

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 21 February 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI

(Poland)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD-ROUIS

Mr. A. TAFEAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.O. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. K. FRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. J.A. BEESLEY

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG

Ms. WANG SHIYUN

Mr. LIANG DEFENG

Mr. LIN CHENG

Mr. LU MINGLIANG

Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA

Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. I. HASSAN

Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Ms. K. SINEGIORGIS

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. G. MONTASSIER

Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. F. SAYATZ

Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S.K. SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Ms. P. RAMADHAN

Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO

Mr. ANDRADJATI

Ms. R. TANZIL

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. G.A. BRACESI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:Mexico:

Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R.J. AKKERMANN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Mr. J. RYCHLAK
Mr. A. KARKOSZKA

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS
Mr. L.E. WINGREN
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. T.F. DMITRITCHEV
Mr. Y. KOSTENKO
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH
Mr. G. ANTSIFEROV
Mr. G. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mr. R. JAMES
Mr. J.F. GORDON
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. N. CLYNE
Mr. H. CALHOUN
Mr. N. CARERRA
Mr. P. CORDEN
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBURGER
Mr. R. NORMAN
Mr. J. HOGAN
Mr. L. MADSEN
Mr. R. WATERS
Mr. J. DOESBURG

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. MIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA-RABEYA

Secretary General of the Conference on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference starts today its consideration of item 1 on its agenda, entitled "Nuclear Test Ban". However, in accordance with Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Algeria, Burma, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Cuba.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ould-Rouis.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first the pleasure of congratulating you, on behalf of the Algerian delegation, on your accession to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, and also to assure you of our full co-operation in fulfilling your duties.

We would like also to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Morelli Pando of Peru, for the manner in which he guided our work in August last and the patience he showed in the consultations during the period between sessions.

I should like also to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament and express our readiness to co-operate with them in pursuing our common objective.

The Conference on Disarmament begins this session in an international climate full of uncertainty. The state of the world at this beginning of 1984 shows the symptoms of a threatened rupture, with its incalculable consequences, unless there is a healthy restabilization in the international community. A grave, world-wide crisis is weakening the whole fabric of international relations. The tension in East-West relations, the deepening of the gap between North and South which results in an ever more critical situation for most of the developing countries, and the persistence of the seeds of tension in many regions of the Third World are signs which reveal the depth of the crisis in every sphere of international life.

It is even more serious to note that this confrontation, expressed more and more in East-West military rivalry, is quickened by the revival in the arms race, bringing with it a dizzy rise in military expenditure at a time when whole regions of the Third World are afflicted by the pangs of hunger.

As for multilateral negotiations, these are blocked in every field. Confrontation has carried the day against dialogue and co-operation and become the dominant feature of international relations. The sphere of disarmament has unfortunately not escaped the general rule.

Inevitably this tension affects the non-aligned countries even though they have deliberately stood aside from the military blocs. In times of crisis the major Powers tend to look upon the Third World as an arena for their conflicts, and to compete in seeking strategic advantage in that part of the world.

The example of the situation in the Mediterranean is significant, and here I may refer to my country's anxious concern for the situation in that region. The Mediterranean has become a favourite area for the deployment of forces and a point of convergence for the predominant tensions of our time. Foreign navies cruise about

(Mr. Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

its waters; its coasts are bristling with bases and used as staging points for manoeuvres by foreign forces, with a frequency and on a scale that cause the greatest concern. Still worse, nuclear weapons have been deployed on a Mediterranean island. This situation goes against our legitimate ambition to make the region a zone of peace, security and co-operation.

My country has never failed to stress the interdependence of security in Europe and in the Mediterranean. We have urged this principle, the taking into account of the security needs of the States on the southern coast of the Mediterranean in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, at Madrid and again at Stockholm, and we hope to obtain satisfaction.

Since the last session of this body, various negative factors have become apparent which still further complicate the task of disarmament. Last year, 1983, which we all regarded as crucial, decisive for disarmament, came to its end under signs of ill omen. Nuclear weapons gained more ground still, with the deployment of new missiles in western Europe. The announcement of countermeasures such as the installation of nuclear weapons in some of the eastern European countries confirms the tendency to extend the spatial dimension of the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The nuclear partitioning of the planet goes on, with the deployment of nuclear weapons further and further from the frontiers of the nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, the bilateral negotiations on "START" and "INF" which despite their obvious limitations were welcomed with satisfaction are now interrupted.

Those are the factors which have raised tension in international relations a notch higher.

The amplitude of the present crisis shows the bankruptcy of the process of détente. Conceived in a purely bi-polar perspective, leaving out of account three quarters of mankind in the consideration of security, such a system, reducing security of the world to that of a mere region, bore within itself the seeds of the present crisis, for while it may be true that a solution to the specific problems of Europe is one of the prime conditions of an improvement in the international situation, it is also undeniable that security is indivisible.

This shows how urgent and essential it is to set up an authentic system of security based on the principle of equal security for all States.

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence which allows a small group of States to hold the rest of mankind hostage must therefore be denounced. While it is legitimate for a State or group of States to ensure its own security, it is unacceptable that this should be at the expense of the security of other States. International peace and security cannot be ensured by the accumulation of nuclear weapons. Only a system of collective security based on a pluri-dimensional approach that assumes responsibility for the solution of the major problems confronting the international community is capable of ensuring lasting international peace and security.

Disarmament, and above all nuclear disarmament, is one of the conditions for the establishment of such a system. Unfortunately we cannot but observe that the process of negotiation in this area is in a total impasse, and the future outlook does not seem promising.

A look back over the five years of the existence of the Committee on Disarmament shows merely a total absence of any results. No objective set for it by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has been achieved. The failure in the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament within

(Mr. Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

the prescribed time-schedule is glaring. Nuclear questions, of the highest priority, have not been the subject of any negotiations. Work on negative security assurances and on radiological weapons is still at a standstill. Gains in the field of chemical weapons are likely to be compromised if the questions still pending are not settled within a reasonable time.

This immobility contrasts with the international community's pressing calls for disarmament. The more and more acutely perceived danger of nuclear war has brought that objective to the front rank on the international scene. The number of resolutions concerning disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at every one of its sessions is edifying. The specialized agencies of the United Nations likewise bring their appreciable contribution to the mobilization for disarmament. The movement of non-aligned countries calls continually on the major Powers to bring to an end this frenetic nuclear arms race which threatens the very existence of mankind. The danger of nuclear war has generated a formidable mobilization of international public opinion, transcending national frontiers and ideological barriers.

It is, then, difficult to understand the resignation and passivity in facing this situation. How can it be explained that the major Powers, which have a responsibility in the present crisis, remain passive and follow a "wait and see" policy, in view of this aggravation of the situation?

Following upon these general comments, which reflect our constant concern at the continuing deterioration of the international environment, I should like briefly to refer to some items on the conference agenda.

I should like first to express our satisfaction upon the fact that consensus has been reached on the question of the inclusion of the prevention of nuclear war as a separate item in our agenda, which should make possible its adoption within a reasonable period.

It is beyond question that in fulfilling its mandate the Conference should give absolute priority to nuclear questions: abandonment of nuclear weapon-testing, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war. All this follows clearly from the Final Document from the General Assembly's first session on disarmament, the validity of which was confirmed at the second special session. The General Assembly's resolutions point in the same direction.

In our view the time is past for academic discussions on these questions; they should be the subject of an examination calculated to lead to concrete decisions and effective disarmament measures. Negotiation is more than ever a need of the moment, not only because these are questions of undoubted importance and urgency but also because the interruption of the USSR-United States of America dialogue increases still further the Conference's responsibility in this field.

The multilateral approach would make it possible to take up the problem of nuclear weapons as a global question, allowing all member States of the Conference the opportunity to participate on an equal footing in negotiations which concern security. This approach should also diminish the consequences of any ups and downs in the relations of the major Powers on the process of negotiation. Lastly, the presence of the five nuclear-weapon Powers constitutes a further advantage for these negotiations.

(Mr. Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

This amounts to saying that the objective conditions for the launching of a negotiating process on nuclear weapons are to be found within the Conference, if only the States which were opposed to it are willing to show some sign of political goodwill. There are certainly very deep differences on the matter, but is not that itself one of the arguments for negotiation? These divergencies should not prevent the Conference from setting up subsidiary bodies with appropriate terms of reference to negotiate disarmament measures.

Our insistence on the need to broaden the terms of reference of the subsidiary body on the nuclear-weapon-test ban is based on this conviction. It is obvious that the existing terms of reference in no way conform to paragraph 51 of the Final Document.

If some delegations consider that the verification problems have not yet been resolved, such questions should be resolved within the framework of the negotiations themselves and in relation to the other provisions of the Convention.

Similarly, we hope that the impasse which prevented the Committee on Disarmament from setting up a working group to follow up paragraph 50, on nuclear disarmament, of the Final Document will be resolved at this session.

Another item which calls for our full attention at this stage of our work is the prevention of nuclear war. The broad consensus which emerged on the urgency and extreme importance of this task should be reflected in the establishment of a subsidiary body to negotiate practical measures with a view to avoiding nuclear war.

The profile of an extension of the armaments race to outer space is becoming more and more threateningly clear. The preliminary signs of such a danger are multiplying to the point where every exploit achieved by man in the conquest of space meets with as much concern about the possibility of military use of its results as admiration for human genius. This is an area to which the Conference should give serious consideration. In our view, the process which led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 38/70 was a positive step which holds out the promise of a possible consensus on the setting up of a subsidiary body to negotiate measures to prevent the extension of military rivalries to outer space.

With regard to chemical weapons, we observe some real willingness to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of this category of weapons of mass destruction. Progress in this area has in fact been measurable. Technical questions of a highly controversial character have been solved. The standpoints of delegations have been clearly defined, points of convergence identified and points of divergence likewise. The report of the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on its 1983 session should serve as a basis for tackling a more concrete phase in the process of negotiation, to preserve what has been gained in the preceding sessions and to solve the questions pending on the basis of concrete proposals.

(Mr. Coud-Rouis, Algeria)

It remains for us to hope that the readiness observed in the negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons shall equally emerge on other questions, and in particular on the nuclear problems.

