

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

7 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 8th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 6 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)
later: Mr. Marschik (Vice-President) (Austria)
later: Mr. Cabactulan (Chairman) (Philippines)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. António** (Mozambique) said that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was now closer to universality than ever before. Progress had been achieved in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing such a zone in Africa, was of particular importance for that continent. His delegation congratulated Mongolia on becoming a nuclear-weapon-free State, and welcomed the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation signed in April 2010. He also commended the efforts of certain nuclear-weapon States to share information on steps taken or envisaged with a view to reducing the number of nuclear weapons.

2. Mozambique remained prepared to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on programmes to ensure technology transfer and national capacity-building. His country was fully committed to working towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and supported international efforts to combat poverty, address climate change and promote sustainable development.

3. **Mr. Solón-Romero** (Plurinational State of Bolivia) said that nuclear weapons were the most inhuman form of armament ever invented. According to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, at least 23,000 nuclear warheads still existed. Some 22,000 were in the possession of the United States of America and the Russian Federation; the remainder were owned by France, the United Kingdom, China, India, Pakistan and Israel. Some 2,000 nuclear weapons were in a state of high alert and could be deployed within four to eight minutes. So long as any such weapons existed, it was inconceivable that they would never be used. The new treaty signed in April 2010 between the United States and the Russian Federation constituted a positive step, which should be followed by further action.

4. It was indefensible to argue that certain States needed nuclear weapons in order to guarantee their security, whereas other States had no right to acquire them. The current Review Conference should seek a new consensus on the basis of the 13 steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. The Plurinational State of Bolivia believed that the nuclear arsenals of the

United States and the Russian Federation should each be reduced to 500 warheads by 2015. The remaining nuclear-weapon States should reduce their arsenals by half during that period. Those measures would leave a total of only 1,500 nuclear warheads. All nuclear-weapon States should give firm security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Those assurances should be supported by a resolution of the Security Council. A world without nuclear weapons should become a reality by 2020.

5. His delegation welcomed all efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East. The inalienable right of States to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be upheld as one of the three pillars of the Treaty. Greater resources should be made available for such activities through the Technical Cooperation Programme of IAEA. All States should take effective measures to strengthen the security of their nuclear materials and facilities, in particular through the adoption and implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Nuclear disarmament was essential in order to preserve Mother Earth.

6. **Mr. Bauwens** (Belgium) said that the Treaty was now at a crossroads: it could be either strengthened or unravelled. Belgium believed that it offered a well-balanced and comprehensive platform with clear commitments in all relevant fields. It was not a static document, but provided stability in a constantly evolving process of checks and balances. Belgium called on India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to and comply with the Treaty, and called on other States to remain indefinitely committed to it. The Treaty was the yardstick for issues regarding nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. An effective, multilateral and multifaceted approach was needed in order to address the complex root causes of proliferation and confront the challenge of non-State actors.

7. Belgium welcomed Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), which supported the work of IAEA and other relevant bodies. That resolution called for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, for the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a treaty banning the production of all material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, and for the early commencement of substantive work by the Conference on Disarmament.

8. The Security Council was united in emphasizing that any failure to comply with non-proliferation obligations should be brought to its attention. Belgium called on the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with the provisions of the Treaty. His country called on all States to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol. A comprehensive safeguards agreement coupled with an additional protocol constituted the current verification standard.

9. The new treaty signed between the United States of America and the Russian Federation in April 2010 on further measures for strategic arms reduction should encourage all nuclear-weapon States to support the zero option. Achievement of that objective would require a gradual and realistic approach. Belgium hoped that the two Powers would hold further discussions as soon as possible.

10. His country had raised the issue of nuclear weapons and disarmament within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon offered a unique opportunity for the European Union to promote the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The working papers submitted on behalf of the European Union reflected that commitment.

