

28. Turning to the second aspect of the USSR draft resolution, Mr. Belaúnde regretted that one of the founders of the United Nations should state that peace would never be reached through the Security Council and that the Charter was a useless document. However, even though the Security Council was paralysed by the veto, it could never be said that the United Nations was bankrupt. The General Assembly would always have the final and moral force to clear up such situations as might be completely put aside in

the Security Council. The USSR proposal had all the characteristics of propaganda, and on that occasion, it had been overdone. Stating that the USSR must be made to realize that it had followed the wrong road, Mr. Belaúnde said he felt sure that the fog of suspicion which existed everywhere would clear up if full understanding were established by means of constant consultations.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 15 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Acting Chairman:* Mr. Jean CHAUVEL (France).

*Chairman (later):* Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).

#### Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (*continued*)

1. In the absence of Mr. Sarper, Mr. ARCE (Argentina) proposed that Mr. Chauvel, representative of France, should take the Chair temporarily.

*It was so decided.*

2. Mr. DJILAS (Yugoslavia) stated that, by using the expression "Tito clique" to describe the representatives of Yugoslavia, the representative of the Soviet Union had revealed the real attitude of his Government towards the independence and sovereignty of Yugoslavia. By the same token, he had insulted the Charter, which defined the rights and duties of sovereign countries, as well as the Yugoslav people. Indeed, if the Yugoslav Government did not enjoy the full support of a people that had paid a high price for its independence and was still defending it strenuously, it could never have resisted the external pressure that was being exercised against Yugoslavia. As the representative of Yugoslavia had stated in the general debate,<sup>1</sup> the USSR proposal (A/996) contained some positive factors. Any initiative, however inadequate and contradictory, that would enable a step forward to be made towards peace and security, the prohibition of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy, relations between the great Powers, and also international relations based upon the principle of the equality of States, would have the support of the Yugoslav delegation. But, the USSR proposal contained certain fundamental deficiencies, and the actions of the Soviet Union Government were incompatible with its utterances. The Yugoslav delegation could, therefore, but consider that proposal in the light of the policy that the Government of the Soviet Union was pursuing with regard to Yugoslavia.

3. The definition of war propaganda and of the principal causes of the danger of war given in the USSR proposal was incomplete and biased. In so far as words were concerned, all Governments were usually peaceful, and open incitement to war in newspapers and on the radio was infrequent. There were, however, many other forms of war propaganda; for instance, certain

Governments endeavoured to present the conditions now prevailing in certain countries in a completely false light, in order to "morally" justify the pressure exercised against those countries and with the view to their future subjugation. On the other hand, the establishment of blocs on ideological pretexts could really only serve hegemonic purposes, which gave rise to preparations for war and threats to peace. The Soviet Union Government could not, therefore, pretend to be the only Government which was not planning the enslavement of other countries, which had not established hostile blocs against other States and which had not prejudiced the cause of peace by its propaganda. It was true that in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries, war propaganda was widespread and at times reached the stage of calling for military measures against certain countries; but Soviet propaganda, on the other hand, apart from its intrinsic harm, was providing weapons for warmongers and anti-democratic elements in the other camp.

4. In the existing circumstances, the disputes leading to war were not ideological: capitalist States such as Germany, Italy and Japan had waged war simultaneously against capitalist and socialist States. The conflicts arose out of the policy of States which, irrespective of their social structure, persisted in their wish to subjugate other peoples, to destroy their independence and sovereignty and to ignore their right to be treated on a basis of equality. The threat to peace, therefore, lay in aggressive policy and methods, and not in ideological or social concepts. Whatever ideology might be proclaimed, any propaganda tending to subjugate a State was war propaganda, and constituted part of a hegemonic plan, fraught with crises and conflicts.