On examining the remaining items in the agenda, we note with regret that the negotiation on so-called negative security assurances is completely held up through the refusal of certain nuclear-weapon Powers to take into consideration the legitimate security considerations of non-nuclear-weapon States, a finding which lays bare the wish of these Powers to reduce the Third World to a mere equation in their strategies.

This refusal to accept responsibility for the legitimate interests of the Third World States reappears in certain aspects of the negotiation on the prohibition of radiological weapons, where the major Powers seek to impose on the Third World still further restrictions on their access to nuclear technology.

This wish to keep the non-nuclear-weapon States outside the process of disarmament negotiations is indeed in part the cause of the failure of all attempts to develop a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In conclusion, I would like to express our uneasiness in seeing the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body becoming gradually a deliberative body, an unacceptable transformation of its true function.

The task of the Conference on Disarmament is to negotiate effective disarmament agreements. This task is perfectly feasible. The arms race, and especially the nuclear-arms race, is not a matter of destiny. It can be stopped and reversed, provided only the major Powers show their political readiness.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Burma, Ambassador Maung Maung Gyi.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. President, As we proceed with the work of the new session for this year, it gives me particular pleasure to express our felicitations to you as the first President of the Conference. We know from past experience that it has not always been an easy task to deal expeditiously with the programme of work and the agenda, and it is encouraging to see that the Conference has made a propitious start by resolving these important procedural issues under your able guidance.

My delegation would like to associate itself with other delegations in welcoming the distinguished representatives of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. We look forward to hearing from them new ideas and approaches that will provide a fresh stimulus to our work and we wish to express our hope to continue our co-operation with their delegations in the traditionally friendly spirit prevailing in this Conference.

This Conference has most auspiciously begun its work for the year 1984 with the enhancement of its status as a Conference on Disarmament. While we will continue to deal with the same issues that have defied solution during the past five years, this change of title should give some psychological impetus to its members so that the work done by the Conference will be in keeping with its new title. The preoccupation of this Conference is to deal succinctly with the items on its agenda. However, it does not operate in an environmental vacuum and we cannot ignore the fact that progress in disarmament negotiations is synonymous with the political will of States, and for all practical purposes the military significant States, and particularly the two Great Powers on whom lies the shared responsibility to avert the threat of a global nuclear catastrophe. The history of disarmament negotiations has shown that political will has not always been a constant factor and is subject to the vagaries of the international political climate in which the state of relations between the two Great Powers is a predominant factor. The disturbing phenomenon we now face is that there has been a marked deterioration of the political climate to the detriment of international peace and security, and also disarmament. The immutable principles of the interrelationship between disarmament, international security and a propitious international climate have been enunciated in the Final Document which, having the unanimous endorsement of the world community during the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and which exists as a scripture for disarmament, emphasized that disarmament, relaxation of tension and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other and that progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them, and failure in one sphere has a negative effect on the other.

This principle, embodied in the Final Document, is most relevant to the current political situation as we witness the aggravation of political tension having the effect of fuelling the arms race and the latter in turn contributing to a politically tense situation. The mere existence of nuclear weapons and their continued accumulation are a source of political tension. Paragraph 48 of the Final Document states that: "In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility." It is also implicit that the most significant nuclear-weapon States create a favourable international climate conducive to disarmament. The categorical acceptance of this special responsibility is indicated in the Agreement on Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the USSR signed on 19 May 1972 which states that:

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

"The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit."

The international community has been dealing with the problem of reversing the danger of a nuclear catastrophe since the dawn of the nuclear age when the first nuclear bomb was exploded. Immediately after the United Nations came into existence, after the signing of the Charter, the first session of the General Assembly met in London on 24 January 1946 and its resolution No. 1 (1), which was adopted unanimously, called for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction." When the General Assembly passed its first resolution there were believed to be three nuclear weapons. At present, the United States and the USSR have, between them, accumulated a stupendous number of over 40,000 nuclear warheads. The number of resolutions passed by the General Assembly, which amount to 62, at the thirty-eighth session clearly indicates the serious concern that the international community feels on this grave situation. The growing number of resolutions passed from year to year by the United Nations General Assembly is also a reflection of the increasing complexities of nuclear disarmament. However, the proliferation of resolutions has not been able to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the latter in numerical terms is far outpacing the former.

Negotiations on intermediate-range missiles reached a critical phase towards the end of last year. Had the negotiations been successful, it could not only have made it possible to halt and reverse the arms race in Europe but also have paved the way to stultify the strategic dimensions of the nuclear-arms race. The situation in Europe is not only a matter of concern for the European region but should be the concern of all States, for the threat of nuclear war cannot be seen in a limited context in one region or in one part of the world. Perceptions of such a threat must be seen from the larger context of international security.

During the past year, on 19 February, the Committee was honoured by the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General and we have gained much from the wisdom of his statement. It is perhaps important to recall the following passage in which he said that:

"1983 will be a critical, indeed a crucial year for disarmament and therefore for the future of all of us. Governments must arrive at a more complete understanding of what true security entails. They must realize that there is no such thing as national security in isolation, one that does not take into account the security of others."

Well, a year has passed since then and we all know how critical that year has been for it will go down in history as one of the important milestones of lost opportunities for disarmament and which has precipitated another round of a nuclear arms race in intermediate-range missiles, the impact of such a race being felt also in the strategic aspects of nuclear armaments.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

There is no greater task entrusted to this Conference than the issue of dealing with the threat that nuclear weapons pose for the survival of mankind. Despite this fact, due to lack of consensus on the establishment of an appropriate institutional format, it has not been possible to deal resolutely with this item since it was inscribed on the agenda over five years ago. Meanwhile, we have witnessed further deployment of new weapons systems and new doctrines are being expounded which continue to have a diminishing effect on the security of States and which is also making our task of disarmament more difficult to achieve. There was a time when it was expedient to make assertions that nuclear disarmament negotiations were sensitive issues touching upon the security of States and that it was not propitious to deal with the matter in this multilateral forum, and that such negotiations were the responsibility of those directly concerned. In our view, the rationale for such reasoning has never existed and the basis on which such contentions were advanced no longer exists in the context of the current situation. My delegation wishes to reiterate its position that this issue should be dealt with in a multilateral context which would take into account the security perceptions of States from an international perspective. At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly in its resolution entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" has called upon this Conference to proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to establish for this purpose a working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. It is incumbent upon this Conference to initiate work on nuclear disarmament by conducting an in-depth exploration and elaboration of the principles mentioned in paragraph 50 of the Final Document in an appropriate working group.

The inclusion of the item dealing with the prevention of nuclear war on the agenda last year has brought into sharper focus what delegations or groups of delegations perceive as measures necessary for the prevention of nuclear war. There is now a Working Paper of a group of socialist States, a Working Paper presented by the Federal Republic of Germany and a Working Paper by Belgium. Of course, it would not be possible for this Conference to give equal consideration to the numerous measures suggested; a selective approach is necessary so that it would be possible to deal specifically with the more urgent issues relating to the prevention of nuclear war. At the same time, it was noted that delegations have stated that not all of their proposals would be suitable material, and this flexibility of approach is encouraging.

My delegation feels that measures concerning international peace and security of a general character have their importance in the relevant spheres of international activity and in appropriate forums of the United Nations, and suitable subject matter that deals more specifically with the prevention of nuclear war should be given priority attention. Nuclear weapons have a life of their own in international relations. The world has witnessed a situation where

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

nuclear weapons have precipitated a political crisis, and direct recourse to the use of nuclear weapons was contemplated. It is such situations, as well as the possibility of nuclear wars or conflicts due to miscalculation, accident or failure of communication, that should be prevented.

The maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations was founded upon the principles of peace through the concept of law. If nuclear war is to be prevented through the strengthening of international peace and security under the principles of the United Nations Charter, the introduction of the regime of law relating to the use of nuclear weapons comes into sharper focus.

If this Conference is to proceed with its work on a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, we should begin with consideration of the review of the mandate of the Working Group. Last year, my delegation joined other delegations who constitute an overwhelming majority in voicing our opinion on the need to conduct further work on a nuclear test ban in a working group with a broader mandate. Despite the fact that the majority of delegations expressed their dissatisfaction with the mandate, it was possible to continue discussions last year on the basis of the Chairman's statement. At the same time, delegations requested last year that the Chairman of the Working Group should also hold informal consultations with a view to enhancing the Working Group's mandate. The Chairman of the Working Group, in presenting the report on 23 August last year, stated that:

"An overwhelming majority of delegations held that the Working Group has fulfilled its mandate and it should therefore be changed in order to enable the Working Group to proceed without delay to negotiations on a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In this connection, the view was expressed that the Committee should take up this matter at the beginning of its 1984 session."

It is on the basis of what was expressed by the Chairman of the Working Group that this Conference should proceed its work. My delegation has joined other delegations in expressing our reasons for the need to enhance the negotiating element and the undesirability of circumscribing its mandate to the issue of verification. We believe that both these aspects should be taken into consideration when a review is made on the mandate.

The arms race in outer space has a new dimension and unless timely and appropriate steps are taken by the Powers concerned to prevent such a race, it could well act as a catalyst that would have disastrous consequences on Earth itself. The technical possibility of emplacing a vast array of weaponry in outer space has frequently been the subject of currently available literature.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

Anti-satellite weapons are the fore-runners of space-age weapons, for they are now said to have operational capabilities, and assertions have been made in this Committee last year that such weapons are being emplaced in outer space. The arms race in outer space is said to be on the verge of taking place but the militarization of outer space by the use of satellites as eyes and ears to increase the fighting efficiency of the military forces of the two Superpowers is an accomplished fact. An arms race in anti-satellite weapons could, therefore, have a destabilizing effect on the strategic weapons systems which, consequently, would increase the hazards of a nuclear war.

It would be reasonably safe to say in the context of the existing situation, and as the title of the subject seems to suggest, that what we are dealing with is the non-armament of outer space. Without too much of an over-simplification of this extremely complex issue, it could be said that we are dealing with a situation that has not taken place as yet, and from the practical point of view the act of preventing an event from happening would prove to be less intractable than trying to rectify a situation which is already an accomplished fact; and this would be particularly true of disarmament, where security considerations are of a highly sensitive nature. At the same time, we cannot ignore trends regarding research and development of anti-ballistic missiles which could nullify efforts to prevent outer space from becoming a new arena for the strategic arms race. Technological developments have a momentum of their own that creates a forward drive for the deployment of weapons once they become technically feasible. Thus would begin the unilateral initiation of the arms race which in time enters into its bilateral stage. In seeking measures to prevent the arms race in outer space, the observance of existing legal principles is also important and the practical necessity of such a requirement is particularly relevant to prevent weapons of more destabilizing types from becoming operational.

