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*President:* Mr. Hamilton Shirley AMERASINGHE  
(Sri Lanka).

**AGENDA ITEMS 31 AND 32**

**International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space**

**Preparation of an international convention on principles governing the use by States of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space**

**REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/31/285)**

1. Mr. SHRESTHA (Nepal), Rapporteur of the First Committee: I have the honour of presenting to the General Assembly the report of the First Committee on agenda items 31 and 32 [A/31/285].

2. The First Committee considered the two items simultaneously. Its consideration of the items resulted in the unanimous adoption of the draft resolution which appears in paragraph 14 of its report.

3. On behalf of the First Committee, I commend the draft resolution to the General Assembly for adoption.

*Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the First Committee.*

4. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the First

Committee in paragraph 14 of its report [A/31/285]. The report of the Fifth Committee on the administrative and financial implications of the draft resolution is contained in document A/31/319. Since the First Committee adopted the draft resolution unanimously, may I take it that the General Assembly wishes to do the same?

*The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 31/8).*

**AGENDA ITEM 124**

**Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations**

**REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/31/305)**

5. The PRESIDENT: Before we consider the report of the First Committee on this item, I should like to invite the Assembly's attention to the decision it adopted at its 16th meeting on 4 October 1976, when the Assembly allocated agenda item 124 to the First Committee for consideration and report. On that occasion, the Assembly also decided that, at the appropriate stage, the item would be referred to the Sixth Committee for examination of its legal implications. At the 16th meeting, when the General Committee's recommendation was being considered, I referred to the discussion in the General Committee on the allocation of this item and stated that it was my understanding that it was agreed that the item would be referred to the Sixth Committee promptly upon completion of its consideration in the First Committee.

6. As the First Committee has now completed its consideration of this item for this session, it is for the General Assembly to take a decision on the report submitted by the First Committee, after which the Sixth Committee will be requested to consider the legal implications of the item. Reference of the item to the Sixth Committee should not prejudice the consideration of the report of the First Committee on this item by the Assembly at this stage.

7. It would be in keeping with both the letter and the spirit of the General Assembly's decision at its 16th meeting and with my understanding of it that the Sixth Committee should report to the Assembly as early as possible and before the end of this session.

8. I therefore suggest that the Assembly should proceed immediately to consider the report of the First Committee and to take a decision on it, and that the Assembly should then request the Sixth Committee to consider the item in the manner outlined by me. May I take it that the General Assembly agrees to this suggestion?

*It was so decided.*

9. Mr. SHRESTHA (Nepal), Rapporteur of the First Committee: I have the honour to present to the General Assembly the report of the First Committee on agenda item 124 [A/31/305].

10. At the conclusion of its deliberations on this agenda item, the Committee adopted the draft resolution which appears in paragraph 5 of the report. At the 21st meeting of the Committee, the representative of Mali stated that had his delegation been present at the time of voting it would have voted in favour of the draft resolution. Since the report contained in document A/31/305 had already been issued at the time the representative of Mali made his statement, it was not possible to include his statement in that report. However, I recommend to the General Assembly that his statement be included in the final report.

11. On behalf of the First Committee, it is my pleasure to recommend to the General Assembly that it adopt the draft resolution to which I have just referred.

12. The PRESIDENT: I take it that the Assembly agrees to the recommendation that the request of the representative of Mali be complied with. As there is no objection, it is so decided.

*It was so decided.*

*Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the First Committee.*

13. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now proceed to vote on the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee in paragraph 5 of its report [A/31/305]. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

*Against:* Albania, China.

*Abstaining:* Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Canada, Chad, Chile, Denmark, Fiji, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Netherlands, New

Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 88 votes to 2, with 31 abstentions (resolution 31/9).<sup>1</sup>*

14. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Bangladesh to explain his vote.

15. Mr. KARIM (Bangladesh): During the debate on this item in the First Committee my delegation expressed its views in detail on item 124. We welcomed the Soviet proposal as one deserving in-depth examination, particularly since it had emanated from a permanent member of the Security Council. We also expressed the view that:

“... the only meaningful exercise is to determine what can be done practically to constrain and limit the use of force and resort to intervention in the affairs of other States, rather than to adopt a Utopian instrument which will remain only as a devout universal wish without practical manifestation or utility.<sup>2</sup>

16. Unfortunately, the consideration of this item in the First Committee revealed a basic division in the receptivity of this important initiative, as all other permanent members of the Security Council either opposed, or abstained in the vote on, the draft resolution. Such a position, we believe, is not conducive to a practical follow-up of this question, especially when some of the difficulties expressed were procedural in content. In the circumstances, my delegation, while reiterating the need for further examination of the question, has abstained in the vote on the draft resolution on this item.

17. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Soviet Union, who has asked to speak at this time.

18. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The discussion at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly of the item put forward on the initiative of the Soviet Union with regard to the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations has confirmed the importance and timeliness of bringing this issue up in the United Nations. The discussion and the results of the voting showed that a large majority of States are interested in working out such a treaty, which should prove a serious deterrent to the threat or use of force in relations among States. Therefore it would also be an important contribution to the strengthening of world peace and an effective measure against aggression.

19. Many delegations have correctly pointed out that the proposal to conclude such a world treaty is in keeping with

<sup>1</sup> The delegations of the Congo, Costa Rica and Qatar subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the draft resolution. The delegation of Luxembourg subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as an abstention.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, First Committee, 17th meeting.*

the most profound aspirations of peoples. It is aimed at lessening the threat of war, creating favourable conditions for progress in disarmament and giving a new and powerful impetus to the development of the process of the relaxation of international tensions and to the broadening of many-sided co-operation among States with different social systems.

20. The serious and responsible approach to this problem is indicated by the fact that in the resolution just adopted it is pointed out that it is necessary that States continue to study the draft world treaty submitted by the Soviet Union as well as the proposals and statements made during consideration of the item. There is also a provision for continuation of the discussion of the matter at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly.

21. Thus we can note with satisfaction that there was a broad measure of approval not only of the idea of the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations but also of the main points suggested for inclusion in such a treaty.

