, find updated arrangements for their implementation, as appropriate. They should: realistically agree on plausible actions towards disarmament, including the new package of measures proposed by Australia and Japan; support the

Secretary-General's five-point plan and, in particular, lay the foundations for preliminary discussion of a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons; give particular attention to practical ways forward, particularly a reduction in the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, as proposed by New Zealand; swiftly launch negotiations on the treaty for the prohibition of the production of fissile material for military purposes; reaffirm the need for the speedy entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty; forcefully proclaim the practical importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as an intermediate stage towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, urging their expansion to the northern hemisphere; highlight the importance of Mongolia's self-proclamation as a nuclear-weapon-free State; as a matter of priority, seek ways of advancing implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, including intersessional monitoring mechanisms; identify and firmly condemn existing risks of proliferation, seeking effective prevention mechanisms; strengthen the international safeguards system through universalization of the IAEA additional protocol; reaffirm the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in full compliance with the provisions of articles I, II and III of the Treaty; establish an institutional base for the Treaty, taking as a starting-point the proposal made by Canada and co-sponsored by Chile, with significant civil society participation; regulate exercise of the right to withdraw from the Treaty under article X, particularly by States not in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations; and raise public awareness of the need to abolish nuclear weapons, through disarmament education programmes, and, in the meantime, prevent their proliferation.

6. He drew the participants' attention to document NPT/CONF.2010/2, which set out, article by article, Chile's views of the Treaty and the best ways of strengthening it.

7. **Mr. Sobków** (Poland) said it was paradoxical that, despite the collapse of the bipolar world order, nuclear weapons continued to play a significant role. The proliferation of nuclear weapons remained one of the greatest challenges not only to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime but to international security as a whole.

8. The recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic arms reduction treaty strengthened non-proliferation while

building on agreements reached in the early 1990s. It built confidence and promoted transparency, thus contributing to international security. Disarmament efforts also made nuclear weapons less attractive to potential proliferators.

9. The announcement by the United States that it would release information on its stockpile of nuclear weapons was welcomed by Poland. It was expected that other nuclear-weapon States would follow the example of the United States.

10. Those positive developments had already launched the debate on a future arms-reduction treaty, which should set new limitations not only on strategic weapons but also on other types of nuclear weaponry, especially those designated as tactical or sub-strategic. The reduction and elimination of those weapons had not yet been the subject of any legally binding international agreement. The goal of a world without nuclear weapons could not be met without addressing that issue directly. Large arsenals of sub-strategic nuclear weapons seemed anachronistic in the post-cold-war world and increased the risk of proliferation by non-State actors. Instead of enhancing international security, they made it more volatile. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Poland and Norway had therefore undertaken a joint initiative whereby sub-strategic nuclear arsenals would be included in the arms-control framework.

11. They suggested an incremental approach without deadlines, which would be flexible and realistic. That process would aim to accomplish objectives in three stages. The first two, which should be given the highest priority, would be the enhancement of transparency and the introduction of confidence-building measures. The third stage proposed the reduction and elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in conjunction with a general disarmament process. They hoped that their initiative would contribute significantly to the debate on nuclear disarmament.

12. The risk of proliferation was also related to the security of sensitive nuclear and radiological materials, and in that regard international terrorism and the uncontrolled spread of sensitive technologies posed an even greater threat. Poland, as a transit country, had a direct interest in strengthening the international norms relating to the control of those risks. It had therefore attended the Washington Nuclear Security Summit held in April 2010. One of the issues discussed at that

Summit had been the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in promoting nuclear security and non-proliferation. Poland strongly supported all initiatives aimed at providing IAEA with the instruments it needed to carry out its important mandate. It called on all States to cooperate with IAEA and introduce full transparency with regard to their sensitive nuclear activities. That meant universalization of the IAEA additional protocol as a safeguards standard.

13. Poland was not advocating that any State should take steps which Poland had not already taken itself. In January 2009, the Polish Government had decided to develop a nuclear power programme. It hoped to set a positive example by complying with international non-proliferation and transparency norms as it expanded its nuclear facilities. Poland had implemented an IAEA additional protocol and since 2006 had been covered by the integrated safeguards system.

14. **Mr. Heller** (Mexico) said that the possession of nuclear weapons was a threat to international peace and security and that their use would be a crime against humanity. Mexico, having complied with all its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and taken every possible step towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world, could legitimately demand that other States comply with those obligations. The fact that the Treaty had been extended indefinitely in 1995 did not imply acceptance of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the five States concerned.

