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President: Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

AGENDA ITEM 28

**Question of Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General
(continued)**

1. Mr. BARTON (Canada): Canada joined with a great majority of Member States in supporting the resolutions adopted by this Assembly on the question of Cyprus in 1974 and in 1975. We have supported as well the mandate of the Secretary-General to provide his good offices to the two communities in Cyprus. We have continued to support the work of both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross on the island.

2. But the principal focus of our direct interest in the situation in Cyprus has remained the presence on the island for the past 14 years of Canadian soldiers as part of UNFICYP. Over 19,000 Canadians have served in Cyprus during this period. We are proud of the contribution those men have made—along with their comrade soldiers and policemen from the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Ireland and Australia—to the practical implementation of United Nations peace-keeping operations.

3. I personally had the privilege of visiting the island in March of this year and can add my own testimony to that of others with respect to the efficiency, dedication and competence of the members of all contingents in UNFICYP. We were therefore pleased to note that draft resolution A/32/L.16 of 4 November, includes, in its operative paragraph 6, a renewed call for the parties concerned to co-operate with UNFICYP.

4. Canada's involvement in Cyprus stems primarily from our membership in the United Nations and our readiness to assist the Organization to maintain peace and security. But it also stems from concern for the national integrity of a fellow Commonwealth member and for the harsh fate that has befallen countless individual Cypriots. In this connexion, in our view, further attention needs to be focused on the matter of individuals who have been unaccounted for since the conflict in 1974. This question was considered at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, and

international concern over this humanitarian issue was reflected in the language of resolution 3395 (XXX) that was adopted at that time. Yet the situation persists and we must once again urge that the tracing and accounting for missing persons be conducted as effectively as possible on an urgent basis.

5. The Canadian Government has on many occasions in this forum expressed its reservations about certain aspects of the United Nations role in Cyprus. We have always believed that peace-keeping should be accompanied by peace-making. Despite the fact that the existence in Cyprus of a United Nations peace-keeping force has lessened the tensions on the island, with the effect of improving the atmosphere for a negotiated settlement, we nevertheless remain disappointed that the presence of UNFICYP has not led to significant progress in achieving a political solution to the problems of Cyprus.

6. In the Canadian statement in the Cyprus debate last year,¹ we also underlined our concern about the growing deficit in the UNFICYP account and we called upon Member States to provide a larger number of voluntary financial contributions. In the past few months, we, in association with other troop-contributing nations, have been actively involved in assisting the Secretary-General through our own representations in support of appeals for new and/or additional contributions to the UNFICYP account. I must say that the contributions which have actually materialized to date in response to these appeals fall far short of the total need, but we are hopeful and optimistic that, in the course of the coming months, our efforts will bear significant fruit in helping to reduce the ever increasing deficit which—I must once more reiterate—is largely being met at this time, because of the shortfall in voluntary contributions, by the troop contributors themselves. As the sponsors of this year's draft resolution have themselves recognized, UNFICYP continues to play an important role on the island and it is difficult to imagine what the consequences would be if the Force, already reduced recently by the withdrawal of the Finnish contingent, were to be trimmed even further because of financial considerations.

7. Turning now to the political situation, I should like to reaffirm the Canadian Government's continuing support for the Secretary-General and his representatives in their efforts to stimulate a resumption of the intercommunal talks. At this time, I should like to pay a special tribute to Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, on the eve of his retirement from his position as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, for his tireless endeavours in the cause of peace.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 62nd meeting, paras. 35-40.

8. As for the intercommunal talks themselves, the Canadian Government has every sympathy about the frustrating position in which the United Nations Secretary-General is being placed. Nevertheless, we wish to encourage him to persist in his good offices role with regard to the negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus. The international community was encouraged earlier this year by the resumption of the intercommunal talks last February and we held high hopes that significant concessions would be made by both sides. Unfortunately, our hopes were not sustained, and we are fully aware of the fact that before meaningful talks can be resumed, certain pre-conditions will have to be met, at least implicitly. To our mind, the Turkish Cypriots will have to demonstrate their willingness to make territorial concessions and the Greek Cypriots their willingness to discuss new constitutional arrangements. We also hope that the other parties directly concerned will demonstrate a similar willingness to assume a helpful and catalytic function. However important international debate of this issue may be, it is through resumed intercommunal talks that progress will come about, as the draft resolution recognizes in its operative paragraph 3. Needless to say, we also remain convinced that any political solution to the question must include the preservation of the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

9. Mr. PETRIĆ (Yugoslavia): Comrade President, may I, first of all, address our warm congratulations to the delegations of the Byelorussian SSR, the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Revolution and convey, through them, to the peoples of the Soviet Union, our best wishes for further successes in their efforts to realize the great ideals of the October Revolution. The Great October Revolution has inspired other revolutions, including the Yugoslav socialist revolution. The October Revolution, together with other socialist revolutions, has contributed, in its way, to making socialism, as the most progressive socio-economic system, a world process of democratic transformation.

10. Three years have already elapsed since the unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 3212 (XXIX), which laid down the basic principles and framework for the solution of the Cyprus crisis through negotiations between the two Cypriot communities. That resolution is of particular significance to the General Assembly and I believe to all the Member States of our Organization. In drafting it, the group of five non-aligned countries exerted great efforts and conducted intensive consultations both with the parties to the conflict and with other concerned countries. Only thus was it possible to elaborate a generally acceptable formulation of basic political principles and to lay down the appropriate framework for negotiations on this complex and difficult problem. Bearing in mind particular the character of the resolution, as well as the fact that its adoption was approved both by the parties directly involved in the conflict and by other concerned parties, the Security Council considered it appropriate to endorse it in its resolution 365 (1974) and to call on the parties to the conflict to implement it without delay.

11. I feel that the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council regarding that question provide a rare

example of a unanimous view as to how, by what means, within what framework and on the basis of what political principles a complicated problem, which has become the focal point of a conflict, should be solved.

12. The Yugoslav delegation feels that the principles and framework provided in General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) continue to provide a valid basis for resolving the Cyprus crisis. We believe that we all share the same opinion with regard to the question.

13. After the unanimous decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, in the debate on which all the interested parties participated, it would have been normal to expect that the parties to the conflict would find it possible on the basis of negotiations to reach acceptable political solutions to all outstanding issues, on the basis of respect for their fundamental and legitimate rights and interests. Unfortunately, we must note again that the justified expectations of the international community have not been fulfilled. There are several reasons for this and it would serve no useful purpose to engage in an analysis of the causes that have brought about the present situation. It is basically due, in our opinion, to the fact that the negotiations conducted periodically have not fully reflected the spirit of the United Nations decisions. Not enough attention has been paid to the urgent necessity to solve this crisis, nor have the efforts of the Secretary-General and his good offices been sufficiently recognized and used. My delegation wishes to thank the Secretary-General and to pay him a tribute for the personal efforts he has been exerting in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

14. The lack of progress has led to the present unfavourable situation on Cyprus. Foreign armed forces and alien military personnel continue to be stationed on the island. Interference, on various pretexts, in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, has not yet ceased. Attempts are being made to impose unilateral solutions based on and supported by the presence of foreign armed forces, while there are no clear indications of readiness to find a definitive solution on the basis of the full equality of the two communities. Lack of respect for the decisions of the world Organization is, in our mind, one of the basic causes for the prolongation of the Cyprus crisis.

15. That prolongation is rightly viewed with concern and uneasiness by the international community. That is quite understandable if one bears in mind that the perpetuation of the crisis endangers international peace and security not only in the region of the eastern Mediterranean but also beyond. Furthermore, it leads to a further complication of the process of negotiations; it leaves the door open to outside interference and to speculation concerning new forms and frameworks for negotiations, including bypassing the United Nations. I think that there is no need to emphasize where such a course would lead and what consequences it could have for non-aligned Cyprus; as well as for the prestige of the United Nations.

16. Yugoslavia has been constantly supporting the justified efforts of the Government of Cyprus to protect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. Since the exacerba-

tion of the Cyprus crisis in 1974, Yugoslavia has been urging the parties to the conflict to find a political solution to the problem. In that it has been guided only by the desire to see a hotbed of conflict eliminated as soon as possible from a region where my country is also situated and has proceeded from the conviction that questions in dispute between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities can and should be solved exclusively by peaceful means, through negotiations on all outstanding issues involving their common life, on the basis of the full equality of the two communities and without any interference from outside. I wish to reiterate that that basic position of ours remains unchanged.

