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held on
Tuesday, 14 December 1976
at 3 p.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 49th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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CONCLUSION OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 86: QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (A/31/23/Add.1-2, A/31/61, A/31/62, A/31/66, A/31/71, A/31/77, A/31/155, A/31/197, A/31/237, A/31/258, A/31/274; A/C.4/31/L.45, L.46) (continued)

1. Mr. MANGAL (Afghanistan) said that the continued success of the liberation struggle of the peoples of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe had introduced positive changes in the colonial situation in southern Africa, inspiring the current diplomatic efforts for a peaceful solution to the problem and strengthening the hope that the peoples of Namibia and Southern Rhodesia would soon be free from colonial and alien domination.

2. His delegation was cautiously optimistic about the Geneva Conference as the illegal white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, conceding to increasing international pressure, seemed to have finally accepted that majority rule and the eventual legal independence of the territory was inevitable.

3. Although a time-limit for independence and African majority rule had been set, the basic issue of the structure of an interim government still remained to be agreed upon, and his delegation believed that unless there was an African majority in the Zimbabwe interim government, it would not be possible to ensure the speedy and orderly transfer of power or the convening of a full constitutional conference to work out the independence constitution.

4. Furthermore, any organ of the interim government in which automatic blocking power was given to the illegal white minority régime of Southern Rhodesia could not promote the early transfer of power to the majority.

5. Because of his past record in negotiations, the caution and scepticism prevailing in some circles regarding the sincerity of Mr. Smith in the current Geneva negotiations were perhaps justified. As recently as March 1976, he had stated that there had never been a policy in Rhodesia to hand over the country to any black majority and, as far as he was concerned, there never would be. It was to be hoped that that attitude would not be reflected in the Geneva negotiations and that the opportunity for peaceful settlement would not be abused by the illegal white minority régime. Mr. Smith's reluctance to proceed with substantive negotiations on the basic question of the structure and composition of the interim government had already raised serious doubts about his intentions, and his insistence on the recess of the negotiations at a crucial stage was perhaps based on his expectation that any existing division in the liberation movement would be heightened, and that the conference would thus break down. The national liberation movement of Zimbabwe could not be blamed for any failure of the negotiations.

6. The intensified oppression of the people of Zimbabwe and the denial of fundamental human rights had continued, and the Smith régime must show a change in

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(Mr. Mangal, Afghanistan)

its attitude by terminating such measures forthwith and releasing all political prisoners.

7. The United Kingdom, as the administering Power for the territory, should play a much greater role than at present and take all effective measures to enable the people of Zimbabwe to gain their independence in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population.

8. There was no justification for relaxing international pressure on the illegal minority régime of Southern Rhodesia while the current negotiations continued. On the contrary, it should be intensified, and if economic sanctions were to be effective they ought to be comprehensive, mandatory and properly enforced. His delegation appreciated the courageous decision of the Government of Mozambique to close its borders with Southern Rhodesia and the statesmanship of the so-called front-line States in connexion with the diplomatic efforts on the future of Zimbabwe. His Government, which had always supported the legitimate struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for self-determination and independence, hoped that the Zimbabwe national liberation movement would be able to continue the critical negotiations in Geneva as a united front.

9. Finally, his delegation hoped that the Geneva Conference would succeed in bringing about a transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe, thereby establishing conditions for early independence.

10. Mr. BADI (Libyan Arab Republic) said he regretted that the United Nations was powerless to find a solution to the problem of Zimbabwe as it depended on the compliance of the colonial Powers with the sanctions imposed. The United Kingdom Government could have prevented the Smith rebellion in the aftermath of the unilateral declaration of independence but had failed to live up to United Nations standards, thereby causing the African people of Zimbabwe humiliations and allowing the country to be plundered and exploited because its population was black.

11. The barbarous acts against black people, especially in the operational area and the so-called "protected villages", so eloquently described in the report of the Special Committee of 24 (A/31/23/Add.2) had gone unpunished, and therefore the people of Zimbabwe were left with only two alternatives: either to accept the fait accompli and wait for the conscience of the ruling régime to awaken, so that it complied with United Nations resolutions or to resort to armed struggle in the belief that freedom was not a gift but a right that had to be seized. They had been compelled to take up arms after all attempts at a peaceful settlement had failed.

12. The leaders of the African liberation movement had participated in the Victoria Falls talks, showing their good faith and interest in a negotiated settlement, but Mr. Smith had sought to sow discord among Zimbabwe leaders in order to win time, hoping that the situation in southern Africa would change in his favour.

13. However, developments in 1975 and 1976, and especially the independence of Mozambique, had forced Mr. Smith to see that the collapse of his régime was inevitable and to take decisions that revealed the true nature of that régime.

(Mr. Badi, Libyan Arab Republic)

As was stated in paragraph 43 of the Special Committee's report (A/31/23/Add.2), Mr. Smith had asked the United Kingdom to play an active part in the attempt to resolve the impasse in the talks and said that he would be prepared to "retract" Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. Yet in the same statement, he was reported to have said that he did not believe in black majority rule ever in Rhodesia - not in a thousand years.