22. By adopting this resolution the General Assembly has taken a serious step towards the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force, and the Soviet Union expresses the sincere hope that States will make every effort to continue the constructive study of this very topical international problem.

23. The conclusion of the treaty would bring us much closer to meeting mankind's age-old desire to create a world without weapons and a world without wars; it would also increase the effectiveness of the United Nations in strengthening international peace and security.

24. For its part the Soviet Union, which has consistently and unswervingly followed the Leninist policy of peace, will also in the future spare no effort to achieve these noble aims.

25. The PRESIDENT: That concludes the consideration of the report of the First Committee on this item during this session. The item will now be referred to the Sixth Committee, which will consider its legal implications and report to the Assembly as early as possible and before the end of this session.

#### AGENDA ITEM 51

**Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation**

#### REPORT OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/31/293)

26. Mr. HAYNES (Guyana), Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee: I have the honour and the privilege to submit to the General Assembly the report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 51 [A/31/293].

27. As can be seen in the report, the Special Political Committee examined the item at its 3rd and 4th meetings. The Committee had before it the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [A/31/229].

28. During the debate, in which representatives of 17 Member States made statements, satisfaction with the work being done by the Scientific Committee was expressed. The growing co-operation between the Scientific Committee and the United Nations Environment Programme was also noted with satisfaction. The statements also indicated the keen interest with which Member States are awaiting the comprehensive report to be submitted by the Scientific Committee to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

29. At the 3rd meeting a draft resolution was introduced by Australia. It was adopted by acclamation at the 4th meeting. The text of the draft resolution is contained in paragraph 7 of the report of the Special Political Committee.

30. The draft resolution requests the Scientific Committee to continue its work, including its important co-ordination activities, to increase knowledge of the level and effects of atomic radiation from all sources.

*Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Special Political Committee.*

31. The PRESIDENT: We shall now proceed to a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Special Political Committee in paragraph 7 of its report [A/31/293]. As no delegation wishes to explain its vote before the voting, and as the Special Political Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote, may I take it that the General Assembly wishes to do likewise?

*The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 31/10).*

#### AGENDA ITEM 118

#### Question of Cyprus

32. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Turkey has asked to make a statement, and I now call on him.

33. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): As we begin the debate on the question of Cyprus, I should like to stress the procedural aspect of this problem, an aspect which has a direct and important bearing on the outcome of our deliberations.

34. This afternoon we shall hear the views of the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, who will present the views of one of the parties to the dispute. The other party, the Turkish community, undoubtedly has the same capacity to make a contribution to the settlement of this dispute, which is of such importance for peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

35. The General Assembly and the Security Council, in all the resolutions they have adopted since the Greek coup against the independence of Cyprus was carried out in July 1974, have identified and recognized the Turkish community as one of the negotiating parties. It would be untenable, therefore, to deny that the discussion of the question of Cyprus, the views of the Turkish community are as important to the members of the General Assembly

as those of the Greek community. Yet the procedure which was adopted early in this session for the discussion of the Cyprus question falls significantly short of enabling the communities to present their views on the basis of equality.

36. The Turkish delegation has made its position amply clear in this regard, both in the General Committee and in the General Assembly on 24 September [4th meeting]. The suspension of the debate in the Assembly for one day so as to refer the matter to the Special Political Committee, to enable the two communities to express their views, is inadequate. That procedure deprives the Turkish community of an opportunity to participate in the debate proper, which will resume in the Assembly after the meeting of the Special Political Committee. That procedure is also unfair, not only because it denies the Turkish community the opportunity to participate in the debate, but also because it magnifies the unequal treatment accorded to the two communities, by enabling the Greek community to double its voice and speak in yet another capacity—that of the Greek community—in addition to its capacity as the so-called Government of Cyprus. Mr. Christophides will claim to speak on its behalf. Why, then, should we hear in the Special Political Committee another representative of the Greek community, who this time will speak on behalf of the Greek community?

37. The matter is indeed simple. It is our belief that we are bound to adopt a procedure which, by taking full account of the realities, will enhance the possibilities for a fair and constructive debate.

38. What I have just said would in itself justify a reconsideration of the procedure adopted early in this session. But there is yet another factor to be borne in mind. During the debate on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa [item 52], the representatives of national liberation movements of South Africa were invited to participate in the debate in the Assembly. That was a move which the Turkish delegation, along with many others, warmly welcomed. The Turkish community in Cyprus, like the South African liberation movements, is a political organization with definite political goals and aspirations. The South African movements aspire to and struggle for the attainment of their legitimate rights and majority rule. The Turkish community aspires to and struggles for partnership in the bicomunal Republic of Cyprus, as well as the safeguarding of its legitimate rights in an independent and sovereign Cyprus. In both cases they are political entities, recognized by the United Nations as parties to the problem under consideration.

39. For those reasons my delegation proposes the reconsideration of the procedure adopted for the question of Cyprus on 24 September. We make that proposal in accordance with rule 81 of the rules of procedure. In order to dispel any misunderstanding, I wish to make it quite clear that this motion cannot and should not be construed as implying a challenge to the rulings of the President. Our proposal is simple. We think there is a case for reconsideration, and we request a vote under rule 81. That rule stipulates that such reconsideration requires a decision by a two-thirds majority. My delegation asks for a recorded vote.

40. The PRESIDENT: Members will recall that the General Assembly at its 4th meeting, held on 24 September 1976, decided that when it took up the present item it would invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to speak in the Committee in order to express their views. It was also understood that the General Assembly would then resume its consideration of the item, taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee.

41. The representative of Turkey has just proposed that the General Assembly reconsider its decision, a proposal which requires a decision under rule 81 of the rules of procedure. That rule reads:

“When a proposal has been adopted or rejected”—in this case it was adopted—“it may not be considered at the same session unless the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decides. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be immediately put to the vote.”

42. I shall now call on two representatives who wish speak against the motion submitted by the representative Turkey.

43. Mr. CHRISTOPHIDES (Cyprus): The representative of Turkey has raised an issue on which a decision has already been taken by the General Assembly. On the recommendation of the General Committee, the General Assembly decided on 24 September that the question of Cyprus, agenda item 118, should be considered in the Assembly and that the representatives of the two Cypriot communities should be heard in the Special Political Committee, which would then report to the General Assembly.

