

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

THIRTY-THIRD SESSION
Official Records *



FOURTH COMMITTEE
15th meeting
held on
Friday, 3 November 1978
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 15th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. DOLGUCHITS (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic)

CONTENTS

AGENDA ITEM 93: QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 95: ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH ARE IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA AND IN ALL OTHER TERRITORIES UNDER COLONIAL DOMINATION AND EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE COLONIALISM, APARTHEID AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

* This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be incorporated in a copy of the record and should be sent *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room A-3550.

Corrections will be issued shortly after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.4/33/SR.15
9 November 1978
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 93: QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued) (A/33/23/Add.1, A/33/61, A/33/63, A/33/118, A/33/151, A/33/206, A/33/279, A/33/291; A/C.4/33/2 and 6)

1. Mr. ZITU (Zaire) pointed out that, having refused to become part of the Union of South Africa in 1910, Rhodesia had become the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 and that for 10 years its Prime Minister had been selected from the white community. The settlers had always tried to prevent the establishment of a Government run by the indigenous population and, fearing a backlash from the local population, they had chosen the road of rebellion by unilaterally declaring Rhodesia independent. They were therefore quite accustomed to employing diversionary tactics and deceit.

2. For more than 10 years the illegal Smith régime had been defying the opinion of the international community, slaughtering thousands of innocent people and freedom fighters, and committing acts of aggression against neighbouring African States.

3. His delegation considered Zimbabwe to be still a British colony, and believed it was therefore up to the United Kingdom to bring the Territory to self-determination and independence in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council. It was the United Kingdom's duty, as the administering Power, to bring the Southern Rhodesian rebels to heel or find a peaceful solution to the conflict. His delegation had greeted the Anglo-American proposals favourably, but it felt that the so-called internal settlement had solved nothing inasmuch as it had established no principles for the peaceful accession of Zimbabwe to real independence under which its people could exercise their democratic rights.

4. The events in Zimbabwe were part of the irreversible process of liberation; neither force nor guile could halt that process. Those who persisted in trying to safeguard sordid interests and privileges should recognize that their efforts were doomed to failure.

5. Zaire keenly desired unity among the opposing forces so that the majority could come to power in conditions of order and tranquillity, and it reaffirmed its determination, stemming from its constitution and its ideals, to contribute to the struggle against the white racist minority in Zimbabwe, and its complete support for the neighbouring African States which had been subjected to acts of aggression at the hands of the Smith clique.

6. Mr. PAPAJORGJI (Albania) said that he was disturbed by the continued existence

/...

(Mr. Papajorgji, Albania)

of racist régimes in southern Africa, which were remnants of classic colonialism and strongholds of neo-colonialism. Ian Smith's Fascist clique continued to oppress and massacre the people of Zimbabwe and to commit acts of aggression against various African countries. Through its policy of genocide, the illegal régime was trying to compel the people of Zimbabwe to give up their liberation struggle, so as to preserve the domination of a handful of white settlers who held power illegally.

7. It was well known that the white racist régime in Southern Rhodesia was arrogantly and disrespectfully flouting not only the legitimate rights and aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe, but all progressive public opinion throughout the world. The events that were occurring daily in Southern Rhodesia showed that Smith's clique had no intention of giving up its policy of racial discrimination and apartheid, but was striving stubbornly to maintain and perpetuate the rule of white minority settlers.

8. It was obvious that the Fascists of Salisbury could not have been capable of terrorizing the people of Zimbabwe and turning a deaf ear to the voice of revolt arising against them throughout the world, without support and assistance. The grave situation in Southern Rhodesia was not only a result of Smith's policies and methods, but also a consequence of the colonialist and neo-colonialist ambitions of the imperialist Powers which, through their rivalry, had created a very complicated situation in Africa. The Smith régime, an offspring of British colonial domination, continued to enjoy the support of the imperialist Powers including the United States, which was using the régime to oppress the people of Zimbabwe, plunder the natural resources of the Territory and convert it into a stronghold of neo-colonialism in southern Africa. The United States imperialists, other imperialist Powers and the racist Pretoria clique continued to give the Smith régime political, economic, military and diplomatic aid, allowing it to crush the liberation struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and pose a threat to the neighbouring independent African countries.

9. The so-called internal settlement drawn up by Smith and the imperialist Powers, far from benefiting the people of Zimbabwe, had led to intensified oppression and increased provocation against neighbouring countries. Events since the production of the proposals for the internal settlement proved very clearly that the so-called endeavours of the United States of America and other imperialist Powers to reach a peaceful and negotiated solution of the problem of Southern Rhodesia were in fact aimed at sabotaging the armed struggle of the people of the country, splitting their ranks and weakening the support they received from other African countries.

10. The imperialist Powers sometimes feigned not to agree with Smith's policies and promised to increase their pressure on him. In reality, that was mere manoeuvring, and Smith knew quite well that his régime, like all reactionary régimes, would always have the support of United States imperialism. His recent visit to the

/...

(Mr. PapaJorgji, Albania)

United States was the best proof of that. It was no accident that Smith had dared to visit the United States, following the example of the Israeli Zionist leaders; he had come to ask for assistance for the acts of aggression he was plotting against the people of Zimbabwe and other African peoples.

