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FOURTH COMMITTEE
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Wednesday, 9 November 1977
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 20th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ALLAF (Syrian Arab Republic)

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ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

REQUEST FOR HEARING (A/C.4/32/11)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he had received from Mr. W. G. Brown of the Bermuda Constitutional Conference a request for a hearing in connexion with the question of Bermuda which appeared in document A/C.4/32/11.
2. If he heard no objection he would take it that the Committee agreed to the request.
3. It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 90: INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (continued) (A/32/23/Add.9, A/32/73, A/32/90, A/32/253, A/C.4/32/L.2)

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Question of Belize

4. The CHAIRMAN said that in accordance with the practice introduced in order to obtain from administering Powers the maximum information on the territories under their administration, he would give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom who wished to make a further statement concerning Belize. Since it was his understanding that the Prime Minister of Belize, Mr. George C. Price, would speak on the subject on Friday, 11 November he suggested that the Committee might consider the matter at the present meeting and vote on any draft resolutions.
5. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom) said that when his delegation had spoken on the Belize item at the previous session the hope had been expressed that negotiations between the parties would be successful and the urgency of coming to an agreement which would enable Belize to achieve independence as soon as possible, had been stressed.
6. No such settlement had been reached and Belize had had to wait for the independence which its Government and people so much desired and which the United Kingdom Government supported wholeheartedly.
7. During the year the United Kingdom Government had been obliged with the utmost reluctance to reinforce the British armed forces stationed in Belize in order to meet its obligation to provide for the security of the Territory. Nevertheless, some progress had been achieved. In July, United Kingdom and Guatemalan ministers had met in Washington and shortly afterwards the Minister of State at the Foreign

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(Mr. Richard, United Kingdom)

and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Rowlands, had held constructive talks with the Guatemalan President and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The parties had committed themselves to making every effort to create a positive atmosphere conducive to the solution of the dispute.

8. On the international scene, there had been two important moves towards assisting the parties in reaching a settlement. In June, the Heads of Commonwealth Governments had met in London and reaffirmed their full support for the aspirations of the people of Belize and had agreed to establish a ministerial committee to assist the parties concerned in finding early and effective arrangements for the independence of the Territory. In August, six Heads of Government of countries in the area, following talks in Bogotá, had issued a communiqué which agreed that a solution to the problem of Belize should be found.

9. The United Kingdom Government was ready to set in hand the appropriate constitutional arrangements for Belize to move to full independence and would take the fullest account of the desire of the people of Belize that their independence should be achieved in peace and security and that their territorial integrity should be preserved. The United Kingdom aim was to ensure that an independent Belize would not have to live in fear, and that it would enjoy a peaceful and co-operative relationship with Guatemala and with the other countries in the area.

10. He repeated clearly and unmistakably the commitment recently reiterated by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Callaghan, that any settlement reached between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Guatemala must be acceptable to the Government and people of Belize. For their part the Guatemalans had expressed their determination to take full account of the vital interests of the people of Belize.

11. He concluded by saying that his Government would pursue the negotiations flexibly and constructively and urged Guatemala to do the same.

Draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.2

12. At the request of the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.2.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,

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Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: France, Guatemala, Honduras, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

13. Draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.2 was adopted by 111 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

14. Mr. MUKHTAR (Sudan), speaking in explanation of vote, said that if he had been present during the vote he would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.

15. Mr. SEQUEIRA (Angola) said that he would have voted in favour of the draft resolution if he had been present during the vote.

16. Mr. QUARTIN-SANTOS (Portugal) said that he had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.2. He recalled that the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations, in a note verbale to the Secretary-General (A/32/73), had stated that his Government was precluded by the situation in East Timor from transmitting relevant information concerning conditions there.

17. Mr. KREINDLER (United States of America) said that his delegation had abstained on the draft resolution because of its well-known views with regard to the substance of paragraph 2.

18. Mr. BROCHENIN (France) said that he had abstained on draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.2 since he thought that it was not for the General Assembly or the Special Committee to decide whether a Non-Self-Governing Territory had attained the full measure of self-government required by Chapter XI of the Charter.

(Mr. Brochenin, France)

Moreover, Article 73 stated that administering Powers should transmit "statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible"; there was no reference to the transmission of political information and it was for the States concerned to decide whether it was appropriate to transmit such information.

19. Mr. JENSEN (Denmark) said that although his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.2 he had reservations on paragraph 2 since he thought that it was not for the General Assembly alone to decide when a territory had achieved a full measure of self-government.

20. Mr. IMANISHI (Japan) said that although his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, he had reservations regarding the text of paragraph 2.

