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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 34th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BOATEN (Ghana)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

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THE CHAIRMAN: After hearing the statements of the representatives inscribed to smeak this morning, the Committe will take decisions on the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/32/L.17, A/C.1/32/L.18 and A/C.1/32/L.27.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Even though the text of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/32/L.28 on the item regarding the bilateral talks known as SALT is sufficiently explicit in itself, I believe that in submitting it now officially before the First Committee - as I shall have the honour to do on behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Nigeria, Sweden and Mexico - perhaps it will not be superfluous to make some comments and observations, the better to assess the significance and scope of the provisions of this draft resolution.

I shall begin by saying that resolution 2602 A (XXIV), which is referred to in the first preambular paragraph, is the best proof of the interest with which the General Assembly has been following the negotiations of the nuclear super-Powers since the very inception of the SALT talks. That resolution, indeed, was adopted on 16 December 1969, that is to say barely a month after the negotiations had begun at Helsinki on 16 November of the same year.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The six resolutions mentioned in the subsequent paragraph gave us authoritative proof of the continued interest of the Assembly, which has been shown consistently for five consecutive sessions, from the twenty-seventh session, held in 1972, to the thirty-first session, which was held last year. It is that same interest, more than justified since what is at stake is the very survival of mankind, which explains why we believe that the General Assembly should, in the resolution it adopts on this question, express regret at the absence of positive results during the last three years of those bilateral negotiations. This is stated in preambular paragraph 3, which is also the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution.

With regard to the first two operative paragraphs of the draft resolution, our sim in including the text of separate statements made by the Heads of State of the two major nuclear Powers is that they should become part of the record of the United Nations. Through these paragraphs it will be recalled, as long as official records of the Ceneral Assembly emist, that within barely a month, from 1 October to 2 November 1977, those two Heads of State made emphatic statements which, in view of the significance they may have in the future, as well as because they essentially concur, I believe it to be my duty to read out here so that we may have a lasting record of them in the verbatim record of our meeting of today.

The President of the United States, Mr. James Carter, said at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly which was held on 4 October of this year:

"The United States is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with our security interests, in limiting and reducing our nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce them by 10 per cent, 20 per cent or even 50 per cent. Then we will work for further reduction to a world truly free of nuclear weapons." (A/32/PV.18, p. 6)

The President of the Supreme Soviet and Control Committee of the Communist Party, Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev, in a solemn statement made on 2 November of this year said:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"Today we are proposing a radical step: that agreement be reached on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States. All such weapons - whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time the nuclear powers could undertake to begin a gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons, and move towards to their complete, total destruction."

These categorical statements made at the highest levels should obviously produce positive results. Accordingly, we thought that the best wording for operative paragraph 3 would be to invite the two countries "to strive to implement as soon as possible the foregoing declarations of their respective Heads of State".

The penultimate paragraph stresses once again:

"the necessity and urgency that the Governments of both countries reach agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In operative paragraph 5, which is the last, the General Assembly, by adopting this draft resolution, would reiterate "with special emphasis" its earlier invitation to both Governments "to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the progress and results of their negotiations" and express the hope of being able "to receive from them a special report in this regard during the eighth special session of the General Assembly".

If it is not possible to approve this draft resolution by consensus - which is our definite preference - we entertain the hope that at least, as always has happened in previous instances, it will be adopted by an overwhelming majority. Indeed we are convinced that it reflects what might be described as the most ardent aspirations of all peoples. The reason for those aspirations must be crystal clear, it seems to us, to anyone aware of the abnormal situation in which the world lives because of the arms race. To have an approximate idea of it, it would suffice to think over some of the views stated by the expert consultants who assisted the Secretary-General in the preparation of his recent report (A/32/88) on the "extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" of the unrestricted arms race which we have been living with for some time. I shall conclude my statement by recalling some of those opinions:

"The threat of ultimate self-destruction as a result of nuclear war is the greatest peril facing the world. For many years, nuclear arsenals have been sufficient to destroy the entire world, but the accumulation and technological refinement of nuclear weapons continues, enhancing the perils and providing increasingly ample means for the final obliteration of mankind.

- "... the military forces of the largest Powers and the immense destructiveness of the weapons with which they are equipped which casts the greatest shadow over the world ...
- "... The threat of war, the risk of final obliteration and the immense human and material costs of the arms race are still the reasons which make disarmament imperative." (A/32/88, paras. 1, 4, 5)

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): The general debate in this Committee has confirmed that the problems related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have the highest priority, that there exist today more favourable political conditions for their solution, and that, moreover, additional efforts should be exerted with a view to overcoming the extended stalemate and reaching indispensable concrete results.

