United Nations GENERAL

ASSEMBLY

THIRTY-SECOND SESSION Official Records *



FIRST COMMITTEE 28th meeting held on Wednesday, 9 November 1977 at 10.30 a.m. New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 28th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BOATEN (Ghana)

CONTENTS

AGENDA ITEM 33: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMAMENTS RACE AND ITS EXTREMELY HARMFUL EFFECTS ON WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 34: IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3473 (XXX) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO): REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 38: INCENDIARY AND OTHER SPECIFIC CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS OF USE FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 39: CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 40: URGENT NEED FOR CESSATION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS AND CONCLUSION OF A TREATY DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 41: IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 31/67 CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO) (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 42: EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE DISARMAMENT DECADE (continued):

- (a) REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT;
- (b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

AGENDA ITEM 43: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF AFRICA (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 44: ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 45: ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

* This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be incorporated in a copy of the record and should be sent within one week of the date of publication to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room A-3550.

Distr. GENERAL A/C.1/32/PV.28 11 November 1977

/...

Corrections will be issued shortly after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

ENGLISH

A/C.1/32/PV.28 la

AGENDA ITEM 46: PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND NEW SYSTEMS OF SUCH WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 47: REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 48: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 49: CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON TESTS (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 51: GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT (continued):

- (a) REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT;
- (b) REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY;
- (c) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

AGENDA ITEM 52: SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 53: WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (continued)

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52 and 53 (continued)

Mr. KUTENDAKANA PUMBULU (Zaire) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, permit me to convey to you my warm congratulations on your unanimous election to the Chairmanship of this Committee. Your diplomatic talents, your experience in such important questions as those of disarmament and international security are a guarantee of your success in the conduct of our proceedings. My delegation is pleased that the post of Chairman of the First Committee this year has gone to a son of an African country with which Zaire enjoys fruitful ties of friendship and co-operation. We can only wish you every success in your heavy and delicate responsibilities.

My delegation would also like to congratulate the other officers of the Committee whose co-operation is so valuable to you in concluding your difficult tasks successfully.

My delegation has listened with sustained attention to the statements of representatives who have spoken before me. In my turn, I should like to associate the voice of my delegation with the expressions of concern which we heard from them about the arms race and its threat to peace and security in the world in general and to the African continent in particular.

In spite of the considerable efforts made in the bodies of our Organization and outside it, the arms race in both conventional and nuclear weapons has constantly grown and been strengthened by the appearance of new arms ever more sophisticated and extremely deadly. This trend to the accumulation of the engines of death is compounded, unfortunately, by an insensate increase in the military expenditures and the opening up of new hot-beds of tension in the world to such a point that experts consider that for 1975, the arms race will swallow up the fabulous sum of \$350 billion. We should add to that the wastage of human resources made necessary by research into and production of arms of all kind.

My delegation deplores the fact that the international community is better able to secure arms for its own destruction than it is to devote even one tenth of those expenditures for the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease. My delegation is happy at the new prospects which exist in disarmament in terms of the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to this crucial problem. We hope that this will provide a great deal of room for the legitimate concerns of the developing countries to see some of the expenses now being used for military purposes being contributed to improving assistance to the poorest and most underprivileged countries.

In the view of my delegation, the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be an important stage in the process leading to general and complete disarmament. If this work is largely successful, it will contribute to the creation of more favourable conditions for the convening of a world disarmament conference.

My country, which is a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, can only be gratified at the efforts which have been made in the multilateral, regional and bilateral approaches with a view to making a start more positively on the process which should lead to general and complete disarmament. Within this context, my delegation is gratified at the progress achieved by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament in the performance of its difficult task, particularly by the establishment of a provisional agenda and machinery making possible the production of appropriate documents for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The convening of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is the fruit of efforts of non-aligned countries made at the Colombo summit. But the success of the work of that session should be the work of all Members of our Organization and, in particular, countries which possess nuclear weapons, since they are primarily responsible for the arms race, the continuation of which poses a terrible threat to international peace and security.

The Republic of Zaire, my own country, has always fought for general and complete disarmament. That is why we are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and have never shirked our obligations which flow from this Treaty.

It is in virtue of this commitment that my delegation has always supported and will continue to support all pertinent recommendations of the General Assembly on the application of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and the application of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and in South Asia. The same holds true for the application of General Assembly resolution 3473 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and General Assembly resolution 31/67 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

Permit me to recall also that my country, which last year supported the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution (31/72) recommending that Member States of the United Nations sign the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, is ready to conclude this formality prior to embarking on the parliamentary procedure for the ratification of this Convention.

In the view of my delegation, the international community should ban the manufacture, sale and use of incendiary, chemical and bacteriological weapons, or any other weapons of the same kind. We hope that harder work will be done by the international bodies concerned in order to bring about the banning of such weapons.

An African country, bound furthermore by the Non-Froliferation Treaty, we cannot but energetically condemn the new threat to peace and security which South Africa, that bastion of racism and apartheid, is getting ready to pose to our continent by preparing to explode a nuclear device in the Kalahari Desert in Namibia, in flagrant violation of the relevant recommendations of the General Assembly on the denuclearization of Africa.

It is for the countries friendly to South Africa which have helped it to secure the means and the necessary advanced techniques to permit it to manufacture a nuclear bomb to dissuade it from further jeopardizing the fragile balance of forces in Africa. Otherwise, as was stated by the Head of my delegation in the plenary Assembly, "We must restore that balance even at the price of a pact with the devil". (A/32/PV.23, p. 46)

The Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mr. Shevel, referred in his statement to our Committee to an agreement signed by a German firm with my country on the installation of a rocket launching pad, and he stated, among other things:

"This agreement runs counter to the process of the deepening of international détente, which we believe is favoured by the Federal Republic." (A/C.1/32/PV.15, p. 39-40)

My delegation is not at all surprised by the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian SSR, because for a long time we have been well aware of the misleading anti-Zaire propaganda on this subject orchestrated by a great socio-imperialist nuclear Power.

