

# United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THIRTY-FIRST SESSION

Official Records



**59th  
PLENARY MEETING**

Tuesday, 9 November 1976,  
at 3.40 p.m.

NEW YORK

## CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 52:	
Policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of South Africa (continued):	
(a) Report of the Special Committee against <i>Apartheid</i> ;	
(b) Report of the Secretary General . . . . .	955
Agenda item 14:	
Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency . . . .	964

**President:** Mr. Hamilton Shirley AMERASINGHE  
(Sri Lanka).

## AGENDA ITEM 52

### Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The PRESIDENT: We shall now continue to hear those representatives who had expressed the wish to explain their votes after the voting that took place at the previous meeting.

2. Mr. KAPLLANI (Albania): The People's Republic of Albania has consistently and strongly condemned and opposed the inhuman policies of *apartheid* pursued by the racist régime of South Africa. It has always been in full solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of Azania. The Albanian delegation expressed its view on the question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa in the debate which took place in this Assembly.

3. In conformity with our already known position, we voted for the draft resolutions that were before us this morning. However, we wish to point out that we have reservations concerning draft resolution A/31/L.6, as well as some parts of the other resolutions, including the one about the Programme of Action against *Apartheid* [A/31/L.14].

4. In operative paragraph 16 of draft resolution A/31/L.13, entitled "Situation in South Africa", the General Assembly, *inter alia*, "invites all Governments to provide those States, at their request, with all necessary assistance for defence against aggression". We cannot accept that all countries and Governments, without distinction, can render genuine and sincere assistance to the Azanian and other African peoples for the purpose of resisting the aggressive acts of the Pretoria régime. We think that the enemies of the people's freedom and independence, the two imperialist super-Powers and the other reactionary forces, are not able to do so. The Albanian delegation wishes to emphasize that,

while my country always welcomes all efforts to strengthen solidarity among the African countries in opposing the policies of *apartheid* and the acts of aggression of the South African racist régime and recognizes the importance of the solidarity of the freedom-loving countries and peoples with the struggle of the Azanian and other African peoples, we cannot fail to point out that the formulation contained in operative paragraph 16 of draft resolution A/31/L.13 may also be used by the two imperialist super-Powers and the other reactionary forces as a pretext for interfering in the region of South Africa in pursuit of their expansionist and hegemonistic goals. We now have precedents of this kind. This is why the Albanian delegation, although it voted in favour of draft resolution A/31/L.13 as a whole, wishes to put on record its reservation concerning operative paragraph 16, the contents of which are unacceptable to us.

5. Mr. STOLTENBERG (Norway): I speak on behalf of the five Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden—and my own country, Norway. The position of the Nordic countries on the question of *apartheid* has been consistent and is well known. We reject all forms of racial discrimination and segregation, which affront our sense of justice and are totally incompatible with our concepts of freedom and the law and our faith in the equality and dignity of the individual. The racial policies pursued by the Pretoria régime are not only in contradiction with the principles of the Charter, but also endanger the stability of international relations. It is clear that, unless progress is soon achieved through international efforts, a full-scale violent conflict in southern Africa may well become inevitable. Therefore, the United Nations must not fail in its efforts to put an end to *apartheid*. There can be no peace in southern Africa until this repugnant system has been abolished. In order to achieve this aim, the international community must impose strong and unrelenting pressure on the Government of South Africa. For this purpose, it is of crucial importance to us all to use all opportunities for an effective international policy of sanctions against South Africa within the framework of the United Nations, as envisaged by the Nordic Foreign Ministers at their meeting last August.

6. As an expression of our firm opposition to the odious policy of *apartheid* pursued by the Pretoria régime, the Nordic countries have voted in favour of most of the draft resolutions just adopted. We deeply regret that we found ourselves unable to support all the draft resolutions.

7. As regards draft resolution A/31/L.13, on the situation in South Africa, our Governments have over the years supported the principle of universality in the United Nations. We cannot, therefore, endorse formulations that may raise doubts regarding the right of all nations to belong to this world Organization. We feel that the said draft

resolution questions this principle and we consequently were unable to vote in favour of it. Moreover, with reference to operative paragraphs 4 and 5, we reiterate our well-known position that the General Assembly should not advocate the use of force as a means of settling conflicts.

8. Draft resolution A/31/L.12, on economic collaboration with South Africa, also contains some paragraphs with which we have certain difficulties. Furthermore, we should like to underline that, under the Charter, only the Security Council is qualified to decide on economic sanctions.

9. The Nordic countries voted for draft resolution A/31/L.8 on an arms embargo against South Africa. We would support a decision by the Security Council on a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. We should like, however, to express a strong reservation with regard to the sixth preambular paragraph, which is clearly inappropriate in its present form, since a number of the countries specifically mentioned have refuted the charges levelled against them. As a result, we do not consider confirmed the specific references and charges in this paragraph. Consequently, we feel that the draft resolution as a whole has been weakened.

10. With regard to draft resolution A/31/L.9, on relations between Israel and South Africa, our Governments consider it inappropriate to single out one country in this context. Furthermore, the draft resolution contains some charges of a specific nature, the correctness of which our Governments find doubtful.

11. While stressing our full support for the main ideas in draft resolution A/31/L.10/Rev.1, on *apartheid* in sports, we should like to point out, as we have done on previous occasions, that the sports organizations in the Nordic countries are private entities.

12. I shall not dwell on certain other points in the draft resolutions on which we have reservations following from the general principles expressed by the Nordic countries on many occasions. Mr. President, permit me to make one final observation. The debate on this item has more clearly than ever before shown the total rejection by the world community of the inhuman and morally repulsive *apartheid* system. The South African authorities would act not only wisely but at long last timely if they were to embark on a new course and thereby heed the unanimous call for decency by the whole international community. The South African authorities would, on the other hand, be gravely mistaken if they were to interpret differences in voting patterns in this Assembly this year as condoning the condemnation of the policies of the past. The Nordic Governments, therefore, once again, commit themselves to the struggle against this evil.

13. Mr. AKIMAN (Turkey): The Turkish delegation voted in favour of all those draft resolutions initiated only by African countries concerning the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa because of our persistent and strong opposition to this abhorrent policy. As my Foreign Minister emphasized in his statement to this Assembly on 28 September 1976, [8th meeting], we harbour the hope that vigorous condemnation of the policy of *apartheid* by the international community will compel the South African

Government to abide by the judgements of world conscience and will encourage it to adopt a rapid solution to this problem, which would give the African population of the country the basic human rights which have been denied to them for so long. We regard the resolutions just adopted as aiming to this very purpose. We do regret, however, that some of the resolutions contain unduly strong language when singling out certain countries and also some controversial points in certain of their paragraphs. For example, the fourth, sixth and ninth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/31/L.8, and operative paragraph 10 of draft resolution A/31/L.13 reflect opinions which we cannot share. We also believe that certain paragraphs of some of the draft resolutions refer to matters which are within the competence of the Security Council and therefore outside the context of the draft resolution in question. Therefore, our affirmative votes should not be construed as an endorsement of these opinions but merely as a confirmation of our strong support of the thrust of the resolutions which are aimed at the eradication of the *apartheid* policies of the Government of South Africa.

14. Mr. MURRAY (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I shall be brief, though in explaining my delegation's vote on the 10 draft resolutions which this Assembly has just adopted I shall have to cover much ground. May I first associate my delegation completely with the explanation of votes given by my colleague, the Ambassador of the Netherlands, in his capacity as current President of the countries comprising the European Community [58th meeting].

15. In his statement of 19 June in the Security Council in the course of the Council's debate on Soweto,<sup>1</sup> Mr. Richard reminded the Council that my Government had consistently and totally condemned *apartheid*, and that it believed the *apartheid* system to be fundamentally unjust. He said that it remained our hope that the white population of South Africa would be obliged to conclude that the time had come to abandon the policy of *apartheid*. So long as discrimination was institutionalized, so long would those who were discriminated against resist those institutions.