11. The obstacles encountered by the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for independence sprang from the increasing rivalry between the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet social imperialists, claiming to be supporters of the national liberation struggle in Africa, were really trying to utilize the national liberation movements to advance their expansionist policy, and could always find excuses to meddle in the affairs of the African continent so as to satisfy their neo-colonialist ambitions.

12. But the people of Zimbabwe knew from experience that they could achieve freedom and independence only through armed struggle. Attempts to get them to negotiate with Ian Smith's clique were nothing but manoeuvres intended to give the illegal régime enough time to consolidate its position and to gather its forces to attack the freedom fighters more fiercely. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that the Smith régime would meet the same end as other puppet régimes in the service of imperialism.

13. His delegation condemned the odious crimes committed by the Smith racist régime. It supported the just struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, as it supported all national liberation struggles of peoples and the efforts of sovereign States to oppose imperialism, social imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. It reiterated its conviction that the people of Zimbabwe would win their freedom and independence if they were determined to reject any compromise and fight on until victory.

14. Mr. KAMJA (Kenya) said that despite the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the question of Southern Rhodesia, no real progress had been achieved so far in transferring power to the majority of the African population. Instead, the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith was engaged in all sorts of manoeuvres to delay the attainment of independence and the introduction of majority rule. His delegation believed that the Salisbury internal settlement would not bring Zimbabwe independence, freedom and human dignity for its peoples, and therefore rejected it.

15. The report of the Special Committee (A/33/23/Add.1) illustrated the way in which a few white racists of European origin continued to oppress the African population in Southern Rhodesia and deny them the fundamental human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, while trying to hoodwink world opinion. A recent amendment to the 1930 Land Apportionment Act purported to put an end to all racial discrimination by allowing Africans to buy agricultural land previously reserved for whites. But since the racists had left the blacks only non-productive areas, from which they could barely manage to produce enough to

/...

(Mr. Kamja, Kenya)

subsist, it was obviously impossible for the blacks to acquire better land. It was entirely unacceptable that wealth should thus become a factor affecting the future of Rhodesia and its people.

16. Upon the unilateral declaration of Southern Rhodesia's independence in 1965 by the white racists, the situation in that Territory had assumed even more importance as it had become clear that international peace and security were being threatened. At the time the United Kingdom Government had affirmed that it would bring down the rebellion in a matter of days, but years had passed and, owing to the inaction of that Government, which in other circumstances had not hesitated to resort to force, the problem had become a subject of concern for the whole world. Rather than intervening resolutely, the Government of the United Kingdom had initiated a process of fruitless negotiations with an incorrigible criminal who arrogantly ignored all proposals for a peaceful settlement of the situation and who continued to rule Southern Rhodesia illegally, while ignoring the interests of the majority in that country.

17. That conciliatory attitude of the United Kingdom and the help received from South Africa, which continued to maintain trade relations with Southern Rhodesia in defiance of the sanctions decreed by the Security Council, and from the Western Powers operating in South Africa had permitted the Smith régime to defy world opinion. The ineffectiveness of the sanctions had encouraged many multinational corporations to increase their investments in Southern Rhodesia in violation of the General Assembly resolutions calling on all Governments to ensure strict compliance with the sanctions by all individuals and corporations under their jurisdiction.

18. Furthermore, certain Member States were continuing to sell oil to Southern Rhodesia by circuitous methods, thus taking part in the "oil conspiracy". His delegation therefore appealed to all countries involved in those transactions with the illegal racist régime to end them forthwith and to adhere strictly to the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council against Southern Rhodesia.

19. It was the international community's responsibility to express the strongest condemnation of the illegal racist régime for committing acts of brutality, intimidation, systematic torture, detention and imprisonment, murder of innocent women and children, displacement of the African population to camps reminiscent of the Nazi concentration camps, and creation of so-called protected villages where the living conditions were deplorable, because all those acts constituted an infringement and denial of the fundamental human rights that the United Nations upheld.

20. In addition, the racist régime had committed acts of aggression against neighbouring African States such as Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia, thus demonstrating its wish to internationalize the conflict and to threaten international peace and security in that region of the world.

/...

(Mr. Kamja, Kenya)

21. None the less, the struggle for the liberation of Southern Rhodesia and for the attainment of independence by it continued. For that reason, the illegal racist régime, determined to hold on to power, had expanded its armed forces and resorted to all kinds of desperate measures. It had gone so far as to attempt to make the Africans and the international community believe that the freedom fighters were committing acts of brutality against their own people. But no one was taken in by those tactics, the aim of which was to confuse the African population and dissuade them from supporting the struggle of the freedom fighters in Zimbabwe.

22. As he had stated earlier, his delegation took the position that efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the situation in Southern Rhodesia were Utopian inasmuch as one had to deal with an incorrigible rebel like Ian Smith, who would always refuse to make concessions. The Anglo-American proposals could certainly serve as a basis for new negotiations, but first of all the administering Power would have to use every means at its disposal to force out the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. Consequently, based on the experience gained during the struggle for its own independence, his country supported the arms struggle and the strict application of sanctions against the rebel Government. His delegation called upon all peace-loving people to increase their material and moral support for the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe under the leadership of the Patriotic Front until genuine majority rule was achieved. The only valid settlement negotiations were those dealing effectively and practically with the modalities for the transfer of power.