44. The representative of Turkey now proposes a reconsideration of that decision and therefore, as he has very rightly pointed out, rule 81 of the rules of procedure is applicable.

45. My delegation strongly opposes the Turkish motion; indeed it opposes any change in the decision already taken. We do so for several reasons.

46. The Turkish Cypriot community is a minority community in a Member State duly represented in this Organization by its legitimate Government, which is recognized as such by the total membership of the United Nations with the exception, of course, of Turkey. As such, the Turkish Cypriot community cannot appear in the Assembly, which is a forum reserved for Governments. Otherwise, we suggest, a very dangerous precedent would be created, which would open a Pandora's box enabling any dissident group or tribe or community from a Member State to claim to speak in this Assembly—and I do not think there are many countries in which there is not more than one ethnic community.

47. At this moment I do not want to enter into the more substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem, which will no doubt be considered in the course of the debate. The position of the Turkish community is clearly distinguish-

able and different from that of the liberation movements allowed to speak in connexion with agenda item 52, on *apartheid*, as, indeed, the President of the General Assembly clearly pointed out in his letter to the Turkish representative [A/31/290]. We consider the statement of the Turkish representative, in which he compares the position of the Turkish Cypriot community to that of the liberation movements, an offence against the liberation movements. In fact, the Turkish Cypriot community's so-called government in Cyprus is very similar to that of Ian Smith in Rhodesia.

48. On the other hand, under the decision of the General Assembly which is now being challenged the Turkish Cypriot community can, if it so wishes, have a full opportunity to express its point of view—as indeed can the Greek Cypriot community—before the Special Political Committee, as was the case at the past two sessions. Therefore there is no question of what Turkey considers to be an effort to deprive that community of the opportunity of being heard.

49. The proposal is a disguised effort to ensure that some semblance of recognition be obtained for the so-called Federated Turkish State of Cyprus, whose establishment has been recognized by none and has, if anything, been rejected, notably by the Security Council. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership wish to create the false impression that they appear on a fully equal footing with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, which is recognized as such by this Organization and its individual Members alike.

50. I will not go further at this point, except to appeal to all those delegations which genuinely respect and support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus not to be misled by the seemingly innocuous manner in which the matter has been presented. The implications of this motion by Turkey are evident and speak eloquently for themselves.

51. It is for those reasons that I oppose the proposal to reconsider the decision already taken.

52. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): As was the case last year when the General Assembly faced a very similar situation, my delegation again categorically opposes the proposal to reconsider the decision adopted on 24 September concerning the procedure to be followed in the examination of the Cyprus question.

53. We oppose such reconsideration first and foremost because we believe the proposal tends to complicate examination of this matter. If the General Assembly were by a two-thirds majority to decide to reconsider its decision of 24 September, that would reopen a procedural discussion and we do not believe such a discussion would in any way contribute to an adequate examination of this important question.

54. However, I want it to be clearly understood that my delegation will of course be gratified to hear the explanations and to take note of the information that may be vouchsafed to the Special Political Committee by the representatives of the Cypriot communities and, as in the past, we shall support the procedure by which those

statements can be heard in the Committee. We believe that that might ensure adequate examination of the question.

55. But at the same time I wish it to be clearly understood that my delegation is in favour of a solution being found to the problems confronting Cyprus, in a spirit of understanding and in the interests of the peaceful development of the population, regardless of its national origin or its cultural or historical background.

56. However, we believe that the mere fact of proposing to the General Assembly that it reconsider a procedural decision arrived at in September bespeaks a prejudgement of the very development of the debate and constitutes an act of injustice to a State Member of this Organization. States Members of the United Nations cannot be divided up into communities or groups according to the views, opinions or whims of any. The States Members of the Organization are equal, sovereign States, and, as such, we owe them equal respect.

57. We believe that to present matters in such a way as to imply that the Assembly does not include a sovereign, independent State called Cyprus, which is being legitimately represented by its Government here, which has never been censured by this Assembly, which has never been condemned by us and has never been treated by the international community in the same way as the South African régime, would be unjust, incorrect, unseemly and inadmissible. The comparison between the Cyprus and South Africa situations does justice neither to Cyprus nor to the African continent, and therefore we believe it is a somewhat invidious comparison.

58. In our view, to try to deal with the representation of the Cypriot State, a State Member of the United Nations, as though that State did not exist, as though it represented only part of the population, would be to ignore the principle of the sovereign equality of States. It would be an act of interference in the domestic affairs of Cyprus. It would be to ignore its territorial integrity. It would, in fact, be nothing less than an open invitation to the Assembly to declare itself, before examining the substance of the matter, in favour of the dismemberment of a Member State of this Organization.

59. For this reason, my delegation categorically opposes the motion to reconsider the decision adopted on 24 September, and we trust that the General Assembly will reject it.

60. The PRESIDENT: Two speakers having spoken against the motion, after which, in accordance with rule 81 of the rules of procedure, it shall immediately be put to the vote. Rule 81 states that:

“When a proposal has been adopted or rejected, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decides.”

61. A roll-call vote has been requested on the motion of the representative of Turkey that the decision of the General Assembly taken at its 4th plenary meeting, held on Friday, 24 September, be reconsidered. That decision was

that when the item was taken up in the plenary meeting in accordance with the General Assembly decision on the allocation of items it would invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to speak in the Committee. It was also understood that the General Assembly would then resume its consideration of the item, taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee.

62. The Assembly will now proceed to the vote on the Turkish motion that the General Assembly reconsider its decision.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Czechoslovakia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan.

*Against:* Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Republic, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus.

*Abstaining:* Denmark, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Surinam, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Brazil, Chile, Colombia.

*The motion was rejected by 70 votes to 23, with 35 abstentions.<sup>3</sup>*

63. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote.

64. Mr. SHERER (United States of America): I want to state that the vote cast by the United States delegation is a

reflection of our view that there should be an opportunity for full discussion in an appropriate forum of any issue that a Member of the United Nations has good reason to consider to be important. Our vote is without prejudice to our position with respect to Cyprus to the appropriate allocation of the item on Cyprus or to our position that only representatives of Member States should be entitled to address the Assembly in plenary meeting.

65. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I cast my vote on behalf of the country that I represent in favour of the Turkish motion, not for reasons of solidarity, but because I thought it was a reasonable request on the part of Turkey, particularly since the Turkish Cypriots are in the minority in Cyprus and, *noblesse oblige*, the majority, which happens to be ethnically Greek and which, I am sure, yearns for peace as much as does the Turkish minority, should have yielded to the request by the representative of Turkey, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, that they be allowed to make their views known before this Assembly.

66. Furthermore, I must recall to the old-timers that this hall does not confer any privilege, to any subject that is being discussed in it. In fact, those who sit in the Special Political Committee are identical with those who are sitting here, and they are instructed as to their policies, and nothing will change. I told some of my colleagues before they voted against the motion that it is not a question of taking sides but rather a question of some who think themselves stronger and more numerous on the island seeking a rapport, even in the United Nations, instead of talking of peace and making things more difficult because of antagonism.

67. We are reaching a point where many of us are voting by groups and out of solidarity. I have the honour to represent a country that has its own mind. I do not say this to be derogatory about the others; they receive their instructions even though they act in solidarity. Solidarity is all right if it is fair and is based on ultimate justice—and there is no absolute justice.

68. Therefore, I had no choice but to vote as I did.

69. Let me say one more thing. There are always loop-holes when things get to a state such as we witnessed today. It may be recalled that I said last year that either the representative of Turkey or I would read the statement of Mr. Denktas if he were not allowed to appear. It is the words that count, not the person standing at the rostrum. The person is only an instrument of policy. Therefore, there are two courses open to our Turkish colleagues: either to read the statement here or to paraphrase it in the Special Political Committee—not by reading it themselves but by having it read by the Turkish Cypriots.

70. So there is always a way out, and we should have saved ourselves a great deal of trouble had we not given this hall a sort of aura that it does not have. The question would have been more intimately discussed had we discussed it in the Special Political Committee, where there is, perhaps, more of a give-and-take than is the case here; here there is more propaganda and the championing of one cause against another, when the spirit of the United Nations should be to bring parties together.

<sup>3</sup> The delegations of the Bahamas and Bhutan subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been against the motion.

71. I think that in future we should not repeat the mistake of giving this hall more importance than is its due, with all due respect to the majority vote cast against the Turkish proposal.

72. Mr. ASHTAL (Democratic Yemen): The delegation of Democratic Yemen voted against the Turkish proposal to allow representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community to address the General Assembly, because the acceptance of such a proposal, in our opinion, would have implied the acceptance of a divided Cyprus. It would, furthermore, undermine the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, which we fully respect.

73. The delegation of Democratic Yemen would not have opposed such a move had it been proposed in any one of the Committees because we, too, wish the Turkish Cypriot community to be heard in the United Nations; we did oppose it in the General Assembly, because it would imply that that community had a sovereign right as a State.

74. The PRESIDENT: There are no further representatives wishing to speak in explanation of vote.

75. I should now like to suggest that the General Assembly invite the Special Political Committee to meet tomorrow, Tuesday, 9 November, in order to hear the views of the representatives of the Cypriot communities. The General Assembly would then resume its consideration of this item on Wednesday morning, 10 November. May I take it that the General Assembly agrees to that suggestion?

*It was so decided.*

76. The PRESIDENT: In this connexion I should like to inform the General Assembly that previously the meetings of the Special Political Committee devoted to the question of Cyprus were provided with verbatim records. May I take it that the General Assembly wishes to make like provision this year in regard to the meetings of the Special Political Committee which will be held tomorrow on the question of Cyprus?

*It was so decided.*

77. The PRESIDENT: I should like also to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed on Wednesday, 10 November, at 5 p.m.

*It was so decided.*

78. The PRESIDENT: We shall now proceed to consider the item.

79. Mr. CHRISTOPHIDES (Cyprus): Over two years have elapsed since Turkey's aggressive invasion of my country, and the Cyprus crisis persists with an ever growing threat to international peace and security. The tragedy of the people of Cyprus painfully drags on, and, under a false quietude, there evolves and unfolds the sinister plan of Turkey for the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus.

80. The designs of Ankara against Cyprus are now manifestly clear. The aggressive occupation of 40 per cent of the island's territory by the continued illegal presence on

the territory of Cyprus of 40,000 Turkish troops, causing untold misery to the Cypriot people, Greek and Turkish alike, and Ankara's policy of faits accomplis give a clear indication of its designs. Beyond this, the prevention by force of the return of the refugees to their homes and lands, the daily expulsions of the remaining Greek Cypriots from the occupied area, the colonization of that area by the mass transfer of settler-colonizers from Turkey and Ankara's refusal to negotiate meaningfully and constructively, openly reveal the true dimensions of such designs.

81. Turkey in Cyprus unhesitatingly violated international law, all basic human rights and every concept of truth. All actions of Turkey, and indeed its whole conduct in Cyprus, are directed to serve its expansionist policy, the tragic victim of which is the people of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike.

82. Ankara has attempted to cover up its devious plans by a pretence of concern for the Cypriots. However, what relation could there be between the welfare of the Cypriot people, or even the protection of the Turkish Cypriots, and the presence of 40,000 troops in non-aligned Cyprus perpetrating all kinds of atrocities and inhuman acts against both Greek and Turkish Cypriots? What relation could there be between Turkey's alleged concern for the Cypriots and the harassment and daily expulsions of the Greek Cypriots still remaining in the occupied area? What relation can there be between the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots and the implantation in their midst of tens of thousands of settler-colonizers from Turkey?

83. Ankara's allegations have been proved false by time and events. Its myths have been exploded and have become submerged under the weight of the inhuman policies it follows and the brutal crimes of its military forces. Turkey appears today without disguise as the mighty conqueror in a small and defenceless country which it tries to dismember permanently by force and even, if possible, to eliminate from among the Members of the United Nations.