17. Proceeding from those positions, Yugoslavia welcomed the talks and personal contacts between the late President Makarios and Vice-President Denktaş in January and February of this year. We commend the far-sightedness of the late President Makarios, one of the founders of the non-aligned movement, who realized all the negative consequences for his country if the present crisis was not resolved soon. We had sincerely hoped that their talks would be followed by more favourable and speedy results. Unfortunately, the Secretary-General's last report [A/32/282] shows that the negotiations between the two Cypriot communities are deadlocked and that for the time being there are no plans for continuing them in the near future. We are also informed that that is principally due to the fact that one of the parties to the talks has not yet submitted its proposal concerning the solution of the main questions under dispute. That causes serious concern and we wish to express our regret that such a development should have occurred. I believe that the General Assembly should address an appeal to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities calling on them to resume their negotiations, regardless of the difficulties that are often encountered.

18. In keeping with the efforts exerted by Yugoslavia regarding the question in the United Nations so far, especially in the group of five non-aligned countries, as well as more broadly within the non-aligned movement, we are again involved in an active search for a way out of the current situation. Convinced that the United Nations cannot remain indifferent with regard to the question, we have participated, with the group of five non-aligned countries, in drawing up the draft resolution now before the Assembly [A/32/L.16] which calls on the parties to the dispute to implement, urgently and effectively, the provisions of resolution 3212 (XXIX) and, with that purpose in mind, to resume their intercommunal talks. My delegation is convinced that that is the only proper course to be pursued.

19. The conduct of negotiations, however, requires the active participation of both the parties: that is, the submitting of concrete proposals for the solution of each and every outstanding problem. I hope that the adoption of this draft resolution will provide a new incentive for fresh efforts by the parties involved to find a final solution to the problem of Cyprus. Historically the two Cypriot communities are bound together by a common fate, and must therefore find a way of overcoming their present difficulties. No outside force can change this. The sooner this truth is realized, the easier it will become, in our view, to find a solution to outstanding problems.

20. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): The paramount trend in international developments at present is that of détente and the growing awareness that positive world processes alone can ensure genuine satisfaction of the legitimate cravings and aspirations of all nations. The recent general debate in this hall and the course of the thirty-second session so far have offered ample evidence in support of this statement. This being the case, the principal task of the United Nations and the world community in general is the consolidation and deepening of international détente and its extension to all regions of the world. But this implies, first and foremost, the elimination of the conflicts and seed-beds of tension wherever they may exist.

21. One of them is, indeed, the unresolved question of Cyprus. The finding of a solution that would bring peace to the people of Cyprus is long overdue. More determined and effective efforts are needed to reach a just and reasonable solution of the problem.

22. Poland believes that all the practical foundations for a speedy solution exist in the numerous resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. If implemented in all good faith they would ensure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and non-interference in its domestic affairs. They provide for a peaceful and non-aligned Cyprus, the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus, the cessation of all foreign intervention in its affairs and the return of all refugees to their homes in safety. Hence, what has always mattered so profoundly is the implementation of those resolutions by all concerned.

23. As Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Emil Wojtaszek, stated at this rostrum in the course of the general debate at this session of the General Assembly:

"The implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions would greatly contribute, on the legal and political plane, to a relaxation of tension in the Cyprus conflict and to ensuring respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus." [12th meeting, para. 62.]

24. The complex nature of the situation in and around Cyprus derives from the fact that the tension and dangers to which it is exposed are both external and internal. Naturally, the gravest dangers come from the outside, and that is where the United Nations must not fail in what is expected of it. Once the external threats and the external interference are removed all other problems can be solved in an atmosphere free from pressure and the present policy of *faits accomplis*. Those problems include relationships on the domestic plane in Cyprus and the country's internal system, which is a matter for the two communities to take up and decide among themselves.

25. Meanwhile, it was not without concern that the Polish delegation listened last month to the President of Cyprus Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, who unfortunately could not but conclude that the already serious situation on the island had deteriorated further, that it

"... is fraught with grave danger and, if allowed to continue unchecked, could have very serious implications for peace and security in the sensitive region of the eastern Mediterranean." [22nd meeting, para. 38.]

26. That is why it is so important that all the parties concerned refrain from any action that might further aggravate the situation and prejudice the indispensable conditions of the island's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment. Anyone who cannot understand this, anyone who pays heed neither to the voice of the international community nor to the decisions of this Organization, will have sooner or later to account for his actions. This is true also of the most retrograde and reactionary external forces on both the political and the military plane, which hamper progress on the question of Cyprus.

27. To the people of Poland, which is the course of history had endured only too many of the hardships now endured by the people of Cyprus, there is no difficulty in visualizing the blueprint for a peaceful future for the island, or indeed calling for it, together with the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations.

28. First, faith in, the credibility of, and full respect for United Nations resolutions on Cyprus must be restored. These resolutions represent the main common denominator of the interests of the people of Cyprus and the world community based upon the inviolable principles of the Charter of the United Nations. They provide the most comprehensive treatment of all the aspects of the question of Cyprus.

29. Secondly, meaningful intercommunal talks must continue since they represent an indispensable internal instrument of progress. In favourable political conditions they possess every chance of success. For, I reiterate, it is not the difference of language, culture or religion of the people of Cyprus that is the root-cause of the problem, as some would like to suggest; the world of today is familiar with several positive examples of the harmonious and friendly coexistence of diversified communities or even peoples sharing their common statehood.

30. In this latter context, I cannot fail to commend the tireless efforts of the Secretary-General of our Organization, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him by the Security Council. We wish him all success on the hard road towards progress, which we know is not an easy objective and is only too often unnecessarily obscured by factors of an external nature.

31. Thirdly, in order to create an atmosphere propitious to a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem, an international conference under United Nations auspices should be promptly convened in order to make its positive contribution to an over-all settlement. As this Assembly is aware, such a conference has been proposed by the Government of the Soviet Union² and that proposal has been given the full support of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

32. On the basis of such considerations and practical measures, a speedy solution for Cyprus has to be found and can be found, lest the question become a perennial item on

the agenda of the United Nations to confront us increasingly with the threat of a flare-up likely to endanger international peace and security even more seriously.

33. The Polish delegation will, therefore, support draft resolution A/32/L.16 as being in conformity with the foregoing considerations and in the true interests of the Republic of Cyprus and the well-being of its people.

34. Mr. JIT (India): We are in the fourth year of discussion of the Cyprus problem. It is regrettable indeed that there has been virtually no progress towards a final settlement of this question. Our only consolation is that fighting has not broken out again. However, foreign forces remain in Cyprus in the absence of a political solution. The refugees are unable to return to their own homes and lands, because confidence between the two communities has not yet been established.

35. The framework for a solution was unanimously adopted in 1974 by the General Assembly in its resolution 3212 (XXIX), and this was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974). If there has been no progress towards a solution, it is not the fault of the United Nations. The responsibility must be placed where it belongs, that is, on the various authorities in Cyprus. It is possible for the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire in a conflict situation. It is also possible for the United Nations to assist the process of building a just and honourable peace. But ultimately it is the parties directly concerned that must construct by their own efforts the edifice of peace in which they must dwell in the future.

Mr. Albornoz (Ecuador), Vice-President, took the Chair.

36. The presence of UNFICYP certainly helps to maintain peace and security in Cyprus; but it cannot be taken for granted that it will continue there indefinitely, because it costs the United Nations a great deal, about \$140 million a year. This amount of money could be better spent on the reconstruction of Cyprus and on the rehabilitation of its refugees than on maintaining foreign contingents under the flag of the United Nations. We had expected the stationing of the United Nations Force to facilitate the settlement of the problem, but it would seem that it has had the opposite effect. The two communities, having been assured of peace and security by the United Nations Force, appear to be in no hurry to reach a solution.

37. My delegation appeals to the two communities to display greater understanding of each other's problems and interests, and to accelerate their efforts for a realistic national reconciliation. They cannot expect the United Nations to solve their problem by imposing a settlement from outside. A solution must come from within Cyprus, if it is to be lasting. The United Nations can do no more than offer the good offices of the Secretary-General and such other assistance as may be necessary for the intercommunal negotiations. In the final analysis, there is no substitute for negotiations between the two communities for reaching an agreed settlement.

38. We fully appreciate the complexity of the problems facing the two communities. We sympathize with the history of discrimination and isolation suffered by the

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974*, document S/11465.

minority Turkish community; but today those sad memories belong to the past, and the Turkish community can afford to be generous in the interests of its common future with the other community. We sympathize also with the sad plight of the Greek community, which has been uprooted and subjected to great suffering. We feel that the Greek community also can afford to be statesmanlike in the interests of its own future with the other community.