5. Mr. Vyshinsky had stated in the general debate that the Soviet Union adhered to the principle of international peace and co-operation. He had, however, refrained from mentioning non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the equal rights of small nations and the abolition of all discrimination, namely, those very principles which had previously been referred to as the basis of the Soviet Union's policy. Thus, Mr. Vyshinsky's speech of 14 November had made no contribution to the peace he had mentioned so often. Mr. Vyshinsky seemed to consider the problem of peace only from the point of view of the four great Powers. Although the

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 228th plenary meeting.

great Powers indeed had special responsibilities, it was also true that peace was indivisible and that threats to small States could unleash a general conflict. How could the Soviet Union speak of universal peace and co-operation? No sooner had a series of demonstrations and meetings in favour of peace under the auspices of the Soviet Union been held in Paris and Moscow, for instance, than it had launched an aggressive campaign against Yugoslavia. How could there be any confidence in the sincerity of the leaders of a country who alleged that they were struggling for the peace of the peoples and, yet, at the same time, by their aggressive attitude exercised pressure against a small country, to the detriment of the real interests of peace, which called for respect for the independence and equality of States?

6. Since Mr. Vyshinsky was wont to base his speeches on facts and figures, the Yugoslav delegation would reply by quoting certain facts relating, in particular, to the Rajk trial which had been intended to reveal the anti-Yugoslav policy of certain Eastern European countries. In the indictment against Rajk, it had been alleged that Mr. Bebler, a Yugoslav representative to the General Assembly, had entered into contact with Rajk in a French camp in 1941, with a view to espionage. Mr. Bebler had, in fact, been seriously wounded in Spain in 1938, had been sent back to Yugoslavia and condemned in 1939 for his political activities. Since 1941 he had commanded partisan units. Similar slander had been advanced against General Maslaric, Chairman of the Pan-Slav Committee, who had lived in the Soviet Union from 1938 until the end of the war. Similar lies had been told about Karlo Mrazovic who, until quite recently, had been Yugoslav Minister to Moscow. Ivan Gosnjak and Kosta Nadj, Colonel-Generals in the Yugoslav Army, had been slanderously accused of having been Gestapo agents since 1941, whereas since that year they had commanded large units of the army of liberation and had inflicted serious losses upon the Germans. Thus, the Soviet Union advanced the incredible allegation that agents paid by the nazis would have been used to annihilate thousands of the soldiers of their employers and masters. The Yugoslav Minister for Mines, Mr. Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, had been accused, like Mr. Bebler, of having had contacts with Rajk in French concentration camps, although he had never left Yugoslavia before he had gone to Bulgaria and the Soviet Union in 1947-1948. It was true that later, after proof had been submitted by the accused himself, the indictment had been corrected and it had been alleged that the two men whose names had been mentioned at the trial were in fact Veber and Vukomanovic, although no Yugoslavs of that name had ever been in Spain. Finally, the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Rankovic, had been accused of having gone to Hungary to give instructions to Rajk, as if in a similar case a Minister would make such a journey, instead of sending his agents.

7. Furthermore, nearly all the Yugoslav diplomatic staff in the Eastern European countries had been accused of espionage by Governments trying to justify their acts of hostility against Yugoslavia.

8. Thus, all the leaders of the Yugoslav liberation movement, a large majority of the staff of the

Federal Government of the various Yugoslav Republics, and all senior officers and high officials had been accused of espionage for the Gestapo and of having offered their services to the United States. How, then, had those men carried out the political and social changes which the whole world had seen? The truth was that the purpose of that slander was solely to justify the anti-democratic and bellicose measures taken against Yugoslavia.

9. On 1 May 1942, Marshal Stalin had announced that partisan war had broken out throughout Yugoslavia. The decisions later taken at Teheran had stressed the necessity of giving assistance to the Yugoslav partisans. On 20 October 1944, when Belgrade had been liberated, a Red Army order of the day had mentioned the Soviet and Yugoslav units which had taken part in the fighting. At Yalta, the three great Powers had granted *de facto* recognition to the new Yugoslav State. Nevertheless, the testimony of two or three unknown persons at a trial that had manifestly been fabricated, had sufficed to enable the Soviet Union Government to draw a conclusion contrary to the policies of the war and of international conferences. Nothing could be more perverse or cruel than to ascribe the struggle of a nation that had lost 1,700,000 of its inhabitants to the Gestapo simply because that nation did not wish to sacrifice its past and its future to the hegemonic plans of the Soviet Union.

