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FIFTH COMMITTEE

42nd meeting

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THIRTY-FIRST SESSION

Official Records \*

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 42nd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. MUNTASSER (Libyan Arab Republic)

Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative  
and Budgetary Questions: Mr. MSELLE

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AGENDA ITEM 100: SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS (continued)

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9 December 1976

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The meeting was called to order at 3.35 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 100: SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS (A/31/11; A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 and Corr.1, L.28, L.30) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would continue the process of voting on draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 and Corr.1. The draft amendments to that draft resolution were contained in documents A/C.5/31/L.28 and A/C.5/31/L.30.
2. He assumed that, in the light of the approval of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2, as amended, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 would wish to delete operative paragraph 4 of their draft resolution relating to the membership of the Committee on Contributions and also that the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany wished to withdraw the third part of his amendment in document A/C.5/31/L.30 relating to the same subject.
3. He recalled that the preceding meeting had been adjourned in order to allow the Legal Council further time to study the question whether the Canadian motion in document A/C.5/31/L.28 constituted a valid amendment within the terms of rule 130 of the rules of procedure and the question whether that Canadian motion was contrary to the decision taken in draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8.

Type of majority required by the Canadian amendment (A/C.5/31/L.28)

4. Mr. SUY (Legal Counsel) said that at its 41st meeting, the Committee had approved the draft resolution in document A/C.5/31/L.8. The operative part of that resolution would have the General Assembly decide to maintain for the period 1977-1979 the current rates of assessment of certain developing countries and that any corresponding readjustment in the proposed scale of assessments should not adversely affect the rates recommended by the Committee on Contributions for any developing country. Conference room paper 8 prepared by the Secretariat indicated that that decision would require a reduction in the assessments proposed by the Committee on Contributions in respect of two developing States, namely, Cuba and Malaysia, each by an amount of 0.02 per cent, in order to maintain their assessments at the same level as in the existing scale. Consequently, the scale would have to be adjusted in such a way as to redistribute that 0.04 per cent among developed States.
5. The specific question that had been asked was whether the adoption of the amendment set forth in document A/C.5/31/L.28 implied a reconsideration of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8 which had already been approved. The amendment in document A/C.5/31/L.28 would change operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 so as to adopt, for a period of two years, the scale of assessments recommended by the Committee on Contributions. As he had indicated at the 41st meeting, that proposed amendment should be read in the light of the decision that the Committee had already taken to adopt the scale of assessments recommended by the Committee on Contributions for a two-year period and maintain

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(Mr. Suy)

during that period as well as for an additional year the assessment of two States at the same level as in the present scale. Consequently, the contributions of some States would be raised by 0.01 per cent each above those recommended by the Committee on Contributions. For the large majority of States, the scale would be precisely that recommended by the Committee on Contributions. In that connexion, it should also be noted that draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8 clearly implied, both in its preambular and operative parts, the adoption of the scale of contributions recommended by the Committee on Contributions.

6. Consequently, neither the adoption of the amendment in document A/C.5/31/L.28, nor the subsequent adoption of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, whether or not amended in accordance with document A/C.5/31/L.28, would entail a reconsideration of the decision already taken with respect to draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8. Thus, a decision on the amendment, as well as on the resolution, whether or not amended, would require only a simple majority.

7. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee was master of its own rules and could either accept or reject the opinion of the Legal Counsel.

8. Mr. EL SHIBIB (Iraq) said that in his many years' experience in the United Nations, he had never seen an opinion of the Legal Counsel substituted for the rules of procedure in order to provide a way out for some Member States. He was too shocked by the Legal Counsel's opinion to give vent to his strong objections to the attempt to force on the Committee the opinion of certain States, however powerful, in disregard to what was customary and legal in the United Nations.

9. The Canadian amendment did not really relate to draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 but rather to the draft resolution of the Committee on Contributions. It was therefore a misplaced amendment and a mere device of subterfuge. It was, moreover, irrelevant, because the Committee had already decided to alter the scale of assessments for two countries. The Legal Counsel had been asked by the Committee to study the rules of procedure and present a legal opinion, not to do the job of the Committee on Contributions by suggesting how the scale of assessments might be adjusted as a consequence of the adoption of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8. The advice given by the Legal Counsel was totally irrelevant. By approving draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8 the Committee had already decided that the scale of assessments had to be adjusted radically; it had not taken a decision to adopt the new scale of assessments.

10. The Legal Counsel had offered a strange judgement that adoption of the Canadian amendment would not require a two-thirds majority. That amendment was clearly contrary to the draft resolution already adopted. He (Mr. El Shibib) was aware that the great Powers had influence within the United Nations and the Secretariat, but he had not realized the extent of their influence.

11. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) said that the Committee had decided, in accordance with rule 131 of the rules of procedure, to give priority to draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 and to consider it before the draft resolution recommended by

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(Mr. de Pinies, Spain)

the Committee on Contributions (A/31/11, para. 59). To seek to amend the former draft resolution by inserting in it the provisions of the draft resolution of the Committee on Conferences would be a subterfuge and a procedural device not authorized under the rules of procedure. The Canadian amendment in document A/C.5/31/L.28 was essentially a proposal to delete paragraphs (b) to (f) of the draft resolution of the Committee on Contributions. As such, it was a ploy to overturn the prior decision of the Committee to consider first the 15-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1). He therefore sought clarification of the situation.

12. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had decided to vote on draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 but that a legal question had been raised with regard to the Canadian amendment. He had frequently stated that he would not issue a ruling from the Chair and left it to the Committee to take a decision in the matter.

13. Mr. BOUAYAD-AGHA (Algeria) said that, at the preceding meeting prior to the vote on draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8, he had drawn attention to the fact that the Canadian amendment aimed simply at reversing the priority which the Committee had decided to give to draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1. The Canadian amendment was merely an echo of the draft resolution of the Committee on Contributions except that it reduced the period for which the new scale of assessments would be applied by one year and failed to include the list of Member States and their recommended assessments, which was a requirement in the resolutions on the scale of assessments adopted by the Fifth Committee. After the adoption of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8, his delegation had pointed out that the Canadian amendment could be approved only by a two-thirds majority. A legal opinion had been sought on that question from the Legal Counsel. It should be recalled that the Legal Counsel, despite his long experience, had not been able to resolve certain problems which had arisen in the Legal Committee of the Assembly. The Fifth Committee dealt with highly complicated budgetary questions affecting the very future of the United Nations. It was, therefore, difficult to see how the Legal Counsel's opinion should be valued any more than that of the members of the Committee who were familiar with budgetary procedures and assessing all the activities of the United Nations. It was quite simply a matter of applying the rules of procedure which stipulated clearly that proposals such as the Canadian amendment which would annul a prior decision could not be adopted without a two-thirds majority.

14. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait) said that he had taken with a grain of salt the opinion offered by the Legal Counsel at the preceding meeting to the effect that the Canadian amendment was a valid amendment and that he had not wanted to challenge him at that time. The essence of the Canadian proposal, which had erroneously been called an amendment, was to reverse the decision taken by the Committee to set aside the new scale of assessments for two countries. The scale of assessments was not divisible; what was good for some countries was good for all. A two-thirds majority was clearly required to adopt the so-called Canadian amendment which intentionally sought to reverse a previously taken decision.

15. Mr. TODOROV (Bulgaria) endorsed the opinion of the Legal Counsel. Adoption of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2, as amended, did not preclude acceptance of the new scale of assessments. Draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8 dealt with only two Members; the Committee's decision to maintain the old scale of assessments for those two countries implied the application of the new scale of assessments for the

(Mr. Todorov, Bulgaria)

remaining Member States. Moreover, the Committee had decided in draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2 that the capacity to pay was a fundamental criterion on which scales of assessment were based, and that decision militated against maintaining the current scale of assessment for two more years, since that scale did not take fully into account the capacity to pay. The proposed amendment in document A/C.5/31/L.28 would provide for a new scale of assessments fully based on the fundamental principle of capacity to pay.

16. His delegation did not agree with the view that the adoption of the new scale of assessments for two years would be in conflict with maintaining the old scale for two countries for three years.

17. Mr. SCHMIDT (Federal Republic of Germany), speaking on a point of order, recalled that at the 41st meeting the Chairman had ruled that the Committee had been in the process of voting. Was the Committee now discussing the opinion of the Legal Adviser or was it hearing explanations of vote before the vote?

18. The CHAIRMAN said that technically the Committee was in the midst of explanations of vote but that there was a problem with regard to the opinion of the Legal Counsel.

19. Mr. STOFOROPOULOS (Greece) said that the Legal Counsel had not taken duly into account the fact that the Canadian amendment was in substance the exact opposite of the provision it sought to replace. It could not therefore be considered an amendment within the terms of rule 130 of the rules of procedure. Revising a proposal did not include substituting provisions diametrically opposed to it. He sought the views of the Legal Counsel on that matter.

20. At the preceding meeting the Cuban representative had been allowed to amend orally the first preambular paragraph of his draft resolution after the Chairman had announced the beginning of the voting, although that representative had clearly explained that he was taking the floor in order to amend his proposal and not to explain his vote. That was proper, because the Committee was master of its own procedure. He therefore proposed to subamend the so-called Canadian amendment in document A/C.5/31/L.28 by replacing the word "adopt" by the word "defer".

21. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at the preceding meeting the Committee had refused to allow the Canadian delegation to amend further its amendment and could not, therefore, accept the subamendment proposed by the representative of Greece.

22. Mr. LAPOINTE (Canada) said that it was obvious that there was no agreement on the legal opinion given by the Legal Adviser and he therefore proposed that it should be put to a vote.

