



SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 11th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. MOLAPO (Lesotho)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK (A/SPC/31/4)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to a letter dated 2 November 1976 (A/SPC/31/4) in which the President of the General Assembly requested the Special Political Committee to give five organizations the opportunity to state their views on the question of apartheid under agenda item 52, entitled "Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa", and he suggested that the Committee should hold a meeting for that purpose during the morning of Thursday, 4 November.

2. It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 53: UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (A/SPC/31/L.2) (continued)

(a) REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL (A/31/13) (continued)

(b) REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (A/31/279) (continued)

(c) REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE (A/31/254) (continued)

(d) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/31/240) (continued)

3. Mr. STANBURY (Canada) said that for 27 years, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East had provided essential services to refugees who today numbered more than one and a half million (registered refugees), some 70 per cent more than when the Agency had been established. The work of the Agency was above all humanitarian and was the responsibility of the entire international community, from which more must be expected. His delegation appealed to all countries to join in that humanitarian cause and it requested donor countries to increase their contributions. Canada, for its part, had consistently supported the work of the Agency through financial contributions and food aid and it undertook to continue and to increase its support.

4. Turning to the political aspect of the Middle East problem, he said that any solution, if it was to endure, must give the Palestinian people a means for self-expression, including political self-expression, consistent with the principle of self-determination. Whatever the solution, it must, on the one hand, recognize the existence and legitimacy of the State of Israel and permit all States in the area to live in security and, on the other hand, provide a territorial foundation for the political self-expression of the Palestinian people.

5. He expressed Canada's concern about the continual financial difficulties of the Agency. He attached the highest priority to providing that body with the funds it needed. In that connexion, he was pleased to note that several Arab

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(Mr. Stanbury, Canada)

countries had recently made generous contributions, despite their well-known reservations. He hoped that other countries would follow their example and that the traditional donors would not reduce their contributions to the financing of the Agency.

6. He deplored the effects of the civil war in Lebanon with its loss of life, injury and destruction of property. He noted the concern caused by the destruction of shelters by Israel as a punitive measure, and also noted with concern that they had not been replaced.

7. His delegation was basically satisfied that, despite enormous difficulties, the Commissioner-General and his staff were continuing to perform their difficult tasks most effectively and with a keen sense of duty. He concluded by emphasizing the need for an immediate solution to the problem of financing the Agency, and once again requested all Members to help it in its humanitarian task.

8. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that, as in previous years, the Committee had heard, during the consideration of the report of the Commissioner-General (A/31/13), a large number of allegations devoid of any basis against Israel, which was once more being blamed for the problem of the Palestine refugees in the Near East, although it was the Arab leaders themselves who had created and perpetuated that problem by encouraging the Palestinians to leave their homes at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in 1948, as had been proved time and again.

9. For the last 28 years, the problem of the Palestine refugees had been exploited for political purposes by the Arab States, which hoped to destroy Israel by refusing to integrate and absorb those whom they themselves had uprooted, by insisting vociferously on their return en masse and by refusing to contribute to the financing of the Agency. Furthermore, Arab leaders had prevented the realization of plans prepared by the international community for a constructive solution of the problem, and funds which had been available for that purpose had not been utilized because of their intransigence.

10. Israel had settled the problem of Jewish refugees who had had to abandon their homes in order to escape discrimination and persecution which they had been suffering in Arab countries. Their numbers had been equal to or even in excess of that of the Palestinian refugees. The problem had been settled without United Nations assistance and only with assistance from Jewish communities throughout the world.

11. The Arab States had refused to do the same for the Palestinians even though 85 per cent of them had remained in the same area, inhabited in many cases by the same families and the same clans. What had therefore happened in practice had been an exchange of ethnic communities without benefit of a treaty. Arab spokesmen, however, had rejected any constructive solution, deploring year after year in the United Nations the conditions in which the Palestinian refugees were forced to live - forced by whom? - and had called for the adoption of resolutions which they used in their political campaign against Israel.