10. The Soviet Union, which was aware of those historical facts, had made the mistake of believing that it could turn Yugoslavia and the rest of the world into a dumb flock of sheep obedient to the voice of the shepherd. History remained, however, and the falsifications of the Rajk trial could not give rise to the admission that occupied Yugoslavia, which had played a decisive part in the revolt against the Germans and had thus given valuable aid to the Soviet forces, had acted upon the orders of the Gestapo. An attempt was being made to prove that Yugoslavia was prepared to invade Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, and perhaps even Czechoslovakia and Poland, and probably also the poor little Soviet Union as well. Thus, the policy of the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia shed a new light on the declarations of peace made by the Government of the USSR.

11. The Rajk trial had been intended to prepare the atmosphere of the present session of the General Assembly and to justify further pressure against Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union, without making the slightest attempt to reach an agreement, had then denounced the pact of friendship and mutual assistance with Yugoslavia which it had violated long before by attempting to destroy the independence and sovereignty of that country.

12. In the course of the campaign against Yugoslavia, that country had been accused of preparing to partition Albania. But one wondered what was the basis and purpose of that allegation, which was in contradiction to the whole history of Albano-Yugoslav relations and the brotherly and disinterested help given by Yugoslavia to Albania. In the name of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav delegation wished to state publicly and officially that that country had not and would never have the slightest aggressive intention against Albania, and that it would never make any attempt against

the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Albania and its other neighbours. Yugoslavia wished Albania, as well as its other neighbours, to be sovereign and independent States. Yugoslavia would support every action to preserve peace on the frontiers of Albania and to safeguard its independence, which was also the duty of the United Nations. Yugoslavia could not be responsible for the fact that the Government of Albania, at the instigation of the Soviet Union, had adhered to a bloc hostile to Yugoslavia, thus placing that country in a difficult position, instead of thinking of its own independence and development.

13. Another pretext invoked for exerting pressure against Yugoslavia was the arrest, by the Yugoslav Authorities, of White Guard émigrés in Yugoslavia who had obtained Soviet nationality after the war, and who had been accused of espionage and subversive activities against Yugoslavia. In reply to a menacing note from the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Government had offered to repatriate those Soviet citizens and to settle any dispute by mutual agreement. Three months had elapsed since that proposal had been made, but the Government of the USSR, unconcerned with the fate of its citizens, had not even replied to the Yugoslav offer, and had merely used that matter to exert pressure against Yugoslavia and to menace the country. In spite of Yugoslavia's pacific attitude, there had been Soviet, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Romanian troop movements along the Yugoslav frontiers. Neither had the Soviet Union Government replied to the repeated requests of the Yugoslav Government and parents concerning the return of Yugoslav children who had been sent to Soviet schools after the war. Yugoslav citizens in the Soviet Union had been refused visas, although no proceedings had been taken against them.

14. The pressure exerted by the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia was only justified by statements of unscrupulous individuals who had repeated a lesson learned by heart at a staged trial, and by the arrest of Soviet citizens which that Government refused to repatriate. The Yugoslav Government had been accused of systematic hostility against the Soviet Union and the other States of Eastern Europe. But it was those States themselves which had taken a whole series of measures against Yugoslavia: the Soviet Union had reduced its trade with Yugoslavia by seven-eighths, and had refused to carry out a whole series of agreements. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Albania and Romania had broken economic, cultural and scientific relations with Yugoslavia and had denounced trade agreements with that country, thus placing it in a state of blockade. The Soviet Union and the Governments which had been led into the struggle against Yugoslavia, with the exception of Albania, had denounced their treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Yugoslavia on some fallacious pretext without instituting any procedure of conciliation and in spite of the efforts of Yugoslavia. The different attitude of Albania was explained by a whole series of plans in which it played only a subordinate role. A few days previously Yugoslavia had, therefore, had to denounce its treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Albania, in order to put an end to a shameful comedy.

15. In spite of the slanders directed against Yugoslavia for a year and a half, the Yugoslav

radio and Press had only stated the truth with regard to the Soviet Union, and far from indulging in hostile propaganda, had observed a strictly defensive attitude and had merely exposed falsehoods. But Yugoslavia, which defended the principle of the equality of all States, had been showered with abuse, which was the only argument of those who were in the wrong.