Halting the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, constitutes one of the most pressing and most urgent tasks of our time. Since the Second World War the arms race has continued to assume ever new forms and dimensions. The number of participants in it has continued to grow, and if the present trends prevail it is quite realistic to expect that it will escalate even further in the future. The arms race is encompassing ever wider geographical areas, and in this respect the fact that the arms race is often part and parcel of bloc rivalry and narrow political interests is particularly dangerous.

Draft resolutions A/C.1/32/L.20 and A/C.1/32/L.23 on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban have been presented in this Committee. In our opinion, they contain several positive elements. They draw attention to the urgent need to complete the present trilateral talks as soon as possible so as to be able to proceed to the next phase of the work, that is, to multilateral negotiations for the elaboration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I should now like to submit some of the views of my delegation on certain issues which are related to the aforementioned draft resolutions.

There is no doubt that the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests could mark an important step forward towards halting the nuclear arms race and initiating a process of genuine nuclear disarmament. However, in order to achieve that objective the treaty should contribute directly towards reaching at least the following two basic goals: first, the prevention of the further sophistication and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by present nuclear-weapon States and, secondly, the cessation of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

These two components of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are mutually firmly linked and cannot be viewed or examined separately. This has been, <u>inter alia</u>, the intention of two international treaties concluded thus far in this area: the Moscow Treaty on the partial

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

prohibition of nuclear tests and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. But, in spite of certain merits and the functions performed by them, those treaties have not become reliable international instruments for preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, precisely because they laid stress on the non-nuclear-weapon States and not on the nuclear Powers which have continued to develop intensively their military nuclear programmes and to bring down their nuclear weapons to ever lower levels of their armed forces.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty should logically be oriented primarily towards the nuclear-weapon States. They should provide clear proof of their readiness to accept the limitation of their own nuclear armaments and to assume the obligation to undertake measures of nuclear disarmament. In that sense, we view this treaty as a first step in a series of other measures that should soon follow it.

The cessation of the manufacture of new and sophistication of existing systems should be accorded a special priority. The treaty should contribute most directly and speedily to the attainment of that goal. It should put an end to research activities of leading nuclear-weapon States in the field of the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, that is, the development of the qualitative component of the nuclear arms race in general; otherwise the treaty would merely sanction once again the existing situation and the divisions created on that basis.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

The cessation of the manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons is the second important objective to be achieved by a comprehensive test-ban treaty. An essential precondition of the effective elimination of the potential danger of the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States is the elimination of the existing real threat posed by the nuclear weapons already developed. Therefore the first step in that sense should unavoidably consist in a cessation of the further manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. In this regard the nuclear-weapon States bear a particular responsibility, and if this is not done it is certain that the road leading to a further proliferation of nuclear weapons will not be completely barred, nor will it be possible to solve this problem on a lasting basis.

Bearing in mind these and other positive processes that could be set in motion with regard to the effective cessation of the nuclear-arms race, as well as the immediate results that could be achieved in this respect, we attach particular importance to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We share the view expressed by many representatives in the course of the general debate that there exist today favourable political conditions for the conclusion of such a treaty. This is borne out by the intensive negotiations conducted recently by the USSR, the United States of America and Great Britain. We interpret the fact that those three nuclear-weapon States have agreed to accept, for a certain period of time, a moratorium on tests, including tests for peaceful purposes, as an expression of their desire to accelerate negotiations and their readiness to achieve concrete results in the near future. In this connexion we should like to emphasize that, with regard to the period of duration of the moratorium, it should be borne in mind that this should be besed on the realities of the present moment and not on narrower political or other needs.

We believe that all the necessary conditions are now extant for the adoption by the leading nuclear-weapon States of a political decision on a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests. Of course, we do not lose sight of the remaining technical problems with regard to which agreement is still to be reached. However, as heretofore, we believe that generally acceptable solutions can be found for those problems, no matter how complex they are. No

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

doubt, in the absence of the political will and conditions, technical questions could as heretofore be used as a pretext for and to justify either the lack of progress or one's own actions. We are convinced that this will not be the case this time.

The progress achieved makes it possible for the trilateral negotiations to be completed soon and for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), when it meets in January 1978, to undertake urgently the task of preparing an appropriate international treaty on a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests. We believe that the CCD could complete its part of the work on the preparation of this treaty before the beginning of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in May next year.