21. Mr. RICHARDSON (United Kingdom) said that his Government provided the information required by Article 73 (e) of the Charter, and had invited four United Nations visiting missions to territories under its administration. The United Kingdom Government could not accept however that it lay within the power of the General Assembly to decide when a dependent territory had achieved a full measure of self-government, as paragraph 2 of the draft resolution stated. He had therefore abstained in the vote.

22. Mrs. JOKA-BANGURA (Sierra Leone) said that if she had been present during the vote she would have voted in favour of the draft resolution of which she was a co-sponsor.

23. Mr. JEICHANDE (Mozambique) said that if he had been present during the vote he would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.

24. Mr. AL-SAIDI (Yemen) said that if he had been present during the vote he would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.

25. Mr. JAIKITE (Mali) said that if he had been present during the vote he would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.

AGENDA ITEM 96: UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued) (A/32/283; A/C.4/32/L.7)

26. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) announced that the following delegations had joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.7: Brazil, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Netherlands and Upper Volta.

27. Mr. NCHAI (Lesotho) said that the root cause of the tension in southern Africa was the racist policy of the Pretoria régime. Lesotho, as a country of asylum, was seriously affected by the problem of the refugees from South Africa. The influx of student refugees had overburdened Lesotho's educational facilities, particularly since the Soweto incidents, and it was feared that the problem would be exacerbated by the worsening situation in South Africa.

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28. His delegation particularly wished to draw attention to paragraphs 101, 104 and 108 of the report of the Economic and Social Council on emergency assistance for South African student-refugees (A/32/65) and trusted that additional aid would be given to States directly affected by the influx of refugees.

29. The CHAIRMAN said that, since the draft resolution dealt with a non-controversial question, he took it that the Committee was prepared to adopt it without a vote.

30. Draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.7 was adopted unanimously.

AGENDA ITEM 95: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (continued) (A/C.4/32/L.3)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

(b) REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

31. Mr. KLIMCZAK (Poland), referring to agenda item 95, expressed the firm conviction of his delegation that the specialized agencies and other organizations in the United Nations system should contribute to the full and speedy implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, should provide as much assistance as possible within their spheres of competence to the peoples of southern Africa fighting for their freedom and independence and should bring about maximum isolation of South Africa's minority régime.

32. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the feelings of solidarity and support generated in world public opinion were finding ever stronger expression in various international bodies and thus served the cause of liberation of the peoples of colonial countries. In that connexion, it commended FAO, UNDP, WHO and UNIDO on their work.

33. It was regrettable, however, that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had not taken the necessary measures with a view to making their contribution towards the implementation of the decolonization measures and other relevant United Nations resolutions.

34. Poland declared its readiness to take an active part, together with the specialized agencies, in working out programmes of assistance to the peoples still under colonial domination and to their liberation movements. It therefore supported the draft resolution contained in document A/C.4/32/L.3.

35. Mr. GREET (Australia) said that his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.3, notwithstanding its serious objections to certain elements of

(Mr. Greet, Australia)

paragraph 6. In his statement on the item to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session, the Australian representative in the Committee had pointed out that the International Monetary Fund was an institution with a separate and independent constitution and that its relations with the United Nations system were governed by an agreement signed in 1947. If delegations wanted IMF to withhold co-operation with South Africa, they should pursue the matter collectively within the framework and regulations of IMF. The same applied to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The agreements between the Bank and the United Nations required both organizations to function as independent international institutions according to their own Articles of Agreement, even though they were formally designated as United Nations specialized agencies. The ability of the Fund and the Bank to respond meaningfully to the draft resolution before the Committee would be fundamentally circumscribed by their Articles of Agreement.

36. If a separate vote were taken on each paragraph of the draft resolution, his delegation would abstain on paragraph 6.

37. Mrs. OSODE (Liberia) said that the draft resolution before the Committee reaffirmed the historic General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and other relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council and had taken into account the Maputo Declaration and the World Conference for Action against Apartheid.

38. Her delegation wished to express reservations with regard to operative paragraphs 6 and 11 of the draft resolution. In reality, most specialized agencies and international organizations had severed their ties with the racist minority régimes of South Africa and Rhodesia or were in the process of doing so. Her delegation had noted the Bank's reply to the Secretary-General (A/32/87) and appealed to the Bank and other institutions to show their good will by co-operating in accelerating the pace of progress towards the desired goals and by formulating concrete programmes for the peoples of the colonial territories fighting for freedom and independence.