16. The propaganda of the Soviet Union, which protested its friendly intentions towards the Yugoslav people, accused the Yugoslav Government of having gone over to the enemies of the USSR and of having become the economic vassal of the West and particularly of the United States. The Americans supposedly had established military bases in Yugoslavia and had sent military experts, while Yugoslav enterprises had passed into the hands of foreign capitalists. It was true that care was taken to give no details, since the USSR Government only sought to conceal certain inadmissible aims by means of such calumnies.

17. The Government of the Soviet Union treated Yugoslavia more abusively than some countries which had relations of quite a different kind with the United States. That was not a mere coincidence: it could not forgive Yugoslavia for being independent. As a socialist State, it ought to come under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union, which thus revealed its desire for hegemony.

18. Yugoslavia had moreover been accused of not having a democratic régime. But, in that country, power belonged to the workers as a result of the popular revolution which had expelled the invaders and their henchmen. Since the war, there had been an evolution towards authentic and always more real democracy which had been more and more marked. From that point of view, Yugoslavia was much more advanced than those who criticized it, and it had made a notable contribution to the progress of humanity. Without laying claim to perfection, Yugoslavia was doing more every day for the people and was striving to grant ever-increasing autonomy to its various republics and to favour decentralization. That was where the shoe pinched for the enemies of Yugoslavia.

19. In reply to so many insults, it was sufficient to say that Yugoslavia saw through the machinations designed to force it to capitulate and not to treat it on a footing of equality. Like the character in Gogol's "Dead Souls" who became intoxicated by lies, certain countries of Eastern Europe were striving to prove that their inventions were in accordance with the facts, and it was well known to what lengths that might lead a psychopathic liar. Under the circumstances, the Yugoslavs remained quite composed knowing that the only aim of the pressure exercised on them by those anti-democratic and war-like methods was to subjugate them.

20. Thus, the policy of the Eastern European countries towards Yugoslavia, their threats and the pressure exercised at the instigation of the Soviet Union, constituted a serious obstacle to the strengthening of world peace and international co-operation. That was an incontrovertible fact in the light of which the Soviet Union's proposal should be studied. That Government no doubt claimed that its relations with Yugoslavia were its own concern, but since the pressure exercised

against that country had unfortunate repercussions on peace and security, the Soviet Union's proposal should be examined in close connexion with the war-like methods of that Government.

21. Yugoslavia was always ready to settle its differences with the Soviet Union and certain eastern European countries by peaceful means. The problems were indeed insignificant and might be settled diplomatically if those Governments so desired. If, however, those problems were to be used as a means of exerting pressure, the world should know that Yugoslavia refused to abdicate its independence and sovereignty on any conditions.

22. The Soviet Union proposal did not give a clear and complete definition of war propaganda. Although it contained certain positive elements, namely, general declarations in favour of peace, it did not clearly indicate the conditions necessary for a general peace, which were: mutual respect for the sovereignty and independence of States, elimination of all discriminatory measures and non-intervention in the internal affairs of a country. More exactly, the procedure of drawing a false picture of the conditions existing in certain countries in an attempt to justify the measures taken against them, should be condemned. Finally, the Soviet Union proposal did not state with sufficient clarity that a general and lasting peace implied that an agreement between the five permanent members of the Security Council, who, though their function and role in the world had particular responsibilities, should not disregard the fact that all the other Members of the United Nations were concerned in the preservation of peace and the safeguarding of their independence and sovereignty. The proposal for a pact between the five great Powers should therefore go farther than the Charter, otherwise it would constitute an unnecessary repetition. Moreover, all nations who so desire should be able to accede to such a pact.

23. Because of the contrast between the peaceful declarations of a very general nature and the real policy of the Government of the USSR, as it appeared from its attitude towards Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav delegation could not support the Soviet Union proposal as a whole, although it was ready to facilitate the practical application of certain general principles of the Soviet Union draft resolution relating to the strengthening of peace.