11. **Mr. Dos Santos** (Paraguay) said that the renewal and strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must be built on an ambitious, substantive and realistic agenda setting nuclear disarmament as the ultimate goal and leading to a regime that strengthened security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy based on greater diversity and transparency in the regime of inspections and checks.

12. Paraguay urged States that were not yet party to the Treaty to adhere promptly and unreservedly to it. His delegation also called for the prompt implementation of the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review Conference to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Paraguay welcomed the entry into force of the Treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia in March 2009 and the Pelindaba Treaty establishing Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in July 2009, as well as the adoption of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) and other new initiatives in bilateral nuclear disarmament, such as the

agreement signed in April 2010 between the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

13. The second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held at United Nations Headquarters in April 2010, had showed that more than 110 States had become members of such zones, nearly two thirds of the membership of the Organization, which clearly indicated the growing commitment of the great majority of the international community to the goal of denuclearization.

14. Paraguay was a party to all conventions and international treaties on disarmament in its various aspects, but was fully aware that the risks inherent in the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their possible use by non-State actors remained a threat to international peace and security, as recognized recently at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. In that connection, Paraguay urged full adherence to the highest international safeguards standards in terms of facilities and nuclear materials and full compliance with the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

15. Paraguay also called for the early commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. In that connection, he cited the resolution adopted by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in November 2009, reaffirming that South America remained a zone free of nuclear weapons under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that nuclear technology was to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

16. Paraguay also welcomed the role played by IAEA in verifying the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, while reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to research, develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The work of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) helped to achieve the various objectives set out in international nuclear non-proliferation treaties.

17. Paraguay called for the 2010 Review Conference to adopt a plan of action to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and provide the technological

and financial means needed to prevent military use of nuclear technologies.

18. **Archbishop Migliore** (Observer for the Holy See) read out a short message to the 2010 Review Conference from Pope Benedict XVI encouraging initiatives that sought progressive disarmament and the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He recalled that nuclear-weapon States had yet to engage seriously in negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons, as called for in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, or to take the steps called for in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

19. The Holy See strongly advocated for transparent, verifiable, global and irreversible nuclear disarmament and for seriously addressing the issues and dangers posed by nuclear strategic and tactical arms and their means of delivery. In that context, it welcomed the new strategic arms reduction agreement signed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation and called for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the ratification of existing nuclear-free-zone treaties and the establishment of new such zones, especially in the Middle East.

20. Every step in pursuit of the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda should be geared towards ensuring the security and survival of humanity and build on the principles of the inherent value of human dignity, which was the basis for international humanitarian law.

21. **Mr. Balé** (Democratic Republic of the Congo) welcomed recent events that served to strengthen a climate of confidence for dialogue and negotiation in the field of disarmament, including the high-level meeting of the Security Council on nuclear disarmament in September 2009, the recent Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., the recent signing of a strategic arms reduction agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and the announcement by the United States that it intended to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. There seemed to be evidence that the international community was moving towards negotiations on effective measures to bring the nuclear arms race to an end.

22. The Treaty remained the cornerstone of the international regime of nuclear disarmament and proliferation, but it was weakened by its discriminatory nature. Furthermore, the emergence of a new group of nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty weakened its effectiveness. The Treaty provided an ideal platform for multilateral cooperation and could serve as a universal legal instrument, if all States became parties. The Democratic Republic of the Congo called for universal adherence to the Treaty and urged States that had not yet adhered to the Treaty to do so and to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

23. Nuclear-weapon States must respect their commitments to implement the recommendations adopted by the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences and the 13 practical steps adopted by the 2000 Conference. The dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons must be transparent, progressive and irreversible.

24. The Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., last April had stressed the growing danger of the proliferation of illicit nuclear materials in recent years, including into the hands of non-State actors, and had called for preventive measures and for strengthening of the security of fissile material. The conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials and other nuclear explosive materials for military purposes would contribute to strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and negotiations to that end must be opened. His delegation also attached great importance to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and therefore called on all States, in particular the annex 2 States, to ratify that Treaty.