39. Liberia would vote for the draft resolution, subject to the reservations she had expressed on paragraph 6.

40. Mr. CASAS (Colombia) announced that his delegation would vote for the draft resolution although it did not agree with operative paragraph 6, which directed criticism against two international institutions that was unwarranted because of the structure of those agencies. The developing countries should be grateful to those agencies, particularly the World Bank, for their strong co-operation in the struggle against poverty and underdevelopment. In a vote paragraph by paragraph, his delegation would abstain on paragraph 6.

41. Mr. OULLA (Ivory Coast) said that his delegation would also support the draft resolution, notwithstanding its reservations with regard to operative paragraph 6.

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(Mr. Oulla, Ivory Coast)

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were institutions governed by their own Articles of Agreement. Consequently, the Committee was not the proper forum for that kind of criticism; any action on the issue should be taken within the institutions themselves.

42. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation would vote for the draft resolution and expressed dismay at the objections and reservations made with regard to paragraph 6.

43. On the contrary, his delegation would like to strengthen that paragraph even further and did not accept the argument concerning the Articles of Agreement of institutions; it could never justify co-operation with the racist régimes of southern Africa.

44. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) announced that the delegations of Benin, Nigeria and Sudan were also co-sponsoring the draft resolution.

45. At the request of the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, a recorded vote was taken on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.4/32/L.3.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

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Against: None.

Abstaining: Germany, Federal Republic of, France, United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

46. Draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.3 was adopted by 130 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.

47. Mr. ADAMS (New Zealand) said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution, but would point out that it did not agree with operative paragraph 6 or with the references to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Moreover, while it agreed that the régime of South Africa could be defined as a "racist minority", it could not be said that South African society was "colonialist" because that concept referred to foreign policy and not to the conditions existing within a country.

48. Miss HOLSER (Austria) said that her delegation had voted for the draft resolution, although it had reservations on some of the provisions, especially those of paragraph 6. Her country considered that the work of the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations contributed to the promotion of the goals and principles of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. However, constitutional and legal limitations on their activities must also be taken into account. If the paragraphs of the draft resolution had been put to the vote separately, her delegation would have abstained in the voting on paragraph 6.

49. Mr. LOWENSTEIN (United States of America) said that although his country shared some of the general objectives outlined by the sponsors of the draft resolution, his delegation had abstained owing to its reservations on some parts of the text. It was opposed in particular to paragraphs 2 and 6. Those paragraphs, in his delegation's opinion, contained provisions which were inconsistent not only with the agreements concluded between the United Nations and the specialized agencies but also with the basic instruments governing the activities of several United Nations organizations.

50. The United States position on the increased politicization of the specialized agencies was well known. That process undermined the effectiveness of the specialized agencies in performing the technical and humanitarian functions for which they had been established. Moreover, political issues should be considered in the General Assembly and the Security Council.

51. Mr. MONSALVE (Chile) said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution although it had reservations about paragraphs 6 and 11. It considered that it was the Security Council which should impose sanctions against a State Member of the United Nations and that the General Assembly lacked competence in that regard.

52. Mr. QUARTIN-SANTOS (Portugal) said that his delegation had voted for the draft

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(Mr. Quartin-Santos, Portugal)

resolution although it had serious reservations regarding the provisions in paragraph 6 relating to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

53. Mr. SCARANTINO (Italy) said that his country had voted for the draft resolution and endorsed its basic aims; however, it had reservations about paragraph 6 because, as far as it knew, the World Bank had not granted loans to South Africa since 1966 and South Africa was not represented on the Board of Governors of the World Bank.

54. Mr. BROCHENIN (France) said that his delegation had abstained on the draft resolution because it considered that the specialized agencies should not undertake work outside their own particular spheres of competence. In addition, as it had already stated, it had legal reservations regarding the references in the preamble and the operative part and the citation of resolutions for which France had not voted.

55. Mr. van COPPENOLLE (Belgium) said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution because it was in favour of the main ideas relating to the contribution of the specialized agencies and the international institutions to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. However, it had reservations concerning some of the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 11 because they made inappropriate references to resolutions of the General Assembly and urged the severance of any ties that might exist between a State Member of the United Nations and the agencies and institutions in question.

56. Mr. JENSEN (Denmark), speaking on behalf of the delegations of Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and his own country, said that the affirmative votes of those countries should be viewed against the background of their active support to peoples struggling to achieve self-determination, to whom they had extended humanitarian aid. The specialized agencies had an important role to play in that assistance and should preserve their universal character. Some of the paragraphs of the draft resolution appeared to overlook the practical and constitutional difficulties which would face the specialized agencies when complying with the recommendations of the General Assembly.

57. Mr. IMANISHI (Japan), explaining his delegation's interpretation of the draft resolution for which it had just voted, said that, in its view, paragraphs 6 and 11 should not be understood as implying that the specialized agencies should sever their relations with or withhold assistance from any State Member of the United Nations, and paragraph 7 should not be interpreted as implying any kind of armed assistance.