14. The Organization of African Unity, in the so-called Dar es Salaam Declaration, had called on all African States to render unconditional support to the Zimbabwe people in their struggle for majority rule and independence. The Geneva Conference had reached a crucial stage in the progress towards those objectives, yet Mr. Smith had provoked the Zimbabwe nationalists and sown discord by threatening to negotiate with the moderates.

15. The repeated aggression against Mozambique testified to the bad faith of Mr. Smith and his clique, and now the United Kingdom Government should assume full responsibility by removing the illegal régime and paving the way for majority rule and independence. Otherwise there would be a serious danger of a full-scale war between the racist régimes and the African peoples.

16. Peace and justice were needed, but there could be no equality under a racist régime. In the last quarter of the twentieth century the racist régimes were only able to challenge the United Nations resolutions calling for sanctions because they were supported by colonialist régimes.

17. The United States of America was a Member of the United Nations, and yet it continued to import chrome and nickel from Rhodesia, thus flouting resolutions in order to further its own economic ends.

18. His delegation recommended that all States should be compelled to abide by the United Nations resolutions calling for a boycott against the Southern Rhodesian régime; that countries which continued to violate those resolutions, especially the United States of America, should be condemned; that the boycott should be made effective; that the United Kingdom should assume its responsibility as the administering Power and help to promote progress towards majority rule and independence for Zimbabwe, upholding the principle that independence could only be achieved by majority rule, and that the people of Zimbabwe should be helped by all possible means.

19. His delegation confirmed its unqualified support for Zimbabwe in its fight for freedom, dignity and independence.

20. Mr. ABDULDJALIL (Indonesia) said that, with the intensification of their struggle for liberation on all fronts, the Zimbabwe freedom-fighters had demonstrated the heightened determination of the people of the territory to free themselves from colonial and racist domination and to institute majority rule in place of the present oppressive minority régime, thus confronting the Smith régime with the strongest challenge of its entire existence.

(Mr. Abduldjalil, Indonesia)

21. The illegal régime had on the one hand, been compelled to increase its military expenditures and operations. But on the other hand it had been compelled to enter into substantive negotiations with the genuine representatives of the people of Zimbabwe on the transfer of power and democratic majority rule.

22. His delegation noted the decision by the administering Power to play a direct role in a transitional government, as well as the fixing of 1 March 1978 as the deadline for independence, and it welcomed the effort to formulate a settlement.

23. Nevertheless, it deplored the obstructive and dilatory tactics of the illegal régime and its efforts to use the conference to ensure the continuance of minority domination of an independent Zimbabwe. No manoeuvres could be allowed to distract the people of Zimbabwe and the international community from the goal of full self-government on the basis of democratic majority rule.

24. His Government sincerely hoped that the transition to majority rule could be accomplished by peaceful means, but reaffirmed its unwavering support for the just and legitimate struggle of the oppressed people of Zimbabwe to attain their sacred right to self-determination and independence. It would continue to demonstrate that support through contributions to various United Nations funds for the peoples of southern Africa.

25. The people of Zimbabwe had already demonstrated their readiness to make sacrifices necessary to overcome the illegal régime's intransigence, and there could be no doubt as to the fate which ultimately lay in store for the Smith régime if it continued to oppose a peaceful transition on realistic terms.

26. His delegation appreciated the efforts by the front-line States to terminate the illegal minority régime by peaceful means, and welcomed the actions taken by the administering Power and the United States in that regard.

27. It would be necessary for the international community to take additional steps to ensure that an interim government truly reflected the interests of the majority of the Zimbabwe people or to take whatever action was necessary to put a speedy end to the existence of the minority régime. The knowledge that the international community was prepared to take such action if the talks failed would bring additional pressure to bear on the Smith régime.

28. It was clear that the people of Zimbabwe would no longer endure protracted negotiations which only underscored the insincerity of the illegal régime, and the Geneva Conference was a last chance to secure peacefully the long overdue transition to majority rule in the territory. That opportunity should not be lost, but whatever the outcome of the negotiations, the United Nations must take steps to ensure that the people of Zimbabwe were enabled to exercise their inalienable rights in the very near future.

29. Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) said that certain recent developments, such as the

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(Mr. Badawi, Egypt)

victorious emancipation from Portuguese colonialism of the people of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, as well as the intensification of the armed struggle of the freedom fighters in Zimbabwe, had brought about the Geneva Conference, which was a constructive step in the right direction.

30. He earnestly hoped that the Conference would succeed in establishing the conditions for a smooth and peaceful transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe, who had taken the wise decision to accept participation in the Conference. But peaceful solutions could not be achieved unless all parties were earnest and willing, and on that score he had no illusions about the real intentions of Mr. Ian Smith.

31. By his statements at the Geneva Conference and his insistence that effective power would remain in white hands during the transitional period, Ian Smith had confirmed Egypt's doubts that he had not the slightest intention of yielding to the pressures of reality and the determination of the people of Zimbabwe to attain their legitimate objectives, and had shown that his participation in the Conference was merely another delaying tactic and a desperate bid to demonstrate that it was impossible to negotiate with the black nationalist leaders.

