

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 July 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Ambassador V.L. Issraelyan (Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. B. OULD-ROUIS
Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. J. CARASALES
Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. BUTLER
Mr. R. ROWE
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Mr. K. STANKOV
Mr. N. MIKHAILOV
Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U HLA MYINT
U PE THEIN TIN

Canada: Mr. G.B. SKINNER
Mr. R.G. SUPPERLAND
Mr. R. VANIER
Mr. G.K. VACHON

China: Mr. QIAN JIADONG
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M. BADR
Mr. F. MONIB
Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. G. MONTASSIER
Mr. H. RENIE
Mr. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic: Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. H. THELICHE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. W. KUBICZEK

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. M. GERDTS
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary: Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TOTI
Mr. L. MATE

India: Mr. M. DUBEY
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia: Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. I.M. DAMANIK
Mr. I. WIRANATAATMADJA

Islamic Republic of Iran: Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI
Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan: Mr. M. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. T. ISHIGURI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. S. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. F. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBLIEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD
Mr. T. ZORIGTBAATAR

Morocco: Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands: Mr. R.J. Van SCHAIK
Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria: Mr. J.O. OBOH

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru: Mr. P. CANNOCK
Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland: Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. J. RYCHLAK

Romania: Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka: Mr. J. DHANAPALA
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Ms. E. BONNIER
Ms. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
Mr. S.V. NAGRADOV
Mr. A.P. KOUTEPOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mr. J.F. GORDON
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Mr. H.W. DAVIDSON
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. B. MORTON
Mr. A. HOROWITZ
Mr. A. LIEBOWITZ
Mr. J. WOODWORTH
Mr. J.J. TIERNEY
Mr. J.E. MCATEER
Ms. M. WINSTON

Venezuela:Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The 275th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 7, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In accordance with our timetable of meetings for this week, I intend to suspend the plenary meeting as soon as the list of speakers is concluded and convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider the following matters:

- (a) Proposals concerning subsidiary bodies on agenda items and, if necessary, consideration of decisions in that connection;
- (b) Increase in the membership of the Conference;
- (c) Proposals concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

After we have settled the questions to be considered at the informal meeting, I intend to resume the plenary meeting and invite the Conference to take a decision on the draft mandates contained in documents CD/515 and CD/520, as well as any other matters which may call for the adoption of a decision as a result of the informal meeting.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Netherlands, Poland, Australia, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Van Schaik.

Mr. Van SCHAIK (Netherlands): Permit me to start by congratulating you, Mr. President, on your presidency. Over these last weeks I have already had an opportunity to observe your skilful, experienced and active chairmanship. We shall need that skill, experience and action, in particular in these coming weeks in order to help us overcome the major difficulties with which we are faced. My delegation also wishes to express its gratitude to Ambassador Mrs. Theorin and Ambassador Ekéus who so aptly steered the course of this Conference in the first period of the summer part of our session. I wish to express my gratitude to all colleagues who welcomed me with kind words and who also, outside the meetings, showed their readiness to provide support and co-operation in these first six weeks of the summer session.

Today I take the floor for the first time since the assumption of my duties in Geneva. I am looking forward to the tasks that will be mine in the coming years. Throughout the years multilateral disarmament negotiations have contributed to making this world a somewhat better and safer -- at least less unsafe -- place to live in. I am happy now to be in a position to participate in those negotiations.

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

Little, if anything, has thus far been achieved in this year's sessions of the Conference, despite the efforts of delegations to move forward, but, in some areas progress has been made. During the spring part of the session, for example, a sound basis was laid for substantive work on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban.

Let me mention in particular the tabling by the United States of a full draft treaty of such a chemical weapons ban at the end of the spring part of our session. My delegation welcomes this initiative as a particularly valuable contribution to our work in this field. This draft provides us with a detailed analysis of ways and means to rid the world of an entire class of -- indeed appalling -- weapons. On an earlier occasion my delegation already expressed its satisfaction on the Soviet willingness to accept permanent on-site inspection of the destruction of stockpiles. We express our sincere hope that it will be possible to reach agreement on a chemical weapons treaty in the near future.

In due course, I hope to address the subject of chemical weapons in detail. I now only wish to pay tribute to the perseverance with which Ambassador Ekéus, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, furthers a successful outcome of our work during this session. Permit me to add that, in our view, the importance of an early conclusion of a chemical weapons ban would warrant a continuation of our work during the autumn, provided we could reach agreement before the end of this session on a suitable basis to do so.

Despite positive developments, the word "impasse" seems to describe best the present situation in a number of areas. This applies particularly to the nuclear items on our agenda, which, together with outer space, will be the main subject of my statement today.

Before turning to these issues I shall make some general remarks on the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, against the background of the current international situation.

Many delegations have voiced their concern at the present state of international relations, particularly between East and West, which they feared can hardly be seen as conducive to progress in disarmament. I wholeheartedly agree that certain minimum conditions should be created, providing for a better climate in which the Conference can perform its functions. A renewed and more intensive dialogue between East and West would help to ensure that existing intentions and motivations of the other side are understood, that confidence will be restored and that the foundations be laid for a more stable relationship between the two sides. This fundamental thought was once more stressed in the Declaration issued at the end of the meeting in Washington of the North Atlantic Council on 31 May of this year.

This is not the proper forum to dwell at length on the issue of Longer-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces, but since matters of arms limitations are the concern of this Conference, I think a few observations should be made regarding this pressing problem.

Much to our regret, we continue to face a situation in which negotiations broken off by the Soviet Union at the end of last year have not yet been resumed -- this in spite of the fact that the United States has repeatedly expressed its willingness to resume the negotiations without pre-conditions.

Meanwhile, to our grave concern, the Soviet Union has continued to increase its Longer-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces potential. The Netherlands Government strongly hopes that the Soviet Union will halt further SS-20 missile deployments

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and that she will return to the negotiating table. It is with this in mind that the Netherlands Government has taken its recent decision on the possible deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands.

To return to the Conference on Disarmament proper, one of the main obstacles to substantive progress remains our inability to deal in a pragmatic and business-like manner with the procedural aspects of our work. Despite enormous efforts, consensus on the texts of mandates enabling the establishment of ad hoc committees on a number of important issues has thus far proved to be beyond our reach. As a result we are still prevented from making full use of the potential of this body.

So far we have been unable to agree on consensus formulas enabling the Conference to deal in appropriate working formats with the substance of agenda items 1, 3 and 5. I wish to make a few observations with regard to each of those issues.

The first two of these items deal with nuclear subjects. I think we can all agree that from the viewpoint of arms control, nuclear weapons must have priority. Here our Conference -- and not only the nuclear-weapon States represented here -- has an important task. I am thinking first and foremost of a comprehensive test ban that would be binding on nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

Also topics, such as negative security assurances, are of concern to all of us, because they link nuclear-weapon States with non-nuclear-weapon States.