15. His delegation welcomed recent positive developments, in particular the conclusion of a new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, and called for efforts not only to lower the operational readiness of nuclear weapons but also to move towards their irreversible, transparent and verifiable destruction. A new window of opportunity had been created for bilateral and multilateral negotiations to strengthen the three pillars of the Treaty, especially in the present economic context, since huge spending on nuclear weapons was detrimental to the economic and social development of peoples. While it was true that the possession of nuclear weapons could act as a deterrent to the use of such weapons, a false assumption was thereby created that individual and collective security

was not possible without them: their mere existence spawned a need to possess them.

16. It was not possible to disregard the challenges facing the Treaty. India and Pakistan had declared themselves to be nuclear powers outside the Treaty; Israel was presumed to have nuclear capacity; and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had announced its withdrawal from the Treaty and carried out two nuclear tests. It was unacceptable and indeed contrary to the goal of the Treaty that an increasing number of States should acquire nuclear capacity for military purposes.

17. Mexico, as one of the architects of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, while recognizing that, in the Middle East, such a zone could be contemplated only as part of a comprehensive political arrangement that would address all related security issues. Mexico continued nevertheless to support the establishment of such a zone and called on all the parties concerned to undertake negotiations to that end.

18. As for Iran, its nuclear policy could not be dissociated from its foreign policy, which appeared to reveal intentions incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. That country was required, in a fully transparent spirit, to comply with IAEA decisions, respond to requests for information about its nuclear programme and give verifiable assurances, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions that it would not seek to possess nuclear weapons.

19. Mexico called on Israel, India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the universalization of which was the responsibility of all States parties and militated against the conclusions of agreements with States outside the Treaty that ran counter to commitments assumed in the context of the Review Conferences. Mexico agreed that nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from the territory of the European allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in accordance with articles I and II of the Treaty. It supported the establishment of a multilateral nuclear-fuel mechanism, provided that it involved IAEA and did not limit the inalienable right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

20. Mexico hoped that, in addition to progress on the 13 practical steps, the Conference would result in: a commitment by nuclear-weapon States that had not yet

done so to declare publicly the number of nuclear warheads in their arsenals and their alert levels; the establishment of a nuclear arsenal accounting system within the United Nations; a no-first-use pledge by nuclear-weapon States; an undertaking to negotiate a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances; and a reaffirmation of the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to destroy their nuclear arsenals and negotiate a convention on their prohibition. In conclusion, his delegation stressed the importance of civil society participation in the promotion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

21. **Mr. Carrión-Mena** (Ecuador) said that in Ecuador, under its new Constitution, nuclear weapons were banned and no foreign military installations were allowed. Ecuador had long been an advocate of the prohibition of such weapons and, accordingly, as a signatory to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, hoped that nuclear-weapon-free zones would be established in all regions of the world where they did not already exist. Such zones were a fundamental contribution to the disarmament process, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The only way to remove the threat of the use of nuclear weapons lay in their complete elimination, in particular through the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

22. Ecuador welcomed the recent positive and complementary developments in the international security climate, notably the new arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation; they should form part of increased multilateral efforts leading to further such reductions, which must be irreversible, transparent and verifiable by IAEA. To that end, his delegation supported the speedy implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted by the 2000 Review Conference and the five-point plan proposed by the Secretary-General. His country urged nuclear-weapon States to negotiate a binding universal treaty whereby they would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and, in the meantime, to comply with their negative security assurances. It called on all IAEA Member States to accede to the Agency's nuclear safeguards agreement and allow full access by inspectors to all nuclear installations. Israel, the only country in the Middle East that was not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should change that situation and place all its nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards regime; it would then be possible to establish a

nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Ecuador similarly called on India and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and join the IAEA safeguards regime. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should also become a party to the Treaty and place its nuclear installations under that regime with the ultimate aim of achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

23. Ecuador looked forward to the early entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty; in the meantime, it supported a continuing moratorium on all nuclear tests. It also looked forward to the opening of negotiations towards a verifiable treaty banning the production of weapons-grade fissile materials. His country recognized that each State had an inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and that the only restrictions thereto must be for reasons of non-proliferation under the Treaty. It supported all initiatives for cooperation in the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a means of speeding up the advent of a nuclear-weapon-free world, which would be achieved only on a gradual step-by-step basis. Most people aspired to such a world, in which the resources swallowed up by nuclear weapons would be used for the economic and social development of present and future generations.