During last year's discussions in the Committee, delegations that consider the banning of anti-satellite weapons as a priority issue stated that they were also prepared to consider other questions as well. At the same time, other delegations that were in favour of dealing more comprehensively with this issue also expressed that they were not averse to the consideration of questions relating to the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons. The two approaches seem to be mutually compatible. This compatibility of approach has found expression in resolution 38/70, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, at its thirty-eighth session, which has given a specific mandate to this Conference for the establishment of a working group with a view to undertaking negotiations

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

for an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on the agenda for two years and it is now necessary for this Conference to move from discussion of generalities to more specific areas of work.

As my statement is of a general character it would hardly appear necessary to express our opinion on the subject of chemical-weapons prohibition, which has already reached an advanced stage of negotiations. However, it would be an omission on our part not to mention a subject which is important not only because it concerns the elimination of a particular type of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenal of States, but also because the prospects for an agreement are beginning to emerge. Although discussions have been proceeding since 1970, detailed work during the last two years have highlighted the areas of convergence as well as those of divergence, and the principal elements necessary for a chemical weapons convention have also been delineated. The principle of the need for an effective verification system to assure compliance is not an issue. The issue is to determine the modalities for an effective verification system on the basis of mutual accommodation which would provide equal security for all States.

There is now a need to generate further momentum in the negotiating process with a view to arriving at a timely agreement on a chemical weapons convention. The process of disarmament is slow and arduous and experience has shown that it takes years to arrive at a mature stage of negotiations; this has been particularly true of chemical weapons.

Disarmament proposals have a life cycle of their own. Those on which negotiations were made but agreements could not be concluded at an opportune moment are either consigned to the limbo of lost disarmament proposals, never to emerge again, or are reincarnated as new proposals, some of them to be discussed and defined but not to be negotiated. Opportunities for disarmament agreements are few and far between, and when such opportunities present themselves every effort should be made so that they will not be missed.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Burma for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas.

Mr. VIDAS (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, I would, first of all, like to express the satisfaction of my delegation at being able to greet you, the representative of friendly Poland, as President of the Conference for the month of February and to wish you success in the carrying out of your duties. I am convinced that the Conference, under your experienced guidance, will make progress in its endeavours. We also owe our gratitude to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Morelli Pando of Peru, for his indefatigable efforts at the end of the work of last year's session of the Committee. Our appreciation also goes to the members of the Secretariat and particularly to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal.

It is also a great pleasure for me to welcome the new Heads of delegation who have joined us this year. We look forward to close co-operation with the distinguished Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

We begin the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament without the Committee having achieved any results in the past five years.

Since it was established in its present form, after the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, the Committee on Disarmament, despite the efforts undertaken by most of its members, was prevented from achieving concrete results and was unable to make a significant breakthrough in the ongoing negotiations. At the same time, the impressive number of resolutions on disarmament adopted at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly represents the expression of continuous efforts of all member States to initiate the process of disarmament, and also reflects their concern over the existing deadlock in negotiations and over the continuation of the arms race. The Conference would certainly commit an error if it failed to take these facts seriously into account.

Very little time has elapsed since the conclusion of last year's session. The international circumstances in which the Conference is to work are no longer the same: in the meantime they have considerably deteriorated, which will render the work of the Conference much more complex. The most recent unfavourable trends in international relations have taken on a concrete expression in a general increase in armament, bloc rivalry through the acceleration of the missile arms race, particularly on European soil, as well as the use of force, military interventions and various types of political and economic pressures which burden these relations on a lasting basis. The most recent accelerations of the arms race increase global insecurity throughout the world, including for its main protagonists, and also increase mutual distrust. This once again confirms the repeatedly issued warning that more arms does not mean more security. The consequences of such developments are manifold, including a further widening of inequality between the big and the small, the developed and the under-developed, and the wasting of human and material resources which are geared towards destruction instead of the overcoming of backwardness, disease and famine and for development, which is so badly needed by the developing world.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

At the end of the last session in July 1983, in the statement before the Committee by the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lazar Mojsov, Yugoslavia once again expressed its views on the fundamental issues of disarmament and reiterated its concern over the present state of affairs. Yugoslavia, as a non-aligned country, has always emphasized that if the Committee is to fulfill its role of single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the principal pre-condition is the restoration of confidence in negotiations and a political will to arrive at concrete disarmament agreements.

In this connection, we consider it indispensable that the interrupted or suspended negotiations in the area of disarmament in Europe should be renewed as soon as possible; the lack of confidence and mutual accusations between the East and West should be replaced by broad co-operation and the already initiated process of converting the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation should be encouraged and enhanced. This is why we welcome the decision on the resumption of the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The convening of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe constitutes a new effort on the part of the European States, the United States and Canada, through reinforcing confidence, security and disarmament, to implement the objective contained in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Conference that States refrain from the threat of and use of force in their mutual relations.

In keeping with the aspirations of their peoples and in the spirit of the Madrid Conference, the Balkan countries have commenced a series of meetings of their experts aimed at examining numerous issues of vital importance for relations among the Balkan countries, including that of the setting up of a nuclear weapon-free zone.

The Conference on Disarmament, in its tasks, complements the efforts exerted in various regions and in various negotiating fora to strengthen security, peace and disarmament. Although the Conference has an independent role, it has the clear responsibility and duty to contribute by its results to the successful conducting of the over-all process of negotiations in the field of disarmament.

Can the Conference accomplish this? We think it can, but in order to do this it is necessary to meet one of the fundamental conditions, namely, to initiate genuine negotiations, and proceed from debate to the elaboration of concrete agreements. The Conference has already noted some areas in which such progress could be possible.

On the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament are some of the most important disarmament issues, especially nuclear ones, on whose solution depend peace and security in the world and, in the final analysis, its survival. The key issue among them is the prevention of nuclear war, of which the Secretary-General of the United Nations has rightfully said in his message to the 1984 session of the Conference that it is "the unique challenge of our time since such war would be the ultimate negation of all human endeavour". The General Assembly noted with concern that the Committee on Disarmament at its 1983 session was not able to start negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It expressed its conviction that the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority and of vital interest to all peoples of the world. This question was the subject of careful consideration by the majority of

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

delegations at last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. Proposals on undertaking, within the framework of a working group of the Committee, negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war were submitted by the Group of 21 (CD/341) and on conducting negotiations for the elaboration of concrete steps in this field by a group of socialist countries (CD/355). Some delegations belonging to the Western group of countries submitted Working Paper CD/411 listing indicative items to be considered in order to identify possible practical and appropriate, negotiable measures for the prevention of nuclear war and armed conflict in general. It seems to us that all these proposals represent a solid basis for the commencement of a serious consideration of this item. We must reach an agreement on the best way to approach this task, according to each of the above mentioned proposals the attention it deserves. The most efficient manner in which to carry out this task, in keeping with the fundamental role of this Conference, is by creating a special subsidiary body. This subsidiary body should work out such a programme of work that would take into account all of these proposals. The programme of work would not be an end in itself but should clearly give rise to concrete proposals on the further consideration of the rather voluminous subject matter which must be encompassed within the issue of prevention of nuclear war. Such work is indispensable, since one cannot ignore the existence of certain agreements in this area, such as, for example, the "hot line" agreement, "accident measures" agreement and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, concluded between the United States and the USSR as well as of similar agreements existing with some other nuclear-weapon States. It is certain that such an important task as the elaboration of practical measures and agreements on prevention of nuclear war cannot be carried out overnight, and that there is more than one measure which must constitute an entire set of such agreements. Therefore, it is high time immediately to initiate this work within a subsidiary body whose programme of work ought to be as structured as possible.

An indispensable part of prevention of nuclear war is also the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and, within this framework, the specific issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Both of these issues occupy a place of the highest disarmament priority at the United Nations and for the international community. The question of cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament has so far been considered at the Conference only in an academic manner, through informal debate, while the issue of the nuclear-test ban has so far been considered within the existing working group only with regard to verification. Both of these issues must be considered most urgently and with the utmost seriousness in the subsidiary bodies. The creation of a subsidiary body on the prevention of nuclear war may also contribute to the consideration of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. Now, when there is, unfortunately a suspension of the negotiations within the bilateral framework between the United States and the USSR on intermediate range and strategic nuclear weapons -- the necessity for this issue to be considered within the Conference on Disarmament becomes even more urgent. As concerns the nuclear-test ban, we think that the consideration of other significant issues within the subsidiary body should be initiated as soon as possible, especially the proposals submitted in 1983 by the delegation of the USSR in document CD/346 entitled "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests", and by Sweden in document CD/381 entitled "Draft Treaty Banning any Nuclear Weapon Test Explosion in Any Environment".

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

In connection with the above mentioned, it should be recalled that the issue of cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament as well as the questions of nuclear non-proliferation will again be addressed together next year at the Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Review Conference will once again consider the balance of obligations between the commitment by the non-nuclear-weapon States not to possess nuclear weapons and the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to pursue the negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament. This Conference will be doomed to failure and the basic credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty further weakened if the delicately established balance of obligations stemming from the Treaty continues not to be fulfilled by nuclear-weapon States both in the sphere of nuclear disarmament as well as concerning the benefits for the non-nuclear-weapon States of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space has acquired particular urgency at this moment. Some of the latest military developments in relation to outer space make this an issue whose consideration at the Conference on Disarmament should not be delayed any longer. The concern expressed in the Committee on Disarmament and in other international fora that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race has been voiced also by the General Assembly. The Conference on Disarmament has been requested by the General Assembly to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and to intensify its consideration of this question in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals. It also requested the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group at the beginning of its 1984 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. The basis for such an undertaking is contained in various proposals which were submitted to the Contact Group established last year by the Group of 21 (CD/329), a group of socialist States (CD/272) and a group of Western countries (CD/413). We consider that the first task of the subsidiary body, which should be created without delay, should be immediately to consider all of the above-mentioned proposals in order to draw up the necessary recommendations on how best to fulfill the task given it by the United Nations General Assembly.