25. Given the problem of global warming, nuclear energy seemed to have an important future, especially in view of its many applications in the fields of medicine, agriculture and animal husbandry. The right to engage in research, production and utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be ensured for all States without discrimination or restriction. However, it must be recognized that the IAEA safeguards system remained the core monitoring mechanism for preventing diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.

26. His delegation also called for technical cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear States based on the appropriate international obligations.

IAEA should be provided with adequate resources to strengthen its role as the competent authority responsible for verifying and ensuring compliance with agreements including the Additional Protocol.

27. Nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed significantly to the goals of disarmament and international security. The entry into force in 2009 of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Asia and Africa strengthened the international peace and security architecture. His delegation supported the efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, in accordance with relevant General Assembly resolutions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. It also encouraged efforts to adopt an internationally binding instrument granting security assurances to non-nuclear States. The goals of non-proliferation and the elimination of all nuclear arsenals required cooperation and the strengthening of the system established by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on weapons of mass destruction and other relevant international legal instruments. Such cooperation should be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations and in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner.

28. **Mr. Jeenbaev** (Kyrgyzstan) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) faced extraordinary challenges, despite positive new developments that included the signing of the new strategic arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation. Furthermore, two new nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties had entered into force, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States, including one in Central Asia. As had been highlighted recently at the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, such zones now covered the entire southern hemisphere, and parts of the northern hemisphere, including territory in which nuclear weapons had previously been based. The Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia included provisions that called for efforts to remedy the environmental damage to the region resulting from prior nuclear-weapons activity and the requirement that parties adhere to the IAEA Additional Protocol.

29. His country continued to regard the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but had to recognize that the world had changed significantly in recent years. New proliferation challenges had emerged. The

Treaty and the broader non-proliferation regime had to adapt to changing circumstances, which included the growing risk of nuclear terrorism. International safeguards and the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities were the first line of defence against nuclear terrorism. It was crucial to boost support for the efforts of IAEA to strengthen the international safeguards system, including through the adoption of the Additional Protocol as the safeguards standard.

30. His country also supported efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Similarly, machinery established by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) sought to address the new proliferation challenges posed by non-State actors.

31. His country attached great importance to the issue of mitigating the environmental consequences of uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. It reiterated its call for all Governments and international organizations that had expertise in the clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance. Meetings on the problems associated with radioactive waste disposal and uranium tailings had been held in Bishkek in April 2009 and in Geneva in June 2009.

32. Education and training played a vital role in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. In that connection he cited the recommendations of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on the subject (A/57/124) and General Assembly resolution 57/60. Japan and other States parties continued to raise the issue in the NPT context, and he urged delegations to join in efforts to develop practical steps to implement the measures called for by the United Nations study.

33. **Mr. Muller** (Marshall Islands) recalled the fact that islands of his country had been used in the 1950s, while it had been a United Nations Trust Territory, as a test site for more than 65 large-scale surface tests of nuclear weapons, which had led to the displacement of people and serious health hazards. Furthermore, a large nuclear waste facility had been constructed on one of the islands within metres of the ocean. The issues of safe resettlement, restoration of economic productivity and assistance with remediation and disposal following nuclear testing had been raised at recent Review Conferences, and the responsibility of the former United Nations Trust Territories had been recognized

by States parties. The former Administering Power, which had conducted the tests, had undertaken to address some of those issues, but much remained to be done. He reminded States parties that United Nations Member States bore some responsibility as well, as those tests had been conducted with the authorization of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, despite the protests of Marshallese petitioners.

34. The Marshall Islands had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and hoped that it would soon enter into force. His delegation was alarmed that there remained a few States, some of them parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that continued to violate the rules of the Test-Ban Treaty, seemingly attempting to build and test nuclear weapons. The Marshall Islands was examining its position with regard to the Rarotonga Treaty on the establishment of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone. His country welcomed the new strategic arms reduction agreement signed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation and the new Nuclear Posture Review issued by the United States, as well as the recent Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C.

