

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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19 July 1984
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 July 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. V.L. Issraelyan

(Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD-ROUIS

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J. CARSALES

Mr. R.R. HUBER

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. K. STANKOV

Mr. N. MIKHAILOV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U HLA MYINT

U PE THEIN TIN

Canada:

Mr. G.B. SKINNER

Mr. R.G. SUTHERLAND

Mr. R. VANIER

Mr. G.K. VACHON

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG

Ms. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. LU MINGJUN

Mr. LIN CHENG

Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Mr. YANG MINGLIANG

Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA

Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M. BADR
Ms. W. BASSIM
Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia:France:

Mr. G. MONTASSIER
Mr. H. RENIE
Mr. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. M. GERDTS

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. I.M. DAMANIK
Mr. I. WIRANATAATMADJA

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI
Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. M. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. T. ISHIGURI
Mr. K. TANAKA

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. S. GONZALEZ y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH
Mr. F.O. ADESHIDA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS
Mr. J. NORDENFELT
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
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United Kingdom: Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mr. J.F. GORDON
Mr. G.H. COOPER
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America: Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Mr. H.W. DAVIDSON
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. A. HOROWITZ
Mr. A. LIEBOWITZ
Mr. M.G. MacDONALD
Mr. J.J. TIERNEY
Mr. J.E. McATEER
Ms. M. WINSTON

Venezuela:

Yugoslavia: Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire: Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of
the Conference on Disarmament: Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The 274th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference today continues the consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As you know, at our last plenary meeting I informed the Conference that today we would have to consider and take a decision on the draft mandate for the ad hoc committee on agenda item 3, contained in document CD/515, submitted by the representative of India on behalf of the Group of 21. As you will recall, after consultations the representative of India informed me at the beginning of this week that the Group of 21 agreed to defer until today's meeting the consideration and adoption of a decision on the draft mandate, which was originally to have been considered at our last plenary meeting on Tuesday. I therefore intend to invite the Conference to take a decision on document CD/515 after my list of speakers for this plenary meeting is concluded.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America. I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Alessi.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy): Mr. President, last April, in Moscow, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and Italy agreed on the fundamental importance, for international peace and security, of pursuing efforts aimed at achieving agreements on the limitation and the elimination of armaments; they also agreed on the fundamental importance of creating conditions of mutual confidence and security capable of conducing in a concrete way to the strengthening of international stability and to the reduction of the risk of war.

You, Mr. President, represent a great nation and a great Power which, in the field of peace and security as well as in other fields, has a primary role and a particular responsibility. You represent it with the talent of an experienced diplomat and the rich humanity of a man of culture. I wish to pay tribute to such qualities, which constitute for us all a guarantee of progress in our work.

I wish also to extend to Mrs. Theorin and to Ambassador Ekéus, who preceded you in the Chair, the deep appreciation of my delegation for their relentless efforts to guide and foster our activities during the month of June.

In the domain of arms control in outer space, encouraging news reaches us from outside. I refer to reports of the United States acceptance without preconditions of a Soviet call for talks on preventing an arms race in outer space to be held in Vienna. We consider this development a very positive one and hope that a final agreement can be worked out as soon as possible.

Bilateral talks between the two major space Powers seem indispensable in order to advance the task of preventing an arms race in outer space. It is also legitimate to hope that such talks may facilitate parallel progress on other issues of fundamental concern, in particular nuclear disarmament. The Italian Government made known its position in this regard on 3 July, wishing that the Vienna talks "may mark a more constructive phase of international relations leading to a gradual resumption of a dialogue on issues relating to arms control and disarmament".

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The prospects of bilateral talks on space issues should reverberate positively on the Conference on Disarmament. In the contrary case, a continuing deadlock on item 5 of our agenda would constitute an ever more striking and unjustifiable contrast.

In addressing this Conference on 10 July, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, stated: "I regard the bilateral process aimed at achieving disarmament as complementary to the main process at the multilateral level. It is therefore important that the efforts of this Conference should be maintained and increased".

