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**GENERAL
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THIRTY-FIRST SESSION

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FOURTH COMMITTEE

35th meeting

held on

Tuesday, 30 November 1976

at 10.30 a.m.

New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 35th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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The meeting was called to order at 11.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 85: QUESTION OF NAMIBIA (A/31/23/Add.1, A/31/23/Add.3, A/31/24 (vol. I and II), A/31/45, A/31/92, A/31/155, A/31/181, A/31/190 and Corr.1, A/31/197, A/31/213, A/31/237; A/C.4/31/L.29) (continued)

1. Mr. AARVIK (Norway) said that his Government had for years supported the struggle of the black population against the white minority régime's policies of racial discrimination and economic exploitation. It had repeatedly stressed that Western countries had a particular responsibility for the development of southern Africa because of its colonization by them and its continued economic dependence on the West.
2. However, history was taking its course. The days of such régimes were numbered, and the way was open for self-determination and independence of the oppressed peoples. If the change was to be a peaceful one, pressure on the South African Government would have to be intensified to compel it to abolish its system of apartheid, which constituted the core of existing problems in Namibia, Zimbabwe and, of course, South Africa itself. In that connexion, his delegation welcomed the constructive efforts made by the five front-line States and other Powers, including the United States and the United Kingdom.
3. Unfortunately, there was nothing to indicate that the South African Government intended to retreat from its unacceptable policy with regard to Namibia. It continued to equivocate and to entrench itself in illegality, turning a deaf ear to United Nations resolutions and decisions. It had taken no measures towards ending its illegal occupation, abolishing discriminatory and repressive laws in Namibia, releasing Namibian political prisoners, withdrawing its troops from the Territory or holding free elections.
4. On the contrary, the South African Government was widening its policy of apartheid and bantustanization. It was intensifying the persecution of Namibian patriots. Recently, it had illegally sentenced to death several Namibian opponents of the régime. It had continued the militarization of Namibia, which it was using as a springboard from which to attack neighbouring countries. Pretoria had tried to strengthen its hold on the Territory by arranging so-called constitutional talks - condemned by the international community - from which SWAPO, the principal representative of the forces seeking independence in a unitary Namibia, had been excluded.
5. The United Nations would not accept any solution that compromised the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia. No constitutional arrangement concerning the Territory could have any validity unless it was based on the wishes of the people, freely expressed, under United Nations auspices. When the time came, elections should be held under the supervision and control of the United Nations.
6. In the meantime it was imperative to prevent the situation from ending in

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(Mr. Aarvik, Norway)

violent liberation, which would bring in its wake mourning and suffering and poison the future of Namibia for decades. Such an explosion of violence might also encourage unwanted intervention from outside.

7. Decisive, prompt action was therefore needed. No Member of the United Nations should retreat into a no-policy position. The Organization had to be given the means to act effectively. In that connexion, it was unfortunate that the Security Council had not been able to adopt the draft resolution calling for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, which would have represented a considerable political and diplomatic setback and might have compelled South Africa to enter into meaningful negotiations with SWAPO. In accordance with that view, his delegation had been one of the sponsors of the resolution recently adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/31/6 K) concerning the cessation of new external investment in South Africa. In addition, his Government had unilaterally decided not to guarantee export credits for trade with South Africa and to deny the currency licences necessary for Norwegian investments in South Africa.

8. Increased assistance should be given by Member States, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to the people of Namibia and its liberation movement. Norway, for its part, would increase its assistance considerably in 1977. It attached great importance to the work of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia and of the Council for Namibia, and had nothing but praise for their initiative, which had led to the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Namibia. The Institute would fill a very important role for the future of the Territory. In particular, it would make it possible to train Namibians for the tasks awaiting them and to conduct research on the Namibian people and their country. His Government had already made substantial contributions to the project and would contribute 500,000 Norwegian kroner - approximately \$100,000 - to the Institute in 1977.

9. His Government was also in sympathy with the Council for Namibia's determination to protect the natural and human resources of Namibia and to ensure that they were not exploited to the detriment of the Namibian people.

10. In conclusion, he stressed again the need to strengthen the Western world's contacts with the black African States and liberation movements in South Africa. Increased Western contacts with SWAPO and mounting pressure on South Africa would be instrumental in sweeping away the remnants of an outdated political and economic order and in improving prospects for a peaceful solution of the conflict.

11. Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia) thanked the representative of SWAPO for his enlightening statement on conditions in the Territory. Such first-hand information was of considerable value to the Committee in its deliberations on the question. Events in Namibia, no less than in other Territories in southern Africa, had responded to the collapse of Portuguese colonialism. The liberation of Angola, in particular, had constituted a source of material and moral support for the people of Namibia in their struggle to achieve liberation under the dynamic leadership of SWAPO.

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(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

12. Indonesia strongly condemned the attitude of the South African Government which, itself hard-pressed, had intensified its repression of those opposing the illegal occupation, in defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971.

13. The Dakar International Conference on Namibia and Human Rights, had exposed all the violations of human rights in the Territory and revealed that they were part of a consistent pattern of intimidation designed to continue the subjugation of the Namibian people by the Pretoria régime.