Under our agenda item on the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, various other measures could be discussed, to which I shall return in a moment. Suffice it to note now that all States, nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, have a legitimate interest in negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Indeed, article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty refers to "each of the parties" that have to undertake these negotiations in good faith. The Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be held here in Geneva next year will provide countries with an opportunity to review the actual implementation of that article.

Progress towards a comprehensive test ban continues to be a matter of the greatest importance for my delegation.

A comprehensive test ban, once brought about, would in essence be the first treaty to limit a specific form of research aimed at the qualitative improvement of arms. As such it would inspire confidence that the role of nuclear arms in our security policies is really diminishing, and it would thus stimulate non-proliferation.

A comprehensive test ban, moreover, would do away with an element of discrimination at present existing between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The world now has known over 1,400 nuclear tests. The rate of tests shows a tendency to rise; in 1983 50 tests took place, of which 27 in the Soviet Union and 14 in the United States. Continued testing, not only testing for the reliability of stockpiles but also testing of completely new weapons systems based on nuclear explosives, can only have adverse effects on and in the long run threaten non-proliferation.

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

Of course, a CTB in itself is not tantamount to reductions in nuclear armaments. Negotiations, in the framework of START or otherwise, remain essential. Although we are aware that a CTB is not yet in immediate sight, a lot of work needs to be done and can be done. We sincerely believe that the mandate put forward by a number of western countries would provide a suitable basis for doing so. We hope that the Conference's inability thus far to create a subsidiary body to deal with a nuclear test ban, will soon be overcome.

Permit me, before addressing the test ban issue in more detail, to make a few observations with respect to the two bilateral, so-called threshold, treaties concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1974 and 1976. In the absence, for the time being, of a comprehensive test ban, ratification of these treaties would seem to be of great importance.

The Netherlands is aware of existing problems, for example, with regard to the calibration of test-sites, but we ask ourselves whether these are not outweighed by the advantages of ratification. Those treaties contain interesting provisions with regard to data exchange and international on-site inspection which also have an important confidence-building potential. In case there are problems, these can perhaps be discussed in the joint consultative commission as foreseen in the treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions. My Government, therefore, urges the United States and the Soviet Union to remove the remaining obstacles and to ratify the treaties as soon as possible.

Mr. President, recently the threshold approach has also been mentioned by the Foreign Minister of Japan, H.E. Mr. Shintaro Abe, who suggested that this Conference should look into the possibilities of this option. My delegation agrees with the Japanese delegation that no avenue towards reaching the objective of a CTB should be left unexplored.

We still have doubts, however, on the desirability of a multilateral threshold treaty. It could, for instance, have the effect of "legitimizing" tests in the permitted yield-range by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to such a treaty. On the other hand, we of course welcome the observance of a lower threshold by the present nuclear-weapon States until such time as a CTB is achieved.

What could at present be done by the Conference on Disarmament with regard to a comprehensive test ban? We think quite a bit. First, the ad hoc committee to be established should direct its activities at fully elaborating the institutional set-up accompanying a future CTB, such as the international seismic data exchange system, data centres, complaint procedures, etc. The "trilateral" Powers could give their views on how they wish to see verification problems solved or how they had them solved already amongst themselves at the time of their talks. Much of this will have to be based on the reports of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. My delegation was impressed by the Third Report of the Group indicating the greatly increased possibilities for the effective verification of a CTB, on the basis of the model of a global system, described in the report. Similar suggestions of increased possibilities for verification are contained in the interesting Working Paper (CD/491) submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany.

We welcome the testing of methods of exchanging and analysis of level I data through the WMO/GTS communications system later this year. The Netherlands will be pleased to participate in this exercise, as we hope many other countries will do, including those from the Southern hemisphere. Of course, we realize that much work has yet to be done in this field, such as carrying out tests

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which would include level II data. The improved possibilities for verification however, are a cause for optimism. In the 1970s the identification of seismic events was possible for all nuclear explosions above 10-20 kilotons. Now this has been reduced to no more than a few kilotons. Today we wish to urge countries to make full use of those new possibilities. Our substantive work on this most important subject must not be stalled by the present procedural impasse.

Needless to say, apart from what the Conference can do, the partners in the trilateral talks could consider the resumption of their negotiations. This would indeed be a major step forward.

My delegation regrets that thus far this Conference has not been able to agree on a suitable basis for embarking upon a discussion of the subject-matter of item 3 of our agenda on the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. Like many other delegations, we attach utmost importance to this subject, which touches upon one of the central questions of our times: how to preserve and strengthen international security in the nuclear age. We share the great concern that so many leading personalities, politicians and scientists have expressed.

The recent Joint Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of India, Greece, Sweden, Tanzania, Mexico and Argentina is a striking example of this. We feel that it is high time that this Conference, representative of the international community in the field of disarmament, meets this challenge and gives effect to this ambitious part of our programme.

My Government places the question of the prevention of nuclear war in the wider context of the prevention of war in general.

We therefore attach great importance to the general principles governing relations between nations, such as the obligation not to use or threaten to use force, be it conventional or nuclear. This latter principle is firmly anchored in the Charter of the United Nations and therefore binding on all Member States of that Organization. Strict adherence to this principle and promotion of its observance by all States must remain our primary goal.

In our substantive dealings with the subject we will have to go from the general to the specific, as our work progresses. We hope it will be possible to avoid unnecessary discussion of subjects which would hold no promise for consensus. It seems to us, to cite only one example, that confidence-building, including nuclear confidence-building, is one of the areas that hold promise for successful work. But there are many other areas to be explored usefully and meaningfully. Indeed we are not short of subjects to tackle, as was borne out by the useful compilation, contained in document CD/398, which the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Jaipal, presented almost a year ago.

I hope that the ad hoc committee can shortly start its substantial work. It would be good to keep in mind that all five nuclear-weapon States take part in our Conference. Without wishing to prejudge the scope of the work of the ad hoc committee we believe that those States could in this forum work towards

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a better mutual understanding on some aspects of their nuclear armaments. The foundations for this have been laid in the bilateral agreements of the United States, the United Kingdom and France with the Soviet Union concluded in the 1960s and 1970s. We also see grounds for the exploration of possibilities for nuclear confidence-building measures between the nuclear-weapon States: exchange of information on size and structure of nuclear forces; notification of decisions on the production of major weapon systems; notification of launchings of intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-launched ballistic missiles within and outside their territory; notification of large manoeuvres of strategic nuclear forces; and measures to prevent misunderstandings in times of crisis, including first-class communication facilities. As for the latter, it was encouraging to learn that just recently the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on the improvement of their hot-line.

Mr. President, allow me also to make some observations with regard to the highly important question of preventing an arms race in outer space. This subject could well dominate the debate on our security in the next few decades.