39. What is encouraging is that there seems to be basic agreement on the ultimate goal of an independent, united and non-aligned Cyprus. Two questions, however, remain to be negotiated and resolved: the territorial and constitutional questions. Each community has presented its proposals which the other community has rejected, and there is therefore a deadlock. So far as the territorial question is concerned, it seems to my delegation that through third-party mediation or arbitration the two communal zones could be defined on a basis that is fair and equitable; but this will not be possible unless the two communities agree on such a procedure.

40. The constitutional question presents problems of a very different character. Although the case of Cyprus is unique, the world is full of a variety of situations where ethnic communities, minorities and majorities live together under different constitutional arrangements that are also democratic in nature. My own country, India, has diverse societies linked together in a democratic framework with fundamental rights and constitutional guarantees of autonomy. While neither my country nor any other country can provide an exact parallel or precedent for Cyprus, I feel that Cyprus can derive much benefit from the practical experience of other societies. In order to break the deadlock over the constitutional question it might be useful for the two communities to seek the advice and assistance of neutral experts in establishing a constitutional basis for a bi-zonal federal structure for a sovereign, independent, united and non-aligned Cyprus.

41. In conclusion, my delegation would like to place on record our high appreciation of the dedicated efforts of our Secretary-General in promoting the intercommunal talks under his auspices. We should also like to record our gratitude to Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom for contributing their contingents to the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

42. Mr. VELLA (Malta): The question of Cyprus, which seems to be running the risk of becoming a permanent item on the General Assembly's agenda unless the resolutions on it are duly respected, is of concern to my country for several reasons. We feel what one might call a spiritual affinity, nurtured by geography, history and political development, with Cyprus and the Cypriots. Both Malta and Cyprus are washed by the same sea, which has been called the cradle of civilization, a civilization that has moulded the character of the two islands. Both have experienced the historical vicissitudes of the area and both share a common colonial past, out of which they emerged as independent nations almost simultaneously, while at the same time retaining membership in the Commonwealth. On a wider international plane, both Malta and Cyprus are island developing countries, sharing the aspirations and yearnings for a new international economic order for which they are

committed to struggle within the framework of the Group of 77, and they are both member States of the group of non-aligned countries and, as such, committed to a political philosophy based on the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, be they great or small, which, if put into practice, should contribute to a speedy and lasting solution to the present problems of Cyprus.

43. Above all, my country has espoused a policy of peace, fraternity and harmony among Mediterranean States and we cannot but view with the utmost concern the fact that Cyprus, together with the Middle East, persists as a festering wound in the eastern part of that historic sea. We are furthermore convinced that the countries closely involved in the Cyprus situation share with us our policy for peace in the Mediterranean.

44. When addressing this Assembly last year,³ my delegation expressed the view that it was not here to impute wrongs. We remain of the same opinion now, but we remain equally of the opinion that it is our clear duty in this particular situation which, together with that in South Africa and the Middle East, has been described by the Secretary-General in his report on the work of the Organization [A/32/1] as serious in itself, and also having very special implications for international peace and security, to point the way to solutions, even if solutions have so far proved elusive and impossible.

45. The longer the problem of Cyprus stays unresolved, the more complicated it is likely to become. Whatever were the antecedents that produced a situation which resulted in the occupation of 40 per cent of the island by foreign troops, these conditions are no longer there, and it seems to my delegation that if the cause has been removed, its effects should by now have started to recede. Unilateral actions are not the right path towards a solution when both the communities agree that such a solution should be the result of negotiations between them. Indeed, it is commonly understood that negotiations imply keeping options open; but in spite of statements to the contrary, we all know from past sad and unfortunate experience that unilateral actions tend to foreclose those very options. My delegation therefore strongly hopes that this process will not only not continue but will possibly be reversed, as a sign of goodwill.

46. To state that the problems of Cyprus, particularly since 1974, have never been amenable to a simple solution is not only to state the obvious but rather greatly to understate the case. Yet at its twenty-ninth session, at the height of an unprecedented crisis on the island, the General Assembly succeeded, by a unanimously adopted resolution, in cutting through the dense fog of complications and reaching for the basic requirements for a solution. Resolution 3212 (XXIX) contains all that is necessary for speedy progress towards normality in the Republic of Cyprus. It urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, and calls for respect of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. It commends the contacts and negotiations taking place on an equal footing, with the

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 61st meeting, paras. 145-160.

good offices of the Secretary-General, between the representatives of the two communities, and considers that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety, with all parties concerned ensuring that that return is in fact effected. Furthermore, resolution 3212 (XXIX) was subsequently endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974), thus giving it mandatory effect. Yet those resolutions go to a large extent unimplemented, making a mockery of those very solemn promises voluntarily given by States in this very hall.

47. The non-implementation of the resolutions on the question of Cyprus, apart from being each year a source of concern to this Assembly, which repeatedly sees its own solemn undertaking thrown to the four winds, has also engaged the consideration of other important groups of States. The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Colombo in August 1976, devoted a number of important paragraphs to Cyprus in its Political Declaration.⁴ It would be futile to quote in full the relevant paragraphs of the Declaration to this Assembly which is already well aware of them, but it would not be futile to remark that the thrust of those paragraphs is precisely that this Assembly's resolutions have not been implemented. The Conference recalled the resolutions and urged their immediate implementation, and in doing so it reiterated in great detail the very wording of the resolutions because, as the Declaration itself says, the Conference considered those resolutions as continuing to provide the principles and the valid framework for the solution of the problem. It is a source of pleasure for my delegation to see that a highly respected group of countries, practically all of which have recently emerged into the family of nations, by common declaration rely on the wisdom of this Organization to solve one of the thorniest problems in the world today. But on the other hand, we cannot but notice almost a touch of rebuke in that this Organization needs to be reminded of its very own decisions, which somehow fell by the wayside when the time came for their implementation. These resolutions were further commended, and a new call for their implementation was made, by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi this year [see A/32/74].

48. My delegation, in this short statement, has preferred to dwell, almost exclusively, on the failure to implement the resolutions adopted by this Assembly because we feel that very little can be done without such implementation. We have no other framework for negotiations before us; there is no other machinery except that contemplated in the resolutions. This is the fourth year in which we have considered the item, but for all we know we may continue being seized of it for an indefinite period unless the resolutions are implemented. I know that I may run the risk of being called a pessimist for expressing this view, but my pessimism is not altogether without logic. Unless we are careful, each year might see the erosion of the very basis on which we have planned to build a solution. This is the reason why we read deeper into the Secretary-General's remarks in his report on the work of the Organization. In those remarks, ominous in their terseness, the situation in Cyprus is mentioned in the same breath as that in South Africa and in the Middle East, two trouble-spots that have

so far not only proved impervious to solution but continuously menace international peace and security. I hope and pray that between now and next year I will be proved wrong in my forebodings, as new initiatives will, it is to be hoped, be taken to bring an end to the present impasse.

49. Malta, as the only other independent island country in the Mediterranean, appeals to all the parties concerned not to desist from exploring ways and means for a solution. Under the good offices of the Secretary-General, who has spared no effort to guide the talks to a successful conclusion, contacts and dialogue should be resumed and maintained. The Mediterranean should be a sea of peace, but obviously this cannot come about with the present situation in Cyprus. A solution of the problem, however difficult it might seem, is not impossible. Whatever stands in the way should be removed, and there is no better method of doing that, with honour for all parties concerned, than by adhering to commitments freely entered into and clearly expressed in the resolutions of this Assembly.

50. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Earlier in this debate [61st meeting], the representative of Belgium made a statement on behalf of the nine member countries of the European Community, and I take this opportunity to associate myself with all that he said. I have asked, however, to be allowed to speak separately now in order to underline the particular importance that my country attaches to a settlement of the problem of Cyprus, bound together as our two countries are by almost 100 years of history.

51. This is the fourth occasion since the crisis of July 1974 on which the General Assembly has debated the Cyprus problem, and my delegation shares deeply the disappointment that has already been referred to by other speakers in this debate that so little progress has yet been achieved towards a settlement. Still, after more than three years, the problems of the refugees remain unresolved, and the deep underlying tensions caused by the absence of a political solution remain. The consequences of this situation stretch far beyond the island of Cyprus. They embitter relations between two other countries with each of which my own country has ties of long-standing friendship and alliance and with which we are now connected by new links through their association with the European Economic Community. I do not agree, however, with those who say that time is on the side of a settlement in Cyprus. On the contrary, I believe that the passage of time risks making the positions of the parties increasingly rigid and the gulf between them still wider. The British Government, therefore, believes it to be of the greatest importance that substantial progress towards a settlement in Cyprus should be made soon if an already explosive situation there is not to become still worse.

