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LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1984 FROM THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

On behalf of the unified command established pursuant to Security Council resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, I have the honour to submit a report of the United Nations Command concerning the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement of 1953 during the period 1 January 1983 through 31 December 1983.

I request that this letter, together with the enclosed report of the United Nations Command, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jose SORZANO

Annex

Report of the United Nations Command concerning the maintenance of
the Armistice Agreement of 1953 during the period 1 January 1983
through 31 December 1983

1. Background

The United Nations Command (UNC) was created in response to United Nations Security Council resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950. a/ In that resolution, the Council recommended the establishment of a unified command for United Nations forces in Korea under the United States and also requested that the latter "provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command". The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), signed the 27 July 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Armistice Agreement, his successors in command are responsible for compliance with, and enforcement of, the terms and provisions of the Armistice Agreement. UNC continues to carry out its functions and fulfil its obligations under the mandate of the Armistice Agreement. This includes participating in the activities of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). In view of a major deliberate effort on the part of the North Korean leadership to direct continued and systematic armed infiltration attempts into the Republic of Korea (ROK), in serious violation of the Armistice Agreement, and tensions created due to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) terrorist attack on the ROK leadership in Rangoon, Burma, in 1983, UNC considers this year's report to the United Nations Security Council covering these serious incidents during the period from 1 January to 31 December 1983 to be of unusual significance. The last CINCUNC report to the Security Council (S/15728) was submitted on 25 April 1983.

2. Armistice mechanism and procedures

The Korean Armistice Agreement was designed to ensure a "complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces of the opposing sides until a final peaceful settlement is achieved". The term "opposing forces" includes all ground, naval and air units of both sides. CINCUNC signed the Armistice Agreement on behalf of 16 United Nations Member nations, and ROK, which contributed forces to the unified command. The commanders of the Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers (KPA/CPV) signed the Agreement on behalf of the KPA/CPV forces.

(a) Military Armistice Commission (MAC)

The purpose of MAC in Korea, as established pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, is "to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement". The Commission is a joint international organization and is composed of 10 members: 5 senior officers from UNC and 5 senior officers from KPA/CPV. CINCUNC has appointed one member from the United States, two from ROK, one from the United Kingdom and one designated on a rotational basis from among the other four United Nations Member nations represented on UNC (Australia, Canada, the Philippines and

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Thailand). Meetings of MAC are held at the request of either side in the Joint Security Area (JSA), commonly known as Panmunjom, in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). To assist MAC in fulfilling its functions, the Armistice Agreement provides for a joint secretariat which maintains 24-hour telephone communication between the duty officers of each side located at Panmunjom. The joint duty officers also meet daily except Sundays and holidays and serve as the basic channel of communications between the two opposing sides. There have been 423 plenary sessions of the Commission and 472 of the MAC secretaries since the Armistice Agreement was signed. MAC, or the senior member of either side, is authorized by paragraph 27 of the Armistice Agreement to dispatch joint observer teams to investigate reported violations of the Armistice Agreement that occur within DMZ. KPA/CPV, however, has frustrated this function of the Commission since April 1967 by refusing to participate in joint investigations proposed by UNC. During the reporting period alone, the KPA/CPV side failed to participate in 21 joint observer team meetings proposed by UNC to conduct joint investigations of incidents reported to have occurred in DMZ.

(b) Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

NNSC, established by the Korean Armistice Agreement, is composed of four delegations representing Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Its primary function is to conduct independent inspections and investigations of Armistice-related developments and violations outside DMZ and to report its findings to MAC. NNSC holds weekly meetings in JSA, Panmunjom, to discuss and evaluate reports submitted by either side of MAC. Although its essential functions have been drastically curtailed, owing to KPA/CPV obduracy, NNSC does provide a very worthwhile and stabilizing influence, as well as a means for indirect communications between the two opposing forces.

(c) Role of the Republic of Korea (ROK)

A unique feature of the Korean Armistice Agreement is that no nation is a signatory to the Agreement. CINCUNC signed the Agreement on behalf of the unified command, consisting of the military forces from 16 United Nations Member nations and the Republic of Korea. During the Armistice negotiations and afterwards, at the request of the KPA/CPV side, the ROK Government furnished assurances that it would abide by the Armistice Agreement. Today, the Republic of Korea provides most of the "civil police" who have been assigned the mission of maintaining security and order in the UNC portion of DMZ. The ROK Government and its armed forces have complied and co-operated with UNC in carrying out the Armistice Agreement, and ROK senior military officers have served on MAC over the years.