It is therefore proper, indeed imperative, that the international community should give increasing attention to current developments which might not only add a new and costly dimension to the arms race but, even more important, could in addition have far-reaching implications for global stability.

The major space Powers bear a special responsibility and we welcome their recent efforts to reach agreement on a suitable basis for bilateral talks on this subject. Yet, my delegation holds the view that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum where the international community should discuss this vital question. For this reason we deplore the fact that it has not yet been possible to reach agreement on the text of a mandate of an ad hoc committee on outer space.

A good starting-point for a structured discussion in the Committee would in our view be an analysis of existing international law in order to ascertain to what extent international law already restricts the military use of outer space.

Such an approach allows us, against the background of the ongoing development of military space technologies, to identify loopholes or deficiencies in the existing legal system with respect to outer space. In this connection I wish to recall the statement made by Ambassador Ekéus on 22 March 1984, which rightly draws our attention to a series of questions concerning the interpretation and application of existing agreements. Such an analysis would also be useful for the evaluation of various proposals tabled on the subject.

Although this approach would contribute greatly to a better and clearer understanding of the complex questions, we should not, of course, restrict ourselves to the legal aspects of the issue alone. The clear objective of our discussions remains the adoption of concrete measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

As part of the consideration of such concrete measures, the Conference on Disarmament should on a priority basis focus attention on the issues raised

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

by the development of anti-satellite weapon systems (ASAT), in particular on a prohibition of the testing, deployment and use of specific anti-satellite weapon systems.

We do not underestimate the technical complexities of ASAT arms control and its adequate verification. These factors indeed complicate things. They should not however discourage us from vigorously seeking practical and pragmatic solutions. An agreement which comprehensively bans all means of anti-satellite warfare appears to be impossible. Residual ASAT capacities of certain space systems are amongst the main obstacles. We have to look for a combination of verifiable and co-operative elements in a future agreement; which would prevent anti-satellite warfare from any longer being an effective military option. In the view of the Netherlands, negotiated constraints on ASAT would be greatly preferable to a totally unrestrained ASAT competition.

Discussion on ASAT arms control in the Conference on Disarmament does not preclude bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union as the major space Powers. On the contrary, it may even require such negotiations. Our work in the Conference would greatly benefit from bilateral arrangements. As I said, we hope that it will be possible for the United States and the Soviet Union soon to start outer space negotiations.

Anti-satellite weapons are only one aspect of the burgeoning arms race in outer space.

Intensive research efforts are taking place in the field of ballistic missile defence, including space-based systems. The process could, if carried beyond the present stage of feasibility research, have far-reaching implications for arms control and stability. We therefore very much hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will reach agreement to hold further talks on that subject too.

To summarize, with respect to outer space too, maintenance of peace and stability at much lower levels of armaments, as well as the prevention of developments of a destabilizing nature, remain our basic objectives.

The other day one of our colleagues, Ambassador Beesley, quoted from a recently discovered 17th Century treatise by Grotius, saying that what people had in common was much more important than what divided them. Having had a look at the text in the meantime, I now know that Grotius in fact echoed the words of an Egyptian scholar called Meletius. This early representative of the Group of 21 added that people prefer fighting about words and doctrines instead of acting rightly, because for acting rightly we had to conduct a battle with ourselves. Let us not get submerged in quarrels about words and doctrines, in the "theology of arms control". But let us conduct the battle with ourselves, let us find the right way to act.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Comrade President, it gives me great pleasure to most warmly welcome in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament the representative of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, a country whose contribution to the strengthening of world peace and whose numerous initiatives aimed at lowering the level of armaments and at improving global security are highly valued and appreciated all over the world. Since this is the first occasion for me in July to take the floor in plenary, allow me at the outset to extend to you personally our sincere congratulations and to assure you of the Polish delegation's full co-operation in the discharge of your responsible duties. Your well-known diplomatic skill and vast experience together with deep knowledge have been matched by the dynamism and dedication with which you have been conducting our business in order to achieve the best possible results in our work. It will be only right to say, Comrade President, that the close co-operation which exists between our delegations is a fruitful extension of the co-operation and friendship existing between the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union.

I wish also to take this opportunity to extend cordial thanks to Ambassador Mai Britt Theorin and Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, the Presidents in June, for their strenuous efforts to expedite the work of this Conference.

Comrade President, since I am speaking only two days after the fortieth anniversary of the Polish People's Republic, I cannot fail to mention that this anniversary marks the beginning of a new foreign policy of my country, the cornerstone of which is both the friendship, alliance and mutually advantageous co-operation with the Soviet Union and active promotion of peace, disarmament and international security.

Thanks to that foreign policy Poland regained her place in the post-war world and created favourable conditions for the security, independence and territorial integrity in her new, just borders. It is not an exaggeration that our foreign policy had already brought and continues to bring new factors of great quality to the security of Europe, a continent which, happily, for almost the last 40 years has been living in peace. Yesterday and today alike, the supreme goal of Polish foreign policy has been the maintenance of peace and consolidation of international security as well as mutually advantageous co-operation among States and nations. Despite unfavourable conditions at the beginning of the 1980s, "Poland" -- let me quote the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs -- "one of the 51 founding members of the United Nations, continues to develop active co-operation in all sectors of this universally recognized international organization. We were in the past and continue to be present at all the negotiations concerning both disarmament and international economic co-operation ...". Let these words be read in this forum also as an expression of the great importance my country attaches to this disarmament negotiating body.

Once again I would like to devote my intervention to the question of chemical weapons, concentrating on some aspects of the ongoing process of negotiations. I think, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is at the stage of determining exceptionally important questions. This is perhaps the reason why the results of its work are not at present as visible as one would wish them to be. On the other hand, some problems under active consideration become more and more clear and more and more understood by those most concerned. There is no doubt that further continuation of bilateral and other informal consultations between the most interested delegations will contribute to the achievement of better results by this Conference.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

I would like to thank, as a number of other colleagues did earlier, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, as well as the Chairmen of the Working Groups who, in organizing numerous meetings and informal consultations, spare no efforts to achieve as much progress as possible. It seems at the moment that if the Committee could agree on the most important questions regarding the destruction of stockpiles and on the verification of this process, together with the procedure on submission of the initial and detailed plans for destruction, then the question of how and what to do with facilities would also be easier to solve. Let me say that an understanding on the questions mentioned above would make it possible to establish the main trunk of the future convention. The Polish delegation persistently works towards this end. Of extreme importance at the present stage would be the elaboration of guidelines for initial plans for destruction. Based on such agreed guidelines, the States signatories of the future convention who are in possession of chemical weapons could, after its entry into force, agree between themselves the detailed contents of such plans and submit them to the Consultative Committee. Any action in this respect at present would enhance an outlook on the whole process of destruction and verification. In other words, we consider that further work in this field will be both prospective and useful in all respects.

