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## Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee)

### Summary record of the 16th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 26 October 2009, at 10 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Al-Nasser ..... (Qatar)  
*later:* Mr. Valladares ..... (Honduras)

## Contents

Agenda item 33: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (*continued*)

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.*

**Agenda item 33: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects** (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Lidén** (Sweden), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the candidate countries Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia; and, in addition, Armenia and Republic of Moldova, said that the European Union welcomed the recommendations outlined in the non-paper entitled "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping" as well as the non-paper on the implementation of a new field support strategy. The European Union encouraged the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and other relevant parts of the United Nations system to proceed with the implementation of the recommendations that could be addressed independently. The recent joint internal memorandum of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support offered important guidance in that regard.

2. The desire of troop- and police-contributing countries for increased involvement in the planning and conduct of United Nations peacekeeping was understandable; the European Union therefore encouraged the Security Council and the Secretariat to further develop consultation procedures, including when deciding on new peacekeeping mandates. Dialogue with regional organizations on how cooperation could be improved, both conceptually and practically, should be strengthened. Likewise, coordination between relevant bodies within the United Nations system must be enhanced. The success of peacekeeping operations and of the efforts to reform them depended on active political support and guidance. The European Union looked forward to cooperating with the Secretariat and all other partners in advancing the reform agenda.

3. Continued steps must be taken to enhance effective management of United Nations missions at all levels. Wider consensus was needed on robust peacekeeping and the protection of civilians, and the opportunities provided by a capability-driven approach to peacekeeping should be explored. A central challenge for effective peacekeeping was to make full

use of and strengthen the synergies between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. An early focus on capacity development would require strengthening and deepening the pool of deployable civilian experts. Peacebuilding roles at all stages of peacekeeping missions must be identified and clarified. Further discussions were needed on the roles and functions of police in peacekeeping operations, as well as the logistics of peacekeeping mission management.

4. Stressing the importance of the empowerment of women, in particular through implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), he said that the capacity of United Nations missions to address that and related issues must continue to be enhanced. United Nations operations must also be conscious of the socio-economic impact of peacekeeping and other missions on the local economy and labour market, as well as of the relationship between security and development. The command and control components of peacekeeping operations must be reviewed. The European Union acknowledged the need to improve the capacities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, as well as their ability to respond to crises, and supported further restructuring of the Office of Military Affairs and the Police Division.

5. The European Union remained fully engaged in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Since the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy, 20 military and civilian operations had been carried out in support of United Nations peacekeeping missions. Most recently, the European Union had launched a bridging operation prior to the deployment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) in Chad. Support to regional organizations, in particular the African Union, and capacity-building efforts were important elements in the strengthening of United Nations peacekeeping. Under the framework of the African Peace Facility, the European Union had committed an additional 300 million euros for the period between 2008 and 2010. In addition, the European Union currently had four missions deployed on the African continent within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy.

6. **Mr. El Alaoui** (Morocco), speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to seek the views of troop-contributing countries on various

aspects of current missions and for the Security Council's efforts to deepen consultations with troop-contributing countries through the mechanism of triangular cooperation. All efforts and initiatives must be conducted in conformity with the basic principles of peacekeeping, namely, consent of the parties, non-use of force except in self-defence and impartiality. The principles of sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of all States and non-intervention in matters that were essentially within their domestic jurisdiction should also be maintained. The Non-Aligned Movement was ready to engage in the debate on the New Partnership Agenda; however, it believed that more emphasis should be placed on critical operational aspects, including military aspects. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations should be involved in the discussions on that non-paper, and on the new field support strategy.

7. The protection of civilians was the primary responsibility of the host country and required integration of efforts at all levels. A comprehensive approach was needed which encompassed the provision of timely and adequate resources, logistical support and training, along with well-defined and achievable mandates. With regard to robust peacekeeping, the Non-Aligned Movement cautioned against introducing confusion on the use of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which could lead to serious repercussions. Any further debate on robust peacekeeping should be restricted to the operational and tactical levels.

8. The Non-Aligned Movement called for more engagement from the Secretariat to support the capacity-building activities of the regional and national training centres of troop- and police-contributing countries. Those countries should play a meaningful role in all stages of planning of peacekeeping operations, in particular because they bore the burden of implementing mandates crafted in the Security Council, yet they were often the sole object of criticism when missions faced difficulties. Greater interaction was needed between troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

9. The Non-Aligned Movement strongly believed that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rested with the United Nations, and that the role of regional arrangements should be in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. It supported continuing efforts to strengthen

African peacekeeping capabilities, in particular through the implementation of the Joint Action Plan for United Nations support to African peacekeeping. The partnership between the United Nations and the African Union should be enhanced in order to improve the planning, deployment and management of African peacekeeping operations.

10. The Non-Aligned Movement was gravely concerned about the precarious security environment prevailing in many peacekeeping missions and the issue of reimbursements on account of death and disability of peacekeepers. The Secretariat should provide compensation in all cases of death and disability unless they were on account of gross negligence or were self-inflicted. The Non-Aligned Movement continued to be concerned over the outstanding reimbursement that the United Nations owed to troop-contributing countries and urged the Secretariat to ensure the rapid processing and payment of reimbursements. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations should hold informal consultations on the issue. The Non-Aligned Movement commended the Government of the United States of America for taking steps to pay its arrears. All Member States must pay their contributions in full, on time and without conditions.