24. **Mr. Christian** (Ghana), while recognizing the sovereign right of each State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to determine its own security agenda, said that such an agenda must respect the provisions of the non-proliferation regime. He welcomed the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and urged the United States and the Russian Federation to sign and ratify the respective protocols of that Treaty and to work with other signatories to ensure that Africa remained a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As a developing country, Ghana attached immense importance to the right of States parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the indispensable role played by IAEA in assisting the developing world. Since establishing the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission several decades ago, his Government had actively promoted the development and utilization of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, while complying with necessary inspections.

25. He welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, as well as the commitments made by

countries attending the Nuclear Security Summit recently held in Washington, D.C. In order to give effective meaning to global efforts aimed at eliminating all weapons of mass destruction, all States must sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and other related treaties to facilitate and accelerate nuclear disarmament. It was only through universal accession to the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes that the spread of nuclear weapons could be curbed and the preservation of mankind, guaranteed.

26. **Mr. Ščepanović** (Montenegro) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. He welcomed the positive steps taken by nuclear-weapon States towards disarmament and urged States to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. As a contracting party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, his Government welcomed its ratification by three States in 2009 and the announcement by the United States of its intention to ratify it as well.

27. Only a multilateral approach to disarmament and security issues would lead to long-term peace and stability. His Government was committed to further strengthening its national security system and contributing to international security mechanisms and cooperation to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. Preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups required a comprehensive approach to international challenges such as poverty, poor governance and conflict.

28. The verification capabilities of IAEA should be strengthened and expanded. The ratification and full implementation of additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements should be recognized as a standard for verifying States' compliance with obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Montenegro had taken steps to develop its institutional and legislative framework for the verification and protection of nuclear and radiological material from misuse, including through several agreements with IAEA and a number of other international instruments. He reiterated his Government's support of diplomatic efforts towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue in a peaceful manner.

29. Access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy could not be denied to States that complied with their non-proliferation obligations in good faith. It was important to link the use of nuclear energy with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; that objective could be achieved by securing access to nuclear fuel cycle products and services for interested countries through a multilateral mechanism. All stakeholders, including developing countries that were launching nuclear energy projects, should be encouraged to participate in the definition of multilateral approaches to the securing of such access.

30. **Mr. Nobilo** (Croatia) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. He welcomed the outcome of the recent Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., as well as the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010. The Non-Proliferation Treaty remained of vital importance in the international community's efforts towards nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and he welcomed the strong involvement of civil society organizations in the Review Conference.

31. The three pillars of the Treaty were mutually reinforcing. Current proliferation threats, including not only States' non-compliance with their obligations under Security Council and IAEA resolutions but also non-State actors' attempts to obtain nuclear material, should be dealt with effectively. Furthermore, the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not be a privilege of the few, but a right of all countries, provided they exercised transparency and responsibility in respect of international non-proliferation and safeguards instruments. IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and their additional protocols offered the proper standards of verification. He advocated strengthening that system and called upon all States parties to conclude and bring into force such agreements. The Government of Croatia also supported the work of IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear supply, as an effective means of addressing the growing need for nuclear fuel.

32. He called upon those States that had not yet done so to consider ratifying the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. It was also important to discuss in

greater detail the procedures and consequences of withdrawal from the Treaty. The suspected proliferation of nuclear weapons by some countries, regardless of their status under the Treaty, was a matter of great concern, not least because it helped to fuel the arms race. Welcoming the announcement made by the Government of the United States of its intention to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as similar statements made by other States listed in annex 2 of that Treaty, he urged all States that had not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty. Noting with satisfaction the adoption of the programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament, he called for an early conclusion of the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. He welcomed the steps taken to conclude treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones, which enhanced regional and global security.