I would like to devote also a few lines to the question of the diversion of stocks. As is well known, different misunderstandings or lack of understanding concerning this problem have impeded progress of negotiations. We note therefore with satisfaction that a considerable degree of mutual understanding is emerging. It was especially encouraging to hear in this connection that the United States delegation would show flexibility to consider any proposals in this respect. All of us should have in mind that regardless of destruction or diversion, both these kinds of elimination of chemical weapons will have to be exactly reflected in future plans of destruction which the States parties concerned will have to submit at the mutually agreed time to the Consultative Committee. Thus the problem as such will be in full sight of all participants to the convention.

It is obvious that the diversion process will have to be adequately controlled.

Let me say also a few words on the forms of verification, particularly in the context of the United States draft convention contained in document CD/500. As I observed in my intervention on 15 March this year, no verification, however intensive and elaborate, can provide absolute certainty that no violation, even the least meaningful, occurs. The United States draft contains and proposes the widest and most demanding system of verification. Has it been justified by a real need or by an excessive care for the obligations to be fulfilled by future signatories of the convention? I shall try to make a short analysis of different requirements for the verification systems. Out of numerous requirements, the following could be mentioned:

- first, correspondence of the verification system with international law and with the provisions of law of the States parties concerned;
- secondly, correspondence of the verification system with the principle of the inviolability of security interests of the States parties concerned;
- thirdly, the intrusiveness of the verification system should be reduced to minimum and justified only by the nature and the dimensions of the scope;
- fourthly, the verification system should be reasonable in the sense of costs involved which are to be covered by the future signatories.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We are of the opinion that the most appropriate verification system is one which ensures in practice the effectiveness of verification on one hand and is acceptable to the interested parties on the other. It seems, in this connection, that the intrusiveness of the system proposed by the United States is incommensurable with real needs. Some proposed methods of verification overlap, although that does not double the control effects and does not increase the volume of information achieved. As an example I quote from the statement of Ambassador Fields on 12 July. What is proposed is "... systematic international on-site verification of chemical weapons, from the moment they were declared, to the moment they were destroyed ...". In a system thus proposed there should be: immediate verification of the initial declarations, verification of the declared stocks between the declarations and elimination, and the verification of the destruction of stocks. In fact, such a system could allegedly reduce to a minimum the eventual cases of violation of the convention but, on the other hand; it may bring distrust among States parties as to the real intentions for conducting at least some on-site inspections. What can be achieved as a result might be the reluctance on the part of certain States to participate in the convention. This result would be exactly the opposite of what I believe we want to achieve.

In another statement, namely that of 19 July, the distinguished Ambassador Fields tried to answer some criticisms and dispel some legitimate questions and doubts many delegations, including mine, have with regard to article X of the United States draft convention by saying, inter alia, that "... the private chemical industry of the United States is fully subject to the inspection provisions of article X ...". I must say, however, that our doubts have not been dispelled. They are further strengthened by the opinions of some United States experts; for example, in a serious work on the subject entitled "Arms Control and Inspection in American Law", an American author, Louis Henkin, suggests that the question of on-site inspections in case of private industry, and that would of course pertain also to chemical industry, may go even as far as to require amendment of the United States Constitution.

During the last plenary meetings we have listened with great attention also to several other statements devoted to chemical weapons. Some of them, containing interesting ideas, are subject to careful study by my delegation. Today, without going into details, I would like to dwell on two of these thoughts. We have no doubt that chemical weapons must be destroyed, and this should be done as soon as possible, without any artificial complications. Thus we sympathized very much with the idea voiced by the delegation of Australia that obsolete stocks of chemical weapons, which sooner or later will have to be disposed of, could be destroyed as an act of goodwill, before entry into force of the Convention.

Such a step could not only reduce the burden to be carried by verification but would also build up the confidence necessary for the early elaboration and implementation of the convention banning the chemical weapons.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We are also in favour of the practice suggested by Ambassador Wegener in his plea that we should take more care in preserving the results of the work accomplished during previous sessions. Indeed the proposals of the past should serve not only future research workers but also, and in the first place, the negotiators.

These are the questions I wanted to touch upon briefly in my statement today.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Polish People's Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to my country and to myself.

I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, I know that on 10 July, during my temporary absence from this Conference, the then acting head of the Australian delegation, Mr. Richard Rowe, assured you of the Australian delegation's full co-operation with your attempts to advance our work.

His statement could have been taken as having absolved me of the responsibility of making similar remarks on this, the first occasion of my speaking in a formal plenary meeting under your Presidency. But during a recent informal meeting you were kind enough to make some remarks to me on my return to this Conference, so may I now respond, in this formal meeting of the plenary, by saying that my Government recognizes your distinction in the foreign service of the Soviet Union. That distinction is reflected in your membership of the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union. We also have no doubt about the greatness of the people you are privileged to represent.

In my recent absence I was privileged to visit your country in the company of the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Bill Hayden, where as you know interesting and constructive talks were held with his colleague, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Andrei Gromyko.

It is sufficient for me to conclude these pleasantries by saying, Mr. President, that we depend on you in these crucial last weeks of July to do whatever you can to bring to conclusion, indeed to positive conclusion, the outstanding issues that are as yet unresolved with respect to the establishment of the required ad hoc subsidiary bodies of this Conference.

It is precisely one such issue that is the purpose of the statement I now wish to make. This is the question of a mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on a nuclear-test ban.

Two things are undoubtedly true. First, every delegation to this Conference recognizes the unqualified importance of action to bring about an end to nuclear testing. Second, it is thus all the more curious and puzzling, if not plainly incredible that, given that common goal, we are still without a mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on this vital question -- and we have been considering this for six months.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

What explanation can be given for this apparent contradiction?

What does it mean in terms of our will to reach agreement with each other when we all recognize that this is the only course open to a Conference which works on the basis of consensus, especially when it is faced with a subject as important as that of working towards the end of nuclear testing?

The position of the Australian Government on this matter is absolutely clear and is known to all.

We want to see the early negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban which would outlaw all nuclear testing by all States in all environments and for all time.

We want this because we know and believe that such a test ban would play a significant role in efforts designed to bring about an end to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and to prevent the horizontal proliferation of such weapons.

In making our policy clear we have emphasized that for such a treaty to be effective it would have to be fully verifiable. No one can escape this fact.

We have also made it clear that we do not have in mind a treaty of limited scope, that is, a treaty which would cover only the problem of nuclear weapons testing. We have in mind a treaty that would end all nuclear tests.

We recognize that not all delegations in this Conference share our views. Some have proposed an approach which would be restricted only to the prevention of the testing of nuclear weapons.