58. Mr. RICHARDSON (United Kingdom) said that his Government attached great importance to the objectivity and non-politicization of the specialized agencies and associated institutions of the United Nations. His delegation could not therefore agree to some of the provisions in the draft resolution, especially paragraphs 2, 6 and 11, which, in its opinion, disregarded the specific functions of some agencies and ignored the practical and constitutional difficulties to which compliance with the resolution would give rise. His delegation had therefore abstained from voting.

59. Mr. CHARPENTIER (Canada) said that his delegation had voted for the draft

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(Mr. Charpentier, Canada)

resolution because it considered that the role to be played by the specialized agencies and other international institutions in promoting decolonization was extremely important. Every international organization and specialized agency should act constitutionally and extend its assistance to the process of decolonization in accordance with specific guidelines. His delegation therefore had reservations about the wording of paragraph 6.

60. Mr. ECONOMOU (Greece) said that his delegation had voted for draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.3 because it agreed with that resolution's treatment of the question of the assistance to be provided by the specialized agencies to the process of decolonization. However, it had reservations about paragraph 6, some of whose provisions it could not approve.

61. Mr. FLITTNER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that his delegation had abstained on draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.3, just as it had abstained on the corresponding draft resolution in 1976. The current draft resolution continued the practice of trying to involve the specialized agencies in activities of a political nature - a practice which undermined their effectiveness and did nothing to promote the cause of decolonization. In addition, his delegation disagreed with the criticism of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in paragraph 6 and had some reservations regarding the provisions of paragraph 9.

62. Mr. LESSA (Uruguay) said that his delegation had voted for draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.3 because of the importance of the subject-matter, even though some of the issues were normally dealt with in other forums rather than in the Fourth Committee.

63. Mr. OBA (Nigeria) said that if his delegation had been present it would have voted for draft resolutions A/C.4/32/L.2 and L.3.

64. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had already explained its vote; however, it wished to express its concern over the comments made by some delegations in defence of the depoliticization of the specialized agencies. That was leading to a division. The United Nations held long debates and adopted resolutions but the activities subsequently carried out by the specialized agencies were of a very different nature from the activities foreseen in those discussions and resolutions.

AGENDA ITEM 24: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued) (A/C.4/32/L.5, L.6, L.8, L.10, L.11, L.12, L.13, L.14, L.15, L.16 and Corr.1, L.17, L.19 and L.20)

65. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the draft resolutions on Guam in documents A/C.4/32/L.10 and L.11 should be considered at a subsequent meeting.

66. It was so decided.

67. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the draft resolution on Western Sahara in document A/C.4/32/L.20. The draft was the product of talks between himself and the interested parties.

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68. Mr. N'DONG (Gabon) welcomed the draft resolution submitted by the Chairman and withdrew his delegation's draft resolution on Western Sahara (A/C.4/32/L.12).

69. The CHAIRMAN suggested that since draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.20 had been prepared in consultation with the interested parties and submitted with their approval, it should be adopted by consensus.

70. Draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.20 was adopted by consensus.

71. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) said that the adoption of draft resolutions A/C.4/32/L.5, L.6, L.10, L.11, L.15 and L.16, which referred to specific Territories, would mean that the General Assembly would request the Special Committee to dispatch visiting missions to the Territories concerned. The Secretary-General was of the view that the estimated costs of implementing those resolutions could be met from within the resources requested for the Special Committee in the proposed programme budget for 1978-1979. Consequently, the implementation of those draft resolutions would not give rise to additional financial implications.

Question of Tuvalu (A/C.4/32/L.13)

72. Draft consensus A/C.4/32/L.13 was adopted.

Question of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands (A/C.4/32/L.14)

73. Draft consensus A/C.4/32/L.14 was adopted.

Question of Tokelau (A/C.4/32/L.16)

74. Draft consensus A/C.4/32/L.16 was adopted.

Question of the Gilbert Islands (A/C.4/32/L.5)

75. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) announced that Thailand had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.5.

76. Mr. GREET (Australia) proposed, at the suggestion of various delegations, that paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.5 should include the full title of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The same amendment would apply to paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.6 and L.15.

77. Draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.5, as amended, was adopted.

78. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) announced that Senegal and Upper Volta had joined the sponsors of that draft resolution.

79. Draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.6, as amended, was adopted.

80. Mr. LOWENSTEIN (United States of America), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had been very pleased to join in the consensus. However, he wished to place it on record that independence was only one of the possible results of the exercise of the right of self-determination.