33. Croatia continued to support the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and had actively participated in the recent comprehensive review of the resolution's implementation. His Government had devoted particular efforts to combating non-proliferation and enhancing the institutional network of relevant institutions in south-eastern Europe. It continued to be active in sharing its expertise with countries in the region, especially with regard to export controls. Croatia had established legislative and operational procedures relating to non-proliferation, export controls and nuclear safety. It had adopted legislation on nuclear safety and security in accordance with European Union legislation and had established a national office for nuclear safety. Croatia was, moreover, a party to all the major international nuclear non-proliferation agreements, and had concluded an IAEA additional protocol. He invited all States that were not already members of the relevant arms control and non-proliferation regimes to utilize the related standards and procedures. Croatia also participated in non-proliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

34. **Mr. Menon** (Singapore) said that it was important to convince all States that nuclear weapons reduced rather than increased security and did not enhance prestige. The nuclear-weapon States must take the lead in that regard, lest the failure to make progress on article VI should cause the Treaty as a whole to lose credibility. He welcomed the new treaty on strategic

arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation as a significant step forward and urged all nuclear-weapon States to use the momentum created to address other critical issues, for instance, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in strategic defence doctrines, providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and continuing to significantly reduce nuclear weapons in a transparent and verifiable manner. All nuclear-weapon States should furthermore commit to ending testing and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Welcoming the decision of the Indonesian Government to initiate the process of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, he urged the nuclear-weapon States and all States listed in annex 2 of that Treaty that had not yet ratified it to do so without delay. It was imperative to involve in the discussion of such issues States that had not signed the Treaty but had nuclear weapons capabilities.

35. As long as some countries had nuclear weapons and others did not, a sense of international imbalance and insecurity would prevail. He therefore welcomed steps taken towards fulfilling the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. A pragmatic, rather than purist or ideological, approach to such zones should be encouraged, in order to give all stakeholders the confidence that their vital security interests would not be compromised. He expressed support for the efforts by the Group of Arab States towards achieving a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, but stressed that the broader geopolitical context of that region must not be ignored: a number of conditions, including a just and sustainable two-State solution to the Palestine question and the recognition of Israel by all States in the region, were necessary to make a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone a realistic objective.

36. While supporting the renewed interest of many States in the development of nuclear power to meet energy needs, it was important to recognize that such development entailed risks, as it inevitably hastened the spread of nuclear technology, including capabilities and knowledge that could be used for nuclear weapons programmes. It was therefore imperative that all countries that chose to exercise their right under article IV of the Treaty should spare no effort in reassuring the international community through actions as well as words, of the peacefulness of their intentions. In that

connection, all States that had not yet signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with IAEA should do so without delay. The international community urgently needed to strengthen nuclear safety and security while enabling States that were abiding by their international obligations to reap the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All States should adopt higher standards of safety and security with regard to nuclear materials and facilities. The mandate and capacity of IAEA in setting such standards should be strengthened. Regional arrangements could play a useful role in supporting the Agency's activities. A more robust universal global export control regime should be established to guard against the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, while not hampering legitimate trade. The creation of a multilateral fuel assurance mechanism could help prevent the transfer of sensitive nuclear know-how, yet provide countries interested in pursuing nuclear technology with the means to do so.

37. A mechanism was urgently needed to encourage countries with nuclear weapon capabilities that were not parties to the Treaty to abide by the same international rules and safeguards. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must be given incentives to rejoin the global non-proliferation regime. As for Iran, it was in its own interest to do all it could to restore international confidence, particularly by fully cooperating with IAEA. States parties should agree on concrete, time-bound and verifiable actions in order to prevent the Treaty from becoming irrelevant. If the current Review Conference ended in the same way as the previous one, he feared that the decline of the non-proliferation regime might become irreversible.

38. **Mr. Badji** (Senegal) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime for the past 40 years. Despite the slow pace of progress over that period, his delegation was firmly convinced that the Treaty could enable the international community to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, particularly in the light of recent positive developments such as the 2009 Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the new treaty on strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Russian Federation.

39. In the area of nuclear disarmament, the 2010 Review Conference should work to strengthen the authority of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by promoting universal adherence to the Treaty and compliance with previously agreed commitments. To that end, the Conference should, *inter alia*: reaffirm and implement as a matter of urgency the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference; draw up a list of the specific actions needed to implement article IV of the Treaty on the basis of an agreed timetable; and decide on the modalities for a treaty on general and complete disarmament pursuant to article VI of the Treaty. In that connection, his country remained convinced that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty would make a decisive contribution towards the objectives of article VI. Furthermore, while the provision of unilateral security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was welcome, the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be further strengthened if such assurances were provided through a legally binding instrument.

40. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were interrelated and equally important goals under the Non-Proliferation Treaty: nuclear non-proliferation was essential to prevent non-nuclear-weapon States, or worse, still terrorists or non-State actors, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Since IAEA had a leading role to play in that regard, sufficient resources must be provided to enable the Agency to strengthen its verification and monitoring capacities. The current non-proliferation regime was far from credible and the time had come to implement the relevant decisions of previous Review Conferences in that regard. The nuclear-weapon States should also ensure strict compliance with articles I, II and III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty when cooperating with States not parties to the Treaty.

41. Efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime should reinforce the security of all States and must not impede the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty. Access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy was crucial for the development of a country such as Senegal, which complied fully with its obligations under the Treaty.

42. Lastly, Senegal welcomed the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty and launched an urgent appeal for a similar nuclear-weapon-free zone to be established in

the Middle East, pursuant to the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

43. **Mr. Sinirlioğlu** (Turkey) said that Turkey remained committed to the full implementation, further strengthening and universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The three pillars of the Treaty were inseparable and mutually reinforcing, and required equal and balanced treatment.

44. The inconclusive outcome of the 2005 Review Conference had been a stark manifestation of the challenges facing the Treaty. The States parties could counter those challenges by reaffirming and reinforcing their prior commitments. Indeed, past achievements, such as those of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the 13 practical steps of 2000, were testimony to States parties' ability to achieve unanimity during difficult times.

45. The Turkish delegation believed that all treaty-based nuclear-arms control and disarmament accords played distinctive roles in meeting article VI obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It commended the steps already taken by nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty towards further reductions and transparency, and hoped that the momentum thus created would be maintained. In that context, Turkey welcomed the recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic arms reduction treaty. It also welcomed the renewed commitment of the permanent members of the Security Council to the principles of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

46. Turkey would continue to encourage further positive steps by all nuclear-weapon States to enhance global security. It attached particular importance to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in those efforts.

47. Turkey also continued to support the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. In that regard, it was encouraged by the announcement by Indonesia that it would begin to ratify the Treaty. Turkey called on all States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty — particularly those whose ratification was required for its entry into force — to do so as soon as possible. In the meantime, States should continue to observe a moratorium and refrain from any acts contrary to the provisions of the Test-Ban Treaty. Likewise, Turkey supported the

commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. That could pave the way for parallel advances in related fields, including further progress on nuclear-weapon-free zones, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

48. IAEA was the sole legitimate body to determine compliance within the non-proliferation system. Turkey recognized the need for further strengthening and universalization of the Agency's verification authority and its promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It called on all States that had not yet done so to sign, ratify and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement as well as an IAEA additional protocol as soon as possible.

49. Turkey supported the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, wherever feasible. In particular, it supported the establishment in the Middle East of an effectively verifiable zone free of such weapons and their means of delivery. It encouraged all efforts for developing a common regional understanding on that project, with the participation of all parties concerned.

50. Turkey believed that the States parties to the Treaty had the right to withdraw from it under conditions stipulated by the Treaty itself. Turkey nonetheless believed that the States parties should establish procedures and consequences applying to those States that chose to exercise that right of withdrawal while found in non-compliance with their Treaty obligations by IAEA.

51. The risk of terrorists and other non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery should not be underestimated. The first and most important step towards eliminating the risk of nuclear terrorism was to further nuclear disarmament efforts and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies. The balanced and carefully crafted outcome of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit held in April 2010 demonstrated a common will to enhance nuclear security. The international community must redouble its efforts to ensure the effective and universal implementation of all non-proliferation instruments, including Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009) and the Proliferation Security Initiative. The contributions made by other multilateral arrangements such as the

Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee were also valuable.

52. Turkey supported the greatest possible enjoyment of the benefits of nuclear energy by States parties that were in full compliance with their Treaty obligations. At the same time, it believed that all necessary steps must be taken in order to ensure that there would be no increased risk of proliferation associated with the expansion of nuclear energy.

53. IAEA played an essential role in helping developing States parties gain access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Turkey had been closely following the efforts to establish a new multilateral framework for the supply of nuclear fuel. Provision of nuclear fuel in a predictable, stable and cost-effective manner over the long term without undue interference, as well as ownership of those mechanisms under modalities agreed to by the wider membership of the Agency, were essential for a broader basis for their implementation.