Mr. BLOMBERG (Fin and): On behalf of the delegations of Australia, Bahamas, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Tunisia and Zaire, I take this opportunity of introducing the revised draft resolution (A/C.1/32/L.3/Rev.1) distributed this morning under agenda item 51 and entitled "General and Complete Disarmament; Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

In the general statement of the Finnish delegation on 27 October I briefly outlined the structure and aims of the draft resolution. We have regarded the first draft $(4/C \cdot 1/52/L \cdot 3)$ mainly as a working paper. Its purpose was to assist us and other delegations in formulating and developing the draft further so as to reflect accurately the views of the Committee on the subject-matter of the draft.

My delegation is gratified to note that a great number of delegations have indeed responded to our hope that we could, in co-operation with other delegations, further improve the draft. We have received a number of valuable suggestions in consultations with our colleagues and several delegations have made comments on the draft in their statements in this Committee. As a result of these contacts and comments, a new version of the draft resolution $(\Lambda/C.1/52/J..3/Rev.1)$ has been prepared and circulated in the Committee.

The response to our draft is, to our mind, a clear indication of the urgency of the issues dealt with in the draft resolution; the urgency of nuclear disarmament, the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the non-preliferation régime. We are all the more gratified that the response concerning the substance of our draft has been overwhelmingly favourable and encouraging.

Let me briefly reiterate the motivation of my delegation in proposing this draft resolution. It addresses itself to the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency as a follow-up of resolution 31/189 D adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. In taking this initiative the Finnish delegation has been motivated, on the one hand, by an awareness of the importance of nuclear energy to the world's energy needs and of the particular needs of the developing countries. On the other hand, we consider the proliferation of nuclear weapons to be a risk that threatens the security of all nations, and, as we have said before, the developments in South Africa are a telling reminder of these risks.

In the absence of effective safeguards the spread of nuclear technology adds to the risk of proliferation. However, an intensified use of nuclear energy and efforts to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons are not irreconcilable or even incompatible aims. The purpose of our draft resolution is to set out the principles on which the international community could take co-ordinated action in the interest of both these objectives and for the benefit of all countries.

Many countries have voiced in this Committee and elsewhere concern about the availability of and access to nuclear materials and facilities. In many respects international co-operation in the field of nuclear technology is characterized by inconsistency and lack of confidence. The countries whose national energy programmes rely on imported nuclear technology naturally view international nuclear co-operation as a vital issue.

The basic reason for the lack of consensus that has been hampering international nuclear co-operation is not, we believe, the restraints exercised, but rather the fear of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The obvious

imperfections in nuclear co-operation can only disappear if this fear is dispelled. To dispel it, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should be made universal or, failing that, other reasonable assurances against proliferation should be adopted, such as the application of complete nuclear-fuel-cycle safeguards. This is the main thrust of our draft resolution. It is defined in a nutshell in its operative paragraph 6.

We therefore believe that the problem of proliferation and the question of the availability of nuclear technology should be viewed and discussed as closely-related issues. In designing the draft, our purpose has been to reach a balance between these two issues and, as a third, indispensable element, include the question of nuclear disarmament.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty expressly obligates the nuclear-weapon States Parties thereto to take measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Such measures would be an important contribution to non-proliferation. And we note with satisfaction that the latest developments in this respect, both in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and in the test-ban issue, give us cause for encouragement. This obligation, and the need to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, are clearly spelled out in the draft, especially in its operative paragraphs 1 to 3.

The draft recognizes the right of States accepting effective non-proliferation restraints to enjoy fully the benefits of nuclear energy. This has been elaborated in operative paragraphs 4 to 7. The exercise of this right should be facilitated, particularly for the needs of the developing countries, by co-ordinated international efforts; as one approach, operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution calls for an essential increase of the International Atomic Energy Agency technical assistance programme. Paragraphs 4 to 7 contain the crux of the draft resolution. We are particularly grateful to a number of delegations for helping us to revise the language of the draft, including the corresponding parts of the preamble.

As the third central element, the draft clarifies the notion of effective non-proliferation restraints: in particular it urges, in operative paragraph 6, that States at present outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty accede to the Treaty, or at least accept other arrangements involving the application of safeguards to their complete nuclear fuel cycle. In addition, Member States would, by adopting the draft resolution, affirm the principle that States should not convert civil nuclear materials or facilities to the production of nuclear weapons.

That is the essence of the draft resolution now under consideration. The working out of the revised version of the draft has reinforced our belief in the vitality of the issue. The debate, both formal and informal, on the various aspects of the question has resulted in a draft resolution which, we hope,

reflects in as balanced a way as possible the relevant views prevailing in the Committee. Therefore, the delegation of Finland, on behalf of the sponsors, which themselves represent the different roles of nuclear co-operation as well as the various geographical areas, expresses the hope that revised draft resolution $\Lambda/C.1/32/L.3$ will be adopted by a broad consensus in the Committee.