32. His delegation supported the decision of the Zimbabwe nationalists not to lay down their arms before achieving their ultimate objectives and called upon the United Kingdom to assume its full responsibility and to do its utmost to make good use of the Conference, which might be the last opportunity to avoid a bloody racial war in Zimbabwe.

33. The whole of Africa expected the United Kingdom to ensure that majority rule and independence were achieved on the date already agreed upon. It felt that no political, legal or military considerations could exonerate the United Kingdom from assuming full responsibility for ensuring the attainment of the people of Zimbabwe of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

34. His delegation had noted with appreciation the renewed commitment of the United Kingdom that there would be no independence in Zimbabwe before majority rule. It also appreciated the constructive role played by the front-line countries, and counted on their continued vigilance and unity in backing the nationalists of Zimbabwe.

35. It saluted the courageous decision of the Government of Mozambique to close its borders with Southern Rhodesia, thus playing a vital role in the implementation of the mandatory sanctions against the illegal racist régime. At the same time, it condemned the collaboration of certain States, particularly the régime of South Africa, which continued to violate United Nations sanctions and to co-operate with the illegal minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

36. The General Assembly should not only remain seized of the situation but should continue to seek every possible means of putting additional pressure on the racist régime, should the Geneva Conference fail. Egypt would continue to afford the people of Zimbabwe all assistance in their legitimate struggle until they achieved their final goal of majority rule and independence.

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37. Mr. STEPHANIDES (Cyprus) said that the United Nations had failed to take adequate action in accordance with the principles of the Charter. The situation in Zimbabwe had therefore deteriorated and the racist régime of Ian Smith had behaved despicably towards the people of Zimbabwe. Only the determination of the people of Zimbabwe to struggle for their inalienable right to self-determination and independence had recently brought their legitimate cause into better focus.

38. His delegation commended the latest efforts by the United Kingdom in the Geneva negotiations. He also wished to pay the highest tribute to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, to the front-line States and to the whole of Africa for the readiness to negotiate and the determination to fight for Zimbabwe's freedom and independence if the racist régime continued its obstructionist attitude and its contemptuous disregard for United Nations resolutions.

39. Cyprus, which had witnessed and suffered the devastation and calamitous effects of aggression and occupation, understood very well the desire of the people of Zimbabwe to achieve justice, freedom and independence. No power on earth could forever deny the legitimate rights of peoples that were ready and determined to sacrifice their lives for their liberation and independence.

40. He expressed the hope that the United Nations would expeditiously lend its full political and material support to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, while ensuring the strict application by all States of the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council.

41. His delegation wished to join in urging the initiation by the United Nations of a programme of assistance to Mozambique, in view of the losses it had sustained as a result of its highly commendable action in scrupulously implementing United Nations sanctions against the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia.

42. His delegation wished to become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45, and would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46.

43. Mr. PINTO GAZURCO (Peru) said that the report of the Committee of 24, the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, and the statements made by many delegations in the debate, showed the various aspects involved in the complex problem of Southern Rhodesia. The Geneva Conference certainly gave reason to hope that power could be transferred to the legitimate representatives of the people of Zimbabwe, thus creating the necessary conditions for early independence.

44. His delegation, however, considered that if a just and lasting solution was to be found, the following factors must be taken into account: the paramount responsibility of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to put an end to the critical situation in Southern Rhodesia; full compliance with United Nations resolutions, which reflected the feeling of the international community that Southern Rhodesia should become a free and sovereign nation under the leadership of the legitimate representatives of the people of Zimbabwe; full respect for the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination, which was impossible under the illegal régime in power.

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(Mr. Pinto Gazurco, Peru)

45. It was extremely disturbing to note that the activities of foreign economic interests in Southern Rhodesia were increasing, and had become an obstacle to the independence of the people of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, those business interests had helped to consolidate the power of the illegal Smith régime.

46. The support received, mainly from South Africa, by the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, raised doubts about the ethical values of societies which were becoming increasingly incapable of appreciating the ideals of liberty and justice. The sanctions imposed by the Security Council could be effective only if they were implemented by all States, especially those which had the greatest economic power.

47. His delegation was deeply concerned at the intensification of oppression in Zimbabwe, where the situation had become a serious threat to international peace and security.

48. In Peru, the ethnic symbiosis deriving from four centuries of racial integration was an essential component of the personality of the people, and had contributed to the greatness of the country. That fortunate situation formed the basis for the foreign policy of the Government, which rejected all forms of racism and racial discrimination. It was therefore with genuine conviction that Peru supported the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Africa who were suffering under colonialism, which was using racial discrimination to perpetuate its domination.

49. His delegation would continue to support the people of Zimbabwe in their just struggle, which involved the whole international community and which should not cease until freedom had finally been won.