23. Mr. EL SHIBIB (Iraq) said that the Committee was dealing with a serious matter which should not be considered in the light of the majority opinion. It was known that certain delegations with heavy guns could muster a majority for their point of view. The majority of Member States, however, were small countries without heavy guns and the protection of their equal status in the United Nations depended on the strict observance of the rules laid down in the Charter and in the rules of procedure. The Committee was now being asked to forget those rules. At the preceding meeting, the Canadian representative himself had immediately recognized

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(Mr. El Shibib, Iraq)

the irrelevance of his amendment in document A/C.5/31/L.28 by requesting to subamend it. The strange opinion of the Legal Counsel that the Canadian amendment could be adopted by a simple majority was an insult to the intelligence of the Committee. The delegation of Iraq was disturbed by the attempt being made to tamper with legality and to change a decision already taken by the Committee simply because it did not suit certain large Member States. As the representative of a small State, he believed in the equality of all Members of the United Nations and that, should the efforts of certain large Member States succeed a dangerous and illegal precedent would be created. The subterfuge being used by them must be defeated because it was contrary to the principle of the equality of States and the rule of law.

24. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) said that, before the Committee voted on any motion, he would like the opinion of the Legal Counsel as to whether the Canadian proposal in document A/C.5/31/L.28 was, under rule 130 of the rules of procedure, an amendment to the 15-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1) or whether it was a procedural device to reverse a previous decision of the Committee and give preference to the draft resolution recommended by the Committee on Contributions over the 15-Power draft resolution.

25. Mr. SUY (Legal Counsel) reiterated the interpretation of rule 130 which he had given at the 41st meeting (A/C.5/31/SR.41, para. 108). In his view, the Canadian proposal was an amendment within the terms of rule 130 of the rules of procedure. In the event of doubt, however, the Committee could decide otherwise.

26. Mr. LAPOINTE (Canada) reiterated his proposal that the opinion of the Legal Counsel be put to the vote.

27. Mr. TALIEH (Iran) regretted that certain Member States were attempting to impose an unjust and unfair scale of assessments on the membership of the Organization and that in order to create greater confusion, those States were seeking to reverse a decision adopted by the Committee. Immediately after the adoption of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8, the Canadian delegation had itself attempted to amend its proposal, that in itself was sufficient evidence that the Canadian delegation realized that its proposed amendment would alter a decision taken by the Committee and therefore, if put to the vote, would require a two-thirds majority. The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany himself had admitted that, in the light of the adoption of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8, the adoption of both A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 and L.28 would require a two-thirds majority. Document A/C.5/31/L.8 was no longer a Cuban draft resolution; it was a resolution of the Fifth Committee. Any decision altering the provisions of that resolution either entirely or in part must be taken by a two-thirds majority. That resolution had established the fact that the assessments of Cuba and Malaysia would remain the same as in the previous scale of assessments. Both the draft resolution of the Committee on Contributions (A/31/11, para. 59) and the Canadian proposal in document A/C.5/31/L.28, by adopting a new scale of assessments, would necessarily require an increase in the assessments of Cuba and Malaysia. In other words, they both went against a decision adopted by the Committee.

28. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) said that it would not be proper for the Committee

(Mr. de Pinies, Spain)

to vote on the opinion of the Legal Counsel, as had been requested by the representative of Canada. The point at issue was whether the Canadian proposal (A/C.5/31/L.28) required a simple majority or a two-thirds majority in order to be adopted.

29. The CHAIRMAN agreed with the representative of Spain. He invited the Committee to vote on the question as to whether the proposal in document A/C.5/31/L.28 required a simple majority.

30. A vote was taken by roll-call.

31. The Comoros, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Sweden, Togo, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia.

Against: Comoros, Congo, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, China.

Abstaining: Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Lesotho, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Surinam, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma.

32. The motion was adopted by 46 votes to 45, with 36 abstentions.

Draft amendment submitted by Canada (A/C.5/31/L.28)

33. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the Canadian amendment (A/C.5/31/L.28), which, as a result of the vote just taken, would require only a simple majority for adoption.

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34. Mr. EL SHIBIB (Iraq) said that he would like the Legal Counsel to enlighten the Committee as to what exactly it would be voting on. As he understood it, the Canadian proposal endorsed the scale recommended by the Committee on Contributions. Yet, by adopting draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8, the Committee had already decided to modify that scale. In other words, the Canadian proposal was out of date.

35. Mr. MATSEIKO (Ukrainian SSR) said that the delegation of Iraq should have confined itself to explaining its vote instead of querying the legitimacy of the Committee's taking a decision on the Canadian amendment. The Committee had already decided that the Canadian amendment could be adopted by a simple majority.

36. Mr. MATHIAS (India) said that his delegation, too, was baffled by the situation and was not sure what a vote on the Canadian proposal would involve.

37. The Indian delegation had hoped that the controversy on the scale of assessments proposed by the Committee on Contributions would have been settled through informal consultations among Member States and that the interim solution arrived at would have provided time for further refining the criteria on which the scale of assessments was based. It deeply regretted that no solution had been arrived at and that a matter normally settled through consensus had led to divisive voting.

38. His delegation considered that a fair decision would be either to retain the existing scale for one year more or to adopt the new scale for one year only, pending the finalization of a new set of criteria for determining assessments. Its votes on the various proposals would be cast in the light of that basic position.