14. In addition, the Government of South Africa had sought to mislead international opinion by conducting sham constitutional talks with its henchmen in Namibia. SWAPO, as the authentic representative of the Namibian people, was rightly refusing to participate in those talks because it rejected the tribalism and separatism which South Africa was seeking to impose on Namibia.

15. Far from conforming to the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Namibia, particularly resolution 385 (1976), the illegal occupying régime had stubbornly continued its military build-up in the Territory and its policy of bantustanization, which was designed to destroy the integrity of Namibia so that, once fragmented, it would be more easily controlled. Working paper A/AC.109/L.1089 of the Special Committee showed that South Africa had continued to strengthen its military potential and that it was gathering thousands of armed troops in Namibia. In addition, it had forced thousands of Namibians to leave their homes in order to establish a "no man's land" in the northern part of the Territory.

16. South Africa was redoubling its efforts to develop a capacity for producing nuclear weapons. That was extremely disturbing. His delegation appealed to the Powers which were assisting South Africa to develop its nuclear capability to end their assistance, because South Africa's efforts to strengthen its military position, as long as it was resolved to resist the will of the international community, constituted a serious threat to international peace and security. The Security Council, convinced of the seriousness of the situation, had adopted resolution 393 (1976) on 30 July 1976. That resolution reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Namibia to liberate their country, condemned the armed attack of South Africa on the territory of a neighbouring country and declared that the Security Council was prepared to meet again to consider "the adoption of effective measures, in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the United Nations Charter" if South Africa persisted in its violations and its refusal to withdraw from the Territory.

17. There could be no doubt that the people of Namibia would eventually be victorious. The only question was how that victory was to be achieved. Indonesia, which fully supported the determination of the Namibian people to free themselves from foreign domination, naturally favoured a peaceful solution. To that end, it supported the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control. Such elections would give the Namibian people the opportunity freely to decide their own future in an atmosphere free from terror, oppression and manipulation by the white minority and the illegal occupying régime.

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(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

18. Should South African intransigence make it impossible to hold such free elections, the only alternative left to the Namibian people would be to intensify its armed struggle. The human and material costs of such a struggle would be high, and South Africa would be to blame.

19. In pursuing their struggle, the people of Namibia, under the leadership of SWAPO, deserved the full support of the international community. It was therefore most important that those countries which had established consulates in Namibia should comply with the decisions of the United Nations. Likewise, those nations which indirectly supported the illegal occupation of Namibia by permitting their nationals to conduct business in that Territory should take steps to terminate such contacts.

20. His delegation hoped that the United Nations would redouble its efforts to help the struggling people of Namibia. It supported the proposed programme of work of the United Nations Council for Namibia. Having the honour to serve as a member of the Council for Namibia, it viewed that programme as a most effective instrument for promoting the implementation of the decisions of the international community and for assisting the Namibian people. The United Nations and its agencies should continue to co-ordinate and expand their aid to Namibia. The Institute for Namibia was particularly deserving of such aid, since, through its research and training programmes, it was doing much to prepare Namibians for self-government and to educate them in the skills necessary to meet the challenges of independence.

21. The assistance of the specialized agencies of the United Nations was also of vital importance to the Namibians. Much had been done already, but still more was needed. When he had represented the Council for Namibia at the session of the UNDP Governing Council in Geneva in June 1976, he had proposed on its behalf that UNDP should include Namibia in the category of newly-independent countries which qualified for additional assistance from UNDP. The Governing Council had accordingly authorized an increase of more than \$1 million, or approximately 25 per cent, in the indicative planning figure for Namibia. His delegation hoped that other agencies would find it possible to make generous contributions to the cause of the Namibian people during the coming year.

22. Finally, it was the view of his delegation that, faced with the intransigence of the South African Government, the appropriate organs of the United Nations should be used to bring the illegal occupation of the Territory to an end. If necessary, consideration should be given to applying the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. His delegation held that the most effective means available to the United Nations to defeat that last remaining bastion of racism and colonialism was to co-ordinate aid to Namibia and to increase the pressure of the international community on South Africa.

23. Mr. NIYUNGEKO (Burundi) said that it was high time for the international community to give serious consideration to settling the Namibian problem once and for all, because the people of that Territory had been suffering for quite long enough.

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(Mr. Niyungeko, Burundi)

24. He outlined the historical background to the question of Namibia, the most important steps taken by the General Assembly and its organs in the matter, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council and the advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice in June 1971, and emphasized that South Africa had no reason to maintain its presence in the Territory. In August 1966, conscious of its historical responsibilities, the Namibian people had begun its national liberation struggle under the leadership of SWAPO, which would one day lead it to final victory. The international community had endorsed the legitimacy of that struggle when, in General Assembly resolution 3111 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973, it had recognized that the national liberation movement of Namibia, SWAPO, was the authentic representative of the Namibian people, and had expressed support for the efforts of the movement to strengthen national unity. South Africa deserved strong condemnation for its policy towards Namibia, for which there was no legal basis.