12. With regard to the report of the Commissioner-General (A/31/13), he pointed out that the economic situation of the refugees had improved markedly and that the great majority of them did not depend for their subsistence on the rations and

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other forms of assistance provided by the Agency. That Agency, however, with a staff of some 16,000 people, mainly recruited from among the refugees, had become a veritable institution, with its own interests, and tended to perpetuate services which should be provided by the host countries. The distribution of rations should have been dispensed with long ago. People who earned a good living continued to draw rations and thus burden the international community.

13. Another aspect of the problem was the impossibility of verifying the number of refugees in camps in Arab countries, as was acknowledged in the report by the Commissioner-General, who pointed out that the statistics did "not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population".

14. With regard to the refugee camps in Lebanon, he recalled that the Palestine Liberation Organization had taken them over and had gradually turned them into armed encampments, training bases, arms and supplies depots and the like. That strange situation had apparently been accepted by the Agency which had even, at the request of the General Assembly, established contacts with the PLO.

15. The report referred a number of times to what it called "Israeli raids" or "Israeli attacks" on the camps. As had been pointed out on many occasions, the Government of Israel had been constrained to take action against the terrorist installations located in or near the camps, but it had always tried to spare the civil population. The blame for the destruction of property, deaths and great suffering inflicted on the population therefore lay solely with the Palestinian terrorist organizations. The civil war in Lebanon had resulted in almost 150,000 casualties, including more than 50,000 deaths, involving a large number of refugees from the camps. According to the report of the Commissioner-General, the number of refugee dead or wounded was so high, and the damage caused to the Agency's installations so extensive, that not even approximate figures could be arrived at, and the operations of the Agency in Lebanon had been almost entirely paralysed.

16. He was surprised to find a reference, in paragraph 3 of the introduction, to contacts between the Commissioner-General and the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and to recommendations made by that Committee. His delegation considered that an account of those recommendations in a report on the activities of the Agency was out of place. It also regretted the political overtones in the concluding passage of the introductory statement made by the Commissioner-General in the Committee (A/SPC/SR.7). Statements of such a nature did not appear to be within the competence of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA.

17. After making those general comments on the over-all situation, he wished to take up some subjects dealt with in detail in the report. The first subject was the housing situation of refugees living in the Gaza strip. When Israel had taken over the administration of that area, after 19 years of Egyptian rule, it had already become a veritable concentration camp and its population, including refugees, had been subjected to endless restrictions and denied freedom of movement. A rigid curfew had been imposed. There had been few sources of livelihood. The prisons had been full, and torture had been commonplace.

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18. When the Israeli administration had begun to function in 1967 and it had become clear to Egypt that Israeli policy was one of promoting well-being and development in the area, a terror campaign had been organized, not only against the Israeli authorities, but even more so against the local population, including the refugees, in order to force them to refuse offers of employment and other improvements in their lives. Over a period of four years, more than 200 Arab residents and refugees had been killed and more than 1,300 wounded. At that time the refugees had been living in overcrowded camps and it had been easy for the terrorists to escape from the security forces.

19. In order to put an end to that situation and protect the population, access roads had been built through the camps, necessitating the demolition of a number of shelters. It had not been possible to construct other housing in advance, but no effort had been spared to place alternative accommodation at the disposal of the families affected by those measures, or even to provide cash to enable them to pay rent. Besides, compensation had been paid to all refugees who had made improvements to the shelters before they had been demolished.

20. As a result of that action the incidence of terror acts had decreased to practically nil. Furthermore, as a result of a joint survey undertaken in 1973 by the Agency and the Israeli authorities, the large majority of those affected by the action of July/August 1971 had been rehoused in much better conditions.

21. It was no easy task, even in normal times, to rehouse a large number of people. But the efforts of the Israeli authorities had been interrupted by the Yom Kippur war of 1973.

22. It was stated in the report of the Commissioner-General (A/31/13) and that of the Secretary-General (A/31/240) that only a certain percentage of the refugees affected by the demolitions had been provided with free alternative accommodation. His delegation saw nothing wrong with that. It was time, after nearly 30 years, for the people of the area to get rid of the mendicant mentality. They were happy to be able to work again, earn their living and provide their families with some comforts.