The highest hopes exist in this Conference and outside it in the world regarding the completion in the course of this year of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. There is a sound basis for this, since, after many years of elaboration, definite progress has been made in the process of negotiations to this effect. A detailed consideration of technical issues has already taken place in the Committee on Disarmament, and the bodies that preceded it and bilaterally between the Soviet Union and the United States. Important contributions have been made in respect of the destruction of the existing chemical-weapon stockpiles by several countries such as the Netherlands, Indonesia, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States through the information supplied or in workshops specifically organized for the purpose of demonstrating the verification process during the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles. An enormous amount of effort and goodwill has been invested by a great number of experts and by various delegations to the Conference. We also welcome the announcement made by the United States that it will submit to the Conference its own draft of a chemical weapons convention very soon. We are sure that this new contribution will receive very careful consideration alongside with other proposals

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

submitted to this negotiating forum. Although there are still some issues which need to be further elaborated, we consider that 1984 is the crucial year in which a determined effort should be made to resolve outstanding political issues. If we were to fail this year in initiating the long-awaited drafting process on those elements on which agreement does exist, this would then signify a further, very grave erosion of confidence in the importance of this negotiating forum. And on the contrary, if we are capable of submitting in our report to the United Nations General Assembly the first draft of an even incomplete text of the convention, whose final drafting would continue, this would be, after five years, the first more specific example of accord on a very important agreement in the area of disarmament. Such a development would certainly also have a broader beneficial impact.

We should not permit another repetition of the situation of a complete blockade of the Committee's work which we had at the beginning of last year. Similarly, we must not allow that the beginning of each session be transformed into a procedural battle in which fundamental issues such as the agenda and the resumption of the work of the subsidiary bodies of the Conference have every time to be settled anew. This procedure, for which there is no justification either in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament or in the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, can be abused to serve as a political instrument which delays or slows down the work of the negotiating body, since it calls into question the continuity of its nature. Paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament states that "The General Assembly is deeply aware of the continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus". I would like to emphasize that the Conference on Disarmament, as a negotiating forum, must work on a continual basis. Year after year there seems to be a tendency to impose the view that with the conclusion of the work of the Conference for one year, it is necessary again to reach new decisions on all matters. In this way, we ourselves also contribute to the procedural and not the negotiating character of the Conference on Disarmament. It seems that the long, exhausting battles that we have had in the past with regard to the working out of the mandate of particular working groups, have become an end in themselves. The question of the mandate of the Committee on Disarmament, and now of the Conference on Disarmament, has been settled in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in the rules of procedure. They stipulate very clearly that "The Committee on Disarmament is a disarmament negotiating forum" and that it will "conduct its work by consensus". This says it all, especially the taking of decisions by consensus. One should ask whether the mandate of a working group formulated in any possible way, which contains or does not contain the word "negotiations" can mean coercion to any delegation to agree with any proposal if it is not the result of a shorter or longer process which is called negotiation and which also contains a clarification of the terms and a detailed consideration of both technical and political issues, the scope of prohibition and verification, etc. -- that is, if it has not been adopted on the basis of a sovereign decision of each individual State. We ought to be much more rational in terms of how this negotiating forum should best be put to use and carry out the fundamental task for

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

which it was created without losing much time. This also refers to the participation of countries not members of the Conference in its work. In our view, once a decision has been made for a particular country to participate in the work of the Conference in its plenary meetings, or those of its subsidiary bodies, it should be automatically renewed for each subsequent year, unless the State itself announces its wish to discontinue its work.

Last year we created a special contact group which has prepared its first report on certain issues concerning the improvement of the work of the Committee on Disarmament. So far the Conference has not had the opportunity to consider this report and we hope that it will do so as soon as possible at its informal meetings. One of the ways to avoid losing time at the beginning of the year with regard to the adoption of the agenda, renewal of the mandate of subsidiary organs, election of Chairmen of working groups and the like is to perform this task at the end of the year, within the framework of the adoption of our annual report. The Conference would thus, at the beginning of every new session, have to consider only possible additional items on the agenda or the creation of new subsidiary organs, if need be. This would not affect the normal and efficient conducting of the Conference's current work on the basis of decisions taken previously concerning work in the new year. Such a decision would be in no way contrary to rule 27 of the rules of procedure, and would be completely in keeping with the spirit of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. A task of this nature, with the help of the secretariat, should be entrusted to the representative contact group, which should be set up as soon as possible.

In the course of the work of the Conference my delegation shall again revert to some of the issues on the agenda.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, today the Soviet delegation would like to touch upon the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The reason for this is that the Conference on Disarmament, having agreed in principle on the revised mandate of the subsidiary body on this subject, will, it is to be hoped, begin without delay a new important stage in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. This is unquestionably one of the priority items in the work of the Conference in 1984, and as before we intend to pay it our unabated attention.

The Soviet Union has always resolutely and persistently advocated and continues to advocate the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, for their withdrawal from the arsenals of States, and the physical elimination of this type

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of weapon of mass destruction. Our country was among the first to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. As far back as in 1927, in the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union raised the question of supplementing the prohibition of use of chemical weapons by the cessation of its production. It also took an active part in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament during the 1930s. The initiatives made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries during the post-war period with a view to banning chemical weapons as rapidly as possible are well known, particularly within the Committee on Disarmament: draft Convention of 1971 on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and draft convention of 1972 on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. From 1976 to 1980 the Soviet Union participated in bilateral Soviet-American talks aimed at the preparation and submission to the Committee on Disarmament of a joint initiative on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is not our fault that the talks were suspended.

In 1982 at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament the USSR came forward with a new initiative: the "Basic provisions of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction". During the 18 months since that time the Soviet Union has repeatedly further developed that initiative and submitted numerous constructive proposals on the subject of a chemical-weapons ban taking into account the progress at the negotiations. Among them there were the proposals to include in the convention a provision on the prohibition of use of chemical weapons; a number of proposals designed reliably to ensure non-production of chemical weapons in peaceful chemical industry enterprises and to facilitate verification in this field; a range of proposals on the problems connected with the declaration and elimination of the stocks of chemical weapons and verification of their destruction; considerations on the elaboration of a special order of destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons assuring security and interests of all participating States; and other proposals.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries deem it necessary to use all the possibilities in order reliably to save mankind from the danger of chemical war. This is the aim, in particular, of the recent proposal put by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the NATO member States on the question of saving Europe from chemical weapons, which its authors intend to distribute as a document of the Conference.

Let me dwell upon this important proposal in some detail. The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty believe that in the conditions of the present aggravated international situation the danger of use of chemical weapons, particularly in Europe, increases. The radical elimination of the chemical-weapon

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

threat for the States and peoples of Europe, as well as for other regions of the world, may be assured by the world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons and elimination of their stockpiles. At the same time, before this global task is solved and in order to promote its implementation, certain parallel steps can and must be taken within the European continent. That would make it possible substantially to reduce the risk of chemical war in Europe, and consequently in the entire world, to start the reduction of the chemical-weapon arsenals. Of course, this initiative of the socialist States is not aiming in any way at undermining the negotiations conducted at the Conference on Disarmament. On the contrary! I would like to stress that the implementation of the partial measures of a regional nature on the limitation, reduction and elimination of chemical weapons would promote, in our view, the world-wide efforts and speed up the conclusion of the convention of the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is the ultimate goal of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that many delegations of the States participating in the Conference on Disarmament recognize the importance of that initiative of the socialist States, justly regard it as a fresh confirmation of the sincere desire of the socialist countries to eliminate the chemical threat for the States and peoples of Europe and the whole world, and to speed up the conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We expect the NATO countries to consider this proposal seriously and with due attention and to give a positive reply to it.

The Soviet delegation and the delegations of other socialist countries, of course, do not claim a monopoly on making proposals on the prohibition of chemical weapons. A large number of documents on various aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons have been also submitted by other countries. As is known, the total number of documents on this subject distributed within the Conference on Disarmament is already more than 300. What matters, of course, is not the quantity of the submitted proposals but their nature. We have in mind first of all the flexibility of the positions of States, their readiness to seek mutually acceptable solution. If we regard from this point of view the proposals which are at the negotiating table now we cannot but recognize that the proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are notable for precisely these features. There is no need to give the examples. The delegations know them very well.

To our regret, frequently we do not see the same desire to seek mutually acceptable solutions, to take into account the positions of other participants in negotiations, from the part of some of our partners at the negotiations. From year to year they repeat the same proposals which are unacceptable to us. Sometimes there is a movement in quite the opposite direction: toward greater differences, tougher, maximalist, unrealistic demands. In this connection I cannot but refer to the statement made a week ago by Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, containing an appeal to display readiness to compromise. But allow me to ask whether the United Kingdom itself is ready to follow this path? What compromises on its part can we speak of, when, for example, in its working document on the procedures of on-site challenge inspection of the implementation of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons it repeated the whole number of hard-line demands which had been many times rejected by other participants in the negotiations. Frankly speaking, even with a microscope one would be unable to discover in that document the signs of any readiness to compromise.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Let us take another example -- the demands of some delegations to conduct immediately after the convention enters into force the verifications of the credibility of the declarations of the chemical-weapon stockpiles and to this end to submit information on the places of the storage of such stockpiles. The Soviet delegation has already repeatedly explained why it considers such demands both unrealistic and unacceptable. I shall now repeat only the following -- in certain cases they inherently threaten the national security interests of the States Parties to the future convention. Nevertheless this demand is being stubbornly repeated, even though, as we have already stated, it can lead to a stalemate in all the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the same time there is a simple way out of the situation which was proposed by the Soviet delegation. We have in mind the international systematic of verification, at the depots at special facilities, of the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons, through which all such stocks would proceed during the destruction process and consequently the initial declarations would also be verified.