25. His delegation had listened attentively to the statement by the representative of SWAPO, who had described the situation in the Territory in striking terms, and it had concluded that all the atrocities inflicted on the Namibian people were not attributable solely to South Africa but also to the United Nations. As the head of his delegation had stated in the General Assembly on 1 October 1976 and in the Security Council on 7 October 1976, the Organization's failure in its mission to administer Namibia and to lead it to freedom and independence was due, not only to the refusal of Pretoria to transfer power to SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, but also to the active, unquestioning support which certain major Powers were giving to the South African régime. The triple veto of the United States, France and the United Kingdom against a draft resolution designed to institute a mandatory embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa proved that that country was not acting on its own. There was no doubt that it enjoyed military and nuclear co-operation.

26. The Committee should in its recommendations to the General Assembly denounce and condemn all acts which provided direct or indirect support to the Pretoria régime, or which encouraged that régime to persist in its refusal to withdraw its illegal administration from Namibia, a refusal which was at the root of all the sufferings of the Namibian people.

27. It was quite clear that the continuation of the South African administration of Namibia was designed to prepare the way for the dismemberment of Namibia by the creation of mini-States which would not be economically viable and would inevitably be drawn into the orbit of South Africa in order to survive; Namibia would thus become a confederation of ethnic nations which South Africa would continue to dominate and exploit. That such a conclusion was justified was obvious from the Odendaal Plan drawn up in 1968, which had provided that 40 per cent of the least fertile and least developed land in the Territory should be set aside for the creation of 10 homelands, or "bantustans"; the land in which most of the mineral reserves lay would be occupied by whites, while all lands which had not yet been surveyed and the two major diamond-bearing regions on the southwest coast would revert to direct control by South Africa.

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(Mr. Niyungeko, Burundi)

28. While the South African administration went on with the execution of its plan to dismember Namibia, a sham constitutional conference, initiated in August 1975 and attended by tribal representatives whose legitimacy had been questioned even by a number of tribal groups, was taking place at Windhoek. The United Nations should denounce that so-called constitutional conference because it had been organized and was controlled by the illegal administration of South Africa, which was at the same time imposing extremely harsh emergency and exceptional measures to prevent the nationalists from opposing the holding of the Conference.

29. The militarization of Namibia was continuing at an alarming and almost outrageous pace. Entire populations were being displaced against their wishes, fields and crops were being burned, and a zone had been created where any living being could be shot on sight. Given such a situation, it could hardly be argued that no threat to international peace and security existed and that an embargo on arms to South Africa was therefore not justified. That argument was all the more repugnant in that South Africa was launching attacks against neighbouring African countries from the Territory, as had happened in the case of the attack against the People's Republic of Angola and those against Zambia.

30. His Government had condemned those unacceptable and senseless acts and felt that any attempt to justify the supply of arms to South Africa was blatant dishonesty.

31. His delegation had welcomed diplomatic moves to put an end to the bloodshed in Namibia, but had been disappointed to learn that they were merely a confidence trick. In fact, when the Security Council had been about to wind up its debate on the question of Namibia, an attempt had been made to dissuade the African Group from persisting in its call for an embargo on arms to South Africa, by trying to convince the Group that Vorster had accepted several SWAPO proposals. Only by its vigilance had the African Group managed to discover that that report was simply a ploy, designed to create confusion.

32. Referring to the fears voiced in the Committee by the representative of SWAPO, when he had denounced South Africa's plot to set up a reactionary puppet government in Namibia and then withdraw, thus placing SWAPO and the United Nations in the position of having to negotiate with such puppets, he said that the United Nations should condemn South Africa's designs as a betrayal of the interests of the Namibian people.

33. His country firmly supported SWAPO and urged the international community to increase its material and moral support to that organization.

34. Mr. HOUNA (Chad) said that 10 years had elapsed since the adoption of resolution 2145 (XXI), whereby the General Assembly had terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia and had affirmed its legal responsibility for that Territory. Five years had passed since the International Court of Justice had delivered its advisory opinion. Since that date, the Security Council had adopted two to four resolutions on the question each year. The triple veto

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(Mr. Houna, Chad)

recently exercised by the members of the Council who set themselves up as the traditional defenders of freedom, justice, equality and inalienable human rights had surprised and aroused the indignation of his delegation. His delegation would like to think that the purpose of that triple veto had been simply to defend and protect the interests of those countries in South Africa and did not reflect a decline in their dedication to the cause of freedom. Otherwise, there would be grounds for concluding that those countries were endorsing, before the international community, South Africa's practices of oppression and racism towards the Namibian people and the blacks of South Africa.

35. After recalling the various provisions of Security Council resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976, which was the most important of the 13 resolutions adopted by the Council on the question since 1966, he said that the Namibian people were being held hostage. The occupation of the Territory by South Africa, the restrictions and arbitrary sentences to which Namibians were subjected, the murders committed, and the increased militarization of the Territory were a form of institutionalized terrorism, and the international community should be seriously concerned over the situation. The resolutions and decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly would remain a dead letter unless some decisive action was taken.