11. **Mr. Heller** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of the Rio Group, said that it was imperative to strengthen the operational capacity and organizational structure of peacekeeping operations, both at Headquarters and in the field. Coordination and interaction between the different stakeholders must be enhanced. The Rio Group looked forward to discussing the non-paper on the New Partnership Agenda in the framework of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

12. Since 87 per cent of military and police personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations were provided by developing countries, those countries should be involved in a meaningful manner in all aspects and stages of peacekeeping operations. It was essential to increase the levels of information-sharing, coordination and consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries. The Rio Group urged the Security Council to continue the practice of holding private meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries in advance of its consultations. Better coordination between the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries was essential. The

Group noted with satisfaction the initiative taken by the Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to invite troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat to exchange views and concerns regarding specific operations. Those meetings should be continued on a more regular basis and in an inclusive manner.

13. The Rio Group stressed the importance of respecting the principles and standards for the establishment and conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations, such as consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the authorized mandate. Universality of participation in peacekeeping operations must also be ensured.

14. Since mandates were implemented in the field by troop-contributing countries, it was imperative to maintain a substantive discussion on all operational matters regarding mandates, which needed to be clear and achievable. There should be adequate capabilities, clear and appropriate guidelines, logistical and financial resources and appropriate training so as to enable peacekeeping missions to carry out all their mandated tasks. Better coordination between mandates and resources was also needed, not only to ensure effective implementation but also to guarantee the personal safety of peacekeeping personnel.

15. The primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security remained with the United Nations. Regional arrangements must be in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter and could not replace the role of the United Nations or be exempt from fully implementing the guiding principles of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

16. It was essential to guarantee the highest level of ethical conduct of peacekeeping personnel. The Rio Group was committed to the zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual exploitation and abuse and welcomed the progress made towards eliminating and preventing misconduct. The relevant provisions in the revised model memorandum of understanding represented a substantial improvement in that regard.

17. The General Assembly was the appropriate forum for the formulation and evaluation of policies and guidelines for peacekeeping operations. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations played an important role in reviewing the whole question of

peacekeeping operations in all their aspects; its work must continue to be strengthened and recognized.

18. The Rio Group was concerned about the significant amounts of outstanding reimbursements that the United Nations currently owed to troop-contributing countries and stressed that such reimbursements should be made in a timely and efficient manner, bearing in mind the need to give equal treatment to all missions. Under the current conditions offered to Member States, the availability of human and material resources from troop-contributing countries, especially from developing countries, could be undermined.

19. The training of personnel for specific tasks had become increasingly important since United Nations peacekeeping operations had become more complex. The Rio Group looked forward to receiving detailed information on the work of the Integrated Training Service in connection with the development of a set of minimum training standards and training modules and requested, once again, that publications on peacekeeping operations should be translated and distributed in Spanish and Portuguese.

20. In order to achieve long-term stability and prevent the recurrence of conflict, the United Nations presence in the field must be strengthened, not only in terms of peacekeeping operations, but also of reconstruction, institutional strengthening and promotion of economic and social development in conflict areas. The Rio Group encouraged enhanced interaction among Member States and all relevant United Nations bodies, in particular the Peacebuilding Commission.

21. The Rio Group reaffirmed its solidarity with the Government and people of Haiti and reiterated its strong support for the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Members of the Rio Group were contributing a majority of the troops and part of the police forces and were cooperating in other ways through the United Nations system, as well as through regional organizations and bilateral arrangements. Special attention must be given not only to security aspects, but also to the social and economic development of the country and the consolidation of its institutions with the aim of achieving long-lasting and stable peace.

22. **Mr. Mungkalaton** (Thailand), speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), said that United Nations peacekeeping operations must respect the principles of sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity and non-intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. The basic principles of consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate must continue to be upheld.

23. In order to operate effectively in a harsh and hostile environment, United Nations peacekeepers needed appropriate operational capabilities that would provide sufficient force protection and enhance operational security; timely and reliable logistical field support; and a credible and effective political process. System-wide cooperation and coordination among all stakeholders was essential. Peacekeeping operations must have clear and achievable mandates consistent with allocated resources and the situation on the ground. Troop-contributing countries should be involved in and consulted on the drafting of mandates. Complex and integrated mandates, such as the protection of civilians and human rights protection, needed clear guidelines from the Secretariat, while mandates related to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and rule of law needed both operational guidelines and strategic guidance.

24. The safety and security of peacekeepers was of paramount importance. The member countries of ASEAN were concerned about the recent loss of one of their peacekeepers as a result of negligence of medical staff responsible for providing medical attention to peacekeepers in the field. Serious efforts should be made by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support to address questions in connection with the death of the peacekeeper as well as to ensure that medical personnel assigned in mission areas were qualified and able to attend to the medical needs of peacekeepers and were held accountable should they be found to be derelict in performing their duties.