52. We have on frequent occasions in the past emphasized our view that a settlement in Cyprus can only be brought about through negotiations between the parties. We therefore attach the highest importance to the intercommunal talks, which we believe provide the best forum in which to work towards a negotiated settlement. We have been pleased to note the support for the intercommunal talks that has been reiterated on all sides, both in the course of

⁴ Document A/31/197, annex I.

the present debate and earlier in the general debate and elsewhere. We were, indeed, much encouraged by the talks which took place in Nicosia in February between the late Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Denktas, in which agreement was reached on a set of principles on which a settlement might be based and which led to a resumption of the intercommunal talks in Vienna in March. Despite the very wide gulf evident between the positions of the parties, at least some progress was made at those talks. They were then followed up by further meetings in Nicosia under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar. Since then, however, virtually no progress has been made, and the report issued by the Secretary-General on 25 October [A/32/282] recounting the events of the past few months makes depressing reading.

53. We agree with the Secretary-General that the key to the situation lies in the initiation of an effective negotiating process. We believe this can best be achieved through the medium of the intercommunal talks under the auspices of the United Nations, and that it is of the greatest importance, therefore, that the talks should be resumed as soon as possible. But if the talks are to make progress, it is essential that both sides should give assurances in advance that they are ready to negotiate constructively and that they are prepared now to put forward comprehensive and concrete proposals both on constitutional issues and on territory. In particular, it is to be hoped that, when the talks do resume, the parties will be in a position to make a concrete response to the proposals put forward at earlier rounds. It must be recognized that a lasting solution depends primarily on the commitment of the parties immediately involved.

54. I would at this point also like to make a special appeal to both sides to recognize the importance of creating a climate of confidence between them if the negotiations are to make any real progress. My delegation took part a few weeks ago in the debate in the Security Council⁵ called for by the representative of Cyprus out of concern about the situation in Varosha. We then expressed our clear view about the need to avoid any unilateral action that could adversely affect the prospects for a settlement. But the situation is by no means one-sided. There is a constant temptation for both sides to indulge in extreme statements or to make unilateral moves that may seem justified in the short term but which in the longer term can only make a settlement still harder to achieve. I would therefore appeal to both sides to take the longer view, to avoid such statements and, in particular, to refrain, pending a settlement, from any unilateral moves that would alter the existing *status quo* in the island.

55. I have referred already to the role played by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in Cyprus, but I should here like to place on record once again our deep appreciation for the very considerable efforts that they have made over the past year. I am conscious that their task has at times been a thankless one, but we believe that if progress is to be made in the near future, as it can and must be, their continuing efforts will remain essential.

⁵ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-second Year, 2031st meeting.*

We are very pleased to note, therefore, that the Secretary-General has undertaken to continue to make his good offices available in this regard. I am sorry to see the recent announcement by Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar of his decision to relinquish his post as Special Representative of the Secretary-General. I should like to offer him our profound thanks for the way that he has carried out his task and for all that he has done in the cause of peace in Cyprus.

56. I should now like to say a word about the continuing importance of the role played by UNFICYP in the island. Our Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. David Owen, speaking in the general debate here some six weeks ago [9th meeting], drew attention to the danger that continued involvement by United Nations peace-keeping forces might become an excuse for political inactivity or a substitute for serious negotiation. He emphasized that the United Nations must not be seen as a permanent crutch for remaining in a state of "no peace, no war".

57. But while we believe, therefore, that the presence of UNFICYP must be understood as being purely temporary, as primarily a tool to facilitate the process of the negotiations, we do believe that its presence remains essential at the present time, and that this view is shared very widely in the international community. In his speech, Mr. Owen also pointed to the massive financial deficit which now threatens UNFICYP's very existence and to the appeals which the Secretary-General has recently launched to many Member States for additional funds. We earnestly hope that those appeals will now meet with a positive response. It would be tragic if UNFICYP's ability to function effectively in Cyprus were to be prejudiced for lack of funds. Such an eventuality could hardly fail to have a most serious effect on the situation in Cyprus itself and on the prospects for peace. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that the heavy financial burden of UNFICYP is yet another factor adding to the urgency of reaching a settlement.

58. Turning now to the role which this Assembly can play, I should like to begin by recalling my delegation's vote in favour of resolutions 3212 (XXIX) and 3395 (XXX). We believe that those resolutions were valuable in establishing a framework within which negotiations between the parties could take place and in encouraging the two sides to negotiate. We believe that what we need to do now is not to try to construct a new framework, but to provide fresh encouragement to the parties to make proper use of the existing one, and to emphasize once again the urgency of making progress in the very near future.

59. We consider that it is right and important that the General Assembly should apply the tremendous moral influence that it possesses to urging the parties to come to the negotiating table ready to negotiate substantively on all the subjects under discussion, and that this can best be done by adopting a resolution that has the very widest possible support in this Assembly. We think, however, that it is a mistake for this Assembly to go beyond this to the extent of trying directly to coerce the parties or to prejudge the separate discussion of this problem by the Security Council. A real settlement in Cyprus can only be brought about by negotiation between the parties themselves.

60. In view of all this it will be readily understood that we have reservations about the draft resolution now before the Assembly. The gap between us, however, was not a wide one and there were a number of points in the draft resolution with which we were happy to agree. My delegation, therefore, much regrets that the sponsors of this draft resolution were not able to accept the small number of amendments which we and our partners in the Community had suggested to them and which would have gone some way towards satisfying the concerns mentioned above and would, in our view, have ensured a much wider measure of support for the resulting resolution. Above all, we doubt whether the draft resolution now before us will make a real contribution to the early resumption of talks between the two communities, which should in our view have been the primary objective of this Assembly. For all these reasons we shall not be able to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

61. In conclusion, I should like to look beyond the resolution and to express the hope that 1978 will be the year in which the parties in Cyprus at last break out of the stalemate which has plagued the negotiations over the last three years. Given the necessary will on both sides, I believe that the opportunity is there and that it must now be seized if the situation is not soon to deteriorate with all the consequences that this would bring, not only for Cyprus, but for us all.

62. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): The statements which have been made so far in this debate have all stressed the importance of the intercommunal talks. The Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim himself, in his report of 25 October 1977, which he submitted to the General Assembly, states that he:

“... undertook a series of consultations in New York in an effort to assess the possibility of ‘[resuming] negotiations as soon as possible meaningfully and constructively on the basis of comprehensive and concrete proposals’.”
[A/32/282, para. 18.]

63. He further states in his report:

“My recent consultations in New York with all concerned were designed to ascertain whether a basis for activating a genuine negotiating process within the existing framework could now be developed. These consultations will be followed up shortly by my Special Representative, who will also, as a first step, explore the possibility of reactivating the mechanism for continued contact between the representatives of the two communities. I shall continue to use my best efforts to promote the undertaking of substantive negotiations with a view to attaining the objectives set out in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.” [Ibid., para. 27.]

64. The Turkish delegation is convinced that these statements by the Secretary-General should set the tone of this debate. The only constructive contribution the General Assembly could bring to the search for a peaceful solution is indeed to conclude its deliberations in a way which would strengthen and support the endeavours of the Secretary-General.

65. On this occasion, I wish to renew to him, on behalf of my Government, our profound gratitude for his determined

and untiring efforts in pursuance of his task. We have come to admire his tremendous ability to tackle even the most complex political problems and his wise, patient and imaginative approach whenever faced with intractable situations.

66. I wish to express our deep appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar, who has just been assigned to other duties, for the diligent, resourceful and tactful way in which he fulfilled his mission in Cyprus.

67. The United Nations is involved in the Cyprus issue, not only through the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General under a Security Council resolution, but also in the field of peace-keeping through the stationing in the island of a United Nations Force since 1964. In this connexion, I should like to reiterate the appreciation of my Government to the Member States which have contributed to UNFICYP. There is no doubt that, although the basis on which it operates needs a reappraisal because of changed circumstances, UNFICYP has played an important part in containing the confrontation between the two communities in the last 13 years.

68. It was only yesterday [59th meeting] that the Turkish delegation stressed the importance of the procedural aspect of the debate and requested that a representative of the Turkish community be accorded the right to address a plenary meeting of the Assembly. The Greek Cypriot delegation vehemently opposed this request by advancing the absurd contention that the Cyprus question is not a question to be resolved exclusively through intercommunal talks.

69. Whenever the procedural aspect is raised the Greek Cypriot representatives mention some wider implications of the problem which they maintain can be pertinently discussed by the Assembly in plenary meeting in the absence of a representative of the Turkish community. They sometimes go as far as alleging that the communities could negotiate only constitutional matters, forgetting their own clamorous demands for a meaningful discussion between the communities of the other aspects, particularly the territorial aspects. Does this mean that they are no longer interested in negotiating the territorial issue, which is, after all, nothing more than the delineation of the border between the two zones of the future federal State?