Mr. ERDENCHULUUN (Mongolia): The Mongolian delegation wishes to make a few brief comments on the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/32/L.11 and A/C.1/32/L.25, under agenda item 52, on the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and item 55, on the World Disarmament Conference.

The importance that we place on the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament was amplified anew in the reply of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic to the relevant note of the Secretary-General. We believe that the special session of the General Assembly, if properly prepared, could play a constructive role in the solution of the problems of halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament. It is in this spirit that Mongolia, although not a member of the Preparatory Committee for the special session, closely followed and participated in its work.

My delegation highly commends the work done so far by the Preparatory Committee. As we see from its report, nearly all organizational and procedural questions have been successfully resolved. This has, in our view, become possible largely through the constructive and business-like atmosphere which prevailed throughout the deliberations. We cannot fail to note the excellent manner in which Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina guided the work of that Committee. All that undoubtedly facilitated the adoption of all decisions of the Preparatory Committee by corsensus. We consider it only appropriate that the same procedure has been recommended for the special session as well.

The seriousness of the matter requires further sustained efforts on the part of all members of the Preparatory Committee, with a view to elaborating an agreed text of the final document, or documents, of the special session.

(Mr. Erdenchuluun, Mongolia)

Here, however, I wish to point out that the present composition of the Preparatory Committee fails to reflect the important role which the socialist countries play in disarmament negotiations. My delegation is of the view that due account of this fact should be taken in the draft resolution on the special session.

As regards the final documents to be considered and adopted at the special session, the position of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic found its clear-cut expression in the two working documents relating to the basic provisions of the Declaration and Programme of Action on Disarmament sponsored by the socialist countries, including my own.

The Mongolian delegation shares the view that the principal document, or documents, should consist of four essential parts - namely, an introduction, a declaration on disarmament, a programme of action, and machinery for disarmament negotiations. Since the contents of the aforesaid parts are elaborated in detail in working documents of the socialist countries, I shall confine myself at this stage to highlighting some basic elements of these documents.

In the first part of the document, an account should be given of the current state of affairs in the field of disarmament, based on objective analysis. The second part - that is, the declaration on disarmament - could contain fundamental, provisions and principles which should form the basis of disarmament negotiations. Among them, the ultimate objective - that is, general and complete disarmament under strict international control - as well as the principles of the non-use of force in international relations, the non-impairment of the interests of any of the parties to an agreement, the abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantage, and the importance of the universality of disarmament agreements, should be reaffirmed.

The third part would determine priority tasks upon which the efforts of States should be concentrated. In this connexion, the Mongolian delegation considers that serious attention should be given to the memorandum of the Soviet Union on the questions of ending the arms race and of disarmament, which contains a comprehensive programme of priority measures in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Erdenchuluun, Mongolia)

As regards the machinery for disarmament negotiations, we believe that the special session should help to enhance further the role and effectiveness of proven forums for disarmament negotiations, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The Mongolian delegation is still convinced that the World Disarmament Conference represents an authoritative world forum which would work out practical measures in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Erdenchuluun, Mongolia)

This view, which is shared by the overwhelming majority of States, has been properly reflected in the agenda of the forthcoming special session. My delegation has already made it clear that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference should be extended. It is on this basis that the Mongolian delegation supports draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.25 and wishes to be included among its Sponsors.

Mr. CHRYSTANTHOPOUTOS (Greece): I wish to make a brief statement on draft resolution A/U.1/32/L.21, introduced by the representative of Cyprus, regarding studies on the relationship of international peace and security to disarmament.

Greece, a small country, situated in a sensitive part of the world, is burdened with an unbearably high military budget for exclusive defensive purposes and is vitally interested in the achievement of disarmament and effective international control. In fact, as my delegation has already stated, my Government believes that peace and security are prerequisites to, rather than the consequences of, disarmament. It is our firm belief that if the principles of the United Nations Charter are fully respected and the resolutions adopted by its principal organs implemented, a general atmosphere of peace, goodwill, confidence, trust and security will prevail.

Such a spirit would, more than any other factor, contribute to the efforts aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament. The need for arms would be reduced automatically irrespective of whether or not general, partial or regional agreements were arrived at. On the contrary, without international security by means of the aforementioned measures, all agreements regarding disarmament become more and more difficult to negotiate and, if concluded, could well become a dead letter. Let us not forget that public opinion the world over is becoming increasingly impatient at the slow progress of international deliberations on disarmament.