25. Bearing in mind that modern armed conflicts were structurally complex and multi-dimensional in nature, peacekeeping operations required an integrated and holistic approach that included conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction, building on ownership by the host country and regional support.

It was therefore crucial that mandates should be reviewed at an appropriate stage, with an effective benchmarking system.

26. A good exit strategy required careful planning and involvement of all parties concerned to ensure a smooth transition to post-conflict peacebuilding. That transition should draw on regional expertise as much as possible. Relevant actors in peacekeeping operations should engage more closely with the Peacebuilding Commission. United Nations peacekeeping operations must be part of the political process that sought to address the root causes of conflict through engagement with all parties involved based on dialogue, peaceful settlement of disputes, mutual respect, inclusiveness and non-discrimination. Since security and development were interrelated and mutually reinforcing, socio-economic reconstruction must be prioritized along with the establishment of peace and security.

27. ASEAN member States had long contributed troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations and would continue to do so, based on their capacity. They had nearly 3,500 peacekeepers serving in various missions at the current time. As ASEAN moved towards becoming one community by 2015, it was looking at the possibility of establishing a network among the existing peacekeeping centres of ASEAN member States to conduct joint planning, training and sharing of experiences, as envisaged in the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint.

28. **Mr. Wolfe** (Jamaica), speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), said that the Caribbean countries welcomed the Security Council's decision, in its resolution 1892 (2009), to renew the mandate of MINUSTAH for another year. They also welcomed other positive developments that had taken place in Haiti over the past year, including the holding of senatorial elections, the adoption of key legislation and the appointment of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Haiti. CARICOM was committed to the goal of ensuring the long-term growth, development and stability of Haiti and the Haitian people and through its participation in MINUSTAH it continued to work with the Haitian Government to consolidate gains in the areas of security, rule of law and the promotion and protection of human rights. It was assisting in a number of capacity-building projects which should place Haiti on a path towards becoming a part of the CARICOM Single Market in the near future. He urged

the international community to continue its support to Haiti.

29. CARICOM was committed to engaging in all efforts to improve the Organization's ability to achieve the various peacekeeping mandates and lay a firm foundation for lasting peace and sustainable development in countries emerging from conflict. It reaffirmed the primacy of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations as the only United Nations forum mandated to review the whole question of peacekeeping operations. Any delays in the Special Committee's work could have a negative effect on United Nations peacekeeping. Seamless synergies and cooperation between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Commission were essential. CARICOM was committed to ensuring that the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations were duly reflected in the future work of the Peacebuilding Commission, giving due regard to the primary role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in all operational matters.

30. The international community must address and eliminate the root causes of conflict such as poverty, competition for scarce resources, unemployment and the systematic violation of human rights, and also develop conflict early warning and early response systems. It was becoming clear that many developing countries, including those in the Caribbean region, would not meet all the targets for the Millennium Development Goals. Without the full implementation of previously agreed commitments on the part of developed countries to enable developing countries to meet their development goals, some of the most vulnerable countries might relapse into conflict, and the United Nations would be called upon to keep the peace in other countries that had previously been free from conflict. General Assembly resolutions 63/261 and 63/620 were important building blocks in strengthening the Organization's capacity to further deliver in the areas of conflict prevention and the development agenda.

31. CARICOM fully supported the Organization's zero-tolerance policy towards all forms of misconduct and, in particular, acts of sexual abuse and exploitation on the part of peacekeeping personnel. It took note of the remaining work that needed to be done, particularly in the area of victim assistance.

32. Developing countries continued to provide the majority of troops and police personnel to peacekeeping missions. In recent times, developing countries, some of which were now classified as middle-income countries, were being asked to shoulder more of the financial cost of peacekeeping missions. That had been the case with countries in the Caribbean that had been graduated in the peacekeeping scale, including up to level B alongside developed countries. The current financial and economic crisis continued to threaten the economic sustainability of small, middle-income developing countries, including those in the Caribbean; as a result, many of them were unable to meet their increased financial obligations. CARICOM countries would continue to meet their financial obligations to United Nations peacekeeping operations; they wished to recall, however, that General Assembly resolution 55/235, which emphasized the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security, should be borne in mind. Developing countries with small, vulnerable economies could not and should not be expected to shoulder the same financial burden as developed countries.

33. Over the past year, Jamaican police contingents travelling to United Nations peacekeeping missions had faced significant challenges, including delays in the granting of visas and the inability to obtain gratis in-transit visas, and long waits for the arrival of their personal effects. He hoped that the situation would be quickly resolved. Those negative occurrences would not in any way deter Jamaica from its commitment to play its part, as a police-contributing country, to United Nations peacekeeping missions. He called on Member States to demonstrate some flexibility when nationals were on official travel to serve in peacekeeping operations.

34. **Mr. Wetland** (Norway) said that the protection of civilians must be at the heart of the reform process. A new incentive structure needed to be developed. Norway supported the Secretariat in its efforts to devise a capability-based approach and favoured a similar approach to the design of a comprehensive field support strategy. The flexibility of the Organization's operational and administrative support apparatus, as well as its logistical system, must be strengthened. The role of partnerships must be enhanced and there must be a focus on the transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

35. Norway welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1888 (2009) and 1889 (2009). Recent reports about appalling sexual violence against women in Eastern Congo underlined the urgency of the matter. It must be ensured that all United Nations peacekeepers were trained to implement protection mandates, which must be clear and enforceable.