My delegation scornfully and categorically rejects such allegations, which are liable to mislead representatives here and are designed to cover up the subversive threat of that super-Power in Africa. We will not return to a problem that has already been the subject of a right of reply in the plenary, where my country was accused on the same subject by the Foreign Minister of a neighbouring African country. Suffice it to recall to the Committee the programme that was referred to by the Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, an essentially civilian programme within the context of my country's freely expressed sovereign will to promote scientific and technical co-operation with all peace and justice-loving States Members of our Organization.

Faithful to its African policy, essentially one of peace, Zaire, my country, can only repeat its commitment scrupulously to respect the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and faithfully to apply the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

In this context my delegation has already informed the Committee that it was a sponsor of the joint draft resolution presented by the States members of the Organization of African Unity on the denuclearization of our continent. I should like, on the same occasion, to express my country's hope that those who have been testing the murderous capabilities of their weapons in Africa will stop deluding us and be true to themselves in both deed and speech.

Mr. MARIANO (Somalia): My Government shares the concern and disillusionment expressed by the representatives of many States over the slow pace of progress towards general and complete disarmament and particularly towards nuclear disarmament. We all know that the arms race in nuclear weapons threatens the survival of mankind. We know that if it continues to escalate the majority of the world's peoples will be able to do nothing to remove this terrible threat that hangs over their lives.

This is a gloomy picture, and while I believe it remains a true one it is reassuring to know that there are a number of developments which give rise to the hope that this picture can and will be changed for the better.

The forthcoming special session on disarmament, for example, provides a welcome light on the horizon. As a result of the wise and vigorous initiative of the Non-Aligned Group of States, international public opinion will next year be focused on all aspects of disarmament. The good work of the Preparatory Committee makes it reasonable to hope that the special session will go beyond establishing priorities to a programme of action on disarmament and will make specific contributions towards the solution of long-standing problems.

The achievement of a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons has long been urged by the General Assembly. My Government welcomes the recent call by certain States Members of the United Nations for a moratorium on both military and peaceful explosions. We were disappointed at the failure of the trilateral talks on this question, but we trust that the way is now open for the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Leadership by the nuclear Powers on crucial disarmament issues has never been more urgently needed than at the present time, when the acquisition of nuclear capability by a growing number of States seriously threatens the non-proliferation régime. It is not surprising that horizontal proliferation has increased when vertical proliferation fostered a climate of mistrust and threatened the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. My Government is happy that both nuclear super-Powers have made concrete proposals for slowing down the nuclear arms race.

The substantial reduction of the nuclear-weapon stockpiles of the super-Fowers is a major disarmament goal, and my delegation welcomes the statements of Soviet and American leaders on their willingness to reach agreement on the reduction of these stockpiles. The majority of the world's peoples are seeking to establish just societies, to attain their inalienable political, social and economic rights and to enjoy a measure of stability and progress. These aspirations are constantly threatened by the escalation of nuclear-weapon arsenals, which long ago achieved the power to obliterate the world many times over.

The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic hopes that the substantial progress envisaged for questions concerning a test-ban treaty and the reduction of nuclear stockpiles will be directly relevant to the reduction of strategic weapon systems, which are the most dangerous and potentially destructive manifestations of nuclear power.

In our view, the heart of nuclear disarmament lies in a willingness to change the basic premise of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. That premise remains the maintenance of an ever escalating balance of terror. Unless it is replaced by a sincere determination to reduce and eventually eliminate these systems, the spectre of a nuclear holocaust will remain with us.

The existence of stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological weapons is a threat to peace second only to that posed by nuclear armaments. My delegation regrets that it has still not been possible to draft a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of these uniquely inhuman weapons. We hope that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will accelerate the pace of its efforts to prohibit chemical and bacteriological warfare and that the bilateral consultations between the Soviet Union and the United States on this matter will bear fruit.

Another complex problem of nuclear disarmament which faces the world community is that of transferring nuclear science and technology without increasing the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The failure of the Nuclear Suppliers Conference to adopt a common code on nuclear exports and nuclear safeguards lends additional urgency to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We hope that the Agency will achieve good progress in its efforts to promote the search for a safe fuel cycle and to provide a stronger framework for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The transfer of science and technology to the developing countries, including peaceful uses of atomic energy, is an essential part of the struggle for a new world economic order. If it were to be hampered for any reason the international objective of closing the gap between the industrialized and the developing countries would never be achieved.

At the same time, the growing availability of nuclear material that can be converted to military use presents a threat to world peace and security which must be given most serious consideration.

The danger of this situation is further increased by the fact that South Africa and Israel are undoubtedly among the States possessing nuclear-weapon capability. These are, of course, States whose regional and internal policies have been condemned by the United Nations because they threaten both regional and international peace. While my Government welcomes the fact that it has been

possible for the Security Council to achieve unanimity on an arms embargo against South Africa, we believe that the embargo should be directed against all forms of nuclear co-operation with the Vorster régime. It is difficult to accept the argument that continued nuclear co-operation between South Africa and donor countries would ensure control over South Africa's use of nuclear material, when only last month Mr. Vorster was accused by the United States Government of reneging on his promise not to develop nuclear weapons.

The undeniable threat to regional and international peace posed by the situation in South Africa makes it imperative that nothing be done which might facilitate the development of nuclear weapons by a régime which is determined to maintain its unjust minority rule at all costs. In addition, the withholding of nuclear technology and materials from South Africa would have both a symbolic and a practical effect in the context of the international campaign to isolate that country until its rulers accept the common humanity of all men.

The tenth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco highlights the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace and leads to the hope that the achievement of Latin America will serve as an example and as an encouragement to such areas as Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, where there is a desire for a similar arrangement.

I need not emphasize again the urgency of excluding nuclear weapons from the African continent where South Africa's militant and racist régime flaunts its defiance of international law and international morality. My Government is prepared to support regional initiatives for putting into more concrete form the General Assembly's frequent reaffirmation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

With regard to the Indian Ocean my Government welcomes the creation of a commission by the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to reducing their rivalry in that area. A vital first step towards this goal would, of course, be the reversal of the recent expansion of American naval facilities on the island of Diego Garcia. We hope that the new interest of the super-Powers in the Indian Ocean question will be extended to include their support for and participation in the conference of Indian Ocean and hinterland States called for by the General Assembly.