24. The Yugoslav delegation could agree to almost all the paragraphs of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and United Kingdom (A/C.1/549) with the exception of one or two clauses which prejudged, to a certain extent, the attitude of the various delegations regarding the veto and the control of atomic energy. The principles of the Charter were embodied in that draft resolution, and obviously they should form the basis of the peace policy of all countries. Declarations, however, were easily forgotten. It would be preferable to take concrete steps to put an end to the cold war, and to promote international co-operation. In that respect, the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom marked no progress. Wherever the responsibility for the existing situation lay, the propaganda battles which took place in the form

of general declarations were not the right way to strengthen peace, even though certain questions might be elucidated in the course of such discussions. Every problem should be solved peacefully and international co-operation developed with the mutual respect of independence and the equal sovereignty of States. That was the road to peace; any other was merely an illusion, and illusions were a poor defence against the danger of war. The Yugoslav delegation could not therefore support the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution in its entirety.

*During the speech of the Yugoslav representative, Mr. Sarper replaced Mr. Chauvel in the chair.*

25. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said that the USSR representative had often referred (325th meeting) to the speech made by the Canadian representative in the General Assembly during the general debate. Unfortunately, his replies to the arguments adduced had not been satisfactory, for he had confined himself to abuse. There was a saying that applied to the situation: "If you wish to disturb a man's equilibrium, tell him the truth". The USSR representative's speech had nevertheless had one good effect: it had drawn the Committee's attention to the danger that unsolved problems in international affairs might lead to another war. Mr. Vyshinsky had not failed to launch an attack of unparalleled violence against the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, to which he attributed all the evils of humanity.

26. The USSR representative would have served the Committee better if he had pointed out objectively what he regarded to be the major issues threatening peace and had made suggestions for the solution of those problems on a basis of compromise and negotiation. Many delegations would probably have disagreed with his analysis and made reservations about his suggestions for settlement. If, however, those suggestions had contained the slightest indication of compromise on the part of the Government of the USSR, the Canadian delegation would have put its full weight behind any process of negotiation which might have led to a settlement. It was therefore regrettable that the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996) merely proposed in the most general terms the conclusion of a peace pact between the five great Powers, especially since, having violently attacked two of those Powers, it could not be said that Mr. Vyshinsky had created the confidence liable to the establishment of the pact he proposed.

27. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR had already signed, together with his colleagues of the other great Powers, a series of documents pledging their countries to settle international problems peacefully. It was not more signatures that were needed, but effective settlements. If Mr. Vyshinsky wanted peace, he only had to submit concrete proposals about specific problems that would give some hope of a settlement based on mutual confidence and tolerance. It could therefore be concluded that, in submitting his proposal, Mr. Vyshinsky had had no intention of strengthening peace but simply of misrepresenting Western civilization once again and, in particular, the United States and the United Kingdom. Those misrepresentations were like the distortion of curved mirrors. The Western Powers were described by Mr. Vyshinsky as either

lean or fat, tiny or tremendous, depending upon the view-point which he adopted. In fact, the USSR representative did not care about what replies were made to his speech nor did he care what resolution might be adopted. His only concern was to be able to have the communist Press of the world reproduce his speech, accusing the Western Powers of being responsible for the fears which gripped the world, of course without their publishing any reply or contradictory statement. Yet recourse to abuse was but a sign of weakness.

28. The vital problem was the fear and insecurity which lay in the hearts of men everywhere. If gradual understanding were to come, however, the representative of the Soviet Union would have to renounce his attitude that he was always right and admit for a moment the reasons for the anxiety felt in the Western world in regard to the Soviet Union and the countries it dominated. Unfortunately, Mr. Vyshinsky had recently stated, during the debate on the Greek question, that compromise was only possible upon points where one would be in the wrong, never, when one was in the right. As the Soviet Union always thought it was in the right, such declarations did nothing to dispel the uneasy watchfulness that characterized relations between East and West.