We share this view: bilateral and multilateral consideration of these issues should complement each other.

It is reasonable and indeed necessary that the United States and the Soviet Union discuss bilaterally weaponry that only they possess. This obviously should not obscure the magnitude of the interest that all States have in the solution of these problems. Space technology is within the reach of a growing number of countries; an even larger number of countries will benefit, for their own progress, from the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. The international community is anxious and watchful. We have no alternative but to intensify our efforts.

I do not wish to raise **today** matters of procedure. I am confident that with your recognized ability and experience, Mr. President, you will bring to a positive conclusion the two years of discussions on the creation of a subsidiary body on item 5. The Conference cannot afford to fail again.

I would like to use this plenary session to continue our discussion on substance: in March 1982, my delegation put forward a number of considerations on issues relating to a ban on ASAT systems; we tried to develop such considerations on 21 July 1983; on 27 March 1984 we aired further thoughts against the background of existing international legal instruments and the need to review and assess their implications. The main thrust of those statements was to focus attention on the question of ensuring the immunity of satellites, by prohibiting attacks or activities directed against them.

Those statements provide the necessary terms of reference for today's statement which is devoted to some collateral measures. On the basis of our previous discussions I would venture to say that four main threats in and from outer space could be identified:

- (a) physical attack with conventional or nuclear explosives;
- (b) collision or physical tampering with manoeuvred spacecraft; hypervelocity projectiles;
- (c) directed-energy weapons, in particular lasers;
- (d) interference with electromagnetic communication systems in space.

There are in addition technologies and systems designed for purposes other than ASAT, which can give rise to capabilities inherently useful for ASAT purposes.

Discriminating among such systems and technologies, identifying which ones can be constrained or prohibited, and working out reliable procedures for verification, constitute formidable tasks.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

We see, therefore, wisdom in considering the adoption, prior to or parallel with more incisive measures of arms control, of collateral steps that would be aimed at increasing confidence, at avoiding provocative or ambiguous actions in space and at helping to ease the way for disarmament negotiations proper.

One such step has been evoked many a time in the past, lately by the distinguished representative of France on 12 June: it would consist in the strengthening and expansion of the 1974 United Nations Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.

I would like to be more specific on this point: damage to spacecraft by co-orbital approach with a manoeuvred object at orbital velocity (about 8 Km/sec or less) which uses techniques which bear a general resemblance to the rendezvous and docking operations; these latter operations are routinely conducted by some nations and are likely to become more and more important in the peaceful exploitation of outer space. The two kinds of operations can perhaps be distinguished by noting that rendezvous requires a very long time (several orbits) and a very small relative velocity (e.g. a few cm/sec); therefore in the final phase the orbital elements of the two objects would have to be almost equal. The instrumental techniques required in the two cases, however, (infrared sensors, radars or lasers) would be similar and some ambiguity may arise.

On the other hand, collision between spacecraft, especially in the geosynchronous orbit, are a possibility and there is a safety problem for civilian operations as well.

Steps can be taken to make space more secure by agreeing on minimum separation distances for satellites in orbit or in transit to orbit (including those belonging to the same owner). An official statement would be required, beforehand, whenever such a regulation would have to be suspended for justified reasons.

Another positive step would be the prompt communication to an international authority of the full orbital elements of every object launched into space and a more detailed description of its mission on the basis of a standardized reporting instrument. This would involve a modification of the 1974 United Nations Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. At present, parties to that Convention are free to provide whatever kind of information they wish on their launches, and in the format they wish. The result is that such information is too sketchy and difficult to compare.

Co-operative measures to permit ready verification of orbit and general function could also be envisaged on the basis of article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, which calls for prior consultations on activities that would "cause potentially harmful interference with the activities of other States Parties".

The 1974 Registration Convention provides also, at least in part, a basis for the identification of interest in a space object. The elaboration of a detailed set of principles or circumstances which would identify a space object as one covered by a future arms control agreement would also be of primary importance.

The question of ownership, control, or other elements of interest in and responsibility for a space object is a delicate question to be solved with priority in the appropriate forum, in particular at a time when joint space ventures, including commercial ventures, are becoming more and more numerous.