23. His delegation was surprised that the Commissioner-General and his staff had been able to devote so much time to that subject and provide such detailed statistics. There was no possible comparison between the proper housing furnished to the refugees by the Israeli administration and the shelters in which they lived in the Agency camps.

24. It would, perhaps, have been easier to set up a large number of shelters, similar to those in the camps, but the Israeli administration had preferred to improve the living conditions of refugees, and that fact was not properly reflected in the report. It was also stated, in paragraph 13 of the Secretary-General's report, that the refugees whose shelters were not scheduled for demolition but who wished to purchase new accommodation in one or the other of the housing projects established by the Israeli authorities were required, by the Israeli authorities, to demolish their shelters (unless the authorities indicated that certain shelters were

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required for reallocation). He wished to make it quite clear that in accordance with the town planning schemes in the Gaza strip, no refugee was asked to leave his shelter unless alternative accommodation was provided for him. No one was forced to buy a new house. The actual situation was that the refugees were prepared to buy more houses than could be built.

25. As for the 210 hardship cases referred to in that report, the Israeli administration was prepared to provide new housing for those families, if that had not already been done. None of those people had been left without housing.

26. With reference to foot-note 8 on page 20 of the Commissioner-General's report, in which a distinction was made between three categories of buildings in the camps, his delegation wished to point out that former camp residents were attempting to buy shelters in sections about to be demolished, so as to qualify for the new housing. Even some Agency employees had attempted to do so.

27. Lastly, he pointed out that 400 contracts had been only recently distributed to refugees who had bought new houses or building plots in the area of Sheikh Radwan and that the refugees themselves had expressed great satisfaction with those measures. A high-ranking official of the Gaza District had stated, furthermore, that the Israeli administration would invest 70 million pounds in infrastructure for new housing and the construction of houses and community centres, to ensure the rehabilitation of the refugees.

28. Besides making those improvements in the housing area, the Israeli administration was continuing to better the living conditions of the refugees, both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. Health conditions had considerably improved in the areas administered by Israel since 1967, and the refugees had benefited as a result. Infant mortality had sharply decreased and, as was indicated in paragraph 90 of the report, the incidence of poliomyelitis had been sharply reduced in the area.

29. In paragraph 86, the report stated that in April the Israeli authorities in Gaza had introduced legislation requiring the payment of fees for most medical services provided by government institutions and that that innovation had deprived the refugees of the free services previously enjoyed at in and out-patient government facilities in Gaza. The medical health insurance scheme applied to everyone, not only to refugees. The law had been introduced in order to prevent abuses, but the fees remained extremely low and, since there was no unemployment and most people had sufficient funds, there was no real problem, not even for the refugees. Those who could not afford to pay received the same services as before, without payment.

30. In that connexion, he wished to remind the Committee that the Assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) had requested the Director-General of WHO to prepare a comprehensive report on health conditions in the occupied territories. A WHO official had gone to Israel in 1973 as the personal representative of the Director-General. He had stated in his report that he had found the situation on the whole satisfactory. At the following Assembly, the Arab delegates, after attacking the

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Director-General's representative, had asked for a new study. Once again the experts had found that curative and prophylactic medical assistance had improved, and that morbidity due to communicable diseases had decreased. But the Arab States members of WHO had not been satisfied and had brought about a resolution declaring the report to be null and void, on the pretext that the members of the committee responsible for the new study had visited the area separately and not together.

31. Israel would not be discouraged by such political manoeuvres and would continue to improve the medical services in the area in the interests of the local population, including the refugees.

32. In the field of education, in addition to the praiseworthy efforts of UNRWA, restricted to refugees only, the Israeli administration was expanding facilities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Particular progress had been made in Arab vocational training, work supervision and labour relations. There had been a great deal to do, as the situation had been allowed to deteriorate under the Jordanian régime. The Israeli administration had organized a series of lectures for the inhabitants about their rights as workers. Labour inspectors were responsible for enforcing legislation. Information campaigns had been conducted on safety in factories and workshops had been obliged to insure their workers. Workers, including refugees, who came from the administered areas to work in Israel were automatically insured against accidents.