54. **Mr. Beck** (Solomon Islands) said that changing global military postures were creating uncertainty within the international system. Those postures guaranteed security for some and insecurity for others. Militarization and threats by non-State actors to use their arsenals were on the rise.

55. The Review Conference must arrive at practical steps for the systematic and progressive elimination of nuclear weapons through a legally binding international instrument and provide unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. That could only be achieved through genuine dialogue and cooperation.

56. Accelerated negotiations were needed in order to produce a time-bound plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons. His country had no objection to the proposed establishment of a standing committee to review, monitor and verify disarmament undertaken unilaterally and bilaterally. Such a plan should comprise three phases, including full implementation of the nuclear-free-zone treaties by the nuclear-weapon States by 2015; conclusion of negotiations on the further reduction of nuclear arsenals and the transfer of nuclear weapons to secure storage sites under international supervision between 2015 and 2020; and the elimination of all nuclear weapons and the application of safeguards for nuclear facilities on a universal basis.

57. The Solomon Islands delegation was saddened by the divisive actions taken by some States parties during the course of past week. All States parties must cooperate in order for the Review Conference to succeed.

58. The continued existence of nuclear weapons represented a significant threat to humanity. Solomon Islands had experienced atmospheric as well as underground nuclear testing by a number of nuclear-weapon States. The people of Solomon Islands continued to suffer from the impact of those tests.

59. The Solomon Islands delegation commended the recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their nuclear arsenals. However, the principles of transparency, verification and irreversible dismantlement of nuclear arsenals must be woven into such arrangements. In that regard, IAEA was the sole competent authority. Confidence in the impartiality of the Agency's work and programme must be restored and upheld, and any politicization of its work must be avoided.

60. Solomon Islands was in a region that had established a nuclear-weapon-free zone pursuant to the Rarotonga Treaty. It joined others in welcoming the entry into force of similar zones in Africa and Central Asia and would welcome the establishment of such zones globally, including in the Middle East.

61. Lastly, Solomon Islands reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee it was seeking and it called for the full implementation by nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament commitments under the Treaty.

62. **Mr. Pálsson** (Iceland) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the most widely adhered to multilateral disarmament agreement in history. Among other things, the Treaty provided the basis for the work of IAEA, exemplified by the thousands of extensive inspections carried out by the Agency in a great number of countries every year. Thanks to the Treaty, non-proliferation had become a global norm.

63. The Treaty had nonetheless been under critical stress for a number of years. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the capabilities to deliver them over long distances was one of the key challenges confronting the international community and one of the most difficult to solve.

64. The purpose of the Review Conference was to chart a course for the next five years or more. Recent developments, including the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic arms reduction treaty, Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) and the Nuclear Security Summit held the preceding month in Washington, D.C., together with the renewed commitment of the United States in seeking to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and initiate negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, had set the stage for progress to be made.

65. It was now necessary to move beyond the stalemate reached at the 2005 Review Conference. The outcome of the present Conference must demonstrate that the States parties as a whole were willing to assume their full responsibility in upholding the Treaty for the benefit of all. Progress must be achieved on a balanced review of each of the Treaty's three pillars. The aim should be to strengthen and reaffirm the Treaty, as part of the broader non-proliferation regime.

66. To realize that goal, strict compliance with existing non-proliferation obligations was essential. Iceland shared the concerns that many had expressed in that regard concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and called on both States to meet their obligations consistent with Security Council resolutions and IAEA agreements. Iran's nuclear activities were also a matter of regional security. Iceland supported efforts by States to make progress towards a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in conformity with the resolution of the 1995 Review Conference.

67. The Non-Proliferation Treaty clearly stated the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Reliable supplies of energy were vital for sustainable development and more and more countries were considering nuclear energy as a means of meeting their energy requirements.

68. Everyone was aware of an inherent weakness in the Treaty, namely, that it gave scope for countries to acquire technologies that brought them to the very brink of nuclear weapons capability without explicitly violating the agreement. A common position must be sought on how to respond to a State's withdrawal from the Treaty, which must not be without consequences for the State concerned.

69. Iceland was confident that the momentum created by the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and other recent developments in the area of nuclear disarmament would help achieve the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, as envisaged in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That would be the greatest service the Conference could render to the cause of international peace and security.

70. **Mr. Kohona** (Sri Lanka) said that the recent Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the bilateral agreements between nuclear-weapon States were welcome signs. Those signs of political will must lead to action. There was reason to hope that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons could be achieved.