16. On 4 December 1974, Mr. Callaghan, who was then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, said in the House of Commons, and I quote:

"Our aim throughout Southern Africa is to make a constructive contribution to peace, justice and racial equality, and we shall work in co-operation with other countries and organisations to that end."<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Crosland, said in this Assembly on 5 October, and I quote again:

"... time is running out. We urge the South African Government to accept the need for a fundamental reappraisal of its racial policies, so that a society can be

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, 1930th meeting*.

<sup>2</sup> See *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series* (London, HM Stationery Office, N.D.), vol. 882, p. 1558.

built. . . in which all South Africans, regardless of colour, can live and work in peace, equality and mutual respect.”  
[17th meeting, para. 60.]

17. We are committed to these principles, and our policies give practical effect to them. We have imposed an arms embargo, and we have made the necessary arrangements to ensure that our policies are fully in line with our international undertakings. We have made it clear that sporting contacts with South Africa will receive no official support or approval so long as selection on the basis of race or colour is maintained. We have terminated the Simonstown Agreement. We have commended the guidelines of the House of Commons' Trade and Industry Sub-Committee on Wages and Conditions in South Africa to the chairmen of British firms with interests in that country, and have reminded them of their special duty to non-white workers, who are prevented by the *apartheid* regulations from defending their interests. We have contributed to a number of United Nations funds operating in southern Africa, and we shall continue to do so.

18. There have been a number of unhelpful remarks about my Government's policies in Rhodesia in the course of this debate. As the item which we are discussing concerns *apartheid* rather than Rhodesia I do not propose to reply at any length. Our sole aim in Rhodesia is to bring that country peacefully to early majority rule and independence. To this end we have called a conference in Geneva, which has embarked upon an intensive programme of work under my distinguished colleague, Mr. Richard. I can only regard the statements from outside Africa which I have just mentioned as deliberate attempts to spoil the negotiations.

19. I turn now to the resolutions which have just been adopted. I should first like to make a general point to which my Netherlands colleague referred earlier in making his explanation of vote on behalf of the European Community. We do not regard the situation in South Africa as a colonial one. South Africa is an independent State. We cannot agree that violence on anyone's part is a legitimate way of achieving change inside South Africa. We deplore the deaths which have resulted from the actions of the South African authorities. We shall continue to impress upon the South African authorities the urgent need to end a system of government which we, in common with the rest of the world, find repulsive and immoral. We do not believe that an end to all contacts with South Africa would help to bring about change in that country. We maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa and shall continue to avail ourselves of our contacts to make our views known to the South African authorities.

20. My Government took part in the consensus on draft resolution A/31/L.7, on solidarity with South African political prisoners. We did so because we find it inadmissible for any person to be persecuted for his beliefs, and because we share the concern of the world community about the killings at Soweto and elsewhere. We have noted from the annual reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross that the South African Government allows it to visit convicted prisoners only. My Government is concerned about the fate of the many people under detention for security reasons in South Africa, and consider that the Red Cross should be given access to them as well.

We support this draft resolution, however, only in so far as it demands the release of all those persons in South Africa who have been imprisoned solely on political grounds for their opposition to *apartheid*. We also have specific reservations on the first and fourth preambular paragraphs and on operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of this draft resolution, since we regard the struggle in South Africa as one for basic human rights, and not as a struggle for self-determination. In this and in a number of other draft resolutions we can only accept references to “struggle” if it is carried out peacefully in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

21. My delegation voted against draft resolution A/31/L.8, on an arms embargo against South Africa. We object particularly to the fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs of this draft resolution, which make false and unfounded allegations against my country. We also deplore the attempt made in this draft resolution to prejudge any action that the Security Council may take in pursuance of its own specific responsibilities under the Charter. My country operates an effective arms embargo against South Africa and we intend to go on doing so.

22. It is with great reluctance that my delegation found itself obliged to abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/31/L.10/Rev.1, on *apartheid* in sports. In his statement of 4 December 1974, to which I referred earlier, Mr. Callaghan said:

“The Government regard sporting contacts with South Africa, so long as selection on the basis of race and colour are maintained, as repugnant, and they will receive no official support or approval. The Government asks organisations and individuals to take serious note of this policy, although we shall, clearly, not interfere with their right to decide these matters for themselves.”<sup>3</sup>

23. That remains my Government's position. We discourage our sportsmen from visiting South Africa or from receiving South African sports teams, and we shall give them no official support. But our sports bodies are independent of the Government, and we cannot force them to take decisions. We have particular difficulty with operative paragraphs 5 (c) and 5 (d) of this draft resolution. We believe in the freedom of movement of individuals, and we are not prepared to stop South African or other sportsmen from coming to our country, nor to stop British sportsmen from visiting South Africa or any other country if they so wish. Nor is it clear to us that there is a need for an international convention against *apartheid*, as proposed in operative paragraphs 1 to 4 of this draft resolution. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [resolution 2106 A (XX), annex], which in its article 3 refers to the question, is in our view a more workable instrument.

24. We found ourselves obliged to abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/31/L.11, on the programme of work of the Special Committee Against *Apartheid*. As explained earlier, we have reservations about the applicability of the phrase “right to self-determination” in the context of the situation in South Africa, and we likewise cannot accept the reference to decolonization in operative paragraph 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1556.

We also feel that some of the publications distributed by the Centre Against *Apartheid* make unfounded allegations and fail to be objective in their presentation. We have more general reservations about the financial implications of this draft resolution, and in particular about the need for the conferences envisaged in operative paragraphs 4 and 5.

25. My delegation voted against draft resolution A/31/L.12, on economic collaboration with South Africa. We cannot accept the statement in operative paragraph 1 that "any collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa constitutes a hostile act against the oppressed people of South Africa and a contemptuous defiance of the United Nations and the international community". We believe that continuing contacts between South Africa and the outside world offer more hope of change in the *apartheid* system than a policy of ostracism. We also have specific reservations on operative paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9, since it is for the organizations concerned to consider their attitude towards South Africa in the light of their own specific responsibilities and their own constitutions.

26. I need say little about the general draft resolution on the situation in South Africa in document A/31/L.13. My delegation voted against a similar draft resolution last year, and we have done so again. My delegation also voted against draft resolution A/31/L.14, on the Programme of Action Against *Apartheid*, because we are opposed to its philosophy.

27. Finally we abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/31/L.15, on investments in South Africa. As Mr. Callaghan said in the House of Commons on 4 December 1974, "... it is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government that commercial trading relations with other countries should be based upon considerations of their internal or external policies."<sup>4</sup> None of us can gain from establishing precedents for demands in international bodies that economic and financial relations should be determined by such considerations. We particularly regret the short notice that was given for the consideration of all the implications of this draft resolution, and the failure to consult other delegations.

28. My delegation was greatly disappointed that we were obliged to vote against a number of these draft resolutions. If their sponsors had concentrated the language of these resolutions on consideration and condemnation of *apartheid* itself, we would have had little difficulty with them, since all of us share an identity of views on *apartheid*, and all of us want to bring it to an end. Unfortunately these draft resolutions range much wider. They seek to challenge South Africa's legitimacy, to consider *apartheid* as a problem of decolonization, to justify an armed struggle against an independent State, and to put an end to all contacts between South Africa and the outside world. Many Governments, including my own, sincerely believe that the steps advocated in this series of draft resolutions are unlikely to help to end *apartheid*, and will certainly not bring about change peacefully. We regret that the sponsors of these draft resolutions did not consult all Members of this Organization or seek to take their views into account.

It should have been possible to reach a consensus in this Organization on more of the draft resolutions before us; and, as my Netherlands colleague said earlier, we believe that their unanimous adoption would have had a much greater impact upon opinion in South Africa itself. This after all is the objective we all share.