For the aforementioned reasons, the Greek delegation considers the study on the relationship of international peace and security to disarmament as a fundamental factor in the study of the whole problem of disarmament. It therefore supports whole-heartedly draft resolution $A/C \cdot 1/32/L \cdot 21$, and will vote in favour of its adoption.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.17, pertaining to agenda item 34 entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3473 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weepons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)". The draft resolution has no financial implications. It is sponsored by 22 delegations and was introduced by the representative of Mexico on 15 November 1977.

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. WILLIAMS (Guyana): Guyana has asked for the floor to explain its vote before the vote on the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/32/L.17 and A/C.1/32/L.18.

My delegation has noted that statements on the principal Treaty made by various delegations during the general debate implied that every State on the Latin American continent which wishes to become a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco has done so or can do so. Furthermore, the language of the sixth preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) gives credence to this implication.

It is now some 10 years since the Tlatelolco Treaty régime was established and it is for that period of time that Guyana has embraced its noble purposes and supported the desire to see the Latin American continent a nuclear-free zone. However, Guyana is faced with the discriminatory exclusionary paradox of article 25, paragraph 2, of this Treaty.

The paradox is that while the Treaty has as its aim the support of all Latin American States for a continent free from the testing, manufacture, storing and use of nuclear weapons, it nevertheless militates against a legal commitment to this purpose by Guyana. That paradox is also inherent in a position in which the signatories to Tlatelolco seek support for the Treaty among extra-continental, albeit nuclear States, and urge two such States to become parties to Additional Protocols I and II, while at the same time the perpetuation of certain provisions in the Treaty prevents one of the States of Latin America from becoming a party to the Treaty.

(Mr. Williams, Guyana)

Finally, Guyana has observed that the understanding of the General Assembly on the question, as expressed in the sixth preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) "that it is the intent of the signatory States that all existing States within the zone defined by the Treaty become parties to the Treaty without any restriction", is not yet a reality. For these reasons, while remaining committed to the purposes of the Tlatelolco Treaty régime, Guyana is constrained from supporting the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/32/L.17 and A/C.1/32/L.18 and will abstain on the vote.

Mrs. BORODOWSKY JACHIEWICH (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): The creation of nuclear-free zones is, of course, an essential factor in the strengthening of international peace and security, which itself contributes to general and complete disarmament. Proof of this is to be found in the numerous draft resolutions under consideration in our important international organization. Only yesterday we adopted the resolution on the denuclearization of Africa which rightly reflects the major concern that South Africa might become a nuclear Power, thus endangering the security of the African States. My delegation considers that the creation of nuclear-free zones, whether in Africa the Middle East, the continent of Latin America or elsewhere, is what the progressive and peace-loving forces sincerely desire.

(Mrs. Borodowsky Jachiewich, Cuba)

For our part, in trying to conceive what should be the nuclear-free zones in the case of Latin America we come up against a contradictory situation, namely, how can we possibly conceive of a genuinely nuclear-weapon-free zone on a continent where there are military bases in Puerto Rico, in the Virgin Islands, in Panama and in the very territory of Cuba itself, which moreover has been the object of innumerable acts of aggression and has been subjected to a blockade? How is it possible for a nuclear-weapon-free zone to be really effective if this situation persists? Which is the nuclear Power which has military bases in Latin America?

At this time, when we are in an era of international détente, intentions are not sufficient. It is necessary for them to be put into practice. Life will show us to what extent these intentions will be translated into concrete realities.

It is because of all this that my delegation will abstain in the voting on the two draft resolutions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for it believes that they do not reflect the fact that the only State possessing nuclear weapons in Latin America does not respect the status of this nuclear-weapon-free zone. Moreover, they do not call upon the only nuclear Power in the Latin American continent to dismantle its military bases, including nuclear bases, which are imposed and maintained against the will of the Governments and peoples of the region. Furthermore, these draft resolutions are not addressed to those who alone have the power to take practical and concrete steps so that Latin America could consider itself a genuine denuclearized zone, free from all acts of aggression or hostility against any country of the region whatsoever.

We would truly welcome the crowning of the noble purposes of the Latin American countries in general, and the work of Mexico in particular, by the attainment of a genuine denuclearization of Latin America, in order that, in the words of one of the draft resolutions,

"the peoples of the territories in question may receive the benefits which derive from the Treaty and which consist mainly in removing the danger of nuclear attack and sparing the squandering of resources on the production of nuclear weapons". (A/C.1/32/L.17, para. 3)

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): My delegation has repeatedly stated its support for efforts aimed at the

establishment of zones completely free from nuclear weapons. We consider that this is an important trend in the struggle to extend the process of international détente to all regions of the world, to reduce the danger of nuclear war and to strengthen the régime of non-nuclear proliferation. It is, of course, important that a decision to set up nuclear-weapon-free zones should effectively ensure the nuclear-free status of the zones.