Let us look at the situation with regard to the verification problem from the following angle. The delegations of the USSR and other socialist countries have very often repeated that the prohibition of chemical weapons may become a reality only in the case when the verification measures of the future convention correspond to the nature of the obligations and are determined in strict accordance with the requirements of such a convention i.e. on the prohibition of chemical weapons. To take extremes in this matter, regardless of how they are embellished, would torpedo the current negotiations. We pay no less attention than other States to the effective control of the implementation of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We do not have a slightest basis to trust our negotiating partners any more than they trust us. Our premise is that each type of activity prohibited or limited by the convention should be effectively verified. To this end, during the negotiations we have proposed and continue to propose a very broad range of verification measures. They include national control, the use of national technical means, on-site inspection on a voluntary basis or, as it is also called, by challenge, and international systematic on-site inspections. Confidence in compliance with the convention is also promoted by various declarations by the States parties, many of which have been proposed by us.

One of the unresolved problems remain the methods of verification of the destruction of stocks at special facilities. This is a very important question and we pay great attention to it. The Soviet delegation has already had occasion to state its approach to this question. As is known, it stated that it was in favour, in this concrete case, of the use of systematic international verifications, the annual number of which (the quota) would be determined by the Consultative Committee individually for each facility on the basis of preliminary agreed criteria. That is to say, the number of visits would depend upon such notions as the quantity of the stocks to be destroyed, their toxicity and danger characteristics, technological parameters of the destruction facilities, etc. We have described it in detail both within the Working Group and in the course of various consultations with other delegations.

Such a differentiated, one might say scientific, approach could, in our opinion give the States parties to the future convention complete confidence that the stocks of chemical weapons are being really destroyed and eliminated.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This proposal is countered by the idea of the permanent presence of international inspectors at the destruction facilities. The Soviet side has carefully listened to the arguments in favour of such approach and conducted a number of bilateral and multilateral consultations on this subject. In particular, last January there was useful exchange of opinions with the group of delegations of non-aligned States.

Further study of the question, and the consultations, have shown that systematic international on-site verifications of the destruction of stocks at a special facility on a quota basis represent a sufficiently effective verification instrument and that other delegations' understanding of this fact is increasing. They have also led us to the conclusion that in respect to some chemicals the verifications could be more strict. In the final analysis, the Soviet delegation, displaying its desire to achieve progress as rapidly as possible in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in an effort to unravel one of the most complicated and important moot issues at the negotiations, and once again demonstrating its real rather than feigned interest in progress at the negotiations, declares the following.

It would be prepared, during the elaboration of the procedures for verification of the destruction of chemical weapons at a special facility, to agree to such a solution when the efficiency of the verification, from the beginning of the destruction process up to its completion, would be ensured by the permanent presence at the special facility of the representatives of international control, as well as by a combination of systematic international verifications at the facility, including also the storage of the stocks of weapons at it, with the use of instruments (gas chromatographs, dynamometric counters, measuring thermoelements, etc.).

The verifications in the depots at special facilities of the next batches of chemical weapons to be destroyed could be conducted together with the inspections at the special facility. We shall state in detail our view on the subject in due time in the subsidiary body of the Conference.

In declaring today our readiness in principle to consider in a positive manner the proposal for the permanent presence of the representatives of international control at the special facilities for the destruction of stocks, we would like to particularly to stress that our premise is that our partners at negotiations will also for their part prove their readiness, not in words but in deeds, to seek mutually acceptable solutions.

Recently, references have frequently been made here at the Conference to a supposed presentation by the United States of a new document on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. We shall, of course, study it as carefully as we have studied all other documents of the States participating in the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban. What is important, of course, is not the fact itself of the future presentation of the document, but its content. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will judge the seriousness of United States intentions as regards a chemical-weapons ban only by how it takes into account the position of other participants in the negotiations, in particular our position. We have heard more than enough of wishful thinking and generalities. We wait for reliable proof of goodwill and the desire to achieve an agreement. The existence of such a desire will determine success in the negotiations.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Of great significance here will be correct organization of the work of the subsidiary body on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Let me dwell upon this question somewhat in detail.

The mandate agreed upon for that body is quite impressive and promising as regards its content and purposes. It envisages advancing to a new stage in solving the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons -- to a full and comprehensive process of negotiations and the formulation and elaboration of an appropriate convention.

These terms of reference correspond to the present advanced stage of the negotiations on the prohibitions of chemical weapons and reflect, as we hope, the readiness of all the States represented here to start real negotiations. It remains far from enough, however, to turn our attention to high, I would say, noble goals, to see as our task the preparation, for the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, either of a more or less complete text of the future convention in full, or of its substantive part. We share the view expressed today by the Ambassador of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vidas, concerning the need to submit at least an incomplete text of the future convention to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session. In order to come really closer to the solution of such tasks we need good organization of the activity of the appropriate subsidiary body.

The socialist countries have elaborated their collective opinion on this subject and have already submitted an appropriate document to the secretariat of the Conference. Without going into the detail of the approach proposed by us, I would like to state only some general considerations.

In our view, it is very important to agree at once to cover in 1984, by the process of concrete work upon the text of the future convention, all its chapters and provisions. Inter alia, this should eliminate any suspicions that the drafting work is designed to prevent delegations from considering the most vexed issues.

It would seem important to follow the principles of logical sequence in considering some or other parts of the future convention. Experience has shown, for example, that the elaboration of a mutually acceptable definition of chemical weapons is the most important question, without which the work on other problems is constantly hampered. To speak in more general terms, taking into account the relationship between different parts of the convention priority should be given to resolving in their entirety the questions of the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons.

The socialist countries consider it important to agree in advance upon an indicative time-table of work which, eliminating the danger of a deadlock on one concrete question or another, would prompt consideration of the next question even when final agreement had not been reached on the previous problems. Such pauses in the negotiating process are sometimes not only useful but also necessary for special consultations both between the most interested delegations and with their capitals.

The organization of our work should have as an important rule that due account be taken of the interests and possibilities of all delegations without exception. This means that within the subsidiary body we should set up a relatively small number of subordinate bodies, avoid overloading our work with a great number of official meetings, and conduct work in such a manner as not to discuss a large number of questions at the same time.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The title of the subsidiary body also plays an important role. We consider that it should be called the Special Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The working groups and other necessary subordinate bodies would be set up accordingly within its framework.

The Soviet delegation considers it advisable to set up four working groups within the Committee. At the same time, it is prepared to consider the observations of other delegations on this score.

In the opinion of our delegation, the setting up of the following working groups in particular might be envisaged:

On questions of the purposes and scope of the Convention (definitions and criteria; formula of basic undertakings; non-production; permitted activities; non-use of chemical weapons; monitoring measures for such weapons; preamble and concluding provisions; etc.);

On questions of the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons and the elimination of production facilities for them (initial declarations, interim measures, elimination and monitoring);

On questions of compliance with the convention (international verification on request, national implementation measures, activities of the consultative and preparatory committees, consultations and co-operation, consideration of complaints, etc.);

On questions of the structure of the Convention (arrangement and order of articles, appendices, agreed understandings, etc.).

We believe that it may in turn be necessary to set up subsidiary bodies and other smaller organs within these working groups.

Naturally, the title of the organ itself must be fully in keeping with this complex structure of working bodies; as we stated earlier, we propose that it should be called a committee.

In conclusion the Soviet delegation would like to note your personal able leadership of our Conference which played an important role in assuring agreement on the mandate for the subsidiary body on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are convinced that if all the delegations represented at the Conference display a responsible and honest approach to the negotiations, as well as a real readiness to seek mutually acceptable solutions, the Conference will be able to solve the important task facing it -- the elaboration of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for his very kind words to the President.

I now give the floor to the Representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, may I begin by joining others in congratulating you on your accession to the Chair. Canada and Poland share a tradition of co-operation in this body and in the United Nations on arms control matters. Canada and Poland have for some time alternated in sponsoring what has become known as the "traditional" consensus resolution on chemical weapons at the General Assembly. A Polish representative was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, and was succeeded by a Canadian representative, Ambassador McPhail. In this regard, we are now well placed to commence work on the chemical weapons Convention, and we have just heard what we regard as an important statement by the distinguished representative of the USSR, on which I will attempt to offer some preliminary comments later in my statement. Indeed it is our opinion that we are in a good position to commence substantive work in other fields as well as chemical weapons. This is a particular source of satisfaction and your role, Mr. President, in guiding the Conference efficiently through the early procedural issues is especially appreciated.

May I also express our appreciation to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Morelli Parido of Peru, for his skilful effort to press ahead with our work during the closing phase of last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. We are grateful also to the many members of the secretariat who have worked so hard to advance our collective endeavours, particularly the distinguished Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Rikhi Jaipal, who is also an old friend and colleague. If I may do something somewhat unusual, may I also take the liberty of expressing appreciation to my predecessor, Ambassador McPhail, to whom I have already referred, and to his colleague, Mr. Skinner, for the work they did in pressing forward on the question of chemical weapons. I should like to thank all those who have welcomed me, and join others also in welcoming other newly appointed representatives.

Mr. President, if I may depart from my text for a moment to add a more personal note, I should say I am pleased and honoured to be back here again after nearly 20 years, in the same room, and for the same purposes, as when I occasionally sat behind General Burns as his "intermittent legal adviser", as he used to call me. But I dread to think of his reactions to the procedural tangles which have since plagued our work. It is significant that both the number of the members and the status of the forum have been elevated since those days nearly two decades ago, but unfortunately the number, range and magnitude of the problems facing us have also grown.

I wish today to address a number of recent developments, viewed from a Canadian perspective. I should like to present also some thoughts on the theme of mutual security.

I was present a year ago when the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, delivered a Canadian policy statement in this forum. His theme was mutual security. He made clear that an increase in mutual security is the only sound basis for effective arms control and disarmament. Quoting the words of the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, he stressed that security in today's world cannot be achieved on a purely national basis; that attempts by one side to make gains at the expense of the security of the other ultimately will not work; and that action produces reaction and in the end neither side achieves a long-term gain.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

In Europe, the deployment by one side of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, followed by the consequential deployment by the other is a demonstration of the principle of mutual security. Its corollary is the impossibility of conducting successful arms-control negotiations if one side seeks unilateral advantage.