29. Mr. VINCI (Italy): The representative of the Netherlands has stated once more on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community its rejection of the *apartheid* policy of the Republic of South Africa. Italy fully shares this position, as stated by my delegation many times. My country is firmly committed to the struggle against *apartheid* and has repeatedly expressed these views to the Government of Pretoria. Italy already fulfils voluntarily the arms embargo against South Africa in acknowledgement of the resolutions of the Security Council, but we cannot accept the blatant, unjustified accusations against some of our partners and allies as contained in draft resolution A/31/L.8. Accordingly, we voted against that draft. We also have some doubts as to whether the application of Chapter VII of the Charter as contemplated in draft resolution A/31/L.13 is really appropriate in this case.

30. My delegation has voted in favour of draft resolution A/31/L.10/Rev.1 against *apartheid* in sports. We have, however, some reservations about a few paragraphs of this document. Italy strongly discourages any contact between the Italian and South African sports organizations. It should, however, be borne in mind that our national organization enjoys full autonomy in its activity, which consequently cannot involve any responsibility on the part of the Government. Equally Italian law safeguards the principle of individual freedom, which makes it arduous, not to say impossible, to deny the entry into our country of persons without a specific motive contemplated by the law.

31. Finally, we have some mixed feelings about the idea of an international convention since it may lead public opinion to the conclusion that the policy of *apartheid* is here to stay for many years to come. Rightly or wrongly, my delegation is strongly convinced that this will not be the case. We believe, on the contrary, that under increasing international pressure, this abhorrent policy will fade away sooner than expected.

32. My delegation also voted in favour of draft resolution A/31/L.11, on the programme of work of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. Although it does not share entirely the views embodied in that text, I have to note among other things that the publications of the Centre against *Apartheid* are not always objective and do not always reflect all the aspects of the real situation. I will not go into all the reservations besides those which have been already raised by the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Kaufmann, on behalf of our nine countries. I refer in particular to the financial implications of some initiatives suggested in the draft resolution. We also have doubts about the usefulness of large conferences on *apartheid*.

33. Italy rejects the practice of *apartheid* as contrary to the dignity of mankind. We were glad to hear that the

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*



Special Committee had taken due note of the closing of the immigration offices of the South African Embassy in Rome and Milan in accordance with the policy of my own Government. I hope that I have made clear the reasons for our objections to some of the draft resolutions, objections which refer to certain means and methods and not to the cause common to all of us in this house. Italy is wholly committed to the total abolition of *apartheid* and has, we trust, given solid and concrete evidence of this commitment and to its genuine dedication to this objective.

34. Mr. HJORTH-NIELSEN (Denmark): I would like first of all to associate myself with the explanations of vote pronounced by the representative of the Netherlands on behalf of the members of the European Economic Community, and that pronounced by the distinguished representative of Norway on behalf of the Nordic countries. These two declarations express our views on the complex of draft resolutions just voted by the General Assembly and on certain features of specific draft resolutions among them.

35. With regard to draft resolution A/31/L.8, on an arms embargo against South Africa, my delegation wishes to state the following. The Danish Government believes that the situation in South Africa calls for a binding arms embargo against the South African Government in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. This was specifically confirmed by the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs when he addressed this Assembly in the course of the general debate [8th meeting]. In line with this position we have voted in favour of draft resolution A/31/L.8. We have, however, serious misgivings about the contents of the fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs in which a number of countries with which we entertain close relations are singled out for reproach. When similarly in the Third Committee, the draft resolution on the adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights and political, military, economic and other forms of assistance given to colonial and racist régimes in southern Africa [A/C.3/31/L.16/Rev.1] was put to a vote, Denmark felt compelled to cast a negative vote in view of the condemnation of certain countries specifically named in the operative part of the resolution. We regret that the sponsors of the present resolution have found it necessary in the fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs to level sweeping and unqualified accusations against a number of named countries. We had seriously considered abstaining in the vote on the draft resolution in order to make it clear that in our opinion these paragraphs express a policy of confrontation which has no place in the United Nations. In a separate vote Denmark would have voted against these paragraphs. If we have finally decided to cast an affirmative vote, it is due in part to the fact that these phrases to which we strongly object are found in the preambular and not in the operative paragraphs. But the decisive factor in our attitude to the draft resolution as a whole has been our firm support of the idea of a binding arms embargo against South Africa. For our own part we have scrupulously observed the call of the Security Council for an arms embargo.

36. Mr. ARNELLO (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Chile has participated in the voting with a manifest wish to co-operate with United Nations action on this matter. Today, as always, we have done so attempting to interpret in the most responsible way both our support for the

humanistic and legal principles which govern Chilean thinking and tradition and our firm will to contribute to United Nations action against racism and *apartheid*, in accordance with the provisions and rules which govern us. Regrettably, not all the draft resolutions were compatible with these principles and guidelines. In our desire to co-operate with United Nations action against *apartheid* we have supported the majority of the draft resolutions, despite serious reservations in regard to certain aspects of several of them. We must, with regret, note that the justified rejection on the part of the sponsors of the various draft resolutions of *apartheid* has nevertheless led them to formulate them in terms and concepts which have given rise to reservations on our part and with which we cannot agree, especially since they are not consistent with fundamental legal norms nor with explicit provisions of the United Nations Charter. We cannot agree with certain paragraphs where the need to use force or violence as the only means to combat *apartheid* is expressed or implied. We cannot accept a denial of existence in South Africa of an independent nation. On the other hand, we maintain that it is precisely the conditions which create *apartheid* in that independent State that give greater moral force to United Nations action against *apartheid* since racial discrimination against the African population in that nation is counter to the principles of our Charter.

37. There are other points the direct consequences of which would have far greater repercussions on the people of South Africa than on the racist régime of *apartheid*. Nor do we agree with attacks on other countries, which we consider to be unwarranted and which are tantamount to regrettable discrimination.

*Mr. Hagras (Oman), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

38. Lastly, we cannot agree with those provisions—basic in some drafts but merely incidental in others—the extreme legal weakness of which make them detrimental to action against *apartheid* in the United Nations. Accordingly, despite our sincere desire to co-operate in condemning *apartheid* in this Organization, we were not able to vote in favour of some of the draft resolutions and had to abstain in the vote on others. Furthermore, we must make reservations on certain provisions in draft resolutions which we support, or in regard to certain expressions contained in them which are in contradiction with the principles I have stated above, as in the case, particularly, of draft resolution A/31/L.13. However, I would not wish to prolong this statement or to specify each point in respect of which my delegation does not agree. We do not wish to do so, so as not to weaken our full support for the essential purpose—the supreme goal of the United Nations action against *apartheid*, which we completely share.

39. Once again, however, we must point out that it is a mistake to combine purposes other than condemning racism and racial discrimination with action against *apartheid*. Such efforts do not lead to a broader, more effective and more universal condemnation of *apartheid*, but, on the contrary, weaken and obfuscate that condemnation. We consider that it must not be forgotten that condemning racism and its expression—*apartheid*—is the result of firm support for the lofty principles of human dignity and equality which the United Nations recognizes and which

the Charter considers to be a fundamental principle. Condemnation of *apartheid* is therefore the result of a moral and legal obligation for this Organization, but it is not a means to serve other political purposes.

40. Once again, we reiterate our complete support for the condemnation of racism and racial discrimination and, therefore, our support for United Nations action against *apartheid* within the guidelines of our humanistic conscience and the principles, purposes and rules of the United Nations Charter.