39. Mr. AKASHI (Japan), explaining his vote before the vote, said that his delegation would vote against the Canadian amendment (A/C.5/31/L.28) since it ran completely counter to the intent of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1. Indeed, it was legitimate to doubt whether the Canadian proposal did indeed constitute an amendment under rule 130 of the rules of procedure.

40. In his opinion, one main thrust of the 15-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1) was the deferment for two years of a decision on the new scale of assessments and the continued application of the existing scale during that period. Such a step was very reasonable in view of the unprecedented controversy to which the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions had given rise.

41. His delegation had the highest regard for the Committee on Contributions, which had discharged its responsibilities with integrity and competence under its able Chairman. However, the situation with which the Committee on Contributions had been confronted was one which the General Assembly had not fully anticipated. The economic turmoil of the period 1972-1974 had had profound and capricious repercussions on the scale of assessments, with the result that new thinking and a fresh approach were required so as to ensure the equity and justice of the criteria used and the manner of their application.



(Mr. Akashi, Japan)

42. Another thrust of the 15-Power draft resolution was the provision to re-examine the question of a new scale in the light of the proposals made in the Fifth Committee, taking fully into account additional criteria and guidelines, of which one, namely, the lowering of the minimum rate, had already been endorsed by the Fifth Committee. The orderly and systematic examination of the matter by the Assembly provided for in the 15-Power draft resolution was essential to the adoption of a commonly acceptable and up-to-date methodology.

43. Reference had been made at the preceding meeting to the implications of the sponsors' acceptance of the Japanese amendments to draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 (A/C.5/31/SR.39, para. 57). It was his understanding that, if the 15-Power draft resolution was adopted, the mandate of the Committee on Contributions would be broadened to encompass not only the three important criteria and guidelines explicitly referred to in that draft but also various proposals made in the Fifth Committee by a number of delegations, including his own. In that connexion, reference had been made to his delegation's proposal to relate the scale of assessments to the status of the permanent members of the Security Council. The special privileges accorded to permanent members, as all were aware, extended from peace and security to other areas and to organs other than the Security Council. His delegation submitted that such privileges had become anomalous and outmoded at a time when the contributions to the budget of two Member States which were not permanent members of the Security Council were distinctly larger than those of three of the permanent members. One of his delegation's proposals was that there should be some correlation between the role a Member State was permitted to play in the Organization and the degree of financial responsibility it was asked to bear.

44. Such an assertion should not, however, be interpreted to mean reluctance on the part of his Government to assume its due share of the financial and other responsibilities for the functioning of the United Nations. Japan was one of the most consistent supporters of the Organization and had contributed more voluntary funds than any State to alleviate its financial difficulties.

45. With regard to the amendment submitted in document A/C.5/31/L.30, his delegation had difficulty in agreeing with the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany that there should be no 30 per cent ceiling on the rate of increase of assessments of Member States, because it considered that "capacity to pay" should be weighed not merely on the basis of transitory cash flows of a few years but also on the basis of the real accumulated wealth of a country. It was important to refer to national wealth, national welfare and other sophisticated indicators when adjusting net national income indices. His delegation trusted that that consideration was reflected in the Canadian amendment to draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2, which had already been adopted. The Japanese delegation also believed that it was time to reintroduce the past practice of mitigating drastic shifts in the scale of assessments, which tended to create serious hardships owing to rigidities in the budgetary procedures of many States.

46. In conclusion, he said that it was with a view to establishing fairer and more equitable guidelines for drawing up future scales of assessments that his delegation had submitted its proposals during the general debate and that it supported the 15-Power draft resolution.

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47. Mr. AL-NOWAISER (Saudi Arabia) said that he could not support the Canadian amendment (A/C.5/31/L.28) to draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, since he was not convinced that the amendment was valid. Furthermore, the scale of assessments proposed by the Committee on Contributions, which would apply if the Canadian amendment was adopted, was unacceptable, since it involved a 400 per cent increase in his country's contribution. Also, the amendment was illegal, since it contradicted draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8, in which the Committee had decided to adjust the scale of assessments proposed by the Committee on Contributions with respect to Cuba, Malaysia and the developed countries. According to the Committee's rules of procedure, the adoption of the Canadian amendment would require a two-thirds majority, since it changed a previously adopted decision. The Committee should seek legal advice on the legitimacy of the Canadian amendment and should establish a group of advisers to consider the question, since the majority of the members of the Committee did not agree with the Legal Counsel.

48. Mr. THOMAS (Trinidad and Tobago) said that, like the representative of Iraq, he was not sure what the Committee would be voting on. The Legal Counsel had said that the Canadian amendment (A/C.5/31/L.28) should be read in conjunction with draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8, and it was therefore his understanding that the Canadian amendment complemented operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8, rather than superseded it.

49. Mr. BOUAYAD AGHA (Algeria) said that his delegation would vote against the Canadian amendment, since it was not an amendment. Furthermore, if adopted, it would mean the approval of an unfair scale of assessments based on obsolete criteria. A country's capacity to pay could not be determined on the basis of the income from a single finite resource. He was astonished that the Ukrainian SSR was supporting a Canadian amendment.