70. In his statement yesterday [59th meeting], in which he opposed the request of my delegation for a decision inviting a representative of the Turkish community to address the Assembly, Mr. Christophides tried to prove his point by making a reference to the composition of the population of Turkey. I fail to see the connexion. Anyway, I am thankful to him for having through his argumentation added a few millions to the already considerable population of Turkey.

71. In that same statement Mr. Christophides said that he regretted that I had had the audacity to compare the Turkish Cypriot community with the Palestine Liberation Organization and other liberation movements. I had not, of course, mentioned the Palestine Liberation Organization or any other movement as such. In seeking to establish its

right to an equal say in international forums in which the Cyprus question comes up for discussion, the Turkish community has never purported to draw any comparisons between the substance of the Cyprus question and situations elsewhere in the world. It is preposterous, however, that Mr. Christophides, carried away by his verbosity, has endeavoured to make an analogy between the virtues of the cause of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the African liberation movements and what he has called the struggle of the Greek Cypriots. Among the similarities he cited was the fight against racial discrimination and violations of human rights. This is nothing but hypocrisy. The Greek Cypriot administration indeed not only practised racism in the most ruthless and inhuman manner but even boasted about it. None other than the late Archbishop Makarios stated:

“Unless the small Turkish community, forming a part of the Turkish race, which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism, is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA⁶ can never be considered as terminated.”

Is this what Mr. Christophides calls fighting against racial discrimination?

72. Mr. Christophides has once again depicted the Turkish Cypriot leaders as agents of Ankara and has repeated his view that the Turkish Cypriot policy is dictated by Turkey. It should be pointed out in this regard that the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has a democratic structure and that the Turkish Cypriot leaders were elected under an extremely liberal and democratic Constitution. The elected leaders of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus are therefore the true representatives of the Turkish Cypriot people and are accountable only to them.

73. The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus functions independently of Turkey, and although there are deep bonds between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, some disagreements, as evidenced by the Turkish Cypriot press reports to which Mr. Christophides has referred, might exist. Instead of drawing the wrong conclusions from them, Mr. Christophides should have been persuaded that the Turkish Cypriot Government is far from subservient to the Turkish Government.

74. The Greek Cypriot representatives, and the representatives of Greece for that matter, like to stress the need for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. But they cannot bring themselves to admit publicly that a comprehensive solution to the problem can be reached only through intercommunal negotiations. However, in the report to which I have already referred, the Secretary-General himself points out that:

“My recent talks with all concerned have served to strengthen my conviction that, as a practical matter, the key to any substantial progress towards the several goals set out in the resolutions of the General Assembly lies in the initiation of an effective negotiating process in relation to the underlying political problem of Cyprus. The intercommunal talks under my auspices have constituted a concerted effort on the part of the United Nations to

give the parties an opportunity to get such a process started.” [A/32/282, para. 26.]

75. Do the Greek Cypriots need another argument to convince themselves that they have been entrapped in an incredible contradiction by insisting on the implementation of the resolutions, on the one hand, and minimizing the importance and scope of the negotiating process on the other? Well, there is another argument. As we all know, the draft resolution that has been submitted was prepared by a group of non-aligned countries. In working out this draft, the group has had consultations this year, as last year, exclusively with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives. What could better show that all the aspects of the problem fall within the purview of the negotiations between the two communities? How utterly inconsistent it is, therefore, to exclude the Turkish community from this debate.

76. It is not a secret that we are witnessing a period of political disarray and squabbling in the Greek Cypriot community following the death of Archbishop Makarios. In such an atmosphere all those who vie for power try to exploit the debate in the General Assembly to further their political ambitions. Apparently, moderation does not appeal to Greek Cypriot voters. The hard line is popular, and the old battle-cry of *enosis*, of the annexation of Cyprus by Greece, has been revived. This takes the form of pledges to uphold the ideals of the late Archbishop Makarios and a new insidious insistence on the concept of a “unitary State”. This is what Mr. Kyprianou said to two Athens newspapers, *To Vima* and *Ta Nea* on 4 September 1977:

“In the event of a solution, nationally acceptable of course, within the framework of a unitary State, the Cyprus Government will do anything possible for the restoration of harmonious relations between the Greek and Turkish communities.”

77. Now, in the long history of Cyprus the word “unitary” has a clear and distinct connotation. It means the opposite of communal partnership and federation, which the late Archbishop Makarios had accepted at the meeting between himself and Mr. Rauf Denktas, the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, on 12 February 1977 under the Secretary-General’s auspices.

78. Mr. Kyprianou’s mention of harmonious relations also has a familiar and rather cynical ring. We know Mr. Kyprianou too well not to understand what he means and we are not the only ones to do so in the United Nations. Harmony signifies for him the absence of dissent; the absence therefore of any political power-sharing with the Turkish community—in other words, it means a return to the good old days which existed prior to July 1974 when the Greek Cypriot leadership had the monopoly of power and exercised it in a most ruthless and inhuman manner.

79. How strange it is under these circumstances to hear the Greek Cypriot representative rehash the litany about the so-called Turkish aggression and the presence of Turkish military units in the island.

80. How many times do we have to say that what happened in 1974 was not an aggression by Turkey but an

⁶ Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

aggression and invasion by Greece and that the Turkish intervention was not the cause but the result of the Cyprus problem? Was it not the late Archbishop Makarios himself when he came to speak before the Security Council on 19 July 1974 in the aftermath of the coup carried out by the Greek military junta, who said:

“... the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks.”⁷

81. These words in themselves are sufficient justification for the intervention that Turkey was compelled to undertake in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee.⁸ There was no doubt whatsoever about the real and ultimate purpose of the coup of 15 July 1974. Mr. Clerides, who I believe is present among the members of the Greek Cypriot delegation, has said in an interview with the newspaper *Agon*:

“In my view the coup was carried out because the Greek military Government, known as the junta, believed that it would be possible after the coup to proclaim *enosis*.”

82. The Turkish forces which are in Cyprus cannot, therefore, be considered as forces of occupation. They have been sent to the island in conformity with the Treaty guaranteeing the status of Cyprus as an independent State to stop the invasion of Greece, to remove the threat to the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to protect the Turkish community until a new constitutional order is devised by common agreement.

83. So much has been said about the presence of Turkish forces in Cyprus that the presence of Greek forces in the south of the island is very often forgotten. But Greece had already dispatched 20,000 troops to Cyprus in 1964 and since then the Greek army has been present in the island, at times officially and at other times in disguise. This is what the Secretary-General states about the armed forces of Greece in Cyprus in his report to the General Assembly:

“On the Cyprus Government side, a number of officers, especially senior commanders and staff officers of the National Guard, appear to be Greek national military personnel. In addition, a Greek national contingent is stationed in the island. The number of Greek national personnel in Cyprus is not known accurately to UNFICYP, nor is the extent of withdrawals.” [A/32/282, para. 20.]

84. We hope that in the light of this statement the one-sided obsession with the Turkish military presence will be overcome. It should be clear also that the allegation of Mr. Christophides that the provisions of the United Nations resolutions are clearly directed at Ankara and that their implementation concerns Turkey exclusively, has no validity.

⁷ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, 1780th meeting.*

⁸ Signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960. See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382 (No. 5475), p. 4.

85. The outcry against the presence of the Turkish forces is nothing but an echo of the nostalgia felt by the Greek Cypriot side for the overwhelming superiority they enjoyed during bygone days. But what is incredible and even ludicrous is that although there have been several statements by the Turkish Government to the effect that the totality of the Turkish forces sent to Cyprus after the events of July 1974 would be withdrawn as soon as a settlement was reached between the two communities, not a single word about the withdrawal of Greek forces has been heard from the representatives of Greece. They apparently still consider that Cyprus is part of Greece and that whatever they do in the island is not the business of the United Nations. What they cannot admit is that there is for the first time in Cyprus an equilibrium which enables the Turkish community to live without fear of oppression and annihilation and to negotiate on an equal footing with the Greek Cypriot community.

86. At each debate on Cyprus the Greek Cypriots stress the refugee problem, emphasizing the plight of the refugees and insisting that they should be allowed to return to their homes.

87. The truth is that the Greek Cypriots discovered the existence of such a problem in Cyprus only in 1974, but the Turks of Cyprus have known it since 1963, when the Greek onslaught against the Turkish community took place: 26,000 Turkish Cypriots were then uprooted, some of them for the second time, since they had suffered the same fate in 1957. But these were not the only Turks living in distress. From 1964 to 1974, for 10 years, all the Turks of Cyprus were forced to live in isolated enclaves surrounded by armed Greek bands and continuously subjected to threats, harassments, humiliations, economic blockade and very severe restrictions of movement. Then in 1974, following the Greek military coup, some 60,000 Turkish Cypriots had to move to the north to find security and freedom.