41. Mr. GREGORIADES (Greece): The Greek delegation has cast a positive vote on most of the draft resolutions just adopted, and we wish to make it clear once again that, even in the few cases when we had to abstain in the voting, our condemnation of *apartheid* is, and remains, unchanged. Our abstention was therefore due solely to certain legal considerations. Thus, in draft resolution A/31/L.8, we met with difficulties in the fourth, sixth and ninth paragraphs of the preamble and in paragraph 3 of the operative part. On draft resolution A/31/L.13, we cast a positive vote; we simply wish to formulate a reservation on its operative paragraph 10, owing to purely legal considerations. On draft resolution A/31/L.14, we again met with legal difficulties with regard to some of the points of the annex to this draft.

42. Mr. ORTEGA (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Costa Rica has followed a policy of supporting all United Nations resolutions which condemn the practices of racism and all other kinds of discrimination and, in particular, the policy of *apartheid*. My delegation has voted in favour of the various draft resolutions on this item. The substance of the item has and will continue to have the support of Costa Rica out of consistency with our clear-cut condemnation of any form of racial discrimination.

43. Nevertheless, when dealing with agenda item 52, my delegation was bound to abstain in the vote on draft resolutions A/31/L.8, A/31/L.9 and A/31/L.13, since we consider that these draft resolutions contain categorical accusations based on unproven facts and since some Member States are mentioned as having relations of various kinds with the racist régime of South Africa while others are not.

44. My delegation also regrets that the excesses in the wording of several of the draft resolutions made it impossible for the texts to be adopted unanimously as we would have wished.

45. Mr. WOLF (Austria): The Assembly has adopted this morning several important draft resolutions on agenda item 52, concerning the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. Since Austria has always rejected, and we continue to reject categorically, this kind of policy, the Austrian delegation has voted in favour of all those draft resolutions, the content of which we can endorse in principle.

46. Bearing this in mind, my delegation has joined in the adoption of even those draft resolutions that contain various paragraphs on which certain reservations have been expressed. In this spirit the Austrian delegation has voted in

favour of draft resolution A/31/L.8 concerning the arms embargo against South Africa, although there are strong reservations based on principle in so far as some Member States and members of the Security Council are singled out for criticism.

47. During the debate on the question [*52nd meeting*], the Austrian delegation has expressed the opinion that in its view a unanimous or quasi-unanimous adoption of the various draft resolutions would considerably contribute to and enhance the peaceful solution of this urgent subject. Therefore, we have greatly regretted that the wording of some drafts has not left us in a position to cast a favourable vote, although there we completely agree on the question of principle concerning the earliest possible termination of the *apartheid* policies.

48. Consequently, the Austrian delegation had to abstain in the voting on these particular draft resolutions and to cast a negative vote on draft resolution A/31/L.9. My delegation deeply regrets that there was no common ground for a consensus among Member States in the struggle against *apartheid*.

49. Mr. MATHABA (Lesotho): My delegation voted for draft resolution A/31/L.13, though with reservations, particularly on its operative paragraph 1. We cast an affirmative vote for draft resolution A/31/L.14, although we have difficulties with some sections of the Programme of Action submitted with that draft. We also voted in favour of draft resolution A/31/L.9, although we would have preferred all countries having similar relations with South Africa to be listed.

50. Mr. ALBORNOZ (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): As we have said in past years and was stated by our Foreign Minister in this Assembly [*12th meeting*], Ecuador rejects all forms of discrimination in any part of the world and, in particular, the policy of *apartheid*, which is the most reprehensible of all. Ecuador abolished slavery in 1851, 125 years ago, because already then we considered it to be an affront to civilization and a blot on the honour of the Republic. The legislation of Ecuador has eliminated all forms of discrimination in the so-called existence of its inhabitants; there are equal opportunities for all citizens, as is proper for a people of mixed blood. Racial discrimination is a crime punishable by Ecuadorian law. Furthermore, Ecuador was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, which is referred to in document A/31/L.13. We consider that South Africa is a country in open rebellion against important resolutions of the entire United Nations system.

51. Today we voted in favour of nine resolutions on this subject. Ecuador already voted in the Third Committee in favour of draft resolution A/C.3/31/L.16/Rev.1, whereby we condemned the collaboration of several countries with the racist régimes of southern Africa. Because we consider it redundant and unnecessary to single out only one of the countries which were mentioned in the aforementioned draft resolution, my delegation abstained in the vote only on draft resolution A/31/L.9.

52. Furthermore, we consider pertinent the appeals made by several speakers to the effect that, given the substantial

unanimity existing in the developing world with regard to the condemnation of *apartheid*, in the future a consensus of all the regional groups concerned should be sought in preparing the texts of the relevant draft resolutions so as to achieve a unanimity which would help to make them more rigorous from a legal point of view and enable them to be implemented as we would wish.

53. Mr. BAEYENS (France) (*interpretation from French*): The French delegation was unable to support all of the 10 draft resolutions on *apartheid* just adopted by the Assembly. You may be assured that it regrets this deeply, because there is no ideology which is the subject of so much censure and indignation on the part of the French Government and French public opinion as the racist doctrine of *apartheid*.

54. The statement made from this rostrum in September last by Mr. de Guiringaud [9th meeting] leaves no room for doubt on this point. Hence my delegation's feeling that the entire course of this debate is as though certain Member States represented here deliberately introduced one or another paragraph into the drafts which we have just debated so as to prevent France from joining in their just condemnation of the policy of *apartheid*.

55. In this regard I would cite draft resolution A/31/L.8, on the arms embargo against South Africa. The language resorted to by its sponsors adds errors to untruths. South Africa is not our ally. The French Government's condemnation of racial discrimination and other aspects of Pretoria's policy has led it to take an increasingly restrictive approach in its policy regarding the sale of arms and finally to ban any further contract or sale. In spite of that, France and others have been subjected to accusations which are as inappropriate as they are groundless. We do not understand why the sponsors of this draft resolution persisted in these allegations.

56. Similarly France does not wish the measures advocated in this draft resolution to be proposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The policy of *apartheid* is essentially a matter which pits one part of the inhabitants of the Republic of South Africa against their fellow citizens. However deplorable it may be, this policy cannot be equated with a threat to peace within the meaning of the Charter. In any event, it is regrettable that proposals to this effect should be made without the least consultation with members of the Security Council.

57. Nor can France associate itself with the various recommendations of this Assembly proposing the breaking off of all relations with South Africa. It is inconceivable to have a situation in which all those who are suffering because of *apartheid*, be they black or white, would be cut off or isolated from the rest of the international community. Why reduce them to despair by sealing off their few remaining avenues of communication with the outside world? Is it really in the interests of this country's African neighbours to break off the substantial exchanges of all types which they maintain with it? As Mr. de Guiringaud observed during the general debate, the fact that France, like other countries—but doubtless to a less extent than some—maintains trade relations with South Africa should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with its position regarding *apartheid*.

58. Speaking on behalf of the European Community, the representative of the Netherlands rightly pointed out that reference had been made in our debates to principles and concepts that were irrelevant to the subject. It would be regrettable if certain delegations pursued objectives only remotely related to *apartheid*, and sought to damage the many and various links that have so fortunately been established between Western Europe and the countries of Africa in the past 30 years.

59. France cannot lend itself to this game. It wishes to maintain and develop its old and friendly links with all the African countries. Partisan considerations should not, in the end, detract from the effectiveness of our struggle against *apartheid*. I reiterate that we strongly condemn the dangerous and insufferable system which in South Africa separates people from each other, people who are born free and equal. We are in solidarity with the victims of such a system, including political prisoners of all origins, who are the subject of one of today's draft resolutions. We are taking measures we consider to be appropriate. However, it will be understood that we cannot approve of excesses of language which could only lengthen, rather than shorten, the time when the evils from which South Africa is suffering are brought to an end.