36. Norway was heartened by the priority being accorded to concepts and guidelines for protection of civilians. Humanitarian assistance must be protected and given access, and security sector reform was needed. It was also important to address bottlenecks in the deployment of civilian personnel, who often played a crucial role in civilian protection; strong leadership and clear communication of roles and responsibilities were essential. Protection strategies must be developed, including plans for support to host Governments, which bore ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of their citizens. Norway had decided to fund the project of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to develop a strategic doctrinal framework for international police peacekeeping, which was critical to the effective implementation of mandates and to the safety and security of United Nations police officers.

37. He hoped that the Security Council would reach agreement on further strengthening the African Union's capacity to undertake successful peacekeeping operations. Norway was actively engaged with African partners in the training of civilian African personnel through its Training for Peace programme. Together with its Nordic partners, and in cooperation with the Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism, Norway was also contributing to military capacity-building in East Africa.

38. Peacekeeping operations must be accompanied by a viable political strategy and by a well-funded peacebuilding process. The non-paper on the New Partnership Agenda, along with the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304) constituted a solid basis for moving forward in strengthening the Organization's capacity to maintain international peace and security.

39. **Mr. Berrah** (Algeria) said that the comprehensive approach to improving current peacekeeping practices that had been set out in the New Partnership Agenda merited inclusive and

transparent discussion. Peacekeeping was an ambitious enterprise with many dimensions ranging from military and police operations to reconstruction in the interests of peace. Many of the Organization's structural, financial and capability-related problems had been exacerbated by the number and scope of missions it had undertaken. Past reform efforts had, however, come up with solutions that were still pertinent.

40. Even as it undertook new missions, the United Nations should not be diverted from its first responsibility, which was to deal with the underlying causes of conflict. Moreover, each mission must meet the criteria of effectiveness and sustainability; be integrated into an overall strategy for addressing the particular crisis; have clear mandates; have the unanimous support of the Security Council and all other stakeholders, including the troop-contributing countries, the donor countries and the administrative bodies involved; and be supported by appropriate and adequate financial, human and technical resources.

41. On the question of protection of civilians, the responsibility of the United Nations towards vulnerable populations consisted primarily of supporting the action of the national authorities; it was the State which bore primary responsibility. The discussion of robust peacekeeping, which had taken place in closed forums, had introduced an element of confusion or even suspicion; that concept must be clarified, particularly since it would require projections and capacities which were generally lacking. The concept of post-conflict reconstruction should be introduced early on, because it was a determining factor in a mission's exit strategy to ensure that countries did not fall back into a spiral of violence and instability.

42. The distribution of roles and the definition of the kind of intervention required must be worked out between the Security Council and regional organizations involved in peacekeeping, especially the African Union. The Secretary-General's report on support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (A/64/359-S/2009/470) recognized the African Union's peacekeeping efforts in implementation of the decisions taken by Africa's leadership at various meetings and summits, the latest being the decision taken in August 2009 to double the amount of the African Union regional budget allocated to the African Union Peace Fund. The African Union was also on schedule with respect to its 2010 goal for the activation

of the African Standby Force, yet it was still short of resources and capabilities at a time when urgent action was increasingly a necessity in Africa. All would stand to gain from solid international support for the African Union peacekeeping missions. It was especially important to provide the African Union with adequate, predictable financing rather than having the missions depend on voluntary contributions. There was still room for closer cooperation between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council to exploit the full potential of joint action.

43. **Mr. Taleb** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that peacekeeping operations played a vital role in relieving tension and had contributed to the resolution of conflicts and peacebuilding in the post-conflict phase. They should not, however, be regarded as a substitute for the long-term resolution of conflicts but rather as a temporary means of preventing the deterioration of conflicts and laying a sound foundation for a gradual transition to peacebuilding, which required the root causes of the conflict to be addressed.

44. His Government appreciated the sacrifices made by peacekeepers, especially those engaged in the removal of mines and cluster bombs in South Lebanon. It regretted the continuing inability of the United Nations to deter the repeated attacks by Israel on international peacekeepers and United Nations personnel. Israel denied some of those attacks outright while claiming, implausibly after so many instances in the course of over three decades, that others were due to unintentional errors. His Government maintained good relations with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). Peacekeeping operations in the Middle East had unfortunately lasted for decades and, in the case of UNTSO, for half a century, and the prospect of peace had become remote because Israel persisted in defying United Nations resolutions, escalating tension in the region and attacking its neighbours.

45. His delegation reaffirmed the importance of compliance with the principles and guidelines for peacekeeping operations and of timely reimbursements to troop-contributing countries. In that context, peacekeeping operations must restrict themselves to fulfilling their mandates, and must adhere to the principles set forth in the Charter, including respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States, which implied securing the

consent of the States in which peacekeeping forces were deployed. Mandates must be clear, realistic and achievable so as to maintain the credibility and impartiality of the Organization. Responsibility for financing peacekeeping operations should be borne by the aggressor and by the occupying Power in accordance with the principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV). His delegation was ready to take part in discussions on the reforms envisaged in the New Partnership Agenda as long as they did not result in any changes to the mandates established by the Security Council.