88. We do not know the exact number of Greek Cypriots who chose to go to the south during the military operations in 1974. Grossly inflated figures are mentioned for obvious propaganda purposes. But the Greek Cypriot Attorney-General, Mr. Criton Tornaritis, in a book entitled *Legal Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Cyprus*, asserted that there cannot possibly be more than 120,000 Greek refugees in the island. Whatever the number, it is becoming more and more evident that the refugee problem is being magnified and dramatized deliberately. In an article which appeared in the Chicago daily *News* on 27 January 1976, Mr. Bruce Love wrote the following:

“Hardly a week goes by without a visit by representatives of Congress and various charitable organizations. They are dutifully shown the 14,000 ‘tent refugees’. They interview the same heart-breaking cases. Needless to say, they are not told that the refugees could be housed in some of the solid houses vacated by British troops or in prefabricated housing so easy to import. The truth is that Makarios wants at least some refugees under tents. As it is, the authorities have a hard time keeping the 14,000 from defecting to more comfortable shelter.”

89. That the economy of southern Cyprus has been able to absorb the Greek refugees has been attested by many

press reports. This is what the correspondent of *The New York Times* wrote on 3 August 1977:

“Their three-year economic miracle threatens to deprive the Greek Cypriots of the international sympathy. Last year the gross national product rose almost 15 per cent and foreign currency reserves jumped 42 per cent. *Per capita* income is almost back to pre-war levels and so many people are buying new cars that the Government recently increased import duties. Unemployment has dropped so fast that building projects are stalled for lack of labour.”

90. This, then, is the economic picture in the south of Cyprus. The south is not plagued by a refugee problem, since there is even a lack of labour.

91. The refugee problem has to be assessed in the light of all the elements of the problem and not exclusively as an issue of Greek refugees. The Turkish Cypriot community has 86,000 refugees, some of them still in the process of being rehabilitated and an approximately equal number of Cypriots have been resettled in Turkish houses and on Turkish properties in the south.

92. The report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly [A/32/282], ascertains the extent of the refugee problem in both communities. In paragraph 22 the Secretary-General points out that:

“As a consequence of the exodus of Greek Cypriots during and after the 1974 hostilities, 145 towns and villages in the north have been emptied of their Greek-Cypriot population.”

In paragraph 23, referring to the movement to the north of Turkish Cypriots, the Secretary-General writes: “As a result of these movements, 132 town and villages in the south were emptied of the Turkish-Cypriot population.” This, in a nutshell, is a comparison of the result of the movements of Greek and Turkish Cypriots: 145 towns and villages vacated by Greek Cypriots as against 132 town and villages vacated by Turkish Cypriots.

93. But this is not the whole story. The scope and nature of the problem underwent a great change in 1975. In that year an agreement was reached in the intercommunal talks on a voluntary exchange of population. As a result of that agreement all Turkish Cypriots who were living in the south of the island under the jurisdiction of the Greek Cypriot administration have moved to the area under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

94. It is not at all my intention to underestimate the importance of the issue of refugees for both sides. But I think it is clear from what I have said that the problem of refugees in Cyprus does not lend itself to sweeping generalizations and to the advocacy of clear-cut solutions. The issue is complex. It has many facets closely interrelated with the developments of the last 15 years, the deliberate choices of both sides and the framework agreement on which the intercommunal talks are based. The solution of the remaining aspects of the problem is therefore linked to the over-all settlement of the Cyprus dispute.

95. The Greek Cypriot representative yesterday again argued that there is a massive immigration of Turkish nationals from Turkey to Cyprus for the purpose of altering the demographic character of the island. He accused Turkey of pursuing a policy of colonization. This allegation has been refuted several times. As I have pointed out repeatedly here and in the Security Council, the Turkish Government does not entertain even the remotest intention of annexation or partition. Also, as far as the Turkish community is concerned it is in no need of an infusion of population to assert its legitimate rights under a federal solution. It should also be stressed that the economic situation in the north is not one that lends itself to massive immigration.

96. There is no room for further permanent immigration under present economic conditions. On the other hand, there are more Turkish Cypriots abroad than the Turkish Federated State can ever accommodate. If the Turkish Federated State had followed a policy of increasing its population for political purposes, it certainly would have drawn on that source rather than importing immigrants from Turkey.

97. What has taken place is that skilled technicians and workers have been imported from Turkey on a temporary basis to meet the immediate requirements of the economy. Some Turkish Cypriots who had emigrated to Turkey, Great Britain and other Commonwealth countries over the past years in order to liberate themselves from the Greek oppression, have also been given the opportunity to return to their homeland. Those movements have stopped for more than a year and the Greek Cypriot representatives certainly know it. This, of course, does not prevent them from falsifying the facts as they do in the case of Greek Cypriots living in the north under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The controversy on the subject has been resolved long ago. Now UNFICYP is in a position to verify whether any Greek Cypriot who moves from the north to the south does so of his own free will.

98. The Turkish Cypriot side has all along searched for ways and means to promote co-operation and understanding between the two communities and has always encouraged the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the holding of intercommunal negotiations. The policy of the Greek Cypriot side, on the other hand, aims to isolate the Turkish Cypriot community, both politically and economically, further to deepen the rift between the two communities and to hamper the sincere efforts of the Turkish Cypriot side to foster co-operation between the two sides.

99. Among the initiatives taken by the Turkish Cypriot side to put an end to the further alienation and separation of the two communities, perhaps the most important is the proposal for the establishment of a joint transitional Government, which was originally made at the second round of the intercommunal talks and has been repeated on many occasions since then. However, that constructive offer, which would certainly have gone a long way to securing fruitful co-operation between the two sides, was systematically rejected by the Greek Cypriot side out of hand. No doubt the Greek Cypriot leaders were more interested in maintaining their image as the so-called Government of Cyprus than in contributing to the estab-

lishment of a working governmental machinery which would have been the very corner-stone of an eventual partnership based on equality and mutual respect.

100. Furthermore, in the belief that trust and co-operation between the two communities is crucial for their future coexistence, the Turkish Cypriots side, on several occasions, has proposed the joint operation of some public services, such as the international airport, and, recently, has even invited Greek Cypriot businessmen to resume their operation of tourist installations in northern Cyprus. Unfortunately, all the attempts of the Turkish Cypriot side to secure co-operation between the two communities have been of no avail, for the Greek Cypriot side has adamantly refused the establishment of even the most rudimentary links between the two communities.

101. Instead, the Greek Cypriot side has been relentlessly pursuing, and indeed further intensifying, its efforts to isolate the Turkish Cypriot community economically as well as politically. To that end, the Greek Cypriot side declared that Turkish Cypriot control of the ports was illegal, and regarded all persons entering through those ports as illegal immigrants. It sought the disruption of trade between the Turkish Federated State and the outside world through trumped-up court actions, through threats against foreign importers of Turkish Cypriot products and through the prosecution and imprisonment of captains of ships which happen to call at Turkish Cypriot-controlled ports in northern Cyprus in the course of normal commercial traffic.

102. By declaring Turkish Cypriot control of the ports illegal, by disrupting the commercial activities of Turkish Cypriots abroad, by obstructing tourism to northern Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot administration is merely deepening and perpetuating the separation between the two sides.

103. The representative of the Greek Cypriot administration implied yesterday that the use of a postal code in Turkey amounts to the colonization of northern Cyprus by Turkey. He failed to mention that the use of that code is the consequences of the Greek Cypriot decision to deprive the Turkish community of all international postal services since 1963.

104. Similarly, the use of the Turkish lira in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, in addition to the Cyprus pound, is necessitated by the fact that the Central Bank of the Republic is situated in the Greek-controlled region and, following the Greek Cypriot assaults against the Turkish community, the Turkish Cypriots have been ousted from the administration of the bank. Since 1963 the Turkish Cypriot community has been deprived of the services of the bank, including its foreign exchange facilities, and all Turkish Cypriot funds therein have been withheld by the Greek Cypriots.

105. The Turkish community hopes that with the establishment of a federal machinery of government it will be possible for such essential services of the Republic to be operated for the benefit of both communities. Until such time, a *modus vivendi* has to be found to ensure that the Turkish Cypriot community is no longer deprived of services such as postal communication and foreign exchange facilities.