60. Mr. GUNA-KASEM (Thailand): My delegation has always abhorred the inhumane practice of *apartheid* and has consequently voted in favour of the 10 draft resolutions submitted this morning. We have difficulty, however, concerning certain paragraphs in some of the draft resolutions, as they use intemperate language and contain sweeping statements with insufficient substantiation. Had there been separate votes on the fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs of draft resolution A/31/L.8, and on operative paragraphs 4 and 10 of draft resolution A/31/L.13, we should have abstained in the vote. My delegation also has reservations concerning operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/31/L.9, and would have abstained had it been put to the vote separately.

61. Mr. KOH (Singapore): This morning my delegation voted in favour of nine draft resolutions and abstained in the vote on one. We have, however, some reservations concerning certain paragraphs in two of the draft resolutions for which we voted. In respect of draft resolution A/31/L.8, we have reservations concerning the fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs, and in respect of draft resolution A/31/L.13, concerning operative paragraph 10. If those paragraphs had been voted upon separately, my delegation would have abstained in the vote.

62. The anti-*apartheid* cause is a just and worthy one, but a just cause must still be pursued by just means. We should be doing the anti-*apartheid* cause a disservice if we were to employ tactics which were ethically questionable. For example, the levelling of accusations which have not been proved and which cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt would not be worthy of our united cause.

63. Mr. VELLA (Malta): I have only a very short statement to make. In a spirit of solidarity we supported the 10 draft resolutions concerning *apartheid*. This, however, does not necessarily mean that we agree with every single word or sentence contained in the preambular or

operative paragraphs. We cannot, for instance, restrict our citizens, since freedom of movement is one of the rights guaranteed by our Constitution.

64. Mr. MORENO MARTINEZ (Dominican Republic) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of the Dominican Republic wishes to place on record that, as proof of our firm support for the struggle against *apartheid*, it voted in favour of all the draft resolutions against *apartheid* except that contained in document A/31/L.9, on which it had to abstain because we considered it to be discriminatory. We would have voted against several paragraphs of several draft resolutions had they been put to the vote separately. Some contain concepts contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter. Others are couched in language which we would have preferred not to use. In other paragraphs there are statements of facts and criteria with which we do not agree. Why, then, did we vote in favour? We did so because, despite the errors in form and substance in these draft resolutions, they contain many truths, and principally one fundamental truth: the situation in Azania is intolerable and demands a solution now; it will brook no delay. It suffices to think that most of those who died at Soweto were not even born when the United Nations adopted its first resolution condemning *apartheid*. It would be inhuman to expect anything else. That would simply mean more suffering for the black people of Azania and less chance of establishing a multiracial society in Azania, where people of all races can live and progress with equal rights and opportunities.

*Mr. Amerasinghe (Sri Lanka) resumed the Chair.*

65. Mr. ERNEMANN (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): Belgium scrupulously implements the resolutions adopted long ago by the Security Council on an arms embargo against South Africa. The system of controls and bans we apply in this regard is compatible with the essential goals pursued by the sponsors of draft resolution A/31/L.8.

66. Belgium had to vote against draft resolution A/31/L.8 as well as against certain draft resolutions submitted to the Assembly at the conclusion of the debate. As was stressed by the representative of the Netherlands in his statement—made on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community—we have had to bear in mind particular considerations which were unacceptable in the documents in question, especially those which point a finger at certain countries.

67. The PRESIDENT: We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote. The representative of Nigeria has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply. It is customary to give any representative who wishes to exercise his right of reply the opportunity to do so at the end of a meeting, but as that would be interrupting the presentation of this item in order to take the next item, I propose, if there is no objection, to call on the representative of Nigeria now.

68. I should like to remind representatives that by decision of the General Assembly statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes.

69. Mr. HARRIMAN (Nigeria): I crave the indulgence of the members of the General Assembly in plenary meeting

here to express a few views on what criticisms we have had since the right of reply commenced this afternoon.

70. First of all, I should like to say that the countries of the European Economic Community [EEC] have stated through the Ambassador of the Netherlands that they would not support language suggesting that the white minority population in South Africa be mainly regarded as colonial settlers who have no right to stay there.

71. It is a great pity that after my detailed explanation on Friday [56th meeting] of what I meant, many delegations, and, in particular, the EEC countries have resorted to this argument in order to create a red herring in support of their very unpopular votes on the draft resolutions before the plenary meeting of the Assembly. We are not stupid people in Africa, neither are the liberation movements the stupid people we try to represent them to be by our lust for profits and for power in the world today, as evinced by the statement by the Ambassador representing the EEC countries.

72. I believe the nationalists of South Africa are not that stupid. No group in South Africa can continue to dominate indefinitely: this is our theory and our premise. No group can expel the other group. It is impossible for even the 18 million black people in South Africa to expel 4 million people. We have never said that, and we will never say that.

73. For this reason, I quoted on Friday the declaration of a number of bodies which I repeat here: the African National Congress of South Africa declared in its charter, paragraph 1—I will not quote the rest—that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and no Government can justify and justly claim authority, unless it is based on the will of the people. This is the argument.

74. Robert Sobukwe, leader of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, declared that everybody who owes his loyalty to Africa should be regarded as an African and that there is only one race—the human race.

75. Even at his trial, Nelson Mandela declared: "I detest racialism because I regard it as a barbaric thing—whether it comes from the black man or the white man."

76. I said all this on Friday to illustrate that when I talked about colonialism I knew exactly what I was talking about, but I did not at any stage imply—as the EEC representative and his supporters claimed that I implied—that it is the policy of the South African blacks to chase out 4 million people. This is an impossibility.

77. As I said, this can never be a realistic policy. Neither can it be a sane way of approaching the problem. Please understand that this has never been the policy of the nationalist movement—neither is it the policy of the Organization of African Unity as stated in the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa.<sup>5</sup>

78. Unless we wish to continue to hoodwink this Assembly, I believe that the EEC group as represented by the

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.



Netherlands understands that what we have been talking about was put in the Freedom Charter.<sup>6</sup> Any settlement in South Africa must be based on the will of all the people.

79. However, there are two reasons why the situation in South Africa should be seen in its true perspective. In the first place, it is a colonial settler situation. South Africa was colonized by the Dutch, at about the same time as colonialism superseded slavery in Africa. The colonization of South Africa was at about the same time as the Portuguese colonization of other parts of Africa.

80. Following the Boer War the British took over and, thereafter, in true Anglo-Saxon spirit, as in Rhodesia, handed over power, under one pretext or the other, to the white settler minority, without conforming to international norms of self-determination, decolonization or majority rule. These norms exist today as they existed then. In fact, colonialism was transferred by the colonial government to the settler population in South Africa and colonialism still continues today in that part of the world.

81. But this argument does not mean that the settlers—like those in East Africa, in Zambia—should be expelled. Rather than conform to international norms of decolonization, settler participation, self-determination and majority rule, the white settler—as you all know—introduced the further offensive and inhumane policy of *apartheid*, which has now set up a programme to grant independence to the blacks. What is “colonizing”? Who grants independence but colonialists? And yet we are told that the expression “settler-colonizers” is offensive.

82. All that is different is that the successor Governments of the white minorities, as in Rhodesia, decided to grant independence to some 200 homelands, with the people who owned the land being deprived of citizenship in their own country. And this is not colonialism! Yet they are granting independence to Transkei and to the other bantustans.

83. Secondly, I think we should conform to certain value judgements when we talk about South Africa. As I said, we should not attempt to hoodwink this Assembly. We were told, in addition, that self-determination, decolonization, liberation and colonialism do not exist. I hope I have proved by my argument that these situations do exist and have been reckoned with by settler colonialist régimes that have decided on a Machiavellian, inhuman scheme for the bantustanization of South Africa.