23. In conclusion, his delegation reaffirmed its unwavering support for the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and all other Territories still under colonial and racist domination in their struggle for liberation.

AGENDA ITEM 95: ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH ARE IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA AND IN ALL OTHER TERRITORIES UNDER COLONIAL DOMINATION AND EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE COLONIALISM, APARTHEID, AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued) (A/C.4/33/L.1)

24. The CHAIRMAN announced that Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Equatorial Guinea, the German Democratic Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Uganda and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1.

25. Mr. PARISIS (Belgium) said that he liked the central idea of the draft that was before the Committee. Obviously, the activities of foreign interests should not impede efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination. Unfortunately, his delegation also had the impression that the draft resolution was primarily a pretext for a series of assertions which had to be rejected.

/...

(Mr. Parisi, Belgium)

26. That categorical statement was prompted by wording strongly condemning the collusion of all States which collaborated politically, diplomatically, economically and militarily with South Africa. Such wording would embrace a great many African, Asian and European States. His delegation likewise rejected the paragraph of the draft resolution deploring the complicity of successive United Kingdom Governments with South Africa. What was to be deplored was not the honesty which the United Kingdom had demonstrated, but the fact that its action was an exceptional one. The language of the most controversial paragraphs of the draft resolution showed clearly who had inspired them and why they had been anxious to single out certain countries.

27. His country maintained no military relations with South Africa. It did, indeed maintain diplomatic relations with Pretoria, but some of the countries who stood ready to condemn it would understand that the fact of diplomatic relations did not imply approval of an entire policy. His country believed that ignoring the leaders of a country was not the best way of modifying the reprehensible aspects of its policy. That was why it approved of and supported the efforts by several members of the Security Council to achieve peaceful and negotiated solutions for a number of the problems of southern Africa.

28. His delegation hoped that many other countries would agree that such an unconscionable text could not be approved by them; for its part, it had no choice but to vote against the draft resolution.

29. Mr. VERGAU (Federal Republic of Germany) concluded from the general debate on agenda item 95 that the members of the Committee were unanimously pursuing the same goals - the early accession of Namibia and Zimbabwe to independence under internationally acceptable conditions and the speedy elimination of the apartheid system in South Africa. Those were also the goals of the Federal Republic of Germany.

30. The draft resolution contained elements which his delegation could accept, since they were in line with that policy. Nevertheless, his delegation rejected the condemnations contained in the draft and the radical action which was proposed to prevent any kind of co-operation with South Africa. Before all relations with South Africa were simplistically condemned, the realities must be kept in sight. The possible positive effects of any specific measure must be very carefully weighed against the adverse consequences it might have for those whom the international community was trying to help. In that field, political decisions must be based carefully on expert analyses and economic data.

31. The economic relations of the Federal Republic of Germany with South Africa gave it some leverage enabling it to support the changes which the United Nations would like to see in southern Africa. It was common knowledge that his Government had taken an active part in the Namibia initiative of the five Western members of the Security Council. The Federal Republic of Germany also supported the idea of a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. Thanks to its influence on companies in South Africa, it systematically worked against racial discrimination and social injustice. Of course, much still remained to be done, but the policy of the

/...

(Mr. Vergau, Federal Republic of Germany)

Federal Republic had achieved far more positive results than the indiscriminate accusations and condemnations contained in certain resolutions.

32. The Federal Republic of Germany agreed with many African countries that the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) was a matter of the first priority. That, however, required pragmatic co-operation between the five Western countries, the United Nations and South Africa. A rigid policy of confrontation at that stage in the negotiations would furnish South Africa with a pretext for evading its commitments with regard to the settlement plan. Without the relations existing between the five Western countries and South Africa there would have been no chance of establishing the conditions for Security Council resolution 435 (1978). It was not right to destroy those relations a priori, as required by draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1. They must be shaped in such a way that they could promote the achievement of the aims of the United Nations as much as possible.

33. His delegation noted with deep disappointment that the sponsors of the draft resolution were once again proposing an express condemnation of the Federal Republic of Germany, instead of following the example of reason and justice set by the OAU at Khartoum. It was unfair strongly to condemn certain countries for maintaining economic relations with South Africa when the majority of the States Members of the United Nations did the same.

34. The Federal Republic of Germany took strong exception to being accused of military collaboration with South Africa. That allegation was false. As proof of that, the Federal Government had submitted the pertinent documentation to the Organization of African Unity. Those, who by voting for the draft resolution, participated in such gross distortions of fact would be violating the principle of sincerity in international co-operation. Group solidarity was no excuse for such an attitude. The Federal Republic of Germany had co-sponsored Security Council resolution 418 (1977), thus reaffirming its refusal to supply any weapons to South Africa. Nor was there any co-operation in the nuclear field between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa.