50. Mr. BELYAEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said it was clear that the Committee was voting on the Canadian amendment as contained in document A/C.5/31/L.28. His delegation would support that amendment, since the new scale of assessments proposed by the Committee on Contributions was based on countries' capacity to pay and was therefore fair. By adopting that scale for the period 1977-1978, the Fifth Committee would enable the Committee on Contributions to discuss the proposals put forward during the debate.

51. Mr. McCREDIE (Australia) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the Canadian amendment, since that amendment constituted a compromise. Its adoption would not entail the full acceptance of the report of the Committee on Contributions, since the new scale of assessments would be introduced for two years, not three. In view of the explanation provided by the Legal Counsel, he was satisfied that there was no conflict between the Canadian amendment and draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8.

52. Mr. PIRSON (Belgium) said that, by adopting draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2 as amended, the General Assembly would request an enlarged Committee on Contributions to study urgently ways and means of increasing the fairness and equity of the scale of assessments and to report on its findings to the

(Mr. Pirson, Belgium)

thirty-second regular session of the General Assembly, so that early action could be taken on a new scale. In the meantime, there was no justification for rejecting the proposed new scale of assessments, which was based on criteria established by the General Assembly and the most recent statistics on Member States' capacity to pay. The adoption of a scale of assessments which had not been examined by experts, or the maintenance of the old scale, based on Member States' capacity to pay as calculated for the period 1970-1972, would not only be unjustified, but would be unfair to many States. The Canadian amendment A/C.5/31/L.28 represented a good compromise, and his delegation would vote for it in the hope that, in the next two years, the Fifth Committee would be able to agree on new criteria for the scale of assessments. It would also be wrong to impose criteria which would force the Committee on Contributions to submit an unfair scale of assessments, as would be the case if paragraph 3 (c) of resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, was adopted. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of the amendment to paragraph 3 (c) submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/C.5/31/L.30). He agreed with the representative of Trinidad and Tobago as to the relationship between the Canadian amendment (A/C.5/31/L.28) and draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8.

53. Mr. SCHMIDT (Federal Republic of Germany) said that his country would vote in favour of the Canadian amendment, even though the adoption of the scale of assessments proposed by the Committee on Contributions would result in a significant increase in his country's contribution. If all those countries whose contribution was to be increased protested, and all those countries whose contribution was to be reduced accepted the new scale, it would be impossible to reach a figure of 100 per cent. He agreed with the representatives of Australia and Belgium that the Canadian amendment represented an acceptable compromise.

54. Mr. OKEYO (Kenya) said that the General Assembly had an obligation towards the Committee on Contributions, since the latter had based its calculations on criteria established by the General Assembly. The Canadian amendment (A/C.5/31/L.28) provided for the adoption of the new scale for two years, whereas the Committee on Contributions had recommended the adoption of that scale for three years. The Canadian amendment therefore represented a compromise. His delegation was even prepared to accept the adoption of the new scale for only one year. The rejection of the report of the Committee on Contributions would not only be unfair, but it would set an undesirable precedent. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of the Canadian amendment.

55. Mr. SUY (Legal Counsel), referring to points raised by the representatives of Iraq and Trinidad and Tobago, said that the Canadian amendment (A/C.5/31/L.28) must be read in conjunction with draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8. Accordingly, the Canadian amendment, if adopted, would mean that the existing scale of assessments would be retained for Cuba and Malaysia, that the subsequent readjustments in the new scale of assessments would not affect developing countries, and that the cost of those readjustments would be borne by developed countries.

56. Mr. EL SHIBIB (Iraq) requested that the views of the Legal Counsel be reproduced in toto and circulated among delegations for their consideration. The

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(Mr. El Shibib, Iraq)

Legal Counsel had implied that the Committee would be voting on the amendment as he had interpreted it. The amendment itself made no mention of the points raised by the Legal Counsel.

57. The vote was taken by roll-call.

58. Somalia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone.

Against: Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Burundi, China, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Greece, Grenada, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore.

Abstaining: Sri Lanka, Surinam, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mozambique, Pakistan, Romania.

59. The draft amendment contained in document A/C.5/31/L.28 was adopted by 56 votes to 46, with 29 abstentions.

Draft amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/C.5/31/L.30, para. 2)

60. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the draft amendment contained in document A/C.5/31/L.30.

61. Mr. SCHMIDT (Federal Republic of Germany) said that, at the request of several delegations, his delegation would withdraw its amendment to paragraph 3 (a) of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, on the understanding that the principle of capacity to pay applied to individual countries, not groups of countries. The

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(Mr. Schmidt, Federal Republic of Germany)

paragraph 4 of the draft resolution had been superseded by a similar provision in draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2.