106. We have heard loud complaints from the Greek Cypriot side about the absence of progress in the intercommunal talks. I must point out immediately that the Government of Turkey is also concerned about the delay in reaching a solution. But, to give a new impetus to the talks, we should try to make an objective assessment of the difficulties encountered in the negotiating process and not shout recriminations at only one of the negotiating parties. We would lack historical perspective if we did not take into account the fact that intercommunal talks have been going on not only since 1974, but since 1968. During the first phase of the negotiations, between 1968 and 1974, no lament was heard from the Greek Cypriot side, which was not complaining at that time about the slow pace of the intercommunal talks nor arguing that time was pressing and that the international community was indifferent. Negotiating from a position of strength, and comfortable in the belief that the *de facto* situation was to their advantage, it never occurred to the Greek-Cypriot leaders that time was precious. It is only because the *de facto* situation has now changed, because an equilibrium of forces exists in the island and because they have to deal with an equal negotiating partner that they display such a self-righteous impatience.

107. 1977 has been a remarkable year in the history of Cyprus not only because of the relative calm and tranquillity that has prevailed on the island throughout the year but also because of the significance of the meetings between the leaders of the two communities in late January and early February upon the initiative of President Denktaş. The second meeting, which was also attended by the Secretary-General, resulted in a framework agreement containing the following four points: first, both sides are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic; secondly, the territory to be administered by each community should be discussed in the light of its economic viability or productivity and land ownership; thirdly, the basic principles of freedom of movement and settlement, the right to property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community; and fourthly, the powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.

108. In any conflict situation such a framework agreement enunciating so clearly the basic principles of a solution should be hailed as a landmark. As a matter of fact, the Security Council did take note of that agreement in its resolution 410(1977), which it adopted last June, and emphasized the need to adhere to it.

109. Mr. Christophides in his statement has admitted that the Denktaş-Makarinos meeting created a climate of optimism for a break-through and stressed the importance of the agreement on a federal solution for the constitutional aspect and of a bi-zonal settlement for the territorial aspect of the problem. However, not only did he alter the meaning of the Denktaş-Makarinos meeting by saying that the questions of the withdrawal of forces and the return of the refugees were outside the scope of the agreement, but he also accused the Turkish Cypriot side of not negotiating in

good faith. As regards the first point—the scope of the agreement—I have already stated that an eventual agreement between the two communities will encompass all the elements of the problem. The four points which I have read *in extenso* obviously include inherently the solution of the refugee problem. As to the withdrawal of forces, it will be an automatic consequence of an accord between the two communities.

110. What about the tirade we heard against the alleged intransigence of the Turkish representatives at the last round of intercommunal negotiations? I shall refrain from entering into an exchange of arguments on the subject. We cannot here go over the details of the negotiating positions and pronounced judgements on the behaviour of the two parties. What is important is that, in our view and in the view of the Turkish Cypriot community, a significant milestone has been reached in the intercommunal talks, even though the subsequent developments may not have been as encouraging as expected. In such a complex problem as the Cyprus problem, so loaded with the legacy of the recent history of bitterness, resentment, fear and distrust, it would be a great error to rush to conclusions simply because one or two meetings have not been successful. If this Assembly is willing to make a contribution to the search for a settlement, it should unambiguously encourage the negotiations and refrain from introducing in the resolution it will adopt language which can be interpreted as an invitation to have recourse to other means. The Assembly should evaluate carefully the opportunities and dangers inherent in any given situation and not use the same terms indiscriminately in defining completely different sets of conditions.

Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) resumed the Chair.

111. Coming to the end of my statement, I wish to recall again the basic principles which guide the policy of Turkey with regard to the question of Cyprus. It should be clearly understood, I think, that Turkey has no interest in Cyprus beyond the independence of the island and the safeguarding of the legitimate rights and interests of the Turkish community. It goes without saying, therefore, that any solution acceptable to the Turkish community will unquestionably be welcomed and endorsed by Turkey. As my Foreign Minister stated in the general debate on 3 October 1977:

“In our opinion, the future solution should be based on the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. Even though Turkey is not a non-aligned country, it believes that a policy of non-alignment would be desirable for Cyprus and would contribute to the peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean.

“The events precipitated by the Greek military intervention in 1974 have inevitably produced a regrouping of the two communities. Sixty thousand Turkish Cypriots have found refuge in the north of the island after abandoning their homes and properties in the south. A movement in the opposite direction has taken place for the Greek Cypriot population of the north of the island. An agreement between the two communities has completed this exchange of population. Various problems that have emanated from these movements can be settled only within the framework of an over-all solution.

“The Turkish forces that are in Cyprus have been sent there in conformity with the obligations undertaken by Turkey. However, Turkey does not have the least intention of keeping its forces in Cyprus. It has already substantially reduced its forces on the island. The totality of troops sent to Cyprus after the events of July 1974 will be withdrawn as soon as a lasting political solution is reached. However, a complete withdrawal of Turkish troops in the absence of such a solution and the present atmosphere of distrust and political tension is unthinkable.”

One cannot ask Turkey to abandon the Turkish-Cypriot community to the mercy of a majority demanding vehemently and fanatically the return to the *status quo ante*, which, for the Turkish Cypriots, was but a régime of tyranny and oppression.

“To conclude with the Cyprus question, I should like to reiterate that Turkey will continue by every possible means to encourage the intercommunal talks with a view to reaching a just and equitable solution as rapidly as possible.” [17th meeting, paras. 185-188.]

112. The Turkish Foreign Minister, after visiting the Secretary-General on 6 October 1977, also reiterated in a statement the desire and readiness of the Turkish Government to encourage the continuation of the intercommunal negotiations in a constructive and meaningful manner. On 27 October 1977 the Turkish Government further announced new withdrawals of troops in addition to the 13,000 troops already withdrawn. The policy of the Turkish Government is therefore very clear and straightforward. We seek no division of the island and no perpetuation of the present situation. We are not a party to the negotiations but we are ready to contribute to the utmost to a resumption of the intercommunal talks and to encourage the parties to undertake a constructive, substantive and productive dialogue. Nothing would conform more to the interests of Turkey than an early and equitable settlement of the question of Cyprus.

113. Mr. JACKSON (Guyana): In addressing this Assembly on the question of Cyprus I have the distinct honour of speaking not only on behalf of my own country but also on behalf of the delegations of the sister Commonwealth Caribbean nations of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

114. It is with a certain kind of regret and with deep concern that we participate once more in the debate on the Cyprus question. Such regret and such concern do not spring from an unwillingness on our part to shoulder our responsibilities to the international community in the search for ways to resolve situations of conflict. Rather, they are prompted by the sad and disheartening realization that the current debate serves to dramatize vividly the continuation of the Cyprus tragedy and by our very real fears that there may be forces at work determined to make of the Cyprus question yet another problem invested with characteristics of intractability and permanence.

115. This debate is the fourth that has taken place in this General Assembly on the Cyprus question since the events of 1974. In the light of the present situation on the

island, in which foreign troops still bestride 40 per cent of the territory, the time and effort devoted to the consideration of the question starkly contrast with the unmistakable lack of meaningful progress towards a permanent settlement of the conflict.

116. As Members of this Organization and as participants in the non-aligned movement, our countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean have been active in efforts to alleviate the present distressing situation of stalemate which confronts the people of Cyprus. The true and large dimensions of the continuing problem are underlined by the Secretary-General in his report on the work of the Organization when he so rightly declares that:

“The situations in southern Africa, the Middle East and Cyprus are serious in themselves and also have very special implications for international peace and security.”
[See A/32/1, sect. III.]

The Secretary-General goes on to warn that: “In all the three situations I have mentioned the stakes are very high and the dangers of failure are increasingly ominous” [*ibid.*].

117. The grave situation described by the Secretary-General is the direct result of the failure to implement effectively resolutions adopted by this Assembly and the Security Council, resolutions which establish the indispensable ingredients for the achievement of a lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem. Such resolutions have been complemented by decisions taken in other forums. In this connexion, I am thinking in particular of decisions adopted by the non-aligned countries at the Colombo Conference last year and at the ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau in New Delhi last April.

118. General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974) and which has the advantage of having been adopted unanimously, continues to provide the only valid framework for a just settlement. In its essential provisions it calls for respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus; urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs; and considers that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety. Finally the resolution commends negotiations between the two communities—the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots—and supports their continuation on an equal footing with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable political settlement.

119. To focus for the moment on the question of the intercommunal talks: we are particularly concerned at the lack of progress. It was well over two years ago that the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a new mission of good offices with the aim of facilitating the progress of comprehensive negotiations between the two communities. Since then no less than six rounds of talks have been held, but these have failed to come to grips with the substantive aspects of the question, with the result that the talks have little to show in the way of progress in spite of the length of time that has elapsed since they began.