Mr. MacEachen also made clear in the same policy statement that "an attempt by any Power to develop a policy which assumes that nuclear war can be winnable contributes to mutual insecurity. This affirmation has since been echoed by other world leaders; and this, in itself is an encouraging development at a time when events make such pronouncements particularly relevant and important".

Last summer, the seven leaders of the industrialized democracies proclaimed at Williamsburg their determination to devote their full political resources to reducing the threat of war. At the turn of the year, in December, the North Atlantic alliance issued what has become known as the Brussels Declaration. It said, in part, "we urge the countries of the Warsaw Pact to seize the opportunities we offer for a balanced and constructive relationship and for a genuine detente". We in Canada have made special efforts to this end.

Prime Minister Trudeau has undertaken a personal initiative to encourage the re-establishment of political dialogue and confidence at the highest level between East and West and North and South. He has received the support in his initiative from the Heads of Government of Commonwealth countries who met in Goa last year. He has, moreover, conferred also not only with western leaders, but has met with the leaders of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the German Democratic Republic. He has held discussions at the highest level with the People's Republic of China and with Sweden. He has also pursued his initiative with the United Nations Secretary-General.

The leaders whom the Prime Minister met have agreed that there exists a pressing need to provide what the Prime Minister has called "that jolt of political energy", that political trust and confidence which is required to improve the climate and refine the mechanisms for achieving arms-control agreements. A step in this direction was taken at the Stockholm Conference last month which opened at ministerial level. We have since welcomed agreement reached to proceed with the MBFR talks in Vienna next month.

The Prime Minister has recently reported to the Canadian Parliament on the results of his initiative. In doing so, he listed 10 principles that represent areas of common interest and agreement between East and West, emerging from his wide-ranging discussions. They are as follows:

1. Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
2. Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
3. Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
4. Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
5. Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

6. Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
7. Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
8. Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
9. Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
10. Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

Mr. President, how do we apply these principles in this forum?

When Mr. MacEachen spoke before the Committee on Disarmament last year, he emphasized four Canadian priorities:

Canada will press for progress toward the objective of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; Canada will press for a more effective non-proliferation regime; Canada will press for a convention to prohibit chemical weapons; Canada will press for progress towards the objective of prohibiting all weapons for use in outer space.

These remain, in our considered view, the issues where there are prospects for genuine progress, and where progress can make a direct contribution to mutual security.

We are particularly pleased at the steps that have already been taken in the Chemical Weapons Working Group towards the objective of ensuring continued progress towards a chemical weapons convention. We would hope to see an early decision on the establishment of a working group on outer space which might bring about some movement in that area. It is therefore critical that the appropriate mechanisms are found for this body to advance matters forward. Horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation is of primary concern to the world community and the forthcoming Third Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty will provide a focus for our efforts to restrain both. The realization of a multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty remains one of the most difficult objectives of this Conference. Canada will continue to pursue realistic measures towards such a treaty. We shall continue to make a contribution within the seismic experts group and to work on other verification aspects.

Throughout our discussions, I hope we shall bring our imagination to bear on one of the most important aims of arms control and disarmament negotiations, namely, to deal not only with existing weapons systems but to gear down and eventually to halt the momentum of new technology.

(Mr. Beasley, Canada)

Mr. President, we have heard a number of important statements this morning, and it is perhaps invidious to comment on one without commenting on all, but I do think it important to note the statement we have just heard from the distinguished representative of the USSR, given the imminence of the decision, we hope, on a chemical weapons working group. Firstly, I think I should say as a very preliminary response, that we are pleased at this positive reaction of the Soviet Union to the initiative announced by United States Secretary Schultz at Stockholm of the intention of the United States Government to table a draft convention on chemical weapons. Secondly, we are equally pleased that this new Soviet policy should be one of the first signals emitted to the West and to the world by the new leadership in Moscow, and we say this most sincerely. Thirdly, the positive Soviet response on the issue of on-site verification of destruction of chemical weapons appears to develop in a concrete way the position announced by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament to the effect that the USSR was prepared to accept on-site inspection. It is well known of course that it is the Canadian position that this is the only viable approach from a functional point of view to this problem. Fourthly, we would hope that this new policy of on-site verification foretells an across-the-board engagement by the Soviet Union in all areas of arms-control verification. The fifth point I would like to make is that we will have obviously to react more definitively to the Soviet proposal somewhat later, after careful study and in the appropriate body. Finally, in the meantime, like others, we await with even greater interest than before the tabling of the United States draft convention which, we assume, will reflect what is now common ground on this point just discussed, and I might say of course that we await that proposal with somewhat more confidence than some others have expressed.

In concluding, Mr. President, I would like to say that although it may seem like stating the obvious, the arms-control process is not an end in itself but a means to an end --- mutual security; nevertheless the process itself affects prospects for success. We can all think of examples. The process should contribute to and not detract from such prospects. As many have said before, the purpose of the Conference on Disarmament is to contribute to the building of mutual security through real negotiation. This is our challenge and our collective responsibility.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement, for the friendly reference to Polish Canadian relations, and for the kind words addressed to the President.

We have exhausted the time available to us this morning. I suggest, therefore, that we suspend the plenary meeting and resume it this afternoon, at 3.30 p.m. to listen to the remaining members wishing to address the Conference today. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

As agreed earlier, we will now listen to those speakers listed to address the Conference today. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Lechuga.

Mr. LECHUGA HEVIA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): First of all, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to present my respects to Ambassador Turbansky, our President for the current month. His country, Poland, has given proof of a firm desire for peace and has put forward important proposals on the subject of disarmament, mainly in connection with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Mr. President, you have already shown your skill in guiding the work of the Conference and we are sure that your Presidency will be fruitful.

Your predecessor, Ambassador Morelli Pando of Peru, directed the work of the Committee on Disarmament to the great satisfaction of all and we should like to express our appreciation to him. We would also thank those speakers who welcomed us to this important forum.

Let me also compliment the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Jaipal, and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Vincente Berasategui, on their magnificent contribution to the Conference.

The Cuban delegation must convey to the delegation of the Soviet Union its sincerest condolences on the death of the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Yuri Andropov, valiant champion of peace, illustrious leader of his people and a brotherly friend of the Cuban people.

Taking a general view of the problems on this first occasion, we may say that the Conference on Disarmament is meeting today at a difficult time, in the midst of very grave tension and dangerous conflicts making for an international climate which augurs no good for the peoples of the world, in marked contrast to the climate in previous years, when the process of détente in international relations seemed to be making good progress.

Today, the deterioration of the international climate, which was already making itself felt, has been further aggravated by the war-like policy, closed to dialogue and negotiation, which is dramatically reflected in Europe by the deployment of the 572 "Cruise" and "Pershing 2" missiles. This has created a qualitatively new strategic situation which brings the whole of humanity to the brink of a nuclear holocaust; for the macabre illusion of a limited nuclear war has no foundation in reality.

It must be said, for we cannot deceive ourselves, that the upsetting of the rough military balance as a result of that decision will have disastrous consequences for the world. That is a reality which no partisan propaganda can conceal, however

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

cleverly manipulated, and however powerful the means by which it is spread. No one can forget that the earlier situation permitted the signing of agreements on the control and limitation of arms which gave a certain respite to all our peoples and consequently enabled progress to be made on various aspects of international co-operation.

That is an obvious fact recognized by governments throughout the world, by eminent persons in all quarters, and by the vast majority in the United Nations General Assembly which, as recently as 1982, in its resolution 37/100 B, referring to the need for a nuclear-arms freeze, declared in unequivocal terms that it was -- and I quote -- "firmly convinced that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an over-all rough parity".

Nothing, then, justifies the installation on European soil of such sophisticated new weapons of destruction unless, presumably, the intention is to increase the threat to world peace and security, bring about a situation of international tension in order to mask unavowable purposes, obstruct a constructive and rational dialogue and, in the last analysis, aim at negotiating from positions of strength.

We shall not be saying anything new by recalling that the argument about the upsetting of the nuclear balance, today being brandished in an attempt to justify the new impetus to the arms race, has been used on various occasions over the years, not only to create new international situations, but also -- and most reprehensibly -- to satisfy domestic political interests, thereby gambling recklessly and irresponsibly with the destinies of the world.

On this occasion, however, that fallacious argument has more dangerous connotations, due to the tremendous technological advances in the development of destructive weapons and the accompanying unprecedented expenditures on arms manufacture. To this is added the gravity and deep injustice of an arms race in a world economic crisis which in many respects is also without precedent.

With all countries suffering from the effects of the economic crisis, particularly the peoples of the developing countries, it is impossible to keep silent on the paradoxical situation of a world contemplating the criminal squandering of immense resources on destructive weapons, instead of trying to raise the standard of living of millions of human beings. It should be asked whether the children, the young and the elderly who are dying of hunger or disease in Asia, Africa or Latin America because they are without the barest necessities for survival, or because they lack medical attention, would prefer the death agony of departing this world for want of food and medicaments or through the radioactive effects of a nuclear bomb.

The blind policy which has led to this situation in Europe has resulted in the breaking off of the bilateral negotiations which were under way and made the possibilities of concrete disarmament negotiations more remote, and since these events are the result of a general policy, of a view of the world not adapted to present-day realities, this situation of force is present not only in the European continent, but in all continents. Thus these efforts to gain supremacy have created hotbeds of dangerous tension in southern Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East and Central America alike, for although they may have different manifestations their outlook and objectives are the same; the strategy is similar even if the tactics differ.

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

It is very important to take that fact into account, because this negotiating body does not function in a vacuum, nor are the talks which take place in other forums divorced from the prevailing international climate. Hence, it may be affirmed that those who are helping to increase the nuclear capacity of, for example, the racist regime of Pretoria or the Zionist regime of Israel are conspiring against peace and creating possibly insurmountable obstacles to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those parts of the world.

Those who seek to impose military solutions in Central America, those who attack Nicaragua, those who scoff at the efforts made to resolve differences through peaceful and constructive dialogue, and those who support the genocidal Government of El Salvador, pose a threat to world peace and hinder negotiations.

And how can one forget and pass over in silence the brutal aggression by the armed forces of the United States against the small island of Grenada, which has been universally condemned by international public opinion and even by its own allies? ... the little island of Grenada with less than half the population of the Canton of Geneva and rather fewer inhabitants than this small city which is hosting our deliberations!