35. Furthermore, it would be absurd to condemn the Federal Republic of Germany for maintaining political and diplomatic relations with South Africa. That proposal openly contradicted Security Council resolution 435 (1978). It was only because of those political and diplomatic relations that the five Western members of the Security Council, which had always remained in close contact with their African partners and the liberation movements concerned, had been able to negotiate the settlement plan for Namibia. It was in the interests of the international community that those relations should be maintained.

36. For those reasons his delegation rejected the draft resolution.

37. Mr. MURATA (Japan) recalled that the Japanese delegation had voted the previous year against the draft resolution condemning Japan despite the extensive

/...

(Mr. Murata, Japan)

efforts Japan had made to co-operate in international actions aimed at the solution of the problems in southern Africa. Japan had always maintained that the system of apartheid should be abolished and that international pressure should be applied to eliminate that institutionalized form of racial discrimination. For that reason the Japanese Government had refrained from extending any economic co-operation to South Africa and had prohibited Japanese investment in that country as well as the sale of arms and military equipment. Japan had exported neither a nuclear reactor nor uranium technology to South Africa.

38. With regard to Southern Rhodesia, the Japanese Government had always implemented the United Nations sanction against that territory. It was currently strengthening its measures to prevent the import of Rhodesian chrome. Regarding Namibia, Japan had prohibited investments in that Territory by Japanese nationals or by bodies corporate under its jurisdiction. It had taken the necessary measures to ensure the observance of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, and it had never imported uranium from that Territory.

39. Japan's relations with South Africa were limited to normal trade relations. Even that trade was declining in volume, while Japan's trade relations with other African nations were growing stronger. Japan had, moreover, decided to expand its assistance to the developing countries and substantially increase bilateral and multilateral economic co-operation with the African countries, excluding South Africa, of course.

40. Japan had always enforced the sanctions decreed against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and was making every possible effort to strengthen its co-operation with African countries. In spite of that, the Committee was considering a draft resolution which once again condemned Japan for the simple reason that it had trade with South Africa. The Japanese delegation therefore had no choice but to repeat what it had already said on the subject: the condemnation of Japan was arbitrary and unfair, and the Japanese delegation could not support the draft resolution.

41. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom) said that it would come as no surprise that his delegation intended to vote against the draft resolution before the Committee. The United Kingdom sympathized with the concerns of some of its sponsors but, as it had already explained, it could not accept many of the main points in the text.

42. It recognized, for example, that as an administering Power, it had the solemn obligation to encourage political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Territories under its administration, as well as to protect human and natural resources against abuses (ninth preambular paragraph). But it must reject the assertion that foreign economic and other interests were necessarily detrimental to the interests of those whom the resolution described as "indigenous populations". Having been enjoined by resolutions of the Special Committee of 24, with which the delegation of the United Kingdom was actively co-operating, to take all possible steps to strengthen

/...

(Mr. Richard, United Kingdom)

the local economy, particularly through continuing promotion of economic diversification, his delegation was at a loss to explain how such a call on it could be compatible with some of the intemperate language in the resolution. In another recent resolution of the Special Committee of 24, there were references to the urgent need to reduce the economic dependence of a Territory and cope with a number of serious economic problems, including a scarcity of natural resources, chronic trade deficits, under-development of the Territory's infrastructure and manpower resources, inadequacy of development finance and a high level of unemployment and underemployment. If the Fourth Committee expected the United Kingdom to solve those problems, which were characteristic of many small Caribbean and Pacific Territories, both dependent and independent, without the involvement of outside economic capital, expertise and institutions - or, in other words, foreign economic interests - it was practising self-deception. It should be added that the local governments in the United Kingdom's remaining dependent territories normally controlled the amount of such activity and the form it took.

43. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the draft resolution referred to the Bingham report. The United Kingdom Government had itself commissioned that report, had caused it to be published and referred it to the Director of Public Prosecutions so that he might consider whether criminal proceedings should be instituted. The report would be debated in Parliament the following week, and had also been made available to the United Nations for the consideration of the Security Council's Sanctions Committee. That clearly showed his Government's concern for the full and faithful implementation of sanctions and its desire to investigate and publicize any reports of evasion. The draft resolution suggested that the Bingham report had implications only for the United Kingdom Government and the British oil companies. That was not the case, and his Government hoped that other Governments would take equally vigorous action to investigate issues raised for them by the report. The United Kingdom maintained its strenuous efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia and did not consider that it would be appropriate to apply at the present time the new sanctions measures contemplated in operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution.

44. His delegation was well aware that many members of the Fourth Committee did not share the United Kingdom Government's views on foreign investment and other links with South Africa. The United Kingdom strongly condemned the hateful policies of apartheid, but believed that peaceful means should be used to persuade the South African Government to renounce those policies. It was for that reason that the United Kingdom, in association with the other four Western members of the Security Council, had embarked on its initiative to secure a peaceful and internationally recognized independence for Namibia. How could that initiative, broadly supported by the majority of the international community and recognized by the Security Council, proceed without diplomatic and political contact with the South African Government? It was therefore hard to see how the Fourth Committee, in operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, could strongly condemn the policies of States which collaborated politically and diplomatically with South Africa.