29. Although the leaders of the Soviet Union denied the fact from time to time, the USSR policy was based on the theory that war between the communist States and the non-communist States was inevitable. Lenin had written that it was inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist for any length of time side by side with imperialist States; that ultimately one or the other must conquer, which meant that if the proletariat wanted to rule it would have to prove itself the ruling class by military organization. Unless, therefore, Mr. Vyshinsky and the Soviet Union Government were prepared categorically to refute the Marxist analysis of history, they must believe that one day, whenever the occasion arise, they would wage war on the rest of the world. The newspaper *Red Fleet* had stated in that respect, on 24 October 1946, that war found its origin in class society founded on private property and that the task of the Soviet people was to increase its economic and military might.

30. Those who really prepared for war were those who believed in its inevitability. The Western nations, on the contrary rejected that fallacious principle and believed that all political problems could be solved by negotiation. War became inevitable only when some nation was determined to obtain what it wanted or resorted to force. The Western world thought the same about civil war, and upheld the principle that no individual or group of individuals could be permitted to have its way by the use of force. Mr. Vyshinsky certainly did not believe that it was possible to govern with the freely expressed consent of the people. The system in the USSR did not allow a man to take his own decision; he had to accept the party line. It was considered dangerous to the State if a man had an active conscience of his own, because there was a State conscience which sought to substitute for man's free mind the pattern of State-controlled thought. It was therefore possible that the USSR representatives might not really understand the meaning of "negotiation" or "compromise". Since they considered that

force was an inevitable aspect of their government at home, it was not surprising that they should also accept the inevitability of conflict in world affairs. If that was the case, the hopes of the Western world of finding a compromise solution were indeed illusory. If, however, the rulers of the USSR could bring assurance to the peoples of the world that they were willing to agree to a compromise, they would be doing more to strengthen peace than could be accomplished by the signing of a dozen pacts.

31. Although Mr. Vyshinsky said he wanted peace, he violently attacked the States which had concluded treaties of collective security against aggression and particularly the States which had adhered to the North Atlantic Treaty. That Treaty, however, was not aimed against any specific country, but only against any State which might commit an aggression. In that connexion he read a statement, made by the Prime Minister of Canada, in the Canadian Parliament on 28 March 1949, in which he had pointed out that the purpose of that Treaty was to preserve peace by warning a possible aggressor that he might suffer the same fate as the Kaiser after the First World War or Hitler and Mussolini after the Second.

32. It was probably because the Soviet Union Government wanted the States not subservient to it to be weak and divided that it criticized all the efforts made to organize collective security and all the efforts made by the specialized agencies to organize prosperity and welfare in the economic, social and cultural fields.

33. The delegation of the USSR had also refused to participate in a world organization to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes and ensure the effective prohibition of atomic weapons. Mr. Vyshinsky explained his refusal by asserting that international co-operation in that field would be incompatible with the sovereignty of the USSR, which would be threatened by a kind of super-trust dominated by the United States. That explanation showed that the Soviet Union Government was obsessed by the idea of domination. It could not imagine an international organization in which one of the parties did not dominate the other. It was true that Mr. Vyshinsky did not openly reject the principle of international co-operation for atomic control, but he would limit it so drastically that his proposals were completely ineffective.

34. When Mr. Vyshinsky was prepared, on a basis of reciprocity, to allow international inspectors to go anywhere, at any time, in the USSR in order to satisfy themselves that no clandestine operations for the production of atomic explosives were taking place; when he was prepared to accept quotas on the amount of nuclear fuel to be produced, and limits to the size and nature of atomic energy facilities; when his Government was prepared to give up the right to act alone in producing and possessing atomic explosives—then humanity would have taken a great step forward towards peace. If, however, Mr. Vyshinsky could not accept those principles, the Western States would remain on guard, for, in that matter, no State's unverified word was sufficient.

35. The peoples of the whole world and most of the Governments, including the Government of Canada, wanted disarmament. Disarmament could

not, however, be unilateral. The experience of 1930 had proved that the disarmament of the democracies encouraged dictators in their policy of aggression; and assurances of peaceful intentions from dictators were not enough. In 1930, those deceptive assurances had engendered a false sense of security, which had been the precursor of war. That was why at the present time the problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons should be linked with the establishment of effective control; and that was why the question of reducing conventional armaments should be linked with proposals to establish methods of inspection and verification. In view of the USSR representative's systematic refusal to accept that system of control and verification, the Western States could not help asking what the motives of USSR policy were. In that connexion he recalled a quotation from Lenin's book *The Infantile Sickness of Leftism in Communism*, according to which it was necessary to resort to cunning, unlawful methods and lies; and he pointed out that, unfortunately, those methods were too often employed by the various Communist Parties in the Western States.