These events are closely linked to the warlike policy it is sought to impose on the world and therefore directly affect the complex situation with which we are faced. That is the general setting for this Conference on Disarmament, showing the urgent need to undertake negotiations on an equal footing and in good faith, without partisan propaganda, rhetoric or demagoguery.

At present, the Conference on Disarmament is the only negotiating body still functioning for the consideration of, inter alia, the priority issues of nuclear disarmament. That increases its responsibility and therefore lends greater importance to the efforts made at the last session of the General Assembly, which entrusted the Conference with various tasks contained in the resolutions transmitted by the Secretary-General.

There is no need to enumerate those resolutions because they are well known to all, but it is useful to point out that they have an air of urgency which we cannot ignore. A call is made to undertake negotiations on a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, deploring the persistent obstruction of a very small number of its members; the Conference is urged to examine the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race; the Assembly again expresses concern that this body has been unable to start negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war; as well as concern and the disappointment that, although there was no objection, in principle, to the establishment of a working group to prevent an arms race in outer space, the Committee had not thus far been able to agree on an acceptable mandate for that group.

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

As we see, the vast majority of members of the international community once again shows its burning -- not to say anguished -- desire, in view of the present world situation, for the carrying out of serious and concrete negotiations on issues of such vital importance for all mankind.

My delegation's position on those issues is well known. To be clear, we shall place on record that we favour, in the first place, the immediate re-establishment of all the subsidiary bodies which have met up to now in the Committee on Disarmament, with a clear negotiating mandate.

Second, we desire the immediate establishment of a subsidiary body for negotiating appropriate practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, in conformity with the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

Third, we propose the urgent establishment of a subsidiary body for negotiating the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament, in conformity with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Fourth, we support the elaboration of an unequivocal negotiating mandate for the subsidiary body on the nuclear-weapon-test ban.

Fifth, we shall work for the elaboration and final drafting of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, within the competent subsidiary body with the new mandate provided for it.

Sixth, we are working for the establishment, with the corresponding negotiating mandate, of a subsidiary body to deal with the prevention of an arms race in space.

Seventh, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/73 G, we favour the start of negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

As additional measures, which would undoubtedly contribute to the success of our work, in that they are proof of political will and readiness to build up confidence, my delegation furthermore pleads for an immediate freeze on nuclear-weapon arsenals; for the establishment of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests; and for renunciation of the first-use of nuclear weapons by States possessing such weapons which have not yet assumed that undertaking.

These measures have the backing of the majority of the international community and world public opinion in general. The Conference on Disarmament cannot ignore that reality in the discharge of its functions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement, for his friendly reference to my country and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade President, Let me at the outset express our feeling of truly deep satisfaction in seeing the representative of brotherly, socialist Poland presiding this Conference in the first month of its deliberations. The peoples of our countries have, historically and ethnically, much in common. But what is most important, they pursue a common goal, that of building a new socialist society. Let me, Comrade President, wish you all the best during the rest of your tenure and assure you of full co-operation and support from my delegation.

I cannot open my first statement of this year without expressing the sincere thanks of my delegation to Ambassador Morelli Pando of Peru, who so skillfully chaired our work during the complicated closing month of the last session of the Committee on Disarmament. It gives me pleasure to welcome among us our new colleagues, the distinguished Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. I look forward to the same friendly co-operation with them as I maintained with their predecessors.

Co-operation for disarmament, as reflected in the United Nations Declaration and a number of resolutions, will be an indispensable ingredient for the activity of this body. The Conference on Disarmament opens this year's session in a complicated and dangerous international situation. This is the considered opinion of my delegation, in spite of the fact that we are told that, after all, it is not so bad and that the world is now a safer place to live in.

The United States Administration has embarked on a dangerous course, having set itself the aim of tipping the military balance in its favour. To further increase the "safety" of the world, President Reagan asked for a 13 per cent increase in military spending, bringing the military budget for next year to a record \$US 305 billion -- the largest military budget since World War II, surpassing the peaks of the Korean and Viet Nam wars. We do not doubt that the Pentagon will know how to use this money, since it is now simultaneously carrying out 15 programmes for the development of strategic weapons of different kinds. To ensure success of these programmes, the Administration is planning to spend \$US 1.8 trillion during the next five years.

It is the strategic potential of the United States which will be developed in the first place. In a couple of years the first giant MX missiles will be sited in Wyoming, and by the beginning of the next decade smaller, mobile and thus more destabilizing Midgetman missiles will become operational. By that time the United States will have increased the number of their nuclear warheads to 29,000.

At the same time the United States Government keeps on negotiating on disarmament -- but mainly with itself. While the White House successfully concluded negotiations with the Capitol Hill on the so called "build-down" concept, which amounts to a new form of qualitative arms race, new American missiles in Europe posed a direct threat to the existing strategic balance and disrupted the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons. Nor have the Soviet-United States negotiations on a number of questions, interrupted unilaterally by the United States from 1978 through 1980, been resumed.

Is the absence of negotiations, the deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe and the intensive military build-up in the United States a sign of an improved situation in the world? No, it certainly is not. We would rather interpret it as a clear sign of the intention of the United States military-industrial complex to launch the world into a new spiral of the nuclear-arms race

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

in a vain effort to tip the scales in its favour. And the present United States political leadership is faithfully providing the necessary foreign policy. President Reagan did not want to leave any doubts about this and stated to the Chicago Tribune recently: "We act from a position of strength and are fully resolved not to retreat."

But the present United States leadership is not only blocking the achievement of new agreements, it is also, as is well known, trying to undermine the existing ones. This approach has been justly characterized by Mr. Krepon, director of a project on treaty verification at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who said that the Administration's actions threatened to bring down the "scaffolding" of existing arms treaties and to kill the chances of new agreements.

The danger of the outbreak of nuclear war has never been as imminent as today. A strong peace movement in Europe and America is a spontaneous reaction to this danger. Attempts to give it different interpretations reflect simply an unwillingness to acknowledge the fact that peoples could actively express themselves on basic political problems. It should come as no surprise that peoples prefer peace and disarmament to annihilation or prospects of a global climatic disaster equaling the Ice Age. The World Assembly for Life and Peace, against Nuclear War, which took place last summer in Prague, with the results of which we have informed you, was unequivocal in this regard.

The director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Mr. Frank Blackaby, talked recently to a correspondent of the Czechoslovak newspaper Rudé Právo. He drew his attention to the fact that the nuclear arsenal of the United States has been increasing since World War II each 30 minutes by the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. He also stressed that it was always the United States which started the new round in the arms race through the introduction of newly developed nuclear systems. Mr. Blackaby said that "it is clear beyond dispute that the Soviet Union was always, as second, levelling up in both nuclear technology as well as conventional systems."

The matter of special concern to my country is the commencement of the deployment of new United States intermediate-range missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Italy. We have stressed on many occasions, including in the Committee on Disarmament, that we would consider this deployment as endangering our most vital interests. At the same time the highest party and State leaders of seven socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, declared at their meeting on 28 June of last year that under no circumstances would they permit military superiority of the NATO bloc over the countries of the Warsaw Treaty. The missile deployment poses a direct threat to the socialist countries in Europe. It also constitutes a flagrant breach of a number of Soviet-United States agreements based on the existing strategic military balance.

A limited number of delegations in this room tried and continue to try to dispel our preoccupations by asserting that new United States missiles have to be deployed as a reaction to the so-called SS-20s. Listening to such arguments, one is tempted to wonder whether one is sitting in a body with long experience and expertise in disarmament negotiations. It is but a trivial fact that from 1953, when first United States nuclear weapons were placed in Europe, a chain of military bases, stocked with United States nuclear weapons, have been established on the Continent or close to it. By the end of the Fifties, the United States started to

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

deploy in Western Europe more than 100 nuclear missiles of medium range. Later the United Kingdom and France also acquired nuclear weapons, which are also directed against the Soviet Union and the Eastern-European socialist countries. It is precisely against these bases and nuclear weapons, and not the Western-European countries as such, that the Soviet missiles are targeted.

No, Comrade President, the story about a necessary reaction to SS-20s is untenable. But the new United States missiles have a well deserved place in aggressive concepts and plans of a first nuclear strike, limited nuclear war and achieving strategic superiority. Furthermore, they cannot be seen in isolation from the adventurist concept of a "Land-Air Battle", with the Rogers doctrine which represents a direct call for a first preventive strike.

My country has tragic experience of aggression. This experience is only too well remembered. In view of the fact that the deployment of new United States missiles in Western Europe was started, we have to undertake necessary measures in order to safeguard our security. The President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Gustáv Husák, said in an interview with an Indian correspondent:

"We have to react to a new situation created by the fact that in spite of all efforts and peaceful proposals of the socialist countries, the aggressive circles of imperialism continue with their militarist actions including deployment of their missiles just behind our western borders. Having tragic historical experience, we are forced to undertake, together with our allies, appropriate measures to increase our defence capabilities. At the same time we believe that goodwill and peace efforts will finally prevail, that anti-war forces will succeed in ridding the world of the arms race and above all of the nuclear threat."

Our Conference did not have to spend much time deciding on its agenda. As far as its priority items are concerned, we did not in fact, have to decide at all. The urgent questions of prevention of nuclear war, nuclear-test ban, nuclear disarmament or the prevention of an arms race in outer space have all been imposed on us by hard realities of the present-day world. The recommendations adopted on these subjects by the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly are unequivocal.

But the recommendations go further than simply asking us to look at these problems, to put them on the agenda. With regard to the prevention of nuclear war, we are called to negotiate "with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of a nuclear war ..." (A/RES/38/183/G). The relevant resolution recommends the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the subject. We are further called "to elaborate a nuclear disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament" (A/RES/38/183/D). Similar recommendations have been adopted also with regard to the nuclear-test ban and outer space.