As regards the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America, the Tlatelolco Treaty, we have repeatedly noted here in the General Assembly and in other bodies that, in our opinion, that Treaty suffers from serious drawbacks which substantially weaken its effectiveness. It lacks any clear-cut ban on the conducting of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by States parties to it or a ban on the transit of nuclear weapons through their territories. The sphere of application of the Treaty covers the wide space of the open sea, which is not in keeping with the generally recognized canons of international law.

For the reasons I have just mentioned, the Soviet delegation will abstain in the vote on both draft resolutions A/C.1/32/L.17 and A/C.1/32/L.18.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.17. The delegation of Mexico has requested a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde,
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of,
Ghana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia,
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines,

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Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Argentina, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Central African Empire, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Guyana,
Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The draft resolution was adopted by 100 votes to none, with 16 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has thus concluded its consideration of agenda item 34.

The Committee will now proceed to take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.18 entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 31/67 concerning the signature and ratification of additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)". The draft resolution has no financial implications. It is sponsored by 22 delegations and was introduced by the representative of Mexico on 15 November. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cula,
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Guyana,
Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
The draft resolution was adopted by 105 votes to none, with 12 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We have concluded consideration of agenda item 41.

The Committee will now proceed to take a decision on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/32/L.27, pertaining to agenda item 44 and entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East". The draft resolution has no financial implications. It is sponsored by five delegations and was introduced by the representative of Iran on 15 November 1977. Yemen has asked to be included among the sponsors.

The representatives of Argentina, Brazil and India have asked for separate recorded votes on operative paragraphs 1 and 2; and France has asked for a separate recorded vote on operative paragraph 2 (c).

The Committee will proceed to vote on operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana,
Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic,
Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda,

Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia

Against: None

Abstaining: Algeria, Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, France, Guayana, India, Israel, Portugal, Spain, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania

Operative paragraph 1 was adopted by 98 votes to none, with 14 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to vote on operative paragraph 2. A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam. Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo,

Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia

Against:

None

Abstaining: Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, France, Guyana,

India, Israel, Spain, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania

Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 103 votes to none, with 12 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of the Netherlands on a point of order.

Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands): It is not clear to me why we did not vote on paragraph 2 (c). I thought there was to be a separate vote on paragraph 2 (c).

The CHAIRMAN: France asked for a separate vote on paragraph 2 (c) and India requested a separate vote on paragraph 2, so we voted on paragraph 2 as a whole.

The Committee will now proceed to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.27 as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Equador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland. France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Juirea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao Feople's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia. Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morecco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland,

Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Pritain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against:

None

Abstaining: Isra∈l

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 117 votes to none, with one abstention.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Israel, who wishes to explain his vote.

Mr. ELIAV (Israel): My delegation has studied with interest draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.27 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Government of Israel wishes to reiterate its support in principle for the establishment of such a zone in our region. However. as we already noted last year, the "Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects" issued as a special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which remains the most authoritative and comprehensive study of the subject, has demonstrated the considerable disagreement that still exists concerning the practical meaning and implications of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It confirmed that what might have appeared at first sight to be a clearly defined concept in fact contains several controversial elements.

Yet, with all these divergencies, that report indicates clearly that such zones should be established through negotiations between the States concerned. This is brought out in section n of paragraph 90, which enumerates the principles for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and again in paragraph 96, which deals with the procedures for the establishment of such zones, from which I should like to quote the following:

(Mr. Eliav, Israel)

"The view was expressed that once an initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone had been taken, consultations to that end should be held among the States concerned. The view was also expressed that prior consultations" - I repeat, "prior consultations" - "should be undertaken with the countries concerned" - and again I repeat "with the countries concerned" - "regarding the implications, feasibility and acceptability of the proposed zone, in order that an initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone could elicit the necessary support ..."

(A/10027/Add.1, para. 96).

My Government therefore continues to hold the views it expressed in its letter of 14 September 1976 addressed to the Secretary-General, as follows:

"... in accordance with general international practice, the Government of Israel feels justified in its call for negotiations between all the States of the region as an indispensable requirement for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. ... such negotiations should lead to the conclusion of a formal, contractual, multilateral convention between all the States of the region, on the lines of such notable precedents as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the proposals for similar agreements in the areas of South Asia and the South Pacific." (A/31/189, p. 21)

The most recent reaffirmation of the position of Israel was made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Moshe Dayan, in his statement during the general debate on 10 October 1977, when he said:

"Israel is ready to enter into an agreement on arms limitation with all the States in the Middle East.

"With regard to another crucial aspect of disarmament, Israel has frequently called on its Arab neighbours to join it in direct negotiations with a view to establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

... Israel firmly believes that such negotiations should lead to the conclusion of a formal, contractual, multilateral convention between all the States of the region, on the lines of such notable precedents as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America ..."

