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**2010 Review Conference of the Parties  
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  
of Nuclear Weapons**

7 June 2010

Original: English

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**Main Committee II**

**Summary record of the 3rd meeting**

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 12 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Yelchenko ..... (Ukraine)

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*The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.*

**General exchange of views** (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Baddoura** (Lebanon), speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States and referring to its working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.29), recalled that the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been one of the fundamental elements that had made it possible to extend the Treaty indefinitely without a vote. Fifteen years later, failure to implement the resolution damaged the credibility not only of all the resolutions adopted at that Conference, but also of the Treaty itself. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference stated that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East remained valid until its objectives were achieved and called for Israel to accede to the Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

2. At the sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Conference, the Arab States had submitted working papers setting forth their positions on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East. Israel's persistent refusal to accede to the Treaty and defiance of the relevant resolutions threatened the safety and security of the Arab States, all of which were parties to the Treaty, and that of the region as a whole, casting doubt on the capacity of the Treaty to provide security, which might lead the Arab States to review their approach to the issue.

3. Stressing the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the Group called on the Security Council to exert genuine pressure on Israel to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions. It also insisted on the establishment of a subsidiary body under Main Committee II to take up the matter and determine a follow-up mechanism.

4. In view of such considerations, the Arab States strongly urged the 2010 Conference to adopt resolutions in order to emphasize that the existence of any nuclear weapons in the Middle East constituted a threat to regional and international peace and security; reiterate the call on Israel to accede without delay to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; affirm that nuclear-weapon States should refrain from transferring

to Israel any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or assisting it to acquire or develop such weapons; stress that all States parties to the Treaty should declare their commitment not to cooperate with Israel in the nuclear domain; call on the United Nations to convene an international conference that genuinely aimed, within a specific time frame, to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions; request IAEA to prepare the necessary reference documents; establish a standing committee comprising the members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference, with a mandate to follow up and monitor implementation by States parties of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, and to submit a comprehensive report thereon to the 2015 Review Conference and the sessions of the Preparatory Committee; request the Secretariat of the United Nations to circulate State party reports for consideration at the 2015 Review Conference and sessions of the Preparatory Committee; and affirm to the Agency that the relevant IAEA resolutions should be implemented, including the resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities (GC (53)/RES/17), and that interim reports on implementation should be submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference.

5. Speaking as the representative of Lebanon, he said that, while the Non-Proliferation Treaty had played a pivotal role in containing nuclear proliferation, it had not prevented some countries from obtaining nuclear weapons. Moreover, it had been insufficient insofar as the disarmament undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States were concerned.

6. The participants in the 2010 Review Conference must step up their efforts on several parallel fronts: accession to the Treaty must be universal; resolutions adopted at previous Review Conferences, notably the 1995 resolution on the Middle East must be fully implemented; all States must enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA; treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones were important in advancing non-proliferation; pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be a priority; non-proliferation concerns and efforts, while of the utmost of importance, should not

hamper international nuclear cooperation, especially with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, nor should it erode the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty should adhere fully to its articles I and III.

7. **Mr. Al-Sudairy** (Saudi Arabia), recapitulating the salient points contained in the working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.29), said that his country was gravely concerned at the failure to implement the resolution on the Middle East, fifteen years after its adoption at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Saudi Arabia also affirmed the necessity of implementing the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and noted that Israel's consistent refusal to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to implement the relevant international resolutions posed a threat to the security and stability of the region as a whole, a state of affairs that might prompt the Arab States — all of which were parties to the Treaty — to revisit their approach to the issue. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and constitute a step towards achieving universality of the Treaty in the region. The Security Council should therefore bring pressure to bear on Israel in order to compel it to implement United Nations resolutions calling for the establishment of such a zone. It was to be hoped that the resolutions adopted by the 2010 Conference would reflect the recommendations set forth in the working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States.