/...

(Mr. Richard, United Kingdom)

45. The same paragraph went on to condemn strongly those, including the United Kingdom, that had economic relations with South Africa. The United Kingdom Government's objections to that condemnation were twofold: firstly, it maintained that economic relations were not incompatible with the promotion of peaceful change in South Africa. Secondly, the condemnation was highly selective. A large number of countries in all quarters of the globe had economic relations with South Africa. For instance, trade between South Africa and the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, had been valued at \$33 million in 1977, according to the African Abstract of Trade Statistics. It was thus illogical and unjust for the United Kingdom, with a small number of other countries, to be singled out for condemnation.

46. On the subject of so-called "military collaboration", his Government had voted for and implemented Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on arms sales, and had imposed a voluntary embargo long before the resolution had been adopted.

47. The United Kingdom delegation also took the strongest exception to the use of the words "collusion" and "collaboration" in operative paragraph 6 of the draft. His Government's contacts with South Africa in no way approximated to collusion or collaboration. Furthermore, the United Kingdom maintained relations with Governments of all political persuasions, which was normal international practice. The word "collusion" was equally inappropriate in operative paragraph 7.

48. Lastly, the content and tenor of the draft resolution were in general mischievous, inappropriate and misleading. He was aware that in many respects the text of the draft resolution did not properly reflect the views even of countries that had felt constrained to vote in favour of it, which was an attitude beyond the comprehension of his delegation. The adoption of such texts by the Assembly could only serve, over a period of time, to reduce the authority and worth of Assembly resolutions in general.

49. Mr. SCARANTINO (Italy) said he had expected that the Fourth Committee would take a more responsible approach at the current session after the highly controversial results of the decision taken the previous year on the item. Unfortunately those expectations had been disappointed.

50. As in the past, the draft resolution submitted made no distinction between those economic activities which might be detrimental to the indigenous populations of the non-self-governing territories and those which were not only beneficial, but indispensable to the welfare of such populations and to their progress towards independence. That omission was all the more striking in view of the fact that in other United Nations bodies, whether the Second Committee, the Committee Established under General Assembly Resolution 32/174, or the Economic and Social Council, it was consistently stressed that substantial foreign economic assistance was essential for progress in the developing countries, whether they were independent or not. It was contradictory, to say the least, that a contribution of foreign capital and technology should be requested in one forum and condemned in another - in each case, by vote of a similar majority.

/...

(Mr. Scarantino, Italy)

51. Other elements in the draft resolution were thoroughly unacceptable to the Italian delegation, in particular the condemnation in operative paragraph 6 of the draft, which explicitly singled out certain countries. As it had already stated at the previous session, the Italian delegation considered that any reference to political co-operation was gratuitous. Italy had always been firmly committed to rapid decolonization. Furthermore it was strongly opposed to any kind of racist philosophy or policy and had always explicitly condemned the South African régime, which it considered guilty of practising the most inhuman and extreme forms of racial discrimination as well as of massive violations of human rights. Such practices were contrary to all the values on which the Italian Constitution was based and in which the Italian people believed.

52. As for the concept of diplomatic collaboration, the Italian delegation failed to grasp the meaning of that term. If it was meant to imply that diplomatic relations between two States were automatic evidence of their approval of each other's policies, his delegation must express the view that the application of such a principle to international relations could have very disruptive effects. Those considerations also applied to what was defined as "economic collaboration" with South Africa, an expression which referred mainly to trade relations with that country. In that case, moreover, the condemnation was particularly selective and partial, as it was well-known that a large number of countries on all continents maintained trade relations with South Africa, as could be seen from the trade statistics published by the South African Government for 1977, which showed that a number of Eastern European countries fell within the same category. In the circumstances, it would only be fair to include all South Africa's trading partners in paragraph 6 of the draft and not just some of them.

53. Turning to the alleged military co-operation between Italy and South Africa, he wished to reiterate his Government's concern over the recurrence of such charges, which utterly ignored the measures adopted by Italy to ensure the full implementation of Security Council resolutions 311 (1972) and 418 (1977). His delegation had provided all the necessary information in that regard to the appropriate bodies of the United Nations, and would continue to do so. The truth was that Italy had abided loyally by resolutions 311 (1972) and 418 (1977) and the charges made against his country referred to commercial transactions which, in fact, had taken place mainly in the 1960s, and, in any event, prior to the adoption of resolution 311 (1972) approved by Italy as a member of the Security Council.

54. The Italian delegation could not escape the impression that elements alien to legitimate African concerns - concerns for which his delegation reiterated its full solidarity - had been introduced into the draft in order to create artificial divisions between the Western and the African countries. This was all the more disturbing since the Special Committee of 24 had itself chosen for its own decision on the matter a different wording, much closer to that of the resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity of Khartoum. Italy would not hesitate, therefore, to cast a negative vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.4/33/L.1.

/...