50. Mr. BEIN (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, no matter what subject the Committee was dealing with, some Arab and communist delegates were sure to connect it with Israel and its national liberation movement, zionism. He, too, could recount atrocities, such as the genocide against the Kurds, the hanging of Palestinians and Jews in the market squares of their capitals, the brutal murder of tens of thousands of Palestinians, the discrimination and campaign of hatred against citizens who happened to be Jewish, and the collaboration and trade in oil, gold and arms with South Africa and Rhodesia. However, such futile repetitions of accusations only served to divert the Committee from the main issues before it.

51. Consequently, he wished to thank the representatives of some Arab countries for demonstrating so clearly to the Committee that they were not interested in helping to further the process of decolonization or peace, but simply in using the Committee and the United Nations for their short-sighted campaign of hatred against Israel and zionism.

52. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, he wished to make it clear that Israel had no ties, overt or covert, with Southern Rhodesia. Unlike some countries attacking it, Israel had no shares in the London Rhodesia Company, nor did it sell oil to Rhodesia or buy Rhodesian goods. Regulations in existence in Israel

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(Mr. Bein, Israel)

clearly and unequivocally prohibited all imports or exports to or from Rhodesia. Every care was taken, and would continue to be taken to ensure that those regulations were duly complied with.

53. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the United Kingdom representative seemed to have been somewhat hasty in taking the floor, since the Geneva talks were still in progress. It would be better if the representatives of the administering Power endeavoured to bring the Geneva Conference to a successful conclusion instead of indulging in premature rights of reply.

54. He had been unaware of United Kingdom legislation prohibiting service by United Kingdom nationals as mercenaries in the armies of other States. Such legislation was highly commendable.

55. The representative of the United Kingdom had also stated that United Kingdom nationals were free to leave the country at any time. It was a strange freedom which allowed nationals to leave the country in order to serve in the army of another State. Obviously, the British and Soviet concepts of freedom were different. Furthermore, the United States press and other sources had confirmed the recruitment of British nationals in the United Kingdom to serve as mercenaries in Southern Rhodesia, even while the Geneva talks were in progress.

56. With regard to United Kingdom legislation on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, he said that such legislation was useless unless it was fully implemented. Large corporations and monopolies continued to bypass it. Their co-operation with and aid to Southern Rhodesia was an established fact. The provision of arms to the Smith régime enabled it to prolong negotiations indefinitely and to consolidate its position in Zimbabwe.

57. He welcomed the United Kingdom initiative in convening the Geneva Conference, which he was sure would yield positive results. He expressed the hope that the United Kingdom would be able to achieve a peaceful transfer of power to the indigenous people of Zimbabwe. If any help was needed in achieving that end, he was sure that many Member States would be in a position to provide it.

58. Mr. VERGAU (Federal Republic of Germany), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his delegation had been somewhat surprised by certain allegations that his Government tolerated the recruitment of mercenaries for Southern Rhodesia. Such allegations were unfounded. As his delegation had explained at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, under article 109 of the German Penal Code, the recruitment of citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany for a foreign army was a criminal offence. In January 1975, a national of the Federal Republic of Germany had been arrested on suspicion of recruiting mercenaries for foreign armed service, in violation of article 109, and had subsequently been sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment for that offence. His Government had informed the United Nations Committee on sanctions of the matter in July 1975.

59. While his country's authorities continued to enforce article 109 by all means at their disposal, they could not guarantee that no other individual of German

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(Mr. Vergau, Federal Republic of Germany)

origin would ever operate as a mercenary in southern Africa. Contrary to the practice in certain other countries, whose delegates had tried to criticize his Government, citizens of the Federal Republic could not be prevented from leaving the country. Nor did the authorities of his country prevent citizens from returning by depriving them of their citizenship while they were abroad.

60. Mr. EL-ZOEBY (Egypt), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the assertion by the representative of Israel that his country had no dealings with Southern Rhodesia or South Africa was unbelievable. The representatives of Israel in the Committee and in the General Assembly had repeatedly attempted to deny any links between Israel and South Africa. However, articles in the Jewish Observer of 5 November 1976, and The New York Times of 26 November 1976, had confirmed that Israel supplied South Africa with arms, some of them highly sophisticated. It was to be hoped that the representative of Israel would not accuse those newspapers of engaging in a hostile campaign against Israel, or in anti-semitism.

61. Mr. KHALEF (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the statement of the Zionist representative in the Committee, and the position adopted by that delegation in the various debates concerning southern Africa, were clear proof that the Zionist entity wished to maintain its links with South Africa, in spite of the condemnation of the international community. The Zionist entity's co-operation with South Africa had been demonstrated once again by the fact that meetings of a joint committee to co-ordinate trade relations between the two States had taken place during the General Assembly's debate on the question of Namibia. Like South Africa, Israel had always acted as an instrument of imperialism. Its relationship with South Africa was well known, as was demonstrated by various United Nations resolutions.

62. Referring to the question of the Kurds, he said that the situation in northern Iraq was one of lasting peace and security. The Zionist entity had endeavoured by every means to exploit the situation which had existed in that part of the country, in order to sow dissension and to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq. In doing so, it was carrying out the role assigned to it by the colonial Powers that had established it. Israel's attempts to exploit the situation and to paralyse the role of the Iraqi army in the northern part of the country during the October war had been reported in an article in The New York Times.