3. United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) activities

Meetings of MAC are normally called to discuss serious incidents involving the Armistice Agreement and significant Armistice-related issues. These meetings, as well as 24-hour telephone communication between the two sides, serve to minimize escalation of incidents based upon possible miscalculations. The Commission is a valued means of communications, as demonstrated by its continued use by both sides. Of the eight meetings of MAC held during the reporting period, UNC called

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two meetings and KPA/CPV called six. UNC charges against the KPA/CPV side during the reporting period include: firing across the military demarcation line (MDL) into the UNC portion of DMZ; introduction into DMZ of heavy and illegal weapons; fortifications in DMZ; continued and systematic armed infiltration attempts into ROK; and the terrorist bombing attack on the ROK leadership in Rangoon, Burma. (The appendix to this report contains the details of these serious incidents.) In spite of these continued and deliberate hostile actions by DPRK which have drastically heightened tensions, the major emphasis of UNC has been to promote positive measures to reduce tensions. (The appendix to this report also discusses positive proposals presented by UNC at the MAC meetings.) On the other hand, the KPA/CPV side has misused these meetings to disseminate distorted political propaganda which falls outside the purview of MAC and has refused to respond positively to any UNC initiatives to reduce tensions. KPA/CPV called one MAC secretaries' meeting to pass a list of alleged minor violations by UNC. During the reporting period, UNC charged the KPA/CPV side with more than 4,070 well substantiated Armistice Agreement violations. These charges were passed expeditiously, either telephonically or through the daily joint duty officers' meeting in JSA, Panmunjom, to provide KPA/CPV an opportunity to cease ongoing violations or to conduct timely investigations to prevent similar violations.

4. Conclusions

For more than 30 years, MAC has been the only joint international mechanism and official channel of communication for the maintenance of the Armistice between the opposing military commanders in Korea. The Republic of Korea has exercised great restraint in the face of a continued systematic DPRK campaign of violence and provocations directed against the Republic of Korea and, moreover, has demonstrated its sincerity toward the reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula. UNC will continue to fulfil its obligations under the mandate of the Armistice Agreement and to reaffirm its readiness and determination, consistent with the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions, to preserve peace and security until such time when the parties directly concerned are able to arrive at a more permanent arrangement for peace in Korea.

Notes

a/ For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, Resolutions and Decisions (S/1588), p. 5.

Appendix

Major incidents/issues discussed at the Military
Armistice Commission
(1 January 1983 to 31 December 1983)

1. KPA firing upon UNC guardpost in DMZ

At about 1935 hours, 17 June 1983, KPA soldiers at a KPA guard-post located north of MDL marker No. 0563 fired automatic weapons across MDL toward a UNC post in DMZ. This unprovoked DPRK hostile act, which constituted violations of paragraphs 6 and 12 of the Armistice Agreement, inflicted damage on the UNC post. UNC displayed shell fragments recovered from the scene in support of its charges at the 419th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) held on 27 June 1983.

2. KPA armed infiltration into ROK by land

At about 0230 hours, 19 June 1983, two UNC defence force personnel detected three DPRK armed infiltrators in the Munsan River beneath a concrete bridge located 12 kilometres south of DMZ and only 309 kilometres north-west of Seoul. UNC defence force personnel tossed grenades into the water and opened fire on the intruders, killing all three. Equipment recovered from the dead KPA infiltrators included three 7.65 mm Skorpion machine pistols manufactured in Czechoslovakia (serial numbers 1454Y, 5840V and 1257Y) with four 20-round magazines; one .25 calibre Browning automatic pistol (serial number 478832) manufactured in Belgium, equipped with a DPRK silencer; two Nikon F2 cameras (serial numbers 8019668 and 8044424) with a 200-600 mm zoom lens (serial number 301133) and a 50 mm lens (serial number 5310356); three scuba tanks; three sets of diving equipment; imitation ROK Army uniforms; DPRK military maps marked "Korean People's Army General Staff", covering the area from the north of Kaesong in DPRK to south of Seoul and Inchon in ROK; and a code-sheet with typical DPRK slogans exalting Kim Il-Sung. One of the DPRK-manufactured grenades recovered had the DPRK ordnance marks with a series of three two-digit numbers, 16-75-53, which correlate to the Kuncha-ri Ordnance Factory located in Songchon-Gun, South Pyongan Province, DPRK. At the 419th meeting of MAC, held on 27 June 1983, the United Nations Command charged the KPA/CPV side with violations of paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 12 of the Armistice Agreement by infiltrating armed intruders into the Republic of Korea on an aggressive and subversive mission.