36. The States Members of the United Nations would be making a sad mistake if they defined the means of combating terrorism without taking into consideration the practices involved in terrorism, whether committed by an individual, by a group of individuals, or a State. South Africa came under that heading. In his delegation's opinion, it was high time to take action to prevent the annihilation of an entire people and the plunder of the entire resources of a country. Since the crimes, the odious acts and the violations of human rights to which the Namibian people had been subjected had been amply described in statements by delegations, in the press, in the reports of the Special Committee of 24 and the United Nations Council for Namibia and in the statement made by the representative of SWAPO, his delegation would refrain from reverting to them. The film shown to the Committee had also helped to shed some light on all the economic and political aspects of the question. The attacks launched by South Africa from Namibia against neighbouring States were too well-known to need further comment. He would simply recall that the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad had stated in the General Assembly on 8 October 1976 that the time had come unequivocally to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Namibia, particularly resolution 385, and to provide the necessary assistance to the Namibian people in their struggle for independence. If nothing was done, the freedom-fighters would have no choice but to expand their guerrilla activities on all fronts until victory was achieved.

37. At a time when public opinion was increasingly horrified by the enslavement of a whole people, certain countries which posed as the traditional defenders of freedom, justice and equality continued to create confusion within the United Nations by flagrantly and deliberately violating the principles which the Organization upheld. His delegation wished to ask those Western countries which

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(Mr. Houna, Chad)

continued blithely to maintain, and even strengthen, their relations with South Africa in all fields and which went so far as to supply the latest weapons and nuclear matériel to that country, to reconsider their policy towards Africa. They must realize that their interests, or the friendly relations to which they aspired, could be preserved or established only in an Africa which enjoyed freedom and dignity.

38. With regard to trade relations with South Africa, his delegation firmly denied the report in The New York Times of 11 November 1976 that certain African countries, including Chad, maintained trade relations with South Africa. Although those false allegations had been denied by the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations through the Secretary-General, he wished to state that the Republic of Chad had always denounced and condemned the policy of apartheid, that at the thirty-first session his delegation had been a sponsor of a number of resolutions condemning South Africa for its racist policy, and that it would continue to co-operate closely with the Special Committee against Apartheid. Those wholly unfounded allegations and that campaign of denigration were intended simply to create confusion and sow division in the ranks of the OAU and the non-aligned countries. The Republic of Chad did not maintain and would never maintain relations of any kind with South Africa until that country abandoned its policy of apartheid.

39. In conclusion, his delegation expressed the hope that contributions to the United Nations Institute for Namibia and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa would be increased, particularly by the Western countries he had mentioned. Furthermore, UNDP's declared intention to make even greater efforts to discourage the policy of apartheid were to be welcomed. Perhaps other United Nations agencies would follow that example.

40. His delegation continued to hope that the Security Council would not let itself be deceived by the South African puppet Government and that it would discharge its responsibilities to the international community by finally taking the necessary measures when considering the question of Namibia again.

41. Referring to draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.29, submitted by Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the Committee's debate on the question of Namibia, he reminded the author of that text of the procedure followed by the Group of 77 in general and the African Group in particular, whereby no draft resolution was to be submitted without the support of the overwhelming majority of the Group. He invited the author of the text to contact the Executive Secretary of the OAU and the Chairman of the African Group for the current month. If the African Group and the Fourth Committee decided to retain that resolution, his delegation would have some amendments to make to it.

42. Mr. MOKTAR (Mauritania) said that his delegation felt obliged to state its position on the question of Namibia, although that position was clearly reflected in the resolutions of the OAU and was identical to that of the other African countries.

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(Mr. Moktar, Mauritania)

43. In spite of the many appeals to South Africa, in spite of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and OAU, and in spite of the growing indignation of the international community, that country was blindly pursuing its criminal policy in Namibia. The Namibian people who, like all peoples of the world, should have the right to independence and to live in peace, were still being subjected to the atrocities of the policy of apartheid. The recent disturbances showed that the situation, which had already been serious, was steadily deteriorating to the point of jeopardizing the peace and stability of the area. There was no indication of a reversal of the racist and colonial policy of South Africa, which continued to occupy Namibia illegally, although the United Nations was considered to be responsible for its administration.

44. If South Africa persisted in its refusal to withdraw from the Territory, it was because the policy of apartheid was supported by its Zionist allies, which had only recently sent delegations to Pretoria to sign agreements for economic and trade co-operation. Quite clearly, the racist régime of South Africa was relying not only on its own resources, but, above all, on the solid and varied support - particularly in the political, economic and military fields - which it enjoyed abroad. If South Africa were not receiving that support, Namibia would already be a Member of the United Nations.

45. The policy of bantustanization which was intended to divide the Namibian people and thus impair national unity, was becoming institutionalized, as could be seen from the efforts made in the context of the Windhoek conference. That conference was simply another chapter in the policy of apartheid designed to perpetuate South Africa's hold on Namibia. It was no accident that the authentic representatives of the Namibian people, namely the representatives of SWAPO, had not been allowed to participate in those so-called constitutional consultations. In pretending to organize a constitutional conference in accordance with the provisions of United Nations resolutions, the Pretoria leaders had devised a plan to delay the inevitable progress of the Territory towards independence. As the representative of SWAPO had pointed out, a genuine constitutional conference could not have been held without the fulfilment of certain conditions. South Africa continued to disregard those conditions.