I have tried today to put forward some ideas that we consider relevant for a better understanding of the complexity of the subject-matter.

The establishment of a subsidiary body remains of the utmost importance and urgency in order to deal with the identification of those aspects which are related to arms control and disarmament and provide a possibility of concrete negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words addressed to my country and to myself.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, a few days ago, the Minister of State in the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Alois Mertes, took a cue from your welcome presence at the helm of our Conference to speak about the promising perspectives that characterize the relationship between our two countries. I am pleased to underwrite his remarks in full. I would also like to add a personal element, paying tribute to the great qualities which you bring to our work. My delegation is impressed to see how you put your long experience and considerable diplomatic skills to work in order to assure a business-like and constructive advance of our proceedings. I would also like to stress the exemplary nature of your manifold consultations with delegations and groups of delegations, testifying to your wish to take full account of all views of the representatives of sovereign nations united in this room. My delegation is confident that a good number of problems that presently beset our work will admit of solution before your presidency comes to its prescribed end.

The main purpose of my intervention today is to introduce Working Paper CD/518 that records the results of the recent Workshop on the Verification of the Destruction of Stocks of Chemical Weapons organized by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in Münster, Lower Saxony. The Workshop, to which member and observer delegations of the Conference on Disarmament were invited was intended to acquaint these delegations with the procedures used by one of the few existing destruction facilities of chemical weapons, and to provide a forum for discussion of all aspects relating to the destruction of such weaponry. The destruction facility in Münster undertakes to eliminate old stocks of chemical weapons that were found after World Wars I and II. The Federal Government had chosen to devote its 1984 Workshop to the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons because it holds the view that the destruction of stocks deserves a particularly high priority in the negotiations on a future chemical-weapons ban. The current threat emanates in the first instance from existing chemical weapons stockpiles. Furthermore, the Federal Government considers the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks to be a key problem of the entire verification complex of a future chemical weapons convention. If it proves possible to reach agreement on the verification issue, it should also be possible to agree on the necessary inspections for the other areas of the convention.

The Federal Government draws the following conclusions from the Workshop in Münster:

Firstly, the requirement of effective verification of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons can be met only with a monitoring system operating on a continuous basis;

Secondly, a continuous monitoring system should comprise a mutually complementary combination of checks by inspectors and monitoring by tamper-proof measuring devices;

Thirdly, the integration of technical monitoring devices should aim at reducing the number of inspectors required to be present at all times, thus diminishing the degree of intrusiveness that inspections can imply;

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Fourthly, at the present juncture, all technological prerequisites exist to solve the verification problems inherent in the destruction of chemical weapons.

The failure or success of any workshop depends largely on the contributions that come from the participants themselves. I should like to express our gratitude to all those delegations who enhanced the effect of the workshop by their valuable participation.

Few will dispute that workshops of this nature — and aside from the visit to Münster, I would equally like to mention the workshop in Tooele, Utah, of late last year — provide interesting insights and learning experiences. But what is the direct relevance to our negotiating tasks in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons? I realize that this question has frequently been asked, and the question certainly deserves an answer. Obviously, it is nobody's intention to write into a future chemical weapons convention norms which oblige the parties to the treaty to embark on particular technical processes, or to buy and employ specific apparatuses of particular brands. But the link is there, and it is direct. Workshops of this kind demonstrate both the necessity and the feasibility of certain technical processes. They thus show how planned prescription can be translated into law-abiding action, and at what cost. The obligation the parties are to undertake in the future treaty will be simple. They will be expressed in abstract legal language. But behind the normative language, knowledge looms. Negotiators, with the aid of such technical experience as the workshops have given them, have assured themselves that it is possible to translate treaty obligations, such as are now envisaged, into effective action, and that the most practical and least costly and intensive approach has been chosen in defining obligations and selecting legal language.