8. **Mr. Ryabtsev** (Ukraine) said that all States must comply with their non-proliferation obligations, including their safeguards agreements with IAEA and relevant Security Council resolutions. Ukraine fully supported the efforts of IAEA to resolve safeguards implementation issues associated with States' safeguards agreements. It was very important for States to accept a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol so that IAEA could provide credible assurances regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear materials and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

9. Ukraine called for the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, especially in regions of tension and in the Middle East in particular. To that end, it called on all parties concerned to take

the practical and urgent steps required for full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference.

10. Ukraine welcomed the recent ratifications of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which constituted an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, combating international terrorism and preventing nuclear materials and technologies from falling into the hands of non-State actors.

11. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation), referring to article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, said that the implementation of IAEA safeguards was an important prerequisite for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Furthermore, additional protocols, which helped to detect potentially undeclared activities, should be signed and ratified by all States as swiftly as possible and should also be one of the criteria used for decisions on nuclear exports. The Russian Federation was already prepared to make the existence of an additional protocol one of the conditions for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology and equipment. Recommendations to that effect should be contained in the outcome document of the 2010 Review Conference.

12. Countries had a right to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, provided that they abided by their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and complied with their IAEA safeguards agreements. With respect to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he therefore called on the international community to pursue a political and diplomatic solution to the current crisis, and urged Iran to show the goodwill necessary to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, including by complying with the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors.

13. The Russian Federation supported the Agency's efforts to enhance the effectiveness of its safeguards, including with respect to their legal, organizational and technical aspects. It had been providing technical support to the Agency's safeguards system for 26 years through its own national programme, which included the analysis of environmental samples in Russian laboratories, the training of inspectors and personnel in accounting and control techniques at Russian

specialized institutions, and the development of new technologies to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

14. His delegation also supported the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. They had shown that it was practicable to establish an agreed procedure for the transfer of controlled items without limiting the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The universal application of their control lists to nuclear exports and projects for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be advisable. The Russian Federation export control system was itself based on the control lists and export regulations compiled by both bodies.

15. All countries should implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of non-State actors, particularly terrorists. Further progress in that area would be facilitated by the agreements reached at the Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Washington, D.C.

16. The Russian Federation was cooperating actively with IAEA to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material. In that connection, his Government underlined the importance of the Agency's systematic efforts to strengthen the international physical protection regime and welcomed the successful implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009; regularly submitted information to the Agency for inclusion in its Illicit Trafficking Data Base; would make a voluntary contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund in 2010 with a view to further strengthening the nuclear security regime; and urged all States to sign and ratify the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as soon as possible.

17. The Russian Federation supported the IAEA programme to reduce the level of enriched nuclear fuel in the research reactors of IAEA member States to below 20 per cent. While the success achieved to date was welcome, the most powerful research reactors using the greatest amounts of highly enriched uranium had still not been converted to low enriched uranium.

18. Lastly, his delegation welcomed the progress achieved by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, launched by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in 2006. The Global Initiative, with which 79 member States were now associated, was a positive example of

international efforts to combat new threats and challenges. The Russian Federation attached great importance to the forthcoming sixth plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to be held in Abu Dhabi in June 2010.

19. **Mr. Lauber** (Switzerland) said that his country expected four elements to be included in the final document of the 2010 Review Conference. The first was a call for all States that had not yet done so to implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement as quickly as possible with IAEA. The implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement was an obligation under article III, paragraph 1, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, one with which some 20 States had yet to comply. The second was a request to IAEA to engage in discussion in order to identify incentives for States to implement an additional protocol and integrated safeguards, including a reduction in verification costs. Such an approach could facilitate discussions on the Model Additional Protocol and its eventual establishment as a key element of the new safeguards standard. The third element was the adoption of a process for the implementation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, pursuant to the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference. The fourth was the commitment of all States parties to seek ways of bringing States not party to the Treaty closer to the non-proliferation regime without undermining the principles of the Treaty. Such States had the same responsibilities as States parties for global stability. Hence, it was legitimate to demand that they integrate the rules of the non-proliferation regime into their practices. The start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would be a useful way of further involving States that were not parties to the Treaty in non-proliferation efforts.