46. His delegation stressed the necessity of strengthening the security measures and procedures at United Nations mission headquarters so as to ensure that there was no further Israeli aggression against the headquarters of the United Nations mission in Qana, following Israel's two earlier attacks in 1996 and 2006, and to safeguard the lives and security of peacekeeping personnel. A genuine, three-way partnership needed to be established between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries, which should all be involved in the planning, preparation and management of missions.

47. *Mr. Valladares (Honduras), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

48. **Mr. Ali** (Sudan) said that United Nations peacekeeping efforts would achieve swifter and better results if they were combined with other efforts to address the root causes of conflicts and took into account the special problems of the developing and least developed countries, as a consequence of poverty, climate change, natural disasters, rising food and fuel prices, the world financial crisis and the spread of epidemics.

49. He reaffirmed his country's commitment to comply with all its obligations under Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) and to work with the United Nations and the African Union through the tripartite consultation mechanism and other mechanisms to complete the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). His country looked forward to working with all parties at the forthcoming peace negotiations in Doha to reach a peace settlement for which the people of Darfur yearned and which was being impeded by the armed movements and by those who provided their leaders with material and political support.



50. As one of the first countries to have taken part in a United Nations peacekeeping operation and as a country with two peacekeeping missions on its soil, the Sudan took a keen interest in the discussions on the New Partnership Agenda. Peacekeeping operations must adhere strictly to the established principles and guidelines, including non-use of force other than in self-defence, impartiality, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the host countries and non-interference in their internal affairs. They should not, under any pretext, be assigned any tasks that might justify intrusion by the United Nations as a party in a dispute. The image and impartiality of the United Nations must be preserved and the Organization must not be used in such a way as to further the political aims of any influential Power. Peacekeepers should not be equated with those who hindered peacekeeping efforts, and national Governments, armies and police personnel should not be equated with armed rebels, robbers and terrorists who committed aggression against individuals and property and attacked aid convoys and United Nations posts and humanitarian organizations, even though some Governments might not be to the liking of certain parties because of political differences.

51. The mandates of peacekeeping operations must be clear and the necessary material and human resources must be made available. The troop-contributing countries must be consulted, as should the host countries at every stage of the operation. His own country's experience of the tripartite mechanism in connection UNAMID exemplified not only the success of that approach but also the importance of not making statements to the media that might be prejudicial to the peace process and of dialogue with the host countries, mainly to resolve problems during deployment or during the implementation of the mandate.

52. Peacekeeping should ideally lead to peacebuilding linked to national development plans; peacekeeping missions could not operate in isolation from the competent national authorities because it was the latter who would undertake the task of rebuilding what had been destroyed in the war and continuing their development efforts. Accordingly, the participation of the national authorities was of fundamental importance in order to prepare for a smooth transition when the exit strategy, which must be prepared in advance of the mission, was put into effect.

53. The protection of civilians was central to the responsibilities of the national authorities of any country; any attempt to take away that responsibility, or to replace it by any form of external interference would have dire consequences for the peace process, worse than the problems that were to be resolved. The Security Council, in resolution 1769 (2007) establishing UNAMID, had provided that the Mission should protect civilians without prejudice to the responsibility of the national Government. The protection of civilians required a subtle understanding of the cultural heritage and local society that went beyond the mere stationing of troops or establishment of outposts. It was unacceptable that an independent study on the protection of civilians, which had been commissioned without prior consultation with Member States, had resulted in directives which were given to certain missions for implementation without the consent of the host States.

54. The use of force in peacekeeping operations had always been restricted to cases of self-defence. The robust approach to peacekeeping advocated in the non-paper was on the surface unobjectionable but questions arose as to how threats to the peace process and "spoilers" would be identified, how a robust mission would work with national authorities to deter them, what kind of force should be used and what were its limits. Status of forces agreements needed to be worked out at the outset so as to define the fine line between performance of peacekeeping tasks and interference in the internal affairs of the host country.

55. Security sector reform was a national responsibility; United Nations assistance in that connection should be by request and with the agreement of the State concerned.

56. His Government fully supported the policy of zero tolerance for sexual abuse and exploitation but had still not received the results of the high-level investigation into abuses committed in the town of Juba over two years previously by United Nations peacekeepers in the Sudan. His delegation urged the Secretariat to disclose the results of the investigation and of any trials that had taken place, as well as details of assistance that had been given to the victims.

57. His delegation commended the African Union on its role in UNAMID and also on its valuable role in the peace process. It looked forward to the outcome of the discussions that were to be held by the Security

Council on enhancing the capacities of the African Union to maintain peace and security in Africa and emphasized the necessity of continuing the ten-year capacity-building programme for the African Union in the framework of support for regional arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter.