55. Mr. BROCHENIN (France) said that his delegation could not vote in favour of the draft resolution before the Committee. First of all, the text referred to resolutions which France had never supported; secondly, it had to do with completely different situations, since it dealt simultaneously with the small Pacific and Caribbean islands, with Namibia, with Rhodesia and with South Africa. But the situation prevailing in South Africa was not, as in the other cases, a colonial situation. However abhorrent the ruling régime in that country might be, South Africa was an independent State. Besides, the administering authorities were asked to stop the exploitation of the natural wealth of the Territories still under their control, yet in a few weeks' time they would be urged to develop the economy of those very Territories. There was thus some confusion, and there were some contradictions prejudicial to the clarity of the discussions, in the text. Thirdly and lastly, France was in general opposed to the very principle of implicating States directly. The United Nations was not a court of law. If France generally refrained from mentioning names it was not because it was inadequately informed or unable to do so but because it was anxious to maintain the decorum which should be observed in discussions between States having diplomatic relations which were for the most part friendly or, at least, normal.

56. More specifically, France was condemned for collusion with South Africa in the political, diplomatic, economic and military fields. The term collusion implied deliberate complicity and was an accusation which was all the more serious in that it was unfounded. Could one ignore the efforts made for months by France, with other States, to induce South Africa by peaceful means to grant independence to Namibia? Was it felt that France was not honouring the commitments it had made in voting for the embargo on arms destined for South Africa, or that it approved of the abhorrent apartheid regime? Many States other than France maintained diplomatic, and above all commercial, relations with South Africa and should therefore be named.

57. France was also condemned for collusion in the nuclear field. On that subject he could only repeat what he had said the previous year: France felt that any nuclear collaboration with South Africa which would enable it to acquire nuclear weapons should be condemned. The same could not, however, be said of the strictly peaceful use of the atom, and it was not only in South Africa that a clear distinction should be drawn between military and peaceful uses. With reference to the nuclear power station being built in South Africa by a French company, he stressed that the facility could not enable South Africa, directly or indirectly, to attain nuclear military capacity.

58. France, like many other nations, had had an empire and it believed that it had carried out the task of decolonization in a manner which had earned the tribute of many leaders of countries represented in the Committee. Far from repudiating the principle of self-determination which had guided its actions, France firmly adhered to it; that was why it strictly applied the sanctions against the rebel régime of Ian Smith. That was also why it was working persistently for the achievement of a truly independent Namibia. On 19 November 1976, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had stated before the French Senate that until the situation in

/...

(Mr. Brochenin, France)

Namibia was settled in the desired manner, in other words by speedy accession to independence, the French Government would in no way encourage the activities of French companies in that Territory. Accordingly, the French export guaranty agency would not underwrite transactions with Namibia and requests for authorization to invest in that Territory would be denied.

59. The French delegation regretted that it could not, by an affirmative vote, express its support for the general principles underlying the resolution. It wished to remind those who were ready to condemn France and certain other countries that, at that very moment, in the Security Council, France was giving its full and sincere co-operation to efforts to find a solution to the Namibian problem consonant with the goals of the United Nations.

60. Mr. HUTCHINSON (Ireland) said that his delegation, with considerable reluctance, felt itself obliged once again at the current session to vote against the draft resolution on the item under consideration. The reason for that was the repetition and, in some cases, the amplification of the indiscriminate accusations which had characterized resolutions on the item in recent years. His Government objected to the selection of particular countries for condemnation. Moreover, it felt that it was meaningless for political, diplomatic, economic and military relations, which were quite separate issues, to be combined in a single condemnatory sentence. The text of the draft resolution ignored the explanations made by the countries mentioned therein, both in the general debate on the item and elsewhere. His delegation must therefore vote against the draft resolution, despite the very firm position taken by the Irish Government with regard to the exploitative orientation of many foreign economic interests in Non-Self-Governing Territories.

61. Itself long a colonized country, Ireland had a deep interest in the attitudes of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories to the activities of foreign interests. However, as foreign economic investment had played a beneficial role in its economic development, Ireland realized that certain types of economic enterprises could also play a positive role in Non-Self-Governing Territories. Foreign economic activities would admittedly best serve the interests of the Territories in question if those Territories, as independent countries, were able to select them.

62. Moreover, his Government had been concerned with the detrimental impact of certain foreign economic activities on the interests of the people of the main colonial Territories currently under consideration. Many of those activities, by their very nature, far from being in the interests of the peoples of the Territories concerned, irreversibly depleted and, in some instances, exhausted their natural resources. His Government reiterated its view that the administering Powers must, in accordance with their Charter obligations, ensure that the activities of all economic enterprises in the Territories under their administration were geared to the long-term interests of the inhabitants of those Territories and, in particular, did not constitute an additional barrier to the future development of those peoples.

/...

63. Mr. RAMIN (Israel) said that Israel had never condoned colonialism or racial discrimination in Africa or elsewhere. Having themselves been the victims of such abhorrent and inhuman practices, the Israeli people opposed all manifestations of colonial rule and racial intolerance.

64. Paragraph 6 of the draft resolution strongly condemned Israel and a number of other States for their relations with South Africa. Israel had nothing to conceal with respect to its relations with South Africa: its trade with South Africa constituted less than 0.5 per cent of that country's total foreign trade. If the sponsors of the draft resolution had seen fit to make specific mention of Israel, it was legitimate to ask why they had not made similar mention of other States that maintained economic and other ties with South Africa.