63. It was for those reasons that Israel was seen as a source of dissension in the Arab world and as an instrument of imperialism in the Middle East.

64. Mr. MAUERSBERGER (German Democratic Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, noted that, in his statement, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany had referred to "German" Penal Code. However, as the representative of the Federal Republic, he was authorized to speak only on behalf of that country.

65. The German Democratic Republic had always opposed the use of mercenaries, and none of its citizens fought as mercenaries against the liberation movements, or to consolidate racist and colonialist régimes. His delegation would always vote in favour of resolutions requesting all Member States to prohibit the use of mercenaries.

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(Mr. Mauersberger, German
Democratic Republic)

66. His Government would do everything in its power to prevent activities of foreign mercenaries contrary to the principles of the United Nations and the wishes of the overwhelming majority, as expressed in the Committee.

67. Mr. TAHA (Palestine Liberation Organization), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of the Zionist entity had attempted to distort reality and to conceal his country's relations with racist régimes. His attempts to convince the Committee of the Zionist entity's humanitarian treatment of the Palestinian people were pointless, since the suffering imposed on that people was common knowledge.

68. Furthermore, zionism bore no relation to any national liberation movement, since the aims of such movements were not to inflict suffering on an entire people, but to bring about prosperity and freedom.

69. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the Congo, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, the Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, and Uganda had become co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45. He invited the Committee to vote on that draft resolution.

70. Draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45 was adopted without objection.

71. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that Bulgaria, the Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Gabon, the German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Iraq, Jamaica, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Uganda had become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46.

72. He also informed the Committee that a recorded vote on that draft resolution had been requested by the representative of Sweden.

73. Draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46 was adopted by 121 votes to 1, with 6 abstentions.

74. Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom) agreed with the observation made by the representative of the Soviet Union that their two concepts of freedom were indeed different.

75. Speaking in explanation of his vote, he said that his delegation had taken part in the adoption without objection of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45, and had abstained from voting on draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46.

76. His delegation reaffirmed its determination to do everything possible to bring Rhodesia to independence under majority rule as soon as possible. In that connexion the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary had just made a statement in the

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(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

House of Commons to the effect that, while no agreement had been reached at the Geneva Conference, good progress had been made in identifying and clarifying the views of the different parties and the points that must be settled before a transitional government could be established. After consultations with Mr. Ivor Richard, the Foreign Secretary had concluded that the stage had been reached where the United Kingdom should attempt to give a fresh impetus to the search for a solution. Clearly, however, that process was more likely to be successful if it was not initiated during the normal meetings of the Conference. A further period of intensive consultations in southern Africa was needed to lay the foundations for an agreement. The Chairman had therefore been authorized to adjourn the Conference until 17 January 1977. In addition, Mr. Richard, as the United Kingdom's special representative, would leave for Africa immediately after Christmas in order to consult with all the parties concerned. Mr. Richard would develop the United Kingdom's ideas for a settlement, including, in particular, the direct role which the United Kingdom would be ready to play in the transitional period. If, at the end of those consultations, it proved necessary or desirable, the Foreign Secretary himself would go either to Africa or to the resumed conference at Geneva. The United Kingdom's intention would be to meet the concern of the nationalists that the process of transition to independence should be guaranteed, and the anxieties of Europeans that it should be orderly.

77. His delegation had reservations with regard to paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45. The report of the Ad Hoc Group stated that the only alternative open to the people of Zimbabwe was recourse to armed struggle and demanded the extension of sanctions to all measures envisaged under Article 41 of the Charter. That report had, of course, been drawn up before the developments of September and the convening of the Geneva Conference. His delegation continued to believe that a negotiated solution was both possible and desirable. His delegation had a similar reservation regarding paragraphs 1 and 10 of the draft resolution, where it took the reference to "struggle" to mean a non-violent struggle.

78. Furthermore, the references to the national liberation movement in the final preambular paragraph and in paragraph 10 were somewhat ambiguous. His delegation's acceptance of that phrase was based on the assumption that it was a general term covering all nationalist groups. His delegation also wished to express its usual reservation about the proper role of the specialized agencies, as referred to in paragraph 10 of the draft resolution.

79. His delegation associated itself with operative paragraph 12, concerning the Geneva Conference, the main objective of which was to bring about a rapid and orderly transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe.

80. Ms. EDELSTEIN (Canada) said that her delegation had been pleased to join in the consensus on draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45 and, in particular, to support those provisions which expressed the hope that the Conference at Geneva would succeed in establishing the conditions for early independence for Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule. It welcomed that Conference because it provided the opportunity to bring about that objective by peaceful means. With that in mind, her delegation would not support any provisions in the reports and declarations

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(Ms. Edelstein, Canada)

referred to in the ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs and in operative paragraph 6 of that resolution which advocated solutions other than peaceful solutions.