33. One encouraging aspect of co-operation in education was that for the seventh consecutive year UNESCO, after consultation with the Egyptian and Israeli Governments and in co-operation with UNRWA, had organized in the Gaza Strip examinations for the Egyptian secondary school-leaving certificate (Tawjihi). Examinations had also been organized for the Al Azhar Tawjihi, for the diploma of the Egyptian agricultural school and for a teacher-training certificate. More than 5,000 candidates had passed out of 7,000. It was hoped that that type of co-operation would extend to other fields.

34. Enormous strides had also been made in agriculture. The term "green revolution" had been used to describe what had taken place in the past nine years in Judaea and Samaria. The introduction of new methods of cultivation had greatly improved the lives of West Bank and Gaza Strip farmers. Prior to the six-day war, Amman had been the only administrative and operational centre for the West Bank agriculture. Since then, a network of district agricultural offices had been established. Major achievements had been obtained in market gardening, particularly in the Jordan valley, resulting in a steep increase in exports. The improvement in West Bank livestock was no less remarkable, particularly through sheep imported from Romania and the campaign against foot-and-mouth disease.

35. The efforts made had been successful. Not only had the wages of agricultural workers increased, but they now had a large number of agricultural machines, enabling the West Bank to export its produce to neighbouring countries and Europe.

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36. The economic development, full employment and security felt by the inhabitants of the administered areas were illustrated by the considerable increase in construction in the West Bank and Gaza; construction had increased almost tenfold between 1968 and 1974.

37. The Israeli administration had done everything in its power, and probably much more than many other countries in similar situations. Its contribution to the UNRWA budget for the current year was \$1,092,383 and its total contribution to UNRWA so far amounted to \$7,522,126. In addition, it had furnished various services to refugees at a total cost of \$12,285,615, an increase of almost \$2 million over the previous year. Finally, a considerable part of its annual budget for the administered areas benefited the refugees, who formed a large proportion of the local population.

38. There was considerable disproportion between these figures and the miserly contributions made by the oil-rich Arab countries. Some of them had made an effort, but in general they did not really attempt to help UNRWA to resolve its financial crisis.

39. In spite of the hostility of the Arab countries, Israel continued to do everything it could to improve the situation. For example, the Israeli authorities had permitted a very large number of persons coming from Arab countries via Jordan to enter the administered areas and even Israel, in the hope of improving human contacts. Since 1967, more than 60,000 displaced persons had been granted permission to return to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in addition to some 50,000 refugees of the 1948-1949 hostilities who had also been permitted to return over the years.

40. So far, however, no Israeli citizens were being permitted to visit Arab countries, not even Moslems who wished to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. In that connexion, the Commissioner-General had noted in his report that some Governments, not all of them Arab, did not permit Israeli nationals employed by international organizations to visit or work in their territories. As a result of that negative attitude, a small number of UNRWA employees had not been given visas to travel to the administered areas by the Israeli authorities. Such matters could be treated only on a basis of complete reciprocity.

41. Finally, he hoped that everything would be done to improve the situation in the administered areas and that his observations would be borne in mind. In the situation as it was at present in the United Nations, nothing was easier than the adoption of further resolutions condemning his country. But they were entirely negative and could not solve the problem. All should join in working for something more positive and more constructive leading to coexistence, co-operation and eventually peace and friendship.

42. When peace was achieved, the problem of the Palestinian refugees would undoubtedly be solved.

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43. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) recalled that UNRWA had been established in 1949 to help Palestinian refugees who had then been in a deplorable situation brought about by the conspiracy of the imperialist countries. Over the years, the United Nations had regularly considered the question, but the refugees' situation had not improved and no progress had been made towards a fair solution.

44. It was regrettable that every year meetings had to be held to examine the financial difficulties of UNRWA, without any positive result. The United Nations adopted numerous resolutions on the issue but they were ineffectual, as were the measures taken for implementing them. The problem of the Palestinian refugees was a result of measures taken by the imperialist countries to establish a fabricated State of Israel by evicting the indigenous inhabitants who had been obliged to make way for foreigners from 102 countries.