46. After stressing the importance of conferences such as that held at Dakar on Namibia and human rights, which had made it possible to draw public attention to the situation in that Territory, he said that his country would continue whole-heartedly to support the Namibian people in their struggle.

47. Mr. MONTEMAYOR CANTU (Mexico) said that for 10 years Namibia had been under the direct responsibility of the United Nations, in other words, of each Member of the Organization. That meant that it was not simply a question of decolonization, principles or rights, but also a question of the very prestige of the United Nations. The General Assembly and the Security Council had adopted several resolutions to no avail. Refusal to consider the application of sanctions against the Power which had usurped the rights of the Namibian people was thus an affront to the United Nations and a serious threat to international peace and security.

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(Mr. Montemayor Cantu, Mexico)

48. By its resolution 2248 (S-V), the General Assembly had established the United Nations Council for Namibia, on which Mexico had the honour to serve, to carry out the direct responsibility which the United Nations had assumed for the Territory. The Council, which according to its mandate should be based at Windhoek, could not, in fact, be there because the Security Council had not taken the necessary measures to compel South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. Since its establishment, and despite insufficient support from other organizations in the United Nations system, the Council for Namibia had undertaken a very wide range of activities, as could be seen from the report it submitted each year. The report for the current year also included a set of recommendations which his delegation hoped would be approved by the Committee.

49. The Security Council, in its resolution 264 (1969), had stated that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal, a decision which had been confirmed by the advisory opinion handed down in 1971 by the International Court of Justice. The General Assembly, in its resolutions 2372 (XXII) and 2403 (XXIII) had added that that illegal occupation constituted a serious threat to international peace and security, and in its resolution 3111 (XXVIII) it had recognized SWAPO as the authentic representative of the Namibian people.

50. The Security Council had entrusted the Secretary-General with the task of establishing contacts with interested parties, a task which had not succeeded because of the negative attitude of the Pretoria régime. Finally, in January 1976, the Security Council, in its resolution 385 (1976), had given South Africa until 30 August 1976 to take certain measures, in particular, to withdraw from the Territory and organize elections under United Nations control.

51. As could be seen, the legal situation in Namibia had changed considerably over the years, but unfortunately the actual situation was quite different from the legal situation since Namibia, an international Territory placed under the direct responsibility of the United Nations, which had established a special body to administer it until its independence, in fact remained under the control of South Africa which, not content with oppressing and exploiting the people and the resources of the Territory, was now attempting, through the so-called Turnhalle "constitutional talks", to keep it indefinitely under its yoke.

52. The illegal occupation of a territory by a State was an act of aggression. Since the Territory was under direct United Nations responsibility, the State in question was committing an act of aggression against the United Nations, and the resolutions of the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council should make that clear.

53. Mr. AL-SAID (Oman) recalled that the United Nations had, 10 years earlier, terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia because it had realized that the racist Pretoria régime, with its abominable murderous policies, had not been worthy of administering an African territory. South Africa had nevertheless persisted in and strengthened its policy of exploitation and repression, and had extended it to Namibia. In recent years, and especially since the collapse of Portuguese colonialism, the Pretoria régime had been using Namibia for its acts of aggression against independent African States.

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(Mr. Al-Said, Oman)

54. His delegation regretted that the States which had opposed the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council by the non-aligned States and calling for the adoption and implementation of concrete measures that would put an end to the illegal South African domination of Namibia, had not acted in the interests of justice and of the African people of Namibia, but had been motivated solely by their own selfish interests and by commercial considerations. That attitude was unworthy of countries which often in their history had struggled for the cause of justice, freedom and equality.

55. Far from demonstrating that it was prepared to comply with the will of the international community, South Africa had extended and intensified its domination of Namibia and had attempted to deceive by manoeuvres such as the so-called Turnhalle talks.

56. His delegation was in favour of the immediate and total independence of the Namibian people and it supported their just struggle, under the leadership of SWAPO, to achieve self-determination and win freedom, justice and dignity.

57. Mr. MAMPUYA MUSUNGAYI NKUEMBE (Zaire) said that the most complex decolonization problem with which the United Nations had been confronted for more than 20 years was the problem of the former German colony of South West Africa. There were several reasons why no solution had yet been found for the problem. Firstly, while the League of Nations had given A and B Mandates to other mandatory Powers, it had given the Union of South Africa a C Mandate, which in fact amounted to annexation of the Territory by the Mandatory State and did not provide for the subsequent granting of independence to the Mandated Territory. It was for that reason that South Africa had administered South West Africa as its own territory and had given it the same internal legislation. One might well wonder why the mandate in question had not been given to the United Kingdom.

58. Secondly, the indecisiveness of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, which had refused to rule on the substance of the problem in July 1966, had strengthened South Africa's position.