81. Her delegation had also voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46. As it had indicated in the past, it would be useful to review or to continue to review the present sanctions and to consider the necessity for any new sanctions which would be enforceable and realistic in their application. It therefore regretted that the resolution did not contain some wording to that effect. With respect to operative paragraph 4 (b) and (d), as her delegation had stated in previous years, although there was no significant immigration or tourism from Canada to Southern Rhodesia, inclusion of such provisions in Canada/Rhodesia regulations would run counter to the well-developed body of Canadian law relating to individual freedoms. With regard to operative paragraph 8, her delegation still believed that it was preferable to avoid cutting off all communications with Southern Rhodesia so that pressures of international opinion might continue to be brought to bear on the régime.

82. Mrs. SKOTTSBERG-AHMAN (Sweden), speaking on behalf of the delegations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway and her own delegation, said that the five Nordic countries had been happy to join in the unanimous support for draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45. Those countries felt very strongly that a resolution adopted by consensus was the clearest possible message to Mr. Smith from the international community.

83. The United Nations had for years demanded that the United Kingdom should call a conference on the future of Southern Rhodesia with the full participation of the nationalist leaders of Zimbabwe. The main development during the past year had surely been the fact that such a conference was now meeting in Geneva. The Nordic countries wished to commend all the parties that had helped to bring that development about, and welcomed the United Kingdom's statement, at the 41st meeting of the Committee, to the effect that the United Kingdom was ready to play a direct role in the transitional period leading to independence under majority rule at the very latest by March 1978. They trusted that the United Kingdom Government would spare no effort to live up to its responsibilities and its commitment to the African majority in Zimbabwe.

84. The Governments of the five Nordic countries considered it to be the duty of the United Nations to throw all its weight behind the current efforts to pressure Mr. Smith to relinquish, without further manoeuvring, the power he had illegally usurped 11 years earlier. In that connexion, the draft resolution might well have expressed, in a more direct and forceful way, the unequivocal support of the General Assembly for the ongoing efforts to find a negotiated settlement bringing majority rule to Zimbabwe without its people having to continue sacrificing their lives to attain what was rightfully theirs.

85. In order to enforce peaceful change in Southern Rhodesia, the Nordic countries believed that it was indispensable that international pressure on the Smith régime

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(Mrs. Skottsberg-Ahman, Sweden)

should not only be maintained but strengthened further by more effective use of the instrument of sanctions. That was the only way to bring it home to Mr. Smith that he had to come to terms with reality without any further dilatory tactics which would not deceive anyone. Failing that, he would continue to live as an outlaw. The Nordic countries had therefore voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46.

86. The Nordic countries had reservations about some provisions in both draft resolutions, reservations of which the Committee was certainly aware. Their position with regard to the phrase "by all means" remained unchanged. Similarly, while operative paragraph 4 (b) and (d) of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46 had no practical relevance to their countries, there being in actual fact no emigration or travel from the Nordic countries to Southern Rhodesia, they all, as a matter of principle, were against limiting the constitutional right of their citizens to travel freely. That, however, in no way detracted from their support for the two draft resolutions as the best ones available, at present, for achieving the goal on which the entire membership of the United Nations was agreed.

87. Mr. WU Miao-fa (China) said that his delegation supported the contents of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45, which reaffirmed the right of the people of Zimbabwe to attain their self-determination and independence by all means at their disposal, which strongly condemned the Smith racist régime for its brutal and repressive measures against the people of Zimbabwe and which firmly supported the Zimbabwe people in their struggle to achieve majority rule. It had therefore voted in favour of that draft resolution.

88. Mr. ADAMS (New Zealand) said that his delegation had participated in the consensus on draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45 with a good deal of satisfaction because it showed the unanimous agreement of the international community on the basic principles which must be fulfilled if the Southern Rhodesian crisis was to be settled. The most important of those principles, as clearly and categorically enunciated in the draft resolution, was that there should be no independence before majority rule, a principle to which the administering Power had adhered throughout with commendable firmness. His delegation also commended the role which the United Kingdom had played in setting up the Geneva Conference.

89. The resolution that had just been adopted unanimously served as a warning to the illegal Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia that the international community would not allow Zimbabwe's inalienable right to self-determination to be subverted by a minority of its population acting in its own interests. The Smith régime must and would be brought to understand that. It must negotiate realistically towards the only acceptable outcome - majority rule in Zimbabwe. New Zealand supported that resolution as it supported all peaceful means of driving that point home.

90. His delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46. New Zealand had stringently enforced sanctions against Southern Rhodesia ever since they had been established, and would continue to do so as long as they remained in force. His delegation, however, wished to express a reservation

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(Mr. Adams, New Zealand)

regarding operative paragraph 4 (d). In accordance with article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New Zealand did not restrict the freedom to travel of any of its citizens.

91. Mr. QUARLES van UFFORD (Netherlands) said that the nine countries of the European Communities had gladly associated themselves with draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45. They unequivocally rejected the intolerable policies of the minority régime and ardently supported early independence and majority rule for Southern Rhodesia. They had therefore welcomed the efforts of the United Kingdom in convening the current Conference in Geneva.