If we attempt to digest the negotiators' lessons out of the Tooele and Münster experiences, the usefulness of the exercises is amply born out. On the basis of a general consensus that is forming on the subject matter in the field of the verification of destruction of stocks, formulations like the one in Article V (1) (f) of the draft convention contained in document CD/500, or the corresponding draft provisions in document CD/326, now prove themselves to be so drafted that, if accepted, they would stand the test of eventual implementation with the assistance of current-state technology, and at low and adequate cost levels.

If satisfaction and, indeed, a measure of accomplishment derive from the recent technical workshop in Münster, my delegation is much less optimistic with regard to the general level of progress in the chemical weapons negotiations. Although the negotiating process is manifold — if somewhat over-complicated in its structure — the general state of negotiations is hardly encouraging and leaves much to be desired.

This is all the more deplorable because this year we should have been particularly concerned about making progress rapidly. The findings of a team of experts charged by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in conformity with the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions, revealed that chemical weapons had been used in the conflict between Iraq and Iran. However, not even the actual use of chemical weapons in an ongoing conflict and the unfortunate likelihood of further proliferation of these barbaric weapons have prompted the Conference on Disarmament to speed up negotiations and to produce decisive results. Yet, the 1984 session had commenced under particularly favourable conditions. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was placed under the skilful and competent guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. Mr. Akkerman of the Netherlands, Mr. Duarte of Brazil and Dr. Thielicke of the German Democratic Republic

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

have once again proved their high abilities in chairing their respective Working Groups. Many delegations have introduced important working papers or initiatives.

In spite of these favourable conditions, the positive momentum that had marked previous years of work is about to peter out. My delegation has no explanation for this unfortunate state of affairs. It cannot but urge all delegations to contribute fully to the negotiations by demonstrating more flexibility and readiness to compromise. The urgency of achieving results does not only bear upon the chemical weapons convention itself. This segment of our work constitutes an important test case for the ~~over~~-all commitment of governments to the task of disarmament.

In spite of a **negative over-all** assessment of the negotiations my delegation, of course, does not wish to belittle the efforts to come to a closer understanding in certain areas of the convention and the progress that has been achieved so far. In the area of elimination of stocks a consensus is now emerging. My delegation is equally hopeful that a solution of the question of verification of initial declarations can be found on the basis of discussing further the ideas of subjecting the declared stocks to verification measures either at intermediate storage sites or at the destruction facility. My delegation also welcomes the endeavour to provide a complete structure for the future chemical weapons convention as has skilfully been elaborated by Ambassador Turbanski of Poland.

One obvious task before the negotiators at the present moment is to look to the scheduled end of the annual session. The form and status of their report will be of great importance for the further course of work. The primary responsibility of the negotiators should be carefully to preserve the results of the work accomplished during the previous sessions as well as during the present one. The forward movement may have been limited, but no backward movement should be allowed to occur. We must make absolutely sure that the next round of negotiations will start on the basis of present accomplishments, and does not embark on yet another round of needless and frustrating rehashing of past work. The decisive contribution of Chairman McPhail during the preceding session was his skilful compilation of the results of the 1983 session in one comprehensive document which all delegations could underwrite. This has been the conceptual basis of our negotiations this year and largely foreshadows the shape and contents of the future convention. It is therefore of overriding importance that an amplified and developed version of his comprehensive paper, in the more advanced version which we owe to the Swedish delegation, in document CD/CW/WP.67, be accepted as the general format of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this session.

My delegation is grateful to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, for having given considerable thought to the annual work product of his Committee. Many of his ideas are fertile, and greatly to the credit of his own delegation. It is without doubt within the prerogative of the Chairman to formulate his own views and instill them into the future negotiating process under his own responsibility. It is, however, even more important that the structure of document CD/CW/WP.67 is preserved and further developed. The vital feature of the Committee's report at the end of the session should be a comprehensive consensus text which can fully serve as a reference document, accepted by all, for the next round of our negotiations. My delegation will find it difficult to agree to any document that would not comply with these criteria.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The annual report of the Committee is not an end in itself. It is designed to be a tool to facilitate further work. Concentration on its elaboration should, therefore, not deduct from our ongoing negotiation effort and should not preclude reflections on the future timeframe of negotiations.