58. **Ms. Hernández Toledano** (Cuba) said that peacekeeping operations had become the most costly activity in which the United Nations was engaged, but were a basic instrument for fulfilling one of the purposes for which it had been created, the maintenance of international peace and security. Peacekeeping operations were growing in scope and complexity as well as number, but that must not obscure the need to address the root causes of conflicts. Peacekeeping missions were not an end in themselves but only a temporary measure to create a framework of security within which a long-term, sustainable socio-economic development strategy could be applied.

59. Peacekeeping operations must be carried out in strict accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-intervention in their internal affairs. Other principles as well must be observed: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence. Peacekeeping operations must have clearly defined and realistic mandates, specific goals and the resources needed to achieve them, as well as a clear exit strategy from the outset. Regional arrangements for peacekeeping operations had proven their worth, but they must be in full accord with Chapter VIII of the Charter and not supplant the role of the United Nations or fail to observe the basic peacekeeping principles.

60. There must be ever closer cooperation between the troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat; their interaction needed to be more inclusive at all stages of decision-making. The New Partnership Agenda study should be considered a work in progress, requiring detailed analysis in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Any overhaul of the conduct of peacekeeping operations must be consistent and system-wide, and build on earlier gains.

61. **Mr. Sangqu** (South Africa), noting the unprecedented surge in the demand for United Nations peacekeeping, said that his Government supported the current efforts to reform the manner in which

peacekeeping operations were conducted. The New Partnership Agenda study was one more contribution to the endeavour to adapt to the new dynamics and challenges of peacekeeping; it should build on previous reform proposals. Despite its weaknesses and constraints, peacekeeping continued to make an important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

62. Enhanced triangular cooperation between the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat was important to ensure effective coordination and better information-sharing. The challenges facing peacekeeping operations could be addressed only through a coherent, multi-dimensional approach, clear mandates and guidelines, and institutional flexibility.

63. The protection of civilians was a vital part of peacekeeping operations; all the relevant stakeholders should work together to develop realistic operational guidance for the military personnel on the ground so that they could respond properly when faced with such situations. Robust mandates should at all times ensure the protection of human and humanitarian rights, the protection of women and children in armed conflicts and the protection of civilians.

64. The United Nations partnerships with regional organizations involved in peacekeeping, such as the African Union, provided comparative advantages, as recent United Nations-supported African Union missions had shown. Peacekeeping by regional organizations had to be financed in a predictable, sustainable and flexible way.

65. Security sector reform was an important instrument for achieving sustainable peace, security, democracy and development: it must be nationally owned and should address the realities in the specific countries. The United Nations should continue its efforts to develop a common approach for such reform.

66. Peacekeeping missions were not in themselves a panacea for resolving conflicts. They had to be integrated into a broader political solution to the underlying causes of conflicts, through peacebuilding, conflict prevention and management, and mediation.

67. **Mr. Avidar-Walzer** (Israel) said that it was increasingly important to evaluate the situation on the ground and to prioritize objectives as peacekeeping missions grew in size, scope and complexity while the

United Nations confronted growing shortages of personnel and resources. Israel hoped to expand its own participation in peacekeeping missions.

68. Israel appreciated the difficult and delicate circumstances in which United Nations peacekeepers conducted their work. His Government remained committed to the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and continued to offer full support to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a robust mission whose success was important. Israel remained deeply concerned, however, by disturbing developments within the UNIFIL area of operation. Two instances of munitions explosions gave unquestioned evidence of Hezbollah's ongoing rearmament South of the Litani river, which posed a security threat to the region. In the aftermath of both explosions, Hezbollah operatives had sought to remove evidence and prevent UNIFIL personnel from reaching the weapons storage locations. Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) must be scrupulously implemented, and that included the full disarmament and dismantling of Hezbollah as well as the full enforcement of the arms embargo. Moreover, a timetable needed to be established for the disarmament and dismantling.

69. The presence of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) had been contributing to stability in the region since 1974 by stabilizing the Israeli-Syrian border.

70. **Mr. Gutiérrez** (Peru) said that peacekeeping operations had changed dramatically over time and now dealt with many interconnected issues. They had helped to prevent conflicts, provide security, protect civilians and bring stability to areas previously given over to despair, violence and oblivion. The solidarity and cooperation inherent in such missions was a tangible sign of the commitment of Member States and the Organization to peace and security.

71. The goal that guided Peru's participation in peacekeeping missions was having the country itself assume responsibility for maintaining peace, and therefore every effort was made to strengthen State institutions, the capacity to resolve conflicts and national sovereignty. Peacekeeping operations coexisted with conflict prevention, mediation and good-offices missions by the Secretary-General, and action by the Peacebuilding Commission and, increasingly, regional and international organizations

as well. At a time of flux, many aspects of peacekeeping needed to be reassessed and ways had to be found to ensure sufficient resources for putting the desired reforms into effect, including a more precise definition of the scope of mission mandates. That entailed integrated, dynamic and consistent management on the part of all the United Nations bodies involved, and better coordination and interaction among them. It was important for troop-contributing and police-contributing countries to be a part of that coordination. An example of a particularly successful mission was MINUSTAH, which was not only ensuring security but also dealing with the urgent needs of the people and the Government as part of its operation.