92. Although the nine countries had joined in the consensus, they had reservations about some of the provisions of the draft resolution. With regard to the words "all the means at their disposal" in operative paragraph 1, those countries continued to hold the opinion that a solution to the question of Southern Rhodesia should be sought by peaceful means. They also had difficulties with operative paragraph 5, because they could not agree with the conclusion of the Ad Hoc Group which had visited the front-line States that the only alternative now open to the people of Zimbabwe was recourse to armed struggle. Furthermore, in the view of the nine countries, the term "national liberation movement" in operative paragraph 10 should be interpreted as comprising all the nationalist political groups.

93. With regard to draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45, the nine countries shared the view that, now more than ever before, maximum pressure should be exerted on the illegal Salisbury régime. However, for humanitarian reasons, they did not favour a total severance of services affecting personal relations between human beings, such as mail and telecommunications services. They therefore wished to express reservations with respect to the fifth preambular paragraph and to operative paragraphs 4 (d) and 8 of the draft resolution.

94. Mr. FORRESTER (Australia) said that his delegation welcomed the consensus on draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45 which, in particular, expressed the hope that the Conference on Zimbabwe at Geneva would succeed in establishing the conditions for early independence for Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule. It fully supported the Geneva talks and hoped that all the parties now brought together in Geneva could agree on the peaceful transfer of the Territory to majority rule. The opportunity for a peaceful settlement which now existed must not be lost or wasted, and his delegation congratulated the United Kingdom on the constructive role it had played in convening and chairing the talks.

95. His delegation had again supported the draft resolution (A/C.4/31/L.45) relating to sanctions against the illegal régime. The Australian Government continued to apply sanctions to the fullest extent of its capacity and to co-operate closely with the Security Council Committee on sanctions. The Australian Government had now prepared legislation to forestall any possibility of the recruitment and the training of Australians as mercenaries. It had also announced its decision to provide a food aid package to Mozambique, the value of which would be A 1 million. That assistance was to be provided through the

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Mr. Forrester, Australia)

Secretary-General's programme for co-ordinating assistance to Mozambique. In addition, Australia had given US 100,000 to the Commonwealth fund for technical assistance to Mozambique.

96. With regard to the specific terms of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46, his delegation continued to have reservations about the propriety of the measure called for in operative paragraph 4 (d). Nor did it support a total ban on communications with Southern Rhodesia, although limited measures could be taken which would strengthen current economic sanctions without placing an inordinate burden on individuals or restricting humanitarian contact. Finally, Australia did not believe that the language of operative paragraph 3 was consistent with the circumstances of the breach of sanctions in question.

97. Mr. IMANISHI (Japan) said that, although his delegation had supported draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45, that support should not be construed as acceptance of language that ran counter to Japan's position regarding the need for efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. While his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45, it had reservations about operative paragraphs 4 (d) and 3.

98. Miss HOLZER (Austria) said that the position of her Government on the issue of Southern Rhodesia had remained consistent and was well known. It welcomed the convening of the Geneva Conference which, for the first time, had brought together all the parties involved in the search for a peaceful solution.

99. Her delegation agreed with the general goals, intentions, ideas and recommendations in the draft resolutions and had therefore joined in the consensus on one and had voted in favour of the other. It wished, however, to reiterate its position on certain points: it had difficulties with operative paragraph 4 (b) and (d) of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45 because Austria's legal system and basic attitude to questions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms made it difficult for it to associate itself fully with those recommendations. Austria interpreted operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45 to imply the use of all peaceful means in accordance with the Charter, since it did not believe that the United Nations should advocate the use of force, even in the pursuit of just causes. Finally, with respect to operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46, she wished to draw attention to the position of principle which Austria, bound by its status of permanent neutrality, continued to take on questions of sanctions and which had been explained on previous occasions. In conclusion, her delegation wished to express its appreciation to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45 for their efforts to arrive at a text which the Committee could adopt by consensus.

100. Mr. PETREE (United States of America) said that his delegation had participated in the consensus on draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45. The United States Government fully supported the Geneva Conference as the best means of achieving majority rule and independence in Southern Rhodesia. It called on all participants at the Conference to redouble their efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the problem.

101. The United States had voted against draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.46 but not

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(Mr. Petree, United States)

because it opposed sanctions or wanted to see them vitiated in any way. As members of the General Assembly were fully aware, the United States supported the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and had been open and frank in those circumstances in which the United States had been unable, because of domestic legislation, to implement the sanctions fully. The United States voluntarily reported fully to the Security Council Committee on sanctions about imports under the Byrd Amendment.

102. For obvious reasons, completely accurate statistics on all Southern Rhodesian exports were not available. However, it was unlikely that United States imports accounted for more than 5 per cent of total Southern Rhodesian export earnings. Obviously, 95 per cent of Southern Rhodesian earnings originated elsewhere. The resolution therefore cited one country, which was honest, and ignored the countries which his delegation estimated to be the providers of 95 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's export earnings. Accordingly, the United States deeply resented being singled out for criticism. In a year when the United States had exerted every effort to bring about the peaceful transition to majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, it believed that it was petty and unjust for the General Assembly to criticize the United States alone for sanctions violations. The resolution applied a double standard in dealing with Southern Rhodesia because, as everyone knew, there were other countries involved in trade with Southern Rhodesia, some of them African countries. Some of those countries had joined in voting for the draft resolution, and his Government would not associate itself with that form of hypocrisy. Because the United States openly and fully reported what was permitted by its own domestic legislation, it alone was chastized while other nations went unmentioned for their secret and much more extensive trade with Southern Rhodesia.