84. For the third consecutive year, Cyprus appears before this Assembly seeking support for its survival as a sovereign, independent, territorially whole and non-aligned country. Our pleas in 1974 and 1975 did not go unheeded. The General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session adopted resolution 3212 (XXIX) and at its thirtieth session resolution 3395 (XXX), providing the framework and the guidelines for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. These and other United Nations resolutions expressly call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops without delay, for the urgent return of the refugees to their homes in safety, for meaningful and constructive negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be freely conducted with a view to solving the constitutional issue. They also call upon Turkey to abstain from unilateral actions, including actions aimed at changing the demographic structure of Cyprus.

85. Since the Turkish aggression, a total of 16 resolutions on Cyprus have been adopted by the United Nations, 13 by the Security Council and 3 by the General Assembly. None of these resolutions has been respected by Turkey, not even the landmark resolution 3212 (XXIX) for which it voted, and none of their provisions has it implemented. Sixteen

United Nations resolutions have met with the full contempt of Ankara and have been treated by it as mere scraps of paper.

86. Ankara alleges that it wants a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem. Since this is also the objective of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, why, then, does Ankara not proceed with their implementation, thus proving the truth of its allegations and the sincerity of its intentions? Turkey's refusal to comply with the resolutions can be given one of two interpretations: either the United Nations resolutions do not aim at a just and lasting solution or Turkey itself does not aspire to such a solution. I do not think that it is difficult to conclude which of the two interpretations is the correct one.

87. In an attempt to create confusion and to cover up its aggressive acts against Cyprus and in a vain effort to absolve itself from the heavy responsibility that falls upon it for the non-implementation of those resolutions, Turkey tries to present the problem of Cyprus as an issue that can be solved by negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as provided in the relevant United Nations resolutions. But the purpose of the negotiations is clearly and unambiguously stated in the resolutions. The negotiations are concerned only with the constitutional aspect of the problem, which is distinct from the withdrawal of the foreign troops and the return of the refugees to their homes which, as demanded in the resolutions, should precede, not follow, the negotiations.

88. For how could the people of Cyprus, of whatever origin, bring about by themselves the termination of the aggression and the occupation of their country by a foreign Power and in what way could they be expected to negotiate their future freely with the presence of a powerful army of occupation looming large on their territory? It should be stressed that the Cyprus problem is not in its essence one between the two Cypriot communities, but a problem of aggression by Turkey against Cyprus.

89. The contemptuous disregard shown by Turkey for United Nations resolutions on Cyprus proves beyond any reasonable doubt that Ankara does not aspire to a solution in accordance with internationally accepted principles. Turkey neither desires nor seeks a just and lasting solution. What Turkey wants is a settlement that in name would be called federation but in reality would be tantamount to partition. It is trying to impose a solution that would permit it at present to annex *de facto* the occupied part of Cyprus and at the same time create conditions allowing it to occupy the whole of Cyprus at the first opportune date. Ankara is after a solution which would leave Cyprus at its mercy. While such a solution would for Turkey be "just" and "lasting", for Cyprus it would mean a new tragedy with incalculable and painful consequences.

90. It is indeed those plans that are served by the policy of *faits accomplis* which Turkey follows in Cyprus. By a series of illegal and arbitrary acts—which Turkey calls "new realities"—it tries to pave the way for the implementation of its insidious designs. And while, in order to create false impressions and mislead world public opinion, Ankara proclaims that it wishes Cyprus to remain independent, sovereign, territorially whole and non-aligned, at the same

time it works systematically and laboriously for an island dependent, dominated, territorially mutilated and, in essence, aligned with Turkey—a form of protectorate anachronistic in the era of the United Nations.

91. The feigned participation of the Turkish side in the intercommunal talks should also be viewed in the light of Turkey's designs against Cyprus. Turkey's attitude in the talks has been procrastinating and dilatory, and the Turkish presence at the negotiating table is not motivated by any desire for the achievement of a just solution of the Cyprus problem. Ankara, in fact, uses the period of the talks for the purpose of consolidating its position in the occupied area through a series of *faits accomplis* and for heading off international efforts for a just solution, on the pretext that negotiations are in progress. In this respect it may be recalled that Turkey, deliberately evading such efforts, rejected outright the Soviet proposal for a wider international conference on Cyprus, which my Government accepted.

92. Whenever Turkey is given friendly advice to make concessions in Cyprus, it always invokes the intercommunal talks and does nothing; so does the Turkish Cypriot representative at the talks, whose instructions from Ankara are strict and unequivocal: to prevent any progress in the talks and lead them by any means to stagnation—even if that involves the breaking of promises and renegeing on agreements and undertakings. It is obvious that Turkey is interested not in meaningful and constructive negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem, but only in a semblance of negotiations that would allow it to consolidate its stronghold on the island.

93. The Greek Cypriot side placed much hope in the intercommunal talks and approached them with goodwill and a spirit of compromise. Sincerely wishing for a just solution of the Cyprus problem through a constructive dialogue, the Greek Cypriot side participated in the talks with the reasonable expectation that the Turkish side would negotiate meaningfully and constructively and that Turkey, in compliance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, would—if not in advance at least in a parallel way—set in motion measures for the withdrawal of its troops from Cyprus and the return of the refugees to their homes.

94. Those hopes and expectations have unfortunately been belied. Not only has Turkey failed to fulfil its own obligations under the United Nations resolutions, it has also prevented a meaningful dialogue by undermining the talks through a policy of broken promises and intervening *faits accomplis*.

95. A recent example of the negative attitude of the Turkish side towards the talks is the breaking of its express commitment to put forward concrete proposals at the negotiating table. At the fifth round of the intercommunal talks held last February in Vienna under the auspices and direction of the Secretary-General of the Organization, it was agreed that the two sides should exchange within a fixed time limit concrete proposals on all aspects of the Cyprus problem. The Greek Cypriot side, adhering to its undertaking, submitted within the prescribed period concrete proposals on all aspects of the problem. Those



proposals have been characterized by independent observers as constructive and realistic. The Turkish side has, however, in breach of its express undertaking, refused to submit any concrete proposals on the most crucial aspect of the Cyprus problem, namely, the territorial. It confined itself to referring only to generalities and some nebulous notions, which it chose to describe euphemistically and arbitrarily, as "criteria". To this date the Turkish side persists in its refusal to honour the commitment it had solemnly undertaken in the presence of the Secretary-General.