65. The absurdity of the false accusations made against Israel was also demonstrated in operative paragraph 7, which strongly condemned Israel for its collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field. Once again, he repeated that there was no military or nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa. That paragraph, as far as Israel was concerned, was groundless. His delegation regarded paragraphs 6 and 7 of the draft resolution as discriminatory and felt that the draft resolution, which sought to advance the struggle against discrimination, was in fact itself discriminatory. His delegation would therefore adhere to the principles of equity and impartiality which should guide the United Nations by casting its vote against draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1.

66. Miss MOWLE (United States of America) said that her delegation had fully supported the goals of the resolution on foreign economic interests adopted by the Special Committee of 24 (A/AC.109/572). However, at the time the United States delegation had also pointed out that that resolution did not sufficiently distinguish between the situation in southern Africa and the situation which existed in other Non-Self-Governing Territories. In addition, it had pointed out that it was unable to support the proposition that economic interests and other economic activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories were, by their very nature, detrimental to the interests of the people of those Territories. Because of those reservations, the United States had planned to abstain in the vote on any resolution before the Fourth Committee which closely followed the language of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee.

67. However, the draft resolution now before the Committee (A/C.4/33/L.1) went beyond the resolution adopted by the Special Committee. It expressly condemned the United States and other countries for political, diplomatic, military and economic co-operation with South Africa. It was a fact that many nations still maintained trade and other relations with South Africa. In that regard, she drew attention to information contained in the 1977 edition of the African Abstract of Trade Statistics, published by the Government of South Africa, which showed that the countries of Eastern Europe also traded with South Africa. There was therefore no reason why the United States and other Western nations should be singled out for criticism.

/...

(Miss Mowle, United States)

68. The United States did not discount the imperfections of the present economic system and recognized that some Western economic interests had been guilty of impeding the process of decolonization. However, it also believed that there were many more such interests which had contributed to that process and it therefore hesitated to discount the very real benefits which economic interests could provide in an era of truly global interdependence. The United States was prepared to work with other members of the world community to shape those economic interests in ways which would enhance their beneficial impact and correct any deficiencies.

69. It was with regret that the United States delegation found it necessary to vote against draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1.

70. Mr. PFIRTER (Argentina) announced that, in accordance with Argentina's position on agenda item 95, his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution under consideration. However, as it had pointed out during consultations, it regretted that the resolution should expressly name certain States, since that could only diminish support for it and weaken its impact. Moreover, the draft resolution did not take into account the efforts made by certain States mentioned in it to implement United Nations resolutions relating to South Africa.

71. The General Assembly had, of course, the right to criticize severely any co-operation with South Africa which was contrary to the relevant United Nations resolutions; that was why his delegation supported the idea contained in paragraph 6. He wished, however, to point out that there was a difference between having diplomatic relations with a State and co-operating with it. Maintaining diplomatic relations with a State clearly did not mean approval of its policy. The existence of diplomatic relations between countries with very different and even contrary ideologies was today rather commonplace and no one would think of suggesting that one Government supported another's policy simply because there were diplomatic relations between them. In another regard, there was as yet no United Nations resolution calling for the severance of diplomatic relations with South Africa. The condemnation contained in paragraph 6 was not relevant with respect to diplomatic relations; on the other hand, it became relevant if bilateral relations were intensified to the point of becoming special relations of co-operation in various fields. His delegation felt that that was the idea expressed in paragraph 6 and, accordingly, it supported it.

72. Mr. HEINEBÄCK (Sweden) said that his Government took strong exception to anything that worked against the interests of the indigenous populations in dependent Territories and consequently did not hesitate to condemn the activities of foreign economic interests whenever it was shown that they prevented the people of those Territories from freeing themselves from colonial oppression and apartheid. In view of the vulnerability of colonial Territories, in contrast to the strength of foreign economic interests, States Members of the United Nations had a clear responsibility to exert every effort to protect their interests.

/...

(Mr. Heinebäck, Sweden)

73. The main thrust of draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1 was the explosive situation prevailing in southern Africa, for which South Africa bore the principal responsibility through its policy of racial discrimination, its support of the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, its defiance of the United Nations sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and its illegal occupation of Namibia.

74. However, his delegation had considerable difficulties with the text. In the first place, it contained a sweeping condemnation of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in colonial Territories. Then, the naming of certain countries in operative paragraphs 6 and 7 tended towards the arbitrary. Finally, the wording of certain paragraphs failed to observe the division of competence between the main organs of the United Nations.

75. His delegation would therefore abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, although it shared the deep concern expressed in it about conditions in southern Africa and supported the general political objective of the text.

76. Mr. ADAMS (New Zealand) said that his delegation would vote against the draft resolution, as it had done in previous years in the case of draft resolutions on the item because they did not distinguish between foreign economic activities which impeded decolonization and those which did not. The distinction was particularly relevant in the case of small colonial Territories where the administering Powers had an obligation under the Charter to foster economic development. Draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1 was no more realistic than its predecessors in that respect.