59. Thirdly, everyone knew that Namibia was rich in strategic and other resources that were essential to the development of the industrialized countries. That was one of the main reasons why South Africa and the Western Powers were so anxious to maintain their presence in the Territory.

60. The international community had on several occasions condemned the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa, which had first delayed the process of independence and then divided the Namibian people along tribal lines, and was now depleting the resources of the Territory to the detriment of the rightful owners.

61. His delegation unequivocally reaffirmed that there could be no solution but independence based on the free exercise by all Namibians of their right to self-determination and independence. It rejected the so-called constitutional conference currently taking place and called for a genuine conference under United

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(Mr. Mampuya Musungayi Nkumbe, Zaire)

Nations auspices, with the participation of SWAPO and all political forces in the country. As a first step, South Africa must free all political prisoners, allow all exiles to return to their homes and abolish all the laws on bantustans and the apartheid laws. Furthermore, South Africa must recognize the authority of the United Nations over the Territory by handing over its administration to the United Nations Council for Namibia.

62. It would be wrong, however, to harbour too many illusions about the achievement of those objectives because so far that country had paid no heed to the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question.

63. It should nevertheless be noted that it was not only South Africa that held the key to the problem. The Western Powers also had a major role to play with respect to the Vorster régime, which could not remain in power without their support. Those Powers must therefore use their influence to induce Pretoria to change its attitude.

64. His delegation was not opposed to the effort undertaken by Mr. Kissinger in southern Africa. That action should not be condemned a priori, as some had done, but should be judged in the light of the results achieved. It should be acknowledged that that effort by the United States was a courageous political act which had no precedent in the policy adopted on the subject by the Western countries. If the current talks succeeded, his delegation would be gratified. If they failed, SWAPO would have no choice but to intensify the liberation struggle until the final victory. In the latter event, Zaire would provide it with material and military assistance, as it had always done.

65. Mr. SHAHI (Nepal) noted that the United Nations had achieved considerable success in the decolonization of many Territories but that the problem of Namibia still remained unresolved. The Namibian people had experienced long hardships and untold sufferings under the worst form of colonial domination. The persistent refusal of the racist South African régime to end its illegal occupation of Namibia had been a challenge to the world Organization, which had adopted innumerable resolutions with the aim of liquidating one of the last remnants of colonial oppression in Namibia. South Africa, heedless of world public opinion, was flagrantly violating United Nations resolutions and attempting to disrupt the territorial integrity of Namibia by creating bantustans.

66. It was known to all that the attempt to prolong the illegal occupation of Namibia was motivated by the economic and other interests of South Africa and its Western allies. South Africa and many foreign multinational corporations were engaged in plundering the vast mineral wealth and exploiting the human resources of the Territory.

67. His delegation appreciated the untiring efforts of the United Nations Council for Namibia in helping to accelerate the process of decolonization and

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(Mr. Shahi, Nepal)

promote the welfare of the people of the Territory, and also the activities carried out by the Special Committee of 24 to that end.

68. On 30 January 1976 the Security Council had once again demanded, in its resolution 385 (1976), that South Africa should hold free elections in Namibia under the supervision of the United Nations and arrange for the transfer of power to the Namibian people. South Africa had ignored that resolution and had even attempted to perpetuate its domination by increased militarization of the Territory. The racist régime had introduced martial law in some parts of Namibia and created terror among the people by various repressive acts. The leaders of the Namibian people had been imprisoned, tortured and even mercilessly sentenced to death. Moreover, South Africa had used Namibia as a base for aggression against neighbouring countries.

69. South Africa, apparently disturbed by the intensified liberation struggle under the leadership of SWAPO had been manoeuvring to maintain its presence in Namibia. For that purpose it had organized the so-called constitutional conference at Windhoek, from which SWAPO, the authentic representative of the Namibian people, had been excluded. The conference had adopted a declaration ignoring the United Nations, which bore responsibility for the Territory. That revealed the real intention of South Africa to strengthen its hold on Namibia with the help of its hand-picked agents. Consequently, the declaration of the Windhoek conference had been rejected categorically by the Council for Namibia, SWAPO and the world community as a whole.

70. His Government had consistently opposed the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and it fully supported the liberation movement led by SWAPO and all appropriate measures taken by the United Nations to end the occupation.

71. Various international bodies and gatherings had condemned the so-called constitutional conference. They included the Council of Ministers of the OAU, which had held its twenty-seventh session at Port-Louis (Mauritius) in June-July 1976, and the Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held at Colombo (Sri Lanka) in August 1976, at which the participants had emphasized that South Africa should meet the representatives of SWAPO under the auspices of the United Nations and make the necessary arrangements for the transfer of power. South Africa had responded negatively to the international community's appeals, and the South African Prime Minister had rejected any contact with SWAPO.

72. His delegation considered it regrettable that the Security Council had failed to adopt a resolution imposing a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. The use of the veto by some Western countries had not helped to solve the problem. On the contrary, it had encouraged South Africa to continue its illegal occupation by taking repressive measures against the Namibian people.