While the major disarmament efforts of the world community must still be directed towards the elimination of existing weapons of mass destruction, it is noted with satisfaction that the search for preventive measures against foreseeable, but still undeveloped, forms of warfare is not being neglected. The sea-bed Treaty and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques are valuable achievements. Also in this category of preventive measures is the proposed convention to prohibit new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and we urge the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts to reach agreement on this vital question.

It has become almost axiomatic that there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General has often called attention to the fact that the annual world military expenditure has been about \$300 billion for some years while funds for internationally approved development goals have been lacking. In this context my delegation hopes that proposals and studies on the reduction of military budgets with a view to using the savings for development will soon be translated into effective action.

It seems clear to my Government that real and substantial progress towards general and complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, can be effected only in a climate of détente, in a world where the achievement by all

people of their inalienable rights has removed the root causes of conflict and tension, and in a world where the shocking disparity between armaments spending and the funds available for urgent human needs has been fully recognized and remedied.

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): I have the honour to introduce on behalf of the Pakistan delegation the draft resolution in document A/C.1/32/L.8 regarding the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This question has an extensive history, and I should like briefly to recount the background.

More than a decade ago, during the consideration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the international community recognized the necessity of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. After all, it is axiomatic that the non-nuclear-weapon States do not constitute a military threat to the nuclear-weapon Powers. Therefore, the former States having renounced nuclear weapons, it is only just and right that they should have an assurance that their security will not be jeopardized by nuclear weapons. Without such assurances the climate of confidence necessary for a universal non-proliferation régime would be vitiated.

We regret that the response of the nuclear Powers, particularly the major nuclear-weapon States, has failed to meet the security concerns of the non-nuclearweapon States. In the first place, the leading nuclear Powers have not lived up to their commitment to make progress towards genuine disarmament, and, on the contrary, their nuclear and military arsenals have increased ominously so that in quantitative terms alone the danger of the use of nuclear weapons is greater today than ever before. The recent pronouncements of Presidents Carter and Brezhnev, which have also been reflected in statements in the current session of the General Assembly and the First Committee, are of course most welcome. But while they provide some grounds for optimism, they do not in any way reduce the danger that is constituted by the physical presence of large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the meantime, no credible and effective means have been devised to provide political insurance to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the possibility of the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons against them. The statements of intention made by the three nuclear Powers parties to the NPT, in the context of Security Council resolution 255 (1968), to act through the

Council in case of a nuclear threat or attack against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT, are restrictive and liable to be arbitrary, unreliable and ineffective. More importantly, they lacked credibility in view of the veto provision. As the representative of Sweden declared in her statement to this Committee on 1 November:

"... Security Council resolution 255 (1968) cannot be regarded as a realistic answer to requests for security guarantees." (A/C.1/32/FV.19, p. 42)

In the past, several efforts were made by non-nuclear-weapon States, including Pakistan, to evolve effective and credible measures to strengthen their security against the nuclear threat. At the non-nuclear-weapon States Conference, my country submitted a proposal calling on the nuclear Powers to act jointly and individually on behalf of a non-nuclear-weapon State threatened by nuclear weapons, and also to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Similar proposals were also put forward at the Review Conference of the NPT held in 1975 by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to that Treaty.

The response to these proposals by the major nuclear Powers has ranged from indifference to opposition. Apart from one or two exceptions, the major nuclear Powers concerned themselves only with the requirements of their respective military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, and appeared unwilling to extend credible security assurances against nuclear attack to the non-nuclear-weapon States which were not members of either of those alliances. The majority of the non-nuclear States, especially those of the third world, do not, however, wish to subscribe to the thesis that security against the nuclear threat can be ensured only by participation in the nuclear security arrangements of the major nuclear Powers.

While it is possible to envisage that the extension of the scope of guarantees for assistance against a nuclear threat or attack - the so-called "positive" guarantees - may prove difficult for the nuclear-weapon States, there seems to be no technical obstacle to extending a "negative guarantee", that is, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Indeed, one

nuclear Power, the People's Republic of China, has already given such a guarantee unilaterally to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Many non-nuclear-weapon States, including Pakistan, Romania and others, have called for negative guarantees from the nuclear Powers. But here again the purpose of the super-Powers appears to have been inhibited by their respective commitments to their NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, which do not exclude contingency options for the use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear-weapon States of the rival bloc. The major Powers have thus so far not found it possible to consider a general formula requiring them not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation cannot accept the concept of a strategic doctrine which contemplates the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Nor do we see any reason why these doctrines which relate mainly to the situation in Europe should be an obstacle in the way of extending an undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against those non-nuclear-weapon States which are not, and do not wish to be, part of the nuclear security arrangements of the two rival Power blocs.

Therefore, at the last session of the General Assembly, the Pakistan delegation, together with a number of other non-nuclear-weapon States, evolved a formula for negative security guarantees which would circumvent the difficulties posed by the military doctrines and strategic concepts of the two super-Powers. Resolution 31/189 C of the General Assembly invited the nuclear-weapon States to consider undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers. This formulation in no way condoned the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in certain cases. The undertaking called for from the nuclear Powers was only "a first step towards general and complete disarmament" and the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. The resolution, however, faced the reality as it exists and attempted to provide an avenue by which those non-nuclear-weapon States that are not involved in the rival big-Power alliances, could obtain an assurance that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. The resolution clarified, furthermore, that the undertaking asked of the nuclear Powers would be without prejudice to their obligations under treaties establishing nuclear-weaponfree zones, such as those they have undertaken under Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It was gratifying that 96 Member States, including one nuclear Power, China, voted for that resolution.

We consider that the adoption of resolution 31/189 C of the General Assembly represented a first significant step towards evolving a guarantee of non-use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers. The formula recommended in resolution 31/189 C can form the foundation on whose basis credible and binding guarantees can be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those of the third world, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The purpose of the draft resolution in A/C.1/32/L.8 is to make another advance towards that goal. The preambular part of the draft provides a general indication of the background to the proposal, a background which I have sketched in my preceding remarks. The first operative paragraph merely seeks to reaffirm the provisions of resolution 31/189 C adopted by the Assembly last year. In view of my explanation of the painstaking and sincere efforts that were made to evolve the formula for negative guarantees in this resolution, I hope that such an affirmation of the resolution will be readily accepted by Member States.