One of the interesting features of the present negotiating phase is the vivid interaction between scheduled meetings of the various working units, and a great number of bilateral consultations between delegations. The latter are characteristic of a very advanced negotiating process. Delegations find that there is a need for detailed discussions designed to explore the viewpoints of particular delegations. Their frequency is thus a positive sign, provided that the findings of delegations are channelled back into the multilateral process. This appears even more necessary when the Chairman of the various working units are themselves involved in consultations of this kind. It is certainly the prerogative of these Chairmen to obtain the fullest possible information by contact with delegations, as much as it is their obligations to bring their unique quality as officers of the Conference to bear in the interest of progress and compromise. However, particular care should be taken that the transparency and multilateral nature of these processes be fully observed. In the view of my delegation it would therefore appear indispensable that the Chairmen of the working organs provide a clear picture to all delegations and at all times about their particular transactions. It is also desirable — yes, indeed, indispensable in this multilateral framework — that all negotiating activities conducted by the Chairmen themselves are in principle open-ended and accessible to all delegations that have a legitimate interest in participation. I am confident that the officers of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons are aware of these necessities, and that they will continue to preserve the necessary transparency of the negotiating process during the remainder of our session.

The more negotiations on chemical weapons progress and the more the treaty to which all delegations aspire comes within reach, the more it is incongruous that we indulge in the seeming luxury of adjourning negotiations so early in the year to resume them only four or five months later. The need for negotiators to pause and reflect, and to seek instructions is obvious. But such long intermissions are quite evidently to the detriment of the negotiating momentum and may even imply a backward movement. It is also beyond the comprehension of our general population which feels the need for urgent action while the negotiators have dispersed and seem to have abandoned the negotiating table.

From the viewpoint of the chemical weapons negotiations, then, the annual meeting cycle of this body is highly unsatisfactory. I realize that remedies are not easy to find, and that earlier attempts to schedule resumed sessions of the chemical weapons working group have not proved conclusive. Under the supervision of a "lame-duck" chairman who had already submitted his final report, and without the necessary political interaction with, and simultaneous presence of Conference delegates, these meetings remained on the level of technical exchanges, and produced very little movement. It is imperative — and will become more so during the final negotiating stages of the convention — to look for a format which will to some extent bridge the time gap between official annual sessions, and yet generate true political momentum. This need must be taken into account when the Conference takes another look at its general working pattern. My delegation is ready to participate in any appropriate new format, even if it deviates from our ingrained habits, and implies additional sacrifice in terms of meeting time.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to my country and to myself.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. President, in my statement on 12 July, I began to address the last of four major issues involved in a comprehensive and effective chemical-weapons ban, that is, the vital issue of verification. I described in detail the regime of systematic international on-site verification established by the United States draft convention in document CD/500. I also stated that that regime, by itself, would be inadequate to provide the required assurance of compliance with all the provisions of the draft convention. Today, I will examine the system for dealing with compliance issues that is a necessary and vital complement to the systematic verification regime I described last week.

In the United States view, the future chemical weapons convention should set forth a range of actions that can be taken by a party to resolve compliance concerns. The convention should also set forth the obligations of a party to co-operate in the prompt resolution of such concerns. The arrangements should be designed to prevent dilatory tactics and to promote clarification at the lowest possible political level. However, the right to escalate an issue politically, if necessary, should be built into the arrangements to serve as an important stimulus to provide resolution of compliance problems. A party should be able to select the course of action it believes will resolve its concerns most effectively and expeditiously.

The United States draft convention incorporates a number of provisions for dealing with compliance concerns. These provisions are contained in articles IX, X and XI, as well as in annex II. Taken together, these provisions would provide an effective system for resolving compliance concerns.