Equally, a number of delegations have talked in terms of the need to begin negotiations immediately without first addressing the question of verification and, in some other ways, without making precisely clear what those negotiations would achieve or how, or if, they could be started; and, in a Conference which operates under consensus, the question of if they could be started is of critical importance.

I said that not all delegations share the view of the Australian delegation on this matter. Some of those differing views are held by countries with which Australia in fact has particularly close relationships. But those differences of view or emphasis between ourselves and our close friends have not been permitted to divert us from the common purpose of working towards the end of nuclear testing.

I want to give the Conference an example of this point. It is a concrete example.

Last week the annual meeting of the ANZUS Council took place in Wellington, New Zealand. ANZUS is the treaty relationship which binds Australia, New Zealand and the United States together in a spirit of mutual co-operation. On the question of an end to nuclear testing the ANZUS Treaty partners agreed last week as follows: "They reaffirmed the commitment of their Governments to work towards the goal of a comprehensive and fully verifiable nuclear test ban treaty".

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The ANZUS Council then turned its attention directly to the work in this Conference. Council Members "expressed satisfaction that the western group of countries in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had agreed on a draft mandate for the Nuclear Test Ban ad hoc Committee. They urged the Conference to move promptly to re-establish an ad hoc Committee under this mandate".

This goal was also given practical expression in the terms of resolution 38/63 adopted last year by the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. That resolution was widely supported. Of the CTB resolutions last year, it alone attracted no negative votes, and that is itself significant in a Conference that works under the rule of consensus.

We have sought to translate this goal and this commitment into a practical and workable mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body at this Conference.

That draft mandate has been agreed to by nine countries. In addition to Australia, those countries, member States of this Conference, are Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and it is my privilege now, on behalf of these nine countries, to table the draft mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on item 1 of the agenda of the Conference contained in document CD/521.

Our purpose in tabling this draft mandate is to facilitate what we hope will be a conclusive stage of consultation between delegations on a mandate which will lead to the establishment of this important ad hoc subsidiary body.

I believe that you, as President of the Conference for the month of July, share our determination to reach a constructive decision on this subject.

All members of the Conference know that the question of a mandate for a subsidiary body under item 1 has been under active consultation since the end of February.

On 3 April the Group of 21 sought approval for another form of mandate. Consensus was not able to be given to that draft at that stage.

Subsequently, under the Presidency of the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, a helpful informal paper was drawn up listing various proposals and sources of ideas for this mandate. Consultations continued on those various approaches.

On 21 June, that is, over one month ago, a group of western countries passed to other groups, informally for their consideration, the draft mandate which is embodied in the Conference document CD/521 that I have now tabled.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Consultations took place during the last month but it has regrettably proved to be the case that consensus on that western draft was not able to be offered by other groups.

At our last plenary meeting on 19 July, the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, the distinguished Ambassador of Algeria, tabled a revised draft mandate prepared by that Group and you suggested, Mr. President, that a decision on that draft might be taken today.

It is the view of the group of countries for which I am presently speaking that consultations should continue and to that end I would like to make a few remarks about the draft mandate I have just tabled. In doing so I will come straight to the point of the three issues which have been those principally in contention between the various groups.

First there is the issue of negotiations. Our purpose is to bring a comprehensive test ban treaty into existence. Our action in submitting a draft mandate for a subsidiary body of this Conference has no other meaning than to give expression to that purpose. Our draft mandate recognizes the reality that the only practical step which can be taken is that stated in our draft mandate. It states that this Conference should conduct a "substantive examination" of the main issues which are involved "with a view to the negotiation of a treaty". These are the issues of scope and verification, and such an examination is specifically provided for in our draft mandate.

Second, the issue of scope. Our purpose is a treaty which would end all nuclear testing, not just testing of nuclear weapons, although naturally such testing is a matter of deep concern to us all. In our view, then, our "substantive examination" of the issues which are involved in the negotiation of a treaty must continue to include the issue of scope.

Third, a CTB which did not contain adequate provision for compliance and verification would be an illusory document and one which I think none of us would want to see come into existence and few of us would be prepared to adhere to. Accordingly, our draft mandate also contains a provision for the "substantive examination" of the issues of verification and compliance. Our draft mandate would also bring about an examination of the mechanisms required to be established for an effective verification system. These include an international seismic monitoring network.

It is sometimes said that a CTB cannot be verified. Let us test that contention. It is sometimes charged that those who in reality do not want a CTB hide behind the issue of verification. Let us test that claim.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

We urge a constructive approach towards the adoption of this mandate. There is no ground for doubt about its purpose or its practicality.

I raised earlier the question of how can it be possible that we are agreed about this goal and yet we are not able to get on with the practical work leading towards the achievement of it?

As I understand it, the main argument against our draft mandate is that it is not absolute enough, that it does not provide for the immediate achievement of negotiations. I must say that while that argument has all of the appeal that attaches to any absolute assertion, it has the great deficiency of both ignoring contemporary realities and of shunning the inevitable implication of the process of consensus -- compromise.

What is worse, such a position, if persisted with, will lead to no work being done on this issue in 1984. We do not believe that it would be responsible for this Conference to take such a decision. We ask how can those who state that a comprehensive test ban is their goal refuse a decision which is in fact the practical step towards that goal?

We are therefore appealing to other delegations in this Conference. We ask that our draft mandate be understood in the clear and practical light in which I have described it. We ask that a spirit of compromise prevail -- the spirit of which is required from a body which operates under the rule of consensus.

Finally, as is well known to this Conference, the making of our draft mandate itself involved very considerable compromise, and I want to emphasize that compromise, on the part of the States which are not sponsoring it.

This compromise was not easily won and it took time to achieve. But it has been achieved and it represents real sincere and substantial progress.

We should not let that progress fall away and we appeal to those delegations, and I believe that their number is not that large, to those who have previously had reservations about this approach. We ask them to reconsider those reservations and to join in consensus on this draft mandate.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to my country, to the people of the Soviet Union and to myself.

I now give the floor to the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Harald Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Thank you, Comrade President.

I wish to introduce two Working Papers submitted by a group of Socialist States on agenda items 1 and 2 respectively, and I would like to make the following observations.

First, document CD/522 before you contains a draft mandate for a Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The draft is based on the proposals formulated in document CD/434, subparagraph 5.1, of 7 February 1984. The text put forward today takes into account both the organizational decisions which the Conference has taken in the meantime, and the course of events since February. I would like to point to one change in particular: instead of "to negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests" the draft submitted today reads "to carry out practical negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty". This wording has been chosen as a result of consultations with many delegations. It is our hope that it may facilitate the task of arriving at an appropriate mandate. By presenting this Working Paper, the sponsors reiterate their demands that negotiations should be started without delay on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Many delegations have argued this point in a convincing fashion. I need not repeat all the reasons for such negotiations and why there has not been any progress so far. Having listened very carefully to the statement just made by Ambassador Butler, my question is simply how can one be in favour of such a treaty and oppose negotiations?