62. The CHAIRMAN requested the Committee to consider the second part of the draft amendment only.

63. Mr. TALIEH (Iran) said that, after holding consultations with all groups, particularly the Group of 77, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 had decided that the percentage increase in Member States' contributions after each review of the scale of assessments must be controlled. The draft resolution had originally provided for a ceiling of 15 per cent but, as a result of negotiations within the Group of 77, the ceiling had been raised to 30 per cent, which was regarded as a maximum. The sponsors of the draft resolution objected to increases of several hundred per cent in the contribution of any Member State, particularly the developing countries, and it was important to establish safeguards for the future. If the Committee on Contributions was not given clear instructions, the same situation might arise again. His delegation would vote against the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/C.5/31/L.30).

64. Miss FORCIGNANO (Italy) said that her delegation would vote in favour of the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/C.5/31/L.30). The Committee on Contributions should be given only general guidelines, as had been the case in draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2. It should be for that Committee to decide which statistical indicators and which criteria would best reflect the many changes which had taken place in the world economic situation, without departing from the principle of capacity to pay. The adoption of paragraph 3 (c) of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 would involve a departure from that principle.

65. Ms. TROTTER (New Zealand) said that her delegation would vote in favour of the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/C.5/31/L.30), since New Zealand opposed the establishment of arbitrary ceilings. The Fifth Committee should ask the Committee on Contributions to examine the implications of the new mitigation formula before it took a decision on the matter. Draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 was aimed at freezing the level of contribution of some countries, and that was against the principle of capacity to pay which had been reaffirmed in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2.

66. Mr. SEKYEI (Ghana) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, since the imposition of a ceiling of 30 per cent would make it impossible to increase the contribution of countries at the floor level.

67. Mr. McCREDIE (Australia) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany. Recent experience had shown that it would be wise to anticipate the need to increase a country's contribution by more than 30 per cent in cases where the objective criteria used to establish capacity to pay showed that there was no equitable alternative to such an increase. If a country with a rapidly increasing income was not assessed on its real capacity to pay, the membership as a whole, including developing countries,

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(Mr. McCredie, Australia)

would have to bear the burden of the shortfall. The Committee on Contributions should not be hindered in the application of its criteria by the imposition of artificial ceilings.

68. Mr. EL SHIBIB (Iraq) said that the proposal to establish a ceiling of 30 per cent represented a compromise which had been agreed upon by the Group of 77. The original proposal had been for a ceiling of 15 per cent. Reference had been made to the imposition of an artificial ceiling, but the idea of a ceiling was nothing new, since there already existed a floor and ceiling for the scale of assessments. The disagreement within the Fifth Committee had been caused by the very great increase in the contributions proposed for a large number of countries, and if a ceiling of 30 per cent was not established, the same problem would arise in the future. It was also desirable to establish clear criteria for the Committee on Contributions.

69. Mr. THOMAS (Trinidad and Tobago) said that the Committee on Contributions should be provided with general guidelines. The criteria referred to in draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 were acceptable, since they were not incompatible with the principle of capacity to pay. Furthermore, there could be no harm in establishing a ceiling for the percentage increase in Member States' contributions, since such a ceiling already played a part in the work of the Committee on Contributions. His delegation would therefore vote against the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany.

70. Mr. SHARMA (Nepal) said that, since draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2 had reaffirmed that capacity to pay was the fundamental criterion on which the scale of assessment was to be based, his delegation would vote in favour of the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany.

71. Mr. HUMAIDAN (United Arab Emirates) said that his delegation would oppose the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, since that amendment would make it difficult to determine what constituted a gradual increase. In increasing the contribution to be paid by his country, the Committee on Contributions had taken no account of the country's internal difficulties and had provided no explanation for its decision.

72. Mr. GARRIDO (Philippines) said that establishing a ceiling of 30 per cent for the percentage increase in Member States' contributions was not incompatible with the guidelines to be established by the Committee on Contributions. An agreement to that effect had been reached in the Group of 77, and his delegation would therefore vote against the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany.

73. Mr. BENKIRANE (Morocco) said it had been suggested that, if a ceiling of 30 per cent was established for the percentage increase of Member States' contributions, it would not be possible to lower the floor to 0.01 per cent. That argument was not valid, since an increase of 20 or 30 per cent in a certain number of contributions would make it possible to reduce the contribution of the least developed of the developing countries to 0.01 per cent. His delegation would vote against the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany.

74. Mr. OUEDRAOGO (Upper Volta) said that his delegation would abstain on the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany and on paragraph 3 (c) of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, if that amendment was not adopted. On the one hand, to establish a ceiling for the percentage increase in Member States' contributions was not entirely consistent with operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2. On the other hand, large increases in their contribution could create problems for some developing countries. Paragraph 3 (c) of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 made no distinction between Member States and it would be difficult to accept that a ceiling be established for developed countries. Furthermore, for those countries at the floor level, whether that floor was 0.02 per cent or 0.01 per cent, any increase would represent an increase of at least 50 or 100 per cent. There was therefore a danger that some countries would not be able to rise above the floor level, whatever their national income.

75. Mr. PLASEK (Czechoslovakia) said that a ceiling similar to that referred to in draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 had been imposed in the past, but had proved unsatisfactory and had been removed by the General Assembly. His delegation would therefore support the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany.