96. Another agreement flagrantly violated by Turkey is the humanitarian one reached during the third round of the intercommunal talks, held in Vienna in August 1975. Turkey, as is well known, has turned that agreement into a painful exercise of bad faith and broken promises. In the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, under whose auspices and direction, as I have already mentioned, the intercommunal talks are held, it was agreed that the Turkish Cypriots who remained in the Government-controlled areas would be allowed to move to the Turkish-held areas, and that the Greek Cypriots who remained in the occupied areas would be free to stay there and would be given every facility to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and the practice of their religious rites, as well as medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the occupied area. It was also agreed that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus would have free and normal access to the Greek Cypriot villages in the occupied areas.

97. Turkey, having secured the implementation of those provisions of the agreement which were to its advantage, chose to violate the rest of them and to throw them by the wayside. Not only did the Turkish occupation authorities on various pretexts prohibit teachers, priests and doctors from entering the occupied area, not only did they forcibly prevent the Greek Cypriots who remained in the occupied area from moving freely and leading a normal life, denying the United Nations Force the exercise of its agreed role, but they also embarked upon a process of systematically expelling them through a combination of oppressive tactics, harassment and brute force.

98. Since 2 August 1975, when the humanitarian agreement I have mentioned was signed, until mid-October this year, more than 5,000 Greek Cypriots of a total of 9,000 were expelled from the occupied areas. The expulsions have recently been intensified, as the Turkish army has set as its target the expulsion of all Greek Cypriots from the occupied areas by next spring. These inhuman expulsions accentuate the grave refugee problem, indicate the disquieting dimensions of a human drama and give a pale but telling picture of the tragedy of the Cypriot people.

99. The explanation of the expulsions given by the Turkish side that the people expelled signed "voluntary applications" asking for their transfer to the Government-controlled areas is, to say the least, an offence against the integrity of hundreds of objective observers and an unconvincing attempt to underestimate human intelligence. Ankara cannot conceal any longer the inhuman methods used by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Turkish troops to secure the so-called voluntary exodus of Greek Cypriots from the occupied areas.

100. Restrictions of movement, deprivations, intimidations, continuous harassment and increasing threats to their lives give a grim picture of the living conditions of these people under the Turkish occupation. Faced with such humiliation and physical danger, the forced signing of applications by some people to leave their homes and property to save their lives is being described by the invaders as "voluntary departure".

101. But who would wish by free choice to abandon his ancestral home and the fruits of long labour without serious reasons connected with his very existence? Who would ever decide freely to abandon his land and property in order to go and live under the subhuman conditions of a refugee camp?

102. The usurped homes and lands of the more than 200,000 uprooted refugees have been distributed to the settler-colonizers from Turkey, who have been imported *en masse*. The international crime of colonization of the occupied areas constitutes yet one more painful aspect of the Cyprus problem. The mass population transfer of settler-colonizers from Turkey has assumed the dimensions of a nomadic influx of an alien people who disembark by the thousands in the occupied parts of Cyprus and are implanted in the usurped homes of the Greek Cypriot refugees.

103. In order to facilitate the transfer of those settlers to Cyprus, the Turkish Government has established in Ankara and Mersin offices which have become centres for the distribution of other people's houses and property. Crowds of idle persons converge in front of these "offices" anxious to snatch the loot of conquest.

104. It is indeed difficult to describe and characterize the abhorrent practice of colonization. Undisturbed and unhesitatingly Turkey proceeds on the basis of a well-prepared plan to change the demographic character of Cyprus in contradiction of the express provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions that call upon it to terminate such arbitrary actions.

105. Ankara, in a vain attempt to justify the implantation of these settler-colonizers and cover up the true facts and its real intentions, has invented a number of lame excuses. At the beginning, describing those settlers as skilled workers and alleging later that they were Turkish Cypriot immigrants returning to Cyprus, Ankara is evidently trying to mislead world public opinion as to its expansionist designs against Cyprus.

106. The purpose of the expulsions and colonization is only too obvious. Ankara is trying to "homogenize", as it calls it, the occupied area and to bring about changes in the demographic character of Cyprus, with a view to paving the way for its partition and the *de facto* annexation of the occupied area.

107. This policy of Turkey has proved disastrous not only for the Greek Cypriots but also for the Turkish Cypriots, for whose sake Turkey allegedly invaded Cyprus. Events, since the invasion, have amply proved that the Turkish Cypriots have been almost as much the victims of the infamous policies pursued by Ankara in Cyprus as have the

Greek Cypriots, and are suffering a great deal as a result of Ankara's policy of self-segregation—closely resembling South Africa's ignominious policy of bantustanisation—and the influx of the settler-colonizers who receive preferential treatment from the Turkish occupation authorities. The plight of the average Turkish Cypriot—and I am not speaking of the few belonging to the ruling class surrounding the Turkish Cypriot leadership—is attested to by all objective observers with access to the occupied area and is grimly and extensively reflected in the darkest colours, even in the Turkish Cypriot press. It is our firm conviction that if the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were left alone without any outside interference in an island with no foreign armies and no refugees, they could once again live amicably together as they have done in the past for so many years.

108. Another facet of the Cyprus tragedy is that of missing persons. More than 2,000 persons are missing. There is concrete evidence that a great number of them were taken as prisoners by the invading forces and were alive in their hands. Despite repeated efforts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross and in disregard of General Assembly resolution 3450 (XXX), the Turkish Government declines to co-operate even on this purely humanitarian issue and refuses to allow an investigation by the International Committee of the Red Cross or to give any information as to the fate of the missing persons. Ankara pretends that there are no undeclared persons in Turkish hands, thus evading its responsibilities for the unaccounted for disappearance of those persons. The families of the missing persons are in constant agony not knowing what the fate of their loved ones has been. I appeal to this Assembly to assist in this purely humanitarian matter by taking steps for the urgent implementation of resolution 3450 (XXX) and to impress upon Turkey the necessity of allowing freedom of movement to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the area under the occupation of the Turkish army, for the purpose of tracing the missing persons or obtaining information about those who may have been killed, so that an end may be put to the agonizing ordeal of their families.