84. It is very good for us to talk of equal rights as the basis of the struggle. Vorster in a television programme of the Columbia Broadcasting Company only a few days ago said that the South Africans would never grant equal rights and they would fight until the last white man is killed in South Africa. I hope some of us listened to that programme. And yet we talk about options. We talk about “no violence”. We talk about peaceful options not being exercised. How do you exercise peaceful options in South Africa when unarmed children demonstrate and are shot down with automatic weapons? We talk about channels of communication remaining open through universality. What is

universality? Universality based on Western European and EEC collusion with the minority racist régime of South Africa to continue to treat Africans as slaves and to continue with the bantustanization policy that will make them slaves for ever?

85. We talk about universality, but what of legitimacy? I did not know that these were conflicting terms to use in such a context. We talk about “selective reaction” to the situation in South Africa. How do we apply “selective reaction” when there is totalitarianism and people are being killed by the dozens every week for demonstrating without weapons, for demonstrating as students, for trying to be free, for trying to have basic human rights?

86. Some of us here have criticized the Centre against *Apartheid*. We might as well pass a resolution dissolving the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. The Centre against *Apartheid* was set up by this Assembly to support the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. The Centre does not issue one document without the approval of the Committee. We listen to everybody. We accept documentation from everybody. As I emphasized a few days ago, we circulate these copies and ask for reactions. I do assure you that this Jewish document which was circulated a few weeks ago accusing third-world countries of trading with South Africa is being processed and every country involved will be made to react to this publication that has been sent to the Centre. But as I said on Friday, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan were in continual dialogue with South Africa. We have no facilities to confirm the authenticity of the documents. Whenever we receive documents, we circulate them to countries; when the countries send their replies, we publish them. This is all we do. And we get the General Assembly and the various Committees to decide whether these documents are genuine or not and whether the denial or acceptance of the Member States involved is more valid. And it is on this basis that we work as the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. So whoever tries to denigrate the Centre against *Apartheid* and the Special Committee against *Apartheid* should once and for all appreciate what the whole system is about.

87. I should also like to make a brief comment on the theory of the nine members of EEC that a peaceful solution can be promoted through communication with South Africa. It is not my wish to go into this analysis all over again. My views and the views of my Government are very well known: that there is no point—after 15 years of white domination and of Western Powers supporting racist régimes in southern Africa, while socialist and nationalist groups have given support to legitimate liberation movements—if overnight, with the twilight of independence, the Western countries want to be liberal, magnanimous and to move in and to stop the bloodshed, without noticing that blood has been shed in the struggle for liberation for the last 15 years at least.

88. Obviously we all are aware as diplomats that national interests should govern our foreign-policy strategies and tactics. We are all aware that we work for the well-being of our peoples, their investments abroad, their investments at home, their social patterns, and that, in this process, nationalist interest is valid in any form it takes in the pursuit of those objectives. It is when we are told that these

<sup>6</sup> For the text, see *Objective: Justice*, vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1970), pp. 44 and 45.

Western countries come at the last minute to help as they did in the Congo, as they did in Angola, by covert and overt means, in order to “stabilize” those countries and install puppet governments, that we say “No”.

89. Finally, I should like to take this opportunity to thank those members of the Assembly who made kind remarks about the Special Committee. I assure the General Assembly, on behalf of all members of the Special Committee, that this Committee accepts the responsibilities with which it has been charged, and that with dedication and loyalty, we shall continue to uphold these principles and help the struggling peoples of South Africa to achieve basic freedoms and human dignity and to contribute to the welfare of humanity. There can be no new international economic order without a new world order. There can be no strong United Nations without all of us adhering to the principles for which the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and its scion, the Centre against *Apartheid*, were established.

90. We thank all of you who have supported the draft resolutions today. We hope that you will continue to understand the problems as presented by us, and will not let yourselves be diverted from the objective of liberating the people who are struggling and laying down their lives every day in southern Africa.

#### AGENDA ITEM 14

##### Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

91. The PRESIDENT: I invite the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Mr. Sigvard Eklund, to present the report of the Agency for the year 1975.<sup>7</sup>

92. Mr. EKLUND (Director-General, International Atomic Energy Agency): The Agency's *Annual Report*, as circulated under document A/31/171, gives details of our recent activities and I shall confine myself to three main themes, namely, nuclear power, safeguards and technical assistance.

93. Most of us believe, on the basis of tangible experience, that cheap energy, increasingly in the form of electricity, is as imperative for raising the standards of living in developing countries as it is essential to maintain and develop our industrialized societies. Without it, we face stagnation, unemployment and little prospect of increasing the productivity of labour.

94. On the other hand, there are some who maintain that we should put a stop to the growth in energy consumption and even aim at a reduction. I hardly think it is necessary, however, to convince anyone here of the crucial need for more energy to develop their resources, expand their industry and improve conditions of life for their people.

95. One of the tasks of IAEA is to promote nuclear energy as the only immediately available alternative to coal and oil, keeping in mind the dwindling supply of oil. It is also the Agency's task to contribute to the safe and economic

implementation of nuclear power programmes and associated plants.

96. It is paradoxical that this form of energy, which has been proven safe and easily controlled from an environmental point of view, is the one that has come in for the most violent and sustained criticism from environmentalist circles. I said last year<sup>8</sup> that there had not yet been a single fatal accident attributable to the nuclear side of atomic power plants. As of today, this remains true, despite the fact that some plants have been in operation for 20 years and many for 10 years and that we have an aggregate of well over 1,000 reactor-years' experience. Yet, in some countries opposition would bring the nuclear-power programme to a virtual standstill.

97. The focus of opposition changes. Relatively little is now said, at least in better informed circles, about the danger of power-plant accidents. Criticism revolves rather around social and political issues—can society look after nuclear waste over long periods of time? Can we prevent the hijacking of plutonium? Can we prevent the spread of nuclear weapons?

98. The importance of IAEA activities with regard to the last two questions is obvious, and I shall return to these points later. As for the question of long-term nuclear-waste management, let me point out that society generates enormous quantities of virtually permanent toxic materials, which, in contrast to nuclear waste, are not readily identifiable and controlled.

99. Part of the problem may lie in the fact that in the nuclear industry, to an extent quite unequalled in any other industry, we know the risks with which we have to deal. On the other hand, we have little knowledge of the long-term effects on the climate and the atmosphere, and consequently on health, of the burning of fossil fuels—for example the accumulation of sulphur dioxide.

100. The marked economic advantage of nuclear stations over conventional power plants above a certain threshold-size in most parts of the world has been demonstrated and is known. The problems of the nuclear industry therefore do not lie in the field of comparative economics.

101. They are instead to be found in uncertainty about the future of commercial reprocessing of nuclear fuel. Other questions are posed on the storage of spent fuel and waste disposal, the adequacy of fuel supply in the form of reasonably priced uranium, and enrichment capacity. All these problems, which increase the uncertainties of power planners, will be considered at a major international conference in May of next year at Salzburg, Austria, which, as you know, IAEA is organizing. The thrust of this conference is to give energy planners a comprehensive overview of nuclear power and its fuel cycle.

102. A year ago there was grave concern about the adequacy of the world's uranium resources. Recent large discoveries and the rapid rise in the price of uranium have greatly changed this picture. It is now estimated that the

<sup>7</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency, *Annual Report for 1975* (Vienna, July 1976); transmitted to the members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/31/171).

<sup>8</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2403rd meeting.

world's uranium resources amount to about 3.8 million tons against a demand of about 4 million tons in the next 25 years. This sounds very satisfactory. However, only about half of the 3.8 million-ton figure consists of reasonably assured resources. The other half represents projections that still have to be confirmed. We must, therefore, continue to discover and confirm new sources at the rate of 180,000 tons a year and to give a high priority to exploration and to the expansion of mining and milling capacity. It is reasonable to assume that much uranium exists in the relatively unexplored developing areas of the world. Uranium prospection, therefore, continues to be one of the main subjects of the Agency's technical assistance programme, to which I shall allude later.