Should a party to the convention have reason to believe that another party is not completely fulfilling its commitments under the convention — if, for example, that party suspects that chemical weapons are being stored at a location that the other party had not declared to be a chemical weapons storage location — then that party could initiate bilateral consultations with the other party, as provided in article IX. Article IX would require the party receiving such an inquiry to provide sufficient information to the inquiring party to resolve the latter's doubts concerning compliance. If both parties so desired, article IX would permit them to arrange a bilateral inspection to aid in resolving any lingering questions.

When necessary — if, for example there continued to be concerns over whether the party was complying with its commitments under the convention — either party involved in the dispute could request the Executive Council of the Consultative Committee to initiate fact-finding procedures. Upon receiving such a request, the Executive Council would request the party whose actions were suspect to clarify these actions. If the clarification provided still did not resolve the question, the fact-finding panel of the Executive Council would immediately begin an investigation. The report of its investigation would then be made available to all parties to the convention. If still unsatisfied, the inquiring party could initiate a special meeting of the Consultative Committee to consider further the compliance question.

It is hoped that most compliance questions can be resolved through information exchanges that occur either bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee. However, in some instances assurances more persuasive than the uncorroborated statements of a party will be necessary. In other cases, the assurance will be required more rapidly than the time periods contained in article IX. Articles X and XI of the draft convention were designed to meet the needs of such situations.

Under article X of the draft convention, procedures for special on-site inspection will apply to any facility either already subject to systematic international on-site inspection pursuant to other articles of the convention or to

(Mr. Fields, United States)

any facility or location owned or controlled by the government of a party, including military facilities. Annex II would contain provisions aiding in the specification of such facilities and locations. For these locations and facilities, a party to the convention is deemed to have issued an "open invitation" with regard to the possibility of their inspection. This means that a party must permit an on-site inspection of the location or facility within 24 hours of receipt of a request from a member of the fact-finding panel for such an investigation. Members of the panel could initiate such an inspection on their own or on behalf of a party not represented on the panel. A party cannot refuse a request for a special on-site inspection.

My Government recognizes that these special on-site inspection procedures will require an unprecedented degree of openness on the part of all countries that become parties to the convention. The United States also recognizes that such openness could potentially pose a risk to sensitive activities not related to chemical weapons. However, the United States strongly believes that a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons, which would provide substantial security benefits, must, if it is to be truly effective, contain an "open invitation" inspection scheme along the lines I have sketched out today. Thus, the United States has decided that the benefits flowing from such an inspection scheme greatly outweigh the risks.

The United States seriously considers that any risks can be minimized and managed through appropriate procedures for initiating and conducting special on-site inspections. The United States draft contains a number of provisions designed to do just that. In the United States view, the inspection procedures should be designed to resolve the issue at the lowest possible level of intrusion. For example, the inspectors' access should be unimpeded, but the procedures could stipulate that the least intrusive steps be taken first. More intrusive steps would be implemented only to the level needed to resolve the specific issue in question. We would welcome other suggestions for minimizing the risks that might result from a special on-site inspection.

I want to assure all delegations in the Conference on Disarmament that my Government did not take the decision lightly to include this "open invitation" provision in our draft convention. There should be no question that the United States is willing to accept the consequences of these provisions. I hope that other States will display a like amount of political will and accept this "open invitation" concept, because it is essential for an effective chemical-weapons ban.

I would also like to respond to some criticisms that have been publicly voiced concerning the article X provision on special on-site inspection. The statement has been made that, since the provision applies to government-owned or government-controlled facilities, it discriminates against some economic and political systems. The argument seems to be that, since the civilian chemical industries in some socialist countries are owned by the government, these facilities would be subject to article X, whereas the chemical industries in the United States or other western countries, since they are privately owned, would not be covered by article X. In passing I would like to note that the countries voicing this and other criticisms of the convention have done so without accepting the invitation of my delegation to meet with any interested delegation to explain fully our draft convention. If they had availed themselves of this opportunity to meet with us, this matter could have been clarified privately. Article X covers not only those locations and facilities that are owned by the government, but also those controlled by the government, whether through contract,

(Mr. Fields, United States)

other obligations, or regulatory requirements. The privately-owned chemical industries of the United States are so heavily regulated by the United States Government that this equates to the term "controlled" as used in the draft convention. Thus, the private chemical industry of the United States is fully subject to the inspection provisions of article X.