3. DPRK armed infiltrations into ROK by sea

(a) On the evening of 4 August 1983, a heavily armed, high-speed DPRK infiltration boat intruded into ROK coastal waters to a point about 1.4 kilometres off the east coast of ROK. From that position, it launched armed DPRK personnel to the shore, about 14 kilometres south of Kampo. In the early morning of 5 August 1983 the DPRK infiltrators, dressed in imitation Republic of Korea Army uniforms underneath waterproof garments, were discovered by ROK coastal defence posts along the beach and fired upon. Meanwhile, a ROK Maritime Police patrol boat, which was being dispatched to the scene of the incident, was fired upon and hit by the armed DPRK intruder boat.

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The DPRK intruder boat then escaped quickly to the east at a speed of about 40 knots. A thorough search of the area was made during daylight hours and the bodies of four dead DPRK armed intruders were recovered. On 6 August 1983, the body of an additional DPRK infiltrator was discovered in the same area. Equipment recovered from the dead infiltrators included items of previous DPRK infiltration teams with the exception of five non-standard M-16 automatic rifles without serial numbers. Serial numbers had never been stamped into the M-16s recovered. Obviously, DPRK had equipped the infiltration team with imitation United States weaponry in an attempt to disguise them as ROK Army soldiers. Other equipment recovered included one DPRK-manufactured type-68 semi-automatic pistol magazine with 32 rounds of ammunition; Japanese-made communications equipment including a transmitter-receiver encased in a waterproof pouch; a code-sheet with typical DPRK slogans in its margins; a DPRK officer's satchel; a Canon FX 35 mm camera (serial number 335399); a Pentax ME camera (serial number 1961186) and a 400 mm zoom telephoto lens (serial number 7305700). The United Nations Command called the 421st meeting of MAC, held on 23 August 1983, and charged the KPA/CPV side with violating paragraphs 6, 12, and 15 of the Armistice Agreement by infiltrating a team of five armed intruders into the Republic of Korea and committing hostile acts against the Republic's coastal defence forces and Maritime Police patrol boat. The UNC senior member displayed the weapons and equipment recovered to substantiate his charges against DPRK.

(b) At about 0910 hours, 13 August 1983, an unidentified suspicious vessel was detected about 80 kilometres north-east of the Republic of Korea's Ullung Island heading south-west toward the Republic's coastline at a speed of 20 knots. Aware of the 5 August 1983 incident in which a ROK Maritime Police patrol boat was fired upon by a heavily armed DPRK intruder boat and realizing that 20 knots is faster than normal speed, a ROK naval ship requested identity and destination from the suspicious vessel. When all queries were ignored, a warning shot was fired 1,000 metres across the suspect vessel's bow. At that point, the suspect vessel committed a hostile act by firing a burst of heavy machine-gun fire toward the ROK naval vessel. The suspect vessel then attempted to escape the scene at a speed of 40 knots, an extremely high speed for a vessel of its size. The ROK naval vessel reacted by launching a helicopter to pursue the fleeing vessel and it also received heavy machine-gun fire from one of two gun mounts clearly visible on the deck. The helicopter returned fire in self-defence and sank the hostile vessel. The hostile vessel, which carried the name Cho Il-hwan, was armed with machine guns and equipped with four propellers for high speed operations, but had no fishing equipment visible whatsoever. It also carried unique printing paddles to facilitate rapid name changes on the bow. Although three bodies were sighted on deck as the vessel sank, they could not be recovered due to fire and smoke. An extensive search of the area turned up various equipment carried by the vessel, but no survivors. Equipment recovered during the search operation was similar to items recovered from past DPRK sea-borne infiltrations into ROK. A new piece of equipment, an "underwater body transportation device" believed to be used in carrying equipment or personnel to or from a shore-line, was also recovered. Additionally, a notebook recovered from the sinking vessel provided irrefutable evidence linking the mission of the hostile vessel with the infiltration of DPRK armed intruders into ROK. Several of the more relevant passages from its text read "Instructions given to the Wonsan Liaison Office on 5 November 1976 by the great