109. Cyprus is struggling today for its national and physical survival. Turkey, on the other hand, is engaged in carrying out a premeditated plan for the destruction and dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus. Contemptuously disregarding the purposes and principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations, trampling upon every norm of international law, violating fundamental human rights, reneging on agreements reached and behaving in a provocative manner, Turkey turned Cyprus into a place of pain and misery and created a situation constituting a serious threat to international peace and security. This situation and its implications, besides the concern they cause, pose primarily a grave challenge to the effectiveness of the United Nations and negate the basic principles on which the continued existence of the Organization depends.

110. It is therefore imperative that appropriate measures be taken for the effective implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. If such implementation is for us a fervent wish, for the United Nations it should be a compelling duty if it is to fulfil its fundamental purposes.

As the Secretary-General pertinently pointed out in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization:

“The responsibilities of Governments do not cease when a resolution is adopted; indeed, resolutions usually require determined action by Governments, in addition to the parties . . . concerned, if they are to be translated into reality.” [A/31/1/Add.1, sect. IV.]

111. It is such determined action that we are seeking from this Assembly, which should take a firm and unequivocal position on the effective implementation of United Nations resolutions in accordance with the Charter and this Organization's own self-respect.

112. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): We have just heard the statement of our colleague from Cyprus and have taken into account all the points which he has adduced. I am sure that he will be good enough to allow me to state that, if the two parties—the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots—were to continue in this manner there could hardly be any progress not only between the two communities but between two States Members of the United Nations which happen to belong to the same so-called North Atlantic Treaty Organization bloc.

113. What we have heard today has been repeated for the past three years or so at this rostrum and in the Special Political Committee of the United Nations. I was under the impression that our colleague from Turkey intended to make his statement, but it seems that, as a result of a last-minute decision on his part, he will speak on the subject at some future date.

114. Far be it from me to stand here as a judge to adjudicate questions that have been before not only the General Assembly but also the Security Council. One might ask why Saudi Arabia, which, relatively speaking, is far removed from the scene of this trouble, should speak on this question. I hasten to mention that Saudi Arabia is an integral part of the Arab world and the Middle East and that we consider our Cypriot brothers living on that island, regardless of whether they are of Greek or Turkish origin, as constituting part of our region. Therefore, any trouble there may directly or indirectly affect us.

115. That was from the political point of view. From the humanitarian point of view, I believe that we are against anything that protracts the suffering of human beings, regardless of their religion, ethnic origin or anything else. Hence it pains us that the Cypriots, our brothers, should still be the victims of the politics of the parties in the area.

116. Our Greek Cypriot brothers are exhorting this General Assembly to bring pressure to bear on Turkish troops to withdraw from the island. On the face of it, this is a simple request. They would give the impression that the Turkish army is there to establish itself and perhaps eventually to partition Cyprus.

117. We have all along been against partition and, as I mentioned once before at this rostrum, I happen to have played a humble role in paving the way for the independence of Cyprus. None other than my friend Mr. Rossides

personally pleaded with me in 1951, as one who was engaged in translating the principle of self-determination into a right, to do everything possible to see to it that there would be an integral Cyprus. That was in 1951, when we met at the Palais de Chaillot. Thereafter there were many rumblings and much dissension. I consulted with my Government and with other States and, listening to my conscience, I came to the conclusion that Cyprus should preserve its territorial integrity and that it should not be divided on any ethnic basis. After all, when the Cypriots were part of the Ottoman Empire, they lived side by side, with no dissension; they lived in amity.

118. Need I refresh the memory of the representatives here by giving the historical background of Cyprus? Until 1878 Cyprus was part and parcel of the Ottoman Empire. In my younger days—and I was born an Ottoman myself—we never heard that the Cypriots had anything against Turkey. There was not even a national movement in Cyprus. Nor did we hear that the Turkish element, which was the minority, was victimizing the majority because it happened to be of Greek origin. Both lived side by side in amity until the end of the First World War. The Young Turks, who overthrew the sultanate in Turkey, aligned themselves with the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II. When Germany lost the war, Cyprus became one of the spoils of victory.

119. In 1878 Britain had been entrusted by the Sultan with looking over Cyprus from the strategic point of view. There were no Communists then. That was in the days of Tsarist Russia. Tsarist Russia also, allegedly, had designs on the Mediterranean. The British decided to profit from having brought peace between Tsarist Russia and Turkey. All the trouble began because Cyprus became one of the spoils of victory. Our British friends remained in Cyprus until their grip on the island became untenable because of the awakening of the Cypriots, who, like people everywhere, wanted to throw off the yoke of foreign rule.

120. It was then, and only then, that extraneous political pressures were brought to bear on various parties, and differences were artificially created. It was all done on the basis of "divide and rule". I could cite many examples of events in other regions of the world. Suffice it to say that it was then, and only then, that the ethnic differences were projected on to the scene and the people began to have a national awakening.

121. Thus, the whole situation was artificially created by the pursuit of extraneous politics in relation to the affairs of Cyprus.

122. I played a humble role when I was approached by the Foreign Minister of Turkey, the late Mr. Zorlu—may God have mercy on his soul; he met with an inhuman death; he never should have been killed—at the home of his Ambassador to the United Nations in Sutton Place. He asked me to tell him what I personally thought about the Cyprus question. I said that there should be no partition and no *enosis*. Our Turkish friends had been thinking of establishing a sort of suzerainty over part of Cyprus. I said that neither that nor *enosis*—that is, union with Greece—would be the right solution. I said, "Let Cyprus be independent." Mr. Zorlu said, "I think that is a reasonable solution."

123. Then came the protracted negotiations, which ended in the creation of an integral, unitary State. Of course, there were two ethnic groups. What country does not have ethnic groups—indeed several, not just two? Now and then I have to remind the Assembly that France and the United Kingdom have several ethnic groups. The United States consists of many diverse nationalities, but it is one integral State—although on a federal basis, the states being the components of the United States as a whole.

124. Who is playing politics in Cyprus? Extraneous sources are playing politics in Cyprus. Who sent that Mr. Sampson there to try to kill none other than the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios? Did the Turks send him there? If Sampson, or whoever sent him, had succeeded, what would have happened—modern politics being what it is? The Turks would have been massacred. And who would have been held responsible for not playing a role in the affairs of Cyprus? The Turks.