73. However, recent developments had changed the situation in southern Africa. South Africa was faced with internal uprisings and was more isolated from the outside world. The desperate attempts by the racist régime, with the help of its

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(Mr. Shahi, Nepal)

few friends, to lengthen its illegal occupation, would ultimately be foiled because the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, were determined to liberate their homeland and the people of the whole world were on their side. If all States Members of the United Nations exerted more pressure on South Africa to submit to the legitimate demands of the Namibian people, the liberation struggle, which had entered a crucial stage, would bear fruit.

74. Mr. NIKULIN (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) noted that the United Nations had now been trying to settle the problem of Namibia for a decade. However, South Africa was continuing to defy the decisions of the Security Council and General Assembly, and particularly Security Council resolution 385 (1976), calling upon it to cease its occupation of Namibia, to withdraw its colonial administration, police and troops from the Territory, to organize free elections under United Nations supervision and to grant the Namibian people the right to self-determination.

75. However, there was nothing to indicate that the Pretoria régime would listen to the voice of reason, that it intended to yield to the demands of peace-loving forces or that it had decided to approach the Namibian problem in a realistic and serious way. All the evidence suggested the contrary - United Nations documents, the information provided by SWAPO and the articles in the press on the situation in Namibia.

76. The South African régime, in its attempts to undermine the national unity of Namibia, was not only pursuing its bantustanization policy but had called a so-called constitutional conference, composed of hand-picked representatives, which had proposed a form of self-government based on the principle of apartheid. The leaders of SWAPO had pointed out that the Turnhalle tribal talks had been designed simply to mask South Africa's true intention, which was to turn Namibia into a confederation of tribal States, controlled and manipulated by the racist South African régime, which would serve as a buffer between South Africa and independent Africa.

77. In the decisions it had adopted, the Special Committee of 24 had emphasized that a political settlement of the Namibian problem must be based solely on the exercise by the Namibian people of their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), provide for the establishment of majority rule and be consistent with the principle of the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia.

78. It was disturbing to note that South Africa, defying the appeals made by the United Nations, was substantially strengthening its military potential in Namibia. The main base at Grootfontein had been considerably expanded recently, and new bases had been established for the purpose of committing aggression against Angola and Zambia. In the northern part of the country free-fire zones had been set up. African patriots, and particularly members of SWAPO, were being persecuted everywhere. In fact, the racist Pretoria régime had turned Namibia into a military and police State. The continual acts of provocation and aggression committed by the South African armed forces against neighbouring sovereign States constituted a direct threat to international peace and security.

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(Mr. Nikulin, Byelorussian SSR)

79. Furthermore, the collaboration with South Africa of certain Western NATO countries in the nuclear field made the situation in the region still more explosive.

80. The film on Namibia which had been shown in the United Nations had depicted the forms of colonial slavery which were still in existence in the twentieth century - reserves and ghettos for the indigenous people, slave labour, a wretched existence, disease and widespread illiteracy. All those factors made the present life expectancy of the indigenous African population about 30 years.

81. According to the information provided by the Special Committee of 24, the average income of the population of the Territory was 17 times lower than that of the white settlers and, in most cases, the wages of the African worker were below the poverty line. In order to attract foreign investments to Namibia, South Africa was keeping the wages of the Africans at an extraordinarily low level. By means of the system of apartheid it was maintaining a pool of cheap African labour for the imperialist monopolies.

82. The abundance of mineral resources in Namibia and the existence of cheap labour attracted an increasing number of foreign investors to the Territory. Foreign capitalists controlled practically all the mining industries (diamonds, uranium, non-ferrous metals and other minerals). It was precisely those who were plundering the wealth of Namibia who, in the United Nations, claimed to uphold freedom and justice for the Namibian people while opposing the adoption of effective measures against the racist South African régime. In reality those countries wanted to maintain the status quo in Namibia and to perpetuate the system of colonial oppression in the Territory.

83. It was the duty of the United Nations to ensure that its decisions concerning Namibia were implemented and, first and foremost, to see that Member States strictly observed the arms embargo against South Africa. The United Nations must do its utmost to exert pressure on South Africa, by such means as the sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, to induce that country to comply with the mandatory decisions of the Security Council, and particularly the provisions of resolution 385 (1976).

84. The Soviet people, faithful to the principle of proletarian internationalism, had always supported the struggle of peoples for liberation anywhere in the world. His delegation fully supported the just cause of the people of Namibia and favoured the immediate withdrawal of South Africa from that Territory. It categorically rejected all attempts to maintain colonial and racist oppression and declared its conviction that the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO and with the help of all anti-imperialist forces, would soon gain freedom and independence. The United Nations should do everything in its power to help the Namibian people attain those noble objectives.

85. Mr. KINI (Upper Volta) observed with bitterness that at the very moment when the question of Namibia was being discussed in the United Nations, Namibians were being persecuted, hunted down, arrested and thrown into prison, adding to the number of those already long imprisoned.