20. Switzerland hoped that the final document of the Review Conference would address the institutional strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To that end, it had joined a number of other States in sponsoring working paper 4 (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.4), which envisaged the holding of annual meetings with decision-making powers and the creation of a Treaty support unit.

21. **Mr. Askarov** (Uzbekistan) said that it was in the interests of all countries to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was the cornerstone of

international security, and that it was more important than ever to maintain a balance between its three pillars.

22. Against that background, he welcomed the signature of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Russian Federation and commended the constructive contribution to non-proliferation efforts made by the Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Washington, D.C.

23. His delegation particularly wished to note that the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, held recently in New York, had reaffirmed that nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, made a major contribution to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process, and to regional and international security. The international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, must therefore provide appropriate support to facilitate the efforts of the States parties to treaties establishing such zones.

24. In that context, he welcomed the decision of the United States Government to seek the Senate's approval for ratification of protocols providing for United States participation in the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the South Pacific, as well as its readiness to consult with the parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central and South-East Asia with a view to signing and ratifying the protocols to those treaties. However, further efforts were now needed by all relevant stakeholders to implement the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

25. Lastly, he urged the participants in the 2010 Review Conference to support the working paper on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones submitted by the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.54).

26. **Ms. Mishar** (Malaysia), reaffirming her country's commitment to non-proliferation and the central role of IAEA in nuclear safeguards and verification activities, called on all States to abide by their safeguards agreements; to exercise full transparency in their nuclear programmes, which should be subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols; and to fully comply with the provisions of the

Non-Proliferation Treaty. Only those measures would provide credible assurances to the international community of the peaceful nature of all nuclear programmes. In that connection, IAEA must be given the necessary resources to discharge its mandate in an effective and professional manner. There was also a need for the Agency to enhance the rules and modalities governing the confidentiality of information related to safeguards.

27. Malaysia particularly wished to express its support for the IAEA project entitled "Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services" and for the addition of new certified laboratories to the Agency's Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) to address delays in environmental sampling. In that connection, she was pleased to announce that Malaysia was in the process of establishing its own environmental sampling laboratory which, she hoped, would one day be a part of NWAL.

28. As a country committed to fully implementing its safeguards obligations, Malaysia welcomed safeguards inspections at its sole research reactor facility. Furthermore, as an undertaking to ensure transparency, it continued to provide IAEA safeguards inspectors with access beyond the defined material balance areas of the facility.

29. Malaysia, which had taken note of the Agency's efforts to improve nuclear safety worldwide, called for greater international cooperation in the handling of nuclear and radiological material in view of the transboundary nature of potential hazards. It also called on those States that had not yet done so to immediately sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which Malaysia had ratified on 17 January 2008.

30. **Mr. Abbas** (Iraq) said that IAEA had been established to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to facilitate the exchange of relevant scientific information and technology between States parties to the Treaty, which would contribute significantly to human progress and to closing the scientific and technological gap between developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, peaceful nuclear programmes had been saddled with unjustified restrictions and conditions that contravened the letter and spirit of the Treaty, thereby preventing the Agency from fulfilling its mandate.

31. Referring to the working papers submitted by Iraq to the current Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.57-59),

the contents of which his delegation hoped would be included in the outcome of the 2010 Conference, he called on IAEA to intensify its efforts to assist States parties in developing the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology to developing States, in particular through its Technical Cooperation Programme. IAEA was ideally placed to guarantee the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes; it should be possible, within the framework of IAEA, to devise an acceptable and non-discriminatory mechanism to enhance the transparency of such programmes. Nuclear cooperation between States should take place against the background and in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

32. Nuclear-weapon States and IAEA should step up their provision of technical assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty, and non-States parties should be urged to accede to the Treaty and thereby become eligible to reap the benefits of technical programmes.