76. Mr. GAMBOA (Venezuela) said that his delegation would vote against the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, since the Committee on Contributions must have explicit guidelines if excessively large increases and the resulting controversy were to be avoided in future.

77. Mr. STUART (United Kingdom) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the amendment submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany. If the Fifth Committee established a ceiling before the Committee on Contributions had examined the question, the system by which impartial experts determined the scale of assessments in accordance with countries' capacity to pay would be replaced by a system based on political considerations. The issue was a crucial one, upon which there could be no compromise.

78. At the request of the representative of Iran, a vote on the amendment of the Federal Republic of Germany was taken by roll-call.

79. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

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Against: Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Greece, Grenada, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates.

Abstaining: United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Zaire, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Burma, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Lesotho, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Surinam, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia.

80. The draft amendment (second part) contained in document A/C.5/31/L.30 was rejected by 50 votes to 36, with 44 abstentions.

Draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, as amended

81. Mr. ANVAR (Secretary of the Committee), at the request of the Chairman, read out the entire draft resolution, as modified in the light of the approval of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.8 and as amended in the light of the approval of the draft amendment in A/C.5/31/L.28. He drew attention to the fact that paragraph 3 (b) had been deleted and paragraph 3 (c) would become new 3 (b). Paragraph 4 had been superseded and was also deleted and old paragraph 5 should be renumbered accordingly.

82. Mr. ZDROJOWY (Poland) requested a separate vote on operative paragraph 2.

83. Mr. TALIEH (Iran) proposed that a separate vote be taken on paragraph 1, since the Canadian amendment to that paragraph had been adopted and consequently the co-sponsors were not able to vote in favour of it.

84. Mr. SCHMIDT (Federal Republic of Germany) asked whether it was possible to hold a separate vote on operative paragraph 1, since that would entail reconsidering a decision already taken by the Committee and thus would require a two-thirds majority.

85. Mr. BOUAYAD-AGHA (Algeria) said that his delegation, too, requested a separate vote on paragraph 1. The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany had just invoked the same argument used earlier by other delegations in connexion with the Canadian amendment in document A/C.5/31/L.28 and the Committee must decide again whether the proposal required a two-thirds or simple majority.

86. The CHAIRMAN requested the opinion of the Legal Counsel on the question.

87. Mr. SUY (Legal Counsel), giving his opinion on the Iranian proposal, as

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(Mr. Suy)

requested by the Chairman, said that in his view the proposal was admissible under rule 129 of the rules of procedure. Rule 129 stated that: "A representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If objection is made to the request for division, the motion for division shall be voted upon."

88. Mr. TODOROV (Bulgaria) said he considered that the Iranian proposal should be dealt with under rule 123 of the rules of procedure.

89. The CHAIRMAN, after reading out rule 129 of the rules of procedure, invited two delegations to speak in favour of the Iranian proposal and two delegations to speak against it. The Committee would then vote on the Iranian proposal.

90. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait) endorsed the request made by the representative of Iran, who was merely exercising his rights under the rules of procedure.

91. Mr. McCREDIE (Australia) said that strictly speaking rule 123 of the rules of procedure applied and that therefore the Iranian proposal was out of order. However, he would not oppose the motion if that would expedite the Committee's work.

92. Mr. BELYAEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) opposed the Iranian proposal and said that its adoption would require a two-thirds majority.

93. Mr. MARPAUNG (Indonesia) supported the Iranian proposal. The Committee had earlier voted to adopt the Canadian amendment; now it was engaged in a different process, namely, that of voting on the draft resolution itself.

94. The Iranian proposal for a separate vote on paragraph 1 was adopted by 52 votes to 46, with 25 abstentions.

95. Mr. BELYAEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Iranian motion should be considered as rejected because it had not received the two-thirds majority required under rule 123 of the rules of procedure.

96. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that, on the advice of the Legal Counsel, he had applied rule 129 of the rules of procedure, under which a simple majority sufficed. He invited the Committee to vote on paragraph 1, as amended.

97. Mr. MOLTENI (Argentina), speaking on a point of order, said that rejection of the amended paragraph 1 would require a two-thirds majority under rule 123 of the rules of procedure.

98. Mr. de PINIES (Spain), speaking on a point of order, said that the Committee should immediately proceed to the vote in accordance with rule 129 of the rules of procedure.

99. At the request of the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the vote was taken by roll-call.

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100. Bulgaria, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium.

Against: Burundi, China, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Greece, Grenada, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain.

Abstaining: Burma, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Maldives, Mali, Mozambique, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil.

101. Paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, as amended, was adopted by 55 votes to 47, with 26 abstentions.

102. Mr. ZDROJOWY (Poland) withdrew his request for a separate vote on paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1. If a separate vote had been taken, his delegation would have voted in favour of the paragraph.

103. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, as a whole, as amended.

104. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait), speaking in explanation of vote before the vote, said that the original draft resolution had been mutilated and sabotaged. His delegation would therefore vote against draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1.