35. **Mr. Aisi** (Papua New Guinea) expressed his appreciation to the President for his tireless efforts over the past year, through far-reaching global consultations with States parties, to generate the consensus needed to ensure the preservation of the integrity of the non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Since the previous Review Conference in 2005, various measures had been taken that strengthened the Treaty, in particular actions covered by the disarmament provisions of article VI, which included the recent signing of an arms reduction agreement by the United States and the Russian Federation.

36. With regard to article IV issues, he cited cooperation offered by IAEA in the fields of health and food production. Pacific Island Forum members, including Papua New Guinea, supported the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, but that use had to be conducted within a framework that minimized proliferation risks and adhered to the highest international standards of safety, security and safeguards.

37. As a State within the South Pacific region, Papua New Guinea enjoyed the protection of being in the nuclear-weapon-free zone established under the Rarotonga Treaty. He welcomed the announcement by the United States Secretary of State that her country intended to ratify that Treaty, which might induce other Pacific States to do so as well.

38. He expressed the hope that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would soon receive the ratifications needed for it to enter into force. He welcomed Indonesia's announcement that it intended to ratify that Treaty and said that Papua New Guinea was currently engaged in the ratification process.

39. **Mr. Mahiga** (United Republic of Tanzania) said that his delegation fully endorsed the Secretary-General's five-point benchmarks for the success of the 2010 Review Conference. In that connection, he urged the Conference to build on the 13 practical steps to nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. There was an unprecedented positive trend towards nuclear disarmament, as reflected in the new strategic arms reduction agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation to reduce significantly their respective nuclear stockpiles and United States President Obama's articulation of a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, both of which augured, it was hoped, an irreversible universal commitment to disarmament by the nuclear States and the international community as a whole.

40. In that connection, his country had initially hesitated to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, because it saw the reduction and elimination of existing nuclear stockpiles and the abandonment of nuclear deterrence doctrines as a necessary precondition for serious nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As the cold war had come to an end and the nuclear super-Powers began reducing their nuclear weapon stockpiles, it had adhered to the Treaty and supported universal adherence.

41. On the negative side, his delegation was concerned by the spread of nuclear weapons in recent years, and the related problems that had arisen in connection with the peaceful use of nuclear energy, all of which should be addressed collectively and in a transparent manner through the NPT framework. Unilateral action could only engender regional and international suspicions and tension, and a variety of confidence-building measures were called for. As a

developing country, Tanzania saw the immense importance of nuclear energy as a source of power and the value of nuclear technologies to development in areas such as food production, addressing the adverse impacts of climate change and applications in medicine and related sciences.

42. Tanzania had vast proven resources of uranium and would continue to work with IAEA to develop nuclear technologies. Africa continued its collective efforts to strengthen the NPT regime through regional approaches and initiatives, such as the Treaty of Pelindaba establishing the African nuclear-weapon-free zone, which strengthened the non-proliferation regime and promoted cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. The African Union was proceeding to establish the African Commission on Nuclear Energy for peaceful uses in the development of its member States. Tanzania encouraged the establishment and effective operation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other areas, including the perennially volatile region of the Middle East.

43. **Mr. Al-Saadi** (Yemen) said that multilateralism, transparency and dialogue constituted the best way to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The three pillars of the Treaty were all necessary and mutually reinforcing. Yemen remained committed to the objectives of the Treaty, and ensured that such weapons and their components did not cross its borders.

44. It was a source of concern that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence remained in place, and that new nuclear weapons continued to be developed. Security strategies founded on the possession and use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime. Pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, their use and the threat of their use should be prohibited, and non-nuclear-weapon States should receive security assurances. Recent developments on the issue of non-proliferation and disarmament were welcome, and should lead to further practical steps. His country urged all nuclear-weapon States to seek bilateral or multilateral negotiations towards disarmament.