71. Sri Lanka was fully committed to discharging its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It called, however, for a balanced approach to the three pillars of the Treaty. It supported the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. Sri Lanka was also committed to the Test-Ban Treaty and its early entry into force. A fissile material cut-off treaty would help counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Sri Lanka strongly supported nuclear-capability verification under the framework of the IAEA Statute and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nuclear disarmament required comprehensive and verifiable steps, as well as a precise and realistic timetable, and IAEA played a valuable role in that regard.

72. His delegation agreed with Japan that comprehensive safeguards measures together with an additional protocol should be the current IAEA safeguards standard. In order for the application of additional protocols to become universal, assistance should be provided to developing countries that were willing to accept such a safeguards standard.

73. While Sri Lanka supported non-discriminatory efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it also recognized, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty, the fundamental right of the States parties to develop research, production and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty. Sri Lanka also agreed with the Secretary-General that the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not have unintended consequences. In that regard, Sri Lanka fully supported any international initiative to enhance and strengthen technical cooperation related to nuclear energy

development within and outside of the IAEA framework. It was hoped that technological advances would include new safety measures applying to nuclear energy and the disposal of nuclear waste.

74. The establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements entered into freely by the States of each zone strengthened world and regional peace and security, reinforced the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributed to nuclear disarmament.

75. Stringent controls and greater cooperation were urgently required to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear materials. In that regard, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was a useful instrument.

76. There was a need for an institutional mechanism to guide the Treaty process. The views of all delegations on the structure and duties of a permanent secretariat must be taken into account.

77. All States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, must recognize that a holistic concept of security could only be realized if there were a serious commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament, while pursuing nuclear non-proliferation measures. The implementation of the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences should be evaluated and the Treaty-review process should be streamlined. The 2010 Review Conference would be successful only if the decisions that were adopted were duly implemented.

78. Lastly, his delegation believed that a genuine commitment to non-proliferation could be ensured only by creating confidence where there was insecurity. As the Treaty process moved forward, the broader context of global peace and security must be taken into consideration.

79. **Ms. Nyamudeza** (Zimbabwe) said that the Review Conference should strengthen the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty without discrimination. The selective implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty would not advance the objectives thereof.

80. Zimbabwe welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation. However, positive steps must be followed up in order to move closer to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. The Review Conference must agree on clear, transparent, irreversible and verifiable action plans and a time frame for the

implementation of article VI by nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon States should implement the 13 practical steps to eliminate nuclear weapons, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, there was an urgent need for a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

81. The universality of the Treaty was critical to the success of any nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process. The fact that some States were not party to the Treaty severely undermined its viability.

82. Zimbabwe fully supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world as an important measure in achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It was regrettable that 15 years after the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review Conference, a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region was still not a reality. It was therefore important for the current Review Conference to adopt practical action plans for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Zimbabwe welcomed the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, which it had ratified, and called on nuclear-weapon States that had not yet ratified the protocols to that Treaty to do so unconditionally and without delay. It welcomed the announcement by the United States of its intention to initiate the ratification process.

83. The promotion of the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was enshrined in article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as an inalienable right of all States. It was also the main statutory objective of IAEA. Any restrictions of that right constituted a violation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty. The peaceful use of nuclear technology could benefit African countries tremendously in their development efforts and Zimbabwe therefore called for increased international cooperation in that area.

84. Raising awareness of the tragic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons through education was very important and public support was needed to move forward the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

85. **Mr. Sinhaseni** (Thailand) said that the international community must pursue its efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remained the cornerstone of international

nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Meanwhile, a balanced and non-discriminatory approach must be maintained to the implementation of the Treaty's three pillars. The 2010 Review Conference should therefore reaffirm the relevant commitments undertaken by States parties to strengthen disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In that connection, his delegation supported the Secretary-General's five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament of 24 October 2008 and the five benchmarks for success also put forward by him in his opening statement to the 2010 Review Conference.

86. In the field of nuclear disarmament, Thailand welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010 and called for the early commencement of negotiations on a nuclear material cut-off treaty by the Conference on Disarmament, whose programme of work should be adopted and implemented as soon as possible.

87. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were important confidence-building measures which played a pivotal role in safeguarding regional peace and security. Furthermore, the negative security assurances enshrined in the treaties establishing such zones were an essential guarantee for the global non-proliferation regime. Thailand therefore supported the establishment of such zones and encouraged greater coordination among them to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

88. In view of the increasing importance of the various applications of nuclear technology, IAEA technical cooperation programmes should be strengthened and the rights of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be upheld in conformity with article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle would also need to be addressed within the framework of IAEA in order to secure the global supply network for nuclear fuel and to guarantee long-term energy security.

89. **Mr. Cancela** (Uruguay) reaffirmed his Government's commitment to full and strict compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the need to strengthen all three of its pillars. While recent positive developments were welcome, particularly the new treaty on strategic arms reduction between the

United States and the Russian Federation, the opportunity provided by the 2010 Review Conference must be seized to make tangible progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A world free of nuclear weapons remained remote but it could still be achieved with sufficient political will. The current Conference should therefore be a starting point towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons on the basis of good-faith negotiations.

90. His country reiterated its call for all States to sign or ratify additional protocols to their safeguards agreements as soon as possible. Furthermore, reservations or unilateral interpretations by nuclear-weapon States which adversely affected the status of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be amended or withdrawn.

91. Uruguay shared the legitimate concerns of others that the nuclear-weapon States must provide genuine negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, including through a legally binding instrument to that effect. The 2010 Review Conference was the appropriate forum to begin discussions on that issue.

92. A robust safeguards system would help the international community to effectively combat the threat of nuclear proliferation. Uruguay was fully committed to making IAEA as efficient and effective as possible in its efforts to combat nuclear proliferation.

93. Lastly, the 2010 Review Conference should provide effective support for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, which was not only a vital development tool but also the third pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

94. **Mr. Cujba** (Republic of Moldova) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a key instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. The progress achieved as a result of recent positive developments provided a unique opportunity for the 2010 Review Conference to strengthen the credibility of the Treaty by addressing its three pillars in a constructive and balanced manner, and by adopting a realistic and focused programme of action.

95. The recent entry into force of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Asia and Africa was welcome because it promoted the maintenance of both international and regional peace and security. The establishment of such a zone in the

Middle East would significantly help to strengthen collective security in that part of the world and should therefore be encouraged.

96. IAEA safeguards played a central role in providing assurances that States were pursuing peaceful nuclear activities. The Republic of Moldova had demonstrated its commitment to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime by concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA and by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In addition, his Government had recently deposited its instrument of ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and would shortly ensure the timely signature of an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.

97. The Republic of Moldova, which had enjoyed fruitful cooperation with IAEA through its technical cooperation programmes for the past 15 years, was also committed to the responsible development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy pursuant to article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

98. His Government firmly supported the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which played a critical role in preventing non-State actors from acquiring nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It had also signed and ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2008 with a view to addressing the unlawful possession or use of nuclear devices or materials by non-State actors.

99. The timely entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was an essential part of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, should be a top priority for all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His delegation welcomed the commitments made by the United States and Indonesia to ratify the Test-Ban Treaty, which should encourage the remaining annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty.

100. Progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should be complemented by reductions in conventional arms. The control of conventional weapons was of particular importance to the Republic of Moldova because of the separatist regime in its Transnistrian region. An international fact-finding mission to assess the huge stockpiles of weapons and ammunition in that breakaway region was imperative.

101. **Mr. Hoxha** (Albania) said that his country was committed to further strengthening the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remained the cornerstone of international peace and security. The 2010 Review Conference must agree on a stronger Treaty regime that would reinforce security while guaranteeing peace and stability in the world.

102. Recognizing the growing momentum created by the nuclear-weapon States towards a world free of nuclear weapons, his delegation welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, together with the commitment of the United States to work towards the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy. Those positive developments should be built upon during the current Review Conference in order to produce a successful and balanced outcome.

103. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would make a major contribution towards the promotion of world peace and security. His delegation called upon all States that had not yet done so to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. It also hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would be able to overcome the current deadlock in order to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

104. IAEA comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols were integral parts of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA verification instruments needed to be strictly observed and further strengthened, particularly in view of their importance in combating nuclear terrorism. In that connection, while Albania attached great importance to the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, that right was contingent upon strict compliance with the obligations enshrined in articles I, II and III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

105. Albania had taken a number of practical steps to combat illegal trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials, including improvements to the national legal framework for export controls of arms and dual-use items, and upgrades to the infrastructure at border checkpoints.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.