We are aware, of course, that some of the nuclear Powers abstained on this resolution last year although they were prepared to consider measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation believes that the formulation is a step towards meeting the varied security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. We, therefore, would like the General Assembly to urge the nuclear-weapon Powers, in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, "to give serious consideration to extending the undertaking proposed by its resolution 31/189 C ..." (A/C.1/32/L.8).

Finally, my delegation believes that the opportunity offered by the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly should be taken advantage of to evolve a universal agreement on this question. Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, therefore, recommends that "all possible efforts be made at its eighth special session on disarmament to evolve binding and credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States ...". In this provision as well, we have endeavoured to retain the flexibility that may be required to arrive at a consensus. The paragraph recommends merely that the assurances to non-nuclear States would be evolved "taking into account ... resolution 31/189 C".

It is our hope, therefore, that the draft resolution in A/6.1/32/L.8 will be adopted by this Committee and by the General Assembly.

Mr. ASHE (United Kingdom): I should like to introduce on behalf of the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Ivory Coast, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom a draft resolution entitled "Weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles". This has been issued as document A/C.1/32/L.5.

This is the third year in which the First Committee has included in its disarmament discussions the subject of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, a topic originally introduced in 1975 by the Soviet Union. Weapons of mass destruction were defined in August 1948 by the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments as "atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above". These weapons thus fall into four categories. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in its report to the General Assembly has given an account of its second year of consideration of this subject. The CCD's discussion of this subject, assisted by experts in this field, has led my delegation and many others to the conclusion that there is no immediate danger that any new weapon of mass destruction based on any identified new scientific principle will emerge in the near future. At present, the only foreseeable developments in weapons of mass destruction arise in the first three categories set forth in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted in August 1948. That is to say "atomic explosive weapons" or, as we call them today, nuclear weapons, "radioactive material weapons, and lethal chemical and biological weapons". These are all the subject of existing agreements or negotiations, and thus lie outside the scope of the resolution which we are considering now. So this leaves us with the fourth category set out in the 1948 definition of arms of mass destruction that is to say, "weapons which have characteristics comparable in destructive

MD/mmb

(Mr. Ashe, United Kingdom)

effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above". Here we do agree that it is difficult to predict what new scientific discoveries may eventually be made at some time in the future - or to say as the representative of Czechoslovakia put it a day or two ago, that military technology has pronounced its last word. And we therefore agree that it is necessary, without hampering scientific research, to ensure that no such new discovery shall be used for the creation of such weapons of mass destruction.

We have studied with great care and sympathy the Soviet Union's proposal, set forth once again in draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.4, that that objective might be achieved by a single all-embracing treaty prohibiting "new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons". We recognize that in preparing the revised version of its draft treaty, submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 8 August 1977 in document CCD/511/Rev.1, the Soviet Union has attempted to take account of some of the objections to this method of proceeding which my own delegation and many others have expressed both here in this Committee and also in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. However, it remains our conviction that an all-embracing treaty would inevitably be so vague and so general in its provisions as to be ineffective. I am confident that all of us here agree that international agreements must be clear and precise in their language - otherwise their interpretation only leads to misunderstanding and dispute among their signatories. A general umbrella agreement on the banning of new weapons of mass destruction could only be vague and misleading in its definition of the weapons of war we are trying to abort. How can you define a nightmare before you have had it? Moreover, given this imprecision over definition, it would be impossible to devise workable means of verifying compliance with the treaty. There would also be a danger that a general treaty might appear to overlap, and hence call into question, the area covered by existing treaties banning already identified weapons of mass destruction, of which perhaps the most important example is the Biological Weapons Convention. It is also our view that the conclusion of a general treaty would not in any way simplify or assist our efforts to agree on international instruments to prohibit or control weapons within the other identified categories which are already under negotiation nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons.

A new feature of the Soviet revised draft treaty is the provision to the effect that as new weapons of mass destruction are identified they should be made the subject of individual treaties. This proposal we can whole-heartedly support - and indeed we originally initiated this idea and have

incorporated it in our own draft resolution - for such treaties, each designed to cover a particular weapon, could have the necessary precision in definition to make them effective legal instruments and could have clear provisions for verification. We believe that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament could be asked to draft such individual treaties whenever new dangers are identified, without the need for a general treaty.

As an earnest of our belief in the principle that new scientific principles should not be used to produce new weapons of mass destruction as deadly in their effect as nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons - that is to say, those weapons of mass destruction already identified in 1948 - the delegations that are sponsoring this draft resolution have offered a draft with the following objectives.

First, the draft resolution urges States to refrain from the development of weapons of mass destruction on the basis of new scientific principles and calls upon them to apply scientific discovery for the benefit of mankind. Then, so that it shall be quite clear what it is we are urging States to do, we propose to reaffirm the definition of weapons of mass destruction formulated by the Commission for Conventional Armaments in August 1948. In doing so we seek to make quite clear what is meant by the expression "weapons of mass destruction" in those legal instruments which already use it, particularly the sea-bed, Antarctic and outer space treaties, and in any future agreements on specific weapons which we may conclude later. We are not suggesting that this definition may not need to be improved or further elaborated in the future. If a new definition, generally acceptable to the Members of the United Nations, were to be put forward in the future, then we would be prepared to consider how it might be made part of the international legal system. However, for the time being, as this definition has stood the test of the last 30 years very well, it is important that a single generally accepted definition should form the basis of our work.