45. Israel's nuclear policy could trigger an arms race across the region. The silence of the international community had allowed Israel to persist in its refusal to accede to the Treaty and defiance of the relevant

international resolutions. Israel's nuclear facilities should be placed under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Security Council should take action in order to ensure implementation of the relevant IAEA resolutions, not to mention its own resolutions on nuclear disarmament, including resolution 687 (1991).

46. In order to preserve the credibility of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the nuclear-weapon States that had supported the resolution on the Middle East should reiterate their full commitment to its objectives. Practical mechanisms should be developed in order to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

47. States parties to the Treaty had a right to possess and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without hindrance. Such activities should take place in a spirit of transparency and full cooperation with IAEA. Developed States should provide technical assistance to developing States for the development of peaceful nuclear energy.

48. *Mr. Cabactulan (Chairman) resumed the Chair.*

49. **Mr. Ba-Omar** (Oman) said that the Treaty constituted the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and must therefore be preserved. However, the failure of the 2005 Review Conference had led to a stalemate in the international community's efforts to address nuclear weapons issues. The extension of the Treaty in 1995 had been made possible by the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East. Most States in the region had argued that Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty would place them at risk of nuclear attack. That situation had remained unchanged. The Treaty had thus become a cause of instability for all States in the Middle East except Israel, thereby creating the risk of a regional arms race. The silence of the international community had made possible Israel's continued refusal to become a party to the Treaty.

50. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference had confirmed the relevance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The 2010 Review Conference should build on both by determining immediate practical steps to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Failure to do so would indicate a considerable erosion in the legal, political and practical foundations of the Treaty. It was important to reaffirm the objective of the universality of the Treaty. It would be difficult for States parties to

accept any further commitments while non-parties continued to develop nuclear facilities and to benefit from international cooperation. The inalienable right of States parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must also be upheld.

51. His delegation welcomed the signing in April 2010 of a new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. It hoped that the positive spirit demonstrated by the President of the United States would facilitate the objectives of the Conference, thereby enabling it to make progress on the resolution on the Middle East, move towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty.

52. **Ms. Brown** (Jamaica) said that misuse of nuclear technology, the threat of non-State actors gaining access to nuclear weapons, covert dissemination of nuclear expertise, and non-compliance with Treaty obligations had all thrown the legitimacy of the Treaty into question. The Conference was an opportunity to renew international resolve to achieve the Treaty's goals and to build on recent positive developments, including the United States President's landmark speech in Prague in April 2009, the new treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a programme of work after a decade of stalemate, the United Nations Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and the recent Washington Nuclear Security Summit. There were many challenges remaining, including universalizing the Treaty, bringing about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

53. By focusing on non-proliferation at the expense of the other two pillars of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States were failing to hold up their end of the "grand bargain" and they needed to demonstrate good faith in discussions on a treaty on general and complete disarmament as provided for in article VI of the Treaty. More stockpiling only encouraged the fabrication of more pretexts for possessing nuclear weapons.

54. As one of the earliest signatories to the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, her country welcomed the entry into force of nuclear-weapon-free zones in both Africa and Central Asia in 2009, and expressed its

support for Mongolia's institutionalization of its nuclear-weapon-free status. Given its proximity to international shipping lanes, her country laid particular stress on shielding nuclear-weapon-free zones from the threat of accidents resulting from trans-shipment of nuclear waste and other hazardous materials. The recent fuel crisis had made the peaceful use of nuclear energy all the more important, and States that complied with IAEA safeguard mechanisms should have unfettered access to its benefits.

55. **Mr. Gaumakwe** (Botswana) said that his country placed great importance on peaceful applications of nuclear energy in agriculture, medicine and resource management, and supported the call by the IAEA Director General for sufficient funding for the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme. His country was a signatory to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Revised Supplementary Agreement concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance by IAEA. It had signed an IAEA safeguards agreement along with the Additional Protocol, and in 2006 had enacted a national Radiation Protection Act to incorporate into domestic law the provisions of relevant international agreements. He expressed support for the Secretary-General's call for a conference to review implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. His country was a signatory to the Pelindaba Treaty that established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. It had acceded to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and hoped for a speedy entry into force of that Treaty. He expressed optimism that the current Review Conference would not repeat the setbacks of 2005.