(A/32/PV.27, pp. 68-71)

(Mr. Eliav, Israel)

However, no response has yet been made to this particular offer and the Arab refusal to take part in any such consultations with Israel still persists.

By way of contrast, we have noted with interest in this respect the draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, and in particular its fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 2, which reads as follows:

"Urges once again the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia ..." (A/C.1/32/L.7)

(Mr. Eliav, Israel)

Thus, the principle of regional concert for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone has once again been put forward.

Still, I would like to remind the Committee that last year when a similar draft resolution on South Asia was presented here, several delegations expressed the view that that call for regional concert was not clear enough and did not indicate sufficiently the need for actual negotiations between the States of the region for the establishment of the zone, and therefore abstained in the vote. It would seem that this attitude should prevail, a fortiori, with regard to any draft on the establishment of a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone which does not even include an implicit call for regional consultations.

Be that as it may, the Government of Israel for its part has noted with regret that the proposal now before the Committee on the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East does not call for the consultations which are the only way for creating it and does not even refer implicitly to this approach. This conscious omission, which, of course, is predicated on the attitude of our neighbours, in fact contradicts the declared aim of the draft resolution before us. For those reasons we could not support it and have therefore abstained in the vote.

Having stated our position with regard to the draft resolution, I would not wish to conclude my remarks without expressing the hope - particularly in the light of recent developments - that when the issue comes before the Assembly next year, or even earlier, a text will be presented which will be fully consonant with the concept of negotiation, and thus will be acceptable to all the States of our region.

U TINT SOE (Burma): My delegation has now voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.27 as a whole. It provides for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We have done so because of our belief that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the various regions of the world is an important step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

(U Tint Soe, Burma)

It is encouraging that all States in the Middle East region agree in principle to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Burma has consistently supported all genuine efforts towards the achievement of world peace and security.

Mr. MISTRAL (France) (interpretation from French): My delegation abstained on the two separate votes on operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of A/C.1/32/L.27 and voted in favour of the resolution as a whole. That is because we favour the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, particularly in view of the fact that all the countries of the region have given their assent to that initiative, at least in principle. Nevertheless, we cannot accept that on this occasion my country should be requested to waive its basic options concerning, inter alia, the Non-Proliferation-Treaty. In regard to that diplomatic instrument, we maintain our reservations. We have not ourselves signed that treaty; therefore, we cannot agree to urge other countries to do what we ourselves refuse to do. The same considerations apply with regard to the commitment requested of all countries to place all their nuclear activities under international control.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): My delegation is pleased to have voted in favour of resolution A/C.1/32/L.27 because we strongly support the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas of the world where they are appropriate, particularly the Middle East, under conditions that would assure the effect: veness of such a zone. In our view the value of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is self-evident.

We continue to believe, however, that the actual provisions set forth in the resolution governing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that area must be negotiated and agreed among the potential participants in the zone before States can be expected to undertake commitments regarding it.

My delegation supports the efforts being made to explore new ideas and steps to relieve apprehensions over possible proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence in the region.

Mr. ANDREESCU (Romania): May I be allowed to present a few remarks that the Romanian delegation would like to make with respect to the draft resolutions concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones which have been adopted or are going to be put to a vote.

Under the present circumstances when the accumulation of armaments has reached huge and unprecedented proportions and some States possess in their arsenals mass destruction weapons which jeopardize the destiny of mankind, the time has come for resolute and effective measures to be taken in the field of general disarmament on the basis of a comprehensive programme within the framework of which the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament.

In that respect, Romania appreciates the initiatives aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as being important steps towards the gradual elimination of the nuclear danger in different geographical areas. Such measures are expected to contribute progressively to the banning of the testing, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and, finally, to their complete destruction.

Romania takes the view that the nuclear-weapon-free zone should be considered as an independent disarmament measure and not merely as a collateral measure subordinated to the Non Proliferation Treaty.

Of course, the two concepts have some common features, as for instance the renunciation of the production and acquisition of nuclear arms. However, the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones has a much wider scope than the political, military and juridical elements contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone represents in fact a real and effective measure of nuclear disarmament which includes the practical disarmament measures conducive to the attainment of the final goal, which is the conclusion of a general disarmament treaty.

At the same time, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones offers wide possibilities for promoting relations of good neighbourliness and extending co-operation to every field of activity, including the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such co-operation would naturally

(Mr. Andreescu, Romania)

involve and stimulate research in that sector and the utilization of the achievements of nuclear physics for the benefit of the economic and social development of all States.