103. One of the Agency's main tasks is to help maintain the high safety record of the nuclear industry. We are vigorously pursuing the consolidated effort to develop safety codes and guides for all aspects of current nuclear-power plants. I hope that this will help to eliminate whatever doubts may still remain regarding the safety of reactors compared with other modern technological accomplishments.

104. I have also referred to the question of long-term waste disposal. This has already been solved to a considerable extent at the pilot-plant level. It still has to be tackled on a full industrial scale. This is crucial not only to meet the needs of industry, but also to allay fears expressed by the public. The Agency intends to expand its role in this area. We must develop further exchanges of information, promote and co-ordinate research and development and look into the question of organizing multinational deposits of radioactive wastes in suitable underground geological formations.

105. The existing organizational structure and comprehensive programme of the Agency, combined with the competence of its technical and scientific staff, has made it possible to pool together, in what is called a "project team" staff, members from various units of the secretariat in order to deal with a specific, complex problem. The market survey study, the regional nuclear fuel cycle centre study, and the nuclear safety standards project could be quoted as examples.

106. It is my opinion that in the future this "project approach" should be more widely used. This might be enhanced by the introduction of a number of temporary manning-table posts, a new development which I highly recommend. These posts would be strictly limited to the duration of the implementation of a given project and would be automatically dropped from the manning table once the project had been terminated.

107. Let me turn now to the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive capacity. All of you who have followed the newspapers in recent weeks will know the importance that this is assuming in the minds and actions of the world's political leaders. Far-reaching proposals, several of them involving activities of IAEA, have been put forward and are now under discussion.

108. Following a resolution adopted by its General Conference last year, the Agency has conducted consultations

with a number of member States in order to design a realistic programme in the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. In this field, the Agency will continue to formulate recommendations and, if required by member States, it will be prepared to assist in developing international co-operation in various forms to solve problems of common interest.

109. During the next decade or two, and before any multinational fuel-cycle centres come into operation, there may be a growing dispersal of significant amounts of separated plutonium produced by small reprocessing plants, distributed for research and development purposes or stockpiled for one reason or another. Most of such plutonium in the non-nuclear-weapon States will be under Agency safeguards, but the statute, in article XII.A.5, foresees the possibility of additional measures such as the deposit of surplus plutonium with the Agency in Agency-operated storage facilities. Until now, there has been little requirement to call upon these provisions of the statute, but the need is now beginning to emerge.

110. I do not underestimate the problems involved; at the same time, it would be hard to overestimate the importance of international control in this area.

111. In regard to the Agency's safeguards responsibilities, an outstanding event in 1976 was Japan's ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. This brought the number of parties to the Treaty up to 100. It means that all major industrial, non-nuclear-weapon States have accepted the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards régime connected with it. Of the 100, 3 are nuclear-weapon States and more than 70 are developing States. Last June, the Board approved the Agreement with the United Kingdom and the European Atomic Energy Agency [*EURATOM*] to implement the offer that the United Kingdom made to accept IAEA safeguards, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only on its nuclear fuel cycle. A similar agreement with the United States was approved by the Board in September. These figures also show that the non-proliferation Treaty is neither a pressure group of industrial countries nor a group of developing countries.

112. I had hoped to be able to inform the General Assembly at this session that the Safeguards Agreement between EURATOM, the States of the European communities concerned and the Agency under the non-proliferation Treaty had entered into force. However, I have just been informed by the Community that the required procedures for the establishment of the necessary legal instruments have not yet been finalized but that efforts were being pursued to that end. I must draw attention to the fact that, even under the most liberal interpretation, the time-limit set by Treaty for the entry into force of that Agreement is now expiring.

113. A small group of countries that have significant nuclear programmes nevertheless remain outside the scope of the non-proliferation Treaty. This group includes nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States, developed and developing countries. In view of the geographical and political commitment that the 100 ratifications of the Treaty represent, I would earnestly like to suggest that the time may be ripe

for these countries to re-examine the grounds that led them five or six years ago not to join the non-proliferation Treaty system.

114. It is common knowledge that some developing countries have progressed to such an extent in nuclear technology as to be able to manufacture sophisticated equipment and material. I hope that, at the very least, should such countries make available materials or technological knowledge to others, they would do so only on the condition that appropriate safeguards are applied.

115. In its article III, paragraph 2, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recognizes the importance of nuclear supply policy. According to reports, the progress made in the London talks is heartening, and we have seen this year an evolution in safeguards agreements reflecting some of the decisions reached. IAEA is not directly involved in the current intensive discussions on nuclear export policy matters but, as has been the case in the past, I am certain that the Agency will be informed of any decision taken at these discussions which may affect the Agency's safeguards.

116. If I make these suggestions to certain non-nuclear-weapon countries, I must once again remind the nuclear-weapon States of the crucial importance of a complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and the promise contained in article VI of the Treaty. Their own long-term security will be enhanced and the non-proliferation régime that they themselves have striven so hard to achieve would be immensely strengthened if they put an end to all testing of nuclear weapons.

117. How will safeguards develop in the next 10 years? Those countries, developed or developing, which have accepted the non-proliferation Treaty will have all their nuclear work under IAEA safeguards, whereas certain countries which have not accepted the Treaty or have not voluntarily placed all their nuclear activity under IAEA safeguards will be able to develop nuclear techniques of their own towards nuclear explosives or towards nuclear weapons if they so wish. I am sure you agree with me that, to say the least, this is not a satisfactory prospect.

118. If the manufacturing countries wish to avoid the prospect I have referred to, I cannot see any other way than that of stipulating, as an irrevocable condition for the delivery of nuclear material or equipment, that the receiving State accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear programme. I am very firm in my conclusion on this point.

119. The use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has attracted the special attention of the General Assembly in recent years. An intergovernmental *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes open to all interested States—32 at present—was set up by the Board of Governors to report on economic, technical, safety and legal aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions and on the establishment and operation of an international service related to such explosions. The results of this study should help the Agency to give authoritative advice to member States and to the United Nations and to assist member States in carrying out projects connected with peaceful nuclear explosions. The Agency has received a request for

one such project and has arranged for its preliminary evaluation. In this way, IAEA is discharging fully the obligations imposed by its Statute as well as the mandate contained in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. However, one must make sure that the technology employed is sufficiently reliable and safe for the environment—the limited experience available still needs a great deal of development. The Agency's activity in this complex field is of interest to both the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly of the United Nations and will no doubt be thoroughly examined at the next Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1980. In this respect, the proposed establishment of a United Nations centre for disarmament is to be welcomed.

120. The Agency's technical assistance activities are directly affected by member States' voluntary contributions to the general fund, the target of which has increased from \$1.5 million in 1959 to \$6 million in 1977. In terms of purchasing power, this increase cannot be regarded as large, especially if you also recall that this sum is to be spread over such a wide field of activities and among so many developing countries—it represents less than 1 per cent of the cost of a single nuclear power plant.

121. The lack of funds has been hampering our technical assistance programme throughout its existence, but it is gratifying to see that in the past five years increasing amounts have been received from the United Nations Development Programme as member States include more nuclear projects in their country programmes.

122. The Agency, as well as other United Nations bodies, is concerned about the growing cost of providing technical assistance, particularly the cost of experts. It has therefore decided to undertake two experimental projects designed to reduce its costs by subcontracting all the substantial components of the projects to an institute or semi-official body that would be responsible for arranging training, providing equipment, and so on.

123. For developing countries the front-end problems of the fuel cycle are pre-eminent, especially those so often discussed during the last 20 years: how to finance new plants and how to build up a staff of trained managers, engineers and safety personnel. With the generous help of a number of member States, the Agency has initiated a major training effort. Four large training courses of six to nine months' duration especially designed to help member States that are embarking on nuclear power programmes have been held since the beginning of last year in France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. They will be continued each year with a view to providing training for about 150 to 200 engineers and plant managers from the developing countries, who will be able to acquaint themselves with all aspects of running nuclear power plants. The success of these courses has been largely due to the counterpart contributions of the host Governments and their enthusiastic and efficient support.