72. For the Organization to have credibility in the eyes of the world public, it was imperative that the main actors involved should agree on how to improve the structure of peacekeeping operations, define chains of command with clear objectives, and ensure sufficient human and technical resources. Peru was interested in continuing to work with others to devise a new framework for peacekeeping operations that would make them agile, functional and effective in the service of international peace and security, while observing the principles of transparency and inclusion of all the actors concerned.

73. **Mr. Okuda** (Japan) said that peacekeeping operations had been given more complex and comprehensive mandates beyond their traditional modes of operation in response to the drastic changes that had come about in the strategic and tactical environment in which they operated. The New Partnership Agenda initiative by the Secretariat would contribute much to the series of ongoing reviews. Japan particularly supported the idea that peacekeeping operations should be established in the context of the broader political process and should have mandates consistent with their objectives and the available resources. It was important to make a clear distinction between what could and could not be achieved. It was also indispensable for missions to set benchmarks and to plan adequately for what they wanted to achieve. His delegation supported the Secretariat's approach of involving Member States in the review of the field support strategy.

74. In 2009, Japan had led the discussion in the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations on the gaps between mandates and their

implementation, with the participation of many troop- and police-contributing countries, donor countries and other major stakeholders. Various issues had been raised, including protection of civilians, capacity-building of troops, coordination of peacebuilding activities and the establishment of partnerships for implementing mandates. Those issues overlapped with the major pillars of the New Partnership Agenda study. His delegation would continue to contribute to mutually reinforcing discussions in the Working Group and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

75. The protection of civilians was an important but difficult mandate. In countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the Sudan, whose vast areas could not possibly be covered with limited personnel, a combination of measures should be considered, such as enhancing the mobility of units, strengthening communication with local populations, and establishing standard operating procedures including for coordinating with humanitarian agencies and NGOs. Building up the capacity of national military and police and the establishment of the rule of law through security sector reform would reduce the burden on peacekeeping operations and make it possible for missions to leave successfully. Close coordination was needed between the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat.

76. The pool of potential troop- and police-contributing countries should be expanded in terms of both quality and numbers, for it was their troops who discharged complex mandates in harsh operational environments. Japan was providing high-quality troops for missions and instructors for peacekeeping training centres in Africa and Asia. It had co-chaired a regional forum for peacekeeping experts to improve cooperation in Asia.

77. All discussion on peacekeeping should be results-oriented. It was important to focus on the broader strategic perspective while discussing individual issues and to improve the strategic environment surrounding operations by enhancing the political process and peacebuilding.

78. **Mr. Rai** (Nepal) said that the ability of the United Nations to deploy peacekeeping missions in a timely fashion presented a serious challenge as a result of political, logistical, financial and managerial

overstretch. New strategies should be sought so as to make the best use of peacekeeping as a tool for maintaining international peace and security and resolving conflicts. He welcomed the non-paper on the New Partnership Agenda, which gave a comprehensive outline of the way forward for the first time since the issuance of the Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809) and represented a step towards meaningful discussions and building broader consensus among partners for effective and efficient peacekeeping operations.

79. Modern peacekeeping included many different activities, including protecting civilians, developing institutions for governance and reforming security institutions. Challenges arose when there was a lack of resources and political support during the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. In addition, during the transition to peacebuilding, the exit strategy for peacekeeping operations sometimes became confused.

80. It was important not to operate without the consent of the parties, even in the pursuit of laudable goals. Operations with limited or no consent from the parties were bound to run into problems. A workable political strategy needed to be devised to deal with such situations in advance. The core values of peacekeeping should not be compromised even in the face of new challenges.

81. The definition and scope of robust peacekeeping missions needed to be agreed upon by all stakeholders. Such missions would also require a robust mandate and support strategy. A better strategy and modalities for regional cooperation in peacekeeping was also needed, including cooperation between the United Nations and the regional organizations involved. Peacekeeping could not succeed without the meaningful engagement of the troop- and police-contributing countries at every stage. The troops should be given operational flexibility and be involved in the development of the rules of engagement in each situation.

82. The current system of recruiting and retaining qualified staff for peacekeeping operation should be reviewed; the high vacancy rates in the missions and the imbalance in comparison with the level of troops and police personnel contributed, inadequate representation at Headquarters and in the field, and lack of geographical and gender diversity in peacekeeping operations must be addressed. The top troop- and police-contributing countries needed to be

given commensurate senior mission leadership and Headquarters positions.

83. Nepal, which was currently the fifth largest contributor, would be deploying an additional 1,335 military peacekeepers and 200 police peacekeepers to various missions in 2009, thereby increasing its contribution by 35 per cent. It was committed to increasing its level of participation provided that it was supported with critical contingent-owned equipment. The initiative of the United States President to meet with the leaders of the top troop- and police-contributing countries, including the Prime Minister of Nepal, during the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, had been greatly appreciated. Such interaction should be broadened in order to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

84. Nepal strongly supported the implementation of a policy of zero tolerance for sexual exploitation, abuse and human rights violations. The safety and security of peacekeeping personnel was paramount both for morale and for the success of the missions and should not be compromised under any circumstances; it should be built into the mandates of missions and the rules of engagement. The parties to the peace agreements and any non-State actors should be made accountable for any attacks on peacekeepers. There should be adequate provision for critical security equipment needed for the protection of peacekeeping personnel.