105. Mr. BOUAYAD AGHA (Algeria) said that the draft resolution had been practically emptied of substance by the Canadian amendment (A/C.5/31/L.28). His delegation would therefore vote against the draft resolution.

106. Mr. EL SHIBIB (Iraq) said that operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 had been amended in such a way that it contradicted the original

(Mr. El Shibib, Iraq)

purpose of the draft resolution. Accordingly, his delegation would vote against the draft resolution.

107. Mr. ALLISON (Nigeria) said that his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, since the draft resolution as amended failed to meet his delegation's requirements.

108. Mr. TALIEH (Iran) said that operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution had been changed substantially by the so-called amendment submitted by Canada. The sponsors of the draft resolution obviously could not accept the adoption of the report of the Committee on Contributions, and, despite the valuable elements contained in the draft resolution, particularly in paragraph 3 (a), new paragraph 3 (b) and paragraph 4, his delegation would not support it.

109. Mr. AL-KHOLAIIFI (Qatar) said that the draft resolution had been emptied of substance and his delegation would therefore vote against it.

110. Mr. KHOJA (Saudi Arabia) said that his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 because of the way in which it had been amended.

111. Mr. GAMBOA (Venezuela) said that his delegation would vote against the draft resolution since it could not accept the amendment.

112. Mr. KRUMIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 as amended by the Committee. The draft resolution represented a compromise between the positions taken by the various groups of Member States. However, while it supported the draft resolution as a whole, his delegation opposed the new paragraph 3 (b), since the establishing of a ceiling for the percentage increase in Member States' contributions would violate the principle of capacity to pay.

113. Mr. KARIM AL-SHAKAR (Bahrain) said that his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, since the amendment to operative paragraph 1 had emptied the draft resolution of all substance. He supported the arguments put forward by the representatives of Iran, Kuwait and Iraq.

114. Mrs. MOHAMUD (Somalia) said that her delegation would vote against the draft resolution, since its substance had been changed.

115. Mr. ALLAFI (Libyan Arab Republic) said that his delegation had voted against the Canadian amendment to operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1, and would therefore vote against the draft resolution as amended.

116. Mr. HUMAIDAN (United Arab Emirates) said that the draft resolution contained some positive elements but, the main idea behind it had been completely changed by the Canadian amendment. His delegation would therefore vote against draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1.

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117. Mr. MALOUM (Mauritania) said that the Canadian amendment had changed draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 substantially. His delegation was therefore unable to vote for the draft resolution.

118. Draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 was rejected by 62 votes to 26 with 34 abstentions.

119. Mr. AKASHI (Japan) said that his delegation had voted against the draft resolution, as amended, as a whole, for reasons already stated. It was profoundly saddened by the Committee's failure to reach an agreement on the scale of assessments, which had shown the futility of confrontation on that issue. It was to be hoped that before the item came before the plenary of the Assembly, genuine negotiations could be held resulting in a generally agreed resolution which was based on mutual concessions by all sides and took fully into account the needs and interests of all States and groups of States. His delegation was willing to participate in such negotiations which would help avoid a repetition of the sad situation which had occurred in the Fifth Committee.

120. Mr. SCHMIDT (Federal Republic of Germany) said that his delegation had hoped that with the introduction of the Canadian amendment and the other amendments which had been put forward, draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.10/Rev.1 could have been shaped into a true compromise. However, that had proved impossible to achieve in negotiations. The Committee had rejected the second part of his delegation's amendment in document A/C.5/31/L.30 which would have left it to the Committee on Contributions to study the question of mitigating increases in a Member State's assessment from one scale to another. His delegation therefore had had no other choice but to vote against the draft resolution, as amended, as a whole. Nevertheless, the Committee was not faced with a situation of tabula rasa since, by approving draft resolution A/C.5/31/L.7/Rev.2, as amended, it had given a mandate to the Committee on Contributions to review the criteria used in drawing up the scale of assessments.

121. Mr. GARRIDO (Philippines) said his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution in the hope that operative paragraphs 1 and 3 (b) would have been able to reconcile the diverging views. It joined with the Japanese delegation in calling on all the parties concerned to reconsider the issue, which was of great importance to the United Nations.

Motion for adjournment of the meeting

122. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait) moved the adjournment of the meeting in accordance with rule 118 of the rules of procedure.

123. Mr. STOTTLEMYER (United States of America) said that the Committee was in a voting situation and that rule 118 did not apply. When the representative of the Upper Volta had moved the adjournment of the preceding meeting, a decision had been taken that he could not do so, since the Committee was in the process of voting. The same should apply to the current situation.

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(Mr. Stottlemeyer, United States)

124. Mr. GRODSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Committee should continue its work until it had voted on all the draft resolutions before it. Much time had been spent in seeking a compromise and the time had come to take a decision in order to allow the Committee to take up other items on its agenda. Only after the draft resolution recommended by the Committee on Contributions had been put to a vote could the meeting be adjourned.

125. The proposal to adjourn was adopted by 58 votes to 32, with 9 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 8.05 p.m.