Question of the Solomon Islands (A/C.4/32/L.8)

81. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) announced that Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago and the Upper Volta had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.8.

82. Draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.8 was adopted.

Question of the New Hebrides (A/C.4/32/L.15)

83. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) announced that Canada, Senegal, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago and Upper Volta had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.15.

84. Mr. BROCHENIN (France) said that, as one of the administering Powers of the Territory of the New Hebrides, he wished to provide some additional information on political developments in the islands since the previous session. In 1977 the Governments of France and the United Kingdom had taken some important measures that should enable the archipelago soon to attain full sovereignty. Owing to certain problems that had impeded the functioning of the established institutions, on 15 and 16 March 1977 a conference had been held at Port-Vila in which the customary chiefs and members of the Representative Assembly and of all the political parties had participated. The conclusions of the Conference, issued as a joint statement by the British and French High Commissioners (A/32/99) had recommended the holding of a ministerial conference in Europe in July, in order to determine the various stages in the decolonization process. That conference had been held in Paris from 19 to 21 July 1977 with the participation of representatives of all the political groups of the Territory, except for the leaders of the Vanuaaku Pati, who had refused to attend, and representatives of the chiefs of the Malfatu Mauri. The results of that conference had been communicated to the Secretary-General in document A/32/172. Recalling the main decisions, he said that it had been agreed to elect a new Representative Assembly and to establish a Council of Ministers at the beginning of 1978 in order to establish a system of internal self-government in 1978 or 1979; and that new elections and a referendum concerning independence before 1980 would then be held.

85. By informing the United Nations of the main events of 1977, France had complied with its undertaking to co-operate with the work of the Special Committee, and the Committee had acknowledged that co-operation in its report. His delegation would be pleased to join in the consensus with a view to adopting the draft resolution before the Committee. However, he wished to place on record his reservations concerning the third preambular paragraph, which mentioned resolutions that France had not supported.

86. Finally, with regard to the possible dispatch of a visiting mission, France

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(Mr. Brochenin, France)

had reservations concerning the appropriateness of such a measure at the current delicate stage, when it was necessary to avoid any move that might jeopardize progress towards self-government.

87. Draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.15 was adopted.

Question of Brunei

88. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.19 concerning the question of Brunei and suggested that it should be considered at another meeting.

89. It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 93: QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued) (A/C.4/32/L.18)

90. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to draft resolution A/C.4/32/L.18 concerning East Timor and suggested that its consideration should be deferred until another meeting.

91. It was so decided.

HEARING OF A PETITIONER

92. The CHAIRMAN announced that the representative of FRETILIN had again requested permission to address the Committee.

93. Mr. SIDIK (Indonesia) said that his delegation was opposed to the granting of permission to the representative of FRETILIN to address the Committee, since the general debate had been concluded.

94. The CHAIRMAN said that, since it had been decided to defer a decision on the question of East Timor, it could be considered that the Committee still had the item before it.

95. Mr. ARAUJO (Guinea-Bissau), supported by Mr. SEQUEIRA (Angola) and Mr. HACHEME (Benin), said that the representative of FRETILIN had the right to speak because the draft resolution in question had not yet been put to the vote.

96. Mr. ESFANDIARY (Iran) said that, if the debate on the item had been concluded, the representative of FRETILIN could not address the Committee. He wished it to be clarified whether the debate had been concluded.

97. The CHAIRMAN explained that, until a decision was taken on the question of East Timor, the debate remained open. However, since the delegation of Indonesia opposed the granting of permission to the representative of FRETILIN to make a

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(The Chairman)

statement, a vote would be taken on the proposal that the representative of FRETILIN should be granted a new hearing.

98. A recorded vote was taken on the proposal that the representative of FRETILIN should be granted a new hearing.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Jamaica, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Austria, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, New Zealand, Oman, Paraguay, Philippines, Surinam, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Zaire.

Abstaining: Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Burma, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen.

99. The proposal was adopted by 67 votes to 24, with 38 abstentions.

100. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Ramos-Horta (FRETILIN), took a place at the petitioners' table.

101. Mr. RAMOS-HORTA (Observer, Central Committee of FRETILIN*) said that he wished to express the appreciation of the Central Committee of FRETILIN, of the people of East Timor and of his Government for the opportunity that had been given a humble citizen of East Timor to address once again the enlightened and important assembly before him. He could not begin his brief statement without emphasizing the

* This statement has been given full coverage in the summary record in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee during the meeting.