36. Mr. Martin also drew the Committee's attention to another cause for alarm resulting from the economic and political pressure exercised by the USSR on the States within its sphere of influence. In that connexion, he recalled that the representative of Yugoslavia had told the General Assembly<sup>1</sup> how the Yugoslav people had been mercilessly exploited by joint Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises. Nor was the appointment of a marshal of the Soviet Union to the post of Minister of War in Poland a manifestation of free and friendly relations between weak and sovereign States. A communist leader in the Free Territory of Trieste had said recently to a representative of *The New York Times*, when speaking of Tito, that the touchstone of a man's progressiveness was his attitude toward the Soviet Union, and that anyone who began to fight against its leadership inevitably joined the enemies of communism.

37. The present relations between the Soviet Union and the States on its borders were a danger to peace, for they were based on force and the threat of force. The USSR was attempting to be the only dominant Power in that area, and had assumed the responsibility for maintaining peace there: those who might endanger peace would incur a heavy responsibility in the judgment of history.

38. That policy of domination was an application in the international field of the Stalinist principle that the Communist Party of the USSR controlled the Communist Parties of the whole world. Puppet governments were the logical consequence of the fifth columns which the USSR had sought to establish almost everywhere. The basic principles of those Communist Parties was party loyalty and blind subservience to the rules of the USSR. Louis Budenz, a former editor of the American newspaper *Daily Worker*, had written in that connexion that the first duty of a communist was to serve the Soviet Union, and that no person or State was right which was not in complete agreement with the Soviet Union. Since Mr. Vyshinsky had raised the question of

the principles on which peace should be based, it was well to point out to him that the best contribution his Government could make in that connexion would be the disbandment of its fifth columns abroad, for the claims of the USSR to the blind subservience of the citizens of other States was a threat to the peace of the world.

39. The policy pursued by the Soviet Union with the purpose of isolating the people of the USSR from the rest of the world was also a matter of anxiety to the States of the West. The Government of the USSR wished to give its population a false impression of the Western world, and consequently it prevented free access to its territory, obstructed the movement of foreign journalists and diplomats on Soviet territory, and even excluded tourists. The ordinary Soviet citizen was denied the opportunity to read about or study Western culture. The Government of the USSR systematically represented the Western Governments as warmongers. It was helping to instill fear and hatred of the Western world in the hearts of the Soviet people. It was a well-known fact that war grew out of fear and fear out of ignorance. Peace was based on a community of interests among individuals which led them to adjust their differences by peaceful means. Today, the Government of the USSR was denying its people the right to belong to the world community which was developing not only among nations but among the people themselves. The present debate was an attempt to excite the hatred of the people of the USSR against the peoples of the West. Peace would be better served if, after the debate, instead of spreading fear and distrust, Mr. Vyshinsky proposed to the population of the USSR that it should co-operate with the West on a basis of confidence.

40. The representative of Canada stated that his Government was disturbed by the fact that the Government of the USSR was systematically withdrawing the immense territories under its influence from the free play of moral, intellectual and spiritual forces which had enabled the Western world to develop. Freedom of belief and expression was at the basis of all progress towards peace. It was the individual who was the basis of all political activities; the individual was an end, and not a means. He was certainly not, as Karl Marx had written in 1848, the personification of economic or social categories.