56. **Mr. Briz Gutiérrez** (Guatemala) called for universal adherence to the Treaty and fulfilment of commitments made at previous review conferences. The current Conference was an important opportunity to make progress towards objective mechanisms to verify compliance with all three pillars of the Treaty. The positive rhetoric coming from the nuclear-weapon States needed to be backed up by action. In that connection, the recent treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation and the Nuclear Posture Review conducted by the United States were both steps in the right direction.

57. The 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference were a good starting point for further progress. The Conference on Disarmament should begin immediate negotiations on both a treaty on fissile materials and an instrument on negative security guarantees, and, pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the moratorium on nuclear tests should be maintained. Disarmament needed to be treated on an equal footing with non-proliferation. He underscored the importance of a transparent and non-discriminatory approach by IAEA to verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear energy programmes. He urged the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission to remove financial obstacles that prevented developing countries like his own from ratifying the Treaty.

58. His country was a proud signatory to the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, and a participant in the Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, the final declaration of which was an important contribution to the Conference. He regretted that the resolution on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had yet to be implemented. The Conference offered an opportunity for States parties to restore credibility to the Treaty by making good on the commitments that were the basis of the original “grand bargain” between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

59. **Mr. Al-Sudairy** (Saudi Arabia) said that the continued failure of the international community to bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards threatened to involve the entire Middle East in a regional nuclear arms race. His country had previously submitted a report to the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference on steps to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The United Nations General Assembly had adopted a resolution supporting such a zone every year since 1974. He urged the Conference to call on the Director General of IAEA to follow up on the resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities adopted at that Agency’s General Conference in September 2009, and to reduce the Agency’s technological cooperation with Israel until that country acceded to the Treaty.

60. His country had submitted its national report to the Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and planned to conduct a regional workshop on implementation of that resolution. It had recently concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA and was ready to exercise its right to develop a peaceful nuclear programme under the auspices of the soon-to-be-established King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy.

61. He expressed concern at the obstacles encountered by negotiations on the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and encouraged that country to cooperate with IAEA with the aim of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. He commended the success of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. He urged nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and implement the 13 steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, bearing in mind that the surest guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their complete elimination.

62. **Mr. Woolcott** (Australia), speaking on behalf of the Vienna Group of Ten (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) said that the Group’s focus, in seeking to strengthen the role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been on reviewing articles III and IV of the Treaty, namely, the pillars of non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To that end, the Group had prepared and submitted working papers on seven topics, namely, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, compliance and verification, export controls, nuclear safety, physical protection and illicit trafficking, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.15-21). Each paper proposed specific language for the 2010 Review Conference final document. A separate working paper had been prepared containing elements for a forward-looking action plan to be adopted by the Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.38).

63. **Mr. Boding** (San Marino) welcomed the enthusiasm and determination of States parties to improve the Non-Proliferation Treaty and ultimately to eliminate all nuclear weapons. The Treaty was a unique instrument for the maintenance of world peace and international security, and the international community

must be resolute in reconfirming its commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. San Marino, like so many small countries, sought to have the international non-proliferation regime strengthened and, in that connection, applauded the commitment of United States President Obama and Russian President Medvedev to substantially reduce their nations' nuclear arsenals.

64. San Marino urged all countries that had not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so and praised those countries that had decided to establish and maintain nuclear-weapon-free zones. The demand for nuclear energy was rising but that technology should be used only for peaceful purposes to further develop economic and social growth. New technology would provide the means for the safe development of future nuclear plants and many other peaceful applications. San Marino urged all States parties to support the efforts of IAEA by reaffirming its authority and providing it with new resources to carry out its mission.