77. Furthermore, the arbitrary and discriminatory condemnation of certain countries was to be regretted, since it damaged the credibility of the document. Although the draft resolution rightly directed strong criticism against United Kingdom oil companies for sanctions breaking, the "complicity of successive United Kingdom Governments" was not proven: the matter was now the subject of a full inquiry in the United Kingdom and was also before the Security Council.

78. Moreover, his Government had always committed itself to applying mandatory sanctions which might be imposed against South Africa, but that decision should be taken by the Security Council and not by the General Assembly.

79. Finally, draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1 had been drafted without consultations with other groups. Such consultations were necessary if a resolution on the subject was to be realistic.

80. Miss VALERE (Trinidad and Tobago) supported the over-all objective of draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1 but had certain reservations with regard to some aspects which should have been formulated in a different manner. Nevertheless, her delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

81. Mr. OYONO (United Republic of Cameroon) stated that his Government, which maintained no relations of any kind with the minority racist régimes of southern Africa, most strongly condemned all countries which, through their co-operation with those régimes, impeded the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XXV).

/...

(Mr. Oyono, United Republic of Cameroon)

82. As the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity had stated, it was a matter of urgent priority that an oil embargo should be imposed on South Africa. His Government regretted that draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1 did not take sufficient account of that requirement.

83. Furthermore, the representatives of some countries mentioned in the draft resolution had implied in their statements that their countries would review their traditional policy with regard to the racist régimes of southern Africa. Other countries had undertaken to redefine their military co-operation with Pretoria.

84. His delegation would take all of those considerations into account when it came to vote.

85. Mr. KIRAKOSYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that he would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1. Despite the statements made by the representatives of certain Western Powers, the Committee was fully aware of the collusion between the imperialist Powers and the racist régimes. The sponsors of the draft resolution had therefore been right in condemning, on the basis of ample and widely disseminated information, certain countries which had violated the sanctions. He was confident that, despite the baseless accusations made by certain Western delegations with regard to the socialist countries, including the USSR, members of the Committee would not reconsider their decision to vote in favour of the draft resolution which condemned the policy of co-operation with the racist régimes. It was obvious that such tactics by representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States would not relieve their countries of the responsibility they bore.

86. Mr. ULRICHSEN (Denmark) said that his delegation would abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1. His Government had always supported realistic measures compatible with the Charter to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. For that reason his delegation would not hesitate to condemn the activities of foreign economic interests which might impede the implementation of that Declaration.

87. Draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1 dealt mainly with the serious situation still prevailing in southern Africa for which South Africa bore the main responsibility.

88. In that context it was regrettable that the draft resolution on a question of such great importance contained unjustified accusations against certain explicitly named countries; that could only be detrimental to the attainment of the goal sought. Furthermore, the condemnation expressed in paragraph 6 was so sweeping that it related to nearly all States Members of the United Nations, including Denmark. His delegation very much regretted that it had not been possible to modify the paragraph and it had even considered voting against the draft resolution.

89. Finally, his Government supported the efforts made by the five Western members of the Security Council to attain a peaceful settlement in Namibia in conformity with Security Council resolution 385 (1976) and considered it regrettable that the arbitrary and unjustified condemnation of those countries might jeopardize their efforts.

/...

90. Mr. JAMES (Australia) noted that the resolutions adopted in recent years on the activities of foreign economic and other interests in colonial Territories had been unbalanced and contained sweeping judgements, where more discriminating language was called for. In southern Africa, in a number of instances, foreign economic interests were indeed impeding the decolonization process. However, not all foreign economic activities in all colonial Territories were necessarily detrimental to the indigenous population, as could be seen from Australia's experience in decolonization. The Committee should not adopt a position inconsistent with the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee of 24 and of other United Nations organs.

91. Draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1 went even further than previous resolutions on the item and did not take into account the arguments put forward by various delegations. The Committee was thus losing another opportunity to express its unanimous support for the right of all peoples to self-determination. For that reason, his delegation would vote against the draft resolution.

92. Mrs. NOVOTNY (Austria) said that for the third time her delegation would be obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution on the item under consideration. There were indeed some activities of foreign economic and other interests which impeded the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, particularly in southern Africa, and draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1 reflected to a large extent the concerns to which those activities gave rise.

93. However, the draft resolution contained provisions and formulations which her Government found unacceptable, in particular operative paragraphs 6 and 7. It was arbitrary to single out certain countries for condemnation. Furthermore, the draft resolution on such an important question should have been prepared by a co-operative approach involving the members of the Committee. Finally, the wholesale rejection of all foreign economic activities might discourage mutually advantageous economic co-operation.

94. At the request of the representatives of Benin and Belgium, a vote was taken by roll-call on draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1.

95. Sri Lanka, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,

/...

Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Austria, Central African Empire, Chad, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Iceland, Iran, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Rwanda, Samoa, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, United Republic of Cameroon, Zaire.

96. Draft resolution A/C.4/33/L.1 was adopted by 87 votes to 16, with 28 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.