I want the Conference to know that the Group of Socialist States is also prepared to agree to the mandate proposed by the Group of 21 in document CD/520. Should that text meet with the approval of the Conference we would not ask for a decision on our document CD/522 in a spirit of compromise.

Second, document CD/523 before you contains a draft mandate in regard to agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of a nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". That text too is based on document CD/434, subparagraph 5.2. It has been updated in terms of organizational matters and time-frame. It contains another modification to which I wish to draw your attention. The words used to read "negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"; the draft submitted today says "negotiations to begin the elaboration of practical measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament". This formulation reflects very deeply the step-by-step approach suggested by our Group. We believe that it could pave the way for the Conference to tackle item 2 of the agenda.

Like the overwhelming majority of delegations, we feel it is no longer tolerable that the Conference is hampered in its efforts to take direct measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. I would like to request you, Comrade President, to bring about an expeditious decision of the Conference with respect to the two draft mandates I referred to above. The reason why we ask for an expeditious decision is quite simple: what can be gained by further deferring decisions on mandates at a time when the end of the session is already approaching? It is a sad fact that some delegations have so far delayed the adoption of mandates in regard to the issues of highest priority on our agenda. There can be absolutely no doubt about it, if the establishment of Committees with relevant mandates is to serve any purpose at all, decisions must be taken very soon.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor apart from the Soviet delegation, which has expressed such a wish? If not, I should like to make the following statement in my capacity as the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to dwell today on a question which seems to be raised most often at plenary meetings of the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament. This is the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. I think, however, that all will agree that in the broad range of problems concerned with the limitation of the arms race, the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons does not have the highest priority and is not the most important. Like the majority of delegations, and like the overwhelming part of the world community, we regard the prevention of nuclear war as the primary issue of contemporary world policy. At the same time, chemical disarmament can play an important positive role in resolving the tasks connected with the limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

The majority of those who have spoken on the subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons, while noting some progress in the negotiations on this question, have also expressed dissatisfaction with their pace and character.

We share this feeling. On the one hand, the negotiations are continuing and the Soviet delegation recognizes the efforts of, and personal interest in the work taken by, the Chairman of the Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus and his staff. On the other hand, however, these negotiations are still very far from the ultimate goal. Perhaps even further from that goal than they were, let us say, a year and a half ago.

What are the reasons for this state of affairs in our work on the prohibition of chemical weapons?

There are certainly many. In our opinion, however, there are two main reasons. We have already had an opportunity to point out that the United States draft convention, even before it saw the light of day, hampered the negotiations. It is a well-known fact that in February, March and April of this year, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee was almost fatally blocked. It is true that at that time delegations of one group of countries did not manifest any concern over that situation and did not call for any acceleration in the Committee's work. If only the matter had been confined to that! When the United States of America presented its draft convention in April, it became clear that it was not making a constructive contribution to the work already done at Geneva, and that it was creating a number of major insoluble problems which had not existed before. However much the United States delegation now tries to paint this draft in the most radiant colours, the main point is that it does not promote mutual understanding but, on the contrary, deepens the differences between the partners in the negotiations and, on a number of questions, particularly with regard to monitoring, sets the negotiations back. We have, of course, listened carefully to the clarifications given by the Head of the United States delegation, Ambassador Fields, concerning the individual sections of the United States draft, but that has in no way changed our general evaluation of this document. We shall talk about this in greater detail in one of our subsequent statements.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Another reason for the lack of progress and even regression is to be found in the fact that several delegations have, in our opinion, adopted a faulty approach. They have begun to complicate the talks, to burden them by constantly introducing new issues whose absence would in no way affect the chemical weapons ban, cause it to lose its comprehensive character or make it less effective. The trouble is that these issues in turn give rise to new questions and, as a Russian proverb states, the deeper one goes into the woods, the more firewood there is. It is becoming increasingly difficult for delegations to find a common language; secondary and tertiary questions push the main issues into the background and sometimes no way out of this situation can be seen. It is to be hoped that this is not being done deliberately, but that does not change the results.

We are resolutely against such an approach. Of course, the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, taking into account the object of the ban and its specific character, will inevitably be a complex international document. However, at the same time, it must not be forgotten that we are conducting political negotiations aimed at the solution of knotty problems which would predetermine the successful functioning of the convention. In any event, we shall not succeed in forcing all possible situations connected with the operation of the convention into a Procrustean bed, since life is considerably more diverse than any human fantasy. We are in favour of concentrating attention on the main elements — on the rules, not on the exceptions. It is precisely for this reason that international agreements on disarmament, including the convention being prepared by us, provide for the establishment of a consultative committee to be entrusted with the function of examining all situations that may arise, whether they can be foreseen or not. That is why we also wish to put forward in our statement today some general considerations concerning the activity of this very important machinery of the future convention.

Before touching on the specific content of our considerations, I should like by way of an example to refer to a few questions whose consideration and solution, it seems to us, could be entrusted to the consultative committee. They are primarily questions which are clearly not ripe for solution at the present time. For example, the proposal put forward by one or two delegations concerning the inclusion in the basic prohibition contained in the future convention of an undertaking by States "not to conduct other activities in preparation for the use of chemical weapons". The participants in the negotiations have a more or less clear idea of the basic obligations which they would accept under the convention: not to produce chemical weapons, to destroy stocks, etc. But what are the other activities which they should not conduct? There is no clear reply to this. It is not possible to separate, let us say, activities in preparation for the use of chemical weapons from activities relating to the preparation of armed forces as a whole. On this question, it is clear that no progress has been made towards reaching agreement.

Is it not better to proceed from the basis that the consultative committee consisting of all parties to the convention, as a forum for discussing all questions connected with the implementation of and compliance with the convention, might resolve any specific problem, including that to which reference has just been made, as soon as it acquired specific form, of course.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Yet another example. It has been proposed -- by the delegation of the United States of America -- to prohibit in the future convention some almost mysterious chemical, specially designed to intensify the effects of the use of chemical weapons. After persistent requests to clarify everything involved, it was stated that the matter concerns substances capable of acting as solvents in chemical weapons or as thickening agents, of changing the viscosity of chemicals or their local stability, of increasing their capacity to penetrate the human skin or the charcoal filter of a gas mask, etc. Even from this list -- and it can, of course, be expanded -- it is clear that the matter does not concern a particular specific chemical, but a great number of chemicals. It is true that, in this connection, we have not been given the name of a single chemical. It is proposed, consequently, that substances unknown to anyone should not be developed, produced or stockpiled and that they should be destroyed. Can this be serious? Here, too, if a genuine need to resolve the above-mentioned question arose, the consultative committee would be able to take the appropriate steps.