If the Conference on Disarmament fails to act on the priority subjects this year it will further undermine its credibility and will not live up to its designation as a multilateral body on disarmament negotiations. These urgent problems have already been widely discussed in the United Nations General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, as well as in this room. Further discussion is not necessary. What is necessary is the establishment of the relevant subsidiary organs with appropriate mandates, providing for specific negotiations on these questions. The group of socialist countries suggested such mandates in document CD/434.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

We have a definite idea about what these subsidiary organs, especially the organ on prevention of nuclear war, should negotiate on and we have stated it on many occasions. The commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, if adhered to by all nuclear-weapon States, would represent the only responsible and realistic attitude towards nuclear weapons -- that they must never be used. It would represent an important step towards the prevention of nuclear war. A treaty on the non-use of force between the two major politico-military alliances, as suggested in the Prague Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, would also be a measure of great significance. Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that we expressed readiness to discuss details of our proposal with individual NATO countries, for the time being it has not been possible to start serious discussion of this proposal. A freeze on nuclear arsenals, as called for by a number of United Nations resolutions, would represent a measure of extreme significance within the efforts to prevent nuclear war. This is a measure which, if followed by further steps of nuclear disarmament, and that is what we propose, could harm no country.

In spite of the fact that the group of socialist countries issued document CD/355 last year and many statements were dedicated to the problem, after a few delegations keep on wondering what could be negotiated under the item on prevention of nuclear war. We are always ready to repeat what our concrete proposals to this item are, but we also know for sure there is no need to do so. Indeed, the delegations which raise these questions know only too well what we propose. But instead of discussing our proposals they prefer to ignore them.

My delegation attaches high priority to a nuclear-test ban. This urgent treaty has repeatedly been called for by the United Nations General Assembly, including in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament which was adopted by consensus. We have a sufficient number of constructive proposals aimed at negotiating the treaty. I mean, in particular, the Basic Provisions of the Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the USSR in 1983 as well as the relevant proposal introduced by Sweden the same year. I listened with interest to the considerations of Ambassador Butler of Australia concerning this problem. I fully share much of what he has said. At the same time I cannot agree that we should unendingly continue our discussion of various questions, including items of lesser importance, while one of the nuclear-weapon States unequivocally declares that it does not intend to stop nuclear-weapon testing. Neither the continuing activity of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts would make much sense if the Conference's subsidiary body on a nuclear-test ban in its new mandate did not provide for undertaking negotiations on this priority item. We are not ready to continue our participation in the Working Group with the crippled mandate we painfully adopted in 1982. The activity of the Working Group since then clearly demonstrated that this kind of mandate not only does not allow for any serious deliberations but, in fact, prevents them. Our proposal for a new mandate is contained in document CD/434.

We would like to appeal to two delegations which prevent the Conference on Disarmament from finally undertaking negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty to abandon their narrow interests and to meet those of the whole international community. Further continuation and intensification of nuclear-weapon tests is contrary to the Moscow Treaty of 1963 and undermines seriously the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is discouraging to note that since the Reagan Administration took office, the Federal budget for nuclear testing has almost doubled. It went up to \$US 388 million for the current fiscal year from \$US 201 million in the fiscal year 1981.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

If we again postpone the commencement of negotiations on further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, we would act against the will of 147 States who voted in favour of resolution 38/70 at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

My country welcomed the submission to the General Assembly of the Soviet draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space against the Earth. This draft treaty, if implemented, could prevent militarization of outer space and would create possibilities for the realization of the great prospects opening up before mankind through the peaceful exploration of outer space.

It is hard to realize the possible consequences of the implementation of the United States military space programmes and what is, ironically called the "People Protection Act" now being discussed in Washington. According to the Air Force Space Command, war in space is inevitable, fighting in space will be "the decisive form of military power" and the United States will win if it hurries. According to some reports the Air Force Space Command planners are not concerned about defence but offence. They openly say that the aim is to restore "preatomic notions of military superiority" and to "make conflict at the upper levels of military violence (nuclear attack) again thinkable". This is considered to be an "invigorating turn of events for the spiritual vitality of the Western democracies." And in order to create a material basis for these dangerous fantasies the American military budget for 1985 provides nearly \$US 1.8 billion for the development of anti-missile weapons based in space and \$US 226.3 million for the development of a satellite-killing weapon. An accelerated five-year programme allotting \$US 18 billion to \$US 27 billion to develop space-based and other weapons is being proposed.

We would like to hope that strategic planners in the United States, who recently persist in looking to outer space in an alleged quest for security, will eventually come to understand that mutual agreement is the only way to true security. They will never achieve reliable security through endangering that of others.

Much has been said about the prohibition of chemical weapons in this body. We have produced an impressive amount of documents, working papers and conference room papers, documents on the consultations of experts, etc. During the last years we have also received several comprehensive documents reflecting the positions of some delegations on basic aspects of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. But if all these papers are not to lose their value in the archives of the Conference on Disarmament, we should finally sit down and draw on them in the process of negotiating and drafting the text of the convention. I would like to express the satisfaction of my delegation in view of the fact, that a new mandate for the Chemical Weapons Working Group has been agreed upon. We would like to hope that this mandate will make it possible to come to real negotiation on and formulation of the convention and that it will block all attempts to avoid it.

On the eve of this year's session, the Warsaw Treaty countries advanced an initiative aimed at the elimination of chemical weapons from Europe. We consider that the removal of the chemical threat to the European States would substantially reduce the risk of chemical war on the Continent as well as in the world. The realization of this regional measure would also contribute to the efforts for the early elaboration and conclusion of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons on the global basis.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Talking about chemical weapons, I cannot but welcome today's statement by the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union, who gave us new aspects of approaches to a conclusion of a treaty. I am certain that his statement will be studied by all delegations very thoroughly and will contribute to an early conclusion, if not of a whole draft treaty, at least of its major parts.

One of few positive events in the development of the present international situation was the convening of a conference on confidence-building and security measures and disarmament in Stockholm. We hope that this Conference will soon come to some positive results. At the same time, we should not forget that it is not acting in isolation from other international developments, especially in the field of disarmament. If no progress is achieved elsewhere, including in the Conference on Disarmament, the Stockholm conference will hardly be able to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the Madrid meeting.

A number of delegations of Western countries have expressed their readiness to carry out negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament. However, their declarations have not been supported by their positions with respect to the establishment of subsidiary bodies of the Conference which should, in the first place, undertake such negotiations. We have also heard appeals to display readiness to compromise. Unfortunately, here we also see sharp discrepancy between what some delegations call for and what they display themselves. For a number of years we have not observed any readiness of Western delegations to compromise. They have not made a single move in order to meet the positions of other States members of the Conference on Disarmament. For its part, my delegation, reaffirming its readiness to undertake a constructive dialogue, calls on the delegations of the Western countries to demonstrate the same readiness by deeds, not words.

In conclusion, allow me to say a few words on document CD/434 which was tabled today by a group of socialist countries. I have talked about this document already in our informal meetings and I stated that this document reflected the views of socialist countries on the problem of the establishment of all subsidiary bodies and on their mandates. Of course, the chemical weapons subsidiary body is not included in the document because the mandate has been agreed to separately. We consider, that subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, should have the possibility to carry out negotiations. Therefore we are suggesting mandates which enable the elaboration of treaties. We suggest the establishment, for the 1984 session, of subsidiary bodies on all items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament which provide for carrying out relevant negotiations. Our group notes with satisfaction that the mandates of subsidiary bodies, not only on chemical weapons but also on negative assurances and on the comprehensive programme of disarmament already called for negotiations during the 1983 session. I apologize for the expression of negative assurances which was already criticized several times here by some delegations as improper. We also welcome the fact that a subsidiary body on chemical weapons, as I already said, was agreed to and that very soon it will be given a mandate "to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting".

Our document contains draft mandates for the subsidiary bodies on the nuclear-test ban, on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, on the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, etc. We did not have to invent the draft mandates, since they come mainly from the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Let me, Comrade President, express our belief that the adoption of appropriate mandates would help us in our work and hopefully complicate and make more transparent all attempts to avoid serious negotiations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement, for the warm reference to Polish-Czechoslovak relations and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? This does not seem to be the case.

As agreed at our informal meeting yesterday, I intend now to convene at 5 p.m. an informal meeting of the Conference to continue our consideration of some outstanding organizational questions which we discussed yesterday at the informal meeting. May I suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting and resume it after the informal meeting in case we might need to take decisions on those questions.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. President, could you be so kind to inform us what are the matters that you intend to bring before the Conference in the informal meeting that you plan to convene? Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: I was going to suggest that we continue the consideration of the question of the establishment of a subsidiary body on chemical weapons as well as the draft mandates for two or three other subsidiary bodies namely, negative security assurances, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and possibly radiological weapons. At the moment I understand that, in the morning, a group of interested delegations was meeting and I am informed that they were about to reach an agreement on the question which prevented us from taking a decision yesterday. We might then be able to present it to the informal meeting and hopefully, when we resume the plenary we could take formal decisions.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. President, as you mentioned the question that we have not been able to decide upon so far, I should like to make a short statement for the record.

My delegation cannot but voice its concern and deep regret for the waste of time in formalizing the decision that the Conference must already have adopted. We would have thought that all the necessary elements of this decision were already present in February, when the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons adopted its report by consensus.

Given the irrelevance of the topic under discussion since a few days now, namely the designation of the subsidiary body charged with the carrying on of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, my delegation preferred not to take part in the debate. This has also been the general position of the Group of 21, whose members assign far greater importance to the start of concrete work than to procedural wrangling over organizational details.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

We must take note, however, of the attitudes of the other two groups of delegations, and particularly the two main protagonists of yesterday's and today's discussions on the question of denomination, since precisely those delegations are the ones that most forcefully profess their desire to resolve quickly the procedural matters and start forthwith the substantive work at hand. It is paradoxical that those two delegations chose to act in the way they did.

It is this kind of procedural wrangling, which in this instance involves the two military alliances, that brings discredit to this negotiating forum. We look upon them to be prepared to enable this Conference to discharge fully and seriously the responsibilities placed upon it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement.

Does any other member wish to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case. If there is no objection, I suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting at 5 p.m. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and reconvened at 5.40 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: Since we have no proposals for decisions which we were hoping to formally adopt at the resumed plenary meeting, it remains to me to announce that the next plenary meeting will take place on Thursday, 23 February at 10.30 a.m.

I wish also to announce that we contemplate an informal meeting in the afternoon to continue and conclude the remaining decisions.

Does any other representative wish to take the floor? This does not seem to be the case. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.42 p.m.