85. **Ms. Eby** (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) said that because civilians accounted for the vast majority of casualties during armed conflicts, protecting them was one of the main objectives of international humanitarian law and a primary responsibility of States and other parties to such conflicts. It was certainly an abiding concern of ICRC, which sought to reduce the risks to which civilians were exposed and remind the authorities of their primary duty to protect civilians. In addition to maintaining peace and security, providing protection for civilians had to be one of the wide range of tasks with which United Nations peacekeepers were entrusted.

86. Political authorities, military forces and humanitarian actors, however, each had distinctive roles in enhancing the protection of civilians. Humanitarian action, for example, was driven by the imperative of saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining or restoring the dignity of people affected

by armed conflict, whereas the objective of peacekeepers was to maintain, restore and consolidate peace yet there were specific areas where they could help ensure greater protection for civilians: with their military capabilities, they could influence the behaviour of persons involved in armed violence with a view to sparing civilian lives and respecting the integrity and dignity of the civilian population; they could in certain cases intervene militarily to prevent grave violations of the law; they could set a good example for other weapon-bearers by their own respect for human rights and humanitarian law; and they could actively work to establish a secure environment in which humanitarian organizations could operate, and in which the rule of law could be re-established.

87. The United Nations and troop-contributing countries shared the responsibility to help ensure that, when violations of international humanitarian law and human rights occurred, all necessary measures were taken to investigate and punish those responsible and to prevent further violations. United Nations peacekeeping personnel, especially troops engaged in military operations, needed to be well trained in international humanitarian law. ICRC had for many years been sharing its expertise in that area with troop-contributing countries by cooperating in the development of doctrine and curricula and in training and predeployment briefings. Whenever ICRC was present in a theatre where peacekeeping forces were deployed, it established a constructive dialogue with them regarding specific humanitarian or protection issues.

88. As peacekeeping missions worked to reinforce the State's ability to provide security in conjunction with observance of the rule of law and human rights, they could help create a safe and secure environment for civilians; but experience showed that it was a delicate task, especially for troops trained for combat operations who were serving in unfamiliar environments, where lack of adequate preparation might result in an excessive use of force. Furthermore, when a peacekeeping mission was helping a State in the area of law enforcement, every aspect — policing, or support for the nation's judiciary or its prison system — should be taken into consideration, in order to enable smooth transfers of persons arrested by the troops, in compliance with the principle of non-refoulement.

89. A clear distinction between the role of the military and that of humanitarian actors must be

maintained and clearly explained to all stakeholders, especially when peacekeeping troops engaged in non-combat action, such as helping to facilitate humanitarian activities. ICRC would continue to take a neutral, independent and strictly humanitarian approach, but it was indispensable for it to have access to armed actors and to those affected by violence in carrying out its protection activities. It reiterated its commitment to continue dialogue and share experience with all stakeholders in the protection of civilians, international humanitarian law and training and capacity-building.

90. **Mr. Ramadan** (Lebanon), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the Israeli Government should back up its words with actions in support of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and UNIFIL. Israel continued to occupy land in southern Lebanon and to criticize the Force Commander of UNIFIL. In addition, on more than one occasion, including since the adoption of the aforementioned resolution, Israel had behaved in a manner intended to intimidate UNIFIL troops.

91. Referring to the two recent incidents in southern Lebanon mentioned by the representative of Israel, he said that the Security Council had been informed at the time that UNIFIL had been advised not to approach the site of the explosion on the first day in order to safeguard the troops from secondary explosions. His Government had informed the Security Council and the Secretary-General that the explosion had been caused by remnants of the 2006 Israeli war against Lebanon.

92. His Government was fully committed to Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and supported UNIFIL, which had been a partner to the Lebanese people throughout the years in their struggle to liberate their lands from Israeli occupation. Hezbollah had not existed in 1978 when Israel had first invaded Lebanese land, on a large scale, nor did it exist in 1982 when the Israeli occupation reached Beirut; it was a grass-roots liberation movement which had grown as a natural response to the occupation. A timetable should indeed be set, but one that would put an end to the cruel occupation in Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. It was time for those who pretended to support peace to start doing so by ending their occupation.

93. **Mr. Taleb** (Syrian Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the statement

made by the representative of Israel was an attempt to divert attention away from the crimes that continued to be perpetrated by the Israeli regime against the Palestinian people. The statement had ignored the fact that not a single instance of weapons being smuggled into Lebanon had been recorded in successive reports of the Secretary-General. The Force Commander of UNIFIL had commended Hezbollah's cooperation, while complaining about Israel's violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and its violations of Lebanese airspace.

94. Israel had a long history of deliberately targeting peacekeepers and other United Nations personnel. To date, UNIFIL had suffered more than 250 fatalities, over two thirds of which had been killed by Israel during operations that Israel did not deny, as a result of mistaken firing and outdated maps. Israel's responsibility for the remaining one third of the fatalities had yet to be proven. Israel was pursuing its own agenda in attempting to change the mandate of UNIFIL and alter the rules of engagement.

*The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.*