In urging States to refrain from developing new weapons of mass destruction on the basis of new scientific principles, and in asking the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to keep the question under review and to

consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which may be identified, we are not condoning the continued development of those weapons of mass destruction which have already been identified and which, in some cases, are already in the arsenals of some States. Operative paragraph 4 of our draft resolution welcomes the active continuation of negotiations relating to the prohibition and limitation of identified weapons of mass destruction, and the preambular part of the resolution also makes references to those agreements on the prohibition and limitation of such weapons which have already been concluded. I should like to stress once again our conviction that it can only be more difficult to negotiate a prohibition of a given type of weapon - for example, chemical weapons - if at the same time that type of weapon appears to be encompassed within an ill-defined general treaty on weapons of mass destruction. I must also restate our conviction that the Biological Weapons Convention is an effective and sufficient instrument for the prohibition of that particular category of weapons of mass destruction and that to cover such weapons again under an over-all treaty could weaken rather than strengthen that useful instrument.

The leader of my delegation, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, when speaking to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in August, proposed that the aspiration, common to us all, of preventing future misuse of science to create new and terrible threats to mankind could best be approached by means of a firm statement by the world community against the abuse of science for that purpose coupled with a request to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to keep the matter under constant review and to negotiate instruments to preclude the development and production of particular weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles in good time. I say "in good time", and here I would emphasize that it takes a considerable time, indeed years, to apply a new scientific principle for either military or civil purposes. We do not believe that a general umbrella treaty would promote this cause but we are still prepared to listen to the arguments in favour of it. Lord Goronwy-Roberts suggested that the best form for such a

statement by the world community could be a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which we should hope to see adopted by consensus. This proposal has met with considerable support, and the draft resolution I have introduced today is offered with the object of giving effect to it. We still hope to achieve consensus and are engaged in negotiations with the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/32/L.4 to this end.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): The German Democratic Republic is a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.4 on the "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons", which has been distributed and which I have the honour to introduce on behalf of the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the Soviet Union.

In this draft resolution, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) is requested

"... to continue negotiations with the assistance of qualified governmental experts aimed at working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and when necessary, specific agreements on this subject". (A/C.1/32/L.4, p. 2)

The position of principle of the German Democratic Republic on this issue is known and was explained once again in the course of the general debate in this Committee.

The present draft resolution on the subject (A/C.1/32/L.4) corresponds with the aim effectively to oppose the spreading of the arms race to new areas through the development of weapons of mass destruction based on new principles of action. This can best be achieved by means of a comprehensive all-embracing agreement which imposes equally binding obligations on all States. Hence it is a major task to prepare such a document through negotiation and to endeavour to ensure that that document, with its obligations, is ratified at an early date by States and is subsequently strictly observed. This cannot be achieved through a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly alone, which merely calls upon States not to develop and manufacture new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Certainly nobody will doubt that the obligations arising from an agreement are much more effective than a mere appeal to this effect.

That is an important aspect which is fully taken into account by the draft resolution before us presented by the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the Soviet Union. It reflects our serious efforts to prevent the dangerous arms race being continued with new means of mass destruction.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

The topicality and urgency of this demand is obvious. The development of the neutron bomb which, as has been repeatedly stressed here, is a disastrous weapon of mass destruction, highlights the necessity for effective measures in time to prevent any future development of similar weapons of mass destruction. In the discussions in the CCD, experts have given scientifically based examples of areas where the development of new weapons of mass destruction would seem to be possible. We note with satisfaction that as a result of the discussions held so far the necessity for the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction is no longer disputed in principle. That is also made manifest by the fact that some States, which for a long time doubted the necessity for such an agreement, have now submitted a draft resolution on that matter themselves. Also, there is no doubt that the Soviet-American negotiations on the question of prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, particularly of radiological weapons, can be regarded as a step forward.

However, it is regrettable that a number of States disposing of significant economic, scientific and technological potential reject the possibility of a comprehensive all-embracing prohibition, as proposed by the Soviet Union and other countries, although it is a comprehensive all-embracing prohibition that would be most effective.

Nobody can know in detail what actual developments will take place in future which might produce qualitatively new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. To wait for their later prohibition in specific agreements only when they are identified is not in **line** with our concern for a comprehensive and timely end to the arms race in this area.

Experience teaches that it is all the more difficult to prohibit new weapons once they have been developed and huge funds have been spent on them. Consequently, a comprehensive all-embracing agreement of a mainly preventive character alone can solve this problem properly. It is known that we do not deny the possibility of concluding specific agreements when necessary. Hence the present draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.4, indicating the most effective way to end the arms race with new types

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

and systems of mass destruction, in our view best takes into account the need for an effective preventive prohibition. Therefore, we are sure that this draft resolution, just as were relevant resolutions in previous years, will be adopted by an overwhelming majority.

May I assure my colleague from the United Kingdom that we share his views and are ready to co-operate with him and the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.5, to explain our views in more detail with the aim of attaining a common formula on this subject.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): It seems to have been accepted by the consensus of the General Assembly that one of the effective means of promoting peace and security and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It is therefore with the aim of making this positive contribution to the objective of non-proliferation that we in the African region have for some time decided, as expressed by our Heads of State or Government at their very first session in 1964, to proclaim the region of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/32/L.10, which I have the honour to introduce on behalf of the co-sponsors, is an expression of the continued fervent wish of African countries to keep the continent free of nuclear weapons. This unanimous view of Africa, which also has been endorsed by the General Assembly, is being challenged by the activities of that international leper, the apartheid régime in South Africa. While the United Nations is seeking ways and means of attaining the objective of a cessation of the nuclear arms race, South Africa, characteristically, is showing itself again to be out of step with the rest of the international community. South Africa seems determined to defy the entire world.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

I need not recall what a great threat to the peace and security of Africa the South African nuclear ambition poses if not checked early enough, for, like <u>apartheid</u>, which many powerful Members of the United Nations neglected in its initial stages until it became the impregnable bastion of the most obnoxious form of government, the South African nuclear programme may soon present an equally intractable problem if we do not take action to prevent it at this stage.

Last August the report of preparations by South Africa to conduct a nuclear explosion brought home the danger to international peace and security posed by the South African régime. The timely joint intervention of the USSR and the United States of America averted that immediate danger. However, it is necessary to ensure that South Africa does not in future frustrate the effort to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This is a joint responsibility of the membership of the United Nations, an Organization which has many times endorsed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and just as often called on all States to consider and respect Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

In formulating the draft resolution in A/C.1/32/L.10 the co-sponsors therefore had to give great attention to the ever-growing threat that South Africa may detonate a nuclear explosion on the continent and acquire a nuclear-weapon capability. We believe that the most effective means of checking this growing danger is to devise a formalized system of carrying out the effective prevention action which the two super-Powers undertook on their own initiative to stop South Africa from proceeding with its preparations last August. Thus our draft resolution, in operative paragraph 4, calls upon the Security Council to fulfil this role, in keeping with its status as the primary organ charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.