125. Time and again the Turks had been approached by Cypriot Turks who said that they were being discriminated against. That was not unnatural. The State was new. People serve their own ethnic interests. I am not saying this in order to level any criticism at the Greek Cypriots; they acted in in very same way as other peoples have acted.

126. At one time the Turks came to me—perhaps my good friend Ambassador Rossides has forgotten this—and told me, "You said that there should be no *enosis* and no partition. But the Turkish minority is being discriminated against." That was in the days of Grivas, who wanted *enosis* in spite of the Archbishop—the Archbishop whom none other than a Greek tried to liquidate. Someone might say that Sampson was just a madcap. But Sampson was no madcap; he was a terrorist. In the days of the British, he had decapitated British soldiers. Who sent Mr. Sampson to Cyprus? We should be complicating matters if we delved into the genesis of the whole trouble. I need only say, as the Koran says, "He who starts evil is the most responsible." Who started the evil? Did Sampson work alone? I do not have any intelligence agency, but people tell me many things. I do not want to embarrass anybody by stating who, according to my information, sent Sampson to Cyprus. I shall give them the benefit of the doubt.

127. Now the Turks are maligned. The Turks are not related to me more than the Greeks are. We are Arabs. Both the Greeks and the Turks are our brothers. Perhaps we have more cultural affinity with the Greeks than with the Turks, although the Turks did take a lot from the Arab culture. We derived a lot from the Greek culture. We transmitted the Hellenic culture to Sicily and Spain during the Middle Ages, when the Europeans were barbarians.

128. We owe the Greeks a debt, and we also owe the Turks a debt for having adhered to our religion, Islam, and for having also borrowed many of our words. Philologically speaking, Turkish is perhaps 30 per cent Arabic. We of the area are a mixture, and who comes to divide us in order to rule us? Forces from outside. And you Greeks and Turks—and mostly, now, the Greek Cypriots—you play into the hands of those outsiders. At first you did not know that was what you were doing, but then you awoke to the fact that outsiders were interfering in the affairs of Cyprus.

You woke up and found that a lot of misery was rampant and that, as the Foreign Minister has mentioned, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were suffering and uprooted. Now you should make something out of this situation that will pave the way for understanding, amity and peace. Instead, what are you doing? You are antagonizing people. And more, so far—and I hope the Turks will not do the same—you are antagonizing the Turks, and not only the Turks in mainland Turkey but also the Cypriots of Turkish origin. Otherwise, why should they not live in amity with you, as they did in Ottoman days? Because somebody is pulling the strings.

129. And you ask us here to solve your problems. You ask us to solve your problems, and all we can do is adopt resolutions that are recommendatory. The Security Council has so far been unable to find the modalities for a swift solution but must go step by step, so to speak. That is the latest fad and fashion in diplomacy: while the people suffer, adopt a step-by-step policy.

130. So what should be done? Many things could be done. We in this Assembly should prevail on both sides not to antagonize each other. I think machinery was set in motion at one time when Mr. Denктаş and Mr. Clerides seemed to be making headway and understanding each other—until something happened. I will not go into the whys and wherefores of what happened, but it did happen.

131. And again somebody is interfering from outside. If the big Powers leave us alone, I think we shall be better off. Not that there will be no dissent. Man is a contentious animal. But I think it will be easier to make up differences.

132. Who can tell me that because of the strategic importance of Cyprus certain Powers are not sacrificing the Cypriot people regardless of their ethnic origin? Who can assure me there is no foul play, in these days of intelligence services that spend millions and billions of currency? I am not going to tell you what currencies, now; you would then know whom I mean. You know who they are. It is high time that, in the age of nuclear bombs, in the age of weapons of mass destruction, we people of my age prevailed on those Powers—not only for the sake of those of the region but for the sake of their children and their children's children. It is high time we had a new approach to political affairs lest the world commit suicide—it may commit suicide by attrition, through the population explosion, through pollution of the biosphere, through many other factors.

133. We are supposed to handle those problems here, through the various agencies of the United Nations, and we hasten to do what? To take sides.

134. I have watched the voting board and its lights. Votes are decided mainly through solidarity. If I belong to the

non-aligned group, with few exceptions, I should vote in a certain way. If I belong to the Western group, then, with few exceptions, I should vote in another way. If I belong to the Eastern group then I should vote thus. Is that the basis of the United Nations?

135. The League of Nations foundered because it was based, not on justice, but on spheres of influence, on power politics. Are we going to pursue the same bankrupt policies?

136. Cyprus is a small island, but it is a microcosm of what is happening all over the world. We cannot afford it.

137. Propaganda: that is what this item amounts to in the General Assembly. Propaganda. And does that propaganda bear any fruit for us? No. It brings about further antagonism between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots.

138. Therefore, give the benefit of the doubt to the Turkish Cypriot minority, which fears that if Turkey were to withdraw it may become the victims, not of any diabolical Greek policy, but, as we know very well, of the psychology of the masses, which Gustave Lebon called "*la psychologie des foules*". The psychology of the masses has no method in its madness, be it Turkish, Greek, English, American, African or Asian.

139. Shall we allow the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to jump at each others' throats because of vengeance and let there be a vendetta between them? No. After having spoken many times with our Turkish friends, I can assure you that they yearn for peace in Cyprus—if not more than, then at least as much as, the Greeks do. I am talking about members of the Turkish Government. Their Foreign Minister was here. He yearns for peace. But not peace that is an ersatz, makeshift peace that disintegrates after the Cypriot troops are evacuated, not the type of peace that will perhaps end up in a new eruption between the ethnic groups.

140. Religion has lost its grip on the world, and so has ideology, because the people of religion and the political ideologists have clung only to the rituals of religion and ideology.

141. It is the brutal streak in man which can be aroused by agitators that is the most dangerous thing in our present life. The only solution is not to have pro-Communists or pro-capitalists or to be pro-this ideology or the other. It is only fair to say that if we are to survive we should have humanism, and only humanism, as a guarantee for our survival on earth.

*The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.*