103. Certain allegations had been made regarding the provision of oil to Southern Rhodesia. He suspected that those allegations were related to those of the Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ, to the effect that the Mobil Oil Corporation, certain of its officers and foreign subsidiaries, had violated United Nations sanctions. As the United States had pointed out in the Security Council Committee on sanctions, the United States Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control had served an administrative order on Mobil Oil on 30 June 1976, directing that company to furnish specified records for examination, and requiring it to obtain additional documents from Mobil South Africa and Mobil Rhodesia. The Office of Foreign Assets Control had periodically broadened the scope of the administrative order to require Mobil to provide additional material as new avenues of investigation had been opened up. The United States would provide the Security Council Committee on sanctions with the final results of that investigation as soon as they became available from the Department of the Treasury.

104. Other allegations had been made concerning assurances to Ian Smith of "tangible assistance", should the Geneva talks fail. There was no basis whatsoever for those allegations.

105. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had thus concluded its consideration of agenda item 86. He took it that the Committee agreed to request the Rapporteur to submit the report on the item directly to the General Assembly.

106. It was so decided.

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CONCLUSION OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

107. The CHAIRMAN said that the discussion in the Committee had reflected the deep concern of Member States at the fact that, 16 years after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), there still remained more than 12 million people scattered throughout the world for whom the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples represented an unfulfilled promise. Furthermore, about 7 million of those people were languishing under the most inhuman system of repression and discrimination at the hands of the minority régimes in southern Africa.

108. A record number of decisions had been taken by the Committee with respect to specific territories as a result of thorough examination of the conditions prevailing in those territories, with the active co-operation of almost all the administering Powers, particularly in the related work of the Special Committee of 24. Many members of the Fourth Committee had noted the outstanding results of the work accomplished by several visiting missions despatched in the recent past by the Special Committee. It was quite clear that the encouraging trend in that direction had been brought about as a consequence, on the one hand, of the intensified commitment on the part of Member States to ensure that the genuine wishes of the peoples of colonial territories were expressed fully and freely as regards their future status and, on the other hand, of increasing recognition on the part of the majority of Member States responsible for the administration of those territories of the positive role which the United Nations had played and could play in facilitating an orderly and peaceful process of decolonization. That trend towards full co-operation must be actively encouraged at all costs if the world community was to continue to serve as an effective guardian of the interests of the inhabitants of the colonial territories until they had attained a full measure of self-government and independence.

109. The participation of the representatives of the peoples of those territories in the Committee's work, whether as petitioners or as observers, was no less valuable for the proper accomplishment of its task. He was more than ever convinced that the direct association of the peoples of the colonial territories in the work of the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee of 24 was an effective means of promoting the progress of those peoples towards the realization of their aspirations, and that the administering Powers should be encouraged to take the necessary measures to that end.

110. A remarkable accomplishment during the current session had been the practically unanimous expression of solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe, as contained in the resolutions which had been adopted by the Committee. With respect to the question of Namibia, the Committee had adopted eight resolutions, each taking into consideration a different aspect of the question. The Committee had also wisely adopted a resolution calling on the specialized agencies to intensify their programmes of assistance to the liberation movements and to the suffering peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia. Indeed, a number of specialized agencies and other organizations were already in the forefront of the move to extend assistance to the peoples concerned, and the representatives of the national liberation

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(The Chairman)

movements had been actively participating as observers in the legislative processes of those agencies and organizations, in keeping with draft resolutions adopted on the subject by the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Special Committee of 24.

111. The Committee had also reaffirmed that the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the colonial territories constituted a major obstacle to political independence and to the enjoyment of the natural resources of those territories by the indigenous inhabitants, and it had condemned such activities. It had also strongly condemned collaboration both in nuclear and military fields between South Africa and certain Member States. It had also given extensive consideration to the situation in small territories, and had put forward a series of comprehensive recommendations relating to those territories. Furthermore, particular attention had been paid by the Committee to the questions of Belize, French Somaliland, Timor and Western Sahara. The Committee had also taken decisions regarding information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter and on the training and educational needs of the inhabitants of the dependent territories.

112. In connexion with the Committee's work, he wished to express his deep gratitude to the Chairman of the Special Committee of 24 for the leading role he had played and the efforts he had made to reconcile the divergence of views which sometimes existed among members. He also wished to thank and pay a tribute to the members of the Bureau and to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization and the other members of the Secretariat who had helped to meet the Committee's requirements.

113. After an exchange of courtesies, the CHAIRMAN declared that the Fourth Committee had completed its work for the thirty-first session.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.