(Mr. Ramos-Horta, Observer, FRETILIN)

appreciation of those he represented to those delegations of Member States that had spoken out in support of the right of the people of East Timor to genuine self-determination and independence. It was a great encouragement not only for the people of East Timor but for all peoples around the world to be able to find an echo in a world assembly of their legitimate aspirations for freedom and dignity.

102. The existence of the United Nations was in itself a tremendous achievement of mankind. The struggling peoples of the world believed that the Organization had had and would have an immense role to play in bringing peace where there was war, more food where there was hunger, more freedom where there was oppression, more dignity where peoples were humiliated.

103. FRETILIN had listened also with great attention to the statements by some delegations, supporting Indonesian armed aggression against East Timor. It did not consider their statements as insults, born out of a mind blinded by arrogance and bias - to use the phraseology of the most distinguished representative of the Republic of Indonesia when he had referred to those delegations that had spoken out for peace, justice and dignity of peoples. FRETILIN believed that those countries that did not approve of the aspirations of the people of East Timor for independence and freedom had been motivated to do so only by lack of information about the real situation in the Territory of East Timor or by excessive consideration for bilateral relations with the Republic of Indonesia. FRETILIN could only regret their opposition to the independence and freedom of East Timor and hoped that time would bring the truth to the noble assembly before him.

104. In order not to overwhelm the Committee with an interminable reply to the gross distortions of fact and laughable claims by the distinguished representative of Indonesia, he would single out only certain facts. He felt bound by his duty to bring to the attention of that important Committee some facts that had been omitted by the skilful Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia. It had been stated there on the previous day that leading positions in the provincial administration were occupied by East Timorese. It was shocking that the distinguished representative of Indonesia should start his round of arguments with a typical colonial tactic. The colonial masters had also been wont to dress up a few puppets and put them in some positions to justify their criminal aggression against the peoples of the colonies. Mr. Arnaldo Araujo was one such puppet. However, Mr. Arnaldo Araujo, the so-called "governor", had written a letter to His Excellency President Suharto on 12 June 1976, complaining that the Indonesian military authorities in Dili were making a mockery of his "authority", and going on to complain that the people in Dili were starving and would come every day to his house crying for food. He had also said in that four-page letter - written in Portuguese, not in Indonesian - that there had been so much corruption among the Indonesian military authorities that he, the "governor" had had to buy fuel for his car from them.

105. Another fact omitted by Ambassador Anwar Sani was that on 29 April 1976 the President of the so-called Kota party, one of the minuscule groups blown up to a

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party by Indonesian propaganda, had addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Kurt Waldheim. Mr. José Martins had said that he was writing to the Secretary-General as President of the Kota party and as an East Timorese who had witnessed and experienced Indonesian bloody intervention in East Timor which had already cost many thousands of lives. His views reflected the feelings and sufferings of his countrymen and women who were currently struggling for self-determination and the independence of East Timor. Those who, like himself, had been forced to cross the border into Indonesian territory were prisoners and realized the evil nature of the Indonesian military. The very moment they had entered Indonesian territory in the first week of September 1975, fleeing before the advancing FRETILIN forces, they had become instruments of the Indonesian Government. The leaders of Apodeti, UDT, Kota and Trabalhista had soon realized that in seeking "freedom", they had fallen into the hands of the Indonesian military. With the leaders, about 10,000 people had also entered Indonesian territory, and he emphasized that while the Indonesian authorities had claimed that 40,000 East Timorese had sought refuge in West Timor, the real figure was no more than 20,000. It was also necessary to stress that those people had not fled to Indonesian territory because they wanted to join Indonesia. They were just looking for a safe place until they could return to their homes. But they had also fallen into the hands of the Indonesian authorities; they had soon realized that while seeking peace, they had found only maltreatment and misery. The refugees had been forced either to take military training and fight against FRETILIN or to work without pay for the Indonesians. Their belongings, such as money, jewellery and so on, had been confiscated. As early as October, the refugees had wanted to return to East Timor, but the Indonesian authorities had not allowed them to do so. Obviously, the Indonesian Government had been using the "40,000 refugees" as a political weapon against FRETILIN. It was also a trick to get funds and aid from the International Red Cross and foreign Governments!

106. The writer had gone on to say that the declaration of integration into Indonesia was a farce because it had been made in Bali in Indonesia on 2 December 1975. When FRETILIN had made the unilateral declaration of independence for East Timor on 28 November 1975 in Dili, the capital of the territory, the refugee "anti-communist movement" had declared "integration" some thousand kilometres away, in the luxury Peneda View Hotel in Bali, which belonged to Colonel Sudlanto, General Ali Moertopo's assistant. The letter concluded that the whole thing had been a farce, without a mandate from the East Timorese people.