In a word, we attach very great importance to the consultative committee and consider that it and its subsidiary organs should be assigned the task of the solution in practice of the broadest possible group of questions connected with the practical implementation of and compliance with the convention.

We proceed from the basis that the consultative committee, if reference is made to it as a collective body, would receive, have custody of and distribute information furnished by States parties in accordance with the requirements of the convention, would provide to States parties at their request assistance in the conduct of consultations among them, would work out recommendations and individual technical questions, etc.

It would also have to perform a considerable number of responsible functions with regard to the implementation and co-ordination of all forms of verification. In particular, we consider it important that the consultative committee should work out standardized verification methods and verify reports of cases involving the use of chemical weapons. The convention must also include a clear provision under which the consultative committee would determine the procedure and periods for carrying out verifications at facilities for the destruction of stocks and at facilities for the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes. It would take into account the size and characteristics of the stocks, data on the destruction facilities and on the permitted production, and a great deal more.

A most important task under the future convention will be the proper organization of the working interaction between international and national monitoring bodies. They should complement one another and assist one another, for otherwise, unless one is under the illusion of "constantly valid invitations", monitoring might prove to be imperfect. In this regard, too, it is clear that the consultative committee might have an outstanding role to play. It will have to concern itself even with such matters as the special training of national staff for carrying out inspections, the sealing of chemical weapons production facilities, the handling of seals, etc.

One would hope that these considerations will facilitate and speed up the preparation of the section of the future convention devoted to the consultative committee.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In connection with the consultative committee, I should like to draw attention to a matter of primary importance -- the composition of its main subsidiary organ, the executive council. We propose that this council should consist of 15 members, representatives of States parties to the convention, 10 of whom would be elected by the consultative committee on the principle of a two-year term for each party, five members being replaced each year; the remaining five seats would be set aside for the permanent members of the Security Council parties to the convention.

This machinery should be seen primarily as an earnest of the effectiveness of the future convention, ensuring compliance with the principle of not endangering the security of any of the parties.

A very important problem is the elaboration of a procedure, acceptable to all the States parties to the future convention, for the adoption by the consultative committee and its subsidiary organ of decisions relating to substantive questions. Many far-reaching proposals of every kind have been submitted on this subject, but no reply has yet been forthcoming. This is not surprising, since the question really is complex. Yet, in our opinion there is a solution -- as in many other questions which have arisen in the process of elaborating a convention on chemical weapons, it lies in a realistic view of matters. We proceed from the basis that the best means of adopting decisions is by consensus. However, if it is not possible to reach a consensus within strictly stipulated periods, reckoned in some cases in days and in others in hours, then, in our opinion, there is only one practical -- I repeat, practical -- possibility: to bring to the notice of the party or parties the individual views on a given question of the members of the consultative committee or the executive council. The opinions of States, set out in the manner established by international law, would together constitute for many States a serious political factor which it would not be possible to ignore. As a last resort, it would always be possible to use other procedures, which would be provided for in the convention.

Those are some considerations which the Soviet delegation would like to put forward in connection with the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? That does not appear to be the case, and therefore I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and convene in a few minutes' time an informal meeting of the Conference as indicated before the opening of today's plenary meeting. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1.20 p.m. and reconvened at 4.05 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The 275th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

In accordance with the request of the Group of 21, I now invite the Conference to take a decision on the draft mandate for a subsidiary body on agenda item 3 entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". This draft mandate is contained in document CD/515. Is there any objection to the adoption of this document? I give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, I am speaking on behalf of a number of countries from the Western Group in this Conference. I would first like to voice my regret that at a time when consultations on this subject have not been finalized, the draft mandate contained in document CD/515 is put up for decision-making in a formal meeting of our Conference; but since this is so, and responding to your appeal for comments, I would like to say the following: At this juncture it has not been possible to rally all delegations of the Group for which I speak behind this particular draft. This, however, does not mean that any of the delegations that are members of the Group would underestimate the pivotal significance of the subject and it is the earnest request of the Group that consultations on the subject be carried on in view of final and more positive results.

In voicing my regret that I have to communicate this message to you, I would like, as I have done previously in an informal meeting, to pay tribute to Ambassador Dubey of India and his colleagues who have, in a notable effort, been helpful in devising language which has gone a long way towards covering the concerns of a number of delegations within the Group.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, and I give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, now that the Conference has been invited to take a decision on document CD/515 concerning the draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21 for an ad hoc committee on item 3 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to make some remarks as Co-ordinator of that Group.

The position of the Group of 21 on the issue of the prevention of nuclear war is well known. It is set forth, inter alia, in document CD/4341. It has been reaffirmed many times by the delegations belonging to our Group.

I therefore do not intend to examine in detail once again the reasons underlying our desire to see the Conference on Disarmament fulfil its responsibilities on this issue and begin negotiations on appropriate and concrete measures to prevent nuclear war. I should only like to stress once again the high priority and urgency which the Group of 21 ascribes to the question of the prevention of nuclear war.

Our position is based on the undeniable fact that the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat of destruction by nuclear war, which I repeat once again, would be fatal for the belligerents as well as the non-belligerents.

Hence the vital interest which the Group of 21 bears in the negotiation of appropriate and practical measures to prevent nuclear war.

The Group of 21 is convinced that the most effective means of preventing nuclear war is the total elimination of nuclear weapons, a goal to which it remains firmly dedicated. However, until this objective is achieved, it is urgently necessary to take concrete measures to prevent nuclear war.

Mr. President, your predecessors undertook a series of informal consultations in order to reach a consensus which would enable the Conference to begin negotiations on this agenda item in an ad hoc committee. You, yourself, since taking the Presidency of our Conference, have deployed efforts to the same end. It must unfortunately be acknowledged that these consultations have not been successful. Throughout the consultation process, the Group of 21 has shown great flexibility on this question. It has proposed a number of variants of a mandate in order to overcome difficulties

(Mr. Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

encountered by delegations. The Group of 21 has also given serious and responsible consideration to all proposals for a mandate submitted by the other groups.

Unfortunately, neither the flexibility shown by the Group of 21, nor the concessions that it has had to agree to in order to make an agreement on this question possible, have led to a consensus. This lack of results at a time when the end of this session is only a few weeks away must be a source of very serious concern to the Group of 21.

This has led us to ask the Conference to take a decision on this issue to which, need I repeat, we attach the greatest importance. We believe that it is time the Conference took a responsible decision in keeping both with the vital importance of the issue and with the urgent need to dispel the risk of nuclear war.