41. Lastly, he declared that the principles he had expounded were at the basis of the attitude which his delegation would adopt towards the draft resolutions which had been submitted. He was of the opinion that the General Assembly should call upon each Member of the United Nations to renew the solemn pledges of the Charter; to renounce the theory that war was inevitable; to co-operate fully and loyally with the efforts of the United Nations and the specialized agencies to prevent war by removing its causes; to maintain or restore freedom of communication between the peoples of the world; to support efforts to achieve the maximum degree of disarmament consistent with security; to accept the limitations on national sovereignty necessary for those purposes; and to pledge itself never to impose its will by force or threat of force upon another Member.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, 228th plenary meeting.*

38. Neither Mr. Austin nor the representatives supporting him could deny the obvious facts mentioned in paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal. What Mr. Austin was asking the Members of the United Nations to do was to approve propaganda for a new war and preparations to that end. The adoption of such a conception would seriously endanger the existence of the United Nations.

39. The second purpose of the Soviet Union draft resolution was to condemn the use of the atomic bomb as well as other weapons for mass extermination which had been recognized by all as contrary to the conscience of the civilized world and incompatible with membership in the United Nations. The condemnation of those weapons was the logical result of paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal, for war propaganda and threats of the use of the atomic bomb were closely linked. The United States policy, in regard to the atomic bomb, was responsible for the war propaganda. The prohibition of the use of the bomb and the condemnation of those who threatened to use it would certainly dispel the existing tension in the world and would clear the way for closer international co-operation. Those who opposed prohibition had lost their argument that control was a prior condition to prohibition, since the Soviet Union had declared that the door was open for such control. That was why the USSR proposal simply called upon all States to settle their disputes by peaceful means without resorting to force. It was a logical consequence of the obligations arising from the Charter.

40. In reply to the Soviet Union proposal that a pact be concluded between the five great Powers in order to strengthen peace, all that was being said was that the principles underlying that proposal were already embodied in the Charter. But the Charter was based on the principle of collective security, which the Soviet Union had proposed well before the end of the Second World War. That principle meant that the independence of all States must be respected, that there could be no interference in the internal affairs of other countries. If the principle of collective security were strictly observed, according to the letter and spirit of the Charter, there would be no need to strengthen peace, but the Truman doctrine was the most flagrant violation of that principle. The same was true of the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty; attempts were being made to justify that Treaty by strange interpretations

of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, according to which it was merely a regional pact. But what was that elastic region without frontiers? Article 3 of the Treaty did not refer to legitimate defence measures but to mutual military assistance, which was in flagrant contradiction and incompatible with international law. Article 5 introduced the concept of automatism even in the case of provoked attack. In other words, an act of legitimate defence by a State that was attacked would authorize another State signatory of the Treaty to have recourse to aggression. Who then would be the aggressor? The United States had thus, through unilateral action, contrary to the principle of collective security, violated not only the spirit, but also the letter, of the Charter.

41. There had been criticism of the fact that the Soviet proposal restricted participation in the pact to the five Great Powers. Such limitation arose from Article 106 of the Charter, however, which provided that the five great Powers, in accordance with their declaration of 30 October 1943, should consult together and take joint action for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. It was precisely because the principal of collective security had been violated by the United States that it was essential to stress once more the principle of co-operation between the great Powers. If the United States opposed that theory, they would only be giving further proof that they did not want to co-operate. The United States seemed to require that all other States should renounce their sovereignty. Mr. McNeil had already renounced that of his country. He appeared to support Mr. James Burnan's theory that the United States should promote the establishment of a federation including as many States as possible and impose it by force if the other peoples objected.

42. In regard to the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/549), it merely stressed the well-known fact that the Charter was the most solemn pact in the history of mankind. But the authors of that draft resolution did not respect the Charter themselves, and their proposal was merely an attempt at diversion with the object of misleading world public opinion.

43. In the struggle for peace, the Soviet Union draft resolution represented a step forward and those who were in favour of peace should support it.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 16 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPEN (Turkey).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was grateful for the Committee's courtesy in giving him priority in the list of speakers. His task was not easy because, though they had touched on irrelevant topics, many preceding

speakers had given such an arbitrarily distorted picture of the Soviet Union's position that their statements could not remain unanswered. Clearly, it had been their aim to lead the Committee astray from a true understanding of the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996). However, that proposal was of vital importance for the cause of peace and, whatever might be said to the contrary, the five great Powers could not eschew the fact that they carried the primary responsibility for war or peace.