45. The Palestinian people still refused to be uprooted. The number of Palestinian refugees living in the camps proved that the Palestinian people existed and the whole world could no longer be unconscious of that fact.

46. When it had been admitted to the United Nations, Israel had unreservedly accepted all the obligations of the Charter. But since then, it had consistently violated the Charter and ignored the Organization's resolutions, especially those concerning the Palestinian refugees. So it was primarily Israel which should help UNRWA to operate until the day, unfortunately as yet unknown, when the refugees would be able to return to their homes. It shared that responsibility with the United Nations, which had created it and then allowed it to ride rough shod over its resolutions, and with the countries supplying it with material and military support, thereby prolonging the refugee drama. In the immediate future, UNRWA had to be given stable financial resources. But resolution 3236 (XXIX) must serve as a basis for all United Nations action.

47. His country was concerned first and foremost with the Arab people of Palestine, whose suffering and hopes it shared and to whom it had always given moral, financial and political support. In addition to its annual contribution, it had made a special contribution of \$1 million to UNRWA and was ready to contribute another \$0.5 million to alleviate the Palestinians' suffering.

48. The problem was not only a human one, but also a political issue and it must therefore have a political solution.

49. Mr. GERRING (Sweden) said that the reports of the Commissioner-General (A/31/13) and the Working Group (A/31/279) showed clearly that UNRWA's task was both necessary and difficult and that the costs were reasonable in relation to results. While the financial situation was disturbing, it was reassuring that the additional contributions made recently and the careful management of the Commissioner-General would enable operations to continue until the end of 1976. But there was a risk of a crisis again in 1977 and his delegation wished to associate itself with the appeal made to Governments which had not contributed or whose contributions had been inadequate.

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(Mr. Gerring, Sweden)

50. His Government had contributed about \$38 million to UNRWA since 1950, a figure which was exceeded only by the contributions of the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Economic Community and Canada. During the current year, it had contributed more than \$6 million.

51. For the past few years, the General Assembly had authorized the Commissioner-General to provide, temporarily and as far as practicable, humanitarian assistance to persons who were in need as a result of the hostilities in June 1967. That assistance was still necessary and his delegation reserved the right to revert to the point later.

52. Mr. BROOMES (Trinidad and Tobago) recalled that at the time when it had established the Agency, the General Assembly had decided that it was to be funded by voluntary contributions. In fact, too few Member States made the necessary contributions to enable the Agency to remain viable. There were, however, at least two good reasons why States should contribute. The first was the humanitarian one. The second concerned the maintenance of international peace and security in the Middle East and the world as a whole.

53. The Commissioner-General had pointed out in paragraph 10 of his report (A/31/13) that it would be of great help to the working capital position of UNRWA if the United Nations could agree in advance to accept a contingent liability against its budget for separation benefits in respect of local staff in the event of the liquidation of UNRWA. The Working Group had commented sympathetically on that idea in paragraph 32 of its own report (A/31/279).

54. A final resolution of the refugee problem would depend on a final resolution of the Middle East problem. In the meantime, both for altruistic reasons and for reasons of self-preservation, UNRWA must be supported.

55. Mrs. OGATA (Japan) recalled the financial difficulties of the Agency, and said that the current level of services provided by the latter for the refugees was minimal. Her delegation fully shared the conviction of the Working Group that any reduction in those services would have serious implications for the refugees, for the countries in which they resided, and for the prospects for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

56. As the Commissioner-General stated in his report (A/31/13), the Agency's unfunded liability for separation benefits for its large local staff seriously aggravated its financial difficulties. The General Assembly could accept a contingent liability against the United Nations budget for separation benefits in the event of the liquidation of the Agency. Her delegation agreed with the Working Group that that suggestion deserved further consideration by the Assembly.