leader President Kim Il-Sung ... although it is difficult, you must continue the struggle and send as many agents as possible to South Korea ..." The result of an investigation conducted by the United Nations Command's multinational investigative team revealed the fact that the hostile vessel was an armed DPRK high-speed infiltration boat similar to the one which fired upon the ROK Maritime Police patrol boat during the 5 August 1983 DPRK infiltration attempt south of Kampo (see para. 3 (a) above). UNC called the 421st meeting of MAC, held on 23 August 1983, and charged the KPA/CPV side with committing hostile acts by firing upon a Republic of Korea naval vessel in serious violation of paragraph 12 and the spirit of the Armistice Agreement.

(c) At about 2140 hours, 3 December 1983, an armed DPRK infiltration boat intruded into ROK coastal waters to a point about half a mile off Tadaepo beach in the Republic of Korea. At that time, two armed DPRK infiltrators slipped overboard and swam to the beach about 7.5 kilometres south-west of Pusan. They reached the beach at about 2230 hours, 3 December, and were almost immediately detected and captured by Republic of Korea defence forces personnel. The intruder boat was also detected under illumination of mortar flares. At about 2305 hours, a pursuing ROK Navy vessel fired warning shots at the intruder boat. The intruder boat returned fire and attempted to escape at a speed of 35 knots. During the hot pursuit, a collision occurred between the two vessels and the intruder boat sank almost immediately. Among the weapons and equipment recovered from the captured DPRK armed infiltrators were two 7.65 mm type-61 Skorpion machine-pistols manufactured in Czechoslovakia (serial numbers J3684 and J3857); one .25-calibre Browning automatic pistol manufactured in Belgium with a DPRK-manufactured silencer (the serial number of the pistol, 478830, is separated by only two digits from an identical pistol with the serial number 478832, which was recovered from the 19 June 1983 DPRK infiltration attempt near Munsan; see para. 2 above); five DPRK-manufactured hand grenades (identical in type to the grenades recovered from the 19 June 1983 infiltration near Munsan); one KPA night observation device (serial number 800015) with the DPRK emblem and inscription which read "Night Time Aiming Device-78"; and a communication code-sheet with typical North Korean political slogans. The captured intruder team leader, Chon Chung-Nam, is a 28-year-old resident of No. 49, Yonam-Oup, Paekam-Gun, Yanggang-Do, DPRK. The other intruder captured was Lee Sang-Kyu. Chon admitted that he was the leader of the 3rd Escort Team, 313th Liaison Station, located in Wonsan, DPRK, which is organic to the 6th Department of the Korean Worker's Party Central Committee. He had been ordered by Cha Hyong-Kun, Chief of Staff of the 313th Liaison Station, to infiltrate into Tadaepo on the southern coast of the Republic of Korea near the port city of Pusan on 3 December 1983. At about 1400 hours, on 30 November 1983, the mother ship, loaded with an armed intruder boat and the five-member infiltration team, departed the port of Wonsan, DPRK, on its mission to the ROK. Chon described the mother ship as about 30 metres' long and powered by four DPRK manufactured "Nasibo" engines of 1,000 horsepower each. Chon stated that those engines gave the mother ship a 45-knot capability. The mother ship was armed with two 14.5 mm double-barrelled anti-aircraft machine guns, one 82 mm recoilless rifle, three rocket launchers, two heavy machine guns, automatic rifles and hand grenades. The mother ship, with a crew of 15 and commanded by Kim Tae-Sam, sailed to the east in the Sea of Japan, circumvented a Japanese "joint" fishing ground known as "Yamado-tai", proceeded between the main island of Japan and Oki Island,