65. **Mr. Tóth** (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization) said that, despite the many challenges to its authority, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty now enjoyed nearly universal support, with 182 signatories and 151 ratifying States, but ratification by 9 annex 2 countries was still needed for the Treaty to enter into force, which would be a clear expression of global confidence in the wider non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The September 2009 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in New York had issued a strongly worded Final Declaration calling on the remaining States to sign and ratify the Treaty.

66. The Test-Ban Treaty provided a firm legal barrier against nuclear testing, thereby curbing the development of new types and designs of nuclear weapons by possessors, and would-be possessors, and served as a strong confidence and security-building measure. The Treaty verification regime was nearing completion: 80 per cent of the system's global monitoring stations had already sent data to the headquarters in Vienna. The Treaty was equally important as an instrument for nuclear non-proliferation. Making the de facto international norm against nuclear testing legally binding through the entry into force of the Treaty would close one avenue for proliferation once and for all. While the

IAEA safeguards system remained the critical legal criterion in verifying a State's peaceful nuclear activities, that "upstream" compliance mechanism had come under significant pressure in recent years. With the resurgence of nuclear energy in many States capable of mastering the nuclear fuel cycle technology, the differentiation between technologies for peaceful and military purposes was increasingly a political and legal issue rather than a technological one.

67. Once the Test-Ban Treaty's verification regime was fully operational, non-compliance could be addressed in a predetermined and pre-agreed manner. In the light of increased concerns over non-compliance in other quarters of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the compliance mechanisms built into the Test-Ban Treaty were of great importance in strengthening the overall objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

68. The purely NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime was being challenged on many fronts. Unless States parties confronted the difficult issues before them with the aim of strengthening the overall non-proliferation and disarmament regime, differences would grow and some would seek opportunities to break consensus, leading to a failed or weak outcome.

69. Progress towards the goal of achieving the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty could bridge the divide between NPT parties on each of the three pillars. The Test-Ban Treaty was an integral part of the comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It had near universal membership, its verification regime was close to completion, and it had been tried and tested by two nuclear test explosions conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

70. **Ms. Wagner** (Inter-Parliamentary Union) said that nuclear disarmament and the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world were matters that concerned people everywhere in the most direct way. In April 2009, the Inter-Parliamentary Union had adopted a resolution on the role of parliaments in advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and securing the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which had included a series of practical recommendations on what parliaments should do to ensure universal ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty, promote the United Nations

Secretary-General's five-point plan for nuclear disarmament and work in favour of reductions in nuclear stockpiles, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty.

71. One year later, parliaments were reporting back on their action in follow-up to the resolution, which ranged from criminalizing domestic nuclear weapons activities to developing legislation that divested Government pension funds from corporations involved in the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. At the regional level, parliamentarians were working with partners on proposals for regional denuclearization and non-proliferation and efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

72. In February 2010, the United Nations Secretary-General had sent a letter highlighting the importance of the 2010 Review Conference and efforts by parliamentarians to advance the proposal for a nuclear weapons convention — one of the principal parts in his five-point plan — and had encouraged parliamentarians to make further efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. Parliamentary resolutions supporting a nuclear-weapons convention, or the more comprehensive five-point plan of the Secretary-General, had been adopted in a number of parliaments.

73. During the first week of the 2010 Review Conference, the Inter-Parliamentary Union had held, in collaboration with the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, a parliamentary dialogue at United Nations Headquarters on the role of parliamentarians in advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Key themes that had emerged included the need to recognize and act on the growing momentum towards nuclear disarmament; the role that nuclear-weapon-free zones and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty could play in developing the institutional and technical components for a nuclear-weapon-free world; the role that parliamentarians could play in supporting nuclear disarmament through the phasing out of nuclear weapons in their countries' security doctrines; exploring the legal, technical, institutional and political requirements for a nuclear-weapon-free world; the benefits for development gained from nuclear disarmament by releasing resources for meeting Millennium Development Goals; the importance of collaboration between legislators,

Governments and civil society; and the importance of disarmament and peace education in building political constituencies to support action by parliaments and Governments for nuclear disarmament.