That is why the Group of 21 has submitted the draft mandate contained in document CD/515. That draft was carefully prepared taking into account the concerns of other groups. It has the advantage of making it possible to consider all the proposals relating to item 3 of the Conference's agenda.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Algeria, and give the floor to the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Mr. KONSTANTINOV (Bulgaria): Thank you, Comrade President. As co-ordinator of the Socialist Group on the item under discussion today, I would have to make a few remarks. First of all, I should like once again to reiterate the conviction of the socialist countries that in the conditions of growing threat of nuclear war the overwhelming majority of countries in the world regard the elimination of this threat as the top political priority. This has been confirmed with resolve by the General Assembly at its last session. In such conditions, the Conference on Disarmament is in a unique position to, and should, contribute in the elaboration of appropriate and practical measures to prevent nuclear war.

In this regard the socialist countries substantiated their position by concrete and detailed working documents and a laudable degree of flexibility in the search for a mutually acceptable mandate.

I should further say that we cannot afford, in the context of an aggravated international situation, to let the issue of prevention of nuclear war be used by some as a convenient opportunity for marking time while their nuclear **rearmament** programmes continue unabated.

I would like to recall something that happened at the end of the first part of this year's session, and I quote from the statement of the distinguished representative of India. "Unless we are able to take a decision within the very first week after the resumption of the session of the Conference, there will just not be enough time between then and the preparation of the Report of the Conference for conducting a really thorough discussion from all angles on the subject, which has been long overdue." The subject in question is item 3. I will not comment, because this statement needs no comment. This statement was valid at that time, and today, at the end of the month of July, is even more justified.

It is very regrettable therefore that the western delegations have once again blocked the possibility of taking a reasonable decision on a vital question. As to the document before us, CD/515, the socialist countries consider that they could support such a mandate although they regard it as a minimum mandate for a group or ad hoc committee which would deal with the very important problem of prevention of nuclear war.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and give the floor to the representative of China.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, as an independent party, the Chinese delegation would also like to say a few words about this issue.

Prevention of nuclear war is a question of universal concern of the people of the world and has always been a priority item on our agenda. Since the beginning of the spring part of our session this year, delegations have engaged in frequent consultations and worked hard for the establishment of the relevant subsidiary bodies. In the process, the Group of 21 has demonstrated a particularly commendable positive attitude, of which the two statements made by the distinguished Ambassador of India are ample demonstrations. The draft mandate proposed on 11 July by the Group (CD/515) once again shows their flexibility and spirit of accommodation. It is not difficult to see that the mandate is very general and takes into account the views of all sides. We have noted that the Group of Western Countries has also made efforts and indicated that it would present its draft. Unfortunately, we have not seen it so far.

The Chinese delegation has always attached great importance to the prevention of nuclear war and advocated establishing the relevant subsidiary body. We believe that the mandate proposed by the Group of 21 is reasonable and constructive, and therefore we support it. It should be able to serve as a basis for agreement. We still hope that other parties will also show the necessary spirit of co-operation and accommodation and consider it in a favourable manner, so that the Conference will be able to establish an ad hoc committee on the prevention of nuclear war without further delay.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of China and give the floor to the representative of Belgium.

Mr. NOIRFALISSE (Belgium) (translated from French): I too should like to express regret today, above all because we are not in a position to finalize an agreement on the text on a mandate for a committee on the prevention of nuclear war. You must know that my delegation is all the more regretful in that it played an active part in efforts to find a universally acceptable solution. I think that at this point it may be said that the flexibility, availability and open-mindedness of several delegations, in particular those of the Group of 21 and especially of its spokesman for matters relating to the prevention of nuclear war, Ambassador Dubey, as well as the spokesman of the Group of 21 for the month of July, should be highlighted, not retrospectively but because I believe they constitute a warrant of success for the future. We remain confident that sooner or later the Conference on Disarmament will be able to deal systematically in a committee with the matters concerning the prevention of nuclear war and all related issues.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Belgium. If no one else wishes to take the floor, I should like to make the following statement. In view of the statements just made, I must, as President, announce that at present there is no consensus on the adoption of the draft mandate contained in document CD/515.

I now invite the Conference to take a decision on the draft mandate for a subsidiary body on agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban", submitted by the Group of 21 in document CD/520. I give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, I apologize for going back very slightly, before dealing with the agenda item you have mentioned, in order to make a very short statement on behalf of the Group of 21 to express our feelings at the lack of consensus which you have just announced. I am making the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21.

"When submitting a draft mandate which takes into account concerns of other groups and delegations, the Group of 21 was motivated solely by the desire to smooth the way for a consensus which would have made it possible to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3.

We must, unfortunately, note that this is not the case, and it is with deep regret that we now take note of the lack of consensus, at least for the time being, on this issue.

Once again, the Conference is being prevented from fulfilling its mandate as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Clearly, this cannot but cause us concern and deep disappointment.

While expressing the hope that the delegations which were unable to accept the terms of this mandate will revise their position, the Group of 21, which has displayed great flexibility throughout the consultations, reiterates its entire availability in the search for a consensus on this issue.

The Group of 21 has constantly stressed the importance and urgency of the issue of the prevention of nuclear war, and remains convinced that the creation of an ad hoc committee with a suitable mandate is the best means of enabling the Conference to undertake negotiations on appropriate and concrete measures to dispel the danger of nuclear war."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Algeria, and I now go on to document CD/520, which we considered this morning at the informal meeting. Is there any objection to the adoption of this document as the mandate for a subsidiary body of the Conference on agenda item 1? I give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, at the plenary meeting on 19 July the Group of 21 asked for a decision to be taken, as you have just recalled, on the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1 which was circulated in document CD/520.

In view of the submission this morning of two other drafts on this same item, and of the statements which we heard this morning, the Group of 21, in a further display of flexibility, is prepared to accept that the Conference should postpone taking a decision on document CD/520 until the next plenary meeting, in order to allow for possible consultations, in the understanding that this is the last postponement, having regard to the urgent nature of such a decision. The Group of 21 also notes with satisfaction the willingness of the Group of Socialist States not to insist on the mandate contained in document CD/522, if the draft contained in document CD/520 is adopted by the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Algeria and give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Thank you very much, Mr. President. I have sought the floor in order to express immediately the gratitude that is felt by my delegation, and I believe I can say the same on behalf of the other eight delegations for which I am spokesman this morning. We did appeal for further time for consultations, and our distinguished colleague from Algeria has agreed to that.

I want also to record that my delegation certainly took note of your very wise suggestion in the informal meeting that we should enter into further, I think you said, multilateral and bilateral, consultations on this issue and I am sure that certainly my delegations and those others for whom I spoke this morning will be very happy to enter into that process of consultations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Australia, and give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): I can be very brief. With some hesitation I have to confess that nevertheless our Group will be ready to support the idea to have a postponement, as far as the mandate relating to item 1 is concerned, until next Thursday, but I would like to underline our hope that this will be the last date.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I shall therefore announce that the consideration of the mandates submitted by various delegations on agenda item 1 will be postponed until Thursday, when the corresponding decisions will be taken. I hope the delegations concerned will have fruitful consultations. If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I now intend to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 July at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.