The adoption last week by the Security Council of resolution 418 (1977), which in operative paragraph 14

"Further decides that all States shall refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons", is a welcome development. That operative paragraph is closely linked with

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

the fifth preambular paragraph of that same Council resolution, which expressed grave concern that

"... South Africa is at the threshold of producing nuclear weapons".

Non-co-operation with South Africa at this stage is by itself alone not enough to prevent South Africa from developing nuclear weapons, since we all agree that it is already "at the threshold", that it has, as it were, some native technology to do this. We think that this step should be supplemented, and the best means of doing this is to use the authority and weight of the Security Council further to ensure that South Africa's own capability is not utilized to produce a nuclear weapon. This is the purport of operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.10. It is the only new element in a draft resolution which has in past years been adopted unanimously in the First Committee. It is the belief of my delegation as well as those which are co-sponsors of the draft resolution that the danger posed by South Africa's nuclear-weapon ambition should enabled us to adopt this draft resolution unanimously, in keeping with our unanimous alarm at the course which the apartheid régime in South Africa is pursuing.

Finally, I should like to indicate that the number of sponsors of the draft resolution has now increased to 32 from the original number of 23.

Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I have spent this morning scrutinizing the draft resolutions before the Committee, and there is one which particularly appeals to me. That is draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.13, co-sponsored by Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Romania, S./eden, Tunisia and Venezuela. Its purpose is to educate the public as to what is going on in the field of disarmament.

I believe that we can enhance the effectiveness of this draft resolution by an amendment which I have worked out and which I shall submit for the Committee's consideration.

But before proceeding with my amendment, I should like to tell my colleagues who submitted this draft resolution that it has certain financial implications. Now, I think that financial implications apply to any step which has to be taken by this Committee or others when a request is made for a working group or a Committee to work out something for the benefit of mankind.

I think that the proposed periodical would be very useful, but I believe that we could supplement it with something visual. It deals with what we call freedom of information, freedom of information about wars by the United Nations and, thank God, not freedom of information only by the mass media, which often slant the news, distort it or portray it in such a way as to suit if not themselves, then the groups which they represent or even some nations which may think that war resolves certain problems.

Since the visual aspect has not been neglected intentionally but that those who presented this draft resolution believed that the printed word would suffice, I venture to submit for the Committee's consideration the following amendment, which would come after operative paragraph 1 and become operative paragraph 2.

The amendment reads as follows:

"Recommends that consideration be given to the making of a United Nations film candidly portraying the vast devastation wrought by the last world war and subsequent wars, and also highlighting the human tragedies and untold misery brought about as a consequence of these wars, so that such a United Nations film could be shown in schools and universities and on television all over the world, with the hope of creating a genuine aversion to all wars in the future."

I may be told: There have already been many war films. But the answer to that is that these have been what I would call national war films; they have not been United Nations war films. Furthermore, some of those films were certainly edited to suit the interests of certain nations. A United Nations film, however, will be candid. It will show, for example, how Hiroshima and Nagasaki were wiped out. It will show how Dresden was bombed one night, leaving 35,000 persons dead and the others either maimed or psychological misfits. It will show what happened in Coventry.

It is not my intention to say how the film should be made; I am not a film-maker. The foregoing were merely examples of what the film could show. It could show, also, the defoliation that took place in Viet Nam. It could show what happened during the war in Korea. It could show the suffering caused by the war in the Middle East. It could show the tragedies that have been caused by wars all over the world.

The film will have an educational impact on the young; it will have an effect on their minds. The young will then tell their leaders: Go bang your heads on the wall; we do not want any more wars.

How could anyone have any objection to this amendment? It will make the leaders think, not twice but a thousand times, before they decide to wage wars. It will have an effect on the hierarchies in all countries, whether capitalist communist, monarchist or anything else. The leaders must be made to think about humanism and not merely about their desire to be superior in power, in wealth, in vainglory.

Of course, the kind of periodical suggested in this draft resolution would be very useful, but the number of readers would be limited. People are tired of printed matter these days. Even if the periodical were produced in an expert way so as to highlight the tragedy and misery of war, not too many people would read it. There would be a much broader audience for a film. It is true that a United Nations film of this kind will cost money. Let contributions be made by those countries that produce armaments. Today I heard on the radio that Mr. Brezhnev thinks that relations with the United States are going very well. I do not know whether Mr. Issraelyan has heard this as yet, but I was very heartened to hear it on the radio this morning. If course, Mr. Brezhnev had SALT in mind. But what about pepper and the other ingredients of armaments?

Let the young in every country wake up and band together to prevent war. The kind of film I am proposing could give them the stimulus for that.

Now, I have not said that we should make a film. I have been here long enough to know better than that. Three decades is long enough. I said we should "consider" it. Let us see whether it will be considered. If not, we shall follow it up. I am now sowing the seeds here, at this Assembly session. We can do more than that.

I did not want to refer this matter to the Secretary-General, because the Secretary-General has hardly enough time to scratch his head, and then he will have to form a committee. I am talking to you as representatives of 149 countries. You represent the peoples of the world but for a few enclaves that are still under foreign rule. We may delegate the making of the film in part to UNESCO, because it would be an educational matter. I do not know; I am thinking aloud with you. But I think the idea of having something to jolt people into consciousness that something constructive should be done is not only appropriate but should be decided upon as soon as possible lest by miscalculation we run the risk of having not necessarily a third world war but various conflicts the sum total of which would be like if not perhaps the First World War then the Second World War. I shall not dwell on the First World War, because why should we go back to that? The Second World War and subsequent wars are enough.