It is also necessary that the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones be gradually widened in order to include, in the final analysis, the States possessing nuclear weapons. The conditions could thus be created for starting the nuclear disarrament process even before the conclusion of a general disarrament treaty. That could be achieved by a number of agreements concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to which the nuclear powers would become parties.

(Mr. Andreescu, Romania)

The nuclear-weapon-free zone should not be affected by dimensional restrictions or considerations. Enjoying first the participation of a small number of participants, it could be progressively extended, finally to include all the countries from a given geographical area.

Starting from the position of principle that I have briefly mentioned, Romania has always supported the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Being deeply interested in the creation of a climate of peace and co-operation in the geographical zone to which it belongs, as early as 1959 Romania suggested making the Balkans a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This matter continues to be given unremitting attention and consideration in Romanian foreign policy.

At the same time Romania firmly supports the role that the United Nations is called upon to play in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. This world Organization could indeed offer its machinery and facilities to speed up the progress of consultations between the various countries that may wish to participate in such zones. The United Nations could also play the role of a guarantor of the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones by adopting appropriate resolutions in the General Assembly.

The inclusion in the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly of many items relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones represents an acknowledgement of the importance of and present interest in this concept which enjoys an ever wider audience and support at the international level.

In conclusion, I should like to assure the Committee that Romania will also in the future consistently lend its full support to the efforts made by the international community to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones as a significant step towards general and complete disarmament.

Those were the reasons that led my delegation to cast its vote in favour of the draft resolutions which have just been adopted.

Mr. MOYILA (Zaire) (interpretation from French): I regret that I was absent during the vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/32/L.17, L.18 and J..27. My delegation would have voted in favour of all three draft resolutions, and I request the Chairman to be so good as to have my delegation's intention duly recorded.

The CHAIRMAN: The wish of the representative of Zaire has been noted.

Mr. HSU Yi-min (China) (interpretation from Chinese): With regard to the draft resolution just adopted, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", we voted in favour of it. However, in a separate vote on operative paragraph 1 - which reads:

"Urges anew all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a means of promoting this objective" -

in accordance with our consistent position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we have reservations on that paragraph and, therefore, we did not participate in the vote on it. We request the Chairman to be good enough to have our position reflected in the records of this meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: The statement of the Chinese delegation has been noted. I should like to announce that the following delegations have joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.28: Ghana, Morocco and Pakistan.

Mr. SATTAR (Pakistan): As I had indicated earlier, I have asked to be allowed to speak to make a few preliminary remarks on document A/C.1/32/L.3/Rev.1, which was introduced earlier this morning by Mr. Blomberg, the representative of Finland.

As the Committee is aware, on an earlier occasion we expressed some reservations with regard to the original text of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/32/L.3. At that time we stated, and we reiterate, that Pakistan fully shares the objective of preventing a proliferation of

(Mr. Sattar, Pakistan)

nuclear weapons. Our difference with the original draft was not over the goal; it was over the means of achieving that laudable objective. We had therefore informally suggested some ideas which, in our view, would improve the draft resolution, make it widely acceptable and enhance its usefulness as a means of achieving its objective.

This morning we rapidly glanced through the revised text. On first reading it seems to us that the ideas we had suggested in regard to the operative part of the first draft had not been found acceptable. However, as I have said, that was a first reading. We should like to study the revised text carefully. We shall have to see if the draft resolution as now formulated succeeds in achieving consistency with the universally accepted view that the objective of the accelerated spread and development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes can be reconciled with the objective of preventing the danger of a proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Sattar, Pakistan)

We believe that the rights and obligations of the suppliers of nuclear technology and the rights and obligations of the recipients can be reconciled and balanced. Whether the revised draft succeeds in achieving that necessary balance is a matter which, as I have said, will require careful examination.

In those circumstances, the Pakistan delegation would like to express the hope that draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.3/Rev.1 will not be put to the Committee for decision immediately or in any great hurry and that time will be given to delegations to study the revised text, reflect on the matter and perhaps express their considered views at a somewhat later time.

The CHAIRMAN: As already agreed, the First Committee will conclude its consideration of the disarmament items on Friday, 18 November. Therefore I request members to be ready to vote on the draft resolutions which are still outstanding. Having other commitments, the Committee will not be in a position to go beyond the deadline of 18 November. If required, we shall have to hold a night meeting to complete our programme.

There are no speakers for this afternoon's meeting, and I am therefore compelled to cancel it. I should like to propose that the Committee take decisions on the following draft resolutions at tomorrow morning's meeting: A/C.1/32/L.3/Rev.1, L.8, L.1\(\lambda\), L.22 and L.26.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.