120. However, in a meeting held in February of this year in Nicosia between the late Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Denktaş, real headway appeared to have been made when the two leaders agreed on guidelines covering the all-important constitutional and territorial questions, the differences on which have bedevilled efforts to move the negotiating process forward. Those developments raised hopes that at last a major break-through was in the offing in the search for a solution to the several aspects of the problem between the two communities.

121. Such optimism has not, however, been borne out by ensuing events. Subsequent negotiations based on the guidelines agreed to could not proceed beyond the procedural stage, and the climate surrounding the prospects for renewed talks is at present so unfavourable that no date has been fixed for their resumption. In the meantime, unilateral actions in the northern part of Cyprus have given cause for alarm and have necessitated a Security Council response to reports of attempts to colonize the new quarter of Famagusta. The Secretary-General's recent report [A/32/282] bluntly underscores the fact that no movement of consequence has been made towards a settlement since the General Assembly last took up the Cyprus question and adopted resolution 31/12 demanding the urgent implementation of resolutions 3212 (XXIX) and 3395 (XXX) and expressing the hope that the Security Council would consider appropriate steps for the implementation of resolutions 365 (1974). The situation is aptly summed up in the Secretary-General's report, where he observes:

“It is evident from the preceding paragraphs that General Assembly resolutions 3212 (XXIX), 3395 (XXX) and 31/12 have yet to be fully implemented. Indeed, with regard to certain aspects of these resolutions there has been little or no forward movement.” [A/32/282, para. 25.]

In short, the foreign forces remain on the island; the tragic refugee problem continues; the *de facto* partition of the island and interference in the affairs of Cyprus remain as obtrusive as ever; and the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus remain compromised.

122. What, then, can be done to induce progress towards a settlement? The answer, of course, lies in the full and scrupulous implementation of the relevant resolutions in all their aspects. The Secretary-General stresses the need for an “effective negotiating process in relation to the underlying political problem of Cyprus” [*ibid.*, para. 26]. But it is important that the intercommunal talks should not be used as a stratagem to delay positive action leading to a comprehensive solution of the question.

123. Despite the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks, many speakers in the general debate, and indeed in this debate, including the representatives of Cyprus and Turkey, have reaffirmed the importance of those talks in paving the way towards a settlement. For the talks to lead to tangible results, however, distrust based on past experience must be overcome; rigid and negative attitudes must give way to more flexible and positive approaches; and concrete proposals on all the important issues must be presented with a view to reconciling conflicting positions.

Steps by all parties in the direction of honouring the United Nations resolutions would help to create a climate of confidence in which negotiations could proceed.

124. In its endeavour to accelerate the search for a settlement, the General Assembly must take account of the special responsibility of the Security Council in bringing about a just solution to this problem and urge that Council to take early appropriate measures in that direction. The small island nation of Cyprus has been for too long the victim of the actions of contending forces external to it. It is essential for the Security Council to reassure small States through remedial action on the question of Cyprus that military and economic weakness and the sovereign right of small States to exist are not incompatible elements in the conduct of international relations.

125. In this regard we of the Commonwealth Caribbean wish to make two specific suggestions. In the first place, we believe that the Security Council should seriously consider sending to Cyprus a fact-finding mission. Such a mission could be of value to the Council in assessing what additional means it may be necessary to employ to accelerate the process of negotiation. Secondly, the Council may wish to consider whether in the light of the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks an enhanced role for the Secretary-General is not desirable.

126. In conclusion, the delegations on whose behalf I speak, those of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago and my own, wish to pay a warm tribute to the Secretary-General and his representatives as well as to UNFICYP. In the delicate situation that exists in Cyprus, their role has been crucial in preventing ancient and deep-seated antagonisms from assuming larger proportions. In the present uneasy situation, their actions sustain a glimmer of hope and an element of reassurance.

127. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like my first words to be words of tribute to the man who symbolized the independence, the unity and the non-alignment of Cyprus, His Beatitude Archbishop Makarios. He left to the Cypriot people his personal example of devotion to the struggle for the preservation of those principles that are still in grave danger. He is and will be a source of inspiration to those who truly wish to preserve the independence and territorial unity of that country.

128. We cannot but deplore the fact that his death should have occurred before the existing situation in Cyprus could be resolved. Makarios in his last years suffered the bitter fate of seeing his country attacked by palace conspiracies hatched among the Powers members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, his country occupied by foreign occupation forces, its citizens expelled from their places of origin and deprived of their property, and the national territory divided artificially by means of military force. President Makarios nevertheless died with his faith in the international community and in the sense of justice and responsibility of this Organization intact.

129. For four consecutive years the General Assembly has been considering the similar situation prevailing in Cyprus as a result of imperialist conspiracies and foreign aggression.

The cardinal principles for the peaceful and just solution of the conflict were clearly defined in resolution 3212 (XXIX) of the General Assembly, when the international community called upon:

“... all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it ...”

and also urged:

“... the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs ...”.

130. On that occasion the General Assembly also expressed its view that: “the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities” and the unavoidable need to ensure “that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety ...”.

131. Since that date, new resolutions have been adopted by both the Security Council and this Assembly, reiterating in one way or another the elements of resolution 3212 (XXIX) and emphasizing the need for its urgent and effective implementation. The fact that, four years later, we should again embark on a similar exercise is but an invitation to us all to reflect on the limitations which the forces of reaction and imperialism impose on the work of this Organization.

132. No one can doubt that the abnormal and serious situation that prevails in Cyprus is, on the one hand, an affront to the principles of the Charter and, on the other, a challenge to the still precarious balance on which international peace and security rest today. If the conflict has not yet become an open war of incalculable dimensions and implications for the whole world, this is not because no such possibility exists, but rather because of the patient and responsible efforts made by the Cypriot Government to achieve a peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict.

133. But it is not possible to negotiate peacefully except on the basis of equality of the parties concerned. The international community can under no circumstances divest itself of the problem and presume that the Cypriot Government can solve, within the framework of its sovereignty, the situation that has been created in which 40,000 soldiers of a foreign Power maintain through the force of bayonets the occupation of 40 per cent of the national territory and where one third of the total population of the country is reduced to the status of refugees.

134. Such a situation cannot but lead to an outburst greater in scale than any we have seen thus far, unless those who today occupy by force that part of the southern Cypriot territory show their sincerity and political will to find a solution to the problem by withdrawing their military forces from the island forthwith and unconditionally. World public opinion cannot accept the argument that those forces must remain in Cyprus to “protect” the

interests of one of that country's communities. It is clear that the conflicts that may derive from disputes between communities within a country can only be solved within the framework of the independence and sovereignty of the people concerned and on the basis of non-interference in its internal affairs. Mankind still remembers the tragic events that occurred when, on earlier occasions in the history of the world, a nation adduced similar arguments as an excuse to make legitimate what was obviously armed aggression.

135. The maintenance of the military occupation of Cyprus and the reduction to the status of refugees of 20,000 of its citizens cannot serve the interests of either of the communities. On the contrary, it affects both directly, since it is the main obstacle to carrying out the negotiations in a climate of equality, respect and honour, as is necessary if they are to result in a just and peaceful solution.

136. However, in the four years that have elapsed, the aggressive Power has not given proof of any such intention, but rather it has aggravated the situation further by undertaking the task of colonizing some of the territories subject to its military occupation. By adopting such an attitude it has flouted the constant appeals of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the non-aligned movement and the whole of mankind, and in particular the Cypriot people, who truly aspire to peace and justice without new outbreaks of violence or bloodshed.

137. In such circumstances, what should this Organization do now? In our view, it is its unavoidable duty to request the Security Council to adopt practical measures likely to

promote the full and effective implementation of the resolutions adopted thus far by that body and by the General Assembly and, in particular, the principles set out in resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1974.

138. The United Nations and its Security Council have a duty to act in an effective manner and to eliminate all obstacles to a peaceful settlement of the situation prevailing today in Cyprus and, to this end, they should adopt whatever measures are necessary.

139. We must urgently put into effect what we have declared in several resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council for four consecutive years. We cannot confine ourselves to adopting yet another resolution, a new decision fated to be recorded in the preambular paragraphs of yet another resolution to be produced at the following session of the General Assembly. That is because, among other reasons, if the decisions of the international community on the Cypriot situation are not effectively implemented and respected, the world may tomorrow awaken to the shocking news that violence has broken out once again in that peaceful island, and that once again, because of that conflict, international peace and security are endangered.

140. The United Nations must not betray the hopes placed in it by President Makarios, nor can it allow the failure to solve this conflict to affect its prestige and reputation.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.