The amendment extends also to the title, which should read, "Publication of a disarmament periodical and considering making a United Nations film on war and its consequences". All this is subject to a few alterations here and there to make it intelligible not only to us - I think all members know the purpose of this amendment - but also to those who may read it outside these walls, so that we may impress upon them that we shall not be talking for another 20 years about how to disarm but are bringing the impact of past wars before the public, and first and foremost to schools and colleges, because, after all, the future belongs to the young, not to us, and I mean the young from the ages of 10 or 12, when they begin to discern, up to the age at which they graduate from college.

Nobody will have an axe to grind because it will be a candid United Nations production.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Saudi Arabia for his amendment, which will be circulated as a document. I have no doubt the sponsors will take it into consideration.

I wish to announce the following sponsorships of draft resolutions: A/C.1/32/L.3, Zaire; A/C.1/32/L.6, Zaire and Togo; A/C.1/32/L.9, Togo; A/C.1/32/L.10, Botswana, Madagascar and Egypt; A/C.1/32/L.11, Madagascar and Qatar; A/C.1/32/L.12, Jordan and Madagascar; A/C.1/32/L.13, Jordan.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I am speaking on a very humble procedural point.

Mr. Chairman, through you I should like to address a question to the person concerned. I say "the person concerned" because I do not know what member of the Secretariat should reply on behalf of the United Nations Disarmament Centre.

My question concerns two of the nine working papers, preparation of which was requested of the Centre by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. That happened during the second session of the Preparatory Committee. During its third session, which took place on 31 August and during the first week of September, the Centre distributed most of these working papers, and I already had an opportunity then to express our appreciation of the effective and competent manner in which they had been prepared.

However, three working papers were missing then, and they are still missing. They were promised by the end of September at the latest.

My delegation wishes to refer to two of those three working papers which are of particular interest to us. The first is that dealt with in paragraph 13 (d) of the Preparatory Committee's report, which reads as follows:

"A synthesis of the arguments adduced for and against each of the four proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been included in the General Assembly's agenda (Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific) and for and against the proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, including a subject index and a country index (A/AC.187/70)". (A/32/41, para. 13)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The second of the two documents which, I repeat, are of particular interest to my delegation is the one which appears under the letter (h), and its title is: "A descriptive report on the human and material resources available to the United Nations Secretariat for its work on disarmament and on the organization of that work" (A/AC.187/74).

My delegation would like to know from an authorized spokesman for the United Nations Disarmament Centre for what reasons it has not been possible to distribute these documents. Although I am obviously speaking on behalf of the delegation of Mexico I believe that there is widespread interest in these documents in the light of talks I have had with several other delegations, so that interest is not confined to my delegation but is shared by many others.

Something for which we have found no explanation is why the report entitled "A descriptive report on the human and material resources available to the United Nations Secretariat for its work on disarmament and on the organization of that work" is one of the two missing documents, when it would appear to us that, because of the nature of the item, it should have been the easiest document to prepare of all those requested and perhaps the first to be distributed. We are coming to the close of our debates on disarmament and it was for these debates that we would have wished to have had these documents. Apart from having them in the Preparatory Committee and at the special session, it was during this regular session that these working papers would have been extremely useful for our debates here.

Besides ascertaining the reasons for the delay in publication, my delegation would like to know whether the two documents to which I have referred can be distributed to us in the course of this week.

The CHAIRMAN: The points made by the representative of Mexico have been noted and the Secretariat will give the information he has requested tomorrow morning.

Before calling on delegations who wish to make statements in exercise of the right of reply, I would remind the Committee that under the existing rules such statements are limited to 10 minutes. I call first on the representative of Egypt. Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): When the representative of Israel spoke two days ago he claimed that his country was acting in good faith. He mentioned what he called the Israeli initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the elimination of the arms race in the Middle East. But that very day we had before us an article published in The New York Times entitled, "Mideast arms: Israel's edge seems decisive - superiority so great that arms sanctions might not influence new crisis".

The representative of Israel tried to mislead our Committee by giving certain figures on the arms race in the Middle East and stating that Israel is face to face with the Arab countries. I should like to give here the figures appearing in clear and precise documents on this subject.

First, a United Nations document dated 12 August 1977, distributed under the symbol A/32/88.

Second, a book entitled World Military and Social Expenditures 1977 written by Ruth Sward.

Third, the Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) that appeared in 1977.

Fourth, the study entitled The military balance 1977-1978, published in September last by the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

The following are the facts as confirmed by the statistics: (1) Israel is one of the foremost military countries of the world; (2) Israel's military expenditures in 1976 amounted to \$4.214 billion and are estimated at \$4.268 billion for 1977; (3) Israel's military expenditures amount to 34.8 per cent of its total gross national product, which is the highest rate in the world; (4) the average military expenditure per capita in Israel is the highest in the world; (5) the average rate of military expenditures in Israel is the seventh highest in the world; (6) the number of citizens mobilized in Israel totals 24 per cent of the population as a whole, and in this respect Israel takes second place in the world; (7) in the world arms trade Israel occupies an important place since it produces, inter alia, aircraft, rockets, tanks, engines, patrol boats and even napalm.

Another source of information is the review <u>Commentary</u> published in New York by the American Jewish Committee. In its October edition the following

figures appear: (1) Israel spent \$5 billion to reconstruct its army after 1973, and increased its military arsenal by 60 per cent and its military manpower by 40 per cent; American aid to Israel exceeded \$600 for each man, woman and child and amounted to more than one third of United States military or economic assistance as a whole. Moreover, in the October issue of the review Armed Forces Journal International, a formerly highly placed American belonging to the Defense Department, in an article entitled "The Arab-Israeli Balance: How much is too much?", gave the following facts confirmed by statistics.

He said in an interview rith the Jerusalem Domestic Service that Dayan had stated in March 1977 that Israel possessed tanks numbering one third as many as those possessed by the United States, three times as many as those of Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, and slightly fewer than those of the United Kingdom. Dayan added that Israel must continue to develop the "nuclear option" in addition to conventional weapons, and that there was no other solution for waging war against the Arabs.

Anthony Cordesman adds in his article, "Israel is no longer a small country surrounded on all sides by neighbours with large forces. It is a militarist State whose military potential goes beyond the requirements of defence". He concludes that the aim of Israel is to obtain clear decisions so as to destroy all that surrounds it before the world makes a move or before the two great Powers intervene.