74. **Mr. Al Assad** (Observer for the League of Arab States), speaking on behalf of the League of Arab States, said that although the Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the strategic arms reduction agreement recently signed between the United States and the Russian Federation were both promising developments, the major issues that stood in the way of a world free of nuclear weapons remained unaddressed. There continued to be an imbalance between disarmament, which was treated as a long-term goal to be achieved by the nuclear-weapon States in the distant future, and non-proliferation, with respect to which non-nuclear-weapon States were expected to take immediate action in the present.

75. The positions of the League of Arab States had been declared at the Arab Summit held in Sert in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in March 2009, and were further elaborated in the working papers submitted to the Review Conference by various Arab States. He called on the conference to adopt decisions banning the development and production of new nuclear weapons and banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Additional obligations should not be imposed on non-nuclear-weapon States before pledges already made at previous conferences were fulfilled. Universalization of the Treaty should not be a long-term rhetorical goal but rather an urgent priority, and the three States that persisted in refusing to accede should be made to pay a price for that refusal. He stressed the primacy of the right to nuclear energy for peaceful uses, and expressed disagreement with those who had urged that the Additional Protocol be made mandatory.

76. The Arab States attached particular importance to the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. That resolution had been an important impetus for Arab States to accede to the Treaty and a basic element of the agreement to extend it indefinitely. But in the 15 years since the adoption of that resolution, not a single step had been taken towards its implementation. He called on the Conference to take concrete action towards implementation of that resolution, and urged IAEA to follow up the resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities adopted at its September 2009 General Conference.

The argument made by certain countries that action on Israel's nuclear programme should be linked to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict only encouraged other countries to believe that possession of nuclear weapons was essential to their security. The submission of Israeli nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would spare that region from an unneeded arms race. The 2010 Review Conference was an important opportunity to strengthen implementation of decisions from previous conferences, in particular those of 1995 and 2000, and to restore the balance between the three pillars of the Treaty.

77. **Mr. Do Canto** (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) said that the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials was the result of a bilateral approach to non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While recognizing the sovereign right of every nation to have access to nuclear technology for the scientific, technological, economic and social development of their inhabitants, Brazil and Argentina had signed an agreement for joint management of the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy in each country, which had established a common system for accounting and control of nuclear materials managed by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency. The agreement implied a clear and definite commitment to the use of all the materials and nuclear facilities under national jurisdiction or control exclusively for peaceful purposes.

78. For the past 18 years, nuclear activities had been conducted in the two countries under a quadripartite agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency and IAEA for the application of safeguards. Under the quadripartite agreement, both States had committed themselves to accept the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities carried out under their jurisdictions and control, with a single objective, namely, to ensure that such materials would not be diverted for nuclear weapons purposes.

79. Since the Agency's founding, more than 1,000 inspections had been carried out in the two countries. The system established by Argentina and Brazil was unique and presented clear advantages in comparison to safeguards agreements in general. The quadripartite agreement went beyond the standard safeguard regime linking a State party and IAEA. It involved two neighbouring States parties and an agency created by

them and IAEA, which formed a much more comprehensive safeguards regime.

80. Nuclear energy was expected to play a leading role in meeting rising energy demand. However, political instability had also led to concerns with regard to the possibilities of diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes. One task was to make nuclear power generation both economically feasible and inherently safe, which required, inter alia, understanding and cooperation among nations. Argentina and Brazil had decided to reactivate their respective nuclear energy programmes, which added significance to the role of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency in its activities of inspection, accounting and control. He urged States parties to consider the establishment of independent and reliable regional safeguards systems working with IAEA while making good use of local resources.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.