107. Contrary to the claim by the representative of Indonesia, the civil war in East Timor had not ended in December 1975. The civil war which had been begun on 11 August 1975 by the so-called "anti-communist movement", inspired and supported by the strongly anti-communist Government of Jakarta, had ended in mid-September 1975.

108. On 13 September 1975, a large delegation of foreign correspondents from The New York Times, Newsweek and major Australian and Japanese newspapers had visited East Timor and travelled extensively. On a number of occasions, he had driven those foreign correspondents to the border with West Timor where in mid-September,

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and until late November 1975, over 2,000 Indonesian troops had confronted the FRETILIN forces. He wished to recall the cold-blooded assassination of five newsmen - two Australians, two British and one New Zealander, working for the Australian television networks. He had driven those brave journalists to the border area on 12 October 1975. Those young newsmen had come to East Timor to find out the truth. Indonesian authorities had denied Indonesian intervention in the border war. On 16 October 1975, at about 4 a.m., some 500 Indonesian Red Berets had assaulted the village of Balibo. The newsmen had been captured and executed in cold blood. He had spent three days and three nights in the border area with those newsmen. He had driven them to the war. He remembered that when on the night of 15 October he had told them to leave Balibo before the Indonesian assault, they had replied that they wanted "to film some action".

109. Parts of the last film shot by those brave newsmen had been shown by ABC, Channel 7, in the programme "Like It Is". If the distinguished delegates wished, his organization would be glad to arrange for a projection of that documentary which proved beyond any doubt that Indonesian armed forces had been intervening in East Timor long before 7 December 1975.

110. The Central Committee of FRETILIN had not rejected negotiations either with Portugal, Indonesia, or with other parties concerned. On 16 September 1975, the Central Committee of FRETILIN had issued a statement calling for: (a) a joint peace force of East Timorese troops and Indonesian troops to patrol jointly the border areas; (b) a joint conference with representatives of Portugal, Australia and Indonesia in order to eliminate rumours, misunderstandings and promote friendship and co-operation amongst the people of the region; and (c) fact-finding missions from the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Fiji.

111. In September 1975, mandated by the Central Committee of FRETILIN, he had met with the Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr. Don Wilisee, and had proposed a meeting with Australia, Indonesia and Portugal in order to work out a formula leading to self-determination for the people of East Timor.

112. All FRETILIN's efforts to placate Indonesian communist paranoia had failed. All FRETILIN's efforts to find a negotiated solution had been thwarted by the Government of Indonesia.

113. Indonesia's plans to take over East Timor dated back to April 1974, after the fall of the colonialist régime in Portugal. It had been decided in Jakarta that "politically" or "militarily", East Timor should be incorporated into Indonesia. The political and diplomatic manoeuvres had failed. FRETILIN was firmly rooted among the masses of the people in East Timor. In a free referendum, FRETILIN would easily command the support of the great majority. The Government of Indonesia, realizing that fact, had opted for disruption of the orderly process of decolonization carried out by the Portuguese administration and finally on 7 December 1975, it had launched the full-scale invasion of East Timor.

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114. The representative of Indonesia had attributed to FRETILIN the killing of thousands of the organization's fellow-countrymen. That was an old trick used by the former Portuguese colonial authorities attributing their atrocities in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau to FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC and by the dying war-horse Ian Smith, attributing his massacres of the Zimbabwean patriots to the Patriotic Front.

115. However, he wished to point out that it was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Mr. Adam Malik, who had admitted earlier that year that some 80,000 people had been killed in East Timor. Surely Ambassador Sani was not calling his former boss a big liar.

116. From September 1975 to 7 December 1975, the International Committee of the Red Cross had had an active presence in East Timor. They could testify to the FRETILIN treatment of the people generally and of Indonesian prisoners of war. Since the invasion of East Timor, even such a humanitarian organization as the ICRC had been banned from visiting the Territory.

117. The Government of Indonesia had made a mockery of the United Nations. The General Assembly and the Security Council had called upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw all its armed forces from East Timor. However, war continued to rage in the Territory. In spite of Indonesian claims to the contrary, popular resistance had become more active than ever since the Central Committee of FRETILIN had been increased from 45 to 67 members and since the creation of a Supreme Council of Struggle.

118. A French photographer and journalist, Mr. Denis Reichel, who had recently visited Indonesia and East Timor had said that despite official denials, 30,000 Indonesian troops were still roaming East Timor, slaying men, women and children in an attempt to end the persistent liberation war. He invited the distinguished representatives to read document A/C.4/32/8 which contained a detailed account of the devastating war in East Timor.