I come now to what has been called by Israel "the war of words" or the accusations of racism levelled when the representative of Egypt was asking himself about Israel's reaction to the Security Council's resolution on the prohibition of the supply of arms to the racist Government of South Africa. The representative of Egypt did not err when he said that Israel, as usual, was going against the will of the international community and refusing to apply United Nations resolutions.

What did Dayan say on 6 November? According to the Reuter news agency he said, in reply to questions from a group of responsible officials of certain American universities:

"Israel's relations with South Africa have always been close, in full view and with the knowledge of everyone, and we shall not break them off simply because they chance not to please others, including President Carter."

In a television interview on Sunday last, the same day that Dayan made his remarks, the Prime Minister of his country, speaking of Israel's relations with South Africa, repeated the same ideas. And after all that the representative of Israel waxes indignant over the fact that his country has been accused of collaborating with the racist régime of South Africa.

In the context of the allegations and falsehoods of the representative of Israel, he says that the Israelis have taken the initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and that the Arabs must react favourably to that appeal.

Does not the representative of Israel know that there are three United Nations resolutions on the subject and that they call on all countries in the region not to seek to possess, acquire or produce nuclear weapons, to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to subject all nuclear activity to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency?

Israel is the only Member of the United Nations which refuses to do so, referring to what it called its initiative while refusing to be bound by any international system or convention. After all this, Israel wants to claim the merits of having taken the initiative. The representative of Israel advisedly forgets the statements made by his country's leaders and the reports that Israel is in possession of the nuclear weapon. Is it not ironical that the Prime Minister of Israel, on 6 November, in a televised interview on "60 Minutes", when asked about the acquisition by Israel of nuclear weapons, should reply by saying that he knew nothing about nuclear weapons, that he was only a lawyer by profession.

Israel's deceit is the best way of judging its real attitude on disarmament. I should like to recall here the method adopted by Israel during the vote on the resolutions of the First Committee at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. It abstained on a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. It supported the resolution on the urgent need to call for a halt to nuclear-weapon tests. As we all know, Israel's nuclear programme is based on computer techniques and that consequently it does not have to engage in nuclear tests at home since it can do so in South Africa thanks to its co-operation with that country's racist régime.

The delegation of Israel abstained from voting on the conclusion of a treaty on a general and complete ban on nuclear tests. Is its position not contradictory? Israel asks the Arab countries to enter into direct negotiations on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East while refusing to accede to a treaty providing for a total ban on nuclear tests.

Israel supports the resolution on Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its representative states that the precedent set by this Treaty in Latin America should be followed in the Middle East but he forgets that in Latin America no country occupies the territory of another country in the region.

The representative of Israel supports the resolution on the implementation of the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference as well as the resolution providing for an in-depth study of denuclearized zones while objecting to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in spite of the fact that the first of these two resolutions invites States to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place nuclear activities under IAEA control, and that the study under the second resolution is aimed at defining the characteristics of each region, which is also provided for in the resolution on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Moreover, Israel abstains on the resolution banning the production and development of new weapons. There is a clear explanation for this since Israel produces and sells weapons. Israel's supports the resolution calling for a reduction of military budgets, and its representative gives us baseless figures from unknown sources. Israel's abstains on the resolutions concerning vertical proliferation, the security of non-nuclear States, the role of the IAFA and the application of its safeguards system, and the implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. After all this, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee mentions a letter from Israel indicating its interest in the question. No comment is needed.

The representative of Egypt was right in saying, in his statement of 4 November, that the representative of Israel should have known that he was speaking to intelligent representatives who think, read and analyse.

Finally the representative of Israel defends his country against the charge that it had seized a quantity of uranium being shipped to another country. He does so by casting doubt as to the integrity of the magazine Rolling Stone and its editors. I have before me the 3 November issue of this magazine which contains the text of an interview with the Prime Minister of Israel. Do the representative of Israel and his Prime Minister still believe that this is a James Bond-type magazine and that its journalistic level leaves something to be desired?

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Israel in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. EILAN (Israel): I do not believe in the maxim more applicable, perhaps, to student debates than to a body such as ours, that whoever has the last word can be said, so to speak, to have won the debate.

The time of this Committee has already been wasted by the injection on the part of some Arab States of the Middle East dispute into our present debate. I have no intention of prolonging a futile debate, but wish to say that the delegation of Israel will find an appropriate opportunity to rebut the totally misleading and inaccurate statement just made by the representative of Egypt including an incomplete and taken-out-of context quotation of a statement made by the Foreign Minister of Israel.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting of the Committee, I would like to indicate that so far 13 draft resolutions have been submitted to the Committee. Until now only draft resolutions A/C.1/32/L.4, L.5, L.6, L.8, L.9 and L.10, have been formally introduced in the Committee. Due to the limited number of meetings which remain for consideration of the draft resolutions, I would like to urge those sponsors of the draft resolutions which have not yet been formally introduced in the Committee to do so without further delay and to let the Secretariat know when they propose to do so. I would also appeal to those delegations which are thinking of submitting draft resolutions to do so as soon as possible, in order to give all delegations enough time to study them and to obtain instructions, if required, from the appropriate authorities.

I plan to put to the vote two draft resolutions, namely A/C.1/32/L.6 and A/C.1/32/L.9, tomorrow, Thursday.

(The Chairman)

I would request the sponsors of those draft resolutions that have already been submitted to indicate that they are now ready so that those draft resolutions may be put to the vote tomorrow.

It may be recalled that the Committee decided to set the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions at 12 noon on 9 November. We have been approached by a number of delegations that have indicated that they would need some time to submit draft resolutions to the Committee. In view of this, I suggest that the Committee decide to extend the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions to Friday, 11 November, at noon. I would urge delegations to adhere to this new time-limit and not to request further extensions. Delegations are aware of the fact that disarmament items are highly complex and sensitive, and any draft resolution introduced without giving adequate time for members to consider and consult would be unfair.

I should like to announce that Bangladesh has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/32/L.9 and L.11 and that Somalia has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/32/L.10.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.