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then arrived at a location about five miles north-east of the Japanese island of Tsushima at about 1700 hours, 3 December 1983. At about 1730 hours, on that day, the armed intruder boat, with its five-member infiltration team aboard, was launched from the mother ship. The intruder boat displaced about five tons and was powered by three "Olympus" engines of 260 horsepower each. Those engines gave the armed intruder boat a maximum speed in excess of 35 knots. The boat was armed with one machine gun, one rocket launcher, and one anti-tank rocket launcher. The intruder boat proceeded north-west for about 61 kilometres, and at about 2140 hours, 3 December, it arrived at a point about 800 metres off the beach of Tadaepo, Pusan. At the 423rd meeting of MAC, held on 23 December 1983, UNC charged the KPA/CPV side with serious violations of paragraphs 12 and 15 of the Armistice Agreement by infiltrating an armed infiltration vessel into ROK coastal waters and landing two DPRK armed intruders onto Tadaepo beach, Pusan. UNC, in support of its charges, displayed the equipment captured and played a taped interview with captured team leader Chon Chung-Nam in which he confessed his role and DPRK culpability.

4. Rangoon bombing

On 9 October 1983, a special terrorist team from DPRK attempted to assassinate ROK president Chun Du-Hwan by detonating an extremely powerful explosive device at the Martyr's Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma. Although the bomb blast missed its intended target, President Chun, 17 Republic of Korea citizens, including four Cabinet Ministers, and four Burmese citizens, were killed and scores more from both countries were injured by this act of premeditated violence.

The Republic of Korea exercised restraint in the face of an outburst of anti-DPRK sentiment in reaction to the terrorist bombing in Rangoon. The mature and reasonable attitude on the part of the ROK Government has been instrumental in preventing any further escalation of an already strained situation.

At the 422nd MAC meeting, held on 31 October 1983, the KPA senior member raised the Rangoon bombing incident by claiming, in part, "the South Korean puppets contrived the Rangoon explosion in an attempt to extricate themselves from the crisis". The United Nations Command senior member responded that there could be no doubt that the apparent assassination attempt on ROK President Chun in Rangoon, Burma, on 9 October 1983, had dramatically escalated tension on the Korean peninsula. He further stated that the weight of all available evidence, well documented in the world press, pointed toward DPRK involvement. Because the incident was still under investigation by the Burmese Government, UNC declined to discuss the incident any further.

On 4 November 1983, the Burmese Government announced that the bombing incident was committed by DPRK commandos and Rangoon decided to sever diplomatic relations with DPRK, withdrawing its recognition of DPRK. On 22 November 1983, two DPRK military officers involved in the Rangoon bombing were placed on trial in Rangoon. According to the confession of DPRK Army Captain Kang Min-Chul, a DPRK Army Major General, Kang Chang-Su of the DPRK Reconnaissance Bureau directed that the three KPA officers (including the two defendants) murder Republic of Korea President Chun during his October State visit to Burma. The three officers

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selected were Major Zin Mo, the team leader, and captains Kang Min-Chul and Kim Chi-Oh, all members of DPRK reconnaissance unit located at Kaesong, DPRK. The three commandos illegally infiltrated into Burma from a DPRK freighter around 23 September and were escorted to the home of DPRK Embassy counsellor Chon Chang-Hui in Rangoon. The three terrorists hid out in the counsellor's home, were provided with the explosive devices they required, and they planted two ballbearing-filled bombs and one incendiary bomb at the Martyr's Mausoleum in Rangoon. At about 1025 hours, 9 October 1983, the three terrorists triggered a remote-control device which caused a massive explosion in the Martyr's Mausoleum.

Equipment captured from these DPRK terrorists included one .25-calibre Browning automatic pistol (serial number 459771), manufactured in Belgium, with a silencer. It is revealing to note that the serial number of this Browning pistol is only separated by two digits from the serial number of another silencer-equipped Browning, serial number 459773, captured during the 3-6 November 1980 DPRK infiltration into the ROK island of Haenggan (United Nations Command report to United Nations Security Council, document S/14499, dated 28 July 1981). According to INTERPOL, an international criminal police agency, DPRK imported at least 200 Browning pistols and 15,000 rounds of ammunition through January 1975. A hand grenade recovered from the DPRK terrorists in Rangoon was also identical to numerous hand grenades captured from DPRK armed personnel who were infiltrated into the Republic of Korea. The serial number on the safety handle of one of the grenades recovered in Rangoon was 14-69-101. The last number, 101, represents the source, a manufacturing plant in South Pyongan Province, DPRK. It must be noted that the equipment captured from the DPRK terrorists in Rangoon is remarkably similar or identical to equipment DPRK has used in the past armed infiltration attempts into ROK.