33. Iraq was fully committed not only to disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements but also to international arrangements relating to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution. His country had signed an additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA in 2008 and would voluntarily apply the protocol as of 17 February 2010, pending its ratification. In addition, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had further affirmed his Government's commitment to the non-proliferation regime in official letters to the Security Council and IAEA (S/2010/37), both of which had welcomed the steps taken by Iraq in that regard.

34. Nuclear terrorism posed a formidable threat to international security, hence the need for strict nuclear security measures to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists or other parties not authorized to possess them.

35. Since reliance upon nuclear weapons to ensure security would inevitably lead to a regional arms race, countries should instead opt for peaceful and diplomatic multilateral discussion in order to resolve tensions and conflicts. Nuclear non-proliferation could only be achieved by universal accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the placement of all installations and programmes under IAEA safeguards. Moreover, acceptance by States of the IAEA Additional Protocol would reinforce the Agency's verification role.

36. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would undoubtedly strengthen the non-proliferation regime and with it, national, regional and international security. Any attempt to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East must include the nuclear disarmament of Israel, its accession to NPT and placement of all its nuclear installations under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. Failure to implement the resolution on the Middle East would perpetuate regional tensions and further complicate the challenges linked to achievement of the universality of the Treaty, undermining its credibility. Security and stability in the region required the eradication of all weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, nuclear weapons, pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted annually by consensus, in addition to the resolution on the Middle East.

37. **Mr. Reyes** (Colombia) said that his delegation wished to emphasize the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and of implementing the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference concerning such a zone in the Middle East.

38. Colombia also wished to emphasize the need for universal accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In addition, progress should be made in negotiating a legally binding instrument to expand and consolidate security assurances and in strengthening the review process.

39. Tightening non-proliferation measures was especially important in order to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons or technology. Colombia supported the independence and impartiality of IAEA. It therefore rejected any attempt to politicize the Agency's work. IAEA activities, especially those involving verification, must be carried out efficiently and with full transparency.

40. **Mr. Al-Hajraf** (Kuwait), recalling that the Arab States had agreed to the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the condition that that Conference adopt the resolution on the Middle East, expressed regret that, to date, the resolution had not

been implemented. The current Conference had before it an important opportunity to redress the situation by putting in place a clear programme of action to that end.

41. The Arab States' accession to the Treaty attested to their proactive approach to peace and constituted a gesture of goodwill, representing the first step towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Instead of guaranteeing the security of any State, possession of nuclear weapons was bound to aggravate tensions and make the terrifying prospect of a regional arms race increasingly likely, especially in the context of the Middle East region's particular security-related challenges.

42. His country insisted that Israel must accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. As the existence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East posed a threat to regional and international peace and security, the international community must bring pressure to bear on Israel to implement the relevant United Nations and IAEA resolutions, in addition to refraining from supplying Israel with nuclear technology or otherwise cooperating with it in that area.

43. **Mr. Jonker** (Netherlands), speaking also on behalf of Belgium, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Spain and Turkey, drew attention to a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.69) which contained the views of those countries on the central role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the international non-proliferation regime. He hoped that the views expressed in the working paper, which elaborated on the working paper submitted by those countries to the third session of the Preparatory Committee held in May 2009 (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.33), would make a useful contribution to the final documents of the 2010 Review Conference.

44. **Mr. Obisakin** (Nigeria) said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be encouraged until such time as nuclear weapons ceased to exist. Noting with satisfaction the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, he called on all African countries to sign or ratify that Treaty and particularly looked forward to its ratification by the United States of America.

45. In that connection, he reiterated his country's support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; called on all United Nations

Member States in the Middle East, and all nuclear-weapon States, to support the urgent implementation of General Assembly resolution 50/66; and called for the United Nations to hold a conference aimed at resolving the Middle East crisis with the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including all Arab countries, Iran, Israel and the five permanent members of the Security Council.

46. Lastly, his delegation called for closer cooperation among the members of nuclear-weapon-free zones and stressed the need to undertake all efforts to enhance the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the work done by IAEA and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

*The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.*