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(Mr. Kini, Upper Volta)

86. The question of Namibia had been included in the agenda of the General Assembly's sessions for the past 10 years without making South Africa stop strengthening its presence in Namibia. It was perhaps time to ask how a group of bandits so insignificant as the South African Government could afford to defy the United Nations.

87. The Upper Volta, for its part, believed that it was not impossible to find a way to put an immediate end to the odious crimes being committed daily by the South African racists against the Namibian people. The United Nations could not remain passive in the face of the South African Government's efforts to consolidate its presence in Namibia by creating an atmosphere of terror and intimidation and establishing its inhumane and often-condemned policy in the Territory. The Pretoria régime was currently doing everything it could to destroy the unity of the Namibian people by extending its system of bantustans to Namibia and by resorting to such grotesque subterfuges as the so-called constitutional conference convened at Windhoek, to which only the lackeys of South African racism had been invited. His Government believed that the situation had lasted long enough and that the United Nations should take effective measures for the unimpeded achievement of independence by Namibia, preserving the unity of its people and the integrity of its territory. The Upper Volta would vote in favour of any decision to that effect and would continue to apply all the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies.

88. Mr. GAZDIK (Hungary) observed that during the past 30 years the United Nations had adopted more than 100 resolutions on the question of Namibia and that during the past 20 years the three principal bodies of the Organization, namely, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, had been obliged to adopt ever more comprehensive measures in response to the Vorster régime's stubborn refusal to comply with their decisions.

89. Apparently, however, nothing could change the attitude of the South African Government, as shown by an interview with Mr. Vorster reported on 18 October by The New York Times, according to which Mr. Vorster had stated in connexion with Namibia: "We are an administrative Power, and our powers of administration were conferred upon us by the League of Nations." Evidently the United Nations practically did not exist for Mr. Vorster, who continued to live in the world of the 1930s, sustaining himself with the extremist theories of racial superiority which had plunged mankind into the most destructive and terrible war ever known in history. The Pretoria régime had consistently rejected the efforts of the United Nations for a peaceful settlement of the situation in Namibia. Blinded by its policy of racial superiority, it was unable to realize that the only way to reach a solution was to negotiate with the genuine representatives of the Namibian people, that is to say, with SWAPO. If the leaders of South Africa were able to learn the lessons of history, they would understand that their position was untenable and that the just cause of the freedom fighters would necessarily triumph, as it had recently done in another country, because the aspirations of the freedom movements represented the interests of the entire nation.

90. Under pressure from international public opinion, South Africa was resorting to the window-dressing of organizing sham constitutional talks at Windhoek with

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(Mr. Gazdik, Hungary)

persons devoted to the maintenance of the political and economic status quo. The United Nations had done well to reject South Africa's misleading manoeuvre, which threatened peace and security. It was particularly commendable that SWAPO, despite South Africa's negative attitude, continued to show its readiness to settle the critical situation through negotiations in order to avoid a bloody confrontation, as had been stated by the Administrative Secretary of SWAPO at a conference held at Lusaka during the visit to Africa of the Committee of 24 (A/31/23/Add.1). In that connexion, he congratulated the Rapporteur of the Special Committee for his excellent and instructive report.

91. It was therefore not SWAPO's fault that the situation was evolving in the direction of an escalating conflict. It must be borne in mind that the fight for Namibia's liberation had already begun under that movement's direction and that the freedom fighters had scored great victories. His delegation was convinced that the people of Namibia was not far from gaining real independence and genuine freedom. Hungary, faithful to its policy and its principles, would continue to do its utmost to help the just cause of SWAPO.

92. In spite of warnings, South Africa had continued to increase its military forces in Namibia and was using that Territory for launching attacks on Angola and Zambia. Pretoria's policy, based on a show of force, was directly endangering international peace and security. There was reason to wonder how South Africa was able to make attacks along several fronts at the same time when Powers whose strength was much greater than South Africa's could not afford to become involved in such a situation.

93. Everyone knew that the leading Western Powers had recently increased their economic, military and financial assistance to South Africa, and everyone was aware of the interlocking economic and political interests involved, so that South Africa did not feel itself alone. What was more, it would appear that the Pretoria régime counted on increased assistance from its Western partners in the event of a crisis.

94. Similarly, it was perhaps not by chance that the International Monetary Fund had recently decided to grant a considerable loan to South Africa. The loan had not, of course, been tied to any political conditions, on the pretext that the International Monetary Fund was a non-political organization and therefore could not demand, in exchange for its assistance, that South Africa should immediately withdraw from Namibia or put an end to its policy of apartheid. It was curious, however, that the allegedly non-political organization was taking political decisions in keeping with the interests of certain big capitalist circles.

95. In any event, the resolutions of the United Nations, together with the activities and efforts of the front-line States and African liberation organizations had led to important changes in southern Africa. The Portuguese colonial empire had collapsed, the Pretoria and Salisbury régimes were becoming increasingly isolated and their domestic crises were deepening. In those circumstances, the United Nations had the obligation to take more effective measures to put an end to the Pretoria régime's illegal presence in Namibia. The Fourth Committee also had a duty to do everything it could to ensure that the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, gained full and real independence as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.