57. The financing of the Agency was the joint responsibility of all States Members of the United Nations, irrespective of their views on the political aspects of the Palestinian problem. Her delegation wished to associate itself with the appeal to Governments which had not contributed in the past or had so far contributed inadequately.

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(Mrs. Ogata, Japan)

58. She paid a tribute to the Commissioner-General and his staff for their efforts and said her delegation agreed with the Working Group that the Agency's services in the form of relief assistance, health care and education remained indispensable until a just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem had been achieved.

59. Her Government had steadily increased its contributions to the Agency. It had decided to make an additional contribution of \$500,000 for the current fiscal year, bringing Japan's total contribution for 1976 to \$5.5 million.

60. In that regard, she stressed that Japanese public opinion was becoming increasingly concerned about the fate of the Palestinian refugees. Non-governmental organizations had already donated more than \$25,000 in 1976 and were expected to donate about the same amount before the end of the year.

61. Mr. SURYOKOSUMO (Indonesia) recalled the political context of the activities of the Agency, whose problems had been aggravated by the internal conflict in Lebanon and the military attacks by Israel against its neighbours.

62. The report of the Commissioner-General revealed the financial difficulties which the Agency would again have to face in 1977. If UNRWA was to maintain the level of its services, sufficient funding must be ensured to permit both adequate planning and continuity of programmes. But a small group of countries could not indefinitely bear the major burden of that financing.

63. Indonesia's annual contributions showed that it was determined to assist the Agency as much as possible within its means. However, his delegation thought that all countries which were in a position to do so should contribute to the Agency. It was also prepared to consider proposals aimed at alleviating the Agency's financial problems, particularly those mentioned in paragraph 10 of the report of the Commissioner-General (A/31/13) and paragraph 32 of the report of the Working Group (A/31/279). The current crisis necessitated a re-evaluation of the mandate of the Agency, which needed a firm financial base in order to be able to carry on its work.

64. Pending a settlement of the refugee problem, the relief work of the Agency must be continued, and it would be a tragedy if its services were reduced.

65. His delegation was prepared to support draft resolution A/SPC/31/L.2, as it sought to enhance the ability of the Agency to remain financially and administratively viable until the end of its current mandate.

66. In conclusion, he paid a tribute to the Commissioner-General and his staff for the work they had done in very difficult circumstances, and to the members of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA for their efforts to secure the necessary funds for the Commissioner-General's work.

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67. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that recent events in the Middle East showed that the Palestinian problem was a political one which could not be considered solely from the humanitarian standpoint; in other words, it was not simply a refugee problem. That point had been stressed in the relevant resolutions adopted at the twenty-ninth and thirtieth sessions of the General Assembly.

68. The Palestinian refugee problem could only be solved within the context of a comprehensive Middle East settlement. That would necessitate the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, the fulfilment of the legitimate national aspirations of the Arab people of Palestine, including the right to establish their own States, and international guarantees to ensure the security of all the Middle East States, including Israel.

69. His country considered that the Geneva Conference should make it possible to conclude the essential agreements. That Conference should be reconvened with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Arab people of Palestine represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization. His country had recently taken a new step to that end: it had proposed a specific agenda for the Conference, including all the problems whose solution would lead to a lasting peace in the Middle East.

70. With regard to the Palestinian refugee problem per se, his delegation considered that Israel should respect the relevant United Nations decisions and in particular implement paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), in which the right of the Palestinian refugees to repatriation or compensation was recognized.

71. With regard to the financing of the activities of UNRWA, his delegation recalled that the USSR had always been opposed to any infringement of the voluntary contribution principle. It would find any such infringement absolutely unacceptable, for two reasons. First, because that would be tantamount to placing the countries which were impeding an equitable solution of the Palestinian problem on an equal footing with those which were striving to ensure that the legitimate national aspirations of the Arab people of Palestine were fulfilled. Secondly, because it would perpetuate the Palestinians' status as refugees deprived of rights, which would amount to condemning them to eternal servitude.

72. His Government and the social organizations of the USSR provided substantial bilateral assistance to the Arab peoples who were victims of Israeli aggression, including the Arab people of Palestine.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.