In addition, I will repeat a statement made many times by me and by other representatives of the United States Government. No imbalance in inspection obligation is either desired, intended, or contained in any provisions of the United States draft convention banning chemical weapons. My delegation welcomes any suggestions concerning ways to improve the procedures for the "open invitation" inspections, as long as an equivalent level of confidence is maintained. It is easy to criticize a proposal. It is much harder to work out mutually acceptable solutions to difficult problems. I hope that delegations that have concerns about the "open invitation" approach of article X will join with us in a constructive manner to seek effective solutions.

For locations and facilities not subject to article X, "ad hoc on-site inspections" are provided by article XI of the United States draft. A party may request the Consultative Committee, at any time, to conduct such inspections in order to resolve doubts and concerns. The fact-finding panel shall convene within 24 hours to determine whether such an inspection should be granted. The panel will make its decision based on guidelines contained in annex II. If the panel decides to request an inspection, the requested party shall, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, provide access to the inspectors. If a party refuses an inspection, it must fully explain its refusal and suggest concrete alternative methods for resolving the compliance concern. The fact-finding panel will review these explanations and suggestions to determine if they resolve the question raised. If the problem is not deemed to be resolved, the panel can again request an inspection. If it is refused again, the Chairman of the Consultative Commission shall immediately inform the Security Council of the United Nations.

As with systematic international on-site inspection, there are many detailed, technical procedures governing the conduct of special and ad hoc on-site inspections that need to be negotiated. Section H of annex II contains a list of the areas where the United States believes there must be an agreement on procedures. Some examples of these areas are: a requirement for definition of the area to be inspected, types of equipment to be used, and protection of proprietary or confidential information. These procedures should be negotiated in connection with our consideration of the inspection provisions contained in articles X and XI.

In two statements I have outlined in detail the provisions contained in the United States draft convention dealing with the verification issue. The regime of systematic international on-site inspection, and the compliance resolution system outlined today, combine to provide the confidence in compliance necessary for a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical-weapons. These provisions are central to the United States draft convention. No chemical weapons convention can be achieved without agreement on effective provisions for verification.

This statement also concludes my series of statements dealing with the four main issues involved in a comprehensive and effective chemical weapons ban. I have explained how the United States draft convention deals with what a party must not do, what it may do, what it must do, and finally the verification provisions that provide confidence in compliance. I hope these statements have been helpful. My delegation is ready at any time and any place to work with any delegation to answer questions concerning our draft convention and to try to achieve mutually acceptable solutions to the many problems in this area which remain to be solved.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ould-Rouis.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): I am taking the floor as Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 to submit a draft mandate for the ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban.

In doing so, my intention is not to deal with the substance of this item which has appeared, with full priority, on the agenda of the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body since its first session.

The draft mandate which the secretariat will shortly circulate under symbol CD/520 simply updates document CD/492, which was submitted by the Group of 21 on 3 April 1984. The changes consist of two improvements to the text. The first was prompted by the time factor, and consists in the suppression of the reference to the possibility of the ad hoc committee's transmitting to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session the complete draft of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. The second consists in the deletion of the adverb "immediately", which seemed to raise difficulties for some delegations.

With your permission, Mr. President, I shall read the text of the draft in English:

[Spoke in English]: "The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish for the remainder of its 1984 session an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to initiate the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the session.

Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, it will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The Ad Hoc Committee will also take into account the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events."

[Spoke in French]: The Group of 21 has taken this new step because of our deep concern at the failure of the consultations zealously undertaken by yourself, Mr. President, and your predecessors on the mandate for the ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, at a time when the end of this session is only a few weeks away. It is yet another addition to the long line of efforts unceasingly made by the Group of 21 to enable the Conference to begin negotiations on an item of its agenda which enjoys the highest priority.

It is based on the attachment of the Group of 21 to the objective of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, and its conviction that this goal must urgently be achieved.