124. In order to be able to provide well-based and sound advice to its member States, especially developing countries, the Agency needs to have an adequate knowledge of conventional and emerging alternative power sources. A broad approach to energy matters has been a much



appreciated and valued aspect of our advisory missions to member States, and the question has often been raised whether the Agency should not also have competence in other unconventional energy fields, the potential of which show some promise, at least in the eyes of the general public: for example, solar, geothermal and tidal energy, wind power, and so on. Wider activities in this sense, based on the use of temporary assistance by competent specialists, would not, in my opinion, detract more than marginally from our primary tasks, which already include fusion. On the contrary, they would make the Agency more competent in serving its member States, and especially the developing countries. Such an approach would also help to avoid the creation of additional international organizations in related fields, with the inevitable overlapping of responsibilities and operations which that entails.

125. I would like here to make some personal comments on two suggestions which have been made recently, namely, the holding of a world conference on energy matters and the possible establishment of an international energy institute under the auspices of the United Nations. I am conservative on both questions. We have the 10th World Energy Conference taking place next year in Istanbul and that is, by tradition, a most productive and competent body. Further, we have at least one organization in the United Nations family, IAEA, dealing with one specific form of energy and a number of units in varying degrees of affiliation with the United Nations dealing with other forms of energy. For the sake of efficiency and economy, I believe, as I indicated before, that no new agency need be established for this purpose; and that, instead, every effort should be made to utilize fully the activities of already existing bodies dealing with energy questions.

126. A few words regarding actions taken by our General Conference in September. First, it approved the Agency's programme for 1977-1982 and the budget for 1977, totalling \$51 million, including a target for technical assistance of \$6 million. The General Conference further invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to be represented as an observer at all its sessions, expressed strong condemnation of *apartheid*, and asked the Board of Governors to report to it, at its twenty-first session, next year, on its review of the annual designation of South Africa as the most advanced country from the area of Africa.

127. Construction work in relation to the permanent headquarters of the Agency is progressing and it is now foreseen that the move to the new headquarters will take place in the spring of 1979. The presence of a number of international organizations such as the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which will presumably also move to the new Centre, will certainly facilitate the Agency's work. The same holds true of a number of other organizations, for instance the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. I should also recall that SALT<sup>9</sup> and the MBFR talks<sup>10</sup> are being conducted in Vienna.

<sup>9</sup> Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

<sup>10</sup> Negotiations on mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe.

128. Since its establishment in Vienna 19 years ago, IAEA has enjoyed continuous assistance and understanding from the Austrian authorities and the Austrian Government. I mention this because the General Assembly, later in this session, will discuss the transfer of some United Nations units to the new International Centre in Vienna. We in IAEA will welcome this new staff as colleagues and I am certain that they will be accorded the same consideration and hospitality by the Austrian Government as we have enjoyed throughout these years. For its unsparing efforts to meet our requirements, I should like to express the Agency's gratitude to the Austrian Government.

129. In conclusion, I should like to recall that 20 years ago, on 26 September 1956, the Agency's statute was signed upon completion of the Conference on the Statute which had assembled here at United Nations Headquarters. During all this time, the Agency has enjoyed the full support of the United Nations and, in noting this, I would like to express the Agency's deep appreciation for this indispensable support.

130. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly, I should like to thank the Director-General of IAEA, Mr. Eklund, for his statement introducing the report of the Agency for the year 1975. At the same time, I feel it would be proper for me to express appreciation of the diligence, efficiency and devotion that Mr. Eklund has displayed over the years in the discharge of his enormous responsibility.

131. I now call on the representative of India, who wishes to introduce draft resolution A/31/L.16.

132. Mr. JAIPAL (India): First of all, I should like to place on record my delegation's appreciation of the high quality of leadership provided by Mr. Eklund as Director-General of IAEA. His is a difficult job, because he is virtually presiding over the liquidation of the monopoly system in nuclear technology for peaceful uses. In carrying out this delicate task, he has to avoid incurring the wrath of nuclear Powers as well as the criticisms of developing countries. The fact that he has successfully done so is a tribute to his diplomatic skill. We are glad to say also that he has always been responsive and sympathetic to the needs of developing countries. Under his guidance, the Agency is slowly expanding its activities in areas of great interest to developing countries, especially the introduction and development of nuclear power, nuclear safety and the application of nuclear techniques in agriculture.

133. We have studied the Agency's annual report and we have listened with attention to the statement of the Director-General of IAEA this afternoon. We agree with much of what he has said, though not with all. However, we fully support those activities of the Agency that are of interest and concern to all member States. We would reiterate in this context that the principal objective of the Agency, as set out in article II of its statute, is "to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". We would therefore expect the Agency to continue to be guided in the performance of its functions primarily by the terms of its own statute.

134. We see from the annual report that the Agency's technical assistance programme has received some addi-

tional voluntary contributions, but even so, the programme seems to be relatively modest in relation to the growing importance of nuclear energy. An expenditure of only \$US 6 million on technical assistance out of a total budget of \$51 million seems to be a little out of proportion to the primary objective of the Agency. According to the annual report, coal and nuclear energy from fission will be the main source in the foreseeable future for the generation of electricity. Also, nuclear energy has been able to maintain its cost advantage over coal and oil. One may, therefore, expect further demands for an increase in the technical assistance programme. Nuclear power has now become an accepted alternative to conventional power, and many developing countries have embarked on nuclear power programmes. But of late there have been certain trends which, unless checked, may inhibit the projected growth of nuclear power. It is quite natural therefore for developing countries to be concerned about the attitude of certain donors who wish to impose restrictions on recipients on a selective basis. We would hope that as a rule technical assistance would be provided strictly on a non-discriminatory basis, which is after all the only basis sanctioned by the Agency's statute.

135. We observe that the Agency has undertaken a study of the establishment of regional fuel-cycle centres. We trust that political considerations will not enter into the question of where to locate such centres. The Agency is also engaged in the preparation of codes of practice and safety guides for nuclear power plants. Here again, we would expect the Agency to make sure that the codes and guides are related exclusively to considerations of safety, and that their effectiveness is not diluted by other considerations.

136. The *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes has made some progress in identifying the major practical applications and potential benefits of this technology. It is unfortunate, however, that some

quarters still choose to ignore the beneficial aspects of this technology for their own reasons, which are neither technical nor scientific. The participation of a large number of States in the work of this Group is clear evidence of their interest in this technology. The appraisal of this technology should therefore be insulated from extraneous political considerations.

137. As regards the Agency's safeguard activities, my delegation continues to be of the opinion that safeguard functions should be strictly governed by the provisions of the Agency's statute. The introduction of any new safeguard concepts that might alter the rationale and structure of the Agency's present system of safeguards would not be acceptable to all the Member States. We trust, therefore, that the Agency will not introduce new restrictions or unilateral procedures that would impose limits on the growth of nuclear power and technology, since it holds great promise for the future of developing countries. It is the Standing Advisory Group on safeguards implementation which should advise the Agency on the technical aspects of the effectiveness of safeguards, leaving aside all other issues. It is not acceptable to us either in logic or morality that only the recipients of assistance should be subjected to safeguards and not all the suppliers. The notion that some States are more responsible than others is quite repugnant to us, and I am sure it is repugnant to others also.

138. In conclusion, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/31/L.16 sponsored by India, Poland and Senegal. The draft resolution is quite non-controversial. It takes note of the report of the Agency; it welcomes the conclusion of safeguards agreements during last year; and it urges all States to continue their co-operation with the Agency. I trust therefore that the draft resolution will be adopted unanimously.

*The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.*