At the 423rd meeting of MAC, held on 23 December 1983, UNC charged DPRK with drastically heightening tension and endangering the Armistice in Korea through the attempted assassination of the ROK President Chun in Rangoon and the resultant massacre. In so doing, UNC quoted the official Burmese Government account of the sequence of events and covered the public trial of the two DPRK terrorists. In closing, UNC called upon DPRK to cease its continuous acts of terror and violence directed against the Republic of Korea and respond to several constructive proposals advanced in the recent past by UNC in an attempt to reduce tensions and open the path to dialogue and peace.

5. United Nations Command initiatives

UNC has, during the reporting period, taken constructive initiatives to reduce prevailing tensions on the Korean peninsula which are attributable to the systematic and continuing DPRK hostilities directed against UNC and the Republic of Korea. UNC has resurfaced its past tension-reducing initiatives and introduced new proposals which would certainly reduce tension if agreed to by the KPA/CPV side.

(a) Mutual notification of major training exercises

UNC continues to seek a constructive KPA/CPV response to the UNC proposal for prior mutual notification of major training exercises in order to prevent possible

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miscalculations and unnecessary tension. Military training exercises, per se, are not violations of the Armistice Agreement; however, secretive military activity and movement could result in miscalculation. UNC called the 417th meeting of MAC, held on 18 February 1983, for the single purpose of negotiating the subject of mutual notification of exercises. The KPA/CPV side, however, failed to make a positive response to this tension-reducing proposal. To demonstrate its good faith, UNC notified the KPA/CPV side on 28 December 1983 (prior to the public announcement) that training exercise "Team Spirit '84" would be conducted from early February to mid-April 1984.

(b) An invitation to observe the training exercise "Team Spirit '83"

At the 416th meeting of MAC, held on 3 February 1983, in the face of continued and heated denouncement of "Team Spirit '83", UNC invited the five members of the KPA/CPV component of MAC (one Chinese and four North Koreans) in company with the four principal Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission members to come south and see for themselves the non-provocative nature of "Team Spirit '83". The North Koreans countered the UNC invitation with a distorted propaganda tirade that the exercise was designed to invade DPRK.

(c) Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission role in DMZ

At the 418th meeting of MAC, held on 21 May 1983, UNC proposed that MAC empower the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission - a neutral third party to the Korean Armistice Agreement - to assume the responsibility of impartial inspection of DMZ or, as a beginning, a portion of DMZ and report to MAC on exactly what they found in DMZ. The ultimate goal of this UNC proposal is to restore DMZ to its intended status as a true buffer-zone. This would be accomplished by removing military troops and illegal fortifications and weapons to prevent accidental confrontation between the opposing military forces. The KPA representative responded by saying, "We have no intention to invade the south and have already made our position clear a long time ago", but failed to address the subject. Again, on 31 October 1983, UNC urged that the KPA military commander accept the UNC initiative to restore DMZ to a true buffer-zone as intended. The North Koreans have yet to respond to this UNC proposal to reduce tensions in DMZ.

6. KPA/CPV patterns at the Military Armistice Commission

The KPA/CPV side has shown themselves unwilling to co-operate in enabling MAC to carry out its assigned mission. They have invariably refused to investigate jointly any violations of the Armistice Agreement and they have demonstrated absolutely no interest in constructive discussion of measures to reduce tensions. The KPA/CPV side consistently disavows any responsibility for these serious violations - continuous hostile actions directed against UNC and the Republic of Korea - even when confronted with incontestable evidence to the contrary. Instead, they dismiss them as "fabrications" and continue to misuse the forum of MAC to conduct propaganda attacks, seeking to shift responsibility for tensions in Korea to UNC and ROK.