(Mr. Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

The Group of 21 hopes that this draft mandate will meet with consensus so that the Conference can without delay begin negotiations on a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? That does not appear to be the case, and if there is no objection I intend, in accordance with the request of the Group of 21, to invite the Conference to consider and take a decision on document CD/520 at its plenary meeting on 24 July.

In accordance with the request made by the representative of India on behalf of the Group of 21, I now invite the Conference to take a decision on the draft mandate for the subsidiary body on agenda item 3 which was submitted in document CD/515. Does any member wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Belgium.

Mr. DEPASSE (Belgium) (translated from French): I think that my statement can be compared to the request which a pretty woman, who had been sentenced to death during the French revolution and brought to the guillotine, addressed to the executioner: what she kept saying was, "Just a little moment more, please Mr. Executioner". I am not thinking of you, Mr. President, in the role of executioner, any more than I am thinking of myself in the role of the pretty woman, but the sense is the same. We in the Western Group have worked very hard to be able to submit a proposal on this subject, which may in fact take the form of an amendment to document CD/515. Our work is at an extremely advanced stage but is not yet finished. I have already explained to the Conference why that is so, and therefore I shall not repeat myself now. I am firmly convinced that very shortly we will be able to reach a position which could serve as a basis for a fruitful exchange of views with other delegations and which could settle this very difficult question for this session and for the future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement. I am very sorry that he used the expression "executioner". In this connection, I should like to point out that the proposal submitted by the Group of 21 does not directly concern the President, and I would convey the request of the representative of Belgium above all to the Group of 21, and also to all members of the Conference. I give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Before the start of this meeting, the distinguished representative of Belgium, in his capacity as Co-ordinator of the Western Group, informed me of his intention to request a further postponement. In this very short space of time I have been able to consult the members of my Group concerning this request and I am in a position to answer as follows on behalf of the Group of 21. Displaying once again its flexibility, the Group of 21 agrees to the postponement of the adoption of a decision until the next plenary meeting of the Conference in the hope that the Group which requested the postponement will be in a position to participate in a consensus on the setting up of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3. However, in view of the importance and urgency of this issue, the Group of 21 considers that this decision cannot be postponed indefinitely.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Algeria. Does any other member wish to take the floor? If not, I take the statement of the representative of Algeria on behalf of the Group of 21 as signifying agreement to the further postponement of the adoption of a decision on the mandate for the subsidiary body on agenda item 3 until Tuesday, 24 July. I should like to draw attention to the fact that if another document appears on 24 July, rather than document CD/515, a different situation will probably arise. Do I understand correctly that we are referring to the adoption of a decision on document CD/515 in the form in which it has been submitted? I give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): That is correct, Mr. President, thank you.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The secretariat has today distributed a time-table of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The time-table was established in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees of the Conference. As usual, the time-table is indicative and can be changed if necessary. You will note that the time-table provides for the holding of two informal meetings next week. This is in accordance with the time-table of informal meetings which we adopted on 3 July. The list of items to be considered at these informal meetings was drawn up on the basis of this time-table and the understandings reached by members of the Conference during our informal meetings concerning the subsequent discussion of the issues before it for consideration. I should also like to point out that next week will obviously be most strenuous since we are nearing the end of our session. I would therefore request all delegations to arrive at the plenary meetings at 10.30 a.m. so that we can hold informal meetings immediately after the conclusion of statements at plenary meetings.

In addition, I should like to request the secretariat to prepare as rapidly as possible the material on the improvement of the effectiveness of the Conference's work. We intend to consider this matter at the next informal meeting on Tuesday, 24 July. I wish to inform you that the Group of Seven is nearing the completion of its work for submission of the corresponding material to you, and I think that it would be most useful if the secretariat could circulate it to delegations on Friday. In this way, they will come to the meeting on 24 July already familiar with the material which the Secretary-General of the Conference will circulate. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the time-table for next week.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 24 July, at 10.00 a.m. The plenary meeting of the Conference on disarmament is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.