119. A Jakarta-based correspondent, Mr. Hamish McDonald, often quoted by Indonesian officials, had written for the prestigious Australian newspaper, The Age, on 31 October:

"Indonesian armed forces have embarked on big retraining programme as a result of unexpectedly high casualties in East Timor.

"Senior officers believe their forces are taking casualties that could be avoided at this stage of their 22-month war of suppression against FRETILIN nationalist guerillas. They also concede that FRETILIN has proved itself to be a tough enemy."

120. Whereas Ambassador Sani had been claiming for over two years that FRETILIN had only some 100 or 200 terrorists, the senior military in Jakarta had conceded to Mr. Hamish McDonald that FRETILIN was capable of launching operations at company strength.

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121. FRETILIN had studied the draft resolution proposed by a broad list of sponsors from its own region of south-east Asia, from Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. That sponsorship reflected a widespread concern within the United Nations at the war situation in East Timor.

122. The draft reflected the most fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. FRETILIN had particularly noted operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7. It welcomed a United Nations mission to East Timor. The visit had to be arranged in such a way that it included towns under Indonesian occupation and the liberated areas under FRETILIN administration where the great mass of the people lived. The visiting mission should be accompanied by East Timorese interpreters who spoke both Tetun and English. There should be no time limit and no hurry in visiting the Territory. The United Nations team should travel overland, by four-wheel drive vehicle, truck or horse and sometimes on foot, going to the mountains and the villages in the jungles where the great mass of the people lived. He assured the Committee that it would be a tough mission. However, the reward would be that the mission would be a justice and truth seeking mission.

123. It would be most convenient for the appointment of the special representative of the Secretary-General to be made in consultation with the Chairman of the Special Committee.

124. Operative paragraph 7 called upon the conflicting parties, the Government of Indonesia and FRETILIN, to facilitate the entry into the Territory of the International Committee of the Red Cross. FRETILIN welcomed that decision. It would suggest that a representative of the ICRC should accompany the United Nations visiting mission with a view to assessing the humanitarian needs of the people. The Central Committee would also take the opportunity of the ICRC visit to the liberated areas to hand over the Indonesian prisoners of war who had been ignored by their own Government.

125. United Nations teams should also be accompanied by independent observers who might wish to visit the Territory, such as the World Council of Churches, representatives of the American Congress, the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, the World Peace Council, etc.

126. FRETILIN believed that such a United Nations mission, as defined in the draft resolution, would be an excellent opportunity for the Government of Indonesia to prove that it was right and FRETILIN was wrong. It should therefore give its support to the draft resolution.

127. Addressing himself particularly to the Indonesian delegation, he said that the leadership of FRETILIN and the people of East Timor deeply admired the people of Indonesia. The history of Indonesia had been a source of inspiration for the people of East Timor. A free and independent East Timor would seek to promote friendship and co-operation with the people and Government of Indonesia. However, when on 7 December 1975 the armed forces of Indonesia had invaded East Timor, slaughtering women and children, raping young girls, looting houses, burning crops and schools, that crime had evoked in the memories of the East Timorese the horrifying massacres of some one million Indonesians in 1965-1966.

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128. When the East Timorese looked at Indonesia, they were horrified by the suffering of some 100,000 political prisoners. They could witness dangerous secessionist wars being waged by the peoples of West Papua, West Timor, Achech-Sumatra, against many years of neglect, repression and misery.

129. The war in East Timor was slowly extending into West Timor. Soon Indonesia would face a major upheaval that would shake up its present unfortunate situation. The Central Committee of FRETILIN was willing to find a negotiated solution to the war in East Timor, under the auspices of the United Nations and on the basis of General Assembly resolutions 3485 (XXX) of 12 December 1975 and 31/53 of 1 December 1976 and Security Council resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976). The complete withdrawal of Indonesian armed forces from East Timor was the only acceptable solution to the devastating war there.

130. The Indonesian permanent representative might try to dismiss the war in East Timor. However, FRETILIN looked forward to the day when the Government of Indonesia would no longer be able to hide the truth from the Indonesian people and the international community. The Government of East Timor was willing to join Indonesia in promoting peace.

131. Mr. Ramos-Horta withdrew.

132. Mr. JEICHANDE (Mozambique) proposed that the statement by the representative of FRETILIN should be reproduced in extenso.

133. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Committee should bear in mind the financial implications of that proposal. If he heard no objections, he would take it that the Committee agreed that the statement by the representative of FRETILIN should be reproduced in extenso in the summary record.

134. It was so decided.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

135. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions relating to specific territories should be 6 p.m. on Friday, 11 November.

136. It was so decided.

137. The CHAIRMAN said he understood that there was a consensus in the Committee to authorize the Rapporteur to inform the General Assembly directly at its plenary meeting.

138. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.